Turkey's Radical Left: History, Current Situation and Differences of Opinion (short summary)

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Translator's note:

This article was originally a Chinese article. Before starting, let me briefly explain why this article was translated and some things that need to be explained.

The Turkish Communist Movement occupies a special position in the international communist movement. In an international political sense, Turkey is not an imperialist power, but it is different from a typical neo-colony to a certain extent. At the same time, the Kurdish problem is a major issue in Turkey's domestic political life, which has resulted in a situation in which significant nation and class contradictions are intertwined in the country. Since İbrahim Kaypakkaya, countless Turkish revolutionary communists and radical leftists have sacrificed their lives and blood for the liberation of the people. Today, Turkey is one of the three countries with relatively significant Maoist guerrilla activities, and it also has a considerable mass base. (Note: "Turkey" in this article only refers to the so-called "Republic of Turkey" under the control of the reactionary Turkish regime, and does not mean to deny the Kurdish nation's right to national self-determination)

Therefore, I believe that the Turkish revolution will definitely bring many fresh and instructive experiences to the international communist movement and world revolution. However, it is regrettable that there is very little international information on the history of the Turkish underground left, especially the Turkish Maoists, and there is often a language barrier. Originally, RIM should have had a lot of correspondence with Turkish revolutionaries and had a certain understanding of the Turkish Communist Movement, but I have no idea where these correspondences were. Another regrettable problem is that the Turkish Maoist organization has been relatively divided since shortly after the death of İbrahim Kaypakkaya. I am not an advocate of unprincipled unity. If revisionist, revolutionaries to rise up and form a new party. However, correct truth should also be able to persuade and educate people, allowing scattered revolutionaries to come together and become stronger.

Recently, I learned that some Maoist revolutionaries in the world are very confused about the Turkish Maoist movement. This is apparently due to overly convoluted histories, language barriers, and often too similar names between organizations. Therefore, I translated this article. This article provides a relatively detailed and systematic summary of the history of the Maoist movement in Turkey, with special focus on the current situation, and summarizes the possible major differences between the several Maoist organizations in Turkey in the author's opinion. I think this point is very important, because frankly speaking, I have not seen a detailed and systematic discussion of these differences by the Turkish revolutionaries.

The last thing I want to explain is the writing background of the original article. This article was written by the author in response to the so-called "Gonzaloist" in China. Chinese " Gonzaloist faction" has an extremely bad behavior. After the split between TKP/ML and TKP-ML, without the background of the disagreement being completely clear, they declared that TKP-ML was a "pseudo party", a "revisionist" and "not recognized at all by the international Maoists". In the end, they even spread rumors that TKP-ML "has fully served the interests of the United States, Russia and Iran." The reason is that they learned that one of the reasons for the split between TKP/ML and TKP-ML was that the former advocated withdrawing from the United Front Organization "Peoples' United Revolutionary Movement, HBDH". This relatively left approach made them believe that TKP/ML had " The possibility of getting closer to the advanced forces ("Gonzaloist")". But then TKP/ML published a long article criticizing the international draft of the "Gonzaloist" and the Chinese "Gonzaloist" angrily accused TKP/ML. (Frankly speaking, to this day, I still believe that TKP/ML wrote very good criticisms of the "Gonzaloist" International draft. However, why did TKP/ML join "Gonzaloist" International, the so-called "International Communist League", before "Gonzaloist" made a systematic reply and self-criticism? I still feel confused about this). What's even worse is, Chinese "Gonzaloist" can fabricate a certain organization's claims on major issues such as social nature and revolutionary character at will. To this end, the author of the original article cited a large number of Turkish documents and archival materials from various organizations to fight back against the rumors spread by Chinese " Gonzaloist ". The views quoted and refuted in the original article without mentioning names are the rumors spread by the Chinese "Gonzaloist ". However, Chinese " Gonzaloist " problem does not end there. They even vigorously advocated the "Three Worlds Theory" and suggested that "opposing the control of US imperialism" is also the "main task." To this day, they still enthusiastically advocate "anti-comprador" in China and slander the idea that the Chinese bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie, which controls the state machinery, should be the main enemy of the revolution with a clear-cut stand, as "an idea that serves the interests of US imperialism and international capital." Of course, these issues are beyond the scope of this article.

The original Chinese text was written in January 2022. Some pictures in the original text, as well as references to works by Chinese historians, were omitted in the English translation. Some paragraphs irrelevant to the topic of this article have also been omitted, and some minor modifications will be noted in the text. I sincerely hope that this article will allow international Maoists and interested people to learn more about the Turkish revolutionary communist movement. It is also hoped that Turkish revolutionaries who understand English can take this opportunity to further increase the outside world's understanding of themselves, and point out that possible inappropriateness in the article. This will be extremely beneficial.

In order to make it easier for readers to find information, the official websites or important websites of several organizations in this article are posted:

Communist Party of Turkey /Marxist-Leninist:

https://www.tkpml5.net/

https://ikk-online16.net/

Communist Party of Turkey -Marxist Leninist:

https://www.tkpml.com/

Maoist Komünist Parti:

https://maoistkomunistparti.org/

Maoist Komünist Partisi;

https://maoistkomunistpartisi.net/ https://www.devrimcidemokrasi3.org/

Since I have not been able to contact the author, despite my best efforts, I cannot confirm that the translation is 100% consistent with the author's original intention. Therefore, if there are any errors or misunderstandings during the translation process, I should be responsible.

The following is the original text.

Briefly explain why I wrote this article. This article is titled "Turkey's Radical Left: History, Current Situation and Differences of Opinion." The so-called radical refers to the fact that the focus of this article is not on those pan-left organizations that are still active in the Turkish parliament or legal environment, but mainly on the " Communist Party of Turkey /(Marxist-Leninist)" (abbreviated as TKP/ML), the "Kurdistan Workers' Party" (abbreviated as PKK) and other pan-left forces that engage in armed guerrilla struggles and openly declare that they want to overthrow the current political and economic order in Turkey. At present, there are not many left-wing forces in the world who engage in armed struggle, and even fewer who have a certain influence. Currently, those that have become large-scale include the Communist Party of India (Maoist), the Communist Party of the Philippines, the "Communist Party of Turkey /Marxist-Leninist (Central Committee)" " Kurdistan Workers' Party" (hereinafter referred to as the PKK) and other organizations active in Turkey, the "Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria " which is generally active in the Kurdishpopulated area in Syria (known as "Rojava") and has actually established a separatist regime, and the "International Freedom Battalion" active within its territory (composed of multiple left-wing organizations such as the "Communist Party of Turkey-Marxist-Leninists (Organization Committee)", "Maoist Communist Party", "Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Turkey", etc.), as well as the two or three pan-left armed forces currently active in Colombia. Among them, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and the Communist Party of the Philippines are communist organizations that are clearly guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and are truly promoting and carrying out the new democratic revolution. It's hard to say how good the situation in Colombia is. Some information indicates that the local self-proclaimed "left-wing" armed forces are actually serious about becoming warlords, and in fact, a large number of people have surrendered their guns. The situation in Turkey is more complicated: Communist organizations such as the " Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (Central

Committee) " and the " Communist Party of Turkey -Marxist Leninist (Organizing Committee), are limited in scale, but the PKK has resisted the national oppression of the Turkish ruling class and try to defend the Kurdish national rights for decades and have a certain influence. The situation in Syria is inseparable from the struggle of Turkey's radical left. In addition, although Turkey has publicly announced that the leftwing guerrillas guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism are currently small, they are actually second only to India and the Philippines. At the same time, Turkish leader Erdogan is pursuing personal dictatorship in the country. The economic situation has deteriorated, prices have soared, and class conflicts, ethnic conflicts, religious beliefs, and even conflicts within the ruling class have become very intense. This has also prepared the ground for revolution. Therefore, the country's left-wing activities and communist movements still deserve attention.

I History

First, let's introduce the ins and outs of various left-wing armed organizations in Turkey.

The Communist Party of Turkey (abbreviated as TKP) was founded in 1920. Shortly after the establishment of the TKP, fifteen comrades including the newly elected Chairman Mustafa Suphi and General Secretary Ethem Nejat were killed on a ship by killers said to be sent by the Pasha reactionary forces. This was undoubtedly a very serious blow to the newly established TKP. However, who is the real culprit behind this incident is still shrouded in mystery. The TKP, which was founded in its early years, immediately faced the problem of how to deal with the relationship with the then Turkish leader Kemal. Although the leadership of the TKP that succeeded after the "Shiphouse Murder" strongly praised Kemal as an "anti-imperialist and progressive leader", Kemal did not appreciate it. He sent a large number of party cadres to prison and announced that TKP is an illegal organization. Since this period, due to the continuous domestic repression and its own line errors, TKP has never done much. In

the 1970s, TKP, which was still a nominally illegal political party in the country, even touted Turkey's then-ruling Republican People's Party, saying that it would join in the "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal" struggle together with the Republican People's Party. Regarding the vigorous international debate on the general line of international communism at that time, the TKP leadership acted as a blind follower of the Soviet revisionists for the Soviet revisionists. In this case, it is inevitable that it will be abandoned at the climax of the mass struggle.

In 1960, the Menderes regime in Turkey was unable to cope with the rising antiimperialist democratic movement in the country, so the military generals stepped forward to "serve the motherland" and decisively launched a coup to stabilize the ruling order by form of horse-trading. Shortly after the coup, the military announced a "general election" and established a "democratically elected government," but the real power was still in the hands of senior military leaders. When the time came to the late 1960s, China's Cultural Revolution was in full swing, the Vietnam War was raging, and the student movements in Western countries also reached a climax. "The east is red; the west is preparing". All these internal and external factors prompted the birth of the new revolutionary organization.

The "Workers' Party of Turkey" (TIP) was established in 1961 and was the first nominally "socialist" party organization to enter the parliament in Turkish history. Nonetheless, the line of the TIP was mainly reformist in nature. The organization later merged with the TKP in 1988, and finally renounced Marxism-Leninism and disappeared completely. The TIP is mentioned here entirely because the party established a youth organization called the "Federation of Ideological Clubs" that year, which was later renamed the "Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey, (DEV-GENÇ)". There seems to be very little introduction to this organization can be called the "source of all evil." Because almost all Turkish left-wing organizations currently engaged in armed struggle have their organizational roots here (from the Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, to the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front/(DHKP/C), and even the PKK). The young people in the federation quickly rose up to criticize the opportunistic behavior of the leadership of the TIP. They burned the car of the American ambassador when he visited Ankara University, protested against the docking of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in Turkey, then finally robbed a bank and beat up American soldiers... More importantly, the struggle of workers and peasants grew, strikes occurred one after another, and the left-wing student movement began to integrate with workers and peasants. At this time, in order to deal with the "red disaster", far-right gangs such as extreme Islamic forces and pan-Turkist forces instigated by the Turkish ruling class also began to become rampant. The far-right political party " Nationalist Movement Party, (MHP)" and its notorious "Gray Wolves" organization began to appear on the historical stage. However, compared with the actions of the "Gray Wolf Organization" ten years later in assisting Turkish military and police to massacre left-wingers, these were still small steps. At the time, Turkey's current President Erdogan was still a small character in an anticommunist drama at that time.

