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
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far east Reporter

Some
Background
On

UNITED STATES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA MAPHILINDO



Introduction

The South East Asian peoples, newly emerged from colonial rule, are in the process of building their new societies. In this early period of their independence and their development as modern nations they are now being subjected to neo-colonialism - that is, to the attempt of the highly developed nations of the so-called "free world" to maintain their economic, political and military privileges in the area.

The American press reports South East Asian popular and sometimes governmental anti-American actions; but the facts behind these expressions of resistance to economic, military and political intrusion on the part of the United States and Britain into their affairs and into their area are not made clear to American newspaper readers.

FAR EAST REPORTER herewith makes available to its readers this reprint of an article, "Maphilindo: Afro-Asian or Anglo-American?". This article by the editor of the Philippine publication, Progressive Review, presents some of the pertinent facts which must be taken into account in any attempt to understand the growing hostility to United States and British policies in South East Asia.

To help clarify this presentation FAR EAST REPORTER adds explanation of some of the terms in the article:

- "Maphilindo": the name of the proposed loose federation of Malaysia, The Philippines, and Indonesia agreed upon in August 1963 by the leaders of the three countries. The subsequent dispute over Malaysia ended for the time being any move to bring the federation into being.
- "Manila Summit": a meeting of the leaders of the three countries in August 1963.
- "Agreements of the Manila Summit": see page two for the program.
- "Afro-Asian Ministers Preparatory Meeting for the Second Bandung": held in Jakarta April 1964.
- "Bandung": the April 1959 Conference of 29 Asian and African countries in Bandung, Indonesia.
- "SEATO": the South East Asia Treaty Organization initiated by Mr. Dulles; formed September 8, 1954 as an anti-Communist pact. Its members are the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, The Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand.
- "Tokyo Summit": a meeting of the leaders of the three countries in Tokyo, Japan in June 1964.
- "Four Nation Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission": a proposal to establish this Commission was agreed to by the leaders of the three countries at the Tokyo Summit meeting in June 1964; the Commission was to work for peace between Indonesia and Malaysia.
- "UN Survey Commission": a commission sent by the United Nations in September 1963 to North Borneo, at the request of the three countries, to determine whether plebescites favoring the Malaysia merger correctly represented the views of the inhabitants. The mission reported that they did. The Malaysia Federation was proclaimed two days later.
- "Malaysia": a new nation formed September 16th 1963 from the former British colonies of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabat (formerly North Borneo).
- "Kennedy": Attorney General Robert Kennedy was sent to South East Asia in January 1964 to try to settle the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia.
- "Thailand": Kennedy arranged for a February 1964 conference in Thailand for the Foreign Ministers of the three countries to discuss a settlement of the dispute over Malaysia and prepare for the Tokyo Summit meeting of June 1964.
- "Kalimantan": Indonesian name for Borneo.
- "Kalimantan Utara": Northern Borneo.
- "Moshi": an African-Asian conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, in February 1963.

Jose Ma. Sison **MAPHILINDO: AFRO-ASIAN OR ANGLO-AMERICAN?**

AS THE CONCEPT of Maphilindo remains unrealized and plagued with the non-fulfillment and violations of the Agreements of the Manila Summit, it opens itself to two major approaches: the Afro-Asian and the Anglo-American.

These two categorical and contrastive approaches have been highlighted by the simultaneous holding of the Afro-Asian Ministers' Preparatory Meeting for the Second Bandung and the SEATO Military Advisers' and Ministers' Conference in Jakarta and Manila, respectively.

To Philippine observers particularly, these two major conferences have stressed the possibilities of development for Maphilindo and exposed the forces operative behind and within each prospective nation-participant of Maphilindo.

That Maphilindo should either be Afro-Asian or Anglo-American in direction has been indicated beyond doubt by the agreement of the Tokyo Summit, upon the proposal of the Philippines, to create the four-nation Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission to deal with the questions and differences between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

That the conciliation commission should be called Afro-Asian betrays an attempt to give the impression that it is free from the influence of the old-established forces, particularly the Anglo-American power. Thus, the decisions of the commission would be more acceptable even if in reality the main driving forces behind it are Anglo-American.

The Afro-Asian Approach

From the Afro-Asian point of view, Maphilindo may be an anti-imperialist instrument within the Afro-Asian framework. This involves fulfillment of the most significant terms of the Manila Agreements, approved by Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, such as the self-determination of the peoples of Kalimantan Utara, the ending of exploitation of man by man and of one nation by another, the common struggle against colonialism and imperialism, the prohibition against further extension of foreign military installations, and abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.

