Brief history of the

Maoist Communist Centre  
of India (MCCI)

*(This article was first published in the first issue of People’s War. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Naxalbari, as a continuation and development of it, we felt a study of the revolutionary movement and the Bihar-Jharkhand movement in the leadership of the MCCI would help develop a theoretical and political understanding. We added certain important aspects from the MCCI POR and the post-merger POR – Editorial Board)*

Preface

It is well known that the decade of the sixties of the 20th Century was a decade of upheaval that shook the whole world. In such a background, genuine revolutionaries, inspired by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung thought (now Maoism), gave the clarion call of rebellion against revisionism. The Great Debate was conducted by the CPC under Mao’s leadership against Khrushchvite revisionism at that time, and it was under its stirring influence that the communist movement in India, while waging struggle against revisionism, made a fresh beginning.

It was in such a situation that many extraordinary and front-ranking leadership comrades in the course of the struggle came forward and fought against revisionism**.** Comrades CM and KC emerged in this way. During the seventh Congress of the CPM in 1964, the struggle against revisionism in fact arose clearly as a struggle between parliamentarism and the path of Protracted Peoples’ War. Thereafter, the earth-shaking Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) had a tremendous impact upon this new stirring of the Communist movement in India. In 1967 the Great Naxalbari Uprising under the leadership of Comrade CM occurred as a spring Thunder over India. All over India a new upsurge began against revisionism and a state of political ferment was generated.

In such a situation, on the one hand the CPI (ML) party was formed under the leadership of Comrade CM on April 22, 1969 and in the same year, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was formed under the leadership of Comrade KC on October 20. Thus the two revolutionary streams forged ahead, all along surmounting many hurdles, though remaining as separate entities, until the year 2004 when, on September 21, their confluence gave rise to one big torrent. The CPI (ML) [PW] and the MCCI together gave birth to the CPI (Maoist).

As was inevitable, although the aims and objective of two parties have been the same, their history comprises both the aspect of similarity as well as some differences.

Now, as per the decision taken to acquaint the broad ranks with the brief history of both, we hereby present a part that comprises the history of the MCCI in brief.

The inception of MCCI’s history

Drawing a clear-cut line of demarcation on political and organizational issues with revisionist views and path, as a firm commitment was made to build a genuine revolutionary party on the basis of revolutionary theory and in the course of revolutionary struggle, soon after the revisionist Seventh Congress of the CPM in 1964 a revolutionary centre was established, followed by the emergence of the organisation as MCC on October 20, 1969.

At the outset, the nature of this organisation formed by the initiative of Comrade KC, Comrade AmulyaSen and Chandrashekhar Das was that of a revolutionary centre. This organisation then was very limited in strength and isolated. In such a situation, Comrade KC had described what should be our important duty, which in brief can be summed up thus : as a guiding line for the Indian revolution create public opinion on the basis of a concrete line regarding Strategy and Tactics; build Professional Revolutionary cadres; a line for work in the rural area, adopt a line for work in cities, a line for work among workers, student-youth etc. and, as the principal and central task, adopt a concrete plan for building the Army and Base Areas in accordance with our strength and capacity; and must in fact, to get involved in practice fully.

As concrete reflections of revisionism, the various expressions against which under Comrade KC’s able leadership it was then decided to conduct struggle were: (1) Economism, (2) Spontaneity, (3) Legalism, (4) Bureaucratic Centralism, (5) Bourgeois Parliamentary system etc.

The various opportunist perceptions that we had to vigorously struggle against in the course of our struggle against revisionism were: (i) The view that did not accept neo-colonialism as a new form of Colonialism, that is the method of indirect exploitation instead of direct exploitation-rule by imperialism; (ii) The view that did not accept the (neo-colonial type of) semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the Indian state and rejectedthe national and democratic character of Indian revolution.

It was in the process of parting ways with the undivided Communist Party in 1964, right since the seventh Congress of the CPM wherein the banner of revolt was raised to rupture ties with the revisionist line of the CPM, that the question emerged as to what should be the correct line of the Indian revolution, what would be the stage and path of Indian revolution.

In fact to find answers to such questions, an attempt was made through documents called *‘Chinta’*, published in 1965 [It was to vigorously struggle against revisionism secretly within the then CPI (M) party 6 documents were brought out]. Later in 1966, the political and theoretical debate was continued vigorously against revisionism through a magazine called *‘Dakshindesh’*. However, the need was felt for a consistent line through a basic document. In this process, as an effort to find answers to the above questions, Comrade KC presented (for discussion) a document on the *outline of a strategic and tactical line for Indian revolution*. Comrade KC had prepared this document basically on the basis of Comrade Lenin’s Colonial Thesis and articles on Nationality Problem; Comrade Stalin’s article on Nationality, the *History of the Bolshevik Party*, *Problems of Leninism*; the important documents related to the Great Debate published by the CPC led by Mao, especially the General line of the International Communist Movement (the June 14th letter), *Apologist of Neo-colonialism*; Mao’s *On New democracy*, *Analysis of classes in Chinese society*, *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, important articles on military matters etc.

Through this document presented by Comrade KC, a sharp line of demarcation was politically drawn with the revisionism of the CPI and CPM. The political points on which the documenton strategy drew a sharp line of demarcation were:

(a) Indian revolution as an inseparable part of world revolution.

(b) Indian society today - (i) Has imperialism been eliminated? On the contradiction between imperialism and the broad masses; (ii) Indian polity; (iii) Has feudalism been eliminated? On the contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses; (iv) Indian culture today.

(c) The character of the present Indian national economy.

(d) The Indian social system and social crisis.

(e) The character of Indian revolution; two stages of Indian revolution.

(f) On the internal relationships and the leadership of National revolution and Democratic revolution.

(g) The basic duty of democracy : (i) Democratic state and politics - the specificities of the state system; (ii) Democratic economics; (iii) Democratic culture.

(h) The basis of unity of nationalities.

(i) The path of revolution - the central task of revolution is to capture political power through Peoples’ War; the path of Protracted Peoples’ War demonstrated by Chairman Mao is the path of India’s liberation.

(j) The protracted nature of the Peoples’ War in India that was determined by the specificities of the actual conditions.

