



1973:
Writings and speeches
Mao Zedong

Introduction

In 2013, a private collector of Mao Zedong's works and related memorabilia, published 52 volumes of the Collected Works of Mao Zedong.

Zhang Dijie, from Luoyang City in Henan province was born in December 1959, and joined the PLA in 1976, the year of Mao's death. He began collecting everything he could related to the writings of Chairman Mao, and his 52 volumes, each often comprising 500 or so pages, spans the first poem written by Mao in 1901 at the age of 8 years old, to the final message attributed to Mao before his death, the message on the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea.

According to Zhang Dijie, over 36 years of painstaking effort he had accumulated 102,000 copies and 15,000 editions of Mao's works from over 130 countries. The content of the published collection, by a Hong Kong publishing house, comprises 30% that is widely known, 50% that has only been released to a limited audience, and 20% published for the first time.

This is a translation of those parts of Volume 51 that span the year 1973. The five volumes of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong published in various languages by the Foreign Language Press, Beijing, have made Chairman Mao's writings on protracted people's war, the New Democratic Revolution, literature and art, and a host of other topics prior to the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution available to the international communist movement.

I am not fluent in Chinese. I know enough to get by on a daily basis in China, but for the sake of getting the job done quickly, I use the online translators Google Translate and DeepL. As good as they are, they invariably contain errors or contain references that need to be explained for non-Chinese readers. I can at least recognise and correct the errors, and search the internet in Chinese to find the information that will help readers.

There are two types of footnotes in this collection of Mao's speeches and writings. Those enclosed in [] brackets at the end of each writing or speech by Mao are by Zhang Dijie, those at the bottom of a page are my own. There are not many of the latter. Those by Zhang Dijie are translated as they appear in his collection. Some are simply matters of fact ("XXX was at that time director of such and such an institution") while others reflect the revisionist reappraisal of events and people connected with the GPCR. Comrades will no doubt be able to use their own bullshit detectors in relation to the latter.

I have not been able to contact Comrade Zhang Dijie to thank him for his great effort in collecting and publishing the 52 volumes of Mao's Collected Works, so I use this opportunity to acknowledge his great contribution to our knowledge of Mao's thinking across the years, and particularly during the tumultuous year that saw the launching of the GPCR.

Nick G. (Contents pages at rear)

Comments on Tan Zhenlin's Letter [1]

(January 2, 1973)

Print and distribute to all comrades of the Politburo. Please ask Ji and Wang [2] to handle the issues raised in the second letter.

January 2, 1973

[1] Tan Zhenlin, formerly a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, a member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, and a vice premier of the State Council. He was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and exiled to Guilin, Guangxi. On December 26, 1972, he wrote two letters to Mao Zedong. The second letter mentioned that he had unfortunately broken his right leg on July 24 and hoped to return to Beijing for a checkup. He also suggested that his wife Ge Huimin should return to Beijing for treatment and that their two children should be taken back to Beijing for schooling or employment. In August 1973, Tan Zhenlin was elected a member of the CPC Central Committee at the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

[2] Ji refers to Ji Dengkui, then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Organization and Propaganda Group of the CPC Central Committee. Wang refers to Wang Dongxing, then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and others congratulating the formal signing of the Paris Agreement on the Vietnamese Question [1]

(January 29, 1973)

Hanoi

Comrade Sun Duc Thang, Chairman of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

Comrade Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam,

Comrade Truong Chinh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

Comrade Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

His Excellency Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front,

His Excellency Hoang Tan Phat, Chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam:

On the occasion of the formal signing in Paris of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, we, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people, extend our warmest congratulations and highest respect to you, and through you to the Workers' Party of Vietnam and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and to the people of North and South Vietnam.

For the independence of their country and the liberation of their nation, the heroic Vietnamese people, holding high President Ho Chi Minh's banner of "decisive battle, decisive victory," waged a bloody battle against U.S. imperialism for more than a decade. They ultimately persuaded the U.S. government to sign the Vietnam Armistice and Peace Agreement, agreeing to the deadline-bound withdrawal of all U.S. and its allies' armed forces. The agreement also affirmed the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people and the right of self-determination of the people of South Vietnam. This created conditions for the Vietnamese people to resolve their own problems without foreign armed interference and opened up prospects for peace, independence, unity, democracy, and prosperity in Vietnam.

The signing of the Paris Agreement is a major achievement of the Vietnamese people's protracted struggle on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts. It is a great victory

achieved through the Vietnamese people's self-reliance, arduous struggle, and persistence in the protracted people's war. It is a great victory for the united struggle of the three Indochinese peoples, and a common victory for the people of the world, including the American people.

The Chinese people are heartfully happy for the Vietnamese people's victory, as if it were their own. The tenacious revolutionary spirit and fearless heroism you displayed during the protracted war of resistance have won the admiration and praise of people around the world. Your shining example proves that a small country can defeat a big one, and a weak one can defeat a strong one. It is a powerful inspiration to the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of all oppressed nations and peoples around the world. Your heroic struggle and great victory will go down in history as a shining example of contemporary national liberation wars.

China and Vietnam are close neighbours linked by mountains and rivers. Our two peoples have consistently supported and encouraged each other in their long struggle against imperialism, forging a profound revolutionary friendship. The Chinese people have always regarded your struggle as their own and supported your just cause as their internationalist duty. We did so in the past wars against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. In the future, we will continue to stand with the brotherly Vietnamese people and the brotherly peoples of the three Indochinese countries, and give resolute support to the just cause of the Vietnamese people and the peoples of all Indochinese countries.

We sincerely hope that the people of North Vietnam, under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, will achieve new successes in the cause of consolidating and building a socialist North. We sincerely hope that the people of South Vietnam, under the banner of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, will work together with the other two political forces to swiftly establish national committees for national reconciliation and concord at all levels, hold universal suffrage through consultation, determine the political future of the South, and continuously advance along the path of independence, democracy, and national unity. We firmly believe that the Vietnamese people's desire for national reunification will surely be realized, and that the just cause of the Vietnamese people will triumph.

Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong

Acting Chairman of the People's Republic of China Dong Biwu

People's Republic of China National People's Congress Chairman of the Standing Committee
Zhu De

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai

Beijing, January 29, 1973

[1] Refers to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed in Paris on January 27, 1973 by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the United States, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and the Saigon puppet regime. It is also known as the Paris Agreement on Vietnam. The main contents are: the United States and other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the Viet Minh issue; the United States undertakes to withdraw all U.S. and its allies' troops and military personnel from South Vietnam within 60 days of the signing of the agreement, not to continue its military involvement in South Vietnam, not to interfere in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, and to guarantee respect for the right of the people of South Vietnam to self-determination; the people of South Vietnam will decide the political future of South Vietnam through universal suffrage; and the unification of Vietnam will be achieved gradually through peaceful means.

Comments on the letter reflecting the situation of Li Yimang, Shu Tong, and Lin Tie [1]

(January to June 1973)

1

Ji and Wang will deal with it at their discretion.

Mao Zedong

2

Ji and Wang will handle it at their discretion.

73. 4. 2

3

The Premier [2] will handle it at his discretion.

[1] The first part of this article is based on a letter dated January 4, 1973, from the wife and daughter of Li Yimang, former Deputy Minister of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee. The letter states that Li Yimang is seventy years old and suffers from hypertension, heart disease, emphysema, etc., and pleads with the Chairman to approve his release from prison for medical treatment. The second part of this article is based on a letter dated March 1973 from Shu Tong, former Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Shaanxi Provincial Committee, to Mao Zedong. The letter requests that a formal conclusion be made on his case as soon as possible, that he resume his organizational life, and that he be able to participate in certain work. In 1977, Shu Tong returned to work and became the Director of the Shaanxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee. The third part of this article is based on a letter dated June 11, 1973 from Lin Tie, former First Secretary of the CPC Hebei Provincial Committee, to Mao Zedong. The letter states that he is 68 years old and in good health. He hopes that the Party will assign him work within his capabilities so that he can continue to work for the revolutionary cause of the Party and the people. In 1978, Lin Tie became an advisor to the CPC Central Organization Department.

[2] The Premier refers to Zhou Enlai.

Conversations with Kissinger [1]

(February¹ and November² 1973)

1

Henry Kissinger: I think the Chairman is doing much better this time than last time.

Mao Zedong: It seems so. In fact, God has invited me. (Turning to Lord) You are so young.

Lord: I am getting old.

Mao: I am the oldest person here.

Zhou: I am the second oldest.

Mao: Back then, some in the British army opposed your country's independence. Field Marshal Montgomery [2] was one of those who opposed your policies.

Kissinger: Yes.

Mao: He also opposed the policies introduced by Dulles [3]. However, he probably won't oppose you anymore. Back then, you opposed us, and we opposed you. So we were enemies. (Laughter)

Kissinger: Former enemies.

Mao: Now our relationship is what we call friendship.

Kissinger: That's how we feel.

Mao: That's exactly what I say.

Kissinger: I told Premier Zhou that we haven't been as frank and open in our talks with other countries as we are with you.

Mao: Don't tell lies, don't play dirty. We didn't steal your documents. You could have just put them there and see what happens. We don't use bugs. Those little tricks are useless, and some big tricks are useless. I spoke to one of your reporters, Edgar Snow [4], and I told him that your CIA isn't good at big things either.

Kissinger: That's absolutely true. That's our experience.

Mao: Because when you give an order—for example, your president gives an order requesting information on certain issues—the intelligence agencies pour in with reports. We

¹ The US transcript of the February discussion can be found here: [Historical Documents - Office of the Historian](#). It has some differences with the Chinese.

² The US transcript has some additional passages relating to the Middle East, India and Hegel. See: [Chairman Mao Zedong and Secretary Henry Kissinger, November 12, 1973](#)

have our own intelligence agency, and the situation is the same. They don't do a good job. (Zhou Enlai laughs.) For example, they don't understand Lin Biao. (Zhou continues to laugh.) Similarly, they don't know you want to come to China.

Mao: You're doing a good job, flying everywhere. Are you a swallow or a dove? The "Vietnam issue" [5] can be considered essentially resolved.

Kissinger: That's our feeling. We now need a transitional period toward peace.

Mao: That's right.

Kissinger: The basic issues have been resolved.

Mao: We need it too. Your president is sitting here and saying this (pointing to Ki's seat). Our two countries are in need, so here we are, (clasping hands together) hand in hand³.

Kissinger: Yes, we all face the same danger. Sometimes we may use different methods, but our goal is the same.

Mao: That's good. As long as our goal is the same, we won't harm you, and you won't harm us. We'll be fighting a bastard together! That's actually how it is. Sometimes we have to criticize you, and you have to criticize us. Your president calls it the "influence" of "ideological power," saying, "To hell with the Communist Party! To hell with communism!" We say, "To hell with imperialism!" Sometimes we have to speak out; we have to.

Kissinger: I believe both sides should remain true to their respective fundamental principles. If both sides speak the same tune, it will only lead to chaos. I told the Prime Minister that in Europe, based on your principles, you can speak more firmly than we can.

Mao: We hope you will cooperate with Europe and Japan. We can argue about certain issues, but fundamentally, we must cooperate.

Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, from our side, while there may be occasional criticism between you and us, we will still coordinate our actions with you. We will never participate in any attempt to isolate you. As for Japan and Europe, we agree to cooperate with them on all substantive issues, but European leadership is currently weak.

Mao: They are not united.

Kissinger: They are not united, and they don't have the foresight you do. When they face danger, they always try to make it go away without any effort.

Zhou: (To Mao) Help Pompidou, he (referring to Kissinger) agreed.

Kissinger: We are doing our best to do so, and we will strive to do even more when we return.

³ Mao spoke the phrase "hand in hand" in English.

Mao: Pompidou is now threatened by the Socialist Party and the Communist Party joining forces to oppose him.

Kissinger: A coalition of the two.

Mao: A coalition of the two. The Soviet Union wants the Communist Party to come to power. I don't like that Communist Party, just as I don't like your Communist Party. I like you, not your Communist Party. (Kissinger laughs) You Westerners have always had a policy: at the beginning of both world wars, you pushed Germany to fight Russia.

