

## RADICAL PERIODICALS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890-1960

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# Party Organizer

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
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# Party Organizer



"Difficulty is not impracticability. The important thing is confidence in the correct choice of a road, and this confidence will strengthen a hundred-fold revolutionary energy and revolutionary enthusiasm which are able to work wonders".

—Lenin.

Vol. VII.

JANUARY, 1934

No. 1

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

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## Lenin On the Organization of the Communist Party

**L**ENIN, following the lead of Marx given in the Communist Manifesto, defined the Party as the vanguard of the working class. In chapter two of the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, we read the following:

"The Communists . . . in the proletarian movement in various countries put forward and champion the common interests of the whole of the proletariat, irrespective of national interests . . . in the various stages of development through which the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie is proceeding; they always champion the common interests of the movement as a whole. Thus, the Communists practically represent the most determined and the most progressive section of the Labor Parties of all countries, and with regard to theory they have this advantage over the rest of the masses of the proletariat, that they understand the conditions, the progress, and the general results of the Labor Movement. They have no interests other than those which coincide with the interests of the whole of the proletariat."

### Role of the Party

Lenin expressed the same idea in the theses passed by the Second Congress of the Communist International, on "The Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution". In these theses we read:

"The Communist Party is a section of the working class; its most progressive, most class conscious, and therefore its most revolutionary section. A Communist Party is formed by the selection of the most class conscious, most courageous and most far-sighted workers. The Communist Party has no interests differing from the interests of the working class. A Communist Party differs from the rest of the mass of the workers in that it sees the whole of the historical path of the working class as a whole, and strives at all the turning points of this path to champion, not individual groups, not

individual trades, but the interests of the working class as a whole. The Communist Party is the organizational-political lever by the aid of which the most progressive section of the working class directs the mass of the proletariat and semi-proletariat along the right path."

In his speech at the Second Congress of the Communist International Lenin said:

"A political Party can combine only a minority of the class, in the same way as the really class conscious workers throughout the whole of capitalist society represent only a minority of all the workers. For that reason we are compelled to admit that only a class conscious minority can guide the vast masses of the workers and get them to follow it . . . If the minority is really class conscious, if it succeeds in getting the masses to follow it, if it is able to reply to every question that comes up on the order of the day, then it is in essence a Party . . . If the minority is not able to lead the masses, link itself closely up with them, then it is not a Party and is good for nothing even if it calls itself a Party."

### Organizational Principles of Lenin

Lenin left to us the fundamental organizational principles of Party organization which have remained in force to this day, and which should be thoroughly studied by every Party member. These fundamental principles are as follows:

1. The doctrine that the Communist Party is the vanguard of the working class.
2. The doctrine of the formation of the principle cadres of the Party, so-called professional revolutionaries.
3. Activity of all the members of the Party, their direct participation in the work of the organization.
4. The basis of the Party organization, its "fortresses" are the factory nuclei.
5. The Communist Party, through Communist fractions in non-Party workers' and peasants' organizations, must link up closely with the masses of the workers and peasants and take an active part in all their struggles, against their exploiters and oppressors and lead the struggles through the Communist nuclei and Communist fractions.
6. Democratic centralism in the Party and in the Communist International.
7. Iron discipline for the proletarian Party.

To carry out these fundamental organizational principles of Leninism, our Party has much work to do. With regard to our Party, it may be said today, what Lenin wrote in 1900 in No. 1 of the "Iskra". He wrote:

"The question of organization is one of our most painful questions. In this respect we have lagged behind considerably from the old workers in the Russian revolutionary movement. We must frankly confess this defect. We must train men and women who will devote to the revolution, not merely their spare evenings, but the whole of their lives. We must build up an organization so large as to introduce division of labor in the various spheres of our work."

### Party Must Be Ready

In 1901 in an article entitled "Where to Begin", Lenin wrote:

"We must work at forming a militant organization and conducting political agitation even in 'drab' and peaceful conditions, and even in the period of 'declining revolutionary spirit'. More than that, it is precisely in such conditions and in such a period that this work is necessary, because in the moment of outbreaks and outbursts it will be too late to set up an organization. The organization must be ready in order to be able to develop its activity immediately."

This applies in its entirety to the Communist Party of U.S.A.

We will be able to fulfill Lenin's will in the sphere of organization only when we have a Party closely linked up with the masses of the workers and the toiling peasantry, similar to the Bolshevik Party, a Party capable under difficult conditions of leading the struggle of the working class and the toiling peasantry.

"In the present epoch of acute class war", wrote Lenin in "Conditions for Affiliation to the Comintern"—  
"The Communist Party will be able to fulfill its duty only if it will be organized in the most centralized manner, if it will be governed by an iron discipline, bordering on military discipline, and if the Party center will be an authoritative organ with extensive powers enjoying the general confidence of the Party.

"The unity of the Party, internal compactness and strict revolutionary discipline in its ranks, are not less necessary now than in the period of civil war. Finally, flexibility of organization, the ability quickly to adapt

it to changing conditions,—while preserving the fundamental principles of Bolshevik organization—are necessary.”

In future issues of the Party Organizer we will deal specifically with the seven fundamental principles of organization laid down by Lenin. In this issue we have dealt only with the first point. To assist us to speedily carry out the testament of Lenin the Party Organizer will bring to the Party members Lenin's fundamental ideas on the question of organization, quoting Lenin's teachings on each of these points.

### The Group System In the Units

The control of membership books has been carried through in most of the units. We set ourselves the task: that through the control we will bring back into the Party those members who for one reason or another dropped out of the Party and will activate those who have become passive in the last period. It is too early yet to establish whether we succeeded in fulfilling this task. Only a few districts sent in the report to the center, and from these it is very difficult to draw conclusions for the whole Party.

Let us take one example. New York District combined the membership control with a thorough registration of the whole membership. Up to date about 4,500 members were controlled and registered. In three months (Sept., Oct. and Nov.) the average dues payment in the district was about 4,500. Without any speculation we could accept the fact that if three months dues payment averages 4,500 members, then the actual active membership in the district cannot be below this figure. But we know very well that quite a number of members drop out of the Party, don't pay dues, do not attend unit meetings. How is it possible that only 4,500 were controlled in the district. Was a conscious effort made to bring back the comrades who have dropped out or become passive? Something went wrong with the control.

One fact however remains. New York District registered on December 23rd about 4,500 members. 4,500 Party members came voluntarily to the unit meetings, or to the Section Headquarters, to pay their dues, presented their membership book for control and received their control stamp. But—immediately after control week, only 3,679 dues stamps were sold at the next unit meeting. Let us assume that every sold stamp represents one Party member. How can we explain that out of 4,500 registered members, who were supposed to be acti-

vized through the control, about 1000 do not appear at the next unit meeting and do not buy stamps? Are these comrades shirking Party work? By no means. Only a very small minority of these 1000 comrades are inactive. The overwhelming majority are active in the unions, or in one of the various mass organizations. Nevertheless, the fact remains that about 20% of the membership failed to pay dues, and a certain number of these members, although they were not busy elsewhere on that night, did not come to the unit meeting.

What will be the situation next week? If every Party member would pay dues, a minimum of 6,300 (5,300 current dues, plus 1,000 back dues) stamps should be sold (assuming that no new members were taken into the Party, otherwise the number sold should be 6,300 plus the number of new members). Thereafter the dues payments should not fall below the number of registered members plus the number of new members. Perhaps the New York comrades will try their best to reach this figure. But we know from experience that if we fall back in dues payments one week, it is quite difficult to make up for it.

Is this only a question of dues payments? As one comrade put the question: "So what? Are you interested in getting dues from your members?" We have to understand one thing very clearly. The neglect of dues payments is the first step on the road out of the Party. The first sign that a comrade is not satisfied with the work of the unit, or fraction, or unit Buro or Section committee can be seen in the fact that he begins to fall behind in his dues. Perhaps he has a grievance against someone, maybe he has been overburdened with work, or on the contrary, he may not have been assigned any responsible task. Something is wrong, either with him, or with the method of work of the Party organization. He does not pay dues, and we let him drift away. We lose him from the Party, and we lose thousands of members each year.

In the registration taken at the beginning of 1933, New York District reported 4,250 members. Today, almost a year later, approximately the same number are reported. What about the 2588 new members, who entered the Party during 1933? New York District today should have 6838 members, but less than 5,000 are reported. The same situation exists in almost every district. We recruit monthly a minimum of 1500 members throughout the country. But in spite of this, we have a slow, almost invisible growth.

### The Way Out

Can we find some method by which this evil of tremendous turnover can be eliminated, or at least reduced to a minimum? Yes, we can. First of all, proper help and guid-

ance by the higher committees can be given to the units. Secondly, we can establish better unit leadership, which will be able to lead the unit membership in mass work, to improve the inner life of the unit, and thirdly, the establishment of the group system in the units will be a powerful instrument by which the bad situation in many units will be overcome.

What is the group system? Let us take an example. A street or town unit has 25 or 30 members. They live in a territory covering several blocks. The members of the unit see each other only at unit meetings, or when two comrades go out together to sell the *Daily Worker*, distribute leaflets, or canvas the houses. The Bureau has no other connection with the membership except the unit meetings, or the mail. It would be impossible for the unit organizer to have personal contact with 25-30 members. Because of this situation, the members don't know much about each other. They know one another's Party name. In most cases, they know little more. In the smaller towns the situation is a little better, but not much. In a unit of 25-30 members, it is very difficult for the Unit Organizer to keep in touch with every member. He cannot help the members in their daily mass work, in their political development, etc.

We must find some method by which the members of the unit can get close to each other, and help each other in the work, by which the more developed comrades will help the weaker ones to understand the problems, the more active members activate the passive ones, etc. We must find some means, some form, which will help us to change the present situation.

What is this form? The group system.

We have to go ahead boldly with the establishment of the group system in the units. We already have a number of good experiences in certain districts.

How do we organize these groups? We divide the membership of the unit into five or six groups. A group should have no less than four and no more than seven members. The basis of the group is the territory where the comrades live. If we have five comrades living near each other, they will comprise one group. In another part of the unit territory, in another block, or on another street, four members of the unit who live near each other will be another group, and so on. In each group, the best comrade is selected as the leader of the group. If we understand the task of the group leader, and the role of the group, then it will be clear why we propose the best comrade of the group, and not a member of the unit bureau as the leader.

### How the Group Functions

What is the task of the group leader? He or she is responsible to the Unit Bureau for every member of the group. He will visit the members of the group, find out everything about them, about their family life, their home life, their activities in the union or the mass organization, and in this way, help the unit to give proper assignments to the members. The group leader should see to it that every member of his group attends every unit meeting, and should be in a position to inform the unit bureau why the member could not come to the meeting. The group leader should know exactly how his group members are developing, what they are reading, etc. He should organize a study circle in the home of one of the members of the group, where an editorial in the *Daily Worker*, or an article in the *Communist* will be discussed, or certain books systematically studied. The group leader must know how the members of the group stand with their dues, and must see to it that everybody is always in good standing. If some member of the group cannot attend a given unit meeting, the group leader must collect the money for the stamp and buy it for him at the unit meeting. A good group leader will go into the homes of his group members before unit meetings, and will ask them one by one to come to the meeting. The group leader will help the comrades of his group to carry out their tasks, and will bring the assignment to the member who could not attend the unit meeting. The group leader will see to it that every task assigned by the unit to his group members is carried out. The group leader will report to the unit bureau about the problems he faces in the group, about the activities of the individual members in the various mass organizations, and in the territory of the unit.

The establishment of well functioning groups will contribute to the solution of a number of problems that the Party has been facing for a long time, such as: 1. Activizing every Party member to participate in the mass work of the unit. 2. Better control of the carrying out of assignments. 3. We will know better the activity of the members in the mass organizations. 4. We will secure better attendance of the members at the unit meetings. 5. We will have better discussions in the units, because the members of the various groups will raise problems which they have discussed in their circles. 6. A more friendly relationship between the members of the units will be established. 7. The members of the units, as well as of the sections in the big cities, and towns, can be mobilized through group leaders in a few hours' notice, instead of having to wait for the next meeting, or being forced to use the government apparatus—the mails. 8. We will be able to build the Party around each group, providing the groups on assignment from the

units develop activity in the territory of the group. 9. We can develop revolutionary competition between the Party groups in Party recruiting, Daily Worker subscriptions, etc. 10. Last, but not least, through the group leaders we will be able to make every member a member in good standing.

With a good functioning group system in the units, New York would not have 1,000 members staying away from unit meetings and not paying dues, immediately after registration. The group system will help tremendously to stop fluctuation. It will help to develop new forces for the Party, because each group leader, with proper attention from the Euro and Section Committee will become a potential leader to take the place of the present leadership in the event that it is removed by government terror, or that it is promoted to higher positions of leadership.

### Division of Work Helps Improve Activity of Units

**A** VISIT to four or five units, especially in the largest districts, discloses one of the reasons for the poor functioning of many of the units.

The major part of the unit meeting is spent in assigning work; there are many cases where comrades, one by one, with good or not good reasons, decline the assignment of certain tasks; and in most cases the reasons given are the necessity for attending a whole series of meetings or being too busy in some mass organization.

There are cases where in a unit three or four comrades are active in two or three and sometimes four organizations. The result is that while busy everywhere these comrades have no time to devote to the unit and many times don't attend unit meetings for weeks. Such a situation, especially in the smaller units, brings the whole unit to inactivity and sometimes to demoralization. While there are comrades who are really active and conscientiously doing work in the trade unions and other mass organizations, yet because of our failure to check up on the activities of the individual members of the units, there remains a category of comrades who use the excuse of being active in some organization as a way of escaping certain duties of unit work.

This is not the first time that we have discussed this problem and proposed the proper solution. Still we are confronted with it for the simple reason that all the past decisions on this matter either remain on paper or we have failed to follow them up.

The way out of this situation is the proper division of work among the Party members. Is it necessary that com-

rades maintain three or four functions, being in leading positions or active in three or four organizations, to the extent that they are not able to give any time to unit work or attend unit meetings? Certainly not. The fact that there are comrades who sometimes are in two or three leading positions, clearly shows that other comrades are practically barred from certain activities, that there is lack of faith in the development of new forces, that the idea of the "indispensability" of certain comrades which still prevails here and there, has to be outrooted. This is not all. The fact that many comrades are so busy—yes, doing Party work, many times very important work—to the extent of divorcing themselves from the activities of the units, shows that we are confronted with an underestimation and misunderstanding of the role of the units as the basic organization of the Party. To whom are these comrades responsible for this work? In many instances they are responsible to other comrades who are practically in the same position—also divorced from the units and not responsible to the unit which is their Party organization.

This problem, of course, cannot be solved within 24 hours. It must be solved, however, and in the shortest time. It is the task of the District Org. Commissions and Section Org. Commissions to look into the situation and take drastic steps to divide the work, starting with the comrades in leading positions. This will not only relieve many comrades of some functions, but will bring forward new forces and, more than that, many of the capable comrades, in giving more time to the unit activities or to the activities of leading organs on a section and district scale, will be instrumental in strengthening the activity of the Party as a whole.

The units from now on must check up on the activities of every individual member, making a distinction between those comrades active in the mass organizations who are assigned to certain tasks, and those who are merely members of the fractions. The units must call to the attention of the sections the cases of those comrades handling too many functions in order to facilitate the tasks of the section or district committee in dividing the work.

The moment when units will complete a record of the various activities of their members, will demand regular reports, will guide them in their work, and will practice the division of work also in the units, will distinguish between the activity of the active members in the organizations and the activity of the fraction members, then and only then will many of the excuses disappear, and this will certainly be a step forward in improving the unit life and unit activities.

—F. BROWN.

## The Work of Our Unit and Party Recruitment

**T**HE 5th Ward Unit, E., for a period of weeks and months was in a state of stagnation. The comrades were working hard as individuals, in their Block Committees and other organizations. Some recruitment was carried on, but as fast as workers were recruited, so quickly would they drop out.

At one of the unit meetings, the comrades took up the problem of dropping 7 or 8 Party members from the lists because they did not attend their unit meetings. Most of the comrades present failed to realize the fact that it was mainly due to the poor inner life of the unit, the manner in which our meetings were being conducted, our own failure to provide sufficient interest in the work and activities of the Party that failed to keep these workers in our ranks after we had attracted them into the Party.

For instance, at one of the unit meetings, we had exactly 17 points on the order of business. Meeting after meeting would take up the same dry routine—reading of communications, tickets, and what not. A checkup with comrades showed that our Unit, which comprises mainly Negro workers, had never yet had a discussion on the Party position on the Negro question.

In connection with the Recruitment Drive, our unit has undertaken not only to recruit, but to keep the new recruits in the Party—a really worthy Communist ambition that every other unit of the Party and every individual comrade should strive for.

First: discussions in the unit are being organized on an average of twice a month. Comrades in the unit are assigned to give these talks on burning issues and problems of the day.

Second: the cutting down and eliminating of unnecessary business as much as possible. This is only a matter of planning the agenda, and the Unit Buros actually functioning and bringing in proposals. The usual tendency is for the unit to rehash every question that the unit buro has already taken up. This can easily be eliminated with a little bit of planned work.

Third: when new comrades attend the meeting of the unit, the unit buro assigns a comrade to make a short talk on what the Party is, welcoming and greeting the comrades in joining our ranks, and explaining what are the Party duties, tasks, and responsibilities of every Party comrade.

When we first introduced this into our unit, the response was excellent. The two new comrades were given an idea of what the Party is and what is expected of them. It made them feel at home—that it was their Party, and they were no strangers in it.

While no one proposes that this procedure should become a formality or a ritual, yet we believe that short 10-minute talks to new comrades when they come into the unit meetings, help to draw them closer into our ranks.

Fourth: at the close of the unit meeting, we ask the new comrades their opinion of our meeting, its conduct, etc. It is interesting to note that the first time we did this, one new worker made some real criticism of our unit. He stated that he was very much impressed by the problems we took up, he now is beginning to realize that our movement is a world wide one, that he is glad to have joined the Party, has obtained a good idea of how the Party works. "But", he declared, "you prolong your business unnecessarily. You repeat yourselves too often. There seems to be some duplication. Become more efficient at your work." Of course, the comrade was very hesitant in making this criticism, but it surely emphasized the weaknesses of the inner life, and the work of our unit (and incidentally, probably every other unit in the Party).

Fifth: Introducing more social life. Social life is only known to small circles of personal friends in the movement. The Party as such, the comrades in the Party meet each other weekly at meetings, in the Block Committees, in delegations, demonstrations, eviction fights, etc. Insofar as developing a real comradely and Communist spirit amongst comrades, this is practically unknown.

### Social Life Important

Our unit decided to hold a little social gathering at the home of one of the comrades last Monday (New Years' night). Every comrade promised to bring a little food, coffee, cake, sugar, etc., along, and another comrade promised to supply the music. Over 30 comrades showed up, Negro and white. Ten or Twelve were non-Party.

The comrades ate and drank, sang songs, danced, spoke to each other, and had a real swell time. Later on, the music was stopped and a short talk was given on the Party, and 5 workers were recruited into the Party. All comrades declared that they never spent a more enjoyable evening.

The question of social evenings is not only necessary from an inner Party standpoint (that of improving the life

of our units), but from a broader political standpoint as well. The bringing together of our white and Negro comrades in these social gatherings (and not only at big dances, meetings, etc.), does very much to really convince our comrades that the fight for full social equality is not only a hackneyed phrase that we use for special purposes and mass meetings—but is a living reality practiced and shown to be true in the daily lives of Communists.

Sixth: discussions arranged on topics of local interest and importance. For instance, one of the best discussions our unit had was on the question of the struggle for Negro school teachers getting jobs in the city of Pittsburgh.

Another excellent discussion was provoked by a comrade's report on the picture of Lenin painted by a Negro miner in Greensburg, Pa., which was on display in the Party office. The whole discussion centered around Negro culture, about the oppression that stifles and attempts to kill the tremendous latent potentialities and surging creative spirit of the Negro toilers in this country.

The whole discussion brought out in the sharpest manner the whole national character of the Negro problem in the U. S. A.

The picture drawn by this Negro artist is surely a masterpiece and evaluated as such by the comrades who saw it.

Insofar as recruitment is concerned, it is not only the problem of numbers and getting cards filled out. It is both a question of quantity—increasing our Party quantitatively, and especially qualitatively. The improvement of our inner life, the question of giving some few and simple tasks to new comrades and not overburdening them with tasks immediately; the problem of involving these workers immediately into our ranks and making them feel at home, all of these tasks go hand in hand with the job of further extending the mass work of all units in the neighborhoods and shops, and the individual mass work of each comrade.

—PHIL FRANKFIELD.

**T**HE Proletariat has no other weapon in the fight for power except organization... The proletariat can become and inevitably will become an indomitable force only because its intellectual unity created by the principles of Marxism is fortified by the material unity of organization which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working class.—Lenin—"One Step Forward, Two Back".

## Lessons of the Packing Strike

(Resolution of Party Fraction, Adopted By District Bureau, District No. 9)

**T**HE Armour Packing strike was the first big strike struggle in a basic industry organized and led by the Party and T.U.U.L. in the district. It was an expression of the widespread radicalization of the workers, and the growing disillusionment in the Roosevelt program and the N.R.A., which has resulted in the strike wave throughout the country, and the beginning of the first struggles in the packing industry since 1921. The beginning of strike struggles in the district (Austin, South St. Paul, Minneapolis, Duluth), and the perspective of increasing struggles in the immediate future make it all the more necessary that the lessons of the Armour strike be thoroughly analyzed by the Party, and the necessary conclusions drawn.

The building of the Packing House Workers Industrial Union into a mass union was the result of serious persistent concentration and the correct development of partial struggles for a period of more than a year, and in recent months since the issuance of the Open Letter was given close attention as a district concentration task by the District Committee. The building of the Union, however, was marked by a number of shortcomings and mistakes which had been on numerous occasions sharply criticized by the District Bureau, and had a direct bearing on the shortcomings evident in the strike itself. Firstly, the class struggle program of the Union was not brought out sharply enough, especially in its relation to the capitalist state. Secondly, the hesitancy and in some cases resistance to bringing the Party forward and to the building of the Party, made it easier to bring in the "red scare", and to allow company agents and other disruptive elements to carry on propaganda for the A. F. of L. or for an "independent" union. Thirdly, the failure of the Section to give any leadership or establish any contact with the work in the packing industry, and thereby failing to mobilize the Party for this concentration task and for preparations for struggle. Fourthly, a tendency at the beginning to "soft pedal" the attack on and exposure of the N.R.A. Some of these shortcomings were partially, but not entirely, overcome before the strike, but the major weakness remained, that there was no active functioning Party unit in existence before or during the strike, to which fact many of the other shortcomings can be traced.

### Strike Preparations Neglected

Although the possibility of a strike in the fall had been discussed for several months, and the spontaneous walkout in September against the firing of Union members made it more evident that a strike was inevitable, no real organizational preparations for the strike were undertaken by the Party until almost the last minute, while in the Union itself a certain indecisiveness and vacillating tendency on the part of some leading comrades delayed the preparations for the strike considerably, and gave some disruptive elements in the Union an opportunity to organize a struggle against Party and T.U.U.L. leadership. This lack of preparation was an especially serious matter, when it is considered that the strike was conducted against a powerful Packers' Trust, with a bitterly die-hard anti-union policy such as the steel and auto bosses have; also that while there were sporadic struggles in the packing industry throughout the country, we had no functioning national union to establish connections between the different centers and spread the struggle. Although the National Conference of the Union was held when these struggles had already begun, it was not utilized as a means of mobilization and preparation for strike struggles.

Our first plan was to organize struggles simultaneously in all the plants. But when it became evident that the uneven growth of the Union made this impossible, the tactic adopted was to concentrate on one plant, with the perspective of spreading the struggle to the other plants. While this tactic was undoubtedly correct, it developed a tendency to neglect too much the other plants. The result was that whereas in Armours our Union had the majority of the workers, in Swifts the A. F. of L. became stronger than we were, and in Cudahy we had hardly any foothold. This weakness played a decisive role in the defeat of the strike.

The strike itself actually involved about 1,000 workers of the 1,500. 700 registered for picket-duty at least once, while the active force that maintained the picket lines was never more than 200-300 after the first day of the strike. An important factor was the neutralization of important departments of the killing floor, consisting of A. F. of L. members, the majority of whom favored staying out as long as there were picket-lines, in spite of the open policy of the A. F. of L. leadership to break the strike by sending scabs and strikebreakers through the picket-lines.

### Unable to Spread Strike

It was obvious from the beginning that the strike could not remain effective for very long if the Swift workers were not called out. This was due to the difficulty of maintaining picket-lines covering several miles, day and night, and the impossibility of identifying Armour scabs who were filtering through the Swift entrance by mingling with the Swift workers. Our policy from the beginning was to try and get a strike vote taken by the Swift workers at the earliest possible moment. A Swift mass meeting was held on the same night the Armour strike was called, but it showed that we were in an extremely weak position in Swifts, and that there was practically no sentiment for strike among the Swift workers. We worked hard to build up strike sentiment within a few days in Swifts, and we succeeded in calling four days later a big mass meeting of Swift and Cudahy workers; here, too, we encountered great resistance to calling a strike, especially calling a sympathy strike without even presenting demands, but we succeeded in getting a Swift committee elected to present demands, with power to call a strike. In the next four days, Swift and Cudahy carried on such a campaign of terror and intimidation in the plant as to cow even the most militant workers, and at Swifts the committee was terrorized, the answer to their demands was postponed, until they refused to take the responsibility to call a strike. At both plants, hundreds of workers were persuaded to remain in the plant day and night, by threats and intimidation, and would have been prevented from leaving if a strike was called. This campaign of terror succeeded so well, that at the third Swift mass meeting, the workers felt it would be useless for a small minority to go on strike, and the sentiment was almost unanimous against going on strike, but to wait for settlement of their demands. The sentiment of sympathy for the Armour strikers was nevertheless shown by the financial support voted by the workers.

The refusal of Armour & Company to negotiate except through arbitration (which the strikers rejected), spread a defeatist mood among many of the workers, who have had no traditions of struggle nor organizational experience in recent years, and the feeling grew among them that if Swifts did not join them, all was lost. For several days, the sentiment for returning to work was only checked by the hope of Swifts joining the strike. Actually, after one week the strike was still effective, as the 300 scabs in the plant were not from the important departments, and could not operate the plant; the newspaper propaganda, however,

that the plant was operating with 800 scabs who remained in the plant day and night, had a discouraging effect on the workers. The Strike Committee therefore decided that if the final Swift mass meeting did not take a strike vote, an Armour strikers' meeting would be called next day to decide whether the workers were willing to remain out longer, or whether we should make an organized retreat.

### Strike Committee Repudiates Party

Before this could be accomplished, however, a well-organized offensive against the strike started, beginning with the arrest of the leading comrades, the police smashing the picket-lines, and the newspapers proclaiming that the strike was over. We were caught completely unprepared, and the attack was helped along by a few company agents in the Strike Committee winning over the weaker and vacillating elements in the committee to sign a statement repudiating the Communist leadership, in the hope that this would gain some concessions for the strikers. The fact that immediately afterwards, the Strike Committee members were made to realize the mistake they had made, and all of them withdrew their signatures and repudiated the statement, did not stop the company agents from carrying out their original plan of announcing in the press that the Communists were repudiated, and the damage was done. With the majority of the workers thus tricked or driven back to work, it was considered advisable on the eighth day to officially call off the strike, in order to prevent the victimization and isolation of the best and most militant elements of the Union in the plant as much as possible, and to put up a fight against discrimination.

The attitude of the police and local authorities, and of the Farmer-Labor leaders, was one of hostility masked with pretended sympathy, which misled many of the strikers. The experience of the Austin strike sell-out, however, made the strikers firm against arbitration, and hostile against any efforts of the Farmer-Labor leaders to "settle" the strike as could be seen by the hostile reception Congressman Shoemaker received on the picket-lines. The policy of neutrality or hypocritical "sympathy" was exposed, however, in Mayor Mahoney's open attack on the strikers as "chiselers". Governor Olson played a more clever role, however; in answer to demands that he intervene with the militia, Olson's attitude was that he was satisfied the local authorities could break the strike without his intervention. The workers on strike received in a few days a valuable class education which shattered many of their previous illusions.

The question is raised whether it was correct to call

the strike, in view of our many evident weaknesses. The strike was necessary and inevitable. It grew out of a whole series of partial struggles previously developed, and it was clear that either we should choose the proper moment for the strike during the busy season, or a strike would be forced upon us by an open attack on the Union by the company during the slack season, when mass lay-offs take place, and our Union would have been smashed. Our failure to act would also have given a weapon to the A. F. of L., as we have always stressed that our Union was one of action and struggle in contrast to the A. F. of L.

### Shortcomings and Mistakes

What were some of the outstanding shortcomings and mistakes in the conduct of the strike:

1. Improper organization of the strike so that the leadership would have better contact with the rank and file. Failure to hold regular strike meetings, due to the constant danger of scabs breaking through when pickets were withdrawn at any time of the day or night. This made it possible for hundreds of demoralizing rumors to be circulated, by the A. F. of L. and company, without being sufficiently combated.

2. Unpreparedness for the terror. Although we knew that an attack could be expected, we were not prepared for it when it came. Also, insufficient combatting of the illusions among the strikers about the so-called "friendly neutrality" of the police and the deputies.

3. Insufficient isolation of disruptive elements. Some company agents were openly exposed at the very beginning of the strike, but were not sufficiently isolated.

4. Slowness in mobilizing the Party and mass organizations to support the strike. Food and funds came in so slowly, that if the strike had lasted another day, the strikers' kitchen would have had to close down. Insufficient mobilization in St. Paul of the unemployed to help picketing.

5. Although the "red issue" came forward at the very beginning of the strike, the Party moved very slowly to counteract it. The Party statement was delayed until it was too late to distribute it, and the Daily Worker distribution was not organized properly and could have been much more effective. The fact that we had no functioning Party unit made it more difficult to counteract the propaganda that the Communists were "outsiders", and we could not depend on Communists who were strikers to give leadership to the Strike Committee when the arrests took place.

6. Our previous failure to work inside the A. F. of L. union to build an opposition there and develop the united

front, resulted in our almost complete isolation from the A. F. of L. workers, which could have played an important role in strengthening the strike. This can also be traced to our not having a functioning Party unit.

7. The Party leading fraction in the strike was not sufficiently connected with the Twin Cities sections; the District Buro met only once during the strike, and should have had at least one more meeting during the crucial period in the last few days. The sections outside of the Twin Cities hardly reacted at all to the strike, until it was nearly a week old.

### Tasks of Union and Party

It is inevitable that the defeat of the strike, and the discrimination and lay-offs in the plant, create difficulties and pessimism in the ranks of the workers. Against this defeatist attitude we must carry on the most vigorous struggle in the Union and the Party. The strike has created a solid militant core in the Union, and consolidated the best elements more closely to the Party, and brought some of them into the Party. The A. F. of L. has more openly exposed its strikebreaking role to the workers, and our Union must thoroughly expose them and win workers away from them. The possibility for building the Union, even though under greater difficulties, still exists and must be fully utilized. In one plant, the Union is still nearly 100% organized and has won some raises in pay. We must undertake the task of rebuilding the Union in the concentration plant, based on the most militant elements, and weeding out the company agents. Meetings of department representatives of the plants must be called. The Union must undertake a real struggle against discrimination, and for relief of laid-off and blacklisted workers. Partial struggles must be developed in the plants. An unemployed movement must be organized. Educational activities must begin, including forums, classes, and the continued issuance of the Union paper. Mass meetings must be organized on the lessons of the strike, and the statement of the Union on the strike must be given mass distribution. Increased efforts must be made to draw workers into the Party, and to establish a functioning Party organization in the packing plants, and strengthen the Section leadership and include some workers from the plants; this is the only guarantee that the same mistakes will not be repeated again. Close contact must be established between the Section leadership and the work of the Party and the Union in the packing industry, which will remain the chief concentration point of the District Committee, which will review the carrying out of these tasks at regular intervals.

## Methods of Mass Agitation Among the Ford Workers

**P**ARTICULARLY because of the special position which the Ford Motor Co. occupies in the capitalist world, the activities of our Party among the Ford workers assume tremendous importance.

More than 150,000 workers were employed at the Ford plant during the course of the last few years. These workers live in many small Ford-controlled towns, as well as in Detroit and Dearborn. About 9,000 of these workers live in Dearborn, where the Ford plant is located. About 5,000 are employed at this time in the Ford plant.

Our agitation therefore has two sides, one, the direct agitation in the plant itself, and secondly the agitation among the Ford workers not employed at the time in the shop, but who are in hopes of being hired and who are employed for various periods from time to time. From this it is clear that any agitational material issued in the district reaches large numbers of Ford workers.

We distributed many leaflets to the workers in the Ford plant. At first we distributed long, large leaflets, but the reaction among the workers made it clear that short and concise leaflets had much greater effect. The most effective leaflets were those containing one idea around a special slogan. Such, for example, was the leaflet issued when the Ford plant shut down during the Briggs strike last January. The leaflet raised the slogan of demanding pay for every day lost as a result of the closing of the plant by Ford due to the strike. This was the most effective leaflet we had issued. This was valuable not only because of the issue raised but because its size,  $4\frac{1}{2} \times 6$ , made it easier to distribute in and around the shop. Such a leaflet was also issued during the recent Tool and Die Makers strike.

### Methods of Distribution

The problem of distribution inside the shop is difficult in view of the method of production, which keeps the men apart, as well as the strictly enforced rules which keep the men from talking to each other. Even during lunch time the men are prevented from talking to each other. We have used a number of methods of leaflet distribution, which have proven successful. One is the bringing of rolls of toilet paper which contain leaflets rolled in them. In this way quite a few leaflets get into the hands of the workers before the company gets wise. On the cylinder line the workers attached a leaflet which had been dampened

with water to the warm core which passed along the line and was read by many workers before the foreman discovered it. During Christmas season a group of workers in one department got out a leaflet. It was folded to a very small size and a Christmas seal wrapped around it. The leaflets were dropped on the floor in various parts of the department and picked up by the workers. But the distribution inside the shop could not be very effective without considerable help from the outside.

The Ford plant was built with the idea of preventing any activity of workers. Street cars stop on Ford property and the workers are compelled to walk over a viaduct into the plant. Any worker who walks across the road under the viaduct is immediately fired. On a number of occasions we were able to get leaflets distributed here, but not with sufficient success. The best and most effective method of reaching the workers in the shop with leaflets from the outside was by distributing them in street cars and automobiles.

There are four main street car lines which carry workers into the Ford plant. By stationing ourselves at the street car junction points we were able to carry on an effective distribution. We distributed the leaflets at a time when almost everyone on the street car was a Ford worker. A bunch of leaflets were handed into the car and quickly found their way from hand to hand. The leaflets were thus discussed by the workers before they went into the shop. We reached the workers who went to work by auto by waiting at stop streets near the Ford plant and when the cars stopped we handed a leaflet to each occupant of the car. With other comrades assigned to places where workers who walked to work could be reached, our distribution was very effective. In the method described above, we have on a number of occasions distributed 10,000 to 15,000 leaflets in about one hour.

Another method was used in connection with the election campaign and in preparation for the Ford Hunger March. The road toward the Ford plant, either by street car or automobile, passes a number of railroad viaducts. By painting short slogans about one foot high, we bring them to the attention of the workers. Because the walls of the viaduct are of cement, the paint soaks in deeply. The Ford company has on every occasion covered the slogans with paint, but even this makes the workers discuss the slogan.

In carrying out our agitation we make some small use of the *Ford Worker* and the *Daily Worker*, but certainly not sufficiently. In the Ford section committee a plan was worked out for the selling of the *Daily Worker* at the street car junction points every day. Such a method will reach many workers with our press.

— MAX SALZMAN

## The Nash Strike In Kenosha, Wis.

*(Statement of District Bureau)*

**T**HE Nash Motor Company was one of the first plants to sign the NRA Automobile Code with the statement that wages of Nash employees would be increased by 10%. No sooner did the plant begin working upon the new models than it became obvious to the workers that instead of wages and working conditions being improved, they were being worsened.

The Auto Workers Union, affiliated to the Trade Union Unity League, had six months previously started a campaign to organize the Nash workers into a militant union, at the same time raising demands and awakening the desire for struggle on the part of the Nash workers to realize them. The Auto Workers Union carried on its work inside the shop, also issuing leaflets, calling mass meetings, etc. It was only after this activity of the Auto Workers Union that the American Federation of Labor came upon the scene.

The strike, which broke out on November 9th in the final assembly line, was, to a degree, due to the work carried on by the Auto Workers Union. The strike itself was spontaneous and was not called by the Auto Workers Union or the A. F. of L. This shows that both the Auto Workers Union and the C. P. were isolated from the large mass of workers in the shop, reaching but a small group with their activity and organization. Because of this, we were not the organizer of the strike. This isolation, pointed out by the Open Letter, is true today of the District as a whole as well as for Kenosha. The men simply walked out because the new piece work system lowered their pay by 40c per day. The only demand raised by the workers was for 1½c increase per car. When the walk-out occurred, the Party and the Auto Workers Union in Kenosha were on the job. Already in the morning some comrades were working inside the shop agitating for the spreading of the strike, and putting forward demands for militant mass picketing and rank and file leadership. The first meeting held outside the plant was addressed by our comrades. The American Federation of Labor leadership came in later and began a campaign against our union and the Party, doing everything possible to prejudice the workers against us. At this time, it was necessary to show great determination and to proceed with the meeting in the German-American Home which was originally organized by our Union.

### A. F. of L. Takes Leadership

The pressure of the A. F. of L. bureaucracy and the lack of experience on the part of our comrades caused some hesitation and thus permitted the A. F. of L. to temporarily outmaneuver them. It was able to take over leadership of the strike. Our comrades, however, showed good judgement when, in spite of the hysteria created by the reactionary labor leaders, they were able to inject into the meeting and raise before the workers our militant program of action as the only guarantee for the success of the strike.

The A. F. of L. leadership at the beginning of the strike offered no demands or program. They discouraged mass picketing and made no attempt to turn the lockout into a strike, but were preparing for the betrayal of the strike. It was our task to prevent the A. F. of L. from isolating us from the workers and to organize to take over the leadership of the strike. The Auto Workers Union pointed out the necessity of united action on the part of all strikers and those locked out, around common demands, regardless of union or non-union affiliation. The proposals and demands made by the Auto Workers Union were:

1. 30% increase in wages for all Nash workers.
2. Abolition of the gang system.
3. Turn the lockout into an effective mass strike.
4. Elect a broad strike committee with representatives from each department.
5. No settlement by departments but by the shop as a whole.
6. No return to shop on promises of arbitration. We must win our demands through militant action.
7. Mass picketing! Every man, striker and locked out worker, must come and picket.
8. No settlement by the committee without the fullest consultation and vote of all the men in the shop.
9. No discrimination against any worker for his activity in the strike and lockout. In event of settlement every worker must get back his job.

The Auto Workers Union met every day during the strike, reviewing the situation and making proposals for the next day. The members of the Auto Workers Union were on the picket line daily, setting an example of militancy for the other workers; mingling with the strikers and discussing those proposals. The strikers accepted the proposals of the Auto Workers Union and although they followed the leadership of the American Federation of Labor, they be-

lieved that the only correct proposals were those put forward by the Auto Workers Union. Leaflets were issued daily warning the strikers to be on guard against treachery and betrayal. The Communist Party nucleus in Nash Motors also met frequently, issued a leaflet to the strikers, and regularly sold the Daily Worker to the strikers.

### Betrayal Tactics of A. F. of L.

During this period the American Federation of Labor did not call any mass meeting nor consult with the workers as to the next step. Only under pressure after seeing that the demands of the Auto Workers Union became popular, did they come forward with a set of counter-proposals. Their proposals consisted of: recognition of the union (A. F. of L.); abolishment of the gang system; seven hour day; time and a half for over-time; rest periods during the day; etc. Even these inadequate demands were not put forward seriously by the A. F. of L. leadership. They had no intention of mobilizing the workers for a struggle to win. They relied solely upon the arbitration machinery of the NRA and carried on secret negotiations with the government mediator, Dr. Lapp, and the representatives of the Nash Motors Company. No attempt was made by the A. F. of L. leadership to raise relief for the strikers. The Unemployed Council, however, issued a call to all workers in the city to support the strike and promised solidarity on the picket line.

On Monday, November 20th, the strike was at its height. On that day, we witnessed the greatest and most militant picket line, consisting of more than 2,000 workers, men and women. The same afternoon, thousands of workers gathered in front of the Nash plant and then paraded through the streets of Kenosha, mobilizing sentiment and support for the strike. It was precisely on this day that the A. F. of L. leadership carried through its act of treachery and agreed to call off the strike, issuing an order to stop picketing.

The shameful settlement agreed to by the A. F. of L. does not contain one single demand which was originally put forward either by the workers or by the A. F. of L. leadership itself. Instead of recognition of the union, the Nash Motor Company, in the settlement, refers to paragraph 1 of the union proposal (recognition) by stating that this "is fully covered by law by the Automobile Manufacturers Code and we always have and always will comply with it". In paragraph 5, the Nash Motor Company says: "full right of discipline and discharge shall remain with the company, but this right exercised with due regards to the interest of the employees." This paragraph which the Nash Company

refers to is the famous open shop clause in the Automobile Code which was agreed to by the NRA, Green, etc.

Thus the A. F. of L. officialdom deserted the 3,000 workers in the plant who were locked out, and betrayed the workers in the assembly line who were the first to go out on strike. The settlement does not say one word about the question of wages. Not a word about the gang system which is so despised by the workers. In fact, on this point, the A. F. of L. officials say that in view of the fact that industry everywhere is adopting the gang system, there is nothing that can be done about this in the Nash Motors. Time and half for over-time was completely thrown overboard. The same is true with the question of the rest period. The demand for the seven-hour day was just a fake because the Nash plant was working 35 hours a week before the strike.

Many of the workers going back into the factory are not yet clear as to the settlement. In the mass meeting itself there was a certain amount of opposition, but due to the confusion and the tactics of the A. F. of L. leaders, it was difficult to determine the exact number of those who voted "no".

### Lessons of the Strike

It is the task of the Party and the Auto Workers Union to continue to expose this flagrant betrayal of the A. F. of L. In the shop we must continue to raise the demands and grievances of the workers; to mobilize them for everyday struggles. The workers have demonstrated a willingness to fight and we can look forward to new struggles in the very near future. These struggles, however, must be under our leadership and not under the leadership of the A. F. of L. bureaucracy. The Party and our Union have shown themselves as the only true defenders of the interests of the workers in the strike and lockout. Many of the workers see this. The leaflet issued by the Auto Workers Union exposing the meaning of the settlement was received enthusiastically by the Nash workers. The so-called Red scare which the A. F. of L. attempted to create was not successful because of the correct line pursued by our Party. The fact that our comrades at strike meetings took the floor at every opportunity and pointed out to the workers the burning issues and exposed the A. F. of L. leadership, has created a great deal of sympathy inside the shop for the Auto Workers Union and the Party. As a result of our activity during the strike, we have helped to greatly discredit the company union in existence in Nash Motor Company.

The shop nucleus must continue its work from within, and must recruit some of the best elements into the Party. The Auto Workers Union can be built if it can properly mingle with the workers and put forward a daily program of action based upon the needs of the workers. The A. F. of L. has succeeded in misleading many of the workers in getting them to join it. The number that they claim is undoubtedly exaggerated. However, while we must continue to build the Auto Workers Union, a strong opposition group to work inside the A. F. of L. must be organized at the same time.

The Nash strike should arouse the Party in our District to the importance of shop work and to the possibility of leading economic struggles and building the revolutionary unions. Had our Party worked more diligently inside the Nash plant and carried on a more vigorous organizational campaign, there is no doubt that we would have been more certain of defeating the reactionary A. F. of L. officialdom and could have maintained the leadership of the strike from the start. The experiences in this strike prove the correctness of the Open Letter to our Party membership.

The Party and our unions will draw valuable lessons from this strike which can serve as a future guide to action.

## Improve the Fraction Work In the Mass Organizations

**I**MMEDIATELY after the Extraordinary Party Conference the Language Buros of the C. C. accepted the Open Letter with enthusiasm, discussed, and with practically no exceptions began to draw up plans of work in their particular sphere of activity.

To better enlighten the comrades in the key positions in the various mass organizations (fraternal, cultural, etc.) some of the buros called special fraction conferences at which the programs of work were discussed in the light of the Open Letter. The past activities were reviewed, the weaknesses discovered, and the new tasks determined.

Already at this conference, some of the buros could register some results on the concretization of the program, and analyze the experiences in their first steps of concentration (Yugoslavian, Greek, Armenian, Hungarian and other conferences). Some of these experiences were made known in the Party Life Column of the Daily Worker, for the purpose of stimulating the fractions in their activities

and making these experiences available to other fractions of language mass organizations.

In all discussions the comrades active in the mass organizations spoke without exception about the necessity of involving their organization in the daily struggle, of making the organizations instruments for reaching the workers of the basic industries, for building the unions, etc.

Hundreds, thousands of members of the language mass organizations not only accepted the Open Letter with enthusiasm, but were eager to concretize the plans of work, eager to be guided in the concentration work, and eager to become a factor for the penetration among the masses.

### Must Follow Up Control Tasks

After a month, after a good start, the Yugoslavian Buro of the C. C. is sounding the alarm, finding out that many of the fractions are either inactive, or are showing open opportunism and sectarian tendencies as in the case of Farrell, Pa., where the Party members have practically divorced themselves from the Yugoslavian workers who constitute a large portion of the steel workers in Farrell, or as in other places, are functioning very badly.

Such a situation, however, is not limited to the Yugoslavian field. We find, if not the same, a similar situation in other language fields. We must ask ourselves: how is it possible that after such a good beginning, after the special fraction conferences and tours, after a campaign of enlightenment in the language press, we did not move forward as we expected? Is it because the programs were wrong, because they were not based on the Open Letter? No. Many of the programs and especially the one worked out by the Yugoslavian Buro were good, basically correct, and because of this some of them were published in the *Daily Worker* as examples to be followed.

The first reason for the weak results is to be found in the failure to follow up and control the tasks, the failure to lead and help the fractions in their activities. The second reason is that while the programs were good, were discussed and the comrades from below were urged to work out their tasks accordingly, very little or no effort was made to simultaneously strengthen the fractions ideologically and organizationally. In many instances the District Committees, the Section Committees failed to check up on the activities of the fractions, especially in those districts where there is no continuity in the work of the language mass organizations or where these were simply abolished or disappeared.

It is because of lack of guidance, because of the fact that especially the new Party members are not clear on the

task of the fractions that some of the good results completely disappeared.

This was the case of the Greek clubs in Baltimore and Philadelphia which, after having grown into real mass organizations, are today reduced to merely paper organizations because of lack of guidance, of misunderstanding of the relationship between the Party and the mass organizations, and especially because of lack of enlightenment of the nature and tasks of the fractions. And these are not isolated cases.

### How to Improve Activities

What must be done to remedy this situation, to improve the activities of the fractions in the language mass organizations as a prerequisite for the concretization of the program of work?

1. Through the language press, through the Buros and the comrades in charge of guiding the fractions on a district and section scale, we must enlighten the comrades on the nature and tasks of the fractions.

2. Where the District language commissions are in existence they must work hand in hand with the Org. Commission, must go down and examine how the fractions are functioning, assist them, and not limit themselves to taking up the current problems with the language buros. Where there are no language commissions in existence they must be formed, or at least steps must be taken to put one of the members of the Org. Commission in charge of this important work.

3. The language commissions in connection with the Org. Department must determine how many and who of the comrades of the mass organizations are to compose the group of actives, having as their major Party task the work in the mass organizations.

The same process shall take place on a section scale, in regard to the locals and neighborhood organizations. While the fraction consists of all Party members in a given organization, the Party must make a distinction between those few comrades who are in the leadership—the real active ones—and those who are merely fraction members and need not be continuously occupied with work in their mass organizations. This procedure will prevent so many Party members in mass organizations from escaping the activities to which they are assigned by the units by giving the excuse that they are busy in the mass organizations.

4. The units from now on must demand a report from time to time from those comrades active in the mass organizations and also check up on their activities.

5. The language press, the buros and fractions must be mobilized to energetically conduct the recruiting drive among the sympathetic elements in the language mass organizations, among whom there are hundreds who are enthusiastically willing to follow the Party line, and make powerful instruments of the existing mass organizations for the reaching of the masses in the factories. —F. BROWN

## The First Month of the Recruiting Drive

**O**N the first of December, our Party began an intensive drive for new members. Our task in this recruiting drive was to strengthen our base in the factories, among the decisive elements of the American proletariat; to win for the Party workers from the concentration factories and industries and from the industrial, independent and A. F. of L. unions; to increase the number of Negroes in the Party, and to build new factory nuclei and strengthen the old ones, and to make the Party fractions function.

How were these tasks carried out in the first month of the drive? A total of 2100 were recruited, a gain of 25% over the previous month. The five concentration districts, New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Detroit recruited a total of 895 workers. 602 (68%) of these were unemployed. Only 32% are employed. Where was our major recruiting carried on during this month in these districts? The figures indicate that it was not in the concentration industries. A total of 201 (22%) were recruited in all five concentration districts from the concentration industries, and of this 201, only 83 are employed. 100 of these belong to unions—55% to the A. F. of L. and independent unions and 45% to the industrial unions. 88 of these 201 are native born and 17 are Negroes.

What conclusion can we draw from these figures? That the Party in these districts, while it has improved to a certain extent its work in the concentration industries, has not as yet linked up recruiting with its daily activity. Unless recruiting is made an inseparable part of all our work around and in the concentration factories, mines, etc., and in the unions of the concentration industry, we will not succeed in rooting our Party in the basic industries, and we will not make our Party the mass revolutionary Party which it must be if it is to lead the American working class in the struggles which it is facing in the immediate future.

For example, New York District has as its main concentration the marine industry. We know that work is

being carried on, led by the Party fraction in the Marine Workers Industrial Union, among the longshoremens in New York. Yet only one employed and 13 unemployed marine workers were recruited into the Party during a period of five weeks. The same situation exists in Detroit. Surely the 10 auto workers (only 2 employed) does not reflect the amount of activity and attention given by the entire district to work in the automobile industry! And can Chicago be satisfied to have their Party work in the concentration industries judged on the basis of 6 steel workers, 9 metal workers, 2 automobile and 2 unemployed packing house workers recruited? Was no railroad work carried on during this period in the Chicago district? Pittsburgh makes a better showing in this respect, recruiting 14 steel workers, and 49 miners, as does Cleveland, which, out of a total of 115, recruited 40 from the basic industries.

If we apply the same logic to our recruiting among Negro workers, we could only assume that the Party in the concentration district carries on no activity among the Negro masses. We know that this is not the case.

There is only one way to remedy this unsatisfactory situation. The PolBuro has decided to continue the drive until the Convention. We must at once cease considering recruiting as a task separate and apart from our every day activities. To win workers for our Party—workers from the basic industries,—American workers—Negro workers,—must be our first and last consideration in every task which we undertake. When we begin carrying out our work with this in mind, the recruiting figures which we present to the Convention will show a different picture.

## Meeting the "Red" Attack In Strike Struggles

**I**N nearly all struggles, and particularly strike struggles, which are led by unions affiliated to the Trade Union Unity League, and where the leadership consists of Communist Party members, inevitably the bosses raise the red scare in an effort to disrupt the strike and alienate the strikers from the leadership and the organization.

In every struggle which is conducted militantly and fearlessly the charges of "Communist inspired" and "Communist led" are a common occurrence.

The attitude taken by our comrades and the tactics resorted to often determine the success or failure of the employers when they raise the "red scare". Too often have our comrades followed a line of covering up and retreating in the face of the bosses' assault on the union and leader-

ship, of denying, etc., and finally winding up in swamp of opportunism in an effort to keep the union and strike in lily-white, simon-pure "American" lines. Too seldom do our comrades meet the red scare head-on, take the offensive and expose it to the workers. Too often the role of the Communist Party is deliberately hidden in the struggle and the revolutionary character of the strike, its leadership and the organization leading the strike are hidden because of an opportunistic fear that the workers will drop the union and strike, will desert the struggle and repudiate the leadership, if its Communist character becomes open and known. Undeniably this is a disease in the movement which appears in nearly every struggle.

### Lessons from New Mexico Strike

Some lessons from the strike of the miners in New Mexico in this regard are illuminating. How the comrades in N. M. met and defeated the red scare and came out of the struggle much stronger provides some interesting experiences for the entire movement.

In New Mexico the miners followed the leadership of the National Miners Union to victory, through an intense three-month struggle, which was conducted under conditions of severe repression, terror and practical illegality.

The coal operators even prior to the strike raised the red issue. The bosses were joined by the Chamber of Commerce, by the City Government of Gallup, by the Mayor, and by McGrady from Washington who added his support. At this time there was a tendency on the part of even leading comrades to cover up and crawl into a shell and merely to try to scoff away the bosses' attack. This was, for example, expressed in a lack of willingness to circulate the *Daily Worker* amongst the miners, to put out the *Labor Unity*, etc., because the *Daily* vigorously attacked and exposed the "New Deal", exposed the Roosevelt program, exposed the NRA, etc., and because the *Labor Unity* often referred to "revolutionary unions". The comrades thought if the miners saw the *Daily Worker* and *Labor Unity*, the attacks of the bosses would be given justification and the miners would desert us in hordes, because these miners were still deeply under the illusions and demagoguery of the NRA and Roosevelt. As a result the *D. W.* was kept hidden in an inside office of the union headquarters, while the opportunistic theory gained headway.

### Miners Liked the Daily

One day, however, one of the active union leaders from the M—mine, who was an enthusiastic supporter of the NRA and Roosevelt and who was considered "unripe" to be

approached for the Party (but who later became one of the most steadfast Party comrades) accidentally picked up a copy of the *Daily Worker*, read articles on the NRA and Roosevelt program, and from then on was very clear as to what the NRA and "New Deal" were all about. This experience somewhat convinced the Party comrades that the workers would not run from us in terror if they read the *Daily Worker*, whereupon the *Daily Worker* was systematically circulated. From the beginning the miners liked the *Daily* and considered it their own paper. The *D. W.* salesman had little difficulty in selling 100 to 150 copies daily to the strikers. Later, the *D. W.* could be found in every restaurant, pool-room and barber shop in town along with the capitalist daily papers.

In the period preceding the strike, while the enemy was raising the red scare far and wide, and our forces were doing little to combat it for fear of "repercussions", but had a tendency to shy off the issue, it was noticeable that the enemy was making progress in the N. M. U. ranks.

### Red Scare Combatted

When the strike was declared the red attack still continued. Now, however, the Party forces met the issue full force. When Mayor Watson, or McGrady, or General Wood, or the coal operators raised the red scare, the Party forces immediately responded by raising in turn the question: "who are the Communists and what do they stand for?" When Mr. Iden, head of the State Federation of Taxpayers came to the strike zone for the purpose of issuing a whitewashing report justifying the huge expenditure for troops and martial law, he condemned the strike as part of an international Communist conspiracy to overthrow the government. Iden's report was met by a campaign by the union leadership among the strikers as to the role, function and program of the Communist Party. Thousands of circulars were issued by the union to the strikers and workers answering every red attack, explaining the purposes of such attacks, the motives and reasons behind them, covering in detail the fighting class character of the N. M. U., which in itself explains why the bosses hate the N. M. U., and then explaining what the Communist Party stands for. These leaflets and statements were issued openly in the name of the Party. This brought the Party before the miners.

During martial law several mass meetings were permitted for various reasons by the militia. During the height of the red campaign of the bosses and city officials, a representative of the District Committee of the Party openly appeared before the strikers and explained the role of the Party in the struggle. The miners then knew the Party.

knew its role and program, because it came out openly to answer the slander and lies of the militia and bosses.

Throughout the strike there was always present in the strike district a representative of the District Committee of the Party, who guided, led and gave to the strike leadership the experiences of the Party. At the end of the strike, when the victory meeting was held, this representative appeared at the meeting and addressed the miners and was given a tremendous ovation.

When Major John Moore of the National Labor Board arrived in Gallup to "settle" the strike, he thought his task was relatively easy, because the military stockade was full of every leader of the strike and Moore was to deal with only plain miners from the picks, who constituted the Executive Board of the strikers. But Moore came to find that another force was present—the Party. Exasperated because the strikers firmly insisted upon certain demands, Moore shouted—"someone is giving you instructions." At another time he attacked the Communists, saying "you would sign if you would not listen to the Communists." He was answered by non-Communist strikers, "if you want to argue Communism, alright, if you want to argue the strike, that is alright too." At the first meeting with the strikers Moore had things pretty much his own way. But in the meantime the strike leadership consulted with representatives of the Party.

#### Party Building Responsible for Successful Strike

Another disease in the movement, which Comrade Browder sharply called attention to at the 17th Plenum, is that of failing to build the Party prior to and during the struggle, but leaving this until after the strikes. Such mistakes were made in the Utah strike. Learning from the Utah errors the New Mexico comrades at the outset resolved to establish the Party as a firm guarantee of militant leadership and correct strike tactics.

It can be said that without the Party in the Gallup struggle, new and raw as it was, no victory or sustained struggle would have been possible. The Party here functioned as a steel frame-work within the union and strikers' ranks, holding solid the ranks and leading the workers to victory. By development of the captain system in mining camps, local unions and among the strikers, close touch could be maintained by the Party and union leadership with the masses of the rank and file. The picketing was organized on the captain basis as well. Such measures made it possible for the Party and union leadership, functioning illegally, to keep in close touch, lead and direct militant mass and guerilla picketing.

# Party Organizer

Wenslow Collection

"Victory never comes alone. It must be bought. Good resolutions and declarations for the general Party line are a mere beginning. They merely show the desire for victory, but not victory. When the correct line is given, when the problem is correctly solved, success depends on organizational work, on organization of struggle for the materialization of the Party line, on the proper selection of people, on checking up, fulfillment of the leading body's decisions. Additionally, when the correct political line is given, organizational work decides all, including the fate of the political line itself, its fulfillment or its failure."—Stalin: REPORT TO SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS OF C. P. S. U.

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

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February, 1934

No. 2

## The Eighth National Convention of the C.P.U.S.A.

**T**HE Eighth Convention of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. will be held in Cleveland April 3rd to 8th. The discussion period in preparation for the convention has already begun. Every Wednesday the **Daily Worker** will carry a special "discussion supplement", which will form the basis for this discussion in the districts, sections and units. In addition, some districts will issue a special district discussion bulletin, in which the discussion is concretized and applied to the particular problems and tasks of each district.

This discussion, beginning with the 13th Plenum of the E.C.C.I., must very concretely review the entire work of the Party, with the whole membership. We must ask the questions: "How much of our concrete tasks have we carried out? Why have we failed to carry out certain tasks? Who is responsible for not carrying out these tasks?" And in finding the answers to these questions we must, not bureaucratically, but in a planned, organized way, draw the entire Party membership into the discussion. We must make every Party member, from the members of the Central Committee down to the newest member in the units, feel individual responsibility for carrying out these tasks.

The discussion of the resolution of the 13th Plenum of the E.C.C.I. must be organized and developed in every organization of the Party, particularly in the shop and street nuclei. This must be done in order that the membership of the Party will gain an understanding, not only of the immediate problems, of the routine questions of the Party, but a political understanding of the whole situation, internationally as well as nationally; in order that they will understand the tactics and strategy of the Party, the trade union policy of the Party, as well as all of the problems connected with the approaching war.

The discussion should not be confined to the Section and District Conventions, but should begin at once in the units, and should be led in the units by leading comrades from the sections and districts.

### Character of New Leading Committees

The National Convention, as well as the District and

Section Conventions will have the task of selecting the leadership for the coming period. Unit bureaus, unit officers, section committees, district committees, and bureaus as well as the Central Committee and Political Bureau will be elected at these conventions. The Open Letter has given us guidance both as to the character of the delegates to be elected to the conventions and the new leading committees. The Open Letter states:

As delegates to all Party conferences, section and district conferences, and above all to the Party Congress, there must be selected comrades who carry on active mass work and who have distinguished themselves in struggles.

"Every Party member, and especially every Party functionary, must be a real organizer of mass struggles in his particular sphere of work. From this standpoint, the Party must judge the activity of its functionaries and must choose its leading bodies. All leading bodies, especially those in the sections, must reorganize their work on the basis of the carrying out of the revolutionary mass work."

It is with this understanding and this approach that we must face the question of the renewal of the cadres and the question of the election of leading bodies. But in addition to this there are certain further specifications. This applies particularly to those sections where there still exists a division between those engaged in Party work and those engaged in mass and trade union work. This division must be overcome. We must elect on the section and district committees, as well as on the Central Committee, those comrades who are real links to the masses, who have real connections with the factory and street nuclei, comrades who as collective bodies will understand and fuse the general work of the Party with mass work, who will establish the leadership of the Party in this mass work.

### Aim of Convention

If we succeed in carrying out these two tasks; if we succeed in our discussion in connecting the 13th Plenum Resolution with the Open Letter and our control tasks, and thus make the Resolution understandable to all the workers; if we succeed in bringing to the workers a real understanding of war and fascism, and connect these problems up with our own trade union questions and all the tasks of the Party; if we succeed in drawing in the wide sections of the Party to solve the many problems which are indicated in the Resolution for the United States, and if we are able at these

Conventions to strengthen our leadership, in accordance with the directives in the Open Letter, the Convention will achieve the end stated by Comrade Browder at the 18th Central Committee Meeting:

"...the carrying through of the decisive turn to the development of a mass movement, mass organization and mass struggles in the United States under the leadership of the Communist Party, to consolidate a strong mass Bolshevik Party in the United States, to face the tasks which arise in this country, and to prepare the American workers for the seizure of power."

## Too Many Campaigns

*(Excerpt from speech of a leading comrade at the Central Committee meeting.)*

**P**ROTESTS are frequently received from the districts, which bitterly complain about their great difficulties because the Central Committee gives orders for central campaigns. They tell us that it is a burden on them, and prevents them from carrying out their work. To some extent these complaints are justified. But let us examine the situation and see what central political campaigns have been carried on during the past months.

There was a big campaign for the *Daily Worker*. It is true that this is a tremendous "burden" for the Party. But there is nothing more important than to make the *Daily Worker* financially secure. We have to carry this burden as long as it is necessary. Without a central organ we would not be a revolutionary Party. But if the *Daily Worker* had 100,000 readers, it would be a much better kind of a burden, and it would not be necessary to have a financial campaign twice a year to raise this money for the *Daily Worker*. Since we do not have so many readers, we must accept this burden. We can solve this problem. Let us secure 100,000 readers for the *Daily Worker*, and then we can make a concentrated financial drive for the *Daily*, which will not occupy the Party's attention for months and months. Let us use the same energy in the drive for circulation as we do in a drive for money, and we can soon eliminate this burden and use the efforts and the time which we have expended on this campaign for work which will be more effective politically.

### What Is Wrong With Campaigns?

There is, however, something wrong with our national

campaigns. It is not that we have too many campaigns. What is wrong? Our method of carrying on these campaigns is what creates difficulties in our districts. How do we lead such campaigns? The District Committee gets directives. They organize one or two big meetings or demonstrations, and that is usually the end of the campaign. This is typical of all districts. We have not yet learned that these various campaigns should be made a part of the regular activity of every section and unit, adapted to their particular territory and translated into action. The districts should utilize these campaigns to help the units and sections to develop initiative. For example, in Pittsburgh, where the Party has been concentrating for six months on the Jones and Laughlin plant, why could not the anti-Nazi campaign have been brought into this plant, connected with the struggle against the "Hitler" terror in the plant, as a part of the daily activity of the Party concentrating there? Or, in the mines, where we have been concentrating, or in the Ford factory, against Ford, who has financially supported Hitler and who rules his plant in fascist fashion? Why should it be so difficult to develop a campaign in these points of concentration, without groaning in despair over "another campaign"?

It is often necessary to organize special campaigns, as well as national actions, on the German question, on Cuba, on many questions. But we must learn how to coordinate these campaigns and make them an integral part of our every day work in the factories, in the A. F. of L. unions, in the mass organizations, in the neighborhoods, on the docks, on the ships, and wherever we have groups of Communists and sympathizers working.

### Develop Initiative of Lower Bodies

Our comrades, not only in the District leadership, but the comrades in the units and in the sections must learn to take their directives from the *Daily Worker* and to use their initiative in developing these actions. When the German campaign was initiated, a circular letter was sent to the Districts by the Central Committee. Then the *Daily Worker* appeared with an appeal to the districts, particularly calling upon the units and sections to initiate actions. This was not merely a polite plea. It was a directive from the Central Committee. The *Daily Worker* is the Central Organ of the Party, and when directives appear there, it is an order, and the comrades must carry it out. The district leadership must improve its work with the lower organizations, explain this to them, teach them not to wait for special directives from the District, but to immediately translate into concrete actions the directives in the *Daily Worker*. If we do not systematically educate the units now, we may find our-

selves in a more difficult situation, where the *Daily Worker* or perhaps only a leaflet, will be the only connection we have with the units. We must therefore have a guarantee that our comrades in the units and fractions will carry out the line of the Party by developing systematic activity on their own initiative. This is a difficult task, but in a time of increased struggles, in a time when we speak about approaching war and revolution, when we will have to meet increased attacks upon the Party, we must develop this kind of activity in connection with the general campaigns of the Party, as well as with special actions and struggles. Without developing firmness, and initiative in the lower units we are not building on firm ground.

If we carry on our campaigns, our whole activity, in this manner, if we help to develop the lower units, if all leading comrades are integral parts of the units, the comrades in the districts will not complain about too many campaigns, but will eagerly utilize each new campaign as a means of further developing the work which they have undertaken.

## Lessons of the Gloversville Tannery Strike

By L. LEWIS

**T**HE successful strike of the 2,000 leather workers in Gloversville offers important lessons for our Party. This struggle was led and organized by Party members. Its victory was only possible because the line of the Open Letter was actually put into practice, although some serious mistakes were made at the beginning, which were corrected in time.

The tanning of leather is the basic industry in the glove cities. The 2,000 workers employed in the industry perform the fundamental operation in the manufacture of leather gloves. It therefore affects 8,000 other workers in that community. The tannery owners are the actual political and economic rulers of Fulton County, which is known as the nest of the K.K.K. and other forces of fascism.

There are only about 10 Negroes in the trade. There is a vicious discrimination against the Negroes. Nevertheless, this chauvinism was broken down during the struggle, and one Negro worker was elected to the union's Executive Board.

The economic conditions of these workers were bad. Wages averaged around \$10 a week with a constant fear of being fired and no organization whatsoever.

The party unit which "existed" was practically isolated

from the leather and glove makers in spite of the resolutions and attempts made by the section leadership. Some of the leather workers belonged to an A. F. of L. union in 1920, but were sold out during a strike and the organizer broke the union by provoking discrimination of native workers against the Slovakian workers.

The glove manufacturing industry is organized into an A. F. of L. union with about 2,500 of the 4,000 in the trade. There was only one militant local union in the community, the Rabbit Dressers of the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union. These workers produce the skins for the fur-lined gloves in the county. This inspired a section of the glove industry, those cutting and making the fur linings, to seek organization for the improvement of their conditions. They looked up the N.T.W.I.U. local rather than the A. F. of L.

The fur workers were organized within one week and prepared for a strike. After four weeks of struggle, the 150 fur workers were victorious. They won a 50% increase in wages, union recognition, recognition of shop committees and equal division of work.

Although only 150 were involved in the strike (this is practically the lightest section of the glove industry), it had a tremendous effect on the leather workers. During the fur liners' strike contacts with leather workers were established through a C.P. member, a native-born leather worker who has prestige among the workers.

### Methods of Approach

Our contacts were mostly gained by personal friendship. We often had friendly chats (even with single workers) over a glass of beer, and at the same time discussed conditions of their respective shops.

These contacts were organized into shop groups, based on concrete issues of the shops or departments. Each group functioned without knowing of the existence of the others. After having established fourteen shop groups out of 36 mills, an open meeting was called, to which about 300 workers responded. These workers were mainly skilled and represented about 20 mills.

An A. F. of L. organizer came to the meeting and tried to hamstring the workers into the A. F. of L. However, this was successfully counteracted due to the preparatory work in the groups.

Officially, the work was carried on by the native comrade who was given personal guidance on how to carry out the policy for a class struggle union. His program was always enthusiastically accepted by the workers and he

gained high prestige. He was unanimously elected president of the union.

### Underestimation of the Readiness for Struggle on the Part of the Workers

The union grew rapidly. Four hundred members joined within one week, with committees established in 26 shops. In some shops the workers began to talk strike. However, the Section Conference held on Aug. 26th, in its resolutions, did not foresee the possibilities for struggle within the near future, but only the possibility of organization. I also shared this view.

On Oct. 3rd the workers of a department were discriminated against in an important shop. The spokesman of the shop committee in that mill was fired. All the workers of that mill struck in protest. The bosses of the other mills prepared for a lock-out for Monday, Oct. 9th. We counteracted these plans and called a meeting of all shop committees for Oct. 5th. The plans of the lock-out were exposed and we drew up demands to be presented to the employers.

The following morning committees were stationed at every mill to call the workers to a mass meeting. At this meeting the workers accepted the demands drawn up by the shop committees and unanimously voted to strike for these demands and thus counteract the plans for the lock-out.

We elected a strike committee of 120, representing every mill and department. However, these workers were totally inexperienced, as they had never participated in any previous struggles. The top leadership consisted of 11 members, who proved to be quite capable; but 6 of them were influenced by the priests and the N.R.A. and were extremely conservative. One of them proved to be a stool-pigeon.

The local N.R.A. stepped in. We were able to expose it because of its composition. Most of the members of the Compliance Board were directly connected with the tannery employers. However, I failed to convince the workers of the character of the National Labor Board, which is in no way different from the local one, and thereby helped to continue the illusions about the N.R.A. This was the worst opportunist mistake in the strike.

### Bringing the Party Forward and Combatting the Red Scare

It is true that the time was short to enable us to prepare the workers ideologically against the red scare. Nevertheless, even this was not utilized enough and the Party was not brought forward, with the exception of 2 leaflets

issued by the section and the distribution of some Daily Workers in an ineffective way.

As a matter of fact, when Ben Gold came to speak, he did not speak in his own name, hiding the revolutionary significance of his name.

The N.R.A. mediator, assisted by the Labor Board, opened a vicious attack on the outsiders, mobilized the local press, met with the owners, told them that shop committees was a Russian method, plotted with the Mayor and Chief of Police to take the representative of the N.T.W.I.U. for a ride and destroyed the youth group which was organized. The local press viciously started a campaign that the strike would be settled within 24 hours, if the outsiders leave. This campaign penetrated and influenced part of the workers and especially part of the leadership. The top leadership, by a majority of one, decided that we leave town. They threatened a split in the union.

Before we withdrew, we made clear to the workers that the bosses are using this issue merely as an excuse to eliminate leaders and to break the strike.

I was forced to carry on the work underground in a neighboring town through the connection of the party member and the militant group which was organized. Workers fought militantly for rank and file committees and mass picketing. Our organized group was able to expose the lies of the bosses and the N.R.A. and after 2 weeks, putting up a militant fight, a campaign was created in the union by the rank and file for my return.

### Bringing Forward the Party

After my return to town, in spite of the terror, the workers destroyed the red scare, because the Party was brought forward by explaining the role of the Party in the struggles of the workers. The workers convinced themselves why the N.R.A. and the employers fought against the Communists. It was then that the militancy of the workers intensified in a great fight against the terror. The workers disarmed the Burns detectives, the deputy sheriffs, smashed the windows in the mills, broke the injunction by tremendous mass picketing and went in mass delegations to the Mayor and Chief of Police, warning them that they will be held responsible for my safety, after my life was threatened. Also, we succeeded in establishing a united front with the A. F. of L. glove workers who adopted resolutions for the strike.

Thus, after 7 weeks of militant struggle, the workers won the following:

1. Recognition of the Union;

2. Recognition of shop committees;
3. Increases in wages of between 20 and 30%;
4. The organization grew from 600 members before the strike to 1,700 members after the strike.

This victory of the workers was made possible because of the following reasons:

1. Because the strike was organized and not spontaneous; we were thus able to eliminate A. F. of L. forces which came in during the early stage of the strike.
2. The organization of mass committees, based on the shops and the free, unbureaucratic approach.
3. The thorough exposure of the N.R.A. and meeting the red scare by discussing openly the role of the Party in the latter part of the strike.
4. Building the Party through individual contacts in the strike which served as a group to carry out the strike policy, although these workers were not taken into the Party at that time, but joined the Party right after the strike.

While there were only 2 Party members before the strike, there are 12 now. From 5 readers of the Daily Worker, there are 60 steady readers in the mills. These numbers are growing. The papers are coming directly to workers employed in the mills.

5. By establishing a real united front with the workers on the basis of concrete issues and grievances in the mills, notwithstanding the fact that most of these workers were members of the American Legion, and some ex-members of the K.K.K., religious, or belonging to other organizations of a fascist character.

The same workers who were ready to lynch a Communist before the strike, were ready now to defend the Communist leaders, even with their rifles, against any attack. As one of these workers said, "If we want to have a strong union, we must have at least five Communists in every mill."

6. The drawing in of the women into the strike by establishing a women's auxiliary of the wives and daughters of the strikers.

### Communists Can Lead Struggles of the Workers

1. The strike also proved that Communists can lead strikes.
2. That we have underestimated the readiness of the masses to struggle, that, we did not believe that these backward workers will stay on strike for seven weeks. This resulted in going to the N.R.A. and other opportunistic tendencies.

There are big perspectives for the building of the Party, and the life of the union will depend on how strongly we build the Party in that region. The strike has also awakened the political consciousness of the workers and they are now speaking of an independent ticket in the next elections. Our orientation must be to prepare for a real political campaign.

Our immediate steps must be the cementing of the united front with the glove workers A. F. of L. union, the N.T.W. I.U. and the Rabbit Dressers union to build a Labor Council in the county. This must be closely watched and opportunist mistakes must be guarded against. We must draw the most militant elements into the leadership of this body with a strong organized Party fraction that will give leadership to the coming struggles of the workers in this community.

## Political Education In Mass Organizations

By SIDNEY BLOOMFIELD

**T**HE value of political education is greatly underestimated by the leading comrades in the revolutionary trade unions. Some of them are so inattentive to the need for education that any kind or number of appeals for action affect them in the same way as water on a duck's back.

Our organizations are constantly involved in struggles and are forced to smash through the many traps set for the workers. Our leaders are forced to overcome all sorts of misleaders and demagogy in the labor movement. Shop problems, unemployment, social, cultural and general problems in the life of the workers call for attention and solution.

Even the purely trade and economic questions require a wide range of understanding and ability on the part of our leaders. As the class struggle sharpens the problems multiply. Yet, what are the functionaries doing to prepare the rank and file to become leaders of the working class? The usual method is that of going along the purely "practical" activity. Workers are appointed on all kinds of committees, which in itself is very good and basically necessary. In most cases committees are left to flounder about with little guidance and training. The result is that they either "sink or swim". Many good workers "crack up" under the strain and confusion because they lack a firm sense of essential and basic revolutionary theory. Many serious and costly mistakes are made in the course of the "practical" bitter experience, simply because the leading functionaries

are involved in more than is humanly possible to handle.

As for the wide masses of workers, the nearest they get to enlightenment is in an occasional mass meeting. A still smaller proportion read revolutionary literature and attend union meetings. The top layers of active workers get almost no time to study and prepare themselves for better leadership, while the wide masses are neglected almost completely in so far as reaching them with political education.

What does such a situation lead to? Backwardness, dragging behind events, and inability to maintain ideological and organizational influence and leadership over wider sections of the masses. Such conditions leave us to the destinies of the blind and spontaneous though militant actions of the masses. Hence in many cases the workers fall victims of the vilest demagogy of the agents of the capitalist class. To continue such relations with the masses is not a fulfillment of our responsibilities as class (political) leaders of the working class, because we do not help the masses to become class (politically) conscious. This is what Lenin called Economism, Tail-endism, which gives way to the spontaneous, un-planned, un-directed and non-conscious actions of the masses.

Lenin never tired of fighting such attitudes in the working class movement, because he saw the danger for the working class in such theories and practices. As far back as 1902, in his book *What Is To Be Done?* Lenin pointed out that such attitudes towards the workers merely abandon the masses to the capitalist ideological poison that is dished out to the proletariat through all avenues of information and culture of the ruling class.

"But why," writes Lenin, "the reader will ask, does the spontaneous movement, the movement along the line of least resistance, lead to the domination of bourgeois ideology? For the simple reason that bourgeois ideology is more fully developed and because it possesses immeasurably more opportunities for becoming widespread. And the younger the Socialist [at that time there was not yet a Communist movement.—S.B.] movement is in any given country, the more vigorously must it fight against all attempts to entrench non-Socialist ideology, and the more strongly must it warn the workers against those bad counsellors who shout against 'exaggerating the 'conscious elements', etc."

Replying to the Economists who could not stand Lenin's withering attacks upon their "practicalness", Lenin continued:

"The authors of the Economic Letter, in unison with Rabocheye Dyclo, [the paper of the Economists.—S.B.] declaim against the intolerance that is characteristic of the

infancy of the movement. To this we reply: yes, our movement is indeed in its infancy, and in order that it may grow up the quicker, it must become infected with intolerance against all those who retard its growth by subservience to spontaneity. Nothing is so ridiculous and harmful as pretending that we are 'old hands' who have long ago experienced all the decisive episodes of the struggle!"

### Educational Work Neglected By Trade Unions

Some of the examples of the Economist attitude on the part of our functionaries in the trade union and other mass organizations in New York can be seen from the following: After much prodding to get action from the leadership of the Food Workers Industrial Union to organize the education of its members, the Workers School arranged with their educational director and sent credentials for them, so they would be enabled to go to the Workers School on reduced rates. This was done many weeks before the school term started.

Time went on and we kept inquiring at the union about the delayed action. About four days before school started, their educational director asked at the school why we did nothing to aid the union membership to go to the Workers School. Upon hearing this we called up the union and spoke to the General Secretary. His reply was that the credentials were received but due to the pressure of "practical" activities nothing was done.

When I asked him why the credentials were not turned over to the educational committee, he replied that "this is not a communications union," whatever that means. About four weeks before the present (Winter) term, we visited the office of the Food Workers Industrial Union and raised the question again, but this time, both comrades—and—of the Cafeteria Section merely shrugged their shoulders and gave a similar excuse as at the previous term—"Practical" work!

About two and a half weeks before the present term, long after credentials had been sent to them, I appeared before the fraction of the Shoe Workers Union. This was after many rank and file shoe workers were being propagandized by us to raise the question of workers' education in the union. At the fraction meeting with more than a hundred Party members of the union present, I proposed, in behalf of the Workers School, that the fraction should arrange to have the union elect a committee for the purpose of meeting with the Workers School administration to devise ways and means to facilitate enrollment of union members for important courses at extremely low rates,

out of consideration of the fact that many shoe workers have been in many struggles and are not able to pay the full fee.

The amalgamation of the Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union with a group of other such unions makes it necessary for us to give leadership to the new members as well as to the shoe workers in the industry as a whole. The proposals were enthusiastically received by the meetings, yet in spite of the repeated insistence upon my part, the chairman, a Party member of long standing, refused to put the question before the fraction for a vote. A comrade (member of the union) confirmed my suspicion when later he told me that the reason the chairman refused to put the matter to a vote at the fraction meeting was because he feared it would entail some activity upon the part of the functionaries to carry out the decision. And yet no one got up to criticize such arbitrary and bureaucratic action of the chairman.

In the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union, the officials were besieged by young workers, who begged their help to get into the Workers School for the Fall term, only to be discouraged. It was only after writing several articles in the Daily Worker mentioning this situation, and after sending a sharp letter to the leadership of the union that a little action was obtained. Three classes were later organized by the union with the aid of the Workers School as a result of this prodding.

### "Practical" Work Prevents Training of Cadres

Such instances can be multiplied and practically every union and league comes within the scope of this criticism. The rank and file are anxious for revolutionary education but many of the functionaries are so much concerned about the "practical" work that they cannot see the practicality of carrying on one of the most practical forms of activity, which is education and training the rank and file to rise to leadership of the working class.

Many of our leading functionaries who cannot see the practical importance of revolutionary education should ponder over these words written by Frederick Engels in his preface to his book, *The Peasant Wars In Germany*:

"Without a sense for theory, scientific Socialism would have never become blood and tissue of the workers . . . It is the specified duty of the leaders to gain an ever-clearer understanding of the theoretical problems, to free themselves more and more from the influence of traditional phrases inherited from the old conception of the world, and constantly to keep in mind that Social-

ism, having become a science, demands the same treatment as every other science—it must be studied. The task of the leaders will be to bring understanding, thus acquired and clarified, to the working masses, to spread it with increased enthusiasm, to close the ranks of the party organizations and of the labor unions with ever-greater energy..."

The Central Council of the R.I.L.U., in recognizing the conditions of backwardness in our trade union movement in respect to the problem of theoretical development of the rank and file and promoting them to positions of leadership, went so far as to call for removal from position of responsibility of those who stood in the way or could not fulfill the requirements of leadership, a great part of which is also the problem of self re-education, the organization of schools, classes, etc.

The barriers set up in the mass organizations by the functionaries must be broken down. These organizations must be reached even if it has to be done through the rank and file by insisting that this problem be raised in the membership meetings. The attitude of Economism must be burned out of our organizations with a hot iron. We must make our leading functionaries understand fully what Lenin meant when he wrote that "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement", and understanding this we must demand action for mass education in the mass organizations.

## Building the Opposition In the U.M.W.A.

By TONY ———

**T**HE organization of the opposition in the United Mine Workers in Westmoreland County has lessons for the other counties and districts. Here, by picking out one of the grievances in a mine, the miners turned this into a broad opposition to the operators and the Lewis machine.

Under the NRA the Westmoreland Coal Company decided not to pay for dead work (extra work) in their mines. At the same time they did pay for this in some of the mines. In order to bring this condition about in all the mines, a meeting of the bosses was held. They decided to take away all conditions from the miners.

The company then told the miners at the Biddle mine of the Westmoreland Coal Co., that they would no longer pay for putting up cross bars. This was taken up at the

meeting of the U.M.W.A. local. The pit committee was instructed to fight for pay for this work. The committee then went to visit the leaders of the U.M.W.A. in that district. But these leaders would not help them fight for their grievance.

The local union then decided that the pit committee visit the other locals of the Westmoreland Coal Company mines, and call a meeting of delegates of these locals to discuss this and other grievances. This was done. In doing this, the conditions of mines of other companies were also taken up. At this meeting the action of the U.M.W.A. leaders was discussed, connected with the actions of Lewis and the NRA.

The miners decided to call another meeting of delegates or officers of the other local unions. This meeting was held and many of the locals in the district were represented. There most of the problems of the miners were taken up. They also decided to hold two meetings a month at which they would take up the conditions and problems of the miners. The meetings were to be held in different mining towns, so that all of the locals would be represented. They also broadened out their discussions.

The coming convention of the U.M.W.A. was taken up. Resolutions were introduced and adopted. They embodied all of the points in the fight against Lewis, the coal operators and the NRA. The delegates were also instructed by this conference to support all of these resolutions. This has now become the opposition conference for Westmoreland County.

While the left-wing miners were not instrumental in organizing this, they had a correct approach to these meetings from the first. Now they are organizing their forces to bring greater clarity and understanding to these miners on all problems against Lewis, the operators and the NRA.

At one time in the organization of this opposition movement the left-wing miners were making a big mistake. They called a meeting of oppositional miners to take up a program for the opposition conference. This would have been a big mistake. The miners would not have understood the need and purposes of such a meeting.

They would have raised the question that someone was calling a meeting to "put something over on them." This would have isolated the left wingers from the broad movement against Lewis.

The correct way to work is to recognize the broad movement as one against Lewis, to keep raising the conditions of the miners and to connect this with the conditions of the other fields and industries. At the same time the communists and close sympathizers should get together and discuss the program for these meetings and give it the necessary leadership. This is now being done. This is especially

necessary because some of the would-be leaders of this opposition are in reality for Lewis.

The organization of this movement in Westmoreland County should be a lesson for the Communist and left-wing miners in the other districts. They should take steps to organize similar movements.

## Some of the Aspects of Our Financial System and Our Financial Policies

By W. WEINER

**W**E have had in the past a sort of contempt for the question of finances and we have regarded the matter as unimportant and non-political. At the Extraordinary Party Conference this question was taken up quite seriously in a special section of the document issued by the Conference and also in the report of Comrade Browder. At the last Plenum this matter was again in some respect mentioned. Let us examine briefly how, in the light of the report of Comrade Browder at the Extraordinary Party Conference, as well as in the light of the document issued by the Conference, this phase of the work has been carried out and the outstanding weaknesses corrected.

In the Center we have meagre information upon which we can base this report. We still treat the question of finances in our Party as something separate and apart from the basic work in the districts and in the Party generally. We still treat the question of finances as a matter of getting a dollar, five dollars or a hundred dollars to meet certain emergencies, and we do not yet sufficiently realize that this question of finances affects our mass work, our mass agitation and educational work, our developing and preservation of cadres. I can illustrate with a few examples, how it really affects every phase of our work.

Comrade Browder in his report at the Extraordinary Party Conference laid down certain basic lines along which we can solve some of these problems. What are they? The most important were the following: first, a real attempt to overcome the financial laxness in our Party by a more responsible attitude to the finances of our mass organizations, as well as the finances of our Party; second, to bring about a situation in which the main bulk of our money is spent for mass work, for educational work, and not for maintaining apparatuses; third, to broaden out the financial base of our Party in the course of extending our mass work; fourth, to establish a properly functioning financial apparatus—a small one—a comrade, a trustworthy, tried comrade, who will be in

charge with a small, very responsible committee to take care of this work; and last, but not least, a strict system of accounting.

### Financial Integrity Increasing

Now, in the light of this line, what has been done? From my observation, I may state that as far as our attitude to the financial integrity of our mass organizations, there has been a marked improvement. There is a better relationship now between many sections of our Party districts and the mass organizations. Everything is not yet perfect. There still is friction here and there, there are still attempts in some cases to fleece these mass organizations, but on the whole, considerable improvements have been made. There is more responsibility on the question of money that belongs to the *Daily Worker* or to literature, but I must also make the statement that here and there we meet resentment on the part of leading comrades when we tell them that they have to pay for bundle orders of the *Daily Worker*, or any other money belonging to the paper, or money they owe for literature. However, there is an improvement also in this.

