



Mao Zedong at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee

1969:

Writings and speeches

Mao Zedong

Introduction

In 2013, a private collector of Mao Zedong's works and related memorabilia, published 52 volumes of the Collected Works of Mao Zedong.

Zhang Dijie, from Luoyang City in Henan province was born in December 1959, and joined the PLA in 1976, the year of Mao's death. He began collecting everything he could related to the writings of Chairman Mao, and his 52 volumes, each often comprising 500 or so pages, spans the first poem written by Mao in 1901 at the age of 8 years old, to the final message attributed to Mao before his death, the message on the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea.

According to Zhang Dijie, over 36 years of painstaking effort he had accumulated 102,000 copies and 15,000 editions of Mao's works from over 130 countries. The content of the published collection, by a Hong Kong publishing house, comprises 30% that is widely known, 50% that has only been released to a limited audience, and 20% published for the first time.

This is a translation of those parts of Volumes 50 and 51 that span the year 1969. The five volumes of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong published in various languages by the Foreign Language Press, Beijing, have made Chairman Mao's writings on protracted people's war, the New Democratic Revolution, literature and art, and a host of other topics prior to the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution available to the international communist movement.

I am not fluent in Chinese. I know enough to get by on a daily basis in China, but for the sake of getting the job done quickly, I use the online translators Google Translate and DeepL. As good as they are, they invariably contain errors or contain references that need to be explained for non-Chinese readers. I can at least recognise and correct the errors, and search the internet in Chinese to find the information that will help readers.

There are two types of footnotes in this collection of Mao's speeches and writings. Those enclosed in [] brackets at the end of each writing or speech by Mao are by Zhang Dijie, those at the bottom of a page are my own. There are not many of the latter. Those by Zhang Dijie are translated as they appear in his collection. Some are simply matters of fact ("XXX was at that time director of such and such an institution") while others reflect the revisionist reappraisal of events and people connected with the GPCR. Comrades will no doubt be able to use their own bullshit detectors in relation to the latter.

I have not been able to contact Comrade Zhang Dijie to thank him for his great effort in collecting and publishing the 52 volumes of Mao's Collected Works, so I use this opportunity to acknowledge his great contribution to our knowledge of Mao's thinking across the years, and particularly during the tumultuous year that saw the launching of the GPCR.

Nick G. (Contents pages at rear)

Opinion on the Grand Alliance of the Two Factions of Mass Organisations in Xuzhou [1]

(1968 to 1969)

1

Both factions in Xuzhou are revolutionary mass organisations and should unite.

2

Xuzhou has already been turned upside down several times, and it can no longer be turned upside down again.

3

One faction is ineffective, but two factions are effective. One faction cannot rule alone, but two factions can rule together.

4

If you explain the policy clearly, most people will accept it.

[1] This article consists of four consecutive directives issued by Mao Zedong between 1968 and 1969 in response to the prolonged failure to achieve a revolutionary alliance in the Xuzhou-Haizhou region of Jiangsu Province. In a report dated 26 July 1969 requesting the reorganisation of the Xuzhou Revolutionary Committee, the Party Committee of the 68th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army quoted these four directives in bold type in its request for approval to reorganise the Xuzhou Municipal Revolutionary Committee. This report was later submitted as an appendix to the 68th Army Party Committee's 'Report on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of the Spirit of the Ninth National Congress' titled 'Request for Approval to Reorganise the Xuzhou Municipal Revolutionary Committee' for review by Mao Zedong and others. On 29 July 1969, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved the 68th Army Party Committee's 'Report on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of the Spirit of the Ninth National Congress' and its appendix. When reviewing the Central Committee's comments, Mao Zedong wrote: 'Proceed as instructed.'

Comments on Not Criticizing All Veteran Comrades and Their Families Involved in the "February Countercurrent" [1]

(January 3, 1969)

1

There is a note [2] in it, asking Comrade Huang Yongsheng [3] to handle it.

2

All veteran comrades and their families associated with the February Countercurrent should not be criticized; instead, good relations should be maintained.

Mao Zedong

January 3

[1] The so-called "February Countercurrent" refers to the righteous struggle waged around February 1967 by leading comrades of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, including Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, and Xu Xiangqian. At several meetings (primarily the February Politburo meeting held in the Huairan Hall of Zhongnanhai and the earlier meeting of the Central Military Commission at the Jingxi Hotel), they, representing the will of the vast majority of Party members and the people, strongly criticized the erroneous practices of the "Cultural Revolution" and waged a resolute struggle against the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing gangs. After the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique was crushed, on November 14, 1971, Mao Zedong, while meeting with participants at the Chengdu regional symposium, stated: "Now that this matter has been clarified, there's no need to talk about the 'February Countercurrent' anymore." Following the crushing of the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique, the CPC Central Committee decided to rehabilitate the "February Countercurrent."

[2] This comment appears on a report submitted by the Central Military Commission's Office on December 26, 1968, that reflected the current situation of Xu Xiangqian (then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission).

[3] Huang Yongsheng was then the head of the working group of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and the chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army.

Comments on the Central Committee's forwarding of Tsinghua University's policy report on implementing the "re-education" and "offering a way out" policy for intellectuals [1]

(January 28, 1969).

Distribute as is.

[1] The main contents of this report, written on January 20, 1969, by workers in the capital and the People's Liberation Army's Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team stationed at Tsinghua University, were: 1. We must firmly believe that the majority of intellectuals are willing to participate in revolution, but they must undergo re-education. 2. We must do more to educate "children who can be educated well" and not push them to the enemy's side. 3. Those who have committed capitalist-roader errors must be promptly liberated when they become aware of their mistakes. 4. Bourgeois academic authorities must be given a way out after thorough criticism. 5. Counter-revolutionaries must be treated differently based on their circumstances and given the opportunity to redeem themselves through meritorious service. On January 25, the Beijing Municipal Draft Committee submitted this report to Mao Zedong and others. On January 28, Mao Zedong affirmed the report, saying, "The five points are correct and can be forwarded." On January 29, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Cultural Revolution Group forwarded the report.

Warfare is about concentrating forces to destroy the enemy's fighting power. [1]

(28 January 1969)

Most of the existing fortifications may be useless and will not be effective in battle. Wasn't the Maginot Line breached? It didn't serve much purpose. It tied up a lot of troops and reduced the number of troops available for other operations.

Some people have always paid little attention to enemy airborne operations and air strikes. Now we are in a three-dimensional war, and the enemy will attack your rear. When building fortifications, you also need to guard against airborne operations and air strikes.

Fortifications may be somewhat useful, but their effectiveness is limited. Some fortifications can hold for a week or two, while others can last longer, perhaps half a year. But what about the second half of the year? We still need to prepare. There are two types of fortifications: temporary ones that provide brief protection and those that can withstand longer periods. Most of the rest are not very effective. The enemy can come from anywhere; why provoke them? For example, when the Soviet Union invaded Northeast China, those who took the route through Baichengzi faced no resistance; those who took the eastern route suffered losses near Wujang when they reached the Mudanjiang River.

We have never been good at fighting wars. When the enemy comes, they come; wherever they want to go, they go. The fifth anti-“encirclement” campaign was a success, eliminating a central Soviet area.

We have built too many fortifications, most of which will be useless in the future and must be abandoned. If you wait in the fortifications for half a year and they don't come, they will end up attacking elsewhere. If you station your main forces there and they don't come for half a year or a year, what can you do? Heroes have no place to display their talents.

The south has grass, which is better, but the north has no grass. However, after seven or eight years, some of the fortifications may collapse.

Why do enemies come to fight? War is always about destroying enemy forces, destroying convoys, and then occupying territory. The Soviet Union invaded Northeast China to eliminate the Japanese Kwantung Army. This applies to any country: first eliminate the military, then occupy the territory. Without eliminating the military, there is no solution.

War is not about engineering work but about combat effectiveness—concentrating forces to eliminate enemy combat power. On the battlefield, occupy the high ground and do some engineering work.

[1] These are the key points of Mao Zedong's remarks during a briefing by the Central Military Commission's Working Group.

Comments on a letter requesting the election of Jiang Qing [1] as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee [2]

(January 1969)

They are just empty names, and neither of them is suitable.

Also, Li Na and Mao Yuanxin [3] are not suitable to be representatives [4].

[1] Jiang Qing was then deputy head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee. On April 28, 1969, she was elected as a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth CPC Central Committee.

[2] This comment was published in the People's Letters Digest, compiled and printed by the Letters and Visits Office of the Secretariat of the State Council on 11 January 1969. The digest stated that on 10 January, a letter was received from a certain individual at the Wushan State-Owned Farm in Henan Province addressed to the Premier, requesting that "Comrade Jiang Qing be nominated as a candidate for the Central Committee of the Ninth National Congress and should become a member of the Standing Committee," and expressing the hope that "Comrade Jiang Qing should also serve as Minister of the Central Organisation Department."

[3] Li Na, Mao Zedong's daughter. Mao Yuansheng, Mao Zedong's nephew.

[4] Refers to representatives at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

Rushing to Shaoshan

To the tune of Ru Meng Lin (A Dream of a Lyric)

(January 1969)

Fusang¹, Fengtian², Longtan³,
Young ducks roam the Milky Way⁴.
Where do I go now?
I haven't dreamed of Yokosuka⁵.
Where? Where?
The stone lanterns are dim⁶.

¹ Fusang, one of the spiritual places in Chinese mythology, legend has it that on the Far East sea, the Fusang tree is made up of two large mulberry trees that support each other. The sun goddess Xihe drove up from here for her son Jin Wu (three-legged crow, the spirit of the sun).

² Literally an "abundant field", I can't place it in Chinese mythology. As Japanese *kanji*, the characters spell out the name Toyota.

³ Longtan is an ancient town in Nanjing, with a history of more than 500 years, beautiful scenery and outstanding people. According to the "Jurong County Chronicle": "The back of the dragon pan, there is a water pool called Longtan", which is the origin of the name of Longtan Town.

⁴ A possible reference to the myth of the Weaver Girl and the Cowherd, two young lovers forbidden to see each other. They were banished to opposite sides of the Milky Way and only allowed to see each other once a year. In ancient Chinese culture, a pair of mandarin ducks were a metaphor for lovers.

⁵ Yokosuka, located on the Miura Peninsula in the southeastern part of Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan, is famous for its exotic townscape and sightseeing spots unique to a military port city. Not only does it face the sea, but it also has a unique mountain and sea landscape.

⁶ Stone lanterns were the earliest lamps used by ancient Chinese. Originally, they were formless, but in the Warring States Period, began to be shaped into animal figurine lamps such as monkey lanterns, lion lanterns, sheep lanterns, but also figurine lamps of various shapes, geometric lanterns, floral pattern lamps, etc. They either symbolised a certain power, or represented auspiciousness.

Comments on the Report on the Management of Rural Commerce by Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants [1]

(January 1969)

To understand the situation, we must patiently examine the materials.

