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CHINA REPORT

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Translation of the semimonthly theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party published in Beijing.

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ACTIVELY LAUNCH CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 16, 16 Aug 81 pp 2-4, 22

[Article by Commentator]

[Text] Criticism and self-criticism are one of the three main work styles of our party--our party's hereditary treasure. Our party always uses the powerful weapon of criticism and self-criticism to unify its ideology, strengthen its unity and enhance its combat effectiveness so that it continues to grow and flourish. At this historical turning point of the new period, we should use this weapon to solve the contradictions within the ranks of the people and unify the thinking of the entire party, the whole army and people throughout the country on the basis of the spirit of the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." In so doing, we will unite as one and promote socialist modernization.

It is not easy to carry out criticism and self-criticism, particularly self-criticism. Some people never accept criticism, although they have committed mistakes. Once they are criticized, they see it as wielding the big stick. Some people always sympathize with those who are criticized and bolster them up without making any distinction between right and wrong. An extremely abnormal phenomenon has even occurred in this respect: Those who were criticized have a sudden rise in their social status and those who adhered to principle, upheld justice and dared to criticize were isolated. The severity of the problem does not lie in this phenomenon alone, but in the party's lax and weak leadership over the ideological front. Confronted with various erroneous tendencies, ideology and conduct, some party organizations and leading comrades failed to actively carry out ideological work and dared not criticize. This is a very bad work style.

Why does such a thing happen? It is mainly because of the fact that our inner-party life has been very abnormal over the past 10 or 20 years. The protracted leftist mistakes mixed up the two different types of contradictions. Some problems which did not belong within the realm of class struggle were regarded as class struggle, and ideological differences within the party were treated as line struggle. In so doing, the party's fine tradition of criticism and self-criticism was abandoned. In particular, during the 10 chaotic years of the "Great Cultural Revolution," to achieve their sinister goal of usurping party leadership and state power, the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques carried out vicious and brutal criticism and struggle against the broad masses of cadres and people and inflicted relentless blows on them. Although all these things

happened in the past, their influence and frightful psychological effects have not yet been completely eliminated. Therefore, once the subject of criticism is raised, some people wrongly think that they will become the targets of attack again. To them, nothing can be worse than that! Those who intend to criticize still have a lingering fear and are afraid of repeating the leftist mistakes. Those who are criticized are perplexed and uneasy, fearing that disaster will soon befall. All these are understandable. However, it is wrong to refuse to carry out the practice of criticism and self-criticism or even oppose it. Furthermore, the reluctance to criticize is also caused by the corrosive bourgeois influence which results from our open-door policy with foreign countries. Those who are infatuated with the bourgeois liberalization dislike criticism and self-criticism. It goes without saying that in order to do away with party leadership, they are liable to oppose our practices of carrying out active ideological struggle and criticism as well as self-criticism. Our present task is to overcome the leftist mistakes and eliminate the influence resulting from the sabotage of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques. In addition, we should seriously criticize those who are passionately seeking bourgeois liberalization. In so doing, we will be able to restore and carry forward our party's fine tradition and work style of criticism and self-criticism.

With regard to the problem of criticism and self-criticism, our party has acquired and summed up a full set of experiences in the protracted revolutionary struggle. When the second revolutionary civil war had just started, in the revolutionary army and revolutionary base areas, we adopted the method of criticism and self-criticism to deal with the relations between the party and the masses, between the army and the people, between commanders and fighters and other contradictions within the ranks of the people. During the period of the war of resistance against Japan, we used this method more consciously. Comrade Mao Zedong epitomized it in the formula "unity-criticism-unity," which means starting from the desire of unity, resolving a contradiction through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a unity on a new basis. We extensively adopted this method inside and outside the party and achieved good results. When we review our party's history, we will find out that the enthusiasm of all party members, cadres and masses which has been brought into full play, the growth and flourishing of our party's cause and the successive victories in the revolutionary struggle are inseparable from the correct utilization of the weapon of criticism and self-criticism. The historic Zunyi meeting, the rectification movement in Yanan and the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee unified the party's ideological understanding by carrying out criticism and self-criticism. As a result, the party strengthened its unity and led the revolution to march forward triumphantly. During the recently held 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, we also implemented the spirit of criticism and self-criticism in the process of summing up historical experience and electing and reelecting leading members of the party Central Committee. This has shown that our party has restored and carried forward its fine tradition. However, some of our comrades have forgotten this positive experience and only remember the negative experience of vicious criticism and struggle during the "Cultural Revolution." Of course, negative experience is also very important and should be firmly kept in mind. In so doing, we will be able to carry out criticism and self-criticism more effectively. The problem is that some comrades fail to adopt a positive attitude and draw a lesson from it. Instead, they adopt a passive attitude.

"Once a person is bitten by a snake, he is unduly frightened at the sight of a rope for 3 years." These comrades abandon the normal practice of criticism and self-criticism. How can they do so? We should never cast away the hereditary treasure of criticism and self-criticism which makes our party grow and thrive.

The practice of criticism and self-criticism is a main method for solving contradictions within the party and within the ranks of the people. If we want to make revolution and progress and carry out construction, the practice of criticism and self-criticism is indispensable. It is because within our party and the ranks of the masses, there always exist contradictions between the proletarian and nonproletarian ideologies, between the correct and erroneous ideologies and between the advanced and the backward. If we fail to solve these contradictions, unify our thinking and keep together, how can we win victory in our revolution and construction? To solve these contradictions, we are not allowed to adopt the method of struggling against the enemy or issuing administrative decrees. We can only adopt the method of criticism and self-criticism. If we had failed to actively carry out criticism and self-criticism and correct the erroneous policy of the "two whatevers," would it have been possible for us to score such a great success in the campaign of bringing order out of chaos? We are now using the method of criticism and self-criticism to correct the leftist mistakes and the rightist trends to deal with some people who pursue an erroneous ideological line, adhere to the leftist mistakes, deliberately speak contrary to the party and wantonly spread erroneous political views. We should solve the problems of some people who deviate from the four basic principles, break away from the socialist road and the party leadership and engage in bourgeois liberalization. Some people distort the party's image, defame the socialist system and vilify Mao Zedong Thought. Should we not criticize them? If we fail to criticize them, where will they lead the people to? Some party members or even a tiny number of leading cadres disregard the party spirit, refuse to go about things according to the party's principle, adhere to factionalism, get something done "through pull" and seek privileges. We should also criticize these people. After drawing lessons from past errors, we are determined not to launch any political movement. However, we should criticize erroneous trends, ideology and conduct. We are not allowed to pursue a laissez-faire policy and let matters drift. Otherwise, our party, state and socialist cause will be inconceivably endangered.

Will the practice of encouraging criticism and self-criticism not impede democracy, hamper the implementation of the policy of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" and stifle suggestions? The answer is no. Carrying forward socialist democracy and implementing the "double hundred" policy embody the spirit of criticism and self-criticism. Whether or not we can normally carry out the practice of criticism and self-criticism is an important criterion for testing whether we have truly carried forward socialist democracy and implemented the "double hundred" policy. If we fail to carry out criticism and self-criticism or refute erroneous ideas, literary and artistic works and articles, if we are only allowed to praise and eulogize but refrain from airing divergent views and if all people only lean to one side, can we say that we carry forward democracy and implement the "double hundred" policy?

Whether the practice of criticism and self-criticism will stifle suggestions depends on the correctness of the criticism. If the criticism is correct and those who are criticized fully accept the criticism and thereby make self-criticism willingly, suggestions will never be stifled. The following things might occur: Although the criticism is correct, those who are criticized adhere to their mistakes and refuse to express their own views. As a result, everything quiets down again. This does not mean stifling suggestions and criticisms. We maintain that those who are criticized may defend themselves. They are even allowed to express their erroneous ideas. However, if they refuse to do so, they are allowed to reflect on their cases. Once they have seen things in the right spirit, they may make self-criticism if they are willing to do so. If they are unwilling, they are also allowed not to make any self-criticism. It is all right as long as they correct their mistakes. If they still cannot see things in the right spirit and again express wrong tendencies, they will be criticized repeatedly. The weapon of criticism and self-criticism should be used all the time. We should never allow wrong things to spread unchecked.

Some people might ask: Does it not mean wielding the big stick again? No! We will never repeat the mistakes of the past. We will never seize on people's mistakes, pin political labels at random and wield the big stick. These are not helpful to differentiating between right and wrong within the ranks of people. The practice of carrying out criticism and self-criticism and the act of wielding the big stick are two entirely different things. The practice of carrying out criticism means starting from the desire for unity and adopting methods of discussions, presenting the facts and reasoning things out. Criticism is aimed at helping people, curing the sickness to save the patient and helping those comrades who have committed mistakes to enhance their ideological understanding and correct their errors. Wielding the big stick is entirely different from criticism. Those who wield the big stick fly in the face of the facts, show no respect for the truth, do things in an oversimplified and crude way, exaggerate the mistakes of others to the maximum and always try to overthrow people. There is a great difference between these two methods. Due to the influence of the leftist mistakes over a long period in the past, there still exists the tendency of doing things in an oversimplified and crude way. We should pay attention to this matter. While carrying out criticism, we should attach importance to its effects. We should stress the method of criticism. We should make criticism and self-criticism in a gentle and mild way and avoid doing things in a crude way and going about our work blindly and haphazardly. In particular, we should avoid attacking people from all sides. It is important to adopt an appropriate method which we should never underestimate. We should know that without a good method, it is impossible to get an effective result. Criticism should be carried out within proper limits and be based on investigation and the practice of seeking truth from facts. We should make specific analysis of the seriousness and nature of the mistakes and the conditions in which the mistakes were made. We should not draw hasty conclusions. While judging a person, we must not confine our judgment to a short period or a single incident in his life, but should consider his life and work as a whole. We should not totally negate him because of his mistakes. Those who commit mistakes should be criticized and those who make serious mistakes should be punished. If we fail to do so, we will not be able to educate those who make mistakes and other people. If we adopt an accommodating attitude toward those who commit mistakes, they are bound to slide

farther down the erroneous road. This will eventually lead to irreparable consequences. Criticism cannot be avoided. Vicious criticism and struggle do people great harm. Reluctance to criticize will also ruin people. The practice of criticizing and educating our comrades in time means that we are willing to take good care of and help them. We should never regard criticism as the act of wielding the big stick.

Now some people inside and outside the party are pursuing vulgar practices, which severely hamper criticism and self-criticism. They say: "Grow more flowers, but take away the thorns," "if you do not attack me, I will certainly not counterattack," "keep on good terms with everybody," and so forth. Various kinds of "special personal relations" are established here and there. These comrades are eager to do some other people favors, but unwilling to offend anyone. Lower units do not dare to criticize the higher in fear of being retaliated against and "maltreated." Leaders are reluctant to criticize their subordinates because they are afraid of losing ballots and supporters. No criticism is carried out among comrades because some people are afraid of hurting personal feelings and relations. Some other people wrongly think that once they offend someone, their source of getting "back door benefits" will be withheld. As a result, they say as little as possible while knowing perfectly well what is wrong. To them, personal feelings mean everything. The party's principle, the people's interests and the rise and fall of our country are negligible. They have cast them to the winds. These vulgar practices are a kind of corrosive agent which harms our party and revolutionary ranks. Party members, league members and all fair-minded people should fight against these vulgar practices.

To carry out criticism and self-criticism actively and correctly, we should strengthen the party's leadership. The fact that it is not easy to carry out criticism and self-criticism is not a separate phenomenon, nor simply a problem occurring in a small number of places or units. This problem is widespread. Party organizations at all levels should pull themselves together, be resolute and resolve to change this state of affairs. They should also resolutely change their lax and weak leadership over the ideological front. At present, this is our party's main task. Party organizations at all levels, including party branches at the basic level, are not allowed to turn a blind eye or adopt a passive attitude toward various erroneous tendencies, ideology and conduct. They should be bold and straightforward in carrying out ideological work and criticize people who should be criticized. Otherwise, the party's leadership will be cast aside. Leading members of party committees at all levels should take the lead in carrying out criticism and self-criticism to correct the unhealthy tendencies. Various party organizations at the basic level should set strict and specific demands on party members. All party members should do their best to be models in carrying out criticism and self-criticism and be bold in waging irreconcilable struggles against all unhealthy tendencies. At present, we are not satisfied with the general mood of society and our party's work style. Once we have done a good job in rectifying our party's work style, the general mood of the society will improve.

Practice of criticism and self-criticism is a hallmark distinguishing our party from all other political parties. We should restore and carry forward the party's fine tradition and carry out criticism and self-criticism actively and correctly so that marked progress will be made in ideological work. In so doing, a new atmosphere will occur and our work in various fields will be promoted.

MAO ZEDONG'S MILITARY THINKING IS THE GUIDE TO OUR ARMY'S VICTORIES

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 16, 16 Aug 81 pp 5-15

[Article by Song Shilun [1345 2514 6544]]

[Text] Looking back on the glorious fighting career of the party at a time when we are commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, we deeply cherish the memory of and respect Comrade Mao Zedong and other proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation who made immortal contributions to the Chinese revolutionary cause and realize more clearly the great role of Mao Zedong Thought representing the correct thought of the CCP. The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" adopted at the recent 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee sums up the experiences gained since the founding of the PRC, scientifically evaluates the role of Comrade Mao Zedong in history and Mao Zedong Thought and points out the direction for our future endeavor. The resolution points out at the same time that Comrade Mao Zedong made an extremely outstanding contribution to Marxist-Leninist military theory. Historical experience has proved: Mao Zedong Thought is the banner of our victory and, as its important component, Mao Zedong's military thinking is the guide to our army's victories. At present, to further study Mao Zedong's military theory and practice in depth and to understand and master the theory of Mao Zedong's military thinking comprehensively and correctly and to inherit and develop it in relation to the future practice of war have an extremely important bearing on the modernization of our country's national defense and on the winning of victories in future wars against aggression. Here, I should like to talk about my personal understanding of a few problems in the study of Mao Zedong's military thinking.

I. Main Contents of Mao Zedong's Military Thinking

Mao Zedong's military thinking is a very important component of the entire scientific theory of Mao Zedong Thought. It was a military theory brought into being by the Chinese communists with Comrade Mao Zedong as a representative. By adapting themselves to the historical needs of the Chinese workers' and peasants' armed revolution, they integrated the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolutionary wars. In all the previous revolutionary wars led by the CCP, the theory had displayed an ever-victorious strength.

After the Opium War of 1840, China gradually became a semicolonial and semifeudal society. In this process, the Chinese people waged heroic struggles against the

imperialists and their lackeys, including, among other things, the large-scale peasant war of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the many wars against imperialist aggression, the military struggles waged by China's newly emerging bourgeoisie against the feudal forces and the northern expedition in which the political party of the Chinese proletariat joined its leadership. However, before Mao Zedong's military thinking came into being, no military theory which was suited to the Chinese people's armed revolution and which led this struggle to victory was formulated. It wasn't until the Chinese proletariat led an armed struggle independently and brought Mao Zedong's military thinking into being that the Chinese people found an ideological weapon to win revolutionary victories through armed struggle. It was not at all easy and very amazing that our party should succeed in discovering such a military theory after arduous struggle and bloody sacrifices.

Mao Zedong's military thinking is a scientific theory with a substantial content. It expounds profoundly the Marxist concept of war, and the methods of knowledge and methodology of war and puts forth a whole series of theories, policies and principles in building the people's army and waging a people's war. It has inherited and absorbed the quintessence of the military theory of ancient times and from abroad, attached particular importance to the summation of the practices and experiences in war according to the special feature of the Chinese revolutionary war and created something unique.

Mao Zedong's military thinking points out that war is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes or political groups, and it has existed ever since the emergence of private property and of classes. War is politics with bloodshed. In a class society, it would be impossible to accomplish a leap in social development without revolutionary wars. The central task and the highest form of revolution is the seizure of power by armed force, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war and to eliminate war by means of war. These understandings of the nature of war and the attitude of the proletariat on war are the fundamental basis for the Chinese people in waging revolutionary wars.

Mao Zedong's military thinking considers that war, being a social phenomenon, is more difficult to ascertain and less certain than other social phenomena. That is to say, the element of probability is more prominent. However, war is the inevitable movement of a matter and can be recognized. Military thinking stems from the practice of war and the laws of war are reflections in our minds of objective realities. To study and not only the laws of war in general but, what is more important, the specific laws of war in relation to the war situation at that time and place. In planning and directing a war, the object of recognition must include both the enemy and ourselves. The process of recognizing a situation exists not only before the formation of a military plan but also after its formation. It is necessary, in accordance with the logical order of reconnaissance, judgment, determination and deployment, to deepen our understanding of war, solve the contradictions between subjectivity and objectivity and direct the war correctly. Mao Zedong's military thinking expounds profoundly the dialectical law in the realm of military affairs and makes lively and concrete exposition and analyses of several categories, such as military and political affairs, military affairs and the economy, weapons and man, self-preservation and destruction of the enemy, subjective guidance and objective realities, despising the

enemy strategically but taking their tactics seriously, interior and exterior lines, protracted war and battles of quick decision, offensive and defensive, initiative and passivity, concentration and dispersion, planning and flexibility, mobile and positional warfare, regular and guerrilla warfare, annihilation and attrition and so on, the interdependence between them and their transformation under certain conditions. Comrade Mao Zedong proficiently applied materialist dialectics in military affairs, formulated military philosophical thinking with distinct features which served as a theoretical basis for his complete military thinking.

Mao Zedong military thinking applies the Marxist basic principle that the masses of the people are makers of history in the realm of war and establishes the great thought of waging a people's war by mobilizing, organizing, arming and relying on the masses under the leadership of the CCP. It includes, among other things: the establishment of rural base areas as a strategic base to persist in a protracted revolutionary war; the exercise of unified leadership within the party, government, army and people in the various base areas and, with armed struggle serving as a core, undertaking full responsibility for the organization and application of armed force; the combining of regular army with guerrilla forces and militia, main formations with local formations and of armed masses with unarmed masses; and the direct and indirect coordination between armed struggle, this main form of struggle, and various forms of struggles on various fronts. Therefore, the people's war led by the CCP is completely different from any spontaneous people's war in history and is characterized by a more distinct revolutionary spirit, scientific character, organizational discipline and broad character.

Mao Zedong's military thinking puts forth as a primary problem in an armed revolution the establishment of a people's army and stresses that, without a people's army, the people would have nothing. In the early period of army building, the idea of building a people's army began to be established after the reorganization in Sanwan and the Gutien congress and was gradually perfected in later struggles, forming a whole set of principles for building a people's army. They chiefly include: insisting on the Communist Party's absolute leadership over the army; insistence on the sole purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly; insisting on politics as the commander and the Red Army as an armed group carrying out revolutionary political tasks; carrying out the task of chiefly being a fighting force but at the same time being a work team and a production team; establishing revolutionary political work and making it clear that the revolutionary political and military work under the leadership of the party are of equal importance and should be done in harmony; stressing that political work is to educate the troops with revolutionary spirit and thus ensure that the party's line, principles and policies are implemented and the tasks of the army are accomplished ideologically, politically and organizationally; stressing the three great principles of political work of unity between officers and men, unity between the army and the people and disintegrating the enemy; stressing practice of democracy in the three main fields of politics, economics and military affairs, supporting the government and cherishing the people; observing the three main rules of discipline and eight points of attention; undergoing strict training and accepting demands; and giving full play to the fine style of courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice and arduous struggle. To persist in and carry out these principles will enable our army to

keep forever the innate character of a people's army, to have a strong fighting will and very good internal and external unity, to gain the support and help of the people and forever be in an impregnable position.

Based on defeating with inferior weapons an enemy equipped with superior weapons, Mao Zedong's military thinking puts forth flexible strategies and tactics. Its basic idea is to bring into full play the subjective initiative on the existing objective material basis and strive for victories in war. To this end, it is imperative to proceed from the objective actual conditions of the enemy and ourselves and direct the operations of our army by making use of the strong points and avoiding the weak points. The strategic and tactical principles of Mao Zedong's military thinking include: the basic principles of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy; strategically despising all our enemies, but tactically taking them all seriously; accepting active defense, opposing passive defense and, when strategically conducting a protracted defensive warfare within the interior line, tactically conducting offensive battles of quick decision within the exterior line; knowing that the chief and important forms of battles are mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare but positional warfare can be employed where it is possible and necessary; according to changes in situation and tasks, effecting in time a strategic shift with changes in the chief forms of battles as its content; adopting a prudent attitude in fighting the initial battle and fighting no battle unprepared; using initiative, flexibility and planning; making the elimination of enemy armed forces the main objective; concentrating a superior force to annihilate the enemy one by one; combining interior and exterior lines in strategic offensives and coordination among various strategic areas; blockading the enemy's retreat in a decisive strategic battle and pinning down the heavy forces of the enemy in order to annihilate them; surrounding and outflanking the enemy in strategic pursuit. The implementation of these principles by our army will make it possible for our army to hold a dominant position in some areas when we are in a weak position as a whole, win every battle and gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. When we gradually hold a dominant position as a whole, we can shift from strategic defensive to strategic offensive until we completely defeat the enemy and win a final victory.

What is the fundamental point in Mao Zedong's military thinking? It is to proceed from the actual conditions between the enemy and ourselves and direct the war according to the objective laws of war. To put it briefly, I think it is to seek truth from facts. In 1945, Comrade Zhu De summarized in simple language the "new military strategy and tactics of Comrade Mao Zedong" as follows: "Fight battles according to whatever weapons we have, whatever enemy we are confronted with and according to different times and places. The first is related to the weapons and equipment of the troops, the second is related to the condition of the enemy and the third is related to the various conditions of time and place. This is the materialist method of directing military operations in a practical and realistic manner." This is a very brilliant and penetrating summation.

Mao Zedong's military thinking not only guided the Chinese revolutionary wars to victory and pushed the history of China forward swiftly and violently but also added new contents to the treasure house of the Marxist military theory in a series of major issues which have become the common property of the international proletariat and the revolutionary people.