(k) Expose the Treacherous Façade of Elections, Take to the path of Protracted Peoples’ War.

(l) Three Magic Weapons of Revolution.

(m) The international significance of the great Indian revolution.

Then, the points on which a line of demarcation was drawn with revisionism in the document regarding tactics were:

(a) The central task of revolution is to seize political power by armed force.

(b) The path of revolution in Russia or the path of revolution in China? The path of the new democratic revolution of India is the path of the great Chinese revolution.

(c) The vast countryside is the enemy’s weakest area - the sto**r**m centre of revolution. The peasant masses are the firmestfriends of revolution, the Agrarian Revolutionary War is the basic key that would make the peasant masses join the Peoples’ War.

(d) The focus of all work is to establish Protracted Peoples’ War; the primary, principal and central task at present is to form a Peoples’ Army and Base Areas in the countryside.

(e) The work in the rural areas must be principal. On the correct relation between the work in villages and cities, on the line for work in the cities.

(f) The principal form of struggle and organisation are Peoples’ War and Peoples’ Army.

The relationship between the main and secondary forms of struggle and organisation.

(g) Maintain a firm hold over the class line and mass line, centralise work on the working class and poor and landless peasants.

In fact, the above document on Strategy and Tactics presented by Comrade KC is a concrete expression of political views and practical work of the MCCI.

The struggle of Sonarpur and our preliminary Experience

If theoretical struggle does not get linked with practical work, then on the one hand the theory becomes somewhat meaningless and on the other, we cannot develop a correct understanding of the theory itself. Besides, on giving the back-seat to actual struggle, neither is it possible for the theoretical struggle to advance or extend too far, nor is it possible to isolate the revisionists outright. Therefore, at that time after having got together our forces to a limited extent through theoretical struggle, we took our small force to the countryside to concentrate upon the task of arousing and organising the peasants for guerilla war. We found our first contact in Sonarpur, so it was there that we started our work.

In Sonarpur, even before the organisation could be built up and made concrete and functional to some extent, the enemy began attacking it. In such a situation it was not possible to adopt any tactics other than the method of retreating in self defense. As a result**,** qualitatively, the Sonarpur struggle could not reach an advanced stage.

Even so, it was owing to our direct work at Sonarpur that we could understand better the questions such as class analysis, the peasant problem and agrarian revolution. Moreover, we could also understand that: (a) The revolutionary armed struggle should be built and developed in order to seize state power; therefore constant theoretical and ideological struggle should be conducted against the concrete expressions of revisionism, that is economism, militant economism, legalism, reformism, parliamentarism etc. (b) In our country where the revisionist current has prevailed since long in the name of mass organisation and mass struggle, we should from the very beginning give stress upon secret activist groups as the basic foundation of the party and centring upon them, emphasise upon the formation of Armed Guerilla Units and Peoples’ Militia, and practice the method of carrying our work among the broad masses while keeping the party secret, build mass organisations and mass movements to assist armed struggle, especially emphasise upon the building up of armed resistance struggle and armed struggle as a means of capturing state power and also give special emphasis while building such struggles on building the armed force of the masses, namely Self Defense Squads, Peoples’ Militia and Guerilla squads. (c) As an essential condition to build and develop armed struggle in the countryside, prepare cadre and leadership groups from among poor and landless peasants and depend most of all upon poor and landless peasants. (d) Realize the importance of enlightening, organising and involving peasant women and working class women in the armed struggle of the countryside etc.

The revolutionary struggle of Kanksa – Gaya - Hazaribagh could be advanced only after taking Lessons from the Sonarpur struggle. From the Sonarpur struggle the lesson we learnt was that in a vast country such as India, having extreme political and economic unevenness, where the enemy is very powerful and we are weak, it is extremely necessary that we work in some strategic areas that are convenient and conducive to the conduct of guerilla warfare. Therefore, after having obtained some primary and elementary experience during the armed agrarian revolutionary work in Sonarpur, we began working in some selected or strategic areas with Armed Revolutionary Guerilla Struggle and Protracted Peoples’ War as the basis. Keeping in mind the concrete conditions of India, how do we at this moment succeed in our political duty through military activities? This was a major question posed before us. In order to resolve this question, we concentrated upon studying some special articles from the military writings of Comrade Mao. We gave special emphasis on studying especially such articles where one could find clear-cut perceptions on the process and method of building the Army and Base Area.

We felt the need to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation on every aspect, which is on political-organisational aspects and the aims, forms and methods of struggle against the trends of reformist, economist and revisionist movements that had been persisting since long in India. With this view, we decided to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation with the old revisionists on the aims and objectives, orientation and agenda of the peasant movement. While doing so we took notice of the situation in Soviet Russia and the Russian experience, and the situation in China and the Chinese experience, and emphasised upon how the peasant movement could advance in the concrete conditions of India with the orientation and progress of armed revolution. In accordance with this perception and understanding, we decided to give two basic slogans having the underlying political concept regarding the peasant movement, that is the slogans of : “*Land to the tillers !*” and “*Political Rule and Power to the Revolutionary Peasant committees!*”

It was by putting into practice this outlook and the corresponding work method and work style that it was possible to begin the development of a new path and new stream of the revolutionary movement and mass movement in Kanksa-Gaya-Hazaribagh etc. areas. Equipped with the above aims, objectives and orientation, the revolutionary peasant masses and toiling masses began to participate in different types of struggles with renewed vigour. During this period they built new kinds of mass organisations and mass movements, and developed them on the basis of their own experiences. They opted such a path and such a stream that enhanced many times their sense of righteousness and confidence. This helped them understand that they can establish their own political power on the strength of their organised armed force, or in other words on the strength of the gun. They promoted and applied such an ideology of revolutionary struggle and such tactics, forms and methods that pave the way to destroy the law and regime of the ruling nexus and establish the law and regime of the people. Now they did not go to the B.D.O. or S.D.O. or to any officer with folded hands, staging dharnas for food and relief or to raise demands as if with a begging bowl. They did not go to the ruling nexus or government servants asking for alms. They believed in their own organised force, we may say on the strength of the gun alone, to solve their own problems for which they are going ahead. Instead of begging at the enemy’s door for pity and relief, they adopted the path and method of depending on their own organised armed force, asserting to forcefully seize what is rightfully theirs.

