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The death of
Veerappan on 18 October says many things.
The circumstances in
which he died point to the fact that it was not a real but a stage-managed
encounter. As the Jayalalitha and Dharam Singh governments answer and dodge
probing questions, it will become increasingly clear that the encounter was a
murky affair.
Ruling class sections
and top police brass wanted him dead than alive. If Veerappan was alive and
provided a fair trial he would have continued to threaten top politicians and
senior bureaucrats of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. By killing him, these utterly
corrupt and criminal elements, have saved their skin. The ruling classes of the
two states have preferred a visibly fishy operation to eliminate him rather than
face the embarrassment of a live Veerappan spilling the beans by addressing the
people from a courtroom pulpit.
The suspicious
encounter of Paparapatti in Dharmapuri, TN, tells that police are not bound by
law. They are a law unto themselves. And, the more specialised a police force
gets, the more it integrates with the top political leadership and the more
brutal and murderous it can get in the elimination of its adversaries.
This is the most
apparent and immediate fact that emerges from the so-called Veerappan encounter.
But that is not all.
The death of
Veerappan and his leading associates has other serious implications too.
Veerappan operated in
expansive jungle terrain. He compelled the Karnataka and TN state governments to
allocate up to 4,000 police forces during peak periods and a regular combined
force of about 2,000 during periods of "normality" in operations to eliminate
him. The Karnataka Special Task Force (STF) of more than 1,000 personnel was
trained and formed in the course of the state government’s armed operations
against him. All police reports and the versions of those kidnapped and released
by him establish that he adopted a guerrilla mode for his sustenance. Hence the
most important instruction for the Karnataka government in the two decades of
anti-Veerappan operations has been the experience it has provided the STF in
specialising in counter-guerrilla operations in a vast jungle terrain.
A part of the new
Rapid Action Force (RAF) to take on Maoist revolutionaries in the Malnad has
been formed with handpicked personnel who have also had anti-Veerappan field
experience. This is an advantage for the enemy.
In 2001 the CPI
(Maoist) [formerly CPI (ML) (People’s War)] commenced its activity in the
Perspective Area (PA) by organising the peasantry on their social, economic and
political demands. The state government was pressed by the need to concentrate
its forces in two different forest pockets separated mutually by a distance of
about 300 kms. This was an additional strain on the police. The presence of
Veerappan served the objective division of the state government’s specialised
forces and was in this sense advantageous to revolutionaries. But with the
elimination of Veerappan and the subsequent withdrawal of STF from south Malnad
now, the state government has the advantage of concentrating its special forces
in one pocket.
The inability of the
state government to capture or kill Veerappan led it to making a deal with the
murderous Israeli secret service agency Mossad in 2003. Like its counterparts in
Andhra Pradesh, the Karnataka government will continue to develop closer
counter-revolutionary links with the Israeli state in the days to come to deal
with the revolutionary struggle and any popular democratic movement.
The death of
Veerappan therefore broadens the smile of Chief Minister Dharam Singh. He and
the police coterie at the top are doubly happy. With Veerappan gone, they
presume they can eliminate the Maoist revolutionary movement much sooner than
they envisaged.
Despite some apparent
advantages for the government, a correct reading of the Veerappan experience
will prove that the reality can continue to be disturbing for the enemy.
Veerappan relied on
the support of a narrow section of people. But CPI (Maoist) revolutionaries rely
on the broad masses of the people. Despite certain similarities in the mode of
guerrilla operations with Veerappan, guerrilla units of the PLGA (People’s
Liberation Guerrilla Army) differ widely from Veerappan since they rely entirely
on the masses. They organise them in struggles against the landlords and the
state on their social, economic and political demands. Maoists build mass
organisations, party units and militia units among the people. We educate and
train the people by continuously learning from their rich practice to undertake
the New Democratic Revolution. While Veerappan had no social mission, Maoist
guerrillas have lofty social objectives. We are guided by the revolutionary
ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and we imbue the people with revolutionary
politics and activise them in order that they realize and play their role as the
movers and makers of history. Revolutionaries grow from small to big and from
weak to strong as they engage the masses in the social struggle against
oppressors more and more. Advanced elements from the masses identify and join
the ranks of revolutionaries. This is very much unlike Veerappan who by himself
had no potential for growth.
Maoists imbed
themselves deep in the hearts of the masses. In this sense they are like fish in
water. Maoists mobilise the people to fight Hindu fascism, untouchability and
the hated caste system, against patriarchal oppression of women and for the
liberation of the oppressed nationalities. To undertake a counter-insurgency
operation against a Veerappan and against Maoist guerrilla units which rely on
the masses and mobilise them for the establishment of revolutionary political
power and a liberating democratic alternative are two entirely different
matters. This will be the first and foremost difference and the first and
foremost challenge before the armed forces of Dharam Singh. This is something
the Karnataka police will in future only hopelessly contend with.
Veerappan sustained
himself for two decades without a revolutionary mass base. He did so by not only
combating the 4,000 strong STF units of Karnataka and TN, he also overcame
simultaneous operations of the central para-military forces such as the BSF and
CRPF. In the course of his armed presence, he also effectively retaliated
against the central and state forces, while neutralising informers
intermittently. This is the biggest instruction to Maoist revolutionaries. If
Veerappan with all his characteristics, could manage to sustain himself for two
long decades, the armed forces of the CPI (Maoist) which has rich experience in
organising the people in class struggle and conducting guerrilla warfare from
the forests and plains of Dandakaranya, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkand or Bihar can
confidently surpass and overcome the advantages that have resulted for the enemy
from Veerappan’s death. Besides, Veerapan is just a local phenomena while the
Maoist armed struggles are part of not only an all-India movement, but and
international movement — getting all-India and international support.
The PA today covers
territory which is as vast as the area in which Veerappan operated. While it
took two state governments and a commitment of up to 4,000 forces to conduct
anti-Veerappan operations, the Karnataka state government has to now manage
comparable forces single handed to fight Maoist revolutionaries. This is an
obvious disadvantage for DGP Borkar’s police.
Though Veerappan
started off as a bandit, the fact that he fought and sustained himself against
the state for two long decades is instructive for Naxalite revolutionaries. The
brightest illustration of the Veerappan phenomenon, despite some immediate
advantages it poses to the Karnataka police, is the fact that a guerrilla mode
of existence can sustain a small and weak force against the might and the
thousands of highly trained and well equipped forces of the centre and the
states.
Veerappan was finally
killed not as an armed guerrilla in the jungle, of which he was master. He died
in terrain and conditions that were new and strange to him. In this sense though
Veerappan is dead, the mode of guerrilla existence which he introduced into the
annals of Karnataka’s current history is instructive and lives beyond him.
Gangadhar
For Karnataka State
Committee
Communist Party of
India (Maoist)
20 October 2004
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