


DECEMBER, 1967



POLITICAL
AFFAIRS

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A REPLY TO ISAAC DEUTSCHER

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PORTRAIT OF A TURNCOAT

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Toward 1968: The Electoral Arena

In 1968, the people of our country will face an electoral crisis. Our electoral system will be tested as to whether it can provide an opportunity for the American people to express their will on such burning issues as peace, Negro freedom, economic security, the crisis of our cities and a host of others.

The number of problems which are now on the agenda for solution by elected government bodies has become monumental because of the all-consuming role of the war in Vietnam, because of the absurd but real pressure of the Johnson Administration and the industrial-military complex to make this brutal war the dominant factor in American life. All this bears witness to the growing degeneration in the ruling circles of our country. But the 1968 elections, together with other forms of mass struggle by the people, can serve to reverse this process, to establish different priorities and objectives for our country.

In 1948, some 48 million votes were cast in the Presidential race; in 1964, the number was more than 70 million. These figures—an increase of 22 million in 16 years—show that growing millions of American voters seek to express their views on issues in the elections. The opportunity to do so in November 1968 is being determined *now*, and the outcome will be decisive for the future of our country.

Massive Repudiation of Johnson

Among present developments, of special significance in relation to 1968, is the so-called "Dump Johnson" movement. It has an important bearing on our total electoral policy.

At our 18th National Convention in June 1966, Gus Hall raised the demand for a radical change and documented the developments which made such a demand realistic. He pointed to the rise of anti-imperialist consciousness and to the advance of political independence. He then stated: "The independent forces, again because of necessity, must master the art of alliance. It is a necessity because you can't win without it." He observed further that "we are entering a period in which we are going to test whether the electoral structure as it is can be an effective avenue of struggle." And he added: "Many political independents are concerned with this problem and some

are raising the need for an alternative Presidential candidate—an alternative for peace.”

That was sixteen months ago. Today this is the central factor in the political scene. It was the main feature in the recent convention of the California Democratic Council, which proposed a slate of peace delegates to the Democratic National Convention to be held in Chicago next August. The idea is encouraged by polls in California which show that Johnson could be defeated in the Democratic primaries of that state.

The peace delegation idea has now taken hold in New York, Oregon, Wisconsin, Michigan and possibly a dozen other states. Some started with the idea of seeking only to influence the platform, among them Joseph Rauh and the ADA and apparently the “Negotiation Now” group, although many of its prominent leaders have also called for an alternative to Johnson. Now, however, with the growth of the “Dump Johnson” movement, the drive for peace delegates applies to both a peace plank and a peace candidate.

When the organizers of the movement were asked whether this was a pro-Kennedy move, they answered that this is an open question. In fact, since Kennedy's praise of Johnson, people are not enthusiastic about him. The movement is not committed to any one candidate, only to “dump Johnson.”

People in the Democratic Party in California have given leadership in this drive. Others in New York and elsewhere are also giving major attention to it. Other independents, who work both inside and outside of the two parties, are involved. Thus, the members and national leadership of SANE are telephoning people and urging active participation—something new for them. Mr. Curtis Gans, who has been on the ADA staff for three years, has resigned to spend full time in this movement as director of the Conference of Concerned Democrats.

The escalation of the war and the ghetto rebellions have made the question of an alternative to Johnson a mass issue. It is not just a narrow defeat-Johnson move but is programmatic, calling for basic changes in government policy. The movement arises from masses of people who are deeply concerned with the “crisis of confidence.” It reaches into many organizations.

While the newspapers reported that a recent ADA national board meeting refused to support the “Dump Johnson” movement, they failed to report that when one board member moved support to Johnson he was laughed at and did not even get a second to his

motion. Though this group is divided, clearly its thrust is against Johnson and the Johnson program.

The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, which is making a major campaign to be seated at the coming Democratic National Convention, is another important factor. The development of anti-Johnson sentiment among certain sections of the Negro people is reflected also in an impressive series of speeches by Reverend Martin Luther King and Floyd McKissick.

Sources of Johnson Support

However, Johnson's strength should not be underestimated. Polls among the Negro people and Negro leaders show a continuing block of Johnson support, partly stemming from certain appointments and relations with certain civil rights leaders. Johnson also continues to hold top labor support. COPE is doing a job for him. Recently the top AFL-CIO leaders have intensified their pressure on all labor officials to give full support to Johnson even where they differ with his war policy. In line with this, Walter Reuther, while expressing a difference with the war policy, also expressed support to Johnson.

Possibly the source of Johnson's most powerful and solid support is the industrial-military complex. The influence and power of this group go far beyond its own economic operations, and the spending of some \$100 billion on the Vietnam war, plus billions for other military purposes, carries with it many other commitments. Moreover, in his demand for support and power, Johnson is just as unscrupulous toward his friends as toward his enemies. Every office holder knows that and so do the labor, academic and civil rights leaders, as well as the representatives of the press.

However, not everything is settled in any of these areas, and the expression of the masses will be decisive. And all the indications show that Johnson is at an all-time low in popularity and still declining.

Recently Johnson has come under sharp attack from the Republicans on whom he has depended for support to his war program. Governor Romney charges he was brainwashed in Vietnam. Percy makes major speeches against the war. Senator Clifford Case charges Johnson with perverting the Congressional authorization resolution. Senator Thruston B. Morton charges that Johnson was brainwashed by the industrial-military complex. Senator Cooper of Kentucky speaks out against the war policy. And Senator Brooke of Massachusetts is reported to be re-examining his observations in Vietnam,

while Governor Rockefeller is supposedly changing his views on the war.

Of course, much of this is partisan politics and demagogy under the pressure of the strong popular opposition to the war. But at the same time the speeches of Case, Morton, Cooper and others have an influence on independent voters outside of Republican ranks who are decisive in most states, and thus add to the "Dump Johnson" movement. Among these are the large numbers who rallied to Johnson in 1964, giving him his record popular vote.

Although, it is said, the liberals are unable to organize their votes to guarantee victories, it is also true that their apathy spells defeat for Democrats. If the Republican Party were to adopt the course of Case, Morton and Cooper and implement it with effective candidates, and if the war is still on, they could win the election.

Prospects of the Movement

It is very doubtful that the "Dump Johnson" issue would get to the national convention. The New York, California and New Jersey primaries are in June. At that time the major convention delegations will be elected. If the vote goes against Johnson, chances are that he would find an occasion to withdraw, for a substantial vote for an alternative candidate in a few major states would indicate that he could not win in November. Indeed, if the "Dump Johnson" movement continues at its present pace, and if a serious contender enters the New Hampshire primaries in March and then the Wisconsin primaries and defeats Johnson, that could well be the occasion for his withdrawal. It should be remembered that when Kefauver defeated Truman in New Hampshire in 1952, Truman withdrew. Also, Nixon has announced that if defeated in the New Hampshire and Wisconsin primaries he would withdraw. Johnson may be forced to that position.

Even if the peace ticket candidates for convention delegates do not win in these primaries, those who voted for them can be a force for an independent peace ticket, which is essential under all circumstances.

Much attention must be given to the "Dump Johnson" movement outside the Democratic Party as well as within it. A major reason for the New Politics convention was the need for an alternative to Johnson. One problem in its preparation was the failure of the convention staff to make serious efforts to get dissident Democrats to attend. At one meeting of the New Politics board, one member moved that the invitation to the convention should be extended only

to those who had broken with the Democratic and Republican parties. Though the motion was defeated by a vote of 23 to 1, only minimum efforts were made to involve the various reform or independent Democrats. Yet it was the dissident Democrats who really gave birth to New Politics, even though they are now estranged from their offspring and vice versa.

Nevertheless, the convention was anti-Johnson. That was taken for granted. New Politics can easily be part of the "Dump Johnson" movement, and by showing an active interest in it, can strengthen its relations to other forces and its role in the country.

At the time of the 18th Convention of our Party a peace alternative to Johnson was only a slogan. Today it is the property of millions. We must strengthen our ties with such a movement. Its arena of activity is in the Democratic Party, but the net result of its efforts can be a strengthening of independent political action, and it could be most important for the development of a third ticket. If the third-ticket forces give genuine help and establish proper relations to this movement inside the Democratic Party, they will gain politically and organizationally in the long run.

The New Politics Convention: Negro-White Relations

The First National Convention of New Politics convened in Chicago over the Labor Day week end. The Call was not issued until early in July and the final mailing was made only at the end of July. In view of this, the registration of some 3,600 delegates, representatives and observers, including more than 600 Negro delegates, was a tremendous achievement. This was the most important mass political event for independent political action of the past two decades.

On the basis of the political needs of this period, the announcements of the convention committee and the background of the New Politics leadership, it was fair to believe that with a serious political effort the Convention would adopt a program of local grassroots organizing activity and would outline a course of action for a third Presidential ticket in 1968. The Johnson escalation of the war in Vietnam and especially the ghetto rebellions called for a meaningful new program and challenged every political force, including the New Politics.

That challenge also exposed a basic fault in New Politics and in the work of many of us who became involved in any degree. Prior to the Convention, prominent leaders including Julian Bond, Stokely

Carmichael, Reverend Andrew Young, Carleton Goodlett had participated in its leading committee. However, the Negro activists had not been involved in day-to-day leadership or on the staff in any meaningful way. When, consequently a Black Caucus was organized—in part at the initiative of some who sought to pit the Negroes against the Convention, in part by others who sought meaningful participation on a basis of equality—a struggle developed which altered the agenda, direction and work of the Convention.

Those who sought to split the Convention and prevent Negro participation were defeated the day before the Convention opened, and they set up a separate convention. Within the Black Caucus and in the plenary sessions of the Convention, the overwhelming majority, including the Communists, fought for the adoption of proposals which would establish the basis for a new working unity and new relationships of black and white within the Convention. This was the meaning of the acceptance of the thirteen points proposed by the Black Caucus and its demand for half of the vote and the representation in leadership.

That struggle had to be made and it has created the conditions for new relationships between Negro and white in the field of political action. That is a tremendous achievement. Yet the struggle was conducted and the new relationship was achieved in such a manner and under such pressures that much more must be done to guarantee continued advance. The fact is that we were not prepared for this development and that others at the Convention, both Negro and white, were not prepared for it, even though comparable Black Caucus developments had occurred at other recent gatherings.

The "Radical Caucus"

Another development was the formation of a "White Radical Caucus" which later changed its name to the "Radical Caucus" or the "Local Organizers' Caucus." This was a grouping of younger people with backgrounds in the National Student Association, Students for a Democratic Society, the Vietnam Summer Project, and local organizing activities. Some were professional conventioners.

These young people classify themselves as "radical" and seriously profess to be against the system or the establishment, or poverty, or those in power. With few exceptions they are dedicated and determined to seek "radical changes." However, some see the election of a library commissioner as more basic than a Presidential campaign, and seek some form of community commonwealth or "neighborhood

socialism." Some prefer to debate definitions rather than issues or problems. But among them are also many who are dedicated to solving problems and participating in struggles.

Within the Radical Caucus there was also a grouping which worked to split the Convention and set the caucus up as a rival to New Politics. At the same time, some of the most able leaders of New Politics were associated with and had leading responsibilities in it. They did not, however, have organizational control, and were later completely dumped by their own caucus in the election of the new board, assertedly because these leaders had also had relations with the third ticket advocates. Unfortunately, we did not sufficiently give serious thought to the role of this caucus. This contributed to the failure to get a satisfactory resolution adopted in relation to 1968.

The "Third Ticket" or Electoral Caucus was established by Convention action on the last day for the purpose of proposing six members of the new board to be elected by the Convention. There were also workshops and state caucuses that discussed the third ticket, and a full plenary session was devoted to 1968.

The debate was on three proposals: 1) to make 1968 a year of intensive local organizing without working for a Presidential ticket, 2) to work for a third Presidential ticket, 3) to work for a third-party perspective including a Presidential ticket. The battle was between local organizing and the third ticket, with the Convention evenly divided. Ultimately unity was obtained by amending the local organizing resolution to include working for a third ticket in those areas which chose to do so. This was reaffirmed the next night by the Black Caucus.

Finally, a board of 24 members was elected, with 12 primarily concerned with electoral work including the third ticket and 12 concerned with local organizing. Negro and white were given equal numbers on both sections.

The Convention was so sharply divided on the political action resolution, and was in such uncertainty as it moved from one critical debate to another on the major proposals for Black Caucus participation, that its ultimate position on the third ticket and the 1968 elections lost much of its meaning. Nor did the board meeting on September 29 resolve the problem.

A Third Ticket for 1968

Many proposals are now being considered for moving New Politics into the local and state political arenas as the base for

national politics. At the same time, it must be recognized that its immediate contribution may well be limited even though it has a great potential. It cannot be expected to become the only agency for initiating the third ticket, however important a force it is for this goal. Other independent forces must share responsibility.

The fact that the Convention did not take the step of supporting a third ticket nationally must be regarded as a setback for all those who sought this goal. True, our Party was effective in helping to preserve a form of unity in the Convention, which gained us prestige and respect among many new forces. True, the moves of those who sought to disrupt the Convention were defeated. But that, though important, was not enough.

Since it is clear that the need for a third ticket cannot be fully met through New Politics, it becomes urgent for those who see it as necessary to seek additional forms. This requires consultation with people in New Politics and others who share this view. Representatives from working-class and Negro people's organizations and from the peace movement need to be involved. Many supporters of a third ticket were not able to be at the Convention. In fact, the Call reached only a limited part of them and made no claim that it tried to reach or represent the entire third ticket potential. The problem now is to reach and involve all these interested persons and groups through whatever forms prove suitable.

The forces to be involved include those in New Politics who are seriously interested in a third ticket; those in mass organizations such as SCLC, CORE, SANE and others who have a like interest and whose relation to New Politics is a limited one; and those dissident Democrats and Republicans who were not involved in New Politics. It is necessary to learn from the Chicago experience—to consult and involve Negro leadership from the very outset and to reach into the ranks of labor. In this connection, serious attention should be given to the actions of the National Assembly of Trade Unionists for Peace, held in Chicago on November 11 under the auspices of the Trade Union Division of SANE.

It is necessary to put New Politics in proper perspective, to see the interrelation of work on various levels, to examine other developments in relation to 1968.

At our 18th National Convention, the point was made by Gus Hall that "the independent forces of the 'New Politics' must also keep some fences mended. . . . The independent forces must, of absolute necessity, make greater efforts to win over the labor movement, not as

supporters but as full partners." This has not been given sufficient attention and there is a danger that it may continue to be neglected. Despite a minimum of attention, it is reported that more than 300 trade union members registered at the New Politics Convention and some 100 attended a labor caucus. This can be greatly improved.

The report of Gus Hall to the national committee meeting in December 1966 stated:

Our policy is to struggle for the most advanced understanding and crystallization of thought and organization outside of the strait-jacket of the two old party machines. We are for the maximum expression of independence that each level permits—not more, not less. Ours must be a policy of *constant probing*—testing new forms of political independence.

And further:

How to see these different levels as necessary reflections of political reality, how to see them as part of the whole political spectrum, how to avoid counterposing one level to another, how to see the inner relationships between the levels—this is our problem.