Kissinger: However, it is not our policy to push Russia into attacking China. If a war breaks out in China, it would be just as dangerous to us as a war in Europe.

Mao: That's exactly what I want to say: Are you now pushing West Germany [6] to make peace with Russia, and then pushing Russia eastward? I suspect there is such a course for the entire West. Eastward, primarily toward us, but also toward Japan, and partly toward you, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Kissinger: We do not approve of Germany's policy. We would rather the German opposition come to power, and the German opposition does not pursue this policy.

Mao: I talked to a foreign friend about this. I suggested creating a horizontal line, a latitude line, encompassing the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Europe. This is a complex approach, driven by the domestic situation.

Mao: What does "mode of action" mean in English?

Shen Ruoyun: Mode of action⁴.

Kissinger: Regardless of public opinion, we will make a firm decision on our basic objectives. If hegemonic intentions become active, then the real danger will develop. Wherever such intentions arise, we will certainly counter them. The President once told the Chairman that we are doing this for our own benefit, not to show goodwill to anyone else.

Mao: You speak the truth.

Kissinger: That's our position. (Mao Zedong begins to smoke a cigar and tries to offer it to Kissinger and Lord. Lord says he doesn't smoke.)

Kissinger: We have no plans to significantly reduce the number of American troops stationed in Europe over the next four years.

(Mao Zedong looks at Zhou Enlai)

Zhou: When you say disarmament, you mean a maximum of 10 to 15 percent.

Kissinger i: Absolutely correct.

⁴ This phrase is spoken in English.

Mao: How many American troops are stationed in Europe? They're mostly missile forces, right?

Zhou: The nine major forces have between 200,000 and 350,000, including those stationed in the Mediterranean.

Mao: This probably doesn't include the navy.

Kissinger: Not including the navy. There are about 275,000 in central Europe, but that doesn't include the Sixth Fleet deployed in the Mediterranean.

Mao: Your forces deployed in Asia and the Pacific are widely dispersed. You have troops in South Korea—I've heard there are about 300,000.

Kissinger: About 40,000.

Mao: Chiang Kai-shek has about 8,000 to 9,000.

Zhou: In Taiwan, I think.

Mao: I've heard that Japan also has two garrisons: 40,000 in the Ryukyu Islands and 20,000 to 30,000 in mainland Japan. I don't know how many American troops are in the Philippines, but there are only a little over 10,000 in Vietnam right now.

Kissinger: But they will all be withdrawn soon.

Mao: Yes, I heard you have 40,000 people in Thailand.

Kissinger: That's right. But what you just mentioned is mostly air force troops, so I'm afraid it can't be measured solely by numbers.

Mao: You also have ground forces, for example, in South Korea [7].

Kissinger: We do have ground forces in South Korea.

Mao: When you pass through Japan, it would be best if you spent more time talking with them. If you only talk to them for one day, they'll be embarrassed.

Kissinger: Chairman, we hope the focus of this trip will be the talks in Beijing. I will go to Tokyo later on, separately.

Mao: Very good. Make it clear to them. You know Japan doesn't feel very well about the Soviet Union either.

Kissinger: They have a mixture of love and hate.

Mao: (Gestures) In a nutshell, this is what Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka told Premier Zhou: What the Soviets did is like seeing someone about to hang themselves and immediately pulling the chair out from under their feet.

Kissinger: Yes.

Mao: You could say that, they seized a vast tract of land without firing a single shot. (Zhou Enlai chuckled softly) They seized the Mongolian People's Republic, half of Xinjiang, and Manchuria in the Northeast, and they declared it their sphere of influence [8].

Kissinger: They also took away all the local industries.

Mao: Yes. They also took away Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands [9].

Kissinger: Japan is fascinated by the economic development potential in the Soviet Union.

Mao: (Nodding) They hope to get something back from the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: But we will strengthen Japan's relations with the United States, and we also hope to strengthen relations with China.

Mao: We believe that if Japan strengthens relations with the Soviet Union, it would be better to strengthen relations with the United States.

Kissinger: It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed close political relations.

Mao: In reality, this seems impossible.

Zhou: (To Mao Zedong) We have decided to set up liaison offices in the capitals of both countries to maintain contact between Huang Hua [10] and the White House.

Mao: (To Zhou Enlai) Why is it so important?

Zhou: The liaison office will handle general public communications. Confidential and urgent matters will not be covered; these will be handled through Ambassador Huang Hua's channels.

Mao: Huang Hua has a tough life. (Zhou laughs) He did a great job with you, and now he's back in Shanghai with a sprained back.

Kissinger: We'll find him a doctor when he returns to his post.

Mao: Good. (Zhou laughs) Huang Hua seems safer with you. He fell down as soon as he returned to Shanghai. Since your president watched the Chinese Acrobatic Troupe, I think the Vietnam issue is almost resolved. There are also rumours that you're about to fall down, too. (Laughter) The ladies present are not very happy about this. (Laughter, especially the ladies) Some say that if Dr. [Doctor] falls down, we'll be out of work.

Mao: The volume of trade between China and the United States is pitifully small, but it's gradually increasing. You have to understand that China is very poor.

Mao: The Chinese are very xenophobic. You can accommodate many ethnic groups. We don't have many foreigners in China. How many different ethnic groups do you have? You have 600,000 Chinese in the United States, but we probably don't even have 60 Americans. I

don't know why, but you should research it. We've never disliked foreigners, including very few Japanese, and none Indians at all.

Zhou: Very few.

Kissinger: This is because you've had bad luck dealing with foreigners in history.

Mao: There are some reasons for that. I think the main reasons for the past hundred years were the Eight-Nation Alliance, and then the Japanese occupied China for thirteen years, taking over most of the territory. Their previous occupation of Chinese territory doesn't count. They even had to pay compensation for occupying Beijing.

Kissinger: Yes, and there's also extraterritoriality.

Mao: Extraterritoriality, that's a lot! Now we don't want compensation from Japan. It's impossible to calculate, no one can figure it out, and we can't afford it.

Zhou: Any compensation would increase the burden on the people.

Mao: Only in this way can we eliminate hostility and improve relations between the two peoples. Resolving hostility between the Chinese and Japanese people is more difficult than resolving hostility between you and me.

Kissinger: Yes, the American people have no hostility toward the Chinese people. On the contrary, there is only a question of judgment between us.

Mao: That's right.

Kissinger: We will resolve this issue in the coming years, but a powerful community of interests will soon begin to operate.

Mao: Is that so?

Kissinger: Between China and the United States.

Mao: What community of interests do you mean? Taiwan?

Kissinger: Other countries with similar interests.

Zhou: Are you referring to the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: I am referring to the Soviet Union.

Zhou: Ms. Shen understands what you mean. Mao: (Looking at translator Shen Ruoyun) This person has excellent English. (To Zhou Enlai) Who is she?

Zhou: She is Shen Ruoyun.

Mao: We really have too few translators.

Kissinger: However, the translators we've met have all done a very competent job.

Mao: The translators you met and our current translators are only in their twenties or thirties. If they get older, they won't be able to translate as well as they do now.

Zhou: We should send some people abroad.

Mao: We should send some tall children like this (gesturing with his hand), not too old.

Kissinger: We're planning to set up some personnel exchange programs so you can send students to the United States.

Mao: If ten out of a hundred students master a foreign language, that would be a great success. Even if more than ten students don't want to return, like some girls who want to stay in the United States, that's okay, because you Americans aren't as xenophobic as the Chinese. In the past, Chinese people going abroad refused to learn the local language. (Looking at translator Tang Wensheng) Her grandparents refused to learn English. They're just that stubborn. You know, the Chinese are very stubborn and conservative. Many older generations of overseas Chinese refuse to speak the local language, but the younger generation is much better.

Mao: (Gestures and points to his book) If the Soviets dropped bombs and killed Chinese people over the age of thirty, that would help us solve the problem, because old people like me can't learn English. We only read Chinese. Most of my books are in Chinese, with only a few dictionaries in foreign languages. The rest are mostly in Chinese.

Kissinger i: Is the Chairman learning English now?

Mao: I've heard rumours that I'm learning English. I don't care about those rumours; they're all false. I know a few English words, but I don't understand grammar.

Tang: The Chairman invented an English word.

Mao: Yes, I invented an English word—paper tiger.

Kissinger: Paper tiger. Yes, that refers to us. (Laughter)

Mao: If Russia attacks China, I tell you now that we will use guerrilla warfare and protracted war. We will make them go wherever they want. (Zhou Enlai laughs) If they want to go to the Yellow River basin, that's good! Very good. (Laughter) If they go further to the Yangtze River basin, that's not bad either.

Kissinger: But what if they use bombs instead of sending troops? (Laughter)

Mao: What will the dragons do? Perhaps you could form a committee to study this issue. We'll let them attack fiercely, and they'll lose a lot of resources. They say they're socialists, and we're socialists too, so a Soviet attack on China would be socialists attacking socialists.

Kissinger: If they attack China, we'll certainly oppose them for our own reasons.

Mao: But your people haven't awakened. Europe and you will both think that diverting the blame to China would be a good thing.

Kissinger: What Europe is thinking, I can't judge; they won't do anything because they're essentially irrelevant to the matter. We're concerned that if the Soviets occupy China, it will affect the security of other countries and isolate us.

Mao: (Laughter) What would happen then? Since you've been so deeply entangled in Vietnam, you've encountered so many difficulties. Do you think the Soviets would be comfortable if they were deeply entangled in China?

Kissinger: The Soviet Union?

Tang Wensheng: The Soviet Union.

Mao: Then you could keep the Soviet Union deeply enmeshed in China for six months, a year, two years, three years, or four years, stabbing the Soviet Union in the back. Then your slogan would be to seek peace. In the name of peace, you would dismantle the socialist empire. Perhaps you would help them through trade and offer them every possible assistance against China.

Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important that we understand each other's intentions. We will absolutely not join forces to attack China.

Mao: (interrupting Kissinger) No, that's not the case. Your goal is to disintegrate the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: That's a very dangerous thing. (Laughter)

Mao: (Mao gestures with his hands. The Soviet Union's goal is to occupy both the Eurasian continent.)

Kissinger: Our goal is to deter a Soviet attack, not to defeat it. We hope to stop it.

(Zhou Enlai checks his watch)

Mao: Things are unpredictable. We prefer this development; it's better for the world.

Kissinger: Which way?

Mao: That means the Soviet Union attacks China and is defeated. We must consider the worst-case scenario.

Kissinger: That's your inevitable inference.

Mao: In any case, Providence has sent me an invitation.

Kissinger: I truly notice that the Chairman looks better this year than last.

Mao: Yes, I'm feeling better. Please give my regards to President Nixon, and also to Mrs. Nixon. I'm sorry I won't be able to meet with her and Secretary of State Rogers.

Kissinger: I'll certainly convey that.

2

Mao: Let's discuss the Taiwan issue now. Our relationship with the United States should be handled separately from our relationship with Taiwan.

Kissinger: In principle...

Mao: As long as you sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the diplomatic issues between our two countries can be resolved. This is the same approach we took with Japan. As for our relationship with Taiwan, it's quite complicated. I don't think it can be resolved peacefully. They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries [11], how could they cooperate with us? I say we should let go of Taiwan for now and deal with it in a hundred years. Don't be too hasty about worldly affairs. What's there to rush? It's just a small island with a population of a few million.

Zhou: They have a population of 16 million.

Mao: As for your relationship with us, I think it will take less than a hundred years to resolve.

Kissinger: I believe so. We should be able to do it much faster.

Mao: But this is a matter for you to decide, and we won't rush you. If you feel it's necessary, we'll cooperate. If you feel it's not possible now, then we can wait a little longer.

Kissinger: For our part, we hope to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The difficulty is that we can't immediately sever ties with Taiwan. There are several reasons, all of which are related to our domestic situation. I told the Premier that we hope to complete this process before or during 1976. Therefore, we must find some way to establish diplomatic relations that can also serve as a symbol of strengthening our relationship, because technically, the liaison office (12) is very useful.