The terms of the Manila Agreements, if they are really to be followed in line with the Spirit of Bandung, would certainly undermine British and American neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia and the whole of Asia. The American military bases in the Philippines, the British Unified Military Command covering Malaysia and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) are directly criticized under these terms.

Under the same terms, an honest referendum would have prevented the formation of Malaysia. As it has been deviously rammed through, Malaysia remains in the Afro-Asian view a British-concocted and American-supported neo-colonialist project. This view has been manifested in the decision of the Afro-Asian ministers in Djakarta to put off discussion of Malaysian attendance in the Second Bandung Conference. Full acceptance of Malaysia is still difficult in spite of the full-scale attempt of India and other-Afro-Asian members of the British Commonwealth to make it possible.

The Afro-Asian point of view recognizes that while Maphilindo is not yet realized and Malaysia remains the serious neo-colonialist pro-

blem that it is, the spirit of anti-imperialism might gain enough time to reach the highest level in Indonesia and to make a clear breakthrough in the traditionally American-linging Philippines.

For, after all, the revival of Maphilindo, if it should be justifiably effected, can only be based on the full implementation of the Manila Agreements, whose terms are definitely directed against the interferences of imperialist powers in the region of Maphilindo. The genuine Afro-Asian approach, which is basically anti-imperialist, repudiates the Anglo-American approach.

The possibility of an anti-imperialist breakthrough in the Philippines and the possible doom of Western imperialism in Southeast Asia are prodded by the rise of internal revolutionary forces in Malaysia, the anti-imperialist unity and militance of the Indonesian people and the impending downfall of American power in Indochina.

To encourage the current revolutionary trend in Southeast Asia is perfectly Afro-Asian and anti-imperialist, in accordance with the Spirit of Bandung. It is, therefore, disconcerting that a so-called Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission, with the objective of dampening that trend through conciliation between an anti-imperialist Indonesia and neo-colonialist Malaysia, be created. It is extremely perplexing for Indonesian President Sukarno to let Indonesia be a party to an arrangement where the client-nations of both Great Britain and the United States have the majority voice.

Any tested revolutionary would realize that, under such an arrangement, a genuine implementation of the Manila Agreements is no longer possible through negotiation. The concept of conciliation can only maximize the recognition of Malaysia and minimize the prestige of internal revolutionary forces in Malaysia.

The Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission is obviously an improvement of the U.N. Survey Commission, led by the American Michelmore, which merely attempted to legalize the iniquitous formation of Malaysia. Not only an improvement. First, it was a survey commission and it really performed a survey. Now, it is a conciliation commission, so, it will perform conciliation work. From U.N. survey to Afro-Asian conciliation within less than a year: that is the achievement of the Tokyo Summit. The success of the summit lies in achieving this clever progression of the Anglo-American approach.

The Anglo-American Approach

From an integrated Anglo-American point of view, Maphilindo—even as a concept by which negotiations are made—is already an instrument to fulfill a certain set of Anglo-American purposes; namely:

1. to gain eventual acceptance for Malaysia through steady Philippine pressures on Indonesia;
2. to trap Indonesia between two Anglo-American client-nations;
3. to place Maphilindo more effectively under the SEATO shield;
4. to contain the French drive to return to Southeast Asia; and
5. principally to make the Maphilindo consolidated as a barrier against Communist China.

The Anglo-American point of view recognizes that an immediate revival of Maphilindo would lead to the fulfillment of the above purposes.

The British and the Americans are acutely afraid of the Indonesian nationalization movement, particularly the current take-over of British enterprises. The Americans are also wary of growing anti-imperialism even in the Philippines stimulated by the continuing crisis of Malaysia and the American failures in Indochina.

The Anglo-Americans readily recognize their advantage in the immediate majority and present character of their two client-nations, the Philippines and Malaysia. They take advantage of the Maphilindo framework to trap and neutralize Indonesia right away. Just to make sure that a Philippine-Malaysian squeeze-play is successful, Thailand — a SEATO and ASA constituent — has been brought into the picture as another "peacemaker", side by side with the Philippines and the United States.

