Volume 2, No. 12, December 2001

 

A.P. Rectification Campaign

An Example to Emulate

— Ashok

{Based on an interview with the APSC secretary Com. Srinivas and APSC secretariat member, Com.Suryam.}

 

After traversing the South Telangana guerrilla zone for some days I was finally able to squeeze in some time between the numerous responsibilities occupying the attention of coms. Srinivas and Suryam. Therefore the interview had to be brief covering only the chief aspects of the rectification campaign (RC), without being able to go into its details. But it is precisely in the details that a full picture could emerge bringing out its living essence. Yet, this brief account gives a general idea how a RC, if conducted well, and not as a mere formality, can have an enormous effect on purifying the Party, reducing the influence of non-proletarian tendencies within it, assisting in the re-molding of its cadres, heightening the level of unity though out the rank-and-file, and further deepening the confidence of the masses in the Party.

Modest and unassuming, Coms. S & S recounted their experience of the RC held in 1999/2000 in all the then three regions under the jurisdiction of the then APSC (i.e. South Telangana, Rayalseema, and the AOB). Notwithstanding, its enormous impact, there was no sense of glorification in the comrades’ report, which was presented as just one necessary step in the onward march of the people’s war in A.P.

Com. Srinivas recollected that it was in early 1999 that a Plenum of the A.P. State Committee (APSC) decided on a rectification campaign to be taken throughout the Party. It was a time when, after two years of intense repression, the Party had faced large losses of entire squads, cadres and even leaders. To some extent the government had seized the initiative, the peoples’ morale was low, recruitment had dropped and the Party had been thrown onto the defensive. It was then that the APSC at its Plenum went into the causes of the problem. Besides, shortcomings in the sphere of military planning it pinpointed certain deviations in the Party, as one of the chief causes of the problems being faced. The chief weaknesses pinpointed at the Plenum that required rectification were: liberalism, spontaneity, subjectivism, economism and bureaucracy. These were decided to be investigated in nine different spheres of work. As Srinivas stated, "more than the enemy attack, it was these weakness that were acting as a big hurdle for the advancement of the movement. With our big losses the enemy forced us to think". The Plenum passed a resolution to conduct a RC on these major weaknesses.

First, the question arose as to how this campaign was to be conducted. There was only one earlier experience of a RC in 1985. Srinivas elaborated, "this campaign was only limited to Party circles, and had only a limited impact. There had been mistakes of mass organization leaders, commanders, etc in their relation with the masses, which had resulted in a gap being created between the people and the Party. But this problem was not addressed, as the RC was confined only to the Party. This was later sought to be tackled by the lower committees bringing out circulars. So, on this occasion it was decided that the RC itself would be taken deep among the masses".

It was the State Committee (SC), which then led the campaign. It was decided that the main focus of the campaign was to be education and rectification and punishments were to be meted out only in extreme cases. In reality, the punishments were very few. The SC decided on the study material needed for the campaign. It then disseminated throughout the Party relevant material by Lenin and Mao, PW articles and the State POR (Political Organisationsal Review). Two articles were printed in the SC organ, Red Flag, on liberalism and spontaneity. First the Regional Committees devoted some days for study. Then the Regional Committees and District Committees organised meetings for the Area Committees and PMs. After this the ACs conducted elaborate extended meetings to determine how these deviations are concretely manifested in their areas. They decided on which deviations to concentrate, where precisely they have made errors, on what the RC should be concentrated, and to what level and the villages where the rectification campaign should be focused. It was further discussed as to how these 5 deviations were reflected over the past two years in: mass struggles, in dispute settlement, in relations with the masses, in relations with other classes and in relations with the enemy. So, for example, it was discussed whether contradictions amongst the people were correctly resolved; were there any excesses while meting out punishments; were there liberalism in tech methods and financial expenditures; was proper class analysis done in the villages; which classes dominated the mass organization leadership; were we really depending on the poor and middle-classes; etc.

Also, the question of a proper class approach was discussed at length. As Srinivas explained " even if our general approach was correct, the question is what type of struggles were we taking? Were they issues of the middle-classes or the poor classes? This would reflect in whose interest we actually stand for, and whether the poorer class were being given a middle class approach".