Seeing that Turkey's "democratically elected" government was unable to maintain order, the "patriotic" generals followed the story of 1960 and stepped forward to "serve the country": in 1971, the military launched a coup and took over power. In the subsequent actions to "stabilize order", progressive forces bore the brunt. DEV-GENÇ was banned outright, and many members were sentenced by military courts. However, the influence of this organization will remain long-lasting. Before and after it was banned in 1971, DEV-GENÇ had been divided into several factions. Here are a few that later developed into famous ones:

1. Perinçek led the formation of the "Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey";

2. Mahir Çayan and others formed the "People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C) ";

3. Deniz Gezmiş and others formed the "People's Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO) ";

4. Abdullah Öcalan, a figure whom the PKK has revered from its inception to the

present, decided to establish a Kurdish left-wing revolutionary organization with several students in DEV-GENÇ. National contradictions in Turkey have always been extremely acute. The Kurds, with a population of more than 10 million, have been denied their national identity by the authorities and are prohibited from using the national language and wearing their national costumes. The long-standing national oppression of the Kurds by Turkish rulers caused left-wing ideas to quickly spread among the Kurds.

The four branches are described below. Let's talk about the Perinçek's Party first. At that time, a 23-year-old male left-wing youth also joined the party, but soon discovered that the leadership talked about Marxism-Leninism and even Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, but had a completely wrong understanding of Kemal and Kemalism. It also denies Turkey's national oppression of the Kurds, and there are major differences in analysis of the nature of Turkish society. After discovering that there was no way to get leaders such as Pelinçek to correct their mistakes through intraparty struggle, the young man named Ibrahim Kaypakkaya founded the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (abbreviation (TKP/ML)).

Since then, Pelinçek's party has fallen deeper and deeper into the quagmire of opportunism. Today, the party has been renamed the "Patriotic Party". Although it still claims to agree with the revolutionary practices of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, internally it openly denies the historical massacre of the Kurds by the Turkish government and the current national oppression policy for the Kurds by the Turkish authorities, and even slandered the PKK as an agent of the United States that received dollars to undermine Turkey's territorial integrity; externally, it adheres to the principle that "anti-Americanism is revolution" and supports "anti-imperialist regimes" such as Russian imperialism and Iran. The party publicly expressed strong support for the recent Turkish invasion of Rojava. It can be said that the Pelinçek's Party is an example of engaging in national chauvinism and defending the order of the ruling class in the name of anti-imperialism. In fact, how come something like Pelinchak, who appears to be "left" but is actually right, only appears in Turkey?

Several examples of Kaypakkaya's theoretical analysis clearly distinguish him

from other radical left movements (also including the THKP-C and THKO). First of all, Kaypakkaya conducted a thorough criticism of Kemalism, pointing out that it was essentially a fascist movement instigated by the big comprador and big landowner classes. This was considered groundbreaking in Turkey at the time, because Kemal was almost revered as a god. Even the other two most radical organizations, the THKO and the THKP-C, spoke positively of Kemal himself and of Kemalism, and regarded the Kemalists as potential allies. Secondly, Kaypakkaya carefully analyzed the oppression of the Kurdish nation by the Turkish authorities and made it clear that the Turkish proletariat should recognize the Kurdish nation's right to self-determination. Finally, Kaypakkaya clearly supported China in the international communist movement debate, and regarded the Soviet Union as social imperialism. This was also clearly different from the vague positions of the THKO and the THKP-C.

After the establishment of the THP/ML, its military force, the Liberation Army of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey (TIKKO), carried out guerrilla warfare in urban and rural areas. Despite differences of opinion with the THKO, Kaipakkaya and his comrades executed an operation to execute a village chief who betrayed the THKO fighters, so Kaypakkaya was regarded as a symbol of left-wing unity.

Unfortunately, Kaypakkaya was betrayed during an operation and arrested by the Turkish military police. After four months of torture without uttering a word, on May 18, 1973, at the age of 24, he was shot dead and his body was subsequently mutilated. Since then, Kaypakkaya has been recognized as a martyr by the entire Turkish radical left, including the non-Maoists. The central organizational structure of the TKP/ML was virtually destroyed under the frenzied attack of the ruling class. Similar to the situation of the CPI(ML) in India, the struggle of the Maoists in Turkey, after a short period of glittering, went into the doldrums.

Between 1973 and 1978, the TKP/ML was reorganized several times and held its first "Congress" (now renamed the "conference") in 1978. At this time, Hoxha was questioning and even slandering Mao Zedong Thought and the Chinese revolution. Therefore, some splinter factions openly supported Hoxha on this issue, namely the "TKP/ML-Hareketi", and part of which the centrists also split off and formed the

"Bolshevik Party (North Kurdistan-Turkey) ". Judging from public materials, the struggle between TKP/ML and the Turkish state apparatus was very heroic, and several general secretaries died in the battle; but the internal line struggle was also very fierce. After establishing the guiding position of Mao Zedong Thought (later renamed Maoism), several splits still occurred. In the process, another political party, the "Maoist Communist Party" (Turkish: Maoist Komünist Partisi, abbreviated as MKP), which also claimed to be guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, finally separated. The TKP/ML also often condemned the previous leadership through documents for practicing "opportunistic line." From 2015 to 2016, due to internal differences in attitude towards the Kurdish national movement and other reasons, the TKP/ML once again split into two factions: one faction announced that it had formed a "Central Committee", which was eventually named the "Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist" (TKP/ML), another faction declared the former "illegal", announced the formation of an "organizing committee" and eventually called itself the "Communist Party of Turkey -Marxist Leninist" (TKP-ML). In fact, the official self-identifications of the two organizations are highly similar, except that one uses the slash symbol "/" and the other uses the dash symbol "-". In order to avoid confusion, the author will hereafter refer to the "TKP/ML" as the "TKP/ML (central committee)", and the "TKP-ML" as the "TKP-ML (organization committee) ". (Translator's note: Both organizations now of course have their own central committee. This annotation is only for the convenience of identification and does not mean that the author is inclined to agree with the position of which of the two organizations.) The other party, the MKP which claimed to be guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, also split into two factions due to an internal crisis at its third congress in 2013: "MKP (2013 3rd Congress)" and the "MKP (2020s 3rd Congress)"). The details are described below.

Among the two factions that split due to Hoxha's slander of the Chinese revolution - the Hoxhaist faction TKP/ML-Hareketi and the centrist Bolshevik Party (Northern Kurdistan - Turkey), the "Bolshevik Party" is relatively small, mainly active among Turkish expatriates in Germany. The theoretical characteristic of this organization is that it has long adhered to some formulations from the Stalin era, such as insisting that

"although there is class struggle under socialism, there is no bourgeoisie that exists as a class." However, recently, it is said that the organization has gradually recognized and accepted China's criticism and analysis of the reasons for the Soviet Union's reforms at that time, and admitted that after the Soviet Union completed agricultural collectivization, due to the existence of bourgeois law (Das Bürgerliche Recht in Germany, See Chapter 5, Section 3 of Lenin's State and Revolution), a bourgeoisie was created that was parasitic within socialism, which eventually led to the Soviet Union's transformation into a revisionist state. But the organization remains unwilling to acknowledge the "Maoist" reference. Due to its small scale, we will not introduce it in detail here. The Bolshevik Party is a small organization operating mainly among Turkish expatriates in Germany. However, the organization is still reluctant to recognize the term "Maoism". On the other hand, the Hoxhaist TKP/ML-Hareketi is very active in Turkey, and in 1994 it merged with the successor organization of the THKP-C to form "Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (Turkey) "(MLKP), of which the TKP/ML-Hareketi is the larger part. It is worth noting that while the MLKP remains a Hoxhaist party in theory, in practice, its involvement in international conferences and armed struggle, makes it appears to be closer to the Maoist parties. The MLKP has played a prominent role in participating in the International Freedom Battalion (IFB), which is made up of a number of left-wing organizations, and in the fight against the "Islamic State (Daesh) ".

Next, let's talk about the THKP-C. Generally speaking, the group believed in the guerrilla strategy advocated by Guevara. The THKP-C famously kidnapped and executed an Israeli consul, in addition to carrying out several bank robberies. Soon Mahir Çayan and his comrades were arrested by the military police and sentenced to death, but they managed to escape. Afterwards, the THKP-C organized guerrillas on the Black Sea coast, and in one of their operations eleven guerrillas kidnapped three NATO soldiers in order to use the soldiers as hostages to force the Turkish government to promise not to execute the leader of the THKO, Deniz Gezmiş. The Turkish military and police tricked Mahir Çayan into expressing a willingness to engage in negotiations, and then suddenly attacked, killing 10 fighters, including Mahir Çayan, and sparing

only one. The one who survived was Ertuğrul Kürkçü, who now serves as the honorary chairman of Turkey's pan-left political party, the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which can actually be considered the legal organization of the PKK. The tragedy occurred on March 30, 1972, so that the organization, the THKP-C, was virtually destroyed. Nevertheless, many left-wing organizations have since claimed to be the successors of the THKP-C, even though they are not organizationally related to the THKP-C.

