[From The Worker, #2, June 1996.]
Two-Line Struggle within the PCP
A vicious two line struggle raging within the Communist Party of Peru for some time now has drawn the attention of the revolutionaries the world over. As the PCP is a participating member of the RIM and the people's war led by it since 1981 on the basis of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is ahead of all the revolutionary movements going on in the present day world, a line struggle affecting the very continuation of this people's war and overtly being manipulated by the reactionary ruling classes of Peru and their chief external prop U.S. imperialism, should naturally be a subject of serious concern for all Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionaries and particularly those affiliated to the RIM.
It is already well recorded that Com. Gonzalo, Chairman of the PCP, was captured by the reactionary Fujimori regime at the height of the people's war in September 1992. After one year, i.e. in October 1993, while Com. Gonzalo was kept in strict solitary confinement, Fujimori made a dramatic claim that there was a proposal from Com. Gonzalo for a peace accord with the reactionary regime. The CC of the PCP quickly denounced it as a total fabrication and a hoax, and hence nobody took Fujimori's claim with seriousness. However, when a group of incarcerated PCP leaders came out with a similar proposal of peace accord and claimed Com. Gonzalo's concurrence with it, while Com. Gonzalo was still kept incommunicado, the matter assumed serious proportions. Meanwhile the group of jailed leaders made their proposal public through the document "Take up and fight for the New decision and the New definition" (or Asumir in Spanish) and forwarded a "11-point proposal" outlining their terms and conditions for the peace negotiation, and a public debate ensued over the issue. As the PCP CC and the Committee of the RIM have already condemned the line and proposal of this peace negotiation as a right opportunist line and capitulationist proposal, it has become easier for all the revolutionary forces to take a clear position on the issue.
Revolutionary communists do not negate peace negotiations or compromises per se. The changes in objective situation, the twists and turns of the revolutionary struggle, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the opposing camps, etc. may necessitate the changes in the strategy and tactics of the Party. The examples of the oft-cited Brest-Litovsk treaty with the German imperialists by the Russian communists, or the Chungking negotiations with Chiang Kai-she by the Chinese communists, or the famous Long March, are there for all to see. But the revolutionary communists always negotiate for peace, or compromise with the opposing camp, or make a temporary retreat, to enhance the prospects of ultimate seizure of power for the proletariat, or without reneging with the basic interests of the people. But the case with advocates of the peace accord in the PCP seems to be just the opposite. Their "11-point proposal" for peace negotiation makes it crystal clear that they want to disband the revolutionary army, dismantle the revolutionary base areas and return to the position of 1980 (i.e. before the initiation of the people's war) leaving the masses of the people at the mercy of the fascist rulers, just for the release of some people in jails. This is a clear case of abject surrender and cowardly capitulation, and no 'peace negotiation'! Their vain arguments of change in the objective situation in the form of viability of the bureaucrat capital, (as if the character of imperialism and bureaucrat capitalism underwent a sudden change after 19921) etc., and in the subjective situation in the form of 'lack of leadership' to lead the war (as if the CC leading the war successfully so far does not exist!), do not cut any ice either with logic or truth and sound mere apologies for surrender. Also their proposal to wind up the war (not a temporary cease-fire or a retreat from specific areas!) and start it from the scratch in the distant future goes against the basic Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theory of people's war, which cannot be developed to a victorious conclusion by just turning it on and off at will. In this context, detailed critiques by the Committee of the RIM and the Union of Communists of Iran (Sarbedaran) (See, A World to Win, No. 21 ) deserve perusal by all.
Though ordinarily questions of two-line struggle within a given Party should be best left to be resolved by the concerned Party, the revolutionaries cannot remain a silent spectator when the struggle centers around broader ideological and political questions with universal implications like this one. For the Nepalese revolutionaries who have recently embarked upon the path of the people's war the experiences of the PCP on such questions would have a direct bearing and added significance. In this context the recent Peru campaign launched in different metropolitan cities of India, including Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Ludhiana etc., in which revolutionary intellectuals like Raymond Lotta from U.S.A., Hisila Yami from Nepal and others gave a discourse on the two-line struggle within the PCP and demanded the breaking of isolation of Com. Gonzalo could not have been more timely.