[1] This comment was written on a report Zhou Enlai submitted to Mao Zedong and others on January 14, 1969. The report stated: On December 13 of last year, the Chairman instructed me to discuss with comrades from the finance, banking, and commercial departments the issue of rural commerce being managed by poor and lower-middle peasants, and to sign my opinion. On the evening of the 14th, I convened a meeting with over 30 military control personnel, leading cadres, and leaders of the Revolutionary Masses Committee from the aforementioned departments and related departments to discuss this issue. Everyone unanimously advocated that the management of rural supply and marketing cooperatives and credit cooperatives be transferred to the poor and lower-middle peasants in the commune and team. Rural commercial purchases should be handled through the commune and team's purchasing and marketing service agencies and stations. State-owned commerce would only establish wholesale and purchasing stations and state-owned stores in counties, cities, and towns. The purchase and sale of grain and oil in rural areas would be decentralized later. Zhou Enlai also submitted to Mao Zedong three documents: a briefing from the State Council Duty Office on the decentralization of rural commerce and credit cooperatives on January 11, 1969; a report from the National Supply and Marketing Cooperatives' Business Group on the basic situation of the supply and marketing cooperative system's personnel and institutions on December 6, 1968; and a comprehensive report from the military representative of the Ministry of Commerce on the discussion of "Rural commerce should be managed well by poor and lower-middle peasants (investigation report)" on December 19, 1968.

Comments on Chen Qihan's Nomination as a Delegate to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China [1]

(February 1969)

Comrade Chen Qihan⁷ seems worthy of consideration.

[1] On February 5, 1969, Zhou Enlai wrote a report to Mao Zedong, stating: "Regarding the question of whether members and alternate members of the Eighth Central Committee who attended the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Central Committee should be nominated or not nominated as delegates to the Ninth National Congress, I had originally intended to report this to the Chairman and Vice Chairman Lin in person during the meeting for a final decision. However, due to the postponement of the meeting, I am submitting a copy of the written document approved at the Central Cultural Revolution meeting for your review, so that the Chairman can consider it in advance." Mao Zedong wrote this comment while reviewing the report. Chen Qihan was an alternate member of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and attended the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee. He was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in April 1969.

⁷ Chen Qihan (1897–1981), held the rank of general of military law of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. In his early years, Chen Qihan served as a student captain, company commander, and political captain of the Whampoa Military Academy. After the Nationalist government attacked the Communist Party, Chen encouraged peasant resistance in the Fuzhou area. In 1933, Chen was dismissed from his post for following Mao Zedong and was purged by Bo Gu. Later, he participated in the Long March as a staff officer with the army, and served as the chief of the education section of the Red First Army Headquarters. In May 1949, Chen was appointed commander of the Jiangxi Military Region and presided over the suppression of bandits in Jiangxi. He was an alternate member of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and a member of the 9th to 11th Central Committees.

When making plans, we must leave ample room for manoeuvre.

(1969)

When making plans, we must mobilize the masses and ensure ample room for manoeuvre.

[1]

[1] In the People's Daily editorial "Grasp the Revolution, Promote Production, and Win New Victories on the Industrial Front," published on February 21, 1969, this sentence was quoted in boldface after "Chairman Mao recently pointed out."

During the struggle-criticism-transformation phase of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, we must pay close attention to policy.

(1969)

During the struggle-criticism-transformation phase of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, we must pay close attention to policy. [1]

[1] In the People's Daily editorial "Grasp the Revolution, Promote Production, and Win New Victories on the Industrial Front," published on February 21, 1969, this sentence was quoted in boldface after the phrase "Chairman Mao recently pointed out."

Remarks during a Report on the Zhenbao Island Self-Defense Counterattack [1]

(March 15, 1969)

1

What about Shenyang? We must prepare for the Soviet Union to occupy Shenyang. We should give them Shenyang, Harbin, and Changchun. We are prepared to live in the countryside. They won't come unless we give them some respect. They're fighting simply to save face. We must be prepared. We have too many standing troops in peacetime, and not enough in times of war. Every county in Northeast China should have one, two, or even three battalions. In times of war, these battalions can be transformed into independent divisions. Small counties should have one battalion, medium-sized counties should have two battalions, and large counties should have one regiment and three battalions. With over 2,000 counties nationwide, at an average of two battalions per county, that's over 4,000 battalions. Even if we fight a major war, we still need to continue to increase production, so we shouldn't have too many troops; too many are useless. Our country is so vast that the Soviet Union and the United States can't swallow it all in one go. We should give them some respect and let them occupy some territory. If they reach us, pushing in hundreds or thousands of kilometers, we'll give them Northeast, North China, and Northwest China, and let them occupy them all. Give them some face, let them come in a little more, occupy more territory. Once they come in, it will be easier to fight them, and then we can slowly devour them.

Local armed forces should be cultivated like leeks. One battalion in a small county, two in a medium-sized county, and three in a large county. This will allow us to continuously grow our strength and our main force. Their entry demonstrates their territorial ambitions. You've come to my place, and I haven't gone to yours. People all over the world know this. This is politically and militarily advantageous, and there's ample reason for it. This is formal logic. Our method of cultural struggle is to convince people with reason, to fight with reason. To prevent them from entering and occupying our major cities is insufficient. I haven't captured your Vladivostok, I haven't captured your Khabarovsk and Chita, but you've captured my Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin. You're not paying attention to me. You occupy yours, I fight mine. The earth keeps turning. Whether you come in or not, it keeps turning. Humans cannot be completely eliminated or annihilated. You can't invade from one side of the earth and then break through it. The Soviet Union's current occupation of Zhenbao Island is driven by domestic needs. Demonstrations are permitted throughout the country. If they really wanted to attack you, they wouldn't be holding a parade. Their artillery fire has penetrated seven kilometres into our territory, so why should we fire back seven kilometres? Give them some face!

2

If we don't seize the opportunity to prepare, what will happen if a war breaks out? It depends on where we're going. Some areas can be developed first. Don't expand the military too much, as this will hinder production. First, develop Northeast China.

3

All southern provinces must prepare for both scenarios. Northeast, North China, and Northwest China must prepare for war. Northeast, North China, and Northwest China must prepare for the Soviet Union's arrival, while the southern provinces must prepare for the United States' arrival. If they don't come, we're prepared; if they do come, we won't suffer any loss. Failure to prepare means loss.

4

The US and the Soviet Union colluded, expanding their military and preparing for war, hoping to redive the world. It's been over twenty-three years since World War II, and twenty-two years between World War I and World War II.

As soon as Nixon [2] came to power in 1911, he went to Europe, essentially expanding his military and preparing for war. They always felt the need for war.

The US defense budget this year is \$85.4 billion, the highest ever, accounting for 10 percent of its GDP. The Soviet Union's defense budget this year is 17.7 billion rubles (compared to 16.7 billion last year), also the highest ever. Why spend so much on the military? It's simply because they always feel the need for war. And what about Japan? They've taken advantage of this by not expanding their active military, so their defense budget is only one, two, or three percent—a tiny fraction. The US is putting pressure on them, hoping they'll become a war partner.

Nixon now went further, saying that because China was strong, anti-missile bases against China and the Soviet Union were necessary. Nixon went to Europe to pressure West Germany and sent people to Japan to pressure Japan, facilitating US-Soviet collusion in military expansion and war preparations, allowing them to direct everything. We see that such military expansion and war preparations must have a purpose.

The revolutionary movement is flourishing worldwide, not only in the West but also in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, from students to workers, and even in parts of the countryside, such as Italy.

There are two possible outcomes before us. Either the world revolutionary movement will rise, leading to a direct revolutionary situation and burying the rule of imperialism and revisionism; or they will launch a Third World War, resulting in the defeat of imperialism and the subsequent overthrow of their own rule, just as the First and Second World Wars did. These are the two possible outcomes. We support the world revolutionary movement, but more importantly, we must prepare for war. The Third Five-Year Plan, and even the Fourth

Five-Year Plan, must be based on preparing for war, preparing for famine, and serving the people.

As for the Soviet Union's current provocations on the Ussuri River, they can't yet be linked to a major war; they're merely the beginning. But seeing this action, we can see the future, its social-imperialist ambitions. It even wants to destroy China's atomic bases first.

The Soviet Union has never lost face in a border conflict like this. Now we are a socialist new China; how can we allow it to succeed? Yet, it always seeks provocations, to save face, not just this year, but for several years now.

Facing a formidable enemy is the best way to mobilize.

[1] Sections 1 through 4 of this item are part of Mao Zedong's conversation with Zhou Enlai and others when he was reporting on the Zhenbao Island self-defense counterattack.

[2] Nixon, then President of the United States.

Comments on the Red Flag magazine editorial, "On Summarizing Experience" [1]

(March 1969)

This article will be published after discussion at the meeting.

[1] The original title of this editorial in Red Flag magazine was "Summarizing Experience." When Mao Zedong reviewed it, he changed it to "On Summarizing Experience" and included this comment. He also made some revisions to the draft editorial, primarily changing "The revolution is advancing. The situation is excellent. The enthusiasm of the broad masses of the people is very high" to "The revolution is advancing. The situation is good. The enthusiasm of the broad masses of the people is high." He also deleted the four words "with great proletarian genius" from the sentence "Chairman Mao attached great importance to the creativity and wisdom of the masses and, with great proletarian genius, scientifically summarized and generalized the fundamental and universally significant advanced experience of the masses." He also changed the sentence "Chairman Mao's extremely important instruction should be highly valued by our leading comrades at all levels, studied earnestly, and implemented conscientiously" to "Chairman Mao's instruction should be highly valued by our leading comrades at all levels, studied earnestly, and implemented conscientiously." This editorial was published in the combined third and fourth issues of Red Flag magazine on March 14, 1969, and reprinted in the People's Daily on March 15.

We must seriously sum up our experience [1]

(1969)

1

We must seriously sum up our experience.

2

Go to a work unit to understand the situation and the entire process of the movement: how it started, how it ended, and how it is now; how the masses responded, how the leadership responded, what contradictions and struggles occurred, how these contradictions subsequently evolved, and how people's understanding has developed. From this, one can identify patterns.

[1] In the editorial "On Summarizing Experience," published in the combined third and fourth issues of Red Flag magazine on March 14, 1969, after the phrase "Chairman Mao has recently taught us once again," the passage from the first and second parts of this article was quoted in boldface. The People's Daily reprinted this Red Flag editorial on March 15.

Comments and revisions [1] to Lin Biao's [2] draft report for the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China

(March and April 1969)

1

I read it once. It is well written and only needs a few minor revisions.

2

Parts I, IV, and V have fewer issues and only require minor revisions. Parts II and III have more issues and require major revisions or rewriting. The drawback is that there are *too many arguments, which are almost like a collection*. Consider combining the two parts, deleting repetitions, and not describing many stages. Do not mention the names of any members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

3

I have read it once and made some revisions [3]. It is generally acceptable. I think it should be further condensed, and empty words and unnecessary adjectives should be deleted as much as possible. Please decide as you see fit, Comrade Lin Biao.

4

Please review, Comrade Lin Biao. Return to Comrades Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan. There are some minor revisions. [4]

Mao Zedong

4 p.m. on the 29th of March

5

This document has been reviewed, and comments [5] have been sent for review in advance.

6

Comrade Lin Biao:

I have reviewed it again and made some revisions [6], primarily swapping the fourth section with the third section and designating the final subsection as the fifth section. This was suggested by Comrade Guo Moruo [7], and I believe it is a reasonable suggestion. Please consider whether this is acceptable. Please inform Comrades Zhang and Yao. Mao Zedong

2:00 p.m. on the 31st of March

7

Comrade Lin Biao reviewed it. I think this revision is better [8]. Only a few changes were made on page 24. The new edition [9] will be left for review. Please return this document to Comrades Zhang and Yao after you have reviewed it.

Mao Zedong

April 7, 23:00

8

Read and understood.

9

Yes, you can.

10

After the deaths of Marx and Engels, the parties of the Second International, with the exception of the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin, almost entirely betrayed Marxism.