### Small Mass Base for Finances

However, when we come to the question of broadening the mass base of getting finances, we find we have made hardly any progress. We have not received financial reports from all districts. But we have some financial reports from some districts and what do they show? First of all, they show that the income of our districts is very small. If you take a district like Buffalo, which has grown in membership in the last few months, which has developed considerable mass work, etc., you see that they operate on a budget of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty dollars a month for the maintenance of all the functionaries they have in the District Office, for developing mass work, for issuing mass literature, etc. You have a district like Minnesota, where they operate on as narrow a basis with an income of one hundred to one hundred and fifty dollars a month.

Even if you take Chicago, one of our largest districts, you find that it is one of the few districts that at the beginning of the year 1933 attempted to work out a budget, and plan its finances. However, the income does not come up to the expectations and they must cut certain expenses that they have allotted to certain mass activities. And Chicago is not the worst district. I take this because it is one of the best examples. In the month of September the budget called for an expenditure of one hundred twenty-five dollars for printing. I presume printing of leaflets to the workers, etc. Well,

they had to save, so they cut out printing altogether. They had an item in the budget, a subsidy to the YCL, twenty dollars. They did not have enough maney so they cut out this. Then they had another item, a subsidy to the most important concentration points in the Chicago district, Southern Illinois and the stock yards. This should have amounted to one hundred dollars. They gave Southern Illinois sixteen dollars and fifteen cents and two dollars to the stockyards. Forty dollars was supposed to go to the T. U. U. L but they did not get a cent.

### Concentration Work Weakened by Bad Financial Situation

What does this show? It shows that it is impossible to carry out our policy of concentration, our policy with regard to entrenching ourselves in the basic industries, to a satisfactory degree, without at the same time solving this financial problem. We cannot blame the district. They did not have the money. But the fact of the matter is that the concentration work—the work in the stock yards and Southern Illinois suffers. If we examine some of the other districts with respect to mass agitation, we find the same thing. For instance, Buffalo in October did not spend a single nickel for printing, and wherever there is printing it is in connection with some affair, tickets, announcements, etc. There was no money spent on the printing of mass literature. We may say some of the responsibility of this mass agitation has been shifted to the sections recently, but the sections are still woefully weak and do not issue sufficient mass agitational literature; and when the districts send in report after report without anything listed as expenditures for printing, it is evident that our mass agitation, the explaining of our program and policies to the workers, which is impossible without printed material, is very weak.

Or, let us look at Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh is the only district that sent a report to the Center at our request, at the beginning of December, for the last eight months of 1933, giving the comparative expenses on the last three months of the year, together with some orientation on the budget for 1934, and we find that most of the money collected is spent on the maintaining of the apparatus, rent, postage, etc., and very little on agitational expenses. In comparison with the other districts, Pittsburgh is one of the best in this respect. However, for 9 months they spent only eighty-nine dollars for agitational expenses. This is a very serious situation which can be corrected only on the basis of really broadening out the financial base of our Party, of finding new methods of raising finances and methods of going to the workers and appealing for money.

This bad financial situation not only leads to a weakening of the concentration work but in some respects destroys our cadres.

We know of many instances where organizers take sick because they have no money to live on. We have also had some occasions recently of what we might call petty-larceny, where comrades are forced to take a few dollars from literature or other funds in order to live and we have had some expulsions in this regard in order to instill financial responsibility. But what is really responsible for this situation? The fact that the comrades cannot live. The district is primarily responsible, but the center must also take some of this blame, because no steps are taken to create the financial basis for the comrades to live. In this respect we also fail in the organization of schools, section and even unit schools.

With respect to accounting, we do not get reports from all districts, but it is very doubtful whether the financial system of reporting which was taken up and outlined so well in the Extraordinary Conference is being put into effect. We examined Buffalo and Boston, to which our accountants went. A very bad situation existed in these districts in respect to accounting and control. In Boston, for instance, the accountant tells us that until September 16th, no attempt at all was made to keep books on the Daily Worker and no record of expenditures or receipts was kept. With respect to the Party office itself, the accountant said the following:

"The bookkeeping system in the District Office was not satisfactorily maintained. This inefficiency is primarily due to the fact that the leading comrades underestimate the importance of keeping financial records in perfect order."

They do not think it political enough, important enough, to keep financial records and account for every cent taken in. Also, in Boston, out of an income of \$1400, the I.L.D. spent \$1180 for administrative expenses. In order to spend so much money for administrative expenses they had to use money collected for prisoners' relief, anti-deportation campaign, money collected for a special fund and, yes, for Scottsboro!

### More System and Planning Needed

There is no cure-all remedy as to how to broaden out our very narrow financial base, but there are some things which the districts fail to do. Literature, apart from its financial income, has a tremendous agitational and political value for the Party. But even from the point of view of finances, the district should be interested in this also. New York has

developed this to the extent that it subsidizes all sorts of Party work with this method. Literature departments and book stores have been established out of the profits in various sections. New York has sold \$6500 worth of literature, in comparison with Chicago, which sold only \$405 worth, and, naturally, there cannot be any money out of this for other work. On the contrary, they had to borrow money to pay a bill to the Workers Library Publishers. Is it so difficult to develop a mass sale of literature?

Another instance—there is a special film agency organized to supply our districts and organizations with Soviet movies, which also are of great propaganda value for our movement in the United States. At the same time it can bring in money. What do we find? The districts wake up to the existence of this agency only when they send a protest about the Trotskyites and Lovestoneites getting pictures. The fact of the matter is that all kinds of organizations avail themselves of this opportunity of making money. The S.P. and the S.L.P. locals do it. But our Party is not doing it. The F.M.A. in Illinois made from \$100 to \$150 a week for several weeks from showing these films.

The most important thing is that we can build up a very large sustaining fund for the Party. We must learn from the last *Daily Worker* drive. The *Daily Worker* at the conclusion of the drive, announced that from eighteen to nineteen thousand workers participated in this campaign. This is incorrect. At least from sixty to eighty thousand either participated actively or gave funds to help the *Daily Worker*. What does this mean? It means that there are thousands of workers who are not in our Party or even in our mass organizations, but who are sufficiently sympathetic to support our press, and support our Party financially. In August the center sent out directives with regard to the establishing of a sustaining fund. Most of the districts not only forgot about this document but never even read it. It is true that the Center is responsible for not explaining it and not pushing it. We can reach tens of thousands of workers and sympathizers who will donate regularly and who will help the Party to carry out its mass work. We must have more system and planning in the matter of finances.

## The Utilization of the Party Press— The Development of Cadres

*(Excerpts from speech of Comrade Peters,  
to Central Committee Meeting.)*

**T**HE directives of the Central Committee today to the lower organizations, to the districts, sections and units, are

given through the *Daily Worker*. The editorials and articles in the *Daily Worker* are the editorials and the articles of the Central Committee. If Comrade Amter writes an article about the C.W.A., this is not Comrade Amter's articles, it is the PolBuro's article. If Comrade Hathaway writes an article, it is not Comrade Hathaway's personal article, it is an article expressing the opinion of the PolBuro, and giving the leadership of the PolBuro to the Party.

How do we utilize the *Daily Worker* today? To a large extent, our membership is not aware of the fact that through the *Daily Worker*, the Central Committee gives daily political guidance and even organizational directives. Many of these articles, many of these editorials, are simply shelved and filed, without being considered, and sometimes not even being read, not only by the unit and section leadership, but even by the district leadership. That is why it is possible to have inquiries from certain districts, three months after the Anti-War Congress, asking, "What kind of a committee is this anti-war committee? We do not know anything about it. You did not send any directives."

A situation may arise when the Central Committee can speak to the membership only through the press, when the political line can be given only through the press. If the comrades do not learn to use the press today, then, in such a situation, the membership will be disconnected politically from the leadership of the Party.

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## Reserve Cadres Must Be Prepared

The Open Letter and the control tasks dealing with concentration say: "We have to strengthen the leading cadres in these plants and guarantee capable leadership of these selected units and sections." In another place the Open Letter says: "It is necessary to develop a strong corps of proletarian cadres experienced in mass work and establish collective leadership of sections and tried secretaries in the units."

Let us consider what it means to lack forces and to lack cadres. In Germany thousands of our functionaries are in concentration camps, hundreds were executed, tortured, taken away from the Party. If the German Party had not been able to replace these leaders, if it had not already prepared in advance reserve cadres, it would not be able now to carry on its heroic struggle, and to give leadership to the German working class. But the German Communist Party, because it understood in advance what it means to develop its forces, had thousands and thousands of comrades who were ready to step into the place of the arrested comrades.

Let us examine our own situation in regard to our cadres today. We can state that in the recent period we have

succeeded in stabilizing our forces to some extent. There is less shifting of our cadres from one place to another. In certain districts and sections we have established leaders who have grown up in the struggles, and we do not, as in the past, take them from this place, where they are known, and where they have developed, and send them to some other place. We have more local leaders in the unions. In the textile, marine and mining conferences we saw how the new forces are coming forward, how they are really developing leadership in the basic industries all over the country. The same is true in the unemployed movement.

### Bad Practices

However, in some districts and even in the center we have examples which show that we have not entirely overcome our bad practices. For example, a comrade is removed from a certain post because he failed on the job, or made certain political blunders which could not be corrected. What do we do with this comrade? He is placed in another post almost as responsible as the one from which he was removed.

The second weakness, which is one of the main problems before the Party, is that we place in responsible work forces which are not sufficiently proved and tried. We do not check up sufficiently when we assign comrades to work,—where he came from, who he is, how did he carry on the work previously. He becomes a leader, and often we do not know whether he is a tried and reliable comrade who should be leading responsible work.

We have experiences where in important Party offices, we place technical forces without any discrimination.

We have examples where spies can come into such offices and get the addresses of the members of the organization easily. For instance, someone volunteered his services to the W.I.R. The comrades were very glad to accept the offer of voluntary work, without investigation. Within two or three weeks a couple of hundred dollars were stolen from the envelopes that came into this office, by this willing volunteer. Many of our offices are careless in this respect. Anyone who is willing to work without pay, can work in many of our organizations.

The third basic weakness of the Party in respect to cadres is the demoralization of our forces because of the lack of support from the Party committee which assigns him to work. Every district can offer examples to prove this point. In one particular case a comrade was assigned to carry on certain work. He did his work, and then because he was starving, he asked to be released. The leading comrades quoted Lenin on Bolshevik discipline and forced him to remain. As a result this comrade deserted his post and was expelled

from the Party as a deserter. Now, this comrade was not a steeled Bolshevik. He was weak. But if the District at the first sign of demoralization had considered the problem, and had permitted him to go to work, this comrade would have been saved for the Party.

### No Time Can Be Lost!

We must bear in mind that our time is very short. We cannot lose a minute in developing the new forces. Comrade Lenin says:

"Revolutionary epochs are to the social-democrats the same as wartime to the army. We must expand the cadres of our army, from peace contingents the reserve forces must be mobilized, the men on furlough must be called to the colors, new auxiliary corps, detachments and services must be set up. One must not forget that in wartime it is inevitable and necessary to replenish one's ranks by raw recruits, frequently replace officers by rank and file soldiers, accelerate and simplify the promotion of soldiers to officers' ranks."

We have to very boldly bring forward the best elements in the Party to leadership, and no time can be lost. We must organize schools,—not only full time schools where we take the workers out of the factories, but evening schools, where after work they can come to school, learn, and then go back to the factory and be the leaders of the workers in the factory. We must train forces from the unions and mass organizations, and first and foremost from the native-born elements. Especially must we train forces from among the women. The Thesis of the 13th Plenum of the E.C.C.I. points out the importance of developing women cadres, because of the approaching war. When the men are sent to the front, the women will remain here, and will have to carry much of the responsibility. We must develop forces among the Negroes, among the youth and among the colonial workers in America. These are the categories on which we have to concentrate in the shortest possible time.

It is necessary to pay more attention to the comrades who have already received training, and who are engaged in work. They must be supplied with all the literature of our Party. We must follow their activity, watch their development, give them guidance and assistance, and help them really to develop into mass leaders.

## Training Forces In the Chicago District

By BEATRICE SHIELDS

**L**ENIN stated that some comrades do not see the forest for the trees, referring to the question of forces. The constant refrain at all Plenums and meetings is, "We have no forces." This comes from the sections and leadership in the mass organizations—from all directions.

It is about time this refrain is changed. What is the good of constant complaint if opportunities and facilities to develop and train cadres are not utilized?

There are plenty of forces in the ranks of the Party and mass organizations, in the working class. In times of struggle we have seen leaders arise from among the workers, and in places where attention is paid to this problem good results are obtained. Generally speaking, what do we do with new workers who come into our ranks? Do we consciously concentrate on each individual in an effort to build, develop and strengthen these potential leaders? As a rule, we don't. We rely too much on spontaneity. There is a deep division between theory and practice. Workers will of themselves want and desire to fight. The deepening of the crisis has radicalized them and they are ready for action. Workers will organize into trade unions, but cannot of themselves develop class consciousness or become Communist leaders. Leaders must be built, trained and armed with revolutionary theory and experiences of the international working class movement.

We hear very frequent complaints that the reason for the lack of sufficient work in the trade unions and shops is due to the low political level of our units, that our units do not understand the Open Letter. But merely recognizing the fact does not change the situation. We cannot continue to treat our Party membership as a mass—as backward. The workers joined our Party because they were ready to participate in its life and struggles and desired to carry out its program. The duty of the Party is to make Communists of them—to teach them our program and how to carry it out. Our duty is to give leadership and guidance in their daily work in order to improve our basic work of the Party.

How to solve this problem is the burning issue before us. The Party will not move forward quickly enough unless every Communist becomes a conscious moving force among the masses. Too few of our comrades can convincingly bring the line of the Party before the workers. Every Party member among the masses should be so trained that he will be able to spread the influence of the Party, to gain

the confidence of the masses, to develop and lead struggles for their demands.

Repeated decisions have been made to change the life of the units, to organize the agendas so as to have weekly discussion, politicalizing the tasks and break the deadly routine and mechanical procedure. With reference to unit discussions, for instance, decisions have been made to have section supplements to District outlines which will focus the attention and make the connection between the general tasks and political explanations with the concrete work of concentration facing the sections and units. These decisions were carried out in some sections with great results, but as yet the decisions have not affected the lives of every unit.

### Lack of Systematic Leadership

Why were the decisions not carried out by all sections? The leadership in few sections remained stable. Every few weeks there are changes in the sections. New agitprop directors are always starting from the beginning. By the time the comrade gets some work started, he is withdrawn for something else. The result of this shifting is that the leadership in the sections is narrow, mostly confined to the Section Organizer alone. How can one expect a Section Agitprop Director, who is not given an opportunity to carry out his own decisions, to improve the life of the units? In some cases the Section Agitprop Director does not function as an agitprop director at all. He is a sort of general technical worker and completes details that the organizer leaves undone. The life of the units will be improved only with systematic follow-up of decisions and constant attention. The duty of an Agitprop Director is to concentrate his work in line with the general plan of concentration, on the agitation-propaganda work of the sections and units and all assistance must be given him by the Section Committee to carry out this work properly.

### Schools

The response of the mass organizations to the winter term of the Chicago Workers School is an outstanding example that our leading comrades still indulge in words about forces, but take little steps to develop them. The splendid opportunity given by the Chicago Workers School was not utilized. The schedule of the winter term was so organized as to fit into the program of work of the sections and mass organizations. The courses were designed to give immediate assistance to the units, sections and fractions.

No effort was spared to popularize the school and the courses in the mass organizations and Party. Detailed booklets, describing each course, were issued. Special meetings with the agitprop directors of the sections and special

letters to the units explaining the connection of the courses with the Open Letter and their basic tasks were sent out. In spite of all this, the weakest registration comes from the trade unions and the Party.

Is the lack of response due to the lack of interest on the part of the Party and trade union membership? We must emphatically reject such an idea. The fault lies with the leadership. There is still too much talk of "our membership is no good", "we cannot do anything with them", etc. This attitude attempts to sidetrack the responsibility and tasks of improving the life of the Party and its membership. Good or bad, this is the Party that will have to make the turn—good or bad, the present Party membership will have to be trained to "root our Party among the decisive sections of the American working class". It is important to state here that the majority of registrations at the school this winter are young workers, Negro and white, which shows the tremendous desire among the workers to learn about Communism. In this important task, as part and parcel of our plan of concentration, we must remember the words of the Open Letter: "Not to be carried away by events." Our basic task is to train and educate forces for work in the concentration sections and shops.

#### Trade Union Fractions

The worst offenders are the comrades in the leading fractions of the T.U.U.L. and opposition groups in the A. F. of L. In spite of the fact that special provisions were made for three classes in Trade Unionism and other courses to draw workers in the unions closer to us and develop them for future leadership, the T.U.U.L. leadership completely neglected to utilize the opportunity. The basic task of the T.U.U.L. was to intensify the concentration on heavy industry and consolidate the existing unions. Can this be done through professional organizers who come once a week or so to a meeting? No. To do this, the leadership must be broadened and must come from the workers in the unions themselves.

In spite of this urgent need for forces, the members of the T.U.U.L. are conspicuously absent at the school. No campaign was conducted among them for the school. The excuse was that the letters were sent out too early. The leading comrades state that we bother the workers too much—we don't let them concentrate. And what does he say we bother them with? Precisely too much demand for them to go to school and conduct discussions. This is the crassest expression of the gross underestimation of training forces. There is no guarantee that those workers who follow our militant struggle program during the strikes automatically are ready to adopt our entire program. The experience in

the Coleman Bronze strike, where the workers left the T.U.U.L. and formed an independent union, shows that we did not do sufficient work to explain and convince the workers of the meaning of our revolutionary program.

#### Fractions in Mass Organizations

In the other mass organizations some educational work is being conducted. Some classes are organized. There also, however, is no consistent training of new forces. For instance, the I.W.O., the largest revolutionary mass organization in Chicago, undertook to conduct a class in the Chicago Workers School in "Social Insurance and the Workers' Fraternal Organizations". All arrangements were made to help the I.W.O. develop fresh forces for the growing movement. The result, after six weeks of preparation, is that four workers registered for the course. This again is definitely due to the lack of campaign on the part of the leadership of this organization. The same goes for the I.L.D., which had a special class in "Labor Defense". Last semester, with a little work, a very popular and successful class was conducted. This time, no work was done and the result is only seven workers registered. As for "Principles of Communism" and other subjects of vital importance to draw the workers of the mass organizations closer to the Party and into the Party, this is entirely out of the question.

#### Shop Units — Shop Papers

Generally speaking, there is a great improvement in the quality and quantity of our shop papers in recent months. Especially important is the issuance of two mine bulletins which are already taking a prominent place in bringing the Party to the miners. There is a conscious effort by the editors and comrades in charge to secure shop stories from the departments, to raise the union and Party prominently. However, the papers are still sort of small newspapers. The role and program of the Party are not brought forward boldly enough through the articles and editorials. The bulletin must be the voice of the Party in the shop, bringing forward its program, and its proposed solution to every problem raised in the shop letters. Every occurrence must be carefully linked up with the nature of capitalism, the revolutionary way out of the crisis and the ultimate goal, the overthrow of capitalism. Our bulletins only speak of the Soviet Union during the time of anniversaries. The achievements of the workers in the U. S. S. R. must be utilized as a constant contrast to the conditions of the shops, and as the best weapon to rally the workers to struggle for the revolutionary way out of the crisis.

On the whole it can be said that there is an improvement in the life of the sections and units. Discussions are being

conducted more or less regularly in most of the sections. The sections are all working for the opening of weekend schools during the winter. Last year every section conducted a school with excellent results. Systematic classes have been organized in the coal fields, two new schools were opened in the Calumet steel region. There is a monthly publication as a guide to speakers, and the quality of our leaflets and agitation has improved. But these achievements are only beginnings of what must be done to awaken the entire Party to the very bottom with new political life and vigor.

The problem of training cadres for our Party and the mass organizations cannot remain the problem of one department alone. It is the problem for the entire movement to solve. The leadership in the mass organizations must change their orientation to this question. A coordinated, systematic approach must be developed in order to solve the problem. We must stop crying and complaining—pick out our forces, concentrate on them, and utilize every facility and possibility to train and develop them.

## International Women's Day

By ANNA DAMON

**T**HE Thirteenth ECCI Plenum estimated the present period as one of "revolutions and wars", and directed the Communist Parties to increase the tempo of work in order to win the majority of the working class for the final struggle for power.

To speak of accomplishing the task of winning the majority of the working class, without giving special attention to the particular needs of the various categories which make up the working class, would be idle chatter.

The crisis has dealt heavy blows to and has lowered the standard of living of the working and farm women. The meagre labor legislation, won through decades of struggle, has been wiped out by the NRA. Industries are now organized on war basis so that women can run the factories at a 24-hour stretch. The U. S. government has officially sanctioned lower wages for women in the industrial codes of the NRA. Meanwhile tens of thousands of Negro and married women have been thrown out of industry into domestic service, in many instances working for room and board without any wages whatsoever.

Jim-crowism and discrimination against Negro women, in their jobs and in relief distribution, have increased.

The increased misery of working and farm women has resulted in their greater readiness to fight the bosses' and

government offensive. This has been exemplified in the numerous strikes against the NRA and in unemployment struggles, where the women were found in the front ranks.

While gains can be recorded in the growth of the number of women in the Party and the T.U.U.L. industrial unions, it does not measure up with possibilities. Above all, it is not a result of specific work among the masses of women in leading their fight on the job and among the unemployed. Nor is it a result of our agitation for particular women's demands in addition to the general demands of the workers.

The ECCI has time and again pointed out, at the 6th World Congress and in the 12th ECCI Plenum resolution, the need for special work among women, and the need for putting a stop to the under-estimation of the importance of this work.

The 13th ECCI Plenum Resolution on fascism and the danger of war and the tasks of the Communist Parties points to the immediate necessity of broadening our work among women:

"Increasing the mass work among women, at the same time promoting and training even now a body of active Party women who, during the war, could in a number of cases replace mobilized comrades."

International Women's Day Campaign, March 8th, 1934, gives our Party the best opportunity to arouse masses of women against Roosevelt's New Deal, against fascism and war, in defense of the Soviet Union. To accomplish this task the Party and the T.U.U.L. must become politically conscious of its importance and proceed to an immediate plan of action. This plan must be based on realistic possibilities in given industries, cities, towns and farm regions. This will mean that district and section leadership will have to find forces and give more than formal patronage to the I. W. D. campaign. It will mean leading and organizing struggles against the NRA for equal pay for equal work in the factories; leading struggles in the neighborhoods against the high cost of living resulting from inflation; taking the initiative in organizing the unemployed single women in their struggle for relief; becoming acquainted with the problems and daily needs of the Negro women and leading them in united action with the white workers in the struggle against discrimination.

### Character of I.W.D. Campaign

The campaign for International Women's Day should have the broadest possible united front character around the immediate issues of working class women in shops, factories, neighborhoods, and among unemployed women, we should

rally the women around the issues of wages, speed-up, high cost of living, social insurance and immediate relief, connecting these economic issues with the struggle against the NRA, and against fascism and war.

Appropriate concrete local slogans should be issued in addition to the general I. W. O. slogans. The agitation and propaganda should be in simple and direct language. The activities should terminate in factory and street demonstrations and indoor mass meetings on March 8th.

### Working Woman

Throughout the campaign the Working Woman should be brought forward. Working Woman clubs should be built around the paper, and an endeavor made to increase the circulation from 8,000 to 12,000.

### Immediate Organizational Steps

Special meetings of the District Departments for Work Among Women should be held with representatives from the fractions in all trade unions and mass organizations, at which concrete plans for International Women's Day will be formed. The Districts should arrange for discussions in the units on work among women, at which the special importance of this work is stressed in view of the present situation of approaching war. The district functionaries' meetings in Feb. should also consider this question.

Special factory gates meetings at the concentration factories, where women are employed, should be held in the period prior to March 8th, as well as special women's meetings in the Unemployed Block Committees and branches and councils of the unemployed.

At least one open meeting should be organized in the unions, women's organizations, mass and fraternal organizations, where the workers in the trade and neighborhood will be invited by the organization to listen to a talk on the programs of the working class women in connection with International Women's Day.

Section demonstrations and open air rallies around concrete issues should be held throughout the month of February, culminating wherever possible in central open air demonstrations on March 8th. Where it is not possible to arrange open air demonstrations, indoor meetings should be held under the auspices of the Party with prominent Party speakers.

Utilize March 8th to make a real beginning in organizing the working women of America.

## Shop Papers and Concentration

By Agit Prop Dept.

"It is idle chatter to talk about the revolutionizing of the working class by the Party unless the Party conquers a firm basis for itself among the miners, metal and steel workers, railroad workers, auto, marine, and textile workers."

"Talk about defense of the Soviet Union and struggle against imperialist war is nothing but empty phrases unless systematic work is carried out in the war industry plants and in the ports." (From the Open Letter.)

**W**ITHOUT a doubt, one of the best criteria for examining the Party work in the shops is to compare the number and quality of shop papers issued. The shop paper is the basic Party organ in the shop, mines, docks and factories. We can truthfully say that to the extent that we systematically issue and circulate our shop papers, shall we be carrying out the Open Letter, and conquering a firm base for the Party among decisive strata of the workers.

What is the situation with regard to Party shop papers? By no means is sufficient work in this regard being done. Chicago, the best of the concentration districts in this regard, has only 12 shop papers. Important concentration districts like Cleveland and Pittsburgh report few or no shop papers. The comparison between the number of shop nuclei and the number of shop papers issued in given districts bears out our contention that wholly insufficient attention is being paid to this most important phase of our work. New York, Dist. No. 2, with 65 shop nuclei, issues only 8 Party shop papers. And where are these issued? Mostly in the lighter industries: needle, light metal, etc. Not a single Party shop paper in its basic industry—marine. It is not possible for us to speak seriously of carrying on effective struggle against war if on the docks and ships we do not have the basic Party organs.

District 8, with 45 shop nuclei, has 12 shop papers, the largest proportion and a better composition. Papers have been issued for some time in steel and packing, and recently mine papers have been established. These must be continued and strengthened. The other concentration districts present a much weaker picture, and undoubtedly require a great deal of intensive work to establish shop papers in the key industries.

### Shop Paper Must Be Party Paper

One of the incorrect tendencies which has become apparent on a wide scale is the tendency to issue union or group

papers instead of Party shop papers. Without doubt, this tendency is greatly responsible for the lack of Party shop papers, particularly in the concentration districts. This has been seen in the "Hot Billet" of Pittsburgh, the "Ground Hog" of the Gillespie, Ill., coal mines, and in many other points. In one case, this takes the form of an openly issued union paper, with no Party paper issued; while in the other, the paper is issued in the name of the Party, but in character and content is actually a union or left group paper. Of course, we support union and opposition group papers. But it is clear that the primary and basic paper in the shop must be the Party paper, to revolutionize the workers, to raise their political understanding.

Further, the importance of shop papers is increasing rapidly, as the N.R.A. drive toward fascization of the bourgeois state increases in tempo. As the most important phase of our struggle against fascism, it is necessary for us to more boldly bring forward the face of the Party, to establish the Party as the political leader of the workers.


The shop paper is normally a semi-illegal or completely illegal organ; and the experience gained in composing and distributing it are invaluable in preparation for the probable underground illegal state into which we may be forced.

The experiences of our heroic German Communist Party in this respect are instructive. Within a very short period after the suppression of *Die Rote Fahne* and the rest of the Party legal press, the shop papers had taken their place in the workers' hands, with a total circulation of more than ten times that of the former legal press.

The experiences which the Party had gained prior to illegality through the issuance of shop papers are today enabling our brother Party to distribute tons of illegal agitational material, to the acute discomfiture of Herr Hitler. It is necessary that the comrades in the districts, particularly the concentration districts, and in these, the concentration industries, mining, steel, metal, packing, railroads, auto, marine and textile, should clearly understand the importance of shop papers as the basic Party organ in the industry.

Let the comrades make the turn to the shops called for in the Open Letter by building more and better shop papers. Less talk about carrying out the Open Letter and more work, more shop papers.

# Party Organizer



"The whole Party, all the Party members, must know exactly what is the real condition of the organization, what are its real forces, what are the tasks set before it by history, where its main forces are directed, according to what clear and exact plan the whole Party must work from top to bottom so as to become a real mass Party, the real Bolshevik Party of the American proletariat. . . .

"If the whole Party and all its members begin to participate actively and consciously in the planned construction of the Party, there is reason to state that it will be prepared for the mass revolutionary fights of the American proletariat, which face it in the very near future."—Green, "SOME QUESTIONS ON THE WORK OF THE CPUSA."

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

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## Pre-Convention Discussion in the Units

By F. BROWN

**T**HE pre-Convention discussion takes place at a time when the revolutionary crisis is ripening, when the whole world is closely approaching a new round of revolutions and wars. Because of the urgent necessity of bringing clarity to the membership on the general Party Line and of raising the Communist consciousness of every Party member as to the tasks of the units and the members, the discussion assumes a special importance. Through this discussion the Party must learn that only through a clarification of the Party line and through a real understanding of the situation in the territories and shops in which the units are functioning will the units be able to work out their program of work and their tasks, and that therefore discussion is necessary at all times and not only before conventions.

If we examine the discussion which takes place in the units, we find that in general it is very poor. In many instances it is mechanical and deals only with mere assignment of tasks. While in some of the units genuine political discussions are held on the main problems which confront the Party in general, as well as on the specific problems of the units, in others there is no discussion at all. There are many Party members and leading comrades in the units and sections who believe that the discussion of the Party line is an abstract thing, and that the unit discussion shall limit itself to the taking up of the tasks which the shop nucleus or street unit must carry out.

This tendency is sometimes exaggerated to the point where the discussions on general problems brought before the units by the Center or by the district committees are postponed for weeks because they are regarded as hampering the activity of the units. Or discussions are carried on mechanically, as for example in a New York unit, where the day after the Austrian revolt broke out, a discussion was held on the Resolution of the 13th Plenum of the ECCI, without one mention of the Austrian situation. The mobilization for the distribution of the Daily Worker was confined in this unit to a bureaucratic order for special distribution. The organizer of this same unit made a proposal to her

buro, that in this pre-convention period, discussions be postponed for a period of four weeks in order that the unit might have more time to carry out its work.

### Discussion Lever by Which Party Will Be Activized

When we consider that the majority of Party members have been in the Party for less than two years, then we will understand that it is necessary to hold political discussion in the units. Only in this way will we raise the Communist consciousness of the Party members and gain a better understanding of the nature and tasks of the shop nuclei and units. This will help to increase the activity of the Party, to develop within the units an understanding that they are the Party in a given shop and territory and at the same time develop each individual Party member as a leader of the working class.

It is precisely because of the lack of political discussion in the units that activities are hampered, that here and there we encounter resistance in performing some task, or that friction develops between the members.

Discussion is the lever for the activization of the units as such, and of the individual Party members.

### Party Line Must Be Explained and Applied

What kind of discussion do we need in the units? Not an abstract discussion on the Party line or on the Party program and its ultimate aims, but a discussion on the basis of an analysis of the situation in the place (shop or territory) where the unit functions as an integral part of the general Party line and Party program. But this is not enough. In view of the fact that so many new members are at all times entering the Party, discussion on the fundamental principles of our Party is necessary in order to help the comrades to understand, not only the general Party line, but the necessity of carrying out the tasks embodied in the Party resolutions. Here we should note that some of the old Party members, instead of being the driving force in the discussion, instead of stimulating it by their example, and in this way establishing a closer unity of the old and new members, resist discussion. Their claim is that discussion of this kind is an old story for them, and they see no reason for repetition. This claim is not valid. If they would help the new members to a better understanding of the fundamental principles of our Party, these older comrades would have an opportunity not to repeat what they already know, but to further develop their own understanding and through this development raise the whole ideological level of the units.

How can we explain that often new Party members be-

come demoralized after a few weeks, and many times drop out of the units? Because of the lack of interest of the unit meetings. Because many times all burdens are shifted to the shoulders of the new and enthusiastic members. The units and especially the unit leaders forget that the new Party members must be developed into Communists and that only with their development will we succeed in keeping them in our ranks and develop them further.

It is not enough to believe that the line of the Party is given through the *Daily Worker* and the other Party organs, and that every Party member shall learn it from the columns of our papers. In many cases we are confronted with the problem that Party members, and sometimes whole units, do not thoroughly understand the problems treated in our press, despite all of our efforts of popularization. These problems can be simplified by verbal explanations in the unit discussions, which will help many of the Party members to understandingly read the Party organs. For this reason the units should institute a regular discussion of the main editorials of the week in the *Daily Worker*, on some of the articles in the *Communist*, *Party Organizer*, etc.

### Discussions Must Be Led

These discussions will not develop spontaneously. They must be led. For this reason the comrades of the Unit Buro, as the political leaders of the unit, must prepare themselves for the discussion. Therefore, it is necessary that in the coming elections the best comrades shall be elected to the unit buros. This will partially solve this problem. But only partially, because the solution of the problem of how to develop discussion in the units and raise it to a higher level requires the solution of another phase of this problem: namely, the development of the unit leadership to real political leadership.

The pre-convention discussion in the units will achieve its aim of clarifying the Party line and the tasks with which the Party is now confronted only if the units in their discussion will succeed in understanding the necessity of fighting for the Party line. This does not mean to discuss the Party resolution and the tasks before the Party in an abstract manner, but to apply the Party line in the solution of the specific problems of the units in their shops and territories.

What do we mean by the Party line? Is it an abstract thing? The Party line means the way in which the Party as the vanguard of the working class carries on its work in the shops and among the unemployed; the Party program for work among the Negro masses; the approach of the Party to the united front; how we work in the A. F. of

L.; the work of the revolutionary unions, etc. It is this understanding which we must bring to our members in this pre-Convention discussion. And in the achievement of this understanding, the units will realize that political discussion, at all times, is the means of clarifying our tasks and the lever by which the activity of each individual Party member will be developed.

## How S. P. Took Advantage of Our Work

(Lessons and problems are from the work of Shop Nucleus—  
New York District.)

By MARGARET COWL

**D**URING the strike in this shop, the Party unit ceased to function. Now and then the Daily Worker was sold to the strikers. The strike was led and won by the militant trade union and its leaders were known to be Communists. But since the Party nucleus was not on the job to broaden out in a more political way the struggle which the trade union was carrying on around the demands of wages and union recognition, and because there was no recruiting into the Party of the best fighters during the strike, those most known to the workers, a Socialist who had been forced to support the strike, was elected shop chairman. He carried on disruptive work against the union and openly sided with the boss against the workers after the settlement of the strike. He began to organize a clique to bring the A. F. of L. into the shop.

## How D. W. Helped to Defeat S. P. Policies in the Shop

Mainly due to individual efforts of certain of our trade union comrades connected with the strike, about 8 new members were recruited into the Party after the strike. The Section committee immediately attached several comrades (including several trade union members who had been active in the strike) to this shop nucleus, to give personal guidance.

The nucleus spent entire meetings in serious discussion of how to convince the workers in the shop that S. P. policies were being brought into the shop via the shop chairman. Special committees were appointed to write articles for the Daily Worker, giving the difference between the rank and file controlled trade union and the A. F. of L., supported by the S. P. These articles were written on the basis of the actual conditions in the shop, before and after the strike and in other shops controlled by the A. F. of L. in the same industry. These special issues of the Daily Worker were sold and distributed inside the shop by members appointed by the nucleus. Copies of the Daily Worker were sold to more reliable workers or left at the machines and in the dressing

rooms. At each nucleus meeting there would be a check-up of previous decisions. The discussion centered around how Communist leadership should be established in the shop, around questions of immediate interest to the workers. This work was carried through not without inner struggle. Influences of the "red scare" had to be combatted. Resistance to bringing in the leadership of the Party nucleus and the Daily Worker in the re-elections of shop chairman had to be overcome. Due to persistent work of the nucleus, the Socialist shop chairman was removed by a nearly unanimous vote of the shop meeting.

## Strengthening the Nucleus

In the course of the above work, each meeting of the nucleus took up the question of how to recruit workers into the Party. Party members began to bring their lunch into the shop and converse with workers during lunch hour. They concentrated on those who had been active in the strike. They started the conversation with the most personal topics, and then proceeded to talk about their own departments, about the revolution in Cuba, etc., after which they asked the worker whether he had read what the Daily Worker had to say about these things, and gave him or her a copy of the paper. Through such methods, the Party nucleus increased its membership from 13 to 33 members, 30 of whom are working in the shop. In addition a few young workers were turned over to the Y.C.L. unit which was organized in the shop. There was opposition to recruiting so fast, the workers do not know what the Party is, etc., were the remarks. But the new comrades staunchly defended their position in that you must bring the workers first into the Party and then educate them.

## Developing the Leadership of the Nucleus

Most of the members in the nucleus were politically and organizationally inexperienced. They did not understand the language in the letters of the higher Party committees. They did not know the structure of the Party. Older Party and Y.C.L. members had to attend every meeting of the nucleus and its buro to give guidance. Special attention was given to individuals in order to develop them for leadership of the nucleus. In the beginning certain older Party and Y.C.L. members hindered instead of helped by talking very much at nucleus and department group meetings and thereby preventing the development of the initiative of the new members. By coming late to nucleus meetings, they also demoralized new members who would come to the meeting from the shop without their supper and who took the discipline of the Party seriously. Due to this latter cause, three new members were lost to the Party. Another promising new member for leadership was lost because of the commandeering attitude of an

older Party member who returned an article which he had written for the shop bulletin and told him to re-write it after he had put the best that he had into that article. Still another new member left the Party because an older Party member, without consulting the nucleus, told him that he should resign as chairman of his department. She thought that he was not fit for the job, although he had been very active in the strike and the workers in the shop liked him very much. The nucleus buro took these questions before the meeting of the nucleus with the result that all but one of those who had left the Party, returned.

Leadership by the new Party members has now been developed to a point where the department groups independently react to even unforeseen spontaneous situations in their departments in the proper, political way. Party members talk to the workers in their departments to get their opinions about the Dally Worker and the shop bulletin. They bring this to the editorial committee of the bulletin so that the bulletin is able now more than before to reflect the sentiment of the workers in the shop. They induce workers to write for the bulletin and collect workers' correspondence from the workers. The last bulletin was the result of the work of 15 workers. Through the independent leadership of one Party department group, workers who had been influenced by the former Socialist shop chairman to try to bring the A. F. of L. into the shop, openly exposed this Socialist at a shop meeting. The unit buro only meets regularly outside the shop, but whenever necessary, holds a short meeting in the shop and informs Party members what to do in emergency situations.

There is still very much room for strengthening the leadership, as there is for raising the political level of the whole nucleus. One of the chief shortcomings of this nucleus is that it has not yet succeeded in arranging its work so that part of the time of its meetings is used for education around more fundamental questions other than the education derived from discussion of shop problems.

#### Relation Between the Trade Union Fraction and the Shop Nucleus

Certain Party members, functionaries in the higher trade union committees, do not yet consider the Party nucleus as the leader in the shop, if one is to judge by their acts.

After a discussion of several hours, the shop nucleus decided to recommend to the workers to expel the Socialist former shop chairman for his continued disruptive work. The Party members began to prepare the workers in the shop for the shop meeting. At the shop meeting one of the Party trade union functionaries, without consulting with the nucleus or its organizer, made the proposal to suspend this disrupter for only two months. The act of this comrade was condemned

by non-Party workers in the shop bulletin. A favorable situation to expel this Socialist disrupter was lost. Upon recommendation of Party comrades, functionaries in the higher committee of the trade union, the nucleus decided to recommend to the workers at their next shop meeting to empower the shop committee to suspend this disrupter if he does not stop his disruptive work against the militant trade union. On the same day of the shop meeting, these comrades in the trade union committee called a hurried shop fraction meeting without consulting the nucleus organizer (the shop fraction is the same as the nucleus) and there have a decision carried to recommend the expulsion of the disrupter. At the shop meeting the same day, not one of these comrades raised this question, neither did they tell other Party members to raise the question. (Most all the Party members in the nucleus are less than 6 months in the Party). These comrades acted not like Party leaders in this meeting, but purely as trade union functionaries.

Such juggling with Party nucleus decisions demoralizes the new Party members. This problem was already once taken up by the Section Committee of the Party. The nucleus cannot solve this question alone, because it involves a fraction taking in a larger territory than the nucleus. The nucleus elected a member to attend the fraction meetings. This will probably help, but will not solve the problem. The higher Party committees will have to tackle this problem, and define the proper relationship between shop nuclei and trade union fractions in shops where the militant trade unions are in control.

## How the Unemployment Councils Were Built in Lackawana County

By STEVE NELSON (Scranton, Pa.)

AT the outset it should be stated that in the vicinity that we speak of there was absolutely no Party organization, and the work of building the Unemployment Councils was practically in a virgin field. The methods that were used in building the Unemployment Councils were as follows:

Our organizer made contacts with a few workers in one town, workers who were complaining about the relief that they were receiving and the discrimination in handling the relief. Most of these contacts were made at the relief buro. The workers helped to draw up a leaflet, helped to find a hall, and distributed the leaflets. The leaflet was brief and appealed specifically to the unemployed, small home owners, women, and single young workers. At the meeting, no matter how small, we explained the purpose of the meeting and stressed that this work should be done by the local people themselves.

We had prepared petitions of the following kind: (1) One especially raising the problems of those receiving inadequate relief. (2) One specifically written for the women of the unemployed. (3) One written directly for the young and single workers. Each of the above mentioned petitions raised some concrete demands, for each category mentioned, with space below for signatures. We gathered all of the women and gave them the petitions dealing with the women, asking them to get the petitions signed, and to tell every one of them that signed to come to the next meeting of the Council, with definite time and place arranged. The same was done with the young workers, and also with the adult unemployed workers.

This approach meant that we did not simply shower leaflets in the community, but had personal talks with every individual that was asked to sign. This personal approach was a departure from our old usual way of doing things and the workers already had an idea of what the meeting was going to take up. This made them feel more at home at the meeting, and stimulated discussion on various points. This has also overcome the fear of the workers accepting work on various committees. The workers readily accepted to act on committees, and to act as officers of the Unemployment Councils.

#### Special Organizations Formed

At the second meeting we had three workers assigned to meet with each of the above mentioned groups. The small home owners were called in one corner of the hall and asked to elect their officials, and discuss the grievances of the workers pertaining to the sale of their homes, etc., etc. The same was done with the women, they organized themselves into a Women's League, a part of the Unemployment Council. The young workers organized the same way.

Thus we had three different organizations, appealing to three specific categories of workers, taking up the particular problems of that section of the workers. This created greater interest in the work and struggles of the Unemployment Councils, and brought in new layers of workers that had never been touched by us before through the old methods of work. These new workers, when the question of meeting place was taken up, raised the question: "Why not meet in the School House, or in the Town Hall? We paid taxes in this town, now we are unemployed. We can't afford to pay the rent for halls, why shouldn't we meet in these buildings?" These workers proceeded to elect committees to demand the use of these institutions by the unemployed. It is very interesting to point out that while these new workers considered it absolutely justifiable, the few old Party comrades were the ones that feared to take such action. The workers at the next meeting were able to report that they had secured the school house for the unemployed meetings.

### Unemployment Councils and Party Units Organized

In this manner we were able to approach the best kind of workers for the Party. The result of this work is that six Unemployment Councils have been organized in Lackawana County. Two new Party units have been established, and there are prospects for the formation of two more units of the Party in the very near future.

Another interesting thing about these new Councils is, that the workers develop political consciousness very quickly. The first lesson that they get is with the relief officials, school directors, burgesses, etc. The workers learn a practical lesson that these people are a part of the capitalist State, and that this State is against the interest of the workers. They obtain this lesson not through speeches, but through their struggles for bread. In mass struggles in the form of demonstrations, when the relief officials became cocky with our unemployed committees and began to buck them, the workers themselves urged that we must reply to these attacks by mass demonstrations. One of these took place in the City of Scranton, where 1200 workers participated in a march that resulted in gaining all of the four demands that were placed with the relief officials. The women have shown a remarkable interest in the work of the Unemployment Councils, and in most of this work are the driving forces, showing particular interest in organizational matters, by arranging socials and other affairs. This has the effect of drawing the workers closer together in their everyday struggles, and making for a closer personal contact and relationship.

### Shall We Split Our Districts and Sections?

By J. PETER

**"T**HE Thirteenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. sets before all Communist Parties as most important tasks the carrying on of regular and constant check-up on the fulfillment of decisions, especially on mass work, the organizational strengthening of their ranks, of preparing to go underground, of tightening up discipline and fighting fitness of every Party organization and of every member of the Party."

Let us examine a few organizational problems of our Party in the light of the above decision of the E.C.C.I.

The Open Letter states that "every Party member must now understand that it depends on correct policy and above all, the execution of the correct policy whether we will be able to mobilize the masses of workers for struggle and whether our Party in this historically favorable situation will

become the decisive mass Party of the American Proletariat."

The Party, since the Seventh Convention, after cleansing its ranks of the opportunist elements, had the correct policy on all basic questions. The Party adopted good resolutions, such as were adopted at the Fourteenth Plenum of the Central Committee and at the Extraordinary Party Conference. But these resolutions to a certain extent remained the property of the higher committees. There are yet many Section Committees and nuclei where these resolutions have not been thoroughly understood, and many more where these resolutions have not been executed.

Why does this situation exist? Because "the leadership of the Party . . . does not work out carefully with the comrades of the lower organizations ways and means for the carrying through of resolutions and checking up on their executions."—(Open Letter).

Has the leadership of the Party, since the Open Letter, tried to change the old method of work and to get closer to the lower organizations? Yes. There is a much better understanding of this question in the Party. However, there are still many weaknesses, especially in connection with the problem of concentration. We would have had better results in many Districts if we had not allowed ourselves "to be driven by events," if all available forces had been concentrated in the most strategic factories, mines, docks, mills, etc.; if the leading committees had given more guidance to the nuclei in these factories and to the concentration units there. However, there are certain good beginnings.

### Large Territories Make Personal Leadership Difficult

What are the reasons for these weaknesses, in addition to an insufficient political understanding, in some cases, of the necessity for strengthening the lower organizations? We will deal in this article with only one of the reasons, and that is the physical possibilities, under the present circumstances, for giving leadership to the lower organizations. Let us assume that every Party committee really wants to "give the members practical assistance in carrying out their tasks and to check up on the carrying out of these tasks." The present organizational structure of our Party, with huge territories containing very important industrial centers, under a District or Section Committee, makes it quite difficult to give personal leadership to the organizations in these centers. A few examples will give more clarity to this problem.

Let us examine the four concentration districts. District 8 is concentrating on steel, packing house, coal mines and railroad. One of the biggest railroad centers in the U.S.A. is in St. Louis. This section is more than 250 miles from Chicago. The coalfields in Southern Illinois are about 200 miles away. The District has two states in its territory—

Illinois and Indiana—covering an area almost twice as big as England. District 6 is only a little smaller in area than England, and contains such important sections as Columbus, Cincinnati, and East Ohio, which can be given regular attention only with great difficulty and expense, because of the great distance involved. District 5 has in its territory the West Virginia coalfields where the miners are ready and anxious for our leadership, but because of the great distance the District Bureau cannot pay sufficient attention to this very important mining field. The District Committee of District No. 11 has four states—North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Idaho to take care of—a territory which is as big as France and Germany together. The nearest town where we have Party organization is 120 miles away from the city where the District Headquarters is located. The furthest one is 1100 miles from the headquarters, a distance as great as from New York to St. Louis. District 19 has also four states in its territory: Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, almost as great an area as Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland combined. The important mining sections in Utah and New Mexico are from 700 to 800 miles from Denver where the District Headquarters is located. District 20, a new district, has jurisdiction over the states of Texas and Oklahoma, a territory which is bigger than France and Italy together and six and a half times bigger than England.

The Sections in these Districts are hundreds of miles away from the Headquarters city, requiring much time and money if the members of the District Bureau are to visit them.

On a smaller scale, the same situation exists in the Sections, large territories, many important industries, many unions, mass organizations, and last but not least, a large number of nuclei to guide and direct. It is quite difficult in a Section, where at best we have only one comrade who gives his full time to Party work, to pay proper attention to all out of town units. Sometimes weeks and months pass before someone visits these important units. Even when the comrades in the Section Committee make all possible effort (which is not always the case, as for example in Youngstown) to visit these units, stay with the comrades for a while and help them in their work, they still face the problem of the number of available forces and of the lack of sufficient finances.

The Sections in the big cities, like New York and Chicago, do not have the problem of distance, but the other difficulties are there with one additional one, and that is the large number of units in the Section. In New York, for example, we have sections with 35-50 units, with a membership of between 600 and 800, and with 10-15 shop nuclei. In the Section Committees there are only three or four comrades who have time

and are able to give leadership to the units. The rest are leaders of unions, and other mass organizations, and even if each of them were to carry out their task and be responsible for a unit, only a small number of units (8 or 9) would have members of the Section Committee participating in their work.

We could bring forward the argument here that the best solution would be to concentrate on a few sections, on a few units, and let the rest get along as best they can. This is a good argument for continuing the present organizational structure of the Party, but we must also consider one other important problem and that is that even the most important concentration sections cannot be reached and adequately taken care of because of the great distances and the insufficient number of trained forces in the lower organizations. If we permit them to function without personal guidance, there is a danger that the lower organizations and strategic points will disintegrate as has been the case in the past. Besides this, we must consider another important problem, which the Party faces in this period, and that is the absolute necessity of being in personal contact with all organizations. What would happen if in the very near future the Party should have to work in an illegal situation? It would be impossible to send out circular letters to the lower organizations, or to give directives about a certain campaign. We will have to personally guide the lower organizations through members of the Section Committee, the District Committee, and Central Committee by means of an elaborate system of instructors from the higher committee to the lower organizations. All of these considerations argue for splitting the present huge territories of the districts and sections.

#### What Are the Advantages of Smaller Districts and Sections?

What problem should be considered in splitting the districts and sections?

1. Whether the party organizations will have the proper industrial basis;
2. Close proximity to the lower organizations, — this means, how can we, with the least difficulty, maintain personal contact with the lower organizations;
3. To parallel the electoral districts as far as possible, with state borders for districts; and congressional election districts for the sections;
4. Strengthening of Party organizations (number of units; number of members; mass organization units; influence of Party; Daily Worker; circulars, etc.)
5. Last, but not least, the available forces for leadership.

What will be the result of a proper splitting of the districts and sections?

1. We will develop hundreds of new forces for leadership;
2. We will create a basis for more self-initiative;
3. The responsible leading committees will have the possibilities of giving real leadership to the organizations in their territory;
4. It will be easier to react on political problems because a district will cover a state, or the section—a congressional district, and the leadership will be in a position to study and follow very closely the activities of political parties in the given territory. The agitation and propaganda of the Party will be more concrete.
5. The small territories in the districts and in the sections will enable the leading comrades to follow up every decision very closely, and to find out whether the decisions are carried out by the lower organizations.
6. Because of the many more districts in the Party as a whole, the Central Committee will have more direct contact with, and information about the problems of the various factories and territories.
7. The smaller districts and sections will be able to work under conditions of illegality more effectively than big ones.

In the pre-Convention period, the Central Committee is already considering the splitting up of Districts 8 and 11. The comrades in other large districts should think very seriously about the problem of splitting the sections on the basis of the above enumerated points.

### Some Experiences in Concentrating on Republic Steel, Youngstown

By J. D.

**B**ECAUSE Republic Steel in Youngstown is one of the few "concentration points" at which there has been some actual concentration, its experiences should be summarized and the lessons digested.

Republic has been in theory at least a "concentration point" since the middle of 1932. At that time there were about 8 Party members working in the mill, who occasionally gave the Party section organizer information on the basis of which he wrote a shop bulletin. There were about 100 workers in the union, but no functioning local. According to reports of our comrades, the union meetings were places where the organizer made a general agitational speech, some dues were paid and invariably a collection was taken. There was little effort to work out the demands in the departments. Naturally no struggles were developed. In spite of this the

union had grown, showing the tremendous will of the workers to organize. Some efforts to develop department form of organization were unsuccessful, primarily because we did not convince the workers that that was the best means of developing struggle and building the union. The result of these methods of work was that the whole organization collapsed following the firing of a few members for union activity.

Following the Warren Strike (Sept. 1932) a "concentration school" was held in Youngstown with a C.C. comrade in charge. But not one student at the school worked in the main concentration point, the Youngstown Republic mill. A splendid young and inexperienced comrade was appointed "concentrator." He was given a \$5 weekly subsidy and told "concentrate on Republic." Neither District or Section Buros seriously took up his work with him. Nor did he receive help from the leading bodies of the union. Party units and language fraction were not mobilized for Republic work. The result was no progress and a badly demoralized comrade. The separation of the Section Buro from Republic can best be seen when we record that the Buro representative strenuously objected to the shop unit taking time at its meeting to discuss the main grievances in the mill as a basis for a first draft of demands around which struggles could be developed.

At the beginning of 1933 we began to help this comrade a little more. There followed months of sporadic activity—quite a few leaflets into the mill, a campaign developed in the chipping department which won the workers' demand for posting of working schedules, but which we conducted so unskillfully that we got nothing out of it organizationally. We made agitation around Republic, but up to July we still had no organization. In the meantime the C.C. "concentration subsidy" stopped, and the "concentrator" was put on other work.

Every Party conference decided to concentrate. Everyone agreed in theory. But we didn't plan our work in such a way as to guarantee systematic development of a campaign in and around Republic.

Following the Open Letter we made a plan of work to insure concentration involving Party units, fractions, etc. We decided to concentrate first on the chipping department. After many failures we finally got three chippers to a meeting. We drafted tentative department demands and issued simple half-page leaflets inviting the chippers to discuss the demands. We worked systematically, both inside the mill and visiting the chippers at their homes, popularizing the demands and the idea of struggle for them, and our union. In the meantime we were exposing the N.R.A. Steel Code, popu-

larizing our own code, and sharply exposing the A. F. of L. But we found that many of our mass meetings were less successful than the A.A.'s meetings, because we relied entirely upon leaflets while they had committees preparing the meetings inside the mill.

Meanwhile concentration on the chippers began to bear fruit. We got enough chippers interested to hold separate meetings of each of the three shifts. Sometimes we met with them at the union headquarters when they left the mill at 11 at night. Other shifts met at 7 a.m. when they quit work. (The union office is only 3 blocks from the gate). We met at these hours so as to get the men before they scattered to their homes in all parts of town. We were unsuccessful in signing up many for the union (only 20), but developed a strong sentiment for united action for our demands. At least a dozen different leaflets or pluggers went into the mill during August, and a union organizer was at the gate at almost every change of shifts. In addition to this, union and chippers committee members took small typewritten slips into the mill, giving time and place of chippers meetings to those whom they trusted.

### Struggle Developed

Sentiment for strike developed very high, but we held back because our union was so weak—only 20 members of 200 in the department. Finally the sentiment for strike was so strong that some action was imperative. We got out petitions with our 5 demands and 189 chippers signed them with their check numbers. These were sent to the company by registered letter with the demand that we get an answer within 48 hours. No answer came. At the meeting called to hear the company's reply only 18 chippers attended, but the sentiment was unanimously for strike and the men reported similar sentiment in the mill. Since we could not stand still, but had to go either forward or backward, the meeting elected a committee of 5 to go to the company. It was arranged that if the committee didn't get out of the company office by 11 a.m., or if the report was unfavorable before then, the day shift would walk out and picket the next turn. In event the demands were granted of course work would go on.

The company refused the demands. The chippers refused to listen to the superintendent's speech telling them to leave "the Bolsheviks" alone and wait. As one man they threw down their chipping hammers and walked out, marching to the union hall where all registered and some 40 signed up for the union. They elected a strike committee representing their turn, sent a committee to the open hearth gate to notify and pull out the open hearth chippers and burners, elected picket captains and then returned in a body to the

Besmer gate to picket the afternoon turn. This turn struck solid, as did the open hearth chippers.

### Strike Won

Meanwhile word came that the company was ready to compromise. A committee went down, got the company's offer of a 16 per cent increase, recognition of the chippers committee, equal division of work, etc., reported to the packed strike meeting and, after a lengthy discussion, it was overwhelmingly voted to accept the offer, go back to work, and build the union stronger than ever. The mass meeting called for that night (originally called in support of the strike) was turned into a victory meeting. Enthusiasm was high. Many more chippers joined the union, and some from other departments. The mass meeting voted endorsement of the chippers actions and to prepare similar actions in all departments of the mill.

On the basis of the membership gains, we reorganized the Republic Local, elected new officers, all of whom, by the way, were non-Party workers, and most of whom had taken active part in leading the chippers strike.

### Tasks of Union

The tasks before us were clear: (1) Consolidate organization among the chippers. (2) Use the victory, news of which had spread like wild-fire, to conduct a campaign of mass recruiting, and preparation for struggle in all departments of the mill. (3) Establish a strong local leadership in the mill and train it carefully. (4) Rapid scale recruitment of the best of the union members into the Party and Y.C.L. (in the whole campaign up to the strike we only recruited 2 chippers into the Party and both of them had been close to us for years. The shop unit as such played no role at all in the strike.). (5) Popularize the victory in the other mills of the district.

In other words, we recognized that the next period would make or break us. The company was sure to attack us. It was clear that our systematic activity had been the main factor in the success (with all that it was not as systematic as it should have been). But it was precisely at this period, when the previous methods should have been used, but on a mass scale corresponding with the situation, that we fell down.

### Union Driven By Events

This was the period of rising sentiment everywhere. We got calls from Farrell, Newcastle, Sharon, Sharpsville, Hubbard, Salem, Campbell, Lowellville, Struthers, for speakers and organizers. Our forces were few and overworked. Although we did to a certain extent, draw some of the leading

chippers into activity in other departments and in other mills it was done too slowly and on too small a scale.

We decided to make a job next on the galvanizing department, and got pretty solid, but failed to get any of the 14 Negroes in the department. Still we won demands in that department without a strike. Open hearth department was next on our list, but we failed to give it the systematic leadership required, with the result that the A.A. (which was concentrating there) made considerably more headway in the open hearth than we did.

We were dissipating our forces and energies over too broad an area. Although realizing in the abstract that with our forces we couldn't organize the whole district at once, we were infected with the spontaneity of the workers, we "allowed ourselves to be driven by events," with the result that, in effect, we abandoned our concentration. We tried to answer every call. We recruited 1000 members in 12 different mills in 5-6 weeks. But we couldn't give proper attention to any one mill, and most important of all, it meant neglecting the proper development of the Republic drive to do even what we did elsewhere. We didn't consolidate sufficiently the 200 members in Republic, we didn't spend enough time developing the splendid new forces in Republic, we failed to build the Party and Y.C.L. in Republic (also due to a heavy dose of "Red Scare" in the earlier stages, when we were afraid to bring forward the Party and even the *Daily Worker* openly as a paper supported by our union) and worst of all, when the tempo at Republic should have been faster than ever before, we didn't give the necessary leadership.

### The Second Chippers Strike

All this played right into the hands of the company. When the Besmer department started up after a ten day shutdown, they didn't call back (and in effect locked out) 100 of the most active chippers. The men were furious. Close to 100 chippers met, sent a committee demanding reinstatement of all chippers and equal division of work. They were turned down. The men voted unanimously to strike the department, but, they raised no demands for the men on the job, they didn't organize the strike inside the mill, they didn't even consult more than a few handful of the men on the job—the strike vote was taken primarily by layed-off chippers. The whole thing developed so quickly (30 hours) that neither the District Board of the union, the fractions, the shop unit or the Party section committees met to discuss the plans. The District Secretary of the union was away in Weirton when it developed, and only reached Youngstown as the strike vote was being taken, when he allowed himself

to be swept along with the tide. At no time before the strike was there a calm objective analysis made of the situation. From this flowed all the mistakes committed.

The result of the mistakes was the company's success in blocking the effectiveness of the strike in a few days—one group of chippers was turned against another group. When we saw this we withdrew picket lines and adopted a policy (on paper) of working inside the mill. But production was low and by then our best forces were considerably demoralized, many of the men on the job who were not against us, but didn't see the possibility of success, were afraid to come to the hall and especially, we, the leadership, failed to personally lead every detail of the reorganization work, visiting the employed chippers at their homes, talking, convincing, etc.

When on top of this the company laid off all our active men in the galvanizing department (primarily the result of a stool-pigeon in the department), terror swept the local and the mill. We were temporarily broken in the two departments where we had been strongest. Just at this period general layoffs took place throughout the mills, leaving most departments with skeleton crews, and we failed to react quickly enough to the changed situation with a broad campaign against layoffs, for dismissal wages, etc. The result was increasing instead of overcoming our isolation from the masses.

The mistakes of the second strike were: (1) violation of all principles of trade union democracy by not consulting the men on the job; (2) going into such an important action hastily, without preparation, yielding before the spontaneity of the workers. Had we built the Party in the preceding period, things could not have happened this way. But our Party unit played no role in either strike. Had we continued to concentrate on Republic (at the expense of some of the work elsewhere), we would have been able to call out other departments in support of the chippers and galvanizing department workers. But failure to concentrate and to carry out the plans we ourselves had made, allowing ourselves to be driven by events—this put us in the position where the company was able to badly damage our organization in the mill.

We still have members in all departments of Republic. But complete reorganization of the local is now necessary. Just as we can hold the blacklisted members with us only by fighting for relief, against the grievances on the C.W.A. jobs, and for unemployment insurance, so we can hold our membership in the mill, rebuild our local, win hundreds and thousands of new members only by facing the hard fact—that now we must start all over again, building from the bottom up. But now we have the advantage of more and better forces and experience than we had before. Simul-

taneously we must really commence opposition work in the small A.A. organization in the mill.

To base ourselves in Republic on the blacklisted members of the union would be a suicidal policy (as has been proved repeatedly in mining, textile, etc.). Our Republic Local must and will be rebuilt from the workers inside the mill. That is the test to which we now are put.

## On Some Problems of the Harlem Section

By LOUIS SASS, Org. Sec'y, Harlem Section

**H**ARLEM is one of the national concentration points of our Party because of its position as the national center of Negro life. In the past year we have recorded some definite gains in our work in carrying out the Open Letter. This becomes very significant if we realize that Harlem for a long time was one of the sorest points in the work of our Party. These gains, however, do not mean that any one has the idea that all the problems have been solved. But they do mean that as a result of every day work on the part of the comrades involved we were able to improve our work which puts us now in a more favorable position to utilize the opportunities offered to us by the crisis of capitalism.

The most important achievement in the Harlem Section is the consolidation of its leadership. The weakest point in our work has been the inability of the Section Committee to enforce the most elementary discipline on its members. Petty personal questions have been on the order of business at the great majority of our Section Committee meetings. At the present time, however, the Section Committee engages in serious political work at all of its meetings and has assigned all of its members to responsible leading work in the various phases of our Section's activities.

### Fluctuation in Membership

The question of membership fluctuation is another very important point in the work of our Section. Whereas the Harlem Section has always recruited more members in comparison to other Sections its fluctuation exceeded all of the Sections in the District. Because of the inability on the part of our Party to understand the Negro question we have lost many sincere revolutionary Negroes who have joined the Party expecting a solution to their problems. Our Section Committee has in a very thorough manner analyzed the reasons for fluctuation and found:

1. Insufficient political life in the units.

2. The lack of proper understanding of the struggle against white chauvinism.
3. Lack of understanding of the national liberation character of our Negro work.
4. The loose organizational form which made check-up practically impossible and finally the liberal attitude adopted by some of our white comrades towards our Negro comrades.

### Groups of Five Organized

Realizing the importance of consolidation we have re-organized the units on the basis of groups of five comrades living nearest to one another. This enables the Party not only to maintain a strict check-up over the comrades, but also to stimulate political discussion involving every comrade in the Party. The most effective way to struggle for the unity of Negro and white takes the form of drawing white workers into the struggles of the Negro people—white workers who live in the Negro territory amongst whom we have carried on very little work. The drawing of these white workers in the struggle for Negro liberation does more towards breaking down white chauvinistic as well as bourgeois nationalistic tendencies than the old method of shouting against white chauvinism without giving a serious political explanation of its meaning.

Much has been said about the number of Negroes in the Party. The recent control shows eighty-nine Negro members in the Harlem Section. These figures are incorrect. We are in the process now of re-checking our entire Negro membership on the basis of the Group System, and though the figures are as yet not fully available, it can already be seen that the number is over two hundred. It should be noted here that the Harlem Section has increased its total membership from two hundred to seven hundred in the past year. Of course this is a very small number and emphasizes our weakness in the liberation work. But the fact that such low control was possible can be best explained by the loose manner in which the units have functioned before the reorganization and the loose manner in which the control was carried through.

### The Basic Concentration Task

The biggest political task confronting the Harlem Section is to ensure a broad proletarian base in building the liberation movement amongst the Negro masses—that is shop work. We can record some successes in the building of the League of Struggle for Negro Rights. We have organized ten branches, seven well established and the other three in the process of consolidation. We have also established a functioning Harlem Council of the L.S.N.R., composed of all these branches and a few affiliated organizations. The branch meetings are attend-

ed by approximately from twelve to sixty members. However, we must say that to a large extent we have built the L.S.N.R. from the unemployed and the petty bourgeoisie—not yet sufficiently drawing in Negro workers from the big laundries, needle trades shops, etc. These branches were built on a neighborhood basis. The Party units took the initiative, bringing together workers on the basis of local grievances and conditions.

What are the methods used in the building of the L.S.N.R.? The question is asked by many comrades: What will you do in a neighborhood where the most urgent question confronting the workers is high rent and evictions? Will this not turn the L.S.N.R. into an unemployed organization? Will it not take away its national liberation character? The answer is that the more the L.S.N.R. engages in taking up the grievances of the Negro workers in the neighborhood the more rapidly it will be built. The question of high rent is surely a question of national oppression because the Negroes, more than any section of the population, are subjected to unsanitary conditions and high rents. The L.S.N.R. has every reason to take up this struggle as one of its central tasks and at the same time cooperate with the Unemployment Council, etc. Likewise, the L.S.N.R. cooperates with the trade unions when they fight discrimination against Negroes on jobs (Fifth Avenue Bus Company). In other words, the L.S.N.R. in all cases really acts its role as an ally of the working class which at the same time fights for national liberation as its central task.

Space does not permit me to elaborate on the other important concentration activities of the Section such as unemployed work, shop work, and the I.L.D. This we will do at some future time. For the present we can say that the introduction of the Group System in Harlem will not only serve to aid us in our struggle against fluctuation. But it will in every way stimulate the activities of the Party. Recruiting can be carried on on a real proletarian competition basis. The *Harlem Liberator* and the *Daily Worker* sales can be increased tremendously. Functioning fractions can be established in all organizations in the neighborhood and what's most important, these groups are in a position to concentrate on shops, thereby assuring a broad proletarian base in the liberation movement. The tasks of the white workers not only in Harlem, but throughout the Party, must be the most energetic struggle against white chauvinism not only by exposing hidden or open white chauvinists within the Party, but by boldly bringing forward the question of Negro liberation among the broad masses of white workers, convincing them of the undisputable fact "that labor in a white skin cannot be emancipated as long as labor in a black skin is branded."

## Open Letter an Instrument for Penetration Into the Basic Industries

By S. YANDRICH, Section Organizer, Sec. No. 1, Dist. No. 8

**E**XAMINING the work of our six months plan of concentration, we can record that some progress has been made since the Open Letter.

The Open Letter states that the main and most important task of our Party is to root itself in the basic industries, namely, the building of the Party and revolutionary unions of the Trade Union Unity League.

The Open Letter states further, that unless we take most seriously this question, change our methods of work, and in the shortest possible time make a rapid turn, build the Party and revolutionary trade unions in the basic industries, we will not be in a position to lead the working class in decisive class battles.

We decided that our main concentration must be International Harvester Company.

When the Open Letter was issued to every Party member, we may as well be frank and say that we hardly had a Party nucleus in Harvester. This nucleus which was established way back in 1925, was characterized as "no good" and carried on no activity whatever, with the exception of issuing a few bulletins every year and once in a great while a special leaflet. The nucleus seldom met. During the last two years the unit usually met twice a month, and at times every three weeks. There was no life in the nucleus, no perspectives whatsoever. As a result, the unit was losing its members.

Finally the Open Letter was issued to the Party membership. After discussing the importance of the Open Letter, and the importance of concentrating on the International Harvester Company, which is the largest and most important industry in Section No. 1 territory, we began to call meetings of the Harvester unit to get every Party member to attend meetings. At that time we had five Party members working in the plant.

### Plan of Work

First, we decided to meet with the comrades every week, to have unit meetings once a week, and the six months plan was adopted.

What was our plan?

- a. To recruit into the Party twenty workers.
- b. To recruit into the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union fifty workers, and to build the Young Communist League nucleus.

This plan was adopted unanimously at our Section Conference and at the nucleus meeting, then we began to work.

The first thing we did was to check up whether there were any more Party members working in the plant. We found a few, but these Party members did not belong to the Harvester nucleus at that time, so we immediately assigned these comrades to this Party nucleus.

It is interesting, comrades, to know that these Party members who were considered as no good, an element that is dead, etc., began to revive.

At that time we had an insignificant group of SMWIU consisting of our few Party members. What did we accomplish? Today in International Harvester Company we have two Party nuclei, one in McCormack, consisting of seven Party members, who are working in the plant, and one in the tractor plant, consisting of six Party members. The comrades at the last meeting of McCormack, pledged themselves to build another shop nucleus by the time of our District Convention.

In each of these units we have two comrades who are not working in the plant, two comrades that were working there one time, and another two, one from the District and one from the Section.

### Party Recruiting

While discussing the problem of recruiting into the Party with our comrades working in the plant, we met many difficulties and misconceptions as to the role of our Party, and who can be a member of our Party.

Such opinions put forth by some of the comrades, that the bulletins of the Party are too radical; that workers do not understand our program, etc.; that first we must bring workers into the union, and educate them, and then, when they understand our program, bring them into the Party.

However, the District and the Section leadership correctly guided the work of our comrades in the shop and we were able to break such tendencies which existed within the minds of comrades. These tendencies are not eliminated entirely, but progress has been made in this respect.

Building of the union—the SMWIU was built side by side with the building of the Party. In the union we have well over forty workers, and most of the union members are from the tractor plant; the union is being divided into department committees, and the work of our Party and the union is quite effective. We have instances lately where workers filled out application blanks in the Party bulletin, and joined our Party.

Also the activities of the union are very important, and the workers in the plant look to our union for leadership.

As a result of our union activities in the tractor plant, a superintendent and employment manager have been suspended from their positions.

There is another organization known as A.B.C., with which our union is carrying on a united front policy. As a result of this work we have been able to get about fifteen workers into our union so far, and the leadership of the A.B.C. has also joined our union.

### Check Up on Decisions and Plans

This work has been carried out because of constant check-up on our plans and decisions. There has been no unit meeting since the Open Letter which has not been attended by comrades from the Section and District. In this respect the District as well as the Section have been able to convince the comrades of the correctness of the Open Letter.

Concentration from the outside consists mainly of the distribution of leaflets, bulletins and the sale of the *Daily Worker*. We sell an average of from eight to nine copies of the *Daily Worker* at the tractor plant. (Why so few?—Ed.).

In the past we got our contacts through some comrades and mass organizations. We usually would send an outsider to visit these contacts, without success; now we send comrades working in the plant to visit these contacts, and we get better results.

As a result of our activities in the plant, our Party has won prestige among the Harvester workers, so much so that the workers are discussing during the lunch hours and asking each other how many Communists we have in the plant. Some would say, "Well about one thousand." Others say, "Every second worker is a Communist." This instance alone shows that the Party units are quite active in the shop.

We also have co-opted on the Section Committee two comrades who are the most active Party members that we have in Harvester. Our Party in Harvester actually discusses the problems of the workers in the plant and links these daily problems with political, national issues and campaigns of our Party.

## May First Parades

By SIDNEY BLOOMFIELD

**M**AY FIRST will soon be upon us and workers' parades and demonstrations must be planned immediately. The effectiveness of our demonstrations can be increased if we pay attention to some important details and the sooner the better. In the feverish days of the last world war, when the streets resounded daily to the tread of marching feet, opposed as one might have been to the flood of patriotism, neverthe-

less, when a fife and drum corps or military band passed by, the stirring strains went through one's system like an electric current.

In our parades, particularly in New York City, we have several bands, but the line of march is so long that the effect is lost upon the marchers and the bystanders as well. The music cannot be heard beyond four or five blocks down the line. The marchers do not walk in rhythm and the effect is a line of stragglers shuffling along like a tired and discouraged army in retreat. The sloppy and slovenly demeanor of the marchers has a very bad effect upon the onlookers. The result is that the value of the demonstration as a means of impressing and winning over or neutralizing hostile people along the line of march is lost.

It should not be necessary to propagandize the value of stirring music. Every two or three hundred marchers should be led by a band, a bugle or fife and drum corps. We need scores of bands, with plenty of brass instruments. It will put a militant and challenging spirit into our parades and in this atmosphere the spirit is caught up by the masses.

The masses feel closer to a movement about which they can feel proud of. Every workers club, every branch of the International Labor Defense, International Workers Order, every trade union and every youth club should make a drive for the collection of funds to outfit a band, to pay for the music instruction for those unable to do so, and to attract such elements to the organization who like music. Many bourgeois organizations attract new members by advertising that they are going to organize a band or orchestra and upon this basis of interest they call for those who can play and those who would like to learn to play.

The Workers Music League can build up its movement upon the basis of a vigorous campaign to organize bands and orchestras in all workers' organizations. Such a campaign should be started at once. The immediate goal should be not less than twenty-five workers' bands in New York City by May First. The appearance of that many more well organized bands will greatly stimulate the entire demonstration and will add prestige to our movement beyond expectation. It can be done with proper organization work and immediately.

The next problem is that of banners and placards. The getting up of banners and slogans is important for the effect they have upon the masses. Many placards are carried on sticks that are too small. The result is that the placard is not raised sufficiently high to be seen or the one carrying it gets tired holding his arm above his head, or the signs are carried in such manner as to be useless for the purpose intended. The committees must not be stingy with the length of sticks.

Another bad practice is the tendency to make fancy letter-

ing on the placards. This is bad and must be stopped. Fancy lettering cannot be read quickly and easily as the marchers pass by and the meaning of the slogans are lost upon the spectators. The most effective is heavy, wide, bold and plain but neat and distinct lettering—and the less words, with good English and logical phrasing, the more effective.

Some slogans are written and composed in such bad English that the meaning is the direct opposite of what was intended. Some slogans are so bad grammatically, that people are amused at seeing them. Slogans should be discussed first, not merely slapped onto cardboard. In many cases the slogans are wrong from the standpoint of political content and meaning. Also it is best to carry a placard on a slight angle, with wording facing the sidewalks. When signs are carried directly forward, those upon the sidewalks and in the tenement windows cannot easily read our message.

The spacing of banners, streamers, placards, etc., should be carefully planned before the parade starts and the leaders or captains must see to it that these are kept sufficiently apart so that the placard or banner in front does not hide the ones behind. Too many in one spot and no signs at another, spoil the effect. When signs are massed, only the first few in front can be read while the many scores of signs that are crammed and hidden behind each other are simply wasted. Proper spacing should be planned so that every sign stands out by itself, is read easily and therefore serves its purpose well.

Finally, the question of making proper use of streamers that are carried by two or more people. Streamers must be watched more carefully than placards, because too much tension on either side of the carriers may rip the banners, or as is most common, too much looseness tends to cause folds in the streamer. Folds cover the lettering, thus making it impossible to read the inscriptions.

These are important matters and should be taken care of by the responsible committees in planning demonstrations.

## Shall the Party or the Trade Union Be Organized First?

By COMRADE ORGWALD

**T**HE following question and answer is reprinted from the pamphlet "Tactical and Organizational Questions of the Communist Parties of India and Indo-China" by Comrade Orgwald. The questions treated in this pamphlet, while they deal specifically with the problems of Party organization in India and Indo-China, nevertheless are of extreme importance

to us. Every Party functionary should study this pamphlet carefully. It can be obtained from the Central Committee for 10 cents.

**QUESTION:** Should the trade union or the Party organization be organized first?

**ANSWER:** I think that no categorical answer can be given to this question. It is necessary to do both. If there is a group, it is necessary to proceed in the way I have indicated, it is necessary to form a Party organization or a small initiative group for the purpose of forming such a Party organization. If a group of comrades arrives in a town and settles there, Party and trade union work should run parallel. If there is no trade union organization, then some comrade should be given the task of organizing a trade union in the trade in which he works.

Let us take the following case. A comrade arrives in some town by himself and succeeds in finding work in some factory in an industry which is not organized. It will be easier for him to start with the organization of a trade union. Since trade unions are not prohibited, he can speak openly about forming a trade union and about the tasks of such a union. He can call a meeting of workers of his factory who wish to join the union, send delegations to other factories working in the same or kindred trades and in the process of forming the trade union organizations he will inevitably come in contact with a number of workers. He will have the opportunity of observing them and is sure to find among them some brave enthusiasts and energetic young men and thus he can get recruits for the forming of a Party organization.

It all depends on the conditions prevailing in the given town. If you put the question theoretically, what is preferable or what is more important—to form first a Party organization or a trade union organization, the answer is of course—the Party. Trade unions are proletarian organizations, and very important organizations at that, but nevertheless they are organizations only for the defense of the economic interests of the working class.

Side by side with the trade union organizations there are a number of other working class organizations, such as cooperative, sport, International Labor Defense, International Workers Relief, workers' anti-religious societies, musical and educational organizations. Only the Party organization may give the line of action to the Communists and revolutionary workers who are members of these organizations. The Party organization defends the interests of the working class as a whole, since the Party organization is the vanguard of the working class and guides all the forms of the struggle for the overthrow of the capitalist system, whereas the trade union organization (led by the Party through the trade union

Communist fraction) serves as the transmission belt from the Party to the working class masses and leads directly the economic struggle of the workers.

Theoretically, therefore, it is more important to form first of all a Party organization; but if in some places at one time or another it is easier to form a trade union, then the forming of such a union should be taken in hand first of all. It will all depend on local conditions.

## The Shop Nucleus At Sparrows Point

**T**O understand the methods of work of the shop nucleus at Sparrows Point, it is necessary first to get acquainted with the following facts:

The Bethlehem Steel Co. at Sparrows Pt. at present employs about 12,000 people. The plant is running between 50 and 60% capacity. The plant is stretched over a territory of 5 miles and includes the following major mills: blast furnace, open hearth, plate mill, wire mill, pipe mill, sheet mill, tin mill, and shipyards. The composition of the workers in the plant is as follows: 60% American born, 3,000 Negroes, about 35% young workers and several hundred women.

### Past Organizational Structure and Work of Nucleus

This Party nucleus is one of the oldest in the country. Ever since the reorganization of the Party, a large Party nucleus as well as a YCL nucleus which was organized some time later, has been in existence in the plant. All the Party members in the mill, regardless of the departments or mills they worked in belonged to the same unit. All but one member were foreign born workers.

The main activity of the unit consisted in issuing a monthly shop paper which was the work of one individual, namely the union organizer in Steel. Outside of this the unit carried on no political activity whatever. The role of the Party unit in building the union in the plant was very insignificant since the entire orientation was to build a "secret union." Workers were split up into small "underground groups," meeting in private homes, and the work was of such a "conspiratorial" nature, that the workers kept from joining the union.

Nevertheless, the propaganda carried on for years, and the maintenance of a small local of the union had its effects and would have resulted in organized struggle. However, at the height of the strike wave last Summer, the organizer was withdrawn, the union collapsed, the shop paper was discontinued and the unit ceased to function.

## Reorganization

Two months ago, the District Committee and the Section took steps to reorganize our work in the plant. The nucleus was reorganized on the basis of mills. Comrades working in the same mill were organized into a separate nucleus. A plant buro made up of one or more representatives from the mill nuclei was set up. The plant buro also has a representative from the YCL nucleus. This constitutes the leading political committee of the plant. The reorganization immediately gave the nucleus an opportunity to begin taking up problems facing the workers in each mill. Secondly, it made for greater check up on the activities of each individual member. At present, one third of the Party membership is active in Party or trade union activity in the plant. Under the initiative of the Party nucleus and Party members, several actions were carried through in the mill during the past weeks. These resulted in preventing a wage cut in one case, and securing an hours' pay for workers who report to work and are sent home in another. This helped more than anything else to place the Party and our Union before the workers as an active force.

The methods of work of both the Union and Party were completely changed from an underground secret organization to open activity, both outside and inside the mill. Agitation, discussions, and open recruiting of members on the job into our Union are now carried on, in fact, all the recruiting is done on the job. It is important to point out that the non-Party workers were the ones to break down the fear and the theory that everybody is a stool-pigeon and that nothing can be done. The weekly union bulletin, now issued, has established mass influence and following in the mill. It has helped to expose company agents as well as the A.A. (A. F. of L. union) and the N.R.A.

The Party units now meet regularly every other week. The Party shop paper will again be issued by the first of the month. The *Daily Worker*, which did not have any circulation at all during the past months, has picked up its sale.

With the campaign against the company union, which is now being developed, the Party at Sparrows Point has an opportunity to increase its ranks and to especially recruit Americans into the Party. Since the Lenin Memorial Meeting, six new workers joined the Party and three the Y.C.L. Most of these workers are American born.

The Party nucleus, in connection with the coming Party convention, set itself concrete tasks on recruiting, on the *Daily Worker* circulation, the Y.C.L., and the Union. These tasks can be fulfilled if the entire work at Sparrows Point receives a little attention from the District and the Section Committee of the Party.

— G. P.

## The Struggle Against War and Fascism In Our Shop Papers

By Agit Prop Department

**U**NQUESTIONABLY the struggle against fascism and bosses' war is and remains a basic task of our Party shop papers. In examining how our shop papers are carrying on this fight, however, it is obvious that as yet there are many weaknesses and deficiencies. If we are to ask, in the first place, how much anti-war and anti-fascist material appears in these papers, one would already have to answer that it is insufficient.

Aside from the fact that many Party nuclei in important shops do not even issue shop papers, those that are issued do not contain enough propaganda articles explaining the danger of war and fascism and the methods of struggling against them. More important, however, is the low political quality of many of the articles that do treat of these subjects.

Taking at random shop papers from strategic centers and industries such as coal, steel, aircraft, transport, etc., we note that many of them do not even mention fascism by so much as a word. This, in the present circumstances, is certainly a very serious weakness in our work. Some of those that do mention the danger of fascism and propagandize against it, fail to explain what fascism is, from whence it comes, and especially the close relation between fascism and war. Also, most of the shop papers forget entirely to explain the basic cause of war,—exploitation, the fight for markets, colonies, etc. It is clear that the first preliminary to educating the workers politically to the necessity of struggle against war and fascism is to explain to them the nature and causes of these questions.

Some of the shop papers insert just a line or two about the Leipzig trial, or about a red flag being hoisted in Hamburg; all of which is very interesting. But they do not explain the significance of these events.

A division is apparent, usually, between an article on war and the shop grievances which are discussed. Yet the linking up of these questions is a constant necessity. The *Boeing Worker*, from Seattle, is a good exception, linking well the everyday grievances with war, and explaining the role of the Communist Party. But here also, the question of fascism is omitted entirely.

The increased slavery under the NRA codes is exhibited by most of the shop papers, and occasionally linked up with

the frantic war preparations. However, practically nowhere do we see the many Fascist implications of the NRA explained. The importance of educating the workers politically about this question, explaining the meaning of the terror against the militant unions, the denial of the right to strike, the foisting of company unions upon millions of workers, is obvious.

Most of the shop papers neglect completely such an important issue as the role of the youth in the coming imperialist war. This is part and parcel of the general underestimation of the young workers and their ability to struggle which is apparent in the work of most shop nuclei. The *Stewart Warner Worker*, from District 8, is a good exception, having a clear article on Youth and War, explaining the cause of war and the relation of the young workers to it. At the present time, with the increasing numbers of youth in industry, this takes on a special importance. The Party shop papers, if they will seriously tackle this problem, at the same time taking up the fight for the economic demands of the young workers in their shops, and linking this up with the struggle against the war preparations, will go a long way toward accomplishing the much talked about task,—the building of YCL nuclei side by side with the Party nuclei.

One of the central questions in the whole field of how our shop papers are carrying on the struggle against war and fascism is the answer to the question, for the workers, of concretely how they can struggle against war. The shop papers, as a rule, contain long articles on Roosevelt's war preparations, or on the immanence of war, but when they wind up, they are strangely silent on the tasks of the worker in this fight. We find little or no mention of building anti-war committees in the shops, or even of the basic idea that the best guarantee which the workers can have that they will be able to put up some struggle would be the existence of a militant union in the shop. The average shop paper ends its article on war without any tasks suggested. Certainly we will not teach the workers to struggle against war effectively until we tell them, through our shop papers, as well as in our other agitation, how they can carry on this struggle.


The question of the defense of the Soviet Union is usually brought in very abstractly, often merely as a slogan, without explaining the relation of this question to war and fascism: without explaining that one of the basic reasons for the oncoming imperialist war will be the hatred of the imperialists for the workers' fatherland. If more of the shop papers, when they do mention the Soviet Union would point out the conditions of identical workers there, their benefits, etc., and then explain how this came about, the workers would more easily understand why they must defend the Soviet Union. The

hatred of Fascist Germany for the Soviets, the infamous Hugenberg memorandum are rarely explained, yet they may form the driving wedge in the war.

The Party has done a great deal to help build the American League Against War and Fascism. The Party in its regular press and activities considers this united front organization very important. But do the shop papers reflect this? Not at all. Here we see again this non-bolshevik idea of separation. Is there, perhaps, a division of "spheres of influence?" Certainly, the work of the American League Against War and Fascism must be extended by us beyond halls and the press. It must be brought into the shops, and the major responsibility for explaining the League and fighting for its growth, falls upon the shop papers.

Finally, the role of the Communist Party as the decisive factor in the struggle against war and fascism is not sufficiently brought out. Many of the shop papers raise the slogan of joining the Party in order to fight for better economic conditions, without pointing out how the Party as the vanguard of the working class leads the fight against imperialist war, and brings forward the only solution. The shop papers everywhere must increase their emphasis on this point, making it clear that the only final solution in the fight against war is the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a Soviet America.

# Party Organizer



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# PARTY ORGANIZER

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## The Party in the Chicago Stockyards

By BILL GEBERT

**T**HE Stockyards Section in Chicago is the most important section of concentration in the city of Chicago. It has a tremendous task to organize and lead the struggles of the stockyards workers.

The composition of the stockyards workers are Negroes, Mexican, Lithuanian, Polish, young native American workers, quite a large section of Irish-American. In short it is a decisive section of the proletariat of the city of Chicago. The stockyards in the city of Chicago are influential politically and economically in the life of the city. It is the dominant industry.