Mao Zedong's military thinking has a great influence not only in China but also in the world. In waging national or people's liberation wars, many countries in the Third World attach very great importance to absorbing and applying Mao Zedong's military thinking. A few men of insight in the capitalist countries also evaluate Mao Zedong's military thinking very highly. An American military commentator wrote: "Among the communists who have constantly concentrated their attention on the study of military theory, Mao Zedong is the most outstanding"; "of all the strategists, he emphasizes practical results most and he most strongly advocates critical acceptance of experience." In "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," Henry Kissinger pointed out: "Using Leninist theory as a basis, that is, war is the highest form of struggle, Mao Zedong has formulated a body of military theory." "This military theory shows a high degree of ability in analysis and rare insight," "is good at making comparisons between the enemy and ourselves and applying Leninist principles to the actual conditions in China." In "Great Strategy," Collins listed Comrade Mao Zedong as the "most outstanding strategist in modern times." Japanese military commentator Hiroshi Shishido pointed out: "Mao Zedong's articles on military affairs occupy a large proportion of Mao Zedong's works, and military thinking constitutes the cream of Mao Zedong Thought." In the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Japan, quite a large number of these treatises on the study of Mao Zedong's military thinking have been published. This shows that Mao Zedong's military thinking has overstepped the boundary and become an object of study for the world's military thinking. In the history of the world military thinking, Mao Zedong's occupies its due important position.

II. The Formation and Development of Mao Zedong's Military Thinking

Mao Zedong's Military Thinking Derived Chiefly From the Practice of Protracted Revolutionary Wars

Comrade Mao Zedong's recognition of military problems, as his recognition of other things, experienced the necessary process from not knowing to knowing, from knowing little to knowing much and from superficial to profound knowledge. Comrade Mao Zedong served in the army, engaged in a workers' movement and later in a peasant movement for a comparatively long time. In "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," he put forth the proposition of establishing the peasants' armed forces. After the failure of the great revolution of 1927, the objective situation demanded that the focus of our party's work be shifted from the city to the rural areas and that the rural areas be made a base to develop the revolution by chiefly waging armed struggle. Comrade Mao Zedong was the chief representative in realizing this shift. He profoundly summed up the experiences and lessons during the first revolutionary civil war period and put forth at the "7 August" conference the famous thesis that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Later, he personally led the autumn uprising of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area and began to plunge into the armed struggle led by our party. In the early period of leading armed struggle and founding the Red Army, Comrade Mao Zedong had already made some contributions. After some victories and setbacks, especially after suffering some defeats, he led the troops of the autumn uprising to march in the direction of Jinggangshan and creatively put forth the theory of encircling the cities from the rural areas and setting up an armed independent regime of workers and peasants, which was suited to

China's special characteristics. In the reorganization of Sanwan, Comrade Mao Zedong decided on the establishment of the party branch in the companies and the system of party representatives and strengthened the leadership of the party over the army, thus initially formulating the most important principles in building a people's army. After the troops arrived in Jinggangshan, especially after the troops of the Autumn Uprising led by Comrade Mao Zedong joined forces with the remnant forces of the Nanchang Uprising led by Comrades Zhu De and Chen Yi, the 4th Red Army and the popular armed forces led by Comrades Mao Zedong and Zhu De victoriously broke the "encirclement" of the strong enemy by applying the method of "staying clear of the enemy's main force and striking at his weak points." In May 1928, Comrade Mao Zedong summed up the fighting experiences during this period and put forth the military principle of the "16-character formula." That is to say, Mao Zedong's military thinking gradually came into being in this period. Later, the Red Army won successive victories in the struggles against the "encirclement and suppression," suffered subsequent defeat and embarked on the 25,000-li Long March. The process of victory, defeat and victory in the practice of war provided rich contents and laid a solid foundation for the formation of Mao Zedong's military thinking.

The arrival of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi at the end of 1935, the aggression of the Japanese invaders and the anticommunist policy pursued by the Kuomintang made the political and military struggles at that time very complicated. In order to systematically solve in theory the strategic and tactical problems of China's revolutionary war, Comrade Mao Zedong further studied philosophy, the military theories of all times and in all countries, especially the Marxist-Leninist military theory, and the new situation and problems at that time. By applying dialectic materialism and historical materialism, he summed up the extremely rich practical experience in army building and battles during the 10 years of the formation of the Red Army and wrote a number of military treatises. From 1936 to 1938, Comrade Mao Zedong successively published famous military writings, such as "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," "On Basic Tactics in Guerrilla War Against Japan--Surprise Attack," "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," "On Protracted War," "On New Stage" and "Problems of War and Strategy." He also published famous theoretical writings such as "On Contradiction" and "On Practice." These treatises and the related documents published before them did not involve individual problems and arguments of war. They expounded in a comprehensive and profound way a systematic theory on building a people's army, waging a people's war and applying strategy, campaign and tactics, and solved the problems of military theory and practice that needed to be solved at that time. This showed that the military theory of our party, the scientific system of Mao Zedong's military thinking, had already been shaped.

When reviewing this historical period at the enlarged central work conference in 1962, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "On the eve of and during the anti-Japanese war I wrote a few theses, such as 'Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War,' 'On Protracted War,' 'On New Democracy' and 'Introducing the Communist' and drafted some documents on policies and tactics on behalf of the CCP Central Committee. They are a summation of the revolutionary experiences. It was only at that time and not before it that those treatises and documents could come into being because, without experiencing great storms, without

comparing the two victories and two failures and without sufficient experience, it was impossible to fully recognize the law of the Chinese revolution."

In the 15 years that followed, the Chinese revolution experienced the anti-Japanese war, the liberation war and the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. Further tempered in wars, the military talent of Comrade Mao Zedong radiated with more dazzling brightness. As a commander of the whole army, his art in organizing and conducting a war developed to the extent that he could handle it with facility and perfection. The experiences gained in the new and large-scale wars further enriched the existing theory so that Mao Zedong's military thinking developed to a higher stage. The representative works in this period were the related parts in "On Coalition Government" already published publicly, "Concentrate a Superior Force To Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One," "A 3 Months' Summary," "The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theater," "Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation," "Ten Major Military Principles," the concepts of operations for the Liaoxi-Shenyang, Beiping-Tianjin and Huai-Hai campaigns, "Order to the Chinese People's Volunteers" and "Hail the Signal Victory of the Chinese People's Volunteers!" This was an historical process of practice generating theory, theory guiding practice and practice enriching theory.

The battle scale of the 2-odd years of strategic counteroffensive in the liberation war was rare in the military history of China. The theory of strategic counteroffensive in Mao Zedong's military thinking developed as it had never before. For example, Comrades Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping led over 100,000 troops, leaving the base areas far behind and advancing to the strategic deep areas of the enemy. This unique method of offensive had seldom been carried out before. In this period, rich experience was also gained in battles to take big and medium-sized cities. Comrade Mao Zedong issued a lot of important instructions on the theory and practice of taking cities. His instructions included: the principle of army deployment in capturing Jinan and attacking the enemy's reinforcements; the tunnel warfare during the attack on Lingfen; the long siege during the attack on Taiyuan; the combination of long siege and disintegration during the attack on Changchun; the method of cutting off contacts with the enemy forces and of encircling without attacking or cutting off without encircling during the Beiping-Tianjin campaign; the peaceful liberation of Beiping; the tactics of storming heavily fortified points in Tianjin; and attacking Shanghai with one's back to the river, cutting off the enemy's retreat from the sea and the deployment of troops for attacking and holding off enemy reinforcements while attacking the city. With regard to the forms of battle, mobile warfare became larger in scale, the proportion of positional warfare increased constantly and sabotage operations were popularly adopted. Comrade Mao Zedong summed up a lot of new experiences, putting forth the principle of "paying equal attention to annihilating the enemy and giving the enemy an annihilating blow" and "the operational policy of annihilating half of the enemy and putting the other half to flight." After the three great campaigns of Liaoxi-Shenyang, Beiping-Tianjin and Huai-Hai, Comrade Mao Zedong's theory on the timing of strategic decision and area, the fixing of the major direction of the campaign, the use of troops for the decisive battle, the application of encirclement, strategic coordination and cooperation and the organization and direction of decisive battles was more and more perfected. The problem of large-scale and long-distance pursuit was raised

as a strategic problem. In order to suit the needs of strategic counteroffensive, a lot of new tasks were set for army building, such as the direction of the army regularization, the building of artillery troops and troops of engineers, the establishment of an air force and navy, the ample use of modern railways, highways and waterways, the stress on organizational disciplines, the putting forward of the urban policy, the strengthening of the tasks of commanding and logistics, the launching of a new rectification movement in the army and the regularization of political work. It was a pity that Comrade Mao Zedong had no time to make a systematic summation of large-scale wars, especially the practice of strategic counteroffensives in this period in the same way as he had summed up the experiences in strategic defensive operations in the early period of the anti-Japanese war, so that to date they are scattered in the large numbers of cables on battles he drafted.

The war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea was a severe trial of strength and will between the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean soldiers and civilians on the one hand and the enemy on the other, which possessed a first-rate modernization level in the world at that time. The CCP Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong comprehensively analyzed the situation at that time, resolutely made an important policy decision to organize volunteers for a fight abroad and, took advantage of the situation that the enemy did not expect us to send troops to participate in the war. Thus they divided forces to carry out bold attacks, directed our volunteers to enter Korea in secret. They fought side by side with the Korean People's Army and launched a counteroffensive at the start, thus achieving abruptness in strategy and tactics. After fighting five consecutive campaigns, the war situation in Korea became stable. When a stalemate situation occurred, Comrade Mao Zedong summed up the experience of positional warfare adopted by our volunteers, launched a tactical offensive operation against the enemy along the entire front, which later developed into a large-scale offensive campaign, and finally forced the enemy to sign the ceasefire agreement. In this war, Comrade Mao Zedong put forth a series of theories, policies, principles and tactics in operation in waging an international war under modern conditions. These included: policies and discipline for volunteers fighting abroad; close coordination between military attack and political struggle; use of abruptness in an initial battle to gain a favorable position; adoption of small encirclement and war of annihilation to fight the U.S. and British troops; antitank and air drop battles and battles to resist troop landings; a strong defense using tunnel fortifications; tactical offensives and offensives in campaigns; stress on comparing military strength and firepower, using camouflage as well as the establishing strong services in the rear. These theories are especially important as a guide for our army in future wars.

After the seizure of political power throughout the country, Comrade Mao Zedong put forth in time the theory and tasks of building up a modern national defense army and resisting aggression by an external enemy under the new historical conditions and personally led our army to a higher stage of army building. During this period, Comrade Mao Zedong made a series of important and correct instructions on the strategic problems of building our army and the future war against aggression so that Mao Zedong's military thinking continued to develop.

The 25 years during which Comrade Mao Zedong directly led and directed revolutionary wars in addition to the time during which he directly led the military work of our party since the founding of the PRC, amount to half a century. In the history of the proletarian revolution up to now, he was a proletarian strategist who had the longest military practice, the richest military experience and the most comprehensive and systematic military theory. In addition to the works already published, the rich content of Mao Zedong's military thinking found more concentrated expression in his substantial unpublished documents and cables for the direction of war. They are our invaluable military heritage and have yet to be sorted out and studied.

Mao Zedong's military thinking has come into being and been developed on the basis of a people's war. However, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" assumed an ultra-leftist appearance and advocated the so-called "theory of innate genius," saying that "a genius such as Chairman Mao appears once in the world in several hundred years and in China in several thousand years. Chairman Mao is the greatest genius in the world." The publicity they gave to exaggerating individual genius and negating the practice of the masses of the people precisely proves that they were not Marxists. Lenin pointed out: "Practice endows theory with vitality, corrects it and tests it." Facts have proved that, without the protracted practice of the Chinese revolutionary war, there would be no Mao Zedong military thinking.

Mao Zedong's Military Thinking Is the Crystallization of the Collective Wisdom of the Whole Party and the Whole Army

The revolutionary war led by our party represented the fundamental interests of the laboring people, and the masses of people very extensively participated in and supported it. It became the common cause of millions and millions of people. The collective struggle and collective wisdom of the masses of people were the foundation for the emergence and development of Mao Zedong's military thinking.

Our country's revolutionary war broke out and developed in several separate regions. This helped train many outstanding strategists. For a long time, Comrade Zhu De was the commander in chief of our army. He had performed immortal feats in founding the people's army and in leading all past revolutionary wars. Comrade Zhou Enlai was a leader of our party who first went in for military movements. He rendered an outstanding contribution in leading the northern expedition, in training a military backbone for the party, in founding the people's army, in leading the second and the third revolutionary civil wars and in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. Comrades Peng Dehuai, Huang Gonglue, Ye Ting, Fang Zhimin, Liu Zhidan, He Long, Chen Yi, Luo Ronghuan, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Ye Jianying, and other revolutionary martyrs and comrades who are still living have also made immortal contributions to the great cause of founding the people's army and winning a victory in the revolutionary war and important contributions to creating and developing our party's military theory. In fact, they directly participated in activities of creating Mao Zedong's military thinking, whereas Comrade Mao Zedong was an outstanding representative of our party's strategists and was the founder and epitomizer of China's revolutionary military theory.

On the whole, decisions of strategic importance on war problems and the formation of military theory of our party did not rely upon the talents of one or two persons at all but relied upon the leading group's collective wisdom and correct summing up of the experience of the struggle of the masses. Mao Zedong's military thinking is precisely the crystallization of this kind of collective wisdom. The process of the formation of the "Gutian congress resolution," which was the first programmatic document for building our army, clearly demonstrates this. At that time, the Red Army was just founded and there were a series of theoretical and practical problems in building the army that needed correct solutions. In September 1929, Comrade Chen Yi went to Shanghai as the representative of the 4th Red Army to report to the party Central Committee on his work. In accordance with what was reported and with the country's situation, Comrade Zhou Enlai, who was then in charge of the Military Commission of the Central Committee, examined, approved and issued, on behalf of the party Central Committee, "a letter instructing the front committee of the 4th Red Army" (the "September letter"). It correctly stipulated the 4th Red Army's fundamental tasks, orientation for development, strategy and tactics and the current activities. It also gave instructions on relations between the army and the people, organization and training, provisions and the economy and the party's work and leadership. In accordance with the spirit of this letter of instructions from the Central Committee, the enlarged meeting held by the front committee at Changding decided to hold the Ninth CCP Congress of the 4th Red Army. Comrade Mao Zedong made a serious investigation and study on problems existing in the army and solutions to these problems and drafted a resolution. At the end of December, the draft was discussed, revised and adopted at the ninth congress and the famous "Gutian congress resolution" was born. Comrade Mao Zedong's historical contribution was that he condensed correct views from all sectors in the "Gutian congress resolution," put forth concrete measures, dispelled all influences of the old army and formulated a systematic theory on building a people's army. This resolution was implemented not only in the 4th Red Army but in other units of the Red Army as well. It played a very important historical role both in building the Red Army in all aspects and in building our army later.

Comrade Mao Zedong was skillful in concentrating the wisdom of the whole party. In the early period of the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, Comrade Mao Zedong put forth at the Luochuan meeting held by the Central Committee in August 1937 the operational principle of an independent guerrilla war based on taking the initiative. Many leading comrades of our party and our army also published many theses and treatises in succession. In May 1938, Comrade Mao Zedong published the article "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan" and gave a speech entitled "On Protracted War." These two theses summarized the collective experience and made penetrating expositions and scientific predictions on the general political policy, tactics and strategem for the whole war of resistance against Japanese aggression as well as the course and future of the war. Therefore, as soon as they were published, they became representative works of our party and played a tremendous role in guiding the entire war of resistance against Japanese aggression. The famous "ten military principles" was put forth 1 and 1/2 years after the beginning of the war of liberation by Comrade Mao Zedong, who concentrated and summed up our army's rich war experience. We have studied over 30 summaries on the experience of different war theaters during this period. Their contents touched upon nearly all aspects of the 10 military

principles. Comrade Mao Zedong turned our army's war experience into theories and put forth the "ten military principles." This played a very important guiding role in the entire stage of strategic counteroffensive.

During a war, Comrade Mao Zedong would respect very much the views of commanders in different theaters and revise his own views in accordance with actual situations that had been decided. He often sent telegrams to lower levels encouraging them to act promptly on their own discretion and not to ask for instructions for everything. Therefore, the wisdom, capability, enthusiasm and creativeness of commanders at lower levels were given full play. For example, in the campaign along the Beiping-Hankou railway, the Military Commission and Comrade Mao Zedong originally decided that the target of attack should be Hu Zongnan's troops which were reinforcements coming from the north. However, since the situation on battlefields changed continuously and new opportunities for winning the war emerged, the proposals of Comrade Liu Bocheng and Comrade Deng Xiaoping were actually adopted, and Ma Fawu's troops which were coming up from the south were annihilated south of Handan. Another example was the campaign fought in Qinghuabian, Yangmahe and Panlong (that is, the three victories won in northern Shaanxi). Many of the major problems such as selecting targets for attack, determining ways to fight and deploying troops were decided promptly by Comrade Peng Dehuai and others using their own discretion in accordance with the general strategic intentions. Some of the decisions were approved by the Central Military Commission, but others were reported for the record after the campaign because there had been no time to submit them for approval. There are many examples of commanders acting promptly on their own discretion in accordance with the general strategic intentions.

That Comrade Mao Zedong was wise in leading the revolutionary war lay in his being good at listening to views from lower levels and being good at summing up experiences of the masses. Practical experiences of the revolutionary war as a whole belonged to all the commanders and fighters and the broad masses of people and did not belong to a certain individual. These experiences were processed and refined by Comrade Mao Zedong. He turned perceptual knowledge into conceptual knowledge and into scientific military theory with the significance of giving universal guidance. With this theory, we can objectively analyze the situation, find out the intrinsic connections of military movements, predict the progress of a war, and on the basis of these formulate strategic, operational and tactical guiding principles for defeating the enemy and promote vigorous development of the revolutionary war along the correct path.

The victory of the Chinese revolutionary war was the outcome of the protracted struggle of numerous revolutionary martyrs and the broad masses of people, the protracted struggle of the party and the army and the common leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong and his comrades-in-arms. The practice of war and theoretical exploration carried out by our party and our army were the origins of Mao Zedong's military thinking. As stated by Comrade Mao Zedong during the Yanan rectification campaign in 1942, "This is not my own thinking alone but is written with the blood of thousands and millions of martyrs and is the collective wisdom of the party and the people."

Mao Zedong's Military Thinking Was Commonly Acknowledged by the Whole Party and the Whole Army During the Revolutionary Struggle

That "Mao Zedong's military thinking" emerged as a scientific concept was not the result of Comrade Mao Zedong's own proclamation, nor was it imposed on others by someone. It was gradually formed in the practice of revolutionary war.

During the period of the second revolutionary civil war, there was no such expression as "Mao Zedong's military thinking." After arriving in Yanan, many comrades in our party realized the tremendous contribution in theory and in practice rendered by Comrade Mao Zedong to the Chinese revolution when they recalled and summed up the revolutionary course traversed in the previous 10 years. After the failure of the first great revolution the whole country was thrown into darkness. It was Comrade Mao Zedong who, with his farsighted political and military predictions, put forth the theory of armed independent regimes of workers and peasants, personally led an armed force of less than 1,000 people up the mountains to carry out a guerrilla war and opened up a bright and new correct path for the Chinese revolution. Then, using his circumspect and farsighted strategy and direction, we smashed several offensives of our powerful enemy and won successive victories in the struggle to counter "encirclement and suppression" again, with his superb military art and powerful force of political unity, we shattered the enemy's siege pursuit and interception. Under Mao's leadership, the Red Army completed the unprecedented Long March. After the Red Army arrived in northern Shaanxi and before it gained a firm foothold, it was Comrade Mao Zedong again who led the army in smashing the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" campaign in the Shaanxi-Gansu border area, adopted the policy of "seeking consolidation through development," directed the eastern and western expeditions and scored great victories and laid a foundation for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area, turning it into a solid rear base in the war of resistance against Japanese aggression. Of course, all this was realized through the collective struggle of the whole party, the whole army and the masses but was also inseparable from Comrade Mao Zedong's correct leadership. Consequently, starting in 1940, expressions such as "Comrade Mao Zedong is China's strategist," Comrade Mao Zedong's works "are typical examples of Marxism-Leninism of the Chinese pattern," and so on appeared in articles published in Yanan's papers and magazines. In July 1941, Comrade Luo Ronghuan put forth in an article the scientific concepts "Comrade Mao Zedong's thinking" and "Mao Zedong Thought." During the Yanan rectification campaign in 1942, many leading comrades of our party and our army used in succession the expression "Comrade Mao Zedong's thinking" in articles and reports.

In the Resolution on Certain Historical Problems adopted at the enlarged Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth CCP Central Committee in April 1945, the concept "Comrade Mao Zedong's military line" was officially used to distinguish between it and Comrade Mao Zedong's "political line," "organizational line" and "ideological line." In a military report given at the Seventh CCP Congress in May the same year, Comrade Zhu De used the concepts "Comrade Mao Zedong's military line," "military theory" and "military doctrine." In a report on the founding of the army, Comrade Chen Yi used the concept "Mao Zedong military school of thought." Later, the concept "Mao Zedong's military thinking" appeared in reports given by leading comrades of the Central Committee and in their articles published in papers and magazines. After the founding of the PRC, the aforesaid expressions

gradually converged into one--"Mao Zedong's military thinking"--which has been used till now.

Both the content and concept of Mao Zedong's military thinking emerged, formed and developed in the process of the Chinese revolution and in the practice of the revolutionary war. It was the product of the revolution, was historical inevitability and is objective existence. The practice of the Chinese revolutionary war inevitably led to the emergence of the Chinese revolutionary military theory but it did not emerge spontaneously. The reason why this kind of theory is related to the name of Comrade Mao Zedong is mainly because he personally led and directed the revolutionary war but also because of his own knowledge, wisdom, courage, resourcefulness and diligence. Comrade Mao Zedong's remarkable talent and contribution shown in handling complicated problems in military struggle was not only unparalleled among all leaders of revolutionary classes in China's modern history but is also unparalleled among other leaders of our party. It is only natural that the name of Comrade Mao Zedong is used for our party's military theory.