11

Guided by Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, the broad masses of revolutionary people threw themselves into the struggle. Peking University wrote a large-character poster [10] in response to the Central Committee's call. Large-character posters criticising bourgeois reactionary ideas quickly spread across the country. Then, batches of Red Guards rose up, and revolutionary youth became brave pioneers.

12

Over the past three years, traitors, spies, unrepentant capitalists, and counter-revolutionaries have attempted to undermine our great people's army, but they have not succeeded because the people support the army and the army protects the people.

13

For those who have committed errors in following the capitalist road but are otherwise good people, once they have raised their level of awareness and gained the understanding of the masses, they should be promptly released, assigned appropriate work, and encouraged to go among the workers and peasants to transform their worldview. For those who have made some progress and begun to develop some awareness, we should continue to provide assistance from the perspective of unity.

14

If class enemies stir up trouble again, mobilise the masses to overthrow them once more.

15

Chairman Mao pointed out in a conversation in October 1968: "We have achieved a great victory. However, the defeated class will continue to struggle. These people are still here, and this class is still here. Therefore, we cannot say that we have achieved final victory. We cannot say this for decades to come. We must not lose our vigilance. According to Leninist principles, the final victory of a socialist country not only requires the efforts of the domestic proletariat and the broad masses of the people, but also depends on the victory of the world revolution, on the elimination of the system of human exploitation across the entire planet, and on the liberation of all humanity. Therefore, it is wrong to casually declare the final victory of the revolution; it violates Leninist principles and does not align with reality." [11]

16

Here, we would also like to emphasise the relationship between our country and foreign countries. [12]

17

Based on the historical experience of the First and Second World Wars, it can be concluded that if imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries impose a Third World War on the people of the world, it will only greatly accelerate the development of these contradictions, spur the people of the world to rise up in revolution, and send all imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries to their graves. [13]

[1] This article was written on the first part of the draft report submitted for review by Zhang Chunqiao, Deputy Head of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group, and member Yao Wenyuan on 16 March 1969; this article was written on the fourth and fifth parts of the draft report submitted for review on 21 March (the second and third parts had already been submitted for review earlier); this article was written on the revised draft report submitted for review on 25 March; Part Four and Part Five were written on the two revised drafts of the report submitted for review on 28 March; Part Six was written on the revised draft of the report submitted for review on 31 March; Part Seven was written on the revised draft submitted for review on 7 April; Part Eight was written on the revised draft of the report submitted for review on 10 April; Part Nine was written on the report and Party Constitution text correction draft submitted for review on April 25 by Kang Sheng, an advisor to the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group; Parts Ten to Seventeen are revisions to the previously submitted drafts, with the text added or revised by Mao Zedong printed in italics. On April 1, 1969, Lin Biao delivered a report at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. On April 14, the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held a plenary session and adopted this report. On 14 April, the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held a plenary session and adopted this report.

The full text of the report is divided into eight sections: 1. On the preparation for the 'Proletarian Cultural Revolution'; 2. On the process of the 'Proletarian Cultural Revolution'; 3. On conducting the struggle, criticism, and reform seriously; 4. On the policy regarding the 'Proletarian Cultural Revolution'; 4. On the policies of the 'Proletarian Cultural Revolution'; 5. On the final victory of our revolution; 6. On the rectification and construction of the Party; 7. On our relations with foreign countries; 8. The entire Party and the people of the entire country must unite to strive for greater victories. This report was published in the People's Daily on 28 April.

[2] Lin Biao was re-elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, and soon after was named Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

[3] Mao Zedong's revisions to the draft submitted for review by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan on 25 March 1969, except for this article, were all individual deletions of words.

[4] Mao Zedong's revisions to the draft submitted for review by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan on 28 March 1969, in addition to this article sections 10 and 11, he also deleted the following passage: "Chairman Mao's leadership, his belief in and reliance on the masses, his visionary and decisive leadership as a great proletarian leader, were the fundamental guarantees that this revolution could be launched, could overcome all obstacles, and could achieve victory." In addition, there were a few other minor revisions.

[5] That is, on this article.

[6] Mao Zedong's revisions to the draft submitted for review by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan on 31 March 1969, in addition to sections 12 to 16 of this article, also deleted the following passage: 'Under the leadership of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was solemnly convened.' Additionally, there were minor textual revisions. The third and fourth sections of this draft manuscript dealt with issues related to China's relations with foreign countries and the Party's rectification and construction, respectively. After Mao Zedong adjusted the order, they were published as the sixth and seventh sections, respectively. The final subsection of the section that Mao Zedong changed to the fifth section was published as the eighth section of the report, with the subtitle 'The entire Party and the people of the entire country unite to strive for greater victories.'

[7] Guo Moruo, then Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

[8] Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan wrote on page 24 of the draft submitted for review on 7 April 1969: "For the bad elements identified among cadres and intellectuals, except for those with conclusive evidence of murder, arson, poisoning, and other current counter-revolutionary activities, who should be dealt with according to law, a policy of not executing

and not arresting the majority should be adopted." When Mao Zedong reviewed the document, he changed the phrase 'bad elements identified among cadres and intellectuals' to 'bad elements or suspicious individuals identified during the movement to purge the class ranks.'

[9] In their review report dated 7 April 1969, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan wrote: "There are two types of manuscripts here: one type has the revisions noted or pasted in, and the other type is a new manuscript that has been revised and rearranged."

[10] This refers to a large-character poster written on 25 May 1966 by Nie Yuanzhi, Song Yixiu, Xia Jianyao, Yang Keming, Zhao Zhengyi, Gao Yunpeng, and Li Xingchen of the Philosophy Department of Peking University, entitled "What exactly did Mo Shuo, Lu Ping, and Peng Peiyun do during the Cultural Revolution?"

[11] This is an excerpt from Mao Zedong's conversation with the Albanian party and government delegation on 5 October 1968. Mao Zedong made revisions when reviewing it, and the text printed in italics is what he added. All text in quotation marks is printed in bold type when published.

[12] This is a sentence added by Mao Zedong before the third section of the draft submitted for review by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan on 31 March 1969. The third section was later changed by Mao Zedong to the fourth section, and when it was published, it was changed again to the seventh part, entitled 'On Our Relations with Foreign Countries.'

[13]] In the draft submitted by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan for examination on March 25, 1969, this sentence originally read "send the American imperialists and Soviet revisionists to their graves."

Comments on Xu Haidong's report on the issue of participating in the presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China [1]

(March 31, 1969)

Agreed. It is not appropriate for there to be too few people on the podium at tomorrow's opening ceremony. It seems appropriate for Boda, Kang Sheng, Dong Lao, Bocheng, Zhu De, Chen Yun and a few others to participate [2]. Please consider this and make a decision.

[1] On 31 March 1969, Zhou Enlai wrote a report to Mao Zedong stating: "Tonight, after consulting with the preliminary members of the Presidium and the main leaders of the army, we have agreed that Comrade Xu Haidong should be a representative at the Ninth National Congress. If everyone agrees, we propose that Xu also join the Presidium. Then, the conveners of each group will return to their respective groups to seek the consent of all representatives. Since Comrade Xu Haidong has already been elected as a delegate, it would be appropriate for him to join the Presidium. After discussing this with the members of the Military Commission's Office, we all agree and request the Chairman's approval." Mao Zedong's comment was written on Zhou Enlai's report. Xu Haidong was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the 8th National Congress. At the 9th National Congress held in April 1969, he joined the Presidium and was elected as a member of the Central Committee.

[2] Boda, also known as Chen Boda, was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Kang Sheng was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and advisor to the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Dong Lao refers to Dong Biwu, who was then a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China. Bocheng, also known as Liu Bocheng, was then a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Zhu De and Chen Yun were both members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the time.

On 1 April 1969, when the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China opened, they were all seated on the presidium.

Comments on Zhou Enlai's Report on the Preparations for the Ninth National Congress [1]

(March 1969)

This should be done. The number of Central Committee members may need to be slightly increased.

[1] On March 29, 1969, Zhou Enlai wrote a report to Mao Zedong and others, reporting on the preparations and arrangements for the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The report concluded: "At the meeting on the evening of the 27th, I proposed a draft number of Central Committee members for the Ninth National Congress (115 members, 95 alternate members, a total of 210). I ask everyone to consider it, and then consider the specific candidates or range." Mao Zedong wrote this comment after reading it. From April 1st to 24th, the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing, electing 170 Central Committee members and 109 alternate members, a total of 279 members.

Comments on Zhou Enlai's opinions on the Soviet Union's request to communicate with us
[1]

(March 1969)

Agreement with the position of the memorandum, i.e. readiness to hold diplomatic negotiations.

[1] On 22 March 1969, Zhou Enlai wrote a report to Mao Zedong and others stating that, starting from the evening of the 21st, the Soviet side had repeatedly inquired about the Chairman's telephone number, and the Soviet Embassy in China had also contacted our Ministry of Foreign Affairs several times, claiming to be 'acting on the orders of the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, with a message to convey.' Meanwhile, our side observed Soviet troops moving near Zhenbao Island and detected that the Soviet rear was urging their frontline units to act, estimating that the enemy might attempt to forcibly occupy Zhenbao Island today, with last night's diplomatic activities being a mere pretence. After consulting with relevant comrades, it was decided to immediately "reinforce our shore-based forces, make extensive deployments, rest and wait for the enemy to tire, and prepare to strike back." It was also agreed to respond to the Soviet temporary envoy in the form of a memorandum to take the initiative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' memorandum stated: "Given the current state of Sino-Soviet relations, communication via telephone is no longer appropriate. If the Soviet government has any messages to convey, please formally submit them to the Chinese government through diplomatic channels." Mao Zedong's comment was written on Zhou Enlai's report.

Speech at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (One) [1]

(April 1, 1969)

Comrades!

The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China is now open.

I hope that our congress will be well-conducted, a congress of unity and victory.

It has been 48 years since the founding of the Party in 1921. At the first congress, there were only 12 delegates. There are still two of them here: Mr. Dong [2] and me. Several delegates have died: Wang Jinmei and Deng Enming [3] from Shandong, Chen Tanqiu [4] from Hubei, He Shuheng [5] from Hunan, and Li Hanjun [6] from Shanghai. Four of them have betrayed the Party and become traitors and counter-revolutionaries: Chen Gongyue, Zhou Fohai, Zhang Guotao, and Liu Renjing [7]. The latter two are still alive. Another, Li Dazhao [8], died two years ago. At that time, there were only a few dozen Party members nationwide, most of whom were intellectuals. Later, things developed. The first, second, third [9], and fourth congresses each had very few delegates, only a dozen or twenty. The fifth congress was held in Wuhan, with a larger number of attendees, several hundred [10]. The sixth congress was held in Moscow, with dozens of delegates [11]. Comrade Enlai and Comrade Bocheng [12] attended. The seventh congress was held in Yan'an, and it was a unity meeting. At that time, there were also divisions within the party because of the mistakes of Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Wang Ming, especially Wang Ming's line [13]. At that time, some suggested not electing comrades who followed Wang Ming's line to the Central Committee. We disagreed and persuaded them to run. What was the result? Several people became bad. Wang Ming fled abroad to oppose us. Li Lier was also bad. Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang [14] made mistakes. Those were just a few. Others, like Liu Shaoqi [5], Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo [16], and others, fled because we didn't know they were bad and didn't know their political histories.