What may become the most effective Anglo-American instrument is the so-called Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission, which would certainly be determined by a Philippine-Malaysian majority. Simple arithmetic shows that the terms of creating the four-nation commission will not only yield two but three member-conciliators of Anglo-American persuasion. The basic pattern of choice would be for Malaysia to choose one nation from the British Commonwealth, the Philippines from the American share of the "free world" and Indonesia from the non-aligned group. The fourth nation would certainly be of Anglo-American persuasion. A variation to the pattern may be worked out but the result would be inevitably Anglo-American.

With the creation of this so-called Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission, two neo-colonialist trends are evident: one is conciliation which elevates Malaysia to the level of recognition and co-equality in effect; and another is the amelioration of Malaysia as a bona fide member of the Afro-Asian community, even after Malaysia has received the severest condemnation in the Afro-Asian solidarity conference in Moshi and in the Afro-Asian journalists, workers, filmworkers and youth conferences in Djakarta.

The integrated Anglo-American view has become more dominant than any separate British or American view. This is well manifested by the easy entry of the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean and the joint Anglo-American motions on Malaysia in the last SEATO Conference. The British cannot afford to stay away from the American side as its enterprises and estates are being confiscated by Indonesian industrial and agricultural workers and as they need more military assurance of the kind the U.S. is willing to give against national revolutionary forces.

The Philippine-American Combination

The Philippine-American combination within the Anglo-American design is a powerful sub-factor, even more powerful than the Anglo-Malaysian sub-factor. The U.S. intends to use Philippine subsidiaries as channel for trade expansion, for stabilizing American holdings, for strengthening the capitalist bureaucrats in Indonesia and for staving off the rising demands of the Indonesian workers and peasants.

President Macapagal let the tiger out of the sack when he declared for the first time in Tokyo the real and long-range purpose of his mediation work:

"...it is my hope—and many of my countrymen share this hope—that upon the honorable settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, Indonesia could receive the collaboration of the United States, Japan and other freedom-loving and capable countries in the Indonesian endeavor to develop its rich resources..."

In euphemistic terms, President Macapagal has revealed the American scheme of using the Philippines as a bridgehead for the continued

and expanded exploitation of Indonesia by the "free world". The abortive attempt to trap Indonesia into the ASA is now being repeated in the Maphilindo with greater possibility of success. Current pronouncements of U.S. State Department officials on the key position of Indonesia and the need for economic integration in the area support this contention.

The most vicious of the Philippine-American scheme is to make the Philippines, under the cover of an Asian Monroe Doctrine, a channel of American intervention in Indonesia in fields other than economic, and to involve Indonesia consequently into an anti-communist and anti-China crusade.

In unmistakable terms, President Macapagal has divulged:

"...a strong Indonesia, in concert with other free powers in the Pacific region like the United States would be of advantage... because then Indonesia would be a formidable obstacle to the adventurism or expansionism of Mainland China. To speak in blunt terms... Indonesia with the support of the free nations in the area could be an effective deterrent and barricade against China's expansionism."

President Macapagal has lately re-interpreted the Macapagal-Sukarno Doctrine of "Asians solving Asian problems in the Asian way" as an Asian Monroe Doctrine. The application of this Monroe Doctrine has long been made before its pronouncement, when American planes flew and American guns were supplied from the Philippines and British weapons were supplied from Malaya to the Indonesian rebels of 1958. Now, that the Seventh Fleet is happily installed in the Indonesian Ocean, it should be easier to apply this doctrine.

The economic and military foresight of President Macapagal has certainly encouraged him to presume to speak for Indonesia and the Indonesian people in the following manner, "It is . . . my strong belief that it is . . . in the interest of Indonesia itself that it settle in an honorable way its differences with Malaysia and adopt a course of peace in order to undertake the indispensable task of developing its fabulously rich natural resources, thereby strengthening itself and its people economically."

The British tolerate the American scheme insofar as the common target is Indonesia. As long as the stress is still on Indonesia, the British seem to forget the possibility of Philippine-American infiltration into Malaysia — a possibility already marked by the Philippine claim over North Borneo and the cunning American entry into the Indonesian (Indian) Ocean.

Indonesian Policy

At the moment, the official Indonesian policy in Southeast Asia is pro-Philippine and anti-Malaysian. Indonesia, while pursuing a policy of confrontation against neo-colonialist Malaysia, has shown extraordinary sympathy for the Philippines as a client-nation of the U.S. which is lately striving to assert its independence.