Mao: That's possible.

Kissinger: What's possible?

Mao: You can do it the way you are doing it now, because you still need Taiwan.

Kissinger: It's not a question of whether or not Taiwan is needed, but whether it's actually feasible.

Mao: It's all the same. (Laughter) We're not in a rush about Hong Kong right now. (Laughter) We won't even touch Macau. If we really wanted to touch Macau, we would only do so

slightly, because Portugal has had a tight grip on Macau since the Ming Dynasty. (Laughter) Khrushchev even scolded me, asking why we didn't even want Hong Kong and Macau. [13] And I also told Japan that we not only agree with their (Japan's) demand (for the Soviet Union) to return the four northern islands, but also the 1.5 million square kilometres of land that the Soviet Union historically ceded from China.

Kissinger: Chairman, I think this is the issue regarding diplomatic relations. On the Taiwan issue, I think we all understand each other's positions. So our current problem is... and the Liaison Office has performed its intended function. The only question is whether we all believe, or at least to some extent believe, that we should symbolically demonstrate that Sino-US relations are normal in all respects. If so, we should find a way to do so, but it's not absolutely necessary.

Mao: We also have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and India, but they're not very good, even worse than our relationship with you. So that's not very important; the overall international situation is what really matters.

Kissinger: I completely agree with the Chairman and agree that we must understand each other. I believe we have a substantial understanding of each other.

Mao: Our Liaison Office Director has already explained the general principles to you and mentioned the story of George Washington's resistance to the British.

Kissinger: Yes, he gave me a wonderful speech a few weeks ago, and I've heard it from the Premier before.

Mao: There's no need to repeat that argument. We now have a contradiction: on the one hand, we have always supported the Arab countries' movement against Israel's establishment, but on the other hand, we must welcome the United States' efforts to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of the Middle East. Our Ambassador Huang Zhen has mentioned our support for the Arab world, but he doesn't understand the importance of preventing the expansion of Soviet influence.

Kissinger: Well, my statement surprised him, and he also reiterated the official UN position. (Laughter) I understand that you have to publicly adopt certain positions, and these do not violate our common position. However, in fact, we will further resolve the Middle East issue, but we also want to show that this is not due to Soviet pressure. Therefore, whenever the Soviet Union pressures us, we must resist. Besides the merits of the dispute itself, we resist for the sake of resistance. And then, when we defeat them, we may even move in the same direction. We are not opposed to the Arab countries' ideas; we are only opposed to using Soviet pressure to achieve their wishes.

Mao: That's right.

Kissinger: And that's exactly our current strategy.

Mao: The next time you come to China, besides politics, you could also discuss philosophy with me.

Kissinger: I'd be delighted, Mr. Chairman. Philosophical research is my first love.

Mao: Perhaps it's harder to study philosophy after becoming Secretary of State.

Kissinger: Yes.

Mao: Khrushchev said we were like fighting cocks. Kissinger: When he visited here in 1959, it wasn't very successful.

Mao: We broke up in 1958. The rift began when they tried to control China's coast and Chinese naval ports in 1958. When I discussed this with them and their ambassador, I almost slammed the table and scolded him. (Laughter) After the Moscow report, Khrushchev came. At that time, Khrushchev proposed the idea of a joint fleet—a joint naval fleet between the Soviet Union and China. That's what he said. At that time, he was quite boastful because he had met then-US President General Eisenhower: he had a bit of the so-called "Camp David spirit." He boasted to me in Beijing that he knew the US President, and when he mentioned President Eisenhower, he even used two English words, calling him "my friend." (To Ambassador Bruce: Do you know about this?)

Bruce, no, I never knew about it.

Mao: There are some news. After that, Khrushchev never came again. But he did go to Vladivostok. He came from China.

Zhou: He delivered an anti-China speech there.

Mao: No current Soviet leader has ever been as far east as Vladivostok. Kosygin himself said he wasn't very clear about Siberian affairs. (The Chinese side checks the time)

Zhou: It's already been two and a half hours.

Mao: I wanted to discuss another issue with you, but it seems we've gone on too long today, over two and a half hours, and we've taken up time originally reserved for other activities. I want to discuss my strong suspicion that if the Democrats came to power, they would adopt isolationism.

Kissinger: This is a very serious issue, Mr. Chairman. I believe that the current intellectuals and some Democrats might move toward isolationism. However, reality will make them realize that our current policy is the only option.

Kissinger: This is a very serious issue, Mr. Chairman. I believe that the current intellectuals and some Democrats might be inclined toward isolationism. However, reality will make them realize that our current policy is the only option. I don't know yet how much damage will be done before they realize this, or whether they will continue with the same complex tactics. But I don't think they will deviate from their current path.

Mao: You and I seem to be of the same ilk. We both seem to be somewhat paranoid.

Kissinger: I have my doubts, and I have my doubts about certain leaders. But I think the situation demands that we return to the policy we are currently pursuing. However, Mr. Chairman, this is also why we should, while everyone is still in office and understands the situation, strive to strengthen relations and not allow other policies to take advantage.

Mao: This can be demonstrated primarily by advocating for the withdrawal of troops from Europe.

Kissinger: Yes.

Mao: This is a great help to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: We will not do this during President Nixon's term. There are only two possible scenarios: withdrawing troops from Europe, and if challenged, we are not willing to resolve it in a very rough or swift manner.

Mao: When you say "rough," you mean the possibility of war.

Kissinger: If necessary, but...

Mao: I don't like you playing diplomacy with me.

Kissinger: If necessary, but based on our experience, as soon as they know we are going to go to war, they will let up. Until now, they have been very afraid of us.

Mao: Because I also think it's best not to go to war. I don't like war either, although people say I'm a warmonger. (Laughter) If you go to war with the Soviet Union, I also think it's not a good idea. If you do fight, it's best to use only conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons are only a backup, and should be avoided as much as possible.

Kissinger: We will absolutely not start a war.

Mao: That's good. I heard that your previous approach was intended to buy time.

Kissinger: We do want to buy time, but we also have another position. If the Soviet Union attacks any of the important areas we just discussed, we must be able to retaliate. We must take precautions before it happens.

Mao: Absolutely correct. As for the Soviet Union, they bully the weak and fear the strong.

[1] On February 17, 1973, Mao Zedong met with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Attendees included Premier Zhou Enlai, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Hairong, translator Tang Wensheng, translator Shen Ruoyun, and U.S. National Security Council member Liao De. This is part of the conversation between Mao Zedong and Kissinger.

[2] Montgomery (1887-1976), British Field Marshal. During World War II, he was one of the Allied Advisors. He later served as Chief of the General Staff of the British Army and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.

[3] Dulles, an American Republican, served as U.S. Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959.

[4] Edgar Snow (1905-1972) was an American progressive writer and journalist. He first visited China in 1928 and in 1976 visited the revolutionary base in northern Shaanxi, where he met with Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he visited China in 1960, 1964, and 1970. He died of illness in Geneva, Switzerland on February 15, 1972.

[5] On 27 January 1973, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the United States, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and the Saigon puppet regime signed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam in Paris, known as the Paris Agreement on the Vietnam Question. This agreement stipulated that the US government must withdraw all its troops within 60 days, thus creating favourable conditions for the Vietnamese people to resolve their own problems. Due to Kissinger's contribution to this agreement, on October 16, 1973, the five-member Nobel Peace Prize Committee elected by the Norwegian Parliament announced that Kissinger and Le Duc Tho (the Vietnamese leader) had won the Nobel Peace Prize.

[6] West Germany, also known as the Federal Republic of Germany. After World War II, Germany was divided into the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). On October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic officially joined the Federal Republic of Germany, and the two Germanys were unified under the name of Germany.

[7] South Korea, now the Republic of Korea, abbreviated as South Korea.

[8] From the 1920s to the 1940s, the Soviet Union took advantage of China's internal turmoil, leaving it unable to focus on the north, and gradually encroached on Chinese territory. Taking advantage of the Japanese invasion of China during World War II and the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the Soviet Union forced the Chinese Nationalist Government to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) and to obtain a series of privileges in Xinjiang and Northeast China. Outer Mongolia's independence refers to its separation from China in the early 23rd century, a monumental historical event that continues to resonate with China to this day, and is one of the darkest periods in Chinese history.

[9] In February 1945, the Yalta Agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain regarding postwar Japan stipulated that the entire Kuril Islands, including what Japan called the "Northern Four Islands" of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai, would be ceded to the Soviet Union.

[10] Huang Hua, then Permanent Representative to the United Nations and its Security Council.

[11] Refers to the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan

[12] In May 1973, China and the United States established liaison offices in each other's capitals, establishing diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. Huang Zhen, a veteran diplomat and former ambassador to France, was appointed director of the liaison office in the United States, while Bruce, a veteran American diplomat, was appointed director of the liaison office in China.

[13] In December 1962, Khrushchev, in a speech at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, asked: Why is the People's Republic of China not interested in reclaiming Macau and Hong Kong, which had fallen under the control of Portuguese and British imperialism due to wars of aggression and unequal treaties, but instead harbors hostility toward its border with India?

Comments on the draft decision submitted by Zhou Enlai on restoring Deng Xiaoping's Party membership and position as Vice Premier of the State Council [1]

(March 1973)

Agreed.

[1] On March 9, 1973, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao Zedong: "The question of reinstating Comrade Deng Xiaoping as Vice Premier of the State Council has been discussed several times by the Political Bureau and reported to the Chairman at a meeting." "The Political Bureau believes that the Central Committee needs to make a decision, which will be sent all the way to the county and regiment-level party committees." The draft of the Central Committee's decision submitted by Zhou Enlai for review stated that on August 14, 1972, Chairman Mao made an important comment on a letter from Comrade Deng Xiaoping to the Chairman. The Central Political Bureau carefully discussed Chairman Mao's comment and the issue of Comrade Deng Xiaoping and decided: "Restore Comrade Deng Xiaoping's party organizational life and his position as Vice Premier of the State Council. The State Council will assign him an appropriate job." Mao Zedong wrote this comment after reading it. On March 10, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China officially issued this decision. On December 12, 1973, Mao Zedong said at a meeting of the Central Political Bureau: Comrade Jianying and I invite Comrade Deng Xiaoping to join the Military Commission as a member. Should I become a member of the Politburo and then submit my petition for confirmation at the Second Plenum? On December 14, Mao Zedong, in a conversation with relevant Politburo comrades, said: "We have now hired a military advisor, Deng Xiaoping. A notice will be issued, appointing him as a member of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission. The Political Bureau oversees everything: the Party, government, military, civilians, and education, east, west, north, south, and centre. I think the Politburo should add a Secretary-General. If you don't want that title, then you can just become Chief of Staff." On December 15, Mao Zedong, in a conversation with relevant Politburo comrades and the leaders of the Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, and Wuhan Military Regions, introduced Deng Xiaoping to them, saying: "We have now hired a Chief of the General Staff. Some people are afraid of him, but he's quite decisive. His life was probably a 70/30 split. I've brought back your old boss, and the Politburo has brought him back. I'm not the only one who brought him back." He also said to Deng Xiaoping: "People are a little afraid of you. Let me give you two words: 'Soft but firm, a cotton ball concealing within a needle.' Soft on the outside, but a steel company on the inside." Let's slowly correct our past shortcomings. On January 5, 1975, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued Document No. 1, appointing Deng Xiaoping as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army. From January 8 to 10, the Second

Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing. The meeting ratified Deng Xiaoping as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and elected him as Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.

Presented to the Esteemed Guo⁵ [1]

(Spring 1973)

Elder Guo retired from Liu, [2]

Not as good as Liu Zongyuan. [3]

Identified with the Communist Party, [4]

Worships Confucius [5].

[1] Present, to send respectfully. Guo Lao, a respectful title for Guo Moruo.