Since the Eighth National Congress, things have become relatively clear. Politically, organizationally, and ideologically, everything has become clearer. Therefore, we hope this congress can be a conference of conclusions. On the basis of these conclusions, can we achieve victory? Can this congress be a victorious one? After the congress, can we achieve even greater victories nationwide? I think we can. It can be a conference of conclusions, a victorious one, and after the congress, we can achieve even greater victories nationwide!

[1] This is Mao Zedong's speech at the opening ceremony of the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. This speech, along with Mao's speech at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on April 28, 1969, was distributed to all regions by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on May 9, with the requirement that it be "read aloud to all cadres above the level of members

of the Revolutionary Committees in factories, people's communes, schools, and government agencies, and to all cadres above the platoon level in the military, to study them earnestly, and to implement them resolutely

[2] Dong Lao refers to Dong Biwu, who attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1921 as a representative of the Wuhan Communist Group. Dong Biwu was a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee when he attended the Ninth National Congress.

[3] Wang Jinmei and Deng Enming attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1921 as representatives of the Jinan Communist Group. They were the earliest organizers and leaders of the Shandong CCP organization. Wang Jinmei died of illness on August 8, 1925. Deng Enming was arrested at the end of 1928 and murdered by Kuomintang reactionaries in April 1931.

[4] In July 1921, Chen Tanqiu attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China as a representative of the Wuhan Communist Group. In 1939, he served as the CCP representative to Xinjiang and director of the Eighth Route Army's Xinjiang Office. In September 1942, Chen Tanqiu was secretly arrested by Xinjiang warlord Sheng Shicai and secretly executed in September 1943.

[5] He Shuheng attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1921 as a representative of the Changsha Communist Group. After the Central Red Army embarked on the Long March in October 1934, He Shuheng remained in southern China to continue the struggle. In February 1935, while encircled by the enemy on his way to Shanghai, he died heroically while trying to break through the encirclement.

[6] In July 1921, Li Hanjun attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China as a representative of the Shanghai Communist Group. He voluntarily withdrew from the Party in 1922. After the April 12th counter-revolutionary coup in 1927, Li Hanjun angrily denounced Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal. Following Wang Jingwei's rebellion in July, Li Hanjun resisted and fought against the anti-communist activities of the Kuomintang rightists, shielding numerous Communist Party members. In December, he was assassinated in Hankou by a warlord.

[7] Chen Gongbo attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1921 as a representative of the Guangzhou Communist Group. He left the Communist Party in 1925 and joined the Kuomintang. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Chen Gongbo surrendered to the Japanese invaders along with Wang Jingwei and served in various positions under the Wang Puppet Government, including President of the Legislative Yuan, President of the Executive Yuan, and Acting Chairman. After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in 1945, Chen Gongbo fled to Japan but was later brought back to China. In April 1946, he was sentenced to death by the Kuomintang High Court and executed the following June. Zhou Fohai attended the First

National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1921 as a representative of the Communist Group in Japan. He left the Communist Party in 1924 and joined the Kuomintang. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he surrendered to the Japanese invaders along with Wang Jingwei and served as Vice President of the Executive Yuan under the Wang Puppet Government. In September 1945, he was placed under house arrest by the Kuomintang's Military Intelligence Bureau. In 1946, he was sentenced to death by the Kuomintang High Court. In March 1947, Chiang Kai-shek issued a special pardon, commuting his sentence to life imprisonment. He died of illness in prison in February 1948.

Zhang Guotao attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1921 as a representative of the Beijing Communist Group. He served as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, its Political Bureau, and its Standing Committee. In June 1935, after the First and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army joined forces in Weigong (present-day Xiaojin), Sichuan, he became the General Political Commissar of the Red Army. He opposed the Central Committee's decision to march north, engaged in activities that were divisive and harmful to the Party and the Red Army, and established a separate Central Committee. In June 1936, the Second Central Committee was forced to be disbanded. He then marched north with the Second and Fourth Front Armies, arriving in northern Shaanxi in December. From September 1937, he served as Acting Chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government. In April 1938, he escaped from the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region while attending a ceremony at the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor and joined a Kuomintang spy group, subsequently being expelled from the Party. He died in Canada in 1979.

Liu Renjing attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1921 as a representative of the Beijing Communist Group. In 1926, he went to study at the Moscow International Leninist Institute in the Soviet Union and later joined the Trotskyist movement. He was expelled from the Party in 1929. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he worked for a long time as a special editor at the People's Publishing House, engaging in translation work. In 1987, he became a counselor in the State Council's Office of Counselors. He died in a car accident in August of that year.

[8] In July 1921, Li Da attended the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China as a representative of the Shanghai Communist Group. In 1923, he engaged in a heated debate with Chen Duxiu over the issue of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and subsequently left the Party. He subsequently engaged in theoretical research and education, persistently promoting Marxism-Leninism and actively participating in revolutionary activities led by the Party. In 1949, he attended the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and was elected a member of the CPPCC National Committee. In December of the same year, with the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he rejoined the Communist Party of China. After the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, he was framed and persecuted, and died unjustly in August 1966. He was fully rehabilitated in 1980.

[9] There were more than 30 delegates attending the Third National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

[10] The Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Wuhan from April 27 to May 10, 1927, with over 80 delegates in attendance.

[11] The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Moscow from June 18 to July 11, 1928. A total of 142 leading central leaders and representatives from various regions attended the congress, including 84 representatives with voting rights.

[12] Enlai is Zhou Enlai. Bocheng is Liu Bocheng, who was a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee when he attended the Ninth National Congress of the CPC.

[13] Qu Qiubai was elected a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau at the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1927. After the failure of the First Great Revolution, he presided over the August 7th Conference and subsequently served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, directing the work of the Central Committee. From November 1927 to April 1928, he committed the error of "Left" blind activism. In September 1930, he presided over the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, correcting the "Left" adventurism of Li Lisan. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in January 1931, he was attacked by Wang Ming's "Left" dogmatist faction and excluded from the central leadership. In 1934, he served as the People's Commissar of Education of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. After the Long March of the Central Red Army, he remained in the south to continue the struggle. In February 1935, he was arrested by the Kuomintang during the transfer and was executed on June 18 in Changting, Fujian. From June to September 1930, while serving as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and concurrently serving as Secretary-General and Minister of the Central Propaganda Department, effectively overseeing the work of the CPC Central Committee, Li Lisan committed "Left" adventurist errors. During the Cultural Revolution, he was framed and persecuted by the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques, and died unjustly in June 1967. In 1980, the CPC Central Committee rehabilitated him and restored his reputation. In January 1931, Wang Ming, with the support of representatives of the Communist International, was elected as a member of the CPC Central Committee and the Political Bureau at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee. Thereafter, the "Left" adventurist line he represented dominated the CPC Central Committee for four years, causing significant damage to the Party and the revolutionary cause. At the Seventh CPC National Congress, thanks to the efforts of Mao Zedong and other central leaders, he was re-elected as a member of the CPC Central Committee. After traveling to the Soviet Union in January 1956, he engaged in long-term activities against the CPC Central Committee. He died of illness in Moscow in 1974.

[14] Zhang Wentian joined the Communist Party of China in 1925. In January 1934, he was elected a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee. In February, he was elected Chairman of the People's Committee of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In October, he participated in the Long March. In January 1935, he attended the Zunyi Conference, supporting and upholding the correct line represented by Mao Zedong and delivering a report criticizing the "Left" military line. After the conference, according to the division of labour among the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, he replaced Bo Gu as General Secretary. In 1945, he was elected a member of the CPC Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress and a member of the Political Bureau at the First Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee. In 1956, he was elected an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee. In 1959, he was wrongly criticized at the Lushan Conference and severely persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. He died unjustly in July 1976. In August 1979, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a memorial service for him, rehabilitating him and restoring his reputation. Wang Jiaxiang joined the Communist Youth League of China in 1925 and the Communist Party of China in 1928. In January 1934, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he was elected a member of the Central Committee and an alternate member of the Political Bureau. In January 1935, at the Zunyi Conference, he supported and upheld the correct line represented by Mao Zedong. After the conference, he was elected a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and formed a three-person Central Military Leadership Group with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. In 1945, he was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China. After the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1956, he served as a member of the Central Committee and a member of the Central Secretariat. He was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. In August 1973, he was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. He died in January 1974.

[15] Liu Shaoqi, originally served as the Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and the President of the People's Republic of China. On the eve and in the early stages of the "Cultural Revolution," due to an incorrect assessment of the party and domestic situation at the time, he was deemed to have established a counter-revolutionary revisionist line within the party that was opposed to the central line, and was accused of leading a bourgeois headquarters. Furthermore, they departed from the principles of democratic centralism, adopted erroneous policies and methods, and launched an open and erroneous nationwide campaign of criticism and struggle against Liu Shaoqi. Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, and others, driven by their counter-revolutionary aims of usurping supreme leadership of the Party and state and subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat, exploited this error and, leveraging their stolen power, deliberately framed Liu Shaoqi politically and

persecuted him personally. They also falsely accused a large number of leading Party, government, and military officials of being "Liu Shaoqi's agents" and brought them down. Under the direct control and direction of Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, and others, they resorted to despicable tactics, including fabricated and far-fetched material, fabricated evidence, and fabricated a "Report on the Investigation of the Crimes of the Renegade, Hidden Traitor and Scab, Liu Shaoqi" to the Central Committee in September 1968. This report and its accompanying "Evidence of Crime" were adopted by the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 1968, amidst the profoundly abnormal state of Party Central Committee work and inner-Party life. The plenary session's communiqué also announced the Central Committee's resolution to "permanently expel Liu Shaoqi from the Party and remove him from all positions within and outside the Party." In October 1969, Liu Shaoqi, seriously ill, was forcibly escorted from Beijing to Kaifeng for "custody." He died unjustly on November 12 of the same year as a result of persecution. Following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Committee decided in February 1979 that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Organization Department of the Central Committee review Liu Shaoqi's case. On February 29, 1980, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted the "Resolution on Rehabilitating Comrade Liu Shaoqi." The resolution stated: "According to the review, there is absolutely no such thing as a "counter-revolutionary revisionist line" represented by Liu Shaoqi, no "counter-revolutionary revisionist group" with Liu Shaoqi as its "chief ringleader," and no "capitalist roader clique in power within the Party" with Liu Shaoqi as its leader." In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, work teams were dispatched to certain units to guide the movement, a practice our Party had employed for years to address grassroots issues. There was no such thing as a "bourgeois reactionary line" formulated and promoted by Liu Shaoqi. The resolution held that the original investigation report, which charged Liu Shaoqi with the three major crimes of "Renegade, Hidden Traitor and Scab," along with various other charges, was a complete deliberate frame-up by Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda. The resolution adopted by the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee based on this finding, "to permanently expel Liu Shaoqi from the Party and remove him from all Party and non-Party posts," was erroneous. The previous slander, false accusations, fabricated materials, and all false statements against Liu Shaoqi must be completely refuted. Therefore, the plenary session decided to revoke the charges against Liu Shaoqi and the resolution regarding his punishment contained in the Communiqué of the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee. Accordingly, the original investigation report was revoked, restoring Liu Shaoqi's reputation as a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary, and one of the key leaders of the Party and the state.