They thus brought about a sea-change in the forms and methods of struggle and organisation. Instead of Gandhian, unarmed, fully open and legal forms and methods, they stressed upon mainly armed, secret and non-legal forms and methods.

For instance, dividing into small groups in a secret, armed manner, they got together with speed at one place, as if pulling a net, suddenly attacking the houses or dens of big class enemies who perpetrated atrocities or their hired goons, and as if spreading the net, spread themselves in no time. They maintained a strict vigil on the movements and activities of the enemy side. In all work they abided by the directives of the party. They deposited a small portion of the food items seized or recovered as fine form the class enemies and their cohorts evil gentry, and distributed the rest among the masses. Even when seizing crop from the fields of the enemy, they distributed in the same way. In this way, they tried to help the masses solve their food problem. Though not yet enough in comparison to the need, this instilled confidence among the masses at large. They deposited with the party the guns, cash, gold and silver seized from the enemy with the objective of helping take the struggle further ahead. In respect of penalizing the class enemies and their local agents, they adopted the policy of, “*Give the dog his dues*.” Attempts were made to win over some through persuasion while others were threatened with dire consequences, some were subjected to criticism by the masses while others were beaten up and at the same time persuaded or threatened, still others were totally “finished off”.

Generally, only those who committed atrocities upon the people with the help of goons or the police, or those who were known to misbehave with women, or those who conspired to have revolutionaries arrested by the police or murdered were meted out capital punishment with the consent of the common masses. Following threats issued or selective beating up of a few odd forest guards according to the needs, the forest guards did not now dare to enter many a forest area. Their exploitation and atrocities that prevailed without restraint in other neighboring areas as well did not continue thereafter. Peasants were now addressed to with due respect in the struggle areas for sure, and also in the nearby areas. In some struggle areas, the big class enemies who perpetrated atrocities fled the villages out of fear to take shelter in nearby towns, from where they tried to maintain their reign of exploitation and persecution with the assistance of agents, goons and the police. In reality, with the passage of time, these class enemies have been increasingly relying on police and military wings.

The popularity of such new forms of mass movements and Red Resistance Struggles of peasants and the indications of this kind of struggle spreading to wider areas had shaken the ruling areas; the police and the government machinery were shaken out of their wits. On the one hand, in order to crush the struggle by force, they established police camps and conducted encirclement and suppression campaigns. In area after area, they entered the villages, barged into houses, mindlessly letting loose abuse and persecution, trampling upon the dignity of women, damaging property, snatching away everything from fowl and goat to essential household belongings. They sealed property, beat up both men and women with all brutality, carried out large-scale beatings and arrests and well-planned conspiracies, committed murders of revolutionary cadres. All this was done in the name of preserving law and order, in the name of maintaining peace. On the other hand, they also adopted various other **dirty** ploys to destroy the struggle. They tried to wean away peasants from the struggle by offering various kinds of sops, such as giving land, making good laws, giving money, jobs, installing pumps, digging wells, constructing schools and many other doles. The ruling nexus and their stooges adopted various means such as inciting casteist and caste inequalities, provoking parochialist and nationalist sectarianism, inciting or promoting various kinds regionalist or territorialist ideologies from districtism and stateism etc, thus creating discrimination among the militant masses at large, attempting to destroy the struggle from within in numerous devious ways. Further, holding the threat of police atrocities and persecution, they tried to weaken the morale of the militant common masses and simultaneously to force the militant masses to surrender before the enemy and thereby to push the struggle towards the same old Gandhian reformist kind of path; they tried to wean away the masses from the revolutionary path to entrap them into the same old mire of peaceful legal struggle. However, all such nefarious designs of theirs were to ultimately fail. No force can extinguish the flame of armed revolution held aloft by the Indian masses, neither now nor ever.

Our principal weakness has been that our masses are not very much active and organised. The areas of our struggle also are very small. The enemy wields a well-organised police and military wing. In an unorganised condition we cannot combat the well organised police and military wings. Then, without extensive areas it is not possible to conduct a guerilla war against the enemy’s armed wings.

Therefore, the weaknesses must as far as possible be overcome very quickly. The publicity campaign must be made more creative and more developed. The political education, fighting morale and level of activity must be advanced many times over. Along with building the guerilla war and building mass struggles to assist guerilla war and red resistance struggles, the struggle must spread out as widely as possible in waves. Mass organisations that would be useful for struggle have to be built. With those who can be organised, Revolutionary Peasant Committees must be built. Revolutionary Peasant Committees must be built as the embryonic form of peoples’ power through a process. The Party organisation must be built. All these organisations must be built and gradually developed**.** We must maintain coordination in creative ways between the increasing pace of struggle and the concerns, consciousness and militant mind-set of activists and common masses. We must definitely understand that if we do not correctly put into practice our actual organisational line in coordination with our political and military line, then the political and organisational work would suffer seriously. If we do not understand the mutual relationship between the three aspects, namely, revolutionary propaganda, revolutionary struggle and revolutionary organisation, and fail to build all these three tasks together in creative ways and in a powerful manner, then we became severely weakened. Along with the politics of self-defence and retaliation, a very important task before us is to arouse the masses fully with activity and initiative, and organise and arm them as a consolidated and disciplined force in the above three organisations.

The Three upsurges of the Kanksa struggle

The history of the Kanksa Struggle is one of serial episodes. It began in the year 1970-71. In 1970 some economic and political struggle commenced here and there. Between February-March and June-July in the year 1971, many economic and political struggles were waged under the leadership of the Kanksa police station (Area) Committee. There was a good mass participation in these struggles. Yet, what were the main shortcomings of the struggles of this phase?

(1) Shortcomings in carrying out political mobilisation in a better way; (2) Lack of organisational preparedness and taking up struggles spontaneously to some extent; (3) Lack of continuity and comprehensiveness in the various forms of programmes; (4) Shortcomings in adopting the guerilla rules and methods etc.