The "descendants" of the THKO are summarized below. After the military coup of 1971, some of its members began to believe in Mao Zedong's ideas and formed the "Halkın Yolu " organization. The dramatic changes following the death of the Giant of the East in 1976 and Hoxha's attacks on Chairman Mao led to confusion and a subsequent shift to the Hoxhaist position in some parts of the organization. After a few twists and turns, it formed the MLKP with Hoxhaist forces that had split from the TKP/ML. As mentioned above, this organization still exists today and is the mainstay of the International Freedom Battalion (IFB) in Rojava along with the TKP-ML (organization committee). In addition, a small group of members of the THKP-C formed the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (THKP-C/MLSPB) in 1975, which was also involved in the battalions of the International Freedom Battalion (IFB) fighting against the Islamic State (ISIS) gangs as well as the invading Turkish army. Finally, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) deserves mention. This organization assassinated two U.S. military personnel during the first Gulf War in protest against U.S. imperialism and claimed responsibility for the assassination of a retired high-ranking Turkish intelligence officer. In addition to this the DHKP-C has engaged in a number of suicide bombings against the apparatus of state violence as well as against the U.S. Embassy. Overall, the fact that the DHKP-C has not engaged in attacks against civilians is evidence that its designation as a "terrorist organization" is a misnomer; however, I do not believe in or endorse this kind of disengagement from the masses, which I believe is closely related to its Guevaraist ideology. It is also worth noting that, unlike almost all other left-wing guerrilla groups, this organization does not seem to be engaged in

joint operations with the PKK within the framework of a united front.

Then a word about the THKO. The name of the organization could easily lead one to associate it with the PLA of China, and thus to think of it as Maoist. However, this is not the case, and in fact the THKO was heavily influenced by both the Chinese and Cuban revolutions. Deniz Gezmiş, after training in Palestinian guerrilla camps, returned to his country and founded the THKO. THKO's method of struggle is largely similar to that of the THKP-C, i.e., more like the Guevarist. Their slogan is "a truly independent and fully democratic Turkey", and they believe that the THKO will function as both a vanguard and a people's army (reminiscent of the erroneous "military party theory"). Their actions have included kidnapping NATO servicemen, hijacking airplanes, and so on. In one of these kidnappings of four Americans, Deniz Gezmiş was captured. In order to rescue him, as mentioned above, the THKP-C also carried out a failed operation, which unfortunately not only failed to save Deniz Gezmiş's life, but also lost Mahir Cayan. On May 6, 1972, after the President of Turkey signed the death sentence order, Deniz Gezmiş was hanged in Ankara Central Prison. Before his execution, he asked for tea and a guitar concerto by Joaquín Rodrigo. Afterwards, he shouted Long live a fully independent Turkey! Long live the great Marxist-Leninist ideology! Long live the struggle of the Turkish and Kurdish people for independence! Down with imperialism! Long live the workers and peasants!" and went to the gallows with slogans like "Down with imperialism! " The THKO also suffered a heavy blow.

In 1974, the military government announced an amnesty so that some members of the THKO could have the opportunity to come out of prison, gather together, and rethink the future direction of the organization. Most members accepted the then Communist Party of China's analysis of the Soviet Union's essence as social imperialism, which meant they tended to follow the lines of the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania. Later, similar to the "Halkın Yolu" organization, the organization also turned to the Hoxhaist, and eventually formed the "Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey". The organization's legal vest is the "Labor Party" (EMEP), and it participates in the Hoxhaist international organization. At present, it seems that it is more engaged in legal work. It also distanced itself from left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the PKK, MLKP, and TKP/ML. Among the remaining members of the THKO, those who opposed Chinese line and had a favorable impression of the Soviet Union at the time also formed their own political parties. After several twists and turns, they continued their activities under the name of " Communist Labour Party of Turkey/Leninist " (TKEP/L). The group is also involved in the International Freedom Battalion in Rojava, Syria.

Finally, there is the Kurdish group led by Öcalan. There are too many Chinese online materials for this part, so I will briefly describe it. Öcalan founded the PKK after moving the main base of his struggle to the Kurdish region. Since most of the previous Kurdish parties were landlord and bourgeois parties and lacked the will and ability to mobilize the masses, the PKK, which initially carried the banner of Marxism-Leninism and was well-organized, quickly set off a climax of struggle and continued to fight for several years. ten years. After the Maoist guerrillas represented by the TKP/ML fell into a low ebb at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the PKK has been the strongest and most prominent faction among Turkey's left-wing guerrilla organizations until today. However, the PKK is essentially a national bourgeois left-wing and petty bourgeois political force, which is prominently reflected in the weakness and incompleteness of its political program. At the beginning, due to its origins from the radical left-wing student movement, the PKK declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party and fought for the right of the Kurdish nation to self-determination; but in the mid-1990s, the PKK announced that it only pursued "national autonomy" within the framework of the Turkish state. A greater turning point occurred in 1999. After Öcalan was arrested by Turkish agents, he immediately stated in court that the founding of the PKK was a mistake and expressed his willingness to cooperate with the authorities to promote the co-option of the PKK. After being sentenced to life imprisonment, Öcalan renounced Marxism-Leninism in prison and declared his identification with "democratic confederalism " deeply influenced by anarchism. Although this capitulation was highly questionable, the PKK leadership still announced that it would abandon Marxism-Leninism and instead accept Öcalan's newly invented theory. In 2013, Öcalan once again issued a New Year's speech that was highly praised by Erdogan, calling on the

PKK to abandon the arms to ceasefire. Although Öcalan's betrayal has been exposed, the PKK and the Rojava authorities still adhere to his theories. With this in mind, the recent tragedy in Rojava is not an unthinkable result, but an almost certain outcome.

The Kurdish nation is a transnational ethnic group consisting of four main parts, Northern Kurdistan (located in Turkey), Southern Kurdistan (located in Iraq), Eastern Kurdistan (located in Iran), and Western Kurdistan (located in Syria, i.e., Rojava). The PKK's struggle for national right has had a deep impact on the Kurdish population in Syria, Iran, and Iraq. 2011 saw the outbreak of civil war in Syria. The Asad regime, which is a ruthless and authoritarian regime, suffered a series of defeats at the beginning of the civil war and had to withdraw most of its forces from Rojava, creating a partial power vacuum. Seizing this opportunity, the Syrian branch of the PKK quickly gained a strong foothold in Syria and established a regime that came to be known as the "Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria" (AANES), which carried out a number of democratic reforms of progressive significance. At the same time, the regime has also garnered much international sympathy and support in its fight against the Islamic State, which also rose to prominence in Syria's civil war but is undoubtedly extremely dark and brutal, as well as in its defense of the security of various minorities. In 2015, a number of radical left-wing parties engaged in armed struggle in Turkey, including the then-unsplit TKP/ML and MKP (2013 3rd Congress), formed the International Freedom Battalion (IFB) and traveled to Syria in support of the Rojava Revolution and to help in the fight against the Islamic State gangs.

In Turkey, a number of left-wing guerrilla groups announced the establishment of the "People's United Revolutionary Movement" (HBDH) in 2016. The organization is a united front organization, but the specific internal organizational form and the relationship between the participating parties are still not clear to outsiders. These organizations, led by the PKK, announced that they would fight for revolution, democracy and socialism, with the main goal of overthrowing Erdogan's reactionary rule. At the beginning of its establishment, the movement included almost all the Turkish left-wing guerrillas mentioned above. Many organizations are also members of IFB. The author believes that this may be a move by Turkey's radical left to seek unity under great pressure to deal with fascist forces as Erdogan's dictatorship deepens. However, considering the consistent opportunistic line of the PKK leadership, it seems doubtful to say that this alliance line is completely correct. As it happened, the TKP/ML (central committee), which followed the split with TKP-ML (organization committee), announced that it was withdrawing from the HBDH, explaining a number of reasons for doing so:

1. TKP/ML (central committee) believed that participating in a united front organization such as the HBDH is different from its vision of a united front: "One of the necessary conditions envisaged by our party for a united front is that our party should acquire a certain degree of political, ideological and organizational leadership, and that the formation of such an organization should be in accordance with the realization of the national democratic revolution and the class interests of the proletariat ... at present, these conditions are not present";

2. HBDH agrees with the concept of "regional revolution", while the TKP/ML (central committee) believes that the revolutionary tasks of each country can only be determined based on the actual situation of the country;

3. HBDH believes that the solution to the Kurdish national problem is "democratic confederalism", while the TKP/ML (central committee) believes that only recognizing the Kurdish nation's right to national self-determination is the real solution to the problem;

4. TKP/ML (central committee) does not agree with the HBDH's general understanding about the "Rojava Revolution", but clearly points out the nature of this revolution as a national liberation movement and believes that this revolution is far from complete;

5. TKP/ML (central committee) disagrees with the assessment of the HBDH (actually the PKK) which declared the imminent outbreak of a world war;

6. HBDH attributes fascism to Erdogan's Justice and Development Party, while the TKP/ML (central committee) insists that the real source of rampant fascism is the entire Turkish state apparatus. Due to the above reasons, the TKP/ML (central committee) withdrew from the alliance. However, the TKP/ML (central committee) also stated that the HBDH is still a revolutionary organization operating within a revolutionary framework, and that the other political parties within it remain the closest allies of TKP/ML (central committee) and will remain united with it in the struggle.

The other one faction that splintered from the TKP/ML, TKP-ML (organizing committee), and the MKP (2013 3rd Congress) continue to stay within the HBDH and collaborate with other left-wing organizations under this framework.

The above is a brief introduction to the main radical left wingers engaged in armed struggle in Turkey. As I write this, many friends may think it's "too confusing." Indeed, it is indeed chaos. There are many left-wing armed organizations in Turkey and they all go their own way. This is obviously one of the reasons why they have not been able to develop and grow like the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and have not posed too serious a threat to the ruling order. The root cause of this situation of separation and fragmentation is again due to the differences in the understanding of the guiding ideology, the basic conditions of the country and the nature of society, as well as the differences in the methods of struggle determined by the above understanding, and also some problems in the organizational line. Looking back at history, the author believes that although the radical leftists represented by Mahir Çayan and Deniz Gezmiş were sincere and determined revolutionaries and their sacrifices were heroic and touching, their fantasy of liberating Turkey by taking hostages, robbing banks, hijacking airplanes, and other acts of a few people who were detached from the masses was obviously impossible, and the root cause of this is the concept "heroes make history" in the idealistic view of history. In the same period, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) founded by the Indian revolutionary Charu Majumdar and others, despite accepting the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, also gradually deviated from the line of mobilizing the masses, and creating a people's army during the struggle, which also led to its defeat. And although the prominent representative of the Turkish Marxist-Leninists - Kaypakkaya - realized this and was clearly advanced theoretically over Mahir Cayan and Deniz Gezmis, proposing to take the path of

people's war to build red bases, his premature sacrifice led to the downturn of the fledgling TKP/ML as well, and in fact the organization didn't even formulate its own program (it was only after the split in 2016 that the two factions each developed their own Program).

In the following article, I will focus on an attempt to detail the historical origins and current divisions between several left-wing organizations in Turkey that claim to support "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism".