[2] From, by. Han, refers to Han Yu. Han Yu (768-824), a Tang Dynasty writer and philosopher. His courtesy name was Tuizhi, and he was from Heyang, Henan (now south of Mengxian County, Henan). He claimed that his ancestral home was Changli, and was known as Han Changli. In ancient times, he was listed as the first of the "Eight Great Masters of Tang and Song Dynasties". His "Collected Works of Mr. Changli" has been handed down.

[3] Not as good as, not comparable to. Liu Zongyuan (773-819), a Tang Dynasty writer and philosopher. His courtesy name was Zihou, and he was from Jie, Hedong (now Jiezhou Town, Yuncheng County, Shanxi Province), and was known as "Liu Hedong".

[4] "Yue" means to be called. "Ming" means name. "CCP" here refers to members of the Communist Party.

[5] "Worship" means to respect and admire. "Kong Erxian" means Mr. Kong Er, a nickname for Confucius. The word "sheng" is omitted here due to the number of characters and rhythm. Confucius (551-479 BC) was a thinker, politician, educator and founder of Confucianism in the late Spring and Autumn Period. His given name was Qiu and his courtesy name was Zhongni. He was the second child in the family. He was from Genyi, Lu (southeast of Qufu, Shandong today). He gathered disciples to teach and engaged in political activities. At the age of fifty, he was promoted from Zhongdu Zai of Lu to Sikou, acting as prime minister. Later, he traveled around the countries but was not used outside. It is said that he had 3,000 disciples, of whom more than 70 were famous. Confucius vigorously promoted the doctrine of "benevolence". He pioneered the trend of private lectures. In politics, he proposed the idea of "rectifying names". Confucius advocated "rule by virtue" and "enlightenment through education," opposing harsh rule and arbitrary executions. Since the Han Dynasty, Confucius' teachings have been the orthodoxy of feudal culture for over 2,000 years, exerting a profound influence. Feudal rulers consistently revered him as a

⁵ The poem is for Guo Moruo, whom Mao had always respected. The Chinese place the word "Lao" ("Old") before a person's surname to show respect; if the person is highly revered, the "Lao" can be placed after the surname, as it was here. Mao's reverence for Guo Moruo, poet, dramatist and historian was tempered by his criticism of Guo's support for Confucianism.

"sage." The extant "Analects" records Confucius' conversations and the dialogues he had with his disciples.

Letter to Li Qinglin [1]

(April 25, 1973)

Comrade Li Qinglin:

I am sending you 300 yuan to help you out. There are many similar cases across the country; we will address them through a coordinated approach. [2]

Mao Zedong

April 25, 1973

[1] Li Qinglin was a teacher at Xialin Primary School in Chengjiao Commune, Putian County, Fujian Province. On December 20, 1972, he wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, reflecting on the difficulties his children encountered in their rural life while working in the Shuiban Brigade of Halu Commune, Putian County. The letter said that after the state stopped providing food rations and living expenses to educated youth who went to the countryside, the food rations the children earned through labour were not enough every year. They had to rely on black market food to survive for half a year or more every year. In addition, they had no income from labour, so their lives were very difficult. He requested the state to provide a reasonable solution as soon as possible. The letter also reflected on the practice of using connections and backdoors in the recruitment of workers, students, and cadres for educated youth who went to the countryside.

[2] On June 10, 1973, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued Li Qinglin's letter and Mao Zedong's reply, requiring all provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, and major military regions to set aside one day during their enlarged Party committee meetings to read and study Chairman Mao's letter and discuss the "Opinions on Solving Several Issues in the Current Work of Educated Youth Going to the Countryside" issued at the mid-May work conference and the "Notice on Seriously Studying Chairman Mao's Letter to Comrade Li Qinglin" issued by the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Central Committee planned to have representatives from all provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, and major military regions come to the Central Committee in the second half of June to gather information and coordinate solutions to this issue. In June and July 1973, the State Council convened a national conference on the work of sending educated youth to the countryside and drafted the "Draft Provisional Regulations on Several Issues Concerning the Going of Educated Youth to the Countryside."

Diplomats' Style Couplets

Seven-Character Poems⁶

(April 1973)

Under the Double Cherry Blossoms, Young Master Liao [1] and Elder Brother Han [2] of the
Mayflower (Qiao Guanhua [3])

Don't say my achievements are small; I made a lot of money selling newspapers in Beijing.
(Mao Zedong)⁷

⁶ The couplets comprise two phrases each of seven characters.

⁷ After Nixon's visit to China, relations between China and the United States began to ease, and in 1973, the two countries began preparations for the establishment of a foreign affairs liaison office. In order to discuss the details, Nixon dispatched a liaison named Jenkins. When he came to China, the negotiator in charge of receiving him was Qiao Guanhua.

At that time, shortly after Nixon's visit to China, the two sides were in the "honeymoon period", so the talks went very smoothly and an agreement was quickly reached. After the negotiations, Qiao Guanhua was very happy, showing his trademark smile and hearty laughter, and improvised a limerick: "Yae Sakura under Young Master Liao, Mayflower Big brother of China and South Korea. Joyful Jenkins,....."

Young Master Liao was Liao Chengzhi, then an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had in April 1973, just been to Japan and South Korea as the head of the delegation of the China-Japan Friendship Association. The visit promoted the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations.

Elder Brother Han refers to Han Xu, an official of the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of the Americas and Oceanian foreign affairs. After China and the United States decided to establish a liaison office, Han Xu went to the United States as a Chinese representative to prepare for the establishment of a liaison office and stayed in a hotel called "Mayflower". It was named after the first ship bringing the English to what became the US.

In the poem, Qiao Guanhua first talked about the deeds of two colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it can be seen from the two titles of "Young Master Liao" and "Elder Brother Han" that he respects the two very much, and also affirms and praises their contributions to China's diplomatic cause.

After talking about the two colleagues, the third sentence of the poem is the negotiation with Jenkins. The word "joyful" intuitively shows the happy result of this negotiation. However, in order to liven up the atmosphere, Qiao Guanhua stopped after reciting the third line, asking everyone to use their brains and help think about the fourth sentence.

This eventually reached Chairman Mao's ears. Chairman Mao has always attached great importance to Qiao Guanhua and personally named him to represent China at important diplomatic occasions many times. Hearing that everyone had joined in the competition, Chairman Mao, who had outstanding literary talent, decided to continue writing this poem himself.

Unlike others, Chairman Mao did not just add a fourth sentence, but deleted the third sentence and wrote the last two sentences directly: "Don't say that our achievements are small, I made a lot of money selling newspapers in Beijing!"

It turned out that after the beginning of the ten years of turmoil, Qiao Guanhua was dismissed from all positions, and sent to the street to sell newspapers, and he was not allowed to go home if the newspapers were not sold out. Every time he received the newspapers, he would find a place where no one was there and threw them all into the trash can, and then found a quiet place to study, and when the day was about to end, he pretended to be very hard-working and went back, taking out from his own money his earnings from selling newspapers.

In this way, Qiao Guanhua was the fastest and most profitable of the newspaper sellers, and later the story spread, and even Chairman Mao knew about it. In 1971, after Chairman Mao appointed him to represent China

at the United Nations General Assembly, Qiao Guanhua was reinstated and revealed to everyone the little trick he played when selling newspapers.
Chairman Mao used this matter to complete Qiao's poem, as a kind of support for Qiao Guanhua, so that opponents did not dare to trouble him again.
(Rewritten from an anecdote on the Zhuanlan website – Trans.)

Comments on Tan Zheng's Letter [1]

(May 1973)

Ji and Wang [3] will handle the matter at their discretion. Also printed and distributed to all comrades of the Politburo.

[1] Tan Zheng, formerly Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, Member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission, Director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, and Deputy Minister of National Defence. In October 1960, he was framed by Lin Biao at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission and was dismissed and demoted. He was further persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. On April 28, 1973, he wrote to Mao Zedong, saying, "I am already sixty-seven years old, my body is getting old, and my illness is getting worse. I hope you will treat my case leniently and release me in the near future." In 1975, Tan Zheng served as an advisor to the Central Military Commission of the CPC. On March 21, 1979, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission issued a notice approving the General Political Department's "Decision on Completely Rehabilitating the Unjust Case of 'Tan Zheng's Anti-Party Sectarian Group'", which completely rehabilitated him.

[2] Ji refers to Ji Dengkui, who was then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Central Organization and Propaganda Group. Wang refers to Wang Dongxing, who was then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee.

Reports of several conversations with foreign guests

(June to November 1973)

1

Vietnam belongs to the Vietnamese people, not to the Vietnamese reactionaries, let alone to imperialism. (1)

2

We are all called the Third World, and we are developing countries. I wish your country will develop, your people will be happy, and the whole of Africa will unite to defeat imperialism. (2)

3

We will always support you. The people of our two countries, the people of the Third World, and the people of the world will always unite. Please send my regards to President Sadat and your other colleagues when you return home. (3)

4

We are also very happy to receive you. Congratulations to you on the development of Africa. Your development will benefit the whole world. The African people will always rise. (4)

5

We should support you, support you as much as we can. We should also thank you, the people of South Vietnam, because you have fought for so many years. (5)

(1) This is what Mao Zedong said on June 5, 1973, when he met with Le Duan, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Le Thanh Nghi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It was published in the People's Daily on June 6, 1973.

(2) This is what Mao Zedong said when he met with Colonel Traoré, the head of state and prime minister of Mali, on June 22, 1973. It was published in the People's Daily on June 23, 1973.

(3) This is what Mao Zedong said when he met with Egyptian Vice President Hussein Shafie on September 23, 1973, and was published in the People's Daily on September 24, 1973.

(4) This is what Mao Zedong said when he met with Sierra Leone President Stevens and Foreign Minister Luke on November 7, 1973. It was published in the People's Daily on November 8, 1973.

(5) This is what Mao Zedong said on November 19, 1973 when he met with Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and Nguyen Thi Binh, member of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. It was published in the People's Daily on November 20, 1973.

Conversation with Malian head of state Traoré (excerpt)

(June 22, 1973)

We are all called the Third World, that is, developing countries. Don't look at the exhibitions in our country. In fact, we are a very poor country. I say (English: I say), the poorer the better! There will be revolution. Western countries are not so good. In any case, these Western capitalist countries have created culture, science, and industry. Now we in the Third World can use the good parts of their science, industry, culture, and language.

Comments on Ye Fei's letter [1]

(June 25, 1973)

Ji and Wang [2] should make their own decisions. This person seems to be able to be released and assigned to work.

7. 6. 25

[1] Ye Fei, formerly Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, First Secretary of the Fujian Provincial Committee, Commander and First Political Commissar of the Fuzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. He was overthrown after being wrongly criticized during the Cultural Revolution. On June 18, 1973, he wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, requesting the Central Committee to approve the lifting of his supervision and allow him to read party documents. In August 1973, at the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, he was elected as an alternate member of the Central Committee. In 1975, he served as Minister of Transportation and Secretary of the Party Group.

[2] Ji refers to Ji Dengkui, then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Central Organization and Propaganda Group. Wang refers to Wang Dongxing, then an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee.

Conversation with Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao [1]

(July 4, 1973)

You two are responsible for the report and the party constitution. Today I have asked you to discuss a few things. Recently, there have been some unsatisfactory issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I think you are aware of this?

The United States and the Soviet Union held two meetings. The views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not as good as those of several embassies in France, Switzerland, and even Syria. There are many others, all of which are more insightful than the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a "New Situation", which first says that the big things are not good, then says that the deception is greater, and then says that the atmosphere of the United States and the Soviet Union dominating the world is stronger. It is probably about uranium-235, enriched uranium. Everyone says it is good and that the article is well written. I read it and thought that maybe I am wrong and your ministry is right! However, it is not related to the opinions of the Central Committee, at least for several years. For example, the Central Committee always says that the domestic and international situation is very good. A very good situation is not medium good, not small good, and certainly not bad. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that the big things are not good, which is more deceptive and the atmosphere of the United States and the Soviet Union dominating the world is stronger. This situation will continue to be so strong. By next year, the deception will become even greater and will escalate. This deception problem has been going on for more than a year.