Basically, the struggle that began since February 1972 generated an upsurge. This struggle was limited to the Kanksa Police Station Area in the main. In this area this upsurge was at its peak from February 1972 to January 1973. It is also noteworthy that the crop defence and crop seizure struggle of 1972-73 had first begun from a small pocket in the village of Ausgram.

In 1973 despite some kind of struggle having occurred in Kanksa, the upsurge in the struggle basically took place in the Ausgram-Budbud Police Station Area.. This struggle was at its peak beginning from March-April 1973 until October-November.

The upsurge of the struggle that followed lasted from March 1974 till June 1975. That is, until the massive military encirclement and suppression that persisted thereafter. In this period, though there was some struggle, the peak in the upsurge of struggle remained only in Ausgram and Budbud in the main.

Thus, three periods can be seen as regards the upsurge in the struggle. We identity these as the three upsurges of the struggle.

On the positive aspects of the experience related to Squad formation

First, an outlook was in the making regarding squad formation and actual understanding was being acquired. Gradually a correct perception developed on why we should form an “Army”, who should be in this “Army?” “How and in what process can this “Army” be formed, why were “squads” formed?

On this an enthusiastic atmosphere was created among the people and activists of the entire area.

Activists came from almost every village. The mentality of leaving one’s household to join the squad has become like a festival. We do not say that there was no spontaneity in this mentality. However, that this spontaneity was not the main thing. The reason being that the events that unfolded in later years helped us even more in acquiring the confidence that which working in any area on the basis of “armed agrarian revolutionary” politics, whenever a call is given to form an army, a force can certainly be organised.

At the time of the enemy’s massive conspiracy and counter-revolutionary attack, it is very effective and useful to form a mobile squad.

It becomes convenient to carry out propaganda work in an organised form. It becomes a regular activity for local activists to go in the shape of a squad from village to village, holding meetings. A squad in every work, discipline in every thing - everyone learns from this example.

Even in waging war this mobile squad plays a reliable, powerful and important role. Generating a “Bolshevik spirit” during struggle, how the masses are engaged in struggle in a disciplined manner; how the village-based militia squads are made courageous and experienced - all this has proved to be the brilliant role of the mobile squad.

Be it scorching heat or rain or cold, the hard labour of treading on foot each day, seeking out special secret routes to tread on and to walk on only in this manner, giving up the usual routes to use new routes, using the tough tracts in forests and traverse distances, walking without light at night, holding meeting and then going out in the middle of the night form one place to another, swimming across rivers in spate during heavy rains, advancing the work even in the midst of police camps, encirclement and heavy vigil, facing every kind of situation - how can such a mentality and experience be gained ?

Only as a consequence of forming mobile squads is it possible to have such positive development.

Shortcomings and lessons of the Kanksa struggle

Shortcomings and weaknesses of the struggle and organisation in 1972 with regard to the organisational line (Party, Army, Committee). **:**

Among the decisions taken at a Zonal Committee meeting in August 1973 following a review of the 1972 struggle, the following was mentioned “Merely the attempts of the Party do not suffice. It is also necessary to set up a coordination with the masses along with the attempts of the Party. The three weapons of revolution - Party, Army (Regular Army, Local Guerilla Army and Militia) and Peasants Committee must be formed.” A decision was also taken to form “Peasant committees” and “Militia Squads” from village to village and area to area , and to give them a specific form. Thus the “Organisational line” was discussed at length and decisions taken during this 1973 review.

It was also decided to have not separate programmes at the local or area levels, but “a concrete agrarian revolutionary programme”. This was decided as there was also a lack of such a programme.

The “agenda” was to be prepared or approval given not by the party, but the Peasants committee formed at the village level and area level would prepare the “agenda” (with the help and consultation of the broad masses). The party would only keep an eye on such work, give guidelines, provide assistance. The Peasants Committee was not to be replaced by the Party. If things were done otherwise, not only the efforts of the masses, but also the development of the struggle and organisation would be obstructed. Of course, Party Members would be present among the Peasants Committee and they would in fact be the “organisational linkage” of the Party with the Peasants Committee. In the rural areas, the party unit would be the meeting point of the advanced elements of the Peasants Committee and other mass organisations.

In 1972 itself it was the ideal period to form “Peasants Committee” or give them a definite form. However, although there were means to do so at that time, we could not pay attention to form them. We only thought of Party Committees. (This can be said also for the struggle of 1972). In 1972, it was decided in the review that Peasants Committees would be formed, but we could not implement the decision. (We started implementing it only since 1975). This was the shortcoming in our understanding of the political and organisational line; there was a lack of proper understanding of the process of forging the three weapons of revolutions - the Party, Army and “Peasants Committee”. It is true that there was broad mass participation in the struggle. However their participation was not in the form of village based militia, in the shape of organised units. The masses from villages got together for the struggle in large numbers. Thereafter, “squads” should have been formed. This was a weakness of the organisation and struggle. In the beginning for quite some time, there was no conscious effort to operate militia squads in the form of regular and definite squads, giving them a “consistent”, firm and more disciplined form. Village-based militia existed in an unorganised and loose form. In some villages although the form of “militia” did exist, yet efforts were not made to give them a conscious and firm political and organisational form.

It was because the task of making political and organisational preparations for extending the area and also within the main area was not fully completed, or there were serious shortcomings in this regard, that the Kanksa struggle was forced to retreat temporarily. This was our bitter experience.

Lessons Of The Gaya - Hazaribagh struggle in undivided Bihar

Keeping in mind the experience of the Kanksa struggle, where the task of timely expansion of the area and political and organisational preparations within the area, that is, the task of preparations regarding the Party, Army and United Front could not be done in good time, an attempt was made now to advance the revolutionary struggle in Gaya-Hazaribagh of former Bihar in a more systematic and planned manner.

By then, we had developed an understanding regarding military matters that in order to carry out military activities in a proper manner, a vast expanse of area was required so as to advance and retreat, or move to one side or move to the other side from time to time. This thinking was later reflected in practice with the formation of the Bihar-Bengal Special Area Committee.

Anyway, in the then Dhanbad and Hazaribagh area (Hazaribagh district then included the present Chattra, Giridih and Koderma districts) and in the Gaya area (Gaya then included Aurangabad, Jehanabad, Navada and such districts) work started with the perspective of advancing with the concrete orientation of building the Army and Base Area in the middle of 1969 and the later half of 1968, respectively.