II. Context of some of the organizations

Currently, the organizations in Turkey that self-claim to be guided by "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism" all originate from the TKP/ML.

After Kaypakkaya's death, the TKP/ML reorganized several times and held the first "Congress" in 1978 (now it is referred as the "First Conference", which seems to be an attempt to downplay the importance of this conference). When the conference was held, it was at an important turning point in the international Marxist-Leninist movement. In the resolution finally adopted by the Party, it recognized Chairman Mao as a great Marxist-Leninist and one of the five mentors. This was consistent with other revolutionary organizations at the time. However, the organization was strongly influenced by the centrist trend at that time and deleted "Mao Zedong Thought" from its guiding theory. The attitude towards the status of Chairman Mao and Stalin was essentially one of equivalence. The leadership even went to great lengths to defend some of Stalin's mistakes rather than endorse some of Chairman Mao's criticisms of Stalin. This position led to a series of subsequent splits and fluctuations within the organization.

Let me briefly explain why at that time the debate on whether to agree with "criticism of Stalin's mistakes" was linked to the debate on "whether Mao Zedong Thought should be recognized as a guiding ideology." At that time, although Hoxha's method of opposing the Mao was very clumsy, this move still greatly shocked the organizations of various countries that had united around China and Albania in the past and criticized Soviet revisionism and thus involved a reexamination of the Mao's theory and practice. Some Marxist-Leninist organizations believe that although Mao is undoubtedly a great Marxist-Leninist, his contribution is no greater than that of Stalin. Therefore, since there is no word of "Stalinism" or "Stalin Thought", then the reference to "Mao Zedong Thought" is also incorrect. In fact, this part of the trend of thought is skeptical about acknowledging ongoing development in revolutionary theory. On the contrary, they supported some of Stalin's conclusions from the 1930s, such as "the Soviet Union has eliminated the bourgeoisie after the collectivization of agriculture". At the same time, it was opposed to the reflection on and criticism of some practices of the Third International in the 1930s (such as the subordination of the revolutionary movements of the communist parties of various countries to the Soviet Union for a time, the right-deviationist position in the united front, which manifested itself in China in the form of the Wang Ming line, etc.). That is to say, although this tendency did not deny Chairman Mao's identity as a Marxist-Leninist through lies and misinterpretations as Hoxha did, this trend of thought, was similar to Hoxhaism in its wholesale affirmation of the theories and practices of the Stalin era in the USSR. For this reason, this part of the tendency came to be known as the "semi-Hoxhaist faction" or the "centrist faction". Obviously, if the significance and status of Chairman Mao's contributions could not be realized at that time without pointing out his pioneering contributions (the theory of the New Democratic Revolution, the strategy of the People's War, reflections on the degeneration of the USSR and strategies to deal with it, etc.), if without some reflections on Stalin's conclusions, there can be no talk of realizing the significance and status of Chairman Mao's contribution s and subsequent breakthroughs.

As a result of the strong centrist tendencies within the TKP/ML, and the other part of the cadres agreeing with the term similar to "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism" and Chairman Mao's analysis of the Stalinist era, as well as his summary of experiences and lessons learned, the two parts of the cadres became more and more divided and the split became more and more inevitable. At the second "Congress" in 1981 (now recognized as the "Second Conference"), the two factions were divided over the evaluation of Mao (the majority considered him to be one of the five mentors, while the minority considered him to be only one of the "great Marxist-Leninist"), the nature of Turkish society (semi-colonial and semi-feudal society according to the majority, backward comprador-capitalist society according to the minority), the path of the revolution (the majority insisted on the path of the armed struggle of the People's War, while the minority believed that the revolutionary situation didn't exist at that time), and the evaluation of the situation in Albania at that time, (although both factions believed that Hoxha was already an revisionist at the time) were hotly debated. After the split, the majority continued to use the old name TKP/ML, while the minority called itself "TKP/ML (Bolsheviks)" and later "Bolshevik Party (Northern Kurdistan-Turkey)" (BP-NK).

However, despite this split, the ideological foundations of the TKP/ML proved to be shaky and there was a strong tendency within the leadership to deny the significance of Mao Zedong Thought as a guide to the Turkish revolution. The East Anatolian Regional Committee (DABK) of the TKP/ML was deeply dissatisfied with this and chose to break away and go its own way. Subsequently, in 1987, the Third Congress of the TKP/ML (now recognized as the "Third Conference"), announced that it recognized the status and significance of Mao Zedong Thought and "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought" was declared as the guiding ideology of the organization. This seemed to be a positive sign. Subsequently, in 1993, the DABK chose to return to the TKP/ML, and after the merger, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was declared as the guiding ideology of the TKP/ML. Declaring the guiding ideology as "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism" instead of "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought" implied a higher level of recognition of Chairman Mao's contribution. However, the ideological foundations of the unified TKP/ML itself remained unstable, even to the extent that the party magazine openly celebrated the birthday of the opportunist leader Hoxha on the grounds that "Hoxha had done a lot of work in the past," and continued to repeat Stalin's words and reject Chairman Mao's analysis on key issues such as whether there was a struggle between the two classes in socialism or not, and whether or not to continue with the revolution. against Chairman Mao's analysis. Thus, in 1994, the DABK once

again chose to leave the TKP/ML and establish a party of its own, calling itself the "Communist Party of Turkey (Marxist-Leninist)" (abbreviated to TKP(ML), note the difference in the use of parentheses). The TKP(ML) is ideologically closer to the international mainstream Maoists and is openly supported by them. Also in 1987, the "Communist Party of Turkey /Marxist-Leninist (Maoist Center)" split from the TKP/ML, and there is very little information available on the Internet about the reasons for the organization's independence and its subsequent status. The organization may be inactive now.

In 2003, the TKP(ML) announced the organization's "first congress" and changed its name to the "Maoist Communist Party" (Turkish: Maoist Komünist Partisi, hereinafter referred to as the MKP). Obviously, this name was supposed to imply a break with the past tendency of the TKP/ML not to openly and completely fly the Maoist flag. In the following years, a situation was created in Turkey where both the TKP/ML and the MKP operated under the banner of "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism".

In 2013, the MKP splited again due to differences at its "Third Congress". The two organizations that emerged from the split are not even distinguishable by their translations and symbols. The author can only say that one calls itself "Maoist Komünist Parti" (a new name) and the other "Maoist Komünist Partisi" (the old name). Since the former recognizes the resolutions adopted at the 2013 "Third Congress", we call this faction "MKP (2013 3rd Congress)". The other faction completed the integration of its internal organization around 2020, and since it did not recognize the legitimacy of 2013 "Third Congress", so it hold another "Third Congress". We call this group the "MKP (2020s 3rd Congress)". (Translator's note: The author of the original article refers to this faction as: "MKP (2020 3rd Congress)". The reason seems to be that this faction announced in the document that it completed its reorganization in 2020. However, they do not indicate whether their 3rd Congress was held in 2020 or 2021, but only issued related documents in early 2021. For the sake of seriousness, let's call it "MKP (2020s 3rd Congress)".)

However, the splits in the Turkish Communist movement were not yet over...

On the other side, in 2015, TKP/ML was arrested and persecuted by the German

authorities due to its ongoing activities among the Turkish diaspora in Germany. Together with a number of reasons, internal conflicts erupted and the organizations came to the brink of a split. One faction called itself the "Organising Committee" and the other the called itself "Central Committee". Most of the organizations and forces in Dersim, an important guerrilla base in Turkey, have chosen to follow the "Central Committee" faction, while most of the forces fighting in Rojava support the "Organising Committee" faction.

The "Organizing Committee" held its "first congress" in Rojava, probably in the spring of 2019, renaming itself "Communist Party of Turkey-Marxist Leninist" (TKP-ML). Marxist-Leninist". However, in order to avoid confusion, I will refer to this organization as the "TKP-ML (organization committee)". The other faction, which called itself the "Central Committee", also held a congress of its own after that, and continued to use the name TKP/ML. The author will hereafter refer to this organization as "TKP/ML (central committee)".

At this point in the article, I guess the reader is already dizzy. To summarize, there are currently at least four left-wing organizations under the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist banner in Turkey-North Kurdistan-Rojava:

- 1. TKP/ML (central committee)
- 2. TKP-ML (organization committee)
- 3. MKP (2013 3rd Congress)
- 4. MKP (2020s 3rd Congress)

In fact, the author is not very excited to write this. This is very different from the feeling of writing about the Indian Communist Movement. In both countries, the founders also died shortly after the founding of the party, but in one case the party experienced a low ebb, the organization fell apart and but then was reborn; in the other case, the ideology was never truly unified, the organizations were scattered, and the scale of the struggle was also limited. However, the author would like to refute two popular arguments, that "the left is infinitely divisible" and that "the left is keen on infighting". Despite the shortcomings and shortcomings of the Maoist movement in Turkey, they have persisted in their struggle for 50 years, have a certain mass base

(many of them risked arrest to commemorate the martyrs and hold funerals for them), a large number of cadres, right up to the top members, are willing to sacrifice themselves but still remain determined. People overcame their own narrow nationalistic sentiments and demanded the right of self-determination for the Kurdish nation even more thoroughly than the Kurdish national movement. Doesn't all this show the resilience of the Maoist movement in Turkey and its strong communist stance? As the following analysis will also show, the differences between the four factions are not the result of petty or personal disputes, but of a series of major issues related to the revolutionary strategy. Another argument is to arbitrarily designate one of these factions as "correct" and "advanced", while other organizations are "pseudo parties" and traitors, and so on. However, in fact, the propagators of this argument cannot even explain clearly what the differences between the four factions, which is also extremely ridiculous. This style of random talk and arbitrary judgment is often slapped in the face by the facts.

III Theoretical differences among various factions

The following is an attempt to describe and sort out the theoretical differences within these groups based on the materials that the author understands and collects.

First of all, although there are currently four factions, they can still be temporarily divided into two major categories. The TKP/ML (central committee) and the TKP-ML (organizing committee), which have relatively recent joint organizational origins, both believe that Turkey and North Kurdistan are still a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society at present, and the character of the revolution is New Democracy Revolution, the revolutionary leading class is the proletariat, and the main force is still the peasants. The MKP (2013 3rd congress) and the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) oppose this, believing that Turkey and North Kurdistan are already a dependent capitalist society, and the proletariat is not only the leader of the revolution class, and has become the main force

on which the revolution relies.

In other words, the most prominent and obvious difference between the two lies in the judgment of the nature of Turkish society.