You are still young, so it is best for you to learn some foreign languages to avoid being deceived by those gentlemen and getting on their pirate ship.

Regarding the Vietnam issue, the U.S. military strategy shifted its focus eastward, and I proposed shifting the focus westward. It was Europe! They were the ones who acted out this! They wanted to withdraw their troops, but one country refused to let them withdraw, saying that the revolutionary storm in Asia was in Vietnam. If they stopped fighting, it would be a disaster. It was opportunism, right-wing opportunism. We are that kind of person. I am talking about me. I have a bad reputation in recent years. The only Marx and the only beacon in the world is in Europe. Even a fart from that place smells good! They regard it as an imperial decree! I will ignore it! What can you do to me? I am a right-wing opportunist. The "beacon" was written in my name, but I did not read it. As a rule, I do not read any documents of this kind, including the Prime Minister's speeches, because I cannot bear to read them.

Should the focus be shifted eastward or westward? Discuss it. I think it should be shifted westward to some extent. If they want to walk, we will stop them even if we die. "Revolution

cannot be compromised, and we cannot compromise under any circumstances." Which Marxism is this? We compromised with Chiang Kai-shek twice. The president of the United States is coming, please. He sat here and blew for an hour.

It is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' rubbish department (Asia Department) that says Tanaka cannot come to power and that even if he does, it will not improve Sino-Japanese relations. (Interjection: The Second Ministry thinks Tanaka cannot come to power, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thinks that even if Tanaka comes to power, Sino-Japanese relations will not change quickly.) To laugh at someone who has taken fifty steps is to laugh at someone who has taken a hundred steps. Abandoning armour and dragging away soldiers, those who have fled fifty steps laugh at those who have taken a hundred steps. This is in terms of quantity. If we talk about nature, they are all deserters. Go and look up the "Mencius".

So I formally advise comrades to read a little, so as not to be deceived by intellectuals. What about the arguments between Mr. Guo, Mr. Fan (referring to Guo Moruo and Fan Wenlan), Ren Jiyu, and Yang Liuqiao? Mr. Guo now says that Confucius is a saint of slave owners. In "Ten Critiques", Mr. Guo claims to be a humanist, that is, people-centred. Confucius is also a humanist, just like him. Mr. Guo not only respects Confucius, but also opposes the law. Respect Confucius and oppose the law. The Kuomintang is the same! Lin Biao is the same! I agree with Mr. Guo's historical periodization. Slavery is divided by the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, but we cannot curse Qin Shihuang. He was very chaotic. A few decades ago, Chinese textbooks said that Qin Shihuang was good. The wheels were standardized, the writing was standardized, and the weights and measures were unified. Even when Li Bai talked about Qin Shihuang, he started with a long paragraph saying that he was great. "The King of Qin swept across the world, looking so majestic! He waved his sword to cut through the floating clouds, and all the princes came to the west."

A long article only has two sentences at the end, "But I see the golden coffin buried in cold ashes in the three springs." It means he is still dead. What about you, Li Bai? You wanted to be an official! In the end, you were exiled to Guizhou. When you arrived at Baidi City, the general amnesty order came. So "I left Baidi in the morning among the colourful clouds." In fact, he (referring to Li Bai) wanted to be an official. "Liangfu Yin" said that it is not possible now, but there will be hope in the future. "Don't you see the drunkard in Gaoyang drafting" and "commanding Chu and Han like a whirlwind." He was very arrogant at that time. I added a few sentences to make it more complete: "Unexpectedly, Han Xin was disobedient and led an army of 100,000 to Licheng. The King of Qi was furious and arrested the drunkard and put him in a cauldron to cook." He was put into the oil pan.

They also said that the United States was no longer good and could not stand up straight. They both said that American meat and vegetables were not tasty after returning from the United Nations. Nixon himself admitted that there were three pieces of meat in the middle of the meat-filled bread that he could not chew: China, Europe, and Japan. This is not to mention other third world countries.

They often boast about great upheavals, great divisions, and great reorganizations, and suddenly there comes a great deception or a great master. In short, in terms of thinking, they focus on the surface and not the essence.

Our party has always been like this. When a wind blows, it will... For example, Wang Ming's line, the main leadership of each base area and each white area was taken away. In less than four years, alas! The self-proclaimed 100% Marxist, the leader of the Central Soviet Area, refers to me, without any Marxism. When a wind blows, we will follow the wind. There are many people, not just a few. Those who stubbornly resist are a minority. Fortunately, Teng Daiyuan is not dead yet. He can prove how to fight against the Lisan line. I am the only one left. I am afraid of being isolated, so why follow the wind? It is best to stop the Japanese north of Shijiazhuang and Taiyuan. But if the Japanese don't listen, what will you do? Fight all the way to Guangxi and Guizhou. What I mean is that it is best to fight to Chongqing and Xi'an, but they will not listen to me. My thought is close to Lenin's, called the theory of half defeat. Openly support Chiang Kai-shek in resisting Japan and opposing the diehards, but actually hope that Chairman Chiang will be killed. Now this person is still alive, but he cannot see anyone.

I met a reporter stationed in West Germany, Wang Shu, who was tortured to death by Xinhua News Agency! He cried when I saw him. This diplomacy was only successful because I entrusted him to do it [2]. It was me who colluded with the bad guys such as the United States, Japan, West Germany, and Britain.

The doctrine that there can be no compromise in the revolution is not Marxism. Lenin repeatedly said that if you encounter bandits, you should either be killed or surrender your pistols and cars. He advocated surrendering pistols and cars, and waiting for the opportunity to wipe out the gang of bandits one day, and take back the pistols and cars.

I haven't finished reading the Trotsky documents you guys have, I've only read a part of them. He was against the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Lenin advocated ceding territory and paying compensation, and signing a peace treaty. This peace treaty was signed with eyes closed. First, it was written that the territory was ceded, and second, the compensation was paid. German imperialism ran away, dealing with two parties, and it couldn't fight on two fronts. That was the First World War. Later, the territory was not ceded, and the compensation was not paid. The treaty was a piece of waste paper, just like what Nixon said.

I believe in the theory of half defeat. Lenin advocated complete defeat, that the government army was completely defeated. At that time, the Russian and Japanese armies were fighting in Lushun, Dalian, and Liaoyang. The more thorough the better, the revolution will rise, and the prestige of the Russian emperor will be destroyed. When we fight Japan, we cannot learn everything from him, but actually use his knowledge. Chiang Kai-shek, you bastard, what are you doing? ! The representatives of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, the millions of troops are all counter-revolutionary troops, fighting us for ten years, and there

have been three anti-communist climaxes. I hope that the Japanese can occupy as much of China as possible.

The trend of Wang Ming's line was different the second time, but in the end, it was still in line with the opinions of some comrades who wanted to revolutionize and had Marxism. I wrote an article called "On Protracted War" to criticize the theory of quick victory. It was called criticizing those outside the party, but in fact it was criticizing those inside the party, and criticizing the theory of national destruction.

There are many examples of this kind, including the First World War. Germany's William I (interruption: the second) let's call it William X, was majestic and murderous, attacking from east to west, but in the end, no one knew where the emperor was. He was killed, died, or ran away. I didn't find out clearly. The army was completely wiped out.

In the Second World War, this Hitler was even more vicious. The more vicious, the better, do you believe it? The more people are killed, the more revolution is needed. The First World War brought about the October Revolution, and the Second World War brought about the Chinese Revolution. The method is very simple. You can kill people, so I can't? Lu Xun wrote in "The True Story of Ah Q", "The monks can move, but I can't?"

The conclusion is four sentences: Don't discuss major issues, but send minor issues every day. If this tune is not changed, it will inevitably be revised. If you engage in revisionism in the future, don't say I didn't tell you in advance.

(Interjection: Some people look forward to the Tenth National Congress. After the Tenth National Congress, the National People's Congress will be held. Once the National People's Congress is held, the salary issue must be resolved.)

Everyone has their own concerns. When Jia Mu died, [3] everyone cried, each with their own purpose. If they were the same, there would be no personality. Crying is a common trait. As for what each person thinks and what makes them sad, it is different, that is personality. I advise people to watch the times when Sister Liu and Qin Xian's family competed for the kitchen. [4]

[1] These are the minutes of the conversation between Mao Zedong, Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao on July 4, 1973.

[2] On July 24, 1972, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ji Pengfei and Qiao Guanhua summoned Wang Shu to discuss the situation in Europe and the prospects for establishing diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan. In September 1972, he served as a negotiator of the Chinese government and reached an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on the establishment of diplomatic relations. In October 1972, he was appointed Political Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy in West Germany, preparing for the establishment of the Chinese Embassy.

[3] Jia Mu, or Mother Jia, was the mother of Ja Baoyu, a central character in “The Dream of Red Mansions”. As she died, she took Baoyu’s hand, knew she could no longer protect him, and said “My son, you have to fight for yourself!” (Trans.)

[4] Referring to class struggles depicted in “The Drean of Red Mansions, Mao advised Wang and Zhang to consider the descriptions of Sister-in-law Liu's fight for the kitchen with Qin Xian's family – Trans.

A Playful Sequel to Li Bai's "Liangfu Yin" ⁸

Seven-Character Poem

(July 4, 1973)

Unexpectedly, Han Xin disobeyed [1],

Ten thousand troops descended upon Licheng. [2]

The King of Qi's fury reached three thousand zhang, [3]

He arrested the drunkard [4] and cooked him alive.

[1] Han Xin (?-196 BC) was a native of Huaiyin (now southwest of Huaiyin City, Jiangsu Province). He initially served Xiang Yu and later Liu Bang, where he was appointed a general. After the Han Dynasty was established, he was granted the title of King of Chu. Together with Xiao He and Zhang Liang, he was known as one of the Three Heroes of the Early Han Dynasty. Later, someone accused him of treason and he was demoted to Marquis of Huaiyin. He was also accused of colluding with Chen Xi to rebel in Chang'an and was killed by Empress Lü. Unexpectedly, Han Xin disobeyed: refers to the time when Han Xin, then a general under Liu Bang, led his troops eastward to attack Qi. Li Shiqi, who was employed by Liu Bang, persuaded the King of Qi to surrender first. Unexpectedly, Han Xin still led his troops to attack Qi. The King of Qi thought that Li Shiqi was deceiving him with a delaying tactic and threw Li Shiqi into a cauldron and boiled him to death.

[2] Xia, to capture. Licheng, the former site is now in the suburbs of Jinan City, Shandong Province.

[3] The King of Qi refers to Tian Guang. Tian Guang (?-203 BC) was a native of Di (formerly Gaoqing, Shandong Province), and a descendant of the Qi royal family during the Warring States Period. His father Tian Rong and uncle Tian Heng followed his brother Tian Fu in rebelling against the Qin Dynasty at the end of the Qin Dynasty. Tian Xiu proclaimed himself the King of Qi, but was defeated and killed in battle by the Qin army. After the fall of the Qin Dynasty, Tian Rong defeated the three newly appointed Kings of Qi by Xiang Yu and proclaimed himself the King of Qi. He was soon killed by Xiang Yu. As a result, Tian Heng appointed Tian Guang as the King of Qi. Tian Guang was later captured and killed by Han

⁸ Chairman Mao had always been fond of Li Bai's poetry, but did not agree with the ideas expressed in his 'Liang Fu Yin'. Chairman Mao believed that the main reason for the surrender of the King of Qi was Liu Bang's strategic planning and Han Xin's military pressure, and that the role played by Li Shiqi was actually very limited and not at all praiseworthy. Li Bai's poem ignores political and military macro-strategies and exalts aspiring to become an official and exaggerating one's own prowess, things that Chairman Mao had always opposed. Mao then added four lines to Li Bai's 'Liang Fu Yin' to make the poem more historically accurate.

General Han Xin. Fire means anger. Three thousand *zhang* (feet) is an extreme expression of anger.