[16] Peng Zhen joined the Communist Party of China in 1923 and served as Secretary of the CPC Tianjin Municipal Committee and Acting Secretary of the Shunzhi Provincial Committee. He was arrested in 1929 and released from prison in 1935. In 1945, he was elected a

member of the CPC Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress and a member of the Political Bureau at the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. In August, he was appointed Alternate Secretary of the Central Secretariat. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as a member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Central Secretariat, Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, and Mayor of Beijing. He was persecuted and imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. In February 1979, the CPC Central Committee fully rehabilitated him, stating: "All the charges and false accusations against Comrade Peng Zhen during the Cultural Revolution, under the interference and sabotage of the counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, should be refuted." Bo Yibo joined the Communist Party of China in 1925. After 1929, he directed military mobilization work in the Shunzhi Provincial Committee. He was later arrested and imprisoned, where he served as secretary of the CCP branch. In 1936, with the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he was released from prison following simple formalities. He later went to Shanxi to oversee the Sacrifice for the Nation Alliance. In 1945, he was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council. He was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China reviewed and corrected the previous erroneous conclusions about him, affirming his contributions to the Party and the people, and thus rehabilitating him.

Conversation with Xie Fuzhi and others

(April 5, 1969)

First, the historical issue.

There is always a tendency in a period. After the first great revolution, only cooperation was allowed, and independence was not mentioned. Cooperation with the Communist Party was not mentioned, and struggle with the Kuomintang was not mentioned. There is a tendency. Sometimes we talk about tendency, sometimes we talk about trend. Sometimes we talk about ideological trend, sometimes we talk about wave. Under a tendency, many people are deceived. We only think of cooperation, but not split. After the split, another tendency came in 1927: only workers and peasants are needed, not the national bourgeoisie; only the Communist Party is revolutionary, and other parties are not good enough.

Dogmatism advocates that no land should be distributed to landlords, but that bad land should be distributed to rich peasants. Small parties are worse than the unscrupulous party. This is because they are still deceptive and do not recognize the existence of a third force. Under this force, "leftism" emerged, and there was also rightism among them. This was the ten-year land revolution.

During the Anti-Japanese War, there was another climax. The second time we cooperated with the Communist Party, the Red Army was changed to the Eighth Route Army, and wore the hat of the Kuomintang. Many people did not understand and could not figure it out. In fact, we were independent. Later, Wang Ming came back and brought a national defense line, which was "left" in form but right in essence. (The Chairman proposed at that time: adhere to unity and oppose division; adhere to progress and oppose regression. At that time, Peng Dehuai was very bad. He was very interested in bourgeois things and advocated freedom, equality, and fraternity. Land reform was implemented in Taihang, and there were three ups and downs. Later, Marshall came and formed a three-person group, saying that they were peaceful, but in fact they were helping the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. We were ready to fight, and we prepared for a period of time.) Among them, we were ready to fight. Some people thought that the Southern Anhui Incident was the mainstream, but it was not the mainstream. The mainstream was anti-Japanese. We were not fooled in the eight-year war of resistance. There were difficulties and struggles. After the victory of Quanzhou, I Qingcheng secretly went to Beijing for negotiations, and they defeated him. I went to pick him up, which was beyond his expectation. I only picked up such a person in Beijing.

In a period of time, there is always a tendency to cover up another tendency. In the division, there is a union, and in the union, there is a division.

In socialist transformation, we adopt a policy of redemption towards the bourgeoisie. Confiscating the bourgeoisie will not be done with a gong or a drum. Lenin proposed the

policy of redemption a long time ago, but Lenin died early, and it was not implemented in the Soviet Union.

Second, implement policies.

Now in the proletarian cultural revolution, everything is taken to a high level. There is a factory in Beijing with an eight-person special task force, saying that their factory director is a dog spy. After the masses' investigation, the factory director is a good person. I don't believe some special task forces. There are more than 10,000 people in Peking University, and they arrested hundreds of people. Before the propaganda team moved in, they did not explain the tasks. After moving in, they did not summarize the experience and did not report to them. They went in and out of Peking University three times. This is not good for the army! The 63rd Army is no longer needed. This is mainly because the leadership is not good, and reports are received at all levels. Liu Xing is the deputy director of the political department of the 63rd Army. He has not received reports from them once in seven months. I thought it was difficult to catch people far away, and it was not easy to do work in nearby places. But it is not necessarily the case. After being transferred to the countryside, Shu Dafu performed well!

Aren't we talking about targeting a small group of people like Liu and Deng now? Should Peking University arrest a small group? Arresting 1/1000, 2/1000, or 3/1000 will be enough, and let the rest go. Professors, lecturers, and associate professors are unarmed and cannot rebel. If they rebel, we will arrest them.

I only added one sentence to the seventh question of Article 6: During the movement, except for the current counter-revolutionaries who have evidence of murder, arson, poisoning, and stealing family secrets, who should be dealt with according to the law, no one should be arrested, no one should be killed, and no one should be imprisoned. Some special case teams do not distinguish right from wrong. It is easy to imprison people but difficult to release them, because they are afraid of being accused of rightist tendencies. During the Yan'an Rectification Movement in 1942, most of them were not arrested, and no one was killed! Tongxing arrested many people, but didn't they all release them? But it was very passive. In major spy cases, most of them were not arrested, and only one or two were arrested. Don't label rightists casually. The labels are in our hands. If he wants to rebel, he can label him! The labels are not the problem of one rightist, but the problem of the whole family. Why do we snatch them to the enemy? There are too many people who have been trained abroad, and the gains are not great. You have too many people in prison. Release them all. The unrepentant capitalist-roaders will change in a year or two! Nie Yuanzi has changed, that's good enough!

I can't hate the key players in the "February Countercurrent". They are not these few! There are also some in other places. Some of them are excerpted, they did it openly, it was not a conspiracy. They opposed the Central Committee, but actually opposed me and Comrade Lin

Biao. Don't write it about the Ninth National Congress, unlike Yang Chengwu who was a double-dealer. They are still angry.

In every period, there is always a tendency that covers up another tendency. Now we have the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Will the bourgeoisie do it again in the future? We should do it one factory at a time, one school at a time, one commune at a time, one unit at a time. When doing it, we should make small demonstrations, be focused, be specific, and focus on typical cases. Of course, there is a process. It is not a good idea to lock up talents. We have always disapproved of it. The army had confinement. Is it still there now? (Answer: No.) Not necessarily. The Beijing troops still have it. Punish the past and respond to the future, cure the disease and save the patient! Is it true or false? Let's talk about ourselves, such as assigning appropriate tasks to those who made mistakes. In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a few people reversed their verdicts on the Yan'an Rectification Movement. Will anyone reverse their verdicts on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the future? The bourgeoisie, as a class, will always oppose us. Although the bourgeoisie is small in number, they have great energy, especially their intellectuals.

Third, prepare for war. To prepare for war, Northeast, Northwest, and North China must be prepared. If we are prepared, there is no harm in not fighting. We must be prepared for enemy planes to bomb our atomic reactors. When Japan surrendered, they had no bases and were small. Second, the government surrendered. Our leaders were all beaten by them, but our subordinates still have to fight.

The Soviet revisionists were very poor and had poor discipline. When the Soviet army entered the Northeast, the discipline was terrible. The Soviet revisionists only issued one set of clothes a year and asked people to pay for them. First, they wanted things, second, they wanted women, and third, they wanted face. On Zhenbao Island, their artillery hit seven kilometers into our rear, and we did not fight back to give them face. It would be good if they hit seventy, seven hundred, or seven thousand kilometers and reached Zhengzhou. We would have a way. Cut the leeks, but not pull them out. When fighting, we start, and they start too, but they will not start. The Red Guards were very brave and obedient. All the Red Guards in the schools who fought hard in the past were obedient. This time, the army did not want to play, the factories did not want them, and the local governments did not want them. When they arrived in the army, they did not know how to do morning exercises because they could not sleep! Later, they got up earlier than anyone else. At first, they were unwilling to carry backpacks, but after two periods of training, they had physical strength.

Strengthen local armed forces, one battalion in a small county, two battalions in a medium county, and one regiment in a large county. They should be engaged in production and training in peacetime, and be organized into field armies when fighting breaks out. Conscripts will be too late to fight when the war breaks out.

Speech at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (2)

April 11, 1969

Should we continue this small meeting or hold a plenary session?

Hold a plenary session to pass the political report and the party constitution. Pass it first and don't publish it, okay?

.....

The Beijing group briefing said that there is a tendency covering up another tendency. There is a tendency in the cleansing of the class ranks, which is expansion. This issue has been discussed several times in many meetings.

The cleansing of the class ranks involved traitors, spies, unrepentant capitalist-roaders, counter-revolutionaries, and landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists who had not been reformed. Some places did it better, while others did it worse, not quite accurately, and exaggerated. Some people were arrested, and those who should not have been arrested were also arrested. The masses rose up, and more people were arrested, which is understandable. Because the cleansing of the class ranks was carried out by the Central Committee, and it was stipulated that it should be carried out, it was exaggerated as soon as it was carried out. There have been many such cases in history.

In order to clarify the two lines at the Seventh National Congress⁸, I criticized those who made mistakes at the meeting, so the Seventh National Congress was a closed and victorious meeting. After the meeting, it was indeed closed and victorious, and it was more united than during the civil war in the Central Soviet Area.

After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee⁹, the party became even more leftist. Wang Ming's¹⁰ pamphlet 'Struggle for the Central Committee to Become More Bolshevik' described Li Lisan¹¹ as a 'leftist' opportunist, but Wang Ming went even further to

⁸ The 7th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party began in June 1945, before the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the resumption of the Chinese Civil War. The 8th National Congress was held in 1956.

⁹ The Fourth Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee was held in Beijing from February 6–10, 1954. Mao Zedong did not participate, and the report by the Politburo, including criticism of Gao Gang was delivered by Liu Shaoqi.

¹⁰ Wang Ming (1904–1974) joined the CCP in 1924. From 1925 to 1929, Wang studied in Moscow, and in 1931 became the CCP's leading representative to the Comintern, living in Moscow until 1937. On his return, he opposed Mao's application of Marxism to China's conditions. The 1942 Rectification Movement in Yan'an was directed at Wang's dogmatism. During the period of the Second Communist-Guomindang United Front, Wang advocated everything through the United Front and subsequently lost influence as a party leader. Nevertheless, he was elected to the Central Committee at the 7th National Congress. Wang Ming returned to Moscow in the early 1950s, ostensibly for health reasons, and became a supporter of the Soviet revisionists after 1956, attacking Mao and the CCP until Wang's death in 1974.

¹¹ Li Lisan (1899–1967) joined the CCP in the early 1920s after a brief period of study in France. He helped organise workers at the Anyuan Coal Mine and around 1926, in Wuhan. In 1930, Li Lisan advocated the seizure

the left, almost destroying the Red Army. At that time, he was in Moscow. The Red Army had 500,000 troops, but later only 30,000 remained, and he was satisfied.

There were three 'leftist' tendencies, each more severe than the last. Li Lisan was not as severe as Qu Qiubai¹², but Wang Ming was more extreme than Li Lisan. During the Anti-Japanese War period, Wang Ming turned to right-wing opportunism. At the time, there was a prevailing sentiment that since the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation had been established, there was no need for independence and autonomy. Wang Ming returned from the Soviet Union and led this capitulationist sentiment, committing errors. The democratic trend of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation overshadowed the principles of independence and autonomy, mobilising the masses, strengthening the people's power, and establishing base areas.

The Yan'an Rectification Movement criticised Wang Ming's line and corrected his erroneous line. Now some people say that 'the rectification movement was wrong,' and it is not surprising that this may come up again in the future.