Hazaribagh had plenty of hills and forests and was Adivasi-populated with nationality movement i.e., influence of the separate Jharkhand movement. Gaya was a vast plain area (also having a few hills and forests), having an influence of the crude feudal system.

The clarion call of Armed Agrarian Revolutionary Guerilla struggle had echoed in the Parasnath and Jilga hills of Dhanbad and Hazaribagh and the Neri-Mehudia hill of Barkagaon and surrounding areas in 1971 itself. Similarly, in the later half of 1972 the red flaming torch of Agrarian Revolutionary struggle was lit in the Chalho hills**,** Gaya area and surrounding areas of the Gaya area.

In the struggle of the Hazaribagh area, owing to the broad participation of the adivasi masses as well as non-adivasi masses, a revolutionary upsurge-like situation was created. The enemy was alarmed at the revolutionary struggle in this backward and adivasi-populated area. Thus started the brutal “encirclement and suppression” campaign. In order to defeat this “encirclement and suppression” the process of advancing further also began from our side. The “encirclement and suppression” campaign of 1974, was stinging and intense, wherein some comrades were martyred and some other leading comrades were arrested. Therefore, the struggle was forced to retreat for a while.

However, within a year or two the work began to be advanced afresh and with a new plan in a vast expansive area comprising Hazaribagh (including Hazaribagh, Giridih, Koderma, Chattra districts) and Dhanbad (including the present Bokaro district). Especially, as the enemy conducted his “encirclement and suppression” campaign, and efforts were made on our part to defeat it and gradually to expand the struggle further and take it to a higher plane, this process enabled us to acquire new experience in political and military aspects as well as in organisational aspects.

Meanwhile, the struggle in Gaya area too had surpassed the Chalho area, spreading into many new areas. An earth-shaking struggle against feudal landowners, their goons and private armies made it a powerful upsurge. By the thousands, the peasant masses and toiling masses participated in this revolutionary struggle, devastating the old rotten system and taking firm steps ahead to build a new system, that is a peoples’ democratic order.

The idea of forming a special area emerged in order to give practical shape to the task of building the army and base area. Although we had decided very early that building the Army and Base Area was our primary, principal and central task, yet how it would be translated into reality has always been a big question posed before us. In what practical from would Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (then Mao tsetung thought) be implemented in the concrete situation, or concrete specificity of India, has also been posed before us as a big question.

We realized that to seek a proper answer to this serious issue, it would not suffice to merely give a general call regarding the Army and Base area, but it was also necessary to actually determine a concrete task to form the Army and Base Area. In order to carry out this task, it was also necessary to select some strategic area where a Base Area self-sufficient in economic, political and military aspects could be built.

Therefore, in order to build the Army and Base Area on the soil of our country, the idea emerged of considering Bihar (now Bihar - Jharkhand) and some areas of Bengal (West Midnapore-Bankura-Purulia) as a Special Area.

Efforts began in 1975 itself to form the Special Area, and in mid 1976 a Bihar-Bengal Special Area Committee was formed under the direct guidance and leadership of Comrade Kanhai Chatterji with some leading comrades working in the Kanksa area of Bengal and Dhanbad, Giridih, Hazaribagh, Gaya, Aurangabad, Navada and other districts.

The formation of a committee by the name of Special Area had a very positive impact on us. This nomenclature had aroused in us much interest about why a special Area has been formed and what would be its tasks. Thus, a clear concept was formed to form an Army and Base Area, and to form a Special Area in order to enable this. We understood that we could not take even a single step ahead as regards forming the Army and Base Area if we went about it in a spontaneous manner, without any plan or without the concept of Strategic Area.

In reality, we had, under Comrade KC’s initiative and able leadership, begun work first of all by selecting Assam and the border areas of Assam-Tripura as a Strategic Area, and as the second Strategic Area a vast area comprising Bihar (now Bihar-Jharkhand) and some parts of Bengal.

However, since the entire ML movement was dealt a massive blow in Assam on the whole, we arrived at the conclusion that it was not possible to advance the work there as the First Strategic Area. Therefore, in accordance with Comrade KC’s advice we took a decision to consider the Second Guerilla Area, the Bihar-Bengal area as the First and to make maximum efforts there, as per our strength and capacity, to build the Army and Base Area.

**The stand of the CC of the MCCI on the changes in the domestic and international situation after Com KC’s demise**

On July 18, 1982 our leader and teacher, Comrade KC passed away. Comrade KC’s demise is a great loss to us and to Indian revolution. So far it was Comrade KC who presented the basic political line, specific line and tactical line and everything, including the corresponding work-method and work-style. Now, in the wake of Comrade KC’s demise, this responsibility came upon the rest of the CC.

This CC then reiterated its stand on the following points -

(i) After the demise of great Mao, the comrades who were arrested as the “Gang of Four” were in fact genuine comrades. The way these four comrades were arrested was in reality a counter-revolutionary coup d’etat; in fact soon after the demise of great Mao, the HuaKuo-feng - Deng Xiao-ping clique arrested the four revolutionary comrades through a coup d’etat, changing the colour of socialist China and installing in China a bourgeois dictatorship.

(ii) The Three World Theory was proclaimed by the degenerated HuoKuo-feng as a compromise on principles and abandonment of class struggle. [Later when during talks with some revolutionary groups, the M.C.C. was urged to present its views on the Three World Theory in writing, we published a document, titled, “Three World Theory, a Counter-Revolutionary Theory,” in which the Three World Theory was rejected].

(iii) On the international plane, the contradiction between imperialism and oppressed nationalities and people was declared as the decisive and principal contradiction.

(iv) Feeling the need to reiterate our earlier stand since the time Comrade KC was alive on the reports of the 9th and 10th Congresses of the Communist Party of China, we said that the Report of the 9th Congress regarding continuing the class struggle and advancing the construction of socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat was a Basic Report and that the Reports of the 9th and 10th Congress were not mutually contradictory.