III. The Guiding Role of Mao Zedong's Military Thinking in Future Wars

Undoubtedly, Mao Zedong's military thinking will remain the guiding ideology in building our army and in future wars. We should not waver in the least. However, in studying the guiding role played by Mao Zedong's military thinking in future wars, we should guard against two tendencies. One is to copy mechanically, disregarding specific conditions, being influenced by the "two whatevers" viewpoint. Another is the nihilist attitude that Mao Zedong's military thinking is "no longer effective" and is "out-dated." We should adopt a dialectical and historical materialist attitude, comprehensively and accurately study the system of Mao Zedong's military thinking and use its stand, viewpoints and methods to study and solve problems in future wars.

Mao Zedong's military thinking emerged and was formed in China in the first half of the 20th century. The specific political, economic, military, scientific, technological and cultural conditions of China's society at that time inevitably endowed Mao Zedong's military thinking with the characteristics of the time, that is to say, Mao Zedong's military thinking was unexceptionally governed by historical conditions. The "two whatevers" viewpoint ignores the characteristics of the time and demands the mechanical application of all past military principles to wars at present and in the future. It looks upon Mao Zedong's military thinking, which is full of vitality, as a rigid and eternal religious doctrine. This goes completely against Marxist theory of cognition and goes completely against Mao Zedong's military thinking.

At an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission in 1958, Comrade Mao Zedong said that the 10 military principles should be supplemented and developed, and some might have to be revised in accordance with actual conditions in future wars. He himself strictly followed the principle of proceeding from reality and seeking truth from facts in directing wars. With the change of objective conditions, he constantly abandoned his outdated conclusions and replaced them with new ones. For example, in building the army, Comrade Mao Zedong strongly stressed during the period of the Red Army that we should "conscientiously admit the guerrilla

nature of the Red Army," but near the end of the war of liberation, he put forth the demand that we "should further regularize all the field armies." During the early stage after the founding of the PRC, he again asserted that we should overcome "the phenomenon of no centralism, no unity, lax discipline, oversimplification and guerrilla practices," and decided on the task of "building a regular and modern army for national defense." He also gave many instructions on developing the navy, the air force and modern technical arms as well as instructions on developing modern industries for national defense. On the problem of operations, during the period of the Red Army, Comrade Mao Zedong put forth, "to us, positional warfare is basically useless." "Basically, it cannot be used for defense. Similarly, it cannot be used for offensives either." In the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, he stated, "because of changes of conditions and needs of our tasks, attacking positions in the third stage will become rather important" and "positional warfare will be put in an important position." In the war of liberation, he demanded that our army "should attach great importance to studying tactics for attacking positions." During the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, he further put forth the task of "launching a powerful positional war," asking us not only to launch positional attacks on the modern enemy but also to carry out powerful positional defense. These examples show that each concrete conclusion drawn by Comrade Mao Zedong was based on certain actual conditions and it was changing and developing itself. Lenin once pointed out that an absolute requirement of Marxist theory was that a question should be raised within a specific historical scope. Putting forth a question without consideration of concrete historical circumstances means knowing nothing about the basic requirements of dialectical materialism.

Tested by decades of wars, Mao Zedong's military thinking has struck roots, blossomed and borne fruit in China. History has proved that this is correct thinking. In the war against hegemonists' large-scale aggression which we may encounter in the future, we still have to deal with a superiorly equipped enemy with our inferior equipment, rely on a people's war to defeat the enemy and fight a war under China's concrete conditions. Therefore, there should be no doubt about the guiding role Mao Zedong's military thinking will play in future wars. We should not think that Mao Zedong's military thinking has lost its practical guiding significance and refuse to acknowledge its scientific value just because wars will be fought under present conditions or just because Comrade Mao Zedong made mistakes in his later years. To our party and our army, no other military theory can replace Mao Zedong's military thinking. If we actually throw away something which will still be useful to us in the future, we will make a serious mistake. A correct attitude should be persisting in proceeding from actual conditions in all aspect on the enemy's side and on our side, seeking truth from facts, affirming what should be affirmed and negating what should be negated.

The stand, viewpoints and methods of Mao Zedong's military thinking will still be the guiding ideology which our army must follow in studying and guiding future wars. They are: adhering to the stand of proceeding from the people's interest and relying on the masses in carrying out a war; persisting in using the dialectical and historical materialist viewpoints and methods in studying and guiding a war; persisting in using the "arrow" of Mao Zedong's military thinking to shoot the "target" of a future war, and constantly studying new situations and solving

new problems in order to explore new principles and new conclusions which are in conformity with future reality. In order to attain this goal, we must go deep into Mao Zedong's military thinking, correctly sum up our army's experience, and at the same time, we must try our best to investigate, analyze and study in detail the characteristics of future wars and absorb all that is advanced and beneficial from other countries. Only in this way can we understand the laws of action in future wars and give correct guidance to future wars.

We must adhere to the basic tenets and most of the principles of Mao Zedong's military thinking but should also supplement them in accordance with new situations. For example, in upholding the idea of a people's war, we must add modern conditions to it. Under modern conditions, there are many aspects in a people's war which differ from the people's war in our army's history. In adhering to the strategic principle of a positive defense, we cannot fully practice quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and operations but should practice instead defensive warfare of strong positions in a certain direction or at a certain place together with the field armies' quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in order to keep the stability of the defense. In adhering to the armed forces system of integrating field armies, local armies, guerrillas and militiamen, we should establish garrison forces and reserve forces adequate for the fighting tasks. Viewed from the whole process of a war, we should mainly rely on offensive warfare to solve the problem. However, during the first stage of a war, we should mainly use positional defensive warfare, with powerful support and coordination of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare in order to gradually consume and annihilate the enemy's strength and bring about a change in the balance of strength between the enemy and us. Concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one is still the basic way for our army to fight. However, when we use this way of fighting on the battlefield, we have to study and solve a series of new problems because of development in weapons and technical equipment. It is the same in strengthening the army. We should continue to adhere to a series of principles, systems and methods which have been proved effective, but we should supplement, improve and develop them in accordance with the general mission of a new historical period and changes in the objectives of our work.

Some of the principles have to be revised before they are applicable. For example, the formulation that the tasks of our army are those of a fighting force, a work team and a production team no longer suits future needs. Under the conditions that political power has been established throughout the country, according to the principle of division of labor among the party, government and army, the army should make the task of forming a fighting force its main task. Naturally, it is still indispensable to do some tasks of a work team and production team when necessary, such as doing a good job in mass work, establishing closer relations between the army and the government and between the army and the people, and engaging in some agricultural and sideline production, but they are subordinate to that of forming a fighting force. It is absolutely impermissible to involve the great majority of the army in the localities and have them serve as a work team and a production team without being something of a fighting force as was the case in the "Great Cultural Revolution." The principle of "not making the preservation and capture of a city or a place the main objective" is also not wholly applicable to future wars. With regard to Comrade Mao Zedong's specific instructions in the past, it is necessary to stress the understanding of their

spirit and essence and apply them flexibly according to specific conditions. For example, the word "infantry" in "future battles will mainly rely on infantry" should be understood as the concept of "ground forces" today. It is obviously very insufficient to rely on the infantry alone. Again, in shooting a tank, "Do not shoot at a distance of 100 or 200 meters but shoot at a distance of 30 or 50 meters" should be understood as stressing fighting at short distance and should not be practiced as a regulation on shooting distance. The above are only a few examples. In a word, those that do not suit or do not wholly suit the needs of future wars should be revised or supplemented accordingly. Otherwise, they will only affect the war adversely.

A few military principles that are completely unsuitable to the situation in future wars should no longer be applied. For example, the principle of large formation warfare without a rear is unimaginable in a modernized army. In future battles, military supplies and provisions, weapons, ammunition and equipment should mainly come from supplies in the rear. The principle that "our army's sources of manpower and material are mainly at the front" is no longer applicable in future wars. In accordance with the lessons of the Paris Commune, Marx and Engels pointed out in 1872: "This program [referring to "The Communist Manifesto"] is now outdated in a few places." This did not reduce in the least the theoretical value of "The Communist Manifesto" as a proletarian revolutionary program. To abandon the principles which are no longer applicable is to preserve the vitality and strong scientific character of Mao Zedong's military thinking.

Mao Zedong's military thinking has not put an end to the truth but has opened up the way to recognize the truth continuously. Although Comrade Mao Zedong passed away, Mao Zedong's military thinking as the military theory of the CCP will still develop along with the development of history. It is necessary to rely on the comrades in the party and the army to sum up systematically some of the things which Comrade Mao Zedong did not have enough time to sum up systematically during his lifetime. It is also necessary to rely on the comrades in the party and the army to raise to the level of theory and add to the scientific system of Mao Zedong's military thinking some of the things we are now practicing but which he was not able to practice during his lifetime. For example, the theory of strategic offensive, the theory of coordinated fighting among different types of armed forces and services, the military principles of people's war under the modern conditions, especially the principles of campaigns and the tactical principles and so on are all subjects which need to be studied systematically, developed and updated.

When studying the guiding role of Mao Zedong's military thinking in an actual struggle, it is necessary to eliminate the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" and restore the true features of Mao Zedong's military thinking. Flaunting the banner of publicizing and explaining Mao Zedong's military thinking, the two counterrevolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing passed off the sham as genuine, and distorted and tampered with Mao Zedong's military thinking, with the result that many basic theoretical problems were distorted beyond recognition. For example, the practice they followed in building the army is "to do a good job in ideological revolutionization" turned the People's Liberation Army into the only army in the world which "studied culture only but no military affairs." Obviously, this should be repudiated and resolutely rectified.

It is necessary to clear up in theory the relation between army building and battle. The relation between army building and battle is a relation between the organization of armed force and the application of armed force, that is, the relation between the means and the objective. Army building is a means, battle is an objective. Army building should be subordinated to the needs of battle. In other words, it is necessary to build an army according to the needs of war. What is the use of spending such a large amount of money on something of the scope of the People's Liberation Army if it is not for the purpose of defending the fruits of revolution and construction, guarding against aggression and subversion by the enemies and winning the war? In the expression "maintain an army for a thousand days to use it for an hour," the word "an hour" means war, winning a war. However, this shallow theoretical problem was greatly confused by the counterrevolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. In the past 10 years or more, they talked of the means in the absence of the objective, the army building in the absence of doing battle and turned the building of our army into "movement is everything and there is no objective." To date, there are still a lot of questions on which a unified understanding has not been reached. For example, some comrades are presently discussing the question of whether it is necessary to hold a party committee meeting to make a resolution. To strengthen the leadership of the party is a principle we must persist in, but it does not merely express itself in holding a party committee meeting. The question of whether it is necessary for a party committee meeting to make a resolution in wartime wholly depends on whether or not the war conditions permit doing so. The meeting can be held if there is time; it can also be done away with if there is no time. As a matter of fact, during the war years in the past, resolutions were not always made by a party committee meeting. The future war has the characteristics of being abrupt, flexible, intense, continuous, in great depth and three-dimensional; the course of war and the time of battle may be shortened and the high-speed nature of it may be enhanced. Under these circumstances, what should be stressed is that the commanders should calculate the timing accurately, make correct resolutions without losing a moment and act correctly and resolutely at their own discretion. Here, working methods must be subordinated to the needs of war unconditionally and everything is aimed at the victory of war, campaigns and battles. It is impermissible to subordinate the interest of the war to working methods. It is necessary to pay attention to eliminating the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing on similar questions. It is first of all necessary to make clear the basic interests of the party so that their correct relationship can be handled well and the understanding can be unified.

In a word, when studying Mao Zedong's military thinking under the new historical conditions, it is necessary to stress the method of linking theory with practice, that is, the method of seeking truth from facts. The method of study which starts from concept and goes to concept, from principle to principle and is divorced from practice should be prevented and overcome. On the one hand, it is necessary to recollect the specific historical practice at that time from the theoretical abstractions and find out their theoretical bases and conditions. In this way it is possible to understand the spirit and essence of the theory, understand the content of the theory and principles more profoundly and learn from them Comrade Mao Zedong's stand, viewpoint and methods in recognizing and directing a war. On the other hand, it is necessary to conduct conscientious investigations and studies on the actual conditions of both the enemy and ourselves, apply flexibly

the historical experiences from the angle of characteristics and developments and study and solve the existing and future problems. We should apply the stand, viewpoint and methods of Mao Zedong's military thinking in the study of the present conditions of both the enemy and ourselves, such as politics, economy, military affairs and natural conditions, find out the essence and laws from the phenomena and, by applying these laws, solve a series of problems in building up the national defense under modern conditions, including army building and engaging in battle. This is the correct style of study in our study of Mao Zedong's military thinking.

An invaluable spiritual treasure of our party, Mao Zedong's military thinking will guide our actions for a long time to come. Likewise, in the realm of military affairs, Mao Zedong's military thinking will still be a guide to building our army and engaging in battle. Provided we apply the stand, viewpoint and methods of Mao Zedong's military thinking in the study of new situations and problems, enrich and develop the military theory of our party with new conclusions conforming to practice, we will certainly be able to greatly push forward the various tasks of our army and the modernization of national defense.

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THE COMMUNIST IDEAL IS THE CORE OF SOCIALIST SPIRITUAL CIVILIZATION

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[Article by Xie Hong [6200 1347]]

[Text] In the upsurge in building socialist spiritual civilization, people have generally paid great attention to the question of establishing communist ideals. This is reasonable. Ideals and convictions are people's spiritual props. Lofty ideals can kindle people's fervor, stimulate people to exercise their ability and wisdom, and help people acquire fine moral qualities and sentiments. In modern or ancient times, in China or elsewhere, all those who have achieved success and contributed to human progress have been encouraged by lofty ideals. Whether a state or nation possesses lofty ideals is related to whether it is capable of opening up a new epoch and whether the whole nation will, with one heart, build itself and the country into a prosperous and powerful nation. Ours is a socialist country under the leadership of the Communist Party, whose historical mission is to lead the people to achieve communism. The socialist system, which we have established and will continue to develop and perfect, is the preliminary stage of communism. We must advance toward higher stages. Therefore, we must take the communist ideal as the core in building socialist spiritual civilization.

Our country has entered a new period: socialist modernization. The hopes of those who were extremely worried during the decade of upheaval about our party's and our country's destiny, have been rekindled, and they have unswervingly embarked on a new road of endeavor. It is particularly satisfying to note that the hundreds of millions of young people in our country are maturing in the socialist modernization. They encourage themselves with heroic slogans, such as "the four modernizations begin with my endeavor" and "we are the ones who will achieve the four modernizations" and so on. They are gradually forming themselves into vigorous contingents which perform rush jobs on various fronts. However, during the decade of chaos, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" wantonly distorted and falsified Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and thus spoiled the reputation of the communist cause. Moreover, complications and setbacks have occurred in the international communist movement, and some superficial phenomena of the capitalist world have been misleading people. Consequently, some people among our contingents, particularly a minority of young people who have little experience of life, and who do not quite understand Marxism, are vexed and confused about ideological questions. Some even have a so-called feeling of "disillusionment." Although only a minority of people have this ideological

problem, the appearance of this problem as a social trend of thought is owing to deep-rooted social causes and must not be given inadequate attention. If we let this ideological problem spread freely, it will be very difficult for us to build a socialist spiritual civilization and the cause of communism will be seriously disrupted.

The appearance of such erroneous views and confusion on the question of establishing the communist ideal is not only owing to objective reasons but is also owing to subjective reasons, which are mainly as follows: First, people do not understand that the communist ideal includes some scientific foresight that is compatible with the laws of social development. Second, the communist ideal is viewed merely as a distant prospect unrelated to reality. People do not understand that the realization of the communist ideal is a real process of movement. Third, people view the path toward the goals embodied in the communist ideal as plain and smooth. Their faith in the communist ideal wavers when they encounter even slight setbacks. Fourth, people divorce the communist ideal from, or even set it against, personal ideals. The communist ideal is considered in abstract terms, and specific personal ideals are used to negate the communist ideal. If these problems of understanding are not correctly solved, the communist ideal cannot really be established.

I. The Communist Ideal Is a Scientific Prediction

The communist ideal is not an illusory fantasy. Instead, it is a scientific prediction that conforms to the laws of social development.

In human history, there have been two categories of "communist ideals" of different natures. The first category consists of the ideals utopian communists and socialists which appeared prior to Marxism. The second category consists of the Marxist communist ideal. Although the first category of ideals are of some value, they are really utopian and cannot be realized. The kind of communist ideal which we now advocate, and which people are required to devote themselves to, is a scientific prediction which will inevitably come true and which has been derived by Marxism from the laws of development of human society, and in particular from the laws of development of capitalism, through criticizing the purely imaginary nature of all the "utopias." The utopian socialists did perceive the defects and evils of the capitalist system, the serious class antagonism in capitalist society, and also certain factors inherent in that society which would lead to its own disintegration. They vividly depicted the broad prospects of communism which they envisaged. However, they did not really understand the laws of social development but merely made conjectures according to their subjective desires. They did not consider the proletariat as the principal force in overthrowing the old world and building a new world, but placed their hopes on the pity and compassion of those in power. Therefore, the kind of communism which they imagined "will more seriously tend to become a pure illusion, the more detailed its formulation is." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 3, p 409) Discussing this theory of utopian communism, Engels said that this "immature theory corresponds with the not yet ripe conditions of capitalist production and with the immaturity of the classes. The solutions to social problems are hidden in the not yet developed economic relations, and therefore people can merely create solutions by imagination." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 3, p 409)

In the earlier half of the 19th century, the contradictions inherent in capitalist society continued to intensify, the strength of the proletariat reached an unprecedented magnitude, and the worker movements developed on a new scale and in new forms. It was only then that conditions were ripe for Marx and Engels to turn the communist ideal into a science. Marx carefully studied the movement of contradictions in capitalist society and in various stages of development of human history. He discovered the basic causes of social development, and by analyzing commodities as the cells of capitalist society, he discovered that the secret of the exploitation of the workers in capitalist production was the extortion of surplus value. He further revealed all the existing and latent contradictions in the entire capitalist society as well as the orientation of the development of these contradictions. By means of his two great discoveries, namely, the materialist historical outlook and the theory of surplus value, Marx discerned the trend inherent in capitalist production toward a high degree of concentration in population, means of production, material wealth, and means of livelihood. He discerned the sharp contradiction between the socialization of production and the private ownership of the means of production. He revealed that with capitalist production relations, the relationship between the capitalist and the workers will forever be one of enslavement and exploitation. Marxism tells us that, whatever political, economic and ideological tricks the bourgeoisie might play and whatever "fascinating" scenes might appear in the capitalist world, the class relation whereby the capitalist wants to extort surplus value from the workers will remain unchanged; the sharp contradiction between the socialization of production and the capitalist ownership of the means of production will remain unchanged; and the laws of social development governing the inevitable dying out of capitalism and the inevitable triumph of communism, which is based on public ownership of the means of production, will remain unchanged. Moreover, Marxism reveals that capitalism had, in the first place, given birth to its gravedigger, the proletariat. With the development of capitalism, the cruel and relentless exploitation of the working class by the bourgeoisie and the various evils of the capitalist system will be increasingly more clearly exposed and will inevitably awaken the proletariat. Tempered by class struggles and guided by Marxist ideology, the proletariat will inevitably continue to develop into the strongest class and will become the social force to bring about the great historical change from capitalism to communism. Precisely because of Marx' two great discoveries, communism has finally changed from a utopian thought into a science.

Some comrades think that the communist ideal is merely a conclusion from theoretical deduction; it amounts to a tentative idea, not yet tested by practice, concerning the future society, and its reliability is dubious. This reflects a one-sided and narrow understanding about testing truth by practice. Of course, it is impossible today to fully affirm by means of practice that communism is a social system which will inevitably be practiced in the future. However, the bases on which the theory of communism is established, in particular the materialist historical outlook and the theory of surplus value, have been studied in depth and verified systematically, have been both derived from practice and testified by the practice of worker movements, and are therefore scientific. Engels held that the theory of surplus value, which "shook the whole civilized world like a bolt from the blue," has attained a degree of "rigor and accuracy" comparable to that attained by the natural sciences. The laws of the development of human history, which Marx discovered, constitute a scientific conclusion derived by

summing up the history of human development over several thousands of years. Just as conclusions in the natural sciences must not be doubted because they have been derived through scientific experiments and a series of scientifically based and rigorous proofs, the inevitable realization of the communist ideal must also not be doubted.

II. The Realization of the Communist Ideal Is the Process of a Real Movement

The communist ideal is not an illusory fantasy, not only because it is a scientific prediction but also because this ideal has become the proletariat's practice and has been developed into a global communist movement. The history of the international communist movement over the past 100 years and more has been the most convincing proof of the scientific and realistic nature of the communist ideal.

We know that communism, as an ideal, cannot be realized overnight. Its realization requires a long and arduous historical process in which people can only follow the principles of communism to make new theoretical generalizations in the light of new historical developments and new practical experiences, and to gradually effect the realization of communism through their own revolutionary struggles and creative labor. It is precisely in this sense that Engels held that "communism is not a theory; instead, it is a /movement/." [slantlines denote boldface] ("Collected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 4, p 311) Expounding the same idea in "German Ideology," Marx and Engels said: "Communism amounts to a most practical movement in which practical means are employed to pursue practical goals." In this short sentence, the word "practical" has been used three times to repeatedly emphasize that "communism" is a real and practical movement and that it is definitely not something purely imaginary. Discussing socialism as an elementary stage of communism, Lenin also said that socialism is not a "readymade system"; instead, it is "a struggle in which we proceed from today's goal to tomorrow's goal and gradually approach the ultimate goal." ("Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 19, p 26) It is also precisely in this sense that Marxism sometimes states that, as a theory, communism is the theoretical generalization of this practical movement and that, as a social system, communism is the end result of this practical movement. If we say that, as a theory, communism is a scientific one, then, as a "practical movement," communism is the product of the integration of this ideological theory with practice. If we say that, as a social system, communism amounts to some fine aspirations, then, as a "practical movement," communism has existed in the world for more than a century. Over the past 100 years and more, to realize the communist ideal, the communists in many countries of the world, working with the broad masses of working people amid various difficulties and adversities which are beyond description, fought bloody battles, waged various kinds of struggle, effectively changed the face of the world and promoted historical development. If the communist ideal lacks a scientific and practical basis, how can it occupy such an important place in the hearts of proletarians all over the world and encourage hundreds of millions of people to go through all kinds of ordeals for its sake? And how could the international communist movement, which the communist ideal promotes, last a century without declining and even become an irresistible historical trend that is in the ascendant?