The stockyards workers have a tradition of militant strike struggles which have been betrayed by the treacherous officialdom of the American Federation of Labor. Today the conditions of the stockyards workers are such that there is a growing discontent and growing revolt against these conditions. Wages are on a starvation level. A section of the workers are working part time; there are thousands of unemployed stockyards workers. At the present time the stockyards are increasing in production somewhat, primarily as a result of the U. S. government orders for canned beef for the Army.

### United Front Through Department Committees is Key to Problem

In the stockyards we have two shop nuclei. From time to time we are issuing a shop bulletin, the *Daily Worker* is being sold to some extent outside of the gates. There are weak union groups of the Packing House Workers Industrial Union and in addition there are unions of the A. F. of L. and a Stockyards Labor Council. The key to the stockyards problem is the united front from below of these organizations, through the organization of department committees. Our experience so far shows that this is the basic task confronting us in the Yards. These department committees will unite workers, members of different unions and unorganized workers, who are in a position to develop struggles around concrete problems, grievances and demands confronting the workers in the yards. This is a stepping stone towards

developing, preparing and organizing bigger struggles leading to mass struggles of the workers.

The second task is developing an opposition movement inside of the unions of the A. F. of L. and the Stockyards Labor Council, and in the course of these activities strengthening and building the P.H.W.I.U., as the majority of the workers in the stockyards are unorganized.

That the workers are ready to fight was demonstrated by the strike of the 800 livestock handlers a couple of months ago. This strike was supported by the masses of stockyards workers and if this strike was not spread, it was because we had not been a factor in building department committees and had not been able to establish a mass P.H.W.I.U. Today the livestock handlers are again speaking of action, because the 10 per cent increase in wages which was forced through militant action was given to them not as an increase of wages, but an increase of working hours corresponding to the total 10 per cent increase in wages.

In addition to the development of the work inside of the yards, it is advisable in this state of development to organize neighborhood groups of unemployed and employed and language groups (Mexican, Polish, Lithuanian, etc.), with the objective of bringing the workers through these means into the department committees to the union and Unemployment Councils. These are the tasks, these are the problems and how we are to tackle them.

### Section Decisions Not Carried Out

First of all, let us examine some of the recent decisions made by the sections of concentration around the stockyards. In addition to the Stockyards Section, (Section 11), Sections 2 and 7 are also concentrating on the stockyards. At a recent meeting of the District Committee (January 27-28), Sections 2, 7, 11 and the Communist fraction inside the P.H.W.I.U. each pledged to recruit 10 stockyards workers into the Party, that is, to recruit before the National Convention of the Party 40 stockyards workers. Three weeks passed since the leadership of the Sections 2, 7, 11 and the fraction made this pledge. During these three weeks of "hard work" they were successful in recruiting three workers into the Party. At such a tempo of work it will take us to complete the task set by the Section Committees themselves, not until April 1st, but until New Year, 1935. The fact that we proceed in such a slow tempo reflects the weakness of the work in the stockyards among the masses of stockyards workers, unemployed and employed. We cannot say here, however, that a certain part of the membership is not active, but that the leaders of the Sections are not sufficiently alert to all the problems confronting the stock-

yards workers there, and are not able to mobilize the membership politically for work.

The District Committee of the Party and the National Committee of the Food Workers Industrial Union strengthened the forces by assigning two leading comrades to work with the comrades with the Section Committees and the Union. Unfortunately there is some tendency to consider that only those that were assigned are responsible for the work and shall carry on the work. There must be a change in this, involving together all the forces of Sections 2, 7, and 11 to accomplish the tasks set by the Section Committees themselves in the point of concentration, the stockyards.

The District Committee time and again has not only reviewed the work of the stockyards, but given necessary political guidance and help to formulate the policy and decisions and strengthened the forces to carry them through. Unfortunately not all the decisions of the District Committee have been carried through. At present, the District Committee must thoroughly discuss these questions with the Sections 2, 7, and 11, and the leading fraction in the P.H.W.I.U.

### Stockyards Conference Proposed

It has been decided to organize a conference for the purpose of strengthening the work in the stockyards. The conference will have a mass character with delegates to the conference elected by the workers in the departments with the opposition groups inside the A. F. of L. and Stockyards Labor Council as well as delegates from the working class organizations, Negro and white, on the south side of Chicago. The purpose of the Conference will be the setting up of a committee to help to carry on the work in the stockyards. It is proposed to combine this conference with a demonstration of the employed and unemployed workers of the south side of Chicago to the stockyards demanding that the meat produced for the U. S. Army be distributed to the unemployed through the committees of the employed and unemployed workers. This task was unanimously accepted by the Section Committee and the leading fraction of the P.H.W.I.U. will bring results only if the preparatory work for the conference will intensify the building of department committees, and the organization of neighborhood language groups of the stockyards workers. When we will visit and penetrate not only organizations of the workers close to our movement but organizations of other workers, both Negro and white, young workers and women workers: when we will go to the churches and fraternal organizations, everywhere, for the definite purpose of rallying workers for the demands of the workers inside of the yards as well as the unemployed, then we will be able to build organization among the packing house work-

ers as well as the Party and Y.C.L. It is in the light of these tasks that the Stockyards Section Conference must be prepared, that these and other problems confronting our Party in the stockyards must be discussed by all units in the Stockyards Section and units concentrating on the yards. The section leadership must be held responsible for fulfillment of their pledge to the District Committee to recruit their quota of workers into the Party and increase the mass work in the yards. There must be also further improvement in the composition of the leadership in the Sections by drawing into the Section Committees the more advanced workers from the yards and unemployed workers who show initiative in their daily work among the masses. Carrying out this, we will at least make the first step towards improving the work in the yards.

This work in the stockyards section must not only be confined, however, to the Stockyards Section itself, it must become the task of the whole Party in the District. The C.C. placed the problem of the stockyards before the entire Party nationally. The Chicago District must give maximum attention to the problems of the yards. Every member of our Party, and fractions of all the mass organizations, must be mobilized to overcome the lagging behind of the work in this most important concentration point, the stockyards.

## Winning the Negroes in the Struggle Against Unemployment

By M. WORK (Dist. 2)

**T**HE solution of the Negro Problem, the successful mobilization of the American working class in the National Liberation struggles of the Negro people, the fight for full political, economic and social equality for the Negroes as an oppressed national minority, looms with decisive importance at this period. The resolution of the Thirteenth Plenum describes this as a period immediately preceding mass revolutionary struggles in all the ranks of the toilers.

### We Have Not Won the Negro in Our Unemployment Struggles

This is seen especially in our unemployment work.

"It is the duty of the white workers to march in the forefront of the struggle for Negro rights."—(October Letter of the C.I.). But the Open Letter of our Central Committee had to state on this point: "... among our comrades there is a deep-going lack of political understanding of the necessity of strengthening our basis of the decisive sections of the American workers."

Unity among the toiling masses and especially in the decisive sections is absolutely necessary in the revolutionary struggle against American capitalism. This unity can be accomplished only by fighting for liberation and equality of the Negroes. Karl Marx, in his letter to the American workers, said: "Labor in the white skin cannot free itself while labor in the black skin is chained."

### No Demands Against Discrimination in Rent Strikes

Negroes are most cruelly discriminated against in housing and rents. Six or seven adult Negroes in a three-room apartment is not the exception today. Not only are rottenest, bug-ridden, antiquated fire-traps set aside for and forced upon the Negroes but even for these apartments we are forced to pay more rent than the white workers have to pay for better apartments.

Thousands of rent strikes have been conducted by revolutionary individuals and organizations, and these were uniformly successful in winning their demands. Practically all of these have been conducted in houses inhabited by white workers.

Although these organizations and the leaders of the strikes know the universal discrimination against the Negroes on the question of housing and rents, and although the workers who accept our guidance in these struggles know of our program against discrimination of Negroes, almost in no rent strike have we raised the demand that Negroes shall be permitted to live in these houses under conditions of equality with the whites. Why?

Most of us are spoken of as "Reds" and Communists even in the streets shortly after we participate in these strikes. However, because there is a "deep-going lack of political understanding among our comrades," they miss this opportunity to rally the white workers in a struggle for Negro equality. They do not see clearly that in the concrete situation, Marx' statement becomes: "Labor in a white skin cannot free itself of high rents and rotten apartments while Labor in the black skin can be made to pay higher rents for the same apartments."

Naturally in many such strikes we will fail to win the workers to put forward this demand, but where we do succeed we will involve increasingly large numbers of workers and, in particular, large numbers of Negroes fighting in revolutionary solidarity with their white brothers not only for their everyday needs but also in the strategically most important struggle for Negro equality.

I took part in a rent strike in 1932 where the tenants were all white. In most of the houses on the block Negroes lived. The demands put forward were: (1) Reduction in rent.

(2) Better (specific) service in the house; and (3) No discrimination against tenants on Home Relief.

### Party Members Should Lead Struggle

In order to involve the hundreds of Negroes there in the strike I raised the issue of Negro discrimination in the block and in the house. The Party member in the house did not respond to the demand. In the strike meeting I won the majority to support the demand. But the Party member, a leading figure in a revolutionary union, blocked the movement with the following argument. "The Negroes are not sympathetic. You cannot get them to help us in our strike. Our house has been organized for nearly three years and this is our third strike, but they won't do anything." We could not convince her even in the fraction meeting of the Unemployment Council.

But consider the Negroes. They lived in a block predominantly Negro, where they paid exorbitant rents for miserable accommodations. The white Communists had sold hundreds of Dailies and pamphlets on Scottsboro and Negro Liberation, and the white tenants in the all-white house had conducted two rent strikes reducing their rents from an average of \$28 to \$22. They didn't organize the Negroes to strike for lower rents and failed to raise the issue of breaking the jim-crow rules in their own house.

Should we expect the Negroes to come out and picket in the face of certain police terror to help the white workers reduce their rents to \$18?

No! But they would have been interested to reduce their own rents.

And it is precisely because we are revolutionary workers and understand the importance of Marx' statement that we must carry on the fight for Negro equality even when the Negroes do not appear to want equality!

The Lovestonite renegades classed the Negroes in the South as "a bulwark of reaction" and said that the slogan of "self-determination for the Black Belt" was leading the workers to a bloodbath. This was because they didn't understand the October Letter when they read that "the white workers must march in the forefront of the struggle for Negro rights." Not the Negroes alone, but the Negroes and the white workers must fight American imperialism! The renegades are now in a united front with the Socialist leaders who call now in the capitalist press for the cops to use their clubs on the workers, white as well as black. This danger must be fought with a deep-going political understanding of the Party line.

### The Negro Problem is a National Problem

So little is the national problem understood that we have the spectacle of trade unions in Belgium and England investing their funds in enterprises which make their profits from slave labor in Africa (diamond mines, rubber plantations, etc.). Therefore it is no mystery that the majority of American workers fail to see the importance of fighting for Negro rights because they are an oppressed national minority.

I have been a member on several delegations to various officials but on only one of these did a white comrade seize on the issue of Negro discrimination and put up a fight for equality of Negroes in the specific situation which was the occasion of the delegation. This was Bob Minor on the delegation to the special session of the legislature in August, 1932. On Thursday, February 15th, however, on the United Front delegation to Daniels, the comrade who represented the Relief Workers' League, in an otherwise excellent protest, forgot the Negro discrimination on CWA jobs and consequently I had to spend a large part of the time which should have been devoted to the line of the Unemployment Council as contrasted with that of the Socialists, I had to spend this on discrimination of Negroes.

The most important aspect of our unemployment work and the Negro problem is the work of the trade unions. This must be dealt with in a subsequent article.

Our present Party discussions have to clarify and mobilize the comrades and the readers of our press for redoubled efforts in the struggle to win the white workers to a leading part in the fight to win the masses of the Negro people to the revolutionary struggle for National Liberation.

### Chicago Section Learns About Railroad Concentration

By REVA WEINSTEIN (Section Five)

**T**HE 13th Plenum Resolution analyzes the present situation as follows: "The Bourgeoisie wants to postpone the doom of capitalism by a criminal imperialist war and a counter-revolutionary campaign against the Land of Victorious Socialism."

It further outlines our tasks very clearly: "In fighting against war, the Communists must prepare even now for the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war, and concentrate their forces in each country in the vital parts of war machinery of imperialism."

Of special importance in the war machinery of American

imperialism are the railroads as the most important means of conducting war, not only as a means of transporting troops, but also supplying the army with the necessary food, ammunition, etc. The dependence of warfare on transportation raises the importance of the proletariat working in this field.

The role the railroad workers will play in fighting against war solely depends upon how seriously our Party will undertake the concentration work in this industry.

### Section Examines Concentration Work

In line with the above analysis of the 13th Plenum of the E.C.C.I., the bureau of Section Five began in a most self-critical manner to examine the work of our section in all its concentration points, and found the following situation in our major point of concentration, namely, the railroad shops:

1. The Section Bureau did not make a thorough study of its major point of concentration, but instead indulged in lengthy polemics and controversies with the leading comrades assigned to guide the Section in railroad work. This leading comrade was new in our District, and took it for granted that the comrades knew all about railroad work. An antagonistic feeling was created between them because of this misunderstanding and as a result no work was done for some time.

2. The Concentration Unit, although it had a very good group of comrades, had stagnated and developed a great deal of looseness and bureaucracy because of the fact that the comrade organizer was imported into the unit on the merit of having some experiences in railroad work. She lives in another section and had no personal contact with the comrades in the unit, nor with the workers around the shop and neighborhood all week long.

The Unemployment Council headquarters closed down. A general demoralization existed in the unit. Only very few of the members (18) were active.

3. In face of this situation in the unit and because of the fact that there seemed to be a possibility to recruit workers from the shop into the Party, the Section Committee set up an artificial shop unit as a base for recruiting from the shop, composed of three railroad workers. These comrades were unemployed for a period of from 2 to 12 years. To this "shop unit", a Section representative was assigned, who at no time previously had done any kind of railroad work, nor had any contact with railroad workers through the concentration unit. The leading comrades from the District were also assigned to this unit, and they all "stewed in their own juice" until the former shop workers

came to Section members, asking why they were transferred out of the Party, and practically stopped coming to unit meetings. One comrade was lost for a period of two months!

### Bad Situation Remedied

The Section Committee proceeded to remedy this situation in the following manner:

1. By calling the entire membership of the unit to a special meeting where the comrades thoroughly discussed the situation in the unit in a real Bolshevik, self-critical manner.

2. By electing a new bureau, drawing in as organizer, a comrade who was doing some work among railroad workers, but who always claimed to be illiterate and therefore could not act as unit organizer, also two other comrades comparatively new in the Party. The Unit Bureau worked out a three months plan of work.

3. The Section Bureau assigned one of its members to work directly with the unit, dissolved the so-called shop unit and drew most of the comrades into the concentration unit.

4. The leading railroad comrade was assigned by the unit bureau to lead a discussion circle every unit meeting night for one hour on the question of concentration, and in addition he takes comrades assigned to visiting contacts with him and also teaches them how to approach railroad workers.

5. The Section Committee also undertook to establish a Section Headquarters directly in the neighborhood where Open Forums are to be established. At all times a member of the Section Committee is to be present there to give guidance to the unit and to the re-established Unemployment Council. At least two study classes are to be established. Railroad contacts were given by the Section to other units as well as the assignment of the distribution of the Daily Worker at certain points.

### Accomplishments of the Unit Since its Reorganization

1. The unit is beginning to link up the Party campaigns with our contact work, such as the Daily Worker Drive, Lenin Memorial Meetings, etc.

2. Numerous contacts have been visited and followed up with the Daily Worker, the railroad paper, and literature.

The recent articles in the Daily Worker on the railroad situation helped the unit greatly in its work. It gave us something concrete to approach the railroad worker with. On the last Red Sunday, when a railroad article appeared

in the *Daily Worker*, 30 copies were sold and 100 distributed at the shop gates to the railroad workers.

3. One railroad worker was recruited by the unit with two more prospects, and one was recruited by the Section at an open membership meeting.

4. The headquarters were obtained and will be definitely established this week.

### Shortcomings

1. Insufficient check-up within the unit.
2. Sale of the *Daily Worker* at shop gates and neighborhood route not yet definitely established.
3. Weak Lodge work, in the union.
4. No accomplishment on shop group.
5. Section Committee did not as yet sufficiently involve other units and mass organizations in railroad work, because of the fact that the other units and mass organizations were not made railroad conscious by the Section.

### Immediate Tasks Being Carried Out in Connection With Strike Vote and Wage Cuts

1. Every contact in the possession of the Unit is being followed up.
2. The sale of the *Daily Worker* at shop gates.
3. Sale of railroad papers at the union lodges.
4. A leaflet to be issued on this question.

The general life of the unit is greatly improved. Attendance is good and the discussions are alive with all kinds of experiences of the comrades. There is a general outlook of carrying out the three months plan of work with some definite accomplishments, although a number of weaknesses exist.

This experience in Section Five proves that leading comrades in the District and Sections must become the driving force of our units (which means working with the comrades in the units!) if we are to carry out the Resolutions of the 13th Plenum of the E.C.C.I. and the Open Letter.

"Our strength is tremendous, and if we apply this strength to mass work, if we overcome our weaknesses, really get to work in the factories and plants and trade unions....., then despite the whole world bourgeoisie, despite fascism, we will overturn the whole world and assure the complete victory of the proletariat." Khorin, FASCISM, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE COMMUNISTS, 13th Plenum of E.C.C.I., December, 1933.

## Work in the A. F. of L. in Cincinnati

By N. FELD (Section Organizer No. 10, District No. 6)

**A**FTER the Extraordinary Party Conference and the adoption of the Open Letter, Section 10 of District 6 can definitely register some improvements. The Party in the city of Cincinnati has made a clean sweep of the Party's frayed ends by exposing and expelling the stoolpigeons and renegades, such as Berg, Brown, Davis and others. Since then the Party has begun to orientate itself towards really carrying out mass work among the unemployed and attempts have been made to organize the unorganized workers in the metal industry.

However there are still some tendencies to look upon some members of the Party as "no good" elements. In examining some of the individual comrades we find the following: 1. Very low political development. 2. No planned work whatsoever. Most of the comrades who are carrying on work are doing it because they are devoted and loyal to the Party. If they are unable to carry out some of the tasks, it is not because they are "no good"; it is because they are not doing the right kind of work which they are most fit to do. It is not that the comrades are "no good"; it is because the work and the tasks that we give to these comrades are not carefully planned. It is the task of the leading comrades in the units, sections and districts to see to it that every comrade should be given work which he or she is fit to carry out. When we will have done this, all these comrades no longer will be classified as "no good" comrades, but on the contrary, they will enjoy the work, and they will perform their duties much better.

### What is Planned Work?

In order to do this we must plan our work, not only for the units and sections, but for every individual. What is planned work? Does planned work mean to draw up a series of activities for a certain period of time at the unit or section committees and forget about it within the next two weeks? Does planned work mean what we think we should do? Such plans, if they are not based on the abilities of the unit, section and individual comrades will never be accomplished. If we intend to have a plan of work, it must be understood that we must base the entire work upon our knowledge of a given territory or shop, that we must understand the needs, desire and moods of the work-

ers in the territory or shop. Many times we issue tens of thousands of leaflets in a given territory or shop and the workers do not come to our meetings. We make hasty conclusions that the workers are not ready for organization and some of our "bright" comrades make remarks like "let them starve, they do not feel it now, later on they will come to us." Such conclusions are wrong. We have seen that during the organization of the CWA workers we did not have a response at the beginning, but we were persistent in explaining to the workers, day in and day out, the whole "New Deal" and the unemployed situation. We found later that whole jobs came down to the office asking for advice and help. Then we took up the question with the workers and involved the workers themselves in the various committees and activities. The workers have gained many concessions, the movement around the CWA began to take on the character of a mass movement. Many of the workers joined the Party.

Another example is that for a period of time we have been concentrating in one shop. A group of about 15 was built but it did not grow and the workers began to become restless. The work in the shop had been conducted illegally. We came to a conclusion that since there are signs of interest in the shop about the union, it is no longer necessary to keep the union a secret. We took up this question and decided to call an open meeting. The workers responded. At the present time we see that there is more enthusiasm in the shop and in the meetings than ever before and the local is taking questions of conditions and wages. From these examples we can see that when we follow the moods and desires of the workers, they respond, but after all we cannot hold workers with meetings alone. They want to see the union in action and they feel that they are to be the ones to act. When a movement reaches a certain stage it will remain for a while on the same level and unless we advance this movement to a higher level it will decline.

### Our Approach to the A. F. of L.

The main weakness in all our work is within the A. F. of L. We have a wrong approach towards this important work, not only underestimating the work, but complete capitulation to the difficulties. The indignation of the workers against the A. F. of L. leaders is at such a pitch that this indifferent attitude and unwillingness on the part of many comrades in the A. F. of L. is a crime. It is not a question of coming in and telling us of the betrayals. We know them. But why not take up these questions with the workers in the shops and meetings? Workers refuse to go to meetings of the A. F. of L. They refuse to pay dues. What are we

going to do about this? If we are going to repeat some paragraphs from the Open Letter, or C. C. Resolutions that "we must win over these workers", and at the same time do nothing to enforce this, it becomes just an empty phrase. Here I want to bring some concrete examples of how and how not to work in the A. F. of L. The agreement of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers expired. Jack Kroll, the manager, signed a new contract without the knowledge of the workers and in fact without even consulting the Joint Board. In the agreement there is a paragraph which states "that the workers have no right to make any stoppages". This means that the workers will not be able to take up any grievances in the shop directly, that the employers hereafter have the full right to discharge anyone on any pretense, that the destiny of the workers is entirely in the hands of the officials. We issued a leaflet exposing this sell-out. The leaflet appealed to the workers and stirred them into fighting mood. At one shop meeting more than ten workers spoke against the agreement, in spite of the terror on the part of the officials. But in order to utilize the sentiment of the workers against the betrayal, and in order to continue the fight against the agreement, in the sense of following up and advancing the pitch of the sentiment, we failed to do this. We failed to work out a more complete program such as cancellation of dues debts (where workers are behind more than 8 months and are unable to pay). We failed to consolidate and enlarge the Opposition of the rank and file. There was a sentiment for reduction in dues payments, reduction in the officials' salaries, etc. The workers want all these things. It is a burning problem for them. But we are satisfied and drunk with "success".

### Confusion on Question of A. F. of L.

Aside from this many of our comrades are of the opinion that the A. F. of L. is "played out" and "there is no use to monkey around with these fakers." These comrades cannot and will not see that the A. F. of L. has built up a powerful machine which is working hand in hand with the employers to defeat the growing sentiment of the workers against the existing conditions. Many of the comrades are completely confused on the following questions:

1. Since the majority of the needle workers in Cincinnati are unorganized, only 25 per cent out of about eight to ten thousand are organized. Why build an opposition? Why not organize the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union?
2. Now that we are going to work in the A. F. of L. to organize the opposition movement, it means that we must help

the fakers to organize the unorganized, instead of organizing them into the industrial union.

3. If we do not help to organize the unorganized into the A. F. of L. it means that we are going there to break up the A. F. of L. unions.

I will bring some examples which may bring some light and clarify all these three questions to some extent. For a period of more than two months we took up all problems with a group of workers in one metal shop. This shop is organized into the A. F. of L. At the beginning we advised the workers to go to the meetings, and even some of the comrades advised them to pay their dues. We worked out all problems with them in the minutest detail. The business agent promised them everything but delayed keeping the promises from month to month, inventing all kinds of schemes. The workers got tired and stopped attending the meetings. Then the A. F. of L. announced a two dollar fine for not attending the meetings, and the workers decided not to attend the meetings at all, not to pay dues. What was left for us to do? Should we have continued to send these workers to the meetings? Of course not. We called upon the workers to take the matter in their own hands and promised that the S.M.W.I.U. would help them. The workers responded to our call. Now we have all possibilities that the entire shop will affiliate to the S.M.W.I.U.

Does this mean breaking up an A. F. of L. union? Well, the workers in the shop wanted to break long ago, and if we had continued to send these workers to the meetings we would have helped directly to disorganize their ranks, and it would have taken a long time to reorganize them all over again.

The A. F. of L. in the city of Cincinnati is the third if not the second strongest A. F. of L. organization in this country. To have an approach that the A. F. of L. is "played out" is a complete capitulation before the A. F. of L. and opportunism in practice. The work in our Section and in the entire District must be based mainly on the opposition work within the A. F. of L. and at the same time to build the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union.

Why do we not concentrate in organizing the Amalgamated Clothing Workers into the Industrial union, since the majority of the workers are unorganized? Because our concentration is the S.M.W.I.U. and not the N.T.W.I.U. Otherwise it will not be concentration. The fact proves that when we began to really concentrate and pay some attention to the work, we gained in the past three weeks right after the convention two locals and both locals are working openly in the shops. Since the last convention we tripled the membership in our union, and it is only the beginning.

We do not go to the A. F. of L. to break up the unions as some comrades may think. We go there to break the attempts of the fakers to betray the workers. We go there to win over the workers for a rank and file leadership, whether the workers are ready to affiliate to the industrial unions or not. Some of our comrades may think that to win over the leadership of an A. F. of L. union means to gain the control of the office. This is not so. To gain the leadership does not all the time mean to gain the control of the office. To be a leader does not necessarily mean to be a business agent or secretary. We can sit in the back seats and still be the leaders.

The question of how are we going to work in a correct and better way in the A. F. of L. unions has not been sufficiently dealt with in the discussion. This question must be clarified in a thorough manner so that all the Party comrades especially the comrades who are members in the A. F. of L. unions, will speed up their work and contribute their experiences to the **Daily Worker**. Our work of organizing the unorganized depends largely upon our correct work in the A. F. of L. unions. So long as we have a misunderstanding of our work in the A. F. of L. it will be difficult for us to gain accomplishments in the industrial unions.

## Language Work in Youngstown Section

By JOHN ROMAN

### Language Forces Should Be Made Instrumental In Rooting the Party in the Factories and Basic Industries

**T**HE importance of giving our language fractions the proper orientation and of raising the political level of our "language comrades", who are permeated with all tendencies of federational-sectarianism, becomes apparent as we consider the large number of foreign-speaking elements in the basic industries and the great percentage of foreign comrades in the Party and especially in the concentration districts, sections and cities.

Let us take as a vehicle of discussion one of the most important concentration points, the Youngstown section.

What is—first of all—the composition of the working-class and that of the Party membership in this section? Overwhelmingly foreign. Steel is the main and practically the only industry of significance. Estimates concerning the foreign-speaking amongst the steel workers vary from 60 to 75 per cent. Three-fourths of the Party membership in the Youngstown section is estimated to be foreign-speaking.

These figures, even allowing for slight inaccuracy, speak for themselves. The significant role and double responsibility of the language comrades is obvious. But do our language forces have the proper orientation in their activities, do we possess the proper political understanding required for the fulfillment of the tasks?

### Language Forces Lack Understanding of Their Tasks

Perhaps some of the "modest", "simple", "petty" everyday occurrences will be illustrative of the general attitude and political level:

One instance: The Section is in a chaotic situation because of the political and organizational bankruptcy of the previous Section leadership recently removed. Everything is upside-down, and great efforts are made to put things in order. The units are faced with urgent tasks. In unit No. — a South Slav comrade proposes the postponement of the unit meeting, because the language comrades are involved in rehearsing a play, and there is little time left to make the acting successful.

Another instance: A language comrade, on the evening of his local union meeting, goes to the headquarters of his "language-society", to warm his feet. Since he is the chairman of the local, he was asked as to the reason for not going to the local meeting. "Hell, it is too cold, there is hardly gonna be anybody, anyhow", he answered with a feeling of justification.

In the city of F—— non-party workers went to a comrade asking for advice because the workers were in a fighting mood in that particular steel mill and wanted to fight for wage increase. The comrade advises them to form committees, etc. The workers hand in a signed petition demanding 20 per cent increase in wages and they got it. Yet our comrades "forget" to bring these workers into the S.M.W.I.U., they are busy with "language work" and rehearsing a play, "Struggle on the Barricades".

In the city of Y—— we made a checkup of the membership of the Hungarian organizations under Party influence, and also of the readers of Uj Előre. We find that there are about 30 sympathetic steel workers, a good number of them employed in steel mills, Republic, Carnegie Sheet and Tube, etc. How many of them were asked to join the S.M.W.I.U.? None. We find that a number of our fraction members are working in steel mills. How many of them are members of the union? None.

Now these "petty" "everyday occurrences" characterize the situation. But since our language forces (the majority of the Section membership) are "concentrating" practically

all their energies in their language societies, one would assume that there at least we would find a mass movement of some sort. But do we?

On the contrary. The circle of their following is very narrow. We have a situation where a dozen communists "lead" 20 to 30 Party-sympathizers (Hungarians, etc.).

### Language Work Isolated from Basic Tasks of Party

But why the isolation? Is it because we don't do work? No. Primarily because we go about it in the wrong way. Because of our failure to link up our activities on the language field with the basic tasks of the Party. Do our language forces in the Youngstown section properly participate or engage in systematic work in the factories, among the steel workers, on CWA jobs? Are they doing work among the unemployed? Are they working systematically in the reactionary organizations, where the great masses of indifferent misled workers are left to the mercy of the reactionaries, the fascists? National experiences on the language-field show that where this was done, the isolation of our language movement began to disappear, and new masses began to flock toward us. These experiences also show (New York, New Jersey districts) how the language forces can be instrumental in organizing shop nuclei, rooting the Party in the factories, etc., and by such activities in turn also securing new members and injecting new life and vigor to our lifeless language organizations.

There is a complete lack of understanding of this on the language field of the Youngstown section.

The general attitude of the language forces is characterized by incidents quoted above. There is a very low level of political understanding, irregular attendance and participation in the so-called general Party work, a shrinking from any activity that is not within the narrow shell of "society doings," their activities in the main are that of the old line of federalism. That is, limited to associating with their own friends, seeing the same faces year in and year out, having a dance and lecture here and there and of course giving financial support to their language press.

Needless to say that in a section where the overwhelming majority of the basic proletariat is foreign-speaking where almost the whole Section membership is that of the "language forces" such a situation as that in Youngstown is more than intolerable.

### How to Improve the Situation

There are certain steps that could be taken immediately which would undoubtedly tend to improve the situation:

1. A systematic and thorough ideological campaign amongst the language forces to stamp out the federational-sectarianism. This should be conducted in their own specific language. The various Language Buros of the district could be of great assistance by arranging study courses for at least two weeks, where the fraction members and active sympathizers would get political education in a language they understand, and among other topics, the question of "federationalism" would be clarified.

However, actual results are attainable only if the Section leadership will carry out its decision of establishing very close contact with these fractions, giving personal guidance, checking the work, and systematically insist on carrying out the basic tasks. A Section representative should attend these fraction meetings, and regular meetings of all fraction secretaries should be an institution-like procedure.

2. An immediate putting into effect of the Party decision that all Party members eligible to union membership must join the S.M.W.I.U.

3. An immediate registration of the readers of various Party language press and the membership of the language organizations under our influence; to have a clear picture of our contacts amongst the steel workers. Since the S.M.W.I.U. in the section is still in the embryonic stage, a campaign of individual recruiting should be started. Through utilizing these contacts, that are "right in front of our nose" we could undoubtedly "discover" some valuable connections, and form some factory or department groups, as a preparation of the anticipated upsurge of steel workers. Also the setting up of "Build the S.M.W.I.U. committees" in language organizations would be of assistance.

4. A functioning Language Department should be established in the S.M.W.I.U. involving our language comrades in day-to-day concrete work amongst their specific nationality, and issuing leaflets and union bulletins in foreign languages, since thousands upon thousands of these workers do not understand English. And since the financial capacity of the union is very limited, the various language buros of the district should take upon themselves the task of translating and financing such material of union propaganda, in their own languages.

The above enumerated steps could be undertaken immediately, and would, it appears, improve the situation.

The Section leadership, because of the very character of its territory, must give immediate attention to the "language situation". The main responsibility lies with the Section leadership, because only the Section Committee by the virtue of being on the spot and able to give push and

guidance, can reorientate the work of the language forces. Experience shows that with proper methods of work "language forces" may become most instrumental in building the union, rooting the Party in the factories and among the basic strata of the proletariat.

And with the anticipation of the upsurge of the masses, this should and could be the case in the Youngstown section also.

## The Work of the Baltimore Section

By S. HORWATT, (Org. Sec'y, Baltimore, Md.)

**T**HE Open Letter has placed the Baltimore Party section on its feet.

Baltimore was one of the few demoralized Party sections in spite of its strategic importance in the marine and steel industries. Baltimore is also the heart and brain of the jim-crow lynch state of Maryland, (Euel Lee, Armwood, etc.), and as such is a basic center for the Negro Liberation movement.

The Section Committee, however, was not only not in a position to give leadership to the waterfront, steel and Negro liberation movement, but the section committee which in reality did not exist was literally isolated from the units and Party members.

This situation continued until a group of Party actives came together and decided (1) to call a membership meeting (December 24) with the only purpose of discussing the Open Letter, and (2) on the basis of the discussion to call another membership meeting for December 29th to elect a functioning section committee.

The discussion of the Open Letter opened the minds of the comrades and made them conscious of the tasks and responsibilities of our local section. As a result of the first meeting the second membership meeting, armed with political clarity, did not concentrate on "what was not done" but on what is to be done, and on this basis, in the most serious manner, has elected its section committee.

Since then, in a period of only two months, the Party will come to its section convention with at least one hundred new Party members, with a record of improvement in the organizational and political life of the Party units, with some definite achievements in bringing in the Party on the waterfront and to a lesser extent in the steel industry.

### Work on the Waterfront

What has the section done in order to politicalize and strengthen the work on the waterfront?

1. It has established a functioning unit on the waterfront.
2. The section assigned the organizer and org. secretary to work with the unit and fraction.
3. The unit established a Party class and a trade union class.
4. The unit issues a bi-monthly bulletin.
5. The section and the unit raised in a political manner the question of the Negro liberation movement.

Since these things were done, we find at present on the waterfront the (a) best functioning Party unit, (b) more than thirty marine workers already recruited for the Party in four weeks, (c) it has established a political and conscious leadership on the waterfront, (d) a systematic educational campaign and struggle against jim-crow discriminatory practices on the waterfront as a result of which the M.W.I.U. has succeeded in organizing for the first time a Negro Longshoremen Local. It is interesting to note here that during the strike against the Munson line, the longshoremen local criticized the M.W.I.U. for not calling upon them immediately to help in its strike. This is a demonstration of how unity between Negro and white can be forged if we only give the necessary attention to it.

Now the Waterfront Unemployment Council took the initiative in calling a United Front conference to organize a federation of unemployed organizations. The M.W.I.U. is in connection with the Scottsboro campaign, also in the process of organizing an I.L.D. branch on the waterfront which will even more help the union in forging the unity of Negro and white workers on the waterfront. Only last week (Feb. 27) the unit decided to mobilize marine forces to help the S.M.W. I.U. in its present campaign. In short, by bringing in the Party on the waterfront the M.W.I.U. became what it should be, namely, the leader of working class struggles in Baltimore.

However, the Party must not become dizzy by its success on the waterfront. We must constantly be aware of the fact that our present achievements are due to the successful struggles on the waterfront. Therefore, in order to keep up the present position on the waterfront the Party must continue and even strengthen the forces in the struggle for one united Central Shipping Bureau controlled by the marine workers; to have the workers prepared to fight for the upkeep of the projects; to strengthen the Party by recruiting the best elements and to raise the struggle to a higher political level; for united action against the labor fakers and against

capitalism. Only by struggle will we be able to consolidate what we have gained and achieve what we are striving for.

### Work in the Steel Industry

In the steel industry our union has organized a campaign (1) against the enforcement of company unions, and (2) for the mobilization of the steel workers in support of the Social Unemployment Insurance Bill. Though the S.M.W.I.U. has succeeded in drawing new members into the union, the Party recruiting here is very slow. This responsibility rests with the section committee for not giving the necessary help to our leading Party comrades in the union.

However, the section committee has recently assigned three comrades, including the organizer and agitprop director, and also two units which will help our fraction in its work. Now, in connection with the present campaign of the S.M.W. I.U. the section has mobilized the entire Party and has also sent out a call for a conference of mass organizations with the purpose of mobilizing all the possible help for this campaign. The section committee must be on the guard here not to lose the present possibility of building a real fighting S.M.W.I.U.

### Other Work Neglected

When we come, however, to the work in the unemployed field, opposition work in the Amalgamated, I.L.G.W.U., railroad work, furniture union, contact with mass organizations, here, in this field of work, the section committee is entirely out of control in spite of the fact that we have a railroad unit, in spite of the fact that we have devoted Party comrades working in these organizations.

Only now has the section committee, through the Waterfront Unemployment Council decided to call a conference in order to bring in some control and guidance in our unemployed work. As for the rest of the work mentioned above, nothing has been done by the section. The same is true about building the L.S.N.R. in Baltimore.

### Does Concentration Mean Neglect of Other Work?

The reason for neglecting the above mentioned unions and organizations is, in my opinion, the fact that there is uncertainty in our ranks as to the question: Does the fact that we have concentration work justify our negligence in utilizing and guiding our active Party forces in other fields of work?

We have, for instance, a small Furniture Workers Industrial Union which if given better leadership could become a strong and militant union. We have comrades working in other reformist trade unions who if they were given correct leadership could have recruited members for our Party and

strengthened our trade union opposition work. We have mass organizations through which by giving Party leadership we could succeed not only in strengthening our mass base but also avoid the danger of having our organization, an I.W.O. branch, utilized by our Party enemies. In other words, our section committee must become clarified on the question of how to combine concentration work with all the fields of activities which the Party is facing. This question was raised in the presence of a District rep at a functionaries meeting. But the question was not answered clearly enough so that it would bring a turn in our work. In my opinion concentration work should not take the section away from its responsibility on other fields of work but on the contrary, the section should utilize all other strategic centers for the purpose of carrying through effective concentration work. Otherwise the section committee will practically weaken the forces which are involved in other activities.

Another question which interests our section is: Whether it would not be advisable and practical to make Baltimore a District. It is the opinion of many leading comrades that by putting Baltimore under the direct guidance of the C.C. it would strengthen the work here, it would avoid technical and organizational difficulties which hinder a lot the work and development of our Party in Baltimore.

Should Baltimore become a District then the distribution of forces into various sections according to the specific tasks in the sections would also solve many of the political problems which we face now.

With regard to our struggle for a united front and especially the exposure of the bureaucratic and treacherous top leadership of the S.P. in Baltimore, here the section practically failed to do anything in spite of the fact that the section made some concrete decisions after the S.P. City Committee, under the influence of the most yellow socialist leader in Baltimore, Dr. Neishtadt, had refused to unite with the Party on a program of action in solidarity with the Austrian workers.

The section committee, in line with the resolution of the C.I. and the Eighteenth Plenum Resolution of the Party, must come to the section convention with the sharpest self-criticism especially with regard to those tasks which were undertaken and were not carried out for the only reason that we have refused to carry them out.

The section convention must clarify before the Party the question of what is personal responsibility in the Party. Only by introducing section leadership, personal responsibility and a strict check-up, will our section overcome most of its difficulties in the struggle for winning over the workers of the basic industries, and the oppressed Negro masses.

## Work Among Women in the Mining Fields

By A. S.

**I**N this period of decaying capitalism, and especially since the inauguration of the "New Deal," we find that more and more women are being drawn into industry. Women do the same work as men at the machine, and are forced to work for lower pay, thus reducing the standard of living of the working class as a whole. While this has always been the conscious policy of the boss class, it is being developed even more during the present economic crisis and the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. Not only are the women forced to work at starvation wages, they are also forced to put in long hours and extra shifts. Unemployment among women workers is increasing due to speed-up and rationalization, thus lowering their living standards to a new level. Conditions among the Negro women are even worse than among the white. They are doubly exploited, given less pay and the worst jobs. All of these things, coupled with the fact that there are no provisions for the working women under the N.R.A. not only makes work among women doubly necessary, but also has created the need and desire for organization.

### Women Want Organization

This urge for organization extends also to women who are not working themselves, but who see the need of helping the men in their struggle against the bosses. This can best be seen among the miners, many of whom have not worked for years, or at best are working part time. Most of them live in poverty in the company patches, cheated on every side by the coal operators and by the relief agencies. The resentment of the miners is growing, and they are now preparing for strike struggles. In the past struggles in the coal fields the women have played an increasingly important role.

In the last strike wave they helped to close down the mines, picketed with the men and took an active part in the meetings. They were often more militant than the men (Johnstown-Lorain Steel mine, where the women without the aid of the men pulled the mine on strike). The growing militancy among the women in the mining area, also expressed itself in the organization of the women's auxiliaries of the U.M.W.A. in the Frick territory since the last strike.

Although certain results were obtained in this work, an underestimation of its importance has hindered the consolidation of the women's auxiliaries and the carrying of the fight

for U.M.W.A. auxiliaries on the floor of the U.M.W.A. convention. The extent of this underestimation can be seen in the fact that one woman comrade carried out this work without any active help from the men comrades in the field.

### Auxiliaries Formed Over Heads of Reformist Leadership

During the strike over 1800 women were organized into the auxiliaries. Because of the militancy of the women the district officials of the U.M.W.A. opened an attack against the auxiliaries with the attempt to smash them. In those towns where the Party defeated the red scare the auxiliaries were maintained. However, due to the underestimation of the work, and failure to continue it, more than 50 per cent of the organization has been liquidated by the U.M.W.A. officialdom. Local union seals were refused to the auxiliaries and the women were compelled to organize over the heads of the officials. The Lewis machine, continuing its betrayal tactics, is doing everything possible to keep the idea of organization from spreading among the women. On the one hand they openly forbid the organization of the women's auxiliary and on the other, they demagogically ridicule the men for permitting the "women to do the fighting for them." In spite of this, great numbers of miners' wives are building the auxiliaries and preparing for the coming strike struggles.

The program adopted at the Mining Party Conference for the mining fields points out the importance of building the opposition within the reformist unions (P.M.A., U.M.W.A. and the Anthracite Union). It also stresses the necessity of intensifying our fight within the company unions, which applies mostly to the captive mines. Much attention must be given to convincing the men who have been betrayed by the Lewis machine and driven into the company unions. The women can play an important role in this work, through their daily contact with the men, agitating against and exposing the role of the company unions. The women's auxiliaries are a vital factor in the building of militant and live oppositions. The women, both Negro and white, have during the strike shown their militancy and have exposed the role of the officials of the U.M.W.A. The Negro women, for the first time in the Frick territory were among the most active in the strike and in organizing the auxiliaries. With the extension of the women's organization, their influence will be a great step forward in building a mass opposition movement and toward the building of one united miners' union. We cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of our work among the women in the mining field. To speak of building the opposition in the U.M.W.A. without carrying on

the work of building the women's auxiliaries is merely phrasemongering.

### Work Neglected by Party

The Party in the past has neglected the building of the auxiliaries especially in the Frick territory, and has failed to give support and guidance to the comrades who were carrying on this work and building the Party fraction in the U.M.W.A. with the result that where there were auxiliaries they have not been utilized to their fullest extent in building an opposition to the U.M.W.A. officialdom.

It is necessary for us to intensify our work in organizing the auxiliaries for the purpose of building and strengthening the opposition work. The Party must be mobilized to begin a drive to recruit into the Party the best and most militant women sympathizers, especially the Negro women. The building of strong party fractions among the women can be the only guarantee of successful work in the auxiliaries and the U.M.W.A.

### What is to be Done?

It is necessary to immediately take the following steps

1. To build the Party and the YCL among the women and young girls, paying special attention to the development of cadres from among the Negro women.
2. Consolidate and unify the already existing organizations and spread the movement to other districts.
3. Work towards the building of a center for the auxiliaries.
4. To immediately call a conference of existing organizations for the purpose of adopting a program of action surrounding the preparations for the coming strike struggles. The main points to be brought forward in this conference are: (a) fight for official recognition and charter from the U.M.W.A. (b) map out a program of action against unsanitary living conditions in the company patches, against high prices in company stores, and forced trading, and against the discrimination against Negroes, etc. Our aim must be a united struggle for one national miners union; to unify the auxiliaries of the P.M.A., U.M.W.A., and N.M.U. for a militant national union.

By discussing the problem of building the women's auxiliaries in the mining fields as well as seriously discussing the most important phases of organizational tasks among women, we can begin "to get rid once for all of the underestimation of this work (among women), to get rid of the idea that this work is not part of general Party work."

## Work in the Armed Forces

By X. Y., A Communist Soldier

**W**ITH the rapidly developing preparations for war by the United States government it is of the utmost importance that we consider more seriously than ever before the task of work in the armed forces of the country, especially in the regular army. No Party member can deny the importance of this work—but very few Party members have any positive conception as to how this work is to be done. In fact, it almost seems that the average Party member is afraid of the soldier—that, in practice he already considers the soldier as the inevitable enemy of the working class; and that there is little, if any, possibility of developing a revolutionary movement among the regular soldiers until the workers take to the barricades. This is harsh criticism, but the results show that such an attitude exists.

The Party has failed to acquaint its members with the present day conditions of the soldiers; and thus it has failed to give its members the means of breaking through the isolation to which the soldiers are subjected by this economic system, and by the government. If this had been done in a systematic manner there is little doubt but that there would now be an active soldier's movement with good support among the mass of enlisted regular soldiers. The C.I. recognized this fact in the Sixth World Congress in 1928. In its resolution on "The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists" it gave very concrete directives on this work, directives which in so far as the regular army is concerned ("The proletariat's attitude toward Armies in the Imperialist States") the Party has failed to develop on a Party scale, involving all the districts in a coordinated plan of work.

It requires only a brief survey of conditions in the army to show us that there are great possibilities of creating a genuine revolutionary movement among the soldiers. On various occasions there has already taken place, without organized leadership, spontaneous actions in the matter of protests on mess (food), etc., which were revolutionary in character and could have developed into a definite movement. We find that as the mass of workers have received cuts and lower standards of living, so have the soldiers. We find that the cuts of the soldiers, since the depression, total well over 32 per cent; that these cuts have been put over by the most underhanded methods in gradual curtailment of food, clothing, bonuses, etc. At the same time there has been an increase of work for the soldiers in the army building program and the C.C.C. and a resultant cutting of pass and furlough privileges to a large extent. All this has caused strong resentment. There is little

sympathy for Roosevelt and the "recovery program." The N.R.A. is ridiculed by all the soldiers. They are ripe for Communist influence.

In carrying on work in the Army, its composition becomes especially significant. We find first that whereas this army is classed as a "voluntary" force it is made up of men who are volunteers in name only. Because of the depression the mass of the enlisted soldiers have been forced into the army just as countless other young men have been forced into becoming tramps. They are either young men who have lost their jobs, or who have had to quit school and couldn't get a job. They are much higher in standard than the men of the "old army" (1928). They lack political development or class consciousness, but this could be quickly aroused. They are keenly aware of their inferior position as soldiers.

### How is Work to be Done?

There are several ways of carrying on work among the soldiers, the most important of which are the following: (a) direct contact with individual soldiers, and (b) mass distribution of Party literature to soldiers. There are others such as having Soldiers' Nights in workers' clubs, situated near the army posts, and the direct organization of soldiers' clubs. In adopting any of these methods it is of primary importance for the districts to secure a thorough knowledge of the army posts in their districts, the number of men and the branch of service on these posts, their convenience to centers from which work can be directed and all other details that are of strategic importance. Having obtained this data the districts can assign forces in such a way that the most important posts are covered and from them make contacts with the others.

Since direct contact with individual soldiers is the most successful method of work it is most necessary that comrades know how to make and secure these contacts. The districts will have to study the living conditions of the soldiers in each post, acquaint the comrades assigned to these posts with the issues they should stress. Particular attention should be paid to the matter of pay cuts (the pay is now \$17.85 for privates), the large laundry and tailor bills, the comparatively high prices in the Post Exchange stores, which are supposed to be non-profit; the lack of opportunity for advancement and the isolation that soldiers are subjected to, as well as any specific wrongs that may exist on each post. Most soldiers are very willing to talk about conditions on the "inside" and are interested in what's happening on the "outside". Comrades should engage them in conversation at every opportunity on busses, trains, in parks, or any place where they may be met. Where an active interest is shown on the part of the soldier his name should be taken and literature should be given or sent

to him with a view towards developing him into a permanent contact. One good contact on the "inside" can lead to any number of others in other posts. Of course the most thorough way to do this is for each district to enlist a few, reliable, developed comrades directly into the army, providing they don't make the mistake of considering that this is enough, and leave the outside work go. It is practically impossible to build a movement on the inside without strong support and cooperation from the "outside."

Party literature, the *Daily Worker*, small pamphlets, etc., can be distributed by units near army posts or where army men congregate. Usually such literature will be taken by the soldier and brought back by him to his post where it will be read by other soldiers, with interest and comment. By acquainting the soldiers with the Party we pave the way for good personal contact work.

There are numerous details that are peculiar to various localities that will be discovered by the districts as this work is developed, to which they will adapt their work. The thing to stress is that in this work there must be the greatest cooperation between the districts and the sections and the national committee both in the beginning and the following through of work on a coordinated plan.

Forward to a strong soldiers' movement in the U. S. Regular Army!

## The Most Active Mass Workers Must Be Brought Into Leadership

**T**HE Central Committee, in issuing its call for the National Convention of the Party, gave a short outline as to the composition of the delegates to the various conventions and as to the members of the incoming Party committees. There were many section conventions and some district conventions held in the past week; but the bulk of the conventions, especially district conventions, are scheduled for this and the following week-end. Fourteen out of the 20 districts will have their conventions on March 24 and March 31 week-end. We would like to re-emphasize the directives of the C.C. concerning the composition of the delegates and the Party committees.

The Open Letter states: "As delegates to all Party conferences, section and district conferences, and above all to the Party congress, there must be elected comrades who carry on active mass work and who have distinguished themselves in mass struggles."

This sentence of the Open Letter must be our guide in electing delegates. According to the directives of the Central Committee—"The decisive majority of delegates must be non-full-time functionaries of either Party organizations, trade unions, or other mass organizations. The majority must be shop workers, preferably from the basic industries as well as unemployed workers. From the point of view of the political importance of the particular district special attention must be given to the election of Negro delegates and delegates from among working women in the industries. Furthermore, the delegates shall include Party members active in the unions, particularly the A. F. of L. unions, in the Independent unions and of course comrades active in the T.U.U.L. unions and unemployed organizations."

Examining the composition of the delegates to the various section convention held during the previous weeks, we find that these directives were carried out by every Party organization. In the New York Section convention, we had a good representation of factories and the street nuclei sent their best and most active mass workers to the convention. These examples must be followed in the other sections and districts of the Party.

The Open Letter gives the directives for our Party concerning the composition of the Party committees to be elected in the units, sections, district and national convention. The Open Letter states that:

"Every Party member, and especially every Party functionary must be a real organizer of mass struggles in his particular sphere of work. From this standpoint, the Party must judge the activity of its functionaries, and must choose its leading bodies."

The sections and districts which have their conventions in the coming two weeks must follow these directives of the Open Letter very closely. We have to break away from our past bad traditions in electing our buros. In the past we have elected those comrades to the leadership of the units who could spare time for this function. Comrades who were leaders of organizations, unions, or unemployed organizations were not considered as candidates for such functions because they were "busy among the masses." The same wrong attitude towards this question also influenced the election of section leaders especially in the big cities.

In the New York Section conventions the Party succeeded in breaking away from this wrong approach in their elections of the new leadership. In one section they elected to the section committees the leaders of the unions that have organized shops in the territory of the section, and the leaders of the unemployed movement. In Section 2, for example, out

of 17 elected members, five are outstanding leaders of two unions, and two are leaders of the unemployed movement in the territory. The majority of the others are members of the biggest shop nuclei and two of the former members of the section committee.

In electing delegates to the National Convention and members to the section and district committees, the most thorough-going examination of the activities of the candidates is needed. Our slogan should be: Active mass leaders from the shops, from the unions, from among the unemployed, for the leaders of the Party!

**W**HAT is now demanded above all of every Communist is one thing—the will for the struggle for power.

“The will to power means a stubborn, hard, self-sacrificing struggle to win over the majority of the working class, to form a revolutionary army of utterly devoted fighters for Communism.

“The will to power means stubborn work in defending the daily interests of the working class in the factories, the plants, the trade unions, the labor exchanges.

“The will to power means a hard stubborn struggle to win allies of the proletariat in the revolution, to win over the peasant masses, the masses of the petty bourgeoisie in the towns who have been ruined by the crisis, for he who does not think of allies is not facing the question of power seriously, is not thinking seriously about the dictatorship of the proletariat.

“The will to power means a struggle against war and fascism, for the defense of the U.S.S.R. and of the Chinese Soviets, for the defense of the German proletariat.”—*Knorin, Fascism, Social Democracy and the Communists, 13th Plenum of E.C.C.I., December, 1933.*

## Youth Sections in Shop Papers

By AGITPROP DEPT.

**T**HE Eighth Convention draft resolution on youth work states: “The Party must determinedly turn the Y.C.L. towards participation and leadership of the economic struggles of the young workers, especially strike struggles.” And as one of the immediate steps in making the Y.C.L. broader than the Party: “To build a Y.C.L. shop unit alongside of every Party unit.” The Party shop papers can and must become a powerful factor in carrying out these decisions.

Many of the shop papers issued by the Party nuclei pay very little attention to the problems of the young workers in the factory; in some cases the attention paid is very deficient and in many cases the youth problems are completely ignored. It is true that the aim of the Party and the Y.C.L. nuclei should be to establish youth shop papers, but at the same time, the leaving out of youth problems from the Party papers leads to a mechanical separation of the shop problems and does not link up the efforts of the Communists and Young Communists. We have for example the first issue of *The Organizer*, issued by the Packing House Section of the C.P. of Omaha, Nebraska. No youth problems are dealt with and the so-called youth page only has a greeting to the paper from the District Bureau of the Y.C.L. In the *Stock Yards Worker* of Chicago the youth question is not touched in any way. The *Gary Steel Worker* Vol 2 No. 5, mentions some youth grievances but does not deal concretely with the Y.C.L. and the solution it proposes.

The youth sections in the shop papers should not be the work of only the youth comrades who will themselves raise all of the youth problems. Dealing with the problem in this manner will not help to rally the adult workers for the defense of the interests of the young workers but will help to separate mechanically the problems of the youth from the general questions. The editorial boards of all Party shop papers should include a young comrade to edit the youth column, but its contents should be the collective work of the whole editorial board. It is in this way that a real link will be established and the young comrades will be developed. Working properly such methods will give the possibility to utilize youth issues for the development of the general struggle, and to raise youth demands and youth issues in connection with the struggles of all the workers as a means of rallying the young workers for the fight.

Every Party shop paper issued in a shop that employs young workers must endeavour to treat their conditions in each issue. Their grievances should be discussed and demands

raised. The paper should explain the role of the Young Communist League and should agitate for the formation of Youth Committees and Youth Sections. To guarantee this, every editorial board should have at least one young comrade and in every case, whether there are Y.C.L. nuclei or not, a responsible comrade should be assigned as the editor of the youth section. As a general rule we might suggest that every shop paper have:

(a) A youth section prepared by a responsible member of the editorial board.

(b) A young comrade on the editorial board who will help in the preparation of the youth section and also take part in the preparation of the rest of the paper.

(c) The youth section should raise specific youth grievances interweaving them with the grievances of all the workers.

(d) The paper should raise youth demands explaining them to all the workers and not just to the young workers.

(e) The paper should explain the role of the Young Communist League, not utilizing only the youth section.

(f) The paper should raise and explain the role of youth sections and youth committees, showing that this is a problem of all the workers and not just of the young workers.

(g) The paper should in its youth section popularize the Young Worker and call for recruitment for the Y.C.L.

Every Party Functionary Should Read

## TACTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS

of the

## COMMUNIST PARTIES

of

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By ORGWALD

This pamphlet takes up in a fundamental manner the main organizational questions confronting all Communist Parties and is an indispensable handbook and guide in the work of building up a mass Bolshevik Party. Get your copy from your district, section, or unit literature director. The price is only ten cents.

# Party Organizer

## EIGHTH CONVENTION ISSUE

"The central task of the Party is to organize and lead the fight against the offensive of the capitalist class, against developing fascism and the threat of imperialist war, and to develop these struggles, on the basis of the fight for the immediate partial demands of the workers, into general class battles for the overthrow of capitalist dictatorship, and the setting up of a Soviet Government." — Excerpt from "THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE CPUSA," Resolution of 8th National Convention CPUSA.

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

Vol. VII.

May-June, 1934

No. 5-6

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## Organizational Work Decides Everything

By EARL BROWDER

(Closing Remarks at the Eighth Convention of the C.P.U.S.A.)

OUR PARTY has grown materially in membership and politically in its grasp of politics and theory in the period since the Seventh Convention. We have become more a real leader of struggles. We have led successful strikes, unemployed movements, farmers, activities, movements of middle class elements. Through our activities since the Seventh Convention, four years ago, we have extended our basic capital of revolutionary experience and theory. But we made many mistakes, and many mistakes we made twice and three times, because of lack of sufficient understanding of the class relations in the country and the meaning of each particular struggle and situation. The only remedy for that is more systematic approach to the problem of mastery on a larger scale by a growing body of our cadres of the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. Our Party is largely new. The Credentials Committee report read to you showed 66 delegates to this Convention joined the Party since the Open Letter, since our Extraordinary Party Conference. A majority of our Party members are less than two years in the Party.

There is no miracle whereby workers become Marxist-Leninists by taking out a card in our Party. They will become Bolsheviks only to the extent that the Party organization sees to it that every Party member is interested in the study of this question as an essential part of the daily mass work. If every member is made to understand that the study of theory is not something which merely has to do with the improvement of his intellectual level, but is the forging of the weapons of struggle which have to be used every day in the fight, then we can not only train our membership but by training them we keep them in the Party and solve the problem of fluctuation and multiply manifold the force of the Party among the masses.

Bolshevism is a science and to master it we must study it. Study is a necessity of our Party life. We have excellent cadres that have come to us out of the struggles that we organized and led, have been developed by these struggles. In

all the ordinary questions of life these are far more practical and efficient than our 'old guard,' but they still lack something. They haven't been equipped with that something beyond their own experience, with the tremendous treasury of the experiences of the entire world working class movement. That is what we must give them. When we give them that, we will have the force which will make the revolution in America and not before.

A main immediate and practical task before us is the question of the Daily Worker and its mass circulation. Every district and section of our Party must set itself the task of giving the Daily Worker a mass circulation, a task that can be carried out during the year 1934 which by the end of the year will give us a minimum circulation, to be a little conservative, of 75,000. This means to a little more than double the present circulation of the Daily Worker. Can that be done? I'm sure it can. I'm sure every district committee will agree that it can be done. If we put this question seriously throughout the Party it will be done. It must be done if we are in earnest about any of our tasks. Without that, the rest of all that we say and write becomes so much chattering.

Similarly with building our Party membership. Is it too much to say that we should have 50,000 members by the end of 1934? If you think it is too much we will compromise and say 40,000. But at least 40,000 memers.

These tasks, Daily Worker, membership, these are not tasks which will take us away from the mass work of the Party. These will not interfere with our preparations for making May Day the greatest day of struggle that has ever been seen in America. In fact I don't see how we will make May Day a success unless we use the Daily Worker, especially the May Day special edition. I think that May Day will be something of a failure for us if we don't recruit many new members out of it. Similarly, with the preparations for Anti-War Day on August 1.

Just a few words on the strong sides and the weak sides of our Convention which expresses the whole life of the Party. The Convention shows that the Party has grown. That is fine. Everybody feels good about that. But what about our fluctuation, and what about the hundreds of thousands ready for us whom we have not reached, and are not yet seriously trying to reach? The Convention does not show enough determination to remedy this weakness. If the figures of our growth cause any feeling of self-satisfaction, then it would be better to keep quiet about them.

The Convention shows the Party is leading struggles everywhere. Good! That is the strong side of our Party, it is a fighting Party, it is in daily struggles. But the Convention also shows very important places where the workers are fight-

ing, where strike movements are rising, where all the forces of capitalism are brought to bear to prevent these struggles—and we are not there, or there so weakly that our influence is not yet a decisive factor in helping the working class to break through. That is the weak side of our Party in this Convention. Why haven't we been able to go forward at the head of these 200,000 auto workers who are burning with the desire to fight? Here we are weak. We haven't solved this problem yet. What is true of auto is true of many other key points. Our Convention shows, as one of its strong sides, the improving composition of our Party as a result of concentration, of leadership of struggles, of going into the factories, of beginning work in the A. F. of L., of building the militant trade unions, of winning Negroes, etc., but it also shows that we have only begun serious work in this respect. In many localities we have not yet a single important factory that we can call our stronghold. When we speak of our Party being the leader of these struggles, through our improving cadres, at the same time we must say our Convention discussion is still too much merely reporting on these struggles, not drawing the lessons of these struggles—the good lessons and the bad ones. We do not enough draw the conclusions, the directives that must be formulated from these experiences—the directives for ourselves as to how we must work better, and the directives for the masses as to how they must fight more effectively to win these struggles. The Party has a correct line of struggle against all varieties of social-fascism. That is good! We can be glad of that. But the discussions in this Convention have not enough shown that we are carrying on a stubborn unrelenting struggle every day among the masses against the concrete manifestations of this enemy ideology, in the midst of these mass struggles that we are leading. We could carry this analysis of our strong and weak points through a long list. And we must do this. We must have a perpetual and continually renewing self-examination of our work, a searching out of every weak point and finding the way to remedy it.

It is not sufficient to have a correct Party line. On this point I can't do better than to read what Comrade Stalin said at the recent Seventeenth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. These words of Comrade Stalin must become a directive for our daily work. They are meant for us just as much as they are meant for the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union. Comrade Stalin said:

"Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim it from the housetops, enunciate it in the form of general thesis and resolutions and carry them unanimously in order to make victory come of itself, automatically, so to speak. This, of course, is wrong. Those who think like that are greatly mistaken. Only incorrigible

bureaucrats and office rats can think that. As a matter of fact these successes and victories were obtained, not automatically, but as a result of a fierce struggle to carry out the Party line. Victory never comes by itself, it has to be dragged by the hand. Good resolutions and declarations in favor of the general line of the Party are only a beginning, they merely express the desire to win, but it is not victory. After the correct line has been given, after a correct solution of the problem has been found, success depends on the manner in which the work is organized, on the organization of the struggle for the application of the line of the Party, on the proper selection of workers, on supervising the fulfillment of the decisions of the leading organs. Without this the correct line of the Party and the correct solutions are in danger of being severely damaged. More than that, after the correct political line has been given, the organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, i.e., its success or failure."

Comrades, this must be the keynote of our Convention also. This must be the leading thought in all our work throughout the Party, throughout the mass organizations. We have the beginnings of this spirit in our Party. As an example I may mention that yesterday I received a little resolution that came from that shop nucleus I talked about in my report. This resolution declares the nucleus has met and discussed the fact that the National Convention of the Party is examining the work of this nucleus. The nucleus declares that this creates in them a feeling of great responsibility, and as a result they have come together and worked out control tasks for the next three months, to increase the number of Party members in the shop by so many, increase the circulation of the Daily Worker by so many, and so on and so on. This is an application of the line of Comrade Stalin's speech that I just read to you. (Applause.)

Comrades, I think I have said enough. The work of our Convention has revealed to all of us that we have a Party stronger than we ever knew. We have a Party that already has forces capable of doing tremendous things in the United States. If we haven't done these things already, it is not the fault of these forces we have; it is only because we are still so badly organized, and because we who lead the Party are still not the kind of leaders that we must be. This Convention has revealed such forces which we must properly use to seriously carry out among the masses more practical everyday work, collectively organized, collectively criticized, collectively checked up on, tightening our organization, cementing its unity, fighting against and eliminating every deviation, raising the theoretical level of the Party, always and everywhere in the forefront of the rising struggle of the masses. If we do this,

if we make use of these tremendous opportunities revealed to us here in this Convention, comrades, then we can be sure that in a short time we will be a mass Party in the United States; we will be leading serious class battles in this country; we will be challenging the power of American imperialism; we will be seriously preparing the American workers for their revolutionary tasks. (Prolonged applause.)

## Facts and Material on Organizational Status, Problems, and Organizational Tasks of the Party

PREPARED FOR 8TH NATIONAL CONVENTION,  
APRIL 2-8, 1934.

By National Org. Dept.

**T**HE examination of the present organizational status of the Party and the review of our organizational work and experiences since the 7th Convention must be judged by the degree to which we have been able to root the Party in the basic industries, to recruit the workers from large concentration plants and to what degree the lower Party organizations have displayed initiative and ability to organize and lead mass struggles of the decisive sections of the American proletariat, principally in the shops.

The present report will show the main organizational gains: improved methods of work as well as the major organizational defects in our structure and day-to-day work.

The organizational problems of our Party deal with the organization of all our available forces for the execution of the line of the Party as outlined in the Open Letter and the main resolution of the 8th Convention. The past four years since the 7th Convention clearly prove that one of our greatest weaknesses lies in the organization of our work, disposition of our forces, development of new cadres and the consolidation of our mounting influence. Consequently, the organizational problems demand our major attention and become a decisive factor in the further growth of the Party.

Comrade Stalin, in reporting to the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U., clearly characterized the role of organization in carrying out the line of the Party in the following words:

"Good resolutions and declarations in favor of the general line of the Party are only a beginning, they merely express the desire to win, but it is not victory. After the correct line has been given, after a correct

solution of the problem has been found, success depends on the manner in which the work is organized, on the organization of the struggle for application of the line of the Party, in the proper selection of workers, on supervising the fulfillment of the decisions of the leading organs. Without this the correct line of the Party and the correct solutions are in danger of being severely damaged. More than that, after the correct political line has been given, the organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, i.e., its success or failure."

#### Main Organizational Advances.

The increased improvement in the mass work of the Party since the 7th Convention has reflected itself in substantial organizational growth and inner improvement in the ranks of the Party. The following chart illustrates the rise in dues payment since the 7th Convention:

|              |        |
|--------------|--------|
| 1930         | 7,500  |
| 1931         | 9,257  |
| 1932         | 14,475 |
| 1933         | 19,165 |
| 1934 (April) | 23,467 |

This increase in dues payments, which roughly represents 90% of the registered Party membership, took place during the four hardest years of the crisis, a period in which millions of workers were engaged in militant struggles against the attacks of the bourgeoisie, large sections of which were under our leadership; a period which contained all the objective conditions for the transformation of our Party into a mass Communist Party. During this period in which we tripled our membership we witnessed a fluctuation of about 65%.

#### Dues Payments

The 7th Convention introduced the weekly dues payments. The last four years have fully confirmed the soundness of this measure resulting in raising the percentage of those paying dues from 75% to 90%.

#### Penetration of New Territories

The above figures should be understood in the light of the fact that a large proportion of the gains were made as a result of penetration of new territories. Since the 7th Convention, five new districts and more than 100 new sections have been established.

#### New Shop Nuclei

The detailed analysis of the present membership will be dealt with later on. The above gains, however, indicate a growth in shop nuclei from:

1930 — 64 Shop Nuclei, with 571 members  
to

1934 — 338 Shop Nuclei, with 2,355 members

The foregoing facts and figures roughly show the quantitative growth of the Party since the 7th Convention. In addition, there has been a considerable improvement in quality. Especially since the Extraordinary Party Conference of July 1933, more serious attention and activity of the Party has been directed to the factories and to basic industry, resulting in the growth of a number of shop nuclei, shop papers, strike struggles and union activity in many industries. These first steps towards serious work and attention to concentration raise many new organizational problems hitherto unsolved because in the past, the Party has paid scant and only general attention to shop nuclei and factory work.

\* \* \* \* \*

The period since the 7th Convention has shown a great increase in the authority, ability, and the initiative of the District Committees and Section Committees of the Party. In most of the Districts a more stable and experienced local leadership has been developed, capable of handling the main problems confronting the Party.

The methods of leadership and guidance to the lower Party organizations are being improved. The leading committees are systematically trying to replace the old form of universal circular leadership with personal guidance, frequent conferences, and special directives based on knowledge of the local situation. The Central Committee and District Committee leaders spend more time in the field and thereby give greater and more practical assistance to the lower organizations. The shifting of forces from place to place has been considerably reduced giving the leading comrades a better opportunity to grasp the situation and follow up the developments and activities in their territories. There has also been some improvement in the work of the fractions in mass organizations.

The Central Committee has paid greater attention to org problems, combatting a whole series of incorrect approaches to and conceptions of the organizational problems. The most serious of these tendencies were the bureaucratic efforts to solve the org. problems through schematic regulation of inner Party structure along universal and inflexible lines, rules and regulations, and the tendencies to separate the org problems from mass work on grounds that a perfect inner apparatus had to be established before successful mass activities could be organized. These incorrect conceptions became the source of a whole series of bureaucratic practices aimed to regulate every step and activity of the lower organizations through weekly org letters and circulars. This acted as a bar-

rier to the development of local initiative and healthy inner life of the Party organization. To this end the Central Committee has called special conferences, sent out org instructors, raised the org problems in the main political reports, established the "Party Life" column in the Daily Worker, stabilized the regular publication of "The Party Organizer" and increased its circulation.

The above improvements have not yet been fully incorporated into the life and structure of the entire Party. They, nevertheless, show a definite trend.

#### Main Organizational Defects in Shop Work

The improvements in the organizational work of the Party are not reflected to the same extent in shop work, stability of shop nuclei and the general Party activities in the large plants of basic industries. This constitutes our basic organizational weakness and arises directly from the equally grave political weakness which still persists in the Party. The Open Letter states:

"Because in the Party, and particularly among the leading cadres, there is deep-going lack of political understanding of the necessity for strengthening our basis among the decisive sections of the American workers. From this follows the fact that the leadership of the Party has not adhered to a fixed course for overcoming the main weaknesses of the Party, allows itself to be driven by events, and does not work out carefully with the comrades of the lower organizations ways and means for the carrying through of resolutions checking up on their execution. The result is that we talk about factory and trade union work in countless resolutions, without carrying this work out."

That this grave weakness has not yet been fully overcome is illustrated by a whole series of facts.

The growth of shop nuclei has been slower than the general growth of the Party until the improvement of the last 8 months following the Open Letter.

At the time of the Extraordinary Party Conference, the shop nuclei membership comprised 4% of the total membership. While an improvement has taken place since (at present over 9%) there are as yet no serious indications that the new shop nuclei will remain and develop into live dynamic factors in the large plants where they have been established. This is further illustrated by the fact that no serious growth of membership has been registered in the Concentration Nuclei and that the general increase in nuclei membership is the result of organization of new shop nuclei and not the result of work of the previously existing nuclei.

Of the 338 shop nuclei, only 47 issue shop papers, many of which have a very small circulation; some are very poor

papers and many come out irregularly. Most of our shop nuclei are isolated and restrict their activity to weekly unit meetings and issuance of shop papers.

Our shop nuclei, on the whole, have not become sensitive to issues in the shops and moods of the workers because they have not learned to overcome the obstacles of semi-legal and illegal work and to work effectively even under the conditions of terror in the shops.

The shop nuclei receive but scant attention from the main functionaries who plan and organize the bulk of their work to suit the needs and activities of street nuclei which still comprise over 80% of the number of units.

Lack of political attention to the shop nuclei creates a narrow routine conception of shop work which lacks the perspective of utilizing the semi-legal groups as the spearhead of a movement that can break through the company terror into open mass work and mass recruiting for unions and the Party and the preparation of the workers for the proletarian revolution.

The tendencies against issuing of Party shop papers, the tendencies to transform Party shop papers into union papers and the tendencies to hide the face and program of the Party in the shops arises from the failure of our shop nuclei to understand their revolutionary role and purpose, and from their failure to grow and develop serious work.

Our shop units do not conduct a sustained and systematic exposure of A. F. of L. union bureaucrats and with some recent exceptions, have not learned how to develop united front actions in the plants where independent and reformist unions exist side by side with the red unions.

The Analysis Chart of Shop Nuclei for 1934 gives a number of interesting figures:

Of the 338 Shop Nuclei,

154 are in basic industries.

Of the total Shop Nuclei membership of 2,355,

1,323 are in the basic industry shop nuclei, which shows an average size of 8.6 per shop nucleus in basic industries.

There are a total of 350,769 workers in the plants in which we have our shop nuclei. Of these, about 36,000 are organized in trade unions and divided as follows:

9,579 in Revolutionary Unions

5,427 in Independent Unions

21,823 in Reformist Unions

The statistics however, leave out much vital information. For instance, we do not clearly see how long the nucleus is established and its history which would indicate the rise of its influence on the basis of its work. This is especially important when we recall the fact that the Pittsburgh Dis-

trict reported 125 mine nuclei in 1931, all of which disappeared within a few months.

The review of the history of many hundreds of other shop nuclei would reveal similar examples of instability and fluctuation.

The statistics further leave out our role in the unions. They do not reveal the activity of the nuclei in the factories, and the degree of influence of the units in their shops and the growth of this influence.

The statistics also reveal the comparisons of 1933, the time of the Open Letter and the improvement since the Open Letter up to February 1934. The figures show clearly that the most important improvement has taken place since the Open Letter.

The shop nuclei have been tripled in the last 8 months since the Open Letter from 111 to 338. However, in the basic industries, they have been little more than doubled, having grown from 68 to 164, and the membership in these nuclei has grown in a little better proportion, from 469 to 1,323. The same period since the Open Letter shows a rise of only 11 new shop papers.

There are only a few shop nuclei among the 338 that have really become a force in the shops. With one or two exceptions (Sparrows Point Steel, Majestic Metal) these are in the light industries. The shop nuclei that have shown how to influence, lead and organize the workers in their respective factories have been those that received serious day-to-day assistance from Party leaders and Party Committees. This gives the key to the immediate organizational steps necessary for the stabilization and growth of our shop units into real live and dynamic factors in the shops.

#### Concentration

The little improvement in the main District concentration plants is another illustration of the fact that the essence and the decisiveness of factory work is not fully appreciated by our leading forces, and that serious attention is not yet given to the concentration plants. The fact that we have shop nuclei in large concentration plants which do not issue Party shop papers, that do not speak to the workers in these shops, is one symptom of this serious neglect of this main work of our Party.

Leading comrades who are assigned to concentration work must carry out these concentration tasks unconditionally, first and foremost, without any exception. These comrades must at all times resist the pressure of all other tasks until the main—the concentration—task is fulfilled.

The concentration shop nucleus must be made the living example of how the Party organization works and grows in the factory. The Shop Nucleus and its shop paper shall

serve as a guide to all shop units in the district. This can only be done by the personal efforts of the best leaders of the Party and by the conscious collective efforts of the Party Committee.

While the main work and the initiative for all activity in and around the shop shall rest with the shop nuclei, under the immediate guidance of the leading comrades, it is of decisive importance that the best forces of the unions shall also be directed to the union shop groups, union shop locals and opposition groups in other unions inside the plant.

This is especially important in the huge steel plants like the T.C.I.—Jones & Laughlin, Republic Steel, the main auto plants, Ford, General Motors, etc., as well as in the largest key mines and railroad shops. It is precisely in these huge plants that the company union are the strongest, the spy system is most extensive, the workers possess the least organizational background and the general problems of shop organization and shop activity are the most difficult at the beginning. This requires that our best Party workers be assigned to develop the individual members of the shop unit and direct the educational work of the unit. It requires that our best organizers and most experienced Party leaders assist the shop nucleus in the solution of the difficult problems of work and organization in the shop—(editing the shop paper, meeting with groups of sympathizers, meetings with workers of various language groups, arranging forums, lectures, mass meetings, demonstrations and struggles on living conditions, sale of the Daily Worker, distribution of literature, raising of finances, as well as social and cultural activities in the neighborhoods where the workers live). It is necessary that the best forces from the fractions in the mass organizations like the Unemployment Councils, ILD, LSNR, IWO, language organizations, etc., are also assigned to the territories around the main concentration factories. The entire Party and the revolutionary movement should be made politically conscious of the reasons and purposes of our concentration in the given key plants. The fact that our main concentration plants are actually the most decisive production units in the given cities and industries and play a decisive role in the economic life of the community should make this relatively easy. It is necessary that the link between the owners of these plants and the political administration of the government bodies is clearly established and that the role of these plants in war preparations and war production be explained.

Only through a thorough concentration of all sections of our movement (Party, union, mass organizations) upon the most important concentration points will we be able to fulfill the task put before us by the Open Letter and the 8th Convention.

### Growth of the Party

At the time of the 7th Convention of our Party, and throughout 1930, the dues-paying membership averaged 7,545—this despite the fact that during the same period the recruitment into the Party netted 6,000 new members. At the end of the year, the Central Committee characterized the situation in the following way:

"In spite of the successful recruiting drive of the last year and the steady, although very slow recruiting of new members during the period since then, the numerical strength of the Party remains about the same."

Let us examine the facts since the 7th Convention and see whether we succeeded in changing the situation. Chart B shows the actual average dues-paying membership of the whole Party and also the number of members our Party would have now, if we would have retained all those who applied for membership during this period.

Since 1930 we recruited 49,050 members. Together with the membership of 7,545 in 1930, this makes a total of 56,595 (March 1934). However, the actual dues-paying membership in the first quarter of 1934 averaged somewhat over 24,000—a gain of about only 16,500 in the last three years. For the same period 33,000 members dropped out of the Party.

No doubt, this figure is somewhat exaggerated. In the past (particularly in 1930 and 1931), those who signed application cards were considered new recruits, irrespective whether they were or were not assigned to a unit. Later on, the number of new recruits was gauged by the number of initiation stamps sold. But also this gauge is not fully correct, because hundreds of workers who have paid their initiation fees have never received their membership books and never actually became members of the Party. How large these two categories are, is difficult to ascertain.

For example, the New York District in 1933 issued more than 500 Party books after receiving initiation fees. The books, however, never reached the applicants. If we bear in mind that the New York District is one of the best in assigning members, where the unit bureaus function much better than in most districts, we can imagine what proportion we lost in this category of recruits all over the Party.

Another interesting example from the Philadelphia District: Here is a letter from a worker who applied for membership and paid his initiation fee:

"Dear Comrades:

"Almost a year ago, at the May Day Demonstration in 1933, in Baltimore, I decided to join the Communist Party. I didn't even have the fifteen cents to pay my registration fee, but two other comrades gave me the money, so I paid the fee and sent in my application card. May Day is almost

here again, comrades, and still I have no Party membership book. At first I thought that it was taking time for the book to come through from the District. But after waiting some time, I began going to some of the leading comrades about it, but even when I got quite excited about not getting my book, the Organizational Secretary and the Sec. Organizer just put me off or told me not to yell, that it wasn't their fault. Some time ago, I sent in a new application, and still, although the Section is supposed to have been reorganized, still the book has never come."

Finally, on March 4, 1934, this comrade received his book—a reward for his persistency. But this is a very exceptional case. Most of the workers wait until they begin to suspect that the Party does not want them, and then simply give up. How many thousands of these "new members" are among the 33,000 who were "lost" to the Party?

The following table is an approximate analysis of the fluctuation in our Party:

| In the period of | No. recruited | Increased dues av.<br>in ½ year follow-<br>ing this period | Fluctuation |
|------------------|---------------|--|-------------|
| 1931—July-Dec.   | 7,301         | 3,679  | 50%         |
| 1932—Jan.-June   | 11,498        | 1,539  | 77%         |
| 1932—July-Dec.   | 7,322         | 2,339  | 68%         |
| 1933—Jan.-June   | 8,066         | 2,351  | 71%         |
| 1933—July-Dec.   | 9,240         | 4,371  | 63%         |

In this period we recruited 43,426 members and increased the number of dues-paying members by only 15,197. The fluctuation for the whole period being about 65%. In the last 6 months of 1933 there has been a steady decrease in fluctuation, reaching the comparatively low figure of 53%. The tendency in 1934 shows a more decisive improvement. However, the fluctuation is still great, and we must use all our energy to completely wipe it out. To accomplish this we must make a fundamental change in the activities and life of our units. The directives of the 14th Plenum Resolution that "nine-tenths of all our work of the lower organizations must be concentrated directly on the work among the masses and not as at present, in countless inner meetings" still holds good for many units today. To fulfill these tasks the Party units must be basically transformed from narrow inner circles into live, political bodies, alert and sensitive to the needs of the workers, discussing their grievances and how the units can initiate, develop and lead the struggles of the workers around these grievances.

"...the Party must carry on a systematic struggle against the bureaucratic isolation of the apparatus from the Party masses, against the suppression of inner Party democracy, for the development of political life in the lower organizations, particularly in the

factory nuclei, for the development of thorough-going self-criticism, for the development of the initiative in our lower organizations for the improvement of its functioning cadres. Every Party member, and especially every Party functionary, must be a real organizer of mass struggles in his particular sphere of work." (Open Letter).

This paragraph in the Open Letter still remains our guide for changing the inner life of the units. Mass activity, functioning unit bureaus, guided personally by the higher committees, highly developed initiative of the lower organizations, improved political life, activation of every Party member, without overburdening anybody, the mobilization and activation of the widest circle of sympathizers around the units, in the shops, in the neighborhoods, around the fractions in the unions and other mass organizations, will not only help us to overcome the fluctuation but will also immeasurably improve and raise the recruiting capacity of the Party.

#### Recruiting

A study of Chart C will show that mass recruiting into the Party took place chiefly as a result of special recruiting drives, and not as a daily, systematic activity in the course of carrying on mass work. Divorcing the recruiting of new members from the daily mass work of our Party in the shops and neighborhoods, is in a large measure responsible for the tremendous fluctuation.

One or two examples will illustrate our approach to recruiting. In February and March 1932, the period of a special recruiting drive, over 2,600 new members per month came into the Party. While in the following months (no special drive) the number of recruits dropped almost 50%. Of the members recruited in the special drive in 1932 we retained only 28.5%. In the latter part of 1933, and beginning of 1934, there has been a considerable improvement in the methods of recruiting. More recruiting took place as a direct result of the mass work of the Party. Result—more systematic and steady recruitment and the retaining of 55% of the new members.

Let us compare the composition of the new members recruited in the drive of 1930 with that of 1933-34. In 1930, out of 6,167 new members recruited in 4 months, 4,219 were analyzed and in 1933-34, out of 7,825 new members recruited in four months, 7,215 were analyzed.

Below is the comparison:

|              | 1930 | Per Cent | 1934 | Per Cent |
|--------------|------|----------|------|----------|
| Steel, Metal | 331  | 7.8%     | 596  | 8.3%     |
| Marine       | 87   | 2.0      | 183  | 2.5      |
| Textile      | 95   | 2.2      | 95   | 1.3      |

|                      |       |          |       |      |
|----------------------|-------|----------|-------|------|
| Mining               | 314   | 4.1      | 437   | 6.0  |
| Railroad             | 14    | .3       | 110   | 1.5  |
| Auto                 | 750   | 10.6     | 190   | 2.6  |
| Proletarians         | 3,846 | 90.5     | 6,651 | 92.1 |
| Women                | 162   | 3.8      | 1,234 | 17.1 |
| Women in Industry    |       |          | 558   | 7.6  |
| Negro                | 934   | 22.0     | 944   | 13.0 |
| Native               |       |          | 3,769 | 52.2 |
| A. F. of L.          |       |          | 821   | 11.3 |
| Revolutionary Unions |       |          | 1,172 | 16.2 |
| Average Age          |       | 36 years |       |      |
| Employed             |       |          | 2,778 | 38.4 |

The comparison indicates a few basic weaknesses; first of all, the proportionately small number of Negroes recruited this year. In 1930, Districts 2, 6, 7, 8 recruited over 630 Negroes. In the recent drive (1933-34) these same districts recruited less than 400 Negroes. Out of the total recruits in the 1930 drive in the Cleveland District, 38% were Negroes. In 1934, the percentage dropped to 17%. The number of Negroes recruited into the Party for 1930 in Detroit exceeds the entire total of new members in the same District in the recent drive. Another weak point is the small number of auto workers recruited. For example, in 1930, Detroit recruited 750 auto workers in four months. But in four months of the recent drive, Detroit recruited only 113 auto workers.

The mass actions of the period under examination (1931-34) such as strike waves, unemployed struggles, Hunger March, Presidential election campaign, etc., insufficiently increased the recruitment into the Party. For example, at the beginning of 1932 we recruited more members per month than in the heat of the Presidential election activities of the same year.

The reasons for the inadequate recruiting are indicated in the Draft Resolution of the Central Committee to the Convention. Some of the chief reasons are: hiding the face of the Party, not bringing the Party sufficiently forward in the shops, neighborhoods, and in the mass organizations, not bringing out clearly the revolutionary role of the Party as the leader of the toiling masses, the role of the Party in unions, strikes, unemployed struggles, insufficient explanation of the Party's program for the overthrow of the capitalist system as the final solution to the economic and political problems of the working class and all toiling masses.

#### Party Structure

The organizational status and problems concerning the shop nuclei have been dealt with in the previous sections of this document. Here we will limit our observations to other

organizational problems than shop nuclei. Since the 7th Convention the number of Districts has increased from 16 to 20. Great empires like District 10 with Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah,—more than one-third of the whole United States, and twice as large as France, Germany, England and Italy combined—was divided into three districts, and the fourth one was organized recently. The old District 10 was divided into Districts 10, 19, 20 and 21, with still too much territory in all of these districts. District 8 was split into Districts 8 and 18, and now we organized a third District from this territory—District 21. District 2 gave up the New Jersey territory which became District 14.

Even at present we find that all of our important districts and sections still cover enormous territories exceeding in area some of the large European countries. Important sections, such as mining sections in Utah and New Mexico are 700 to 800 miles from the District Center. A similar situation exists with respect to important industrial centers and nuclei, inasmuch as they are separated by great distances from section headquarters. Sections today number more than 200—more than twice as many as in 1930. But the sections are still too large. There are units springing up in many places but because they cannot get connections with any Party committee they disappear. In New York City, we have sections with 700 to 800 members. We have one section in New York with 39 shop and building nuclei, and 15 street nuclei—altogether 54 units, to which the section must give leadership and guidance.

This organizational structure of our Party with huge territories containing very important industrial centers, and with manifold problems, makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to give personal leadership to the organization in these centers.

It is quite evident that it is impossible to let these sections and units function without receiving personal guidance and attention from higher Party committees. In this connection, we must also consider a lot of very important problems—the possibility of semi-legal or illegal situations. It would not be possible under such circumstances to work on the basis of sending circular letters to lower organizations. The need for personal guidance and continuous personal contact with the lower organizations will be much greater. All of these considerations lead us to one inevitable conclusion, i.e., that we must split up the present huge territories in the districts and sections.