I would summarize the three levels of independence as follows:

1. Independent movements within the two parties.
2. Independent movements politically and organizationally outside of the two parties, but still using the two parties' electoral process, especially in the primaries.
3. Broad, Left independent movements, which very often include ourselves, the Communists.

New Politics is now essentially of this third level, although in its origin, early activity and leadership it was of the first two.

We have given great emphasis to New Politics. That was necessary and correct. To call for seeing it in perspective is not to downgrade its importance. It deserves much more attention in every area, but at the same time it should not monopolize our attention. Other forms of independence, especially at the grass roots level, must also receive support.

Developments in the Republican Party

Undoubtedly, every opponent of the war welcomes the recent declarations of Senators Morton, Case and Cooper, in varying degree condemning the Johnson war policy and calling for steps to end the war. These and other such declarations must be utilized to strengthen the anti-war movement. We must master the skill of

utilizing temporary differences and fissures in the ruling class to strengthen the popular mass movements. Too often we fail to do this and lose the moment.

These developments also raise much speculation as to 1968. No doubt the ultra-Right has been doing some intensive work at lower levels of the Republican Party, and in some areas has captured the machinery. Goldwater apparently gained strength among the Young Republicans at their recent convention in Iowa. The ultra-Right made a strong bid for power at the national meeting of the Republican women in Washington, but was defeated. Many other moves were made to increase their power after 1966. At the same time, however, there were many countermoves by Republicans to save that party from the image of the Cow Palace Convention of 1964. Many leading Republicans see the opportunity of victory in 1968 endangered by the Goldwater ultra-Right image.

But the struggle within the Republican Party is not limited to two trends. There are major finance capital groups in the struggle whose influence is much more decisive. It is generally understood that when two or more leading Republican senators change their position on a question of basic policy some major center of finance capital has had an executive board meeting. This adds to the importance of the recent declarations by the Republican senators.

Some months ago the emphasis was on support for Johnson's war policy, with Ronald Reagan and Gerald Ford calling for stepping up the war, and with Senator Dirksen being protective of Johnson and keeping the Republican senators in line. Goldwater was in essential agreement and Nixon intensified his campaign. And at that point Romney had no essential difference with Johnson.

Now the emphasis is not on support to Johnson but on opposition. And it is said that important Republicans and elements in the Boston finance capital group are interested in General Gavin's apparent willingness to be a Presidential peace candidate. Of course, the candidacy of a Republican of the Percy-Morton-Hatfield-Cooper-Case tendency would be of greater importance. It could open up a wide new area of action for ending the war.

There are many other speculations, but the important thing is that a fluid situation is developing among the Republicans, and apparently the ultra-Right forces have been set back in their efforts to capture and control that party. Such developments give increased weight to the need for a third ticket, which would also influence the course of the Republican Party.

The 1967 Elections

In the mayoralty races this year, the victories of the Negro candidates Carl B. Stokes in Cleveland and Richard B. Hatcher in Gary, and the defeat of blatant racist Mrs. Louise Day Hicks in Boston, were historic achievements which set the stage for a new era, not only in municipal politics, but in the electoral arena generally.

Negro unity overcame political partisanship in these cities, resulting in almost solid block voting. This unity also contributed to winning white voters who recognized the need of major changes in Negro-white relations to meet the problems of the cities. Thus, Stokes won nearly 95 per cent of the Negro vote and 20 per cent of the white vote, while Hatcher was supported by 95 per cent of the Negro voters and 17 per cent of the white voters.

The old Negro subservience to political machines was broken. A new relationship of blacks with whites was established in an independent form, functioning within the two-party system but depending on independent organization instead of the old party machines. The candidates were of "a new breed." They had confident relationships with people and campaigned on vital issues. They fought not only the Republican candidates but even more the racist opposition in the Democratic Party machine.

In Richmond, Virginia, Dr. William F. Reid received 98 per cent of the Negro vote and 35 per cent of the white vote to break the lily-white character of the state legislature. Even more significant was the election of Robert S. Clark to the Mississippi state legislature as a candidate of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, breaking the jim crow barrier there. Five other black candidates were elected to county posts in addition to 16 who won office as a result of earlier primary victories. To be sure, 27 other black candidates were defeated by terror, thievery and other foul methods. But this only highlights the importance of the victories.

The number of black Americans elected to city councils, state assemblies and other posts increased across the country. Thus, the rebellions of these past four summers have paid off in part in these elections.

These elections, and especially the Republican victories in Kentucky and New Jersey, also reflect the widespread opposition to the Johnson war policies. The referendum in San Francisco, which called for "immediate withdrawal" from Vietnam, got 36.7 per cent of the total vote. It is widely agreed that if the referendum had been on nego-

tiations to end the war and "systematic withdrawal" the "yes" vote would have carried overwhelmingly.

The victories in the municipal elections make imperative an examination of possible further advances. This means special attention to the 1968 Congressional races now.

These elections demonstrate that not only are the black people determined to end tokenism and "second-place" office holding for Negro candidates, but that growing numbers of all voters are ready for a new relation of black and white in public office. This can mean much in the struggle for democracy and for an end to racism in our country.

On Communist Candidates

We have discussed Communist candidates at various times, but usually the decision has been to devote ourselves to others and to neglect the fight for the right of the public to vote or not vote for a Communist, or to sign or refuse to sign a petition for the right of a Communist to run for office.

Today the legal obstacles have been partially overcome as a result of victories in the courts against the McCarran Act. Other Supreme Court decisions, such as those on the Fineberg Law and on loyalty oaths, have also cleared the way. The logic of this is that we should take further steps now for our right to be on the ballot, which calls for something more in 1968 than one candidate in Los Angeles and another in New York even though there are many state laws which must be challenged. While the legal problem may be an obstacle, the basic problem is much more a political one which can be resolved only by taking bold initiatives to place Communist candidates on the ballot or as serious write-in candidates in as many states as possible.

As for Presidential candidates, we should examine now the steps necessary for Communist Party candidates in each state, so that if it is felt necessary to run a Presidential ticket we can move into action.

Such are the tasks and challenges before us in the political arena today.

Order additional copies of our special issue on "Fifty Years of Socialism" for prospective readers. We have copies available.

The Cleveland Elections

The election of Carl B. Stokes as mayor of a major American city is an event of national and historic importance. It signifies an important advance in Negro representation as well as on a number of other fronts, and lays the ground for further advances.

In a general sense the Cleveland campaign provided, at the grass roots level, a testing ground of the policies and tactics now being projected to meet the crisis of the Negro freedom movement and of the country, and being sharply debated.

Does the electoral process offer a meaningful instrument of struggle? Can the struggle for Negro representation serve to advance the unity of the Negro community? Is Negro-white unity a practical consideration at this time? Can a Negro-labor alliance emerge as a practical working relationship? Can independent movements within the two old parties help in the creation of an independent third party movement? Or, as some claim, does all this merely create illusions among the masses and create, therefore, a diversion from the road to socialism? To these and other important questions the Cleveland mayoralty contest, on the whole, provides positive answers on the main counts. At the same time it points up some negative features as well.

Stokes was elected mayor by a close margin over Seth Taft, the Republican candidate, in a city in which the Negro people constitute one-third of the total population. This fact alone gives his victory special meaning.

In the persons of the two candidates there was reflected much of the drama of the social and class conflicts in this area and in the nation. Stokes is the great-grandson of a slave. He was born in poverty in the ghetto and his mother was once on relief. Taft, on the other hand, is a member of the famous Ohio Taft family—one of the richest and most influential in the state. His uncle was the well-known Senator Robert H. Taft and his grandfather was President William Howard Taft.

Cleveland, the battle ground, is one of the nation's major industrial centers—steel, auto, machine tools, electrical equipment, etc. With a mass exodus of the white middle class to the suburbs, its makeup is now almost exclusively working-class. Its composition

is heavily weighted by ethnic groups—Czech, Slovak, Polish, Hungarian, Ukrainian, Irish, German and others. Some 10,000 Hungarian DP's came here after 1956. The newest arrivals in large numbers are Southern poor whites and Puerto Ricans. The organized trade union movement embraces well over 200,000 members.

Early this year Cleveland was braced for an explosion in the ghetto surpassing the Hough revolt a year before. But though violence did break out in over 100 American cities, it did not happen in Cleveland. Instead, the struggle took a new turn—an electoral struggle that united the Negro community as it had never been united before.

In anticipation of the impending revolt and seeking to channel the course of the "hot summer," many of the national Negro organizations concentrated their efforts on Cleveland. CORE received a grant of \$197,000 from the Ford foundation for its community activity.

Probably the most telling contribution was that of Reverend Martin Luther King, who made Cleveland his focal point of summer activity. He was able to reach the "unreachable" militant youngsters in the black community. He had the largest peace meeting ever held in the ghetto. He helped unify and rally the Negro community behind Stokes' campaign, and sparked the most successful voter-registration ever conducted. (A sign of the times is the fact that the bitterness of the white racist elements over the election results is directed more against Reverend King than even against Stokes himself.)

Thus there was attained an unprecedented over-all unity of the black community which then reflected itself in both the primary and the final election voting. The Negro people voted better than 95 per cent for Stokes. Of the 129,000 votes cast for Stokes, 86,000 were cast in the Negro community and constituted the solid base for his victory. This was a clear exercise of electoral "Black Power."

This by itself was not enough to bring victory. It was essential to make a considerable breakthrough in the white areas of Cleveland. Stokes, being assured of the solid support of the black community, directed his main campaign efforts to the solid white West Side of the city. It was a bold, imaginative and courageous tactic.

This area had provided the main support for the incumbent Mayor Locher, whom Stokes defeated in the primaries. The very boldness of the campaign won him much support. The racist violence that had been expected did not materialize except on a small scale. White homes, churches and organizations were opened to him. His warm personality, obvious competence, and forthright challenge on the race issue made a strong impact.

This impact was documented at the polls. When Stokes ran for mayor in 1965, he received a little over 6,000 white votes or 3 per cent of the total. In this year's primary he received 17,000, or 14 per cent, and in the November 7th elections he received 43,000 or better than 20 per cent of the white vote in the city. It accounted for more than one-third of his total vote.

Without this breakthrough he could not have won. It constitutes one of the main advances of the entire struggle. It now makes possible the further advance and consolidation of Negro-white unity in tackling the difficult problems the city faces.

In the past the AFL-CIO Central Labor Body supported incumbent Democratic candidates almost as a habit. Two years ago it endorsed Locher without opposition, and endorsed him again in this year's primary even though this time a sharp challenge was posed from the floor. But immediately after Stokes won the primary nomination, the Council unanimously endorsed him and gave him an enthusiastic ovation on his appearance there.

Although, despite the endorsement, the full force of labor's strength was not applied, some key sections of the labor movement did work energetically for Stokes. A good example was the activity of the UAW Auto Council representing all the UAW locals in this area. But the most vigorous campaign on Stokes' behalf was waged by the Teamsters District Council through its electoral arm, which systematically contacted all members of the union by telephone, mail and otherwise.

This new relationship is also a big step forward in the development of the Negro-labor alliance. The very nature of the problems that lie ahead for the new city leadership makes it even more necessary further to expand and develop this most significant alliance.

At the other end of the class spectrum, important sections of industrial and banking capital decided to lend their support to Stokes. Their motivation was primarily self-interest—to protect against destruction of their property holdings and investments in the face of mounting mass rebellion. They drew some realistic conclusions from the "hot summer" experiences in the other cities. Both the *Plain Dealer* and the *Press* gave their endorsements to Stokes.

There thus emerged an electoral coalition, loosely bound, at whose very center was the solid block of the Negro community, and which brought about the election of a Negro as the chief executive of Cleveland. There is no doubt that the various components of this coalition will make their own demands and exert their own pressures on the

new mayor. Great pressures and mass activity on the part of the Negro people, the labor movement and the poor will be needed to counteract the pressures of the financial and industrial establishment.

The Cleveland election also emphasized the disarray in the Democratic Party. While the Johnson administration was eager to capitalize on the Stokes candidacy to bolster its own declining fortunes in relation to 1968, Democratic Party support was absent at the local level. The machine endorsed Locher in the primaries and made a scurrilous campaign against Stokes. While endorsing Stokes after he won the nomination, the Democratic Party did little to elect him.

Cleveland is nominally a Democratic stronghold. Out of 325,593 registered voters in the city, only 39,000 are registered as Republicans. The racial issue, however, was such a powerful factor that Seth Taft received 127,000 votes—more than any Republican candidate had obtained in more than half a century. The Democratic machine was totally blind to the mass struggles that had taken place and the changes that had been wrought in the past decade. Locher's own insensitivity to this, his refusal to meet the Negro community leaders after the Hough events, was a decisive factor in his own defeat.

The strong showing made by Taft was due primarily to the above factors. But even in his defeat he has emerged as a strong contender in the Republican ranks. He has acquired a liberal polish and even walked on the picket lines in the hospital strike. There are rumors that his next bid will be for the Senate seat now held by Frank Lausche.

On several issues, such as his proposal to sell the city-owned electric power plant to the power monopoly, Stokes won wide and justified criticism. He was clearly making an open concession to the power monopoly. His most serious weakness was on the issue of the Vietnam war. While he made only some perfunctory statements supporting Johnson's war policies, and even though these were quite clearly made for opportunistic reasons, this created serious problems for the peace movement. On this issue the progressive forces were justifiably critical. Some were inclined, however, to see this as the *only* issue in the campaign and refused to take part in the electoral activity, and some on the Left even voted for Taft. In doing so they found themselves, willy-nilly, in alliance with the racists at the other extreme. In seeing the war as the *only* issue, these forces fell prey to a certain confusion and passivity which had the effect of isolating them from a critical electoral battle.

The election of a Negro mayor, however competent, imaginative

and energetic he may be, does not of itself provide a solution to the problems of a decaying city—the need for the wiping out of slums, construction of decent housing, the war on poverty, ending discrimination, decent jobs for all, adequate education, etc. He cannot do it alone, nor can he perform miracles.

Unless massive financial and technical aid is provided by the state and federal governments, the city will continue to fester and rot, and the harvest will be violence on an even greater scale. The people refuse to live in the old way regardless of who is mayor.

It will require powerful pressures, organized actions by the people in the ghetto, by the trade unions, and by all the people's organizations, Negro and white, to get off dead center and provide the necessary steam. Cleveland will need hundreds of millions of dollars in federal aid. All claims of priority for the Vietnam war must be totally rejected and the funds must be made available instead for domestic reconstruction.

Thus, mass pressure must be exerted not only on the Stokes administration, but on all governmental bodies, agencies and representatives. These tasks now lie before us.

To sum up, we can at this point draw a number of positive conclusions from the Cleveland electoral experience. Among these are the following:

It served to unify the Negro community as never before.

It helped to advance Negro-white unity to a new level.

It opens up a possibility for further Negro-labor unity on a program of action.

It served to set in motion independent political currents inside and outside of the two old parties.

It provides new opportunities for mass actions to improve the conditions of the people in the city.

It demonstrated that the electoral process can be a valuable instrument of struggle in the hands of the people.

Herbert Aptheker is abroad. "Ideas In Our Times" will be back in January.

The Hatcher Election in Gary

The election of Richard Gordon Hatcher as Gary's first Negro mayor was not supposed to have happened. The oracles of the *New York Times* had flatly predicted his defeat a week in advance of the election, and by all the rules of bourgeois politics he was a sure loser.

