Volume 2, No. 6-7, June-July 2001

While walking through the forests of NT, Com. Jampanna explained that, since 1995, 5 districts come under jurisdiction of the NTSZC (equivalent to a state committee, under the CC). These include Karimnagar and Adilabad, where the present movement was born; Warangal, which has given the PW a rich crop of cadres; and also Nizamabad and Khammam. The population of these five districts would be roughly 1.5 crore (15 million). At present, the organisation exists in about 50% of the rural areas of these districts, covering over 2,500 villages. Though there is support even from the rest of the area, due to insufficient forces, the organisation does not exist there. While a large part of Adilabad and Khammam is forest, the other three districts have about 35% forest cover.

Each of the 5 districts have District Committees (DCs), under which are the Area Committees (ACs). The ACs guide a network of Party cells in the villages.

Before 1995 the NT region was looked after by a regional committee under a AP State Committee (APSC). Due to the growth of the movement and the impossibility of looking after such a wide area, AP was split into two SCs with the formation of the NTSZC. Jampanna has himself worked from the grass roots since 1984, gradually taking greater responsibilities until becoming a member of the SC in 1993.

This region also includes the vast coal mine belt with over 1 lakh workers, organised into the SIKASA trade union. Earlier this belt had a separate DC, but due to the severe losses (of roughly 26 organisers/DCMs), it is now part of the Adilabad DC. Adilabad itself was part of Dandakaranya till 1995.

After the great Jagitial upsurge the movement spread like wild fire, in the early 1980s. The organisational form adopted initially was the armed 1+2 or 1+3 formations, with some small squad formations in the forests. The chief mass organisation formed in the region was the RYL (Radical Youth League) and not the peasant association. The reason for this was to draw a clear line of demarcation amongst the masses between the revolutionaries and the rightists/revisionists. In those days ‘Radicals’ was the popular name for the PW, while the peasant organisation already formed in the same region by the rightists (Janashakti) and revisionists (New Democracy) went under the name RCS (Ryotu Coolie Sangham).

In the 1985-87 repression campaign the Party was much depleted, the mass organisations smashed and recruitment stalled. Many areas of work were totally destroyed and some comrades retreated. Many in the area thought the PW was finished. But from 1987 the organisation began to recoup and actions were initiated on the police. People’s morale was slowly regained. 1989 saw the kidnap tactics being successfully used to get a number of senior leaders released.

Then came the gigantic upsurge of 1990. It began from those villages where the organisation existed, and spread throughout NT. It got further impetus due to the brief 9-month relaxation from repression. Many mass issues were taken up and thousands of acres of land were seized. Recruitment increased ten-fold in every district — varying from 100 to 300.

Then came the more severe repression of 1991. There were police firings on rallies and large numbers of youth were brutally tortured and killed. The Party and even the mass organisations were banned. Though the onslaught this time was far more severe than the 1985 attack, the people, on this occasion continued to support the PW. But again the PW lost the initiative to the enemy. Jampanna explained : "The reason being that during the upsurge there was some legalism and spontaneity. There were a lot of mass struggles and mass organisations but little concentration and consolidation into Party cells. Also there were not sufficient preparations for retaliation."

Yet, since 1993 the initiative was once again regained. The reason being that the subjective preparations improved. So, for example Party units (Squad Area Committees — SACs) were formed in squads, Party cells in the villages, and the mass organisations were rebuilt in a fully underground manner. Also the District Committees were much stronger than in 1991.

Though the level of repression took a quantum leap from 1996, and particularly from 1998, the organisation continued to grow, till mid-1999. In this period, the enemy enormously improved their weaponry, intelligence (informer network), training, communications and coordination, etc. There were severe losses of senior cadres.