For quite sometime, this policy has been yielding positive returns such as the progressive, anti-imperialist clauses of the Manila Agreements, the evolution of the Macapagal-Sukarno Doctrine which states that Asian solutions be given to Asian problems, but which has lately been given a military interpretation as the Asian Monroe-Doctrine, and Philippine participation in Afro-Asian conferences, spearheaded by Indonesia, on the level of mass organizations and government.

However, the cost for Indonesia in making possible these positive aspects in Philippine-Indonesian relations is its commitment to the establishment of Maphilindo and the granting of too much favorable con-

sideration for the opportunism of the Philippines in its attempt to build up Maphilindo and settle its North Borneo claim in any possible way, including total alliance with neo-colonialist Malaysia. The opportunism of the Philippines has gone a long way in influencing Indonesian policy, as evidenced by Indonesia's delay in recognizing the nationalist Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara.

The most definite mark of opportunism is the susceptibility to negotiations and the presumption that the negotiators could succeed to settle the basic political problems even above the internal revolutionary forces already in operation in Malaysia. The effect of this addiction to negotiations has been only to invite more imperialist pressure on every party of the negotiation. The "peacemaking" mission of Robert F. Kennedy to Southeast Asia has already shown up the real promoter of negotiations, which only make the Malaysia problem look like an inter-state border question that can be resolved through ceasefire and mopping-up operations conducted and supervised by another external force, Thailand, a SEATO component.

There is sufficient ground for the opportunist line to prosper in Indonesia inspite of President Sukarno's tough talk against Malaysia, Britain, Australia and the United States and inspite of his open advocacy of breaking up Malaysia into Sabah, Brunei, Sarawak, Singapore and Malaya.

There is also sufficient ground for an adventurist line to prosper. As a matter of fact, some adventurist leaders have begun to boast more that they have sent in regular Indonesian troops to liberate Kalimantan Utara and are not humble enough to say that these are volunteers who go in to support the basic liberating forces composed of Kalimantan Utara patriots.

What is common between those who pursue the opportunist and adventurist lines is that they have been only inviting imperialist intervention. The opportunists invite imperialist intervention to the table and the adventurists invite the same to the jungle in the guise of ceasefire overseers. Both only help support the propaganda assertion of the Imperialists that the Malaysia problem is an inter-state question between Indonesia and Malaysia.

One other common characteristic between the opportunists and adventurists in Indonesia is that while they talk tough of going over the Malaysian border they refuse or hesitate to undertake the most effective act of confrontation within their own national territory, that is, the take-over and socialization of British property as demanded by the Indonesian masses to crush Malaysia.

There are, however, those who pursue the revolutionary line of confronting and defeating Malaysian (which is British) power within Indonesian territory itself through civil (workers') confiscation of British enterprises, and of extending material and moral support to the national forces of Azahari in Kalimantan Utara, of recognizing that these are the basic liberating forces and of pressing for Indonesian recognition of the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara.

It is expected that the revolutionary line maintained by the Indonesia masses would ultimately triumph over the bureaucratic concept of conciliation. The ascertainment of the will of the people of Kalimantan Utara can no longer be achieved except through their own mass and revolutionary actions

The Philippines: The Peacemaker

The Philippine government position on Maphilindo and Malaysia is one of opportunism. Its opportunism appears to be based on its

North Borneo claim. Its opportunism consists in claiming sovereignty over North Borneo and, at various times, asking for another referendum, opening itself to an acceptance of a new national state which includes North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, of negotiating in secret with pro-SEATO splitters within the national unitary movement of Kalimantan Utara, and of wishing to settle the matter with Malaysia in or out of the International Court of Justice. None can imagine a more chameleonic opportunism.

But what has come out to be its most consistent line is peacemaking. The Philippines is a peacemaker as much the U.S. is also a peacemaker. Thailand is also a peacemaker. The British and the Malaysians are also peacemakers by killing off those who make trouble—the patriotic citizens of Kalimantan Utara. The SEATO, in effect, is already in the game as peacemaker.

The opportunist line pursued by Foreign Affairs Secretary Salvador P. Lopez, stating that the Philippines is neither for Indonesia nor Malaysia alone but for Maphilindo, has logically deteriorated into an unmitigated pseudo-peacemaking posture. The failure to describe Malaysia strongly as neo-colonialist from the very beginning has allowed pro-Western leaders like Emmanuel Pelaez and Senator Raul Manglapuz to call for making the declaration "positive", that is to say, the Philippines should be for both Indonesia and Malaysia, in the interest of Maphilindo.