Consider all the factors working against a Hatcher victory:

1. After winning the Democratic nomination in the spring primary against two white opponents, including the liberal but machine-supported incumbent, Hatcher was denied the endorsement of the powerful Democratic County machine. The machine, in fact, set out to defeat him by using every dirty trick in the book. He thus had to take on his own party as well as the Republicans.

2. Where it usually takes between \$400,000 to \$500,000 to run an adequate campaign for mayor of Gary, Hatcher had at his disposal between \$50,000 to \$75,000, a large part of it coming from contributions sent in from across the country in response to advertisements and other appeals. About 20 per cent of his funds came from unions, especially steel and auto.

3. According to Tom Wicker, *New York Times* columnist, Hatcher had, in contrast to Stokes in Cleveland, "allowed" himself to get mouse-trapped by the race issue in a city which racist George Wallace had carried in the 1964 presidential primary. As Wicker saw it, from his Washington, D. C. office, Stokes had succeeded in making white voters forget he was a Negro by dealing with other issues, whereas Hatcher had played into the hands of the racists and reactionaries by failing to give satisfactory replies to the charges of John Krupa, the Democratic County chairman. One week in advance of the election Wicker proceeded, with computer-like precision, to write his post-mortem on Hatcher's defeat.

4. Hatcher failed to dignify with any replies whatsoever the Red-baiting campaign against him. The most scurrilous literature and charges, including forged handbills supposedly signed by scores of "known Communists, radicals and Left-wingers," were widely circulated in an attempt to create a McCarthy-like hysteria and fear. His election was to result in the establishment of "a Cuba right in the heartland of the U.S., from which socialism was to be spread across the whole country." This was the "great conspiracy" cooked up by

Krupa, who linked together "Dr. Martin Luther King, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Communists and Castro" as the masterminds behind the plot.

Hatcher, who was much closer to the people and knew that the buyer's market on Red-baiting had dropped tremendously, merely stood aside and let the shoddy goods of anti-Communism boomerang against its sellers. But in the old rule book of reactionary bourgeois politics, this was supposed to have been a devastating blow at Hatcher.

5. Where the Cleveland daily press had endorsed Stokes, the *Gary Post-Tribune* lent aid and comfort to the anti-Hatcher camp in both old parties, by withholding endorsement of either candidate. In the special circumstances of the Gary election this was tantamount to tacit endorsement of Joseph Radigan, Hatcher's GOP opponent.

6. Leaving nothing to chance Krupa, the Lake County Democratic chieftain, organized a conspiracy to deprive Hatcher of victory. This should have been quite simple, since Krupa was also the County Clerk as well as chairman of the Board of Elections. The conspiracy consisted in the removal of the names of 5,000 Negroes from the voter registration lists and, according to Hatcher, the placement of some 1,500 names of non-existent whites on the voting lists.

This was intended to be the master-stroke that was to lock Hatcher into defeat, no matter what he did. If he kept quiet, he would surely be counted out. If he made an issue of it, he would be pointing up the contrast between what was being done to Negro voters as against white voters, thus sharpening the race issue in a way that would serve his opponent. In addition, he would contribute to an atmosphere of defeatism, for isn't it always the sure loser who shouts "robbery" just a week before election?

So, by all the rules in the book, Hatcher was a sure loser.

When all of this is understood, then it is clear that the magnitude of Hatcher's victory goes far beyond the figures of nearly 53 per cent of the total record vote of some 68,000, with a more than 1,800 vote plurality over Radigan.

How was Hatcher able to overcome these seemingly insurmountable obstacles? What did he have going for him?

First of all, he had an army of 2,000 active, devoted volunteers. This army was largely composed of steelworkers and their families, mostly Negro, but with a sizeable white participation. Among Hatcher's white supporters were steelworkers, auto workers, social workers, teachers, professional people, and a number of white candidates running with him under the Democratic label.

Operating out of an integrated store-front office, in the heart of the Central (ghetto) District, the volunteers organized house-gatherings in all communities, did intensive door-to-door work, conducted a "Dollars for Decency" fund drive at the plant gates, and did a magnificent job of manning the polls. A number of unions took workers off the job on election day and sent them to cover the precincts. Included among these unions were a number from Chicago.

The overriding national significance of this election was understood by such important unions as steel and auto, as seen from their endorsement, the assignment of volunteer workers and the full-page coverage on Hatcher in the October issue of *Steel Labor* and in the Gary edition of *Steel Labor* for November, put out earlier than usual to get to steelworker's homes before election day.

In addition, Hatcher's bold and swift federal court suit, supported by the testimony of a vote-fraud conspiracy in her all-white precinct by Democratic Committeewoman Marian Tokarski, resulted in a court order restoring the names of 5,000 Negro voters to the polling lists and brought a revulsion among many decent-minded whites which boomeranged against both old party machines, and frustrated their plans to exploit racist feelings at Hatcher's expense.

Hatcher received nearly 97 per cent of the Negro vote, an overwhelming demonstration of unity and political power. His vote in white precincts ran from 7 per cent all the way up to 25 per cent.

While Negroes make up more than half the total population of Gary, there were far more white registered voters than Negroes. The extent of his support in the white communities was all-important.

In the race for the 9-member City Council, four Negroes were elected as Democrats, one running at large, that is, elected by the city as a whole. Significantly, the two seats lost to the Republicans in white wards, were lost by Democrats who had disassociated themselves from Hatcher and conducted an out-and-out racist campaign.

Attempts to draw far-reaching conclusions about white voting patterns on the basis of ethnic backgrounds just do not stand up. One can select a precinct, inhabited by various Slav nationality groups, and conclude Hatcher got the least support among them because he received only 7 per cent of the vote. But in another, practically all-Slav precinct, he got close to 25 per cent of the vote, among the highest in all white precincts.

The one pattern that does emerge is that where effective work was done on the issues and against racism, there the Hatcher vote was higher. This, indeed, is the big lesson. To be sure, large numbers of

whites, including workers, voted against Hatcher due to the influence of racism. But concentrated effort, even in a few months as in Gary, proves that racism can be defeated, provided the necessary ideological and educational struggle is conducted against the poison of racism, and the real issues confronting the people are emphasized.

There can be no doubt that in Gary, as in Cleveland, the election outcome was a working-class victory, a people's victory. In the first place, the Negro people in Gary are overwhelmingly working class, especially in steel. Organized labor, even if sections here and there dragged their feet, supported Hatcher. White workers in sizeable numbers actively worked for his election.

Self-interest was a big factor in white support for Hatcher. He was the man who, for the first time, defeated the corrupt machine in the primaries, who refused to knuckle under it, who refused to accept a \$70,000 offer from the crime syndicate whose alliance with the city political machine was an open secret. His election meant getting the corrupt machine off the backs of all the Gary workers and middle class, Negro and white. It held out the promise of a better day, of better local government more attuned to the needs of the people. The only way reform could be brought about for the oppressed in the ghetto was by championing reform for all, relief from the oppression of the corrupt machine for all.

Here, indeed, was a new politics, the inner essence of which consisted of a strengthened Negro-labor alliance, which alone could defeat two political party machines. Let those who are fond of talking about "new politics" but shrink from doing the really bold and necessary electoral work, such as providing the people with an independent peace and freedom presidential alternative in 1968, ponder the Gary and Cleveland results.

Let those who write off the labor movement and claim there is no Negro-labor alliance explain the outcome in this tale of two cities.

A new chapter in the qualitative development of democracy has been opened up for our country in the popular election, for the first time, of Negroes as mayors of major cities. It is no accident that it happened in the working-class strongholds of Gary and Cleveland. For it is the working class, Negro and white, which holds high the banner of democracy and which finds its way, despite all kinds of difficulties and obstacles, to carry that banner forward. The Negro-labor alliance exists, is being revitalized on new and higher levels. It must be carried forward everywhere to win the decisive struggles for democracy and peace.

A Reply to Isaac Deutscher

PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR

I did not write this for *Political Affairs*. From its content, it is clear that this article would be unacceptable to the "free" press of this country. But I also learned that it was unacceptable to *any* of the weekly or monthly Left publications. Even those which regard themselves as in disagreement with Deutscher, have been sufficiently infected by Deutscherism to look for models of socialism everywhere but in the one significant country that has demonstrated an ability to get beyond the stage of the cult of a living individual (Stalin, Mao, Castro, Tito), safely past the possibility of terror (i.e., beyond the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat), and to pursue a world policy free of war while sustaining the freedom of nations against imperialism.

My hesitation in publishing in *Political Affairs* had two bases. One was the Communists' previous attitude toward dissent, which has not yet been entirely overcome, even in the U.S. But this I must weigh against the orthodoxies of other types of publication, Left and "free" (!). The other is that I have been fighting for seventeen years to undo McCarthyism since it has blocked my access to the academic world (and the ways in which that can facilitate one's research and make one's life easier). Being published in a Communist magazine doesn't help that in the least, and I don't necessarily recommend it to younger scholars who wish to win the right to be heard in a status-ridden world.

But for a writer of any kind, freedom is the right to be published. And if a Communist organ is willing to publish something of mine, particularly when no one else is, I would be betraying the very freedom I am fighting for were I to refuse. The very fact of such publication compels those in administrative or other positions who claim to hold to academic freedom, freedom of the press and of the air, to confront their own consciences. In the last four years, they have reopened all doors to me except a salaried professorship. They have done so on the basis of my competence in the field of Soviet affairs, and have extended certain honors. Will publication in a Communist organ cause them to close those doors again, or refrain from opening the last of them?

But the ultimate reasons for my submission of this article to *Political Affairs* are not personal. Deutscher did harm, as this article seeks to demonstrate. And since his books remain in print and are used in our higher educational institutions, he will continue to do so. Therefore, the fact that he has just died and cannot reply (others will be able to) is far outweighed by the fact that his views continue to reach vastly larger audiences than this will. (This article was written long before his death.)

The second reason is so plain that it is almost presumptuous to state it. Simply, the 50th anniversary of the world's first socialist state deserves celebrating. And anybody who works in this field and has any understanding

at all of the feelings of the Soviet people on this occasion owes it to them to celebrate what it has done for them, for human progress and for world peace. This is in no sense an apologia for what it did wrong and for what it could have done right and didn't, or for the difference between what many things are like in the USSR right now, and what they could be under the conditions of today. I deal with such matters elsewhere in print, do so in conversation with ordinary people when I visit the Soviet Union, and will continue to do both.

Our reason for publishing Mr. Mandel's article is a very simple one. We, too, believe that Deutscher did harm. We believe that the article effectively exposes the falsity of Deutscher's position, and that it should have whatever audience we can give it. Mr. Mandel is the author of Russia Re-examined (Hill and Wang, New York revised edition, 1967).

—THE EDITORS

Isaac Deutscher writes: "The Socialist Man Stalin presented to the world was the . . . worker or peasant . . . working 10 or 12 hours a day."* My immediate reaction was that in a lifetime of reading plain and fancy embroidery about the USSR, I had never come across anyone who had claimed the Soviet working day under Stalin to be of 10 or 12 hours' duration. I phoned Professor Gregory Grossman of the University of California Economics Department, a man with a world reputation as an authority on the Soviet economy. He agreed that he knew of no such contention by anyone.

To anyone whose awareness of world affairs began 40 years ago, as did Deutscher's, the fact that the Soviet worker's day was the world's shortest after 1927 was literally as universally acknowledged as that the earth is round. Therefore, I simply have no choice but to conclude that Deutscher employed his statistic in the secure knowledge that the younger audience comprising the Socialist Scholars' Conference is quite ignorant with respect to the USSR, has a certain contempt for those who think it socialist, was taught to revere Deutscher by cold-war professors subsequent to publication of his de-bunking biography of Stalin at the very height of the cold war (1949); and avoids the hard problem of trying to understand why the Soviet Union

*Reference is to Isaac Deutscher's address to the Socialist Scholars Conference in September 1966, published in full in the *National Guardian*, September 24, 1966.

is what it is by accepting Trotsky's formula in Deutscher's rephrasing: "It was out of the question that a country like this should be able to achieve socialism in such circumstances."

The Impact of Soviet Society

The matter of the working day bears directly on another of Deutscher's flat assertions: "I cannot go here into the motives of dogma and prestige that had led Stalin and his associates to proclaim that the Soviet Union had achieved socialism and that still cause his successors to keep up this pretense. I am concerned here only with the *impact* this dogma or boast has had on socialism in the West. That *impact* has been disastrous. It has demoralized our labor movement and confused socialist thinking." (I have stressed "impact" for a reason that shortly becomes clear.—W. M.)

As an aside, I'm curious to know what labor movement anywhere would accept Deutscher's patronizing "our." Neither the frankly class-collaborationist movements here and abroad, nor the powerful Communist-led labor movements in France, Italy, Finland and elsewhere acknowledge him.

Deutscher says that the example of the USSR has been so negative as to have discredited the term "socialism" elsewhere. This is remarkably white-chauvinist. Nobody who looks beyond the West denies that the Soviet Union has had the most fantastic revolutionizing effect in Asia, Africa and Latin America, to name only China, Egypt and Cuba. Consider, if nothing else, the reverence in which Stalin is held in China to this day. And if it were merely an example of a dictator they looked for, they could, like former Premier Ky of Saigon, have found other models in the West—and in the East.

But right in Deutscher's own England, Edward Hallett Carr, whose position is unchallenged as the leading world historian of the USSR, holds an entirely different estimate. At the very height of the cold war, in 1947, when Stalin had been in power for a quarter century, Carr wrote a book with the very meaningful title, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*. A few quotes:

"The cult of the 'common man' now fashionable in English-speaking countries is perhaps a first result of the impact of Soviet democracy." "Lenin's numerous attacks on bureaucracy were inspired by (an) intense desire to draw the masses into the direct management of affairs . . . the principle of encouraging the direct participation of the Soviet citizen survived and . . . found expression in the obligation

of unpaid public service for party members and trade unionists and in the work of the local soviets. . . . If Soviet authorities take the view that such direct participation in the running of affairs is at least as essential an attribute of democracy as voting in occasional elections, it is by no means certain that they are wrong. . . . Here at any rate is a challenge of Soviet democracy to western political institutions about which western democrats will be well advised to ponder."

That's the political impact. Now economics: "the economic impact of the Soviet Union on the rest of the world may be summed up in the single word 'planning'. . . President Roosevelt's enemies were never tired of claiming that the New Deal had been framed on a Soviet model. . . . Certainly, if 'we are all planners now,' this is largely the result, conscious or unconscious, of the impact of Soviet practice and Soviet achievement. . . . Lord Keynes's doctrines found such ready acceptance in Great Britain and elsewhere partly because the ground had already been prepared in the minds of his contemporaries by contemplation of the planned economy of the Soviet Union."

Next the social impact. Here is Carr's judgment: "The equality preached in the Soviet Union is not an equality of function or an equality of reward" (which means, incidentally, as we shall demonstrate, that Carr knows his Marxism a great deal better than Deutscher). Carr continues: "equality, in the sense in which it is one of the fundamental purposes of Soviet social policy, means non-discrimination between human beings on irrelevant grounds such as sex, race, color, or class. Soviet principles and practice compare favorably in this respect with those of some democratic countries. One *effect of the Soviet impact* on these countries has been an increased recognition of the irrelevance of such barriers and a strengthened demand to sweep them away." (My emphasis—W.M.)