The most important achievement of the communist movement is the establishment of the socialist system in a number of countries. In these countries, under the leadership of the communist party and the guidance of Marxist ideology, regimes which represent the people's interests, and also the system of public ownership of the means of production, have been established, and the working people have become the masters of their countries. In a socialist society, the irrational phenomenon of some men exploiting or oppressing others have been ended, and new relationships of equality and mutual help between man and man have been established. All this embodies an element of communism. In particular, the communist party's leadership over the cause of socialism and the guidance of the communist ideology are more definitely elements of communism. This demonstrates that in these countries, the communist ideal has begun to be a reality on a partial basis, communist morals have begun to take shape, and the communist system has begun to take root. This ironclad evidence further proves that the cause of communism will inevitably continue to develop and will gradually achieve global victory.

III. The Path to the Realization of the Communist Ideal Is Full of Difficulties and Setbacks

Our country's socialist cause has experienced some setbacks and difficulties. Relapses have also occurred in the international communist movement. These are objective reasons why some comrades who had enthusiastically pursued the communist ideal in the past, in particular some young comrades who lack experience, take a skeptical and wavering attitude toward the communist ideal. These comrades believe that if the realization of the communist ideal is an inevitable law of social development and if the socialist system has begun to be practiced in some countries, then there should not be any more setbacks or relapses, and the path to the ideal realm should be smooth. Obviously, this is an erroneous view of the laws of social development. These comrades do not understand that the process of building socialism and realizing the communist ideal is one of overcoming various difficulties and obstacles. Without going through setbacks, it is impossible to realize communism, the great cause that is unprecedented in history.

In the development of human history, the continual replacement of lower social forms by higher ones, and the ultimate advance toward communism, represent objective laws independent of man's will. However, this is only true of the overall trend in the development of human history. If we consider the path of development, because of the influence of various kinds of complicated conditions, the realization of the communist ideal must inevitably go through various kinds of difficulties and setbacks and might even experience temporary failures. The history of the development of human society has repeatedly testified that there is not any new mode of production or new social system which can be firmly established overnight without going through numerous setbacks and failures. It is precisely these setbacks and relapses which demonstrate that the laws of social development are irresistible. History has testified to Comrade Mao Zedong's scientific thesis: struggle and fail, struggle again and fail again, until victory is achieved--this is the logic behind the people's endeavor.

The laws of development of human society are irresistible. However, through the creative activities of the masses of people, these laws are understood to an

ever-increasing depth and are mastered and applied increasingly more correctly. Therefore, each step of progress in human history and each replacement of one social form by a new one are closely related to people's ideals and conscious struggle. The closer the replacement of social forms is to the plane of higher stages of development, and the more closely such replacement is related to mankind's understanding of their own strength and the objective conditions, the more important will be the role of people's conscious struggles that are motivated by ideals. In particular, when setbacks and catastrophes appear on the road of progress, revolutionary ideals, as an embodiment of the trends of historical progress, can mobilize the whole class and the masses of people to struggle bravely to surmount difficulties and reverse the situation. The greater the difficulties, the greater will be the power demonstrated by ideals.

When the revolution is suffering from a setback, revolutionary ideals are most essential, and also the ideals of some people who are weak-minded will be most prone to vacillation. In history, there have been many recanters who changed from fervently extolling revolution and pursuing ideals to cursing revolution and expressing contempt for ideals; and there have also been many whose ideals were shattered, who became pessimistic and dejected, and who would never be able to recover after a setback. In the past, in times of war or when the revolution was at a critical moment, the wavering of one's revolutionary ideals would often lead one to become politically demoralized or even to deviate and recant. In cracking down on revolution and disintegrating the revolutionary forces, the class enemies also frequently proceeded from disintegrating people's revolutionary ideals and conviction in the revolution. Today, during the period of socialist construction, the communist ideal is also of very great significance to our overcoming of difficulties, achievement of victory and preservation of revolutionary integrity and vigor. In the face of setbacks and failures, it is sometimes difficult for one to avoid feeling worried and depressed for the time being. However, if it is because of some temporary setback that one forsakes the communist ideal and becomes a shortsighted and mediocre person, or changes over to taking the Western bourgeois world as the ideal to pursue, then one is already degenerating and will ultimately be discarded by the times.

Currently, what attitude should be adopted toward the catastrophe caused by the counterrevolutionary cliques headed by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing? This is a severe test for every revolutionary. Comrades whose faith is firm and who understand the laws of social development adopt a materialist attitude in the first place, acknowledge this fact and sum up their experiences to obtain lessons. They discover and correct the imperfections and irrational aspects of various specific systems of ours. In particular, they have been able to acquire confidence and strength from the new atmosphere prevailing in our party and our country since the counterrevolutionary upheaval caused by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" was brought to a halt. Setbacks and failures caused extremely great disruption and losses to our undertakings and even brought about retrogression. However, the fact that our party has correctly handled the setbacks and failures will enable us to avoid taking tortuous paths in the future and to more resolutely march on toward the brilliant communist future.

IV. Integrate the Communist Ideal With Daily Life and Work

Some comrades think that the communist ideal is too lofty and remote. They hold that it is of little practical significance at present to advocate fighting all one's life for communism. Instead, it is more useful to emphasize the specific goals for each individual's endeavor. This is a muddled idea. What we call ideals amount to people's aspirations for and pursuit of a happy future, and they constitute a reflection of the inevitability of historical development in people's minds. The magnitude of the future realm which people can envisage mainly depends on the conditions made available by the times and their class status. Therefore, ideals and faith are products of the times. In different times, different classes cherish different ideals. In our time, only the communist ideal can be the most advanced ideal. Any specific personal ideals can be rational and can have a good future only if they are illuminated by the communist ideal.

It has been mentioned that the communist ideal is a scientific prediction derived from the laws of social development. This scientific prediction was derived according to the conditions available at the time in which the derivation was made. In various historical stages, people had put forth various goals for endeavor according to the conditions of their times. It was precisely these fine ideals which encouraged people and promoted historical progress. However, the ideals of any class at any time in history are not comparable to the communist ideal, which is absolutely established on the understanding of the laws governing social development. These ideals cannot envisage, as the communist ideal can, such broad and distant prospects.

We know that communism is a movement and a long process. To realize communism necessitates arduous fighting by several generations. Therefore, in each historical stage in the course of realizing communism, the communists would often put forth some specific goals for struggle. However, whatever the number of historical stages involved or the number of goals of struggle, overall, they constitute some parts of the communist movement and some links in realizing the communist ideal. We advocate establishing the communist ideal so as to heighten people's consciousness and make them know the inevitable link between each specific goal of struggle and the communist ideal. We must remember the ultimate goal, namely, communism, and always stay on the high plane of communist ideology. Only thus can we soberly understand the place and role of each step and each reform in our forward march within the context of the entire cause. Only thus can we discover the appropriate orientation of development for our next step. In this way, we will not halt at a certain historical stage because of our successful attainment of a specific goal of endeavor. That is why the CCP did not drop down to the level of democrats although it led the democratic revolution, and why it now advocates the communist attitude toward work although it is implementing the socialist principle of "distribution according to work done." As a world outlook, the communist ideal was able to guide us in our opposition to imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism and in the stage of new democratic revolution, we were encouraged by the communist ideal. If this is the case, now that we have established the socialist system and have come closer to communism than in the past, how can the communist ideal be "lofty, remote" and of little practical significance?

The communist ideal does not negate or preclude any personal ideals which one establishes according to society's needs and one's own situation. Quite the contrary, the communist ideal can encourage people to establish lofty aspirations and great ideals in the people's interests and to contribute to the cause of communism at their own posts. This is because the cause of communism is a practical activity involving millions of people. It requires the availability of workers in all realms and fields who are faithful to the cause of communism and requires the availability of outstanding qualified personnel. Our cause not only needs the workers' and peasants' creative labor and the PLA army's faithful protection, but also needs tens of thousands of politicians, economists, scientists, educators, writers, scholars, teachers, engineers, accountants, doctors, service workers in various trades, and so on. If we neglect any field or fail to perform any item of work, even if this is the most common type of work about which nobody pays attention, our socialist construction will not be successful and the communist ideal will not be realized. Therefore, in our country, whatever type of work one performs, if one makes some outstanding achievement and serves the people wholeheartedly, one must be praised and respected. Commenting on the French proletariat's initial uprisings, Marx said: "The workers of Lyon thought that they were pursuing political goals alone and that they were merely soldiers of the republic. However, actually they were fighters for socialism." ("Collected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 1, p 486) Similarly, we can say that in our country, if one's ideals are beneficial to the people and conducive to social development, then these ideals are inevitably and inherently related to the realization of communism whether one is subjectively aware of this or not. We advocate establishing the communist ideal precisely in order to arouse this kind of awareness so that personal ideals can be integrated with the communist ideal. Without specific personal goals of endeavor and without the implementation of the communist ideal among all trades in various aspects such as work, labor, study and daily life, communists will merely be what Lenin criticized as "braggarts," and their communist ideal will become unrealistic big or empty talk. If specific personal goals of endeavor are not linked to the communist ideal or are not guided by communist principles, then, even if such goals are progressive, their positive significance will nevertheless be limited.

V. Carry Out the Martyrs' Behests and Dedicate Our Lives to the Struggle for Communism

In an article written in 1913 in memory of Pottier, author of the "Internationale," Lenin highly appraised this song, which had played an important role in propagating communism, as "the song of the proletariat the world over." This vividly describes how the communist ideal unites the proletariat throughout the world.

Today, the communist ideal has been more widely spread over the whole world. This is particularly so in our country. However, the discovery of Marxism by the Chinese people and the taking of communism as their own goal of struggle have involved several generations' efforts and also the sacrifice of numerous lives and a great deal of blood as the price. Please look at China's modern history since 1840. During that period, the feudal rule, which had lasted more than 2,000 years, entered its final phase. The imperialists, one after another, took advantage of the corruption and incompetence of the Chinese rulers and poked their tentacles into our country. Our motherland became a semifeudal,

semicolonial, poor and backward country. To save our country and people, the progressive elements in China advanced wave upon wave, fought bravely and arduously attempted to learn from the West. They employed all methods and attempted applying all sorts of ideological weapons but could not radically put an end to the semifeudal and semicolonial situation of our country. The mighty Taiping heavenly kingdom movement was defeated. The reform movement of 1898 proved abortive. Bourgeois theories, such as the theory that human rights are endowed by heaven which Yan Fu and so on introduced from the West, could not work. The Yihetuan [Boxer] movement was suppressed. Although the revolution of 1911, led by the great Chinese bourgeois revolutionary Dr Sun Yat-sen, did overthrow the Qing emperor and put an end to the rule by feudal dynasties which had dominated our country for several thousands of years, it failed to alter the Chinese people's tragic lot. Imperialism, fierce as a wolf or tiger, still continued to practice exploitation and oppression. Our nation was subjected to extremely great humiliation, and our people experienced extremely great misery. The Chinese revolution took on a new look only when the Chinese people discovered Marxism and when the CCP was born and assumed the leading position in the revolutionary struggle. In Russia, where the October Revolution took place, it was also through much arduous effort that Lenin and his contemporaries discovered Marxism and make the communist ideal the goal of struggle. Reminiscing about this historical process, Lenin said: "Over a period of half a century, Russia really experienced unheard-of agony and sacrifice. With unprecedented revolutionary heroic courage, and with unbelievable stamina and selflessness, it was engaged in investigation, study and experimentation. It experienced despair. Through examination and taking Europe's experience as a reference, it /finally discovered/ [in boldface] Marxism, the only correct revolutionary theory." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 4, p 182) Judging from the experience of China and Russia, the birth and spread of the communist ideal has taken a very arduous and tortuous path.

Since the communist ideal has been accepted as a scientific belief, it has become a spiritual force which shakes the foundation of the old world. Reactionary forces have tried by all means to defile it, prohibit it or limit its spread. On the contrary, the revolutionary people have studied and propagated it, disregarding all dangers. The brave communists will firmly adhere to it once they are determined to take communism as the ideal for which they will fight all their lives. Punishment with death or imprisonment will not dampen or suppress their lofty aspirations and great ideals. Comrade Li Dazhao was the earliest propagator of Marxism in our country. When the enemy's noose was placed around his neck, he was absolutely fearless and denounced the enemy in a stern voice: "You will be unable to hang communism just by hanging me today!" Shut up in a prisoner's cage, the martyr Fang Zhimin took the opportunity of being paraded through the streets to propagate revolutionary truths to the people. Before his execution, he firmly declared: "The enemy can chop off our heads but they cannot shake our faith, because the doctrine we believe in is universal truth." In the enemy's law court, Wang Ruofei took the opportunity to vehemently express the views of the Communist Party. The martyrs of Qu Qiubai, Zhou Wenyong and Chen Tiejun sang the "Internationale" on their way to the execution ground. Numerous communists shouted "Long live communism" when they bravely faced execution. To show their firm faith in communism, some martyrs in prison composed songs or poems, wrote books to present their theses, or wrote

slogans or embroidered them on red flags. Some martyrs, on awakening in a pool of blood after having been subjected to cruel tortures, dipped their fingers in the blood, clenched their teeth, and wrote verses on the walls to express their heroism, such as "Cruel tortures and lure by promise of gain will never subdue me; it is not manly to bend my head and shed tears." The revolutionary martyrs' deeds move our hearts and souls. Their spirit of bravely dedicating themselves to the communist ideal fills the universe as the rainbow spans the sky. In history, never has any other ideal been comparable to the communist ideal in exerting such a great influence or in arousing such faith, spirit of self-sacrifice and heroism.

Over the past 60 years, our party has developed from one consisting of some 50 members at the time when it was founded to the invincible force of today with a membership of several times 10 million. In our territory, irrigated by the blood of revolutionary martyrs, the irrational system of man exploiting and oppressing man has been abolished, and the 1 billion Chinese people are bravely struggling to build our country into a modern socialist power with a high degree of material and spiritual civilization. Today, the path leading to communism is still very long, and various kinds of difficulties and obstacles still exist. We must, therefore, inherit and carry forward the revolutionary martyrs' spirit of courageous dedication to realizing the communist ideal. We must not give up halfway the great cause which our revolutionary predecessors opened up for us and which should last thousands of years. History has testified, and future events will continue to testify, that the communist ideal will forever be the banner which encourages us to advance. Any infatuation with the past and also the yearning for and pursuit of the capitalist society are dreams of the declining classes and will be doomed to provide no way out for people.

Presently, the upsurge in building the socialist spiritual civilization, the core of which is the communist ideal, is developing on a magnificent scale with the launching of various movements such as the "five stresses and four beautifuls," "learning from Lei Feng and establishing new styles," "possessing four things, stressing three, and not being afraid of two," "carrying out production in a civilized way," "carrying out commercial activities in a civilized way," "providing services in a civilized way," and so on. We can predict with certainty that, with the building of the socialist spiritual civilization, people's faith in communism will be further confirmed, and the people of all nationalities in our country will be further encouraged to make new contributions to the four modernizations and human progress!

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SEEK TRUTH FROM FACTS AND WE CAN FIGHT A HUNDRED BATTLES WITHOUT RUNNING INTO DANGER

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 16, 16 Aug 81 pp 23-28

[Article by Ding Weizhi [0002 0251 1807]]

[Text] Seeking truth from facts is a fine tradition that has emerged in the course of our party's long revolutionary struggle, and it is a thoroughly scientific ideological line that has been summed up in the course of long revolutionary practice.

The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC," passed by the party at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, showered praise on the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, calling it, together with the mass line and independence and self-initiative, the living soul of Mao Zedong Thought. It can be seen that if we are to fully learn Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, we must comprehensively study and master seeking truth from facts and ingrain it into our flesh and bones.

A Review of Our History Over the Past 60 Years

Why is seeking truth from facts so correct and important?

Rather than calling this a question of theory, let us first call it a question of practice. The practice of the Chinese Communist Party in leading the Chinese revolution for 60 years furnishes a most convincing reply to this question.

Studying the revolutionary history of the 28 years before the founding of the state and the 32 years after its founding, and comparing the two, we come across an historical phenomenon that sets people thinking, that is: a great historical turn of events occurred in the course of both historical stages, and each historical turn of events marked a triumph for the spirit of seeking truth from facts.

Naturally, we are not saying that before every historical turn of events, our party basically lacked the theory and practice of seeking truth from facts or that after an historical turn of events we can henceforth absolutely avoid the mistake of violating the principle of seeking truth from facts. The important thing is that great historical turns of events change with the importance of

the guiding thought. From this historic moment, our party consciously and clearly began to bring the ideological line guiding the overall situation into line with seeking truth from facts.

Before the Zunyi conference, the Chinese communists, who had in Comrade Mao Zedong an outstanding representative, applied in the hard times following the defeat of the great revolution the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the analysis of China's concrete national condition and eventually established their headquarters in the rural areas. They established revolutionary bases, launched an armed struggle, encircled the cities from the rural areas and then took the path to complete national victory. This was a path combining the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. This path shows originality in two ways: It was the first in the history of China and was fundamentally different from the old-style peasant ways, being a people's war under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and the leadership of the Communist Party. It was the first in the history of the international communist movement and something that had never appeared before in the then already published Marxist works and the history of revolutions abroad. It bore the fruits of a revolution that was born and nurtured on Chinese soil. The reason why the Zunyi conference, which was convened at a crucial point in the revolution, can be singled out as an epochmaking historical turn of events is, looking at it ideologically, merely because this time-tested line of seeking truth from facts was officially established as the guiding principle for the whole party. Now that seeking truth from facts had become the ideological line guiding the whole revolution, the face of the whole revolution changed overnight and miraculously wrested itself from the depths of defeat onto the path of victory. Through the summing up and improvements of the Yanan period, seeking truth from facts finally became the fine style held up by the whole party for exhortation. In the period of the democratic revolution, the best phase of the Chinese revolution appeared. From that moment on the revolution developed rapidly, much to the surprise of our enemies, our friends at home and abroad, and even ourselves.

By the time of the socialist period, the nature of the revolution and its task and historical content had changed. However, the principle of seeking truth from facts was once again subjected to an historical test, one that determined its strength and value. In a vast country like ours, with a large population, poor foundation, backward economy and complex conditions, there was no precedent in human history we could turn to in our task of carrying out socialist revolution and construction. History and books were of no use, so what could we rely on? We relied on the guidance of Marxist-Leninist theory, on a concrete analysis of the actual conditions prevailing in China and on the integration and formulation of the two into various lines, principles and policies that were in keeping with the actual conditions prevailing in China. Why is it that we have been able to heal our war wounds in such a short time and bring about a fundamental improvement in the national economy? Why is it that, in such a vast country with circumstances peculiar to itself, we have been able to complete in such a splendid fashion the task of socialist transformation? Why is it that, in a country where the productive forces are so backward, we have been able to achieve preliminary, yet important, results in the field of economic reconstruction? There is only one answer. They were the result of our party and the people proceeding from actual conditions prevailing in China and creatively applying

Marxism-Leninism to formulate principles and policies that were in keeping with the actual national condition. Only because we have sought truth from facts have our efforts been of any avail and our results outstanding. On the other hand, the many mistakes we made in the last 32 years and the many twists and turns we have experienced were all, as far as our guiding thought is concerned, contrary to the principle of seeking truth from facts, for subjective desire was substituted for an understanding of the actual conditions, and so principles, policies and measures not in keeping with the conditions prevailing in the country were formulated and carried out. Take as an example the socialist transformation of agriculture. Why was it that for a time errors were committed and that demands were too hasty, work too careless, changes too drastic and forms too standard? Quite obviously, this was because the party proceeded in its guiding thought from subjective desire and was not capable of adequately studying the actual subjective situation. The "Great Leap Forward" and rural collectivization movement launched in 1958 further emphasize just how serious the consequences would be should our guiding thought ever deviate from the principle of seeking truth from facts. The leftist errors committed in those few years caused us to miss the opportunities for socialist construction that presented themselves in our country in the wake of the eighth party congress. This, combined with other factors, ultimately caused the national economy to suffer heavy losses. Looking back at that lesson 20 years ago, it is all the more evident how important it is for a ruling party like ours, which is leading the cause of socialism in such a vast country, to adhere to the principle of seeking truth from facts.

The great historic significance of the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee is, as far as ideological line is concerned, that it laid down the principle of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts, restored and carried forth the fine traditions of the party, resolutely affirmed results according to the principle of seeking truth from facts and corrected errors. In particular, it conscientiously corrected the serious errors committed during the "Great Cultural Revolution," which were entirely contrary to the principle of seeking truth from facts, as well as past leftist errors. At the same time, and by seeking truth from facts, it analyzed the nature of society and the task of the revolution at the country's present stage, and produced strategic policies that have shifted the focus of work to socialist modernization. Recapturing the spirit of the Yanan period, seeking truth from facts once again became the lofty ideal strived for by the whole party. Our party consciously adhered to the principle of seeking truth from facts, judged what was right and wrong, formulated policies, and examined and evaluated all our work. In the field of economic reconstruction, we decided, by seeking truth from facts, to implement the policy of "readjusting, restructuring, consolidating and improving" the national economy, resolutely corrected the leftist mistakes still being committed in economic work and put forth in no uncertain terms the correct principle of carrying out economic reconstruction by proceeding from our country's national conditions. The fact that since the 3d plenary session socialism in our country has grown and flourished proves that since the Yanan period the history of our party has entered another vintage era--the best period within the historical stage of socialism.

Only by seeking truth from facts can we fight a hundred battles without running into danger. This is the conclusion drawn for us by 60 years of revolutionary history.

Seeking Truth From Facts Is a Scientific Approach

Seeking truth from facts is a scientific approach. Communists must adopt a truth-seeking ideological line when they are engaged in or leading the revolution, that is to say, they must be scientific and rely on the scientific theory of social development--Marxism-Leninism--to guide their conduct and transform the world. Therefore, any blind and reckless conduct and all unscientific approaches and methods are incompatible with the revolution in which communists are engaged.