There are some comments on the Chinese Internet out of the need to exalt the TKP/ML (central committee) and belittle other factions, claiming that the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) is the "left wing" of the original MKP. It was said that the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) was founded because it was dissatisfied with the "conclusion of the nature of society by old MKP" and other conclusions, and instead agreed with the conclusion of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Therefore, "it is close to the understanding of the TKP/ML (central committee) ". This statement is really outrageous. In terms of the judgment of the nature of society, the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) has not changed, but it continues to adhere to the view that "Turkish society is a capitalist country dependent on imperialism." As far as the nature of society is concerned, there are certainly differences between the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) and the MKP (2012 3rd congress), and the difference is not small. This point will be discussed briefly below, but the disagreement between the two sides is not about basic conclusions about the nature of society.

When Kaypakkaya founded the TKP/ML in 1972, there was no dispute within the party about the nature of Turkey - a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. But since then, Turkey's industrial structure has undergone major changes. The proportion of agriculture in the national economy and the number of agricultural employees has dropped significantly, and a large number of rural residents have moved to cities. It is estimated that nearly 80% of Turkey's residents currently live in cities. This has led to fierce debates within the left-wing camp that identify with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism on the nature of Turkish society—naturally including the corresponding revolutionary strategy, the division between friends and enemies, and the path of the revolution.

For example, the MKP (2013 3rd congress) believes:

In Turkey-Northern Kurdistan, the capitalist socio-economic structure is attached to international imperialism, with multiple nation groups and minorities, and the capitalist mode of production dominates. The basic social contradiction that leaves its mark on this socio-economic structure is the contradiction between labor and capital. Its class is expressed in the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This fundamental contradiction will continue to exist as a contradiction throughout the process of socialist revolution.

... The main contradiction is the contradiction between imperialism, comprador monopoly capitalism, subordinate feudalism and the broad masses of the people of all nation groups and nation minorities. The main aspect of this contradiction is the contradiction between the imperialist bourgeoisie, the comprador monopoly bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

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(The character of the revolution) is a socialist revolution, essentially a proletarian revolution, with the working class as the leading and main force, and the peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and urban and rural poor as strategic allies, that is, a proletarian revolution with the participation of the broad masses of the people. ...the revolution is directed against...imperialism, comprador monopoly capitalism and the big landowners...

The document of the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) also states:

(in the past) Turkey was defined as semi-feudal and semi-colonial. At this stage, the social structure has undergone opposite changes. Now more than 78% of the social population lives in cities and is in capitalist production or capitalist class relations. As given conditions confirm the dominance of comprador capitalist production, our theory of knowledge must also change in accordance with changing social conditions...

The economic and social structures we have summarized clearly and unequivocally indicate the dominance of capitalist productive forces and modes of production in Turkey and North Kurdistan. The semi-feudal economic structure has given way to comprador capitalism dependent on imperialism. Feudal production relations spread over time, regressed to secondary status, and disintegrated in an extremely painful way. Although the existing feudal remnants appear in the form of dispersed, fragmented and backward peasant production, they are under the control of capitalist capital and trade.

The share of agricultural production in Turkey's total economic output has dropped to around 5%. The urban population increased by 93%, while the rural population decreased to about 7%. Not to mention...most small and medium-sized farmers in rural areas, and even some landlords, have given up their small means of agricultural production and gone to cities. This also indicates the development direction of social and economic life. As the leading force of the revolution, the working class has also become the main force of the revolution, which has greatly increased compared with fifty or a hundred years ago.

Today, the proportion of Turkey's modern industry, that is, its proportion in the total non-agricultural economic output value, reaches more than 95%; agricultural production accounts for less than 5% of the total output value. The cruelty of the capitalist mode of production has destroyed...small agricultural producers. Only 7% of the 82 million people live in small towns and villages, 93% of the population lives in provinces, of which nearly 40 million live in large cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir; Antalya, Bursa and Adana. City. ...Out of a working population of 28 million in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan, just over 4 million are employed in agriculture. ...In this case, the force that hinders social progress and the development of productive forces is not feudalism itself, which has been defeated and disintegrated, but the capitalist mode of production and capitalist private ownership. The main force of the revolution is not the sparsely populated peasantry, but the growing modern proletariat.

Obviously, this change in the theoretical conclusion about the nature of society means that the character, main force, and region of the revolution will undergo fundamental changes. It is for this reason that the MKP (2013 3rd congress) announced the establishment of the "People's Partisan Forces " and established it as another armed force affiliated with the organization in addition to the "People's Liberation Army". It is reported that the "People's Partisan Forces " will mainly carry out urban guerrilla warfare activities. Apparently, MKP (2013 3rd congress) is trying to shift the area of struggle (at least partially) to urban areas.

However, neither the MKP (2013 3rd congress) nor the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) accepted the so-called "new imperialism" theory proposed by the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD) (this theory believes that Turkey is a "imperialist" countries, in fact this theory has little support within the international communist movement). Although the MKP (2013 3rd congress) and the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) believe that Turkey is a capitalist country, they both insist that the country's type of capitalism is comprador capitalism, rather than independently developed capitalism, let alone imperialism.

Before the TKP/ML split in 2016, they expressed firm opposition to the conclusion that "the capitalist mode of production is dominant in Turkey." In 2015, a member of the TKP/ML strongly criticized this conclusion in an article:

However, it cannot be denied that there is a developing capitalism in the country, albeit heavily indexed to imperialism and its growth needs. We have to take it seriously that, proportional to the developing capitalism, there is a numerical increase of the exploitation of labour and therefore of the working class in the charts of social relations. Consequently, its importance gains weight and its organizational level are going up.

However, precisely here we must open a wide parenthesis.

In Turkey and in countries that fall in the same socioeconomic category, the capitalist development was limited and hampered from the very beginning by two major breakwaters. These two restraining barriers before the capitalist development are imperialism and the suffocating oppression of pre-capitalist relations. For imperialism, countries such as ours are areas of consumption of their products, a source of cheaplabour, and cheap raw materials....

Another consequence of this situation was that the hampered and crippled domestic capitalism never had the chance to achievecapital accumulation, which is a prerequisite for the capitalist development in the era of imperialism. ...

It is true that the "direction" of development conditions a process in which market predominates over producers, towards the predominance of commodity. However, it is as much a fact that the "moment" of the development is characterized by the semi-feudal economics. Therefore, in a socioeconomic structure where the two organisms' lines cross each other, the principle task of the revolution is the complete removal of feudal residues. The degree of development of capitalism does not exclude this task and therefore the character of our revolution. The first step of our revolution in essence refers to the needs of the peasantry. Peasantry's issue remains to be paramount importance as the basic link of our revolution. This means that the contradiction between feudalism and the masses as well as the contradiction between imperialism and the masses, which arise from the existing socioeconomic relations, are the fundamental contradictions, determining the current process. Of these, the contradiction between feudalism and the masses is the principle contradiction and has the role of directing the particular phase of the process.

Later, although the TKP/ML split into two parts, the TKP/ML (central committee) and the TKP-ML (organizing committee), the most basic theoretical conclusion on the nature of Turkish society as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society was consistent. This conclusion was reiterated in the "first congress" document of the TKP/ML (central committee) and the "Program" formulated by the TKP-ML (organizing committee).

Who is right in this dispute? Firstly, the author's level is limited, secondly, I lack a deep understanding of Turkey's national conditions, and thirdly, I would rather be cautious about very important issues, so I am unwilling to draw rash conclusions here. Speeches that casually draw conclusions about major revolutionary issues in other countries may seem "well-informed." In fact, such rhetoric is a manifestation of the least understanding of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism: if analyzing national conditions and formulating programs and strategies were so simple that people thousands of miles away could easily judge them, wouldn't it be too easy to carry out world revolution? Is this true? Returning to the above question, what the author wants to say here is that in India, another country where the revolutionary movement guided by Marxism-Leninism-Leninism-Maoism is much larger, there is also a question about whether India is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society or has entered capitalist society. The Communist Party of India (Maoist) published the book "*Changes in Relations of Production in India — Our Political Program*" in early 2021. In the book, while the

Communist Party of India (Maoist) adheres to the conclusions of basic documents such as the "Program" and "Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution", it also admits that capitalism in agriculture in Punjab and other places has arrived at a certain scale of development. And in the latest program, it stated that collective agriculture, cooperatives, etc. should be established in struggles in these areas. Obviously, this kind of change also has certain socialist revolutionary implications. Although for the overall situation of the Indian revolution, these changes are still far from reaching the point where they will change the whole character of the revolution (the new democratic revolution).

The Communist Party of India (Maoist) insisted on the theoretical conclusion that India is still a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Can we conclude from this that Turkey, like India, has not undergone a fundamental change in its social nature? Of course, we can learn from the conclusions of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), but we must also note that 60% of India's population still lives in rural areas, agricultural production also concentrates the majority of India's labor force, and Indian agricultural productivity level lags far behind Turkey, etc. These are the big differences between India and Turkey. There is no doubt that the semi-colonial and semi-feudal theory of the TKP/ML is in line with the more traditional views, and it sounds more "orthodox". However, after all, even the TKP/ML admitted that "there is a developing capitalism in the country." Therefore, I am afraid it will take time and revolutionary practice to answer the question of what the real situation is.

The above is a brief summary of the differences between the TKP/ML factions and the MKP factions. It can also be seen that the claim that "the split between the two factions within the MKP was not a subtle difference of opinion, but a major controversy involving many fundamental issues of principle, such as the nature of Turkish society, the character of the revolution, and the role of the united front, etc.," is a completely empty claim. I have finished talking about the nature of society and the character of revolution. On this issue, the two factions from the MKP are basically in agreement. Let's talk about the differences between the various factions on the issue of the united front.

Today's "Republic of Turkey" is a country with many different nation groups living within its borders. Like the "sick man of East Asia" - the Qing Dynasty of China in modern times, the Ottoman Empire, the "sick man of West Asia", also pursued cruel policies of national oppression. Due to various reasons, the Ottoman Empire collapsed during the revolutionary wave of various ethnic groups seeking liberation in the early 20th century. However, the "Republic of Turkey" established on this basis continues to pursue a policy of nation repression, brutally suppresses the national aspirations of the Kurds and others, and even openly refuses to recognize the objective existence of the Kurds as a nation. Under this circumstance, the Kurdish national bourgeois left-wing and petty bourgeois parties such as the PKK launched an armed struggle against the national oppression of the Turkish authorities. Since the Kurds are a transnational nation, living at the junction of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the PKK branch in Syria took advantage of the power vacuum in the Kurdish area in Syria (also known as Rojava). It quickly took root and developed locally, established a separatist regime later known as the AANES and implemented many progressive democratic reforms. At the same time, the regime has also won a lot of sympathy and support from international public opinion in its fight against the "IS". At that time, out of the need to fight against the "IS", U.S. imperialism also provided certain assistance to the " Syrian Democratic Forces ", the armed force affiliated with the AANES. In 2015, many radical left-wing parties in Turkey engaged in armed struggle, including the then-unsplit TKP/ML and MKP (2013 3rd congress), formed the "International Freedom Battalion" (IFB) and went to Syria to support the "Rojava Revolution".