In considering the question of splitting the districts and sections, certain basic conditions must be taken into account:

1. Proper industrial basis for the New Party organizations;

2. The possibility of maintaining with the least difficulty personal contact with the lower organizations;
3. To parallel the electoral districts, as far as possible, with state borders for districts, and Congressional Election Districts for the sections;
4. Strength of Party organizations (number of units, number of members, mass organizations, influence of Party, Daily Worker circulation, etc.);
5. Available forces for leadership, etc.

Such reorganization of districts and sections will unquestionably lead to the development of many new leading forces, will create the conditions for more self-initiative, will enable the leading committees to give more personal leadership and to keep in more close contact with the lower organizations in the shops and territories, will make it more possible for the leading committees to react to political problems, to exercise a closer check-up on the carrying out of decisions, will transform the Party organization into a more flexible instrument that will be able to adapt itself to semi-legal and illegal situations.

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The number of cities with Party organizations is about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times as many as in 1930 (an increase from 200 to about 500). But we have to bear in mind that the Daily Worker reaches about 1,400 cities every day and about 1,700 every Saturday. We have 1,000 cities in the United States where the Daily Worker, our agitator and organizer, reaches workers every day; but because of the weak section committees and huge territories, we were not able to reach these towns, to build the Party.

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There are not facts at hand about the YCL organizations in 1930. This is the first time the Party districts reported to the Center on this problem. But only the most youth-conscious districts sent in their reports. Out of the 20 districts and three independent sections only 14 reported on YCL Street Units, and 9 on YCL Shop Nuclei. But even these reports are very incomplete. According to these reports, we have about 33 YCL Shop Units with 177 members and about 350 Street Units with 3,500 members. If we consider the fact that the Party has units in 338 factories, and that there are only 33 YCL Shop Units, then we must realize that there is something basically wrong in our approach to the problems of the young workers in the factories and

the Party has failed to recognize the importance of building the YCL.

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The number of street nuclei increased four times since the 7th Convention, from 407 to more than 1,600. The quality of street units improved only slightly. There were improvements especially after the Extraordinary Party Conference. We have some well functioning street units in the Party. For example, one street unit in New York succeeded in building up a Workers' Club in its territory with 80 active members, LSNR branch of 30 white and Negro workers, built up a carrier route for the Daily Worker, they are selling \$10 worth of literature a week, and took steps to organize the working class children in its neighborhood. The unit is surrounded by scores of active non-Party workers, who participate in every campaign of the Party, helping to distribute leaflets of the Party, etc. This unit is an example of how the Party can become the leader of the workers in the neighborhood. There is no doubt that there are many such units throughout the Party.

The basic organization of the Party is the unit in the factory, and among the toiling population in the streets or towns. These organizations are in constant touch with the masses. The decisions, resolutions, theses of the Party and the Comintern will not be carried out if the units do not understand them, if the membership of the Party, the unit members, are not mobilized to carry them out. The central and most decisive organizational task today is the transformation of the units into real political organizations, looked upon by the masses as the leader of their struggles.

In the Communist Party, the Central Committee is an authoritative leading body, with great power entrusted to it by the Convention. The same is true of the District Committees in their respective territories. But that does not mean that the Section Committees and the units should at all times wait for directives from the higher committees. The Section Committees and the units must utilize every favorable moment to strengthen the influence of the Party organizationally and politically in the localities, in the factories. Knowing the general position of the Party and the Comintern on the chief question of Party work, the Section Committees and units must, on their own initiative, introduce changes into the existing forms and methods of work on every occasion when circumstances demand, without waiting for special directives from the Center or District.

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Note:—The second section of this report will be published in the July issue.

## Speeches of Delegates in the Discussion at the Eighth Convention

### The Work of the Steel Unit in the Main Mill of Concentration

By JACK JOHNSTONE

I WANT to deal with the question of steel, especially on the main mill of concentration. And I take this question of steel, because every weakness that we have in our District, finds expression around steel, especially in the mill of concentration, and I take it, comrades, because it is my point of concentration, because I am a member of that shop unit and feel personally responsible in giving personal attention and political guidance.

The main weakness, of course, flows from the fact that we hid the face of the Party, and not fighting for the line of the Party among the non-Party workers. This is the main weakness. The second weakness is the confusion as to what is concentration, which generally results in a desertion by the Party of concentration.

In the mill, for example, Jones and Laughlin, which runs on both sides of the Allegheny River for nearly 7 or 8 miles thru the centre of Pittsburgh, is a company union, the atmosphere of which we have not been able to break down as yet. In this unit we have 19 members, 9 Negroes and 10 white comrades. It is not an easy job to get a small unit in such a large plant into action. When a D. O. goes down to a shop unit, then he finds all of the difficulties, all of the problems. It is all very well to sit back and say you must organize the shop. But when you sit down in the unit and see you have 19 members, in the mill scattered in all departments along the 7 or 8 miles of river territory, then it is quite a different problem of organization, to be able to gather this unit together in order to be able to get it to function as a unit. It is such situations that bring home to the leadership itself the working out of the correct methods of how to understand the problems in the shop in order to give proper political guidance to the general work of the district.

#### What Is Concentration?

We have taken these methods up, but we have not been able as yet to orientate our entire Party of Pittsburgh to-

wards their main task in steel, especially the concentration mill, the Jones and Laughlin mill. Here in Pittsburgh, for example it is steel. There are other industries but steel dominates. It is a steel city and here our main task is in steel. And when we talk about mobilizing our entire membership, to win the steel workers and concentrate on the steel mills, we mean a mobilization of every unit, every unit bureau, section committee, every fraction and mass organization in Pittsburgh for penetrating Steel. This method of concentration around J&L we have analyzed, who are working in the mill. We have Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, South Slav, Russian and other nationalities to a lesser degree. And here our language organizations can play a very definite role. And we are organizing our language fractions to recruit steel workers into the language clubs, mobilizing the non-Party members in these clubs to help to concentrate, to build these clubs around the J&L mill, to map out their campaign, so that the plan of building the Party and SMWIU, of organizing the mill will be put in the Polish press, the language press of all characters, and through this joint campaign surround this mill with open campaigns outside among the language workers, while we are planning our work inside, by mobilizing the unit inside for inside mill work around the immediate demands. Take the Unemployed Councils. They must turn their attention to this work. While their main task is to build their organization, they should build especially the unemployed organization around the territory of the mill. We have begun to do this, and they bring results. We took up the question with the South Slav fraction and they set the task of building the South Slav club at the Jones and Laughlin plant. As a result we can see just a beginning. Where we had 2 subscribers for the "Radnik" inside, within two or three weeks it was increased to 35 readers and 3 new members were recruited into the Party by the fraction. With the Unemployed Council, they too have penetrated not only just around the mill, but there are sections miles away from there where there are J&L workers living as for instance, in Mount Oliver, four or five miles away from the mill, in building the CWA union of which we have 5 or 6 branches. We took up with the fraction that in the building of this Mount Oliver Section, the section in which the main strategic force of the mill lives, the American white workers, they must make contact with them; get them into the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union, and recruit into the Party. On the Hill, where most of the Negroes live, we took up the question with the Section Committee and Unemployed Branches, that in carrying on the struggle against evictions and discrimination of the Negro workers, turning our organization towards finding steel workers living in that

territory; penetrating Negro groups. And it was through this that we got 9 Negroes into the Party working in the mill and to build the SMWIU. We have to surround this mill with fighting organizations, if we are going to make the factory the real force of struggle; that they all turn their face toward the factory, no matter what other main task there might be. In this direction we are trying to organize this mill.

What is the difficulty of the shop unit? Our shop unit disintegrated for a while. Then we found out that they were all working on split shifts, that one worked from 11 to 7, and another from such and such a time, and the unit bureau said we meet on Tuesday night at 8 o'clock. Well, this is not always possible. Sometimes it is possible to meet Sunday morning at 7 o'clock in the morning. Then again to take our comrades and see where they work, and we found in our unit we had six comrades working in one Department, the open hearth, a very important department. And in another very important department, the Bessmer we had seven comrades working. Two of the most important departments of the steel mill, and we began to develop the building of the shop nuclei inside these departments.

And with the work carried on from the outside, through the steel fraction, bring before the union the necessity of an everyday open campaign outside of the mill, so the workers will hear about our union, will see our union organization in action and in this way really begin a working class offensive against the mill owners, and turn it from a point of terroristic contact and fear for the workers to one of independent and open organization for the workers. In the development of this work, every worker in Jones and Laughlin Mill was brought to their bosses and questioned, what they knew about the Communist Party, what did he know about the Soviet Union, did he know that the Soviet Union shattered religion, etc., etc., this is the first time our comrades in the unit got away from only issuing a union shop bulletin and issued a Party bulletin, taking up every question the workers were asked and answering them from a Communist point of view. The result of this was what? That never before was there such open discussion about the Communist Party inside the mill. Since then, in the Western Electric, where we have a comrade who spoke here, (he was too modest to mention it) he himself sold 125 "Why Communism" inside the factory itself. The result of these methods of work is that they are now conducting an open election inside the factory for the election of a workers delegate to go to the Soviet Union for May Day. If we only learn what is meant by fighting for the line of the Party. Fighting for the line of the Party doesn't mean that we suddenly come out and say here is the

Communist Party, follow the line of the Soviet Union and have a revolution. We have to bring forward our Party into the leadership of the struggles of the workers in and outside the mill for the immediate needs of the workers, and in that process show the limitations of these struggles and what is necessary for the workers to do in order to overthrow capitalism. This is one of our greatest dangers and grossest expression of right opportunism, hiding the face of the Party, when you find reasons for not bringing forward the Party. And we have had all kinds of excuses put forward, that it is not the "psychological moment", etc., etc. Every excuse for not bringing forward the Party must be immediately fought against and defeated.

In conclusion, our District Convention had laid down a plan of work. It was a real good convention. We had about 50% new elements from the shop and a new tone was set, a new language was spoken, a language which our Party is beginning to understand, and as it understands, we will be able to go forward and carry out the tasks laid down for winning of the majority of the workers for the revolution.

## The Steel and Metal Workers Union in New York

By LUSTIG

**A**T the time of the Extraordinary Party Conference, the union of our district had 600 members. Today, I am in a position to report that we have organized 5 locals comprising 2,200 workers.

More important than this numerical growth of our organization is the fact that since the Extraordinary Party Conference, the orientation of our Union shifted from the light to the heavy section of the industry.

The first step was to print 25,000 folders acquainting the workers in the heavy metal industry with our union. Following up this folder, we have printed a number of others dealing concretely with the NRA codes, with the A. F. of L., bringing forward concrete proposals for which the workers are to organize into our union to achieve these demands. In our work among the heavy metal workers, we have bucked up against company unions. For example, in the Morgenthaler Linotype Company where more than a thousand workers are employed, we found a company union in existence for the last 15 years. The workers of this factory had a strike struggle in 1919 led by the International Association of Machinists. This strike was sold out. After the strike the company union was formed. The workers during the past 15 years have learned through their own experiences that the

company union is an organization serving the interests of the employers and not that of the workers. As a result of our activity amongst these workers, a number of workers joined our union, but since the spy system is very highly developed inside the plant, we have followed the policy of keeping contact with each and every individual worker who joined our organization, thereby safe-guarding the job of every worker who joined our organization. With this method, we are successful in lining up into our organization, 75 workers from the shop with the possibility of spreading our union. With the quicker tempo which every large number of workers has we will soon be in a position to hold department meetings for we will be strong enough to safe-guard the jobs of the workers even in case of firing. The situation now in this shop is that within a short time we will be ready for actual struggle for higher wages and for union recognition. It is very interesting to note that when the company elections took place we called upon the workers in the department where we have the biggest strength to boycott the elections with the result that only two out of seventy-five workers showed up. The company became frightened and called for re-elections and this time even the two workers stayed away from the polls.

In another shop called the Washburn Wire Company, employing 1,200 workers, two of these workers approached our union for organization. We wanted to follow a similar line as that of the Morgenthaler, but these workers said that the shop is ready for organization and want protection and since we could not convince these workers of the necessity of going cautiously about organizing, we accepted their line, called open meetings with the result that within three weeks we lined up for our union seventy-five workers of the shop. Then the employers woke up and fired 15 workers of our union. Since the NRA, of course didn't do anything in replacing these men on the job, the workers decided to strike. We were successful in bringing out 50% of the first shift as a result of which the company agreed to negotiate with the union and the workers committee. As a result of the negotiations, the company agreed to re-instate the fifteen fired workers, to guarantee protection to all the workers who joined the SMWIU and to carry on an election as to what union the workers wanted to belong to. The election, which took place one week after the strike was settled, resulted in 200 votes for the SMWIU which means that during a short time we were successful in lining up for our union 200 workers out of the 1,200 and thereby encouraging our organization in this very important steel mill and making it possible for us to continue to capture the majority of the workers and lead them into struggle under our leadership. These two examples show

that you cannot organize the workers according to a grouping but you have to adapt yourself from time to time according to the existing organization and the mood of the workers.

In closing, I want to touch upon only two points: first that the fluctuation in our union is negligible. This is due to the fact that in every local and every big shop we have a Party organization, that is instrumental in maintaining the conditions that have been gained as a result of strikes and thereby we are in a position to retain the workers in our organization.

The other point I want to emphasize is the danger that still exists amongst the leading comrades and that is the main danger in our Party throughout the country which expresses itself in trying to hide the face of the Party amongst those workers who are outside of our union as yet. Without any delay the Party Section with the cooperation of the leading fraction of the union must issue leaflets in the name of the Party to all these workers in the shops where our union is concentrating, bringing forward the program of the Party and showing to the workers that our Party is a leader. By doing this we are making it impossible for the bosses to make a red scare at the time of struggle and only by doing this can we outmaneuver the employers, lay the basis for successful struggles. Only by this method will our Party become in the course of the struggles a real Bolshevik mass Party.

## Y.C.L. Concentration in a Cleveland Mill

By A STEEL WORKER

I want to give a picture of the steel mill that the Y.C.L. district has picked out for its concentration. At the present time the steel mill employs, both of them which are closely connected, some 5,000 steel workers, having 3 subsidiaries in the city of Cleveland. This mill is the most important mill in the whole city of Cleveland. Also a nucleus of the Party, a small one, has been functioning, but has not been carrying on activity.

Now, around this steel mill for the last 3 years, the Communist Party and Young Communist League have been carrying on general agitation, but no organizational work. It is a known fact that in this steel mill over 100 sympathizers of the Communist Party work. But the Party has not taken steps necessary to consolidate this influence that it has and build organizationally, and spread out. And because it did not take these necessary steps, it was possible for the A.A. to come in there and organize a sweeping campaign

for a period of about 6 months. At the present time it has some 2,000 members in the mill.

Last summer, when the strike waves took place, the Young Communist League and Party together began some work there. Our comrades in the department signed up some 35 workers—in one department open.y. But this was not followed up, and as a result when the sausage strike broke out the Steel and Metal Workers Union went to organize the sausage workers and completely left the Otis steel.

I want to bring out some mistakes. When we first started work we tried to call all of our comrades to meetings. Because of the shifts we failed to get them to meetings. Later on we corrected this and began to talk to individual comrades on how to carry out activity in their departments, and on this basis we were able to activate our comrades to do some work in the AFL and in their departments. And in this way the unit in the Otis Steel was gradually becoming the leader of large movements of workers, not only in departments, but began to build an opposition movement in the AFL. We issued a leaflet in the name of the committee—the rank and file workers. And this leaflet dealt concretely with the problems of the mill and it was received by the workers very well. Whereas 300 workers used to attend meetings of the A.A., as a result of this leaflet, 1,200 workers came to the meeting and wanted to know if this leaflet was correct. The leaders of the AFL were so frightened that they stayed away with the excuse of a sore toe. And in this meeting, our comrades pressed the question of action, voted for 50% blanket increase in the mill and immediate recognition. Because we did not foresee that this would take place, we were not able to take full advantage of the absence of the misleaders.

I want to tell about a few accidents in the department. A young fellow, who was to join the Young Communist League, a few weeks ago got his hand cut off. Our League and Party members, working together, in the mill immediately elected a committee and demanded safety devices and won it after a fight.

One of the most burning demands in the steel mill, of the young workers, is no work on Sunday, and some even stay away without permission. Our comrades elected a large delegation and the workers backed the delegates. They wanted Easter Sunday and 2 days before off. After a fight this demand was granted and now the workers in this department feel organized—not under the AA, but by rank and file leaders.

At the last meeting of the A.A., 3 of our Party members were elected to go to the A.A. district conference in Monroe,

Michigan. This gives the comrades an idea of the influence of our comrades. At this meeting our comrades called for action. They were quietly let down, out of the meeting by the AFL official. When the workers found this out, a large body went down and beat up the official and brought our comrades back to the meeting.

The most important weakness and shortcoming we have in our work, I think, is that the Young Communist League and Party have not carried on sufficient agitation on the concrete demands of the workers in the mill and have not met the red scare correctly, because we already see that the red scare is being used, not only around the mill but in the A.A. meeting. The officials read the leaflets that we issue, in the meetings—which is good, and they try to say it is wrong. Our comrades ask them to prove that it is wrong. And then the officials shut up.

At the present time we have enough comrades in the mill in the League to establish a League nucleus, but because of the way the different shifts work, our comrades meet from the different shifts together with the Party workers. In a short time we will have 4 nuclei in the steel mill.

## The Work of the Marine Union

By ROY HUDSON

**F**ASCISM, war and revolutionary uprisings are on the order of the day. All of us accept these statements contained in the analysis of the ECCI and in Comrade Browder's report as undisputed facts. But when our comrades do their every day work they say: "These things are coming on us maybe,—but not now." Comrades, these facts are on us today; tomorrow they will be even closer upon us.

Recently, we know every force in Cuba was mobilized to crush the revolutionary movement of the Cuban masses. In attempting to destroy the revolutionary organizations they aimed their main blow against the Cuban dock workers union and to dramatize their determination to smash this, the first blow was struck when an American ship left the Cuban port loaded with scab cargo.

The Cuban workers had more than a right to expect support from us. Their struggle was primarily against our own bosses here. What support did they get from us? It is true that on this ship in Havana members of our union succeeded in mobilizing the seamen to refuse to unload the cargo. In New York we made feeble attempts to stop the unloading. The situation found us—the Communist Party, particularly in New York—organizationally weak, and slow

politically in reacting to the situation, in realizing our responsibility and tasks. But here, right on the order of the day, was a revolutionary situation where the masses were in motion, where we had concrete immediate tasks to support the Cuban workers who were moving forward toward the seizure of power, and struggling primarily against American imperialism.

Our comrades in the trade unions and in the Party itself were not up to this situation. We were not prepared to act in a truly Bolshevik manner. We cannot be satisfied with some of the improvements in our work, in our small successes among the basic workers of the American working class.

### Mass and National Struggle Led by Union

This is true of what we have accomplished in the marine industry. We can say that in the period since the Extraordinary Conference there have been a number of struggles of seamen and longshoremen led by our Party—a mass campaign carried on against the NRA. We have seen the organized growth of the MWIU. Bringing the marine workers into the Party has improved. There has been a beginning of a more serious approach on the part of the Party committees to the question of work in this basic industry. I would like to touch upon a few of the lessons to be drawn as a result of some of our experiences.

First, a number of strikes have taken place aboard ship. These struggles are beginning to take on a mass and national character. For instance, the strike of 14 coal ports in Boston is an example. We have been able to initiate these struggles, extend them to other ports, broaden them out from individual ship strikes to larger mass struggles because we have carried on the policy of concentration. Our main energy was concentrated upon one company and 45 ship strikes were developed out of this concentration. As a result these struggles have become a lever which we are now using to set the masses into action and winning the mass of the workers.

### Government Forced to Grant Workers Control of Relief

In the field of unemployment in our union—the main impetus to the growth of struggles was the fact that our union participated in struggles of the unemployed. Some outstanding victories have been won, especially in Baltimore. What are the main results? Through the proper approach of our marine union to the question we forced real concessions in the form of relief from the government. More than this. In Baltimore we see this: that with our organized power, even at this time, we succeeded in forcing the

government to concede the right of the workers to control all the relief through their elected committees.

The next question is, is it possible at this time for us to build the revolutionary unions here in the United States? I say yes, comrades. This experience we have had among the seamen especially proves it. In this war industry the bosses recognize and fear us and have given full support to the officials of the ISU who have carried on a mass campaign in connection with the NRA. Despite this, we have prevented them from re-establishing themselves with any kind of mass base in our industry. We have placed ourselves at the head of every struggle of seamen that has taken place. The ISU and Independent Unions have not been able to push us aside. On the contrary, it is our union, the revolutionary union alone which can register growth amongst the seamen on the basis of the struggle against the NRA. This does not mean that we have exposed or isolated the fakers. On the contrary, they are still the main danger, but we have some successes. We have the initiative and our perspective here among the seamen must be to prevent the establishment of the ISU or independent unions, to win the masses of seamen from the revolutionary union.

I think it is important to point out that we were able to conduct a successful struggle against the reformists because we are a national union and we have carried on a uniform fight in the principal ports of the U. S. Another lesson that we must drill into the consciousness of all coastland districts is that a strike in the marine industry cannot be confined to one port. We must mobilize all the forces in various ports. The weakness of the Boston Coal Boat strike was precisely because the Party was not conscious of this. We were not able to coordinate our work effectively in Norfolk by bringing the coal trimmers into action.

#### Opposition Work in Reformist Unions

Not only have we made some headway in building our union as a revolutionary union. There have been some successes in developing an opposition movement. At the code hearings in Washington our union presented a statement defending the right of these workers, 12,000 of them, to organize into the ILA, protesting against a ruling of the NRA, and demanding the recognition of the union that the masses had gone into, the ILA. The officials who were present did not take any stand upon these matters. When the workers learned of our stand in fighting for their rights, for the right of their organization to be recognized, what was the result. The result was that we won their confidence, that the opposition movement which we had built up over a period of time received a tremendous impetus.

At one of the meetings, where they read the minutes, a proposal was made by a rank and file worker that they should give the 200 dollars which they were going to give to some shyster lawyer, to the red union, because we fought in their interest. As a result of adopting this correct position toward those workers inside the reformist union, our opposition movement developed. We forced the calling of a rank and file convention. At this convention our whole program, including refusal to load ships flying the Nazi flag was adopted.

There has been during this period some mobilization of the Party apparatus of the mass organizations for support of winning the workers in the basic industries. I can cite some examples in this respect. Members of the Needle Trades attended our convention and they voluntarily decided as a part of the revolutionary working class they would assume some responsibility towards help extending the influence of the revolutionary movement where we were weakest. They pledged \$25 a month to the Marine Workers Voice and kept this pledge. It is my opinion that we have many lessons to learn from the needle trades, and I say this is one example many other sections of the revolutionary movement could follow to good example. For instance, New Orleans which is a forgotten outpost of the revolutionary movement. We could make headway much faster if some sections who are stronger would realize the importance of this work and undertake to support it.

These are the signs showing the possibilities we have. They are fruits of an attempt to apply the Open Letter. But we have just scratched the surface.

What things hold us up? We don't go ahead fast enough.

Let us take the west coast. It is true we have established ourselves at the head of the fishermen and loggers, an agricultural union. These are tremendously important. But marine out there is still the basic task. What is happening there? While we captured the agricultural workers 1200 longshoremen joined the ILA. It does not help to say we are beginning to do opposition work there. If there had been a real orientation, if the Party had mobilized its forces and given more guidance to marine, we would be more in the leadership, we would have organizational control of the longshoremen, who at one time refused to load munition against the Soviet Union.

In New York there is a peculiar problem. We cannot criticize New York as elsewhere because here there has been a more serious attempt to solve some of the problems, to work out a plan of action and mobilize the Party forces. Let us just look at some of the things done in New York

recently since the Party Conference. These are things we have been talking about for years. Some of the proposals just being put into effect, they were made so long ago and nothing done about them, that I forgot them all. It took so long to get around to them. Such hesitation, such slowness, and even unwillingness to completely utilize all of our resources for realizing our concentration task. What New York needs now more than anything else is maybe an Open Letter on Bolshevik tempo.

#### "We Have the Forces, We Can Go Forward"

Comrades, I say that this Convention proves one thing: that the Party is beginning to have an understanding of the Open Letter, has begun to learn how to apply it, is beginning to have results, and the result for one thing is, that we now have such a Convention that has never taken place before in the history of the Party. This Convention shows us that the task can be done, that we are learning how. But we have been slow. Out of this Convention must come the determination, grown out of the fact that it is possible for us to realize the tasks we set ourselves, that we are going to accomplish these things at the rate of 100% faster than in the past period.

We have the policy, we have the experience, we have the forces. These forces are to be seen at this Convention. I say, with this experience behind the line of the Party presented to the Convention by Comrade Browder, with Comrade Browder leading us, I say we can go forward to win the masses of workers of America, to go forward toward a Soviet America.

## Communist Activities in Baltimore

By P.

**W**HEN we discuss Baltimore, it is not just a matter of discussing some small section. Baltimore is one of the main war centers in the country. In this city we have a steel mill which employs 12,000 people; out of these about 2,000 are young workers and close to 3,000 are Negro workers.

This industry is very busy in the production of war materials in the form of special barbed-wire, plate for battle ships and scrap iron, and I think it is the only plant in the country which is located on the waterfront for the transfer of war materials from the factory in ships for foreign countries.

Also in the city of Baltimore we have a large aviation

plant. Here the company at the present time is making 48 high powered bombing planes, the most high powered planes ever built yet, which will have a speed of 250 miles per hour.

Also we have several chemical plants in Baltimore which at the present time are producing poison gases. Besides this we have the water-front. Especially in Baltimore, it is very busy in the shipping of scrap iron to Japan. I have found one specific case, a certain steamship company that sends empty ships to New Orleans. There they take out war materials and charge them for another company. This ship goes to the west coast and there it is chartered to another company, a new crew is hired and from there the war materials are taken direct to Japan. I want to show that one of our main fights is a fight against war in Baltimore.

Our activity in the steel mill in the last few months has been, in the main, action against the company union. We came out boldly for the boycott of the company election and when the election came up the workers boycotted the election in most bodies. This came first, through the struggles developed inside the mill, and second, through general agitation outside. Here too the union began the issue of a weekly union paper, and here we boldly exposed the AA company union and the NRA.

Before this, certain struggles were carried out in the mill. In one department a wage cut was to take effect. One comrade who worked in this department got all the workers who were affected by the cut, to elect a committee which was to go to the boss as soon as the cut was announced. When the company heard about it nothing more was said about the cut. Through our action on such issues, the workers saw our program was correct, and through our agitation against the NRA and AA, supported us in the fight for boycott of the election; and when the election came up over 70 percent boycotted the company election. Our main fight at the present time is for an increase in wages and establishment of shop committees and this has taken form, a part of which is being carried out. In the fight against the company union our comrades in the YCL and the young workers in the union were most active in these struggles. In one department we had a young worker who joined the YCL. He told the workers there to boycott the company union. When he came before the ballot boxes, all the workers looked at him; and because he refused the ballot everyone refused to vote. This young worker was called into the company office, and the boss said, "if you don't cut out your agitation, you will be fired." He said, "if you fire me, instead of 8 hours of work for you, I will spend 24 hours organizing the workers," and he is still

there. In another mill they were using the older workers against the young workers. On a particular job, if the young workers did not put out as much work as the older, the boss said, "You're going to be fired." We discussed this in our unit, decided to get the fellows to balance the amount of production. So the fellows agreed to it and they do not have competition on this thing. This shows when the YCL unit and the Party start discussing the problems in the mill, certain things can be done, and not only organizers from the outside can carry out certain actions. In the mill, cooperation between the Party and the League has not been a difficult question.

Comrades, I emphasize the young workers are the most militant in the fight, especially in the steel mills, and when the youth join the union, our comrades see they are pushed forward, they are drawn into leadership, and when a campaign is organized the youth are drawn in, and today young workers are making headway and building the union. This should be a lesson to other districts. We are getting fresh material and through these real American elements we will be able to build a revolutionary movement.

In the unit one comrade gave me 15 names. He wanted to build a youth club. He just recently joined, and this was on his own initiative. This shows when we recruit American elements in our organization we can discuss things in our units, and they go out and carry it out. This shows, comrades will carry it through if we teach them how.

Another important thing: A short time ago was held the Congress Against War and Fascism. One Party member and one YCL member were in our delegation and the rest were outsiders. One member from the union went to this Congress. Next day he went inside the mill and he told the fellows he was going to the New York Congress, and the 15 fellows said, "We want to send someone too." So he told them to elect a delegate and they did, and they had a delegate at the Congress. This shows, when we carry this campaign inside the mill we can actually recruit basic workers to take part in these important conferences. In the water-front of Baltimore we have at the present time a unit of over 22 young workers. Of these, 11 or more are from ships, and at the present time we have one YCL ship nucleus. This was carried thru primarily because of comrades active on the waterfront and it was thru the cooperation of the Party that we were able to build the Young Communist League on the waterfront, and today we can record results on the waterfront of Baltimore. In the majority of the actions on the waterfront, where ships were on strike, our comrades were the leaders of these strikes. We have a particular case where four YCL members were on one

ship and thru the action of these YCL members this ship went on strike. This came about thru the activity of the YCL on board this ship, and also the actions on the ships near the steel mill where the YCL sent a comrade down to this section. This comrade has been able to bring out several ships on strike. And these strikes have had a tremendous effect on the steel workers in building the industrial union and is gaining more sympathy and prestige for the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union.

Most of the comrades discuss their work and picture it like everything is hotsy totsy. But I think that when comrades discuss things they don't criticize enough. We have plenty of failings, more failings than good things, and we fail to look at this side. In the past, in the YCL work especially, comrades did work here and there and the section committee wondered what they were doing. As for the Party, they paid practically little attention to the work carried on in this place and in Sparrow Point itself, which has been a national concentration point for a number of years.

In Baltimore we have the beginning of an anti-war movement. Our League against War and Fascism there has been more or less the policy that we get together a few students etc., and set up a committee, but the only thing that was carried thru was the question of mass meetings, and we expect to fight war and fascism. In Baltimore we tried to set an example. We have set up a war committee with steel workers, and a few students and this committee will carry out some action. We have set ourselves the following task at the present time: We have a YCL nucleus of 6, and we have set ourselves the task of having a nucleus of 15 by June, by the YCL national convention, to issue a monthly shop paper and with leading comrades to be responsible to work with comrades working in the mills, to discuss the problems in the mills and carry out action in this mill. We hope to catch up and try to surpass the Party in membership on the waterfront in Baltimore, and I am sure that with the young comrades we have there, we will give the Party real competition. To organize 3 shop nuclei on the waterfront, to organize 5 anti-war committees aboard ship, to carry thru a petition campaign against war and fascism on all ships coming thru Baltimore. Last week we organized the first anti-war committee on board a ship in Baltimore. We are holding a youth conference against War and Fascism in Baltimore on April 29th, and the purpose of this conference is for the preparation of National Youth Day, which we hope will be held in Baltimore and before the National Convention of the YCL we will be able to carry thru one certain action. In our resolutions in the past, we have always heard this question, that in order to fight war

effectively we must penetrate the basic industries and arouse the masses of workers on the ships against shipping munitions. Let's put this into practice at least once, and we in Baltimore pledged ourselves by the National Convention of the YCL to develop action around one ship against the shipping of amunitions. We have put into action every comrade on the waterfront and in the steel mills, and this is the best guarantee that when we come to the National Convention of the YCL we can report some real anti-war action in Baltimore, and this will be the step in establishing the beginning of a real youth movement in Baltimore which will be an example to the other sections in the United States.

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#### COMMENT BY COMRADE HUDSON:

I want to finish Comrade P.'s point because one of the points he missed was one example for the entire Party. On this anti-war committee he spoke about, there were 29 youth and practically the whole crew of the ship signed a petition for the struggle against war, and after they signed it, they said, "What do we do next?" and honestly, we were nearly at a loss to know what they were to do next, but we proposed that on May 1st out at sea, they should call a meeting on the ship against fascism and war. The entire Party this May Day must bring out into the streets hundreds of thousands of workers as a protest against Fascism and War.

## Communist Work Among Illinois Miners

By F.

THE history of the Illinois coal miners has been a history of betrayals especially in the last five years. The first betrayal was since we were organized—Lewis—we all know that. But when the reorganized movement came along with Walker, Owett, etc. the miners felt they were going to get a real union. But they found out how Walker, Owett and the others took cases to the court against Lewis and in this way sold out the miners.

Then another outfit came along—the Edmondson-Allard outfit. They were leading the miners back into the Lewis machine. Now we are in the P.M.A., it should be the Progressive Fakers of America but the miners don't call it that. District 8 analyzed the P.M.A. very correctly when they brought out the bureaucracy of the leadership of Pearcy Keck. They said, "Through demagogy and a sham battle against the Lewis machine the P.M.A. bureaucracy is trying to

extend and exercise its influence among the miners. Actually, it is carrying out the same line as the A.F. of L. and the Lewis machine. It is supporting the NRA, working hand in glove with the sheriffs to suppress miners' meetings and hunger marches (Macoupin County), and is using the same gangster tactics as the U.M.W.A. Together with the A.F. of L. they are conducting vicious anti-Soviet propaganda and aiding developing fascism by its anti-Semitic campaign."

"The Musteitites, the left social fascists, actively helped to establish in the P.M.A. the present reactionary leadership and turned over the fighting Women's Auxiliaries to the Pearcy machine."

Allard, the socialist Frazier—these are the men who built up Clod Pearcy. He wasn't known throughout the state and these are the men that built him up. They thought they could push him wherever the hell they wanted to. Pearcy got in and these guys got out. Allard is saying still that he's all right. Allard is trying to have a paper, had it built up to where he had it printed, but today the Communist Party thru exposing Allard made it impossible for him to get it out and he is now running a mimeographed sheet. This was done after we understood that our fight against social fascists is the main political task.

There was no Communist Party when the P.M.A. was organized. Party members did not work, played no important role. They were isolated from the miners and the miners pushed them away, with the result that the miners were misled by the radical phrases of Musteitites and renegades. The Communist Party was always playing the tail end in Southern Illinois. They were letting the Socialist Party take the leadership. This tail playing has been changed. That last local election we participated in we drew up a program and we said to the Socialist Party we are going to run these men. The Socialist Party only run a man for vice president and had to accept our slate because we put up a correct program and put our forces into lead. We ran a man for president and we are going to continue this.

We have a movement in Illinois trying to unify the ranks of the P.M.A. and the U.M.W.A. We know if we keep on the P.M.A. leadership they will bring us back into the U.M.W.A. If we try to build up the P.M.A. we are building up another group of labor fakers. We are trying to isolate both leaderships and have a real union in Illinois. So far the work in the U.M.W.A. has been very weak and we will try to have more U.M.W.A. miners in the unity conference as well as bring more U.M.W.A. miners into the Party. I think this can be done in the Danville District. We have a good basis in Illinois for building up real action through the Denquoin boys, three of whom are facing sentences of 99 years, 60

years and 40 years. The P.M.A. has had no program to get them out. The Communist Party is going to build up mass action and try to get these boys out. In Gillespie we followed for a long time the Socialist Party policy of talking and doing nothing. This has been changed. The Communist Party members are in action now and do put up fights in the local unions.

We have a shop paper in this mine which is known as the "Ground Hog." There are weaknesses in it but we are trying to make it a real Communist mine paper and our last issue was a better one.

We propose in the coal mining section to build mass action on a concrete basis, on issues that affect the miners. We already have two strikes on there, we have one in Pana which is still on and we have another one on in the Belville Sub-District. Now in the Nigger Halla mine they had some bad conditions down there. They kept fining their men as high as seventeen, eighteen fines a day, so a comrade down there, who is in the position of president in that local union called the miners together and told them: "Boys, this company wants clean coal. The men are paying too much in fines. We got to do something to force the company to stop the fines. Now we are going to fix it." So he told them to go down the mine and instead of loading fourteen, fifteen cars a day, they should only load four cars. They went down and loaded four cars a day and before long the company saw they were losing plenty of money. After a 2 day strike on the job the company was forced to agree to stop all fines, so in this way the miners won this demand, and it was a big victory for that field.

#### A Challenge to the Miners of Pennsylvania

Now in conclusion, I wish to issue a challenge to the soft coal miners of Pennsylvania. The miners of Illinois are going to challenge the Pennsylvania soft coal region for membership and for the building of the Daily Worker.

I hope through this challenge that we have a real movement in both fields.

## A Young Negro Communist Becomes the Leader of White Workers

By O., Detroit

**C**OMRADE Manulsky wrote that the main trouble with the Y.C.L. was sectarianism. That trying to get a League member to work among the masses was like getting a Pope to work in a united atheist society.

The Party in Detroit, after the Open Letter, realized the

necessity of work among the masses and turned to the decisive section of the working class. These were the shops, Negroes, trade unions, both revolutionary and reformist. Many gains came out of this. It is also sufficient to say that we had certain experiences that gave life to the Party and Y.C.L. The Y.C.L., following in line with the Party, decided as its first major step to place the leaders of the units, sections and district in those sections where the workers congregated. There were startling results. We shall go into some of them.

It is especially brought out that the Negro communists must become leaders of the Negro workers. Let us take the experiences of some Negro Communists. We shall take one for an example. Going to work in a shop, he found only three Negro workers in the department—the rest were all white. A union of the A. F. of L. was to be formed in a few days. The Negro comrade asked himself the question—shall I go against the A.F. of L. union or shall I be for it? He first raised the formation of our own union. The sentiment of the workers was not so much for it. But he also made application for the A. F. of L. when all the others signed up. The Negro comrade asked himself how can I become a leader among the white workers who have prejudices, where there was no white Communist to take leadership. He remembered that the strength of a Communist was how he worked with individual workers.

At lunch time he discussed with the young workers. And this discussion was such that it raised the Negro Communist into leadership of the white workers. The question came up on Germany. Some workers stated that we don't care about Germany. He said but we must care about it. They must understand us and we must understand them. One white worker who was particularly chauvinistic asked what do you know about Germany? He said he knows that they are workers and we are workers and that is all we have to know. He did not antagonize the workers against him.

Then came the formation of the union. To the surprise of the A. F. of L. the white workers placed forward for secretary the Negro Communist. The factory boss took it upon himself to fire the Negro Communist. The white workers were against it. The tools of the boss raised the Negro question in the union. A white worker took the floor and said regardless of the officials, the Negro will be our secretary. The young Communist continued to raise the question of Communist policy in the union. Then came the elections to the central body of the A. F. of L. These white workers elected a Negro Communist to the Central Body. Finding himself in this position, this Negro Communist at-

tached himself to the Party and the Party group in the A. F. of L. in order to get correct guidance and to be able to present the correct policy at the central body of the A. F. of L.

The question came up at one time of the necessity of training individuals. At one of the meetings of the A. F. of L. the question came up against one of our Communist Leaders. A non-Party worker came to his defense and said that he should stay in the union regardless of his political opinions. The Communists in the union who had made a decision in the fraction to the effect not to take the floor in his defense, would not defend him. This was a mistake. They should have defended him because he was being taken on trial.

The question of presenting the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill before the workers in the A. F. of L. was taken up as a result of the failure of Communists to defend this comrade. The Communists took it upon themselves, to prove to those workers that they could reinstate themselves and fight for the right of the Communists to bring forward the Unemployment Insurance Bill. Now there is one thing that is peculiar. A group like this can raise certain points which can be defended by the same workers who yesterday hammered down this group.

This very same Negro Communist at a meeting two weeks later raised the question that he will bring from time to time problems before the central body. He raised the question that his union was formed thru the front door but that class collaboration policies were being brought in. He carefully worked this in due time in the central body. The big shot got up and explained that the Negro Communist should not raise this question; because enemies outside of the A. F. of L. would use this against the A. F. of L. Old A. F. of L. members got up and praised the speech of this worker—but it was not the individual. It was the communist program that he was presenting against collaboration with the boss.

The Y.C.L. has ever to organize itself with the Party to work in the reformist union. We have certain things to say. It is necessary for us to continue this work. The first thing we must see to it that every young fellow under 24 years of age in the Party must be placed in responsible League work; and especially the Negro Communists; this example in Detroit brings clearly to the forefront that when a Negro Communist is armed with the correct policies and correct methods of work, that he can work among a group of workers and that the white workers will defend him.

While working in this particular local, it was necessary for this Negro Communist to attach himself to a group of people. One of these individuals he was going with as his important ally always attacked the Communists, right and left.

One day he took the Negro to drink some beer with him. But the beer parlor was a white place. He said, "they wouldn't accept me there." The white worker said, "Aren't you a leader in our union? Let's go in there." So they went in and they refused to serve the Negro. The white worker said, "Why don't you serve him some beer? If you don't, then I will go out." So they walked out. The white worker said, "Can you imagine those bastards not wanting to serve you. Why, you are the head of our union." The Negro Communist then said, "In Russia, they would serve me" and he agreed. (Great applause). This white worker was taken by this situation very much and drawn closer to the movement by this display of rank discrimination and seeing the willingness of this Negro Communist to become the leader. He said, "You are a real leader." The Negro answered, "That is because I am armed with the Communist program." The white worker then raised the question of his becoming the paid secretary of the union.

I want to say this because my time is soon up; that is, the task of the Party is to educate as many young Negroes, especially young Negroes who shall be the future Party members who can take their place among the workers and keep in mind that they can become the leaders of adult workers as well. The Negro Communist by applying correct views can batter down the question of seniority and can establish himself as a leader in the A. F. of L. locals.

At this very same local, the question of Negroes attending dances with white workers came up. And because of the correct application of our policies, the white workers said that they would refuse to attend any dance if the Negroes were excluded.

## The Revolutionary Unions in the New York District

By ROSE WORTIS

I WANT to deal with two important points raised in the reports of Comrades Browder and Stachel, namely, the higher political level of the present strike wave and the need of developing the struggle of the workers on the basis of a class struggle, both amongst the unorganized workers and inside of the reformist union, and how we are meeting this new situation in the New York District.

Since the Extraordinary Conference last July we have made some progress in trade union work in New York City. In July we had a membership of 23,000 in the T.U.U.L. unions in New York City; our membership today is about 45,000

in unions affiliated with the Trade Union Unity Council with about 12 to 15 thousand in independent unions, this number has now been increased by the addition of the independent taxi drivers union. At the same time, we have also made considerable gains in our opposition work in the A. F. of L., where we have an organized following of about 50,000 workers supporting our program and leadership; needle, building trades, printing, food, etc. In the recent period we have even made a beginning of opposition work among the longshoremen and heavy metal, etc. In the recent period we have been confronted with a number of difficult problems. Outstanding was the underestimation of the readiness of the workers to enter into struggle. This found expression in practically every industry where important struggles developed. In such industries where we were quick in correcting our line we succeeded in leading the struggles of the workers, increasing and consolidating a much larger membership. This is true in the shoe workers and needle workers, etc. Another difficult problem was discussion about liquidating the T.U. U.L. unions. This was greatly stimulated by an extensive campaign carried on by the renegades which even affected some leading members of the Party. How did we meet this issue? Not on the basis of a formula as to which phase of our work is more important, T.U.U.L. work or work in the A.F. of L. We were guided by only one consideration, namely how can we best advance our class struggle policy among the workers.

In the Furniture Workers Union, our fraction, overwhelmed by the A.F. of L. campaign, came forward with the idea of liquidating our union on the eve of the strike. We defeated the liquidation tendencies with the result that today we have a union which has about 10,000 workers nationally—mostly native American elements.

In other instances in some of the lighter industries, such as jewelry, doll workers, etc., where our unions did not have a mass basis and masses of workers were recruited into the A. F. of L., we decided for our union to go into the A. F. of L. with the result that today our comrades are elected leaders of masses in these unions, fighting for our class struggle line. In the ship yards where we did not watch the situation very closely we continued to carry on agitation for our unions while the A. F. of L. recruited large numbers of workers. As a result when the strike came in the shipyard we were isolated from the workers. Thousands of workers were striking under the leadership of the A. F. of L. with our union playing no role. In the needle trades, building trades and among the food workers, we developed our independent unions side by side with our opposition in the reformist unions with the result that we have not only been able to win better

conditions for the workers in our T.U.U.L. unions, but through our struggles have forced substantial concessions for the workers in the A.F. of L., as was the case in the needle trades where we forced the bosses to give the dressmakers and cloakmakers higher wage scales in the codes. This was openly admitted by Grover Whalen, chairman of the N.R.A., who warned the bosses that if they do not give in to the demands of the workers, the Communists would take over the strike.

This shows that our policies in the trade union field must be based on the conditions found in the particular situation. Another shortcoming in our work during this period was the failure to bring forward the face of the Party and to meet the red scare. This has been corrected after the strike struggles. Our Party fractions in most of the unions have grown, not to the extent possible, but we have gained considerably.

In the past period most of the strikes that we have led were in industries where we had a union in existence. Today we are facing a new situation in New York City. There is a strike wave developing among the workers in New York City, especially in industries where there is neither a T.U. U.L. union nor an A. F. of L. union. In those industries there is today, as never before, a mass resentment growing among these workers against the company unions. For example in the I.R.T. subway system where the workers have succeeded in forcing a meeting of the company union which was attended by close to 1,000 workers where the workers formulated their demands and elected a rank and file committee to present them to the company. I recently met with a group of Western Electric workers where a company union was put over about a year ago. The workers in this shop had a meeting of 1,000 and decided to demand the return of the 10% cut. With proper work we can either convert this company union into a real union or take the workers out of the company union and organize them into a real union.

We also see a mass movement for struggle developing among the radio workers. If we want to reach the young workers and women workers, the radio industry of New York should be given immediate attention since 80% of the workers are young women. Therefore the Party of New York is confronted with a very important task of assigning the proper forces so that we can become the leaders of these workers and organize them into T.U.U.L. or independent unions under Communist leadership.

We had our first experience among these sections of unorganized workers in the taxi industry where there was no union until very recently. The taxi strike is of the greatest importance, not only for the Party in New York but for the entire Party. In this strike we have seen the new phase

of development in the American labor movement as dealt with in reports of Comrades Browder and Stachel. We see here a strike developing on the basis of illusions in the N.R.A. The taxi strike in New York City is the first important strike developed directly against the N.R.A. which helped to sell out the first strike. It is the first important strike against the company union which is a growing menace to the entire labor movement. Our experience in this strike has shown to us the possibilities of establishing ourselves in the leadership of these sections of the workers.

Whereas in the first strike our comrades were bodily thrown out of these meetings, in the second strike the most popular elements were the Communists. Through our militant leadership we have won the confidence of the workers. As a result of this we have recruited in the Party in the past week close to 60 taxi drivers; we have been able to sell more Labor Unities among the taxi drivers during the past month than we sold in all of our unions in New York. As a result of our work many strikers have adopted the Daily Worker as their official organ. It was a fine sight to see the taxi drivers in thousands leaving their hail and almost trampling upon the comrade selling the Daily Worker in their eagerness to see how their strike was dealt with in the news and editorials of the Daily Worker. The leading comrades in the editorial staff took a great interest in the strike, spending their days with the strikers, and I am sure their efforts will be repaid a thousandfold.

Not only have the Daily and Labor Unity become popular among the taxi drivers, but also other periodicals.

However, even in this strike there was some hesitancy in bringing forward the Party. At the first conference called in support of the strike, some of the leading comrades questioned the advisability of permitting the Party speaker to address the conference and bring a donation in the name of the Party. All the comrades agreed after the conference that the action of the Party was correct and the discussion among the workers which followed was helpful to us in combatting the red scare, explaining the program of the Party, all of which strengthened our influence among the workers. There was also some improvement in direct Party participation in the strike. While in the past the section of the Party did not actively participate in the strike struggles, the Party sections responded to this strike, though by no means sufficiently. The sections issued leaflets, a number of mass meetings were called in support of the strike and in that way we were able to bring the face of the Party before the strikers and to expose the treacherous role of the Socialist Party in the first and second strikes. This was very helpful in the struggle.

As far as our unions are concerned, they quickly realized

the importance of this strike and its effect on the entire transportation system in New York City which is a concentration point of the district, and the movement generally responded much better than ever before. We collected \$5,000 within a period of ten days, in support of the strike, from the needle trades workers, food workers, etc., who also sent speakers to address the strikers, thus making the taxi drivers part and parcel of the New York militant labor movement.

Even in this strike there were many shortcomings which I have no time to discuss at this time. Among them was the failure to penetrate the Negro taxi drivers. However, in this strike more than in any previous strike in New York City were the demands of the Negro workers against discrimination, against jim-crowism and the right of Negro drivers to work in every part of the city (at present they can only work in garages in Harlem and operate special color cars known as jim-crow cars) brought forward not only by our comrades, but through our influence by the other rank and file strike leaders. If we follow up our work we will establish our leadership over these workers.

There is one other important lesson we can learn from this strike which is of value to the entire Party, namely this: Not only were we able to lead this strike, but we also understood the psychological moment when it was necessary to make an organized retreat. It is important to state here that the taxi strike was actually settled on March 24th. As a result of the militant street battles the companies were forced to agree to a plebiscite and had already sent out a letter to its men appealing to them to vote against the union. This was a great victory for the workers since there was no doubt as to the outcome of the vote. However, as soon as the news of the treacherous Roosevelt-Green agreement became known, the companies withdrew from the plebiscite. General Motors stepped into the situation. With the help of Comrade Stachel who worked very closely with us, we analyzed the situation and came to the conclusion that we would not be able to get full union recognition at this time. Together with our leading forces we worked out a plan for settling the strike on the basis of garage committees, reinstatement of all workers, elimination of the blacklist and payment of the tax money. This settlement has been accepted by the workers who have returned to work under the leadership of their shop committees. This is a defeat of company unionism in the taxi trade. If we follow up the organized retreat, we can establish a real union of the taxi drivers and a union that will play an important part in the organization of an independent trade union center in New York.

The question of an independent trade union center in New York City is not a matter for the distant future with

us but an immediate perspective. There are close to 100,000 workers in New York who can be brought into an independent trade union center organized under our leadership. The partial success of this strike will be helpful towards realizing this immediate perspective. In order to really get these 100,000 workers under our leadership it is necessary that the unions of the TUUL play an important role in the development and extension of our influence among the workers, something which has been lacking until now.

Our unions in New York City, and I dare say throughout the whole country, are busy with their day to day problems, and do not realize that in order to solve their problems it is necessary for them to help the entire revolutionary trade union movement. Because of this underestimation, the TUUL in New York is not a real functioning trade union center. In most other centers there are no councils in existence at all. This is a great shortcoming and must be corrected. If we want to be a real factor in the organization of this independent trade union center, we must consolidate the TUUC, we must build our own unions with the thousands of members in the TUUL unions. We will then be able to establish ourselves as the leaders of this independent trade union center on the basis of a class struggle policy. To correct this shortcoming, it is necessary to strengthen our Party fraction as the leading force for carrying through the Party policies in the union.

We in New York City know, that as the strongest trade union center, the Party has a right to expect much more and better work from us. We are confident that on the basis of the decisions that will be made at this convention we will go forward in New York City to strengthen our opposition work in the AFL and to build the independent class struggle center so that within a short period we can issue a call for a national convention to form an independent federation in the name of 100,000 organized workers of New York City.

## The Share Croppers Union Grows and Fights

By MURPHY

**A**T the Extraordinary Party Conference held in July in New York, it was reported that we have 3,000 members in the Share Croppers Union. We want to record at this 8th National Convention of our Party at the present time, in spite of the terror that has been leashed against the Negro and white sharecroppers, particularly in Alabama, in spite of the lynch clouds that have gathered, we now register a

membership of 6,000 members in the state of Alabama.

In order to prove that we have this number of members in our union, the organizational secretary of the Sharecroppers Union can point his finger at 400 functioning locals of the Sharecroppers Union at the present time. The most of these 6,000 members are centered mainly in the state of Alabama and a section of Georgia. And also to prove and to show that our union has a mass base, we raised within one month's time \$142.81 to send a truck-load of delegates to the Chicago Conference last November.

At the present time we see that the Roosevelt New Deal is now plunging thousands and thousands of poor farmers, share-croppers and poor tenants, and especially the Negro sharecroppers and tenants into deeper misery and distress. The Roosevelt new deal is sharply expressed through the Bankhead Bill, which is a bill of slavery and hunger for the poor farming masses all over the country, particularly in the South, and especially for the Negro farming masses.

At the present time the Bankhead Bill now has become the legal slave driver, legalizing slavery of the Negro sharecroppers and tenants, binding them to the slave masters and the bankers, evicting thousands and thousands of sharecroppers from the land, confiscating their livestock, taking away from the small farm owners their land and homes, cutting off all relief jobs, forcing them to accept even lower wages for their labor than has ever been seen before in all the history of American capitalism.

It is very clear that this bill which is now forcing the poor farming masses into deeper slavery and deeper misery, is also an invitation to fascism on the farms.

At the present time the share-croppers and tenant farmers are being forced to sign these contracts and are not even allowed to question the landlords or the county agents. Any resentment on the part of the Negroes shown against the signing of such a bill means that they are immediately threatened with eviction from their land and are jailed.

Since the Party Conference held in New York last July, our union has developed one big struggle against conditions we have in the South. This struggle was developed in Chambers County. The sharecroppers and tenants boycotted a landlord's plantation because he wanted to pay them less than the average price which was 50 cents per hundred pounds, and the landlord wanted them to pick for less than this amount. They boycotted this farm. This struggle was led by the share-croppers Union and our Party. The landlords immediately got together, rounded up their forces and united a terrific drive of terror against the Negro people, robbing their cabins, arresting them, trying them and fining them

\$300 and sentencing them for six months. And they are now in prison, most of them are now sick with some kind of diseases as a result of poison put in their food, and we have a report that one of them has died. That is the present situation.

We say that in spite of this, just last month a committee of action, composed of only women, under the leadership of the Share-Croppers Union, went to the C.W.A. officials and demanded relief. The first time one of the women comrades went alone. She couldn't get anything, and the second time she went, she took with her some more women, and at this time they demanded some relief right then, and they got it before they left the office.

At the present time we also notice that one of the main features in our organization in the struggles of the Negro share-croppers and tenants has been the arousing of the white tenants and drawing them nearer to the share-croppers union and Communist Party. At the present time they are seeking the unity of the white and Negro Share Croppers in order to prepare resolutions to send to the President and Secretary of Agriculture and to the State and Local officials. But one of our serious weaknesses has been that we have not organized any of these white farmers to engage them in class struggle with the Negro Share-croppers together with the white workers in committees to go to the landlords and local officials to demand relief. Right now we have tremendous opportunities for doing this thing,—organizing the Negro and white workers in support of the struggle for Negro rights and for the right of self-determination. This is one of our main weaknesses,—the failure to organize the white farmers. Because we know that it is very clear the reason why these white masses are coming nearer to us is precisely because of the past struggles developed by the Share-Croppers and Tenants in Tallapoosa in 1931-32.

On the question of our Party, at the present time we can witness a slight gain. We can now say that just now our Party has begun to function as a real leader of the Share-Croppers and Tenants in the South and as a leader of the struggle for Negro rights and self-determination for the Black Belt. We know that in the past it has been very, very difficult to organize the white farmers and share-croppers and even white workers in the city, but even at the present time we can say that more than 100 white workers are members of the Communist Party or trade unions under our leadership.

In line with the Open Letter adopted at the Extraordinary Party Conference last July, we must say that our Party in District No. 17 has begun to apply in practice this line. It was pointed out in the Letter that the immediate tasks, one of the immediate tasks of the Party was the fight for

the struggle for equal rights for the Negro masses and for the right of self-determination in the Black Belt. This was already begun, taking the fact that we have now begun to work in this direction by establishing our Party on a more basic foundation, a stronger foundation by developing better leadership, by removing the headquarters of the Share-Croppers Union into Montgomery, it being the central town of the entire Alabama Black Belt, and in this very town here we are now organizing the proletarians in this city who will take leadership in leading the farming masses in their struggles. The fact that we have not realized the importance of drawing into our organization the agricultural wage workers and formulating special demands for these workers, drawing them into the Party, placing them in the responsible positions and giving them the leadership along with the poorer strata of farmers, has been one of our main weaknesses.

We might characterize the Black Belt now as a great arena in which there stand the oppressed Negro share-croppers and tenants, together with the white workers, standing face to face, with the landlords and the bankers on the other side. We can see now that the masses in the Black Belt are waiting to see what the Communist Party will do. The Negro masses in the Black Belt and in the South as a whole have begun to organize as never before into the Share-Croppers Union and into the Party. This is precisely because the Party has made a slight turn in its work and begun to get down to business and begun to carry out its real purpose and aim in the south and the Negro and white masses in the South are beginning to realize that the Communist Party is their Party. The tremendous revolutionary upsurge of the masses, particularly of the Negro masses in the South can be seen in the increase of the membership of the I.L.D., mostly Negro workers and farmers, in the tremendous growth of the sharecroppers union where 3,000 share croppers, tenants, agricultural wage workers, women, men and children have been drawn in since July 10th, 1933. And also the rapid drawing into the Party of Negro and white workers, working in the most basic industries in the South, namely the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, which is an affiliate company of the U. S. Steel Corporation and the Republic Steel. Here in this particular industry which is the stronghold of the Southern capitalists and part of the stronghold of the American capitalists in this particular industry for the establishment of our Party units.

On the question of the struggle for Negro rights and on the question of the struggle for the right of self-determination for the Black Belt. At this particular time, it is important to see that there are wonderful and tremendous possibilities existing in the South, especially among the Negro

share-croppers, tenants and workers, in spite of the terror, in spite of every kind of obstacle that has been raised before the Negro share-croppers in their union. We have succeeded in crossing over the Alabama line into Georgia and have begun to establish the union and the Communist Party. It is very clear also, comrades, to see that the main task of our Party at the present time, in the agrarian Black Belt, the immediate task of the Party, is to develop struggles among the share croppers, drawing in the white share-croppers and tenants into the union and Party, to support the Negro share-croppers in their struggles for equal rights, in the struggle for the right of self-determination, the basic task of our whole movement in the South. This means the educating of our membership throughout the union, raising this question in every single local of our union, and especially in every single unit of our Party; popularizing and explaining the slogan for self-determination in the Black Belt, for equal rights for the Negroes.

We thought some time ago that it was sufficient to put out a strong leaflet and at the bottom, demand the right of self-determination in the Black Belt. But we found that this has not been enough. The Communist Party is going to actually become the general staff of this struggle for the right of self-determination in the Black Belt by organizing the white farmers and share-croppers into the union, into committees of action around specific, immediate demands, developing struggles, creating demonstrations wherever possible, create a barrage of protest against eviction, linking up these struggles with the main struggle of our Party, and that is the struggle for Negro rights and the struggle for self-determination. What will have to be done is the leadership of local struggles on a mass basis, including the white farmers, where we see they are ready to support the Negro masses in their struggle for their rights. Again I want to emphasize, that in view of the situation existing in the South, particularly among the Negro people in the Black Belt, that the Party must bring to the forefront more sharply than ever before the struggle for Negro rights, and for self-determination, by explaining to the Negro and white workers what this is, what is the right of self-determination. They want to know what the right of self-determination can do for us.

## The United Front Policy Wins Militant Socialist Workers to the Party

By ASCHE, California

COMRADE chairman, comrade delegates:  
I bring greetings to you from the most recent converts to the Communist Party—the 350 militant Socialists in District 13 that have joined the Communist Party since Dec. 1st, 1933. I think that this example given to you by District 13 should serve to inspire every other district represented to go out and do likewise.

District 13 has demonstrated that a united front can accomplish striking results. District 13 was not satisfied in making a mechanical appeal for a united front with the Socialists; it was not content with merely sending out form letters, with going through the customary phrase-making and the customary routine gestures. To the contrary, the district merely used the formal letter as a starting point. I think it has no illusions as to the reception this letter would receive at the hands of the state executive committee of California. Therefore the letter was addressed not only to the State Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of California but also to its members. With that in mind they proceeded to mimeograph this letter and circularize it to all 60 locals and branches of the Socialist Party of California.

The results were quite startling. As you know, the Socialist Party higher bodies function very slowly, with the result that many of the locals, seeing in this letter an honest, sincere desire for a united front, responded, sent letters to District 13 expressing their desire for a united front and moreover going on record with resolutions endorsing such a united front and demanding of the Executive Committee a united front on a state-wide scale. Before the Socialist State Executive Committee started wheeling into action there were some 20—25 locals or branches that had declared their intention to have a united front with the Communist Party. The appeal for the united front was made on the basis of the immediate needs in our territory. The appeal for a united front of struggle was made on the following points:

1. To help strikers with strike relief funds.
2. Fight evictions, gas and water shut-offs.
3. Against imperialist war;
4. Against fascism;
5. For repeal of the criminal syndicalist law—points on which the Socialists and Communists could get together.

Within two or three weeks there was open rebellion. A prelude was the action of the State Executive Committee in

removing me as state secretary because I had voted for the united front as a state committeeman. The trial was a public one although we had to fight to make it public. It was open to all members of the Party and this trial was used as a means of demonstrating to the rank and file the essential viciousness, the essentially reactionary tendencies of the State Executive Committee. This effort was quite successful. As a result of this trial a spontaneous rank and file committee was formed the very evening of the trial. This rank and file committee for investigation and action was exactly what its name implied. It investigated everything we could lay our hands on and we found plenty; and it gave the Socialist Party of California more action than it had had in the previous ten years. In fact the Socialist Party of California got so much action after that that it overexerted itself and is now suffering a serious relapse.

In the brief time allotted to me I would particularly like to emphasize the absolute necessity in making an approach to Socialists either individually or as groups to beware of attacking Socialist Party leaders in general terms. I think we are too prone to do that and when we do that even a left wing Socialist who may be coming along throws his back up. If we want to attack the reactionary leaders of the Socialist Party, and I doubt that there are any of us that don't want to attack them, if we want to expose them there is only one way to do it, that is to be armed with all the facts and documentary evidence.

In California in our drive against the Socialist Party leaders we have never made a single statement that we could not back up with facts, preferably with documentary evidence bearing the signatures of the leaders. It is because of this fact very largely that we have been able to win over such a very large segment of the Socialist Party of California. Let us enumerate the results so that we can realize it is very much worthwhile to seriously consider the possibility of the united front, even when we know in advance that the Socialist Party top will reject it. Such rejection clearly calls for a concerted exposure to the Socialist Party rank and file of its reformist and social fascist leadership. This is not optional; it is obligatory.

In California prior to the offer of the united front by the Communist Party to the Socialist Party the Socialist Party had 1234 bonafide members, based on dues payments in much the same way as our membership is based on dues payment. Today they have less than 800 on a dues paying basis, so that we see the united front has worked a two-fold benefit. It has not only increased our ranks by 15% but it has decreased their ranks by one-third. However, this is only a part of the gain that we have made. I think the most im-

portant gain we have made is that we have won over at least 70% of their most effective workers and leaders locally. Among the leaders and workers in the Socialist Party that have joined the C. P. in recent months are at least six local secretaries, three federation or district secretaries, and three platform speakers.

While no special effort was made to win over members of the Young Peoples Socialist League, as such, we have already gained as converts following our recent united front mass meeting against War and Fascism two leading officials of the Young Peoples Socialist League and more are expected to join. Here again, I wish to make a distinction between state and national leaders and local leaders. Moreover, the morale of the S. P. in California is at an all time low level.

In touring the state I found one very grave condition locally in which some very enthusiastic comrade without any facts, unwarrantedly and without justification attacked a socialist local leader with the result that we have lost that local. The local leaders in the main are absolutely sincere; they are nothing more nor less than rank and file members who happen to be in local positions because there is nobody else. Some Communists seem to think that a leader is a leader whether he leads 10 or 100 or 10,000. I wish to caution those here to be careful when they attack. In that connection I would like again to emphasize particularly to the older comrades here that a very large part of the rank and file of the Socialist Party is sincere: this is demonstrated by the fact that 350 out of 1200 Socialists in California have joined the Communist Party in the last five months. Carried out on a national scale following the rejection of a national united front by the S. P. similar efforts upon the part of all districts would result in 3,500 new converts and the further reduction of the S. P. effectiveness and membership. If you overlook this fact you are not going to be able to accomplish very much. You are playing right into the hands of the social fascist leaders. If you recognize, however, that a very large part of these members, rank and file members and lesser leaders of the Socialist Party are sincere; if you recognize that, mistaken though they may be, they are laboring under the illusion that they are working for Socialism in the Socialist Party, if you recognize this truth, then and then only will we be able to concentrate our forces and defeat the social fascists, the handmaidens of world fascism.

## The Work of the Textile Unions

By ANNA BURLAK

**T**HE 13th Plenum Resolution of the C.I. places the problem of trade union work and especially the trade union in the basic industries as our most important task if we are to win over the majority of the American working class.

In line with this, the Central Committee has not only selected major districts as concentration points but also industries among which is the textile industry. I want to deal with only a couple of problems which face the textile union because I feel that these particular problems face every one of our revolutionary trade unions in this country.

First, the question of independent unions and our attitude towards them, our work with them, and secondly the question of the United Front. Since the NRA has been applied in the U. S. there has been a tremendous growth of independent unions of various characters: reformist unions that are just a counter-part of the A. F. of L., in some places leaning very much towards company unionism; unions built spontaneously by workers on their own initiative and also unions built by us. These unions have grown up first, because of the great desire on the part of the workers to organize, especially since they were under the impression that the NRA gives them the right to organize. Secondly, because of the great mistrust of the A. F. of L.; and, thirdly, because in many cases our red unions were not in the field. Regardless of the category into which these independent unions fall, unless we as Communists work within these unions and build our fractions within these unions, these unions are bound to disintegrate or degenerate into counterparts of the A. F. of L. The great danger that affects our comrades and we have examples in the textile industry where our comrades built independent unions) is the fear of injecting our revolutionary trade union policy into these independent unions. They try to build a union which will be between the A. F. of L. reactionary policy and the revolutionary policy of the revolutionary unions. The comrades say, "Well, we can't go forward too fast because we will immediately be classified as reds." Comrades, especially because of the sharpening attack of the bosses upon our trade unions, this policy is not going forward at all. It is not even standing still; it is going backward. There is no middle ground on the question. Unions will be either red class struggle unions or they will be yellow reactionary unions, but not somewhere in between. Reds, communists can win over workers in the most conservative areas by boldly presenting our revolutionary program. This was proven in our work in Salem, Mass. where it was possible for me to

go—and, of course, I was not unknown in New England; the capitalist press has taken care of that—where the U.T.W. had 1,800 workers in the A. F. of L. for some 14 years. It was possible to work with these workers, to gain leadership of the strike and to win the demands of this strike. We put through a move where these 1,800 workers unanimously voted to break away from the U.T.W. and organize an independent union. Some of these workers developed into the most militant fighters. Especially was this true of the women. In fact, at one meeting where Mr. Thos. McMahon tried to speak to these strikers, the women jumped up and said, "Mr. McMahon, you talk about God, but you don't care whether our children starve," and pulled him off the platform and practically tore his clothes off.

Today that same independent union is quickly degenerating into a reactionary union, and that is because after the Salem strike, the Paterson strike broke out among the silk workers, and the work in Salem was not continued. We built that independent union, we helped the workers break away from the U.T.W., but we did not have complete leadership of these workers because of not building our Party in that center and not continuing work inside the new Independent Union. With the rise of the independent union, it becomes doubly important to bring in the United front. Where we do fight for the unity, where we fight for it correctly and boldly, the workers recognize this and come to us. In Washington, D. C., after the breakout of the national silk strike, we went down for a conference with Senator Wagner on the national silk strike. There were exactly 38 labor representatives, including McMahon and other U.T.W. leaders, independent union leaders and the N.T.W.U. In that conference with Wagner, McMahon tried to split the delegation by isolating the members of the N.T.W.U. by calling them Communists and Reds. We fought McMahon along the line we fight an important enemy as one who is helping the unity of the boss and the government through the N.R.A. against the workers. It is necessary to develop the greatest amount of unity and present one front of all workers against the bosses. McMahon walked out and called upon the independent unions to walk out, but because we fought for unity of all workers against bosses regardless of union affiliation these independent representatives stayed with the N.T.W.U. and they were the basis for the formation later on in the strike, of the biggest united front conference which we held in Allentown, Pa.

In Paterson because of the application of the United Front, because of our constant fight for unity, the rank and file at one point forced the leaders of the A. F. of L. to come down to our headquarters during a strike and ask for

speakers at one of their meetings. In Allentown the rank and file members took their leadership boldly and brought them to a unity meeting. They told their leaders "We want unity, and you must accept the unity," and they had to do so.

One major point we fell down on in Paterson and which I feel is the important point in every industry, is that while we made good agitational speeches from the outside, calling upon the workers to unite, with us and the workers wanted unity, we did not work inside the American Federation of Silk Workers in order to organize a group that will fight for unity from the inside. Had we definitely organized the fight from within the American Federation of Silk Workers, we would not have had the situation where a renegade, Eli Keller, was able to get up at a strike committee meeting and say, "I will see this strike in hell before I see unity with the N.T.W.U." This would not have happened if we had a rank and file group to force Keller to accept the united front.

I want to deal with one last point. Comrade Browder made an excellent contribution to the Convention in his report in dealing with the importance of developing women cadres in our Party. Especially with the coming danger of war and the possibility that a lot of our men comrades will be out at the front pretty soon. I feel that many of our Party functionaries in the field still take the fact that it is necessary to develop women leaders, with a grain of salt. It might not come out openly, but there is that hidden insinuation. And there is still skepticism as to the capabilities of women becoming leaders. I know that women, although they are militant in strike struggles and demonstrations, are still hesitant to get up and speak in meetings; especially when they get the feeling from the men that they don't know enough to get up and speak at a meeting. It is necessary for every one of our comrades, especially the men comrades, to devote more time to encouraging women to take leading parts in our trade union and Party work. There is still a certain skepticism as to whether women can become district organizers of the Communist Party. I have heard this expressed by many comrades — "she is a woman, how can she be a district organizer?" This is the same idea that existed on the part of some comrades towards Negro comrades. It is incorrect, and against the entire line of the Party. I agree with a previous woman comrade speaker from the Women's Auxiliary of the N.M.U. that for every male worker we take into the Party, let us take in a woman worker, and develop the best among them into leading positions in the Communist Party.

## Concentration in the Chicago Stockyards

By A WOMAN PACKING-HOUSE WORKER

I WOULD like to give a picture of just what we have in the stockyards in Chicago so that the comrades will not get the impression that it is just a large factory. The stockyards are located in one concentrated territory. The stockyards surrounded by a large fence form Packinghouse Town which is controlled by three large trusts: Armour, Wilson, and Swifts. 40,000 Negro, White and Mexican workers are employed there and wield tremendous influence in the city.

We find, realizing the importance of the stockyards, that the A. F. of L. and an independent union, the Stockyard Labor Council, have been making every effort to get the workers under their leadership. The A.F. of L. has already organized under its leadership the stock handlers and the butchers. In the smaller shops the stockyard Labor Council has 100% organization. The status of our union is very weak. In connection with this industry, there is an article in the April Party Organizer by comrade Bill Gebert, our district organizer, in which he discussed in detail the question of the three unions and the unity conference that is being developed. This article should be read in order to understand the situation in this industry.

As far as our methods of concentration are concerned, they have been very general, with very little work accomplished. Concentration has been more or less a question of coming down to the stockyards and selling the Young Workers, distributing a leaflet, etc., not realizing that the territory around there, the blocks where our comrades live, and our unions are, is where the comrades should carry on work, amongst the yards workers.

In the stockyard industry, there is a trend towards drawing in women, to replace men, paying them lower wages, women being paid 37½ cents an hour and men 42c an hour and up. Women are being drawn into this industry because they are preparing them to take the place of the men in the event of war. Therefore, we agree with Comrade Browder's report that special emphasis must be placed upon the question of developing women into leadership of our movement, and drawing women workers into our movement.

The main problem at the present time that faces our union and our movement inside the yards is the development of systematic work for department nuclei and department groups. The only way in which these can be built is on the basis of the particular grievances of the workers in each department. In the stockyards, we have three major grievances. The terrific speed up being the major grievance. In

one department two lines ran 700 hogs an hour with four girls doing the labelling. Now 500 hogs are run and one girl does the labelling. This speed up is characteristic of every department resulting in many accidents. As a matter of fact most workers go once every three months to the doctor. Another grievance is the wet floors and stairs that result in accidents to the workers.

In this connection when we discussed the question of special youth demands, we did not consider the question of these major grievances but were looking for something special. However, we found out that any grievance that affects young workers, is a youth demand, while affecting adult workers, also.

Our nucleus also had a bad outlook stressing more the importance of outside work and belly-aching about lack of section concentration. In my department, we succeeded in getting together a group of girls who discussed the question of sticking together, and formed an action group as a result of which we dominated the entire floor. Grievances arose to which the entire group reacted, and we were able to win various demands, such as rest periods, etc. I developed a deep, personal friendship with one of the girls and came in contact, thru her, with workers from another strategic department of the industry. In this other department thru personal contact, we succeeded in putting up a fight for a half hour rest period. This shows how thru personal contact we are able to carry on work. Thru this personal contact also we built another definite group in that department.

One of the weaknesses in my work was the failure to raise the political consciousness through consistent studying, etc. of the workers and actually recruiting them into the Y.C.L. and Party and more into the union. This is a serious weakness of many of our shop workers at the present time.

One of the major problems is the Negro question. The stockyards is the center of white chauvinism in Chicago. In 1919 the bosses utilized the Negro workers to break the strike which resulted in race riots. The company is doing everything possible to maintain this race hatred. If it is known that white and Negro workers associate together, they are immediately fired and blacklisted from the yards. Inside the yard, there is a tremendous discrimination, with Negro workers working in the worst possible jobs. In the offal department which is one of the dirtiest, wettest departments, where the guts are cut, only Negroes are employed. In the sliced bacon, one of the clean departments, only white workers are employed. However thru our work, we did succeed, thru our actions and thru many discussions with the workers, in breaking down chauvinism to such an extent that we established social relationships between the Negro and white girls inside the dept. and after work in the homes.

There is another weakness of the Party District I would like to name that is the fact that the Party has absolutely failed to give the Y.C.L. Nucleus real guidance. Our unit has no Party rep. attending meetings, the Party doesn't have discussions with us and take up our problems. The Party District has never taken up the question of the Y.C.L. unit and has no discussion with us personally on our work. This is something the Party must change. In closing I would like to say the following: We realize that we've got to increase our tempo so we will be able to lead the coming strike struggles. We've decided therefore to make a challenge, and we have a basis to fulfill it, that we challenge the Pittsburgh packing house Y.C.L. to establish 2 department nuclei by the time of the National Convention of the Y.C.L., June 15.

## Lessons From Needle Trades

By N.

**F**ROM the needle trades, although a light industry, many political lessons can be learned, especially from the experiences of the last general strike in the dress trade. We are acquainted with the fact that the NTWIU played an important role in the last general strike, yet we did not successfully gain a large number of workers to join our NTWIU.

I believe it is important that the comrades know the situation in the fractions of the dress trade. I want to quote from the report of Comrade Kuusinen at the 13th Plenum of the E.C.C.I.:

"Without a persistent struggle against opportunists passivity in its ranks, not a single Communist Party will achieve success in winning mass influence in the factories, in the trade unions, in the rural districts, and in the army. It must be said that in the majority of cases we still work badly in these spheres in all capitalist countries; we have not yet sufficiently learned the methods of Bolshevik mass work."

This is the root of the trouble of the dress department in not winning the masses of dressmakers. But, we must know also that we did try to do something, that the masses of workers, 60,000 dressmakers did come out, and when they came out we were fast asleep. We tried to counteract the sell-out of the ILGWU misleaders, and to find out how it was possible to get some gains for the workers. Just because we were in the field and raised the slogan not to go back to work without increase in wages, etc. This helped

to get some kind of gain. Immediately after the workers came out on strike the ILGWU misleaders attempted to send the workers back without a settlement, and because of our correct slogan we succeeded to help the workers to get some gains. Later on some comrades began to develop a theory of liquidating the industrial union, when the Needle Trades Union was most needed in the dress trade.

We have many young women workers ready to do work. We have not found the method of drawing in these young workers. We must correct this. We must draw in young comrades and help to develop them in strengthening the work in the shops in order to have a better success.

Now, I want to bring out the question of the youth. We did not prepare a group of young workers and give them responsibility; only thru guidance can this be done. This is important for other trades—to know just how to build groups of workers, to teach them how to take the initiative in order to be able to plant our roots in the shops. This is what we must learn how to do, particularly in the TUUL. We cannot do work like the AFL, wait for business agents to come around. We must be the organizers of the workers, teach the workers to be leaders in their shops and develop leaders of the shop committees. If we take time to build leadership in every individual shop then the TUUL unions have a possibility of existing.

In Maimon and Sanger Shop, we had a shop unit and the young women comrades were leaders of the shop, known as Communists, who had a real following in the shop and everything was carried on under the leadership of these young comrades. When wage cuts began to take place in the industry, we still maintained our good conditions in our shop. Finally, we were locked out, and because we had established good leadership in the shop, we were able to give the bosses a real good fight—a fight that the dress manufacturers will never forget. For 11 weeks in zero weather we put up a fight. The majority of workers fighting together—were women and young workers, Negro and white.

Here, I want to deal a little bit on the question of developing women workers. I haven't much time and I want to stress on this because I feel it hasn't been touched upon enough. We must realize the importance of developing women cadres and doing work among the women workers.

I want to quote again what Comrade Kuusinen says:

"We have not yet learned how to carry on Bolshevik work among proletarian women. The first task of all the sections of the Comintern in this sphere is to get rid once and for all of the underestimation of this work, to

get rid of the idea that this work is not part of general Party work."

If Comrade Kuusinen can put this in his report, we must certainly let this sink into our minds. This question was raised at the Extraordinary Conference. It seems we are still talking about it, about developing women cadres also in the shops. Some think because the comrades work in the shops we don't have to develop them. We must especially develop them because they work in the shop. It is particularly important that we develop the Negro comrades, because the Negro women in the shops are the most exploited. At the Convention yesterday, a telegram from Detroit called away many comrades. This shows the American working class is active, and we are glad. But we must also see the other side of it. When comrades are called away suddenly, as may happen any time, when are we going to prepare the leadership to take their places? You can't push anyone into leadership, you have got to guide and develop them into leadership. Now is the time to prepare women cadres. We must plant this important fact in our mind, go back and do something about it and not only talk about it. At this Convention there are whole solid delegations that have not one woman comrade. This is deplorable. Unless we hammer on this we will not do anything about it.

On the question of the youth. We must cease sneering at the youth and calling them children. We must realize how important a role the youth plays in these times of revolution, wars, etc. In this period we have to prepare and if we want to carry in life that most important slogan, "Defend the Soviet Union", we must prepare the Party in the shops thru the women, the men and young workers, spreading out influence and building a strong Communist Party and YCL among the millions of workers in the United States.

## Organize the Farm Women

By V. S.

**T**HE Party must not overlook the importance of organizing the poor and middle-class farmers.

The farmers in the past have showed great militancy in their strikes, hundreds of them fought on the picket lines. Fighting deputies, sheriffs and state militia.

Also the farmers have put up strong fights against the mortgage sharks to save farm homes. June 1933 the farmers of Wisconsin supported the hunger march of unemployed

to Madison. That alone should prove that there is all possibility of winning the farmers over to the side of the proletariat, as their allies and not their enemies. The Party must give more guidance to the farm movement in the future, then it has given in the past, because the farm movement has not grown as it should have grown. At some places it has even taken a serious fall. There is also another great danger, and that is, the Farmer-Labor Party rooting itself in the middle west and in Wisconsin. I fully understand the great importance of the Party to turn to the shop. As Lenin stated: "That every factory should be a fortress for the proletariat." At the same time, the Party should not overlook the importance of winning the toiling farmers.

Comrades, there is one point that has been left out completely at this great Convention, and that is, the importance of organizing the farm women. Here I want to state that we cannot build a revolutionary farm organization in the country side unless we win the farm women. In the few places where we have succeeded in getting the farm women out in the struggle we have found them to be very militant and where we have won the farmer's wife we have won all the family. On the other hand, if we do not take definite steps in winning the farm women, our enemies, the capitalist class, will continue to use these farm women against us in every way and form. Use them as scabs to drive milk trucks through picket lines to uphold the capitalist system, and to work against the Party itself and against the Soviet Union. Comrades, there is every possibility to organize the farmers. They have many grievances, these farm women work from 14-16 hours a day. They have no time for rest or pleasure of any sort. Besides, these women have to watch their children grow up without necessities of life such as fresh fruit and vegetables.

We must increase our work among them. While we recognize the necessity of working primarily among the women in industry, we must realize the tremendous importance of also working among the farm women.

## The League of Struggle for Negro Rights in Harlem

By MACKAWAIN

I WANT to speak specifically for the L.S.N.R. council of Greater New York.

You will recall that before the Extraordinary Conference of our Party last July, we had a revolutionary upsurge of the Negro masses around the Scottsboro case. At the

very moment the legal-lynch verdict was made known in the Scottsboro case, the Negro masses spontaneously surged into the streets, demanding working class justice for these innocent boys. It was these workers who first suggested the march on Washington to protest this infamous verdict. When the masses themselves first suggested this action, the Negro reformist leaders tried to organize this march in order to prevent it from going through. A few days before the scheduled start for Washington, these Negro misleaders suddenly announced that: A march at this time would do more harm than good to the Scottsboro boys. It was at this time that the I.L.D. exposed these reformist leaders, and carried this march through successfully.

A few weeks later at the Extraordinary Conference of the Party held in New York, it was decided to revive the L.S.N.R. which would stand as an effective bulwark for the Negro masses against Negro reformism. The Extraordinary Conference made a momentous decision when it sent one of its best leaders into Harlem, Comrade James W. Ford, because Harlem is the ideological center of Negro Reformism in the United States. After the conference, Comrade Ford called a membership meeting of the Party in Harlem and proceeded to set up control tasks in carrying out the Open Letter to the Party.

In building the L.S.N.R. we were confronted with the problem of getting adequate forces to do this work. A division of work was brought about in the units, and several comrades in each unit were assigned to L.S.N.R. work. These comrades were instructed to canvass their respective territories for some possible issue around which neighborhood struggles could be developed, giving a base upon which to firmly establish L.S.N.R. branches. Many struggles were developed and branches set up on a neighborhood scale. These struggles were against the rotten conditions in the Harlem Hospital; against discrimination on the C.W.A.; the murder of James Matthews in the prison of Welfare Island by the police, and exposed by the Daily Worker; against police brutality, etc. Before the decision to build the L.S.N.R. was made at the Extraordinary Conference, we had only one branch in New York with about 35 members. Today I can report 16 branches with 625 members out of a total of 1,000 recruited into the organization. In the struggles around the Harlem Hospital it was discovered that a Nazi doctor, who was the president of the Friends of New Germany, was on the surgical staff of the hospital. A campaign was launched against him in which he was exposed as carrying out the sterilization policy of the fascist Hitler. Thousands of signatures were collected and protest demonstrations held, forcing his resignation. The C.W.A. was forced to register the Ne-

goes in the neighborhoods in which they lived. Heretofore, all Negroes living outside Harlem were compelled to go to Harlem to register. The L.S.N.R. won the right for white and Negro workers on all C.W.A. projects to make up time lost on account of bad weather.

#### The Struggle Against Petty-Bourgeois Nationalism

This is the first time I have attended a National Convention of our Party. For the first time in my nearly four years in the Party, I can say that I am clear on the correct line of the Party.

When I joined the Party the situation within the Party in Harlem was rotten. Petty-bourgeois nationalist tendencies were very rampant among our Negro comrades. Nearly every white comrade was charged with the crime of white-chauvinism, a vast majority of these charges had no foundation whatsoever. At this time, as a new member, it appeared to me that the duty of a Negro worker in the Party was to accuse a white worker of white chauvinism. The Party took no steps to check this unfair attitude of the Negro comrades toward the white comrades. This served as an adequate blanket under which petty-bourgeois Negro nationalist tendencies were covered. These very bad conditions were allowed to exist so long until our Negro comrades got the impression that petty-bourgeois tendencies within the Party are virtuous instead of dangerous. White-chauvinism was considered the only danger.

#### The Struggle on Two Fronts.

As long as we have capitalism we will have white-chauvinism and petty-bourgeois nationalist tendencies to contend with; both are main props of imperialist reaction and therefore, both are main dangers to our Party, to the revolutionary class struggle. We must carry the fight on two fronts simultaneously; we must crush both where ever they show their poisonous heads. One cannot be a revolutionist unless one is thoroughly convinced of the correctness of the Communist line as the only way out for the whole working class. When ever a comrade slides down into the camp of imperialist reaction, it proves that he has never felt the urge to revolutionary action. Let us see what Comrade Lenin had to say on this question.

"It is not at all difficult to be a good revolutionist once the revolution has broken out—when all and every one joins the revolution from mere enthusiasm, because it is the fashion, sometimes even from considerations of personal gain. It costs the proletariat labor, great labor and I may say excruciating pains, after the victory to rid itself of these pseudo-revolutionists. But it is far

more difficult, and yet more valuable, to know how to be a revolutionist, even when conditions are yet lacking for direct, general, truly mass and truly revolutionary action; to be able to defend the interests of the revolution by propaganda, agitation and organization, in non-revolutionary institutions and oftentimes in downright reactionary surroundings, among the masses incapable of immediately understanding the necessity for revolutionary methods.

"To be able to find, to sense, to determine the concrete plan of still incomplete revolutionary methods and measures, leading the masses to the real, decisive, final, great revolutionary struggle—this is the chief problem of modern Communism in Western Europe and America."

Let us go forward, white and black together in one solidarity to overthrow capitalism, and establish the United States of Soviet America.

## Eighth Convention Decided Upon Recruitment Campaign

**T**HE EIGHTH Party Convention decided to bring the membership of the Party up to 40,000 by the time of the Lenin Memorial. This is not an impossible task. Such a number can be reached and must be reached, but to carry it out, the District Committees must pay more attention to this important task of the Party. We must double the recruiting power and cut the fluctuation in half. If we apply this line, then the decision of the Eighth Party Convention will be realized. The Eighth Party Convention Manifesto to the American toiling masses must be systematically distributed as a means of recruiting workers into the Party. Furthermore, all Districts must take the necessary steps to utilize the election campaign, the Party Anniversary for the speeding up of the tempo in recruitment.