Science and dishonesty do not go together. Comrade Mao Zedong stressed on many occasions that science is an honest discipline and that scientists are honest people. Marxism is a science and an honest discipline. Marxists are honest people. This is general knowledge, to say the least. It is, however, also a most important truth. Taking part in any scientific undertaking entails adopting an honest approach as a basic starting point. Marxists are usually also accustomed to using the phrase "seeking truth from facts" in the sense of "being honest" or "basing things on facts." For example, as far as situations are concerned, we must depict them as they really are, so that both sorrow and happiness are reported; as far as history goes, it must be related as it really was so that both the glorious and seamy sides are told; as for personages, we must make an honest appraisal of them, so that both merits and faults are noted; as for work, this must be summed up in an honest fashion, so that both achievements and errors are accounted for in their true proportions. This kind of honest approach is called seeking truth from facts. This kind of simple and straightforward approach is precisely the cornerstone safeguarding the scientific character and accuracy of our work and our cause. Comrade Liu Shaoqi pointed out at an enlarged work conference of the party Central Committee in 1962, which was attended by 7,000 people, that the formula of "90 percent accuracy" should not be randomly applied. The margin of error in some localities might be 10 percent, but in others it might be 30 percent or more, in which case errors might well account for the greater part. This fully illustrates Comrade Liu Shaoqi's honest approach of seeking truth from facts. It cannot be denied that among our ranks there are still some people and things not in line with this approach and style. Have there not, in the course of economic reconstruction over the past 32 years, been many occasions when we resorted to deception, reported false achievements and covered up errors? In the course of political work, have there not been many occasions when we convicted the innocent and made misjudgments? What do these negative phenomena prove? They prove that as long as there is a small minority of people with a dishonest approach, they will, given half a chance, make dishonesty a common practice, causing serious social consequences capable of harming the party, country and people. Naturally, in our socialist country, to think to prosper by dishonesty is wishful thinking. Even if one were to succeed in this way every now and then, one would not escape the inevitable consequences.

Since the ideological line of seeking truth from facts was advocated at the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, certain misjudgments have been corrected, historical disputes cleared up, and honest people and things rehabilitated, honesty being the good habit to which people aspire. We believe that since the party and Central Committee have shown the way, this good habit will,

with some efforts by the whole party, blow into every corner of society like a spring breeze. All party undertakings and our whole society and nation will benefit no end from the changes occasioned by this habit.

Not only is an honest approach necessary for adhering to the principle of seeking truth from facts, but probing with an honest approach into the internal laws governing objective things is also necessary for obtaining truly scientific knowledge. If we say that the question of whether we are honest is a question of whether we are willing to acknowledge and respect the actual objective situation, then, apart from this, there also arises the question of whether we are able to understand the objective situation. A scientific approach in its true sense involves: understanding objective truth as well as acknowledging it; discerning the nature of phenomena as well as being able to see them; understanding necessity as well as chance; and knowing why things are the way they are. No matter what we are talking about, it is only when people are able to discover, understand and make use of laws that they can be said to possess scientific knowledge in a field. This was what Comrade Mao Zedong was driving at when he creatively interpreted "seeking truth" as studying the laws governing objective things.

Understanding objective laws and consciously operating according to them is a rather exacting demand and not one that can be readily met. Even when dealing with a simple thing or process, it is usually not easy to grasp its internal laws, let alone when dealing with highly complicated social issues. It is undoubtedly only after repeated practice, understanding and arduous investigation that the laws governing the leadership of revolution and construction in a vast country like China can be gradually mastered. However, with 60 years' experience behind us, we can see that, whether in the period of revolutionary war or peacetime reconstruction, all the major problems encountered by our party are governed by laws. Besides, as communists, we are, under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, perfectly able to understand laws and strive for the initiative. We gradually found out, in the course of our practice of revolutionary war and through our victories and defeats, the laws governing the waging of revolutionary war in China, and summed up the strategy and tactics for guiding the Chinese revolutionary war, thus securing victory in this war. In the course of our practice of socialist construction, we have, likewise, through success and failure, gradually found out the laws governing construction in China. Although this process is far from complete, as long as we adhere to the path of searching diligently for laws and further adapt our construction principles and policies to our national conditions, the victory of construction will be ours for the taking.

Seeking Truth From Facts Is the Living Soul of Mao Zedong Thought

Reality and facts, since they are objects of people's cognition and exist objectively, are invariably concrete rather than abstract, and specific rather than general. Proceeding from reality can only mean proceeding from concrete and specific reality, or else we will be indulging in empty talk. Without understanding the concrete characteristics of things, we cannot understand things themselves or the laws inherent in them. The point so constantly talked about, namely, that concretely analyzing concrete things is the living soul of Marxism, means precisely this. So, strictly speaking, when we say that seeking truth from

facts is a scientific approach, this should include, and in fact must include, the concrete analysis of concrete things. If we discuss the facets of this implication, concrete characteristics, which are the objects of people's cognition, can be approached separately from two angles. On the one hand, we have the peculiarities inherent in comparisons between objects, like the peculiarities which different things, localities, nations and countries possess. This is the basis of the difference between one thing and another. If we do not understand this characteristic of the difference between things, we will not be able to differentiate between or understand anything. On the other hand, we have the peculiarities inherent in comparisons between different stages in the developmental process of objects themselves. All things move, change and develop. Their existence is a process and, in the process as a whole, stages are bound to occur as a result of changes in their nature. That is to say, at any given stage in the development of a thing, there are bound to be characteristics different from other stages. If we are unable to understand the peculiarities inherent in the different stages of the developmental process of a thing, or if we do not understand the peculiarities inherent in changes and the peculiar changes, we will still basically be unable to understand things in motion and the nature and laws governing the motion of things necessarily situated in one developmental stage or another. Combining the above two aspects, the principle of seeking truth from facts adhered to by us demands that we understand and grasp the specific characteristics of things in given developmental stages and adopt them as the starting point for all our actions.

This shows more than ever that the principle of seeking truth from facts is by its nature absolutely incompatible with any empty abstract fantasy or fixed, ossified dogma. We advocate proceeding from reality in all cases, but reality is invariably concrete and in a process of developing. Therefore, we cannot but proceed in all cases from the concrete realities of development. Thus, the principle of seeking truth from facts is full of the spirit of development and creativity. When we say that the concrete analysis of concrete things is the living soul of Marxism and that the principle of seeking truth from facts is the living soul of Mao Zedong Thought, the meanings are interlinked. The superiority in "living soul" lies in the word "living." Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought embodies this kind of living soul. It must itself be living, brimming with life, lively and active, filled with exuberant vitality and continuously growing, developing, expanding and enriching itself so that it never dries up.

When we say the concrete analysis of concrete things is the living soul of Marxism, we are on the one hand stating that it is only by concretely analyzing concrete facts under the guidance of the universal tenets of Marxism that the effectiveness of the Marxist understanding and solving of problems can be ensured, enabling it to have a real effect in guiding our action. On the other hand, we are also stating that it is precisely by concretely analyzing concrete facts, continuously studying new situations and probing new problems, that new scientific understanding can be obtained and new scientific conclusions drawn, thus continuously enriching the content of Marxism itself and ensuring that Marxism will never degenerate into ossified dogma. Marx left our world nearly 100 years ago, but his theories are still full of youthful vitality, one of the marvels of which is that Marxism is the most creative and least conservative of scientific theories in human history.

Mao Zedong Thought is a crystallization of the great wisdom of Chinese communists, an outstanding representative of whom was Comrade Mao Zedong. It gives full play to this creative spirit inherent in Marxism and, with the universal truth of Marxism as its guide, concretely analyzes and solves problems arising out of the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. By applying Marxism and seeking truth from facts, Comrade Mao Zedong and his comrades-in-arms created a completely new set of experiences and theories in connection with the Chinese revolution, such as establishing base areas, carrying out agrarian reform and guerilla warfare, encircling the cities from the rural areas, analyzing the national bourgeoisie and so on. All these major theoretical principles and practical policies are not only Marxist; they are also entirely new, for they are not to be found in any Marxist textbook or experience of a foreign country. It is precisely because they are not subject to the limitations of textbooks and established practice and because by seeking truth from facts, they have analyzed the new realities of the revolution, that they have enriched the content of Marxism. From this we can see, that the basic reason for the greatness of Mao Zedong Thought, or the reason why Mao Zedong Thought became Mao Zedong Thought, lies in its truth-seeking analysis of the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, thus making a new contribution to Marxism of historical and international significance.

Seeking truth from facts means not allowing ourselves to be tied down by set rules and old ideas, facing reality and weeding through the old to bring forth the new. Seeking truth from facts means freeing ourselves from all spiritual shackles and carrying forward and developing Marxism with a bold creative spirit. By laying down emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts as the ideological line at the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, the party displayed scientific insight into the internal relationship between seeking truth from facts and emancipating the mind. Mao Zedong Thought is basically the product of the emancipation of the mind. Without emancipating the mind, we cannot apply Marxism in a truth-seeking way, and even less can we develop it in a truth-seeking way, for we will only be able to follow the same old routine. Emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts are organically linked. As Comrade Deng Xiaoping said: Emancipating the mind means making our thoughts conform with objective reality and the subjective conform with the objective, which is in fact what seeking truth from facts is.

Each step of scientific progress constitutes an emancipation of the mind. Marxism is a science. It is continuously advancing along the course of the continuous emancipation of the mind. The serious leftist errors of the 10-year "Great Cultural Revolution," together with the leftist errors committed before it, have for some time constituted a spiritual shackle fettering people's minds. It is precisely because of the prolonged existence of leftist errors in the past and also because they were for a time allowed to take control of the whole situation, that they have had such a profound influence on people. Since practice proclaimed the bankruptcy of leftist errors and since the smashing of the "gang of four," the continued existence of leftist errors has for quite a substantial period of time been the most serious obstacle to bringing order out of chaos and carrying on work as usual. The culmination of leftist errors was the error of adhering to the "two whatevers." Our party, by leading discussions on the criterion of truth, criticized and corrected the error of the "two whatevers,"

thus enabling the minds of the whole party and people to be greatly emancipated and the truth-seeking spirit of innovation to be developed in an unprecedented manner. However, it should be acknowledged that the influence of leftist errors to which cadres at every level have been subjected for medium to long periods of time cannot be wiped out at the drop of a hat, and that some comrades cannot avoid considering and dealing with problems in the same old leftist way, which in our country definitely constitutes a conservative traditionalist force and a rigid way of thinking. Contaminated by this way of thinking, a person will grow obstinate and conservative, be unwilling to study new situations and solve new problems, and even be ill-disposed towards anything new. We are engaged in a new construction undertaking, one which our predecessors never engaged in. We must have the boldness of innovation inherent in Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and truly foster the spirit of seeking truth from facts. Therefore, mention must be made of the fact that the conservative, rigid way of thinking embodied by some comrades has already become a stumbling block to the carrying out of our great task of innovation and modernization. Studying the "resolution," fostering the spirit of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts and clearing away this mental obstacle are undoubtedly tasks deserving top priority.

A Major Pioneering Work of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Historical Development of Marxist Philosophy

The ideological line of seeking truth from facts is something that has been summed up by the whole party in the course of our long revolutionary practice and the crystallization of collective wisdom. However, it is on this question that Comrade Mao Zedong did the most work and made the greatest contribution. Putting forth and laying down the principle of seeking truth from facts was one of the enormous historical feats he performed.

Transforming the philosophical principles of dialectical materialism into a complete set of concrete and vivid methods by which we communists operated and leading us in the revolution in how we should think and work was a major pioneering work of Comrade Mao Zedong's in the historical development of Marxist philosophy. He elevated to a philosophical status, but in a clear and simple fashion, the various problems concerning ways of thinking and working arising in the course of our revolutionary practice and consummately reduced them to theoretical summaries, thus deepening people's understanding of the nature of problems. At the same time, he also transformed a philosophy that had seemed unfathomable to most people into an intimate and practical tool with which to observe and solve ideological and practical problems and with which we feel on close terms, thus truly turning Marxist philosophy into a sharp weapon for the proletariat and the popular masses in their effort to understand and transform the world.

Mao Zedong Thought, with the principle of seeking truth from facts as its living soul, embodies through and through the spirit of materialism and dialectics. This original philosophical exposition of Comrade Mao Zedong's, because it delineates so clearly, vividly and profoundly the internal relationships between the profound principles of dialectical materialism and our everyday thought and work, touches us deeply and is of great persuasive power. Comrade Mao Zedong's philosophical theories have an important enlightening effect on the

revolutionaries' way of thinking and working. They occupy an important and irreplaceable position in the treasure house of Marxist philosophical theory. As for saying that Comrade Mao Zedong himself, because he divorced himself from reality and the masses in the twilight of his life, committed serious errors and caused heavy losses to the revolution, that just proves that the ideological line of seeking truth from facts is something in the nature of an objective truth and that, regardless of whom we are dealing with, it cannot go against its own principles.

We have sufficient reasons for adhering to and continuously advancing Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Any opinion setting adherence to Marxism against its development is wrong. If we divorce ourselves from adherence and talk glibly about development, or if we divorce ourselves from development and talk glibly about adherence, what will be adhered to or developed will definitely not be true Marxism. Only by resolutely adhering to the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and by using it to guide our new revolutionary voyage can we avoid straying onto the wrong path and further enrich and develop it with new experience and theories. At the same time, it is only by continuously using new experience and theories to develop Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought that the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought we have in our hands will be truly alive and full of vitality. Any opinion that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is outdated, or that it has already been developed to its limits, is wrong. A correct approach toward Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought can only be formed by unity between adherence and development and its continuous advancement in a truth-seeking way. This is what Comrade Hu Yaobang meant when he said: "The advancement of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is the basic approach and unshirkable historical duty of us Chinese communists."

We have a task to perform and there is no turning back. Let the whole party take up this heavy yet honorable task!

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MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT IS THE SHINING BANNER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 16, 16 Aug 81 pp 29-34

[Article by Lu Zhichao [4151 0037 6389]]

[Text]

I

The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" made a comprehensive yet brief exposition on the formation of Mao Zedong Thought, its tenets, its guiding role and the correct attitude we should adopt toward it. This exposition set things to right on an extremely important problem about our party's guiding ideology which had been confused, and showed that our party's understanding of this problem had been raised to a new level.

There had been no debates in our party's history on how to correctly understand Mao Zedong Thought and what attitude we should adopt toward it. During the period when Mao Zedong Thought was being formed and developed step by step, the dogmatists represented by Wang Ming refused to admit its scientific nature and guiding role. Moreover, they attacked it and defiled it. After the Zunyi conference and the Yanan rectification campaign, based on the lessons drawn from years of practice and through years of study and discussion in the party, and finally through the approval of the "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions" by the 7th Plenary Session of the 6th CCP Central Committee in 1945, the whole party gained a unified and correct understanding of Mao Zedong Thought and its guiding role. At the seventh national CCP congress, Mao Zedong Thought was unanimously and definitely recognized to be the integration of the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution and was deemed to be the guideline of all the work of our party. As the whole party had attained a correct understanding and unity on the major issue of its guiding ideology, our party's cause developed very smoothly and the party led the people throughout the country in quickly achieving the victories of the war of resistance against Japan and the war of liberation and in quickly achieving the victories in the recovery of our national economy and in the socialist transformation after the founding of our nation. The 11 years between the "seventh and eighth national CCP congresses" was a historical period in which our party achieved its most magnificent victories. This showed how important it was to have a correct and unified understanding on the party's guiding ideology.

After the completion in the main of socialist transformation, our country entered a new historical period of all-round socialist construction. In this situation, new achievements were made in integrating Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the socialist construction in China, and the party's guiding ideology was further developed. Comrade Mao Zedong summed up the experiences in the practice of our socialist construction and put forth quite a few ideas that remain valuable even today. Meanwhile, after 1957, he began to deviate from the path of the integration of Marxism-Leninism with practice in China on certain questions and this developed later into a series of erroneous viewpoints that gave rise to the "Great Cultural Revolution." It was also during this same period, namely, the late 1950's and the early 1960's, that the contents of Mao Zedong Thought began to deviate from practice and science. Owing to vicious distortion and wanton exaggeration, on the eve of and during the "Great Cultural Revolution" the contents of Mao Zedong Thought was distorted to an extreme. First, despite the opposition of Comrade Mao Zedong, some people attached three adjectives-- "gifted, comprehensive and creative"--to Mao Zedong Thought and treated what was drawn from the summing up of the experiences of the whole party as the gifted creation of Comrade Mao Zedong, the individual. Second, they unrealistically exaggerated Mao Zedong Thought and wantonly described as the "pinnacle" of and "a brand-new stage" in the development of Marxism-Leninism. Third, the erroneous views of Comrade Mao Zedong in his later years, especially his view on the so-called "continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat," was said to be the main content of Mao Zedong Thought and even said to be the "third milestone" marking the development of Marxism-Leninism. They boasted that "every word of Comrade Mao Zedong's was the truth itself" and "had the effect of 10,000 words" and that whether understood or not, Mao's words must be carried out. Thus, Mao Zedong Thought was no longer a guide to our actions, but was turned into religious doctrine and an object of worship. While paying lip-service to upholding the banner of Mao Zedong Thought, Lin Biao and his ilk actually distorted and smeared this banner beyond recognition. Naturally, the mistakes in the leading ideology of the party and the serious confusion in this respect inevitably had an extremely detrimental effect on the party's practical activities.

From the time of the smashing of the "gang of four" to that of the 3d plenary session, throughout the party criticism of the erroneous policy of the "two whatevers" was unfolded and struggle was waged for upholding the principle that practice is the sole criterion for testing truth. These activities were undertaken to set to right the basic problem in the party's guiding ideology, which had been thrown into confusion, and to continue to eliminate the residue left by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing and their ilk concerning Mao Zedong Thought. This struggle was carried out simultaneously with the great change in the party's practical work and acted to promote it and was in turn promoted by it. The policy of emancipating the mind put forth by the 3d plenary session and the work carried out under the guidance of this policy played a vital role in mobilizing the whole party to resume its scientific attitude in understanding and appraising Mao Zedong Thought. In so doing, there were also some people who went from opposing the exaggeration and distortion of Mao Zedong Thought by Lin Biao and his ilk and opposing the "two whatevers" to negating the scientific value and the guiding role of Mao Zedong Thought. Therefore, the party again timely criticized this error. Through the prolonged education of both positive and

negative experiences, through the arduous course of setting things to right which had been disordered and through criticizing and fighting against the two erroneous tendencies, since the 3d plenary session, our party has at last achieved on a new plane a unified understanding of its guiding ideology, and has gained a relatively practical and scientific comprehension of Mao Zedong Thought and adopted a relatively practical and scientific attitude toward it. This ideological achievement by the whole party was systematically reflected in the exposition on Mao Zedong Thought in the "resolution."

The "resolution" restored the scientific content of Mao Zedong Thought, which had prevailed during a fairly long period after the "seventh national CCP congress," and pointed out that Mao Zedong Thought was "the product of integrating the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution." Moreover, on the basis of this new understanding, it gave a more perfect explanation of the process of the integration of its main contents than in any other periods. Learning from the "resolution," we can see that in this exposition there were the following features: 1) In expounding the formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought, it gave a matter-of-fact explanation of both the collective role of the party and the role of Comrade Mao Zedong as an individual in the course of its formation. On one hand, it stressed that Mao Zedong Thought is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the CCP and that many outstanding leaders of our party made significant contributions to its formation and development. On the other hand, it pointed out that in forming and summing up this theory, Comrade Mao Zedong was the main representative and that this theory was mainly summed up in his works. 2) Its discussion of Mao Zedong Thought was the scientific embodiment of the integration of the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong Thought is not only an application of Marxism-Leninism in China but also its further development. Every scientific thesis and viewpoint of Mao Zedong Thought is based on the world outlook and the general principles of Marxism-Leninism and have been firmly established on the basis of Marxism, while being characterized by the unique creation of the Chinese communists and by the distinctive Chinese style and flavor. 3) A clear distinction was made between Mao Zedong Thought as a scientific theory and the mistakes made by Comrade Mao Zedong, the individual, in his later years. The "resolution" showed that Mao Zedong Thought is a scientific concept. This scientific concept expresses the integrated and correct revolutionary theory of our party. However, the erroneous viewpoints that Comrade Mao Zedong developed in his later years, first, deviated from the path of integrating Marxism with the practice in China, and second, deviated from the collective experiences and wisdom of the party and, finally, was proved wrong by practice (primarily the practice during the "Great Cultural Revolution"). Of course we should not confuse these erroneous viewpoints with the scientific theory of Mao Zedong Thought and we should make a clear and definite distinction between them. 4) While highly appreciating Comrade Mao Zedong's creative contributions to Marxism-Leninism and its guiding significance both now and in the future, the "resolution" pointed out that in our future practice we should never adopt a dogmatic attitude neither toward Comrade Mao Zedong's mistakes in allowing the policy of the "two whatevers" nor toward the correct theses of Mao Zedong Thought. Our party's theory and guiding ideology will certainly continue to develop along the path of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the practice in China.

II

The key to correctly understanding Mao Zedong Thought and to understanding its formation, development, abundant content and great significance is to have a correct understanding of the integration of the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in China.

Lenin said: "Only a party guided by a progressive theory can realize its role of acting as progressive soldiers." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 1, p 242) No doubt, to become the vanguard of the proletariat and to be able to successfully lead the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party must have the progressive theory of Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology. However, it is not easy to really apply Marxism-Leninism to guide the revolution in China. To this end, it is particularly necessary to make efforts in the following respects:

On the one hand, in order to propagate Marxism-Leninism and defend its guiding position in the Chinese revolution, for a long time, especially during the initial period after the founding of our party, our party was forced to fight against reactionary ideological trends of all kinds outside the party which attacked the guiding role of Marxism-Leninism. A common allegation of all these reactionary ideological trends was, "Marxism-Leninism does not suit the conditions in China." The Chinese communists vigorously refuted all these fallacies, and the revolutionary practice led by the CCP also declared the bankruptcy of these fallacies. It has been proved by historical facts that, on the contrary, Marxism-Leninism has suited very well the needs of the objective conditions in China and the demands of the Chinese people. No theory except Marxism-Leninism can guide us to find a way out for our nation and state.