Jampanna explained : "We did not understand the level and degree of sophistication reached by the enemy by 1998 and we had no proper tactics of retaliation. So by mid-1999, we lost the initiative, and have faced severe losses and even some surrenders. Some confidence has also been lost, particularly from the plain areas, where we have not been able to keep in regular touch with the people. But, this will be temporary. Once we take a counter-offensive, and explain the issues to the people, there will be a revival. Also, the problems have not been even. So, for example, in Karimnagar, there was a reversal between 1996 and 1998, but, since then recruitment increased. So also in Adilabad. The main drop has been in Warangal which has faced severe losses. Much of this was the result of our legalistic methods. Once we correct our mistakes, recovery can be quick. But, it will take a longer time in Nizamabad. Here, though there have also been big struggles, there was little politicisation, so recruitment was much less. Also, the surrenders of senior comrades have affected the morale of some cadres. Yet, even here the masses continue to have full faith in us; the problem is in our subjective forces. In Khammam there have not been serious ups and downs. Here growth, though steady, is slow, partly due to the long-time influence of the rightist and revisionist groups in this region. This area has been the main centre for Janashakti, New Democracy, etc." (See report on page 14)

Later, Com. Jampanna went on to give a more concrete picture of the fluctuations and growth of the various organisations involved.

First he explained the position of the Party. Between 1995 and mid-1999 the number of professional revolutionaries doubled. But, since then, not only has the growth stopped, there has been a temporary drop in numbers. Yet the political level of the Party has increased. In 1995 there were only a few SACs. That too, most were functioning around its secretary (also often the squad commander). Now, all Area Committees (SACs are now called ACs) are much strengthened with 3 to 5 members, most of whom are now active and capable.

The 1999 plenum decided to undertake a rectification campaign to root out shortcomings — such as liberalism, spontaneity, economism, subjectivism etc., in the Party. In accordance with the decision of that plenum, the late Com. Shyam, wrote an article on the manifestations of economism in the activities in NT. The rectification campaign was begun in three districts, but was later shelved after the Koyyuru ‘encounter’ (of the 3 CCMs) as the entire organisation was geared towards widespread retaliations. This was followed by preparations for the Congress. So, it is yet to be completed. Jampanna added that "spontaneity leads to routine type of work, no proper plan and without any focus on the central tasks. Besides, the lack of sufficient retaliation against the police offensive, has had a negative impact on people’s morale."

Then he recounted the situation in the military sphere. Between 1991 and today the total number of squads has grown nearly three-fold. Besides, since 1996, platoons are being formed which has helped develop the striking power of the Party. In addition to all this, each division now has a full-time cultural squad, and there are also a number of special women teams (with 4 to 6 members). The cultural squad concentrates not only on performances but also on training cultural activists throughout NT. The mahila teams focus on building the women’s organisations in the villages and drawing more and more women into the Party and PGA.

In the sphere of mass organisational activities, between 1980 and 1995 the main organisation, as already mentioned, was the RYL. The peasant organisation, RCS, was only formed in 1990; but much of it was smashed in the 1991-92 repression campaign. The 1995 conference decided to build the peasants organisation separately and restrict RYL to the youth. But, its name was changed to VRCS (Revolutionary RCS) to distinguish it from the revisionists.

Now the VRCS has also been built in a large number of villages, and comprises mostly of poor peasants, agricultural labourers and some middle peasants. There are very few rich peasants in the organisation. The caste composition is mainly adivasi, dalits and the backward castes. There is a decision to focus more on dalits and to also take up their specific issues linked to untouchability. To some extent, in a sporadic way, these have been done, and even community dinners have been organised to fight caste prejudices. Jampanna added that "interestingly the upper caste attendance at these functions were less. In fact we find a castiest approach most prevalent amongst upper caste women. Overall, though there is much scope for improvement, there has been good recruitment of dalits, even in the leadership of the Party and PGA."

Regarding the women’s organisation, a decision to form a separate VMS in the villages was only taken in 1990. But not much happened, as there was no focus. The VMS only began to grow after the Party formed Mahila Teams (a sort of mini-squad of women). As a result, between 1995 and today the number of VMS units have more than tripled.