[4] Wine and food refers to Shiqi (?-203 BC), a native of Gaoyang Township, Chenliu (now Qi County, Henan Province) during the Qin and Han Dynasties. He was poor and worked as a gatekeeper in his village. People called him a madman. During the peasant war at the end of the Qin Dynasty, he joined Liu Bang and offered a plan to conquer Chenliu. He was granted the title of Lord Guangye. During the Chu-Han War, he persuaded King Tian Guang of Qi to return to Han and decided to withdraw the defense. Han Xin followed Kuai Tong's plan and took the opportunity to attack Qi. Tian Guang thought he was betrayed by Li Shiqi and boiled him to death.

Comments on a letter from Zhou Enlai to the Party Core Group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American Affairs Group [1]

(July 5, 1973)

This stubborn problem exists everywhere, not just in a few individuals. We should study ways to correct it.

Mao Zedong

July 5, 1973

[1] On June 25, 1973, Zhou Enlai, acting on Mao Zedong's advice, met with Bruce, the director of the U.S. Liaison Office in China, and stated that China was skeptical of the nuclear agreement signed between the United States and the Soviet Union and that the Chinese government still adhered to the position of the Shanghai Communiqué. History has shown that such treaties are unreliable, and the current Soviet leader's visit to the United States gives the impression that two major powers dominate the world. We are not afraid of isolation. First, we will not lose our position. At the same time, we are realists. It is better to do something concrete than to talk a lot. On the 26th, after reading Zhou Enlai's minutes of this conversation, Mao Zedong said, "Now I have become more confident, and Bruce will feel relieved." On the 28th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' internal publication, "New Situation," issue 153, published an article entitled "Preliminary Views on the Nixon-Brezhnev Talks." The article analysed and commented on the world situation following the signing of the US-Soviet Pact to Prevent Nuclear War, arguing that the US-Soviet talks were characterized by "greater deception" and "a stronger atmosphere of US-Soviet world domination." Mao Zedong criticized the article. On July 3, Zhou Enlai wrote to the comrades of the Foreign Affairs Party's core group and the head of the US-China group, requesting the withdrawal of the issue of "New Situation," stating, "The primary responsibility for this mistake lies with me." He also urged, "I hope you will learn from this and actively engage in research and discussion. You may also ask me to convene short meetings to exchange ideas." Don't be afraid of my busy schedule, setting aside minor matters for the sake of major issues. You should learn from the Chairman's working style." On July 4th, Mao Zedong met with Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and others, again criticizing the article's view of the world situation in "New Situation," pointing out: "Recently, there have been some unsatisfactory issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I said there was great turmoil, great division, and great reorganization, and suddenly there came a great deception and domination in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In terms of thinking, they focus on the surface, not the substance." The conclusion was four sentences: "Big issues are not discussed, but small matters are sent every day. If this tone is not changed, revisionism is inevitable. If you engage in revisionism in the future, don't say I didn't warn you in advance." On July 5, he wrote this comment on Zhou Enlai's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On July 15, Zhou Enlai sent Mao Zedong a draft of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs article, "What are the mistakes in 'New Situation' No. 153?," and attached a letter stating, "I will write a separate report on the review of the mistakes." That same day, Mao Zedong deleted the word

"severe" from the sentence "severely criticized by the Central Committee" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs article and wrote, "Don't write a review."

Comments on the draft political report of the 10th CPC National Congress [1]

(July 7, 1973)

Agree in principle.

Mao Zedong

July 7, 1973

[1] This comment was written on the "Report to the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China" (revised by the Central Political Bureau on July 6) submitted by Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan (all members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the time) for examination on July 7, 1973. On August 24, Zhou Enlai read out the report at the conference. The report was divided into three parts: 1. On the line of the Ninth National Congress; 2. On the victory of smashing the Lin Biao anti-party group; 3. On the situation and tasks. On August 28, the conference adopted the report and it was published in the People's Daily on September 1.

Comments on Liao Jingwen's Letter [1]

(July 15, 1973)

Please ask the Premier to send someone to investigate and restore the situation.

July 15, 1973

[1] On July 6, 1973, Liao Jingwen, wife of the famous painter Xu Beihong, wrote to Mao Zedong: "In the summer of 1965, the Xu Beihong Memorial Hall was demolished due to the construction of the subway. More than 1,000 works of Xu Beihong, more than 2,000 pieces of art collections, and more than 10,000 art pictures donated by his family were covered in dust and scattered in several places. The memorials at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery were also destroyed. I have repeatedly requested the relevant departments to repair them, but no one has responded to my request." Mao Zedong wrote this comment after reading the letter. On July 16, Premier Zhou Enlai wrote to Liao Jingwen, saying, "The Chairman approved your letter to Chairman Mao on July 15 and asked me to send someone to investigate the restoration." That same day, Zhou Enlai wrote to Wu Qingtong (then deputy head of the core group in charge of the State Council General Office, responsible for the restoration process) and Wu De (then head of the State Council's Cultural Group), asking them to investigate the situation described in Liao's letter, agree on a restoration plan, and begin preparations.

Conversation with Ngouabi [1]

(July 29, 1973)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): China is similar to you African countries. Imperialism all over the world oppresses us. Now we also call the Soviet Union imperialist because it also oppresses us.

Zhou Enlai (hereinafter referred to as Zhou): We call it social imperialism because Lenin said that what is cloaked in socialism is actually imperialism.

Mao: We hope that all of your African countries and regions will become independent one by one. Secondly, unite, gradually. Even if you rush things, you won't be able to achieve unification. We also hope for Latin America and all of Asia—except Japan—to achieve this. Why is Japan excluded? It doesn't belong to the so-called Third World.

Mao: I don't know if our embassy has made any mistakes in African countries, and I don't know what neo-colonialism is. If the Chinese act as hegemons in your country, in any independent African country, and think they are so great, then this attitude is wrong. The second question is, what is neo-colonialism? I'm not quite sure.

Zhou: It's like American imperialism, which doesn't have colonies but does have privileges. Actually, the Soviet Union was similar, but it didn't directly rule like the communists. If communism doesn't support the world's people's revolution, is it still a communist party? I said, you (referring to Ngouabi) should also adopt this attitude, that is, stand on the side of the people of all countries.

Ngouabi (hereinafter referred to as Ngouabi): That's right.

Mao: In short, we should favour a government that represents the majority. If we favour a government that represents the minority, that's not quite right. Sometimes, we have to do this in foreign policy. For example, American imperialism is a minority ruling the majority, hence the name imperialism. But we interact with it because right now, the left is good, but it has no power. The centre also has no power. It's the right, the most anti-communist Nixon, who has power.

Mao: Don't believe that the world is peaceful right now.

Zhou: The world is in chaos. Chairman Mao often described it as chaos.

Mao: The current situation is like "a storm brewing." But the storm hasn't arrived yet. But the wind has come, and it's coming hard! I wonder how you Africans feel about this?

Zhou: We must remain vigilant, because there's a superficial peace now, but it's not really that way. Everyone talks about "security," but it's just a superficial appearance. That's why we are skeptical about world peace.

Mao: We don't believe in "peace" or "security" at all.

[1] This is part of a conversation between Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and President Ngouabi of the People's Republic of Congo.

Comments on Guo Huaruo's Letter [1]

(August 4, 1973)

Premier, Comrade Jianying [2]:

Please consider assigning Guo Huaruo a job. I also hope you will revise the preface to Sun Tzu and write a critical and instructive preface. Please inform Guo of this letter.

Mao Zedong

73, 8. 4

[1] Guo Huaruo, formerly the First Deputy Commander of the Nanjing Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. He was wrongly criticized during the Cultural Revolution. On July 20, 1973, he wrote to Mao Zedong, saying that he "wrote a seriously erroneous preface to Sun Tzu's Art of War", "arbitrarily exaggerated Sun Tzu and modernized it", and "made revisions to it as soon as possible". The letter also asked Mao Zedong for a job assignment. In the same year, Guo Huaruo was appointed Vice President of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[2] Premier refers to Zhou Enlai. Jianying, that is, Ye Jianying, was then Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, and was in charge of the daily work of the Military Commission.

Reading "On Feudalism" [1] Presented to the Esteemed⁹ Mr. Guo [2]¹⁰

Seven-Character Verse

(August 5, 1973)

I urge you to spare your scorn for Qin Shi Huang [3],
For his burning of books and burying of scholars [4] warrants reflection.
Though Zu Long's [5] spirit perished, his legacy endures;
Confucian learning [6] holds lofty renown, yet its substance is mere husk and chaff.
All dynasties have followed the Qin Dynasty's political system and laws.
Ten criticisms [7] is not a good article.
Read the feudal theories of the Tang Dynasty.
Don't follow Zihou [8] and return to King Wen [9]

Mao Zedong

1973, 8,

⁹ In the title, Guo Moruo is referred to as "Guo Lao" where "Lao" is the word for "old". Where "Lao" precedes a person's surname, it shows respect; when it comes after a person's surname, it displays a higher form of veneration. Although this poem is critical of Guo Moruo's "Ten Articles", Mao continued to hold Guo in high esteem.

¹⁰ In 1971, after the Lin Biao incident, Mao Zedong launched a campaign to criticise Lin and Confucius, dismissing Confucianism in its entirety. He also printed Guo Moruo's "Ten Criticisms" in large print. At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, he suggested that Guo Moruo's Ten Criticisms contained the idea of respecting Confucius and should be criticised; in July 1973, in another talk, he said: "In his Ten Criticisms, Guo claimed to be humanist, that is, people-oriented. Confucius was also humanist, and like him Guo Lao not only respected Confucius, but was also anti-Legalist. Respecting Confucius and opposing Legalism, so was the Kuomintang! So was Lin Biao!" Soon after, Mao Zedong advocated an article by Professor Yang Rongguo of Zhongshan University in Guangdong, entitled "Confucius a thinker who stubbornly defended slavery", which was published in the People's Daily. In late 1975 and early 1976, he also had this to say: "To read philosophy, you can read Yang Rongguo's A History of Ancient Chinese Thought and A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy. This is China. You have to criticise Confucius. Some people do not know about Confucius, so they can read Feng Youlan's On Confucius and Feng Tianyu's Critique of Confucius' Educational Thought. Feng Tianyu's is better than Feng Youlan's. You can also read the section on revering Confucianism and opposing the law in Guo Lao's Ten Criticisms." In 1974, Yang Rongguo's article and a self-criticism by Feng Youlan were printed in "Selected Articles Criticising Lin Biao and Confucius Vol 1" which is available on bannedthought.net here ([CriticizingLinPiaoAndConfucius-1-1974.pdf](http://bannedthought.net/linpiao/linpiaoandconfucius-1-1974.pdf)).

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the 25th Anniversary of the Founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(September 8, 1973)

Pyongyang

Comrade Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Comrade Kim Il-sung, Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people, we extend our warmest congratulations to the Workers' Party of Korea, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the fraternal Korean people.

Over the past 25 years, under the wise leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea headed by Comrade Kim Il Sung, the heroic Korean people have achieved brilliant successes in the struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression and on all fronts of socialist revolution and construction. Holding high the banner of anti-imperialist revolution, the Korean people have firmly supported the just struggles of peoples of all countries and made significant contributions to the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the world. The Chinese people are delighted and encouraged by the great victories and achievements of the Korean people in all fields and are proud to have such heroic people as their close comrades-in-arms.

In the struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of the motherland, the correct line and series of reasonable propositions put forward by the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea align with the national aspirations of the entire Korean people and are practically feasible. Therefore, they have won the sympathy and support of people around the world. Any conspiracy to create "two Koreas" and perpetuate the division of Korea will fail. The Chinese people will, as always, firmly support the just struggle of the Korean people for the independent and peaceful reunification of their motherland until complete victory is achieved.