The first collaboration between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang took place when Sun Yat-sen was still alive. At that time, they also called for the overthrow of imperialism and the overthrow of warlords. The overthrow of local tyrants was also acceptable. Some were loyal, while others were not. At that time, Li Wei-han¹³, the secretary of the Henan Provincial Committee, was not loyal. (Lin Biao: Li Wei-han did not call for the overthrow of local tyrants.) At that time, independence and autonomy also existed. There were mass movements, land reform movements, peasant movements, and student movements, with the peasant movement being the main one. This occurred in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangxi, and Guangdong. After a period of time, the contradictions that had been concealed came to

of power in the cities. When Wang Ming returned from Moscow, the two fell out and Li was recalled to Moscow where he spent the next 15 years. He was elected to the Central Committee at the 7th National Congress held in Yan'an. In 1946, he was sent back to China. After Liberation, he served as Minister for Labour. During the Cultural Revolution, Li was denounced as an agent of Soviet revisionism and he died, apparently suiciding, in 1969.

¹² Qu Qiubai (1899-1935) joined the CCP in 1923 and became acting Chairman of the CCP Politburo and the de facto leader of the party in 1927, replacing Chen Duxiu. In April 1928 he went to Moscow where his "leftism" was criticised. In 1930, he returned to Shanghai where he took part in cultural work. In 1934 he fled Shanghai, only to be arrested in Fujian Province. He was tortured for a year and then executed.

¹³ Li Wei-han (1896-1984) joined the CCP in 1921. He became a member of the 6th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 but fell out of favour shortly afterwards in the wake of the unsuccessful Autumn Harvest Uprising which he sought to bring to an end, and was accused of cowardice. Li was eclipsed until reemerging in the early 1930s as a supporter of Li Lisan, and was promoted to become the first principal of the Yan'an-based Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, the highest training centre for party workers and leaders. Li served as principal from 1933 to 1935 and again from 1937 to 1938. After Liberation, Li was involved in managing China's minorities and nationalities as Chairman of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. He was removed from his post as Director of the United Front Department in 1964 and was subsequently criticised by Zhou Enlai for "capitulationism in united front work". However, he reemerged after 1978 as a supporter of the revisionist Deng Xiaoping and as a critic of Mao and the CCP, which Li referred to as "feudal". Deng promoted Li in 1982 to the post of vice chairman of the Central Advisory Commission, which Deng himself chaired. Li died in office in August 1984.

the fore. Chiang Kai-shek killed people, so we took up arms. At the time, we did not think of establishing a base in the countryside. Some people followed Liu Shaoqi in surrendering their weapons in Wuhan, while others suffered defeat. The Nanchang Uprising did not know to go to the countryside. We went to the countryside because the enemy forced us to go. Because we could not stay in the city, Chiang Kai-shek wanted to kill us. Once the fighting began, everything was targeted—the bourgeoisie, industry and commerce, small capitalists, and urban workshops were all targeted... The democratic revolution, in a nutshell, divides the bourgeoisie into two parts: one part is the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and the other part is the national bourgeoisie. The democratic revolution cannot... national capitalists.

During the civil war, three errors of a 'leftist' nature were committed. Why were there no errors of a rightist nature, but only errors of a 'leftist' nature? Because there was a war going on at the time. The second cooperation with the Communist Party resulted in a rightist tendency. Now that there is cooperation, everything is subject to the united front, and everything goes through the united front. There is no independence or autonomy, no mobilisation of the masses, no army, and no leadership of the Party.

After the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, negotiations took place in Chongqing. While I was in Chongqing, Liu Shaoqi gave a report at the Party School in Yan'an saying that a 'new stage of peace and democracy' had arrived, and telegrams were sent to various places. (Dong Biwu: I didn't hear about it in Chongqing. [XXX]: It was conveyed in Zhangjiakou in Jinzhaoji. Huang Yongsheng: I heard that a telegram was sent to the Northeast. Lin Biao: The Northeast also received the telegram. We did not convey it; we sent a telegram stating that it was not the 'new stage of peace and democracy' but the "beginning of civil war.") The negotiations had not concluded when I returned, preparing for war. Later, Premier Kang went and drafted an agreement, which was signed. Does this agreement hold any weight? In theory, it should, but in practice, it does not.

The Seventh National Congress was a congress of unity and victory. After more than three years, Chiang Kai-shek was defeated. After entering the city, many people were successfully detained, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Liu Shaoqi was later found to be a traitor, spy, and labour saboteur, while Deng Xiaoping had no historical issues. Bo Yibo¹⁴ and An Ziwén¹⁵ had connections with the Kuomintang.

¹⁴ Bo Yibo (1908-2007) joined the CCP in 1925. He was imprisoned by the Guomindang in 1931, but signed an anti-Communist "confession" five years later and resumed his Party work. Bo was China's inaugural Minister of Finance, a member of the Communist Party's Politburo, Vice-Premier, chairman of State Economic Commission, and vice-chairman of the party's Central Advisory Commission. He was purged in 1966, but was brought back to power by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, after Mao's death. He supported Deng's restoration of capitalism and supported his son, Bo Xilai's career.

¹⁵ An Ziwén (1909-1980) joined the CCP in 1927. He was arrested, but released, by the Guomindang. In 1949, he was appointed as head of the Personnel Ministry, and was elected as a CPPCC Standing Committee member. He served as vice minister of the Central Organization Department, and was appointed as the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and deputy secretary. In 1956, at the Eighth CCP National Congress, he was elected as head of the CCP Central Organization Department. In 1966, An was denounced as one of the

The establishment of the People's Republic of China marked the beginning of socialism, but we did not announce it at the time. It was not until after the land reform that it was announced. In some areas, the land reform was not thorough, and it was carried out peacefully. At the time, the national bourgeoisie was utilised, restricted, and transformed.

The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee proposed that the main contradiction was between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but this was not often discussed openly with the public. As a result, the masses did not know that the socialist revolution was to eliminate the bourgeoisie, but some people talked about utilising it instead of restricting and transforming it.

Whether this proletarian cultural revolution is called the Cultural Revolution or not is a matter of history. It can be called the Cultural Revolution, because from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, no matter what name it is called, it can always touch the superstructure, from the central government to government agencies, schools, factories, rural areas...

Bourgeois intellectuals, they also have backers. This work has not been completed yet, and it will take some time. We must do it seriously. We must find typical cases, conduct investigations and studies, summarize experience, and implement policies. (Lin Biao: Our great leader Chairman Mao personally caught several typical cases in Beijing.) I can't manage so many, you have to catch them. In the past, the Beijing Municipal Party Committee couldn't manage it, but now it can. I only caught the typical cases, and I can't manage everything. Factories, schools, and government agencies must find typical cases. We must catch them one by one in factories, communes, schools, and units. (Mao asked Huang Yongsheng about the work of clearing the ranks) Our army must be cautious.

There was an eight-member special case team in Nankou that turned the party secretary into a dog spy. Afterwards, the people handed him over to the public for investigation and found that he was not a spy but a good person. The materials collected by people who conduct special cases are not so reliable. Their view is that the more they collect, the better, just like when we used to catch lice during marches, we would not be satisfied if we caught less. It is not easy for people who conduct special cases to judge cases. If the verdict is overturned, it is the fault of the leaders. I do not conduct special cases.

There is a university in Beijing with over 9,000 students, and over 900 of them were arrested, which is one-tenth of the total. It is not easy to release people once they are locked up. If you want to release them, you have to give a reason. Why did you arrest me? Why are you releasing me? Some can be pushed down, and some can be pulled up. Some are locked up in cattle sheds and forced to clean toilets. (Asking Zhang Chunqiao) What is XXX doing? (Zhang answers...) Intellectuals cleaning toilets is acceptable.

renegades who had cooperated with the GMD to secure their release. He died two years after his rehabilitation by Deng Xiaoping.

Wang Ming wrote an article saying that we should not have intellectuals. Qin Shi Huang burned books and buried scholars alive, killing more than 400 people. We did not kill anyone, but we did engage in practices such as wearing high hats¹⁶, parading people through the streets, and cleaning toilets. These were temporary phenomena. (Kang Sheng: The Soviet newspaper published a photo of Peng Zhen wearing a high hat.) Wearing high hats was a way to suppress landlords and corrupt elements. I wrote about this in an article. We haven't done this for decades. This time, the Red Guards brought it back, and they put the high hat on again. If landlords and corrupt officials can wear the high hat, why can't Peng Zhen wear it? We oppose the high hat, oppose the black badge, oppose the jet-style¹⁷, and oppose arbitrarily arresting people. Once arrested, they must be released; it's simply a matter of cause and effect, with no concrete evidence. At different times, one tendency tends to overshadow another. It is essential for comrades to thoroughly understand the historical experience of our Party to avoid making mistakes. Currently, there is a tendency to only dig latrines when the situation becomes urgent. Some do prepare latrines in advance.

In the past, when we marched, we would dig latrines upon arriving at the campsite. Now that we live in barracks, we cannot do without latrines. If we stay with the people for too long, they will grow tired of us. This time, the 'Three Supports' and 'Two Armies'¹⁸ have once again improved the relationship between the army and the people. You say 'Three Supports' and 'Two Armies,' but foreigners do not understand.

It's a case of 'left' in form but 'right' in substance, where the "left" is just a façade to hide the 'right' essence.

I suggest that several veteran comrades join in: Zhu De, Chen Yun, Deng Zihui, Zhang Dinghan, Xu Xiangqian, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, and Wang Ming. No one will exclude him. Wang Jiaxiang made mistakes, but he also did some work.¹⁹

¹⁶ Also known as "dunces' caps" in the West.

¹⁷ During mass criticism rallies, those accused of being capitalist-roaders were often forced into an excruciating position where they were forced to bow their heads while their arms were pulled back behind them like the wings of a jet plane.

¹⁸ The "three supports and two armies" refers to the policy followed by the PLA during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. The PLA was required to "support the Left, support the workers and support the peasants; and to engage in military management (exercising military control over some regions, departments, and units), and military training (military training of students).

¹⁹ Wang Jiaxiang (1906-1974) joined the Youth League in 1925 and was sent to study in the Soviet Union. In 1928, he joined the CCP, returning to China in 1930 as one of Wang Ming's "28 and a half Bolsheviks". He supported Mao's line at the 1935 Zunyi Conference and in 1938 was appointed as Vice Chairman of Central Military Committee of CCP, replacing Mao's rival Wang Ming. During that time the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out, Chinese Red Army was reorganised into 8th Route Army, and Wang Jiaxiang was appointed as Director of Political Department, taking charge of military command with Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. In 1943, he is said to have been the first to promote Mao Zedong Thought. After Liberation, Wang was appointed as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and then returned to head the International Liaison Department of the CCP. He was critical of elements of the Great Leap Forward and people's communes and was dismissed from his post as head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee. In the summer of 1962, Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng, and others of the Communist Party of China (CPC) critically summed up Wang Jiaxiang's

Speech at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (3)

(April 13, 1969)

What news? (Zhou Enlai: Prepare to convey the Chairman's last speech tonight and hold a large group meeting.)

Why do we need to convey this? (Zhou Enlai: If we don't convey the Chairman's words, they will say we are blocking it.)