Besides all this, the RYL continues to exist in most villages and comprise most of the militant youth of NT. Besides Radical Bal Sanghams (RBS) or children’s organisations are being developed in many villages.

NT became a Guerrilla Zone in the late 1980s. By then the authority of the landlords had been smashed and most had fled to the nearby towns. The more notorious had been annihilated. In the organisational areas of the PW about 5% to 10% of the landlords remain, but they do not assert much power. Most of the landlords’ land remains unoccupied, with no cultivation being done.... due to police terror at any such initiative. It is estimated that only with the development of the PW’s military strength and growth of the organs of power will the people have the confidence to occupy and cultivate this land.

Amongst the rich peasantry, one section supports the Party, while another section supports the ruling class parties. Though they do not oppose the Party openly, it is these rich peasants and upper-middle peasants who are most active during elections.

A section of the landless obtained land, while a section of the middle peasants had grown into rich peasants because of the developments in agriculture. All sections have gained due to the end of landlords’ authority.

In addition, since 1996-97, with the smashing of the landlords’ authority many villages have seen the growth of ‘Development Committees’ (VDCs), Forest Committees (for forest protection), Nyaya or Justice Committees and Education Committees. Though a decision has been taken to form the concrete alternative organs of power, there has been little development in this realm, due to lack of focus.

Simultaneous to the intense repression since 1996-98 the Naidu government has introduced a huge package of World Bank-funded rural reforms. This has been specifically targeted to wean away the masses from the PW. Repression and reforms are the twin weapons of the imperialist backed ruling class. The importance given to crushing the PW by the imperialists can well be understood from the fact that there is not a single top leader of the world who does not visit Hyderabad to encourage the butcher Chandrababu Naidu. Whether it is Clinton, Kofi Annan, Robin Cook, etc.... all have gone to pat their chief stooge on his back. According to Jampanna the reforms have had some impact on a small section of the village people. The reason being that the PW has not done sufficient to expose it. He adds "much more needs to be done. In fact there is need to increase the level of our political struggles as a whole."

The path of revolution is zig-zag. The movement is at the cross-roads. But Jampanna is confident that once the consciousness and involvement in the people’s war grows beyond the militants/activists to encompass the masses at large, and once the military offensive of the enemy is effectively countered, there will be once again big advances. 1990 witnessed a huge upsurge, it is hoped that the coming year will give birth to a qualitative leap in the level of struggle.

Question : We seem to have lost the initiative in our fight with the enemy ?

Prasad : For the present, that is true. Yet, this is not even everywhere. For example, in Warangal there is definitely some demoralisation. Basically we have been weak in countering the enemy offensive. So, we lost the initiative. Unfortunately the interest shown in taking up mass struggles is not seen in military matters. There needs to be a proper balance between the two, and the SZC must drive the organisation in that direction. Once we are able to resist the enemy it will raise people’s morale and demoralise them.

Question : But, in this resistance how will the masses be involved ?

Prasad : It is only by involving all, that we can make this a success. We have to draw the masses into the war. To increase people’s involvement does not necessarily mean involving them directly in actions, but in various aspects of the people’s war. Thereby we have to build their confidence in the people’s war. So far we have involved them on a wide scale in mass struggles, developmental programmes, etc., but not in the war. We have involved some, the militants, but not the masses in a big way. It is true that mass rallies against the enemy have been taken out, yet involvement in armed resistance has been limited.

Question : In India we have no long history of armed struggle. How can the masses be mobilised for war ?

Prasad : It is true we do not have the same traditions of armed struggle as, say China or the Philippines, but we can draw them in by explaining to them the need for armed struggle in a proper and effective way.

Question : If people’s consciousness has not developed for war will you be able to change people’s thinking by forming the PGA ?

Prasad : We have to show the people concretely that even though we have taken numerous partial struggles there has been no basic change. We have to show the people through their own experience that in some villages we have been working for 20 years taking up issues. There have been gains, but they have been limited. We can give examples. Then we must show that only by armed struggle there can be a basic change. So we have to explain to the people the importance of armed struggle, the need to build the PGA and the necessity of people’s power. We have to explain all this to the masses. We need to take the question of PGA formation, militia formation and armed struggle as a widespread campaign.