The dues-paying membership and initiation figures for January, February, March and April, 1934, are the following:

| Dues Payments |        | Initiations |       |
|---------------|--------|-------------|-------|
| January       | 24,737 | January     | 2,000 |
| February      | 22,344 | February    | 2,003 |
| March         | 24,734 | March       | 3,100 |
| April         | 22,011 | April       | 2,084 |

These figures indicate that we are reaching a dangerous situation in the growth of our Party. Why? Firstly, because

the figure for March is the same as that of January. After January, our dues payments declined by 2,000. The figures for April show a still further decline. In spite of the fact that between January and April, over 9,000 members were recruited into the Party, these 9,000 members do not appear in the dues-paying membership. This means that either those who paid the initiation fees are not yet in the ranks of the Party, or that a large percentage of the newly recruited, together with a high percentage of those previously recruited, are lost.


We give these figures so that all District Bureaus shall consider very seriously the problem of fluctuation. These figures indicate that the Eighth Party Convention has not noticeably stimulated the recruiting campaign as a daily task of the Party. They show that, with few exceptions, the struggles of the workers which are occurring in practically all districts, are not utilized for a speeding up of the tempo of recruitment.

In New York, for example, where in the last period recruiting has increased, the leading comrades report that after the workers fill out their application blanks, they find many of these blanks returned with the note: "unfit for Party". This situation which is also to be found in other districts, shows that we are confronted with the problem of correcting a complete misconception on the part of the lower functionaries of the type of member we shall recruit into the ranks of the Party; it shows that there are in the lower ranks many comrades who do not understand that our task is to recruit into the Party all honest workers who want to join the Party and who want to become Communists through the training which they will receive in the Party.

In the last two or three years, much good material has been issued explaining the reasons for the fluctuation, and popularizing the necessary measures to be taken to cut down the fluctuation. However, in many of the sections, there is still a looseness concerning dues payments, in making the life of the unit interesting and in making the new Party members feel at home in our ranks.

In line with the Eighth Party Convention, every district shall prepare an outline for discussion the units, stressing the importance of recruitment, the utilization of the struggle going on to bring into our ranks the best elements, etc., which will spur the activities of each individual Party member in this direction.

# Party Organizer



"The Communist Party must raise before the toilers in the United States the revolutionary way out of the crisis. All members of the Party must in their day to day work, in the fight for the demands of the workers, point out convincingly and insistently that only the destruction of the capitalist system, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the Soviet power, can free the millions of toilers from the bondage and misery of the capitalist class."

Resolution 8th Convention,  
C. P., U. S. A.

Vol. VII.

JULY, 1934

No. 7

Issued by  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A.

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

Vol. VII.

July, 1934

No. 7

## How Are the Convention Decisions Being Carried Into Life?

By JACK STACHEL

(On the problems of increasing the membership of the Party by 40,000 by January, 1935; to increase the circulation of the Daily Worker to 75,000 by the end of the year; to ENROLL EVERY PARTY MEMBER ELIGIBLE TO JOIN THE TRADE UNIONS.)

**T**HE Eighth Party Convention unanimously and with tremendous enthusiasm decided that the Party pledge itself to increase the good standing membership to 40,000 by the end of the year. It was also decided that during this same period the circulation of the Daily Worker be increased to 75,000. A third important decision of the Convention was that every Party member eligible to join a trade union shall join and that the Central Committee shall make a report on this question three months after the Convention.

It is now two months since the Convention. We can already begin to examine to what extent these decisions are being carried through. Before going into detail, we can state that we have been very slow in beginning the execution of these decisions, and where efforts are being made to carry them through the tempo is entirely too slow to give any guarantee that these decisions will be fulfilled in the time specified.

One thing we must root out of our Party: the tendency to make decisions and forget about them. In this case these decisions were made by the Party Convention which is the highest authority in the Party, next to the Communist International, the World Party of which we are a section. Certainly once the leading forces of the Party delegated by the Party membership to the Convention have made this decision, it is a pledge that we cannot take lightly. There is no more time to lose. These decisions must and can be carried through.

These decisions can be carried through provided the entire Party membership and in the first place, the leading forces of the Party, do not for a moment forget about these decisions,—provided these tasks become inseparable from our daily activities.

Here we will deal mainly with the question of Party membership.

### State of the Party Membership

The dues paying membership of the Party for the first 5 months of the year stands as follows:

|                |                     |
|----------------|---------------------|
| January .....  | 26,727              |
| February ..... | 22,844              |
| March .....    | 24,784              |
| April .....    | 22,115              |
| May .....      | 22,564 (incomplete) |

Thus we see that for the first two months after the Convention there has been no growth of the membership of the Party as registered in the dues payments. If anything, there is a small decline. But this is not all. Let us take these figures together with the recruitment during these same months as recorded by the initiation stamps sold in the Districts. These figures show:

|                |        |
|----------------|--------|
| January .....  | 1958   |
| February ..... | 2337   |
| March .....    | 3153   |
| April .....    | 2153   |
| May .....      | 2306   |
| Total .....    | 11,907 |

This situation is more or less true of every district of the Party. Let us take some examples of districts, including the concentration districts and those where there were important struggles. Here we see the following:

| District | Membership<br>in January | Recruited in<br>Past 5 months | Present<br>Membership |
|----------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 2        | 4774                     | 2800                          | 5274                  |
| 4        | 404                      | 175                           | 449                   |
| 5        | 1087                     | 397                           | 1116                  |
| 6        | 2076                     | 715                           | 1390                  |
| 7        | 1420                     | 276                           | 925                   |
| 8        | 3186                     | 1073                          | 2899 (incomplete)     |
| 9        | 2656                     | 409                           | 1451                  |
| 13       | 2236                     | 1496                          | 2128                  |
| 15       | 404                      | 182                           | 479                   |

A glance at these three columns of figures shows how serious is the situation with regard to fluctuation in each of these districts.

If we had maintained all the new recruits and not lost any of the old members we would now have a Party membership of 35,000. These figures do not take into consideration the fact that in the dues payments of January some of the new recruits for that month are included, and that some of these recruited in May could not yet pay dues, but the indi-

cations for the month of June show that the dues-paying membership remains about the same, and that in reality only two-thirds of the 35,000 are actually in the Party.

On this basis of recruitment and present status of the membership the turnover for the year remains about 100%. This is an alarming situation, about which we have already spoken much, but which we have done little to overcome.

Some comrades will say that the dues payments do not show the actual membership, which is in reality larger. This may be true for a short period. But experience shows that in the main the membership figures, as shown by dues payments over a period of a few months, corresponds to the actual membership. The failure of members to pay dues is their first step outside the Party.

Therefore the major problem in increasing the Party membership is to overcome the fluctuation. Much has already been written and said on how this can be achieved, and it is not necessary to restate the whole problem and the means of solving it. What is necessary is that the Party organizations undertake to solve the problem in a serious and systematic manner.

Some comrades when pressed hard about this situation will state that this is due to the fact that the new recruits were not yet ripe for the Party. Nothing can be farther from the truth than this statement. Granted that in many cases there have been some bad methods of recruiting. Certainly it is correct that our recruiting is weakest in the factories, where our principal recruiting should be done. But this does not explain why so many new and old members leave the Party. The main causes for this are the inefficient functioning of the nuclei and the nuclei bureaus, the failure to assign and help the new comrades to carry through their work, the inadequate educational work and the training of the new members, and above all the fact that the Party organizations do not carry on real Communist mass work by which the workers were in the first place attracted to the Party. The solution of these problems will solve the problems of fluctuation.

In addition to this we must stress the fact that there is no real control of what happens to every member, new and old. There is even a certain lack of comradeship in the organizations,—a too impersonal attitude. The new member who comes into the organization finds himself isolated, with the organizations often speaking a language that he does not even understand. This requires that in the Districts and Sections the leading committees take steps to organize functioning membership committees to deal with this problem.

Every new member must be properly assigned, followed up and helped especially in the early period of their member-

ship. This requires visiting the new members in their homes if for some reason they do not attend the meetings.

In the nuclei where the group system has been established the new members should be assigned to a group where there are more experienced comrades to help them in their work, guide them on what to read, help them interpret the daily events, go with them on their assignments, and demonstrate taught how to carry on work in the factory without victimizing how the work should be carried on. This is particularly important in factory nuclei, where the new member must be aided. The comrades in the shop nuclei should receive constant guidance and support from the members of the District and Section Committees.

Some comrades will draw the conclusion that if the problem of fluctuation is solved, we will not have to worry about recruiting. These two problems cannot be separated. In the first place the quality of our recruitment has an important bearing on the fluctuation. The more we recruit directly from the factories, through strikes, through the trade unions, the greater is the possibility of keeping the new members. This is established through an examination of the relative fluctuation in the shop and street nuclei. It is also true that when many members drop out of the Party, some comrades become discouraged about bringing new members in. Likewise the members who drop out tend to discourage other workers with whom they are in contact from joining. On the other hand if they had been kept for the Party they would have become new means for further recruitment. Certainly to solve the question of fluctuation will greatly aid in the recruitment of new members.

But can we be satisfied with the number of workers we recruit to the Party at the present time? Certainly not. There are at present tremendous strike struggles involving hundreds of thousands of workers. There is a tremendous leftward swing among these workers as well as of the rank and file of the Socialist Party. In the face of this our recruitment of some 2,000 members per month is indeed very small.

Worst of all is the fact that in most of the recent big strikes the Party recruitment was very small. Take for example the Connecticut District, where there have been many strikes. In some of these strikes we did not recruit a single member although we carried on extensive activity. This is also true of the strikes in Minneapolis, the longshore strikes, and many others. Why don't we recruit? In the first place because we often fear to bring forward the Party to the masses. In other cases it is brought forward very abstractly. In other cases because we depend on the masses coming to the Party spontaneously. Our organizations and leading comrades simply forget to ask the workers to join the Party.

There is one case that is very enlightening. There is an independent union of some thousands of members where the union secretary is a Party member. He was unknown to the workers as a Party member. But he was a good secretary of the union and the Party was active in the strike of the workers. Recently the reactionary elements in the union threatened to ask the removal of the secretary because he is a Communist. The Party organization decided that he should come out openly and state that he is a Communist, defend the position of the Party in the strike and attack the reactionary elements. What was the result? The workers greeted with enthusiasm the secretary as a Communist. The reactionaries did not dare to raise the issue, and the membership at that very meeting elected this Communist as their paid organizer. A number of workers who until then did not wish to join the Party, immediately applied for membership. This does not prove that it is not necessary in certain situations not to make public for the moment who are the Communists in the union. But it does show that the masses are not afraid of the Communist Party. The only trouble is that the masses get their opinions of the Party from our enemies who vilify the Party. It is our job to tell the workers the truth about our Party.

Because some of our recruitment drives have not had good results, conclusions are sometimes drawn that membership drives in general are no good. This is not so. It is very useful from time to time in connection with certain general events to have for a certain period of time a well organized and systematic recruiting campaign. But what must be stressed is that the building of the Party must be achieved through constant and daily recruiting in connection with all the struggles of the Party. Of special importance is to carry through organized and concentrated recruiting in certain industries and localities during strikes and also in preparation for a struggle and after the struggle when the workers can draw the lessons of the struggle, its outcome, the role of the various organizations, etc. It is to this type of recruiting that we must at this time give our major attention as we see the growing and sharpening struggles that are taking place and that will take place.

#### Daily Worker

What has been said with regard to recruiting to the Party and the fluctuation in membership is also true of the circulation of the *Daily Worker*. The circulation of the *Daily Worker* has only slightly increased since the convention. The turnover is also very great. New readers, new subscribers are won and lost. A good example of this was the recently conducted drive for monthly subs, only a very small fraction of which we succeeded in renewing.

There is an insufficient effort on the part of the Party organization to bring the *Daily Worker* to the workers in connection with strikes, unemployed and other struggles. The *Daily Worker* is the most important weapon the Party has with which to reach the masses of workers. But it is not being used sufficiently.

The convention decision to increase the circulation of the *Daily Worker* to 75,000 by the end of the year can be realized only if the Party organizations stop looking upon the *Daily Worker* as a side issue and take it up as a basic task. Certainly it is possible to far surpass this number by the end of the year. Wherever a systematic attempt is made the workers are eager to get the *Daily Worker*.

If every Party committee, every nucleus, will work out plans how to bring the *Daily Worker* to the masses in the factories and neighborhoods, into the trade unions and mass organizations, if all organizations will create the machinery and constantly check up on the progress of the drive for the increase of the circulation to 75,000, then there can be no doubt that this number will be reached and surpassed.

We have no guarantee of a change. The comrades must now, in the next month, answer by deeds that such guarantees are being created. The *Daily Worker* management and the Org. Commission have already sent out all the material for the drive. In the next issue we expect to print what the various districts are doing to realize the quotas set for them.

### Trade Unions

Not more than between one-fourth or one-third of the membership eligible is in the trade unions. This is also true of the concentration districts as Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh. This is an especially serious question when we consider that many workers are constantly joining the Party.

The Eighth Party Convention discussed thoroughly the necessity of activizing every Party member who is a member of a trade union and emphasized the necessity for each Party member, who is eligible, to join a trade union. This decision of the Eighth Party Convention is of the utmost importance for the strengthening of the Party position in the revolutionary trade unions, independent unions and the A. F. of L. unions. This problem cannot be solved mechanically. In this regard, we must conduct a real ideological campaign in all units, in the fractions, and among the hundreds of thousands of sympathizers in the mass organizations around the Party. Also, we must have continuous articles that will stimulate not only the discussion on this very important problem, but which will make every Party member conscious of this important task.

We propose that an ideological campaign shall be conducted by calling special meetings of Party members, by industries, and discussing and checking up on the activities of the individual Party members in the trade union fields and in the units.

We have no reports on the carrying through of this task from most districts. We urge all districts to send in these reports, and in the next issue we will deal fully with this question.

## Are the Control Tasks Being Fulfilled?

**T**HE various Districts at their recent conventions adopted control tasks to be fulfilled in the three month period from May to August. How have the Districts fulfilled these tasks? Are they checking up now to see what portion of them have been carried out, so that they may know where their major efforts have to be directed? We are not in a position to speak about all Districts, but the bulletins received in the National Office from District 18 and District 6 indicate that both are making an effort to carry out and to check up on their control tasks. The Party Life Column in the *Daily Worker* has published both the control task and the check up from District 18. We are printing below the check-up of District 6, as taken from the issue of their May Organization Bulletin. It is good example for all Districts.

### "Control Task No. 2

"Control task No. 2, adopted at the District Convention reads: 'To fulfill the Eighth National Convention task, that within three months, every eligible Party member will be in the union of his or her grade, whether T.U.U.L., A. F. of L. or independent, and the Section Committees to exercise a strict control and be responsible for this.'

"Already a month has past since the convention. Two months are left to complete this task. At the next unit meeting this point should be discussed and the following concrete steps taken:

"1. Every member should be asked where he or she works, what trade he is in, and if he is a member of a union. Those who are not members of a union should be given a definite time in which to join.

"2. Where there is some argument as to which union the comrade should join, it should then be referred to the Section Committee for final decision.

"3. The following meeting this procedure should be repeated for those who have been absent and convince them to join the union.

"4. The unit bureau should arrange to meet during the week with groups of comrades who are to join the union and discuss their tasks with them on the basis of the Party resolution.

"5. Every unit meeting is to devote part of its time to checking up this control task.

#### "Control Task No. 9

"Control task No. 9: To recruit at least 75 new members into the existing shop nuclei and issue regularly at least 15 shop papers.

"In the Fisher Body shop unit this point has already been discussed during the strike together with comrades from the District and Section Committees who are working with this unit. No reports have come in from the other concentration shops. Place this task on the order of business at the next shop nucleus meeting. Remember it must be fulfilled by August First.

## The Lessons of the Auto-Parts Strike In Toledo

By JOHN BURNS

THE first strike of the Auto Parts workers started on February 23. This strike resulted in a sell-out by the A. F. of L. leadership, who put the agreement over with voting in the following manner: "All those in favor of the government raise your hands; all those in favor of President Roosevelt raise your hands; all those in favor of the NRA doing good for the workers raise your hands." At the time when the workers had their hands up for the government, etc., the business agent of the Union called for voting for the agreement. The workers, not knowing what the A. F. of L. meant by agreement or which agreement, raised their hands, and the thing went through so smoothly for the A. F. of L. fakery that the result was that the workers did not gain anything.

After this first sell-out, our Party did not make any special effort to come in contact with these workers and build up some sort of an organization. Nor was any effort made to get any of the strikers into the Party.

The workers felt that they were betrayed and the whole plant was seething with anger. On April 13 the strike was called in three shops: the Auto Lite, Bingham Stamping and the Logan Gear.

In the Auto Lite almost the entire plant came out, numbering about 1,800 workers. From the very first day of the strike, the policy of the A. F. of L. was against mass picket-

ing. "violence," and against the participation of "outside" organizations.

Our Party, through the Unemployment Council (because the Unemployment Council was the only organization which was popular in the city) urged mass picketing for the workers and actively participated in the formation of mass picketing.

Ramsey, the business-agent of the Federal Automotive Workers Union (A. F. of L.), pointed out our comrades to the police and many of them were arrested and intimidated. As a result of the consistent policy of the A. F. of L. leadership against mass picketing, the picketing dwindled down to nothing and on some days there was only a sign, nailed on a pole, stating that this shop was on strike. This situation continued till about May 18, with no picketing at all at the three plants.

In the meantime, about 30 workers from Bingham and Auto Lite came to the Party office to ask for help. Our comrades had two meetings with these workers, numbering as high as 60 strikers. Our comrades gave them some idea on how to take the situation into their own hands and the necessity for mass picketing, but did not get the names and addresses of these workers, nor did they issue leaflets appealing to the non-striking workers in the city to help picket the plants. On top of this the Party membership was not mobilized to transform this strike into a militant one, though they had all the opportunities to do so, having as a basis these 60 workers.

#### Situation of Party Prior to Strike

Prior to the developing strike struggle in Toledo, the Section leadership was in lethargy. Pessimism and passivity was prevalent among the majority of the Party membership. The orientation of the Section was away from trade union work, and very little efforts were made to make some beginnings in this work. The functioning of the Party was in a miserable situation. This situation found the Party unprepared to meet the rising mood of the workers for struggle.

When the injunction was issued against the Unemployment Council, Communist Party and Y.C.L., our comrades instead of utilizing it to arouse the mass sentiment of the workers against it, capitulated to the three Musteites in the city and concluded a United Front with them for an open demonstration against the injunction, with only one speaker, speaking for the U.C. and the Musteites taking the upper hand in formulating and drawing up the resolutions, monopolizing the demonstration, etc. This demonstration was attended by about 150.

About May 16, the situation reached its climax. The strike was almost lost. The M.E.S.A. sent its 62 members back to work and signed a yellow dog contract. The Bingham and Logan Gear plants were working. The Auto Lite Co. had a full crew, mostly strikers who went back to work. The remaining 800 strikers from all three plants, became desperate. The Miniger interests, seeing the situation, were determined to put the finishing touches to the strike with the help of the police. On May 17, wholesale arrests took place in front of the Auto Lite of about 100 and next day of another bunch of 75.

The Musteites, seeing the situation, tried to make capital out of it, in order to put themselves on the map and use Toledo as a stamping ground to establish their A.W.P. Their three members in the city participated in the picketing with their signs. The whole leadership, Muste, Bidez, Montrose and Cope came to Toledo for the purpose of stopping the influence of the Party and getting the upper hand.

### Role of Party In Strike

We, on the other hand, sent a special call to the entire membership of the Party to be on the picket line. Monday, May 21, we had about ten signs of the Communist Party and the Unemployment Councils and other slogans. About 25 C.P. members participated in the picketing. Budenz spoke in front of the shop and urged peaceful picketing and co-operation with the A. F. of L. leadership and said that the NRA gives full rights to organize and join any union of the workers' choice. Our comrades also spoke in front of the shop and urged the worker to mass picket, violation of the injunction and a sympathy strike of all workers.

As a result of the publicity, there were about 2,000 around the plant Monday and some arrests took place. Tuesday it was repeated with more militancy and many scabs were beaten up while leaving the plant. Fifteen cars of scabs were smashed. At this time we issued a leaflet in the name of the Party, urging mass picketing, violation of the injunction and for a general strike. On Wednesday, May 23, as a result of the fighting Tuesday, and because of the leaflet of the Party and the Unemployment Council, about 10,000 workers gathered around the plant.

The Mayor, Sheriff Krieger, Brigadier General Conley, the police lieutenants and captains had a conference on Tuesday, May 22, and worked out a plan of attack for Wednesday—first, to arrest the "agitators," C.P. members, and later on break up the picket line. This plan was carried into effect Wednesday and five of our leading comrades were arrested.

Budenz, who had been trying hard to be arrested several times earlier, so that he and his Party could get publicity and raise funds, was also arrested.

The entire picket line was led by Comrade Eggert, Section Organizer of the C.P. and other comrades. The gas attack started and the fighting began, with the entire police force and the County Deputies on one hand, and the workers on the other, who by 5 P. M. numbered about 25,000.

The factory was under siege. The scabs remained in the plant. No window of the Auto Lite was left unbroken. No car of scabs passed through without having bricks and stones hurled on it. The police and Deputy Sheriffs were helpless. The entire neighborhood was seized by the workers. The Communist Party and Y.C.L. members played an active part in organizing squads in different streets around the plant and charged the police and the plant and when necessary retreated in an organized way. Hand to hand fighting with police took place, with the workers getting the upper hand. The economic struggle developed into a political struggle, into class war, workers having the upper hand and swelling its ranks to at least 40,000 by 10 P. M. of that day.

The hatred of the masses developed. We could hear shouts among the workers, "if the newspapers say that this is a Communist fight than we are all Communists." The crowd became uncontrollable. There was no A. F. of L. leadership, nor did we establish a leadership. This was primarily because the Party did not organize squads of Communists for every block around the factory, in order to give guidance and leadership to this fight, but individual Communists gave leadership in an unorganized manner in certain sections of the fighting front. This fighting continued all night long, starting at 2:30 P. M. and ending at 6 A. M. the following morning, Thursday, when the National Guard arrived and released the scabs. The rain that morning helped the National Guard carry through their bloody aims. Thousands of workers left because of the rain and if not for the rain, the National Guards could have been disarmed before they came off the busses.

Thursday, 10 A. M. the fighting began anew. The Party issued a leaflet calling upon the workers to demand the immediate withdrawal of the National Guards, the continuation of mass picketing and for an immediate sympathy strike. The Y.C.L. issued a leaflet, calling upon the Guardsmen not to shoot but fraternize with the workers. The fighting continued until Sunday, when it was brought to a halt as a result of the A. F. of L. leadership's bickering with the Arbitration Boards and the local press coming out with misleading headlines of settlement. The Catholic Bishop also

played an important role in making speeches on Sunday and Monday against the strike and picketing.

### Slogans of Party Adopted By Workers

This situation demanded quick action on the part of the Party. The Party and the Unemployment Councils during this situation carried out excellent agitation and propaganda work. We issued 16 different leaflets amounting to 105,000. The C.P. called three open air demonstrations and three indoor meetings with about 4,000 workers attending. We sold 450 copies of the Daily Worker a day and distributed 2,000 copies free. About seven factory gate and ten open air meetings were held. Our slogan put forward at these meetings and in our literature was, an immediate general strike for:

1. The immediate withdrawal of the National Guards, Deputies and police.
2. For the unconditional release of all arrested workers.
3. For the right to organize and strike.
4. For the support of Auto Parts and other strikers.
5. For the removal of Miniger's man, Sheriff Krieger and his prosecution.
6. For increased wages, for adequate cash relief for all unemployed.
7. For the passage of the Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill (H.R. 7598).
8. Against the murder of workers—compensation to their families.

These slogans were adopted by the workers and became their slogans. The slogan for an immediate general strike was the talk of all the workers. Over 80 locals of the A. F. of L. and the M.E.S.A. voted for a general strike. But the leadership of the A. F. of L. from the very beginning sabotaged and betrayed it through settlement of the Edison workers and through the continuation of arbitration of the Auto Parts workers.

Through the work that the Party carried out, we were successful in blocking the activities of the Musteites. They categorically refused to participate in the United Front movement on the above demands. Instead they tried to take the upper hand in order to create a foothold here in Toledo, but they failed miserably. No matter what steps we took they tried to block us. When we called a mass meeting, they did likewise, but setting their date a day earlier than ours. The same was true of demonstrations, but they had only one demonstration with 150 attending, while our demonstration, which started right after they got off the platform was attended by 800. They held one mass meeting before Browder's

meeting, issued two leaflets and had an attendance of eight. Browder's meeting was attended by 500. This was the activity of the Musteites during the struggle. Nevertheless, Muste is trying to boast of his great deeds and influence, (outside of Toledo).

### Some Outstanding Weaknesses

1. The Party leadership lost its head in this situation. Instead of mobilizing the entire membership politically as well as organizationally and creating committees that could carry out the work, such as defense committees, illegal apparatus, Daily Worker and literature committees, committees for mimeographing and distributing leaflets, committees for recruiting for the Party, etc. they haphazardly mobilized a few members and not only did the leadership have to write leaflets, work out policies, and give leadership to this situation, but they were even forced to run the mimeograph machine day and night. With the arrest of two bureau members and with a warrant for the third bureau member, there was danger of paralysis. In this situation the District reacted very slowly. It is true that one District Rep. was on the spot from the very beginning, nevertheless the situation was so serious that it demanded outside forces in order to cope with the situation. This was corrected later on.
2. We failed to carry out and continue building up of the Unemployment Council and intensify our work for the endorsement of H.R. 7598.
3. Our main concentration was of an agitational and propaganda character. We failed miserably to understand the necessity of organizing those 60 workers who attended our meetings previously. When we made a little effort to get these workers together we were able to get as high as 20 to meetings and achieved more in a week's time than in the whole period of the strike. This small group became a factor in the entire situation. They bitterly fought against the sell-out policies of Ramsey, the business agent, to put through a revised agreement.
4. We failed to understand the necessity of drawing in the women in our opposition group, which played an important role in the settlement.
5. We failed and went about very slowly in the building up of the Party and creating a Communist nucleus that would have carried out our policies.
6. We failed to utilize the situation and immediately get in contact with certain local unions, and influence them through the rank and file, which could have called strikes, that would have been the prelude for a general strike in the

city. Especially is this true of the Edison workers, who were the most important factor in determining a general strike in the city, and we did not make any efforts to get any contacts.

If we had opposition groups in at least ten local unions we could have very easily developed a general strike. This proves once more the underestimation on the part of the Party of the necessity of building up groups in the A. F. of L.

### Achievements

1. During this period we have recruited about 50 members for the Party and about 30 for the Y.C.L. Only five were from the Auto Lite, but these were recruited at demonstrations and meetings and not because of the consistent efforts of a single unit of the Party.

2. We have established a rank and file group in the Federal Automotive Union with a possibility of establishing shop units in Auto Lite and Bingham.

3. We obtained contacts from the Edison with possibilities to get a rank and file group organized.

4. We obtained contact with an Independent Trade Union, which has branches on a national scale, with an immediate organization of a shop unit in the plant of this local.

5. The influence and the prestige of the Party has developed tremendously. This can be seen by: a) capturing of the A. F. of L. demonstration, b) workers openly speaking for the Communist Party, c) Committees of strikers from cloak-makers and butchers coming up to the Party office and asking the help of the Party in their strikes, and at present we have organized Rank and File groups in these unions.

The possibilities at present are such that the Party can be built into a mass Party. Now is the time to build up opposition groups in many locals. Now is the time to develop the mass work of the Party in connection with unemployed work and build up the Auto Workers Union in the city. But in order to carry this out, the Section must create workable committees, establish discipline in the units and carry out a campaign exposing those members who are responsible for keeping the Party from its proper orientation. We must bring healthy militant fighting elements who have shown, during the struggle that they are worthy to be members of the Communist Party, and leaders in developing mass struggles of the workers, into the leadership.

The Party at the same time must sharply expose the role of Musteism and this can be done only through the mass activity of the Party. The Party units in their everyday work, must utilize the Daily Worker in order to build up its circulation. The Party must develop an intensive struggle

against the rising fascist organization in the city, the "Square Deal Association," and around this fight, mobilize trade unions and other organizations to smash the attempts of the bosses to introduce fascism. Side by side with this activity, the election campaign must be linked up and made into a real campaign in which we can get the maximum results.

## The Role of the Party In the Truck Drivers Strike In Minneapolis

THE resolution adopted by the Eighth National Convention of our Party points out that,

"The resistance of the masses of toilers to capitalist attack is growing in volume and intensity," and "Still imbued with considerable illusions as to Roosevelt, which are being dissipated by the course of the struggle, the workers are developing towards conscious fight against the Capitalist way out of the crisis. The magnitude of the struggle shows that the masses are accumulating enormous revolutionary energy and that big class battles are maturing.

The strike of the truck drivers in Minneapolis has proven the correctness of this analysis.

The truck drivers' strike which started with several hundred members of local 574, rapidly embraced over 7,000 drivers, and practically tied up all commercial transportation in the city. In spite of the official policy of the leadership of the strike to hold back the militancy of the workers and prevent mass picketing and action, the strike from the very beginning resulted in clashes with the police and the formation of mass picket lines embracing tens of thousands of workers. The police attack upon the workers aroused the indignation of Minneapolis workers who either joined in sympathy strike, (building trades workers) or massed on the picket lines and in the strike headquarters. The sentiment for a general strike in Minneapolis became so widespread amongst the workers, that the A. F. of L. Central Labor Union was forced to make gestures in this direction. The accumulation of revolutionary energy among the Minneapolis workers was sharply manifested in the workers' struggle against the armed forces of the employers and the city on Tuesday, when the deputized police were beaten and driven out of the market. On this day the militancy of the workers and their victory was so great, that Olson was forced to drop the Farmer-Labor mask (he had previously stated that as long as he is governor, no troops will move against strikers in

Minnesota). Three companies of National Guard moved into Minneapolis, while the entire militia force was mobilized under arms as a reserve.

### Role of C. P. in Developing Militancy of Strike

From the very beginning, the Communist Party succeeded in becoming the organizer and leader of the militancy of the workers on the picket lines:

1. In spite of the planned and organized attempts on the part of the A. F. of L. leaders and the Trotzkyites to keep the Party out of the strike and to slander the Party leadership as disrupters, we succeeded in forcing our way through these misleaders by establishing united action with the strikers from below.

2. Our Party membership and the workers influenced by the Party, the Unemployment Council, Y.C.L., I.L.D were in the front ranks of the picket line leading the workers in the struggle against the police and the deputized thugs.

3. The mass solidarity meeting called by the Party and the mass revolutionary organizations, brought together the strikers and our forces, and the line of the Party was accepted and put into life in the next two days of the strike.

4. Finally, the militant struggles of the unemployed under our leadership especially the CWA fight on "Tear Gas Friday" gave tremendous impetus and enthusiasm to the strikers and set a precedent for the workers defeating the armed forces of the city.

### Mistakes of Party in the Strike

1. The general underestimation of work within the A. F. of L., which resulted in our failure to place our forces in the drivers' local, placed us as an outside force in the strike, this in spite of the fact that the Party was aware of the approaching of the strike and the work of the Trotzkyites in this local union.

2. Our failure to take advantage of our favorable position of leadership on the picket line and our influence over the workers, to become a factor in the leadership of the strike. Our comrades were not bold enough to appear before the workers at the strike headquarters and speak in spite of the decision of the strike leadership against it. In some instances where our comrades did get the floor at strike meetings, they failed to expose the maneuvers of the leadership, call upon the workers to dismiss this leadership and to elect rank-and-file militant workers to the strike committee and strike leadership. The Party correctly advanced the slogan of General Strike, but failed to make it clear to the workers how a general strike could have materialized. The

Party itself was not in a position to bring about a general strike of the Minneapolis workers and should have proposed concretely how to bring together all labor unions and workers organizations, to call the general strike, to call upon all workers to put pressure on their leadership in the locals for such action. Instead the Party leaflet, printed in 15,000 copies, gives the impression that the Party calls the general strike.

3. While the face of the Party was brought forward in the strike, no energetic recruiting took place and only very few strikers were brought into the Party. Our fraction in the local of the drivers is yet very small. This is greatly due to our failure to activate the two new Section Committees and place sharply enough the question of recruiting.

4. We failed to help the Young Communist League and to guide them correctly in their activities in the strike. So that while the Y.C.L. members were active on the picket lines, the face of the Y.C.L. was not shown. Not a single leaflet was issued by the Y.C.L. to the strikers, and no special youth demands were presented, while a great number of strikers were young workers.

### Tasks of the Party

The possibilities of our Party amongst the drivers is great. The dissatisfaction of the truck drivers with the way the strike was ended is growing. There are thousands of blacklisted strikers. The Party must increase its activities amongst these workers and its opposition work in all other A. F. of L. unions. Our fraction in the drivers' local must become the champion of the grievances of the drivers in the local and on the job, and on this basis mobilize hundreds of workers in a conscious opposition to the present leadership, with the aim of developing struggle around the following issues:

1. For a struggle to reinstate all blacklisted workers.
2. To fight for the original demands of \$27.00 minimum for the drivers, unconditional recognition of the union, for a closed shop.
3. For the immediate release of all jailed pickets.
4. To develop the struggle for unemployment insurance, lower dues, trade union democracy, and the other demands we raised in our opposition work within the A. F. of L.

We must steadily expose the role of Olson and the Farmer-Labor Party in the strike, (calling of the National Guard against the strikers) and win the drivers to support the Communist Party election campaign and vote Communist.

We have to carry on a systematic campaign to recruit drivers into the Party, by bringing forward the revolutionary program of our Party.

The District Bureau shall undertake a constant check-up on the detailed plan of work adopted by the fraction in the local and make the work in the drivers local an example in our revolutionary opposition work within the A. F. of L.

## How We Developed Party Activity In an A. F. of L. Local

By GENE GORDON

**T**HE two A. F. of L. locals, No. 402 Cooks, and No. 500 Waiters, had jointly declared a strike at the Brass Rail although the officials did not remove the card and start picketing until after fully seven weeks. Because of this delay, during which the business agents of the locals collaborated with the owners of the restaurant in an effort to settle without a strike, when the strike call went out, the waiters failed to respond; and the cooks found themselves locked out.

It was at this time while the cooks were timidly picketing, that a Party member in the cook's local informed the Section of the situation. We immediately got busy. In the next week we organized a fraction in the cook's local. This fraction succeeded in a fight to bring the question of the policies of the T.U.U.L. on the floor. We forced the question of militant picketing before the "secret" strike committee; and extended the influence of the fraction among a group of rank-and-file members of the local who came into our fraction meetings.

In the meantime, the business agent of the local made a secret settlement with The Brass Rail, although the local met the day before and no indication of a settlement was reported. Nor was the settlement reported to the strike committee the following day. Hearing about the settlement and a special meeting that was called, our fraction met and discussed the matter. We analysed the settlement which did not provide for the return of the cooks. It was decided to issue a rank-and-file bulletin exposing the entire mishandling of the strike. We rushed this bulletin through the mimeograph and distributed it just before the meeting. As we had calculated, an attempt was made to push through the settlement; and our substitute motion, to continue the strike unless the cooks were placed back on the job, lost by only two votes. Our bulletin made a deep impression on the rank and file. We immediately received from the rank-and-file members of the cook's local a \$5 contribution to issue another bulletin. As a result of our exposure and criticism, the president of the federated trades council went before the city council with a request to use placards in picketing.

## Rank-and-File Program Presented

Naturally, the "Red scare" issue was raised by the union officials. Our second issue of the bulletin amplified the material in the first issue explaining the question of Communists in the A. F. of L. Our second issue also published a complete rank-and-file program including the Workers' Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill (H.R. 7598), reduced dues, unemployment exemption stamps, democratic control, etc. As a result of our work, a motion was unanimously passed at the last meeting of the local to declare another strike at The Brass Rail if the place was not 100 percent unionized. The A. F. of L. officials of the two locals, the chairman of the federated trades council, and an International official went into a huddle. But they could find no basis to take action against the rank and file. They had plenty of excuses to explain away the rank-and-file criticism.

The executive committee of the cook's local is now paying a great deal of attention to the rank and file. Our present activity is to extend the rank-and-file control of the local, to push the question of endorsement of H.R. 7598, to broaden out the scope of the bulletins and contact other locals, and to build our fraction by recruiting. Our main weakness has been our failure to recruit since the formation of the fraction.

As a result of these activities, our Party members and the rank-and-file A. F. of L. members in the local, working with the fraction, have developed leadership qualities which will bring good results. We propose to bring the fight against fascism into the A. F. of L. through this local.

## Opportunism in Typographical Union

As a result of this example, one of our comrades in a typographical union who has been a Party member for over two years became active in introducing into his local H.R. 7598. At the same meeting, the Wagner company union bill was introduced for adoption. Our members not being familiar with it, failed to take issue. Later, the Wagner-Lewis bill was endorsed. Now this member is organizing a group on the question of the new scale. "This is going to be an opposition group," he told our Section Bureau, "but they don't know it yet." This kind of opportunism, of sneaking over the Party line in the A. F. of L., explains the reason why our comrade has failed to recruit a single member into the Party from his local in two years. Also, he depends wholly on Party literature to do the recruiting. I asked him if he had ever explained to a single member in his local how the Party worked, fractions etc. and he said no. His A. F. of L. work has not borne fruit because he does not show the Party to

the workers as a living fighting thing. He complains that "besides the wage scale, there are no grievances. They are not proletarians; they have homes, cars, radios."

This mechanical approach to A. F. of L. work stands in contrast to our work among the cooks. Our comrades in the cook's local, who are supposed to be politically weak compared to this comrade (who can quote Marx and Lenin), did much better work because they were not sectarian or opportunistic.

One of our comrades introduced a proposal to join the anti-fascist united front before the federated trades council, but the proposal was voted down by the executive body. Although the A. F. of L. officials speak against fascism, they refused to join the united front "because we do not affiliate with Communistic or outside groups." It is up to us to expose these social-fascists in our future work and win over the A. F. of L. workers.

## A Reminder On the Thaelmann Campaign

By F. BROWN

**T**HE Thaelmann Liberation Campaign is on its way: workers delegations from unions, factories, docks, mutual-aid and cultural organizations are daily on their way to the German Consulate to present the protests of the masses against the mistreatment and mishandling by the fascist jailers of Comrade Thaelmann, of leaders of the German Communist Party, of six million German workers. In the name of increasing thousands, the delegations are asking the release of Comrade Thaelmann and all other political prisoners suffering in the fascist jails and concentration camps. The picket lines are continuously being held in front of the Consulate. The cry of the American workers: **Free Thaelmann! Free the Political Prisoners!** is being raised higher and higher.

The campaign is w . on its way, but we cannot be satisfied. We must raise it to a higher level, drawing in hundreds of thousands—millions. It can be done! It must be done! With little effort we can raise the Thaelmann issue before the American toilers if we understand how to connect this campaign with all the activities of the Party, with the struggles led by the Party. There must not be a mass meeting, a picket line, a strike, a demonstration, where the Communists present shall not raise the question of the liberation of Comrade Thaelmann through speeches, resolutions, electing delegations to the German Consulates. It is the task of

every Party member to bring before his fellow workers in the shops and in the mass organizations, the situation in Germany under the fascist regime, to bring forward the role of the Communist Party of Germany and the figure of Comrade Thaelmann, the old revolutionist who devoted all his life to the cause of the German working class, starting at the age of seventeen to organize his fellow longshoremen in his native city, Hamburg.

## Campaign Must Be Means of Strengthening Party

This campaign, while having as its objective the liberation of Comrade Thaelmann, one of the outstanding leaders of the Communist International, of the world proletariat, must have, at the same time as its objective, the strengthening of our Party, the furthering of all activities of the Communists among the masses. This activity must be carried on especially among the longshoremen, the marine workers, among the employed in the basic industries where we concentrate, mobilizing the masses in the Thaelmann Liberation Campaign and connecting this campaign with the every day struggles of the workers, raising their class-consciousness and drawing the best elements into our ranks.

This campaign, like all our campaign, must have as its main objective, the reaching of new masses and in this way building up the Party, strengthening its position in the factories, in the unions, in the mass organizations and in the neighborhoods.

Many times, while conducting a campaign, we forget that our aim is not only to reach the specific objective of the campaign, but to build the Party and to strengthen its position among the masses. In the Thaelmann campaign as in all campaigns, this is part of our daily activity and is connected with the development of the class struggle, with raising the consciousness of the masses and leading them forward to newer and higher struggles.

Those workers who are actively participating in the Thaelmann campaign, who are fighting for the liberation of one of the best leaders of the world Communist Party, who are fighting against German fascism, who are participating in the struggle against the growing fascistization in the United States, who understand the role that the Communist Party of Germany plays in the struggle against fascism, against capitalism, are elements that must swell our ranks, that will bring into our movement and influence hundreds and hundreds of their fellow workers.

**Build the Party by building the Thaelmann campaign. Connecting it with the daily struggles means developing the**

campaign, reaching new masses, raising higher and higher the protest in the factories, in the mills, on the docks and ships. It means enlarging the struggle for the liberation of Comrade Thaelmann and all the victims of German fascism. It means enlarging and strengthening the struggle against our own bourgeoisie, against the capitalist enemies of the American workers at home, which day by day, in the grip of the crisis, are more and more trying to save their profits, shoving the burdens of the crisis on the shoulders of the working class and increasing reaction at the same time by applying fascist methods of oppression against the working class.

### Task of the Campaign

Fighting for the liberation of Thaelmann, fighting against German fascism means the development of the struggle against fascism at home. Concretely, every member must see to it that the following decisions of the Party shall be carried out.

1. Every organization to form broad committees on the Thaelmann campaign, drawing in new outside forces.
2. Not a local that does not pass Thaelmann resolutions at its meeting.
3. A campaign for signatures with a goal of two million signatures.
4. A collection of funds in connection with the signature campaign.
5. A Thaelmann corner in every office or hall of union or fraternal organizations (having posters, leaflets, petitions for signatures, information, news reports on developments in the Thaelmann case, etc.).
6. Organization of speakers at every meeting of trade unions, mass, fraternal and cultural organizations for ten minute talks, (outline for them to be drafted), to be followed by the immediate elections of delegations to go to the Consulate to protest, the sending of protest telegram to the Embassy, the sending of a protest letters to Chancellor Hitler in Berlin.
7. Special city-wide delegations to Consulates.
8. Permanent picket lines in front of Consulates.
9. Organization of meetings and Thaelmann committees in each city.
10. Publicity committees to be organized to flood newspapers with a constant stream of protest "letters from readers."
11. The issuance of Thaelmann postcards and Thaelmann petitions.

12. Protest cards and letters to be sent to Hitler in Berlin, to the Germany Embassy in Washington.
13. That a telephone blockade of every German Consulate in the Country be established from organizations, from thousands of individual members of all organizations.
14. Chain letter to be started by every member of the Party and the members of all mass organizations we can reach to be sent to Chancellor Hitler, Reichs Kanzlei, Berlin, Germany. At the same time, send requests to five friends to follow suit, and so on.

## August First — International Day of Struggle Against War and Fascism

By G. MAUL

**T**HE struggle against War and Fascism, which the Eighth National Convention of our Party set as the central task of the Party, and which must be an integral part of all of our activities in the shops, the neighborhoods and in the countryside, must receive special emphasis in the preparations for August First, the International Day of Struggle Against War and Fascism, under the leadership of the Communist Party.

The preparations for August First, 1934, should be carried out with the fullest consciousness on the part of every Party member that the international stage is set for a new world war, and that fascism, whose bloody rule is already established in a score of European countries, is already preparing to fasten its ruthless dictatorship upon the American masses.

### Our Task an Urgent One

The united front conference which will be called in every town and city must not be considered as a part of the usual routine of the Party, but must be organized with a sense of urgency. We must root from our own ranks the defeatist conception of the inevitability of fascism and war, at the same time that we emphasize their rapid development. We must convey to the workers and farmers of America the conviction that the threat of war and fascism is a real and immediate one, explaining this to the workers in the simplest terms of their everyday life, and with a consciousness that only a Bolshevik struggle can avert these two dangers which face the toiling masses of America. We must mobilize them for a great united front struggle against these dangers.

In preparation for these united front conferences, the work of the Party in the mass organizations, particularly in the A.

F. of L. unions, and the organizations under the influence of the Socialist Party must be intensified. The ferment within the Socialist Party, the revolutionary desire of a large section of the rank and file membership of the Socialist Party, must be utilized by us at this time to draw them into the struggle against war and fascism, and into the August First demonstrations.

### Bring the August First Campaign Into the Factories

Most important of all, we must at this time, increase and strengthen our work in the factories, particularly in the concentration industries. The struggle against war and fascism must be brought into the factories, connecting it with all the activities and struggles of each specific shop. We should especially concentrate our efforts in the war industries.—in the ammunition factories, and those factories which can be easily converted into war industries. In many of these factories large numbers of women workers are employed. A special appeal must be made to them, showing them how women will be utilized in war, and pointing out to them the necessity of preparing now to struggle against it. The campaign among the women should be linked up with the International Women's Anti-War Congress in Paris, and efforts made to elect delegates from the shops, as well as to raise funds to send these delegates. The entire campaign should be utilized to strengthen all the activities in the shops. Special shop gate meetings should be held, special editions of the shop papers issued, and in the many strike struggles which are being waged, the danger of war, and the threat of fascism should be brought to the forefront, showing the workers how even today their most fundamental rights are being brushed aside, troops used against them, workers shot down, etc., and that only the most determined struggle can avert the establishment of a bloody fascist dictatorship in America. In all our agitation in the factories, we should stress the necessity of building groups of the American League Against War and Fascism among the factory workers.

The struggle against war and fascism should be in the very center of the work among the seamen and longshoremen. In the strikes of the longshoremen, in all our agitation and organizational work, the role of the longshoremen and seamen in war should be made clear. We must make sure that the marine workers are well represented at the August First conferences, paying particular attention to those organized in the reformist unions.

The comrades who work in the agrarian districts should make very clear to the farmers the immediate dangers of war and fascism, showing the effects of war, particularly

upon the poor and middle farmers, and connecting the issue with the struggles for the immediate demands of the farmers. Utilize the experiences of Germany to show the effects of fascism upon the countryside, and side by side with the organization of the farmers for the struggle for relief, for the Farmers Emergency Relief Bill, etc., mobilize them in the struggle against war and fascism.

Special leaflets should be issued by every Party unit and every fraction to the workers around whom their activity centers. Leaflets should be issued in the name of the Party, to the neighborhoods, to the farmers, to the regular army, to the National Guard, the veterans, the intellectuals, doctors, nurses. And above all leaflets must be issued in the shops, mines and factories. The issues of war and fascism must be brought to every worker in America.

The August First campaign should be closely linked with the campaign for the freedom of Thaelmann, making it clear to the masses that the struggle for Thaelmann and the anti-fascist fighters of Germany is a struggle against fascism.

We must point out the increasing danger of attack upon the Soviet Union,—the provocative acts of Japan, the expressed designs of Germany against the territory of the Soviet Union, the desire of the British and American imperialists for a war against the U.S.S.R., and the necessity for the workers of the world to defend their fatherland—the Soviet Union. Closely connected with this is the necessity for the defense of the second Soviet power—Soviet China—which is constantly menaced by the Kuomintang, backed by all the force of American, Japanese and British imperialism.

Above all we have the task of making clear to every worker and farmer that the American ruling class is preparing for war, pointing out the mechanization of the army, the naval race which it is entering with Japan and Great Britain, the mobilization and training of the workers in the CCC camps, the preparations for converting factories into munition plants, and the many other war measures which are being taken. We must make them see that the Roosevelt New Deal is in reality a program of fascism and war, pointing out the increased terror used against the striking workers, the Negro masses and the foreign born, showing them how big business is fastening its control over the political and economic life of the country, with a corresponding political oppression and denial of civil rights. In this connection the Manifesto of the Eighth Convention of the C.P.U.S.A. must be popularized and given the widest possible distribution.

The campaign for August First must be utilized to build the American League Against War and Fascism. Wherever sections of the League do not exist they must be built. Where

they are weak they must be strengthened. In those cities where the American League is calling for a demonstration on August 4, the anniversary of the declaration of war, the Party must mobilize all its forces to participate, in addition to the demonstration under Party leadership on August First.

### The Revolutionary Way Out

In all our agitation we must very clearly bring before the masses the revolutionary war out of the crisis. We must show them that the only guarantee against war and fascism is a Soviet America, bringing before them the living example of the Soviet Union, the only bulwark of peace, and the unswerving policy of peace which it pursues in the interests of all the workers of the entire world, showing them that "only a Bolshevik struggle before the outbreak of war for the triumph of revolution can assure the victory of revolution that breaks out in connection with war."

Make August First a mighty day of struggle against war and fascism. Let the bourgeois world see the strength of the international proletariat on this day. Every Party member, every sympathizer must work to mobilize the masses of workers and farmers to join in great protest demonstrations in every town and city of America against war and fascism.

## Mass Defense Is the Only Answer to Terror

By J. PETERS

**T**HE Thesis of the thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International emphasizes that in the fight against fascism we have to brush aside two tendencies in the Communist Party: (1), the fatalist defeatist line of the inevitability of fascism and imperialist war, and (2), opportunist underestimation of the tempo of fascistization and the threat of imperialist war. These opportunist tendencies result in a failure to fight against fascism and war. These tendencies condemn the Communist Party to passivity.

The bourgeoisie of the United States rapidly prepares its apparatus to be ready for the rapidly approaching war and against the revolutionized toiling masses. They no longer attempt to keep up the mask of sham democracy. The rising masses must be terrorized today, otherwise the hinterland can-

not be relied upon tomorrow, when war breaks out. The most vicious attack in every little economic struggle is launched against the workers in order to create a feeling of helplessness when facing the exploiters.

The bloody terror in Ambridge, in New Mexico, in Greensburg, in the strike waves of last year, and the ruthless, terroristic suppression of the strikes in the South; the utilization of the armed forces of the government, National Guard, and the "democratic" cover of fascist forces by deputized business men and rich farmers in Minneapolis and Toledo; the coming to the forefront of the extra legal fascist forces—Ku Klux Klan, White Legion, Vigilantes—in the mine and steel workers' strike in the South, the agricultural strike, and the longshoremen's strike on the West Coast; the brutal provocation of the police in New York, Chicago, Detroit, etc.; the lynch terror against the Negroes and the bombing of houses by agent provocateurs in the South show very clearly what method the bourgeoisie will use against the rising masses.

It is no accident that the American Federation of Labor furnished the government with a special exposure of the Communist Party and the revolutionary unions. It is no accident that Senator Copeland introduced a bill providing for a federal police department (Scotland Yard). It is no accident that Congress appropriated money for the Department of Justice for strengthening the forces of the federal police under the pretext of fighting kidnapers. Nobody will be fooled with believing that armored cars will be used against Dillinger—these are ready for the suppression of the struggles of the fighting masses. It is no accident that 75,000 rifles were given to patriotic organizations for "target practice." The Government very openly arms the fascist organizations against the toiling masses. It is no accident that the Dickstein Committee, which originally was established to investigate Nazi activities, spends most of the appropriated money to gather material on the activities of the Communist Party. It is no accident that Moley, former head of the "brain trust," started a campaign against our Party, calling the Communists gangsters.

Fascist organizations are springing up all over the country. The Nazis in New York already have 14,000 readers of their papers. The Storm Troopers brazenly parade in Yorkville, terrorizing the population. The American fascist organizations are gaining a foothold, especially in the West (Silver Shirts), and growing rapidly in many other states, as in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, etc. There is a special organization of the officers of the army launched on the basis of the Hitler program.

### Build Workers' Self-Defense Groups

The fight against terror in the present situation is one of the most important and burning problems facing the Communist Party. It is necessary to develop the broadest possible mass agitation against fascism and to popularize our stand in this respect. But at the same time it is of vital necessity to start energetically building self-defense organizations in all workers' organizations, in the factories, and around the Communist Party. The emphasis on building the defense organizations must be laid on their mass character, on the united front of all workers in the shops or unions or other mass organizations. We have to guard against the tendency of building some secret defense organizations which are nothing but hot-beds of provocation. The experiences in the Red Front, Red Shirt, etc., were a lesson in this respect. The self-defense organizations must be the united front of the workers in the respective shop, organization or territory, openly propagating the necessity of organized resistance of the masses against the terror of the bourgeoisie.

The A. F. of L. bureaucrats and racketeers have no scruples in hiring gangsters to attack the militant rank-and-file members of the locals. Three or four gunmen, as our experience shows, can terrorize a local of three to four hundred and beat up the leaders of the rank and file without any organizational resistance by the members in the local, in spite of the fact that these members are against the bureaucracy, against the racketeers. What splendid opportunity exists in the locals of the A. F. of L. to organize defense groups, agitating among the masses to come to every meeting of the organization ready to defend themselves. The Minneapolis and Toledo workers succeeded in fighting back against forces of the bourgeoisie. What could organized mass defense groups do in a local with these gangsters, if they were prepared to receive them?

### Build United Front of Workers For Self Defense

In fighting against the lynch terror, we have to organize a broad united front of Negro and white workers for self defense.

The fight against terror is not an abstract slogan. When we fight for free speech, for free assembly, for the right to organize, for the right to strike, we face in every move the terror of the bourgeoisie. In fighting the terror we can build up a mighty united front of the workers who are involved in these struggles. The heroic struggles of the workers in Minneapolis and Toledo prove that this united front can be established without any difficulties. On the picket lines of Minneapolis and Toledo the striking workers wel-

comed the fighting members of the Unemployment Councils and the Communist Party. The united front was built and steered in the fight against terror without any special conference. The general strike sentiment in Minneapolis and Toledo was a result of the mass reaction of the workers against terror. The vote for solidarity strikes was a highly political act of the workers in this situation. The Toledo experience proves that even when the Communist Party, because of the weaknesses of its work in the A. F. of L., was not entrenched in the locals, the Party can influence and give leadership to the workers with mass agitation and propaganda from outside. The slogan of the general strike in Toledo, for example, was issued by the Communist Party and picked up by the rank and file of the locals with a very large majority of these locals voting for it. Only with painful maneuvers did the A. F. of L. bureaucrats and the bourgeoisie succeed in keeping the workers from striking.

### Mobilization of Masses Will Defeat Terror

It is possible to break through the terror of the bourgeoisie with the correct policy and proper mobilization of the masses. The Dearborn experience shows that it is possible. Dearborn, the Ford town where we could not open our mouths, where we could not distribute the Daily Worker or a leaflet, where if three workers were talking together on the sidewalks the police dispersed them, the Party through proper activity, building the united front of the workers, succeeded in breaking through the terror and today the Party is a legal organization there.

In New Mexico we have the same situation. Here the Communist Party was absolutely illegal. In the mining town of Gallup we did not have one Communist Party member before the strike. Our organizers sent down to this town had to work absolutely illegally. We started to prepare the struggles. With proper work we succeeded in mobilizing the workers to such an extent that with the exception of the Chamber of Commerce, the whole town was behind the union and the Communist Party when the strike broke out. The troops of the National Guard could not terrorize the workers. The fifteen hundred miners in this town stood up like one behind their leaders, behind the union and the Communist Party.

There was a situation in Gallup when all the leaders who were developed through the struggle were jailed. But the strike continued with new leaders. The same day that 26 leaders were arrested, a Y.C.L. member took over the leadership. A 13-year old girl, a Pioneer, got the address of the Central Committee from the Daily Worker and sent us a

wire reporting the situation and the arrests. The Pioneers on their own initiative organized a school strike for the support of their parents, to demand the release of the jailed leaders.

Here the bourgeoisie did not succeed in scaring the workers with the bogey of the Reds because the Communist Party was brought forward from the first moment and the workers saw how Communists really fight with them for their interests. The workers saw the Communists in action—saw that they were of their own flesh and blood. The strike was settled only after the demand for the release of all the arrested leaders was granted and the leaders were set free. As a result of this splendid work of the Communist Party more than one hundred miners joined the Party in the small town of five thousand population.

In this period, the political firmness of the Party, the proper application of Bolshevik tactics, the quick utilization of the contradictions in the camp of the bourgeoisie are essential conditions for the effective mobilization of the masses. The bourgeoisie strives to liquidate the influence of our Party among the masses by raising the "Red scare" in all the militant struggles of the toiling masses. The present wave of terror is only a beginning of bloody suppression against the struggles of the workers. This terror and provocation will be increased day by day as the conditions of the workers grow worse, as we come nearer to the imperialist war. The police commissioner of New York issued a statement warning all policemen that they will be brought up on charges if they do not attack mercilessly every demonstration of the unemployed or strikes of the proletariat.

### Communist Party Must Take Lead

The Communist Party must be in the forefront in mobilizing the masses against terror. The District and Section Committees, as well as the Party fractions in the various mass organizations, must realize that only with mass agitation and organized self-defense groups can we fight back the attacks of the armed forces of the bourgeoisie, whether they are legal or extra-legal. In the control tasks of the Party organizations and fractions, the building of the self-defense groups must be one of the most important points. Reliable, responsible comrades should be assigned in each fraction and Party organization to start to build this organization.

We repeat again, the self-defense organizations must have a mass character. They cannot be illegal, secret, narrow organizations. They must be a united front of all workers irrespective of their political or union affiliation. The issue is, shall we wait with folded arms until the bosses kill us

or shall we be prepared to defend our lives and the lives of our wives and children?

The work in the National Guard must be intensified to the greatest extent. The opportunistic, subjectively social-democratic conception regarding work in the armed forces must be rooted out from our ranks. The role that the National Guard played in Toledo and in almost every strike struggle of the workers in the past period must make every Party member conscious of the necessity of working in the National Guard. These young workers and farmers in uniform cannot be put in the same category as the policemen. They are workers—they come from the factory—workers who are working day time in the factory or on the farm and during the evenings drill for the purpose of killing their brothers and fathers, who fight for a bigger piece of bread, for better conditions. Thousands of young Party members and Y.C.L.-ers should join the National Guard, work among them, explain to them what roles the bourgeoisie makes them play in the class struggle. Continuous mass agitation, leaflets, copies of the *Daily Worker*, special papers in the armories must come into the hands of the National Guardsmen. We know very well that these young people are ready to receive us. Let us go to them. Work among them and win them over to our side.

The growing activity of the Communist Party in the factories, in the unions, and among the unemployed, increases the possibilities that the bourgeoisie will launch a final attack against the Party in order to cut us off from the masses. The readjustment of our work, taking all necessary measures in the preparation for the time of illegality, coupled with the most energetic fight against the threatening declaration of illegality against us, as well as intensified activity of the Party in the mobilization of the masses, will help us to destroy the plans of the bourgeoisie, to preserve our fighting policy, and to maintain contact with the masses in the transition time and even during the most vicious terror of illegality. The more forceful and intensified is the fight against the terror, against illegality, the more successful will be our fight during the illegal period.

## The Meaning of Independence Day and the Task of the Party

**T**HE necessary first step for the establishment of Socialism is the setting up of a revolutionary workers' government. "The capitalists and their agents shriek out that this revolutionary program is un-American. But this expresses not the

truth, but only their own greedy interests. Today, the only party that carries forward the revolutionary traditions of 1776 and 1861, under the present day conditions and relationship of classes, is the Communist Party. Today, only the Communist Party finds it politically expedient and necessary to remind the American working masses of how, in a previous crisis, the way out was found by the path of revolution. Today, only the Communist Party brings sharply forward and applies to the problems of today that old basic document of "Americanism," the Declaration of Independence.

"Applying the Declaration of Independence to present day conditions, the Communist Party points out that never was there such a mass of people so completely deprived of all semblance of "the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness." Never were there such "destructive" effects upon these rights by "any form of government," as those exerted today by the existing form of government in the United States. Never have the exploited masses suffered such a "long train of abuses" or been so "reduced under absolute despotism" as today under capitalist rule. The "principle" which must provide the foundation of the "new government" mentioned in the Declaration of Independence is, in 1934, the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the new form is the form of the workers' and farmers' councils—the Soviet Power. The "new guards for their future security," which the workers must establish, are the installing of the working class in every position of power, and the dissolution of every institution of capitalist class rule."

#### From the Manifesto of the Eighth Convention of the C.P.U.S.A.

It is in this spirit that we must take fullest advantage of July Fourth to popularize the slogans for Soviet Power and the revolutionary way out of the capitalist crisis. Every section must take steps to organize meetings in the name of the Communist Party, and must bring forward sharply the solution of the crisis by Proletarian Revolution. We must use these meetings to expose the Socialist Party hypocrisy with regard to the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system brought forward at its recent Detroit Convention.

In addition to open air meeting at central points, special leaflets should be issued in the shops, using concrete issues and the material appearing in the local press as a basis for the exposure of the bourgeois July Fourth propaganda and bringing forward the necessity of Soviet Power. Every effort should be made to hold shop gate meetings on July 3, using these as a mobilization for our July Fourth meeting which will have as their central slogans the struggle for Soviet Power.

# Party Organizer

Wagoner Collection

"The mobilization of the Party for the work in the factories and trade unions cannot be carried through on the basis of an abstract campaign. It can only be successful as part of the preparation of the Party to at once take up the fight in each factory, in each industry in the struggle, in the defense of the interests of the workers, to give leadership to developing strike struggles . . . This . . . requires that we prepare ourselves organizationally to lead these struggles; . . . to raise the confidence and fighting spirit of the workers; to develop their capacity to struggle by extending in the factories the Party and trade union organizations; to develop the united front of all workers; to build strong fighting oppositions in the A. F. of L. unions."—Lessons of Economic Struggles, Tasks of the Communists in the Trade Unions, Resolution of 8th Convention, C. P. U. S. A.

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

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## Two Lessons from the San Francisco General Strike

**T**HERE are many important lessons to be learned by our Party from the San Francisco General Strike, and from the West Coast marine strike which preceded it. Many of these can be drawn only after all of the events have been carefully studied. However, even today, we can point out two significant things.

First, why was it, that in spite of the fact that strikes developed in Toledo, Milwaukee and Minneapolis—militant strikes which carried with them the threat of General Strike, strikes in which we participated—these strikes were quickly broken by the combined forces of the government and the labor bureaucrats, and although the masses of workers were ready for General Strike, the bosses and the bureaucrats were able to prevent it? In contrast to these strikes, we find the longshoremen on the Pacific Coast holding out against all the attacks of the bosses, the labor bureaucracy, and the government, for a period of three months, winning the support of the other trade unions, and finally developing a General Strike to force their demands.

The answer to this question is clear. The longshoremen took the control of their strike from the hands of the labor bureaucracy and placed it in the hands of a rank-and-file leadership, which firmly resisted all of the efforts of the fakers and the government to betray it. The masses in Toledo and Milwaukee and Minneapolis were in motion, the Party played a role in all of these strikes, the workers adopted our slogans and attempted to carry them out, but were defeated by the strategy and tactics of the bosses and the bureaucrats. Why could this occur? Was it because the workers in Toledo and Milwaukee and Minneapolis were less militant, or less determined, than the longshoremen in San Francisco? No, the answer lies in the fact that in these places the Party was working from without. We did not have a firm base among the workers. But in San Francisco the Party had carried out a policy of concentration among the longshoremen, who are a decisive section of the working class, and had built a strong opposition movement within the reformist union. Consequently when the labor leaders appeared before the workers with their betrayal policy, there was a strong or-

ganized group within the union, which was able to expose their maneuvers and defeat them.

This emphasizes with new meaning the tasks set before us by the Open Letter. The Party has been slow in carrying out these tasks. We must set to work with fresh determination and energy to: "establish a firm base for our Party and for the revolutionary trade union movement among the decisive strata of the American workers in the most important industrial centers," and to carry on "systematic work in the reformist trade unions, with a view to organizing a broad revolutionary trade union opposition," bearing in mind the words of the Open Letter:

"Every Party member must now understand that it depends on correct policy, and above all, the execution of the correct policy whether we will be able to mobilize the masses of workers for struggle and whether our Party, in this historically favorable situation, will become the decisive mass Party of the American proletariat, or whether the bourgeoisie with the help of its social-fascist and fascist agents will succeed in disorganizing the mass movement and keeping it down."

The second lesson grows out of the first. That is the question of terror and the attack upon the Party and the revolutionary trade unions. In San Francisco we have seen a wave of fascist violence directed against the working class in general, and particularly against the Communists and the revolutionary trade unions, unequalled outside of fascist Germany. The whole force of the press, the courts, the State, and of all of the agents of the ruling class has been directed in the most savage onslaught against the Communist Party. With the cry of "Reds" and "outside, alien influence," they have hoped to isolate the vanguard of the working class from the masses, in order to betray the workers and drive them into worse conditions of slavery. With a Communist Party firmly rooted in the masses, in the reformist trade unions, such an attack cannot succeed. The masses will come to the defense of the Communist Party, which they will recognize as the Party which fights for their interests.

We must come boldly before the working masses to answer this cry of "Reds" and of "subversive influence." The workers are looking to us for an answer and we must not fail them. Every Party member should read the editorial which appeared in the *Daily Worker* on July 19th, "What is the Role of the Communist Party in the Frisco General Strike," and use this in answering the attacks of our enemies, stating clearly to the workers the aims of the Communist

Party and the day-to-day struggles, as well as our ultimate goal. Our experience in numerous cases where the "Red scare" has been fearlessly and frankly met, is that we need have no fear of the "Red scare" when we explain our position to the workers.

Finally, the experiences of San Francisco bring home to us, in its sharpest form, the necessity of safeguarding our Party against attacks, of building defense corps and of taking the necessary measures to make certain that in spite of fascist attacks the Party will not lose its contact with the masses.

## The Thaelmann Campaign

By ROBERT HAMILTON

THE events in Germany since June 30th indicate strikingly that a new phase in the development of the struggle against Hitler fascism has commenced. The success of the German workers' efforts, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany, to undermine the support Hitler has received up to now from the rank and file of the Storm Troops, is evidenced in the complete disintegration of that body of over 2,500,000 armed men as a political factor in support of the Nazi regime.

In addition, the increasingly severe economic crisis in Germany which the Nazi regime has been totally unable to lessen, much less solve, has brought about aggravation of the antagonisms within the German bourgeoisie itself.

Thus today, the Communist Party of Germany faces a situation in which it can outline a perspective of preparation for an armed uprising to seize power and establish a Soviet Germany within the not too distant future.

The Reichstag fire trial, when mass pressure both within Germany and from millions of workers and intellectuals in foreign countries forced the Nazis to acquit Dimitroff, Torgler, Taneff and Popoff, was the first major political defeat that the Nazis suffered at the hands of the world proletariat.

Hitler's second major defeat—this time at the hands of the German working class—was the two-thirds majority against his candidates in the recent shop council elections in the factories of Germany.

The third major defeat for the Hitler regime was exemplified in the murderous events of June 30th, when one faction within the Nazi party, at the orders of German big business, slaughtered another faction of the Nazi leaders.

Under these circumstances the fight for the freeing of Ernst Thaelmann involves much more than saving the life

of a heroic working class leader. If the workers of the world can get Thaelmann out of the Nazis' clutches, we will have struck a decisive blow for the final overthrow of the Nazi regime. For let us not forget that even for the Nazis themselves Thaelmann personifies the German Communist Party, which is why such desperate efforts are being made to behead him. Today, therefore, the workers of the United States must be made to realize that the fight to save Ernst Thaelmann summarizes our entire battle to overthrow the Hitlerite regime at the present time.

Around the fight for the freedom of Thaelmann we can get hundreds of thousands of workers, who are otherwise difficult to approach, into a very extensive united front lined up against German fascism. There is today, in the United States, almost unanimous hatred of everything that Hitler stands for among the working class, as well as the farmers, the intellectuals and most of the middle class. We can, therefore, if we utilize this campaign intelligently and energetically, use the campaign to free Ernst Thaelmann as the entering wedge for the establishment of the united front with sections of the population whom we cannot otherwise reach.

Up to the present time, the campaign for Thaelmann has been a Party matter to an extent which cannot be tolerated. Practically no efforts of any appreciable magnitude have been made to involve the workers organized in A. F. of L. unions in this campaign. Nor have we, in any District, made serious efforts to approach Socialist Party locals to get their support for the Free Thaelmann campaign. Up to now, all that we have done is to mobilize our own Party members, and those in mass organizations affiliated with the Party, and even that has been done to an inadequate extent.

Our campaign up to the present has consisted largely of the following methods of agitation:

1. Picketing in front of German Consulates.
2. Protest delegations to German Consuls.
3. Sending some 200,000 protest postcards to Germany.
4. Mass meetings, parades and demonstrations.
5. Special dramatic actions, such as bicycle parades, street runs, propaganda trucks through the streets, raising Thaelmann flags, and the like.
6. Protest telephone calls to the German Consulates on a mass scale.

But all this has been done largely by our Party organizations. We have made little effort and we have had even less success in spreading the Thaelmann campaign among those circles of the working class who are under A. F. of L. or Socialist Party ideological domination. And unless we succeed in doing that, we shall have failed in two important

tasks: 1. Widening the Thaelmann campaign to embrace a very large proportion of the American working class and, 2. Making use of the issues involved in this campaign to penetrate these masses with the slogan of the united front.

But that does not mean that the methods of agitation and mobilization used up to now—and listed above—should be abandoned. On the contrary, we must see to it that these methods are employed on an even wider scale from now on since the present murderous unsettled conditions in Germany offer Hitler the opportunity of murdering Thaelmann alongside the hundreds of other murders committed by his forces during the past three weeks.

Another important side of the campaign, which although launched has made but little headway up to now, is the campaign for the collection of "one million signatures and one million pennies" for the release of Ernst Thaelmann. This campaign, if properly pushed by every functionary of the Party, will involve hundreds of thousands of additional workers in our fight and in addition provide the financial resources for sending lawyers to Germany to defend Thaelmann before the "People's Courts."

We must make the American workers fully acquainted with the entire implication of these Courts as well as pointing out to them much more urgently than we have succeeded in doing up to now the imminent danger of death at a murderer's hands to which Thaelmann is exposed every single day.

Our Party owes a debt of proletarian honor to the heroic German revolutionary workers. This obligation of proletarian solidarity can be fulfilled only if we do our share as part of the world-wide campaign to effect the release of Ernst Thaelmann. Our German brother Party expects that we aid it in its determined battle to overthrow the Hitler regime. The fight for the freedom of Ernst Thaelmann is today the keystone of our entire struggle against fascism in Germany.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that we cannot fight fascism in one country alone. The fight against German fascism will remain nothing but words unless it is made an integral part of our fight against fascist tendencies in the United States. It is wholly false to separate the fight for the freedom of the Scottsboro Boys and of Angelo Herndon from the fight for the freedom of Ernst Thaelmann and similarly, we cannot fight effectively for the freedom of Ernst Thaelmann unless we make this fight part of our arsenal for the struggle against fascism in this country.

## The United Front

By G. MAUL

**T**HE Communist Party has addressed two Open Letters to the Socialist Party inviting them to a united struggle for the most immediate and pressing needs of the workers and toiling masses, against developing fascism and imperialist war.

No answer has been received to these letters.

In the meantime the fascist terror of the Roosevelt Government is increasing. Workers demonstrating for relief in Cleveland are shot down in cold blood. Striking longshoremen, fighting for their most elementary rights and needs, are killed by the San Francisco police. And to drown in blood the general strike of San Francisco, the whole power of the State—police, deputies, national guard—has been mobilized, with the federal troops held in readiness for action. Never was the need for united action of all workers so great. Still the Socialist Party is silent.

The Communist Party believes that the rank and file of the Socialist Party honestly desires to enter into united front struggle with the Communist Party. The rank and file have been confused by the militant phrases of the Revolutionary Policy Committee and the so-called "militants," led by Thomas and Co., who were forced by the pressure of the Socialist workers to take a "Left" position. The Communist Party will fail in its revolutionary duty if it neglects to do everything within its power to weld the unity of the working class in the face of the threat of fascism and war at home and abroad, and in defense of the immediate interests of the workers. It is therefore necessary to convince the rank and file of the Socialist Party of our sincerity in making these united front proposals in order to increase the pressure upon the Socialist Party leadership to establish the united front.

In every District, in every city and locality where the Socialist Party has organizations, delegations should approach the Socialist Party with concrete proposals for united action on specific issues, for example, a united front demonstration in support of the San Francisco General Strike, for a united struggle against terror—New Jersey, Cleveland, Milwaukee, California, New York—for a united front struggle against fascism and war, for the freedom of Ernst Thaelmann, etc. These proposals should not be general, but be presented very concretely, and should be widely popularized by means of leaflets to the rank and file of the Socialist Party. Where burning local issues exist that are agitating the masses, e. g.,

a cut in relief, mass lay-offs of relief workers, etc., these issues should be included in the united front proposals.

The units and sections should not wait for specific instructions from the Districts, but should use their initiative to make these proposals to the Socialist Party branches on the major issues of war and fascism, support of the strikes and against the terror, including the local issues with which the workers are immediately concerned.

The results of these proposals, and the answer of the Socialist Party leadership should be widely popularized, by sending the news of the proposals and their acceptance or rejection to the *Daily Worker*, and also by means of leaflets issued in the localities.

We must bring to the Socialist workers the example of the successful united front which has been established in France in the struggle against war and fascism, urging them to bring pressure upon their leadership to establish the united front.

The immediate, practical unity of the working class against the attacks of the police, for the right to organize and assemble, for higher wages, for unemployment insurance, against fascism and war, is an urgent necessity. Let us show to the Socialist workers that the Communist Party is ready and eager to find the way to this unity.

## Build Revolutionary Opposition In the Reformist Unions!

By L. TOTH

**T**HE general resolution as well as the special Trade Union resolution of the Eighth Convention of our Party emphasized the importance of building the revolutionary opposition in the reformist unions.

The recent developments in the A. F. of L. make it imperative that our Party should pay very much attention to working inside it. If we take the strike struggles from the middle of May until July 1st, we will find that 90 per cent of the great struggles conducted by the American workers for increase in wages, for shorter hours, for union recognition were conducted by workers in the A. F. of L. Not in all of these strikes did our Party play a big role. We can divide the role of the Party into three categories:

First, strikes initiated by the rank and file, led by the Communist Party fraction, or rank and file opposition group under the leadership of the Party.

Second, strikes initiated by the workers where the Party stepped in during the strike and helped to crystallize the struggle and give it leadership.

Third, strike struggles where the Party was not influential in originating it, neither did the Party step in while the struggle was going on. As a matter of fact, our Party played no role whatsoever.

To overcome these weaknesses and shortcomings, we have to go further than to write beautiful resolutions or declarations on the importance of working in these unions. We have to start systematically building the revolutionary opposition groups in every local and in every shop controlled by the A. F. of L.

To build such opposition groups, our Party Districts, sections and units must have a definite plan of where and how these revolutionary oppositions should be organized. For example, each District and section should survey its territory and examine every A. F. of L. organization and the possibilities of building such opposition groups. Suppose in a certain city there are 60 local unions, the majority of them affiliated with a central labor body. We should select 10 locals and through our contacts in these local unions organize groups based on a definite program. A close check up must be made of the members in the mass organizations, many of whom, while members of revolutionary mass organizations, are also members of trade unions. Some of these members do not realize that they have certain tasks to fulfill in their respective trade union organizations. Some of them never attend meetings except when they have to pay dues, but, in many cases, they are very active members in the trade union locals and some of them are staunch supporters of the reactionary machine of their respective local unions.

Party members in the A. F. of L. unions must be the most active in the organization and must serve as an example to their fellow members. They have to participate in all phases of work. They have to bring the most constructive program before the local unions, they have to be in the forefront in the strike struggles as well as in the building of the organization.

Communists will gain the confidence of the rank-and-file members only if they will prove to them that they are the fearless and the tireless champions of the rights of the rank-and-file members.

#### "Red Scare"

With correct and systematic work, the corrupt officials are forced into defense. To divert the attention of the rank-and-file members from the real issues, these exposed corrupt

officials raise the "Red scare". The Communists are accused of being disrupters in unions, agents of Moscow, etc. But in a very short time the rank-and-file members supporting the Communists in their fight against the machine discover that every one who dares to criticize, who speaks up for the rights of the membership, who is opposed to gangster methods, is called by these misleaders a Communist and a Moscow agent. The Communists should not hide the face of the Party by denying that they are Communists, but, on the contrary, they should prove to the workers first, that the Communists are the ones who fearlessly expose these misleaders, and second that everyone is considered a Communist if he does likewise.

#### Recruiting Members To the Party

In the strike struggles as well as the everyday struggles in the local unions or the shops, the Communists gain prestige and recognition. This must be utilized by members of the Communist Party to recruit these workers into the Party. Many times this important task is overlooked by our comrades.

## Organization of Fraction Work In a New York Section

**W**HILE we realize that our main concentration points must be the factory and shop, we should not overlook the fact that the members of our mass organizations are workers from the shops and factories and that they have contact with the workers of very important industries. To cite an example—in our section there is a unit concentrating on the B.M.T. Because of the terror and spy system in the B.M.T., it is very difficult to make a contact and it takes systematic concentration before a contact is made. Yet we found out later on that one of the B.M.T. workers is a member of an I.W.O. Branch in our territory.

The same applies to all our tasks. They could be carried out much more successfully, if the Party fractions would be established and all this work discussed and put before the mass organizations in the proper manner.

#### Fractions Can Be Organized

It is time that we not only speak about the importance of organizing fractions in the mass organizations, but that we give the comrades leadership and concrete examples on how to go about the work.

In our section territory, we have 80 mass organizations (including three union locals) with a membership of over 5,000 English, Jewish, Finnish and Italian speaking workers. Our Section Committee elected a comrade as fraction secretary who accepted on condition that he be permitted to build a fraction department around him which consists of the following:

Nine members, each one of whom is assigned to head all fractions and branches of a specific organization in the section, e. g., all fractions of the I.W.O. branches scattered throughout the section are responsible to one of the members of the Fraction Department.

This removes a tremendous burden from the Section executive who previously had to assist the lone Section Fraction Secretary with the numerous problems that arise within mass organizations, etc.

The Department functions as follows:

1. Each member of the Fraction Department meets with the fraction of an organization to guide, clarify issues that need attention, and improve the relation of the fraction to the organization. These can be either on a branch or Section scale.
2. Open fraction meetings are held in each organization where there is a functioning fraction. This tends to straighten out any antagonisms between the Party members and the non-Party members, by bringing in the role of the Party in relation to the organizations and abolishing the conception that the Party uses the organizations as collection agencies. Such discussion and clarification have been a source for recruiting members to the Party from these open fraction meetings.
3. Where serious problems crop up, they are immediately taken up at a special meeting together with the head of the fraction department (the Section Fraction Secretary) for proper direction.
4. When necessary, the Sub-Secretary meets with the unit in the territory of the organization involved, for co-operation between the unit and the fraction.
5. The Fraction Department meets about every six weeks to take up the immediate campaign and local struggles, discuss past activity and how to carry on the work more efficiently. Every Sub-Secretary makes a report which is discussed by the other secretaries. This enables each member of the Section Fraction Department to be familiar with the work and methods of the other.
6. In between the meetings of the Fraction Department, the Fraction Department Bureau (composed of three members) meets weekly and is always available to any Party member on Monday evenings at the Section headquarters for problems

that need immediate attention. The need for this is proven by the fact that the bureau is busy all evening settling problems brought in by leading fractions, etc. Before this was established, these comrades probably would not have known where to go and would most likely have approached the Section Organizer, who usually has his hands full on Monday nights and therefore could give them very little of his attention.

7. Each member of the Fraction Dept. reports on his or her work so that the Section Fraction Secretary can always check up and further direct their work, without having to wait until the department meets.

We have also issued an outline explaining how to do Party work in a mass organization, the role of a Party member in a mass organization, the functions of the Party fraction, fraction discipline, etc. Most of the units held discussions on fraction work, using this outline. Each Fraction Secretary and every Unit Bureau was supplied with a copy of this outline for discussion.

Every two months, we issue a bulletin on how to politicize our work. We send this together with a list of names of those assigned to do major work in mass organizations, to the members of Fraction Dept., Fraction Secretaries and Unit Bureaus, to make sure that we reach those comrades who are not politically developed and do not know how to link up unit work with the work in the mass organizations.

A questionnaire was distributed to all Fraction Secretaries which supplies us with all the necessary information regarding their organizations as well as all information regarding any opponent organizations in their territory. This is an excellent means of keeping posted on what the possibilities are for extending the struggles of the workers.

When we issue a call for a conference requesting delegates from mass organizations, etc. for the purpose of organizing a branch of the League Against War and Fascism, or the Provisional Committee Against the High Cost of Living, etc., a copy of this call is given to the members of the Fraction Department who in turn take this up with the fractions so that when it is taken up in the organization, each Party member is prepared to help to have it favorably received by the organization as a whole.

In addition, we have compiled a file system that is in the hands of the Section Fraction Secretary, with all information of all fractions which enables us on short notice, to mobilize all Fraction Secretaries efficiently because we know in advance when they meet, where, etc., and therefore when available.

As a result of this work for the past six months, we now have stable fractions functioning in 45 out of the 80 mass organizations in our section, and we are making every effort to organize fractions in the remaining organizations just as quickly as possible.

We have also been able to organize new organizations such as an Italian Workers' Club, an F.S.U. Branch, etc.

In the District office of the F.S.U., it was admitted that for the first time, some one representing a Section had come to see them about the branches in its territory, and the possibilities of building new ones, the way Party members function within them, and about building fractions where there were none. If every Section organized a fraction department, they too could follow this step and so strengthen the F.S.U. in the entire District. Multiply such results by the number of organizations to which this can be applied and you have more than enough to warrant every Section having a fraction department. What better methods of contact will we have when the Party is driven underground than that of our fractions? So much more so if these fractions are well woven into a network of direct contact from the highest body down to the smallest.

## Role of Section Leadership In Strike Struggles

**T**HE resolution adopted at the Chicago, District 8, Convention has the following paragraph:

"The task of the T.U.U.L. fractions and Party Sections . . . is to strengthen the influence of the T.U.U.L. . . . To consistently develop leadership of the unions from among the workers. To persistently explain to the workers the program, tasks and tactics of the revolutionary unions and thereby systematically organize, develop and lead the existing discontent among the workers into struggles in these shops."

With this clear explanation of the role of the Party for a guide to action around our shops of concentration, one would expect to find a decisive change in methods of work, especially so short a time after the Convention.

Section 3, Chicago, has shown by example that in the Party ranks, there is as yet no clarity on the line of the Resolution.

When the Dryden Rubber workers, (2,000) walked out on strike, the Section leadership immediately issued a leaflet in the name of the Party. It was correct for the Party to "greet the strikers." But while the leaflet dealt with the

general demands of the strikers, it raised these demands with little appreciation of their immediate importance. The fact that 40 per cent of the workers were girls, and concrete demands to be raised for them, was not presented plainly enough in the leaflet.

The fact that the Employees Club (existing company union which functions as a sick benefit organization) took over the leadership of the strike, after being forced by the movement of the workers towards a strike, was not dealt with by the comrades. The fact that the company had fired the chairman (elected by the workers at the formation of the club) and placed its own man into the position was not dealt with. The fact that the A. F. of L. had discredited itself with the workers long ago was not mentioned.

The strikers were instructed by the Party leadership in Section 3 to organize into a union. Not one word was said in this leaflet, or any of the others that were issued, on the T.U.U.L. The workers were told to continue their strike for the 20 per cent increase in wages.

The Section leadership told the strikers not to accept the offer of Dryden for a 5 per cent increase—but they failed to point out that this offer was actually forced by the actions of the workers. Nor did they mention a word about the role of the Party—the role the workers in the neighborhood—the unemployed, could play in actively supporting this strike—relief, legal aid, mass support on the picket lines—these questions were not raised.

The leaflet ended with a grand gesture of the need for establishing a Soviet America "that only when this is done will we improve our conditions." The strikers could not possibly understand this when it is raised in such a manner, but are left with the impression that strike struggles can't help much—the only thing to do is to go back to work and wait for the Revolution.

The comrades of the Section and the Y.C.L. (which was quite active in this strike) were called in by the acting District Secretariat (this was during the National Convention) to discuss the policy in the strike. The policy outlined at this meeting was a correct one:

1. At the mass meeting called by the Company union for that night we were to present our program.
2. A leading comrade from the T.U.U.L. was assigned to work with the leading comrades of the Party and the Y.C.L. in this strike.
3. Our comrades in the shop were to win the strikers away from the influence of the company union for a union based on representatives from departments and no return to work unless it was voted upon by all the strikers.

The strikers unanimously adopted our program and refused, to a man, to accept the proposal of the Company union to return to work the next morning. Our comrades at this meeting were given the enthusiastic support of the strikers.

The Section leadership issued its second leaflet the next morning in the name of the Party. Again no word about the T.U.U.L. The contents of this leaflet, politically, were poor. Organizationally, the leaflet was weak. As a guide to action it was useless.

The conception of the tactic of the United Front was exemplified in one of the leaflets as follows: The workers of the Communist Party, Republican and Democratic parties were asked to unite their forces, but no mention was made of the Socialist Party workers. Our comrades explained "Why give publicity to the S.P.?"

When leading comrades went to the Section they were told: "Don't worry. We have the correct policy. We have our own policy."

When the Section was told to bring in the T.U.U.L., they said: "If the T.U.U.L. can't issue its leaflets, give its support, help financially, then it doesn't deserve to be even mentioned. The Party is doing all the work—therefore it must lead the strike."

By their policy of contempt for the T.U.U.L., by their stubborn refusal to consult the District leadership, by their sectarian approach to the workers, our comrades failed to gain influence among the strikers. The strikers were forced back to work by the company union thugs at a special meeting. They were forced to return on a 5 per cent increase with a promise of an additional 5 per cent in July.

Resentment among the workers towards this betrayal by the company union runs very deep. Our Party, with all the mistakes made, still has some influence among the strikers. Our comrades have established some good contacts. But the Section leadership, in its last leaflet, while it attacks the company union, still clings to the priority of the Party as the leader of the strike, again fails to mention the T.U.U.L.—but in the name of the Party and the Y.C.L. calls the workers to again go out on strike.

The A. F. of L. issues a leaflet—presents demagogically a program of struggle against the company union sell-out, and calls the workers to a mass meeting at night.

Our comrades issue a leaflet by the Party, with vague references to organizing another strike, but do not bring out the program of the T.U.U.L. and call their own meeting for the afternoon of the same day.

The Section leadership should be criticized sharply for

their attitude towards the correct Party policy and for their stubborn refusal to bring forward the program of the T.U. U.L.

The Section leadership should examine carefully its conduct in the light of the concrete experiences during the strike and draw the proper conclusions in line with the C.C. Resolution: "Agitation must be systematically carried on against company unions, all grievances inside the factory and all manifestations of discontent in the factories in which company unions exist must be utilized by the Communists and revolutionary workers in order to form and strengthen independent class trade unions, at the same time work must be carried on inside the company unions, striving to occupy every eligible post by Communists and militant workers for the purpose of winning the workers away from the company unions and for the organization of independent unions."