Does non-discrimination on grounds of sex, race, color, or class discredit Soviet socialism? Or does labor union discrimination on grounds of sex, race, color, which exists in *every* non-socialist country, discredit Deutscher for blaming "the disillusionment and apathy in the working class" upon the first working class that had the guts to throw its rulers off its back, and that has maintained standards toward non-males and non-Russians in the Soviet Union that has made anything like Watts, or the white working-class attacks upon the Cicero march, unheard of in the Soviet Union for 45 years? Consider another comment by Carr: written during Stalin's life-time in the work referred to:

The English-speaking countries have perhaps not been sufficiently sensitive to the threat to their world-wide position implicit in the Soviet appeal to the brotherhood of man; in so far as they have recently become more sensitive to it and have overcome some of the traditional prejudice of race and color, this is due in large part, directly or indirectly, to the impact of the Soviet Union.

There is not one word on this subject in Deutscher's lengthy and wide-ranging speech, in which he so carefully evaluates and then contemptuously rejects the existing socialist countries as examples in the building of a brotherhood of man.

Before turning to what Deutscher doesn't know about what he himself calls the "ABC of Marxism," we must finish with his critique of the Soviet Union and the damage it has done to socialism. After examining "The Ideological Impact" of the USSR, Carr concludes:

Few intelligent democrats today deny the validity of some aspects of the Marxist onslaught. The impact of the Soviet Union in the last twenty-five years has helped to drive it home; and Soviet prestige has in turn been increased by the recognition of its validity.

Anyone familiar with the literature knows that judgments such as Carr's may be found in dozens if not hundreds of sources today. If I have quoted him at such length, it is because of his towering prestige in all camps as a scholar of the USSR, because he wrote all this during Stalin's lifetime—and Deutscher's argument is that "we must dissociate socialism once and for all . . . from the Stalinist and post-Stalinist parody of Socialist Man."

How Life Has Been Transformed

Deutscher's reputation rests on his skill as a biographer, and some assume that this makes him an historian. Here is his concept of Soviet history, and I am grateful to him for putting it so concisely: "Stalin and Stalinism, unable to raise a poverty-stricken and miserable Russia to socialism, have dragged down socialism to the level of Russian misery." Again, he takes advantage of his youthful American audience's ignorance of what misery meant in Russia. Here is a description of it by an anti-Marxist Englishman who lived in Russia for forty years before the Revolution, was a university professor and newspaper editor there, and one of whose books was declared by the anti-Communist historian and pre-Soviet Foreign Minister Milyukov to be the most accurate description of the Russian people. In *The Eclipse of Russia*, 1918, Dr. E. J. Dillon wrote as follows:

Too often the Russian peasant [the population was overwhelmingly peasant] dwells in a hovel more filthy than a sty, more noxious than a phosphoric match factory. He goes to bed at six and even at five o'clock in the winter, because he cannot afford money to buy petroleum enough for artificial light. He has no meat, no eggs, no butter, no milk, often no cabbage, and lives mainly on black bread and potatoes. Lives? He starves on an insufficient quantity of them . . . And yet those starving men, women and children, had raised plenty of corn to live upon. . . . But they were forced to sell it immediately after the harvest in order to pay the taxes.

That was the level of Russian misery to which Deutscher would have us believe Stalin dragged socialism down. But 10 years later, under Stalin, Dillon revisited the country, and wrote:

Everywhere people are thinking, working, combining. . . . If one could obtain a bird's-eye view of the numerous activities of the citizens of the Soviet Republics one would hardly trust the evidence of one's senses. Nothing like it; nothing approaching it in variety, intensity, tenacity of purpose has ever yet been witnessed. Revolutionary endeavor is . . . fusing heterogeneous elements into . . . a strong people cemented by quasi-religious enthusiasm. . . . The Bolsheviks then have accomplished much of what they aimed at, and more than seemed attainable by any human organization under the adverse conditions with which they have had to cope. They have mobilized well over 150,000,000 of listless dead-and-alive human beings, and infused into them a new spirit.

But here is Deutscher's version of the same country:

The Socialist Man Stalin presented to the world was the hungry, ill-clad, ill-shod or even barefoot, worker or peasant, selling or buying a shirt, a piece of furniture, a few ounces of meat or even a piece of bread on black or gray markets, working 10 or 12 hours a day under a barrack-like factory discipline and, sometimes, paying for any real or alleged offense with years of forced labor in a concentration camp. He did not dare to criticize a factory manager, let alone a party boss.

One does not rejoin with theoretical arguments when, having told Soviet farmers along the Volga as I did last year that one reason Americans don't like communism is the fact that we've never had rulers like Catherine the Great or Stalin, the reply is shot back:

How can you compare Catherine and Stalin? Catherine gave this whole village with all our serf ancestors to one of her favorites. Under Stalin the land belonged to us!

Only a person who has not been to the Soviet Union since the belt-tightening earliest thirties, and conceives the country entirely in his own imagination, can write as Deutscher did in the fall of 1966:

Soviet society has suffered and is still suffering from material scarcity, an extreme scarcity of consumer goods in the first instance, which has over the decades led to an inevitable recrudescence and aggravation of social inequalities, to a deep division between a privileged minority and a deprived majority, to a spontaneous reassertion of the economic forces of the market, and to a revival and a terrifying growth of the oppressive functions of the state.

Extreme scarcity of consumer goods? Edward Crankshaw, a British authority, reported that 1966 was a landmark in world economic history, in that production in the Soviet Union of consumer durable appliances (vacuum cleaners, washing machines, television sets) has for the first time reached the West European level per head of population.

Deep division between a privileged minority and a deprived majority? I spoke last year to the manager of Kiev's equivalent of San Francisco's Golden Gate Park, who is in charge of a staff of 180. The average industrial wage in the USSR is 100 rubles a month. He gets 150. The American worker earns perhaps four times as much as the Soviets. But the head of U.S. Steel gets a salary 50 times as large (not to speak of dividends) as the Soviet cabinet member in charge of the steel industry, which produces more than U.S. Steel.

Social inequalities? I watched a rehearsal last year of a good opera company in a city of substantial size. The cast was in street clothes. Had they been mixed in the crowds I observed all over the country, it would have been impossible to distinguish them, by clothing, carriage, attitude, from any urban worker or housewife under forty, just as it was impossible to tell the stars from the chorus until they stepped out to sing or act. When, in Leningrad, in 1962, I spent every evening for a week talking to passers-by in a neighborhood park it proved impossible to identify them correctly by occupation as manual workers, white collar, professional or whatever, by their levels of knowledge, appearance, or point of view, until I asked point-blank what they did.

"Spontaneous reassertion of the economic forces of the market"? Farmers' markets, where prices are set by supply and demand, accounted in 1964 for 11.7 per cent of the sale of those foodstuffs available in all three types of Soviet outlets: farmers' markets, cooperative stores and government stores. In 1950 they had accounted for 28.7 per

cent. Thus private trade declined very sharply under "revisionist" Khrushchev. In other words, the socialist forms of trade continued to rise, and in 1964 represented 88.3 per cent of sales. Here we are not discussing whether reassertion of the economic forces of the market might not be a useful thing, within the framework of overall planning, now that the period of belt-tightening for reasons of national defense and initial founding of industry is over. We are concerned only with Deutscher's description of the situation as it exists, as contrasted with the facts.

"Revival and terrifying growth of the oppressive functions of the state"? I spent three hours one day last year arguing the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, freedom of dissent, and everything else—in Russian—with a street crowd in front of the brand new, finest hotel in Kiev, which the Intourist people thought was the equivalent of the Waldorf-Astoria. Try that in front of New York's Waldorf-Astoria some day. I did the same thing in the headquarters of a state farm village into which I hiked uninvited, and repeated it under a variety of other circumstances. I might add these situations were entirely unstructured and unprepared.

The Typical Soviet Man

And it is precisely what I learned and felt in these encounters that explains my outrage at Deutscher, particularly the sentence that, more than anything else, prompted me to prepare this rejoinder. He writes:

The typical man of Soviet society, whether under Stalin or his successors, presents so striking a contrast to the Marxist conception of Socialist Man that either we must refuse to consider him as Socialist Man or we must throw the Marxist conception overboard, as the Stalinist school of thought has tacitly done.

I have been to the Soviet Union four times over a span of 35 years, including 1959, 1962 and 1966. In the Soviet Union, I walk the streets and buttonhole people cold, or mix with crowds and listen, or just watch. And, to paraphrase Deutscher, I would say that the typical man of Soviet society, whether under Stalin or his successors, presents so striking a contrast to man as I know him in the United States—a country I deeply love—that either we must consider the superiority of socialism already proved by the kind of new man it has typically produced, or someone must offer an alternative explanation the nature of which I cannot imagine. Could anyone employ, for any non-

socialist country, the language used by the *Look* correspondent who wrote after three weeks in Bratsk, Siberia: "I had come so empty, and I was leaving so full. . . . Finally seeing the answer, the Communist man: happy—happy *here* . . . confident, fulfilled. . . . Happy people, beautiful land." (October 3, 1967, p. 92.)

Soviet cities are crowded, the summers are hot, there is no air conditioning, few cars, and it stays light late due to the Canadian latitude. As a consequence, the streets and beaches swarm, and I estimate that I was physically within shouting distance and sight of hundreds of thousands of people during my stay last year. And so when at the very end of the trip I heard a woman shouting at another in a children's playground, it suddenly struck me that it was the first time in my entire stay that I had heard one human being's voice raised in anger at another, except for the harassed employees of Intourist, which is one of the world's less efficient organizations. And I remembered an interview I taped with three teen-agers I approached as they were lounging on the Moscow River embankment. One of them, a boy of 19, said (this is word-for-word translation of a conversation in Russian):

"We don't have the kind of disorders you do. Ours is a democratic country (demokraticeskii) and therefore we have agencies to look after such matters. You know, in general our people is more attuned—they're not fond of fighting like in your country, the United States." I: "Interesting. What kind of disorders?" He: "Well, you have lots of gansters, hooligans, and such like." I: "You don't have them?" He: "We don't . . . The worst that happens is if a man has been drinking a little, he goes home and that's all: everything is calm and peaceful." I: "That's what I myself have seen." He: "That's a common sight in the Soviet Union. But otherwise there is no disorderly behavior. No murders, thefts, breaking in: it just doesn't happen in our country. We regard this, Russian people regard this as though we would be robbing ourselves."

The boy was not a legal scholar, sociologist, or statistician. Individual crimes of all sorts do happen in the USSR, and the Soviet government passes legislation I regard as entirely too severe, in its exasperation at those it regards as spoiling a perfect record in a country where jobs, education, promotion are available for all. But the boy accurately described the feel of the place.

I have played one of my translated man-in-the-street interview tapes at each session of my Contemporary Soviet Civilization class at the Experimental College at San Francisco State. After several had

been heard, one of my students asked: "They all sound so humanist. Doesn't anyone ever talk in Marxist terms?"

I can't conceive of a more Marxist comment than the one that distinguished between Catherine the Great and Stalin by defining who owned the land under the one ruler and the other. Marxism underlies every word I recorded. But it is precisely the humanism of Soviet man that makes Deutscher's attack so foul. Here are the words of a school teacher from the Cossack village of Veshenskaia, where Sholokov lives. She was one of three adults accompanying a tour from their high school to Moscow, where I ran into them. I had been asking about Vietnam. She: "May I say something about the war?" I: "Yes, yes." She: "I am 34. I have a 5-year-old daughter. During the war, when the fascists were in our place, I was only 9 years old. I know what war is. It is a phenomenon so terrible that I would not want it to happen again anywhere. I can personally picture to myself what the children, the adults, the aged, everybody, is going through in Vietnam. And I would wish for Americans that they do not experience what war is. And we, plain people—you are a father, I a mother—I would not wish for you to have to see your children off to that blood-letting, and I wouldn't want *them* to kill all those children in Vietnam. Those are my wishes."

But that's not a Casper Milequetoast humanism. Here's an exchange with a 19-year-old boy awaiting his induction into the army. I asked: "We have read that at the Party Congress Gen. Yepishev said that in your country a great many are prepared, if necessary, to fight in Vietnam. Well, do you have an opinion on that score?" He: "His opinion is correct, in my view. That is the opinion of all our youth." I: "Do you know such young people yourself?" He: "I would do that myself. That people is small in numbers; it doesn't have the equipment the U.S. has; we must help the weak. Right?"

But if any single thing differentiates Soviet man from man under capitalism, it is his attitude toward society. A 16-year-old boy in another random interview told me that after graduating high school he planned to "enter the Heavy Machinery Institute. Or something along those lines." I: "Interesting. Why that?" He: "Well, our industries are being developed now here in the Soviet Union and our country needs technical men." An 18-year-old on a train on his way to a summer practice project of his building trades high school said he planned to take civil engineering after that. I: "And what particular kind of buildings do you prefer to build." He: "I like to build residential structures, because our people need new houses and

good apartments." *Never* was the answer: "for the money," or even "and besides, it pays well."

How Democracy Is Understood

Finally, on the classic stumbling-block in discussions of the Soviet Union. Do they understand democracy, do they think in its terms as a category? Conversation with a teen-ager: I: "But if our President—" "Johnson." "Johnson. If he does not move to peaceful settlement—" "That is, he is aggressively minded." "Yes." "Then I think that your people has to demand—for it was *you* who voted for the President." "Yes, yes." "You are his electors." "Yes, yes." "You've got to get the message to the President that the American people doesn't want that war in Vietnam. . . . He has *got* to listen to you, to the voices of his electors. He can lose next time when he runs for President."

In another discussion with passers-by, this time including a preponderance of older people, the conversation had reached the same stage, when a woman put in:

"But the people don't decide much. *There*, democracy, in general, isn't as effective as it is with us. For all practical purposes there is no democracy."

I: "You know. Most Americans think the shoe is entirely on the other foot. In our elections, there are either two candidates or more. You have only one. Americans say: well, what kind of democracy can that be with only one candidate?"

Another woman: "What do you mean we put forth only one candidate? Why? We put forth say 10, 7, and then we select one from among these." "You choose one." "One, or two, as the government sets forth. What is this business: propose one, elect one?" Another woman: "The best of the best are nominated, the best of the best. The most worthy are nominated." I asked for examples, and answers came from the whole crowd. Their criteria for good candidates: they come from the working class, they produce more than their plan, they are outstanding pioneering individuals in science, they are leaders of government or Party. Everybody knew and could shout out the names of their representatives in elected bodies of government. Try that on an American crowd sometime.

Socialism—The First Phase of Communism

So much for the morality of Deutscher's address to the 1966 Socialist Scholars' Conference. Now to his knowledge. In the June 1966

Monthly Review he wrote: "The Party Program adopted at the 22nd Congress [1961] has been treated since Khrushchev's downfall almost as a piece of subversive literature." Crap. I have slides of fresh billboards with quotations from that Program up in the most crowded park in Kiev in 1966. It is constantly as authoritative in Soviet journals, as in Zhilin's article, "Improving the Role of the Local Soviets and Advancing the Volunteer Principle in Their Functioning," in the May 1966 issue of *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (*Soviet Government and Law*), or in the lead editorial on the new changes in the Party Rules in No. 7, 1966, of *Kommunist*, the mass-circulation theoretical organ of the Communist Party.