Let us take the situation in any particular village. A few months back we made an analysis of some villages. Take this example : Two decades back there were four big landlords in this village. Now they are like small landlords. Their old-type oppression is much reduced. Their power — political authority — is totally smashed. Also, a section of the middle peasants have now become rich peasants. The earlier ‘Saldars’ (bonded labourers) are now agricultural labourers (or poor peasants) as there is no big landlordism. If we concentrate on this section we can definitely draw them into the armed struggle. They constitute about 50% of the population. They get work only for six months — that too a major part is through the government’s reform programmes. If this is stopped the situation will be even worse.

In addition, today even the peasantry, including a section of the rich peasantry, are in severe crisis as they are in heavy debt and unable to get a remunerative price for the cash crops they now grow. Many are committing suicide. Their suffering has increased enormously since the last two to three years. So, they too can be drawn into the armed struggle.

In the villages landlordism has been smashed. But as we do not wield power, it is the ruling class parties that assert power. The objective factors exist for people’s power, but due to our weaknesses the ruling classes are using the situation to their advantage.

Now we will seize back the initiative by drawing the masses into the people’s war.

Question : The enemy seems to have an extensive informer network, which appears to be the main cause for ‘encounters’. How do you plan to counter this ?

Prasad : No doubt the enemy has its network; but, if we concentrate on this task we can identify it. As a rule, we try to isolate them in the villages through humiliation, beatings etc., and if incorrigible, even through punishments. But the most dangerous factor are those informers/betrayers who go and stay with the enemy. It is they who are building the network in the villages. So far we have totally failed in our ability to hit them.

Ofcourse, their network is not equally strong in all areas. It is particularly widespread in two districts, but less in the others.

Question : What happened in the rectification campaign initiated at the 1999 state plenum, which was attended by the now martyred CCM, Com. Shyam ?

Prasad : It has, to some extent, been carried out in Adilabad, Nizamabad and Karimnagar(West) but not in the other three districts. Where it was done there was a good impact. The SZC brought out a circular pin-pointing the main shortcomings. Its concrete manifestations were taken by the DCs, ACs and at the village level. Each AC took five villages as a test case. We went before the masses and criticised where we had gone wrong, and also asked the people to identify mistakes we had not noticed. The people were very happy. They said this should have been done earlier.

Though there is some demoralisation due to the big losses recently, the masses continue to have full faith in us. They openly say that we must get rid of our shortcomings. [Here Com. Sudhakar (SZC member) who was translating, intervened and added that one characteristics of NT, is that if we make mistakes the people at once point it out. They always raise questions that are on their mind.]

Question : What has been the impact of Naidu’s reform programme ?

Prasad : We failed to do a thorough analysis of the reforms — like who has actually benefited from it, which class has gained, etc. If we had done a proper study we could have done a more concrete and effective exposure. Because we did not do this properly, they could influence a section of the people. Yet the Janmabhoomi programme was exposed and widely boycotted in all areas we are working in, except Nizamabad.

Question : How can the PW fight such a powerful military force ?

Prasad : They are a mercenary force, we are a people’s force. They act for money, we act out of motivation. Their cause is unjust, ours is just. Yet, these generalities are not enough to win the war. There is need for greater politico-military understanding. The leadership must be given politico-military training. They must understand the relation between politics and military affairs.

Every fighter must have the class consciousness to fight for the seizure of political power. Without this consciousness, comrades in battle will think how to save their lives.

Besides, the commander must not just be the main fighter in the squad, but should be able to lead the entire team in battle. Only then it will have proper striking ability. The commander must train all members of his/her unit in effective battle. Ofcourse, in 1999-2000 we did take political and military classes before recruitment, but it is still insufficient.

Question : How do you face the problem of education?