The task now is to systematically build up department committees and establish the leadership of the revolutionary trade unions, based on the program of the T.U.U.L., to win the workers completely away from the influence of the company union or A. F. of L. and prepare them for struggles on the basis of their most burning demands.

## Work Among Lake Seamen

By JOHN ADAMS, Chicago

"THIS convention has revealed such forces that we must properly use to carry out among the masses more practical everyday work, collectively organized, collectively criticized, collectively checked up. . . ." Earl Browder, Eighth Convention report.

"Collective, practical work" means the solution of "how" to organizationally carry out the decisions of the convention. Can the Party lead united fronts? Can the "Red scare" be defeated or, better yet, used to our advantage? Are we practical leaders to follow? Will the false division of "Party work," of "union work" of "unemployed work" break down and properly flow as one onrushing torrent over the bourgeoisie?

The experiences of establishing organization among the seamen of Chicago, important steel trust seamen, have brought out some lessons that may be useful to other sections. This article deals with a period of one week.

The Party was not conducting any work among the Lake seamen in Chicago. About 250 jobless seamen were

waiting for ships in the Lake Carriers Hall (steel trust blacklist system).

The writer located a couple of sympathetic seamen in May, who were willing to help launch organizational activities. It was decided to call a mass meeting on the basis of a boycott against the L.C.A. that was taking place in Buffalo.

Fifty men responded. A report on the situation was made. The work of the M.W.I.U. was reported on. The men then participated in the discussion. They accepted the report. They stated that the idea of action against the L.C.A. was too advanced. The most outspoken voiced the sentiment that the proper approach to the men would be on unemployed relief. Only a few men were receiving flophouse relief. To get this, a letter from the shipping commissioner was necessary. The writer failed to heed the practical, collective expression of the men. They really were voicing the road to the mass of seamen. But the purpose of preparing action against the L.C.A. was kept in front. A small action did develop but only a few men took an interest in it.

With these few men, who carried on agitational work in the hall, a number of discussions took place. Some men joined the union. They asserted their opinions more resolutely. Two joined the Party.

It was decided to call a meeting on the code for the industry and relief. Only twenty men appeared. But by tackling the question of immediate action for relief, the meeting was of utmost importance. The men were made acquainted with the Baltimore struggle. The information as to national struggles being led by the M.W.I.U. was given them. Then the question of what to do was put to the meeting. The discussion immediately got down to concrete work.

A delegation to the F.E.R.A. officials was decided on. The next morning 25 men reported on time. Here the demands were again discussed. The organization of the delegation. How it was to conduct itself uptown. This was put up to the men. One proposal of the organizer was erroneous. The men saw the incorrectness of it and criticized it, voting it down. The details of the delegation were then collectively arrived at.

Uptown the officials received the delegation. For two and a half hours they conferred with the men. The men smashed through every demagogic statement of the officials.

After leaving the officials, a hasty meeting was held. The men reflected more confidence in their ability to mobilize their fellows and confidence in the leadership. They

spoke in terms of a hundred or two hundred men organizing in a few days.

For the next day's meeting time, one hundred men responded. They came in response to the word of mouth report. But we had brought back tangible victories. We had acted on a basic grievance. The men who reported showed confidence in us.

In two days 178 men registered with the committee for relief. Two hundred men came to the meeting, two days after the delegation uptown. Here the men endorsed the actions of the initiators. A broad committee of 25 to lead them was elected. This committee was elected for a period of two weeks but the M.W.I.U. organizer was elected permanent chairman of all committees. Why?

Before the meeting the shipping commissioner spread around rumors of "don't let these Reds fool you. Don't have anything to do with them." At the meeting one man asked "what have the Communists to do with this?"

The M.W.I.U. organizer, the writer, spoke on the Party. He "admitted" he was a Party member. Not only was the Party brought out to the men as being represented in the organization by membership, but the leading role of the Party in this, a united front action and organization, was stressed. The men in the hall applauded the concluding statement that "It is only because of our training and responsibility as Communists that we know how to start and lead organized struggles. We are members of the organization. Our Party guides us in our actions here. We must and will win many of you to join our Party. It is our Party that shows workers how to unite and fight for their betterment." A non-Party, new member rose and proposed a "vote of confidence" in the speaker and his election as permanent chairman. This passed unanimously.

Today nearly any sailor can answer the "Red scare" of rumor-mongers who would break the organization. They answer because they know the Party can and does lead sincere united fronts of workers. One of the leading committee members was under Socialist influence and today is almost ready to join our Party. Members of the A. F. of L. seamen's union are in our organization. They, too, are ready to join our union.

In the meeting, which was crucial, as here we had maybe the greatest number of seamen we would have at any meeting for some time, we brought forward the union as the leader of the marine struggles. The following of its program in unemployed struggles was stressed. The fact that the union would have to be built on the ships and ashore was emphasized.

The meeting gave concrete tasks to committee members. Actions, based on class struggle, recognition of relationship to the rest of the working class, were brought out.

The men began visiting their mates on the ships. The Party comrades, including the writer, were "too busy for a few days" to do Union work. We began to hear this. Individual men would approach us about visiting a ship. They wouldn't listen to "all right, on her next trip we'll be there." In meetings (we had over six in a week, with an average of 80 attendance) men began to demand action from the union. "We are losing members because somebody isn't on the job," one man stated, typical of others.

These men took very seriously and correctly the view that their shore struggle was but an allied struggle of the basic fight, on the ships. They saw a union in terms of thousands of members. By the end of the week, the situation was serious. We reacted sometimes twice a day to dangers in our unemployed work. Seven leaflets and bulletins rallying our seamen in crises were issued. At a mass meeting, one man angrily stated "I know that you have missed at least 30 members this week on the ships."

The Union comrades immediately put a member up to be the delegate. Men volunteered to help him by boarding the ships. The workers had collectively criticized us and given us the solution to our "difficulty".

We did not neglect to "work" on prospective Party members. It is interesting to note that about half of the ten men we are going to ask to join the Party in a meeting several days from now, have been also proposed to us by seamen as "there's a good guy you ought to get for your organization" (meaning the Party).

A meeting of 109 men adjourned to go to a mass meeting of steel workers, to express solidarity. They went in response to an invitation of the S.M.W.I.U. They went, knowing it might be necessary to defend the meeting against thugs.

What to do with the men who waited until gains were made? The most outstanding fighters of the organization have voluntarily waited their relief turn to put these men in front to, as one man said "teach these fellows that when we say all seamen, we mean it. Teach them that organization is for the benefit of all." Any tendency to condemn more backward workers was corrected in open meeting by the men themselves.

The organization protested the denial of an N.Y.D. permit to the youth. Discussions on the nationwide and world struggles receive good response. Men are asking for speakers on other working class struggles. Great interest in the Soviet Union is shown. Fifty copies of the *Daily Worker*, with the

Baltimore series, were distributed. Volunteers among the men took these out, selling quite a number. The small businessmen are contributing to the opening of a hall. The men want this hall for general social and educational purposes.

Every day there has been some kind of action. The men are responding in more disciplined organizational forms, created by themselves, to the daily calls.

We face serious opposition. Two clever attempts of the bosses and relief workers were smashed by the men, who also uncovered them.

We have met every problem that confronted us by taking it to the men. We know as Communists that we must fight on a class struggle platform. Organization execution, "how to do," is not a secret method locked up in our ranks. We have heeded advice, criticism, and suggestions of the men, collectively. We have kept the men in motion. We are accepted as leaders because of this. We drew strength from our applying the resolution of the Convention to the work. We know that the Party can lead masses of non-Party workers, even the most "backward", American workers, fresh in the fight. We will build a strong Party among these seamen. Our union will be the mass union of the seamen. We have to spread to the dock workers. Already we know that they want our organization here. The Party "line" is correct. The workers will prove this if we take it to them "collectively" and seek to bring it to them in practical terms of being the means of building their organizations and winning victories over the bourgeoisie.

## Experiences of a Detroit Y. C. L. Shop Nucleus in Its Work in the A. F. of L.

*By J. G., Detroit Y. C. L.*

**T**HE importance of exposing the bureaucracy of the reformist trade unions and their hand-in-glove method of work with President Roosevelt and his Labor Board has been stressed in the draft resolution for the National Convention of the Y.C.L.

The role of the A. F. of L. as a strikebreaking instrument in the general strike situation in the automotive industry of Detroit, Wisconsin, and Toledo has been properly exposed in the columns of the *Daily Worker*, leaflet distribution on factory fronts, and mass meetings in these districts.

As a direct result of this, the Y.C.L. and Party in the Detroit district raised three slogans on trade union work:

1. Build the Auto Workers' Union; 2. Build an opposition in the A. F. of L. and the Mechanics Educational Society; 3. Work in the company union.

The advice given is not only necessary but timely as well. Yet it is not specific enough nor is it concrete. In the past many of our comrades have applied this advice only when there has been a strike in the offing. "Into the trade union and out again" has been their action. This we must understand: to join the trade union means to stay in it and carry on consistent day-to-day work around the vital issues of the workers in the shop. And if again there threatens "general strike" in Detroit we will be on the inside instead of outside trying to get in.

There are certain specific and concrete directions that the Y.C.L. and Party nuclei of our shop worked out of its experience in building and putting into use an opposition in the A. F. of L. local of our shop.

1. Every Y.C.L.'er a member of the dominant trade union in his shop. This slogan has been raised innumerable times in the Y.C.L. Builder, trade union publications and the Young Worker. For a long time the comrades in our shop voiced the objection that in our local it was impossible for any rank and filer to gain the floor and a still greater impossibility to carry through worthwhile rank and file measures. The fact that occasions do arise, especially when strike sentiment is strong, when even the most dogmatic official and all his company henchmen cannot keep down rank and file discussion, was completely overlooked.

2. Attend regularly the meetings of the local and the opposition. This point seems rather obvious. Yet it has often been the policy of the comrades in our nucleus to attend the opposition meeting and then fail to follow through to the local's meeting, itself. The danger of this action was seen clearly when the members of the opposition lost faith in our comrades and a large number of them stopped attending the opposition meetings altogether.

3. Cultivate the personal acquaintanceship of the members in the local. The tendency of comrades to cultivate only these fellow trade unionists whose possibilities are those of becoming Communists was evident in the last general strike situation. In such a situation our comrades often have the appearance of a disrupter coming from the outside rather than rising out of the rank and file. They are not known to the membership at large nor to any but a very few of the most radical. They support and fight for only those measures directly supporting strike, unemployment relief, and sometimes cases of discrimination. Toward the measures supporting the general welfare of the union, they are deaf.

The value of knowing rank-and-file members was seen in our local when the president accused one of our members of not ever having worked in the plant. A rank and file member came to her support to assert otherwise, to say they had worked together in the same department. Instead of creating the desired effect of distrust in our comrade, it created rather a feeling of distrust toward the president.

4. Be thoroughly familiar with the constitution. Since the constitution and its sacred rules of order are the chief weapons used so ruthlessly and skillfully by the president and his officials to keep rank and filers from gaining the floor, to oust them from meetings, to call special meetings without the knowledge of the membership as a whole, and to delay strike action, the necessity for making a study of the constitution becomes self-evident. Once we had mastered the constitution, we were able to use it to our advantage, to check up on the officials in its use, and to force action on rank and file measures.

5. Work as an organized fraction in the local. This is the tool that when used with the above points; joining, attending, forming acquaintanceship of members, and knowledge of the constitution, becomes most powerful in developing and putting into action rank and file control in the reformist trade unions. It is the tool that breaks and defeats the thug and company control over strike action; the tool that turns the fake, strike-breaking A. F. of L. trade unions into militant trade unions fighting for rank and file demands.

Only when the Y.C.L.'ers in our shop nucleus, who were theoretically familiar with fraction work, began to put it into practice, were we able to realize its full possibilities. When we planned in our unit meetings the work in the opposition, deciding on measures to be brought up at the opposition meeting, planning the supporting speeches, and then organized the opposition as a whole into a functioning fraction in the local's meeting, we were able to send a telegram to the Governor of Ohio protesting the murder of Toledo workers, to send strike funds to Toledo, to secure indorsement by the local of the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill, H.R. 7598, and to take steps for relief to laid-off workers.

This was done in a local whose membership registers 8,000 of the total 20,000 in the plant. This was done with an organized fraction in a local whose president was a former secret service man and who surrounds himself with plain clothes men and men hired by the company. This was the local in a shop where strike broke last year, where strike sentiment swept the plant this year with departmental strikes and stoppages of the line that gained raise after raise and a blanket 2 per cent raise to everyone in the plant. And yet at this time only one Y.C.L.'er was a member of the local.

Comrades, it was only because of our gross negligence that a strike that would have pulled out the whole plant did not take place, a strike that in all probability would have meant a general strike in the city of Detroit. An organized fraction in the local could have done this. In the future let none of us be guilty of overlooking the importance of work in the reformist trade unions.

## How Can We Overcome Organizational Weaknesses?

By FRANK HELLMAN

**I**N the Communist International magazine which is now published in the U.S.A., we find in No. 1, Vol. 2, a review of the "Party Life" column conducted in the *Daily Worker*. It is pointed out there, that, while making the necessary criticism in connection with our organizational weaknesses it is important to show at the same time by concrete examples how to overcome them.

### Some of the Main Shortcomings

Some of the main difficulties consist of lack of understanding of party structure and organization, lack of collective work and leadership, lack of individual responsibility and initiative, weak and badly functioning fractions, the missing of the group system in the units as well as insufficient orientation to build shop nuclei and the *Daily Worker* circulation, and lack of Party Discipline.

### Results of these Weaknesses

As a result of all this, the percentage of fluctuation in the Party is quite high. This is true especially of our District. From the charts exhibited at the National Convention of our Party, the fluctuation in our District is more than 300%. Out of about 4500 workers brought into the Party since it was organized, we had in Feb. 1934, a little over 900 dues-paying members. Since July 1931 we recruited 2200 members. However, there are only 1200 members in the Party in this District (Philadelphia, Dist 3), now.

It is true that the fluctuation within the last year has been greatly reduced. However, it is still too large. Can we reduce it still further? I think we can. The question now arises, how can we do it? In the first place we must organize the group system in the units. This should be done in the following manner:

A street unit of let us say, 20 members is divided into

4 or 5 groups. Each group has one comrade, who is responsible for the activation of the members of this group. The captain or leader who is responsible must see to it that every one of his group attends the meetings of the unit. If one does not attend, he or she must report to the unit why the particular comrade is absent. The captain must then, if any of the comrades from his group are absent for legitimate reasons, carry back to the comrade his assignment and collect his dues. Each group is responsible for one part of the territory in which the unit operates. In the territory of each group, they distribute leaflets, they organize the *Daily Worker* campaign, they arrange open air and factory gate meetings, they sell literature and raise finances in this territory, they canvass the readers of our press and draw them into one of the organizations, and, since the readers of our press are potential Party members, it is they who should be brought into the Party.

New members recruited by the group, as well as others who may be recruited through the fractions but live in the place in which a particular unit operates, must be brought to the unit meetings by one of the members of the group until they become acquainted with the Party. Older party members must work with these new Party comrades, show them how work is to be done by practical examples, explain to them everything they do so they know why they are doing it and make it possible for them to explain to the workers generally why they do certain things. Each group must know what kind of factories there are in its territory, the composition of the workers in the factory. The Party members must know what the grievances of the workers in the factory are, etc. The unit buro must assemble all these facts and on the basis of this information link up all the Party campaigns with the life and conditions of the workers in the factories and the neighborhoods, and out of the activities of these groups there will grow new Party units.

### Records of Dues Payment and Membership Are Very Important

We must overcome the indifference to technical problems. After returning from the convention, we requested the sections to check up how many Party members they had on record on the first of January, 1934, what their dues payment has been at that time and how many members they had on record on April 1st and what their dues payment was then. On the basis of that each section would be able to determine the fluctuation in the Party section, trace the causes and eradicate them. This was done several weeks ago. Up to this time we have not received from any of the sections a report on this important assignment of the

membership; either there is no systematic check up on the dues payment or they simply fail to respond. This proves in any case lack of responsibility and indifference. The figures are now being prepared by the Org. Dept. and we will, on the basis of the facts, demand to know from the Section Committee why there is no check up and no records in the Sections.

#### Shop Units Must Not Be Permitted to Become Stagnant

Within the past few months a number of shop nuclei were organized. Most of them however, do not yet function as a driving force in the shop in which they work. Some of them are small, but there is some work that can be done by all of them. Every Party member in the shop can speak to workers about conditions in the shop and make suggestions in line with the perspectives of the unit in the shop, speak about the corruption and conditions in the A. F. of L. unions, bring workers into the rank-and-file groups. If the shop is unorganized bring them into the revolutionary unions. Literature can be sold on trade union problems, on fascism, war, and above all the *Daily Worker*. The street unit can sell *Daily Workers* from the outside and also distribute leaflets in front of these shops. Members from the street units can also visit workers from the shop whom the Party comrades on the inside do not know well enough to approach for the Party. Above all no Party unit can do effective work without a shop paper.

In publishing the shop papers the Section and District Agitprops must help to guide the comrades politically in editing the papers. There is a danger that some of the shop nuclei organized within the last few months as a result of the struggles carried on in certain industries as well as those who were organized as a result of serious effort on the part of the Section Committees, will become stagnant. It is necessary that every member of the shop units be involved in certain work in order to make them feel that they have certain responsibilities. In planning the work for the section we must have in mind that the shop units are the driving axle of the Party and all Party campaigns must be planned accordingly.

#### Party Fractions

It ought to be understood by the whole Party membership that Communists who are members of a trade union, fraternal or any other organization, must be active in these organizations, because it is only as a result of their own activities that they are recognized as leaders in the particular organization in which they are active. Furthermore, Communists are not only responsible to the membership of

the organization in which they are active, but they are responsible for their activities to the Party at the same time.

Wherever one or more Communists belong to the same organization they must form a fraction. This fraction (i. e., Party members in the same organization and branch of an organization) must have regular meetings, discuss the problems of the organization and work out proposals to improve the work of the organization, plans to bring in the campaigns of Party, build the *Daily Worker* and recruit new Party members. Members of the fractions must at all times work together, support each other. They should, however, at all times convince the workers of the organization of the correctness of the proposals they make.

Top fractions must report regularly to the District Committee and fractions in the branches to the leading fraction and the Section Committee. The Party units must check up on the activities of every comrade and in the planning of the activities for the units, they must take into consideration the necessity of involving all the workers who are members of our organizations in the territory in which the unit operates, readers of our press, etc. This holds true especially in connection with the concentration policy of the unit or section as well as the District.

#### What Is the Present Situation?

A check-up by the Dist. Org. Dept. revealed that there are very few fractions functioning. In the trade unions, the fractions of the various unions, both A. F. of L. and T.U.U.L., function more or less, but, there is no functioning leading fraction. I. W. O. fractions are functioning very badly and are not organized. Clubs, Women's Leagues and other mass organizations have very weak or no fractions at all. This is the situation in Philadelphia. There is no doubt that out of town the situation is worse. Only the I.L.D. has a well-functioning top fraction and the best functioning fractions in the branches.

As a result of this we fail to mobilize the organizations we are active in, and, what is worse than that, Party comrades at the meetings of the mass organizations fight each other and disrupt instead of organizing the work of the organizations.

In Reading, for instance, where we have about 200 workers in various organizations, there were only 35 present at our May Day meeting and some of these were not members of Left-wing organizations. Such examples we can find in Washington and in our language organizations in Phila. All Sections therefore will have to assume greater responsibility, together with the Org. Committee of the District, in establishing the fractions.

## The Question of Fluctuation Faces the Party and Demands Solution

By A. BENSON

THE first elementary organizational duty of the Communist Party members is to pay their dues regularly, every week. But the dues-paying figures show that the members have not yet learned this first fundamental organizational rule—at least as far as regularity is concerned.

Why has the Party adopted the weekly dues plan instead of the monthly? So as to bring every member into constant contact with the Party's basic organization: the shop or street unit. So as to make it easier for the members to pay the small amount weekly instead of accumulating a big amount every month. So as to enable the activation of the membership through the weekly attendance in the units, planning and discussing Party problems, and accepting and fulfilling the weekly assignments.

What do we find is actually happening? Members are not paying their dues regularly, every week. They accumulate 2, 3, 4, or more weeks of dues before they come to the unit meeting. They do exactly what the Party does not want done. To quote from the Party's Statutes, (see Page 2 of your membership book):

"A member of the Party can be (one) who is a member of a basic organization (unit) of the Party, who is active in this organization and regularly pays his membership dues"

We emphasize the regularity. Inactivity goes hand in hand with irregularity—of attendance and the dues payment.

To exemplify the above, let us take the weekly dues purchased by the districts from the Center for the month of April, 1934:

| District | 1st Week | 2nd Week | 3rd Week | 4th Week |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1        | 421      | 832      | 470*     | 326      |
| 2        | 5110     | 4638*    | 6235     | 6234     |
| 3        | 1058     | 1033     | 1042     | 1193     |
| 4        | 108      | 557      | 376*     | 397      |
| 5        | 516      | 770      | 658      | 700      |
| 6        | 1304     | 1898     | 1189*    | 1685     |
| 7        | 499      | 1155     | 657*     | 919      |

|    |       |      |      |       |
|----|-------|------|------|-------|
| 8  | 2297  | 2507 | 3512 | 2218* |
| 9  | 1424  | 2530 | 2138 | 1416* |
| 10 | 155   | 38*  | 167  | 258   |
| 11 | 300   | 151* | 1124 | 990   |
| 12 | 826   | 1345 | 1897 | 663*  |
| 13 | 1497* | 2459 | 2408 | 2598  |
| 14 | 438   | 709  | 362* | 675   |
| 15 | 281   | 300  | 330  | 349   |
| 16 | 235   | 110* | —    | —     |
| 17 | 692   | 419* | 372  | 445   |
| 18 | 305   | 495  | 524  | 543   |
| 19 | 494   | 627  | 290* | 826   |
| 20 | 60    | 80   | 70   | 76    |
| 21 | 195   | 230  | 230  | 294   |
| 22 | 150   | 50   | —    | —     |
| 23 | 80    | 33*  | 68   | 105   |
| 24 | 70    | 68   | 70   | 79    |
| 25 | —     | —    | —    | —     |

\*The asterisk (\*) calls your attention to the extreme fluctuations between any two weeks . . . These examples demand explanations on the part of the districts, sections and units.

And when we take the monthly averages of the districts, we find these fluctuations reflected in an equally inexcusable manner:

### Average Monthly Dues Paying Membership

| District | Jan. | Feb. | Mar. | Apr. | New Recruits during the 4 months of |           |
|----------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------------------|-----------|
|          |      |      |      |      | May                                 | Jan.-Apr. |
| 1        | 922  | 542  | 789  | 513  | 687                                 | 161       |
| 2        | 4774 | 4094 | 6367 | 5554 | 5274                                | 2132      |
| 3        | 1139 | 1244 | 1075 | 1082 | 1190                                | 475       |
| 4        | 454  | 404  | 531  | 360  | 449                                 | 125       |
| 5        | 1087 | 1142 | 1012 | 661  | 1116                                | 323       |
| 6        | 2076 | 1639 | 1675 | 1519 | 1390                                | 562       |
| 7        | 1420 | 1105 | 865  | 808  | 925                                 | 222       |
| 8        | 3186 | 2484 | 3048 | 2634 | 2911                                | 951       |
| 9        | 2656 | 1649 | 1920 | 1877 | 1451                                | 332       |
| 10       | 409  | 261  | 229  | 155  | 130                                 | 70        |
| 11       | 553  | 489  | 306  | 642  | 243                                 | 122       |
| 12       | 1196 | 1605 | 1474 | 1183 | 1571                                | 980       |
| 13       | 2236 | 2950 | 2134 | 2241 | 2128                                | 1255      |
| 14       | 503  | 450  | 483  | 546  | 520                                 | 254       |
| 15       | 404  | 431  | 559  | 315  | 479                                 | 164       |
| 16       | 60   | 54   | 86   | 87   | 159                                 | 70        |
| 17       | 622  | 389  | 384  | 382  | 240                                 | 487       |
| 18       | 454  | 450  | 491  | 467  | 504                                 | 133       |

|       |        |        |        |        |        |       |
|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| 19    | 410    | 745    | 462    | 559    | 339    | 440   |
| 20    | 48     | 50     | 179    | 72     | 340    | 94    |
| 21    | —      | —      | 538    | 263    | 344    | 54    |
| 22    | —      | —      | —      | 50     | 79     | 60    |
| 23    | 4      | 63     | 59     | 73     | 36     | 72    |
| 24    | 6      | 71     | 75     | 72     | 62     | 38    |
| 25    | —      | 33     | 43     | —      | 82     | 25    |
| Total | 24,727 | 22,344 | 24,784 | 22,115 | 22,649 | 9,601 |

All the financial secretaries of the units, sections and districts know—or should know—that the Party's policy on dues is: Every member must pay his dues every week. Every unit must buy every week the exact amount of stamps (in the exact denominations) as sold to the members at the unit meeting. Every section must buy the same number of stamps as sold to the units. Every district must buy the same number of stamps as sold to the sections.

Comparing these figures, and of course, taking into consideration the constant influx of the new recruits into our Party, the result should show a gradual average increase in the dues-paying membership every month. But when, and if, the dues payments do not reflect the Party's growth of over 2 000 new members each month, then we begin to ask: What's wrong? Where are the new members? Where are the old ones? Who is dropping out? Why? This demands the concentrated thought and solution on the part of the entire Party.

Do the members attend unit meetings every week? Every other week? Once a month? Or less often? Why? Do some come to unit meetings only when their membership books have to be controlled or exchanged? Which members? Why? What does the unit do with the new recruits? Are they only interested in making the contact with the prospective members, and remain so interested until they join the Party? After that do they immediately consider these full-fledged disciplined Communists, who take on and carry out their tasks regularly, or otherwise participate in the Party's activities? Or, if, by chance, these new members fail to attend 2, 3, 4, or more unit meetings in succession, does the unit bureau take notice? And what does it do about it? Or doesn't the unit bureau even miss these new members? Or does the unit bureau immediately send another member to see whether this new member is sick, or to find out the real cause of the new member's absence from the unit meetings? Or does the group system of the Party organization function in your unit? This group system, if properly worked, makes the closest contact between a few members of the unit, and thereby avoids delay in checking up on every comrade's activity, as well as his or her being in good-standing.

What does the unit do about the payment of dues on the part of the Party's functionaries and actives in the district, section, trade unions, mass organizations, etc. Not a single member is exempt from the payment of dues—from the general secretary of our Party down to the newest member in the Party. Functionaries and actives are no exception to this rule. The unit bureau must be held responsible for the collection of dues from every single member in the unit. Even absentees must pay dues. The group captains should see that every member in his group is always in good standing.

The sections should compare weekly the dues-paying membership of each unit with the actual membership on the unit roll. (The org-department must work together with the financial secretaries.) The unit's weekly dues report should include besides the denominations of the dues stamps sold at the unit meeting, also the number of members in the unit and their dues standing, so:

Paid up (including 1 to 4 weeks in arrears).....  
 5 to 8 weeks in arrears.....  
 9 weeks and over..... \*

Total membership on the unit roll.....

\*) Why?.....

This information should be relayed from the unit to the section, and the section summary to the district, and the district summary to the Center. At the same time, in each case the next-higher body should assign comrades or reps to check up on the causes of the aforementioned dues-laggers-behind, and to correct this situation.

The district dues secretary must call attention to the district org-department those sections that do not live up in their dues payments to, let us say, 90% of their actual membership on the roll.

Every bureau—from the unit up—must be made to realize the importance of this problem and, therefore, take immediate steps to solve this problem of fluctuation. We ask the Party Committees, District Bureau, Section Committee and the unit bureaus to take this up as a special order of business—at an early meeting—lay plans discuss them, and follow these up. Send to the Center the results of the discussion, giving the causes, the hardships faced, the plans made, the methods adopted for the solution of our task—and we must solve it if we want our Party to grow.

## Excerpts from Report by Comrade F. Brown to C. C. on Organization and Fluctuation

**WHAT** has to be done to improve the recruitment, to concretize the slogan "double the recruitment power and cut the fluctuation in half"?

We must make a real drive to improve the political life of the units; which means that we must concretize into practice all decisions made previously on this problem: development of cadres, improvement of the discussion in the units, building of functioning unit buros, still further reduce the size of the Sections, improve our school system, etc. . . .

The experiences in Cleveland show the importance and necessity of Org. instructors in all the concentration Districts, an Org. instructor who will go down to the units, work out with them the plan of work, help in developing their initiative and show them practically how the work is to be done. If we do not use Org. instructors, on a Section and unit scale, we shall select some of the best comrades who, through their activities, show results, to go and help another section, another unit, for a little while.

Another problem to be solved is the issuing of a simple manual for lower functionaries. . . . Very probably we will need two kinds of manuals: one, for the best developed functionaries on a unit and Section scale and a still simpler one which will help the development of the new Party members, to acquaint them with the structure of our Party, with the main tasks of the units, with the role of the unit as the Party in a given shop or territory, with the nature and task of the fractions, etc.

The method used in Cleveland and other Districts of regular reports of the Org. Department to the District Buro must become a real institution. These reports not only will acquaint the leadership with the more minute organizational problems but will also stimulate the responsibility of the leadership towards the lower organization: the leadership will become more and more conscious of its task of concentrating below, on checking; also, on such problems as recruitment, fluctuation, circulation of the Daily Worker, activity of the Party members in the trade unions, etc.

It is already one year since we discussed the necessity of introducing the group system in the units, yet such a system is only on a very weak experimental stage. We must make up our minds that this system must be definitely established and the group captains will not only be responsible to lead the activities of the groups but also to collect the dues. In view of the difficulty of making a general decision and putting

it into effect overnight, we shall start with one section in each of the larger Districts where the leadership can check up continuously, improve the system, and extend it to the other sections. . . .

The unit must check up more consistently on the activities of all Party members who are active in the trade unions and other mass organizations and while striving to activate them in the units, at the same time in cases where the situation (as strikes and other mass struggles) prevents the comrades from attending their unit meetings regularly, a way must be found on how to obtain the dues payments from these comrades. (I mean members of the street units.)

There must be more discussion on the problems of recruitment and fluctuation in the leading committees and units. This discussion must be led through the Party Life column of the Daily Worker, the Party Organizer and articles in the Party press. The whole Party must feel that we are conducting a fight, that we are determined to make a real turn in increasing the recruitment and stop the fluctuation. . . .

We must reintroduce the initiations of the new members, introduce them into the life of the Party, so that these newcomers will feel at home, will feel a comradesly atmosphere.

Each District must regularly issue its own bulletins which will primarily mobilize the Party to carry out the control tasks set up by the District Committee. The bulletins will help the discussion in the units on many of the important organizational tasks, and in checking on the tasks set up in the plans of work and will stimulate competition.

The sections must compare weekly the dues paying membership on the unit roles. This will help not only in checking on the dues payments but also to see why comrades who appear on the roles do not participate at unit meetings, etc. This weekly check-up will spur the unit to find the reasons for the non-attendance of some of the Party members at unit meetings and, in this way, reactivate some of the elements who have decreased their activity.

We must prevent the units from becoming distributing agencies of all kinds of leaflets and papers. There are cases where the units, besides being very active in fulfilling one of their main tasks by distributing the Party leaflets, Party literature, the Daily Worker, are loaded with the distribution of material of the mass organizations, which should be distributed by the mass organizations themselves.

These are all measures which will help us in solving this burning problem. We must, however, have the apparatus which will orientate the lower units on this task, and help them to solve it. Three Districts, Chicago, Cleveland and Birmingham, decided to carry on a control of the membership with the aim not only of checking the fluctuation but of im-

proving the life of the units, raising the consciousness of all eligible members of trade unions to their Party task, etc. This is a good decision. We cannot, however, have a thorough and general control every three or six months. Such a control takes time, and, to some extent, if frequently applied, would hinder the activity of the units. Such control is correct only when the situation makes it necessary.

We came to the conclusion that all Districts should have a membership commission whose task will be to see that there shall be no delay in assigning the new members to the units, which will check up on the dues payments in the sections, in some of the units, will utilize the Party bulletins to popularize the good experiences, bring forward the weaknesses and methods which will help in stabilizing the dues payments, which will spur the competition between section and units in the recruiting drive, will call special meetings of the comrades assigned to the same task on section scale, will check up on the comrades in the trade union field, etc.


In conclusion, to bring before the Party the seriousness of this problem, stimulate the discussion in the units, popularize the experiences, the methods of how to improve the recruitment and check the fluctuation. We are also of the opinion that the small commission of the Central Committee should select one District for inspection, study the problem of recruitment and fluctuation concretely and upon the basis of a thorough examination of the experiences of this District, will dramatize before the whole Party this burning problem, will stimulate the whole Party in concretizing the three control tasks which will move the Party forward on the road to becoming a mass Party, able to lead millions:

1. Bring the good standing membership to 40,000 by the end of the year.
2. Increase the circulation of the *Daily Worker* to 75,000.
3. Make every Party member eligible to join a trade union, join the particular union of his trade.

The example of the Center should be followed by each District, building immediately the membership commission which will examine one of the sections, study all the experiences and work out the necessary measures for improving the recruitment and checking on fluctuation.

The carrying through of the three main organizational tasks is one of the main prerequisites to equip the Party to lead the struggles of millions of workers, to take hold of the spontaneous movement of the masses and turn it to its revolutionary political fullness.

# Party Organizer



"The things we have to do to commemorate the 15th Anniversary of our Party form an organic part of the preparations for the Seventh World Congress, making the Party conscious of its own history, which is also making them conscious of the history of the Communist International. This is the task of the 15th Anniversary. We have to assimilate in our Party the traditions of the Communist International and the history of our Party and this is a big political task which must be planned on a national scale and then sub-planned down in each district and in every unit. This is a process of making the Party conscious of the world movement, making it conscious of our own Party as a historical movement, and giving the Party the sense of history and partaking in history". — Karl Browder, "Report on Seventh World Congress of Comintern".

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

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## The Organization of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Communist Party

By MARTIN YOUNG

**A**LL LEADING committees of our Party are already informed of the plans of the Central Committee concerning the celebrations of the Fifteenth Anniversary of our Party. The preparations for the Party Anniversary are part of the preparations for the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. The main problem now is the correct and efficient execution of these plans by the Districts, Sections and all lower units of the Party.

As already stated by the Central Committee, the Fifteenth Anniversary campaign has a two-fold purpose: (1) to raise the political level of the Party membership, which concretely means in this case "making the Party conscious of its own history, which is also making them conscious of the history of the Communist International" (Browder); (2) in the course of this campaign to raise funds in order to secure the existence of the Daily Worker.

There are two ways to approach this campaign. If this campaign is approached formally, merely as another campaign, without recognizing its political value, the two objectives set forth by the Central Committee will not be accomplished. With such an approach the results, at best, will be scattered small mass meetings, lifeless discussion in some of the units and the conduct of the campaign relegated to some committee without the entire Party participating in it. However, if any District will be permitted to relegate this campaign to the background it would be depriving the Party of an opportunity to increase its fighting capacity.

It can, however, be stated that the entire Party is taking this campaign very seriously. At the last Central Committee meeting Comrade Browder stated: "The fighting capacity of our Party will be determined to a great extent by how much we can raise the political level in this period of the Seventh World Congress." This means that the fighting capacity of every District and Section of the Party will be evaluated in the light of its preparations for the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Party and the Seventh Congress of the Communist International.

### Planning the Campaign

The first task in this campaign for every Party organization is to work out its plans of the development of the campaign. The period of the Anniversary celebrations is not for a day but for nearly an entire month. This means that the campaign must be continuously moving on and developing new phases during this entire period. This requires serious planning.

The success of these plans and the campaign in general depends on the ability of the District leadership to involve the Party functionaries in the direction and execution of its plans. This means that every functionary of the Party, every Section and unit organizer, every agitator and propagandist and every fraction secretary must know what is expected of him or her in this campaign. It is also necessary to establish the necessary check-up and control of the execution of these plans so as to be able to assist in time those sections of the Party which lag behind.

### The Center of the Campaign

In addition to our general mass agitation in the Anniversary celebrations such as mass meetings, distribution and sale of literature, etc., it is necessary to make the center of this campaign in the units, factories and mass organizations. In the units the task is actually twofold.

In the first place, especially when taking into consideration that the bulk of the Party membership is new, it is essential to acquaint the Party membership with a knowledge and understanding of the history of our Party and the Communist International. We must equip this membership with some knowledge of the role of the Party in the class struggle of the American proletariat. It would be wrong, however, to expect that with one or two discussions at unit meetings we will be able to familiarize our membership with 15 years of history and struggle of our Party and the Communist International. This is of course impossible nor should it even be attempted. We should select major lessons from our Party history with which the membership should be acquainted. For instance, why the Communist Party was organized in America; the role of the Communist International in the development of our Party; the struggle of our Party on two fronts, against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and Lovestoneism; the trade union policy of our Party; our anti-war policies and struggles; the national program of the Party and the struggle for Negro rights; work among the youth; the struggle for Soviet Power and other phases of our Party and Comintern program in their historical development.

Secondly, through the units and shop nuclei we must mobilize the Party membership for the carrying through of this campaign in the factories, especially in the concentration places and in the mass organizations. We mean here the popularization of the Party program among the working masses in the shops, to show them the difference between our Party and other political parties, especially the Socialist Party, the Farmer-Labor Party, the difference between a political Party and a union and to make the most class conscious workers join the Party, spread our Party literature and secure donations and subscriptions for our Party press. This, of course, can best be carried out through personal discussion with groups of workers arranged in private houses, during lunch-hour discussions, visits of workers' homes and bringing workers to our mass meetings and lectures.

The development of the campaign in the mass organizations with the aim of popularizing the program of our Party, recruiting of new members and raising of funds for the Daily Worker will be successfully accomplished only when the Party fractions are prepared and mobilized for this task. A formal approach to this question, that is, mechanically imposing a Party speaker or representative or some casual unorganized sale of literature and collection of funds, will not bring the desired results. The Party fractions must organize and prepare the appearance of the Party representative as well as the sale of literature, stimulate the discussion of the Party program and immediately arrange for the following up of the campaign in the organization, especially amongst those workers who have demonstrated the greatest of interest.

In the Fifteenth Anniversary celebrations and the preparations for the Seventh Congress the sale and distribution of literature have a very important role to play. We must convince our Party membership that nothing can replace minimum reading of essential literature and documents relating to the history of our Party and the Communist International. The special literature prepared for the Party Anniversary must receive especially wide circulation. At the same time, the leading committees of the Party must encourage reading of fundamental and programmatic literature. The best way to stimulate the reading of such literature is through organized group reading and discussion. We must attempt to organize in each unit and shop nucleus special study groups on a specific question in which the comrades are most interested.

The Fifteenth Anniversary celebrations will take place in the midst of the most active stage of the election campaign. It stands to reason that the Fifteenth Anniversary

campaign can best succeed when fitted in the election struggles. The raising of the political level of the Party membership through the Anniversary celebrations must have its effect in the immediate struggles of the Party. This can actually be so if the campaign is properly developed. If the Party membership becomes more politically conscious of the historical development of our own Party and the struggles associated with it, and the world revolutionary movement, the fighting capacity of our Party will be increased. The membership will learn from the Party history how to work better amongst the masses, how more successfully to combat social-fascism and how to win the majority of the working class for our program. The Fifteenth Anniversary celebrations can and must serve this purpose.

## The Communist Fractions and Their Relations to the Party Committees

(Extract from *The Bolshevization of the Communist Parties*)

By O. PIATNITSKY

IT WAS easier for the Bolsheviks in Czarist Russia than for the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries to establish the mutual relations between the Communist fractions and Party committees since the Party organizations actually conducted a great variety of activities. They led the economic struggle, organized trade unions and cooperative societies and created all sorts of labor organizations, such as were allowed to exist under the Czarist regime, from 1905 until the war. That is why the Party organizations were recognized authorities in the eyes of the workers in all these organizations, especially of the Party members and sympathizers. This situation appeared to all to be quite natural and no one raised any question about it. When we came into power there were some tendencies among certain Soviet Communist fractions to supplant the Party organs, but this was a passing phenomenon. The relations between the Party organizations and the Communist fractions (or individual Communists) in the non-Party mass labor organizations prior to, and, especially, since the capture of power, have been such that the Party organizations decide the important questions while the Communist fractions and the individual Communists, no matter what non-Party organizations may be affected, carry the decisions into effect. The Communist fractions themselves decide upon the methods for carrying out the decisions. In their everyday work they

are entirely independent. They can and must display initiative in their work within the non-Party organizations and bodies. The Communist fractions in the leading bodies of the non-Party organizations must not only report to the conferences and congresses which elected them, but also to the Party committees. Prior to the October Revolution, and even immediately after it, when there were still Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries in some of the non-Party mass organizations, the Bolsheviks converted each newly-gained position into a stronghold for the capture of the organization in the district, city, region and nationally. They demonstrated their ability to work better than the others, prepare the questions, lead, and weld together and organize the masses of the workers. That is why they succeeded in driving the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and the other "Socialist" and populist parties out of the mass labor organizations.

In the Communist Parties in capitalist countries things are different because in them social-democratic traditions are still preserved, which are frequently interwoven with sectarianism. The trade unions, and the other proletarian mass organizations, arose before the Social-Democratic Parties in the principal capitalist countries and made a strong position for themselves in the working class as independent organizations which led the economic struggle.

The members of the Social-Democratic Parties who led the mass proletarian organizations, therefore, had a definite amount of independence. Moreover, the Social-Democratic Party not only did not oppose this independence but on the contrary, they themselves developed the theory that the trade unions were equal in value to, and therefore should have equal rights with, the party, that the trade unions were neutral organizations. The only exception in this respect was the Bolshevik Party. A number of cases could be quoted in the history of German social-democracy for instance, when the decisions of the trade union congresses differed from those of the Social-Democratic Party Congresses—for instance, on the question of the general strike in 1905. And this was so despite the fact that the delegates to the trade union congresses were social-democrats who knew the standpoint of the party. The same thing occurred in connection with the celebration of the First of May. Before the war the Social-Democratic Parties in Central Europe celebrated May Day on the first of May, while the social-democratic "free" trade unions sabotaged the First of May celebration, in order to avoid paying victimization benefit to workers who might lose their jobs for taking part in May Day celebrations on the First of May. The trade unions urged that May Day should be celebrated on the first Sunday in May

These relations, which existed between the Social-Democratic Parties and the trade unions before the war, and which the Bolsheviks regarded as abnormal (since the war surprising unanimity has been displayed between the Social-Democratic Parties and trade unions and there has been complete cooperation between them in betraying the interests of the working class in their respective countries) cannot be tolerated in a Bolshevik Party since they prevent uniform leadership being exercised over all forms of the revolutionary labor movement. But they have been inherited from the Social-Democratic Parties by the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries.

The abnormal relations between the Communist Parties and the Communist fractions in the trade unions and in all the other mass proletarian organizations are due to two fundamental causes: the Party committees sometimes supplant the mass organizations, they remove the elected secretaries and appoint others, they openly publish in the press such things as: We propose to the Red trade unions that they do this or that; that is, they act in a way as is very rarely done even by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Usually the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or of the local Party committees are carried out through the Communist fractions or through individual Party members working in this or that non-Party organization. Another cause of the abnormal relations is that the individual members of the Communist Party work on their own accord, disregard the directions of the Party organs or disobey them. There have been cases in France, for instance, when the Party organs thought that they must do absolutely everything, that they must take the place of the International Red Aid, the trade unions, the co-operative and sport organizations, that they alone can perform the functions of these organizations. This is absolutely wrong. Even had the leadership of many of the Communist Parties been a hundred times superior to what it is, in reality, they could not do the work of these organizations. This, in fact, is unnecessary, because both the Central Committee and the local Party organizations should only determine the line, see that the line is carried out, lead the Communist fractions and the individual Communists working in the mass organizations. The Central Committee and the Party committees must get their directives carried out in the mass labor organizations through the Communist fractions or the individual Party members where there are no fractions, but they must not do their work for them.

However, I think it is hardly necessary to go into further details to prove that these incorrect relations between the

Party, the trade unions and the mass organizations generally interfere with the extension of the Party connections among the masses, with the real consolidation of the Party among the masses.

In the countries in which there are Red trade unions there exist side by side with them, in the same industries, trade unions of other tendencies. However, the Red trade unions have very rarely succeeded in capturing whole organizations, or more or less considerable groups of members, from the trade unions of other tendencies.

The trade union oppositions in the reformist trade unions frequently succeed in gaining a majority in the local branches of the different reformist trade unions. But the Communist Parties and the trade union oppositions do not convert these into strongholds from which to extend their influence over the other branches of the same union or over branches of other trade unions which are affiliated to the same local trades council. This can only be explained by the fact that the opposition branches not infrequently take up the same position as reformist trade unions. The same applies to the Red factory committees. They do not receive proper leadership and the necessary aid in their work.

## How the Party Units in the Chicago Stockyards Worked in the Strike

By A UNIT ORGANIZER

THE SECOND strike of the 800 livestock handlers, organized in the A. F. of L. has ended with only small concessions for the strikers. The reason the strike was not won was primarily due to the fact that the strike was conducted in a typical A. F. of L. manner. No mass picketing (although a group of workers were around the gates daily) and the strike was not spread to the rest of the workers.

There was strong sentiment for spreading the strike, especially among the butchers, who are fairly well organized in the A. F. of L., especially in the smaller plants.

The Party units in the Chicago stockyards, as well as the fraction in the Packinghouse Workers Industrial Union, from the very first day of the strike raised the slogan of mass picketing and spreading the strike. Not only did we raise the slogan, but we proceeded toward realization of it in the following manner: We decided to organize actions in the departments. In one department 200 workers stopped work demanding an increase in wages. They resumed work only when a large detachment of police was brought to the de-

partment and terrorized the workers. On another occasion the workers stopped the boss from extending the working day by a half-hour when a mass delegation of workers placed before the superintendent the demand that they do not work the extra half-hour. This demand was immediately granted.

The pressure from below for a strike among the butchers was quite strong and a leaflet was even issued by the butchers' local of the A. F. of L. calling upon the rest of the butchers to strike. The reason the strike did not materialize was due to the fact that the top leadership of the butchers' union, and especially the international leadership, was against it, and above all, that neither in the Livestock Handlers Union nor in the Butchers Union did we have an organized opposition. As a matter of fact, we had no contacts inside of the Livestock Handlers Union. That is why, despite the leaflets, mass meetings and even department actions, we were unable to influence sufficiently the course of the development of the strike, although even our little activity scared the bosses and officialdom of the A. F. of L. and they really feared that the strike might be spread.

The Party units in the yards learned as a result of this strike one basic lesson, that it is not sufficient to have a Party unit organized, as we have several units now, with 63 Party and Y.C.L. members in the yards. It is not enough to have the Packinghouse Workers Industrial Union, which is weak; but it is necessary to have an organized opposition movement with a concrete program of action and demands inside of the existing locals of the A. F. of L.

Although the majority of the stockyard workers remain unorganized, the largest single number of workers organized in the stockyards are members of the A. F. of L.; butchers, livestock handlers; electricians, maintenance men and truck drivers are completely or partially organized in the unions of the A. F. of L. That is why it is absolutely necessary, in light of the Open Letter, the decisions of the Eighth Convention, and of the District Bureau, that the comrades become members of the A. F. of L. and develop work inside of the locals of the A. F. of L., working toward unification of the struggles and developing department struggles.

The problem of the united front of the workers is an important question. However, it can be realized not only by building the Packinghouse Workers Industrial Union, but by developing, above all, a powerful opposition movement inside the A. F. of L.

The building of the Party and Y.C.L. in the yards to 63 members shows that the workers are looking towards our Party for leadership, and that better organization of our

work, with clear political perspective, working inside of the A. F. of L., becoming members of the unions of the A. F. of L., will strengthen the work and will prevent further betrayals and sell-outs of strikes. Among other things, we must in a most patient manner explain to the stockyard workers that by joining the Party they must not drop out of the A. F. of L. On the contrary, the leaflet drawn up by the District Committee of the Communist Party calls upon the members of the A. F. of L. to become members of the Communist Party in order to become better fighters in the unions of the A. F. of L., that under the guidance and leadership of the Party they will be able to defeat the leadership of Gorman, Dennis Lane and faker Martin Murphy of the Stockyards Labor Council.

The units of the Party and Y.C.L. discussed the problems confronting us and in light of this organized their work better.

## Actual Experiences in Building the Party in International Harvester Co.

By A MCCORMICK WORKER

**B**EFORE THE Open Letter was issued to the membership, we had only four members in the International Harvester McCormick and Tractor Plants. Now we can say that we have a much better situation. For obvious reasons, we cannot go into actual figures on the number of units and members—but we can say that now we have an organization in the plants which is giving daily leadership to the workers in their struggles against rotten living conditions and against the bosses' attacks. We are continuing to make more progress. Here is how the work is done.

The work of building the Party was actually initiated by two active comrades—one comrade in the McCormick plant and the other in the Tractor plant. We had a small group meeting where we decided upon ways and means of building the Party. At the second meeting, one comrade brought in two new members and other comrades brought in a new member every week or two. Each month at least one new member is brought in by the comrades. In this way we increased our membership in a very short time.

How did we approach the workers? After our unit meetings are over (our meetings are short and to the point), we go to visit workers in our departments at their homes. Comrades go visiting in groups of two. This brought about wonderful results, bringing in other new members.

When we came into the workers' homes, we talked very simply about the happenings in their departments, actual working conditions, worsening of the speed-up system, etc. We always showed how these bad working conditions could be changed if we were organized and stuck together. We show to them why the Communist Party is the only working class political party that honestly fights for the workers' interests. Then we ask them to join this workers' Party. In this way in a short while we had new units organized in International Harvester.

What do we take up at our unit meetings? At each meeting, we take up the question of new members. We ask each comrade present to give us names of workers in his department whom he thinks we can bring into the Party. Then we visit these workers. Then the following week, just a few hours before the next unit meeting starts, we make another round of these prospective members' homes, reminding them of our unit meeting and that we expect them to attend. If possible, we even take them right along with us directly to the meeting.

At each unit meeting, we take steps to keep these new members in the Party. We hold educational discussions of the Party program, tasks of the unit in the shop, etc. Each week we assign a different comrade to study up and prepare a report on various subjects: one week a comrade reported on Manuisky's report to the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U., another week a report on the Party Convention, then on the Negro question, etc. In this way, we develop the political understanding of the members and draw them closer to the movement.

At the unit we of course discuss concrete conditions in the shop—just exactly what is happening in this and that department. Each comrade makes a short report on the latest development of the last week in his department. Then we discuss how we can develop struggles in the departments around these developments.

The results of this work are plain to everyone. Already we can see the presence of the Party being felt by the workers in many ways. More than that, the foremen and the company feel the presence of the Party. For example, the foremen no longer bully the workers nor swear at them as they used to before we became active. The foremen seem to have shrunk from big arrogant cats into quiet humble mice. How did we do this? We organized a simultaneous agitation in all departments against the foremen's slave-driving bullying tactics. We exposed these foremen personally by name in the Party shop papers (*McCormick Worker* and *Tractor Worker*), calling them down on the carpet for

their dirty work. When the papers come out with these exposures, some workers secretly place copies of the paper right on the foremen's desks, so that the foremen cannot but see their exposures. The foremen go up in steam when they read these exposures, and although they are raging with anger, they are afraid to attack anybody. Immediately, the workers notice that the foremen go easier on them.

The presence of the Party was felt in other ways. At a so-called "safety" meeting of the company, held each week, the foremen announced to the workers that if they forget or lose their pass-checks, they must pay 25 cents and lose a day's wages. This fine really amounts to about five dollars. We at once put up this question in the unit meeting and started a broad campaign in all departments both through personal agitation and through the shop papers, demanding that the company do away with these scandalous regulations. How effective our Party campaign was can be seen by the fact that at the very next "safety" meeting held the following week these regulations were withdrawn and the workers told that they could get new pass-checks without losing their day's wages.

No grievance of the workers, no matter how petty it may seem to us, is too small for our Party to give the closest attention to it. Here is another example of how our McCormick comrades mobilized the workers around a concrete issue. The workers "love" the McCormick plant so much that at quitting time, they hurry to the street cars at a fast walking and even running tempo. The company placed its bull-dogs at every gate to slow down the workers, take their pass-checks, and the next morning they were instructed to report at the employment office. There, about 150 workers were given a long lecture from 7:30 to 10 o'clock on their own time without pay. They were told, if it happened again they would be fined and if it happened a third time, they may be fired. The workers were aroused against this arbitrary rule. So the Party again took this question up in the shop papers, ridiculing this rule and making a joke of it. Result: the company was compelled to stop even trying to carry out this nonsensical ruling. The workers can see that it was the Party which was responsible for this good work.

The units consider their shop papers as one of our most effective and valuable weapons of struggle and organization. Before the Open Letter, the shop papers at International Harvester were badly edited, the articles dull and uninteresting, mostly written in the District office by comrades who did not work in the shops and therefore, did not feel

the workers' irritations and special problems. The articles were long, politically abstract and not connected with workers' own experiences. Never did the papers come out regularly. However, now, since the Open Letter, having taken up in detail our weaknesses and wrong methods in editing and issuing shop papers, we have changed the situation to satisfy the workers' feelings and needs inside the shop. How did we do this? Before the Open Letter, not even the Party members wrote articles. But now, not only do they write articles, but they get other non-Party workers to write department articles. Then they correct and edit these workers' articles and get them ready for printing. Unlike our previous issues, our shop papers became full of short snappy department items, shop news on simple concrete issues, connecting these issues concretely with the political program of the Party. We emphasized how these grievances can be met and remedied by organization and struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party. It is a very good idea, we found, to put the number of the department at the head of each article on department conditions. The workers want to read and learn what is being said about their own department. Variety of articles from as many different departments as possible is advisable. We have never missed an issue each month since the Open Letter. Workers are so enthused about the shop papers that they ask why they are not issued each week, and some say, each day. (Here is a great field for the sale of pamphlets, for the workers are hungry for our literature.) We take care of the actual distribution by getting concentration street units to assign comrades to distribute each issue of the shop papers.

The results of this work are as follows:

1. A considerable number of new members joined the Party through shop papers.
2. Prestige of the Party before the workers in the shop has been increased—workers look forward to the Party with respect.
3. Since the Party went into action, the wages of the workers went up 21 per cent.
4. Quite a few workers joined the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union. We will deal more fully with this question in the following article.

## Party Problems In Birmingham

By SYD BENSON

**T**HE KEYNOTE of the present period in the life of our Party in Birmingham is the organizational consolidation of our membership and influence. This process of consolidation must be carried on in the face of a wild wave of terror directed against the Party, seeking to drive us underground, and away from the masses. This process of consolidation must be carried through in the greatest spirit of concentration. Our forces must be placed in the main points, and must work among the basic masses in the shops and trade unions. Under all circumstances, we must build an apparatus able to reach the masses, able to function under any circumstances, able to recruit from the proletarian masses in the heaviest industries. We must organize a method of work which will develop new forces rapidly, educate our membership, increase our active membership, our dues payments, our *Daily Worker* and *Southern Worker* circulation, and the means to distribute literature and leaflets on a mass scale.

In the past period a series of strikes took place in the Birmingham area, strikes which included thousands of coal and ore miners from our points of concentration. These strikes were sold out by the corrupt leadership of the A. F. of L. without any serious opposition from the rank and file. Yet, we had great influence among the strikers to begin with, and, through our correct slogans and demands, this influence grew during the struggles. The basic shortcoming was in that we did not lay the greatest of emphasis on the units in the key mines, and develop our campaign as much as possible through our Party members in the mines, however new and inexperienced they were. Our agitation was confined to leaflets from the outside, while for the most part, our units in the mines stopped meeting, or carried on very little work, mostly disconnected from the Party as a whole and on an individual scale. At the very time when we should have practiced concentration in the real sense of the word, hit upon the key mines, where we had units and Party members, and developed a powerful campaign in the unions through these units, we stood by and allowed these units to fall apart while we rushed around with all sorts of agitation from the outside. Here we had a chance to train the units to function during struggle, to meet every day, or every other day, to pick out a few good comrades and develop them as the Unit Buro, meeting daily, and even twice daily when necessary. We could have turned these

comrades to real work in the A. F. of L. unions, which met almost daily, and taught them to raise problems, to build rank-and-file groups able to act as the articulate organ among the striking masses, bringing in the line of the District Buro, defending the interests of the men against the bureaucrats.

This demanded that we assign real forces to work among the strikers, forces able to develop the activity and initiative of our Party units and members, raw and new though they were. Instead, we found that some of our comrades, leading comrades, adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the non-meeting of the units, placing the question of picket duty as against unit meetings, bringing up the question of terror. These comrades thus failed to realize any organizational results from the strike, and failed to develop our comrades, and tended to substitute their individual agitation for the planned work of our Party members who were actually strikers and union members. This was the case in the Z—— Coal Mine of the T.C.I., the biggest coal mine in Alabama, where we had a unit when the strike started, and which we are still trying to rebuild. The example of this point of concentration must constantly be held up to our comrades as a sad lesson in how not to concentrate, in how not to work during a strike.

The wave of terror unleashed on May Day, the daily raids and arrests, the beatings and heavy sentences, the arrest of the entire leadership in May, all served to partly demoralize and confuse our local comrades, and for a time to hold back mass work. During this period, recruiting dropped to practically nothing, dues payments to little more, and our work among the striking ore miners, where we had a very good position at the outset of the strike, fell to almost nothing as far as exerting any planned campaign among the strikers in the union locals. This campaign of repression is still continuing, but the work of the Party is growing rapidly anyway. The dues payments have reached just short of the average before the terror and are climbing, and the recruiting is also up to the peak of last April. At the same time, we are learning to work in such a manner that the terror of the police only drives us deeper among the masses, working more closely in the organizations of the workers, primarily the trade unions. The past mistakes, the poor work during the strikes, and the terror, must teach us to develop a firmly functioning apparatus, connecting the units and Sections firmly, and above all concentrating on the key points, the points designated by the Central Committee Letter of July 16.

The Letter of the Central Committee discussed very

sharply our shortcomings in regard to concentration, especially the tendency to spread our concentration over too many points, thus losing the whole essence of what concentration means. The center also very sharply and correctly criticized our weaknesses in trade union work, in the building of an underground apparatus, our failure to organize the mass work of the Party, the mass distribution of leaflets, the building of fractions to guide the mass organizations, at the same time aiming our heaviest guns on our concentration points.

The Letter of the Central Committee had a very strong effect upon the leadership of the Party in Birmingham, and caused a very healthy reaction among the membership in the units and Sections. The rank and file comrades saw and appreciated the policy of the Letter towards concentration on the key places, placing before us concrete tasks and laying down concrete directives to realize these tasks. The Letter names as our concentration points just 3 places, the most important coal mine, the largest iron ore mine, and the main steel mill. And placing the main trade union tasks as building mass rank and file groups in the respective locals, in the U.M.W.A. local at the Z—— Mine, in the A.A. in the Sheet Mill, and in the local of the I. U. of M. M. S. W. at X——. All of these places are part of the T.C.I., the U.S. Steel subsidiary, which dominates the industrial life of the entire Birmingham area.

Since we received the C.C. Letter we have taken up in the District Buro the situation in each of these places week by week, inviting comrades from there to report, and assigning a District Buro rep to each place. An example as favorable as the Z—— Mine is bad is the work in the X—— Ore Mine. Here we had quite a large number of scattered Party members before the strike. After the strike we assigned a responsible comrade to daily work in rebuilding the nucleus. On the basis of individual attention, and serious work, we can now register a functioning membership of 30 comrades, with a functioning group system, and a rapidly advancing Unit Buro, meeting regularly, and directing the work of the groups. The unit is acting as a fraction in the union local, taking up the issues confronting the men, relief, the attacks of the gun thugs, etc., and the result is that we have two comrades in the Executive Board, and are winning the support of the membership for our policies. The experiences of the comrades in this nucleus must be transferred to the Sheet Mill, and to the Z—— Mine units, as well as to the Party as a whole, so that we will most rapidly carry out the directives of the Central Committee Letter, consolidate our position, develop the work

of our nuclei, especially in our points of concentration, strengthen ourselves in the trade unions, and "move forward from the leadership of the day to day struggles to the actual leadership of the big strikes and class battles that lie ahead."

## Are We Using the Tools at Hand to Help Build a Mass Party?

By ROBERT FRANKLIN

**I**N ANALYZING the work of the N. Y. District in its literature distribution for the last six months, we notice a progressive monthly increase. If we would just stop at the totals, 789,000 pieces and approximately \$50,000, we would not get the true picture of the role that the Party membership itself plays in this distribution.

First, we find that in the number of pieces distributed, the Party only distributed 26% of the total, and analyzing the money received, only 16% of the money came through the Party channels.

We all agree that the main task of our Party is organizing workers into our ranks. We all agree that one of the best ways to organize these workers is by having them read our literature. Understanding this, is it not criminal to find that on the average, only one Section has shown a distribution of 3 pieces of literature per week, per member; in 3 Sections, 2½ pieces per member, in 1 Section, 2 pieces per member; in 3 Sections, 1½ pieces per member; in 1 Section, 1 piece per member and in 4 Sections, less than 1 piece per member, per week? We can now see one of the reasons why our Party is not growing as fast as it should in this period of extreme radicalization of the masses of workers.

In considering the above distribution per member, we must understand that in it are included *The Communist, Communist International, Inprecor, Party Organizer*, and a mass of other pamphlets which in the main have not been gotten up for outside distribution, and taking this into consideration, the number of pieces of literature distributed to outside workers grows much smaller.

Of course, many of our comrades in the Sections and in the Districts will say that our Party comrades cannot wait till new literature reaches the Sections and then the unit, but that they will immediately go to the bookshop and buy new literature there. This may be true but this argument further strengthens our contention that the Party members

on the whole are criminally lax in the distribution of our literature to the outside workers.

In the campaign to save Comrade Thaelmann's life from the German butchers, consider the fact that in the New York District only 15,000 pieces of the "Save Thaelmann" pamphlets were distributed. This gives an idea of the extent that our literature is tied up with our general campaigns. In this Thaelmann campaign the Party has gone much further than in any of our popular campaigns in reaching the workers. It is true that we have made quite a good deal of progress in literature distribution through our mass organizations and on this point many of our comrades will say that it is our Party members who are doing the distribution there. But this is not exactly true, because most of these mass organizations get their literature directly from the District literature department and do their own distributing to their own members. The time is past when a member of a unit can say that he gets his literature through the unit and distributes it through the mass organizations. This serious shortcoming of literature distribution in the Party is the result of:

1. The turn-over of Section literature agents in the Sections is very great. At the present only 2 or 3 Section literature agents have been in this most important division of Party work more than 3 months. The Section still feels that the appointment of a comrade to take charge of literature distribution in the Section is a minor task, and one to be filled only because of the pressure put on the Section by the District. Any comrade who cannot be used for other important work in the Section is placed in this responsible position. We can safely say at the present moment that the personnel of the Section literature agents is far below the ability and the development that the position of this nerve center of the Party requires.

2. The complete lack of coordination and cooperation of the work of the Agitprop from the District down to the Section and into the units is another very important contributing factor for the poor distribution through our Party channels. There is absolutely no cooperation in the majority of our Sections and between the literature department and the Agit-props. The separation of these two departments in the planning of work can be illustrated by Section 17. This Section in planning its work for August First, took everything into consideration except the distribution of literature. When this was pointed out to the Section, the literature agent was told, "All right, you can distribute the literature."

3. Another very important contributing factor in the poor distribution of literature through the Party channels that we

have not yet learned, is how to combine our literature distribution with all our campaigns. Our leading comrades have not yet learned how to tie up this work with their plans. And of course, when these plans reach the units, the individual comrades of the Party take their cue from these plans and they leave out literature, as very few units show individual initiative, all this despite the fact that literature placed in the hands of a worker is one of the direct organizational steps in propelling this worker into our movement.

Another very important point in analyzing our report is the poor showing that we made in distributing our 13th Plenum material and the 17th Congress reports of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have had to actually force Sections to take this Plenum material and without exception we have had a good portion of them returned.

This underestimation, or rather offhand viewpoint of the writings on the world situation by our international leaders, is a direct result of the lack of work of the Agit-prop departments in the Districts and in the Sections. When we find such a poor distribution of our 13th Plenum material on War and Fascism, on Germany and Soviet China, etc., this becomes almost like an act of sabotage against our movement, for if only our Party members were to become familiar with the contents of the 13th Plenum material they would do their utmost to see that this material at least reaches the membership of our own mass organizations. This would immediately make for a tremendous distribution and a tremendous rise in the political level of the Party members and our sympathizers. This would act as a real vital organizational force in the movement.

The weakest point of the whole report is the poor showing of our trade unions. When we consider the membership of over 50,000 in the T.U.U.L. unions and the other numbers of thousands in the independent unions, we must stand aghast at this poor showing. We must say in this connection that the understanding of the leadership of these unions of the value of distribution is either all or that the service they render the movement on this important work is only lip service. This lack of distribution of literature in the trade unions is one of the reasons there is such a poor distribution of the Labor Unity amongst the ranks of the trade unions in the New York District.

We find that in the average Section only  $\frac{1}{4}$  to  $\frac{1}{2}$  the Party is in contact with the current literature. We find that the Sections look at this matter quite tolerantly and that in very few cases are the Unit Buros brought in to explain this holding up of the most important work. We invariably find that the average Unit Buro does not ask for a report

or take up the question of the literature distribution in connection with the unit work.

In conclusion, we can say that the work of the Party itself in the literature distribution has not even begun, and only when we as a Party reach that point where each member of every unit distributes not less than 10 pamphlets per week, and when the fact is so clear in the minds of our comrades that without literature the work by the Party cannot go forward, and that without literature no campaign can be successful, and that without literature we cannot organize workers into our ranks and when this fact has become imbedded in the minds of our Party members, that every Party member become a literature distributor and every literature distributor a Party organizer, then only will we begin to see real literature distribution in the New York District.

The following suggestions will illustrate how this is to be accomplished:

1. The organization of a District literature committee composed of a member of a trade union, member of a mass organization, member of the District Agit-prop, member of literature department and one other; this committee to meet regularly not less than once in two weeks.

2. Real cooperation between the District Agit-prop and the District literature department through the Sections and down to the units.

3. A combined meeting of Section Agit-props and Section literature agents at least once in 6 weeks. The regular meeting of Section literature agents with the District literature department every two weeks. A real attempt by the District Buro to finally establish literature distribution in our trade unions. The carrying out of discussions from the Sections into the units on the political and organizational importance of literature distribution.

4. The tying up of all our campaigns with literature distribution. All campaigns to be planned with this important factor included. The immediate obtaining of a column not less than twice a week in the Daily Worker on literature. The writing of articles in all our publications by our leading comrades so as to popularize and make the Party members understand and desire to read and study our literature.

5. The slogan of "Every Party member a literature distributor. Every literature distributor a Party organizer." Every member of the Party to distribute at least 5 pamphlets per week.

## How the New York Party Helped the Y. C. L.

By CHAS. KRUMBEIN

**A**T THE RECENT Conventions of the Party, District as well as National, tremendous stress was laid upon the question of work among the youth. This grows out of the situation in which we find ourselves in the country, as well as on a world scale, facing the danger of war and fascism. Since the Conventions there has been underestimation of the work in this field. It can be said that, generally speaking, we again have a situation where resolutions have been adopted, but far from sufficient is being done to apply these resolutions.

The New York District made some attempts, small but nevertheless a beginning. We felt in the New York District that, similar to many other questions, the Party was not conscious of the political significance of youth in the present situation, and, therefore, did not see as a Party task the winning of the youth. Therefore, we undertook what we labeled a drive which had as its main objective the task of making the Party youth-conscious. That is, that in the course of the day to day work in every campaign, in every field of activity, to see to it that we, the Party, along with the League, see and understand the problems of the youth in connection with the particular campaign or activity and project the proper demands for the youth, drawing them into organization and leadership. This drive we undertook some five weeks before National Youth Day, mapping out a plan of immediate tasks to be fulfilled, a drive that would fulfill these immediate tasks until the National Convention of the League, and from this point on, as a result of the drive, to get the Party as a whole to continue concerning itself with work among the youth.

For National Youth Day we worked out a plan, which, among other things called for the issuance of 200,000 leaflets, a manifesto on youth. This leaflet called upon the young workers, as well as the adult workers, to participate in National Youth Day. We got out 250 posters for National Youth Day, 25,000 stickers; and when the Y.C.L. asked the party in this District to take 10,000 of the special National Youth Day issue of the *Young Worker*, we took up the question with the Section Organizers. We increased this number to 30,000 which we actually took and distributed, as well as tried to get the trade unions to distribute an additional 7,000. We also undertook to sell 10,000 of the special pamphlet issued for N.Y.D., *Flanders Field*, and ac-

tually sold 15,000 in the District. We got out a discussion outline on the entire question that we sent to the units, Sections and fractions, and had quite a thorough discussion from the reports at hand.

We helped the Y.C.L. in a tag day for the purpose of raising money for the Y.C.L., actual results of which I have not had a report on.

### 1,000 Y.C.L. Members To Be Recruited by N. Y. District

Furthermore, we undertook to recruit within this period of 5 or 6 weeks, 1,000 Y.C.L.'ers for the Y.C.L. This was our weakest accomplishment. Partial reports that have come to me for 3 weeks of the 5, show that 110 were actually recruited. Surely this cannot be compared to the task we set ourselves. We did not see this as an unrealizable task because we know that in the past large numbers of youth have been involved in the struggles carried on by the revolutionary movement. We believed that with the 6,000 Party members in the District at that time, it wasn't too much to expect that on the average, one Party member out of six could recruit a Y.C.L.'er into the Y.C.L. from the shop or from the neighborhood organization in which he may be working. Undoubtedly more than this has been recruited, but the figures I have are only 110. The Section Organizers gave us a counter-plan when we got them to accept the quotas of 1,000, which amounted to 1,400 but we fell far short of this number. I think that the preliminary work that we did already reflected itself in our May Day demonstration. Here we had large numbers of young workers participating. We should mention especially the student section of the parade where over 3,000 participated. The youth were very conspicuous in the industrial sections of the parade as well as in fraternal organizations, clubs, etc.

National Youth Day was above the expectations of all of us and is a clear picture of what we can do to win the youth to our side and thereby considerably shatter the base of imperialist war and fascism. We had about 12,000 in the line of march, (a very hot day) and an additional 25,000 in the meeting after the parade. Altogether there were some 37,000. I should have said that in preparation we also organized Section membership meetings of the Party to thoroughly acquaint the members with the importance of the questions, as well as mobilizing them for the actions that we planned. We also, and this was carried through with some success, instructed all of our shop units issuing shop papers to see to it that either a special issue or special material went into the shop papers for the month preceding National Youth Day on the question of the youth. Those shops where

large numbers of youth are employed had a special issue, or special material went into the shop papers for the month preceding National Youth Day on the question of youth. Those shops where large numbers of youth are employed had a special issue and those in shops with less youth, had some special feature material in the shop papers.

We tried very hard to involve the trade unions in this drive. I think we had some small results in this connection, but surely not in the degree it should merit. The trade unions should be interested in this question, because of the large numbers of young workers engaged in industries, and should work among the youth to win and retain them in the trade unions.

The work generally was strengthened a little bit, but far from what we must achieve in the trade unions in connection with this phase of work.

The Party gave considerable assistance in the radio industry to our Y.C.L. comrades and quite some success has been attained. We have a united front Council that has been established with organizations of about 1,000 members. 90% in the industry are young workers. At the conference, our comrade in the leadership was elected chairman of the Council by an overwhelming majority of votes. Many valuable lessons for the Party as a whole can be learned from the activities among the radio workers, showing how to work and the possibilities for work.

The relationship of the Party and Y.C.L. respective committees, as well as the units, has considerably improved precisely because of the attention the Party has given to putting into life the youth resolution adopted at the Convention. We more than fulfilled our Convention control tasks insofar as youth work is concerned.

#### Party's Help Encourages Youth

There are shortcomings and weaknesses in the Y.C.L., but to the degree to which the Party shows some attempts to carry out its tasks it becomes a tremendous factor to get the young comrades to give serious attention to their weaknesses and with the Party's advice to make real efforts to correct the serious weaknesses in the Y.C.L. We saw this at the Y.C.L. District Convention where the Party had six delegates. The District Organizer, Org Sec'y, a leading T.U.U.L. comrade and leading Section Organizers.

We could see the enthusiasm of the Convention which, undoubtedly, reflects the attitude of the membership of the Y.C.L. to the Party. There is a completely changed situation as compared with a few months ago. This was seen also at the National Convention of the Y.C.L. As is to be ex-

pected, the District's attention to this work caused some improvement in the Sections and units of the Party. Section 1 had a big follow-up action after National Youth Day, distributing several thousand leaflets, got quite a turnout and some good results. This Section shows the best recruiting of Y.C.L. members.

I have not mentioned in detail our entire plan, which included the establishing of Y.C.L. shop nuclei, not putting forth a general slogan, but picking out certain shops where the situation is favorable and there try to establish the Y.C.L. Full reports are not in yet. Section 4 is responsible for organizing a Y.C.L. unit. Section 6 organized a Y.C.L. unit in Ridgewood, a territory where the youth is affected by Nazi propaganda. Section 7 organized a Y.C.L. street unit of about 10 members. Section 9, in Jamaica, recruited about 10 members, etc. I am pointing out only a few of the actual accomplishments.

The Y.C.L. in this District has grown substantially in the recent period, from about 500 to 1,600 in the last year with 31 shop units. This doesn't mean much when we consider the possibilities.

Another task is to retain the Y.C.L. members recruited.

#### Party Shares Responsibility for Shortcomings in Y.C.L.

Partly because of the bad situation within the Y.C.L. we have a situation where we have more members of Y.C.L. age within the Party than within the Y.C.L. itself. I think one of the reasons was, and is, because of the bad inner life of the Y.C.L. Serious young workers did not take the Y.C.L. seriously. This is not only the fault of the Y.C.L., but the Party must take its share of the responsibility. We must recognize this and attempt to overcome it. We must help in improving the whole life and work of the Y.C.L. and retain what the Y.C.L. has gained, and keep the 1,000 members whom we expect to recruit within the next few months. In this connection we are making efforts to put some of the young Party members into the Y.C.L. work, making them feel that the best service they can give to the movement is to work within the Y.C.L., winning wide sections of youth.

The important lessons to be drawn are that the youth are receptive to our message. The question of serious attention to the youth is one of the important problems and tasks of the Party. In New York we have to increase our activities and I think that every District of the Party will have to give much more serious consideration to this question and really give attention to it and start some work.

## Strengthen the Fighting Ability of the Party

By J. PETER

**T**HE RESOLUTION of the Eighth National Convention of our Party characterized the New Deal as "the aggressive effort of the bankers and trusts to find their way out of the crisis at the expense of the millions of toilers . . . The New Deal is a program of fascism and the most intense preparations for imperialist war . . ." The recent struggles in Toledo, Minneapolis and especially in San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland proved the absolute correctness of this characterization of the Eighth Convention of our Party. These struggles furnish us with rich experiences as to the trend and content of fascism and as to the problem of the functioning of the Party under difficult conditions. Comrade Browder in his article in the *Daily Worker* (August 4) on the San Francisco situation drew a picture showing how the extra-legal fascist forces financed by the bankers and supported by the Local, State, and Federal government tried to terrorize the workers and how the Party continued to function in spite of the most vicious fascist terror.

In San Francisco, out of 47 Party units, 46 met regularly in this period. Many of them every day. Twenty-two units issued leaflets independently during the strike and the concentrated effort of the fascist bands and police could not get more than an insignificant number of leading comrades.

The question we would like to deal with in this article is: why is it that the Party in San Francisco succeeded to a great extent in destroying the plans of the bourgeoisie, in preserving the fighting capacity of the Party, and in maintaining contact with the masses.

What was the main object of the bourgeoisie?—To isolate the Party from the masses, to cut off all transmissions which connect the Party with the toiling masses, to destroy physically the Communist Party because the bourgeoisie recognized the important role the Communist Party played in developing the mass united front of the toilers on the west coast.

What method did they use in San Francisco and Seattle?

1. Organized mass agitation using the press, movies, churches, etc., to spread their rotten poison against the Communist Party among the population.

2. The utilization of extra-legal fascist forces (vigilantes, American Legion, etc., and the uniformed gangsters, the police) to:

a. destroy the leadership of the Party,

b. to destroy the headquarters of the Communist Party and the revolutionary mass organizations, and the literature and press of the revolutionary movement.

The San Francisco example proves to everyone, who had any doubt, that the American fascism in action is the same as Thyssen's brown army—as Mussolini's black guard, etc.

The San Francisco terror is a serious warning to our Party that no time can be wasted to plunge into the work with more energy and tempo,—root the Party in the factories, building the united front in the shops, docks, mines,—among the unemployed on the streets,—organize the fractions in the A. F. of L., independent unions, and other mass organizations. The mass united front will defeat the terror and the bourgeoisie will never succeed to isolate us from the masses if we have strong, functioning shop nuclei, and fractions in the A. F. of L. and other mass organizations.

In this article we will deal with the problem of forces. The bourgeoisie knows very well that by destroying the leading forces inside the Party, the effective work of the Party is hampered. But the bourgeoisie in San Francisco did not realize that our Party was also aware of this simple fact, that our Party had started to learn from the experience of the German Communist Party, and was prepared for such an attack. Because of the alertness of the Party, only few leading comrades of the District Committee were arrested during the terror and a few leading comrades from the sections. The picture would be entirely different if the comrades had not been trained for such a situation. The District, Section, and even Unit leadership would have been taken by the bourgeoisie, put in jail for a shorter or longer period, and in this way the work of the Party organizations would have been crippled.

In this regard there are two main lessons to be drawn from the experiences of San Francisco: 1. The proper safeguarding of the Party leadership; 2. The development of forces which immediately can take the place of comrades who fall into the hands of the enemy during struggles.

What are the problems we face in connection with the first question?

1. We know very well that the fascist terror in San Francisco, Seattle, Portland, Toledo, Minneapolis are not isolated cases, but a definite trend towards fascism in the United States. We know very well that in the present situation we need honest, sincere, steeled, leading comrades who will not break down under any circumstances. But are we sure that our leading forces are composed of such elements? Have we systematically examined our comrades in the District,

Section and Unit leadership? Have we examined their past? Have we watched their role and their behavior in different situations? If we consider the rapid development of fascism, the intense preparations for imperialist war, we dare not forget for one moment that the effective work among the masses will depend not only upon the reliability and stability of our leading forces, but also upon our having broad cadres and many reserve forces. The Center, the District and Section Committee should immediately start to examine every individual leading comrade in the organization. We have to know everything about our leaders,—about our staff from top to bottom,—their social background, their personal connections, their ability in doing certain phases of work. We must be sure that if we put a comrade in a certain position, he will fulfill the tasks and will not waver or break down under any circumstances. If we neglect to examine thoroughly our leading cadres, systematically, in time,—if we don't make this a permanent task, we will pay very dearly in the coming period. There is no time to lose! Every day, every hour counts.

#### Safeguarding our Party Apparatus

We have to safeguard our leading forces and the Party apparatus. It is understood that the leading comrades should be in the forefront of every struggle of the masses. If they fail to do this, they will not have the confidence of the masses, but, at the same time, we must find ways and means to protect these comrades from being arrested in a situation similar to San Francisco. Every comrade must have prepared already today a place where he or she can stay in case of any emergency; the home of a sympathizer who is not known by the police should be secured in advance so that when the terror breaks, the comrades can disappear from their home. We will not always know when the bourgeoisie will attack us; therefore we must be prepared at all times. We have to keep in mind that the bourgeoisie has an efficient apparatus in following up the leading forces of our Party and the Party apparatus also. They know quite well where prominent comrades live. The fact that the home address of a leading comrade is not known by other members of the organization is not a security against the police.

The most important problem in connection with the question of cadres is the development of new forces and at the same time the training of all our forces to do the work independently. Today in most of our Districts, there is yet a very unhealthy situation in regard to this question. There are many excellent exceptions, but we cannot say yet that the majority of the lower organizations of the Party have already independent life. The activities of the sections and

especially of the units are directed by the higher committees through instructions. In the event of an emergency situation, similar to San Francisco, when it will be very difficult to send these instructions down to the lower organizations, if there are no developed comrades in the sections and units who on their own initiative continue to work, the organizations will cease to function or will not function with full strength and ability. In San Francisco, for example, approximately half of the units issued leaflets on the situation in their own neighborhood, mobilizing the population for sympathy to the general strike. These units did not wait for any instructions. The comrades in these units and sections realized that the Party does not cease to function if instructions do not come from above. They realized that the unit is the Party in the shop and in the neighborhood, and they have to continue their work under any circumstances. We have to develop our forces today to use the greatest initiative in their work and not to wait for org. letters, to apply the general line and policy of the Party to the problems of the shops and territories. If we fail to make our cadres in the lower organizations realize the importance of this orientation, we will lose connection with the masses in situations where the fascist terror is unloosed against us. And that is the object of the bourgeoisie.

#### Developing New Forces

Another problem which we have discussed so many times in our resolutions and articles is the question of developing new forces. In Germany, thousands and thousands of leading functionaries were arrested, killed or sent to the concentration camps, but, when one leading comrade was arrested, there was another one to take his place. There was a systematic conscientious policy in the Party to develop new forces by the thousands. The question of continuous follow-up of every promising member of the party in the unit, in the section, individual attention to these comrades, schooling, promotion of forces from the lower committees to the higher committees, selection of promising comrades who are leaders in strikes, unemployed struggles, will help us to a great extent to solve this problem. There is yet a weakness in many of our Districts which must be overcome as rapidly as possible, and that is the failure to develop and bring forward to the leadership American elements. The new cadres must be developed mainly in the actual and concrete Party work, but this must be supplemented by the necessary training. Our new cadres will be developed on the basis of carrying on work among the masses, and through a maximum increase of the political activities of the Party by which the ideological level will be raised. How can we talk about de-

veloping new forces in the units when we find that in many units of our Party, in some of the concentration Districts, the Resolution of the Eighth Convention which was held in April, had not yet been discussed in July? How can the comrades in the units carry on independent work independently when they do not understand the general line of the Party?

One of the main sources for the training of new forces is the proper development of collective leadership in the Party organization. In the election before the Party convention, hundreds of new forces were elected to the Party committees in the sections and districts. But they have not been sufficiently drawn into the work, developed and trained. Many new comrades are coming forward in the fractions of the unions and mass organizations. Do we see to it that these comrades get political training? The basic weakness of our Party in many places is that one or two old comrades, in reality, do all the work. Nothing is easier than to build around one old experienced comrade a committee composed of new promising forces and distribute various functions among them. The result will be that the work will be really carried out and, in addition, these old comrades will be able to perform their real job of leadership and, which is most important, scores of young active comrades will be trained in the work and developed. The best forces, the best leaders, will come from the factory nuclei where the comrades are in constant touch with the masses, know their reactions on every issue, and will properly reflect the mood of the masses in the leadership. We have to concentrate on these nuclei, select the comrades there and develop them further in the Party. We know that we will have tremendous struggles in the coming period.

The possibilities of giving leadership to the fighting toilers are greater than ever before. The general attack of the bourgeoisie on the living standards of the workers (rising prices, wage cuts, speed-up) against the civil rights of the masses, the development of fascism, the war danger, increase the tasks of the Communist Party. We need more and more forces to carry on the work. Thousands of Communist leaders are needed to agitate, propagandize, organize the workers in the shops, unions, on the street, the starving farmers on the countryside. We need forces to work among the toilers in uniform.

In the coming struggles we will have many victims. Many of our leaders in the units, sections and districts will have to be shifted from one place to another in order to avoid persecution. We will have to replace these comrades. Our reserve forces must be built up now. There is no time for delay! Events are moving rapidly!

## Experiences of Shop Nuclei

In order that there may be an interchange of experiences of shop nuclei the Organization Commission has sent questionnaires to each district for reporting on the activities, growth and experiences of all the shop nuclei in the district. We have also asked each district to send us the outstanding experiences of the shop nuclei. These shall be printed from time to time in the *Party Organizer* and in the *Party Life Column* of the *Daily Worker*. Two of these reports follow. We urge every district to follow this example and send the experiences of the shop nuclei to the National Office of the Party.

### Shop Nuclei in Steel Mills in District 6

In M—, the units played an important role against the company unions. We issued leaflets, exposed the company unions in the shop paper, and carried on a general agitational campaign in the mill. We held a mass meeting in the Park which exposed the role of the company union and the lay-off. The results were good as far as the company union is concerned. In the June elections the vote for the company representatives was very small.

We have a small functioning opposition group in the A. A. which is carrying on a fight against the lay-offs in the mill, following the general policy as outlined in the shop paper, i. e., demanding that relief committees be elected, that all the needy members be registered, and that a fight be carried to the county and city relief organizations demanding immediate relief for them; this struggle to involve all union members, the unorganized and the unemployed, generally. At the same time, to organize a struggle against the Republic Steel Corp. demanding that a minimum of \$5.00 weekly be paid by the company to every laid-off steel worker.

In C—, not much has been done since the steel strike sell-out. Only general agitation in the mill, exposing the company union in the shop paper, and whatever we can do through the opposition group that we have in the A. F. of L. B, the opposition leader in the Federal Local in the Berger Division of the Republic Steel, has been elected delegate to the C. L. U. here and a central opposition group is being organized. We expect to get much better results in the immediate future.

## Shop Nucleus in a Cigar Factory in Dist. No. 25, Builds Opposition Group in A. F. of L.

**N**UCLEUS F 1 was formed in the middle of May with three new Party members in the shop and one outside member. The main activity was to convince the workers of the correctness of the Party policy within the A. F. of L. unions. At that time not one belonged to the union. A shop committee of seven, including the Party members, was formed. By the end of the month, most of the workers in S. C. joined the Party. At one of the picnics of a sympathetic club, the correctness of the Party decision on joining the A. F. of L. was discussed, although, in the beginning, the nucleus members talked very "radically" against the A. F. of L.

The workers present, non-Party members, gave proof of the existing confidence of workers in the A. F. of L. Especially was the Independent Union policy criticized. Its wrong methods and past mistakes narrowed our influence. The workers of this shop now say that they do not join the unions because they have faith in the A. F. of L. leaders, but in order to organize strong oppositions inside the union.