Deutscher either doesn't know or doesn't want his listeners and readers to know that, to Marx and Lenin, there is a very fundamental difference between the socialist and communist stages of post-capitalist society. Deutscher constantly uses the term "Socialist Man," applies to him the environmental circumstances applicable only to "Communist Man," and having erected this man of straw, because no one contends that the communist stage of society exists anywhere, then punches his fist through him.

Here's Deutscher: "By definition, Socialist Man lives in a stateless society. . . . The society in which he lives has to be so highly developed, so wealthy, educated, and civilized that there is no objective need or necessity for it to allow any recrudescence of inequality or oppression. That is what *all* Marxists before Stalin took for granted." (Deutscher's emphasis) Earlier in the same paper: "we maintain that Socialist Man is conceivable only against the background of an unprecedented abundance of material and cultural goods and services. This is the ABC of Marxism."

No. This is why Marx, exasperated by people like that during his lifetime, said: "I do not consider myself a Marxist." Here's what Marx wrote in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* in 1875:

What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, as it *emerges* from capitalist society; which is thus, in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly the individual producer receives back from society—after the deductions have been made [for amortization, expansion, economic and social insurance, administration and public services] exactly what he gives to it. . . . The same amount of labor which he has given to society in one form, he receives back in another. . . .

ON THE OTHER HAND, NOTHING CAN PASS INTO THE OWNERSHIP OF INDIVIDUALS EXCEPT INDIVIDUAL MEANS OF CONSUMPTION . . .

But one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time. . . . This *equal* right [to the proceeds of one's own labor] recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges. . . .

But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural development thereby determined.

In the higher phase of communist society . . . , after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be fully left behind and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. (Italics in original; capitals mine—W. M.)

That's Marx. Lenin quoted the foregoing and then wrote, in *State and Revolution*:

Hence, the first phase of communism cannot produce justice and equality; differences, and unjust differences, in wealth will still exist, but the *exploitation* of man by man will have become impossible, because it will be impossible to seize the *means of production*, the factories, machines, land, etc., as private property.

Like Marx in the earlier work, Lenin understood the psychological factors involved (unlike Deutscher, who talks about Freud in this paper but doesn't say a damn thing about the mental conditions of socialist man). Lenin continues:

If we are not to fall into utopianism, we cannot imagine that, having overthrown capitalism, people will at once learn to work for society *without any standard of right*; indeed, the abolition of capitalism *does not immediately* create the economic prerequisites for *such* a change.

The state will be able to wither away completely when . . . people become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of social life and when their labor is so productive that they will voluntarily work *according to their ability*. "The narrow horizon of bourgeois right," (Marx's phrase—W. M.) which compels one

to calculate with the shrewdness of a Shylock whether he has not worked half an hour more than another, whether he is not getting less pay than another—this narrow horizon will then be left behind.

Lenin had no time schedule. He understood that the question was one of circumstances and development, not dates. He even said, in the same work: "By what stages, by what practical measures humanity will proceed to this higher aim—we do not and cannot know."

Deutscher said that "by definition, Socialist Man lives . . . in a stateless society." But Lenin, having just said that "bourgeois right" or what Deutscher terms "the economic forces of the market" will last until a higher stage no one claims to have attained, then goes on with his searing frankness to speak of the state:

Of course, bourgeois right in regard to distribution of articles of *consumption* inevitably presupposes the existence of the *bourgeois state*, for right is nothing without an apparatus capable of *enforcing* the observance of the standards of right. Consequently, for a certain time not only bourgeois right, but even the bourgeois state remains under communism, without the bourgeoisie!

In a word, the much-commented-upon similarities between Soviet socialism and capitalism, and the Soviet state and the capitalist, occur because they *have* to resemble each other in some respects so long as distribution is in accordance with the quantity and quality of each individual's contribution to society and not with need. When the Soviet Union produces abundance sufficient to distribute in accordance with need, economically this will be communism. The capitalist-type state needed to enforce a principle of distribution inherited from capitalism will no longer be needed, and will be able to wither away. Does this make the USSR a capitalist society today? If so, where are the capitalists? Where is the anarchy and business cycle and unemployment resulting from private ownership of the means of production and overproduction due to exploitation? Capitalism is capitalism; communism is communism; and socialism is a transitional society which, by that very fact, must embody features of both, and does.

* * *

Deutscher says: "I have heard it said, for instance, that the proper subject of my analysis ought to be the Socialist Man living in the USSR or China today. I would take this view only if I held that

those countries have already achieved or that they have nearly achieved socialism. I do not accept this assumption and I do not think that the typical or even the advanced member of Soviet or Chinese society can be described as Socialism Man."

Obviously, by the definition of Marx and Lenin, he is wrong. As far as the typical member of Soviet society is concerned, he is worse than wrong, as I think I have documented. I have never been to China, but I believe he is wrong as far as at least the advanced members of Chinese society are concerned (and I do not identify them with any particular group of leaders). As far as the typical member is concerned, that country has had little more than 15 years.

The conduct of the Soviet Union as a state is that which we have the right to expect of a socialist society. It is the only great power that, by what is now common agreement, is pursuing a policy of peace, while it provides the means for nations to defend their independence and self-determination. What higher tribute can there be to the humanism of socialism? The fact is that today, internally and externally, Soviet society is, all things taken together, the most nearly non-violent mankind has yet produced. For it, the road to nonviolence was through violence against the sources of violence. Dialectics! But Deutscher wouldn't understand.

Everything required for life and human progress is created by labor. Hence every able-bodied man must take part in creating the means which are indispensable for his life and work and for the welfare of society. Anyone who received any benefits from society without doing his share of work would be a parasite living at the expense of others.

It is impossible for a man in communist society not to work, for neither his social consciousness, nor public opinion would permit it. Work according to one's ability will become a habit, a prime necessity of life, for every member of society.

PROGRAM, CPSU

Portrait of a Turncoat

The following is a discussion review of the book *He Who Rides the Tiger*, by Luis Taruc.* This book, published in the name of a man who at one time was a leader in the Philippine national liberation movement, has been chosen for discussion not because its contents merit reading but because a review of its contents provides a vehicle to clarify certain events in the Philippines that have long aroused the concern and the curiosity of Left-wing circles in the United States and elsewhere.

In May, 1954, Luis Taruc surrendered to Philippine government authorities that were engaged, with the indispensable backing of American imperialism, in military suppression campaigns against the Huk movement of which Taruc was a member. This was represented at the time as a victory for counter-insurgency policies of "attraction" propagandized by Ramon Magsaysay, the chosen Filipino instrument of American military agencies, and it came as a shock to people abroad who had heard of Taruc.

How Luis Taruc Became Famous

Taruc had received much of his renown from a book published in his name, *Born of the People* (International Publishers, New York, 1953), which described in autobiographical manner the Philippine peasant movement and the Huk guerrilla movement that was organized to fight Japanese occupation during World War II and was regrouped to fight an armed struggle in the postwar period, to resist brutal imperialist-dictated suppression and to achieve national liberation. The present book, *He Who Rides the Tiger*, was written to repudiate the cause that was eulogized in *Born of the People*.

To understand the Taruc phenomenon, one should perhaps begin with an understanding of the circumstances of the writing of *Born of the People*. In the month of July, 1947, while I was living in the city of Manila, arrangements were made, by representatives of the Huk movement, for me to "go outside" to Central Luzon, where the armed struggle was then in progress, to interview Huk leaders. The interviews were part of research and gathering of materials for a book

*Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967, 188 pp., \$4.95. With a Foreword by Douglas Hyde.

about the Huks, the writing of which had been the motivation for my return to the Philippines after having served there as an American soldier during World War II.

During that time, and during other trips to other sectors of the struggle, I interviewed Luic Taruc, Casto Alejandrino, Vicente Lava, José Lava, Jesús Lava, Mariano Balgos, Celia Mariano (who became my wife in 1948), Peregrino Taruc (brother of Luis), José de Leon (Dimasalang), Sylvestre Liwanag (Linda Bie), Pedro Villegas, Eusebio Aquino, and a large number of others.

With the materials obtained, I sat down to write a book. Originally my intention was to write an objective history of the Huk movement. After two or three chapters, however, it came to me that it would be much more colorful and effective if presented through the eyes and words of one of the Huk leaders. Finally I decided that I would write the book as an "autobiography" of Luis Taruc. This decision was mainly influenced by the fact that Taruc was then being projected as the principal spokesman of the Huk movement.

I proceeded to write the entire manuscript without even submitting an outline to him. It was written during the year 1948, in Manila. Only after the manuscript was completed did I send it to Taruc, via the Huk courier system, for his perusal. He sent it back with his complete unreserved approval, without any rewriting and without any suggested change in presentation. This was the book published in 1953 under the title of *Born of the People*. The only association that Luis Taruc had with the book as such, except his unqualified approval of what it contained, was the fact that his name appeared on the title page and that I had interviewed him, along with others (at which time he did not know, nor did I, that an "autobiography" would result from it).

It is not my desire to be petty or to come forward now with jealous claims of authorship. I was quite prepared to remain unrevealed in the background permanently, as long as Luis Taruc kept faith with his role as a leader of the Huk movement. He has long since broken that faith and left himself open to confrontation with the truth.

Taruc Betrays His People

The circumstances I have related have an interesting bearing, for instance, on the newly published book, *He Who Rides the Tiger*. It is consistent in having been written not by Luis Taruc, but by the man who contributes its introduction, Douglas Hyde, a renegade from the British Communist Party and a one-time employee of the British

Daily Worker, who has since been making his living from anti-Communist writings. While I was confined in the 1950's with other political prisoners in Philippine prisons for involvement in the Huk liberation struggle, Douglas Hyde, by then employed as an anti-Communist "adviser" by the imperialist-concocted Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), visited us in prison and tried to give us "brain-washing" lectures. He was given such a scornful reception that he abandoned the assignment, except in the case of Luis Taruc, who welcomed him in the special separate quarters where he has stayed in the military intelligence compound near Manila, Camp Panopio. As Hyde admits, he lived there for a time with Taruc in order to write this book. At this time, in 1958-59, we were all fully aware that this was going on and that Hyde was writing a book for Taruc (we even knew its tentative title-in-progress, *Born Again*).

Up to the time of his surrender in 1954, Luis Taruc had played an active role in the Filipino working-class movement for nearly 20 years. He had first joined the Socialist Party organized by Pedro Abad Santos in Pampanga province in the early 1930's. When the Socialist Party merged with the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1938 (it had no ideological or programmatic differences with the Communist Party), Taruc became a member of the Political Bureau of the CPP and remained in that post for 15 years, until 1953. During World War II he was chosen to be commander-in-chief of the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon—Army of the Nation Against Japan), the Communist-led guerrilla liberation force. He resumed that post after the war, in 1946, when armed struggle followed the harsh suppression policy of the neo-colonial government to which American imperialism handed independence in that year, but in 1948 he was transferred to supervisory work in one of the Party regional committees (RECO 2, in Central Luzon, which embraced his home province of Pampanga). Casto Alejandrino succeeded him as the Huk military commander. For a time in 1951 Taruc served as Organizational Bureau head in the Party.

What Happened to Taruc

The factors contributing to his surrender were discussed in a document issued by the CPP in 1954, entitled "The Life-Cycle of Careerism," which traced the faults of Taruc from his earliest days in the movement. It pointed to the fact that he had given virtually no attention to theoretical study throughout his membership in the movement and had failed to acquire more than an elementary grasp of

Marxism or of the program of the CPP. This was due in part to laziness, but in the main what was involved was his concept of leadership, which he saw as a matter of personal following: he had built personal relations with comrades and with the masses instead of a relation of political leadership. As one consequence, the Huk armed forces during his time as commander-in-chief had been given almost no political education, a serious weakness which resulted in a surrenderee phenomenon when military suppression became intense. In his own case, his unsound development had resulted in an exaggerated ego that resented criticism, in self-centeredness, and in ambition within the movement carried to the point of careerism. He gloried in being described in the press as "the Supremo" of the Huk movement, although none of the many public statements issued in his name during the struggle were conceived or written by him, but by more competent unpublicized leaders. He resented being removed from military command; he resented being assigned in 1951 to take a post outside his home area in Central Luzon, failing to go to the area assigned; and in particular he resented being overshadowed by other Party leaders like the Lava brothers, José and Jesús.

The CPP document described how Taruc, in 1953, together with his brother Peregrino (a fellow political bureau member) and another leader named Dabu, had circulated a memorandum in Central Luzon proposing an end to the armed struggle. This was done without consulting the Party's leading organ, the Secretariat, and had a plainly factional intent. For this Luis Taruc was deprived of his leading post and suspended from the CPP, and his brother Peregrino, was deprived of his post and expelled from the CPP (as the actual author of the memorandum). They were charged with conscious violations of democratic centralism, with the active organization of a faction, and with capitulationism without dignity in the midst of a sharp struggle.

Peregrino, at the time, accepted discipline and continued to work, in rank-and-file status, in the Huk movement. Dabu admitted his errors and was allowed to remain in the Party. Luis Taruc, however, his ego wounded, refused to accept discipline or criticism and undertook to contact the enemy and to conduct his own personal "peace" negotiations with the Philippine government. These, occurring in February, 1954, at the same time when the newly-elected President Ramon Magsaysay had contacted the Huk leadership to discuss terms of a peaceful settlement of the armed struggle, encouraged the imperialists and their Filipino allies to continue suppression with emphasis on splitting tactics. The CPP thereupon formally expelled Luis

Taruc. In reaction to this, Taruc surrendered.

These facts of Taruc's surrender, understood in the CPP, have not been generally known. It was hoped by many that he would realize his errors and return to the ranks of the working-class movement. Taruc, however, his personal resentment very deep, was looked upon by imperialist and Philippine intelligence agencies as a perfect "defector" instrument, and they played upon his grievances. They promised him early release and assistance in setting up his own movement, but put him in prison in order to exert pressures and influences upon him for future use. At first he was given a 12-year sentence for rebellion, but landlord elements that distrusted his compliance insisted on greater pressures and he was given a life sentence for liquidating a Filipino landlord-collaborator during the Japanese occupation.

These pressures succeeded. At his trial for rebellion, Taruc sought to escape the heavy sentence given all other Huk leaders by reading his own statement to the court bitterly attacking the CPP leaders who had expelled him (especially the Party's general secretary, Jesús Lava, and the comrade who had replaced him as military commander, Casto Alejandrino), and while undergoing trial for the Japanese occupation case he formally joined the Catholic Church to demonstrate his renunciation of Marxist ideas. Step by step he consented to active opposition to the CPP and to the national liberation movement: he agreed to collaborate with Douglas Hyde on the present book, he gave full information on his former comrades to intelligence agencies, he testified against the movement before congressional committees, he repeatedly gave radio and press interviews attacking his former comrades and the cause with which he had been associated.

In his account of his surrender, Taruc tells of a talk that he had with Ramon Magsaysay when he had "come down": "I told him that if I were set free, I would devote myself to the non-Communist peasant movement. . . . The president told me that he could make good use of my services, especially in Central Luzon, as soon as I was freed. I replied that I would always be available for free and voluntary service. . . ." (P. 142.)