After such detailed assessments within the ACs the mistakes and the campaign was carried to 100 key villages throughout the three regions of A.P. involving thousands of people. The impact of the RC had an electrifying impact on the entire region and spread far beyond the 100 villages. All mistakes made by individual comrades and committees were openly accepted before the masses. The people were invited to point out any others they felt existed which had not been assessed by the Party. In many places they too put forward criticisms. So, for example, if a mistake was made by the leadership of the mass organization it was put before that mass organization; if it entailed the mishandling of contradictions amongst the people, the forms of bureaucracy and their manifestation were explained; etc. etc. The people were astounded by the modesty in approach of cadres whom they had only looked up to as leaders. The gap that had grown in the earlier period was, not only filled, the bond was cemented even further.

As the campaign picked up momentum it gained the nature of a mass movement. All were talking about it; songs on the deviations were being performed in the villages; hilarious street plays were being performed on these deviations; short stories were being written; and even the mass media picked it up with feature pieces being written in the daily papers. Though there were some hurdles in conducting the campaign due to the intense repression going on in the region, which made mass contact sometimes difficult, and delayed the process, the entire campaign was completed in 4 to 6 months.

The RC had a tremendous impact and achieved a number of results. First, some gap that had arisen between the Party and a section of the masses, due to mistakes committed, got filled. Second, due to the wide education campaign, every PM developed an approach to understand non-proletarian trends in themselves and the Party. This consciousness helped heighten the unity of thought amongst the rank-and-file of the Party. Also, the rank-and-file developed a confidence, that if we correct ourselves the people will own the Party. Third, it helped win back a section of the intellectuals who had fallen prey to bourgeois propaganda that magnified our mistakes and widely propagated it in the press. The campaign was such a resounding success that it led to a vast leap in the recruitment to the Party. When this was followed by a successful military campaign, the confidence was further strengthened.

The impact of the RC campaign can well be assessed by the fact that it threw the enemy forces into a panic. The police forces were so affected that they began their own rectification campaign. They began going among the people saying that some of their ‘encounter’ killings were incorrect, while others were correct. They were desperate to try and counter the enormous impact of the Party’s RC.

After the RC was completed a thorough assessment was done, conclusions were drawn and the entire Party educated with the results. First, each DC (District Committee) issued a detailed circular elaborating on: how the RC was conducted, what were the major deviations, what was the basis for these deviations, what lessons can be drawn — and framed guidelines as to how not to repeat those mistakes. After that the Regional Committees did an overall review of their region and sent out circulars. Finally, the State committee made a thorough review of the shortcomings of the RC and how to improve it in the future. For example, it said that the period of the campaign, which was fixed for 4 months, was too short and should have been at least six months. Also it was felt that there was lack of uniformity in the process of conducting it. The process started from down upwards. This should have been reversed and then the process could have been given more uniformity by the SC. It should have been called an ‘education and rectification campaign’ to give more emphasis on education. It also said that: the theoretical and ideological preparations for the campaign should have been better; that there was not sufficient clarity on the nature of the deviations identified; and that there must also be a direction for the discussions in the Party, and the RC amongst the masses should not drag. These, and many more, were the assessments of the SC on how to improve the campaign in the future.

The period planned for the entire campaign was:

March to June1999: Education Campaign

July to Sept. 1999: Rectification campaign — actually this went on till Dec.1999.

Then it took a few months for the DCs to finalise their detailed reviews and bring out circulars. Finally the SC review came by about mid-2000. The entire reviews and all documents were published in an entire book by about July 2000. Srinivas mentioned that this RC was long overdue. He said that "by 1995 itself some mistakes were glaring, but we did not decide on a RC. We have since reviewed that it should have been done after the 1995 Special Conference. Not doing so, has led to severe losses in the movement. Due to liberalism, we have not taken political and organizational tactics in time, and due to subjectivism we have not done detailed analysis. What was implemented here was a real mass line as we voluntarily put our mistakes before the masses. Some mass organizations also accepted their mistakes publicly. The people advised them to be good".

The successful military campaign that followed the RC helped the Party to further regain the initiative from the enemy. The assassination of the ex-home minister, Madhav Reddy, who was personally responsible for the killing of hundreds of revolutionaries, in retaliation for the killing of the three PW CC members, was one of its major fruits.

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