Prasad : Literacy amongst our recruits is low, as most come from the basic classes. Most of the leadership is from the peasantry. Even those from student background are mostly those from village schools. So literacy levels at the time of recruitment are low — about 50% in Warangal and just 25% elsewhere.

In a squad one particular member is always allocated the role of teacher. Yet we lack proper teachers. There is a plan to train a set of teachers. There is need for education from the DC level downwards — both in general and in political education. We plan two classes of one month each for our senior cadres.

Question : Before we wind up, can you give a brief profile on how you got into this movement, and rose to become secretary of a whole region ?

Prasad : I joined the youth organisation in 1982. At around that time the Party had come to our village. Some senior comrades used to take shelter in our house. The JNM songs were most attractive and had much influence on me. With education from the Party my family life in poverty came before me, and I was able to understand its cause. First, I became a youth activist in the village. Then, I became secretary of the village party cell. In 1982 I joined a CO-team as a member. In 1984 I became a central organiser (CO); in 1988 a DC member; in 1990 DC secretary; in 1992 a Regional Committee member; in 1994 a State Committee member; and in April 2000 was made SZC secretary.

My father was a bonded labourer and in childhood we used to live and work on the landlord’s land. Earlier the family had 6 to 7 acres, but this was all taken over by the landlord. At the age of 21 my father migrated to a coal mining town and lived by cutting and selling bamboo. Later, he got a permanent job in the coal mines as a coal filler. He took loans at huge interest and bought 3 acres of land in the village. I first studied in Bellampalli town and then in the village.

Question : So how do you see the immediate future for the movement in NT ?

Prasad : I estimate, if we act according to our present plan, we will fully recover within one year. In Nizamabad, it may take a little longer. On the whole, we will regain the initiative—both politically and militarily. We will thereby be able to focus on building the new organs of power, strengthening the Guerrilla Zones and building Guerrilla Bases with the perspective of forming Base Areas.

Revisionist Politics at the Grass Roots
— A Case Study of Khammam

Khammam was a fortress of the CP Reddy party since the early seventies. When that party split in the mid 1980s it also became the main centre for the CPI(ML) New Democracy and the numerous splinters of the parent body (see chart on page 16). In 1985 the PW had a few CO centres in some towns and plain areas. But, in 1985 Com. Mahesh (the now martyred CCM) and many other leading comrades were arrested. Most work collapsed. The RSU unit became inactive. Only one squad continued led by Com. Venkanna. But in 1989 the house in which he and another comrade were staying was surrounded. A gun battle continued for hours. Finally both comrades were martyred and all work in this region came to an end.

In 1991 Com. Mahesh came out of jail and it was thought to enter this region from the Warangal border (Eturunagaram area). Work was restarted. Khammam was then within the NTFD (North Telangana Forest Division) and there was a plan to work in 4 taluks — roughly half the district. This forest region is neighbouring the Singareni coal mine belt. The areas entered were previously the strongholds of the Janashakti and Pratighatana, while the entire area was under the influence of New Democracy (ND). The ND, using their squads, vehemently opposed the PW’s attempt to enter this region.

The PW first spread in the Eturunagaram region and then in the Manugur area. This latter area was under the influence of the Pratighatana group and its popular leader, Com. Manganna. He had taken up numerous anti-landlord struggles, which resulted in serious differences with his leadership. Finally, he left and joined the PW with his entire squad. So, it became easy to spread to this region as well.

Regarding the ND (known as Prajapantha in AP) it initially took up some people’s issues, like podu cultivation, etc., to win over their confidence. But its method of work is similar to most of the ruling class parties, working through the rural elite, sarpanch etc. It built close links with the local gentry, money lenders and touts. These elements crept into their mass organisation, whose leadership was mostly in the hands of the rich peasants and local money lenders. Due to their hegemony in the area they would quietly siphon off government funds allocated to the gram panchayats/sarpanch. Then they would spend a small fraction of this on some developmental activities, and widely propagate it as the "party’s" welfare work.