There are several key themes in *He Who Rides the Tiger* which indicates how he is to be used (the book, it needs to be emphasized, is published by Frederick A. Praeger, a publishing house often cited as being subsidized by CIA funds):

1. *The avowal by Taruc that he was never an anti-imperialist.*

One of Taruc's difficulties as a turncoat is the existence of the book

Born of the People, with its strong presentation of the national liberation struggle. Desiring to retain, typically, the personal prestige that such a book gives him (he keeps referring to it as "my first book") while having to recant what it says, he now pretends to have written it but disclaims its political content. "I should make clear," he says, "that my earlier book was edited by José Lava, who was then general secretary of the Communist Party of the Philippines" and that "the chapter on imperialism and many other important portions that express the orthodox Communist Party line were inserted into the book without my knowledge." (P. 7.)

This, like virtually all of the "facts" in the book, is an utter falsehood, and it is this slander, intended to discredit leading Filipino Communists, that has impelled me to write the truth. José Lava, a man of great integrity who is now undergoing his 18th year of imprisonment for his unswerving loyalty to the cause of Philippine freedom, neither wrote nor influenced any part of *Born of the People*, as Taruc well knows. Furthermore, the book, as published, including the chapter on imperialism, is identical to the manuscript that I sent to him for his approval in 1948. Subsequently, while living in guerrilla camps with Taruc for many months, I had a bound copy of the manuscript with me which Taruc frequently borrowed for perusal and not once did he ever question or object to a single line of it.

By going out of his way to dissociate himself from, of all things, the chapter on imperialism, Taruc makes transparent his complete sell-out as an imperialist agent. Calling himself now a "democratic nationalist," he says not a single word about American imperialist influence in the Philippines and not a single word of sympathy for the issues raised by Filipino nationalists today to realize their country's aspirations. Instead, this is his stand, right out of the State Department, on today's efforts to shake off imperialist control: "Any nationalist who makes an ally of the Communists is going for a ride on a tiger. We must learn our lessons from the past, and this is one that nationalists need to remember today, when once again the Communists are trying to use them." (P. 21.)

Taruc, in other words, is being employed for both an anti-Communist and an anti-nationalist purpose.

2. *The claim by Taruc that he was never really a Communist and that he disapproved of the movement's tactics.*

In attempting to ingratiate himself with the imperialists and with reactionary Filipino circles, Taruc tries to make it appear that he re-

mained a mere "socialist" after the merger of the Communist and Socialist Parties in 1938: "The long-range purpose of this merger did not succeed. Most of the Socialist Party leaders and most of the rank-and-file members did not become ideological Communists. I was never 'Bolshevized.'" (Pp. 5-6.) This is another completely false statement. No such issue and no such division ever existed in the Philippine Communist Party. For example, Taruc's own brother, Peregrino, who also came from the old Socialist Party, was the head of the Educational Department of the CPP, in charge of educating cadres in Marxist-Leninist principles. Casto Alejandrino was also a former Socialist Party leader.

Taruc has simply invented an excuse for his renegacy. In doing so, he has endeavored to set the stage 1) for his leadership of a hoped-for anti-Communist movement, and 2) for the torturous efforts, which occupy most of *He Who Rides the Tiger*, to explain away how he could have held a top-ranking post in the Philippine movement for 15 years without agreeing with its ideas or its policies.

Claiming that "I am by nature a pacifist" (p. 29), this one-time military commander of the Huks asserts that he was always in favor of "peaceful" and "humane" methods and in opposition to his "ruthless" comrades. Why didn't he openly oppose the 1948 decisions to intensify the national liberation armed struggle? "I was unable to support my position with impressive theoretical dissertations, high-sounding and authoritative Marxist quotations, facts and references," he says, while the "Bolshevik Marxist-Leninist Stalinists . . . had come from bourgeois families, had personal and social ties to the privileged classes, and so were familiar with such subjects." (P. 51.)

Where was his voice when the CPP leadership in January 1950, in a meeting in which he participated, called formally for the overthrow of the Philippine imperialist-puppet regime and defined the next two years as the period for the preparation for the final blow? "For the sake of Party unity," he says, "I joined the majority in the unanimous decision." (P. 74.) Why did he not make his alleged opposition to this known to his comrades? ". . . if I pursued that point too hard, I would put the general secretary in an awkward position. And I would have all the time I needed during the two years of preparation to prove to our comrades of the Secretariat and the Politburo that my contentions were right." (P. 77.) (I was with Taruc during those years and never heard him utter anything except active support for the policy.)

In 1951 a CPP Central Committee meeting, held in the Sierra Madre

mountains, reaffirmed and reiterated the objectives and the tactics of the armed struggle for national liberation. Taruc, who attended this and made reports to it, is hard put to explain why he did not express his alleged opposition at this conference. It was, says the "pacifist," because of an earlier enemy surprise attack in which "I lost my gun. . . . In losing my gun without a fight, I felt I had 'lost face' and, with it, my will to pursue my opposition to the 1950 PB resolutions." During the conference, "my 'lost face' and tattered pride kept me from participating in the discussions, and so I had no part in the formulation of the 1951 CC Resolutions." (P. 92.) (Perhaps it was his "tattered pride" which also caused him to accept re-election at this same conference not only to the Political Bureau of the CPP but to be head of the Party's Organizational Bureau, the key post for implementing the resolutions adopted.)

This farcical account of Taruc's career in the national liberation movement is designed to enable him to make attacks on the Lava brothers (José and Jesús), on Casto Alejandrino, and on other devoted and incorruptible Filipino Communist leaders, and to set himself up "for free and voluntary service" as a "humane socialist" against the "ruthless Bolsheviks." This is the best that he and the intelligence agent Hyde could do to disentangle him from the Huk past and to give him a platform for his planned anti-Communist role, in which, he says, he will work for "some form of Christian democratic socialism." (P. 6.)

3. *The declared aim of Taruc to project himself as a peasant leader.*

The concluding chapter of *He Who Rides the Tiger*, to which the book leads, states a program of "agrarian reform" that clearly indicates the "service" that Taruc is to give. "The Philippines," he says, "needs a healthy, militant, democratic outlet for the legitimate protests of the poor. . . . Without a militant democratic movement, revolution will remain an ever-present possibility and the Communists will have their job made easy for them. . . . A positive, democratic answer to the problems that gave rise to the recent rebellion still has to be found. Once such an answer has been found, the specter of Communism will be banished from our land." (P. 182.)

In the "answer" that he presents, Taruc says not one word about the core of any real agrarian reform program in the Philippines, with its semi-feudal peasant-landlord relations: the expropriation of large estates and their distribution to peasants. After vaguely referring to the slogan of "land for the landless" (which is freely bandied about

even by the most reactionary Filipino politicians), he gets down to cases and specifies that "a minimum amount of land" be guaranteed to the peasant. The amount?—"100 square meters for his exclusive use, where he can erect his house, grow vegetables and fruit, keep poultry, etc." (P. 186.) Otherwise the Taruc program is padded out with urging lower rent, irrigation, fertilizer and "government advice." Bourgeois nationalists in the Philippines go much further.

For his "genuinely democratic organization" for the peasants, Taruc suggests that "Catholic lay organizations might serve as models to provide a spiritual foundation for what might otherwise be a pursuit of purely material ends. Such organizations might make the program more stable and productive and prevent the growth of materialism." (P. 187.) Or of peasant unions or another Huk movement.

This new product of the defector school of literature throws some light on the tactics that American imperialism is shaping for the Philippines. *He Who Rides the Tiger* fits into a pattern of moves to contend with the heightening anti-imperialist feeling among the Filipino people, and with their increasing readiness for mass struggle after having recovered from the period of brutal suppression of the Huk movement.

Taruc's "Usefulness" Today

Along with organized worker and student action in Manila and other cities, peasant unions have sprung up once again, like the Malayang Samahang Magsasaka (MASAKA) that has rapidly spread in Central Luzon in the past two years. Parallel to this has been the growth of bourgeois nationalist forces that desire a loosening of the American imperialist grip on the Philippine economy: in November 1967, preliminary talks began on replacing the present Laurel-Langley colonial-style trade agreement with the United States, and Filipino businessmen have accompanied them with agitation for friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The time for Taruc's "usefulness" to imperialism has now arrived. A year ago his prison sentence was commuted to a much lower term, putting him within the range of being pardoned. Petitions for his pardon are currently being pressed. This book's publication is part of the build-up for his release as an anti-Communist agent in schemes to contend with and to suppress liberation forces.

Both major political parties in the Philippines, the Liberal and the Nacionalista, have become increasingly discredited, and as popular movements revive, imperialist strategists have been creating another

political grouping to hold in reserve. They have had their ally in Catholic Church circles, particularly the Jesuits, who have long been ambitious to build a party that would capture the Leftward trend. In the past they tried to step into the vacuum left by the outlawing of peasant and labor unions during the Huk struggle, by organizing a Federation of Free Workers and a Federation of Free Farmers, but both bodies were rejected by workers and peasants because of their Right-wing character.

It is to be hoped that the new "alternative" will have a more "progressive" sound. One of its architects is a former senator with a Jesuit schooling, Raul Manglapus, who ran as candidate for president in 1965 for a Progressive Party, which had the backing of the wing of Catholic hierarchy influenced by the Jesuits. He made a poor showing because of a program that tried to avoid issues, simply hoping to benefit from mass disillusion with the two major parties. Manglapus has learned from that experience and has now come out with opposition to Philippine involvement in the American war in Vietnam, has urged friendly relations with socialist countries, and has announced that he is in favor of "democratic socialism."

For several years it has been openly discussed in the Philippine press that Raul Manglapus (as well as one of his political associates, Senator Manuel Manahan) has been a CIA agent. These men were part of the entourage in the early 1950's of the self-styled "American boy," Ramon Magsaysay, used as the front man for the imperialist-directed anti-Huk campaigns. Today, it is apparent, the imperialists are fashioning a less expensive, more subtle technique of siphoning off the militancy of the masses with a Left-sounding reactionary movement.

It is here that the useful "services" of Luis Taruc are to be employed. The recruitment of Taruc into the Catholic Church in prison and his espousal of "Christian democratic socialism" have their meaning in this context. The CIA-subsidized *He Who Rides the Tiger* was released at the same time that Manglapus began advocating his own "democratic socialism." Taruc is being groomed as the mass leader among the peasantry for a movement made in the State Department.

There are other ramifications of the plan. In Central Luzon, especially in Pampanga, former Huk elements who deserted the Communist-led movement have turned to banditry and criminal acts. These to a large extent are the elements played up in the imperialist press as a "revival of the Huk movement" (although there are genuine, principled armed peasant detachments). Some of the bandits are em-

ployed by American military forces to guard the fuel pipeline between Clark Air Base in Pampanga and the naval base at Subic Bay. They also hire themselves out to the politicians of either party for election campaign purposes.

Taruc, in interviews in the Manila press, has declared that he could win these elements over to his leadership and has urged that a "selective amnesty" be given to them on his recommendation. This would provide Taruc with an armed force with which to impose his "leadership" on the Central Luzon peasantry, and with which to murder and terrorize Communists and other militant peasant leaders.

It is apparent that the Communist Party of the Philippines, outlawed under a vicious Anti-Subversion Law that provides the death penalty for Party leaders, is to be kept illegal while Taruc and his fellow renegades are given the freedom to do the dirty work of American imperialism.

In the meantime, José Lava, Jesús Lava, Casto Alejandrino and many other Communist and mass organization leaders are kept in prison, many having been confined for over 17 years with sentences of death and of life imprisonment. These are the true leaders born of the Filipino people, who have remained firm and loyal to the cause of liberation while the Tarucs have sold out. It is time that the allies everywhere of the Philippine liberation movement extend their support and effective aid to help them gain their freedom and take their places in the coming struggles of the Filipino people.

. . . one of the chief ideological weapons for bringing white skilled workers to understand where their real interests lie, is to make them aware of the danger that the bosses may use differences between black and white workers to destroy unions altogether. White Americans in general and white workers in particular must also come to understand that the growing attack against the Negro in the ghettos should be a warning signal to them, too. The bell also tolls for them. If the government and ultra-Right forces succeed in creating a race war in the country the aftermath could well be a police state in which no one would have any rights, and the AFL-CIO could be replaced by a fascist labor front.

Claude Lightfoot, *Black Power and Liberation*, pp. 42-43.

EARL LAWRENCE

Black Power and New Politics

Many articles have already been written analyzing the New Politics Convention. The capitalist press, of course, has tried to minimize the significance of the gathering and to sow confusion on what really took place. What emerges, despite the slander and libel, is the recognition that this Convention represents an important ideological and organizational trend in the country opposed to war and racism. Beneath the expressed differences on tactics and in the understanding of the source of oppression and war, there was a common bond among all the delegates calling for a change in American foreign policy, for identification with the struggle for Negro liberation and for social change of a more fundamental character.

It is important to understand that this convention was something new in our country. There have been many attempts to bring together the various ideological currents reflected in the struggles for freedom and peace. The conditions of exploitation, the reac-

* We are printing two discussion articles on the New Politics Convention held in Chicago over Labor Day. We urge other participants of the convention to send in their comments.

tionary foreign policy and the widespread racism have brought into being many organizations and groupings across the nation which are attempting to effect basic changes in our society. To forge unity of purpose among these organizations and individuals is a very difficult task, but one that must be accomplished. Both the struggle for peace and the struggle for Negro freedom are objectively anti-imperialist struggles. Sooner or later they must merge into a unified struggle against U.S. imperialism.

To seek political alternatives to the war policy of the present administration and to mobilize the peace and freedom sentiment into a positive political force is a key task for all progressive and freedom-loving people. This needs to be developed on the basis of the existing level of understanding and organization of the American masses. Therefore, it is essential seriously to examine the features of the present liberal-labor-Negro coalition in order to develop new approaches and new directions for the struggle.

The Black Caucus

The fact that there were many different approaches to the strug-

gles for freedom and peace at the convention is not disturbing. That, in my opinion, was healthy. No one grouping represented at the convention could take the position that it alone reflected most accurately the level at which the American people could best be mobilized for achieving these objectives.

In the pre-convention debate around tactical positions, three main trends became evident. One was the concept of the immediate development of a third party. A second called for a peace and freedom ticket in 1968—a course supported by the Communists in attendance. A third argued that the existing coalition of progressive forces was not strong enough for such an election thrust in 1968, and therefore a year of organizing at the grass roots was essential.

However, no estimate in the pre-convention debate took cognizance of a fourth ideological position which, in fact, became the most decisive in determining the outcome of the convention. This was the position of “non-involvement with New Politics” reflected in the Black Caucus. This could be classified as “participatory non-involvement,” since it called not for staying away from the Convention but for participation in its deliberations in an effort to convince the Negro delegates:

1. That identification with the coalition represented by New Politics was premature because it did not have an organized electoral base in the white communities.

2. That the black community was not sufficiently organized to participate as equals in any larger coalition.

3. That political activity in the ghettos should be decided solely by black people, hence participation in a coalition dominated by white middle-class elements would tend to dilute the militancy of the black freedom movement.