On the other hand, in order to actually use Marxism-Leninism to direct the revolutionary practice in China, we should integrate well the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in China. This is a difficult task. If this task is not done and the erroneous trend of dogmatism is not overcome, the guiding role of Marxism-Leninism in the Chinese revolution cannot be realized. Therefore, how this task is fulfilled determines whether our party has matured and relates to the success or failure of the revolutionary cause in China.

There were many reasons why it was extremely difficult to fulfill the task of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the revolutionary practice in China and why its course was full of strife. First, the erroneous trend toward dogmatizing Marxism-Leninism has been a persistent trend in the course of the communist movement. Ever since the birth of Marxism-Leninism, there have always been two different attitudes toward it: one attitude regards it as the stand, viewpoint and method for studying the practical situation, conducting investigations and solving problems and as the guide to action, and the other regards it as a dogma to be copied indiscriminately. Those who obey the truth of Marxism-Leninism on the surface but do not want to make painstaking efforts to make a study of practical conditions are apt to commit the error of dogmatism. That was why, in their lifetime Marx and Engels repeatedly stated that their theses were not dogma but a guide to action. Second, this dogmatic trend was intensified

sometimes owing to the overcentralization of the organizations of the proletarian parties and international communist movements. A remarkable instance of this was the erroneous trend in the late 1920's and early 1930's, pointed out by the "resolution," that dogmatized Marxism in the international communist movement and sanctified the resolutions of the Communist International and the Soviet experience. This erroneous trend had a serious effect on some of our party members and inflicted great harm on the revolutionary cause. The third and most important point is that the many concrete conditions and problems we met with in our Chinese revolution were those which Marx and Lenin had never met with or provided any solutions for. It could not but be an extremely difficult task to use the general principles that Marx, Engels and Lenin drew from the conditions in Europe, where capitalism was relatively well-developed, in China, a big semi-colonial, semifeudal and backward country in the East. This required the Chinese communists to make their own independent study of practice to find solutions. Without great political perseverance and theoretical courage, or without the indomitable fighting spirit and the striving through untold hardships, this task could not have been accomplished.

By understanding these conditions, it is not hard to acknowledge how important and valuable the birth of Mao Zedong Thought--the formation of the guiding ideology of our party--was in the history of our revolution. During the nearly 20 years after the founding of our party, through many repetitions of victories and failures and victories again and failures again in our struggle in which countless martyrs sacrificed their lives, and by comparing the experiences drawn from them, our party, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, relatively and successfully resolved the problem of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in China. The course of the formation of Mao Zedong Thought expounded in the "resolution" and its conclusion that Mao Zedong Thought "is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party" was the summing up in extremely terse yet broad language the historical experience of our party in integrating Marxism-Leninism with the practice in China through years of hard struggle amid bloodshed and sacrifice. We must never adopt a light attitude toward this historical experience or look down on it.

The "resolution" expounded the theoretical conclusions made by Comrade Mao Zedong concerning a series of the problems in the Chinese revolution in six respects. This included all the main contents, though it was not inclusive of all the theoretic summations of Mao Zedong Thought on the Chinese revolution. These theses showed that since Mao Zedong Thought was the product of integrating the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in China, it should definitely consist of two elements: On the one hand, it is firmly based on the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism and, on the other hand, it is creative in that it is suitable to the conditions in China and has special Chinese characteristics. It was precisely because of this that it has enriched Marxism-Leninism and made its unique contributions to the treasure house of Marxist-Leninist theory. In studying the "resolution," we should understand all these theoretical conclusions in Mao Zedong Thought from the angle of the integration of Marxism-Leninism with the practice in China, and only in this way can we master its contents and spirit. Just as the "resolution" pointed out, "We must combine our study of the scientific works of Comrade Mao Zedong with that of the scientific writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin."

III

The principle of integrating the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in China is also an important part of the contents of Mao Zedong Thought. That is to say, Mao Zedong Thought not only developed Marxism-Leninism by deriving many conclusions on the theory of Chinese revolution but also enriched and developed the world outlook and methodology of Marxism-Leninism with the basic stand, viewpoint and method that characterized the Chinese communists.

The foundation of Marxism is its philosophy--dialectical materialism and historical materialism. This is a perfectly strict and well-developed world outlook and is the stand, viewpoint and method by which we investigate and solve problems. Some people might wonder: How can we understand this development by Mao Zedong Thought since the world outlook and methodology of Marxism are the most general laws of nature and society and are universal truths that can be applied everywhere?

The "resolution" provided the correct answer to this question. It pointed out, "Mao Zedong Thought is the application and development of Marxism-Leninism in China." "The living soul of Mao Zedong Thought is the stand, viewpoint and method embodied in its component parts mentioned above. This stand, viewpoint and method boil down to three basic points: to seek truth from facts, the mass line, and independence." The "resolution" expounded on these three basic points and also provided a scientific analysis of the great contributions of Mao Zedong Thought in this respect.

In the past some of our comrades manifested a certain tendency in studying the development of Marxism by Mao Zedong Thought: the tendency to compare relevant theses of Comrade Mao Zedong's with those of Marx' and Lenin's. Any propositions or formulations that had been put forth by Marx or Lenin but were put forth by Comrade Mao Zedong were thought to be the developments of Comrade Mao Zedong and so were propositions or formulations that, although mentioned by them, were worded differently by Comrade Mao Zedong. Owing to the adoption of this method, an exaggerated list containing many items attributed to Comrade Mao Zedong's development of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy was developed and Mao Zedong Thought was improperly separated from Marxism-Leninism. Later, another tendency emerged among some comrades. They also adopted the method of comparison but in a different way. They found that many theses of Comrade Mao Zedong's were drawn from those of Marx' and Lenin's or were similar in meaning to those of Marx' and Lenin's; therefore, they tended to deny that Mao Zedong Thought had developed Marxist-Leninist philosophy in any way. Both tendencies overlooked the integration of theory with practice, that is, the key problem of integrating the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in China.

The correct method must be the method adopted in the "resolution," in which the Chinese special features, the Chinese national forms and what characterizes the Chinese communists were drawn and summed up in the course of Comrade Mao Zedong's application of Marxist dialectical materialism and historical materialism to the practice in China. In fact, the correct application of dialectical materialism

and historical materialism to such a particularly complicated and particularly diversified great struggle as the Chinese revolution was itself a development of them. Moreover, we are sure that there was bound to be a great development. In other words, if they were not developed in line with concrete conditions, a correct application would be impossible. Engels said, "Materialism itself has gone through a series of stages of development. It is bound to change its forms even along with every epochmaking discoveries in the fields of natural science." ("Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 4, p 224) If major discoveries in natural science can change the forms of materialism, how can it be imagined that there would not be a great development in applying so successfully dialectical materialism and historical materialism to the Chinese revolution, which was both extremely wide in scale and thorough in nature. The key lies in whether we can adopt a correct viewpoint and a scientific method to study this development. Lenin once called on the Russian communists to make efforts to study the practical application of dialectics in Marx' "Das Kapital" and other historical and political works. We should do likewise and make efforts to study Comrade Mao Zedong's practical application of the theory of knowledge and dialectics in his various historical, political and military works on the Chinese revolution. As the "resolution" states, Comrade Mao Zedong's many works, "his distinguished works on China's revolutionary war, in particular, provide outstanding shining examples of applying and developing the Marxist theory of knowledge and dialectics in practice."

Comrade Mao Zedong not only applied and developed the theory of knowledge and dialectics in solving the various practical problems in China, but also theoretically summed up how to integrate Marxism-Leninism with China's practice. Back in the early 1930's, he vigorously criticized "book worship"--dogmatism that is divorced from both practice and the masses. He pointed out, "One has no right to speak if one has not made any investigations"; the Communist Party's correct and unwaverable strategy of struggle "should come into being in the course of mass struggle"; and "the victory of China's revolutionary struggle depends on the Chinese comrades' understanding of the conditions in China." This, in fact, laid emphasis on seeking truth from facts, the mass line and independence. It was, moreover, by centering on these problems that he unfolded the work of making a systematic theoretical summation when he arrived at Yanan after the Zunyi conference. "On Practice" mainly expounded the relations between knowledge and practice--the relations between knowing and doing, while "On Contradiction" mainly dealt with the relation between the universality and the particularity of contradiction. Both expounded and proved the integration of the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of China's revolution from the respective planes of the theory of knowledge and dialectics. Through the efforts made by Comrade Mao Zedong and the Yanan rectification campaign, our party thoroughly realized both ideologically and theoretically the demand raised at the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th CCP Central Committee held in 1938 for integrating Marxist theory with the specific conditions in China. The principle of seeking truth from facts, the mass line and independence expounded in the "resolution" have been the result of integrating the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method with China's actual conditions.

Therefore, in studying the three basic points of Mao Zedong Thought--its stand, viewpoint and method--we should pay similar attention to understanding them from

the angle of integrating the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in China. Seeking truth from facts, the mass line and independence are theoretically entirely based on Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism adheres to thoroughgoing materialism and holds that the social existence of people determines their social consciousness and that all studies of nature and society should proceed from existing facts instead of principles. It also holds that the masses are the creators of history and that the emancipation of the working class is their own cause, and it firmly believes in the historical initiative and creativeness of the mass of people. It advocates the unity of the world proletariat and the unity of the world proletariat with oppressed people, and holds that there is only one true internationalism--to be engaged selflessly in working for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle at home while supporting without exception similar struggles in other countries. The basic stand, viewpoint and method of Mao Zedong Thought not only drew from and developed these basic principles but also summed up the creative developments of the Chinese communists in their practice of applying them. The elaboration and development of the Marxist theory of knowledge and dialectics in the light of the revolutionary experience gained in our country by Comrade Mao Zedong in his "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," the series of leading methods, work methods and work styles that have taken shape in our party's practical work of applying dialectical materialism, the mass-line work method and truth-seeking method created by our party, the policy of independence and self-reliance that our party has always adhered to, our party's correct understanding of the unity of proletarian internationalism and patriotism and its contributions to the revolutionary cause of the world--these are all creations with Chinese characteristics. These three points of the stand, viewpoint and method of Mao Zedong Thought--seeking truth from facts, the mass line and independence--not only have summed up the abundant experience of our party but also have carried on the fine historical tradition of our country. They have been expressed in a language loved by the Chinese people and are brimming with Chinese style and flavor. They manifest the unity of the Marxist content and our national form. The contents of Mao Zedong Thought in this respect are more important, of a more universal nature and of far-reaching significance. We should better study, understand and master them.

CSO: 4004/129

TO THE READERS

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 16, 16 Aug 81 p 34

[Text] "A Great Historical Document" is a collection of 15 articles written by some theoretical workers in Beijing at the invitation of our editorial department to relate what they have learned from studying the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC." This book will be published soon. RED FLAG has carried some of these articles since its No 14 issue. Owing to limited space, the articles were abridged by their authors. Studying the resolution and at the same time reading through all articles in the book will doubtlessly help readers deepen their understanding of the resolution.

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CHINA'S NATIONAL CONDITIONS AND THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 16, 16 Aug 81 pp 35-42

[Article by Chen Feizhang [7115 2431 4545] and Jiang Zhenyun [5591 2182 7189]]

[Text] The "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the PRC" adopted by the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee has summed up the experiences of the socialist revolution and the socialist construction of our country. It points out: "Our socialist economic construction must proceed from the national conditions of our country and it must be carried out according to our capability and with strenuous efforts so that our goal of modernization can be realized gradually and in stages." The following is our basic understanding of this question.

An Important Historical Experience

Each country has its own features, historical traditions and processes of development as well as advantages and disadvantages. These are the national conditions of a country. When our understanding of the national conditions of our country is fairly correct and complete, we will be able to work out the principles and policies that are in line with reality to push revolution and construction so that they develop healthily. When our understanding is incorrect, we will suffer setbacks. This is an important experience in history.

Our new democratic revolution suffered various setbacks, but ultimately we were able to defeat strength with weakness, win victory, and establish new China. The basic reason for this victory was that Comrade Mao Zedong led our party in explicitly analyzing the historical conditions of Chinese society at that time and class relations; in clearly understanding the Chinese semicolonial and semi-feudal society, in deciding a series of important questions such as the targets, tasks and motive force of the revolution, and in gradually defining the general strategy and various policies that led to victory in the revolution.

Following the founding of new China, we faced the task of carrying out revolution and construction. There were neither set conclusions nor answers in Marxist books as to the manner in which to carry out the socialist revolution and what principles and policies should be taken for economic construction in the conditions of our country. Nor could we blindly follow the experiences of other countries. The only way was for us to combine the basic principles of Marxism with the reality of our country and explore through practice and advance through explorations.

On the eve of the countrywide victory, Comrade Mao Zedong said in his speech at the 2d Plenary Session of the 7th CCP Central Committee that China's modern industry constituted only about 10 percent of the economy while the other approximately 90 percent was agricultural and handicraft industries. This situation was the basic starting point for all problems that existed for a considerably long period during and after the victory of the revolution. It was precisely because of this point that in 1953, after the wounds caused by war had been healed, our party put forth the general line for the transition period: that over a considerably long period, the state should gradually realize socialist industrialization and also gradually realize the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft industry, capitalist industry and commerce. Under the guidance of the general line and owing to the efforts of the whole party and people, an extremely complicated and profound social change was realized in a matter of several years in a big Eastern country with a population approaching one-fourth of the world's total population. During this great change, our industry and agriculture were not damaged but, on the contrary, developed rapidly. Facts have proved that the party's general line for the transitional period is totally correct. Our party has thus created a road for socialist transformation that is in line with the features of China.

When the socialist transformation was being carried out, measures were taken to begin the first 5-year plan for economic construction. As we did not have experience, therefore, in carrying out industrial construction we regarded the Soviet management system and principles for construction as a universal pattern for carrying out socialist construction and consequently we completely followed their experience. But in practice people found that this experience did not totally accord with the reality of our country, and it became more and more obvious that it could not meet the needs for development of our economy. Comrade Mao Zedong's important work "On the Ten Major Relationships" in 1956 and the resolution of the eighth party congress that we convened in the same year were both aimed at solving this problem and at exploring a new road for socialist construction that accorded with the national conditions of our country. They pointed out that the main tasks following the completion of the socialist transformation were to develop social productivity, develop the national economy on the basis of agriculture, pay full attention to developing agriculture and light industry, develop an overall plan, consider the interests of the state, collectives and individual and to mobilize all positive factors. This series of principles accords with the reality of our country and they must be followed for a long time in carrying out our economic construction.

But it was a pity that the "Great Leap Forward," which began in 1958, departed from the correct principles for developing the economy that were formulated by our party, put forth some unrealistic slogans, and implemented some principles and policies that ran counter to, and even violated, our national conditions. Thus the leftist mistakes that were centered on high goals, blind directives, being prone to boasting and exaggeration, and the "tendency to effect the transition to communism prematurely" were rampant and our socialist construction was seriously damaged. During the readjustment work from 1962 to 1964, such mistakes were overcome in actual work, but our guiding ideology did not completely draw the necessary lessons. Therefore, with the improvement in the situation, the correct principles that were effective and in line with our national conditions

were again denied. During the "Great Cultural Revolution" in particular and because of the interference and sabotage of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques, the leftist guiding ideology was again in a dominant position and this ideology was not corrected in economic construction until the convening of the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee.

Our country has experienced basic changes and recorded big achievements over the past 3 decades and more. The road we traversed was uneven and we suffered serious economic damage. This was not only because of the effect of endless political movements, but what was more important was that we did not clearly understand the national conditions of our country and we failed to find the road for construction that totally accorded with our national conditions.

Treat National Conditions on the Basis of "One Divides Into Two"

What are the basic national conditions of our country? We analyzed this question in the following aspects.

First, our population is nearly 1 billion, of which 800 million are peasants. This is the basic national condition of our country.

Objective facts show that peasants and agriculture occupy an important position in the political and economic life of our country and they are playing decisive roles. Economically speaking, the pace of the development of our agricultural production has a decisive influence on the development of our national economy. Politically speaking, with the development of agriculture, the situation in rural areas will be stable and so will the situation in the whole country.

Objective facts prove that the 800 million peasants must engage in production in order to earn a living, that the commodity rate of our agriculture is very low and that we are still only able to meet half of our needs. The current situation of our grain distribution is that about 60 percent is grain ration for peasants, about 20 percent is in seed grain, fodder grain and collective reserve grain, 20 percent is purchased at fixed and negotiated prices by the state and, allowing for grain that has to be sold back to the rural areas, commodity grain is only about 14 percent. Based on the current agricultural production level, our rural areas are only supplying 80 to 90 billion jin of commodity grain a year for the population in urban areas and for the development of industry. This situation is our basic starting point in deciding the scale and pace of our modernization program.

Objective facts show that, with our huge population, we have rich labor resources and there will be no shortage of labor power for carrying out the modernization program. But this huge population creates many difficulties, and one of the greatest difficulties is that a large population means large consumption. People are both producers and consumers. But to become producers is conditional while to become consumers is unconditional. There are two conditions for people to become producers. One is a physiological condition. From the time when people are born until they have initial labor capability, they are only consumers and when they reach old age, most gradually lose their physical labor and mental labor capabilities and they will gradually change from being producers to being

consumers. Another is a social condition for labor. When people have labor capability, they have to combine that capability with a certain amount of tools for labor and with targets of labor so that they will be able to create social material wealth through labor. The number of people with labor capability that can be absorbed by a country during a certain period is limited by the amount of the means of production. Our economy has been developing quite rapidly since the founding of new China, so why has there been no great improvement in the people's standard of living? The reason is that, in addition to the mistakes in economic work and serious waste in economic construction, there have been big increases in the population and failure to do a good job of birth control, and the greater part of the increased social wealth has been consumed by the increased population. The population, on the average, increased by 12.5 million every year in the past and when individual and social consumption is set at 250 yuan per capita every year, it means that the consumption fund has to be increased by about 3.1 billion yuan annually. Thus, with a huge population and a high level of expenditure, it is of great significance for us to become clear-headed, to guard against arrogance and rashness, and to make steady progress in carrying out our construction.

Second, ours is a vast country but it has little cultivated acreage.

The total area of our vast country is about 14.4 billion mu, and it has very complex natural conditions in topography, soil and climate. Generally speaking, we have more hilly areas, and plains only constitute 26 percent of the total area. According to rough calculations, the area that can be used to develop agricultural, forestry or animal husbandry production constitute about 50 percent of the total area, of which a little more than 20 percent is cultivated. Statistics showed that the area of cultivated land in 1949 was 1.47 billion mu. This acreage was later increased by constantly opening up barren lands and carrying out farmland capital construction. But the development of industry and communications and the expansion of residential buildings in urban and rural areas have taken up a great amount of cultivated land. Compared with the early days after the founding of new China, it is true that our cultivated areas have increased to some extent, but as the population has multiplied, the average per capita cultivated acreage, in fact, has drastically decreased. In some densely populated areas, the average per capita acreage is merely several fen.

Our country's limited cultivated land has no doubt caused a problem that must in no way be ignored. But we must at the same time understand that our agriculture still has a very great production potential. This potential rests on the fact that the per unit output of our present cultivated land is relatively low. Take grain for example. The output of rice in our country is on average just over 500 jin per mu as against about 700 jin in the United States, Japan and Italy; the figure for corn is just over 300 jin as against over 700 jin in the United States and Canada; and the figure for wheat is just over 200 jin as against 500 jin in France and Britain. Such great differences result from the better natural conditions of these countries. But the basic reason is that these countries have very strong industries that have been able to create fairly complete material and technical conditions for high agricultural output such as machinery, water conservancy, fine strains and chemical fertilizer. With the development of our modernization, we will also be able to gradually equip our agriculture and

increase the per-unit output. The strength of our industry in supporting agriculture is still limited, but by relying on party policies we can fully display the advantage of having 800 million peasants, carry out the work that is within our reach and constantly improve conditions for production in order to rapidly reach the goal of increasing the per-unit output.

Although our cultivated land is limited, we have a large acreage for developing animal husbandry, fisheries and forestry. We can also develop production in rivers and lakes, oceans, grassland, hilly areas and even barren lands. The acreage of our grassland that can be utilized is more than 3 billion mu, approximately the same as that of the United States. But the United States is raising 130 million head of cattle while we are only raising 10 million head. As long as we are able to protect our grassland and to strive to develop more, we no doubt will be able to develop considerably our animal husbandry. The coastline of our country is 18,000 km long and is linked to our vast seas that are suitable for promoting fisheries. These bodies of water can serve as very good "marine farms." In addition, we have 75 million mu of rivers and lakes for freshwater fish breeding. In short, we must broaden our vision, and we must understand that there are many ways for developing agricultural production and much work yet to be done. From a long-term point of view, with great development in animal husbandry and in salt and freshwater breeding, we will be able to gradually replace part of the food intake with the animal protein that is contained in meat, fish, eggs and milk in order to gradually change the composition of food we consume and basically solve the problem of feeding the population of our country. It is groundless to be pessimistic about our agricultural production just because the acreage of our cultivated land is limited.

Third, we have rich and yet limited resources and we have to create conditions to exploit them.

Our country has various ores; the varieties of ores with proven deposits are more than 130. Our country is one of the few countries in the world with a relatively complete variety and big deposits of ores. The deposits of some metallic ores are among the world's biggest. Our coal resources rank third in the world, and the potential for hydroelectric power ranks first. All these are important material bases for our modernization program.

Because of our backward sciences and technology and limited funds, we have just started large-scale geological prospecting and, therefore, our understanding of underground resources is far from adequate. In addition, there are a number of difficulties in our utilization of ore resources. For example, because of limited funds, there is a limit to our exploiting and utilizing these resources. Some of our ores are of low grade, and require much labor and money for extraction; our extraction technology is backward and, therefore, it is difficult for us to exploit and utilize the underground ores and other resources in the near future. It is true that we have enormous ore deposits, but because of our huge population, the average per capita deposit is low. So we must understand that our deposits are limited and consequently we must make use of these resources rationally and economically.

Fourth, we have set up a relatively complete economic and technical base, but there are still many weak points.