No, it depends on whether what I said is consistent with the facts. (Zhou Enlai: They are consistent.) (Kang Sheng²⁰: Ask them to read "Study and Current Affairs")

Four questions, and a document. At a party congress, I gave a report, talking about the main contradiction and the secondary contradiction. The contradiction within the party was reduced to a secondary contradiction. After that, I talked about the national united front. I sent it to Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen²¹ and others who disagreed. I said Chiang Kai-shek was fighting against Japan. In the past, they did not fight against Japan and did not mobilize the masses. (Li Xuefeng²²: At the Soviet Party Congress, a student named Yang Cheng said, "Resist Japan, resist Japan, democracy, democracy.") (Kang Sheng: It was the December meeting.) (Cheng Shiqing²³: We found that one of the three articles that the Chairman has not published is "A Letter to the Soldiers on the Front.") I'm afraid that's not right. (Cheng

views on foreign work, saying that "peace should be made with imperialism, with revisionism, with India and the reactionaries of various countries, and with less support for the national liberation movement", that is, "three harmony and one less". He was denounced as a rightist during the Cultural Revolution, but was rehabilitated with 12 other veterans on Mao's recommendation in the preparations for the Tenth Congress and was re-elected to the Central Committee.

²⁰ Kang Sheng (1898-1975) joined the CCP in the early 1920s. He supported Li Lisan and then Wang Ming, but transferred his support to Mao Zedong, and was a head of the Party's internal security. He supported Mao's fight against revisionism but after his death, was posthumously expelled from the Party by the revisionists in 1980.

²¹ Peng Zhen (1902-1997) joined the CCP in 1923 and was imprisoned by the Guomindang between 1929 and 1935. He was a member of the Central Committee from 1944, and after Liberation served as Mayor of Beijing from 1951-1966. He opposed Mao's line on literature and art, and sided with Liu Shaoqi at the start of the Cultural Revolution. He was subject to mass criticism, but was rehabilitated by Deng Xiaoping and restored to the CCP's Political Bureau.

²² Li Xuefeng (1907-2003) joined the CCP in 1933 and held a number of organisational leading positions. In 1966 he replaced Peng Zhen as secretary of the Beijing Party Committee but was criticised for sending work teams into the universities. In 1971, he supported Chen Boda during the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee and was judged to be a supporter of Lin Biao's conspiracy to assassinate Mao Zedong. Despite this, he retained his Party membership and was rehabilitated by the revisionists in 1982.

²³ Cheng Shiqing (1918-2008) joined the CCP in 1931. He had a career in the military, and in 1955 he was awarded the rank of Major General of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. He took part in the CCP's Ninth National Congress and was elected to the Ninth Central Committee. He was accused of being part of Lin Biao's conspiracy and was held for examination in 1972 and was subsequently jailed from 1978-1982. Following his release, he was dismissed from all posts inside and outside the Party.

Shiqing: It was published in the newspaper.) (Chen Boda²⁴: All unity, no struggle. There is also all struggle, no unity... "Rural Investigation Preface" and "On Policy" are written in the two articles.) Is this "On Policy" there? (Chen Boda: Yes.) In summary, the mistakes we have made over and over again in the past few decades are to unite everything and deny struggle; to struggle everything and then unite again. For example, when Li Weiha²⁵ went to Hunan, they agreed to lock up the peasants in the prison. Xiangxiang was better. One Li Weiha, one Xia Xi²⁶. That was a tendency, both to unite with the Kuomintang and to criticize and fight against them. If you want to criticize, it is not okay to criticize the Kuomintang. For example, in Wuhan at that time, I had left Wuhan and went to Changsha to serve as the provincial party secretary.

²⁴ Chen Boda (1904-1989) joined the CCP in 1927. He was a school teacher and spent four years studying Marxism in Moscow. He exercised a leading role in the Yan'an Rectification Movement. He led the Party's propaganda work and was a leading promoter of Mao Zedong Thought. In 1966 he headed the Cultural Revolution Group but his promotion of Mao's "genius" and "absolute authority" saw him condemned as a member of Lin Biao's support group and he was dismissed from his posts. The Deng clique of revisionists tried him at the same time as the Gang of Four, and he was sentenced to 18 years in prison, but given early release due to ill health.

²⁵ Li Weiha (1896-1984) joined the CCP in 1921. He became a member of the 6th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 but fell out of favour shortly afterwards in the wake of the unsuccessful Autumn Harvest Uprising which he sought to bring to an end, and was accused of cowardice. Li was eclipsed until reemerging in the early 1930s as a supporter of Li Lisan, and was promoted to become the first principal of the Yan'an-based Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, the highest training centre for party workers and leaders. Li served as principal from 1933 to 1935 and again from 1937 to 1938. After Liberation, Li was involved in managing China's minorities and nationalities as Chairman of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. He was removed from his post as Director of the United Front Department in 1964 and was subsequently criticised by Zhou Enlai for "capitulationism in united front work". However, he reemerged after 1978 as a supporter of the revisionist Deng Xiaoping and as a critic of Mao and the CCP, which Li referred to as "feudal". Deng promoted Li in 1982 to the post of vice chairman of the Central Advisory Commission, which Deng himself chaired. Li died in office in August 1984.

²⁶ Xia Xi (1901-1936) joined the CCP in 1921 and the Guomindang (during the first period of CCP-GMD cooperation) in 1924. In April 1927, he was elected as a member of the Central Committee at the Fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, and in May he became the secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. Later, he went to Moscow to study at Sun Yat-sen University, during which he was close to Wang Ming and others, and was one of the twenty-eight and a half Bolsheviks. In 1928, Xia attended the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in Moscow. In 1930, he returned to China and served as the Propaganda Minister of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. In January 1931, he was elected as an alternate member of the Central Committee at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In April 1932, Xia began to carry out the first of three purges in the name of "suppressing rebellion", and more than 1,000 Red Army cadres and local cadres at all levels were arrested and killed, including 27 cadres at or above the division level, all of whom were the founders and backbone of the Second Red Army of He Long and the base areas in western Hunan and Hubei. Among them, more than 10,000 grassroots cadres and masses were slaughtered in the Honghu area alone. On February 28, 1936, when crossing the river in Bijie, Xia Xi fell into the water due to physical fatigue and drowned.

Speech at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (4)

(April 14, 1969)

(Mao Zedong and Lin Biao walked briskly onto the rostrum, and the audience applauded enthusiastically. They shouted: Long live Chairman Mao! Long live Chairman Mao!)

Stop shouting slogans. Today's agenda has three items: First, we need to pass Comrade Lin Biao's report, which is a political report on behalf of the Party Central Committee; Second, we need to pass the Constitution of the Communist Party of China; Third, several comrades will speak. Comrade Zhou Enlai has signed up to speak today. (Zhou Enlai: Pass it first, and then speak after it is passed.) What do we need to pass? Don't pass it. We will pass it after you speak. Anyone can sign up to speak! There are so many names who have signed up to speak, including Boda, Kang Sheng, Huang Yongsheng, Wang Hongwen, Chen Yonggui, Wei Fengying, and Sun Yuguo. (After Zhou Enlai spoke, Lin Biao spoke. 5:27) Why are you shouting slogans again! Comrade Chen Boda spoke. (5:35) Comrade Kang Sheng spoke. (5:58) Let's invite another comrade to speak, Comrade Huang Yongsheng. (6:12) One by one, Comrade Wang Hongwen. (6:19) What should we do? Comrades (referring to photographers), don't be so busy, you are all very busy, racing against time, chasing each other.

(The first reporter came in) Then please let Comrade Chen Yonggui speak. (6:29) Chen Yonggui, you are in your forties? Now please let a comrade speak, Comrade Sun Yuguo, he is from Zhenbao Island, he commanded the last battle, the March 15th battle. (When Sun Yuguo saluted Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao stood up and applauded. At 6:38, after Sun Yuguo finished speaking, Chairman Mao, Lin Biao, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, and all the comrades at the meeting stood up and applauded.) How old are you? (Sun Yuguo: Twenty-nine years old.) Twenty-nine years old. Where are you from? (Sun replied: Northeast China.) Northeast China? Where exactly? (Sun replied: Hebei.) Hebei, huh? His name is Sun Yuguo. Sun is the Sun in Zhao, Qian, Sun, and Li. Yu is the Yu in jade, with a dot added to the character for king. Guo is the Guo in country. He is the deputy company commander. After being wounded, he commanded the self-defence counterattack at Zhenbao Island No. 15. (After Sun Yuguo's speech) How come Wei Fengying is also from Liaoning? Comrade Wei Fengying, please speak. (6:50 p.m.) What should we do? Don't worry. (Looking at his watch) It's less than two hours. Where is Comrade Ji Dengkuai? (Zhou Enlai: He's from Henan.) Please, my old friend. He's from Henan, but he's originally from Shanxi. He's always worked in Henan and has also suffered some hardships, you know. You speak. (7:02) It's past 7 o'clock. Time for dinner, I suppose? It seems that all comrades have spoken in favour of the political report and the Party Constitution. All Party comrades should review them again. However, many have not spoken yet. Do you approve or not? (All delegates: We approve! Loud applause) Should we vote? The first item is the political report

by Comrade Lin Biao. Do you approve or not? (Loud applause) Those who approve, please raise your hands. (All raise their hands) (Mao Zedong looks around the hall) Everyone approves. There is hope. It is passed. Is this draft party constitution approved? Those in favour, please raise your hands. (All raise their hands) It seems there is hope after all. Approved. Regarding these two documents, there may still be some wording that needs to be refined, and they also need to be translated into foreign languages. What should we do? Hold another plenary session? Some comrades suggest that the Secretariat undertake this task. Is that acceptable? (All delegates: Acceptable! Loud applause) Today's work is concluded. Dinner, adjourn the meeting! (7:05 PM, concluded)

The Proletariat is the Greatest Class in Human History

(1969)

The proletariat is the greatest class in human history, the most powerful revolutionary class ideologically, politically, and physically. It can and must confine the vast majority of people within its own ranks, isolating and striking down a handful of enemies to the greatest extent possible. [1]

[1] In his report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on April 1, 1969, Lin Biao quoted this passage in boldface after the phrase "Chairman Mao recently pointed out." Lin Biao's report was adopted at the congress on April 14 and published in the People's Daily on April 28.

Two Possibilities of World War

(1969)

Regarding the question of world war, there are only two possibilities: one is that war leads to revolution, the other is that revolution prevents war. [1]

[1] In his report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on April 1, 1969, Lin Biao quoted this passage in boldface after the phrase "Chairman Mao recently pointed out." Lin Biao's report was adopted at the congress on April 14 and published in the People's Daily on April 28. On November 28, 1968, Mao Zedong, in a meeting with Hill, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), said: "Please consider this: is the world in war or revolution? Will war lead to revolution, or will revolution prevent war? In short, the current situation of neither war nor revolution will not last long."

Speech at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (5)

(April 23, 1969)

Li Xuying was a very good person in the past. Are there any comrades from Shandong here? How many are there in the Field Army and North China? (Someone said: Six.) Only one, Zeng Sansheng, came out of the six armies. Sansheng, please come forward...The others have already 'supported the left.' There is also Zhang Riqing in Shanxi. Some armies did not have anyone, but that does not mean that other armies were inferior, but rather that they had already taken on the role of chairman of the Revolutionary Committee. To clarify further, there are still many good people who have not been utilised. Some, such as several old comrades, have even been placed on the list, which is likely to happen during that period. For example, the two old comrades Cheng Qikang and Zhang Yunyi are only on the list because of their seniority. In summary, most of those on the list are good and capable of leading the entire Party and the entire people. However, it is not necessarily too mysterious, and they are not all ideal. For example, there were eight to ten people working at the central level who had made mistakes, and some had made serious mistakes in the past. Could they not be included? The majority were first-time members of the Central Committee, which was unprecedented. There were none at the Seventh Congress or the Eighth Congress. Among the eighth-term elders, 53 were included, while over 200 new members were added, with the elderly accounting for less than one-fifth, while the number of industrial workers and farmers increased.