The material basis for this trend deserves some consideration in our analysis.

The Negro Freedom Struggle

The convention itself was preceded by several events that had a very serious impact on the black communities. Since World War II, the Negro freedom struggle in the country has taken on mass proportions: literally millions of Negroes have moved from the status of onlookers to that of active participants in the struggles. This movement has also been effective in pushing larger sections of the white community to activity. However, it must be noted that significant forces in the white community, particularly the white workers, have not responded sufficiently to this struggle.

To give a balanced picture of the participation of the white workers, it is necessary to include the important statements and resolutions passed at various labor conventions which identified with the Negro people's struggle for freedom and democracy; the financial contributions to the freedom movement by organized labor; the participation of some local unions,

even though limited, in the voter-registration drives and similar demonstrative activities in the South. However, as Henry Winston stated in his press release of November 6, 1967, "The failure of most white Americans, including large sections of the white working class and liberal and progressive forces, to understand the desperate nature of the crisis in the ghettos and to ally themselves with the black people in their struggle for the necessary radical changes to resolve the crisis, has resulted in an increasing lack of confidence in the ability of the white masses to overcome racism and their readiness to join with black people in the fight for meaningful solutions."

It is necessary, also, to take into account the ghetto's estimate of what the massive demonstrative activities of the past few years have accomplished. Literally thousands of demonstrations have taken place across the country which highlighted the fight of the Negro people. These demonstrations were composed primarily of Negro people, but did include thousands of liberal and progressive white Americans as well. But they have not substantially changed the racist policy of the power structure. The Administration's "war on poverty" has been exposed as a farce in the black community, as it has elsewhere. The conditions of the poor have not improved but have considerably worsened, especially in the black ghettos. This is particularly true of Negro youth. In employ-

ment, education, jobs, health and welfare, a crisis exists for the young people in the ghetto.

The escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the consequent growing repression of the civil rights and peace movements, have also had a tremendous impact on the black community. The hypocrisy of American capitalism is further exposed when large numbers of Negro youth—deprived of freedom and security at home—are drafted to fight and die for "freedom" thousands of miles away, in far-off Vietnam.

This does not mean that any large numbers of the Negro people already recognize that capitalism is the source of their misery, the source of war, poverty and racism. The Negro people are not yet demanding the replacement of capitalism by another system. In the main they demand reforms and concessions that would give them a more equitable share in the affluent white society. When, however, these minimum demands are not met, and their non-violent struggles are brutally repressed, there develops a clearer understanding of the character of American society. It is this that has given rise to the various ideological tendencies and trends reflected in the movements and organizations in the Negro community.

The Ghetto Revolts

The American ruling circles have done more than ignore the demands of the Negro freedom struggle. They have consciously

taken steps to suppress, to confuse and even to corrupt that movement. Two developments in recent years have had particular impact on the ghetto, especially among the Negro youth. One was the disfranchisement of the people of Harlem, when Congressman Adam Clayton Powell was forced out of his chairmanship of the House Labor and Education Committee and deprived of his seat in Congress. This event, which the liberal-labor coalition failed to challenge in any meaningful way, had a demoralizing effect on large sections of the Negro people. They saw in this racist attack an attempt to wipe out even the limited gains made in Negro representation in Congress and other legislative bodies. To the Negro people this was a decisive battle, for Adam Clayton Powell represented black power. When he was stripped of his power, limited as it was, this was interpreted as an attack on the very idea of black power.

This was equally true when Muhammad Ali was stripped of his heavyweight boxing crown. Muhammad Ali was not just another world heavyweight champion. He represented the aspirations and the needs of Negro youth for identity, self-confidence and dignity. In addition, his refusal to fight in a genocidal war against another colored people enabled others to understand that the Vietnamese people were themselves seeking dignity, self-respect and the right to determine their own destiny. They saw in the vindictive reprisals against Muham-

mad Ali the repression of the right to dissent as well. One must note again that the attack on Muhammad Ali received limited response from the white liberals and was met with almost complete silence by the organized labor movement.

These two events were not the only factors which helped to give rise to certain new ideological trends in the Negro community. But because of the national prominence of these two individuals, the impact was national in scope, and played a specific role in the rise of these ideological trends. Such efforts of the ruling class to suppress the people's march for freedom have given rise to a heightened consciousness among sections of the Negro people of the role they must assume in achieving liberation.

It is no accident that in many Northern ghettos new Negro working people's organizations have sprung up that deal specifically with the immediate problems facing the Negro masses. There are welfare organizations, tenants' unions, unemployment councils, community unions and others, all concerned with grass roots participation in the struggle for Negro freedom. These organizations are led mainly by young Negro working men and women. They reflect directly the community base of organized resistance to oppression.

In addition, there have come into being organizations directed toward "revolutionary" solutions to the problems of Negro oppression. While not openly advocat-

ing violent revolution, these organizations feel that this oppression must be overcome mainly by Negroes, even if it means armed revolt.

Of special importance have been the sweep of ghetto rebellions in many Northern cities and the significant Black Power Conference in Newark, New Jersey, with more than a thousand black delegates in attendance. It is regrettable that these events have not been sufficiently discussed in our movement. As a result, many conclusions reached are superficial and even erroneous. Had a scientific examination been made of these events, some of the trends reflected at the New Politics Convention would have been anticipated and Communists could have played a more meaningful role in the ideological discussions that took place.

The Slogan of Black Power

What was reflected at the Newark Black Power Conference? I am not going to detail the many fine resolutions that came out of it. Rather, I want to focus on the new level of identity and unity of purpose around the slogan of black power. At the conference this slogan represented a determination of the Negro people to exert a direct influence in all decision-making bodies that affect their community. It was a rejection of the values and standards that the white society established for black people. It was an attempt to make clear that black people, once and for all, must make

their own decisions, determine the direction of *their* struggle for *their* freedom.

It was not a slogan that negates the necessity for united action, for coalitions, and for identification with freedom-loving peoples all over the world. It was not a rejection of Negro-white unity; it was a slogan that laid primary emphasis on the development of black consciousness, the unity of the Negro masses as a prerequisite for meaningful coalitions with white Americans. This ideological trend, therefore, must not be distorted and lumped into the general category of petty-bourgeois Negro nationalism. It has to be seen as a new positive phenomenon and evaluated in a Marxist-Leninist spirit.

A word on black nationalism in 1967 is in order. Marxists have always held that Negro nationalism arises in part from the material base—the conditions of Negro life in this country. It is a reaction to racism, to ghetto life and to rejection by white society. That is correct, but it is not sufficient today. Nationalist ideas, having arisen from this material base, in their turn exercise an influence on the course of social development. If the ideas *correspond* to the current needs of social life, sooner or later they reach the consciousness of the broad masses, becoming their own ideas and welding them into a single mighty army, inspired by a single aim and will. The emphasis is on the ideas that *correspond to the current needs of social life*. Reaction-

ary ideas—such as the anti-white, non-coalition approach, or the backward ideas on the role of women—must be combatted. But this has nothing in common with the nationalism which is a positive phenomenon in the black freedom movement. As Frederick Douglass said: "He who desires freedom must strike the first blow." The dominant ideas reflected in the black power slogan do correspond to the current need of social life in this country.

Many of the black leaders who have rallied around the black power slogan recognize the necessity for participating in coalitions, winning allies for the Negro freedom movement, and for identification with the struggle for peace. However, they emphasize that the freedom movement can participate in these coalitions most effectively when their participation is based on strength within their own communities. They are working in this direction.

Unity in the Black Caucus

It is from this standpoint that we should examine what took place at the New Politics Convention. Representing the Negro communities were sizeable delegations from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the Southwest Georgia project, the black student movement, SNCC and CORE. The issue that dominated the initial stages of the deliberations of the Black Caucus was whether black people

should participate in a coalition with white liberals, who in the main represented the middle-class white community. This was debated back and forth for many hours. But it was not simply a numerical vote which finally decided that the Negro delegates would participate in the convention.

A unified position took shape in the Black Caucus in this initial stage on the following: 1) the Convention Steering Committee had been remiss in the involvement of black people in the preparation of the convention; 2) the Convention Preparations Committee was remiss in involving black people in the mobilization for, and administration of, the convention; and 3) regardless of tactical differences, black people must play a more decisive decision-making role in all aspects of American life. This unified position overshadowed the differences on tactics, on attitudes to white Americans, on the sources of oppression and the evils of capitalism. There was a common acceptance of the need to inject the deliberations of the black people into the decisions of the convention. Thus, the content of the black power slogan infected all delegates, and became a positive element in activating the Black Caucus at the convention.

Many questions were debated in the Black Caucus, some directly related to New Politics as a movement, others, more significantly, on the direction of the struggle for socialism in this country.

Racism and the White Workers

One speech by a SNCC leader pointed to the betrayal of the black liberation movement by the labor-liberal-Negro coalition, citing the compromise at the 1964 Democratic Party Convention at Atlantic City on the seating of the delegation from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, sponsored by trade union and liberal delegates who participated in the negotiations. He included Reverend Martin Luther King as part of that coalition. Defining black power as the unity of the black community in the fight for the political and economic control of the ghetto, this leader stressed that there can be no meaningful coalition unless the black community negotiates and participates from a position of strength. At the same time he pointed to capitalism as the source of oppression and spoke for revolution as a solution to the problems of the Negro masses.

In light of such ideological trends in the black community, it is necessary for us critically to examine how we project the need for Negro-white unity. Our correct class analysis of society sees the working class as the most progressive force in capitalist society, the leading force in the struggle for socialism. Today, however, the organized labor movement is crippled by bureaucratic, corrupt leadership that is tied to the Johnson Administration and pursues class-collaborationist policies to the detriment of its own members.

This leadership, too, is a barrier to the development of a meaningful Negro-labor alliance and the mobilization of the white workers, not only in the struggle for Negro rights but in the struggle for their own economic, social and political needs. It is axiomatic in Marxism, that the struggle for the freedom of oppressed people, is in the self-interest of the working class. In the United States today racism is a large factor that prevents the working class from fulfilling its historic role. The failure to struggle against racism among the white workers weakens their ability to liberate themselves and makes it possible for the ruling class to continue the exploitation of the entire working class—Negro and white.

In the past few years the white workers have reacted negatively to the policies of the Johnson Administration, which has exerted pressures on the working class to support the war in Vietnam, accept high taxes and rising prices, and forego wage increases. The working class—both Negro and white—has not succumbed to these pressures. On the contrary, we witness the spread of a powerful strike movement for improved working conditions and higher wages. But this increased militancy of the white workers has not spilled over into the struggle against racism. There is little if any recognition that divisions within the working class, fostered by racism, prevent the working class from realizing its full potential. A key ideological task,

therefore, is to convince the working class that it is in its self-interest to identify with the struggle for Negro rights and to abolish discrimination within the ranks of the labor movement.

Impact of Negro Freedom Struggle

But it is just as important to recognize that the struggle for Negro freedom is a decisive factor in determining how the working class will play its leading role in the developing struggles. At this historic moment the Negro question is the Achilles heel of U.S. capitalism, exposing the contradictions of capitalist society. It confronts the ruling class with two clear alternatives: either it must suppress this national freedom movement or give in to it. It cannot ignore it, for the freedom struggle can no longer be stopped. Therefore, the ruling class, if it is to exist as a ruling class, is compelled to suppress this movement. The superexploitation of the Negro masses, the racism that results from and is perpetuated by this system, is now threatened by the black freedom movement at home and the national liberation movements of the world. It is today a mass anti-imperialist phenomenon which requires the support of every anti-imperialist, anti-fascist element in the world. If imperialism is to continue and guarantee its profits, it must at all costs suppress this movement. And it will make every effort to do so by every means available to it—

subversion, repression, fascist-like violence, libels, slander, anti-Communism, and FBI and CIA infiltration.

The struggle for Negro freedom under the concept of black power is creating conditions which objectively compel a change in the relationship of forces in the country, irrespective of the ideological level of the white working class at this moment. In my opinion it is incorrect, in 1967, to place as a prerequisite for the setting forth of advanced slogans by the Negro freedom movement a "certain" level of Negro-white-labor unity. What the black power concept connotes is that a conscious organized force can be created in the black community that will have an impact on the labor movement, and force it to face up to its responsibility, as the elections in Gary and Cleveland show.

This, I contend, in no way contradicts the Marxist-Leninist tenet that the working class is the most advanced force in capitalist society. I am mindful, even if others tend to forget it, that the Negro masses are part of this working class, and this in itself gives added strength to the power of the entire class. What I am suggesting is that the social forces necessary to ultimately defeat U.S. capitalism are strengthened by the Negro freedom movement—with its large working-class component—which, because it is objectively anti-imperialist, can be a major factor in impelling the entire working class to assume its leading role in the struggles of today

and in the struggle for socialism tomorrow.

That does not mean, of course, that white Communists and progressives are freed from their primary responsibility of combatting chauvinism in the ranks of the white workers and mobilizing them for the Negro freedom struggle and their own economic and social needs. Rank-and-file movements are needed to challenge the reformist, class-collaborationist leadership of the labor movement. Yet, I want to underscore: the black liberation movement cannot wait for this development. It must expand and intensify its struggle for freedom and in the process will, in my opinion, help create the conditions to accelerate the understanding among the white workers of their need to identify themselves with the Negro freedom movement and come into head-on collision with their reformist, reactionary leadership, for their own survival. Objectively, therefore, the black freedom movement, in this immediate period, is a revolutionary catalyst to set in motion all the class forces that will eventually bring socialism into being.

Need of Defining Main Enemy

Another ideological question that was debated in the Black Caucus was whether the Negro people could achieve their freedom under capitalism. It is interesting to note that this question was raised not by black Communists but by a leader of CORE. While he made no particular ref-

erence to socialism he dealt in considerable detail with the evils of capitalism. As a result many of the participants in the discussion constantly referred to "the system" as being the source of the problem. However, their definition of "the system" was not clear. It failed to treat with its class character. The system in the main became the system of jim crow. Therefore the leaders of the various civil rights organizations did not employ the term "the system" in a Marxist-Leninist sense. Clarity on this question is important because it helps to establish that the main enemy of the Negro people is also the main enemy of the working class.

The need of defining the main enemy is related to the consistency and character of the struggle for Negro freedom. For, in spite of the many weaknesses and mistakes of the white-liberal coalition represented at the New Politics Convention, it would be a fundamental error to center the main struggle against this coalition in order to advance the struggle for Negro freedom. If serious progress is to be made in the direction of social change, it is necessary to register criticisms where weaknesses exist in the coalition, but only within the context of elevating the understanding of all progressive-minded people that the source of war, poverty, exploitation and racism is U.S. imperialism. Any approach to developing ideological clarity must begin with directing the main fire against it. Yet it is important to emphasize that the

struggle, as well as the understanding of the masses, will develop in stages. Each stage of struggle, each united front action, must help to create new levels of consciousness and understanding, and lead to coalitions characterized by greater clarity as to the main enemy and how to overcome it.

There was much discussion at the convention and within the Black Caucus about "revolution." The use of this term in itself means little. Often it is used to cover up the complicated and difficult path of struggle in this country to achieve final victory over capitalism. But any discussion of revolution in the America of 1967 that is devoid of a class content is basically meaningless. There is the need for a bolder ideological struggle on this question within the rising radical movement of today.