The friendship and revolutionary unity forged with blood in the long struggle against the common enemy between the Chinese and Korean peoples is a powerful force inspiring our two peoples to keep moving forward. This friendship and unity between the two parties, two countries, and two peoples, founded on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, will continue to strengthen and develop. We sincerely wish the brotherly Korean people new and greater victories and greater prosperity for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Dong Biwu, Acting Chairman of the People's Republic of China

Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, September 8, 1973

We must run the training courses for workers, peasants and soldiers well

(1973)

We must run the training courses for workers, peasants and soldiers well, with each session lasting three months, four sessions a year, so that they can study and work at the same time.
[1]

[1] In the editorial "Study Hard, Keep Moving Forward," published on October 1, 1973, in celebration of the 2nd anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily, this sentence was quoted in boldface after the line "Recently, Chairman Mao has repeatedly pointed out."

Comments on Luo Ruiqing's Letter [1]

(November 20, 1973)

It seems he can be released. Please let the Central Committee decide.

Mao Zedong

November 20, 1973

[1] Luo Ruiqing wrote to Mao Zedong on November 15, 1973, saying, "I am now sick all over and my legs are disabled. I beg the Chairman and the Party to release me from my imprisonment and grant me a certain degree of freedom." Shortly after Mao Zedong's instructions, Luo Ruiqing was released from prison. In June 1975, Luo Ruiqing resumed his Party membership and served as an advisor to the Central Military Commission.

Comments on a letter [1] criticizing Jiang Qing [2]

(November 25, 1973)

Distribute to all comrades of the Politburo. Some opinions are good, and criticism should be tolerated.

Mao Zedong

1973. 11. 25

[1] This famous letter from "an ordinary Communist Party member" criticized Jiang Qing for her poor democratic style, her excessive emphasis on literature and art, and her failure to implement the "Double Hundred" policy in her literary and artistic work. The letter criticized the slogan "Everything makes way for the young people" and the praise of Jiang Qing as the "heroic standard-bearer of the Cultural Revolution" as inappropriate.

[2] [1] Jiang Qing, former deputy and acting head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee. At the time, she was a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. During the Cultural Revolution, she formed the Gang of Four with Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan, and engaged in sectarian activities to split the Party and seize power. After Mao Zedong became seriously ill and died, she became even more reckless and eager to engage in conspiracy activities to usurp the supreme power of the Party and the state. On October 6, 1976, the CPC Central Committee announced that she would be placed under isolation and investigation. In July 1977, the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth CPC Central Committee decided to expel Jiang Qing, a bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counter-revolutionary double-dealer, and traitor, from the Party forever and to revoke all her posts inside and outside the Party. In 1981, the Special Tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China confirmed her as the main culprit in the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary group case and sentenced her to death with a two-year reprieve and deprivation of political rights for life. In 1983, her sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. She committed suicide on May 14, 1991.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and Others Congratulating the 29th Anniversary of the Liberation of Albania

(November 28, 1973)

Tirana

Comrade Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania;

Comrade Haci Rehi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania;

Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania;

Dear Comrades:

As the fraternal Albanian people celebrate the 29th anniversary of their motherland's liberation, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the people, we extend our warmest congratulations to you and, through you, to the Albanian Party of Labor, the Albanian government, and the people.

For 29 years, the heroic Albanian people, under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, headed by their great leader, Comrade Enver Hoxha, have achieved brilliant successes on all fronts of socialist revolution and socialist construction. They have made important contributions to the struggle against Soviet revisionism and US imperialism and in support of the people's revolutions of all countries. Currently, the Albanian people, filled with revolutionary enthusiasm, are striving diligently to implement the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor. We sincerely wish the Albanian people new and greater achievements.

The Chinese and Algerian parties, two countries, and two peoples have forged a profound revolutionary friendship in the long struggle against imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries, and in the cause of socialist revolution and construction. This friendship, founded on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, cannot be destroyed by any force. In our common struggle ahead, we will, as always, stand in close unity with you, fighting shoulder to shoulder for greater victory.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Dong Biwu, Acting Chairman of the People's Republic of China

Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing,

November 28, 1973

Criticism of Jiang Qing's False Accusations Against Zhou Enlai [1]

(December 9, 1973)

This meeting was well-organized, excellent, except for two misstatements. One was about the eleventh line struggle. That shouldn't be said, and it's not true. Criticism of the Premier is permissible, but not of Lin Biao. Another was about the Premier [2] being impatient. He wasn't impatient; she was [3].

[1] In November 1973, at a Politburo meeting to criticize mistakes, Jiang Qing proposed that this was the eleventh round of the struggle over the line, and Yao Wenyan echoed this sentiment. Jiang Qing also accused Premier Zhou of being impatient to replace the Chairman. On December 9, after meeting with the King of Nepal, Mao Zedong spoke in three groups with Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Tang Tongzou, and Wang Hairong.

[2] Refers to Zhou Enlai.

[3] Refers to Jiang Qing.

China will build the Qinghai-Tibet Railway [1]

(December 9, 1973)

China will build the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. It will not only reach Lhasa but will also connect with Nepal and go on to Kathmandu [2]. I can't sleep until the Qinghai-Tibet Railway is completed.

[1] This is part of Mao Zedong's conversation with King Birendra of Nepal. In 1958, under Mao Zedong's instructions, the first phase of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway (the Xining-Golmud section) began construction. Starting from March 1961, due to three consecutive years of hardship, the construction of the entire Qinghai-Tibet Railway was suspended. In 1974, in order to implement the spirit of Mao Zedong's conversation with King Birendra of Nepal, in March 1974 and March 1975, the 10th and 7th Divisions of the Railway Corps, totaling 62,000 people, were ordered by the Central Military Commission to enter Qinghai and begin construction of the Xining-Golmud section of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. Tracks were laid to Golmud in 1979, and the first phase of the project was completed. It was opened to traffic in 1984. Due to the lack of confidence in overcoming the two major challenges of plateau permafrost and high-altitude hypoxia, the construction of the Golmud-Lhasa section of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway was suspended in July 1978. It wasn't until 1998 that significant progress was made in the technical aspects of railway construction in the permafrost region of the plateau, and the Qinghai-Tibet Railway was once again put on the agenda. On January 11, 2001, Jiang Zemin issued a directive declaring the construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway essential. Construction began on June 29, 2001, on the Golmud-Gol section of the second phase of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, and the entire line opened to traffic on July 1, 2006. Currently, the third phase of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, from Lhasa to Kathmandu, has not yet been approved.

[2] Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal.

Main Points of a Talk on the Exchange of Commanders of Major Military Regions [1]

(December 12, 1973)

1

Comrade Jianying and I asked Comrade Deng Xiaoping to join the Military Commission as a member. Whether he will be a member of the Politburo will be confirmed at the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee.

The Politburo must discuss politics. The Military Commission must discuss the military—not only the military, but also politics.

The Military Commission doesn't discuss the military, and the Politburo doesn't discuss politics. That should change later. If you don't, I'll call a meeting here. I'm simply calling a Politburo meeting to talk to you face to face.

I suggest calling in representatives from all the major military regions, the commanders. What are we discussing? The military.

I propose a military issue: the transfer of commanders from all the major military regions across the country.

You [2] approve, I approve your opinion, I speak on your behalf. I first consulted the Premier [3] and Comrade Wang Hongwen [4], and they also agreed. (Mao Zedong suggested singing the song "Three Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention") We must keep pace, otherwise it won't work. Comrade Chen Xilian [5] will be the commander of the Beijing Military Region, and Comrade Li Desheng [6] will go to the Shenyang Military Region; Comrade Yang Dezhi [7] will swap positions with Comrade Zeng Siyu [8]; Xu Shiyu [9] will swap positions with Comrade Ding Sheng [10]; Comrade Han Xianchu [11] will swap positions with Comrade Pi Dingjun [12]. Xinjiang, Chengdu, and Kunming, they have all just gone, don't move.

It's not good for someone to stay in one place for too long. They become lazy. You still have work to do and you still have to maintain your integrity. In several major military regions, the political commissars have no role to play, and the commanders make the final decision. I've been thinking about this for years. The main problem is that military region commanders are transferred between them, but the political commissars won't leave. You [13] should gather the commanders and political commissars of the four major military regions to participate in the military discussion.

2

What have you discussed? Is it feasible?

Staying in one place for too long is not good.

Transferring you to another post without removing your positions as a member of the Political Bureau, a member of the Central Committee, or a military region commander. You'll still hold office, still carry on with the revolution—just a change of location for your revolutionary work.

The Politburo should discuss politics. The Military Commission should discuss the military—not only the military, but also politics. Without politics, the political and ideological work of the military will be ineffective.

3

Have you discussed the transfer of commanders of major military regions? See if it's necessary. It's not good for someone to stay in one place for too long. There are also problems with transfers. For example, the "Liao Lian"¹¹ and the "831"¹² factions will criticize you (referring to Chen Xilian). That's okay. The "831" and "Liao Lian" factions in Liaoning are two small groups. We need to look after each other and avoid bias. We shouldn't criticize the "Liao Lian" or the "831" faction. We need to work with each province, and we need to give some notice to the areas where the two factions are divided.

I think we should greet the political commissars from all over and give them a welcome. We should gather one or two hundred cadres from government agencies, not too many, including military agencies. They should be welcomed. Otherwise, it would be "cold, desolate, and dismal," which wouldn't be good. We should hold a meeting for the army commanders, political commissars, and division commanders, and political commissars. It wouldn't be good if they didn't get to know each other. For example, in Northeast China, we'd have him (referring to Chen Xilian) present to introduce him (referring to Li Desheng). In North China, we'd have him (referring to Li Desheng) present to introduce him (referring to Chen Xilian). And the political commissars.

¹¹ On February 16, the "Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Rebels Grand Joint Committee" (hereinafter referred to as Liao Lian) was established in Shenyang. The "Liao Lian" is mainly composed of student rebels such as the "Red Guards of Mao Zedong Thought" of Northeast Institute of Technology, and is relatively active in thinking, and is supported by a considerable number of middle and lower-level cadres in organs and senior leading cadres who have "stood up". The "Liao Lian" opposed the suppression of the rebels in the army after the second half of 1966 and the local rebels after the intervention in the local Cultural Revolution in January 1967, and wanted to "bombard Yan'an, burn Chen Xilian" and "overthrow Chen, Zeng, and Zeng" (referring to Chen Xilian, Zeng Shaoshan, and Zeng Siyu), which became the main political slogan of the "Liao Lian" faction.

¹² On June 5, 1967, some rebels did not approve of protecting Song Renqiong or Chen Xilian. It was rumoured that the Liaoning "831 {August 31} Revolutionary Rebellion General Headquarters" was established with Liaoning University's "831" as the main body and became a real rebel organization. At this point, the situation of the three major factions in Liaoning (another was the "Liao Revolutionary Station") was formed. The three factions of the Liaoning Cultural Revolution have different views, and the Liaoning Revolution Station was "protecting Chen and fighting Song"; "Liao Lian" is "protecting Song and fighting Chen"; and "831" is fighting "both Song and Chen".

(Mao Zedong suggested singing the song "Three Major Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention").

Now, we've hired a military advisor, Deng Xiaoping. A notice has been issued, appointing him as a member of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission. The Politburo oversees everything: the Party, government, military, civilians, and education, from east to west, north to south, and centre to centre. I'd like to add a Secretary-General to the Politburo. Since you don't want that title, then you can just make him Chief of Staff.

As for Comrade Desheng's departure, should he still serve in the General Political Department? I say, no.

(Mao once again suggested that everyone sing the song "Three Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention").

When they (referring to the commanders of the major military regions) arrive, get straight to the point and announce the swap. Don't be hesitant. Don't be hesitant with Communist Party members. We're all Communists, so why should we be hesitant? Just be straightforward.

4

Staying in one place for too long isn't good. If there's a revolution, there can be revolution anywhere.

I can still fight a war. If there's a war, then fight! The whole world is in chaos, including China! I can eat and sleep, so if there's a war, I welcome it.

As soon as I leave a place, a faction will start a quarrel and post big-character posters. This matter needs to be carefully studied. If you want to post big-character posters, why do you have to do it so early? For example, the "831" and "Liao Lian" groups, wouldn't they want to post big-character posters about you? If the person who angered you, the person you disliked, is gone, would you still post big-character posters?