At the same time, negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish government broke down in 2015, and fighting resumed. The following year, the PKK also advocated the establishment of the "People's United Revolutionary Movement" (HBDH) in Turkey. This is a left-wing cooperation platform with the participation of most of the radical left-wing parties engaged in armed struggle in Turkey. It announced that its purpose is to "annihilate Erdogan's fascist regime".

Judging from the program and manifesto published by the HBDH, its guiding

ideology and struggle goals were greatly influenced by the PKK's unique, non-Marxist-Leninist thoughts. Sharp differences arose within the TKP/ML on whether to join the HBDH, in fact, on how to view the Kurdish national movement and how to form an alliance with it. This disagreement, combined with other factors, led to the split of the TKP/ML into two factions: TKP/ML (central committee) and the TKP-ML (organization committee). The former withdrew from the HBDH, while the latter and the MKP (2013 3rd congress) continue to operate within the HBDH. As for the IFB, I have not seen a statement from the TKP/ML (central committee) regarding its withdrawal. But in fact, most of the guerrilla fighters in Rojava followed the TKP-ML (organizing committee) during the split. Therefore, it actually no longer matters whether the TKP/ML (central committee) announced its withdrawal from the IFB in Rojava...

In October 2017, after nearly a year of bloody battles, fighters from the Syrian Democratic Forces and the IFB struggled to capture Raqqa, the largest lair of the "Islamic State" The commander of the TKP-ML (organizing committee) Nubar Ozanyan also died in the battle of Raqqa. According to some reports, Nubar Ozanyan was unwilling to see the split of the old TKP/ML during his lifetime. He tried to persuade the TKP/ML (central committee) faction and the TKP-ML (organizing committee) to unite, but failed to do so.

In March 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces captured Al-Baghuz Fawqani, the last town controlled by the "Islamic State" in Syria. The influence and scope of control of the Rojava regime reached its peak. However, this was also the beginning of its decline. In the process of fighting against the "Islamic State", the Rojava regime received some assistance from the United States, and even cooperated with the U.S. Air Force and a small number of ground troops in many battles. I believe that is understandable. However, as a revolutionary force, it must have a clear mind and a deep understanding of the true face of U.S. imperialism instead of becoming dependent on U.S. imperialism and having unrealistic illusions because of aid.

Let's take a look at what the CPC did during the Anti-Japanese War. The CPC did not refuse, and even vigorously sought possible assistance from the United States, and took advantage of the contradiction between Chiang Kai-shek and American imperialism to gain more space for progressive forces to maneuver. In fact, due to the exemplary role of the People's Army led by the CPC in the War of Resistance, the US imperialists realized that it was probably necessary to obtain the cooperation of Yan'an in the war against Japan. Even some high-level officials of the U.S. imperialists, based on their personal likes and dislikes, had to admit the rationality of the CPC's demands for the Kuomintang to carry out democratic reforms during the War of Resistance and to provide the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army with more personnel and fair treatment. Of course, personal feelings are just personal feelings. Mature politicians of any class understand that personal feelings give way to class interests. This is also the fundamental reason why the U.S. imperialists' "mediation of relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party" showed a certain degree of fairness at the beginning but ended up being dishonest and openly favoring the KMT Government headed by Chiang Kai-shek. In Yan'an's negotiations with the U.S. imperialists, although Yan'an failed to receive much material assistance due to the ultimate reactionary stance of the U.S. imperialists, its insistence on independence shattered the conspiracy of the US and Chiang Kai-shek forces to use verbal false promises to deceive the people in service of their ultimate aim of realizing the "dissolution of the Communist Party."

Back to main subject, the support provided by the United States and other Western powers to the Rojava regime was only to eliminate the "Islamic State". U.S. imperialism is not interested at all in the survival of the Rojava regime and the future of the Kurdish nation. Moreover, although the series of democratic reform measures implemented by the Rojava regime appear to be quite mild, they would inevitably offend the interests of the imperialist powers in Syria. On the other hand, after the elimination of the IS gangs, the increasingly powerful Rojava regime has made the Turkish ruling class feel troubled. Erdogan was deeply afraid that the national equality and democratic reform policies promoted by the Rojava regime would inspire people in Turkey to fight for them as well. Therefore, after receiving the tacit approval of the United States in 2019, the Turkish reactionary army and the various puppet forces incorporated by the Turkish regime (the so-called "Syrian National Army") crossed the Turkish-Syrian border and launched a massive attack on the areas controlled by the Rojava regime.

And how does the Rojava regime respond to this drastic change in the situation? Unfortunately, in this case, its class nature—the compromise and weakness inherent in politics dominated by the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie—was fully exposed. During the Turkish invasion, the Rojava regime did not dare to greatly mobilize the local people and wage a people's war. Instead, it placed its hope in the mediation of the United States, Russia and other powers. As a result, it lost many troops and abandoned large territory. The following episode sounds like a joke, but it's actually true:

The Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, sent a letter to then-President Trump, asking him to contact Erdogan to mediate, attaching a letter stating that he "would make concessions that have never been made before." However, after Trump did so, how did Erdogan respond? Erdogan returned the letter directly to Trump, and instead handed Trump what he called "documents concerning PKK terrorist Ferhat Abdi Asin (Mazlum Abdi's former name), who is to be arrested under U.S. law," and said, "I am saddened that a U.S. president is in contact with terrorists."

The Turkish military operation lasted almost two weeks, and after capturing 4,820 square kilometers of land, Turkey declared a "ceasefire" under the pressure of the two imperialist powers, the United States and Russia. As a result of this war, Turkey has basically achieved its pre-war goal of "establishing a zone of separation". The Rojava regime, on the other hand, not only failed to prevent the Turkish invasion forces from attacking, but also had to allow Assad's government forces to "enter" the area which earlier was controlled by Rojava. The situation in Rojava has largely stabilized on the surface since the battle, but Turkey continues to threaten to invade Rojava again from time to time.

The above is a brief summary of the local situation in Turkey and Rojava so far. Regarding this situation, the views of TKP/ML (central committee), TKP-ML (organizing committee), the MKP (2013 3rd congress), and the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) are different.

The TKP/ML (central committee) is the one with the least enthusiasm for the Kurdish national movement among the four organizations. Its previous withdrawal from the HBDH is a sign. The organization evaluated the PKK as "armed reformist" because both the PKK and the Rojava regime have both abandoned the slogan of national self-determination and instead pursued the very incomplete goal of "democratic autonomy", and therefore cannot be regarded as a national liberation movement.

The TKP-ML (organizing committee) is still actively participating in the HBDH and the IFB. Although the organization's "First Congress" documents were not released, we can get a glimpse of its position through a lengthy article titled "The World Situation and the Situation in Turkey" in the organization's official publication *The Communist* in April 2019, as well as an interview talk with Politburo member Ozgur Aren at the end of 2020 titled "We Have No Choice but to Struggle and to Fight for Liberation".

In "The World Situation and the Situation in Turkey", the author theoretically admits:

"In today's era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, the national question arises under the leadership of the proletariat. It is part of the socialist democratic people's revolution and is also a problem that needs to be solved. Under today's conditions, the national bourgeoisie is no longer capable of solving it. This in turn puts the class-conscious proletariat at the same time tasked with solving the national question, as we mentioned above. ... US imperialism develops its relations with the Kurds in order to protect its interests in the region. He first provided military assistance to the People's Protection Units (author's note: the armed force of the Syrian branch of the PKK and the main component of the Syrian Democratic Forces), and then provided military assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces. This situation made the Turkish ruling class even more worried. They have repeatedly asked the United States to prefer them to the Kurds."

It sounds as if the TKP-ML (organizing committee) understands the limitations of

the national bourgeoisie in the national liberation movement and the true purpose of US imperialism in aiding the Rojava regime. However, when analyzing the prospects of the Rojava regime later in the article, it does not apply this conclusion to the analysis of the situation in Rojava. Instead, he believed optimistically (it was on the eve of the Turkish army's large-scale invasion of Rojava):

"The Kurds are the most successful side in the Syrian civil war. The Kurds took advantage of historical opportunities and gained an important position in Rojava. It is clear that as long as no new disaster occurs, the Kurds who are determined to protect this place will continue to advance in Rojava. However, at this point, imperialism and regional reaction, especially Assad, came into play. Although it is difficult to predict how this process will unfold, the Kurdish nation's resistance to imperialist attacks and its regional response to political enslavement and cultural de-identification are historic. ...Although the Kurdish national movement's relationship with US imperialism has been criticized in some circles, the national movement defines this relationship as a tactical one. The system of "democratic autonomy" established by the Kurdish national movement in the Middle East and other regions in the name of autonomous government in northern and eastern Syria is progressive and the result of democracy. Because of this; it is a topic of imperialist struggle, especially the struggle of regional reactionaries."

Although the TKP-ML (organizing committee) also foresaw the following:

"In the coming period, the reactionary countries in the region, especially Syria and Turkey, will not hesitate to use various means, including military means, to eliminate or limit these achievements of the Kurdish national movement. It is an important revolutionary duty to support and fight for the gains of all the peoples of the region, especially the Kurdish nation. "

But how to "support and fight for it"? Can the Rojava regime have the determination and courage to "defend" it? The article has no answers.