There are now 400,000 industrial and commercial enterprises of various sizes in our country. The fixed assets of state-owned enterprises are 500 billion yuan, an increase by 21 times over that of 1952, the year before the first 5-year plan began. The national gross industrial output value increased by 17.9 times. Of these enterprises, a great number are backbone enterprises equipped with advanced technology. Such enterprises are able to supply various quality materials and advanced technology for the modernization program, to produce sophisticated products such as the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb, missiles and satellites, and to train and develop the ranks of highly skilled scientists and technicians. The locations of our industry has been extended from coastal areas to the hinterland, and many regions with backward economies have established certain industrial bases. All these are the foundation for us to make progress in the modernization program and we can in no way underestimate this foundation. But we must also understand that our economic and technical foundation still has many weak points. First, our industrial structure was formed on the basis of lopsidedly developing heavy industry on the principle of "taking steel as the key link," which was very irrational, and the two major categories are out of proportion. Second, the level of socialization in the organization of production is low, many enterprises are small and complete or big and complete, the situation of duplicated construction and duplicated enterprises in the same location is serious and the structure of enterprises is not rational. Third, some enterprises are equipped with backward technology and consume enormous amounts of goods, materials and energy. Fourth, under the influence of the wrong principle of "mountains, decentralized areas and caves" advocated by Lin Biao, a number of the enterprises in the third line in the hinterland have failed to develop productive strength for a long period, and some cannot carry out normal production because of communication problems and incomplete equipment. Fifth, because our enterprises did not follow economic laws for a long period and because they were eating out of the same big rice bowl, their management level was low and they used huge amounts of funds, which resulted in serious waste. All these things resulted in bad economic effects. But all these weak points in our current economic and technical foundation actually represent our potential. Once we are able to overcome these weak points, the 400,000 enterprises will play a big role in realizing our modernization program.

Fifth, we have established a contingent of management cadres and technicians, but their quality and quantity cannot meet our needs.

After a long period of training, our economic front already has a great number of leading cadres at various levels and they have the capabilities of leading and organizing work; some of them have become experts in their own fields but most still have to improve their management skills. The more than 3 million university graduates and 5 million graduates of polytechnic schools trained after the founding of new China have become the technical backbone in various trades and a few of the highly skilled ones have been able to master sophisticated technology. But some of these graduates have been assigned jobs outside their fields and consequently they cannot apply what they have learned. The scientific and cultural level of the whole Chinese people is still relatively low compared to the

needs of the modernization program. The number of technicians in our industrial departments is only 2.9 percent of the total industrial staff and many of them have not received a high school education; the cultural level of 80 percent of the staff of our enterprises is below the level of that attained in secondary school and they do not have a basic knowledge of modern science and technology. The scientific and cultural knowledge of those in rural areas is even lower. In carrying out the modernization program, it is necessary to use modern technology and equipment, and it is even more important to have management cadres and technicians who are able to master such technology and equipment. Without such cadres and technicians, it is impossible for modern technology and equipment to fully demonstrate their advanced economic beneficial results. One of our great difficulties is that we do not have enough talent for our modernization program.

Sixth, the economic and cultural level is unbalanced between regions, and each region has its own advantages and disadvantages.

Our eastern coastal areas are densely populated, and they have fairly advanced economies and cultures, concentrated industrial enterprises, fairly advanced communications, fairly high scientific and technical levels and management levels, better conditions for agricultural production and a tradition of intensive farming. But the western areas are characterized by poor natural conditions and by fairly low economic and cultural levels. For example, the gross industrial and agricultural output value of the 10 coastal provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions of Shanghai, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Guangxi and Fujian constitutes more than 50 percent of the national gross industrial and agricultural output value, and Shanghai alone produces one-tenth of this figure while Jiangsu also produces almost one-tenth.

The development of economy and culture among regions is unbalanced and consequently each region has its own advantages and disadvantages. In fact, this situation is a big problem that has to be conscientiously considered in carrying out the modernization program. This situation also ensures that it is impossible for various regions to achieve the same level of economic development in the same period. Thus, the method of "cutting with stroke of the knife" and of making arrangements indiscriminately is not only contradictory to a balanced economic development of various regions but also beyond the capability of our country.

It is necessary to stress here that ours is a big country under the people's democratic dictatorship and the means of production belong to the whole people. This situation is a very important and advantageous social economic condition for us in realizing the modernization program, and it is the basic starting point for us in studying the national conditions of our country and in exploring the road for socialist construction.

First, the masses of people are the masters of the country and the means of production. All the state policies and measures are in the basic interest of the hundreds of millions of people. The masses of people, on the other hand, have pinned their hopes on happiness in the future on the prosperity of the country and have closely combined their own interests with those of the country. Consequently, the people's strong desire for wealth and happiness has become a

powerful motive force in realizing the modernization program of their motherland. This is the basic source of our strength.

Second, the socialist planned economy, which is based on the means of production being owned by the whole people, is in a position to concentrate the strength of various departments and places across the country to engage in urgent undertakings that are within its capability. Therefore, although our country is not yet rich and advanced, it is still able to realize some aspects of the modernization program at a comparatively rapid pace.

Lastly, the socialist system can, through state planning, consciously readjust the proportionate relationship between goods and materials and production departments, and between goods and materials and production departments and nonproduction departments, so that our economy will be able to develop in a balanced way. It is an objective need in the development of our social production to distribute the social labor force according to certain proportions. Because it is impossible to carry out planned work without shortcomings and because of changes in objective conditions or because of subjective mistakes in working out policies, disproportions might occur at times. But once they do occur, the system itself will, through its own inner power, consciously readjust so that various departments will be able to develop in balance.

The above-mentioned superiority of the socialist system has initially been demonstrated in the course of our economic construction. Needless to say, the superiority of our socialist system has not fully displayed all its facets. This is owing to the fact that, following the completion of the three great transformations, measures were constantly taken which followed the principle of taking class struggle as the key link in launching revolution in production relationships. Thus, for quite a long period, the key work was not concentrated on economic construction and on certain occasions mistakes resulting from undue haste were made in our economic construction. On the other hand, the irrational economic management system obstructed the objective economic law, and we lacked internal and external motive forces in developing the economy. The former reason has, or basically has, been resolved. With regard to the latter, our party has been leading the whole nation in sparing no efforts to solve it. It can be expected that with the gradual completion of the restructuring of our economic management system, centralized economic management will be combined with dispersed economic management. Consequently, in effecting a planned economy, such combinations will play auxiliary roles in regulation by market mechanism, and when this occurs the superiority of the socialist system will be fully displayed.

Our country has made a transition from the new democratic revolution to socialism on a base of semifeudalism and semicolonialism, and such a transition is a new development in the theory of scientific socialism. Socialism with such a foundation has a relatively low productivity, together with backward commodity production, and is deeply influenced by small producers' thinking. With a full understanding of this aspect, people will be able to remain clearheaded and prevent and overcome impatience in carrying out the modernization program. Such an understanding will also help some people to achieve confidence and follow the right track in carrying out the modernization program.

Open Up a New Road for Developing the Economy

Following the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, the state decided to implement the principle of readjusting, restructuring, consolidating and improving the national economy. This was a brilliant decision made after analyzing the basic national conditions of our country on the basis of reality, and this decision is aimed at overcoming the chaotic situations which have occurred in developing our economy. Practice over the past 2 years has proved that through the implementation of this principle our economic activities have begun to be active again and have made an excellent start. Our party has now gradually opened up a correct road for the socialist modernization program that is in line with our national conditions, and this is constantly being perfected and developed.

First, developing the rural economy is a primary question.

Of the 1 billion people in our country, 800 million are peasants and this situation is a primary problem. Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "The condition of the peasants is important in the development of our economy and the consolidation of our political power." Therefore, in carrying out the modernization program, it is imperative to start on the basis of the 800 million peasants and develop commodity production and increase labor productivity in rural areas so that our rural areas will be able to develop quite rapidly. There will be great expectations for our modernization program once our rural areas become prosperous and the peasants become wealthy.

In order to make the peasants wealthy, it is necessary to develop grain production according to local conditions simultaneously with developing diversified management in a big way. People must eat. The question of grain is very important for a country with a population of 1 billion. The situation of the country will not be stable and the modernization program cannot be carried out smoothly unless we solve the problem of feeding the people. That is why we paid attention to grain production in the past and why we will continue to do so in the future. But we must also understand that it is difficult for peasants to become rich by solely relying on developing grain production. Therefore, in addition, we must diversify management according to the specific conditions of each locality. We must get rid of the narrow view which holds that by undertaking diversified management, the land for grain production will be affected. In fact, diversified management covers wide areas and it is only one aspect in managing the use of cultivated land. The point is that in developing diversified management it is necessary to develop an overall plan by making use of the natural conditions of each region; some regions might develop production by making use of hilly areas while others might develop production by making use of water resources. In short, we must consider management diversification as a measure to bring happiness to people and to future generations. In this way, the rural areas will be able to develop fairly rapidly, the life of the peasants will be improved fairly rapidly and it will be easier to consolidate the collective economy.

Various forms of the responsibility system which links remuneration with output quotas have been implemented in our vast rural areas since the 3d Plenary Session

of the 11th CCP Central Committee and, as a result, a number of regions that were long subject to poverty and backwardness have increased considerably their output of grain and industrial crops, and thus have made great changes. Facts prove that with the present level of productivity, the various forms of the responsibility system accord with both the features of our rural areas and our national conditions. It is necessary to constantly sum up experiences in this respect so that the responsibility system will be perfected and popularized on an even wider scale.

Second, readjust industrial structure and develop the production of consumer goods.

The purpose of socialist production is to meet the ever increasing needs of people's material and cultural life. The major way to realize this goal is to develop agriculture while simultaneously developing the production of consumer goods in a big way. To develop the production of consumer goods is an important means by which the state increases accumulation funds. Therefore, we must change the ideology of taking steel as the key link and of lopsidedly developing heavy industry in order to put the development of consumer goods production in an important position.

To put the development of production of consumer goods in an important position does not mean that it is necessary to slacken the production of the means of production. It is an important part of the Marxist theory of reproduction to give prominence to the growth of the means of production and to develop the first and the second categories harmoniously. In order to step up the production of consumer goods, it is imperative for the departments that are producing the means of production to supply advanced technology and good quality and readily marketable categories of raw materials in a big way. What is important at present is that these departments must define the orientation of their service. As pointed out by Comrade Chen Yun, heavy industrial departments must be oriented toward serving agriculture, light industry and the people's livelihood and toward readjusting production structure, so that the production of the means of production will be in harmony with the production of the means of subsistence and comprehensive balance will be achieved. Such a situation will be in the interests of both the development of the production of consumer goods and of the departments that are producing the means of production. In fact, the development of heavy industry was slowed down recently in order to change the situation in which heavy industrial departments are too prominent while light industry is backward and to step up the development of light industry. Such measures are not only imperative but also in line with the need for a comprehensive balance.

Third, readjust the organizational structures of enterprises in order to allow them to fully play their roles through tapping potentials and making innovations and transformations.

Our existing industrial and communications enterprises have the potential of developing production individually. They will have a greater potential when they are organized according to the principle of coordination between specialized departments and regions and through this coordination achieve greater productivity.

In the course of readjusting the organizational structure of enterprises, the work of tapping potentials and making innovations and transformations must be carried out in a planned way. In particular, the equipment of key enterprises and production links must be replaced by new technology so that with less investment we will be able to earn big profits. If we are able to achieve a breakthrough in these two aspects, we will be able to develop our economy with greater, faster, better and more economic results. In organizing industrial and communications enterprises well, tapping potentials and making innovations and transformations are not only important measures but also important goals of readjustment.

Fourth, save energy to raise funds for exploiting energy resources.

Our country abounds in energy resources and yet a contradiction prevails in regard to these resources, namely, our country is in short energy supply. To solve this contradiction it is necessary to save and exploit energy simultaneously and, in the near future, it is necessary to make saving energy the key. At present, the national revenue created by energy on a per-ton basis is only equivalent to half that achieved during the first 5-year plan. This shows that there is a great potential for saving energy. Through technical innovation and strengthening of management, we will be able to cut down excessive energy consumption and greatly alleviate the tense situation in energy supply. The basic way to solve the contradiction is to step up the exploitation of energy, set up a new energy base and build corresponding communications facilities. Since the financial power of our country is limited, a more effective way is to raise funds for energy exploitation through saving energy and exporting part of the saved energy for foreign exchange. Such foreign exchange will be used in purchasing technical equipment for making innovations and saving energy in order to save and exploit more energy and increase production. In this way we will be able to gradually increase exports of energy in a bid to get more foreign exchange and raise more funds for exploiting energy.

Fifth, pay attention to the intellectual development of staff and workers and strengthen their training.

The talent for the modernization program comes from universities and poly-technic schools. But, at the same time, we must strengthen the intellectual development of staff and workers in order to help them improve their management and technical levels. The staff and workers of the existing enterprises are directly positioned at the first front of the modernization program. Therefore, it is of far-reaching significance for our modernization program to provide them with systematic education on management knowledge and scientific technology and train from among them a large number of management and technical staff who are in accord with the modernization program. Our present readjustment of the national economy is a good opportunity for us to organize and train staff and workers. By doing a good job in this aspect for several years, we will have a capable and talented contingent for the modernization program and we will be able to carry out this program with a new surge.

Sixth, carry out the principle of simultaneously making use of mechanization and semimechanization, of mechanical operation and manual operation.

In carrying out the modernization program we must use advanced technology to constantly increase labor productivity, otherwise it is not a modernization program. But, at present, we must do our work according to its importance and urgency, and we cannot pursue the advanced world level in everything, nor can we consider questions solely from the viewpoint of improving labor productivity. We must consider the interests of the 1 billion people and work out an all-round plan. Therefore, we must carry out the principle of simultaneously making use of automation and semi-automation, mechanization and semimechanization, and mechanical operation and manual operation and improve them gradually. In this way, we will be able not only to improve the level of our industrial technology and productivity but also to solve the problem of the employment of our enormous labor force.

Seventh, develop in a big way labor-intensive enterprises that employ more laborers.

Labor-intensive enterprises are characterized by the features of employing more laborers, gaining more foreign exchange from exports and more funds for accumulation, with less investment and less consumption of raw materials and energy. Statistics gathered by departments concerned show that such enterprises, for each 10,000 yuan of fixed assets, employ over 7 times more labor than heavy industrial enterprises with higher technical levels. There are hundreds of millions of skilled handicraftsmen among the laboring people of our country, and their high level of craftsmanship has been passed down from generation to generation. With organization and leadership, these craftsmen will help widely develop labor-intensive enterprises in the cities and countryside throughout the country.

Eighth, develop in a big way the collective economy in cities and towns and allow the individual economy to develop.

The collective economy in cities and towns is part of our socialist economy, while the individual economy in cities and towns is subordinate and supplementary to socialist public ownership. In the past, because of the influence of leftist thinking, we treated the collective economy in the same way as capitalist industry and commerce by using the methods of utilizing, restricting and transforming and the individual economy was chopped off as the "tail of capitalism." At the same time, the enterprises of the collective ownership in cities and towns were "upgraded" again and again, and as a result, while they were called collective enterprises, they were actually local state-owned enterprises. By doing this, not only was the production of consumer goods limited, but the development of commercial service trades was weakened. Social disorder has been restored following the downfall of the "gang of four," various policies have been gradually implemented, and the collective and individual economies in cities and towns has been developed to different extents. It is necessary to support the collective economy and encourage the individual economy in cities and towns so that they will be able to make further progress, absorb more labor, develop social productivity, meet the needs of people's livelihood and play greater roles in accumulating funds for the construction of our country.

Ninth, uphold the principle of maintaining independence, keeping the initiative in our own hands and self-reliance.

Following the downfall of the "gang of four," we ended our closed-door policy in order to begin wide international economic cooperation and actively import new technology by partially relying on foreign capital, and these measures are in the interest of our modernization program. It is a long-term and not an expedient measure to import advanced technology by making use of foreign capital. But in our guiding ideology, we must make it clear that in carrying out the modernization program we must rely on our own work and not on spending money on imports, that is, we must base our efforts on self-reliance.

Therefore, the use of foreign capital is conditional; it depends on our repayment capability and our ability to produce auxiliary equipment. If we disregard these two conditions and arbitrarily use foreign capital to import complete sets of equipment, we will simply be increasing our burden.

With regard to importing new technology, we must mainly import key equipment and technology and there should only be few instances of importing complete sets of equipment. The thinking behind, and method of, importing complete sets of equipment indiscriminately runs counter to the principle of self-reliance, which has always been advocated by our party, and is harmful to our modernization program and therefore wrong.

In the matter of utilizing new technology, we must not pin our hopes on foreign countries and disdain our own new technology. In fact, in our present condition, it may be beyond our ability to absorb and digest certain foreign advanced technologies. It will be easier for us to popularize our own existing advanced technology than to popularize foreign technology.

Tenth, following the development of production, gradually improve the people's standard of living.

The purpose of our modernization program is to constantly improve the level of people's material and cultural life. Owing to the many measures taken by the party and government over the past 2 years, the standard of living of the broad masses of people has been gradually improved, and in the present economic conditions this improvement is by no means small. There is no doubt that with the development of production and construction, the people's standard of living will also constantly be improved. But because of our huge population, weak foundation and limited funds, we must, when considering the need to develop production and construction, consider the need to improve the people's life and, therefore, it is necessary to work out a long-term overall plan. The improvement of people's lives cannot be too quick and drastic; it can only be improved gradually with the development of production. We can in no way depart from reality in demanding the modernization of our life.

We are now readjusting the entire national economy and gradually restructuring our economic management systems according to the national conditions of our country, and these are two great matters that are vital for our modernization program. Through readjustment our national economy will be able to develop

proportionately and become the solid foundation for our modernization program. Through restructuring our enterprises and laborers will have an inner motive force for developing production and they will be able to promote economic activities under the guidance of state planning. By doing a good job in these two aspects, our national economy will be able to make new progress.

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THE CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE 'GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION' AND ITS LESSONS

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[Article by Zhu Yuanshi [2612 0337 4258]]

[Text] In May 1966, Comrade Mao Zedong started the "Great Cultural Revolution" that swept the whole country. But Comrade Mao Zedong had wrongly judged the then prevailing class situation in our country and the political condition of the party and the state. As a result, many devoted revolutionaries of the older generation who had stood the test, and numerous fine party member cadres who remained faithfully at their various posts were ruthlessly trounced. The two counterrevolutionary conspiratorial groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing were given a chance to assert themselves. They exploited Comrade Mao Zedong's mistake to secretly carry out criminal activities on a large scale that brought disaster to the state and the people. Once started, the "Great Cultural Revolution" went out of control like an unbridled wild horse. In fact, for various complicated reasons, it was unusually difficult to stop this upheaval when Comrade Mao Zedong was alive. Only after the smashing of the "gang of four" and especially after the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee did the party and the state enter a new historical period.

Then, was the "Great Cultural Revolution" caused by an accidental mistake on the part of Comrade Mao Zedong? Absolutely not. A thing in real life has its inevitable causes. The outbreak of the "Great Cultural Revolution" on the land of China and its lasting for as long as 10 years may be attributed to the following several main causes:

1. The direct cause was wrong leadership on the part of Comrade Mao Zedong.

With the fundamental completion of socialist transformation, the correct guideline of the eighth national party congress calling for concentrating on developing the productive forces was carried out. The year 1957 was one of the best years for results achieved in economic work since the founding of the PRC. However, in the flush of victory, Comrade Mao Zedong developed a sense of arrogance and self-complacency. Many leading comrades of the central and local authorities also joined Comrade Mao Zedong in magnifying the role of subjective will. Under conditions where they lacked the experience of large-scale socialist construction, they acted against the fundamental laws of economic development and sought immediate results. In 1958 they launched the "Great Leap Forward" movement and

the movement for the establishment of the rural people's communes. They made leftist mistakes marked by overambitious goals, the issuance of conflicting orders, proneness to boasting and exaggeration and "a tendency to effect the transition to communism prematurely." This caused great setbacks in socialist construction. From the end of that year to July 1959 before the Lushan conference of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, Comrade Mao Zedong tried to lead the whole party in correcting the mistakes that had become known. But after the Lushan conference, Comrade Peng Dehuai aired his views about the leftist mistakes made in the "Great Leap Forward" and the lessons drawn therefrom. Comrade Mao Zedong regarded this as an attack on the party. He wrongly subjected Comrade Peng Dehuai to criticism. This developed into a case of wrongly starting an "antirightist" campaign within the party. As a result, leftist mistakes were not thoroughly corrected in regard to the ideology guiding economic work. Instead, these mistakes gradually developed in the political, ideological and cultural fields.

Comrade Mao Zedong's viewpoint putting class struggle on an enlarged basis and in absolute terms was of long standing. It had developed gradually. He said, "The struggle that appeared in Lushan is a class struggle and a continuation of the life-or-death struggle waged between two big antagonistic classes--bourgeois and proletarian--in the process of socialist revolution in the past 10 years." From this call on his part to his emphasis on the theme that in socialist society, "there exists the struggle between the socialist and the capitalist road and the danger of capitalist restoration," and to his putting forward the concept about powerholders within the party following the capitalist road, the spearhead of struggle was obviously directed at the party itself.

In the "May 16 notification" in 1966, which marked the beginning of the "Great Cultural Revolution," Comrade Mao Zedong strongly urged criticizing and transferring the so-called bourgeois representatives that had wormed their way into the party, the government and the army and into various segments of the cultural field. In his view, this was a matter of the utmost importance bearing on the destiny and future of the party and the state and on the world revolution. The greatest pity was that he acted like a dedicated doctor who had made the wrong diagnosis and written the wrong prescription.

Every step marking the process of the development of such an erroneous viewpoint was accepted by our party and treated as a new theoretical creation on Comrade Mao Zedong's part and a development of Marxism-Leninism. This was given repeated publicity and made to produce a deep influence. As a result, when the "Great Cultural Revolution" was launched under the guidance of these leftist ideas, resistance was made very difficult.

2. The "Great Cultural Revolution" took place and lasted for as long as 10 years. Apart from the mistakes for which the blame is directly attributed to Comrade Mao Zedong, there were also complicated social factors.