(v) We held that the interpretation of the current era as a strategic Concept, as presented in the 9th Congress, should necessarily be considered as a correct concept, and at the same time, upheld the interpretation of the historical significance of Mao thought (now Maoism) made in the 9th Congress.

(vi) In the decade of the nineties, following the disintegration of Soviet Russia, we characterised the Russian superpower as a weak superpower. However, what “weak” meant could not be properly analysed. Later during the November meeting of the CC in 2002, as we understood that it was not correct to characterise Russia as a weak superpower, we decided to characterise it as a powerful imperialist country that had an abundant stock of nuclear weapons.

**As regards the question of political analysis of the domestic situation and the political line, the following -**

(i) On the character of the state, the assessment remained the same. That is, India was a neocolonial type of semi-colonial and semi-feudal country; (ii) The comprador and bureaucratic big bourgeoisie of India did not have any relative or partial independence, but they are the compradors and loyal servants of imperialism. Their capacity to bargain is not an indication of any basic change having occurred in their character, but an indication of pocketing some more wealth as a consequence of service as agents, (iii) The perception regarding participating in the elections is not merely related to tactics, but amidst the background of the emergence of Khrushchev revisionism and the talk of transition to socialism through elections or by peaceful means, it acquires the importance as that of strategy; (iv) During the latter part of the Russia-dominated Indira regime itself, the rise of US domination began with the huge amount of loan borrowed from the International Monetary fund, which in the Rajiv period increased even further and US domination became the main form during the NDA regime; (v) The CPI (ML) Liberation was openly declared as modern revisionist and as an opposing element in revolutionary class struggle; (vi) It was decided to give up without delay the mentality of always treading the beaten track or the stereotyped approach in the work of building the Army and Base Area, and further advance and develop the military line, military organisation and military warfare with firmness and in a creative manner.

Two-line struggle is the basic key to party’s development

While writing the history of the CPSU, Comrade Stalin said that the history of the Soviet Party is a history of internal struggle, and Mao put this in such words that the Party is a unity of opposite things.

Looking back at our own history too, these facts seem to be quite correct. For instance: (a) A sharp two-line struggle against CPM revisionism, prior to rupturing relations with the CPM; (b) The debate on what is right and what is wrong among Communist Revolutionaries after having ruptured relations with the CPM; (c) The debate and discussion on the process and method of party formation; (d) A sharp two-line struggle against the wrong line that emerged within the MCC on encountering white terror during 1970-71 according to which “it would certainly not be appropriate right now to wage armed struggle in the city and the rural area adjoining the city, and for that matter even in the remote countryside,” and a two-line struggle against a handful of leadership comrades who fled the arena of struggle at 24 Parganas, Kanksa and Hooghly raising the issue that “The MCC was practising a ‘left’ line;” (e) A two-line debate on an issue raised by a leading comrade of Assam-Tripura in 1971-72, that “in the present condition we can advance only by making continuous squad attacks on the class enemy and state power;” a two-line struggle carried out in varied forms since 1977-78 with Badal when he raised the issue that “The line in Dakshindesh (or LalPataka) Special Issue No. 1 was a ‘left’ line” etc. This two-line struggle went on since the demise of Comrade KC in 1982 until 1994-95. Later, there was a bitter two-line struggle between 1999-2001 (which we shall discuss shortly). Thus through every debate and two-line struggle our line and practice was further strengthened.

The sharp two-line struggle between 1999 and 2001 shook-up the MCCI and helped us in every aspect in taking a qualitative leap

From the very beginning in our organisation Mao Tse-tung thought and Maoism have been synonyms. This has been a general understanding. Then many a time a strong voice was raised for using the term, Maoism. In 1986-87 some arguments were raised in this regard in the Kolkata City Committee. However, the debate could not be concluded then. The reason being that the situation had not become ripe enough to conduct two-line struggle on this issue.

However, it was apparent that within the CC of our organisation, the then CCM Badal was of the firm opinion that it would be politically wrong to consider that *“Mao thought and Maoism were synonyms and it would be more precise to use the term, Maoism”*. It took a few more years for this argument to be advanced, and finally in 1996-97 it did get expressed as such. The fact was that after our Second Central Conference of 1996, within our CC, virtually all except one comrade were of the firm opinion that the use of Maoism instead of Mao thought would be more precise, scientific and appropriate.

Then in 1999 a sharp debate began within the CC on the serial order in which to arrange the portraits of the founders of the MCC - in the order of Comrade KC, Comrade Amulya Sen, Comrade Chandrashekhar Das or of Comrade Amulya Sen, Comrade KC, Comrade Chandrashekhar Das. It was decided in the CC that the question of arranging photographs would be resolved during the CC meeting of August 1999 and the question of using the term, “Maoism” would be resolved during the CC meeting of January 2000.

In the August 1999 meeting, in the course of a lengthy debate and polemics a decision was arrived at by consensus with all CCMs signing it. Accordingly, the order of arranging the portraits was to be as follows : Comrade KC, Comrade AmulyaSen and Comrade Chandrashekhar Das.

Yet on returning form the CC meeting, Badal and Bharat adopted a course a clique formation within the Party in a conspiratorial manner against this decision, and confusion began to spread among party members and cadres.

Then in the CC meeting held in January 2000, after nearly 7 days of discussion, debate and polemics, it was decided with consensus that it would be appropriate and correct to use the term, Maoism , instead of Mao thought.

However, it was on returning from this meeting that Badal and Bharat stooped to engage in mal-propaganda and cliquism though non-organisational procedures and conspiratorial methods. Now the polemic on “Maoism” occupied the centre-stage. Along with this, they also added some other points, such as : (a) Comrade Stalin should not be assessed according to the Great Debate, but the assessment should be done afresh; (b) There should be no relationship with RIM; (c) The declaration of unilateral cease-fire with the PW was wrong etc. etc.

On all these questions, it becomes necessary to conduct a two-line debate within the party, culminating in a decision at Plenum or Conference, but the wrong attitude adopted by Badal and Bharat on this made this impossible. All the same, there was an intense discussion throughout the organisation on these questions. Ultimately except for Badal, Bharat and a handful of comrades from West Bengal, 98 percent of the membership extended wholehearted support to the CC’s line and there was warm support for the decision to use the term, Maoism.