As for the United Front Organization in Turkey -HBDH, Ozgur Aren said in an interview:

" In this sense, if I continue with the approach of our congress to the issue; Our congress emphasized that "HBDH is an important opportunity". The HBDH, in which our party took part in its establishment with several other revolutionary organizations, especially the Kurdish national freedom movement, to deal with the contradictions in our country, especially the Kurdish national issue, to develop the armed struggle, to realize more effective and joint actions against fascism, is extremely important in this respect.... Our Congress has changed its definition of the Kurdish national movement to the Kurdish national freedom movement. However, it has been decided that the conceptualization of the Right to Self-Determination of Nations, which our party has been using since its establishment, should be used as the Right of Free Separation to be clearer and understandable....The first and fundamental condition for a real solution to the Kurdish national question is the recognition of the "right to separate freely". This is the only revolutionary solution. "

It can be seen that although the top leaders of the TKP-ML (organizing committee) have spoken of fighting for "Right of Free Separation" (it seems that they still distance themselves from the incomplete slogan of "democratic autonomy" of the Rojava regime and maintain "theoretical Independence"), but at a time when the Rojava regime had already suffered major setbacks, the interview actually did not mention the issue of the Rojava regime's right capitulationism at all.

The MKP (2013 3rd congress) also theoretically evaluated the PKK as an "armed reformist", which sounds more "radical" than the conclusion of the TKP-ML (organization committee), but similar to the TKP/ML (central committee). However, in reality, its position does not seem to be much different from that of the TKP-ML (organizing committee). It is also still actively participating in the activities of the HBDH and the IFB, and has not publicly criticized the Rojava regime. The MKP (2013 3rd congress) also often conducts some public activities together with the TKP-ML (organization committee).

As for the MKP (2020s 3rd congress), it was too late for the organization to organize again (it only publicly announced its existence in 2021), there are too few reports on specific practices. And its actual attitude can only be estimated from its
congress documents. The organization's congress document fiercely criticized the conclusion of the MKP (2013 3rd congress) that the PKK is an "armed reformist" as "reactionary and indifferent chauvinism":

"A huge gap can be seen between the PKK, which the opportunists call "reformist", and the truly reformist Barzani movement. The reality of the Kurdish national movement does not shy away from alliances with proletarian revolutionaries in all fields, which reveals the fundamental difference between reformism and the national revolutionary movement. What makes it truly revolutionary is its attitude towards the proletarian revolutionary movement and whether it deals a blow to imperialism, albeit indirectly. ...How will those who evaluate the Kurdish National Movement (KUH) as reformist – and above all, those who believe that a revolutionary national movement will be impossible – explain the revolutionary patriotic resistance in Rojava? ... When... the proletarians... accept this reactionary theory, will not a reactionary indifference to the national revolutionary war arise in the conditions of the revolutionary war throughout Kurdistan? And is there no chauvinism in this indifference? Only the dominant nationalists who applauded colonialism and annexation can say this."

The MKP (2020s 3rd congress) criticized the MKP (2013 3rd congress) as "reactionary and indifferent chauvinism", which is obviously excessive. But based on this statement, it is not difficult to conclude that the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) has higher expectations for the PKK and the Kurdish movement in Rojava than the MKP (2013 3rd congress). In advocating active participation in the HBDH and the IFB, their attitudes should be consistent. Of course, it is still unknown whether the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) actually has armed forces and personnel involved. If there are disagreements and debates, it is precisely the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) that are more "right" on this issue. In other words, the so-called "split between the two factions within the MKP...a major dispute involving...the role of the united front and many other basic principled issues" is also false.

The above lists the attitudes of four organizations towards the Kurdish national movement. However, it needs to be emphasized that no matter which organization, including the relatively most indifferent TKP/ML (central committee), their attitude of

supporting and praising the Kurdish national movement is unquestionable. This is not what some people say: "The Kurdish movement has completely degenerated and is no different from Assad and Erdogan." The disagreement is not whether to form an alliance with the Kurdish national movement, but how to form an alliance. Please see the statement in the 2019 "First Congress" document of TKP/ML (central committee):

"Our Party views the paradigms of "Democratic Autonomy" and "Democratic Confederalism" of the Kurdish National Movement to resolve the national question as a result of the changes in the international developments and balances. This paradigm is considered to not include the revolutionary resolution of the National Question, being in contradiction with the tendency to obtaining self-determination that will provide freedom to the oppressed Kurdish nation and seen as an essential compromise given to the Turkish national sovereignty. The critical position towards it being within the system and having the character of being class reconciliatory is maintained. Within this context the Kurdish National Movement is viewed by the Party as an Armed Reformist National Movement. Having this character the consideration of being a political movement that it is an ally of the revolution, it is among the forces of the people is sustained."

After introducing the differences and common points, let's talk about the author's opinions. Of course, this is just a theory on paper and still an "outsider's opinion."

It is obvious that a good situation has been lost due to the weakness, compromise and wavering of the Rojava authorities. At present, the Rojava regime has not only greatly shrunk the area under its control (in addition to facing possible another attack by Turkey and its puppet army), it also needs to face the infiltration of the Russian imperialist client Assad regime. Faced with this situation, the TKP-ML (organizing committee) and the MKP (2013 3rd congress) should publicly stand up to criticize the compromise and surrender line of the Rojava authorities (even in a friendly way), actively mobilize the masses, and be prepared to fight the Turkish invading army and various puppet armies independently to the end when the imperialist countries refuse assistance (this is actually a fact), defend the achievements of the mass movement, and be prepared for protracted war and guerrilla warfare. It should be noted that the local mass base is quite good; but the Turkish invading army made up of a foreign people and has extremely poor military discipline, so it is impossible to win the support of the people. At the same time, although the US imperialists and Russian imperialists do not care about the life and death of the Rojava regime, they may not be able to tolerate Turkish influence penetrating deep into the hinterland of Syria. Therefore, the contradiction between the imperialist countries and the aggressors can still be exploited on the premise of insisting on independence.

Regrettably, regardless of the dispute over the terminology of the Kurdish national movement as "reformist or revolutionary", the TKP-ML (organizing committee) and the MKP (2013 3rd congress) have always talked about "Defend the Rojava Revolution", but they have never publicly criticized or questioned the policies of the Rojava authorities, nor have they taken further independent actions. This is obviously a serious problem. It is even more outrageous that the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) still praises the so-called "revolutionary patriotic resistance in Rojava" while ignoring the problem.

Let's talk about the HBDH active in Turkey. It must be noted that Rojava and Turkey-Northern Kurdistan are two regions that are related but fundamentally different. The HBDH is an organization heavily influenced by the PKK. At present, the slogans and posture of the PKK are much more radical than those of the Rojava regime. This is of course not because the PKK has a more revolutionary class foundation than the top leaders of the Rojava regime (the class foundations are similar), but because the PKK is currently facing high pressure from the Erdogan regime. In addition, it does not have much use value for imperialists such as the United States and Russia at the moment, which makes the revolutionary side of the national bourgeoisie more exposed, while the compromising and possibly surrendering side is temporarily exposed less. Even so, the PKK's current appeal is "democratic confederalism" rather than a slogan for complete national liberation. However, the possibility of compromise does not equal reality. After all, the PKK is still launching an armed struggle against the Turkish state apparatus, and the nature of its struggle is also a movement of progressive and resistance to national oppression. Therefore, four Maoist parties all evaluate the progressive character of the Kurdish national movement.

As mentioned above, the TKP-ML (organizing committee) and MKP (2013 3rd congress) both have obvious "right" tendency that give up their independence when dealing with the issue of the Rojava regime. Will this tendency also be reflected in the relationship between them and the HBDH? It is currently unknown. I have not seen any evidence for the claim that the TKP-ML (organizing committee) and the MKP (2013 3rd congress) "are again organizationally fully subordinate to the HBDH under the leadership of the PKK, a bourgeois party". On the website of the HBDH, the MKP (2013 3rd congress) once publicly published an article declaring that the enemy is the entire Turkish fascist state system. It also said that Erdogan's Justice and Development Party is reactionary and does not mean that the Republican People's Party (the party founded by Kemal) and others are "progressive", and so on. This is obviously the clear theoretical view of the MKP (2013 3rd congress), and it is different from the statement of HBDH. The so-called "HBDH is anti-Erdogan but not against Kemal", it is clear that conclusions have been drawn without at least a serious study of the positions of the organizations within the HBDH. But in any case, considering the tendency of the TKP-ML (organizing committee) and the MKP (2013 3rd congress) on the Rojava issue, their relationship with the HBDH is somewhat worrying.

Of course, as for the current internal structure of the HBDH and how it operates, we can only wait for further information to be provided in the future.

In contrast, the fact that the TKP/ML (central committee) pointed out the problems of theoretical perspective at the very beginning of the HBDH is indeed remarkable. As far as I know, among the many left-wing political parties engaged in armed struggle in Turkey, the TKP/ML (central committee) is the only one that has explicitly mentioned the program and propaganda problems of the HBDH, which is of course a good thing to be happy about.

However, I still dare not make a conclusion as to whether it is appropriate for the TKP/ML (central committee) to withdraw from the HBDH. Because even the TKP/ML (central committee) admit that nation contradictions are extremely fierce in Turkey, and they must put forward correct strategies and slogans to win over the masses. I believe that the key lies in whether the HBDH is a single-minded organization dominated by

the PKK, with the other organizations being subordinate to or even influenced by the PKK in terms of their views and theories; or is it a left-wing united front organization that basically guarantees equal status among its members and keeps them out of each other's internal affairs? If it is the former, joining is obviously a mistake; if it is the latter, getting involved may not be an inappropriate strategy. One of the main reasons for the withdrawal of the TKP/ML (central committee) is that it believed that "the united front organization should be led by our party." This formulation is completely correct in theory. But under the current circumstances, the PKK's strength and influence are still much greater than the TKP/ML (central committee). It is obviously unrealistic to mention in the slogan that "the HBDH should be led by the TKP/ML (central committee)".

At this point in the article, I am reminded of a piece of history in the Anti-Japanese War. At the beginning of the war, under the condition that the KMT was active in resisting Japanese Army for the time being, the CPC once envisaged the formation of a cross-party united front organization, while retaining the independence of the two parties. Chiang Kai-shek, the head of the KMT, ostensibly agreed to the formation of such an organization, but the core of the idea was to "dissolve the Communist Party" by peaceful means. On this issue, the author believes that it is a core issue whether the proletarian vanguard within the united front has an independent status and whether it can preserve its own independent organization and adhere to an independent line.