When the PW entered the area, two issues were taken up : corruption and moneylending. As the local gentry and ND leaders (including squad commanders and DVC members) were deeply immersed in these evils they came into direct contradiction with the PW. For example, the issue of moneylending was to reduce interest rates. Many of the moneylenders were ND members.

The third issue taken up by the PW was the forest issue. The ND had never taken up this issue. In the very beginning they made some pretense of taking up the shifting cultivation issue, to make inroads into the area, but soon abandoned it. To fool the masses, just like any other parliamentary party, they would make a show of taking up people’s issues and then resort to all kinds of compromises, adjustments, etc.

Their main support came from the enemy classes. But they would adjust their class analysis to suit their political line. As Com. Sudarshan said "the moneylenders and gentry they categorised as middle class and called them friends of the revolution. In some areas of Illendu and Bayyaram, some party leaders have 60 to 70 acres, and they are categorised as rich peasants."

So, as the PW aroused the masses, the ND leaders began to get exposed. Previously, when the PW was small in the 1985-89 period their attacks on the PW were ferocious, who was on the defensive. Till 1989 they would even launch armed attacks on the PW. In the post 1991 period as the PW grew in strength their attacks reduced, but they resorted to vicious propaganda and even acted as informers. They began instigating the people to keep out the PW, saying that if the latter came there would be a lot of repression. Issues that they never took before, they would now propagate higher rates than put forth by the PW, but take no struggles for their realisation. Also when they did take up struggles they always retreated in the face of the police, while the masses saw the PW fighting back. So slowly the people were won over by the PW while the rural elite continued with the ND. In most villages in this region 2-3 ML parties have a presence even today. Generally, the youth and masses are with the PW, while the elders are with the others. While the PW cadres depend for their food from houses of the poor, the ND depends on the upper sections for their food. Clashes have stopped since the last decade.

Also in its functioning the ND is legalistic. All their committees are legal. Being legal they are pressurised by the police to inform about the PW. In their squads though some are permanent, the commanders themselves are semi-legal, keeping touch with their families. Within the forest too, they spend much time living lavishly with the gentry. During elections they become very active and their squads are used to threaten opposition candidates to force them to withdraw. Also during the tendu patta (bidi leaf picking) season they get active making deals with the contractors, and compromising the picking rates.

With the Janashakti and Pratighatana parties there have been less clashes. Also their structures are more illegal, though some of their top leaders are legal. But in the Manugur area there were some clashes with the Janashakti in 1993. Discussions were held and no incidents of firing have since occurred.

In the last two to three years of intense repression the Naidu government has targeted all groups and not only the PW (as earlier). But of all, the ND has been least hit. The Pratighatana and Janashakti have lost a large number of their leaders in attacks by the police. Even the Veeranna and Praja Pratighatana groups have lost their secretaries.

Today all continue to exist in the villages and the contradictions between the masses and the gentry get reflected in tensions between the PW and the ND. The latter protect the gentry and threaten the PW mass organisations. Sudarshan explained : "There is pressure on us to retaliate. Some times we call them before the people and expose, and even punish them. Some times the people gherao them. But there are no clashes, as our strength has increased; they only hope that the police repression will drive out the PW, giving them once again total control over their lost domain. They still have one MLA elected from the region, but they avoid campaigning in our strongholds where election boycott is propagated."

Over the years many from the Pratighatana, Janashakti and Veeranna units have joined the PW. All co-exist in the area and the masses are being won over by the genuine revolutionaries while the revisionists are getting more and more isolated. Also in the face of enemy attacks the real revolutionaries are able to sustain while others are being defeated.

The example of Khammam is an excellent lesson for the MCC (Maoist Communist Centre) in Bihar, where they demand distribution of territories and building of fiefdoms. If they are correct and really have the interests of the masses at heart why should they fear working in the same village with other revolutionary forces ? After all, it is the masses who will decide who is right and who is wrong. Khammam has proved this !

<Top>