At the first joint membership meeting of the A. F. of L. locals more than 300 workers were present. The shop nucleus mobilized all the forces at this meeting, and forced, together with others, the adoption of a program of demands that suit the cigar makers. The comrades however, failed to carry out a decision of the Rank and File Committee to present the demands. This is the immediate task, and, through the shop committee, it is being explained to the rest of the workers in the shop.

Because of the above activities, the unit has grown to seven and the shop committee to 12, including Party members. However, it failed to extend its influence to other departments in the shop. Our forces are the cigar makers only. They are the overwhelming majority in any cigar factory; in this one, over 100. The nucleus collects weekly nickels from workers in the shop for general Party activity, leaflets, etc.

## Experiences With the "Midland Worker"

**T**HE FIRST ISSUE of the Midland Worker came out last April, after a long silence of its predecessor, the Hot Rivet. It is issued by the Communists working in the Midland Steel Products Co., of Cleveland, Ohio. Three issues of 700 shop papers and one of 250 have been put out, with no more than a half a dozen workers turning them down. Better known as the "Midland Butcher Shop," the shop victimizes its workers, who say that they all must be stool-pigeons if they are to keep their jobs, to the worst degree, slashing wages, cutting down hours, demanding more work in less time out of machines ready for the scrap pile, and refusing to employ safety devices.

It is with these conditions in mind that the shop paper has carried on an exposure of the N.R.A., linking them up with Roosevelt's policy of "remembering the forgotten man" and the mass struggles of workers against the fascist forces of the government in Toledo, San Francisco and Minneapolis, and raising the revolutionary way out of the crisis as the only means for the workers to raise their standard of living and finally establish a government under which they will be able to live like human beings.

In April the Company issued two letters. The first explained to the workers that the N.R.A. did not demand the workers to organize and asked them to come into the office individually and talk things over. The second announced that business was poor and that the Company had to reduce its force very much. To these we answered with a challenge, but a poor one. A poor one because it was inadequate. We should have demanded that the Company show that the workers do not need to organize by restoring wages to the 1929 wage level, by paying for lost time, by paying cash relief each week that the workers are laid off until the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill is passed, by paying a two-weeks' lay-off wage, by abolishing speed-up, by recognizing the Midland local of the S.M.W.I.U., and by endorsing H. R. 7598. In this way the exploitation by the Company would have stood out in bold lines.


In August the main issue in the plant was the fight against lay-offs. Our front page article raised the necessity of the passage of the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill, calling upon the workers to organize committees in every department to demand that the bosses pay cash relief in

the meantime. Likewise, in an editor's note to a letter asking whether the Company should pay the workers' carfare or not when it asks them to report and then sends them home, we called upon the workers to organize grievance committees to demand carfare from the bosses. Another article interpreted the strike wave, drawing the conclusion that "the Roosevelt program of remembering the forgotten man is a hunger program, keeping the working class chained to the interests of the bosses, denying it every right that labor could use for its protection and reaching into its midst to find fakers to betray it", and bringing out the lessons forged in battle—namely, "1. The rank and file must be in control"; "2. Strike committees must be elected by the workers"; "3. Police terror must be answered with solidarity"; "4. Fakers must be exposed and thrown from our ranks." Against this background of treachery and betrayal we bring the results of building Socialism in the Soviet Union, where the workers own and operate the factories, mines and mills.

By interpreting the mass struggles of workers and the actions of the bosses and their allies, by drawing the inevitable conclusions and showing the concrete organizational way out, we try to rally the greatest number of workers around our Party in the shop. The results may be seen in groups of workers discussing the shop paper during lunch hour and after working hours. They may be seen in the correspondence from the shop. For example, a letter asking the I.L.D. to take up a case of inhuman speed-up immediately. Here, of course, was required an editor's note explaining the function of the I.L.D. and bringing forward the S.M.W.I.U. and the Party.

But the shop paper has more organizational influence on the workers than our comrades in the nucleus. Their meetings are irregular and little real work is being done in the shop. Not for one moment must we forget that the shop paper is an instrument for our Party in the shop. A shop paper is only as good as the nucleus which publishes it. Our first Bolshevik determination must be to make a real fighting nucleus in the Midland Steel. So far no organization has made any considerable headway in it.

# Party Organizer



"The Election Campaign must be conducted by the entire mass of Party members, not by the leaders alone; it is necessary to make use of and be in complete touch with all the manifestations of the masses (strikes, demonstrations, movements among the soldiers and sailors, etc.) going on at the moment; it is necessary to summon all the masses of the proletarian organizations to active work."

The Communist Party and Parliamentarism: Thesis of the Second Congress of the Communist International.

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No. 10

*Issued by*

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

Vol. VII

OCTOBER, 1934

No. 10

## Make the Betrayal of the Workers Impossible

By EARL BROWDER

A WONDERFUL army, the army of the striking textile workers in the North and South, was betrayed by its generals. The strike was called off, the strikers sent back into the mills without having won even a single one of the strike demands. "The greatest victory of the workers"—that is what the Gormans and Greens call this betrayal. But the calling off of the strike must be called the greatest betrayal of the workers, carried out by the Gormans and Greens.

A wave of hatred and anger against this sort of labor leaders is rising in the breast not only of every Communist, but every other honest worker, every honest trade-unionist. It is with this kind of tactics that the German trade union leaders helped Hitler to power, it is with this kind of tactics that the reformist trade union leaders in all countries disorganized and demoralized the workers. With this kind of leaders one helps the company union campaigns of the employers. With this sort of leaders, misery, demoralization, fascism are inevitable. With this sort of leaders there can be only defeats and no victories.

These scoundrels dare to accuse the Communists of organizing strikes irresponsibly for the sake of striking. When we Communists propose a strike we do it in order to win the necessary demands.

But what do this kind of leaders do? The textile workers were striking for three weeks. They were starving. They fought against armed forces. Fifteen were killed, hundreds wounded, but the morale of the strikers was not broken. Even the Gormans themselves had to admit this before the strike was called off. But now they call off the strike without the demands having been won.

Yes, an unheard-of betrayal. But here one question arises which every worker, and especially every Communist must ask himself. That the Gormans and Greens would try everything to betray the strike is nothing new for the class-conscious worker. But this is not all. The

other question must also be asked. How was it possible that the Gormans were able to betray the strike?

And to this question there is only one answer, and every Communist must candidly give himself this answer:

### Communists Were Not Strong Enough to Prevent Betrayal

Because the Communists were not yet strong enough among the textile workers to prevent this betrayal. Because we have not yet brought into the Party hundreds and thousands of the most active textile workers. Because we have much too few organized Communist nuclei in the twelve hundred textile mills. Because the *Daily Worker* is not yet the daily paper of tens of thousands of textile workers. Because we Communists were not yet the driving and organizing force of the unified action of the textile workers against the bureaucrats in every local of the U.T.W. Because we Communists have not yet seen to it that in every local of the U.T.W., honest rank-and-file leaders are put in the lead. Because we Communists have not yet to a sufficient degree popularized the policy of the Party in order to make harmless the insidious Red scare.

Because we have not yet taught the workers to a sufficient degree to conduct the strike over the heads of the leaders, not only to begin the strike but also independently of, and over the heads of the leaders to continue the strike with their own strike committees. Because we Communists have not yet to a sufficient degree exposed to the workers the whole demagogy of Roosevelt and of the arbitration boards.

Yes, the betrayers betrayed. That is their business. But the task of the revolutionaries is to prevent the betrayal, to make it impossible.

It is true, we Communists were everywhere active in the front lines of the struggle, on the picket lines. We fought well in the ranks of striking textile workers. In every phase of the struggle we showed the workers the next step, what they have to do in the interest of the strike, what they have to watch out for. Wherever we had forces we organized in general.

But that is just the question—"where we had forces". In hundreds of towns, in hundreds of mills, in hundreds of U.T.W. locals we have not yet any, or only very weak forces. That is the crux of the matter. As an organizing force, we Communists were still much too weak among the hundreds of thousands of textile workers in the thousands of mills, to prevent this betrayal.

Let nobody make an excuse of the difficulties of the task, the terror, etc. To overcome just this, and to overcome it quickly, that means to be a revolutionary, a Communist.

### The Tasks of the Communists

What are the conclusions to be drawn from this strike?

The struggle showed that there is a tremendous power in the American working class, and showed at the same time that this tremendous power can be disorganized by treacherous labor leaders. It shows at the same time the still tremendous weakness, namely the absence of sufficiently strongly organized Communists among the textile workers. But without this factor, there can be no victory despite the heroism of the striking workers.

Our tasks are therefore clear. We must not, as we did so often in the past, leave the field. We must increase our work among the textile workers tenfold, we must now utilize all connections which were built up during the strike in order to strengthen the Party, the press, the organized groups and the U.T.W. locals.

We must carry on tremendous political and organizational work among the textile workers, individually, in smaller and larger mass meetings. In every nucleus, in every local, in every unit, in every section and district in the textile territory, the whole work of the Party must at once be checked up on, in order to find out who fought well, who was a failure, in order to improve our work at once in order to increase the rate of growth of our influence among the textile workers. The *Daily Worker* must be built into a mass paper among the textile workers.

To make impossible the betrayal of the betrayers—that means better work—that is the conclusion that we Communists must draw from the hatred against the betrayal which is surging through tens of thousands of workers.

## New Tasks In the Election Campaign

By R. GRECHT

**T**REMENDOUS mass struggles of the deepest significance to the entire labor movement have been taking place in the United States in the recent period. The San Francisco general strike brought American labor to a new high level of action as a class. Now we are in the midst of the greatest labor battles in American history—the general textile strike.

In all these struggles, the developing power of the mass resistance of the workers to the New Deal hunger program has been answered by the capitalist class with increasing violence. This is particularly evident in the textile strike. The complete mobilization of the National Guard in the South and New England, the murder of strikers and the threat of the use of Federal troops, martial law in Georgia and the threat of martial law in Rhode Island, the establishment of a concentration camp, Hitler style, in Georgia, for arrested pickets, clearly reveal the strike-breaking role of the capitalist government and the advance of fascist methods of terror.

There is already evident a widespread breaking down of New Deal and N.R.A. illusions as a result of the experiences of the masses not alone in these strike struggles, but also in the worsening situation among the unemployed and threats of curtailment of relief, in the desperate conditions of the poor and middle farmers under the A.A.A. However, it is the task of the Communists to give this disillusionment conscious direction into channels of revolutionary political action.

The present situation demands of us a most intensive campaign to unmask bourgeois democracy and the capitalist State; the broadest utilization of the election campaign to expose the two major capitalist parties and politicians, as well as the Socialist Party, Farmer-Labor Party, Progressive Party in Wisconsin, and to bring the Communist election program before the broadest sections of the toiling population.

### Examination of the Campaign In the Districts

An examination of the election campaign in various districts shows that the campaign is lagging seriously, and is still widely underestimated. In most of the districts the first stage of the election campaign—placing our candidates on the ballot—has been completed, and to a certain extent

an election campaign apparatus established. But the second stage of developing a mass election campaign, in a manner which shows the leadership of our Party in the struggles of the masses, has not yet been definitely undertaken. The approach to the election campaign is as yet too formal. It is considered too frequently simply as another campaign of mass meetings and leaflets, while the necessity of the most intimate linking up of the election campaign with every struggle of the workers, every action led by our Party, has not yet permeated our ranks.

For the remaining period before November, every district committee, every section committee and unit, should review the status of the election campaign, and find the ways to carry out the directives of the Central Committee.

Not a single action shall be undertaken by our Party, in connection with the textile strike, unemployed struggles, anti-fascist movement, farm relief, etc., in which the election program of the Party shall not be brought forward. To every step taken by the government—nationally, or on a state and local basis—to support the textile or other capitalist interests, to safeguard capitalist profits, to intensify fascist methods of terror against the workers, we must react quickly with a sharp exposure of the role of the capitalist State, bringing forward in answer the program of our Party.

Communist candidates must be in the forefront of the actions and struggles of the masses. They must be popularized among the toilers. They should strive to establish personal contact with workers in their election districts, through participation in the local, shop and neighborhood struggles, through group meetings of workers, house to house canvassing with our literature and press. The sectarian approach to the utilization of candidates, basing itself on an abstract, impersonal approach to the masses in the elections, must be speedily overcome. The masses will grasp our program more readily when they hear it through our candidates and see it in their activities. At the same time, this will help to expose the bourgeois and social-fascist demagogues who try to divert the resentment and sharp discontent of the masses into safe channels of supporting social-fascist and "progressive" capitalist candidates.

We must at once extend our campaign to reach new strata of workers, new organizations, with special attention to the American Federation of Labor, to Negro organizations. We must utilize those forms and methods which are suited to the actual state of class consciousness and preparedness of these organizations, emphasizing the sections of our pro-

gram which most meet the needs and interests of these elements.

It is essential to involve the mass organizations supporting our program and candidates in independent activities. All too frequently, these organizations merely participate in the actions of the Party, without themselves undertaking to reach new masses on the basis of their own contacts, their particular role and program, through their own leaflets, meetings, symposiums and debates as on the Negro question, Unemployment Insurance Bill, Farm Relief Bill, etc. This applies, among others, to trade union and unemployed organizations, farm organizations, language and fraternal bodies, cultural clubs. Not is it sufficient to obtain the endorsement of leading committees of these organizations. We must strive to reach and activate the membership down below, so that they, in their shops, neighborhood, labor and fraternal organizations, may act as individual agitators and organizers for the Communist election program and candidates. This cannot be accomplished without an effective mobilization of our fractions in the mass organizations.

#### Planned Activities In Last Weeks of Campaign

We must emphasize strongly that during the remaining weeks of the campaign, every district and section should develop systematic and planned election activities in the factories of concentration, bringing our program to these workers, connected up with their shop conditions, through leaflets, shop papers, shop gate meetings, group meetings of workers from the shop, etc. At the same time, we should follow out a concentration policy in the election districts where our influence is strongest and we have the best opportunities to win the masses for our program and candidates; which means a concentration of forces, speakers, leaflets, election programs, literature, *Daily Worker* and other language press, house to house canvassing, etc. It is particularly necessary to penetrate the neighborhoods where the Negro masses live. A campaign of mass agitation and propaganda should be developed, without which it will be impossible to rally mass support in the elections.

While intensifying our activities in these various aspects of the election campaign, we must at all times bring forward clearly before the masses our revolutionary goal. The struggle for the workers' immediate needs, represented in basic demands in our election platform, should be bound up in all of our agitation and propaganda with an explanation of the Communist position on the workers' way out of the crisis, and for a Soviet America. The statements and editorials on this question in the *Daily Worker* should be

used as a guide, and popularized among the masses. In this way we will more effectively expose the social-fascists and demagogues of all shades, counteract the "Red scare," and win the masses for our Party. In this way we will be able to carry through one of our principal tasks in the election campaign — to build and strengthen our Party through recruiting the militant fighters from the ranks of the toiling masses.

## Youth and the Elections

By J. MARKS

THE problem of winning the toiling youth of America for the support of the Communist election program was never as important as it is in the present campaign. On the part of the youth there is the greatest participation in the present wave of strikes. The number of youth on strike during 1933 and this year far exceeds that of the post-war period, first because in the last decade youth have been drawn into industry on a large scale and in spite of layoffs the proportion of youth in industry is higher than in the post-war period; second, the present strike wave involves many industries in which there are large numbers of youth which in the past were either completely unorganized or not affected by strike struggles (auto, textile, etc.). In these strikes the youth stand out for their militancy. In the textile strike the youth form a large core of flying squadrons—many youth are among the killed or wounded. In the present wave of strikes the youth who have been newly involved in the class struggle are learning for the first time the role of the State. Many of the deeper illusions about democracy are being shattered for the first time. It is the duty of our Party and League in the present election campaign to approach especially the youth, many of them first voters, and turn their bitterness against Government strikebreaking into conscious political understanding. The election campaign is the means for increasing the political awakening of the youth and winning them as supporters of the Communist program.

#### Necessary to Combat Fascist Appeal to Youth

The capitalist parties have an understanding of the feelings prevalent among the youth. That is why they have launched campaigns to recruit the youth for Young Republican and Young Democratic Clubs, which at present

number hundreds of thousands of youth. The Republican Party has set itself the goal of recruiting 4,000,000 youth for its Youth Clubs. The Republican Party utilizes the widespread unemployment among the youth and the failure of the New Deal Government to provide youth relief, the growing disillusionment with the New Deal, to gain the support of the youth for its program. They resort to fascist flattery of the youth to win them. They point out that the present difficulties of capitalism are attributed to old leaders and their policies and that youth is the key to saving the system and for instituting changes in policy.

The best barometer of how easily the youth can be won for the Communist program and to what extent they have advanced in political understanding was witnessed at the First American Youth Congress which was held in New York in July. At this Congress, which was sponsored by a fascist group, connected with the Federal Government, the mass of delegates coming from religious, sports, pacifist and the most varied type of youth groups, rejected the proposals of the committee sponsoring the Congress and rallied behind the program of the Y.C.L. and the Left group in the Congress. Most of these youth had no previous contact with the Y.C.L. Few knew of its exact program. But this cross section of American youth, workers, students, etc., in the discussion at the Congress, saw the correctness and logic of the Communist program. Their own experiences taught them that the way out as proposed by the Y.C.L. answered their needs. The success won at the Youth Congress can be duplicated in every city in America where our program can be brought to the youth. It can result in a large increase in Communist votes that will come from the youth. More than that a proper campaign among the youth will be the best means for converting widespread radicalization among the youth along conscious revolutionary channels and will be a stimulus for building the Y.C.L. and doubling its membership by January 1, the task that was decided upon at the Seventh Convention (July 1934).

### Special Youth Demands Must Be Popularized

An effective campaign among the youth demands in the first place a wide popularization of the special Y.C.L. national demands as well as local youth demands. This will not be done effectively if it will become the tasks of youth candidates or the Y.C.L. alone. The special function of the Y.C.L. in the campaign is to be the best helper of the Party, to win the youth to the Communist program. It can do this if every election leaflet of the Party, if every mass meeting of the Party, if every Party candidate

makes a special appeal to the youth based on the election program of the Y.C.L. and on the local needs of the youth. It is especially important for the whole Party to explain to the youth the revolutionary aims of the Party and what a Soviet America will provide for the youth.

The special demands of the Y.C.L. are:

1. For replacement of the C.C.C. and Transient Camps with unemployment insurance and jobs at trade union rates for all youth, Negro and white. Against the discrimination of youth in relief.
2. Equal pay for equal work for young and old, Negro and white. Against the discrimination of youth in the industrial codes.
3. For the right of all over 18 years to vote, including soldiers, sailors, C.C.C. youth. Old enough to work, old enough to vote.
4. Vocational training for all youth between 14 and 18 years of age, under workers' control and at full wages. Government support at no less than \$3 per week for all children under 14 now working.
5. Immediate Federal appropriations for opening all closed schools and for building new school buildings, playgrounds and recreation centers, especially in Negro territories.
6. Against all form of capitalist militarism. For the immediate abolition of the National Guard.

The above program with few changes was adopted by the American Youth Congress.

In the present election campaign the Y.C.L. is undertaking, not only to force the granting of suffrage to youth over 18, but on Election Day, through young voters' committees, and youth election committees, special election booths will be established in as many cities as possible. There the youth between 18 and 21 will be supplied ballots and will vote on their choice of programs and candidates. The results of their vote will be made public and will be sent to Government authorities. This is aimed at stimulating political activity among this disfranchised section of youth and to create in them the determination to fight for the right to vote. In addition special parades and picket lines in front of polling places will be organized to demand the right to vote.

(Other features and problems of the youth and the elections will be elaborated in the Daily and in other publications. These must be studied by Party as well as League comrades).

## Election Campaign and Unemployment Insurance

By M. RAPORT

**O**UR Party is entering the election campaign of 1934 under conditions much different from those in 1932. Objectively the broad masses are disillusioned more than ever before, with the fake promises of the politicians. Roosevelt's promise in 1932 that "no one shall be permitted to starve" and all the other promises of the New Deal, are becoming clearer to the toiling masses as promises for hunger, war, and fascism, but the disillusionment of the masses and their readiness to struggle depend on how quickly our Party can react and mobilize the workers against the forces of reaction.

### Lessons From Past Campaigns

In entering the election campaign of 1934, it is necessary to draw some lessons from the previous campaigns in which we have participated (1932). The central demand of our Party in 1932 was Unemployment Insurance, around which we were supposed to rally the unemployed and employed workers in a united front to struggle for more relief, against forced labor, shorter hours, etc. It meant that every Communist was to penetrate every unemployed organization, build fractions, and concretely expose the fake leadership who were using the misery of the masses for their own ends.

However, our Party in District 12 did not understand the united front policy, and failed to realize that a united front is an integral part of all our activities, that it must serve as a connecting link between our Party and the workers. While formally accepting the line, the actions were to the contrary. The District leadership failed to realize that 25,000 workers (Seattle) organized their own organizations (the U.C.L.) for the purpose of improving their conditions, and were being betrayed by the leadership led by the Musteites, and we failed to recognize that it was the duty of our Party to form a united front with the rank and file, based on correct leadership, to oust the fakers. The District Committee issued the famous slogan "Smash the U.C.L." which separated our Party from the workers to the extent that while the U.C.L. headed by the Musteites and other politicians was flourishing, we had a small Unemployment Council with a few Party members, isolated from the workers. At the same time the fakers utilized all our mistakes to strengthen themselves among the masses, using

the organization as a vehicle in the election campaign by electing Dore, Stevenson, Zioncheck, and a host of other politicians to the state legislature. But the fakers knew that a mass organization of unemployed would constitute a grave danger to them, and they decided to break it, particularly when our Party learned from the mistakes, and organized a real united front Hunger March, and succeeded in capturing the County-City Building for three days.

And in this historic event our Party, while abandoning the "Left" sectarian slogan "Smash the U.C.L.," pursued a Right-wing line, hiding the face of the Party, told the workers to go home peacefully, failed to raise Unemployment Insurance as a basic demand, and even collaborated with the police, and the commissioners. The District Bureau did not meet to guide the workers. Failing to recruit into the Party, all this helped to break the morale of the workers and to weaken the organization, which played into the hands of the Musteites.

Consequently, the Party faced the task of fighting against Right and "Left" sectarian methods as speedily as possible in order to save the organization and become a leader of the masses.

### Unemployment Insurance the Central Demand

Unemployment Insurance has become the fighting demand around which the Party began to come out of its sectarian rut, began to lead struggles, organized forced labor strikes, stopped evictions (temporarily), won increase of relief, and finally culminated in a real united front Labor Congress (September 1933) with 319 delegates present around the central demand of Unemployment Insurance.

The correct application of a united front policy to Unemployment Insurance (although with many mistakes and shortcomings) helped to weld the unity of the employed and unemployed. We saw in the Maritime Strike, that the U.C.L. became one of the leaders in the strike, mobilizing their membership to clean the scabs off the waterfront, participating in the picket lines, obtaining relief for the strikers, taking initiative in calling a general strike, also teaching the longshoremen and seamen how to defeat the fakers in the I.L.A. and the I.S.U., based on their own experiences. In many cases the misleaders of the I.L.A., and the I.S.U. were forced to retreat.

During the recent fascist attack, led by the government against the militant strikers and our Party, we found that our Party was able to function best precisely where we had our roots amongst the masses. Wherever we had no contact with the masses we suffered the most.

In the fall election of 1934 a greater barrage of demagoguery is being peddled, from Roosevelt down. All politicians in the state of Washington are promising Unemployment Insurance to the workers (in 1932 they promised to build Socialism within the shell of capitalism), Old Age Pensions, and Social Security. At the same time they are feeding the workers tear gas and machine guns, smashing strikes, depriving the workers of their elementary rights more than ever before.

In the light of this experience our Party decided to place The Worker's Unemployment Insurance Bill before the state legislature which convenes January 15, 1935. It requires the collection of 50,000 signatures by January 6, 1935. Thus we shall force the state legislature to act on it at once, and if they say no, the Bill must go on the ballots in the next general election.

### Collection of Signatures MUST Be Accompanied by Other Activities

The collection of signatures gives our Party a wedge to come to hundreds of thousands of people who are looking for a way out. However, we must be careful not to supplant the collection of signatures with other activities. On the contrary the collection of signatures must become a rallying point in the election campaign, to struggle for more relief, against forced labor, concretely to expose the N.R.A., and must be used as a means of building our Party and press. Every action taken, such as demonstrations, street meetings, visiting homes, strikes, other activities, must center around Unemployment Insurance.

Already some disrupters and many politicians are raising the question "what's the use, you tried it last fall, and you only collected 30,000 signatures. Why not support us, and you will get Unemployment Insurance." We must remind them of the promises that they made in 1932, and that after they were elected, workers were clubbed and jailed for raising their demands.

The failure to get the 50,000 signatures last fall was due to the opportunist leadership which still had some foothold in the U.C.L. (Dobbins) which carried on a double book-keeping, which deliberately failed to carry through the plans of our Party, which stifled the initiative of the locals, and supported capitalist politicians in the last city election. We have learned that in order to become leaders of the masses, our units must meet regularly, our unit bureaus must function, our fractions, which are the connecting link between our Party and the mass organizations, must meet regularly and plan the work.

Therefore, the collection of signatures must reach the broadest masses, and it is clear that during the election campaign every rally organized by all candidates must be canvassed for the collection of signatures. We must call for mass endorsements at every meeting, demanding from the politicians, their position on the Worker's Bill. Unemployment Insurance Clubs must be organized in the neighborhoods. Every local of the A. F. of L. must be visited, a broad collection of signatures must be made in the shops and in the mills, the busiest corners in the city must be covered, demonstrations held in the city councils and before the county commissioners, forcing them to endorse our Bill. All this must lead to preparation for the mass mobilization of workers for collection of signatures at the polls on November 6. County Hunger Marches are to be prepared for the week of November 10 to 17. We must begin to make preparations immediately for the state Hunger March for January 15, when the state legislature meets, to be there to support our demands.

All these activities give our Party an opportunity to bring into our ranks hundreds of workers who are ready to join our Party. In every step that we are going to take in this campaign, the Party must be brought forward as the leader. Our answer to Roosevelt's program of hunger, war, and fascism, must be a united front of all workers under the leadership of our Party.

## The Election Campaign in the Countryside

By J. B.

**T**HE Communist Party platform of immediate demands for the election campaign is a basis for building up broad united front support. We can get influential people, groups, and organizations to support the immediate program, who might not agree at all with the ultimate aims of the Communist Party. It is possible and in various cases desirable to have non-Party candidates run on the Party ticket, providing, of course, that they are good fighters and accept the program of the Party ticket. Concerning the support of organizations over which we have control, in many cases it is better to have them endorse candidates and the immediate platform rather than endorse the Communist Party as such. In other cases where official endorsement would tend to cause a split or narrow down our mass organization it would be better not to try to force through

an official endorsement in the organization but to get as much support among the individual members as possible. The Communist demands have wide sympathy and we can rally broad masses around them.

### Daily Needs of Farmers In Communist Platform

A distinguishing characteristic of the immediate demands of the Communist Party platform is that they contain the vital every-day demands of the poor farmers, which, if we are going to win, require a real struggle of the exploited farmers, an alliance with and under the leadership of the workers. In other words our fight is a revolutionary, a class fight, on these every-day issues. No other party stands for such a fight—a fight under the leadership of the powerful working class.

The socialist leaders and the Farmer-Labor leaders are afraid of real unity between the workers and poor farmers and of working class leadership with its vanguard, the Communist Party. They want lawyers, businessmen, big farmers, labor bureaucrats for their leaders.

### Distinction Between Communist and Reformist Demands

We know that any real benefit for either the poor farmers or the workers must come at the expense of the interests which rob and exploit them both. This means a real fight, a real mass struggle on as broad a united basis as possible.

Here is the big distinction between the revolutionary class demands and the reformist demands. The reformist demands try to get something without costing the bankers or landlords anything,—some reform, some New Deal, some tariff, some inflation, etc., which the bankers will be willing to give without a struggle on the part of the toilers. They try to make the farmers think there is an easy, painless, struggleless way out. But these reforms cost something and this something is taken out of the hides of the poor farmers and workers. While the reformists say nice words and raise illusions the farmers' pockets are robbed, and perhaps a little bit handed back to make them keep quiet. (The processing taxes, for example). The farmers themselves have many illusions too, which the reformists cater to, but which we must expose. The Communist Party, on the other hand, always puts forward demands which make the exploiters pay, and to make them pay means a mass fight. No other party keeps to such a principle.

Our election campaign is one way of mobilizing our mass strength to win these vital needs of the exploited farmers. Here we find one of the most effective answers

to the idea "If you vote for the Communist ticket you are just throwing your vote away, Communist candidates won't be elected." We must answer the farmers, first, if you vote for some other Party you vote against the exploited farmers and workers because all other parties are against them. Also, the Communist candidates have been elected in a number of places, and are going to be elected in greater numbers. But most important of all, even if the candidates are not elected, the greater number we get to support these demands, the more we are able to win. This is our principle of mass struggle. Just as in a demonstration, strike or other struggle, every extra person we are able to rally in support makes us stronger, helps us better to win.

### The Way Out For the Farmers

While the Communist Party goes into the election to fight for and help to win the immediate demands we also want the exploited farmers and workers to learn that the Communist Party is the only political party which will lead them in the correct way not only for their daily needs but also toward a lasting solution of their problems through the establishment of a revolutionary workers' and farmers' government. The election campaign gives us an excellent opportunity to do this in a very practical way. If we do not bring forward the Party, as they failed to do in South Dakota for instance, the farmers do not learn that only the C.P. can lead them every day and for the final solution. On the other hand the farmers may even begin to feel that the Communist Party leadership is not necessary, because they do not see it. The revolutionary way out of the crisis is a fundamental distinction between the C.P. and all other reformist parties, Socialist Party, and openly capitalist parties.

The election campaign should bring many new members into the Party because they see that it is really the only party with a real solution, both now and finally.

In explaining the advantages of the Revolutionary Workers and Farmers Government, Soviet Power, we can very effectively popularize the advance of agriculture and industry in the Soviet Union and the rising standards of living. An especially effective comparison can be made between the way in which the Soviet workers and farmers met the drought danger and the New Deal's welcome of the drought destruction here.

In showing the difference between the Communist Party and all other parties, it is important to explain that the Communist Party stands for and fights for the poor and

middle exploited farmers and never for the large farmers. All other parties without exception, especially the Farmer-Labor Party, cater to the large farmer and capitalist elements. Any such party that pretends to represent the interests of the big farmers and at the same time the interests of the poor farmers, is trying to fool the poor farmers, because the interests of the two groups are opposed to each other. Reformist parties talk about "all" farmers, try to make the farmers believe that there is no difference between the rich and the poor farmer, but at the same time they work in the interests of the big farmer. The big farmer lives by exploiting others, while the poor farmer lives by his own labor. The Communist Party works for a direct alliance of the workers with the poorest and small farmers. Middle farmers also, while they may fairly frequently hire labor, are much more exploited than they are exploiters of other people's labor. They have their major interests in common with the small farmers and workers. Therefore the Communists try to draw them into the alliance of the poorest and small farmers with the workers. The election campaign should be a very important factor in showing to these exploited farmers that their interests are inseparably bound up with the workers.

In the campaign we must pay special attention particularly in the West, where the farmers are so politically active, to drawing agricultural workers into prominence and leadership and into the Party. We have not paid enough attention to the agricultural workers and every effort should be made to being among them and to carrying on consistent work among them. We will find it of special importance to make extra efforts to break into the small towns and villages where rural workers live, in order to win them to support us. The agricultural workers serve to form a link between the city workers and the farmers, they become strategically very important.

### The Communist Campaign and the Drought

In this election the Drought Relief Campaign is the central issue among the farmers. The drought also affects all of the toiling population—a splendid united front issue. At the same time it is tied up with the campaign against the A.A.A., the New Deal, with the campaign for the passage of the Farmers Emergency Relief Bill, and the whole fight for relief and better conditions for the farmers.

We should also show the similarity between the Roosevelt and the Hoover-Republican program. Special effort and attention must be given to expose the demagogy and fine words of these leaders, since many farmers still believe

and are affected by them—compare their words with their deeds! We should also become very familiar with the activity of the Farmer-Laborite leaders, etc., so that we can expose them concretely as well as by their paper programs.

In the Campaign special plans must be worked out to distribute and get new subscriptions for the *Daily Worker* and for the *Farmers National Weekly*. These are excellent means of carrying on an educational and organizational campaign on a wide scale, and of maintaining contacts after the election is over. Besides the national leaflets on the election platform and on the farmers' situation, many leaflets should be printed and distributed.

In this connection it is well for the Party members to become more familiar with basic Party documents which will be of great help in understanding how the Communists approach the farmers' movement. The *Second Congress Thesis on the Agrarian Question*, should be read, *The Communist Position On the Farmers Movement*, *Lenin's Infantile Sickness*, and *What is to be Done* will give a start.

In carrying on the election campaign in the country it is necessary for us to give attention to all of the demands of the national election platform, the anti-war and the anti-fascist points and the building up of these campaigns are of tremendous importance in the rural sections.

## Building a Mass Unit in a Concentration Mine

By BILL WILSON

THIS article deals with the Party unit at the X—— mine in Bessemer, Alabama, the largest iron ore mine on Red Mountain, property of the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railway Co., and one of the three concentration points in District 17.

During the great ore strike on Red Mountain during May-June of this year the Communist Party units in the ore mines, which were very young and inexperienced, made the grave mistake of stopping to meet because of picketing, daily union meetings, police terror, etc. At the time the strike began we had about 30 Party members on record in the X—— Mine. Toward the end of the strike we made strong efforts to get contact with the comrades in the camps and were finally successful in getting three comrades out to a meeting. This marked the beginning of the organization of one of the strongest Party units in the District.

With the few contacts we had gained it was impossible, under conditions of illegal work, to prevent the sell-out of the strike although we succeeded in raising enough opposition to postpone the acceptance of the agreement for a day.

Working with the three comrades we had contacted, we succeeded in drawing back a few more of the Party members for meetings. With these comrades we discussed the new problems at the mine, the tasks of the Party unit and methods of organization. The main grievances of the miners were that the scabs continued on the job, getting preference over the union men, the building of the company union by the scabs, the muckers (who form the large majority of the miners) got \$3.45 a day instead of the agreed upon \$3.60, and no pay for dead work or overtime. And 12 days after the company resumed operation the T.C.I. shut down this mine, in order to smash the bona fide union and to weed out the militant union men. At the beginning the major activity of the unit was distributing leaflets which gave the miners guidance on how to better their conditions.

### Problems of Organization

The problem of organization was difficult. We started the group system with groups of five to seven miners in a group with a group captain. The group captains were to form the unit bureau and plan the work for the whole unit. In order to have this function properly we picked the most militant, advanced and aggressive Party members that we had contacted to form the bureau. By the middle of July we had the unit bureau meeting regularly and planning work.

The main problem, the organization of the groups around the group captains, was much slower. When we were able to go into the camps we held large meetings of Party members, instructing them on the tasks of the Party unit in the mine and on the functioning of the group system. These large meetings were very enthusiastic and gave us a real estimate of our strength, once we had it organized in functioning groups. Almost six weeks now we have worked to make the group system function and can already record certain progress. A few of the groups actually function, others not so well, but all the comrades are willing to carry on work. More instruction and educational work will determine how well they will function.

The unit bureau, which has been fairly stable and is becoming more stable each week, is forming plans of work for the whole unit which include the following:

Recruiting for the Party. Since the first week in July the comrades have recruited from two to four members each week and have built the unit up to a membership of about 50. Some of these new members have turned out to be very aggressive and are taking on the most important work in the unit. Recruiting continues each week in planned recruiting meetings. There is a plan for getting white miners into the Party and already we are preparing a recruiting meeting for several of the most militant white miners. This will be one of our largest steps forward, and a most decisive one.

Building rank-and-file groups. The plan here is to organize on certain issues the support of the rank and file miners around the Party groups to support our proposals. We can record some successes already (pushing one of our comrades into office and winning over another on the Board) although we have not been able to utilize anywhere near our real strength. We have managed to push through the endorsement for a United Front demonstration for relief in the last week or two.

Building the Y.C.L. Here the bureau decided to organize the Y.C.L. around each Party group, set up the Y.C.L. unit on the group system and form a unit bureau, having a Party member attend the Y.C.L. group meetings and the bureau meetings, and having a Y.C.L. comrade on the Party unit bureau. So far we have one of the most militant young workers on the Party unit bureau who is in charge of organizing the Y.C.L. and this week we held our first recruiting meeting where we got five Y.C.L. members. Now that we have a foothold the organization of the young workers will go much faster.

Daily Worker, Southern Worker and other literature. Starting from scratch we have built up the circulation of the Daily Worker to 50 of the Saturday edition and a regular bundle of five. Payment for these gets better as the unit becomes more consolidated, so that the last report included payment for almost all of our bill. The Southern Worker sent 100 copies to this unit and for the last issue everyone has been paid for. Other literature that came to the unit has not been paid for and perhaps will not, but new shipments will be paid for because the unit is more consolidated. Considering that the Party members were on strike for eight weeks and then after 12 days work were laid off again, our success here was not so bad.

Dues payments. This important gauge of our work has not been nearly good enough. We have had some dues payments but they have been sporadic. Now we are having another membership check-up, as a means of more firmly

establishing the group system and getting the comrades to pay dues regularly. This has been stressed a great deal and it should not be long before the dues payments are regular.

### The Life of the Unit

The study group. The unit bureau started to study Comrade Browder's Report to the Eighth Convention. During the last few weeks we have not continued this study but we are taking it up again at the next bureau meeting. The comrades are anxious to study and learn so the study group will continue as a regular part of the bureau meeting as we had originally planned.

The most successful work the unit has done was to have their union local endorse a call for an unemployed demonstration which was issued by a rank and file committee. Although the leaders are trying to sabotage this demonstration, every indication at the present time is that we will succeed in getting the unions to take part in the demonstration.

The Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill has been presented to the union and although the leaders are trying to stop it by saying the National Convention endorsed it and that was enough, the mass support for the Bill will undoubtedly force it through over the heads of the leaders.

The unit issues leaflets regularly on every issue that confronts the workers in the mine and in the union. Through the leaflets we have gained a great deal of influence and in the coming weeks we will have our baptism of fire which will be the real test of our strength in the X— Mine. Already we are fighting a vicious Red scare in the union and at present we seem to be coming out victorious. The T.C.I. bosses are quoted as saying, "We don't give a damn about the union, it's that God-Damned Communist Party we want to get rid of."

## A Study of Fluctuation In the Chicago District

(Excerpt from Report of J. Peter to Central Committee)

**T**HE Central Committee, at its July session, after discussing the unsatisfactory situation regarding the growth of the Party and the question of fluctuation, decided to examine the lower organizations in several districts in order to ascertain the reasons for the high fluctuation and unsatisfactory recruiting.

This decision was carried out immediately and in July

three concentration districts were visited. Although only five days were spent in each district, a thorough investigation was made of at least two units and one section in each district, from which certain facts were learned and certain conclusions drawn.

In the investigation, the Commission concentrated on the work of the street nuclei, where the fluctuation is one of the most outstanding problems. One or two shop nuclei were also examined, and it was discovered that in the shop nuclei there is practically no fluctuation. In fact, there has been a definite improvement in recruiting through the shop nuclei. There are also many street units in the districts which function very well, participate in and lead the struggles of the workers in their territories, do real mass work, recruit new members, build mass organizations, spread the Daily Worker and grow steadily, entirely eliminating fluctuation.

The examination of the units and sections was based on the following points: (1) Mass activity of the units as an independent Party organization; (2) utilization of the Daily Worker, literature, leaflets, shop papers, neighborhood papers, meetings, etc.; (3) initiative of the unit; (4) leadership in the unit; (5) inner-Party education, discussion; (6) dues-paying apparatus; (7) method of recruiting; (8) composition of membership; (9) guidance from higher committees.

In order to ascertain the actual fluctuation in the units examined, a comparison was made of the membership in each unit today with that of six months ago. In this article we will deal only with a portion of the examination conducted in the Chicago District, which with slight variations is the picture presented by all three districts.

### Territorial Unit Loses Seven Members

In Section 7, which covers a territory of Negro and white population, the commission examined a territorial unit, which six months ago had 20 members: five social workers, seven housewives, one storekeeper, one peddler, one janitor, three office workers, one shoe worker and one hotel worker. Of these eight were employed, either in offices or on relief jobs. Seventeen were native born. There were three Negro women—housewives, and 17 white members in the unit. This was the picture six months ago. Today the unit has 15 members; seven dropped out of the Party.

Why did these seven members drop out of this unit? The three Negro housewives had been in the Party almost a year, and had been very active. They were in the forefront of every struggle. They have all dropped out, but, what is most interesting, have remained in the I.L.D., where

they are very active. We tried to find out why all of the Negro comrades dropped out of this unit. The comrades tried to explain it on the basis that they got tired; that they had no money to pay dues, etc., etc. Only after a more thorough discussion were we able to learn the real reason. We found that at the unit meetings, the white social workers and office workers occupied the floor all of the time, pushed the Negro comrades in the background, and that there were definite white chauvinist tendencies in the unit. This point came out only after cross-examining the unit bureau. This unit recruited two members during the six months—one lawyer and one social worker. Two other members were recruited through the general activities of the district and assigned to this unit. There is no organized discussion at the unit meetings; discussions are not prepared. The agenda of the unit is based on the Section Org. Letter and checking on the activities of the mass organizations (the unit has an I.L.D. branch and Unemployment Council in its territory with a membership of approximately 100). The Resolution of the Eighth Convention had not been discussed, and only 100 Manifestos of the Convention had been distributed. Eighteen *Daily Workers* are sold daily by two comrades of the unit. The other comrades are not involved in soliciting for the *Daily Worker*. In six months, no leaflets of any kind were issued by the unit, and with the exception of one protest meeting against police brutality, no meetings were organized.

#### No Political Life In Concentration Unit

The next unit which we examined was a unit concentrating on a railroad yard employing 400 workers. Six months ago this unit had 14 members. In this period no new members were recruited, but four of the original 14 dropped out. With transfers in and out, the unit today has 13 members, of whom three are native born. All members are paid up in dues to date, and nine or ten attend meetings regularly. The unit bureau does not meet. In the six months period there was only one discussion—on the Election Campaign. No leaflets were issued; no meetings were held in the name of the Party unit. No *Daily Workers* were sold in the unit territory. Of the 13 members, only one reads the *Daily Worker* regularly. Six buy the *Party Organizer*. Literature is not sold by the unit, and only 100 copies of the *Manifesto of the Convention* were distributed. An agenda of one of the meetings was as follows: (1) Election of Chairman; (2) Roll call, checking on dues, etc.; (3) Railroad Work—one comrade assigned to help distribute the *Daily Worker* at the yard on Mondays; (4) Activity of the Unemployment Council, which has 120 members, with

five Party members in it leading the organization; (5) Raising money for the Section; (6) Signature Drive for the Election Campaign; (7) Demonstration Against Discrimination; (8) Activity of the I.L.D. (which has a membership of 10, with 4 Party members).

#### A Good Example

The Commission examined another unit, in Section 4, Chicago, which can be held up as an example of how a unit should function. This unit is concentrating on a machine shop employing approximately 500 workers. Six months ago there were only seven members, six of whom were foreign-born. The social composition of the unit was 100 per cent proletarian. During the last six months, the unit recruited 7 members, and expelled one disruptive element who was suspected of being a spy. Not one member dropped out of the Party during this period. Today the unit has 14 members (one gained through transfer). During this period it has built up a shop nucleus inside the concentration factory. The street unit has two brigades for concentration—one which brings the Party's face to the factory, sells *Daily Workers*, distributes Party leaflets and shop papers before the factory gate; the other a union brigade, which agitates the workers to join the Metal Workers' Industrial Union, distributes union literature, union papers, etc. The leadership of this unit is young. The organizer has been in the Party 9 months; the agitprop director 8 months; but these comrades understand how a Party unit should function. The unit bureau, which meets regularly and works out concretely the agenda for the coming unit meeting, discusses ways and means of developing the work among the masses in the territory and in the concentration point. Every second week the unit has a street-corner meeting in the name of the Party unit. The basic weakness of the unit consists in the fact that only two members live in the unit territory, but despite this, splendid work is done among the population of the territory. Every member of the unit buys five pamphlets of every new edition and sells them to other workers. The unit sells 60 *Daily Workers* and 100 copies of the Saturday issue. Because of the many young workers in the unit territory, the unit bureau decided to organize a soccer team. Two comrades were assigned to organize it and in two weeks the organization was built, creating great enthusiasm among the young workers. In this sport group, the assigned comrades lead regular discussions on political questions. Four comrades, who are assigned to unemployed work, work as a brigade and report regularly to the bureau on their activity, and the unit bureau, after a discussion, brings the main problems before the unit

meeting. Of the 14 members, 13 read *The Communist*; 10 the *Party Organizer*. The unit has a discussion at every meeting, prepared a week in advance by the bureau, and material is given out to every member to read on the subject a week in advance, resulting in very interesting discussions on current problems. There is real enthusiasm among the Party members for the work. Every member of the unit is paid up in dues, and from 11 to 13 members attend meetings regularly. Those who are not present have legitimate reasons for absenting themselves.

### Conclusions From Examination

What general conclusions can be drawn from the examination, as to the cause of the unsatisfactory growth of the Party and the tremendous fluctuation?

1. The most outstanding shortcoming, from which many others flow, is the weak leadership in the lower organizations. The Party has not yet carried out the task set by the Open Letter of shifting the center of gravity of Party work to the development of the lower organizations, the factory nuclei, section organizations and street nuclei. There is still too much reliance on written directives from the higher bodies, and insufficient daily guidance to the lower organizations. If the situation is to be changed, the Party Committees must take immediate steps to develop the forces in the units and sections, by patiently helping and teaching the new undeveloped cadres; showing the unit bureaus how to plan their work, and encouraging the lower organizations to use the greatest initiative in their work. The members elected to the Section Committee are not activated sufficiently. Two or three comrades carry all the responsibility in the Sections.

2. Another shortcoming, flowing directly out of the first, is the extremely weak, and in some cases the lack of political life in the units and sections, which become merely the apparatus in the hands of the higher committees for leaflet distribution, money collection, etc. It is easily understandable, therefore, that many members, not only new ones, but even older comrades, not having any perspective in their work, and not receiving any political education become discouraged and drop out of the Party. Regular discussions in the units, carefully prepared from material supplied by the higher Party Committees will help to strengthen the political life of the unit.

3. The *Daily Worker* should be utilized more as a guide for the work not only by the District Committees, but by the lower organizations. Most of the units examined by

the Commission did not understand fully how the *Daily Worker* could be of help to them in their work.

4. Insufficient effort to recruit new members for the Party. In some cases, recruiting is not carried on because of fear of spies. But in general we do not recruit because there is no systematic, daily hammering at the necessity of getting new members into the Party. At the same time, the Party organizations, especially the units, do not come forward to the masses as the Communist Party, but work among them as representatives of various mass organizations. As a result of this method of work, the workers in a given territory do not know that a Communist Party exists in that territory; they do not know what the Communist Party stands for, and as a result the poison spread by the demagogy of the bourgeois politicians finds a fertile field.

5. In those units where the membership reads the Party literature and the *Daily Worker*, good work is done, the fluctuation is cut to a minimum, and the general mass work of the unit is more effective than in the other units.

6. In most units there is an insufficient reaction to local political issues.

7. Insufficient work is carried on among the Negro masses; there is general confusion on the Negro question; an insufficient struggle is carried on against white chauvinism, and there is too little systematic work for developing new forces from among the Negro members, as well as from the native-born white workers.

8. Too many unemployed members are dropped for non-payment of dues. The Party organizations must find some method of solving this problem, since a large majority of our membership is unemployed, many of whom either receive no relief, or receive only food, rent checks, etc.

9. There are too many collections in the units. The unemployed members cannot contribute to the various campaigns, and even the employed workers find it very difficult to contribute to the numerous collections. The Party must learn how to develop these campaigns among the masses, thus increasing the effectiveness of the work, and relieving the Party members from the heavy financial burden.

### Fluctuation Can Be Stopped — Every District Must Set Up Commission

The work done by the Special Commission is only a beginning. It must be continued by the establishment of special commissions in every district. In most cases, despite the reasons given by the comrades who drop out of the

Party, a close examination will reveal that we lose our members, not because of personal reasons, but because of political and organizational weaknesses in the Party organizations. Such investigations will help us correct our work, and enable us to quickly change the unsatisfactory situation in regard to fluctuation and recruiting.

## Directives of the C.C. on the Recruiting Campaign

**A**T THE Eighth Convention of our Party, with unanimous enthusiasm, it was decided to carry on a recruiting drive to bring our Party to 40,000 members by January 1, 1935. Today, the membership of our Party is just about the same as last January. Not only is the turnover 100 percent, but, most alarming, is that the figures of the last three or four months show a continuous decline in recruiting.

Here we give only one example which shows in the most glaring manner the fundamental reason for the failure to carry out recruiting as a daily task for each individual Party member. At a fraction meeting of one of the unions, at which 266 Party members were present, to the question, "How many of you in the last month have recruited one or more Party members?", only ten comrades raised their hands; which shows that 256 Party members in a union of thousands, were not able in the period of one month to convince a single worker to join the Party. And this is in New York, where we have a strong Left wing, where the Party is comparatively stronger than in the other districts, and where we have the press, etc.

We see that individual Party comrades are not performing one of the elementary Party tasks. Is this because our comrades are unable to convince the workers, or because the workers resist entering our ranks? No! It is because the individual Party members are not orientated towards this fundamental task. The example given above shows that in the recruiting drive which we must launch with all our might, we must solve primarily the question of how to increase the recruiting activity of the Party members. On this basis we will also cut down the fluctuation, inasmuch as the new recruits will be recruits from the shops, from the unions, from the locals where we have oppositions. Thus the new Party members, together with the older ones, will be immediately confronted with the problems of their shops,

their unions, and in this way, enable us more easily to retain them in the ranks of the Party.

Of course, to activate all the Party members we will have to give more attention to the inner situation in the units and fractions, since we cannot call every Party member separately to talk to him as an individual. Therefore, we will succeed in carrying on the recruiting drive, if, simultaneously with the drive, we will carry on a real campaign of enlightenment, of education, and develop correct methods of work in the units and fractions.

What does this situation show? That we did not yet succeed in putting into effect one of the cardinal points of the Open Letter,—namely, the development of personal contact with the masses which can only be done through individual members. The solving of this problem not only will intensify recruiting, but will solve another basic problem of the Party,—the question, namely, of every Party member becoming a leader among the masses: which means, leader in his shop, in his trade union, unemployed council, mass organization, and neighborhood.

### Recruiting Drive Begins October 1

In this recruiting drive, which begins on October 1, we must expect that every Party member shall be able to make a list of five workers, minimum, in his trade union, factory, or neighborhood, with whom he will establish personal contact, give literature to, and work with very closely during the coming month as prospects for recruiting. Every Party member will have to have his own package of literature, the best suited for convincing the workers of the correctness of our program, and, also, application cards. All comrades will report about their results in their units, exchange their experiences, develop the best method of how to win the confidence of these workers. In this way, we will not only develop revolutionary competition between districts, sections, and units, but we will develop a real competition between individual Party members. Moreover, in view of the fact that Party members will report the arguments used to convince the workers, and the arguments of the workers, themselves, this will serve to develop the individual Party members.

In the last week in October, or the first week in November, special campaign meetings of the unit shall be arranged at which the Party members will invite their prospective recruits. This meeting should have a specially prepared program to clarify the workers on points on which they are still in doubt, and make an earnest appeal to these workers to join the Party now.

The recruiting drive must also solve another important problem,—the problem of the comradely relationship between Party members. The workers who join our Party must be made to feel at home, and not in a place where everybody gives orders, as a result of which he becomes bewildered, and, sooner or later, leaves the Party because he feels that he is not wanted. For this reason, it is necessary to make clear to the units and to each individual Party member that the comrades who bring in a new member into the Party will be responsible to keep in touch with him personally, for at least two months. Why do we make such a decision? Because, very often, the new Party member is not assigned to the same unit with the Party member who recruited him, and at first feels a little strange. The old Party member who brought him to the Party loses track of him; but if he keeps in touch with him either through the factory, trade union or neighborhood, then he can help him over the first couple of months. The comrade should be made responsible to meet the new Party members he has recruited at least every two weeks, to ask him where he was assigned, to what unit he is attached, what are the problems he is facing, etc.; and if he finds any difficulties, to bring a report to the section, or the district where the Membership Commission of the Org. Dept. will handle such questions immediately.

To carry on an effective recruiting drive, each district should select four or five units for concentration, and place a few of the leading forces in them for the purpose of making of these units an example of how to carry on the campaign. The same procedure should be applied in three or four selected fractions. The experiences of these units and fractions should be popularized in the District Bulletins, should be discussed in all units during the drive, popularized in the *Daily Worker*, and in the *Party Organizer*. Individual Party members and units should be stimulated to write about their experiences, giving answers to the many reasons that prevent the workers from joining the Party. New Party members should be encouraged to make statements as to why they joined the Party.

This recruiting drive must not only lead us to the objective of getting the number of members decided upon by the Eighth Party Convention, but it must stimulate all activities of the Party. It must be utilized to raise the ideological level of the Party so that recruiting will become a conscious everyday task for each individual Party member. While intensifying recruiting, we must intensify at the same time the development of the lower leading cadres, section and unit functionaries, inasmuch as it is because of the

weaknesses of these cadres in improving the life of the units that we are confronted with such a large fluctuation.

To achieve the aims that we have set ourselves in this campaign, we will have to take organizational steps for a thorough mobilization of the Party along the following lines:

The recruiting drive shall be discussed by each District Bureau along the line of these directives, of the statement of the C.C., and the letter to the entire membership, enriched by the experiences of the district, section, and units. The District Bureaus, along the line of these directives, should select the units and fractions of concentration, assign the forces, arrange for special issue of District Bulletins, for the purpose of mobilizing all Party members of the units and fractions.

Functionaries' meetings on a district and section scale shall be called to make the functionaries conscious of the importance of the drive, and clarify them on how the recruiting drive shall be conducted, on the methods to be applied, etc.

These measures must guarantee a thorough discussion in each unit and fraction on the letter and the statement, printed as an editorial in the September 22 issue of the *Daily Worker*, of the C.C. to all the Party members.

In each district and section, the Membership Commission must be either strengthened or built. This is necessary for the purpose of getting new members, making a quick analysis of their applications, and assigning them to the units; for the improvement of attendance and dues-payments; for furnishing the units and individual Party members, with the necessary amount of literature, membership cards, etc.

The Seventeenth Anniversary of the October Revolution must become the highest point in the campaign. The tremendous struggles going on as well as the Election Campaign give us the opportunity of reaching large masses; and certainly, with a thorough mobilization of the Party from the top down, along the line of these directives and of the last C.C. resolution, stimulating the initiative from below, we will be able to carry out the decision of the Eighth Party Convention which set the quota of 40,000 members by January 1. On the basis of this quota, each district worked out its own quota some time ago, putting the quota in their control tasks, etc. The problem now is to concretize our previous decisions and stimulate the recruiting drive through the methods of making individual Party members responsible to personally develop contact with the masses along the line of these directives.

## Resuming Publication of the Agit-Prop Section

By A. BITTELMAN

**B**EGINNING with the November issue of the *Party Organizer*, we will resume the publication of the Agit-Prop Section. This will be in the charge of the Agit-Prop Commission of the Central Committee.

It might be well to restate the aims and practical purposes of this Section. Its main purpose is to provide a place for the agit-prop cadres of the Party to exchange experiences in the work of agitation and propaganda. It is expected that in this way we will be able to assist in the building up of competent agit-prop cadres, especially in the Party units and sections.

Such an exchange of experiences at the present time is practically non-existent. Occasionally we find reference to the agitprop work of our Party units and sections in letters to the *Daily Worker*. But this appears very rarely and is not systematically organized.

The latter is not the fault of the *Daily Worker*. The weakness lies primarily with our agit-prop workers, beginning with the units and ending with the Districts. These agit-prop workers rarely write about their experiences. They seldom raise publicly in our press the problems which arise in their work, and what is still a greater rarity, is the description of the successful achievements in agit-prop work and the methods that were applied in obtaining such achievements.

Take, for example, the question of leaflets for mass distribution. The Agit-Prop Commission of the Central Committee receives, as a rule, copies of a number of leaflets published by our Districts, sections, and units. From this we are able to judge the contents and the effectiveness of the agitation. But what is equally important, especially in the case where units and sections issue their own leaflets, is to know how this has been done,—was the leaflet discussed by the unit bureau, the contents of the leaflet, its form? Was it discussed by the unit as a whole? Who wrote the leaflet, a member of the unit or some other comrade? These very essential questions are not reported to us, nor to the press, and it is clear that such information from the units which successfully issue leaflets will be of the greatest value to the Party as a whole.

Or take the question of leaflet distribution. We know that in many instances Party leaflets receive very wide distribution. But it is very seldom that we have in our press a discussion on the methods of distribution.

You might discuss further, as an example, the general question of methods of mass agitation. Here we have in mind the various new means and ways devised by some of our units in furthering the agitation among the masses: posters, signs, stamping sidewalks with slogans, etc. We know that in many units of the Party, especially those which are engaged in mass work and in leading mass struggles, there are continually being developed new forms and methods of reaching the masses with our program and slogans. Why don't we have these developments described and discussed in our press so that others can learn from it?

The above is merely brought by way of illustration of the idea that we must begin to exchange systematically the experiences in our agitational and propaganda work. Only in this way can we have a systematic discussion of these experiences, a learning of lessons from them in order to eliminate wrong practices and to spread out the good practices. The Agit-Prop Section in the *Party Organizer* will undertake to serve this purpose.

### Will Deal Also with Propaganda

We will, of course, not confine ourselves only to problems of mass agitation. We also wish to deal in this Section with our experiences in propaganda—propaganda among non-Party workers and especially with the question of Party education. On this question, too, we know that in our various Districts and sections there are going on intensive experiences. We want to bring the experiences of these activities into the Agit-Prop Section of the *Party Organizer*. We want to discuss them in the same way in which we propose to discuss the question of mass agitation.


It goes without saying that the shop papers of the Party must and should receive in this Section the greatest attention, but without the help of our units and sections and of the District Agit-Prop Directors, we will not be able to accomplish our purpose. Consequently, we want to impress upon our agit-prop cadres to consider this section of the *Party Organizer* as their forum for presenting problems, experiences, etc.

We also wish to introduce a new feature into this section, namely a department to be known as "Questions and Answers." The purpose of this department will be to print

the questions that our agit-prop workers and Party members generally meet with among the masses, and to supply a brief answer to these questions, sometimes with references to reading material. Our Party members, especially those who meet with non-Party workers and discuss with them our Party program and policies, will be able to testify to the fact that hundreds of questions are being asked of us which our Party members are not always able to answer satisfactorily. Our agit-prop functionaries must make it a practice to get from Party members the questions they are being asked by non-Party workers, to formulate answers to these questions wherever they are able to do so themselves, and to write in to the Agit-Prop Section of the Party Organizer all those questions to which they would like us to supply an answer and reference to the material. To satisfy this need will be the main purpose of the department on "Questions and Answers."

We know that we are assuming serious obligations to our Party and to the agit-prop cadres by resuming publication of this section. We hope we can make it of real use and service to our agit-prop cadres, but in this we need their cooperation. We need their systematic reports, articles, and questions. Only on this basis can we make this Section of real service to our Party.

# Party Organizer



"The Party must from day to day win the confidence of the proletarian masses; ... by its policy and its activities, themselves, secure the support of the masses, ... it must not order but persuade, helping the masses to become aware by their own experience that the Party policy is right; ... it must, therefore, be the guide, the leader, the teacher of the proletariat."

STALIN,

*Leninism*, Vol. I, p. 38.

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

Vol. VII

NOVEMBER, 1934

No. 11

## Intensify the Recruiting Drive!

**T**HE RECRUITING drive, on which the Central Committee addressed a special letter to each Party member, is now in the third week. While it is too early to give a critical estimate of the results, especially since many units received the C.C. letter only the second week in October, yet it is possible to draw certain conclusions from the figures available in reports received by the Central Organization Department for the first two weeks in October.

These figures show that during this period, the total number recruited was 862, of which 214 were employed, and 616 unemployed. The total number recruited from basic industries (not including the report of the New York District) was 123.

Clearly the total number recruited is not in accordance with the tremendous possibilities for building our Party, with the increasing influence of the Party among broad sections of the working class. Furthermore, the relatively small number coming from basic industries shows the weaknesses still existing in our factory and trade union work, and in the activities of the shop nuclei. The recruiting drive has not yet taken on the necessary momentum, nor have its line and methods fully penetrated the ranks of our membership. Yet especially now, with the developing election campaign activities in every district, through which the program of our Party is being brought to large masses, stirring up political discussion widely, recruiting should be greatly increased.

The reports from the field show that the leadership in the districts, in the main, is giving serious consideration to the recruiting drive. But splendid programs and plans will not produce the desired results if they remain on top. Their correct execution requires that they be brought down below, that the entire Party membership be made thoroughly aware of the significance and character of the recruiting drive, that the enthusiasm and initiative of the comrades be aroused. This makes it necessary to carry through a real discussion in the units, accompanied by practical organizational measures, based on the Central Committee letter and the direc-

tives sent to the Districts. At the same time, the functionaries in the sections and units, as well as in the Districts, should thoroughly understand the purpose and methods of the present drive, so as to be equipped to guide the membership, and through their own activity set examples for the rest of the members.

The letter of the Central Committee has placed in the foreground the question of personal recruiting through the personal contact of the individual Party members with workers in their shops, and mass organizations, with their fellow trade unionists. Become a leader among workers, and through your own activity among them bring the best, most militant, into our ranks!—This is the appeal of the Central Committee to every Communist. A correct discussion of this appeal will throw the searchlight on the work of every Party member, will enable the units to analyze more basically the character of their activities in the shops and factories of concentration, among the unemployed, in the neighborhood generally, and will help them better to understand the problems and methods of leadership over the masses in their struggles. Regular check-up and control of the decisions must follow the discussion if it is not to remain fruitless of results. To the extent that our Party members are involved in the campaign through discussion and assignments in the units and fractions, we will be able to increase many times the percentage of comrades who bring new members into our ranks.

We stress particularly the recruiting of active, militant workers from the trade unions, as well as the unorganized. To strengthen the Party core especially in the reformist trade unions is fundamental, as the recent textile strike has demonstrated, in building a powerful rank-and-file movement for a class struggle program of action. Yet the number of A. F. of L. members recruited, although it is increasing, is still very low. To change this demands intensive mobilization of our trade union fractions for the drive. It is not enough for these fractions to discuss their specific trade union problems in line with our policies. The fractions have the task of raising the political level of the workers in these organizations, drawing the political lessons from their day-to-day struggles, and promoting their understanding of the class issues involved; the fractions must see how to bring our Party program before them, to counteract the "Red scare," etc. The resistance expressed by many locals of the A. F. of L. to Green's anti-Communist expulsion policy; the development of a rank-and-file movement among the miners, especially in western Pennsylvania, in some textile centers, among the longshoremen on the West Coast, and elsewhere,

show the increasingly favorable possibilities for building our Party among these elements. No set formula need be adopted for indiscriminate application everywhere, but it is advisable rather to apply the best methods suited to each situation, remembering at all times the necessity of developing personal, persevering, and patient contact with fellow workers in the trade unions. This applies to the revolutionary and independent unions, as well as the A. F. of L.

In addition, therefore, to unit discussions, special fraction sessions should be held to take up the recruiting drive, through which meetings of active non-Party members of the trade unions can be organized for a political discussion of the Party program. Classes can be organized in some sections involving non-Party workers from important shops and trade unions, as has already been undertaken in the Pittsburgh district. These steps apply not alone to trade unions, but to all other mass organizations in which we have Party members and sympathizers.

Active recruiting through the fractions in trade unions will help to bring shop workers into the Party. But it is essential to give special attention to the activities of the shop nuclei, to call shop conferences wherever feasible, to tie up the recruiting drive with every phase of our factory work. This means popularizing the program of our Party among these workers, in respect to the daily struggles of the masses and our revolutionary goal, thus helping to create the political basis for the work of our Party members in the shops, and winning new recruits.

All these activities will be especially effective if linked together with the election campaign in the remaining days up to November 6. Every meeting, every house-to-house canvassing, should stress appeals to join our Party. This should be organized in advance, so that the necessary application cards and literature may be on hand and our comrades prepared to make the best approach. The celebrations of the 17th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution, which in many cities are combined with final election rallies, should be organized as a demonstration for the Party, and serve as a departing point to further extend and develop the recruiting campaigns, particularly as a tribute to the October revolution. Workers who have signed the Communist nominating petitions, who have expressed their determination to vote Communist on November 6, are potential members of our Party. It is up to us to convince them to come into our ranks, to help build a mass Party that will effectively lead the sharpening struggles ahead, and win the masses for the final struggle for power.

## An Analysis of Recruiting in a Chicago Section

By E. B., Section 8, Chicago

IN THE MONTH of August Section 8 recruited only two members into the Party. In September 22 were recruited. How can we explain this jump in a Section where mass activity was at a standstill, where units were functioning badly, where there was no collective leadership, etc.?

Beginning with September we were faced with the problem of carrying through the 15th Anniversary campaign. The Section Bureau discussed this seriously and adopted a one-month plan of work.

We first reorganized the units. The forces of each unit, where the comrades lived, the peculiarities and territories of each unit, were carefully examined. We shifted comrades around, putting them in units where they could function. The forces were distributed more evenly. Some units were merged. After this each unit elected a new unit bureau with the careful assistance of comrades from the Section Committee. Side by side we formed the captain groups in each unit. Each comrade from the Section Committee was made responsible to meet with the unit bureaus and to give guidance to the captains in their work.

After this we called a functionaries' meeting where we proposed the tasks for the coming month. We did not propose everything under the sun but only the most important tasks facing us in connection with the Anniversary campaign. We knew that the units had begun to lose confidence in their abilities to do work so we put these tasks in such a light as to show the comrades that they could easily be carried out. The plan of work as adopted was mimeographed and sent to the units for discussion. We also called upon each unit to use its own initiative and set one special control task for itself, such as building one mass organization or strengthening the fraction in existing organizations. Where, in the plan of work, we set quotas on recruiting, the *Daily Worker*, financial drive, etc., for the Section as a whole, we asked the units to set their own quotas, which in most cases became counter quotas. It took about two weeks before the units reacted sufficiently to the plan of work. The Section Committee during this time met regularly and carefully analyzed our progress and shortcomings. The unit bureaus were given careful guidance. We sent out a check-up sheet each week to the units, showing the standing of the units on the different quotas. We fought against every manifesta-

tion of pessimism. When one unit did good work one week we let the rest of the units know about this. A real spirit of friendly competition was developed. In the final week before the completion of our plan of work the units were working against time. The entire outlook of the membership had been changed. The comrades were enthusiastic, but, most important, they saw that things could be done. They appreciated the value of planned activity. The result was that we more than carried through the tasks which we had set.

### Recruiting Placed As Most Important Task

In the campaign we raised recruiting as the most important task. But we raised it in such a way that it fitted in with every activity of the comrades. Each week we talked about recruiting in this way: "You comrades are going out Sunday to sell literature; how many workers are you going to reach with the program of the Party? How many will you bring in? If you know a worker in your organization who is good material, recruit. If your wife is sympathetic, bring her into the Party." We raised the question of recruiting so persistently in connection with every phase of our activity that the comrades felt that even though they did good work in selling literature, *Daily Workers*, etc., that this was not enough. They felt that the best barometer of the quality of their work was how many did they bring into the Party. Last, but not least, socialist competition was a real factor in recruiting.

We raise this question of recruiting to other Sections especially in connection with the 17th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution campaign and the recruiting drive of the Central Committee. The slogan that every Party member recruit another Party member will not bear fruit unless this is concretely connected with every phase of activity, especially with the campaigns of the Party. We must energetically go down into the units and examine the entire situation. We must see the problems of the units and give them the most careful assistance in solving these problems.

Our unit membership is a good membership and willing to do work but over a long period of time they get lost in the countless number of campaigns and activities. Our recruiting will be improved only to the extent that we give more attention to the units, when we begin to understand that they are not just general agencies for the distribution of work assigned by the Section leadership but independent political bodies in the territories.

In solving the problems facing the units, bringing a healthier atmosphere in their activities, we will also solve another

important problem connected with recruiting and that is keeping our Party members and reducing the fluctuation. Our experiences show that we can carry out the campaigns of the Party if they are carefully organized, if they are politically brought down to the membership. The campaigns of the Party, instead of being added burdens, as is felt by many comrades, will become the best means of politically rallying our Party membership and masses of workers, will result in increased activities, will improve the political content of our work, and, as a result, with proper guidance and check-up, will tremendously aid in solving our problems of recruiting and fluctuation.

## Failure to Prepare for Struggles Prevents Carrying Out of Party Line

By PAT TOOHEY

IT IS CUSTOMARY that after we engage in a strike and other mass struggles we follow a necessary and correct tradition by drawing the conclusions and examining the nature and character of our work. It is necessary and correct that we bring to light and isolate those weaknesses and shortcomings which we encountered in this particular struggle, so that our future activities will be enriched by the organizational and political experiences of these former struggles, and so that we shall avoid committing again those errors which tended to hamper our previous work.

What is not necessary and not correct is our recording these lessons and experiences and then going out and committing them all over again. It seems to become a tradition that we again and again fall into errors which we went through before, and which, theoretically at least, we had examined and cauterized with fire and sword. It is customary for us to say, in examining our work in a particular struggle, "this was a shortcoming—that was a weakness" and that "had we done this and that—then the other would surely have happened, etc." But these "shortcomings" are precisely of a kind which we have encountered over and over again in the course of various struggles and still persist in committing them all over again.

### We Must Learn From Past Struggles

Only one conclusion can be drawn from such a situation: that because of a mechanical understanding of the bad methods of work there arises an inability to absorb the

lessons of past struggles in our present work. Just some experiences from our work in the South prove this.

The work of the Party organizations as well as the National Textile Workers Union in the South, during the recent national textile workers' strike, brought to light a whole series of organizational and political weaknesses—the majority of which had previously cropped up in Southern struggles in past periods. These weaknesses, which dog our path, hindered the attempt to carry into life the militant slogans and policies of the Party, which were designed to strengthen and spread the strike and to prevent a betrayal of the workers by the U.T.W. bureaucracy.

It is the same old story: The failure to prepare adequately for the struggle before it happens. The many weaknesses which cropped up, and which tended to hinder our ability to carry out the Party slogans and policies, are entirely connected with the failure to undertake many of the measures before the strike—measures which we attempted to carry through just prior to, during and after the strike. It is ridiculous to expect that in a strike the workers will follow the policies of the Party when we make little, if any, practical preparations before the struggle.

Isolation from the masses and lack of knowledge of the mood of the masses of workers and knowledge of in which direction the workers are rapidly traveling, create in themselves an under-estimation of the determination of the workers to engage in struggle, even if necessary over the heads of the bureaucracy. This isolation created in the South (of which the Southern districts are not alone guilty) a theory that the workers would not respond to a U.T.W. strike call, that the masses would not follow Gorman & Company, that the bureaucracy and government would succeed in heading off the strike before it really started—as happened already in June. Flowing from this theory was the logic that, therefore, practical preparations for the struggle will be time and energy lost—what is the use of preparing when there will be no strike?

Such an estimate, however, failed to take into account the determination of the workers to fight and that the masses would force the bureaucracy into a strike or isolate the bureaucracy; and that the best guarantee that the strike would not be headed off would be the presence and energetic activity of the Communist and Left-wing workers within, giving daily and practical leadership to the workers.

### No Preparation for Strike

The District Bureau held a session a month before the strike started and just two weeks before the U.T.W. Convention. Despite the rapidly changing situation in textile, the

Bureau, in considering textile, took no recognition of the coming strike and made no preparations for it. But the same thing must be said of nearly all other districts. The Bureau declared that they were awaiting a meeting of the National Executive Board of the N.T.W.U. scheduled for August 24th, and on the basis of the decisions of the Board would make preparations (which left then but six days to do it). But the Board meeting was called hurriedly before the 24th and the Southern comrades could not attend. Still no practical preparations were undertaken, and up to September 1, when 200,000 textile workers responded in the South, our forces had moved but little.

What was the result? Only 10 days after the strike started was there a meeting of the leading district forces organized, work assigned, tasks outlined and assignments made. During these 10 days scores of thousands of textile workers were engaged in flying squadron activities, mass picketing and waging a bitter struggle. But our comrades were on the outside largely. All of the preparatory organizational work, assignment of forces, dividing the territory and placing a responsible comrade in each section in charge, of outlining a Party-building and mass Daily Worker drive, etc., was undertaken only after the strike had been on 10 days.

During the struggle itself there were many examples of "what would have happened" had such preparations been undertaken, had the mood of the masses been correctly estimated. Take in the City of C—— which has some 3,000 textile workers. Our forces were compelled to work largely as an outside force, despite the fact that it was generally accepted that had Comrade X—— entered the U.T.W. that he would have been elected President of the Local, and that other comrades would have been elected by the workers to leading positions. Likewise in D—— where our several active, energetic comrades remained outside the movement: Here the strike movement and union were in the hands of a woman, a company stool pigeon, who successfully prevented this town from striking. It was also shown in both these places after our comrades had—so late—amended their error—and had entered the U.T.W. and taken leading parts in the strike, what a powerful force our comrades exercised in these towns. But the error was already committed and weighed the Party down. This same situation prevailed in scores of places: of rank-and-file, newly organized workers, engaged in mass picketing, holding mass demonstrations, etc., and our capable forces on the outside as spectators, or going in very late so that their work did not bear the fruits it should.

After the change had been made the Party commenced to

register numerous victories. Party members in B—— took the initiative in organizing and leading flying squads to nearby towns and closing the mills. In other places the Party forces went into the U.T.W. locals and carried on a vigorous struggle for the slogans of the Party: for mass picketing, flying squads, succeeded in raising the relief issue and organizing delegations of workers to demand relief from the County, State and U.T.W. leadership; the Party took the initiative in extending the struggle to masses indirectly involved by organizing mass meetings with strikers as speakers in various towns, by organizing adoption of resolutions and wires of protest against the troops and terror, etc. On a broad front, in North and South Carolina and in Virginia our comrades became the workers' shock troops on the picket lines and flying squads in the locals.

The activities of the Party were met with a vicious "Red scare" on the part of the U.T.W. leadership, the bosses and employers. The Party was brought openly into the strike at every opportunity. Open mass meetings to support the strike and protest the terror were organized despite the terror and semi-illegal conditions prevailing. The Party fought bitterly in Charlotte, in South Carolina and in Virginia, and despite arrests, breaking up of meetings, terrorism by Klansmen and gangsters, proved to be a steadfast fighter for the workers. On the basis of the fighting activity of the Party, a great number of workers were enrolled into the Party. Some shop units were established. The Daily Worker received a mass circulation on picket lines and in scores of textile towns in the South. Thousands of leaflets and circulars were effectively distributed, urging the workers to mass picket, to fight on, etc. As a result of this thousands of workers for the first time came into contact with the Party and had occasion to learn what the Party stands for.

The Daily Worker was particularly effective. It was taken boldly on mass picket lines, to mass demonstrations, distributed in union halls and strike headquarters. The friendly favorable response the workers gave the Daily destroyed a certain timidity among some comrades about distributing it. An example of the value of the D.W. as organizer and agitator was shown when it was taken to the Belmont (near Gastonia) picket lines. These workers had previously been in contact with the movement through the Gastonia strike, but had not been looked up or organized for this strike. As soon as they saw the D.W. they exclaimed "Hurrah, here's the Daily Worker." It is no accident that the Belmont picket lines were among the most militant in the South, for the D.W. exercised a powerful influence over the strikers.

## Experiences in the Textile Strike in Philadelphia

By I. K., Section Organizer, Section 3

**WE WERE** able to get some good results from the last textile strike because we reacted in time to the situation with leaflets, meetings and personal contact, exposing the leadership and convincing the workers that the strike could be won if they elected their own rank-and-file strike committees and carried out our proposals.

The Section Committee, calling the leading comrades together with some workers in the mass organizations, discussed the strike. We set up a leading committee which met every day, making a constant check-up on all developments, analyzing the changes, in order to react quickly to all developments. All the units and organizations sent greetings to the strikers and pledged their support. Some of these telegrams were later found hanging on the walls of the strike headquarters. The Unemployment Council issued a leaflet calling upon all workers in the neighborhood to support the strike and offered to take the strikers to the relief board. Committees were sent from the Unemployment Council, Communist Party, L.S.N.R. and Women's League to the strike headquarters, offering their support. The leaders refused, saying that "they would have nothing to do with Communists." At one of the meetings a big argument started when a worker made a motion that if the organization is good enough to offer support, they should accept it.

Fifty extra *Daily Workers* were sold every day and two hundred pamphlets, *Communists in the Textile Strike*, were sold or given away on the picket line, in spite of the fact that we were pointed out to the police by the picket captains and driven off the picket line.

After striking a week and a half the workers were only getting one sandwich and one car token a day. Many of the workers refused to come on the picket line since they lived many miles away. Then the Committee decided to open up a kitchen and feed the workers sandwiches and coffee. A committee was again sent to strike headquarters asking for a committee of the strikers to work together with our committee to get and prepare food. Again we were refused. Our units and all our organizations immediately were organized to get food and a kitchen was set up two blocks from the factory. A leaflet was issued denouncing the leaders for not accepting our help while the workers were hungry, and

invited the workers to our kitchen. We fed an average of 200 workers a day. The most developed comrades were assigned to speak to them. *Daily Workers* and literature were always in the hall. Songs were taught to the workers and later were sung on the picket line. As a result five members were recruited into the Party and at least 25 more connections were made for an opposition group. Two more workers were recruited at open air meetings that were held in front of the strike headquarters, where we succeeded in exposing the trouble-makers and proving to the workers that we really were sincere. However, all those recruited into the Party were from a different section, from which they had been sent to picket at this mill. Our task will now be to follow up the connections we have, and the workers that are locked out from this mill, and establish a shop nucleus, which we have undertaken to do in the next two months.

## Right Opportunist Mistakes in Cleveland Anti-Fascist Action

**AT** A RECENT anti-fascist action in Cleveland, serious opportunist mistakes were made by the steering committee, consisting of leading comrades from the District. This action was thoroughly discussed at a meeting of the District functionaries, and on the basis of the discussion a resolution was adopted by the District Bureau, in which the mistakes are discussed and characterized. Following the adoption of the resolution, Comrade Landy issued a statement of self-criticism, which we are also printing. The entire question is closed, but these documents are being published in the *Party Organizer* as a means of clarification for the entire Party, in order that from these mistakes our comrades in all districts will learn how to act in such circumstances.

### Excerpt from Resolution of District Bureau

Upon learning that Hans Gissibl, Hitler's agent in the United States was coming to Cleveland to organize the "League of Friends of New Germany," the District Bureau, although having only three days to prepare, advised the fraction in the American League Against War and Fascism, to initiate a mass demonstration against this fascist agent. Through such activities, we had in mind to give the American League the opportunity to become a fighting organization, with mass support for its objectives, and to further popularize the Chicago Congress. While advising the party fraction

to convince the American League to sponsor this, the Party mobilized its own forces to be the active driving force.

#### Workers Showed Readiness to Fight Fascism

The District Bureau set the objective of calling upon the masses to come to the location of the meeting, and especially to mobilize the neighborhood under the slogan "Drive the Fascist Agents out of the Neighborhoods." Also to make every effort to take over the meeting with anti-Nazi masses and to transform it into an anti-fascist demonstration and elect a delegate to the Anti-War Congress. The strategy of the District Bureau further called upon everyone to enter the hall to accomplish this objective. If circumstances and police forces prevented this, then to organize a mass militant anti-Nazi demonstration in front of the hall. There to have speakers and resolutions adopted against Hitler, demanding the release of Thaelmann and other anti-fascist fighters, supporting the U. S. Congress Against War and Fascism and condemning the defense of the Nazi agent by Mayor Davis' police. Following the defeat of the fascists, it was proposed to march through the neighborhood to Market Square. Telegrams and resolutions were to be sent to the City Hall, protesting the city administration's support and protection of this Hitler agent. While mobilizing workers from all parts of the city, special concentration was to be in the West Side neighborhoods and also among the German and Hungarian population.

The response of the workers to the call, despite shortage of time, and inadequate preparations and united front effort, shows the deep hatred of the masses and their desire to fight fascism. Between 2,000 and 2,500 workers responded, including many from the neighborhood. The workers demonstrated militantly, shouting revolutionary slogans. Police acted uneasily. At the expected opening time, the hall remained empty and the militant masses blocked the streets. Gissibl was taken to the hall in a police car.

#### Party Fraction Led Workers Away From Struggle

As the crowd grew and the militancy increased, and the moment occurred when the speaking should have begun, the Party Steering Committee (Landy, Larkin, Herman) gave the instruction and slogan "On to Market Square." This met with disgust and resentment by all assembled, but under Party influence the majority marched, with several hundred refusing to leave. Immediately, the police aided about 200 to enter and hear Gissibl.

The District Bureau brands this action of the steering

committee as a serious mistake of Right Opportunist character and openly criticizes Comrades Landy, Herman and Larkin. Comrade Larkin agreed reluctantly to the decision, but at such a moment, vacillation led him finally to agreement with the other comrades. The sources of the mistake were:

1. Underestimation of the willingness of the masses to struggle.
2. Failure to understand or analyze the moods of the workers gathered there.
3. Inability to understand that marching away at that moment, was capitulation and precisely destroyed the main strategical objectives of the District Bureau in which Comrade Landy had participated when adopted.

#### Party Makes Open Criticism

The Party makes this sharp political and open criticism of the comrades involved, because it has nothing to hide. Only in this way can the Party solidify its ranks, the comrades themselves correct their mistake, and the entire Party march forward under the leadership of the District Committee.

This is in line with the resolution of the last District Plenum which states:

"The plenum conducted its work on the basis of sharpest self-criticism, placing responsibility upon the shoulders of individual comrades, with the determination to overcome the shifting of responsibility or utilizing the correct line of collective leadership for excusing of the specific responsibility of individual leading comrades. The work of the entire Party must be conducted accordingly."

While greeting the open and frank recognition by Comrades Larkin and Herman in their efforts to analyze the sources of their mistake at the functionaries meeting, we equally rejected the speech of Comrade Landy, which, while stating agreement that what occurred was a mistake, surrounded this statement with so many qualifications and a complete failure to recognize the sources of the mistakes and insisting upon it being "an example of thoughtlessness," and finding of excuses, elsewhere but in the steering committee, that it raised seriously the question of whether the criticism of the Party Bureau and the functionaries meetings was even understood by him.

We further warn against all reactions towards individual actions in the handling of the fascists and emphasize that the growing terror must be met by organizing mass defense,

involving especially the workers of the neighborhood. The Party must be able to fight all tendencies of "Leftist" adventurism and opportunist capitulation, in all such struggles and boldly carry through the correct mass line of our Party resolutions and leadership.

#### Must Intensify the Struggle Against War and Fascism

Armed with our correct analysis and policy, our sharp self-criticism and determination to intensify the mass struggles against war and fascism—and supported by the growing sensitiveness of the Party units and the decision at the functionaries meeting, the Party has no fear of the consequences of this mistake, quickly and sharply corrected, disarming our Party or lessening its influence among the masses. The Party has shown by its deeds and fighting ability that it is part of the working class and is recognized and supported by ever growing numbers of workers as their fighting political leader. The squeaks of such anti-Party renegade opportunist degenerate elements as Foley, Elliot and E. Wagenknecht fall on barren ground and are lost in the sharpening class struggle.

The Party must intensify its struggle against war and fascism, utilizing the united front tactic to involve the broadest possible masses. Increased support must be given to the League Against War and Fascism, as the class struggle sharpens, and the relationship of class forces becomes clearer, and the masses continue to answer the growing attacks of the bourgeoisie and their government, despite the betrayals of the A. F. of L. leadership.

Comrades! Forward to new mass struggles under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, which is a guide to activity, widening the Party influence and building the Party organization, under the leadership of our District Committee.

#### Statement of Comrade Landy

In line with the resolution of the functionaries meeting of September 24 which rejected my speech and called on me to re-examine my position, I wish to submit the following statement which, for reasons of time, I was unable to make at the end of the functionaries meeting.

I fully agree with the sharp political criticism of the action of the steering committee by the functionaries meeting and the District Bureau. The failure of the steering committee, and first of all myself, to carry out the policy of the anti-fascist demonstration which I also helped to formulate, was a serious political error whose political essence is definitely

of a right opportunist character. The district Bureau is perfectly correct in characterizing the sources of this mistake as:

1. Underestimation of the willingness of the masses to struggle.
2. Failure to understand or analyze the moods of the assembled workers.
3. Failure to realize that the slogan to march away at that moment meant capitulation and forfeiting the strategical objectives we had set ourselves.

My speech at the functionaries meeting failed to establish the nature of this mistake, thereby making it difficult properly to correct it. The speech was of such a character, that, despite my intention, it had the effect of destroying the critical recognition of my mistake. Such a procedure does not help the Party to go forward in its struggle against war and fascism. I am therefore writing this statement to correct and clarify my error and analysis. As a member of the District Committee, I shall make every effort, not only to avoid similar mistakes in the future, but to fulfill the responsibilities and exercise greater political care in fulfilling these responsibilities which the working class struggle places upon us.

## Leaflet Distribution in a Period of Terror

By A SAN FRANCISCO COMRADE

THE PERIOD of terror during, and subsequent to, the maritime and general strikes in San Francisco and the Bay Region, showed our Party comrades more clearly than anything else could have done, the danger of depending wholly upon a central printing apparatus. In the first place, a central printing apparatus for a whole city or even a section, necessarily involves a great deal of activity of one sort or another. Comrades are continually going in and out of the building where the apparatus is placed; huge hatches of finished leaflets or mimeograph paper must be taken in and out, and all this is bound to attract attention and leaves too much margin for discovery.

To eliminate a great deal of this clumsiness, we found that the most efficient way to do printing is for each unit

to have its own printing apparatus. Fortunately, before the actual terror began, a good percentage of the San Francisco and Bay Area units already had small mimeographs of one kind or another, ranging in price from \$2.50 to \$25.00. So, when the raids began, these units immediately got their mimeographs into action, and began leaflet printing and distribution. These mimeographs were kept in places known to only one or two comrades. The leaflet paper, ink, and stencils for each mimeograph were kept in two or three different places, so that if one place were discovered, there would still be a reserve supply. The day the first raids took place, there was a very good leaflet distribution, which increased in volume daily as other units got their apparatus going. Incidentally, although our central printing apparatus was completely destroyed, not one single unit mimeograph was discovered.