In addition, at the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, the CPC and the KMT formed the Anti-Japanese united front. The Red Army accepted the reorganization of the KMT Government and formally came under the leadership of the KMT government. Within this united front, the KMT was much stronger than the CPC at that time. The former even denied the objective existence of the united front and only regarded the CPC's kindness as a "surrender." This balance of power is somewhat similar to the united front between the communist revolutionary forces and the Kurdish national movement in Turkey today. Of course, no matter how big its own problems are, the Kurdish national movement is much more advanced than the decadent forces represented by Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time, there may be a certain gap between the PKK and the Turkish communist revolutionary forces, but compared with the bloody feud between the KMT and the CPC during the ten-year civil war, the relationship between the PKK and the Turkish communist revolutionary forces is still much better. Let's briefly review Chairman Mao's attitude towards the issues of "leadership" and independence before and after the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War. These may be something the TKP/ML (central committee) can learn from:

"How does the proletariat give political leadership through its party to all the revolutionary classes in the country? First, by putting forward basic political slogans that accord with the course of historical development and by putting forward slogans of action for each stage of development and each major turn of events in order to translate these political slogans into reality. For instance, we have put forward the basic slogans for "an anti-Japanese national united front" and for "a unified democratic republic", but we have also put forward the slogans, "end the civil war", "fight for democracy" and "carry out armed resistance", as specific objectives for concerted action by the entire nation; without such specific objectives political leadership is out of the question. Second, the proletariat, and especially its vanguard the Communist Party, should set an example through its boundless enthusiasm and loyalty in achieving the specific objectives when the whole country goes into action for them. In the fight to fulfil all the tasks of the anti-Japanese national united front and the democratic republic, Communists should be the most far-sighted, the most selfsacrificing, the most resolute, and the least prejudiced in sizing up situations, and should rely on the majority of the masses and win their support. Third, the Communist Party should establish proper relations with its allies and develop and consolidate its alliance with them, while adhering to the principle of never relinquishing its defined political objectives. Fourth, it should expand the ranks of the Communist Party and maintain its ideological unity and strict discipline; It is by doing all these things that the Communist Party gives effect to its political leadership of the people throughout *China. They constitute the foundation for guaranteeing our political leadership and for* ensuring that the revolution will win complete victory and not be disrupted by the

vacillations of our allies."

"For the sake of internal peace, democracy and armed resistance and for the sake of establishing the anti-Japanese national united front, the Chinese Communist Party has made the following four pledges in its telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang:

(1) the Communist-led government in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia revolutionary base area will be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the Red Army will be redesignated as part of the National Revolutionary Army, and they will come under the direction of the Central Government in Nanking and its Military Council respectively;

(2) a thoroughly democratic system will be applied in the areas under the Government of the Special Region;

(3) the policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang by armed force will be discontinued; and

(4) the confiscation of the land of the landlords will be discontinued.

These pledges are necessary as well as permissible. For only thus can we transform the state of antagonism between the two different regimes within the country and achieve unity for common action against the enemy, in line with the changes in the relative political importance of China's external and internal contradictions. These are principled and conditional concessions, made with the aim of obtaining in return what the whole nation needs--peace, democracy and armed resistance. Moreover, the concessions have limits. The preservation of the Communist Party's leadership over the Special Region and in the Red Army, and the preservation of the Communist Party's leadership over the limits beyond which it is impermissible to go. Concessions mean concessions by both parties: the Kuomintang abandons the policy of civil war, dictatorship and non-resistance to the foreign foe, and the Communist Party abandons the policy of maintaining antagonism between the two regimes. We exchange the latter for the former and resume our co-operation with the Kuomintang to fight for national salvation. To

describe this as capitulation by the Communist Party is nothing but Ah Q-ism or malicious slander."

On the question of the attitudes of the various parties towards the Kurdish movement, this is all that will be written for the time being.

Finally, briefly write a few words about the differences between the MKP (2013 3rd congress) and the MKP (2020s 3rd congress).

Although the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) and the MKP (2013 3rd congress) basically have the same description of the nature of society, the MKP (2013 3rd congress) has made a lot of "innovations" in theory (claiming that this is a "breaking of taboo"). This is unacceptable to the MKP (2020s 3rd congress). In this regard, many of the criticisms of the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) against the MKP (2013 3rd congress) are similar to the criticisms made by the TKP/ML. It can be said that many theoretical concepts of the MKP (2013 3rd congress) for the new society after the revolution are greatly influenced by some theories of anarchism and the PKK; at the same time, their assessment of reality is also influenced by Gonzaloist in the international communist movement(for example, influenced by the "Three Worlds Theory and the theory of American imperialism to dominate the world", it is announced that capitalism has undergone some qualitative changes and has broken the boundaries of nation-states; another example is the public announcement that "socialist revolution can also be achieved through protracted people's war"), finally form a special hybrid theory. This is also rare among political parties in the world that declare to accept Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its guidance.

Apart from some of the accusations it has received that I think are more of a slap in the face, here are just a few examples that I think are indeed problematic:

For example, the MKP (2013 3rd congress) announced that "imperialism has shown not only quantitative but also qualitative changes... It should not be concluded that the anarchy of production has completely disappeared... national monopolies have been replaced by transnational monopolies", That is, "anarchy" only "does not completely disappear"—that is to say, the MKP (2013 3rd congress) believes "anarchy partially disappears." This view has been fiercely criticized as the "ultra-imperialist" theory by the TKP/ML and the MKP (2020s 3rd congress). Obviously, this view is related to the theory that over-exaggerates the power gap between the "superpowers" and other imperialist powers. Perhaps it is for this reason that the TKP/ML (central committee) has repeatedly stated that it refuses to accept some conclusions in the "Three Worlds Theory".

For another example, the MKP (2013 3rd congress) believes that "based on historical inevitability, the party and the state cannot replace the direct participation, control and management of workers in any way. ... Under no circumstances should one organization be allowed to monopolize state power... Credit transfer, wealth accumulation and inheritance are not allowed to be transferred..." It even proposed a "socialist multi-party system" and even advocated replacing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" with the term "new state of the working people". This is obviously very anarchistic. These "new" theories have also been fiercely criticized by the TKP/ML and the MKP (2020s 3rd congress).

For another example, the MKP (2013 3rd congress) also expressed its recognition of the PKK's "regional revolution theory" to a certain extent. The MKP (2020s 3rd congress) criticized this:

"It is an absolute law of capitalism that imperialism has an extraordinary curve of development and leaves behind inequalities in economic development. Under the conditions of an unequal system of commodity production and circulation, the arguments for a 'world revolution' or a 'regional revolution' are put forward at the same time in order to divert the proletariat from its revolutionary theories and objectives."

Of course, there is no lack of opposition to these theories within the MKP (2013 3rd congress). When the organization convened the "Fourth Congress" in 2019, some representatives proposed to restore the expression "dictatorship of the proletariat", but it was not adopted.

My opinion on this point is that many of the views of the MKP (2013 3rd congress) are indeed quite strange...but it is hard to say what will happen in the future.

IV Summary

I have written a lot above, which is a time-consuming and labor-intensive summary of the history of Turkey's radical left wing, as well as the general differences between various "Marxist-Leninist-Maoist" organizations in Turkey. Finally, let me summarize my current views: I am cautiously optimistic about the TKP/ML (but I also hope that it will not make the mistake of being divorced from the masses). At the same time, I hope that the TKP-ML (organizing committee) and the MKP (2013 3rd congress) and the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) will at least realize the seriousness of the rightward deviation of the Rojava authorities in the near future, and realize the necessity of independence, mobilizing the masses, and carrying out a protracted war to defend the fruits of democratic reforms. As for unity, it is obvious that these four parties have considerable differences with each other. Even in terms of the greatest reality - the nature of society, their conclusions are also very different. Therefore, without understanding the differences, some opinions make false claims that " the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) has made progress and its ideas now is close to the TKP/ML (central committee) and is expected to unite." This is really a big joke.

However, I believe that although the Turkish Marxist-Leninist-Maoist movement is not as prominent as the Communist Party of India (Maoist) at the moment, its experience and lessons can still provide some inspiration to revolutionaries in other countries.

For example, as Chairman Mao said: "Whether the ideological and political line is correct or not determines everything." This ideological and political line should firstly clarify the guiding ideology. The second step is to correctly apply the guiding ideology to analyze the national conditions, conclude the nature of society, and clearly identify the enemies and friends of the revolution. Only in this way can more correct revolutionary strategies and tactics be finally formulated. It should be admitted that the unity of revolutionaries based on the correct line is very precious and hard-won. The experience of Turkish revolutionaries in the past fifty years illustrates this point from the opposite side to some extent. For another example, revolutionaries must resolutely support the oppressed nation in its struggle against oppression. However, while supporting this kind of struggle and establishing a united front with it, we should also pay attention to our own ideological and organizational independence.

For another example, it is also very important to correctly distinguish and handle two types of contradictions of different natures. I have limited information, and my theoretical level is even more limited, so it is not possible for me to make an overly detailed evaluation of the many internal struggles of the TKP/ML since its establishment on 1970s. Revolutionaries certainly support ideological struggle, and the I believes that it is absolutely right to set up new party after finding that the old organization is hopeless, as Majumdar did. This is not "sectarianism" or "separatism". But the author also believes that division itself is not the ultimate goal. What revolutionaries pursue is unity after reaching agreement on major principles. This requires fighting against the wrong line while trying to unite as many people as possible on the correct line. However, the TKP/ML and its descendant organizations are still splitting after many divisions and mergers. Obviously, there are some problems with the previous organizational line. In fact, this is also confirmed by the self-criticism of the MKP (2020s 3rd congress) that "violent means cannot be used to resolve ideological differences within the party in the future."

In addition, the author has always had this attitude: as an outsider, it is okay to analyze the facts and think what is right and wrong. However, I do not agree with casually "judging it as a reactionary line" and attacking the nature of a political party without fully understanding the facts. The correct conclusion about the nature, path, strategies and tactics of each country's revolution must ultimately be answered by the revolutionaries of that country's exploration during the revolution. This is also the reason why the Communist Party of India (Maoist) clearly rejected similar "centralized" international organizations when it proposed a new Marxist-Leninist-Maoist international organization. The position of TKP/ML (central committee) is also similar to that of the Communist Party of India (Maoist).

"Whether the political line is correct or not determines everything. Strong strength

cannot replace the correct line. If the line is correct, you will have everything; if the line is incorrect, you will lose the everything. The line is like the headrope, once the headrope of a fishing net is pulled out, all the others mesh open." At present, the global capitalist crisis is gradually deepening. Reactionary forces and far-right forces are rampant in various countries, while the revolutionary left-wing forces are still very weak. It is foreseeable that an era of great turmoil may have begun. It is worth pondering where people who truly pursue equal liberation should go. Here, the author also hopes that revolutionaries in Turkey who truly identify with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism can unite on the basis of a correct understanding of the nature of society, the united front, revolutionary strategy and other issues, and usher in a new climax of the revolution.