But this is particularly true in the black community. Many leaders of black organizations speak quite openly of the necessity for revolutionary changes in our society. Some even refer to the need for the overthrow of capitalism. But when this talk of revolution makes no distinction between the white power structure and the white population but in fact describes the struggle as one against white America it becomes particularly dangerous. In fact, if the black community were to adopt the position that the enemy is all white America, that there can be no relations with any whites, then this is playing into

the hands of the ruling class, who utilize racism to maintain division among those whose unity is indispensable. The racist ruling class is not upset by such "revolutionary" talk, since it can only lead to confusion and disorganization, to a weakening of the unity of those whose common enemy is the same ruling class.

Therefore, there must be a struggle to identify the black liberation movement with the class struggle, with the struggle for socialism. A tremendous responsibility rests on the shoulders of black Communists to help bring this clarity to the black liberation movement. This is essential to prevent the movement from being sidetracked, aborted or destroyed by an ideology which can only serve the interests of the ruling class.

Role of Negro Youth

A significant feature of the new developments in the black freedom movement is the leadership displayed by black youth—men and women. There is no question that today the black youth are in the forefront in every phase of the struggle, showing the tremendous ferment that exists in the ghettos. They are not building separate youth movements as such, but consider themselves leaders in the black freedom movement as a whole. Many are very new to the freedom movement; others have experienced the last five or six years of struggles both in the North and South and have suffered many physical and mental

hardships imposed by the powers-that-be.

After years of struggle without a firm ideological direction, some have become demoralized while others concluded that the only solution to Negro freedom is armed insurrection directed against the white masses. Certainly Marxists should understand the appearance of this phenomenon especially among young people who have been rebuffed, kicked, abused, bitten by dogs, shot at, maimed and tortured by the police, and who have not seen a rising indignation among the white working class against this system of racism and oppression. Thus they fail to make a distinction between the white masses and the role of the power structure; nor do they understand the class nature of society.

But the present young generation in the black communities has become a social factor to be reckoned with. They cannot be influenced merely by talk and polemics, although black Communists have the responsibility to deal with the question of what revolution means and how freedom for the Negro people can be attained in our country. Most important of all, these young people have to be convinced in action, shown that the white workers and other progressive whites can be won for a struggle against racism and for identification with the rights of the Negro people. Furthermore, they have to see in life that coalitions and struggles within the black community can secure mean-

ingful results, while showing them how socialism will establish true freedom and equality.

These young people have embraced the concept of black power with a fervor that is unparalleled in the history of the black communities. Many of them have become serious students of Negro history; have begun to read the writings of Marx, of Malcolm X, and even the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung," and avidly read the speeches of Stokeley Carmichael and others.

The 13-Point Proposal

After the defeat of the disruptive elements in the Black Caucus, who had been fighting for non-participation in the convention, the Caucus then discussed the basis upon which participation was possible. This lengthy discussion led to the adoption of the 13-point proposal for presentation to the convention. The 13-point proposal made crystal clear that the black delegates would not participate in this convention in the old way; that a new atmosphere for participation was essential that included the following major elements:

1. That the concept of black power is a meaningful political reality in the United States today and that the future of the country depends on the attitude taken toward the struggle for Negro freedom.
2. That all questions facing the country are related to the struggle for Negro freedom.
3. That the unity of the black

community is an essential prerequisite for the realization of social change.

4. That the black people will do more than just participate in developments that are concerned with their problems; that they will determine their own destiny, the direction of black liberation.

The essence of the 13-point proposal meant that the black delegates intended to play a decisive role in determining the outcome of all important questions, influencing the direction the convention would take. The Black Caucus placed the adoption of the 13 points as the condition for their participation in the convention, insisting that these were not debatable and could not be altered by the convention as a whole. This represented something new. In fact, the Black Caucus was saying to the liberal coalition represented at the convention that if we are to join with you, you must understand that our freedom is not a debatable question, that we, the black people, will determine the conditions of our struggle. While there have been black caucuses organized in the labor movement and at various Right-led conventions and gatherings, at no time before were conditions placed for the participation of black delegates. Thus, this was something new in the American political scene.

It should be added that most of the black delegates were of the

opinion that their 13-point proposal would be rejected. It is to the credit of the white Communist delegates at the convention that the 13-point proposal was adopted, for they presented the major ideological arguments for a significant role of the Negro people in any political development within the country.

Clearly, those white delegates who voted for the 13 points on the ground that it was necessary to maintain the black delegates at the convention "at any cost" were wrong in my opinion. But there were white delegates who voted not only because they agreed with the 13 points, but because they recognized that no program is possible without the participation of the black communities and that such participation demanded a new level of black-white unity. Only those who voted with this understanding, fully grasped what the Black Caucus attempted to convey.

The New Politics movement that emerged from the Convention has many serious questions to consider in the follow-up of its deliberations. The resolutions finally adopted, if correctly implemented, can help to rally important sections of the Negro people and the working class. Above all, it has the task of mobilizing the masses to stop the vicious, racist war machine in the period ahead, and provide the people with an alternative to the present administration in Washington.

A First Reaction to the New Politics Convention

The Chicago convention of the National Conference for New Politics is difficult to put in focus. It is no easy task to sort out what was done and what remains to be done. But, since many of us had definite ideas about the role of the convention in the development of an independent political movement in the country, we must try to draw the important lessons in good time.

Anti-Imperialist Unity

Development of a political perspective for "1968 and Beyond" was the central task posed to the convention by its organizers, but the convention was preoccupied with an issue in which this question was only implicit. That issue was the clarification of the character of a revitalized Left in this country and the terms on which unity could be obtained among important potential elements of this Left.

The convention resolved this issue in a very clear fashion. Unity between the major constituencies in attendance was possible only with a program and perspective that were categorically anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist, with a style and spirit that emphasized revolution, and with an organizing focus on the development of local, grass-root centers of power. Thus, this would be the nature of

the movement if there was to be one.

It is true that important groupings within the convention did not agree, but they were morally and politically on the defensive, since they had no persuasive alternatives. Despite basic disagreements, few people from SANE, Massachusetts PAX, WISP, etc., left the convention and, indications are, that if the rest of the new political coalition can stay together, they will stick as well. The important fact is that there is really no other place for them to go.

One could easily go overboard with this analysis. The atmosphere at the convention was conducive to revolutionary posing and the passage of radical resolutions. There is no doubt that a good many delegates will have trouble explaining what they did when they get back home. There was a scarcity of concrete proposals to implement the radicalism. Still the basic fact remains that the only possibility for any durable unity among the diverse groups and individuals at the convention was on the basis of an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist movement.

It seems to me that the delegates representing the Communist Party expected something quite different from the Chicago

gathering. They conceived that it would lead to a movement with a permanent independence of the two-party system, oriented towards electoral activity and focusing around an independent presidential ticket in 1968. The movement would be an updated version of the Negro-labor-liberal alliance with a strong Left component, with some organizational muscle and with a program that had a broad appeal. Its strategic direction would be towards a popular-based reform coalition—a third party. Not that this was necessarily what we wanted; it was what we felt would unify the basic constituencies in attendance.

Apparently, some thought that the new movement would still be guided by people with the old concepts of political pluralism with its baggage of assumptions about interest groups, voting blocs, and the above-class nature of state power. To put things in a different framework, we foresaw a movement that would fight for a voice in the determination of national priorities and for influence over the exercise of power—not a movement that, from its inception, would fight for hegemony. Thus we, along with almost everyone else, grossly underestimated the radicalism of the convention.

The Role of the Black Caucus

The dynamic factor in the convention was the confrontation between the Black Caucus and the white majority. Beyond its intrinsic significance, this confron-

tation was also the basic radicalizing force at the convention. At issue in the confrontation was the willingness of the convention—over 80 per cent white—to accept the essential premises that if a new politics movement was to be relevant, it must have a black and white component; and if it was to be new, the movement must permit a sharing of power on the basis of equality between black and white participants.

The black participants suspected, with a good deal of justification, that they had been brought to Chicago to be appended to another integrated movement in which they would provide much of the mass base but where they would have little of the power. Moreover, it looked like a movement that would abandon them before they had gained any real benefit from it. They felt that, if the war in Vietnam were to end, or even if a Kennedy or a Percy were nominated for President, the new politics movement might evaporate leaving the blacks and the ghettos just about as they were before.

The Black Caucus confronted whites—liberal and radical alike—with the demand that as a condition for participation it be given the potential power to impose its position on the entire white section of the convention, and that the whites give some guarantee that their radicalism extended beyond words, that they intended to organize in their own constituencies on a principled basis (categorically anti-racist, anti-imperial-

ist, etc.) even when it entailed serious risks.

This was the meaning of the 13 points, presented by the Black Caucus. The resulting debate showed clearly that black participation in the convention and ensuing movement could not be taken for granted; that it was contingent on ideological and organizational conditions; and that the black people would not be appended to someone else's movement, particularly a movement that was liberal rather than radical and that had demonstrated no real power. But even after the acceptance of the 13 points, the question of practical implementation remained. The convention solution was to give the Black Caucus—voting as a bloc—50 per cent of the votes. At the convention this worked, to the surprise of many, including myself.

For the continuing movement such an arbitrary and mechanical answer is obviously not sufficient, although it may still have utility in some circumstances. New ways must be found to give substantive political guarantees that the black component of the movement will have the opportunity to determine its own position on all outstanding issues, and that their position will never be overridden through a mechanical outvoting of the blacks by the whites. But this must not be done in a way that takes from the white component the responsibility to develop its own positions and approaches.

Much of the force of the arguments advanced against the 13

points and the 50 per cent formula came from the sincere apprehension that acceptance of them would split the convention without leading to black participation. People saw the disintegration of one coalition, basically limited but viable, with a good chance that nothing would be there to replace it.

But even if some motives for opposing the two demands of the Black Caucus were understandable, it is important to see the fallacies in the arguments used. One argument was that the black and white components of the movement should each determine their own organizing approaches to their own constituencies. This assumes that all new politics constituencies are racially distinct. But, more important, it also assumes that there already exists a movement with a black and a white component, when the whole point of the confrontation was that this could materialize only on conditions of the autonomy and power of the blacks within the united movement, the guarantee that the white component would openly confront racism and would be radical.

Some radicals viewed the confrontation with a lofty contempt as a good educational experience for "white liberals," but unnecessary and embarrassing for them, since they already had no trouble in relating to the black movement. This was arrogance and sheer self-delusion. The fact was that the Black Caucus was challenging both the relevance and the radicalism

of the "white radicals," not just the "white liberals."

While many votes on the specific demands were undoubtedly influenced by guilt feelings, no one should think that this was the determining factor. To repeat, the politics of the decision were: a recognition that the new politics movement must permit blacks to share power on the basis of equality, and a recognition that the terms for such sharing were to be an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist position. It is also important to understand that the black-white issue probably saved the convention from breaking up, either gradually, through the alienation of many participants from the academic bias of the debate over perspectives on 1968, or spectacularly, over the revolution-reform dilemma, or the dichotomy between the national third ticket and local organizing.

The Third Ticket and The Communists

The Communists had hoped the convention would provide an impetus for an independent presidential ticket in 1968. This ticket was seen as a major vehicle for a continuing independent political movement and as a means for maximum expression of anti-war sentiment in the coming elections. Obviously, things didn't work out that way at the convention. It is important to understand some of the reasons why they didn't.

It is my opinion that the Party's

view of an independent ticket has undergone a good deal of change since its original formulation at the 18th Convention in June 1966. Then, it was seen primarily as a vehicle for opposition to the policy in Vietnam, as a peace campaign, relating other issues as they impinged on the war. Then, we were not stressing the potential for a permanent independent political movement. Instead, we were looking at the possibilities of forcing a major realignment in the two-party framework.

At the time it was stated clearly, that to be meaningful, a third ticket would require immediate organizational preparations. However, I believe that a large section of the party really favored a token campaign and put major stress on working to defeat Johnson through the Democratic primary and convention structures. Thus the organizational and issue base for a meaningful independent presidential campaign was not begun before this summer. By the time the third-ticket concept was accepted within the Party, the New Politics Convention was only a couple of months away. There was no time to clarify for ourselves—much less for others—the distinction between a third ticket as an electoral tactic for 1968, and a third ticket as part of an organizing strategy for 1968 and beyond, even though the events in Newark and Detroit were making this distinction more and more crucial.

This, in my opinion, helps to explain why the Communists at the Convention were unable to

show how the third ticket would help the growth of local grass roots organizations. We could make verbal connections, but no work had been done in local areas to provide evidence that the third ticket had organizing potential. We were not prepared to counter the arguments that a national electoral campaign was premature. People were still able to argue that the third ticket would necessarily be a public relations affair; that it was a Kennedy or a Percy gambit; that it was a peace movement tactic and not for an independent radical political movement; that it entailed too great a reliance on parliamentary forms of activity. We had not made clear that a third ticket meant: proper candidates, proper platform, proper control of the campaign from below.

It would be wrong to locate the problem of our failure to properly implement our own decisions without looking at some of the reasons. I have already indicated one such reason. Judging from their actions—or lack of same—a good many comrades did not fully accept the policy, and the policy was so general that it could sustain important differences of interpretation.

A more fundamental reason for the difficulty in implementing this policy, in my opinion, was that it was based on a shallow analysis of forces. It did not go beneath the coincidence of interest between the peace and the freedom movements in an independent machinery for political expression, and failed to see important differences in the content of what would

be expressed through such machinery. One movement was fundamentally alienated from the entire structure of U.S. society; the other was still opposing a policy, although a central one, of that society. Thus we didn't examine in concrete detail the various attitudes toward reform and revolution, toward alliances and coalitions, toward parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of activity, toward the system and the movement, held by the various elements that were to come to Chicago, hopefully to form a unified movement. Still more important, we didn't develop our own position on these questions in sufficient depth, and we didn't relate them to our line—to the third ticket.

Given this background, the results of the convention were better than could be expected. Though a majority vote for the third ticket position could have been secured, it would have been a pyrrhic victory. It would have been won by alienating a large number of the most radical and committed groups and individuals and would have seriously jeopardized the chances of any movement developing from the convention. That some people didn't realize this elementary fact is evidence of isolation and sectarianism, not of a militant pursuit of a principled position. With the compromise position adopted, Communists and other supporters of the third ticket, still have a chance to demonstrate the organizing potential of this ticket to a united movement.

No Overt Redbaiting

Despite a good deal of mumbling, there was no overt Redbaiting during the convention, although Communists functioned freely and openly throughout the sessions. Since we took a categorical position on issues where a good deal was at stake, this, in a meeting of the size and diversity of this convention, is a major thing in itself. The Communists can also take major credit for the prevention of a disastrous racial split. That the split was avoided in a way that gave an important object lesson to thousands of white liberals and radicals cannot be

minimized.

Nonetheless, as I indicated above, the Communists attending the convention were grossly unprepared for the challenge that this convention posed. We were able to help salvage the convention tactically, but we were not able to organize strategically to contribute to the initiation of a movement out of the convention. The rudiments of a national movement—a statement of principle, an organizing program, a set of initial activities, a style of work, an attitude toward power and the institutions through which it is wielded—were not adequately developed at the convention.

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