Because the central printing plant had been put out of commission, there was a period of one week when the regular *Western Worker* did not appear. The units, however, showed great initiative, and several "miniature" *Western Workers* were put out on unit mimeographs. These were very well received, and helped fill the gap created by the absence of the regular *Western Worker*. It was our experience that in those units where there were mimeographs, there was good leaflet distribution and generally good functioning, but in the units where there was no means of printing, there were no leaflets, and a measure of demoralization because comrades were paralyzed by the lack of equipment for printing.

As regards distribution, we found that the most efficient way is for each squad to have a certain permanent territory, with the squad captain responsible to see that the leaflets are obtained from the unit and distributed to each member of his squad. Great ingenuity was shown by the comrades in distributing these leaflets. In some section, the following method was used: The squad members take a block (preferably at night), cover it with leaflets, then skip a block and go to a second one and cover it. In perhaps an hour or two, the squad comes back and covers the block that was omitted. This can go on until the entire territory is covered, and reduces the possibility of interference.

## Where Shall We Place Responsibility for Our Weaknesses?

By CENTRAL ORG. COMMISSION

THE ORG. Commission of the Central Committee has received a letter from an Oregon Section, dealing with the weaknesses of the Section and the difficulties of carrying on Party work. The Section included with its letter copies of its correspondence with the District and the District's replies. Since the problem dealt with is one which concerns and is of interest to the entire Party, we are publishing in the reply of the Org. CoCommission to the Section:

"We have read carefully the various communications you have sent us relative to the problems of your Section, your activities, and what you consider to be an incorrect attitude on the part of the District Committee towards your Section. From your communications, we gather that you hold the following viewpoint:

1. That the weaknesses of the Section are due not to weaknesses in the leadership or methods of work, but in the objective conditions.
2. That you are now in a period of "calm" within which it is not possible for your Section to carry on much activity.
3. That the lumber workers in your region are fully satisfied with their conditions, and therefore it is not possible to organize them.
4. That the Party members are not good, and hence the District cannot expect the Section to carry on effective work.
5. That the District gives you too much to do, and does not give you sufficient attention.

In this communication we want to take up these points, which should be thoroughly discussed at your Section Committee meeting.

You are readers of our press. You are aware of the tremendous surge of militancy that has been developing among the toiling masses in many parts of the country. Your District, itself, has been the scene of one of the outstanding struggles in the American labor movement,—the Pacific Coast Marine Strike. These struggles are reaching new high levels of class action, and have not only economic significance, but tremendous political importance. The worsening of the conditions of the masses under the N.R.A. has had a tremendous effect in developing a militant spirit of resistance among

great sections of the working class. In short, the objective situation is extremely favorable throughout the country for the work of our Party.

#### Weaknesses Lie in Ourselves

The Open Letter addressed to our Party, and the Resolutions of the Eighth Convention of our Party, pointed out these facts, and made it clear that the main difficulties with which we are confronted today, the weaknesses that still exist in our leadership of the struggles of the masses, in the growth of the Party, etc., lie not in the objective conditions, but in ourselves, in our methods of work, in our failure to establish roots among the masses, in the lack of political understanding by the Party members of the issues confronting us, in the lack of attention to the lower units of the Party, etc. To consider Section 20 in a unique position, outside of the analysis of the C.C. of our Party, is to develop ideas of exceptionalism, which, far from helping the revolutionary movement, can only seriously hinder it. In those instances which have been brought to our attention, where the comrades raise the excuse of objective conditions for the weaknesses of their work, we find that these are excuses for inaction on the part of these very comrades, who seek to justify such inaction by placing it on the shoulders of the working class, rather than carefully examining the part that we, Communists, are playing. The very fact that a year ago, you had better functioning units and were carrying on mass work, shows the possibilities that exist in your Section. You must seek the reasons why this activity has collapsed, not in the objective conditions, but in the methods you used to maintain and strengthen the union, the unemployed organization and your contact with these workers.

It may well be that you have great difficulties and obstacles. But these exist everywhere. In many places, they are even more serious than in your territory. But who are the Communists, comrades? They are the ones who overcome difficulties, who find ways of removing obstacles and breaking through barriers in order to reach and organize the masses. Therefore, the problem with which your Section is faced is not to search for reasons for your weaknesses among the workers outside of our ranks, but to examine your activities, your own methods of work, on the basis of a thorough discussion of the Open Letter and the Resolution of the Eighth Convention of our Party.

#### Period of "Calm" is Not Period of Inaction

You state that although a year ago, considerable activity developed among the lumber workers, particularly among the unemployed, and that victories were won in the fight

for relief, etc., you are now in a period of "calm" within which little can be expected. And in order to bolster up your arguments, you try to quote from Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* You declare that Lenin pointed out that periods of activity give way to intense calm, and therefore draw the conclusion that there is nothing further to be said or done about the activities in Section 20. In order to answer this, let us take the entire quotation from Lenin, to which you refer. On pages 162 and 163 of *What Is To Be Done?*, Lenin declares:

"It would be a grievous error indeed to build up the Party organization in the expectation only of outbreaks and street fighting, or only upon the 'forward march of the drab, every-day struggle.' We must always carry on our every-day work and always be prepared for everything, because, very frequently, it is almost impossible to foresee beforehand when periods of outbreaks will give way to periods of calm. . . . And the revolution itself must not by any means be regarded as a single act . . . but as a series of more or less powerful outbreaks rapidly alternating with more or less intense calm. For that reason, the principal content of the activity of our party organization, the 'trick' of this activity should be, to carry on work that is possible and necessary both in the period of the most powerful outbreaks as well as in periods of complete calm."

You will see that Lenin has emphasized the necessity of not permitting ourselves to let down in our revolutionary work, but to learn so to carry on our tasks that, in any period of calm, we may be prepared for even the most powerful outbreaks, and after great battles, prepare ourselves for greater activity, for new battles on a higher level.

Let us take the present situation here in the United States. Recall the General Strike in San Francisco, the Toledo and Minneapolis struggles, and the most recent great textile strike. These struggles are now over. In San Francisco, Seattle, Toledo, Minneapolis, even in most textile centers, we are now witnessing a period of relative "calm" in contrast to the militant actions that took place during the strike. But does this "calm" mean inaction, a period of sitting with folded hands and waiting for the next outbreak? Does it mean apathy and pessimism because complete victory had not been achieved? No, comrades,—decidedly no! The tasks in San Francisco and Seattle, for example, following the strike, are to intensify greatly our activities, to build the rank-and-file opposition movement in the A. F. of L. unions, to undermine the influence of the A. F. of L. bureaucrats, to

prepare for further struggles on the basis of the lessons learned in this one, to build the Party and establish nuclei, to develop a broad drive against fascist terror, against the criminal syndicalist laws, develop the Election Campaign among these workers, etc. To carry out these tasks meant not calmness, but tremendous activity, activity which may not be spectacular or dramatic, but which requires patient, day-to-day systematic and planned work, with the participation of all forces and all comrades.

A similar situation exists now in the textile areas. The "outbreak" has for the most part, subsided. The workers have been betrayed. But it would be most dangerous to look upon the present relative calm as a period of inaction. Particularly now, our tasks are to intensify our work in the textile mills, to root our Party therein, to develop an understanding of the Party program and policies so as to overcome the "Red scare," to intensify the work of building rank-and-file oppositions in the A. F. of L.; in short, to prepare for new impending battles in textile, for the pressing demands of the workers.

#### Our Basic Work to Root the Party Among the Masses

As stated in the editorial by Comrade Browder in the last issue of the *Party Organizer*, it was possible for the A. F. of L. betrayers to betray the textile strike precisely because the Party was not rooted among these masses. And this task of rooting ourselves among the basic sections of the workers is one of the most important tasks we have in all periods of "calm" as a means of preparing these workers, as well as ourselves, for great battles and struggles. Calmness, for us, is a very relative term. Under no circumstances must it be interpreted to mean inaction and indifference to the tasks of the Communists. It is in this light that you must understand Lenin's writings. Then you will find that even in the present situation in your Section, you have much basic work before you, which it is necessary for your Section to tackle energetically.

#### The Election Campaign Is Also a Struggle

Take the election campaign. In one of your communications you state the District overburdens you with too many demands for activity in this campaign. Yet, to win support for our activities and program in the elections, to expose the capitalist State through our election activity, to show the relationship of the struggle for immediate demands to our revolutionary goal, to win new recruits to our Party on the basis of clarifying the Party position,—this is pre-

cisely the kind of activity which must be carried on daily in connection with every phase of our work, and which provides us with an excellent opportunity now, not only to prepare the workers to fight militantly for their interests, but actually to engage them today in struggle for their immediate needs. It is not only strikes that are struggles, comrades. The entire work of the Party is a struggle to win the majority of the working class. Every demand, no matter how small, suited to your local situation, to the needs of the workers, involves a fight. To convince the workers of the correctness of our program involves a struggle for the Party line among them—a struggle against prejudice, against the "Red scare," against the further demagoguery and propaganda of the social-fascists, against all the poisonous influences brought into the ranks of the workers by the capitalist class through the press, schools, etc. It involves, also, a struggle in our own ranks against opportunism and resistance to carrying out the line of the Party.

#### Are the Workers Satisfied With Their Conditions?

You say that struggles among the lumber workers cannot be developed because the workers are satisfied with existing conditions. There is no entire section of workers who are completely satisfied. Among them undoubtedly there are those who fear, those who do not understand, but among them also, there are those who are fearless, militant, and prepared to fight for their rights. These we must try to reach through personal contact, meetings, leaflets and literature, discussion circles, if possible, through the raising of demands for their grievances,—perhaps small grievances to begin with, to satisfy the needs of the workers in the lumber camps in your area. Through reaching and influencing these workers we may hope to reach the main body of the workers.

The deep discontent sweeping the masses cannot fail to have affected the lumber workers. The tendency for the capitalist class, particularly today, is to lower real wages and speed up the workers in order to maintain their profits, in spite of the crisis. Lumber barons are not exempt from this. Therefore, comrades, let us not blame the workers, but examine closely our own activities. We will not win the working class by folding our hands and waiting for the proletarian revolution. In your present situation, you must not expect that the lumber workers, by themselves, spontaneously, will get to understand our policy and program. This is our job, and to the extent that we fulfill this job, we are not calm or inactive no matter how much of a period of relative calm we are witnessing.

## Directives of C.C. on Exchange of Membership Books and Registration of Membership

**T**HE MEMBERSHIP books now in the hands of the Party members expire at the end of 1934. The exchange of the expired books should be utilized to:

1. Bring back many hundreds of members who have dropped out of the Party;
2. Place the members in good standing;
3. Take stock of the membership through registration of every member;
4. Tighten up the Party apparatus in the lower organizations.

The period of registration should be utilized to conduct a most thorough-going propaganda in the units for increasing the recruiting, and checking fluctuation. The registration will enable the Party organizations, especially the Sections, to ascertain which members are working in important factories, and which are members of the A. F. of L. locals or other important mass organizations. If the Sections properly and promptly use and exchange this valuable information, many new shop nuclei and many more fractions will be organized. Information gathered from the registration will also help us better to divide the work among the membership, and to strengthen weak fractions in important mass organizations.

We call the attention of the District Committees to the importance of this registration. If the problem is approached in a political way, many weaknesses and shortcomings can be corrected in the process of exchange of membership books. The registration will help us to bring forward new forces in leadership in the units, Sections and Districts.

The experiences gained in visiting former members who have dropped out of the Party will give us valuable material in the reasons given by these members who dropped out, which will help us to a great extent to improve the work of the units. Special efforts should be made to collect this material from the units, and, in the form of articles, be made available for the whole Party.

The decisions of the P.B. in connection with the exchange of membership books are the following:

1. Every member of the Party is to be registered on a uniform blank supplied by the Center. The registration is

to take place between November 15 and December 7. Members who, for one reason or another, do not attend the unit meetings during the registration period, are to be visited and registered in their homes. New members joining the Party after the registration period has ended, are to fill out the same form as well, before membership books are given to them.

2. Every member is to pay up his dues at the time of registration. No one is to receive a new book who has failed to pay up his dues. The months of October and November are to be utilized to collect the arrears from those members who are behind in dues, in order to make it easier for them to become members in good standing. If we neglect to carry out this suggestion, the rigid application to the decision that no members can get their books if they are behind in dues, would result in the dropping of a large number of members.

3. The units must submit all registration cards to the Section Committee not later than December 8. The Section Committees, after checking up as to whether the units have done their best not only to register every member on their list, but also whether they have systematically visited every member who dropped out, should immediately transmit the registration blanks to the District Committee, where the new membership books will be made out on the basis of the registration blanks. No copies of the individual registration blanks must remain in the Units and Sections. The District after issuing the books, and compiling the reports must destroy the registration blanks. No registration blank should remain in the District after February 15th.

4. Until the end of December, the members are to pay their dues and have stamps pasted in their old books. The new books must be in the units the last week of December. When the new books come down to the unit, the members must give their old books to the Unit Bureau, as well as a receipt for the new book. (A receipt on a perforated page will be available for this purpose in the new membership book). In the first week of January (1935) the Section Committees must check up in every unit whether all the books were distributed to the members, and make a report on the situation to the District.

5. The District, on the basis of the registration, is to compile a report and send it to the Center not later than January 8. Report blanks for the units, sections and districts, will be prepared by the Center.

6. Special arrangements must be made for the registration of the members of shop nuclei, (party name; old book

to be taken away; special place provided for registration, etc.).

7. The period before registration begins should be utilized for working out the best possible method for the mobilization of the membership, and the establishment of an efficient apparatus for the registration.

We suggest that a special meeting of the Section Organizers or Org. Secretaries be held, where the details of the registration should be thoroughly discussed, with special emphasis on the problem of bringing back those members who have dropped out of the Party.

The Section Committees should organize similar meetings with the unit organizers and secretaries. Also special meeting of functionaries should be held and a group of comrades drawn from the district and section in order to help the lower organizations during the registration period.

## Increasing "The Communist International" Circulation in District 6

**D**ISTRICT 6, Cleveland, has worked out a very good plan for increasing the circulation of *The Communist International* there. Their aim is to build up a reading body of 400 throughout the District.

To do this they have adopted the following simple steps: Together with each section organizer, a list has been drawn up of Party comrades in each section that should be readers of *The Communist International*. Each comrade on the list was individually contacted on the basis that each one working pay his own six-month sub for a dollar. Those not working are to have their subs paid for by the leading committee, fraction or organization of which they are a member, counting this as organizational expense.

The comrades approached were enthusiastic about the idea, being eager to get *The Communist International* regularly. But while some success has been achieved in increasing the circulation in District 6, on the whole the results have been small, mainly because of inconsistent pushing on the part of the District.

If energetically carried out, this plan will be fruitful all over the country. All Districts, Sections, and units should work out a similar plan for *The Communist International* in their own territory.

## AGIT-PROP SECTION

### The Use of Party Leaflets in the National Textile Strike

By ALEX BITTELMAN

**F**ROM THE Allentown Section of the Party (District 3) we have already received a nearly complete set of leaflets issued during the strike, together with a report of the dates of issue and distribution. This enables us to review the leaflets and to see what use our Party organization has made of this important agitational weapon. We urge the other Party organizations to follow the example of Allentown and to send in their sets of leaflets accompanied by a report of dates of issue and methods of distribution.

The total number of leaflets, stickers and bulletins issued by Allentown Section between September 3rd and October 3rd is 26. This is an imposing number of pieces—a leaflet daily, or nearly so. Unfortunately, the report does not indicate the number of copies of each leaflet. It is obvious, however, that the Party organization in Allentown displayed a correct appreciation of the value of leaflets and was sufficiently alert and energetic to make use of this agitational weapon.

#### No Leaflets Prior to the Strike

The first leaflet was issued on September 3rd, two days after the proclamation of the strike. But why were there no leaflets, or other agitational literature, before the strike began, for the purpose of strike preparation? Allentown, Lehigh County, is an important silk center. Yet there is no evidence that the Allentown Section of the Party carried on any agitational campaign for the strike during the period between the U.T.W. Convention and the outbreak of the strike. This is explained by the fact that the work of strike preparation was generally weak.

With the outbreak of the strike, the picture changes radically. A leaflet appears nearly every day. The Allentown Section moves rapidly into action to rally the workers of the other industries, and especially the unemployed, in support of the striking silk workers. The first leaflet (September 3) is addressed specifically to the members of

the Unemployed Leagues (led by the Musteites) and the Citizen's Welfare League (influenced by the S.P.), calling for a united front on the picket lines, under the slogan: "Support Our Striking Brothers." It connects up the textile strike with the unemployed struggles well, seeking to make one help the other. It raises the question of strike until all demands are won, urges unity between Negro and white and popularizes H.R. 7598. It indicates slightly the role of the *Daily Worker* and urges the workers to buy it. It is a good leaflet.

The first leaflet addressed directly to the strikers was issued on September 5, a bit late. It warns against arbitration, calls for the organization of rank-and-file strike committees, and urges generally rank-and-file unionism. But it has some weaknesses. The strike demands are not stated, something that had to be in it, especially in the first leaflet to the strikers. It counterposes correctly the "top officials" of the U.T.W. to the rank and file but does not explain what is wrong with these top officials, their reformism and class collaboration. None of these officials is mentioned by name, or their past records examined. Especially glaring is the omission of reference to the local reformist bureaucrats, something we should not be guilty of after a similar error in San Francisco. Our comrades have not apparently sufficiently grasped the lessons of the Central Committee analysis of the San Francisco strike. Neither the role of the Party nor that of the *Daily Worker* is mentioned. Nor is there any reference to the election campaign.

Some of these weaknesses are corrected in a subsequent leaflet issued on September 6, but not all. It centers on fighting the arbitration proposals, exposing Gorman skillfully. It calls for a 100 percent strike. The role of the Party is discussed prominently and recruiting brought forward. The *Daily Worker* is mentioned but not more. It correctly raises the question of the Communists' aim in the strike but the answer given is not sufficient. It is true, as the leaflet says, that the Communists fight to win the strike and to defeat arbitration. But is that all? Surely, to say that we wage a "bitter struggle against the bosses and their agents to smash hunger and misery" is not an adequate statement of the Communists' aim in the strike. Here, if anywhere, was the occasion for stating the revolutionary way out and the slogan of Soviet Power, if only in a brief paragraph, linked up with the partial aims of this strike. The exposure of the local reformist bureaucrats is still not in our agitation.

Only in the leaflet issued on September 8 do we find reference to Macri, local head of the U.T.W. But all it does

is to urge the workers to ask Macri "how he stands on these questions" (arbitration, mass picketing, rank-and-file control, etc.). Such method of exposing Macri would have been insufficient even on the eve of the strike, but on its eighth day it was more than insufficient. It was wrong. The situation was crying out for telling the workers plainly that Macri & Co. fought actively against these proposals of the Party on how to win the strike, and not merely asking him questions. This leaflet, which summarizes very well our program for winning the strike, is totally out of date on the question of exposing the reformist bureaucrats.

On September 12, the Party leaflet correctly issues the slogan for a labor conference in Bethlehem to "organize for a general sympathy strike" in order to "smash the police terror in Bethlehem." It was in answer to arrests and to a police order prohibiting picketing. It is a good leaflet because timely, effective in agitation and organization. One wonders, however, why no reference to the role of the government as an organ of class rule in a leaflet devoted to mobilize the workers to smash government terror? It would appear from the leaflet as though all the trouble lies with "Chief of Police, Trafford." But, surely, the comrades of Allentown know better. The Traffords should be singled out to concentrate upon them the hatred of the workers. Certainly. But the Traffords should also be shown up for what they are: agents of the capitalist government. This the leaflet does not do. No wonder the Party's role as a political party, its election struggles, are not in the leaflet. The idea of "now or never" in the slogan: "A General Sympathy Strike in Bethlehem," is not good. Of course, we had to urge the workers to have the sympathy strike now because it would have helped to win the strike. But why tell the workers that if it does not happen now, it will be never? That is not true.

A very important piece of agitation was the strike bulletin, the *Strikers News*, made up of five pages. It was issued on September 15, containing the following: Page One—"Communist Party Proposes Sympathy Strike in Allentown." Good agitation against the terror in the textile centers. Displays the Hazelton sympathy strike as the example to be followed. Page Two—Demands of the *Strikers* and position of the Party in support of them. Page Three—Devoted to Bethlehem. Pages Four and Five—Reprints of *Daily Worker* editorials on arbitration and on what the Communists fight for. The Allentown Section deserves all praise for this effort. But it has one serious weakness: practically no strike news on the course of the struggle in various shops and centers.

The *Strikers' News*, of which only one issue appeared, does

not reflect the "smaller" but vital activities of the masses in the strike. What is happening on the picket lines of the various mills, what progress is being made in the fight for rank-and-file strike committees, how is the matter of relief handled, etc? This brings us to the most important weakness of all these leaflets: the organizational activities find little reflection or guidance in them. We know that little progress was made in the organization of rank and file strike committees, due primarily to the fact that the Party organization was not sufficiently entrenched in the silk mills before the strike. But during the strike new opportunities appeared for our mass work, especially on the picket lines and in the flying squadrons. How were these opportunities utilized? For developing out of them rank-and-file strike committees? For building the Party among the striking workers? We know that efforts have been made. But these are not found in the leaflets.

In other words, the leaflets of the Allentown Section have on the whole correctly spread among the masses the various strike slogans issued by the Central Committee of the Party through the *Daily Worker* and otherwise. Considering that these leaflets were issued almost daily, this is an important achievement. At the same time, the Allentown Section did not utilize the leaflets properly to organize the Party members and the masses in its own locality for the carrying out of these slogans in practice. This could not but make the agitation itself somewhat abstract, not sufficiently integrated with the local activities and problems of the strike.

On the other hand, the failure to show up the police chief as the representative of the capitalist government is an error of being "concrete" in a bad sense; an error of failing to raise partial struggles to the level of general political struggle. Hence, we must guard against two errors: (1) being too general in our agitation, and (2) failure to bring forth local events in their general class struggle significance.

(In the next issue we will review some textile strike leaflets of the other sections of the Party—Editor.)

## Lessons from the Unit Discussions on the Party Anniversary

(Excerpts from the Minutes of the Central Agit-Prop  
Commission Meeting, October 10, 1934)

Bittelman

COMRADE JEROME and I discussed the question of putting the Central Agit-Prop in direct contact with the agit-prop work of some of our units and sections. We feel that we don't know enough of how agit-prop work is being carried on in the units. Our information is mainly of a general character, which prevents us from giving concrete guidance. For this reason, we addressed ourselves to a number of concentration sections in the country; the stockyards section of Chicago, Hill section in Pittsburgh, Ford section in Detroit, Section 7, District 2, etc. As a beginning in carrying out this plan, it is proposed to have Comrade Carroll of Section 7, District 2 take part in our meetings and give now a brief report on the discussions in the units on the Party Anniversary.

Carroll—Section 7, District 2

I would like to say that the discussions on the Party Anniversary in the units in our section were carried out very poorly. Those units that had discussions had very superficial ones and in most cases it did not result in any concrete and definite proposals and concrete plans of action that the units should have adopted. Another very important point is that the most important units, such as the Navy yard, the longshore unit, up to today had no discussion at all. Even when the unit bureau planned to have a discussion, the comrades did not succeed in holding it and linking it up with the immediate problems facing the units on the waterfront. The appropriate thing should be that the Party Anniversary celebration discussions should be very closely linked up with the struggles on the waterfront and the preparations for the strike. Our comrades did not succeed in doing this. They did not succeed because the comrades were overburdened with daily tasks. They are primarily new comrades and don't get sufficient guidance from the leading comrades in the section.

In the street units, out of 12 units, 9 had discussions. In most instances the discussions were almost divorced from the tasks facing the units, and if the tasks were discussed, no plan was worked out.

Unit 1—which operates in Scandinavian territory and a

number of comrades work on the paper—had a discussion in a narrative form by an editor of the paper and the comrades didn't link it up with the practical tasks. The older Party comrades led the discussion and made a nice story of it.

Unit 2—operating in mass organizations, I.W.O., etc. They had a very good discussion conducted by a comrade whom I sent down. This unit has a number of old Party members and they came clamoring to the Section that they wouldn't have a discussion unless we sent someone. Seven comrades participated in the discussion, which was interesting. No plan of recruiting from the territory was worked out.

Unit 3 had a good discussion. 17 comrades participated, led by a comrade seven months in the Party. As a result of his proposals, the comrades sold 90 *Daily Workers* and got contacts in the neighborhood. As a result, they have now the possibility of organizing an Unemployment Council.

Unit 5 concentrates around the Navy yard; it is the outside unit that I have in mind. They had a good discussion; invited three outsiders. It was conducted by a comrade 5 or 6 months in the Party. The discussion was interesting, but it wasn't linked up close enough with the activities in the Navy yard, with the question of putting out the shop paper (they do a good deal of work on the paper). Despite the discussion, the Party Anniversary found no reflection in the paper. The comrade who led the discussion is a member of the Section Committee. In this unit the discussion was on history. It wasn't sufficiently followed up. They didn't have another open unit meeting to invite workers. They sold Bittelman's pamphlet at the gate of the navy yard and they sold 7 pamphlets.

Unit 6—street unit, members of longshoremen's local 808 which went out on strike. The unit, despite having a few leading comrades—the section organizer is in that unit—did not have a discussion yet. The comrades are too busy with the daily assignments to have a discussion. They never had any serious political discussion. In general, I think, it is a reflection that our units function very poorly organizationally and the function of paying dues, assignments, speakers, takes up all the time. The bureau doesn't function properly. They don't function in between units. The comrades have assignments, but all the other problems which are taken up at every unit meeting, hinder every discussion and they are not being held. If they are held, it is to satisfy the agit-prop. Although the Section Organizer is in this unit, they have other problems, issuing the local paper, calling together the rank and file committee, etc.

This Party Anniversary campaign discussion in our Section was not very good. We had no agit-prop meeting in the

District. Although the outline prepared by the Central Agit-Prop was important, it was stuck away with other minor documents. Not every agit-prop director got it personally. We are suffering very much from over-centralization in our agitation and propaganda work. We wait to hear from the District. When I read the editorial in the *D.W.*, I first found out that the outline was issued.

The question of pushing and preparing the discussion, of making it a question to be discussed in the Section Committee, with the Unit agit-prop directors, this we didn't have, which is a very important element in organizing the discussion. Another important element which made this a spontaneous affair rather than organized agit-prop work was because I was very busy in the Section; two members of the bureau were away and we have 24 units. This hindered my making personal contact with every unit. The best that was done was the sending of the outline to the comrades.

When the discussion is prepared, we can see good results, as in Unit 7. Here we have a few more-or-less old comrades and some new comrades. An old comrade led the discussion. He gave a 20-minute introduction and then we had questions, among them questions on Trotzkyism and Lovestoneism. As a result, the unit worked out a plan of reviving the work in the Philippine Anti-Imperialist League. This was begun immediately by the holding of mass meetings of the Anti-Imperialist League, holding a party for the 15th Anniversary, canvassing with the *D.W.* and selling 70 copies. The discussion was interesting and carried over to three meetings. This I found to be true in all the units.

Unit 8—operating in Negro territory. They linked up the discussion with L.S.N.R. work and also carried it over to three meetings.

Unit 9—The comrades told me we didn't have any discussion though we assigned three comrades to prepare the discussion, but they were too busy. They work on the Scandinavian paper, and they are too tired to conduct any discussion in the unit.

Unit 11—the same thing; also in Scandinavian territory. They had a discussion led by an agit-prop director from another unit. They had an interesting discussion. A lot of questions, including questions on Lovestoneism and Trotzkyism, were asked.

Unit 12—A newly organized unit of Greeks and Italians operating amongst food workers. They succeeded in inviting 7 non-Party workers to this discussion to whom they had to translate into Greek. The comrades linked it up very closely to the question of strikes.

The Edison unit is a newly organized unit, but very much

aware and conscious. When they read the editorial in the D.W. and saw the outline, they assigned three comrades to lead the discussion. They had an interesting discussion. They invited three non-Party workers. Despite all this discussion, the Party anniversary was not mentioned in the shop paper.

As far as the shop units are concerned, I will limit myself to this. The most important shop unit had no discussion as yet. They will have a discussion. The Robins Drydock unit had a discussion led by an old experienced comrade, active in the metal union, but it didn't result in inviting outside workers and elevating the plane of the Party members.

### Excerpts from a Letter to the Agit-Prop Commission of the C. C.

#### DEAR COMRADES:

"... The question of unit libraries was taken up very well by our agitprop directors and in some places has already gone into effect. We have arranged with the literature department to give 50% discount to units on 13th Plenum and 8th Convention material.

"The comrades added a few suggestions to your proposals which I think would be very valuable for other districts. They are instituting these libraries as circulation libraries and are fining the price of a pamphlet to the comrade who fails to return the pamphlet or book on time. In several units these fines have been considerable and helped them to build up a fine library.

"I just want to say a few words on the outlines. The outline sent by the Center could have been used for our speakers. Our units are not as yet ready to utilize such general outlines. We have therefore taken the main material in the outline and worked out a series of 8 outlines in which we go into detail explaining some of the fundamental questions, draw our organizational conclusions based on our tasks. These outlines are very well received in the units and are very close to home."

"Comradely yours,  
"Beatrice Shields,  
"District Agitprop Dept.  
"District 8."

(The Agit-Prop Department of District 8 has done well to concretize our outline to the needs of the district. That is in accord with our suggestions to all districts. We would like to hear from the other districts on how this has been done.—Central Agit-Prop.)

# Party Organizer



"It is precisely the task of Bolsheviks to improve the quality of recruiting itself, so that Party recruits are permanently assimilated into the life of the organization. The proper use of the new forces drawn to us, their activation and education in Bolshevism, is our basic task. This is the creation of the main instrument for building a socialist society in America."

— BROWDER: Report to the Eighth Convention of the C.P.U.S.A.

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

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No. 12

## The Recruiting Drive

By F. BROWN

**W**HAT IS the situation in the Recruiting Drive? While, on the one hand, it appears from the reports that the Recruiting Drive has been taken up, on the other hand, if we judge from the material that reaches the *Daily Worker*, and the figures on recruiting during the past few weeks, we must come to the conclusion that as yet we cannot speak of a real drive. There is no evidence that the Recruiting Drive has been taken up with the necessary determination.

Yes, some of the Districts worked out their plans and have mobilized the units and fractions to some extent for the Drive. In other Districts, however, we have evidence, not only that the directives of the C.C. on the Recruiting Drive have not passed beyond the stage of reading material, but that the C.C. letter was not properly discussed in the units. Many reasons are given: i.e., because of the crowded agenda, or because of the election campaign, etc. The fact remains that the C.C. letter and directives remained at the status of half ignored directives.

The fact that very little discussion material,—articles bringing forward the experiences in the Drive, declarations of new Party members, etc., has reached the *Daily Worker*, and that the present figures on recruiting do not indicate an increase over the average recruiting, are more than evident signs that the Drive has not been taken up properly. We are confronted with a certain apathy, which expresses itself in the theory that, "because we are too busy, with so many activities, we cannot tackle properly the fundamental organizational problems before the Party—the building of the Party".

In this drive, there can be no excuse that there was a lack of directives or concrete suggestions from the Center. Where the units took up the letter of the C.C., the comrades greeted the document with enthusiasm. It is in the leading committees that the weaknesses lie. It is the leading committees who have not brought forward the Drive; who have not supervised properly the activities of the units and fractions, who have not developed the competition between sections, units, and individual Party members; who have not gathered the experiences, which, if published in the *Daily*

Worker, in The Party Organizer, would act as an important stimulus in the Drive.

Such a situation must be changed immediately. We call upon the whole Party, from the leading committees down to each individual Party member, to follow up the appeal of the C.C. on the Recruiting Drive with Bolshevik determination. The leading committees, from the District Bureaus down to the Unit Bureaus, must take immediate steps to bring about a drastic turn, upon which depends the success of the drive.

We propose:

1. That the Districts, Sections and Unit Bureaus immediately check up on the activities in the Drive.
2. That the leading comrades, members of District and Section Committees, be assigned to assist the units in their activities during the Drive.
3. That immediate steps be taken by the District Org. Depts., Section Org. Depts., to supply the Daily Worker and the Party Organizer with the best experiences in the Drive; experiences of the units, fractions, individual Party members, etc.
4. That the shop nuclei invite to their meetings the best workers in their shops, sympathetic and militant workers, with the purpose of bringing them into our ranks.
5. That the leading committees see to it that the fractions in the mass organizations be mobilized to call special meet-

**WE HAD** expected to have in this issue of THE PARTY ORGANIZER recruiting experiences from all of the concentration Districts. In spite of letters and numerous wires, no experiences were obtainable from Districts 7 and 8. An assignment was also given to the Section Organizer of Section 1, New York, where we understand that the comrades have succeeded in reducing fluctuation, but apparently Comrade Brandt wishes to keep the experiences of Section 1 within the Section, because, despite letters and wires, he has sent us no article.

Certainly it would be incorrect to assume that Districts 7 and 8 are not carrying on a recruiting campaign and therefore have no experiences. But the fact that these are two of the most important concentration Districts in the country, makes their experiences valuable to the entire Party, and therefore an obligation rests upon these Districts to make their experiences available. We expect therefore that the January PARTY ORGANIZER will be lively with recruiting experiences, not only from Districts 7 and 8, but from every District in the country—The Editor

ings of sympathizers, militant workers of their particular union and other mass organization, at which leading comrades will speak about the role of the Party and appeal to the non-Party workers to join forces with us for the building of the only Party of the working class.

6. That each District utilize its Org. Bulletin as one of the main instruments for conducting the Drive, or take advantage of the Recruiting Drive to establish an Org. Bulletin, which shall not become the organ only of reports of the organizational activities going on, but shall be developed as a guide on a district scale on how to build shop nuclei, how to improve the life of the shop nuclei and of the units in general, taking up all the organizational problems. The District Org. Bulletins should become one of the main educators on the organizational principles and problems of our Party.

## The Recruiting Campaign in Cleveland District

By PHIL BART, *Org. Secretary, District 6*

**A**N EXAMINATION of the recruiting in District 6 for the month of October indicates that the Central Committee letter to the Party membership has not yet penetrated to the lower units and reached the membership. During that month, we recruited 156 into our Party. This is only a slight increase over the previous months. Durnig September, 114 joined the Party and in August, 126.

The Central Committee letter addressed to every Party member was very timely. It reached us in the period when we were involved in intense election activity. During the campaign, literally hundreds of house meetings took place. These were attended by new sections of workers who had previously no contact with the revolutionary movement. It is from these sources, that many of our recruits should have come. Yet the results for the month show only a slight increase.

If we further examine the character of this recruiting, we find that the point in the letter "to strengthen the Party, in the first place among the workers in the large factories and trade unions, in the basic industries of steel, mining, marine, railroad, and auto", has not taken place. During the month of October, four steel workers were recruited into the Party. District 6 has six shops of concentration. Four of them are

steel plants with existing shop units which have shown no increase during October.

In drawing in workers from the unions, some slight improvement can be noted. From A. F. of L. unions, 23 have joined the Party; 7 from T.U.U.L. and 4 from independent unions. This is not due yet to a conscious recruiting activity inside of the unions but reflects the general recruiting. How much more could have been done if, through the conscious effort of our work inside these unions, steps were taken to draw the most active into our Party?

But the most burning problem we are faced with is that of Party fluctuation. The Central Committee, addressing itself to every Party member, reminds everyone of the "problem of a tremendous fluctuation (turn-over) of the Party membership". When we add the number recruited into the Party from January to August with the average dues payment in the District, we should have a membership today of 2,589. To this figure, we can add those recruited during September and October which should bring our membership to 2,859.

However, a wide gap exists between the average dues payment and the number recruited. During this whole period, our average dues payment has not passed the 1,700 mark. This means that some 1,100 members cannot be accounted for. Non-appreciation of this question exists in many of the sections where the Party leaders do not see these problems as one of the major means in building the Party. There is still a distorted understanding between the organization of the Party, constant recruiting, and the building of the unit as a means of improving the mass work. Let us cite an example: We received a letter from the section organizer of Akron, which states:

"After assigning the best possible forces for trade union work, which I am personally responsible for, and after assigning others for unemployed work, we find ourselves in a situation of needing a new Organizational Secretary. Therefore, a motion was adopted by the Section Committee that we ask the District Committee for a suitable comrade for at least three months to take charge of this work and enable us to go out and do mass work."

It is such distortion that results in neglect of organization of the Party unit, of the constant attention to building a leadership and thereby making these units instruments for mass work. It is well for the Section Organizer to take responsibility for trade union work, but only by developing the unit as an instrument in this work can we assure its success.

With the decision of the Central Committee to extend the

recruiting drive until the Lenin Memorial (January 21, 1935), steps are being taken to correct this situation, improving the recruiting and cutting down this tremendous fluctuation. For this purpose, a functionaries' conference has already taken place in Cleveland, where the Central Committee letter was the only point on the order of business for discussion. The Organization Commission has called a special meeting of all Section Organizers throughout the District, where recruiting, fluctuation, dues payment and exchange of Party membership books are the points on the agenda.

In Cleveland, the regular shop unit conference, consisting of unit organizers from all shop units, is being devoted to a discussion of the Central Committee letter. In the A. F. of L. fraction, this question has been placed on the order of business. The District meeting of Section Organizers, in discussing this problem, will also outline a program similar to that of the Cleveland program; that is, holding of functionaries' conferences and shop unit meetings to take up this question.

Basing ourselves on the proposals made in the Central Committee letter, the main attention is being directed towards individual attention to groups of comrades. While calling functionaries' conferences and various other meetings, the leading comrades are responsible to select some specific group, hold discussions with them and draw them into the Party. From the slight beginning made in this direction, we have met some excellent results. During the election campaign a group of workers were called together in one small town in Ohio, where a shop unit of three in a large steel mill was organized; one of them a leader of the Central Labor Union of the town, another one the executive of his union and the third, an active member. Similar examples, even if only few can be cited in other places.

The letter of the Central Committee is not a document to be read once and laid aside. In the whole drive from now until the Lenin Memorial, it should be the guide for every Party member. In this way, it will be possible to carry out the decision of putting an end to this terrible disease of fluctuation which results in constant recruiting, but a loss of as many as are gained each time.

## Some Experiences in Recruiting to the Party

By JIM ALLANDER, *Org. Sec'y., District 5*

AT A RECENT meeting of the District Bureau the problem of recruiting was taken up in line with the general mass work of the Party. The report of the Org. Dept. showed that 364 members had been recruited since March, while we have the task of raising our dues-paying membership to 2,000 before January 21.

Recruitment for the period of a year (August, 1933 to August, 1934) shows a total of 863 recruits or an average of 71 per month, yet recruitment for July, August and September shows the lowest average for the entire year. This would indicate that the activity of the Party was on a low ebb during this period, which was not the case, as we were engaged in a number of very important campaigns such as the Party Anniversary, Election Campaign, etc. The most important was our campaign for the election of a Left wing slate in the U.M.W.A. in coal and the A.A. in steel. With proper methods and attention to recruitment we should have recruited a minimum of 500 new members to the Party during this period.

The discussion of the District Bureau revealed that our leading Party comrades engaged in mass work, as well as our functionaries, had not given the question of recruitment any serious attention, but regarded it as a routine matter.

During the course of the election campaign, more than 100 meetings were held, and in most cases there were never application cards present, no preparations were made beforehand for recruitment into the Party. Our Party units where the meetings took place, were not mobilized for this important work among the workers who attended these meetings.

In places where proper attention was given to the problem of recruitment at the meetings and in our mass work around the elections, good results were obtained, as, for example, in a local steel town with a good Unemployment Council the face of the Party was brought forward and our comrades openly asked workers to join the Party at their mass meetings. One new unit has been established and the membership more than doubled. Today we have 31 members in this place. Six months ago we had none. Another example is X——, where we have had only five members for over a year. They did not ask workers to join the Party. At their

first meeting for the election campaign the whole unit was mobilized. 2,000 leaflets were distributed and, to the surprise of our comrades, it turned out to be the biggest political mass meeting held in the City Hall auditorium attracting more workers than any of the other Parties. 250 attended the meeting. Four workers openly joined the Party and a number have since turned in their applications to individual comrades. The Party is now brought forward in all the activities locally and respected by the workers.

Another example of good recruiting during the Election Campaign is the work of two units in the 5th Ward of the Hill Section, which were the only units that were successful in involving non-Party workers to a large extent in the election campaign and work of the unit. Their work was not scattered over the entire ward, but in a selected section. At the end of the campaign this precinct showed the highest vote percentage compared with the entire Communist vote in the Hill. The unit was able to estimate the vote received approximately before the election. Out of the group of non-Party workers active in the election campaign 10 have been recruited to the Party through one unit and eight through the second unit.

### Recruiting in Mining and Steel

In mining we have succeeded in building a fair Left wing opposition. The leadership of this opposition assumes a broad character which is directly connected with the different locals of the U.M.W.A. It has established a functioning apparatus with a regular schedule of meetings, program, etc. In this work a number of our most active Party members were active, but, during this campaign our most important mine units stopped functioning. Recruitment of miners to the Party also stopped. The fraction leading the work, within the opposition had no plan for recruitment. The District Bureau, in discussing this work, pointed out quite sharply that every comrade in mass work understood that this had been pointed out in previous resolutions of the District, that such mass work without building the Party and Y.C.L. was doomed to crash, endangering the whole Left wing movement.

In our Left wing work in steel and aluminum we had a somewhat similar situation with favorable opportunities for recruitment. Yet our leading comrades overlooked this possibility or hesitated to recruit these new workers to the Party.

After criticizing this failure and weakness the District Bureau set a recruitment quota of 50 employed miners and 25 steel workers for the period of a month. We also assigned

each Bureau member the task of reporting at the end of the month how many non-Party workers he spoke to and recruited to the Party. In the application of this plan for recruitment in mining and steel we have already built two new mine units. In addition a unit of seven in an important mine was established, recruiting several individuals who are leaders of their local unions and committees. Our quota will be fulfilled by the end of the month in mining. However, there still remains a weakness in steel and also aluminum. That is, we are not recruiting employed steel workers, members of the A.A., into the Party fast enough to make our quota for the month, while the possibilities are before us for such recruitment.

#### A Non-Political Method of Recruiting

In analyzing the recent recruitment to the Party throughout the District, the biggest percentage of recruits are listed as unemployed, but upon close examination, when taking up the applicants individually, it was revealed that many of the applicants were employed workers or working part time. Under such circumstances when the applicant was informed that the employed initiation was 50c he in most cases replied, "I was only asked for 10c". This reveals that many of our comrades do not recruit in a political way. They approach the worker from the point of view that he is doing us a favor by joining the Party. This kind of recruitment is an insult to the worker. Many times this same method is carried right into the unit in the payment of dues when they know the worker is employed. Still the dues secretaries in some cases hesitate to ask for the additional dues. Such methods as this disgust the new workers, when we handle them in this manner.

Our experiences of the recent period, have raised the problem of our Org. Dept. paying much closer attention to the methods applied to recruiting, and particularly to the individuals and fractions engaged in mass work, to struggle against the failure and "fear" of bringing forward the face of the Party, asking for new recruits; in this manner combating the idea, that "first we build the opposition or council, then the Party".

## Personal Contact in the Election Campaign

By S. VOROS

**I**N ORDER to involve non-Party workers actively in our election campaign we set as our first task the building of broad committees of workers around each candidate. We discussed with them how many workers they knew and set the task for them to visit as many of these as possible, enlisting their aid.

Those candidates who took this task seriously found a far better response than expected. According to reports, on an average of six out of fifteen non-Party workers expressed their willingness to cooperate in every way possible. They were willing to take out collection lists and raise the necessary funds to enlist other workers—to distribute literature—and to do active campaigning in behalf of our candidates.

These comrades, in the majority of cases, did splendid work. As a matter of fact, it has to be recorded that it was mainly due to them that the campaign got into swing long before the Party apparatus proper did. They arranged house meetings which proved to be of immeasurable value in bringing our platform to the masses. In my estimation, the increase in our votes to more than double of last year was, to a great extent, due to these house meetings. At these meetings, the candidates had a chance to explain the Party's position convincingly on questions around which the greatest misunderstandings existed. A surprisingly large number of questions dealt with our stand on religion, "why do we always cause trouble by demonstrating," "why we demand instead of asking", "why we fight the Socialists", "will we confiscate the homes and private property, bank accounts, grocery stores, etc., of the little fellows", and so on.

The intimate contacts established at these meetings with the workers made it possible for us to arrange larger meetings and also enlarge our group of non-Party actives. Needless to say, it helped recruiting and gave us very valuable contacts with shops where we had no previous connections. The contacts thus made, if followed up, will not only help us in our trade union work, but also help to increase the membership of our Party.

While building these groups around our candidates, we found out how hopelessly isolated many of our Party functionaries and so-called leaders of mass organizations are. For instance, one of our candidates for State Senator, who at the same time is the full-time secretary of one of our largest dues-paying mass organizations, was unable to build even a

committee of five non-Party workers around himself. Perhaps he didn't try hard enough—but the fact remains that out of an organization of about 2,800 dues-paying members, very close to the Party, he didn't or couldn't enlist even five to help his campaign.

On the other hand, some of the candidates had committees of fifty, a hundred, or, in one instance, a couple of hundred, non-Party workers. It must be noted here, that Party members enrolled through the personal efforts of the candidates in these committees, did far more and better active work in the elections than those who were drawn in through the units and Sections.

The members of these committees played a decisive role in manning the booths on election day. Without them it would have been impossible to cover practically all the 763 precinct booths with watchers, challengers, and election workers, and prevent wholesale stealing of our votes. Without them, it would have been impossible to build up an election machine, getting our own results far into the night on election day, a machine that surprised the election apparatus of the major parties and forced recognition by them.

In closing, let us deal briefly with the organization of house meetings. A candidate would ask one or more workers on his committee to call his neighbors together to a meeting at his house telling them that a candidate will be there to speak to them. These workers would go from house to house in that block and invite all the neighbors. We found that the real successful meetings were the ones where the neighborhood was canvassed twice or three times. Sometimes out of fifty families visited, ten or twelve or even twenty people may come—other times, only four or five. As a general rule, however, if the same people were visited two days in succession and also at the night of the meeting, a very successful meeting was the result. Owing to the fact that most of the active candidates were overworked, three or four house meetings had to be arranged close to each other so that the same candidate could attend them all the same night. Unfortunately, most of these house meetings were not attended by Party members and thereby could not be fully utilized. These Party members, however, who did go to these meetings, were amply repaid for their trouble. At one of these meetings, after the candidate got through, a Party member who had come partly prepared, sold 15 copies of the *Daily Worker*, 12 tickets to the Fifteenth Anniversary celebration of our Party, a couple of our election pamphlets, Program of Action and he was also asked for other basic literature, but had none with him.

Our election campaign has again proved that the best work of our Party can only be done if we break through

our sectarian isolation and establish day-to-day, living personal contact with the masses. The workers are now more than ever ready to follow us, if we only take the trouble to contact them. By using our personal contacts, by following them up, we'll find not only that our tasks can be achieved quicker, but that we'll be able to double our Party membership before January 1, as the Central Committee asked us.

## Important Lessons of the Shipyard Strike and Organization of the Shop Nucleus

By L. LEWIS, *Sec. Organizer, Staten Island, N. Y.*

THE first membership meeting to establish Section 19, Staten Island, was held on August 10, 1934. We then had about 30 members, most of whom, although good, loyal and willing comrades, were completely isolated from the workers. The Section was torn by petty squabbles, because of the lack of political activity.

Some important struggles had been carried on here by the Unemployment Council and the Home Owners Defense League, but these organizations disintegrated because of the fact that no Party fraction functioned, and also because of the lack of political understanding. There was complete isolation from the factory workers.

The basic factories in Staten Island are:

1. The Shipyards, with about 1,500 workers.
2. The Proctor and Gamble Soap Factory, with 1,200 workers.

In addition there are about 400 workers in the transit service, the ferry-boat workers, and some factories of minor importance.

### Position Changed From "Outside" to "Inside"

The main question at our first meeting was how to transform our position from the "outside" to the "inside". Some comrades, particularly the "old timers" developed a "theory" that this is impossible, that "Staten Island is not Manhattan, the workers here have a different psychology", etc.

We can now report a membership of 50, with a shop nucleus in the Shipyards, which has already played an important role in the strike of the welders in the shipyard. In addition there is a shop nucleus in the Proctor and Gamble Factory, which has already issued a shop paper, which

was very well received by the workers. The Shipyards nucleus will also issue its first paper this month. In addition we have made contacts with the A. F. of L. painters local.

How did we organize the Shipyards unit, and what was its role in the strike?

The Shipyard unit was born and baptized in the strike. It began immediately to play an important role in this struggle.

At the beginning of September our Committee approached the Welders Union, an independent organization in the yard, asking them to endorse the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill. We then established personal contacts with some leading members of that union, on the basis of their favorable attitude toward the bill. After one week, one joined the Party, and he recruited one more. Two weeks later a strike sentiment developed in the yard among the welders against the rotten working conditions and for higher wages. On the first day of the strike, the Relief Workers Union, through the fraction, adopted a resolution of sympathy and support, and sent a Committee to the headquarters, offering assistance. The reformist leaders politely rejected this offer. The "Red scare" was immediately brought to the fore, but in spite of this our two comrades were able, three days later, to get together a group of eight to discuss the strike situation. The representative of the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union, which has a small group in the yard, met with this group, and, as a result of the meeting, two more members were recruited into the Party. This was done without the disclosure of the comrades to the other members of the group.

#### Party Unit is Formed

At the same time our newly recruited comrades met. Without waiting for their books, we formed the unit, elected a secretary and explained the functions of a Communist shop nucleus. Two days later the unit issued a leaflet on the strike in the name of the Communist unit in the Shipyard.

We warned the workers against relying on the National Labor Board, brought forward the program of united committees with the rest of the workers in the yard, of spreading the strike, of mass picketing, etc.

The workers accepted this leaflet very favorably, and it caused considerable worry for the management.

This leaflet and the influence of the nucleus caused the calling of an emergency relief conference, where we had representatives of the Relief Workers Union, the Unemployment Council, the Union of the Proctor and Gamble Factory, and the Newspaper Guild. The A. F. of L. stayed away from this Conference, but it brought us closer to the strike, and the fear of the "Reds" waned.

After eight weeks' strike, the National Labor Board ruled

that these 118 welders, who are in key positions in the yard on the construction of two destroyers, do not have the right to collective bargaining, but are under the jurisdiction of the A. F. of L. Marine Trades Council, or the employees' representative plan—the company union.

By that time the Party had already succeeded in exposing the N.R.A. and the policy of the leaders. The Women's Council had also provided food to the welders, and the Relief Workers Union had obtained immediate relief for some strikers from the Home Relief Bureau. The workers realized that we are a Party of action.

On the night when the decision of the National Labor Board was made public, the welders met, and our representatives went to the meeting: Our speakers were received with great enthusiasm. "If we had not been made scared of the Reds by the bosses, we would have won the strike", said one. Another worker wanted information about joining the Communist Party. Many workers expressed interest and sympathy with the Party.

#### Lessons of the Strike

The strike was very important in character.

1. It proved to the workers that the N.R.A. is for company unions.
2. It also proved that craft unionism cannot win any strike, even though this craft may be very strategic.
3. It raised the prestige of the Party.
4. It proved to the Party members that we can get on the inside from the outside if we only apply the line and program of the Party, laid down in the Open Letter and in the Eighth Convention, namely, to make personal contacts, to be on the alert, realizing the readiness of the workers to struggle, and not hiding the face of the Party, to counteract the Red scare, and last, but by no means least, self-confidence that the Communists are able to lead the struggles of the workers. The comrades realize now that had we had a Communist nucleus at least three months prior to the strike the results of the strike would have been entirely different.

Our main shortcomings in the strike were lack of Daily Worker sales, no political discussion with the workers, and only a few leading comrades were drawn into strike activity.

With these lessons we expect our Party to be an important factor in the coming struggle which is brewing in the shipyard.

How we organized the P. & G. unit, the effect of the first shop paper, and the difference in the life of an old street unit and the new shop unit will be told in another article.

## The Phila. District Plenum Gives New Perspectives and New Tasks to the Party

By FRANK HELLMAN

**T**HE DISTRICT COMMITTEE of the Phila. District brought together Party representatives from the steel, marine, mining, textile, food, furniture, needle, agriculture and other industries. These representatives came together to discuss the most vital problems confronting the Party and the working class of this District. The major point on the agenda was: Trade Union Work.

In addition to this the Daily Worker, work among the unemployed, and organizational problems of the Party were taken up.

Comrade Stachel, in reporting for the Central Committee, analyzed the developments taking place in the trade union movement and the trade union tactics applied by the Party at various stages since its existence in the period of relative stabilization as well as under conditions of the general crisis of capitalism. (See article by Jack Stachel in November issue of *The Communist*.)

The discussion, in which many comrades from shops and members of trade unions took part, confirmed the correctness of the analysis of the Central Committee and clarified the necessity of shifting the center of gravity to working within the American Federation of Labor.

Second, struggle for trade union unity along the lines of the letter by the Trade Union Unity League to the 54th Convention of the A. F. of L. Furthermore, the strengthening of T.U.U.L. unions in the marine, metal, food, fur, furniture and agricultural industries.

### How are These Tactics to be Applied Concretely in Our District?

In the textile industry, where the masses are organized in the United Textile Workers Union, our line shall be to merge the National Textile Workers local in Easton with the American Federation of Silk Workers, on the basis of certain demands agreed to by both unions before the merger takes place. (This merger has already been carried through, following united front actions of the National Textile Workers Union and the American Federation of Silk Workers, an affiliate of the U.T.W., during the textile strike.)

By the time of the Convention of the Federation of Silk Workers, two former members of the National Textile Workers Union will be delegates to the Convention. A number of the members of the former executive of the N.T.W.U. will be

part of the Executive Committee of the American Federation of Silk Workers. The former organizer of the N.T.W.U. has been made the organizer of the U.T.W. in the Easton area.

In steel, where we have organization, a similar line is being pursued. In places where neither the A. F. of L. nor the T.U.U.L. has any organization, the Party shall take the initiative to organize locals of the American Federation of Silk Workers or the Amalgamated Association.

In mining we must entrench ourselves in both unions. We shall attempt to bring together miners of both unions, beginning at least in one mine, work out a concrete program of struggle on the basis of the grievances and demands of the miners of both unions, develop a fight both against Boylan as well as Maloney and their machine, and in the course of struggle lay the basis for one union of all the miners to be decided by the miners themselves.

In marine, we shall continue to build the Marine Workers Industrial Union among the seamen, to organize opposition groups within the International Seamen's Union and opposition groups within the I.L.A.

In agriculture, food, furniture, we continue to build the unions affiliated to the T.U.U.L. Similar methods are to be adopted in connection with other unions under similar conditions.

### What Organizational Measures Will be Necessary to Carry Out This Line?

First of all, the Party must place itself at the head of the struggles of the workers in all industries in this District. The Party must still more deeply root itself among the basic sections of the proletariat in the factories and trade unions. The Party must extend its ideological influence among the broad masses of workers.

This can best be done by building the circulation of the Daily Worker in the factories and trade unions, without which the winning of the masses for a revolutionary program is impossible. New Party members must be recruited from the shops and trade unions, more shop nuclei must be organized, more shop papers must be published by the shop nuclei already in existence. The political level of the whole Party membership must be raised to a higher stage, with leading comrades paying more personal attention to the lower Party apparatus. The distribution of work must be organized in a carefully planned manner, making it possible for the comrades working in shops and trade unions to spend more time with the workers and less time in inner meetings.

Preparations have already been made by the District Committee for a district circuit School. An org. instructor is to be sent into the field, paying special attention to the most important sections. A District Training School is being

prepared, starting the first of February, to develop new cadres for the Party. Much more attention must be paid to recruit Negro workers into the Party and the building of the Y.C.L. A thorough check up is being carried through, on the basis of the registration of the Party membership, to make every Party member a member of a trade union. (Members of leading Party committees were given one month to join a trade union.)

A Party trade union committee is to be established in the District, guiding the work of all the trade union fractions.

#### Concentration

The discussion at the Plenum has clearly brought forward a number of political and organizational weaknesses of the Party. The Party has not yet mastered a correct policy of concentration. There is still about 100 percent fluctuation in the Party. New cadres are not being developed and real collective leadership and coordination of work is unsatisfactory.

Above all, however, the key to the solution of most of the problems is concentration, in certain basic shops or industries and trade unions. Therefore, in order to make the necessary changes, the following organizational measures are to be adopted, in addition to those enumerated above:

Special units are to be organized in certain places, which will have as their only task to work among the workers of a certain shop, such as: Philco, waterfront, textile, mill, one mine, one steel mill, etc. This unit, with the help of the section, will be responsible to build the *Daily Worker*, to recruit for the Party, to work in the neighborhood and among the language organizations, to bring all forces at the disposal of the Party into play, in order to penetrate into this place of concentration.

The District Committee will have to plan and organize methods of recruiting, analyze the causes of fluctuation and overcome them, give leadership to the organization of a broad opposition movement within the A. F. of L., and, although there is no basis at the present time for the formation of an Independent Federation of Labor, independent unions existing at the present time should be united by the formation of a local committee in which the T.U.U.L. unions should be represented.

On the basis of this understanding, combined with the necessary organizational measures, we will recruit 500 Party members by January 20th. The Party will become a powerful factor in the development of struggles of the workers against the N.R.A. Hunger Deal of Roosevelt, for the organization of a broad united front of the working class on a class struggle program, in the course of which we will build a powerful Communist Party.

## AGIT-PROP SECTION

### The National Agit-Prop Conference

#### PLAN OF PREPARATION

By V. J. JEROME

**A**T ITS session of November 14, the National Agitprop Commission discussed as the principal item on its agenda the preparation for an Agitprop Conference to take place in the very near future.

On the basis of a report submitted by Comrade Bittelman, the Agitprop Commission mapped out the following proposals for the Conference to be submitted to the districts for consideration:

The agenda shall be divided into three main parts: Agitation, Propaganda, and Agitprop apparatus.

#### 1. Agitation.

It is the opinion of the Commission that the discussion of our agitation work should consist of a survey of the Agitprop activity of our Party in connection with promoting and popularizing our theses and slogans in (1) the struggle against fascism and imperialist war, and (2) for effecting the United Front. Our agitational activity in this respect can best be evaluated in examining the manner in which we conducted the campaigns in connection with the strike wave, Unemployment and Social Insurance, the Party Anniversary, the Elections, Thaelmann defence, Scottsboro-Herndon, and farmers' struggles. The analysis should be, not only of publicized forms of agitation, but also of oral agitation (indoor and outdoor meetings, individual agitation, house-to-house canvassing, etc.).

The Thirteenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. in line with its declaration that the revolutionary crisis is fast maturing throughout the capitalist world, made it mandatory upon every Communist Party to make its agitation ring with a broad, compelling mass appeal. The heightened forms of class struggle call for ever newer and more popular modes of agitation. "This means," the E.C.C.I. Thesis states, "that the content and language of agitation and the press must henceforth be addressed to the broadest strata of the proletariat and the toilers, showing the face of the Communist Parties in both agitation and in mass actions (demonstrations, strikes and other mass actions)." In this connection, the Conference will examine the ways in which our agitation has tended to become

more popular and, on the basis of the generalized experience presented by the comrades from the districts, to formulate definite methods of making our agitation, in the genuine sense, mass agitation.

The Conference will discuss, in relation to the question of mass agitation, the adequate and inadequate features of our literature publications and methods of distribution. Particularly important, we shall find, is the question of planning our distribution in line with our task for winning over in every locality the decisive sections of the workers; for example, the question of where we sell our literature, whether mostly in a random manner or through planned contactings in places of work and residence. As forms of mass agitation, the Conference will examine our output of pamphlets, leaflets, bulletins, wall-papers, posters, stickers, etc., especially new forms and methods that help effectively to sloganize and dramatize our issues. We know that in a number of districts some of these new methods were very effectively used in the election and the Party Anniversary campaigns. The reports from the comrades in those districts will undoubtedly help to stimulate the other districts to these and similar new forms of mass agitation.

The role of our press in mass agitation should be discussed, the Agitprop Commission proposes, through analyzing (1) our shop paper work in one of our concentration districts; (2) our district Party papers; (3) our language press; (4) one important trade union paper. Sub-committees have been assigned to make a study of the language press and a designated trade union paper for the Conference. Likewise, the comrades of a specified concentration district have been assigned to prepare a report on shop paper work in their district.

## II. Propaganda.

The discussion of our propaganda work should begin with an examination of our progress in developing cadres for our Party and for our mass organizations. This will necessitate a survey of

1. Our inner Party education: (a) classes for new Party members; (b) classes for Party members generally; (c) discussions in the Party units; (d) section training schools; (e) district training schools; (f) the national training school; (g) circuit schools.

2. General workers' education: Workers' schools: (a) for workers generally; (b) for Party and Y.C.L. members; (c) for members of trade unions.

Particular emphasis will be placed in the discussion on the necessity for improving generally the selection of training-school students. Despite the noticeable increase in the number and frequency of training schools in the districts and

sections, the full value of such schools is not extracted, largely because the district, section, and unit bureaus are often disinclined to recommend the most suitable students but send those whom they feel they can best spare. The result is that the training schools do not yield the maximum product of cadres for our Party. It will be the purpose of the Conference to impress upon the responsible Party committees that studying in the training school is not a loss to activity but an intensified preparation for greater activity and that, therefore, the very best and most promising proletarian elements should be sent to these schools. Furthermore, the question of adequately placing these students when their training period is over will be discussed, to avoid the frequent practice of loosely planned assignments.

8. **Literature.** The Commission proposes that the discussion on literature shall consist of an analysis of our publications of (a) the classics of Marxism-Leninism; (b) general propaganda pamphlets; (c) periodicals.

As regards point "c", time limitations will, of course, not permit an examination of all our periodicals. The plan is, therefore, to organize a discussion of *The Communist* and *The Communist International* on the basis of a report by a leading comrade from one of the districts, who has been assigned the task of making an analysis of the two central theoretical organs.

The examination of our literature should include our output in foreign languages. The sub-committee assigned to report on the foreign-language press will also include in its report an analysis of foreign-language books and pamphlet publications.

An important part of this discussion will be devoted to the question of the formation of unit libraries. A check-up will be made on the extent to which the districts have carried out the directives submitted by the Agitprop Commission along with the Party Anniversary discussion outline for the formation of such libraries.

## III. Agitprop Apparatus.

It is a well-known fact that the question of personnel is still a stumbling block to the effective carrying on of Agitprop activity. There is still a tendency in many places to be indiscriminate in assigning comrades to Agitprop work. While it is necessary to draw in new Party comrades into Agitprop activity, we find that Agitprop leadership in units is often given to brand new members, mostly non-proletarians, solely because they can "best be spared." Because of such an attitude, we find that there are sections, (even districts) that are totally without an Agitprop apparatus; and this is, of course, far more the case with units. The Conference

will investigate the question with the aim of ending this state of affairs and bringing about a condition where all the Party bureaus, district, section, and unit, shall recognize the indispensability of Agitprop work as inalienable from organizational work and the necessity for developing qualified Agitprop directors and committees.

We know too that there are frequently cases where Agitprop directors and committees are not drawn into the thick of the work, where there is no Agitprop participation in the planning of campaigns, so that the tasks of the Agitprop are parcelled out mechanically to the director, with the result that the work becomes lifeless and detached. The Conference will therefore discuss ways of drawing the Agitprop directors and committees organically into the activity of the district, section, and unit.

The discussion of Agitprop apparatus will also include the question of Agitprop bulletins. Only in a few districts and sections, to our knowledge, are there special Agitprop bulletins. In some cases, Agitprop activity and announcements are included in the general Party organs and bulletins. In many instances, even this is not the case. It is the opinion of the Commission that the Conference should discuss the advisability of increasing the publication of special Agitprop bulletins with adequate propaganda and agitation material, for the districts and, as far as possible, also for the sections and units.

We turn now to the tasks of the districts.

There will be but a short time in which to prepare for the Conference. The question of the Conference should, therefore, be placed on the agenda of the very next meeting of the District Agitprop Committee, following which, it should be submitted, with the Committee's report and recommendations, to the District Bureau for endorsement. Immediately thereafter, Section Agitprop conferences should be called to discuss the question and to submit their reports. It is absolutely essential that the reports and recommendations of the District Agitprop Committees be submitted to the National Agitprop Commission without delay, as also those of the concentration sections.

We urge the comrades from the Districts to write to us regarding any question on which they may need information in preparing their reports. The National Agitprop Commission is arranging for the publication of a series of guiding articles on the *Daily Worker*, *The Communist*, and the *Party Organizer*.

In conclusion, we stress the important fact that the Conference can be successful only if adequate preparations are made for it by the District Agitprop directors and committees with the close cooperation of the Bureaus.

## Building Literature Apparatus in the Party

By ROBERT FRANKLIN

**I**N PLANNING literature distribution within the Party itself, we must plan to develop an orientation for mass distribution in the minds of the comrades taking part in the work. Some comrades think that it is not necessary to give the same detailed attention towards the distribution of our pamphlets in the Party as to distribution outside. Just as it is important to acquaint outside workers with our campaigns, it is doubly important that our Party members know everything there is to be known about given campaigns. Just as it is important to raise the political level of workers outside the movement it is far more important to raise the political level of the comrades in the Party, first. Without a trained Party membership able to go out amongst the masses with a knowledge of what the Party is, what the Party stands for, and without a knowledge of correct work amongst the masses wherever they be (in the shops, factories, homes, etc.), we will never be able to organize the masses correctly.

1. The District Committee and all the District functionaries must become so thoroughly saturated with the understanding of the importance of literature distribution that no part of their work should be planned without considering our books and pamphlets. This is basic.

2. There must be established in the District a Literature Department whose activities are a part of the movement as a whole. The District Literature Committee is to guide and be responsible for the work.

3. No District Literature apparatus can function correctly without the closest cooperation of the Agitprop Department.

4. The funds of the Literature Department are not to be used for any other purpose but to replace literature. The profit, less the amount necessary for the extension of the Department, should then be turned over to the District.

The Section appoints a Section Literature Agent who should become a member of the Agitprop Department. A committee must be appointed to work with him. One member of this committee is attached to the Org. Department. The Literature Agent comes once or twice a week, picks out his assortment of literature and periodicals. (This is only possible in larger cities—will speak of outlying section later.) A regular meeting of these section literature agents is held every two weeks.

The central problem of mass distribution of literature in the Party is found right at this point. A Section Literature Agent comes in. He is shown a pamphlet, say, either Stalin's or Browder's Report, and the Literature Agent will say, "Well, I'll try 25 of these." (Incidentally, we understand that this Section Literature Agent may have from 25 to 60 units, from 300 to 900 members, in his territory.) Instead of the Section Literature Agent basing himself upon the number of units and the membership in each unit and figuring that at least one out of two members in the unit will want the pamphlet and order this way he will "try 25."

A few of the units will come in and take up this total 25 and the balance of the units in the section are left without any until one, two or three weeks later. And then, when they finally see the pamphlet again, it is an "old" pamphlet, they have seen it a few weeks ago and they don't want to order any. It is "old" stuff.

The Section Literature Agent is the first problem in mass distribution. Then comes the next, a much bigger problem, the Unit Literature Agent. The Unit Literature Agent comes to the Section, will say "Give me 5 of these penny pamphlets, 5 of these 2c ones and one each of these others," like the Plenum series, "I'll get orders for these." The Unit Literature Agent will then come to his unit meeting and say "Here we have a new and important pamphlet. You should read it. But I don't know if you want to buy it. It's 10c." Then the Literature Agent will take the 1 or 2c pamphlet and say "Every Party member should buy this pamphlet. It's only 2c." Then there will come the distribution of maybe one or two Communists, maybe one C.I. and one Inprecoc. (Of course, this does not apply to all units. There are some that pursue the correct policy.)

The work of the Unit Literature Agent which is after all the foundation for all Party distribution should be carried on in the following manner:

1. Every member of the Unit to be thoroughly canvassed by the Unit Literature Agent to become a regular reader of the Communist, C.I., Inprecoc and Party Organizer. These comrades to understand that they will receive these periodicals regularly.

2. Find out those comrades who are unemployed and therefore cannot buy our literature. Means to be arranged by the Unit to raise money to purchase literature for these unemployed comrades. The Unit library is the means for that.

3. The Unit Literature Agent is to see to it that there is a regular report at every Unit meeting by the individual comrades as to whether they sold literature or not and where

and to whom. This will tend to involve more and more comrades in the distribution to outside workers.

4. The Unit Literature Agent is to see to it that every member of his Unit should become acquainted with every new pamphlet dealing with inner Party matters such as the Plenum material, Congresses, information of the Party, etc.

5. The display of literature must be attractive not only at regular larger meetings but in the Unit meeting itself, and some method should be figured out to take care of this problem. Literature at unit meetings should not be displayed until announced. When displayed at the beginning of the meeting, or before actually announced, it distracts attention from what is going on and also when literature is finally announced, the comrades feel they already know all there is to know about it and won't give the attention needed to understand what the Literature Agent is trying to convey to them. In addition, if literature is kept out of sight until announced, this has the psychological effect of increasing the importance attached to this item on the Agenda.

6. While the above points are mainly for inner Party consumption the Unit Literature Agent must know what kind of work each Party member does for a living, what type of workers he comes in contact with, what Union or mass organization he is a member of. Based on these points the Literature Agent should give each member of his Unit a quantity of our agitational pamphlets retailing at one to five cents, for distribution to outside workers.

7. Another very important thing that must be accomplished regardless of all cost and difficulties that the Unit may go through is the establishment of a Unit Library of Marxist-Leninists works to be used at present and as a reserve for the time when open distribution will not be possible.

8. Placing of literature on Agenda of Unit meetings as a separate item from dues so as not to confuse the two and to get the best results. When Literature and Dues are together, this is invariably used as a sort of intermission—comrades talk, get up, pass money back and forth. In all this noise and confusion how can the Literature Agent properly explain the literature he has, its importance, timeliness, need, etc.? What happens is that he must ask each one individually "Do you want this or that pamphlet?" And no one listens because no one can hear. Not only can the Literature Agent not do this work under these circumstances but this deprives the Unit from gaining the correct understanding of this particular branch of our work. It is therefore essential that Literature be separate from Dues and not just before or after it, since this will result in the same confusion as before.

## The Struggle For Shop Papers in a Concentration Section

By JOE LESLIE, *Shop Paper Committee, Sec. 7, Dist. 2*

**A**BOUT a year ago, our Section seriously began to make provisions to fulfill the tasks outlined by the Open Letter. At that time the street units in the Section outnumbered the shop nuclei by about two to one. We therefore set out to transform the base of our party and to root it firmly in the shops of the territory. Advances in this direction were made. Today, although we have more street units than a year ago, our shop nuclei are in the majority. But perhaps our biggest advance is in the publication of a number of shop papers.

Realizing the need for the development of factory papers, the Section placed a comrade in charge of that phase of work. The first task undertaken was to issue a paper in the concentration shop of the Section—a huge war plant. With the experiences gained in issuing this paper, it became less difficult to develop papers in the other factories. So that when a nucleus formed in B——, a power plant, only three weeks later, a publication appeared. We now have papers in our five most important shops—in the war plant, the shipyard, the power house, and the shoe and light metal factories. About 5,000 copies are issued each month, and reach shops employing 14,000 workers.

Three of the papers (shipyard, power, war) are of a high technical quality, produced by offset printing. Some comrades have felt that it would be better to mimeograph these papers in order better to prepare these nuclei for the continued publication of these papers, under conditions of terror, if necessary. Although we must attempt to make each unit self-sufficient, even to the extent of developing within and about the unit all the technical forces necessary to insure publication of the papers, there is no need at the present time to give up the printed papers. One cannot stress too much the necessity of making the units entirely self-sufficient, with a minimum of direct guidance from the higher bodies in the Party. This becomes one of the basic tasks, not only of our Section, but in all sections where shop papers are issued. Nevertheless, legible, attractive papers are one of the best weapons for mobilizing a mass support, with which to fight the illegality of the Party in the shops.

The attractiveness of the papers produced by offset printing, which is relatively cheap, has been a great factor both in raising the prestige of our Party in the shops and in

developing enthusiasm of our Party membership itself. For example, in the war plant, when we came to the men with mimeographed leaflets, we found that after distribution, the pathway to the gate of the shop was paved with paper. But when we appeared with our printed shop paper, the men readily accepted these papers, generally folding them neatly, placing them into their pockets and carrying them into the shop. In another instance, the higher-salaried mechanics at the production branch of the power plant asked our comrades to come into the shop and distribute the papers inside.

These papers have had an equally good effect on our Party membership. It is not difficult to rally our members for distribution. Last winter, in bitter cold weather, about a dozen comrades were up at 6 a. m. to distribute at the war plant. Even before May First and before Election Day, when we had thousands of *Daily Workers*, leaflets, and other material to distribute, we had no lack of comrades to do the work. A year ago we conducted very little factory mass agitation; but now, with the continued publication of these papers, about \$50 a month is raised for this purpose in the Section, the major portion of which is raised among the workers in the shops.

### Shop Paper Aids Recruiting

Directly after the first issue in the power plant, we doubled the size of the nucleus. In the shipyards, where our nucleus had done little or no recruiting over a period of many months, directly after we began to issue the shop paper, two machinists joined the Party. We cannot say that this recruiting was entirely the result of issuing the paper, but we can say that they were a real positive factor. In the war plant, after the workers received a wage increase, and our comrades became somewhat discouraged because they felt the workers would be less eager to struggle, it was the shop paper that held the unit together, in that it was one of the best weapons they had at this time, to make it possible to combat the illusions built up in the workers' minds. It was also instrumental in aiding in building an opposition in the existing A. F. of L. local.

The shop papers have served to clarify to the comrades themselves the Party policies and program. It was not until the paper was issued in the power plant where a company union exists, that the comrades found it necessary to hammer out a clear line on this question. It was when the comrades had to express themselves and state clearly to the workers what our position was on company unions that our comrades discovered that they themselves really did not know. Again, on other occasions, papers in other plants were held up from publication for two or three days till our com-

rades could formulate the particular slogans to be raised and special unit meetings were convened for this purpose, since these political discussions had not taken place in the units previously.

#### Shop Papers Do Not Yet Play Leading Role

In trying to give an estimate of what role our papers play in the shops, we may say that they are a real factor, but not yet the leading factor. The workers do not yet look to our papers for direct leadership in their struggles. Nonetheless, the factory papers are a tremendous educational factor, and in a number of instances have been the means for developing minor struggles.

On occasions the president of the Independent Union in the power plant and non-Communist members of the shop committee of the metal factory came to our Section Headquarters to discuss the material in our papers. It is clear that, were the workers not deeply influenced by our papers, the reformist union leaders would not come to us to make efforts to get us to change the material in them.

#### Resistance to Issuance of Shop Papers

The greatest resistance we met in issuing the papers came often from our oldest Party comrades. In one clothing shop of 400 workers we were not able to persuade our comrades to issue a shop paper. They argued that two of them were known as Communists by everyone, including the boss, and that if a paper appeared they would be fired. After much discussion we were able to convince the comrades that a publication was necessary. But they were willing to issue the paper in the name of the Party Section or in the name of the opposition union local—any name, but not in the name of the Party nucleus in the shop. The paper was not published. Two months later when the rush season ended, the two comrades were fired. The remaining comrades now want to issue a paper in order to strengthen the position of the Left-Wing group in the shop and to secure their jobs.

On the other hand, there is no difficulty in convincing our new recruits to the Party of the value and effectiveness of shop papers.

The chief reason that our papers are not yet the leading factors in the life of the shop is that our papers are politically weak. At best they are trade union papers, not Communist Party organs. Very often the Party is the tail-end of the trade union, or the shop committee, in the shop. In the metal shop where our industrial union is strong, when we discussed with the comrades what slogans we were to raise in the leading article in one issue, they all had one

reply—"Why, naturally, those adopted by the shop committee." We suggested that they raise the slogan of union recognition; they protested that the workers might be roused to struggle by such a slogan, and that the union was not in a position to lead the struggle at that time. This would embarrass the union. We assured the comrades that if the workers were ready to struggle for union recognition, and the union could not lead the struggle, the Party would lead it.

#### Political Questions Must Be Raised

Although our papers correctly begin with the most immediate economic problems of the workers, they generally do not raise these problems to a higher level. We must never permit any opportunity to pass to bring forward in our agitation the program of the Party—centrally, the struggle against fascism and imperialist war.

In the power plant there exists a company union. Although we mentioned the company union in passing, in many articles we do not link it up consistently with the development of fascism, and the drive towards imperialist war. Likewise, although we have separate articles quite often, dealing with the war danger in the N—— paper, rarely in the articles dealing with the economic grievances of the workers, do we bring forward our position on imperialist war. Another aspect of this weakness in our agitation is our failure to conduct systematic campaigns. In one issue of the paper we may deal at length with Unemployment Insurance, but several issues may go by before it is even mentioned again in any article.

It is not necessary to devote full articles to every Party campaign as some comrades believe. In the Shoe Shop, when the unit outlined the contents for the first issue of its paper, it read as follows:

1. Election Campaign. 2. Who are the Communists? 3. What is the shop paper? 4. The Daily Worker. 5. The Unita Operaia. 6. The Young Communist League, etc.

They saw no need to raise shop problems—for them, the Union and the shop committee take care of these things. To bring the Party campaigns into the shops, in this way, is equally as wrong as not to bring them at all—because when the campaigns are isolated from the life of the workers, from their shop problems and their economic demands, they are almost meaningless, or at best, confusing.

#### Shop Papers Must Be News-Papers

Connected with the political weakness, and contributing towards it, is the fact that our papers are not yet the life and breath of the shop. The workers do not see in our organs, shop newspapers. Where we have made real efforts to bring

the life of the shop into the papers, the papers have become quite effective. After exposing a stool pigeon in the war plant, we were able to isolate him from the men to such an extent, that he attempted through one of the A. F. of L. officials to get his union to appropriate \$1,000 to ferret out the Communists. He was practically the only one that favored this proposal when it came up on the union floor. This exposure led to deep-going interest in our organ and to the reading of the other articles more intently. Even marriages, births, deaths, etc., have a place in our shop papers.

In the development of our papers, the Section Agit-prop committee also played a significant part. Two broad conferences on shop papers were carried through, where the work was analyzed and proposals were adopted for carrying the work forward. The District has also been a help in this direction, having published reviews of two of the papers, and discussed personally the problems of the papers with two of the units.

#### Every Unit Must Be Self-Sufficient

In conclusion, we may say that the immediate problem facing us in this work is the necessity of making every unit a self-sufficient organ of the Party, developing its ability and initiative to the utmost. We can say that this has already been accomplished to some degree in about half of our units issuing papers. The Section Shop Paper Committee, while numerically small, has a perspective of broadening out; it has been able to build around it a staff of technical workers of Party sympathizers. This staff, and all technical assistants, must be decentralized, and each unit must be able to mobilize its own technical workers, and fully prepare itself to be able to issue papers under conditions of terror.

At present our task is not primarily to increase the number of shop papers, but rather to develop the quality of the content of the already existing papers. This can be accomplished by training our comrades in revolutionary journalism, at the same time strengthening them politically. We must in our paper, start out with the most elementary economic issues of the workers, and develop these problems to their proper political level, as the central aim in the consciousness of the units must be the struggle against fascism and war, and the development of the united front. Through these factory papers, we must convince the workers, by our correct presentation of the program and policies of the Party, that we are the only Party to lead them in their struggles. And we must not rely on their own initiative to build our Party but to urge them to join our ranks.

## Experiences of a Cleveland Section in Building Literature Sales

By G. ELLISON, *Literature Director, Sec. 3, Dist. 6*

**O**UR COMRADES who are responsible for the activity of the units in the neighborhoods have paid scant attention to one of the most important weapons our Party has in winning over large masses of workers, namely literature.

Literature has been considered (especially our theoretical organs) as something put out solely for our own membership and close sympathizers. Too many of our comrades put themselves above the workers, and not as part of the working class. A total lack of faith in the workers on the part of some of our comrades can be gauged by the answers we got on "Why is so little literature sold?" For instance, "The workers are too dumb to understand our literature." "They won't spend money for literature, as they would sooner go to a movie." "Wait until they starve a little more, then they will come to us".

And when we look at the literature sales of the units, we are faced with the fact that we have done very little to combat this underestimation on the part of our comrades, of the ability and willingness of the workers to read our literature and follow our leadership in struggle.

There must be a continuous agitational campaign carried on by the District and Section agitprop depts., together with the literature departments, to make our units "literature conscious".

In our Section we have started on such a campaign, and in the following lines intend to show what we have so far accomplished and how this was accomplished.

At the February (1934) Plenum of our District the literature figures submitted for our Section showed that \$67.40 worth was sold for the second half of 1933, and that this average of \$11.00 a month had dropped to \$5.99 for the first month of 1934. We had a membership at the time of 220.

The figures submitted for the other four Cleveland Sections showed an even worse situation. With a combined membership of 536, these Sections sold together a total of \$123.46 worth of literature for the seven-month period.

Added to this report was also a notation that various comrades of our Section, who had taken literature for their units on credit from the District, had piled up bills totalling \$47.72. (Most of these were considered uncollectable.)

### Literature Departments Established

The first step towards a change was in setting up Section literature departments, so that units could get needed literature from their sections instead of having to travel downtown to the District Book Shop.

In our Section a meeting was called of all unit literature agents. Those units without any, were instructed to appoint a comrade to act as a literature agent for his unit. Of the 18 units in the Section, 14 were represented at the first meeting. We discussed all our shortcomings. It was brought out that, (1) not a unit had a literature fund; (2) unit members expected the literature agent to do all the selling; (3) money for literature was used for other unit purposes, bills accumulated, with the result that units stopped bringing literature into their meetings; (4) no efforts made by the units to get literature suitable for their neighborhood needs, and (5) comrades insisted that English literature could not be sold in territory where there were foreign populations.

Our meeting decided on the following: (1) make the unit, and not the individual responsible for literature sales; (2) carry on a campaign to liquidate all old debts; (3) have the units set aside at least \$2.00 as a start towards a literature fund; (4) all current bills to be paid up within two weeks; (5) set aside Tuesday night when all agents would get their literature from a centrally located place, and (6) that the Section would carry on an educational campaign to wake up the comrades to the importance of literature in the class struggle.

The Section Literature Agent initiated a weekly letter to the unit bureaus, stressing the various points raised at our agents' meeting. We asked that literature be made a regular point on the agenda, that they get after those individuals who had allowed their unit to get a bad name, by accumulating debts in the name of their unit, that every comrade possible was to be urged to take at least a dime's worth of literature with them from the unit meeting. We urged the agitprop to link up literature with the weekly discussion that took place in the units. To keep all meetings that took place in their unit territory covered with our literature; that every "Red Sunday" conducted by our Party, was to have timely literature with their other material.

To the unit literature agents we have urged that they keep in stock timely literature; also literature suitable for their unit territory. All agents should find out what literature their members can sell best. For instance, if one of their unit members works in a steel mill, secure literature dealing with the lives of steel workers under capitalism and contrast it with how steel workers live in the U.S.S.R., if a

member belongs to an A. F. of L. union get literature dealing with A. F. of L. questions. If a unit has Jewish territory, get "Lenin on the Jewish Question", etc.

### Literature Sales Increased

The results of the first month (February, 1934) showed literature sales amounting to \$30.80. On the basis of this another literature agents meeting was called. Here we discussed further plans for increasing our sales. The comrades were enthusiastic over the increase, but reported a resistance on the part of most comrades to the idea that they themselves must sell literature. Also that language literature only could be sold in their respective territory.

We have been hammering away against such ideas by pointing out that the capitalist class sells millions of English newspapers and magazines in the same foreign territories; that although the older folks might be unable to read English there are thousands of children and young people who are going to English schools, and are being brought up as Americans; also the Section has taken literature to mass meetings in these territories, and has proved that English literature can be sold to these "non-English" speaking workers. Also on house-to-house canvasses there was no objection to having both English and language literature according to the need.

The second month, not only did we increase sales to \$55.18, but through constant "push", reduced our old District bill from \$47.72 down to \$30.51.

These two months activities, where we sold more literature than in the previous seven months, proved to our comrades that, with literature given the proper place on the unit agenda, we could achieve sales that were previously thought impossible.

In the past seven months, in order to promote literature sales, we have carried on a constant campaign, consisting of weekly letters, reviews of the different periodicals and pamphlets that run in the Daily Worker, have issued a 19-page Daily Worker and Literature Manual for the units, promoted socialist competition among the units, by issuing monthly literature statements. These statements show just how much literature each unit has sold. It points out the weak spots, encourages those units not doing so well, and gives praise to exceptionally good work by some unit, etc. We are pushing sales through the few mass organizations that we are in contact with (only Jewish).

When unit literature agents don't show up on Tuesday nights to get new literature or exchange their old, we make

up a package and deliver it, so that the unit does not suffer through the neglect of their literature agent.

Literature that fits in with unit territory is secured from the District and passed on to that certain unit. Literature for Party campaigns is secured at least a month ahead of time for the units, and special drives are made to get it in the neighborhoods, so that workers will know beforehand what we are demonstrating about, etc. Whenever the Daily Worker publishes experiences in literature selling by other Sections, we clip these and send a copy to each unit bureau. Everything is done to make them literature conscious.

In this Section we have accomplished (through using the above methods) the following results (for the seven month period since we were reduced to about 75 members): \$183.78 worth of literature sold; every unit has a literature fund used solely for buying new literature; every unit has the start of a unit library; all old bills have been liquidated, except for a matter of 85c; we have a sale of 20 of *The Communist International* every issue; 45-50 *Party Organizers* are sold every month; comrades are beginning to carry literature with them to their union meetings, mass organizations. (We find comrades are actually carrying literature with them at all times) and to the shops where they work; the Section itself has built up a literature fund of over \$60.00, and comrades are beginning to cover the meetings held in their neighborhoods.

We have to reach large masses of workers with our literature, and cannot wait until the workers decide to come to us. Then it might be too late. The fascist forces at work are utilizing every means at their disposal to reach these same workers. They are not waiting for the workers to accept fascism, but are propagandizing them every minute of the day through their press, radio, churches and movies. We must reach these same workers through our literature, and the units have the responsibility for this, preparing the workers in their neighborhoods to fight against the menace of fascism, to participate in the coming struggles that will take place, and to follow the Communist Party leadership in the fight to overthrow capitalism.

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