(1) The international communist movement is not marked by a long history. The history of socialist countries is not an especially long one. Some of the laws governing the development of socialist society are relatively clear. But many problems remain to be explored. Marx and Engels only envisioned a communist

society and its initial stages. Except for the Paris Commune that existed for only 72 days, they did not personally witness or practice socialism. Therefore, their great ideals could only be general assumptions which pointed out the general trend of communism and which could not be something very concrete. Lenin had personal experience. But that was in the relatively uncertain first 6 or 7 years after the founding of the Soviet regime. Especially the first few years, witnessed not only bourgeois resistance but hostile action taken against the Soviet by rich peasants. There was also attack from Kolchak, Denikin and other counterrevolutionary bandits at home who joined forces with 14 capitalist countries. The early Soviet Union suffered such setbacks as civil war, famine, and economic difficulties. Though Lenin had many brilliant views about socialist construction, he basically could not find the time or have the ability to scientifically sum up the actual experiences in building socialism on a large scale. In July 1920, in the "Program About the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International," Lenin still stressed that after the seizure of political power by the proletariat, the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie would "become more extensive, more acute and more ruthless." He held that the overthrown landlord and bourgeois classes would become 10 times as frantic in their resistance and were likely to stage a comeback. He even believed that the masses of small producers provided the basis for a comeback. The then prevailing circumstances on which Lenin based this viewpoint were quite different from things in our country after 1957. But this viewpoint had a great effect on us. Carrying out Lenin's behest, Stalin did a remarkable job of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. But he similarly could not provide all the ready-made solutions to the socialist cause. Moreover, he showed great fluctuations in his understanding of the problem of class struggle in the period of socialism. He eventually also believed that class struggle was getting more and more acute. Moreover, where the problem of the international communist movement was concerned, he adopted an attitude of imposing things on others. This oversimplified the complicated problem of socialism--socialism to be practiced by various socialist states in light of their own actual conditions.

(2) The Chinese Communist Party had for long been placed in an era of war and in circumstances of heated class struggle. It was not adequately prepared ideologically for the new socialist society that arrived quickly and for the cause of socialist construction across the whole nation. It had not made adequate scientific research in this respect. We lacked experience in handling the colossal tasks of socialist economic construction and lacked experience in handling various social and political contradictions in socialist society. These historical features of the party determined, to a large degree, the following. When we were observing and handling new contradictions and new problems in political, economic, cultural and other fields that appeared in the process of the development of socialist society, and especially after some serious social and political incidents had developed, the leadership was very likely to get ideologically used to old methods and experiences calling for stormy class struggle, which had become unusually familiar to them in the years of war but which had become basically inapplicable. This led to the enlargement of class struggle.

(3) We erroneously interpreted and dogmatized certain assumptions and viewpoints in the works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, thus finding a "theoretical basis" for these subjectivist ideas and methods detached from real life. For example,

we held that the equal right in the exchange of equal amounts of labor practiced in the distribution of the means of subsistence in socialist society, or what Marx described as the "bourgeois right" should be restricted and criticized. Thus, the principle of distribution according to labor and the principle of material benefits should be restricted and criticized. In fact, what Marx said in the "Critique of the Gotha Program" about the equal right in the distribution of labor in the first stage of communist society still referred to the bourgeois right in principle. It was based on the common ground shared by the economic relations of distribution according to labor and the relations of exchange of commodities at equal value, or on the exchange of equal amounts of labor, or the economic relations embodying the equal rights between both parties involved in an exchange. This is not to say that this right was still of the exploitative nature of the bourgeoisie. Marx' assumption about the first stage of communism was that no commodity production or monetary system and no classes would exist. The "bourgeois right" here basically could not be equated with the right of a bourgeois element or any exploiter. The "bourgeois right" here was basically not used in its original sense. Lenin put things more clearly. In the article, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," he took distribution according to labor and public ownership of the means of production as a common indicator of socialism. He said, "From capitalism, mankind can only make a direct transition to socialism or to public ownership of the means of production and distribution according to labor." ("Selected Works of Lenin," Vol 3, p 62) Other ideas were marked by the same situation of misinterpretation and dogmatization--ideas that with the fundamental completion of socialist transformation, small production would engender capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale, that the ideological division within the party is a reflection of social class struggle, and so forth. This caused us to take our obsession with the enlargement of class struggle as a case of protecting the purity of Marxism.]

(4) The unstable international situation and failure to correctly understand the new problems appearing in the international communist movement added to the puzzling factors about class struggle. In handling the relations between China and the Soviet Union and the two parties of the two countries, the Soviet leadership with Khrushchev as its head acted more and more against Marxist-Leninist principles. Assuming the role of "an authoritative and well established party," the Soviet leadership replaced internationalism with great nation chauvinism and great nation hegemonism. In an ever more open and flagrant manner, it vainly attempted to control our country politically, economically and militarily. After Comrade Mao Zedong righteously refuted Khrushchev, the latter became so embarrassed that he acted more wildly and outrageously than ever. He even went to the length of provoking a battle of words between China and the Soviet Union, turning a matter of principle between two parties into a national dispute. At a time when we were having difficulties due to economic mistakes combined with consecutive years of natural disasters, the Soviet government treacherously tore all agreements to pieces, withdrew all the Soviet experts and forced us to pay debts (chiefly those for arms in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea), causing us tremendous economic losses and adding greatly to our difficulties. This was clear to our whole party and the people of all nationalities of the country. These ugly acts of the Soviet leaders forced our party to wage a just struggle against the Soviet Union's great nation chauvinism. Under these circumstances, we became very receptive to Comrade Mao Zedong's erroneous

viewpoint. To keep the party and the state from changing in their political features, we resolutely conducted in the country a campaign to combat and prevent revisionism. Obsessed with morbid fears, we acted ever more wildly with every passing day. The mistake of enlarging class struggle got the party increasingly involved organically. Many problems were often discussed in an unrelaxed atmosphere. Some usual ideological differences and some not very serious erroneous tendencies within the party were treated as a reflection of inner-party struggle and took on the nature of life-or-death struggle. Things were carried so far that it was believed that representatives of Khrushchev-type figures had wormed their way into the core of the Communist Party leadership and fought the red banner by raising the red banner. It was increasingly believed that within the party there was a revisionist political line and also an organizational line serving this political line and that there had formed in the central group a bourgeois command headquarters with agents in various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. Then a wrong conclusion logically followed. It was that to solve such a serious national problem, we of course could not just rely upon normal criticism and self-criticism within the party as a weapon. Therefore, Comrade Mao Zedong could only draw on his tremendous authority that had long formed in the whole party, the whole army and among the people of all nationalities of the country to personally start a mass movement. This was actually committing in an open and overall manner and from the lower to the upper levels a violent act of having one class overthrow another. Comrade Mao Zedong even thought that such a "revolution" must be repeated many times.

3. The principle of collective leadership and democratic centralism in the political life of the party and the state were seriously weakened and even disrupted. This was also an extremely important reason why the "Great Cultural Revolution" could have been started by Comrade Mao Zedong [alone] and could have lasted for as long as 10 years. Its formation was also deeply rooted in social historical factors.

(1) The eighth national party congress stressed collective leadership and democratic centralism within the party and opposed undue emphasis on individuals, the practice of deifying leaders and the personality cult. But the general regulations then made in this respect were not thoroughly carried out. After the Zunyi meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong occupied the leading position in the party Central Committee all the time. The continuous victory of the Chinese revolution left Comrade Mao Zedong unmatched in the lofty prestige that he commanded in the whole party, the whole army and among the people of all nationalities of the country to excessively praise Comrade Mao Zedong individually. Some people sometimes even attributed to him all the deeds of merit that had been performed to achieve victory in the Chinese revolution. There was ever increasing propaganda wrongly putting him above the party and the people. Comrade Mao Zedong gradually waxed arrogant and could not treat other comrades on equal terms. People found it increasingly difficult to democratically discuss and decide on problems with him. As far as inner-party life was concerned, this abnormal state of affairs first appeared in the political life of the leadership organs of the party Central Committee. On the eve of the "Great Cultural Revolution," the party Central Committee was left practically too weak to produce any restraining effect on Comrade Mao Zedong. Once the "Great Cultural Revolution" was started, so many political commissars and old commanders, who disagreed with the way the "Great

Cultural Revolution" was launched, were condemned as "the adverse current in February." The Central Cultural Revolutionary Group was originally a work organ under the leadership of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee and was established according to a decision of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. Later, the group actually took the place of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. With democratic centralism in the party disrupted to such a degree, who could stop the continuation of the "Great Cultural Revolution!"

(2) In the communist movement, leaders played a very important role. But in the history of the international communist movement, due to failure to correctly solve the problem of relations between leaders and the party, there also appeared some serious errors. Stalin, in particular, as mentioned above, erroneously magnified his own role to an inappropriate degree, when he won great honors among the people at home and abroad. He set individual power up in opposition to collective leadership and democratic centralism. In the latter part of his life, he increasingly enjoyed, accepted and encouraged the personality cult and practiced personal dictatorship. Moreover, the Third International, which was actually led by him after Lenin, also practiced a system of overconcentration of power. All this inevitably had a negative effect on our party.

(3) That individual dictatorship and the personality cult were liable to appear was inseparably linked to our country being originally a feudalist one with a long period of despotism. Despotism had a long history and a deeply rooted social foundation in our social and political life. The new democratic revolution led by our party thoroughly destroyed the feudalist economic and political systems. However, we only paid attention to the decisive role of economic reform and failed to take note that those traditions rooted in people's minds could also play a given role, though not a decisive one. As a result, we did not make systematic and purposeful criticisms against the remaining influence of feudal despotic ideas that had extensively existed in social political life. The remnants and forces of habit represented by the personality cult, patriarchy, clannish relations, the concept of privileged treatment, the class concept and other feudal despotic ideas thus invaded our party. A relevant factor was that we had for a long time failed to acquire an adequate understanding or gained experience, where the establishment of a perfect people's democratic political system and the introduction of a perfect socialist constitution, proper laws and an appropriate legal system were concerned. Instead, we even negated some rational political laws and viewpoints, allowing the remaining influence of feudal despotism to assert itself in our political life. Such a situation enabled the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary groups to promote the personality cult to serve their own ends. A great Marxist like Comrade Mao Zedong also could not help being influenced. Many people felt that things were carried to excess. As a result, anything said by Comrade Mao Zedong was cherished as "the supreme directive," an exemplary truth and even an inviolable law. Without such a political background, the "Great Cultural Revolution" could not have been launched and continued.

We must learn from past mistakes. We must draw lessons from the "Great Cultural Revolution" so that we can compensate in the days to come for the great price we have paid. Otherwise, what are those experiences and lessons worth? Nothing?

1. We should stop practicing the personality cult or "deification" in our approach to any party leader. The outbreak of the "Great Cultural Revolution" and its duration of 10 years must of course be blamed on Comrade Mao Zedong's individual dictatorship and his defiance of the party's principle of collective leadership. But such a phenomenon as his putting himself above the party and the state did not appear overnight and had to do with the improper publicity our party had given to Comrade Mao Zedong over many years. As far as this is concerned, the whole party and the party Central Committee are to be held equally responsible.

According to the principles of historical materialism, any class that does not recommend its own political leaders and advanced representatives as good at organization and leadership cannot possibly have acquired a ruling position. But also according to the principles of historical materialism, any leader of the party or the state who puts himself above the party and the masses and who draws apart from the party and the masses will inevitably lose his overall power of observation concerning national affairs and party problems and make mistakes in leadership. Therefore, improperly building up an individual and raising a leader to an inappropriately high plane is unfavorable to the leader himself and the party's cause. Moreover, party leadership is collective leadership and represents a number of people. Deifying an individual is incompatible with reality. It will only have an increasingly harmful effect on collective party leadership.

2. The principle of democratic centralism within the party can never be undermined. Democratic centralism must be based on a wide democratic basis. The principle of subordinating the individual to the organization, the minority to the majority, the lower levels to the upper levels and the whole party to the party Central Committee must be followed, so that the party Central Committee can have the extensive power that it must command. No matter how high in rank or position, any party member is only a member of the party organization and must carry out the party's collective decisions. The leadership of the party Central Committee is also collective leadership. If these principles are adhered to, there will not appear the phenomenon of an individual placing himself above the party organization. Once such a situation appears, the party organization will immediately take measures to overcome it and will never feel any difficulty involved.

3. We must wholeheartedly uphold strong party unity. Given lack of unity within the party, unity among the people can hardly be achieved. Given internal disorder within the party, the people and the state will similarly get involved with civil strife. If the enemy discredits our party, the masses will not believe it. If we discredit ourselves, people will have doubts. Those who have doubts and those who do not will inevitably "fight among themselves." The so-called claim about "from great disorder across the land" to "great order in the world" made during the turmoil of the "Great Cultural Revolution" was just wishful thinking. Only with unity can there be stability. Only with stability can we run the state effectively.

4. Class struggle should be strictly limited to the scope within which it takes place and can in no way be enlarged and put in absolute terms. With the

fundamental completion of socialist transformation in 1956, the main contradictions of our society were no longer class ones. Later, we still stressed "taking class struggle as the key link." This then constituted a great historical mistake. It is a serious historical lesson. We can never repeat it in future. Of course, there will still be class struggle within a given scope. We must oppose the erroneous tendency toward the theory of class struggle dying out. But such struggle must be limited to the scope of where it arises and be conducted by relying on legal means. Every effort must also be directed toward the business of transformation. We must have faith that by relying on the forces of the people's democratic dictatorship, we can transform people well.

5. Ideological struggle within the party and among the people can no longer take the form of a political movement. If the problem of ideological struggle within the party and among the people is solved after the fashion of a political movement, things will inevitably become complicated. Struggle will be enlarged. Excesses will result, causing harm to comrades.

As far as the problem of ideological struggle is concerned, we must create a style of criticism and self-criticism--a style marked by equality, the practice of setting forth facts and reasoning things out, and a normal state. We must really act according to the guideline of "unity-criticism-unity." We cannot freely raise things to the higher plane of principle, wield the stick and make accusations.

6. Socialist democracy can only be developed and cannot be abused. The socialist legal system can only be strengthened and cannot be undermined. Socialist democracy is first of all a problem of the system of a socialist country. Socialist democracy means the enjoyment of the supreme power of management of the state by the whole people on the basis of a common share in the ownership or control, along different lines, of the means of production. Running counter to the fundamental political principles in establishing this socialist system will inevitably spoil the national nature of socialism. A socialist state must give full play to socialist democracy, as the term suggests. But Marxism holds that socialist democracy is not perfect at the very outset. The proletariat that has achieved victory must continuously improve and round out the socialist democratic system. We once suffered, because we did not recognize, put forward or solve this problem. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary groups were thus given a chance to perform an outrageous and ugly show on China's political stage. Striking with the palm of the left hand, they used "overall dictatorship" to completely overthrow socialist democracy. Striking with the palm of the right hand, they used so-called "great democracy" to completely ruin socialist democracy. Up to now, interference with socialist democracy still comes from the left and the right.

Closely related to socialist democracy is the socialist legal system. The fundamental task of the socialist legal system is to safeguard socialist democracy. Socialist law embodies the unified will and fundamental interests of the proletariat and the masses of laboring people. A law is solemn and inviolable. Once it is drawn up by an authoritative organ, none can act against it. None can overthrow it or formulate a different law. To change a law or make any minor change, we must leave things to a law-making organ that carries authority. During

the "Great Cultural Revolution," there appeared the phenomenon of handling cases according to the will of individuals or basing judgment of people on articles published in newspapers and magazines. This was entirely acting in defiance of the dignity of law and taking law as child's play. Historical experience shows that the violation of the legal system will only give law-breakers and criminal elements a chance to assert themselves and confuse or bring difficulties to people in properly enforcing law. Therefore, as far as the proletariat and the masses of people are concerned, enforcing law is asserting our own authority. The process of acting according to law is exactly one of realizing our own will and protecting our own interests.

7. We must step up studying and researching fundamental Marxist principles and fundamental socialist principles and step up investigating, studying and really understanding the actual conditions of China. During the "Great Cultural Revolution," much of what was criticized was correct and Marxist. Most of what was advocated was absurd and anti-Marxist. This was partly because out of ulterior motives. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary groups distorted, altered and quoted out of context Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. This was also partly because our Marxist level was not high. Thus, some theories running counter to Marxism-Leninism were for a time allowed to dominate the scene. Well-groomed and oily-mouthed crooks like Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan hoodwinked people for a while. Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, full play has been given to democracy, people's minds have been emancipated, chaos has been turned into order, and the true features of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought restored. Such work is still being carried out. This is unusually necessary. Every effort must be made to raise the whole party's level of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and to study the stand, viewpoint and methods of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.

Marxism-Leninism can play a real role only if it is integrated with the realities of China. China is such a vast land. Without understanding its conditions or with only scant knowledge of its actual conditions, we cannot avoid making mistakes. Mistakes made in work chiefly arise from failure to seriously make investigations and studies. They have also to do with such factors as making hasty decisions, rushing to the front recklessly, "cutting with one knife" and "following a fixed pattern." During the "Great Cultural Revolution," Comrade Mao Zedong was advanced in years and was later in very poor health. Besieged by a small group of people, he paid particularly little attention to investigation and study. He chiefly drew on his own prestige to handle major national issues. Later, he even ran the government by just passing on messages. Here lay one of the fundamental reasons why he made mistakes. We must insist on doing investigation and research work--a practice which was advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong and which was once assiduously followed by him. We must keep abreast of changing conditions at all times, so that our guidance for the socialist cause can be built on an objective solid basis.

The lessons from the "Great Cultural Revolution" are too numerous to be cited. Our experience is that so long as lessons are properly summed up, bad things can be turned into something good after proper efforts. It can be rightly claimed that after the "Great Cultural Revolution," the Chinese Communist Party and its Central Committee were made stronger and more mature. The turning point was the

3d Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee--which was marked by the "Resolution on Some Problems in the History of the Party Since the Founding of the PRC." Over 39 million Chinese Communist Party members share unified faith and will. Nothing can stop their advance. We must uphold party leadership, doggedly follow the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, give full play to the superiority of the socialist system, and use the effective guarantee of the people's democratic dictatorship to protect and stimulate the development of the social productive forces. Given the establishment and development of the relations of unity, fraternal love and mutual respect, we can thus surely change the poverty and backwardness of the state and build a modern, highly democratic and highly civilized powerful socialist country.

CSO: 4004/129

CORRECTION

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 16, 16 Aug 81 p 48

[Text] After checking several figures on page 33 of the No 14 issue of this year's RED FLAG, it was determined that the actual figures should be: From 1949 to 1979, our country's industrial production increased 41 times compared to the 1949 figure; in 1979 the per capita total value of China's national production was \$253; and in 1979 China's per capita foodgrain output was 326 kilograms.

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ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THE PRODUCTION OF MEDIUM- AND SMALL-SCALE FARM IMPLEMENTS BADLY NEEDED BY THE PEASANTS

Beijing RED FLAG in Chinese No 16, 16 Aug 81 inside back cover

[Article by Liu Jianhong [0491 0494 5725] and Shao Guo'an [6730 0948 1344]]

[Text] With the development of the introduction of various forms of the production responsibility system in the rural areas and with the diversification of the rural economy, the peasants' demands for medium- and small-scale farm implements are increasing greatly, and there has emerged a situation in which the supply of medium- and small-scale farm implements has fallen short of demand. For instance, the second light industrial system of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and its affiliated organizations and the enterprises run by the communes and production brigades produced altogether 865,000 medium- and small-scale farm implements made of iron in 1980, 501,400 less than in 1979, a decrease of 36.8 percent; and 118,000 farm implements made of wood, 88,600 less than in 1979, a decrease of 42.9 percent. This is detrimental to production, and due importance should be paid to this.

The reasons for the decline in the production of medium- and small-scale farm implements are chiefly that, owing to the influence of "leftist" ideology for many years in the past, one-sided emphasis was placed on producing large-scale farm machinery and the production of medium- and small-scale farm implements was never accorded its proper position. This was expressed mainly in: First, the supply of raw materials, in particular the supply of wood, was insufficient, with the result that some enterprises could not operate at full capacity or had to stop production. Second, in order to seek profits, a small number of enterprises fully used the wood and rolled steel allocated by the state to them for producing medium- and small-scale farm implements to turn out other products and even used them to indulge in unhealthy practices. Third, in the past few years, the prices of rolled steel and wood were raised, but the prices for medium- and small-scale farm implements remained the same. This reduced the profits of the enterprises which produced medium- and small-scale farm implements and even made them operate at a loss, thus dampening some enterprises' enthusiasm for producing medium- and small-scale farm implements. Therefore, paying attention to and speeding up the production of medium- and small-scale farm implements are not only a pressing matter at the moment, but also a "long-term policy" during the current phase.

In order to expedite the production of medium- and small-scale farm implements, we hold that the following problems earnestly require solution. First, production units producing medium- and small-scale farm implements should uphold the orientation of serving agriculture and not change to turn out other products for the purpose of concentrating on profits alone. Second, it is necessary to arouse the enthusiasm of the farm tool (machine building) factories run by the counties and communes, the brigade-run farm tool repair service groups and the rural individual handicraftsmen, to advocate the adoption of various forms of cooperation and joint operation among the state, the collective and the individual and among the departments, trades and regions, and to accelerate the pace of the production of medium- and small-scale farm implements. Third, it is necessary to earnestly implement the policies, effectively ensure the supply of raw materials for producing medium- and small-scale farm implements and put the raw materials under unified management so that specialized raw materials are put to specialized use. Fourth, in order to prevent the enterprises from operating at a loss and to avoid increasing the burden on peasants, it is necessary to appropriately readjust the prices for medium- and small-scale farm implements or financially subsidize the enterprises producing medium- and small-scale farm implements. Fifth, it is essential to put the idea of making production, supply and marketing a coordinated sequence into effect, strictly follow the contract system and prevent easing off when products are plentiful and rushing when products are scarce. Sixth, it is imperative to strengthen scientific and technological research, continuously improve the production technology and product quality of medium- and small-scale farm implements and provide the peasants with farm implements of varied designs and high effectiveness.

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END