As has already been said, in the course of this two-line struggle, we underwent a qualitative change in every aspect. This two-line struggle shook us up so much, that we were motivated to cast away our many weaknesses and filth. It inspired us to understand our serious shortcomings in relation to the dark chapter of mutual clashes between the MCC and PW, and to openly offer self-criticism. It helped us to shed the dogmatist and sectarian trends from within us. Also, it helped us understand the need to form Military Commissions from the Central level to the Special Areas and to two Regional levels under it, and a state level, and to form the Peoples’ Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) from the armed military forces of the people, as the form of the Peoples’ Army in the present condition. It accelerated the task of building the Army and Base Area. Finally, it helped us advance towards uniting with the RCCI (M), RCC (M), CPI (ML) Second CC, RCCI (MLM) and other such genuine Maoist revolutionaries, and especially the CPI (ML) [PW], in order to build an all-India Party.

Extension of the struggle in many other places and accelerating the work of building base areas

On taking lessons from the struggle of Kanksa and Hazaribagh, when the struggle developed in the then Hazaribagh-Dhanbad districts and Gaya-Aurangabad districts, it then rapidly developed in Ranchi-Singhbhum and some districts Orissa under the former Jharkhand Region and in Deoghar, Dumka,Jamui, Munger, Banka, Bhagalpur of Bihar, until the level of Guerilla Zone could be reached. Meanwhile, the struggle of Gaya-Aurangabad under the former Bihar Region also developed and expanded very fast, helping extend the organisation rapidly in the Chatra, Palamu, Latehar, Gumla, Lohardagga, Garhwa districts of present Jharkhand; Sarguja, Jaspur, Koriya, Korba districts of Chattisgarh; Rohtas, Bhojpur, Bhabhua districts of South Bihar; further on to Sonbhadra, Chandauli and Mirzapur districts of Uttar Pradesh and Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Vaishali, Madhubani, Khagariya, Sitamarhi, Sheohar, West Champaran, East Champaran, Katihar, Purnea and other districts of North Bihar, thus leading to the development of the struggles there and raising the struggle even in this region to the level of Guerilla Zone. The struggle of North Bihar soon had an impact on the northern part of Uttar Pradesh and thereon extending to the Uttarakhand area of Uttaranchal, thus building and accelerating the struggle.

Thus, with the development and expansion of the struggle under the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area, in a very short time the work of constructing the Army has gathered speed in a natural manner. As the struggle developed in the Guerilla Zone, the development and expansion of military formations also gathered speed. Beginning with Self Defence Squads and Peoples’ Militia Squads and going on to form Local Regular Guerilla Squads, they were imparted education and training in political and military matters. Then, with Squad Members trained and tested in struggles, Platoons and Companies too were formed. Well-systematising all these military forces, on April 22, 2003 the PLGA was formed and this was declared. At the same time, evaluating the revolutionary struggle in a SAC meeting held in February 2003, 80-85 percent of the struggling area under the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area was identified as a Guerilla Zone and 8 areas were selected as Guerilla Bases. In order to develop these as Base Areas, the struggle is being continued with the perspective to obtain the desired objective within a definite time frame as part of a definite Plan. One after another many important successes have also been achieved as the struggle continues to advance steadily. Now what is needed is to take a big leap.

The Unity Congress-Ninth Congress of the Party reviewed the Bihar-Jharkhand movement thus -

Coming to Bihar-Jharkhand, according to the decision of the newly formed CPI (Maoist), the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area Committee of the erstwhile MCCI and the Bihar-Jharkhand joint State Committee of the erstwhile People’s War were merged and the Bihar-Jharkhand SAC was formed. One and a half years after the formation of Bihar-Jharkhand SAC, the process of merger was completed in the lower levels. Though some problems of unification exist even now, the unity we achieved is remarkable. This is the area that where the conflicts between the two parties led to bloodshed and recognised as a black chapter in the history of Indian Revolution and so it is a main success of the Bihar-Jharkhand SAC. Eighty percent of the area under Bihar-Jharkhand SAC is identified as Guerilla zone. BJSAC selected nine places to build guerilla bases in the guerrilla zone that work as the processes of transformation for achieving the immediate aim of building base areas, to implement the plan of the CC. It took up many counter offensive programs to fight back the enemy offensives. There were historic raids such as the raid on the Giridih armory and the Jehanabad jail break.

In Bihar-Jharkhand enemy improved their intelligence mechanism and the informer mechanism, made large scale arrests, banned our revolutionary mass organisations, coordinated combing operations with the neighbouring states and intensified the counter offensive. The police stations were fortifies to an extent. Killing the arrested comrades are killed in fake encounters is increasing. This is becoming an ordinary affair. There is a considerable decrease in shifting the police forces in vehicles. We must take up the counter offensive tactics so as to give a blow to the enemy forces coming by foot. Another important tactic of the enemy in Bihar-Jharkhand is to make attacks on our forces by organising private lumpen gangs in the name of Sendra. The police formed Gram Suraksha Samithis (Village Security Councils) in many villages against our movement. The reactionary classes are severely attempting to put one section of the people against another. Almost the whole police force is involved in suppressing us. Many battalions of CRPF are deployed. Whenever necessary Army too is prepared. Helipads are built for the landing of helicopters engaged in attacking us. The Long Range Patrols concentrate on our strategic villages and strong holds, major changes are made in the departments related to state and many such measures are being taken up as a part of the country wide strategic scheme of the enemy.

Degenerated, corrupt renegade forces came together as the Thrutheeya Prasthuthi Committee (TPC-Third Conference Organising Committee) with the plan and active support of the state. They are working as open agents of the police. They occasionally attack us. We formulated a political and military plan to overcome this problem and are working in this direction.