In the Philippines, the revolutionary line of supporting the freedom fighters of Kalimantan Utara has not prospered even only to the extent of counter-vailing the Anglo-American press and lobby. The promise of labor leaders to send volunteers of Kalimantan Utara has not developed beyond one press conference. The series of student demonstrations against Malaysia and pro-Malaysian American pressure has not been followed up by appropriate official action or by other sections of the population.

Even the adventurist line of the family of the Sultan of Sulu of raising its own forces to fight for its feudal claim of ownership over North Borneo seems stunted by its opportunist expectations that the Philippine government would succeed in realizing the claim through negotiation or international arbitration.

Meanwhile, the Philippine government position has gone worse and worse. The Philippine government is now on the verge of recognizing Malaysia even without any foreseeable settlement of the North Borneo claim. Consular relations between the Philippines and Malaysia are now established. The Philippines is now leading off Indonesia to recognize Malaysia. And, President Macapagal has announced that it is only a matter of time that Malaysia is recognized and that the very purpose of summit talks is to make Indonesia accept and recognize Malaysia.

Malaysian Calculations

Among the three prospective Maphilindo partners, Malaysia has remained steadfast and non-opportunistic in its British-inspired expansionist selfishness.

It has been its consistent tactic of giving in to any proposal for a ministerial conference or summit, done in the name of Maphilindo, only after inflicting the most vitriolic attacks against Indonesia calculated to soften up indirectly the anti-Malaysia tendency in the Philippines. This Malaysian tactic doubles up the continuous pro-Malaysia pressures made by the American press agencies and Filipino agents of imperialism.

While being genuinely harassed and frightened by a gigantic Indonesian policy of confrontation, already implemented in the \$200 million Indonesian trade shift from Singapore to Philippine ports, in the call-up of 21 million Indonesian volunteers against Malaysia and in the official dispatch of Indonesian volunteers to Kalimantan Utara under Pres. Sukarno's "Command of Action," Malaysia has been capable of bluff and bluster principally on the basis of Anglo-American and Australian support and the expectation that the Macapagal administration, faced with an indecisive picture of the 1965 presidential elections, would continue to be the subject of Anglo-American guidance within the framework of the "free world".

The establishment of consular relations between the Philippines and Malaysia, the removal of Foreign Secretary Lopez, who sees eye to eye with Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio and President Macapagal's announcement of Philippine recognition for Malaysia in the offing and of Philippine pressure on Indonesia to recognize Malaysia have dealt a severe blow to the idea of close anti-imperialist and progressive collaboration between Indonesia and the Philippines.

The calculations of Malaysia have been well made even as the harsh mannerisms of the Tungku look haphazard.

Now, that the Philippines has moved towards a basic change of policy towards Malaysia, Malaysia and the British are becoming too friendly in their actuations to the Philippines in order to hasten the change.

The only considerable danger that Malaysia faces now, aside from a continuity of the Indonesian policy of confrontation, is the growing strength of internal armed anti-Malaysia forces in Kalimantan Utara and Singapore. The British and Malaysian press continue to report a growing number of attacks against government forces by "Indonesian agents" and "Indonesian regular troops."

The British Dilemma

The British share with their puppet, Malaysia, the apprehension that the fast growth of internal revolutionary forces will drain up their strength and will eventually crack up Malaysia. They are more afraid of this development than the Indonesian external policy of confrontation, which is as dangerous to them as it is useful for their scapegoat. While Anglo-Malayan and American propaganda keeps referring to Kalimantan Utara freedom-fighters as Indonesian border-violators, the freedom-fighters are increasing and becoming bolder in their guerrilla operations

The eventuality of an internal break-up, favored by the interstate confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, is worrying the British to death, to such an extent that they might be keeping in reserve now the wildcat proposal of the Americans of creating five puppet states out of Malaysia if worse comes to worse.

The Americans, advising the British, are typically concerned that a revolutionized Kalimantan Utara might come under a doubtful leadership, a thoroughly anti-imperialist leadership, and that leaving Singapore to the old Federation of Malaya would be as dangerous. For, was not the Federation of Malaysia formed for anti-communist reasons?

The Americans favor as a last resort the squeeze-in of Indonesia not only by two client-nations but with seven, the Philippines, North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, Singapore and Malaysia, as "free" states all within Maphilindo. The Americans are too confident that Indonesia can no longer back out of its commitment to the realization of Maphilindo

The British, in spite of their assertions at home of independence from the Americans, have no choice but to tag along with the Americans.