We still have Commander Li. Has he arrived yet? The Commander comes and goes frequently! If things don't go smoothly there, we can discuss it.

(Li Desheng said, "It will definitely go smoothly!")

You're unreliable. You don't consider the needs of your ancestors, you only consider your own interests.

Always praising others isn't a good strategy; you should praise less and criticize more.

Some comrades are obsessed with criticizing others, and they can't stand a single word of criticism from them. It's like digging up three generations of their ancestors' graves! They constantly accuse others of being "Three Antis" or "May 16th Group" elements. Even if they truly are "Three Antis," it doesn't matter. There are so many bad people in China, tens of

thousands, even hundreds of thousands. Let them be. The people will take care of them. What's the big deal?

Our Party doesn't want to kill anyone, including counter-revolutionaries. Preserve living evidence; don't kill.

If you make a mistake, just correct it.

Prepare for war! Civil war or foreign war! I can still fight a few more.

Their missiles have a range of thousands of kilometres, and a hydrogen bomb could obliterate Beijing. But they have an embassy here, so they'd have to destroy it too. I doubt they'll attack Beijing. When the United States attacked Japan, it chose two small cities: Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It didn't attack major cities like Tokyo and Osaka.

Once we attack, we'll know who truly wants to fight and who's colluding with foreigners, hoping to become emperor.

(At this point, Mao directed everyone to sing the song "Three Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention").

Victory comes only with unity. Lin Biao wasn't in step, so he couldn't win. What? Big fleets, small fleets¹³. The selection of concubines¹⁴ was nationwide, with one province selecting 300. This is also something the Communist Party does.

The idea of exchanging troops was initiated by the people of Henan. If you can't stay in this military sub-district, you can be transferred to a farther place. The other military sub-district will welcome you. If the other military sub-district is transferred here, it will also welcome you.

I first met Comrade Yang Dezhi when he brought a brigade to Yan'an. He was intent on apprehending deserters. I said deserters needn't be captured; if he's unhappy under your command, let him go. But if you must arrest him, treat him to a pork feast—he's clearly dissatisfied. You can't bind people together like that and expect them to become comrades, can you? Can you make revolution through coercion?

¹³ Lin Biao's son Lin Ligu and some friends, after watching the Japanese film "Yamamoto Fifty-Six", agreed that the example of Japan's surprise attack on the US at Pearl Harbour served as a symbol of their plans to attack Mao Zedong. In October 1970, Lin Ligu assisted Lin Biao in forming the secret organization "United Fleet", most of whose members were officers of the People's Liberation Army Air Force, and formulated the armed coup plan "Minutes of the '571 Project'". The "United Fleet" was the big fleet, and a smaller group personally recruited by Lin Ligu was referred to as a "small fleet". Its members began as a few people, and then gradually expanded, and the internal members began to be nominated by Lin Ligu as needed, and transferred from relevant departments with the approval of Wu Faxian and Wang Fei. Under the circumstances at that time, Lin Ligu had the special identity of Lin Biao's "beloved son", and he was publicly referred to as a "genius", "super genius" and "third-generation successor". (In September 2014, the Beijing Publishing House released Zhang Yuwen's "The Rise and Fall of Lin Ligu's 'Small Fleet'").

¹⁴ Here meaning followers of Lin Ligu.

We have now invited a Chief of the General Staff [14]. Some people are afraid of him, but he is quite decisive. He has a 70% chance of success in his life. I invited your old boss back. The Political Bureau has also been invited back. I'm not the only one who invited him back. As for you [15], people are a little afraid of you. I have two words for you: be gentle but firm, be soft but strong. Be a little friendly on the outside, but be a steel needle on the inside. Slowly correct your past shortcomings.

If you don't work, you won't make mistakes. If you work, you're bound to make mistakes. Not working is itself a mistake; you'll be treated like an ordinary person. Criticism in the villages and factories is fierce.

They constantly call people "Three Antis" and "May 16th" elements. Even Li Qinglin's letter from Fujian, which I read quite well, was said to have thorns in it. It had to have thorns! I kept it there for months, frequently reading it, three and a half times, before I finally decided to write a reply. Zhang Tiesheng's letter was published in Liaoning, and some people criticized it, saying it was wrong. Didn't it later appear in the People's Daily? They also said it was wrong.

I think they should gather professors from the eight major colleges in Beijing, give them a set of exam questions, and give them a test. They always look down on students. Now many people look down on the Children's Corps. I was in the Children's Corps, too, and so were you. I don't believe you were so brilliant in your teens and twenties.

We must prepare for war!

5

Don't believe that rubbish! Back in the old society, there were so many Kuomintang newspapers and radio stations blowing their own trumpets day in, day out. But we didn't turn into the Kuomintang, did we? We're still Communists. Putting up a couple of big-character posters now? It's no big deal.

There are always two sides. You said Sichuan isn't good, and some people are disobedient and won't listen. This is common, just keep them around! Having someone who can get things done is good. You, on the other hand, need to make good connections. It's difficult, unfamiliar territory. Some people will criticize you, but most won't let you go. (To Han Xianchu) Didn't I tell you, in this world, when it comes to these kinds of things, be open-minded and courageous. It's all about holding office, revolution and all that. One won't step down, the other won't be criticised. This meeting should be nearly done now. Tomorrow will be nothing but a deaf man setting off firecrackers.

Comrade Xu Shiyu, have you read "Dream of the Red Chamber" yet? You need to read it five times before you have the right to speak. It conceals the truth, writing it in false language and rustic speech. Hence there are two characters: one named Zhen Shiyin, the other Jia Yucun. The true story cannot be told—it concerns political strife. These tales of

matchmaking and village gossip serve only to conceal it. In the fourth chapter, there appears a 'Protection of Officials' edict, which states:

The Jinling Jias, if truth be told,
Have halls of jade, stables of gold.
Vast Afang Palace, fit for a king,
Isn't fine enough for the Shis of Jinling.
If the Dragon King wants a white jade bed,
He applies to the Wangs if Jinling, it's said.
The Xues in their affluence are so rich and grand,
Gold is like iron to them, and pearls like sand.¹⁵

This is the finest work of classical Chinese fiction. The very best. It pioneered so much literary language.

You (referring to Xu Shiyong) only talk about fighting. You should do some literature in the future. "I always hate that Sui and Lu have no martial arts, and Jiang and Guan have no literature" (Sui, Lu, Jiang, and Guan are Sui He, Lu Jia, Zhou Bo, and Guan Ying of the Han Dynasty respectively). The word "vulgar" is changed to "hate". Can you understand "Dream of the Red Chamber"? You have to read it five times. "Water Margin" is not against the emperor, but specifically against corrupt officials. Later, it accepted the amnesty.

"Sui and Lu have no martial arts, and Jiang and Guan have no literature" Jiang refers to Zhou Bo. Zhou Bo is profound and "short of literature", and you [16] are also short of literature.

If revisionism appears in China, everyone should pay attention!

(Xu Shiyong said, "Destroy it! Don't be afraid, what's the big deal!")

Aren't you afraid? Just be like Zhou Bo. Go read "Dream of the Red Chamber."

There are many difficulties in arriving in a new place. You don't know the people, you don't know the place, you don't know the Party, you don't know the army. You don't know the Party, the government, the army, or the people. Learn about the Party, the government, the army, and the people, east, west, north, south, and centre. Take it slow, and you'll get the hang of it.

What else do you have to say? We'll have a meeting tomorrow and then we'll be adjourned.

¹⁵ This is a doggerel about the four most notable families of Jinling (present-day Nanjing), and this rhyming version is taken from Gladys Yang and Yang Xianyi's translation published by the Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, in 1978. The four great families were said to support each other, but in fact their rivalries emerged as they declined in influence together with the feudal system of which they were major supports.

(Zhou Enlai said: We still need to draft an order to encourage everyone.)

Oh, that's great. You should take the lead. There are also many people in the political commissars, chiefs of staff, headquarters, provincial military regions, armies, sub-districts, and even the People's Armed Forces Department. This issue isn't a big deal.

The world is always like this (putting two hands together) there are always two sides. Where there's integrity, there's corruption; where there's corruption, there's integrity. Having integrity without corruption won't work either. Then there's only one hand. This hand (raises left hand) represents integrity, and this hand (raises right hand) represents corruption.

It's a unity of opposites.

I spoke to Kissinger for almost three hours. I really just had one thing to say: Be careful! The polar bear [17] is going to mess with you, America! First, the Pacific Fleet, the Seventh Fleet; second, Europe; and third, the Middle East.

The Soviet Union is trying to build ties with us again. At a recent Ministry of Culture reception, they spoke with our military attachés in the Soviet Union. Our conditions are primarily twofold: First, a withdrawal, like the one during Khrushchev's time. Second, an admission of mistakes, starting with the Bucharest Conference.

Commander Chen [18], along with Comrade Yang Dezhi of Jinan and Comrade Xu Shiyu of Nanjing, have been in one place for too long. Comrades Li Desheng, Zeng Siyu, and Ding Sheng, on the other hand, haven't been around for quite as long. If you lead the way, the provincial military regions, sub-districts, and people's armed forces departments will follow suit.

(At this point, Zhou Enlai suggested singing a song. Everyone sang the first verse of "Three Major Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention.")

Yes, that's the most important point. There are eight more points for attention, the first and the fifth. The first is to speak gently. The fifth is to avoid warlordism.

(Mao Zedong personally conducted the singing again. Everyone sang "Three Major Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention." Afterward, they applauded. Mao adjourned the meeting.)

[1] On December 12, 1973, Mao Zedong personally presided over a Politburo meeting. At the meeting, Mao Zedong proposed that the commanders of the major military regions be swapped with each other, and criticized the Politburo for not discussing politics and the Military Commission for not discussing military affairs or politics. On the 13th, 14th, 15th and 21st, Mao Zedong made a series of remarks on the swap of commanders of the major military regions. This first part is part of Mao Zedong's speech at the Politburo meeting of the CPC Central Committee on December 12, 1973. This second part is part of Mao Zedong's conversation with several comrades of the Politburo on December 13. This third part is part of Mao Zedong's conversation with relevant comrades of the Politburo on December 14 on the issue of swapping commanders of the major military regions. This fourth part is part of Mao Zedong's conversation with relevant comrades of the Politburo and the leaders of the Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan and Wuhan Military Regions on December 15. The fifth part is part of the conversation between Mao Zedong and comrades attending the Central Military Commission meeting on December 21.

[2] Refers to Ye Jianying.

[3] Here refers to Zhou Enlai.

[4] Wang Hongwen, then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

[5] Chen Xilian, then Commander of the Shenyang Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[6] Li Desheng, then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Director of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and Commander of the Beijing Military Region.

[7] Yang Dezhi, then commander of the Jinan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[8] Zeng Siyu, then commander of the Wuhan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[9] Xu Shiyu, then commander of the Nanjing Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[10] Ding Sheng, then commander of the Guangzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[11] Han Xianchu, then commander of the Fuzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[12] Pi Dingjun, then commander of the Lanzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[13] Refers to Ye Jianying.

[14] Refers to Deng Xiaoping.

[15] Pointing to Deng Xiaoping.

[16] Pointing to Xu Shiyu.

[17] Refers to the Soviet Union.

[18] Refers to Chen Xilian

A Gift to Deng Xiaoping [1]

(December 1973)

Softness conceals strength;

A needle hidden within cotton.

[1] These are two sentences Mao Zedong gave to Deng Xiaoping. On December 15, 1973, Mao Zedong summoned members of the Central Political Bureau and commanders of major military regions to his study. He pulled Deng Xiaoping to his side and said, "We have now invited back a Chief of the General Staff, your old boss. I have invited him back, and the Political Bureau has invited him back." Some people are afraid of him, but he is decisive in his actions. He then said to Deng Xiaoping, "I will give you two sentences: be gentle but firm, be soft but sharp, be gentle on the outside, but be a steel needle

1973: Writings and Speeches

Mao Zedong

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