The consolidation of our forces in the village level, means mass organisations, militia and others is weak. We have to develop the quality of leadership in the Party, PLGA and mass organisations through education, training and handing over independent responsibilities. There is an immediate need to take up rectification movement to eradicate non-proletarian tendencies in the party. The second meeting of the BJSAC identified that the non-proletarian trends and attitudes are quite strong. We also identified various alien and degenerated values to be rectified in the rectification movement but could not take up the movement in a proper manner. We can intensify war and spread to the broad areas of BJ by overcoming these weaknesses. We also identified the sources to develop guerilla bases with the aim of establishing base areas. We also identified the order of importance. On this occasion we also took up certain organisational changes. We can achieve success in establishing RPCs in the selected areas if we take up the proper perspective, proper plan and program. We also announced the aim to form a battalion in the first half of 2007. But since we were involved in the long process of merger of the party units in the lower level and in conducting classes on basic documents we could not pay proper attention on achieving the above task. We failed in taking a special drive in advancing the organisations to a higher level in the areas selected as guerilla bases and to intensify them. All these must be considered to be the main weaknesses in the area under BJSAC.

In view of the vast opportunities in Bihar-Jharkhand we have to formulate a well worked out plan to utilise these and reach a qualitative leap.

Some of our specificities

During the forty years from the second half of 1964 till the present day, our organisation first came to be widely known as the Chinta and Dakshindesh group; assumed the name, Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in 1969 under the leadership of our founder leader and teacher, Comrade KC; went on while following and carrying forward his line after his death in 1982, to unite with several Maoist revolutionary groups in 2003, and acquired the name, Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). Meanwhile, all over India, MCCI earned recognition as a front-ranking, main revolutionary organisation.

The question is what have been the specific features of the MCCI that enabled us to emerge through numerous unfavourable circumstances from the stage of inception as a very small organisation, and assume the form of the relatively large organisation that it has become today.

First Specific Feature

Drawing a clear line of demarcation theoretically and practically with revisionists on political and organisational and every matter. This is such a point, which if not solved in a proper way, would stand in the way of advancing towards building a correct line and correct revolutionary struggle, and could confront us as an hurdle even if we could make some advance to an extent.

Second Specific Feature

The document *Strategy and Tactics* presented in 1969, provided such a strong foundation, on whose strength we could, while analysing the concrete situation of India, reject the path of elections and the question of participating in elections, and adopt the path of armed agrarian revolution and protracted people's war as the only path of liberation.

Third Specific Feature

While adopting an outlook to advance the protracted peoples’ war, always stressing from the very beginning that to carry out the primary, principal and central task of building the Peoples’ Army and Red Base Area, some favourable areas would have to be selected as strategic areas, in accordance with our strength and capacity, we made and are still making efforts to advance our work by adopting a concomitant cadre policy.

Fourth Specific Feature

In order to constitute the leading bodies of the body, we could take the combination of theory and practice as the correct method of leadership, and with those comrades who had advanced through this process, we could form a team of leading comrades (however few they might have been in number). On this basis we could more or less maintain a continuity of leadership. In spite of some very difficult situations following the demise of Com KC and Com AmulyaSen, there was no division in our organisation; instead we could uninterruptedly advance their line while forging better unity in the organisation.

Fifth Specific Feature

While firmly carrying out the class line and the mass line, we could prepare such sons and daughters of the soil from among the basic classes (however few they may be in number), who are today providing capable and adept leadership to the party and revolution.

We have noted above only some of our many specific features. As a matter of fact, only while remaining steadfastly on the correct line and policy, and correct method and style; drawing a clear line of demarcation on political and organisational matters with the revisionist standpoint and path; adopting the course of revolutionary struggle on the basis of revolutionary theory; uniting with genuine Maoist revolutionaries and taking the Indian revolution ahead with firm determination towards victory, was our organisation built, soon after the revisionist 7th Congress of the CPI (M) in 1964, as the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in 1969, and as the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) now since 2003.

Positive achievements

Our journey had commenced with the objective of drawing a clear-cut line of demarcation with revisionism and of building the three magic weapons of revolution on having determined a revolutionary line, so that after the successful completion of the new democratic revolution of India, the path could be paved for the world proletarian revolution. All that we could do towards achieving this goal could be called our positive achievements. These are following:

1. In this long period, we were able to defeat the old and new revisionism inside and outside of organisation in theory and practice, and were successful in advancing and developing our revolutionary theoretical line on the basis of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
2. We were also successful in advancing our strategic and tactical line, and were able to develop it to the present situation.
3. We could adopt a strong party programme.
4. We were successful in uniting with genuine revolutionaries of the CPI (ML) and with genuine revolutionaries the MCCI. Besides, we were also able to unite with various Maoist forces.
5. In the international arena too we were successful in our efforts at uniting with Maoist revolutionaries.
6. Today, we are on the verge of achieving historical success in forming an All India Maoist Party.
7. In order to be efficient in all military matters, we have built a Central Military Commission (CMC). We formed the PLGA with the objective of forming a Peoples’ Army and Base Area, and advanced our military line. Besides, we are now engaged in the task of building guerilla base areas.
8. We are in a position to play an effective role in rallying the various forces at our initiative in the building of a strategic and tactical united front.
9. We have been successful in expanding the armed agrarian revolutionary guerilla war and protracted peoples’ war on our own independent initiative, and in advancing and spreading the revolutionary struggle.
10. We were able to wage struggles at one advanced level after another in all old and new areas of struggle, and in building able commands and commanders, and the army.
11. We were successful in building revolutionary culture.
12. We have also been engaged in constructive development of our economic policy and the task of economic production.

Negative aspects

Our journey since our inception has covered a long period till today, and it has been a very challenging journey. It was as challenging from inside as it was outside. There have also been some negative aspects during this long period. They are following:

1. The opportunist elements within our organisation, remained ensconced in the highest committee of our organisation for long time, which caused a substantial loss to the organisation, and the political and military spheres remained obstructed. In particular, the task of making the party more dynamic and active, while viewing it as a unity of opposites and implementing this law in a lively manner, was highly obstructed. The task of developing all military aspects, the military line, military organisation, military activities etc. also was highly obstructed. This was a manifestation of treading the beaten track for long time.

2. For a mature communist revolutionary party-organization, remaining engaged in armed clashes for such a long time with another revolutionary organisation and not being able to work out a correct political solution at the earliest was also a negative experience.

3. Educating the entire ranks on the party line and on other topics was less than the required.

4. In comparison with whatever achievements we could gain in our work in countryside in accordance with our line, the development of our work in the urban areas was far less.