Comrades, please be careful not to leave production and work. For example, some of the participants in this conference are in the prefecture, county, commune, team, and factory. If they leave production for a long time, they will be like us, called government staff, and we should ask them not to leave production. They only know their unit and do not know the whole country, just as we do not know them. They are very active in their local areas, but once they arrive at the central government, they are interviewed by reporters everywhere and give reports. They will almost collapse in half a year or a year. We must be serious and responsible. I think there have been such cases in history. Since the Sixth National Congress, farmers have not had such cases, but there have been such cases in the army.

Now it is the Great Soviet, workers, peasants and soldiers. For example, is Huang Yongsheng considered a peasant or a worker? (Huang Yongsheng: Considered a peasant.) Xin said that you were the head of a regiment when fighting Zhang Huisuo. (Huang Yongsheng: Small regiment.) I don't know you either, but I heard that you know me. For example, when we go to the market town, you go your way and I go mine, and who knows where who goes. There are still many who have not been elected. For example, Zhang Riqing in North China, who was just mentioned, was nominated because he was a political commissar. There was no one in Hebei. No one was defeated because Zhang Riqing fought with Liu Geping. First, the war is

not clear now, and I am afraid that there will be people in all regions. As for whether it will change? One is that it will get better, and the other is that it will get worse. What can we do? Another thing is that for the newly elected ones, I am worried that they will be out of production and out of touch with the masses. (Zhou Enlai: Peasants only deal with the two ends, and ignore the middle, such as Lu Yulan. Workers are easy to deal with, and the working hours are set. Zhang Fugui runs around everywhere, reviews everywhere, and does not work.) (Kang Sheng: He also implemented the Liu-Deng line and opposed the Red Guards. When he saw the Chairman meeting the Red Guards at Tiananmen Square, he agreed.)

After the struggle, the masses understood. On the one hand, we need these comrades, factory and rural comrades, and on the other hand, we need these active members. Some provinces cannot put forward candidates because they are unfamiliar with them, which proves that there are problems with the work and that they are busy with administrative tasks. Administrative work must be done, but in fact, some administrative tasks can be ignored. Too many is not good either. Less than 300 people is fine, 279 people is also acceptable. If we expand it to five hundred people, it becomes excessive. Whether it's fair or not, I'm not sure, but that's the general idea. If we want to be completely fair, I can't explain it clearly either. You have a valid point. (A comrade interrupts: Five books are also hard to manage.) Is one book per group enough? Wouldn't it be better to give one book per person? They're representatives. For example, Changsha in Hunan nominated a worker, but the major industrial base is in Zhuzhou. I don't care about my hometown. (Everyone laughs)

What about Hu Kang? (A comrade interjected: He just joined the Party.) Sichuan has so many candidates, given that it is such a large province. How many have you nominated? (Answer: Ten.) Shandong has 50 million people. (A comrade said: Two from Jiangsu.) I'm afraid the difficult ones are still these three or four old comrades. If you want to select him, even Zhu De can't explain it clearly, so don't write it down. If you write it down, people won't be satisfied.

(Someone interjected: It was Mr. Dong who explained it to him.) You can't blame him; he forgot. He was over 80 years old. Chen Yi wrote about it more than ten times, but he did it again in Shanghai. There are such comrades in the world; what can you do? They have merits, but also many mistakes and numerous self-criticisms. I think it's almost enough; let's see their future actions. They will also watch us. During the Yan'an Rectification Campaign, when we proposed "curing illnesses and saving people," others didn't believe us, and they had their reasons. At the Seventh Congress, some believed us, but even if you elect him, Wang Ming and Li Lisan are both corrupt, and I think the earth will still turn. The Soviets can't write articles, they're not even as good as Wang Ming. He said our Revolutionary Committee was militarising. Wang Ming wrote it, and it was published in "The Communist" for three issues. If we hadn't elected him back then, he would have turned against us even

faster. At the Eighth Plenary Session, Chen Duxiu wasn't elected, and he wasn't even invited to the meeting.

(Zhou Enlai: "The Sixth Congress invited him to attend. They invited him, but he refused to go, so I spoke with him. He said, "You abandoned me at the Eighth Congress.""") Only Li Weihaan was involved in the peasant movement during the Great Revolution, but he was on the right wing. However, at the Fourth Plenary Session, he was very 'left-wing.' One was him, one was Qu Qiubai. During the Long March, he wasn't taken along. He was the Organisation Minister, responsible for the Secretariat. As for Qu Qiubai, he was an intellectual; the 'leftist' label masked his right-wing essence. Essence is the core; the form is 'leftist,' but the substance is right-wing. "Form" is the outward appearance, while 'right-wing' is the essence. What should be done? You discuss it; I'm not sleeping.

(Zhou Enlai: Except for the chairman, arrange them by the number of strokes in their names...) The Communist Party is better than other parties. They don't spend money to buy [border] votes. Tan Yanfang sent money to both sides, but he was still elected as a provincial councillor. How much does it cost to elect a provincial councillor? I have a relative who spent money on four or five people to buy a tax bureau chief for three months, so they had to act quickly to recoup the money. Having such a relative has broadened my horizons. The Communist Party doesn't buy votes, doesn't campaign, and doesn't hold funeral processions (like the one in Nanjing during the National Assembly election). The goal is to ensure leadership, which is the Central Committee, so sometimes there are elections, and sometimes there aren't. In the past, it was common. At the Sixth Congress, I was elected, but I didn't go to Moscow. The Communist Party is relatively pure, and its political platform meets the requirements. Wang Ming was expelled ten years later, but he didn't delve into the situation at that time. Later, the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Liberation War were won, so it wasn't just about not buying votes. As party members, we always have to be prepared to make sacrifices. We fear neither hardship nor death. In various base areas, whether in Henan, Hubei, Anhui, or Jinggangshan, there aren't many left. Since the start of the War of Resistance, there have been more. There are also some unresolved issues, such as Shanxi, Guizhou, and Shandong, which need to be discussed. We also need to discuss whether the Shandong army and the province can merge and hold a meeting. So, some delegations are pushing for it, and I agree. One from Shandong, one from Shanxi. As for Heilongjiang, the work is good. For example, Guizhou, you don't want to self-criticise, but can't you criticise a little? As for the election, it still needs to be held. One Zhang Riquing, one Nan Ping.

I think that at this conference, summarising the experience of the past few years, in short, without Liu Shaoqi and his group, if we are to overturn the case, we should overturn this one. They are a group of 'elites,' and we are a group of 'rubbish.' Alright. Two more points: Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi must be distinguished. Deng did many bad things, one was deserting the army and fleeing, and another was aligning with Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen

after arriving in Beijing. There were also some good deeds, such as opposing the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union and not uncovering traitors. Some say he wasn't very good at warfare, but he did fight some battles. In the Soviet region, Deng, Mao, Gu, and Xie (Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong, Xie Weijun, and Bo Gu) were opposed by Wang Ming.

Isn't that about right? We still need to elect the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee, and the Central Committee members. I think a bottom-up approach is better. Just give a number, don't nominate individuals. This will take time, so let's think about a few questions. How do you think the Political Bureau should be formed? How should the Standing Committee be formed? The mass line method is better. One list is called the Soviet method, where the top designates people and the bottom circles them. Ours is not like that; ours is a bottom-up nomination. Can we finish the preliminary election today? The preliminary election time can be discussed privately.

Comments on Chen Boda's Speech at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China [I]

(April 1969)

Page 2 is too extreme and should be deleted. You can write some of your own views.

[1] Chen Boda, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, submitted a draft of his speech, prepared for the adoption of the political report and party constitution at the Ninth National Congress of the CPC, to Mao Zedong for review on April 12, 1969. The second page of the draft read: "Chairman Mao, the great teacher of the proletariat, has experienced more than fifty years of protracted struggle and possesses the richest experience. He is an invincible and creative talent, unique in history. Chairman Mao closely linked the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with revolutionary practice. He came from the masses and went to the masses. On all fronts of ideology and theory, on the fronts of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and on the battlefields of revolutionary war, he always worked fearlessly and meticulously, constantly summing up experience, constantly enriching Marxist-Leninist thought, and guiding us from one victory to another." "Chairman Mao's approach, both in theoretical work and in practical struggle, was comprehensive, correct, scientific, and dialectical." When Mao reviewed the draft, he deleted these words and wrote this comment instead.

Speech at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China [1]

(April 28, 1969)

My words are old sayings, familiar to everyone. There's nothing new. They simply speak of unity. The purpose of unity is to strive for greater victory.

Now the Soviet revisionists are attacking us, using TASS broadcasts, Wang Ming's materials, and lengthy articles in The Communist. They claim we're no longer a proletarian party, but a "petty-bourgeois party." They say we're pursuing a unified system, returning to the days of the former base areas, and are regressing. What does "unified system" mean? They say it's a military-bureaucratic system. The Japanese call it a system, and the Soviets call it a "military-bureaucratic dictatorship." When they look at our list, they see quite a few military personnel, so they call them "military." And then there's the "bureaucrats," probably referring to me, Enlai, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda [2], and the rest of the "bureaucrats." In short, anyone who isn't a military member belongs to the "bureaucratic" system, hence the term "military-bureaucratic dictatorship." As for these things, I let them say what they want! But they have one characteristic: they don't call us a bourgeois party, but a "petty-bourgeois party." As for us, we say that it they are the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and that they are restoring the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

When we talk about victory, we must ensure that under the leadership of the proletariat, we unite the broad masses of the people throughout the country to strive for victory. The socialist revolution must continue. There are still some things in this revolution that remain to be done, and we must continue with them now, such as the struggle, criticism, and transformation. In a few years, perhaps another revolution will be necessary.

Several of us veteran comrades have spent some time observing the factories. We hope that if you have the opportunity in the future, you will continue to observe and study the issues within each factory. It seems that we cannot do without the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; our foundation is not solid. In my observation, leadership in a significant majority of factories, not even for the entire population or the vast majority, is not in the hands of true Marxists or the working masses. It's not that there weren't good people leading factories in the past. There were good people—Party secretaries, deputy secretaries, committee members, and even branch secretaries. However, they followed the line of Liu Shaoqi, which was nothing more than material incentives, profit-oriented leadership, a rejection of proletarian politics, and bonuses. Some factories have now liberated these people and are now participating in the "three-in-one" leadership system; others haven't. However, there were indeed bad people in the factories. For example, the Erqi Factory, the Changxindian Railway Locomotive and Rolling Stock Repair Works, was a large factory with 8,000 workers and tens of thousands of family members. Back then, the Kuomintang had

nine district branches, the Three Youth League had three branches, and eight other secret service organizations. This, of course, requires analysis, because back then, it was impossible not to join the Kuomintang! Some were veteran workers. Did they abandon veteran workers? That wouldn't work either. We need to distinguish between serious and minor offenses. Some were nominal Kuomintang members who had to join, and a brief discussion would suffice. Some were more responsible. A few, however, were deeply involved and had committed bad deeds. We need to distinguish between different situations. Even those who committed bad deeds should be treated differently: leniency for those who confessed, severity for those who resisted. If they now reflect well, they should still be allowed to work, but certainly not for the leadership. If these people are not allowed to work, what will happen to their families? What will happen to their children? Furthermore, veteran workers generally have skills, although some are not particularly skilled.

I give this example to illustrate that the revolution is not over. Therefore, all comrades in the Central Committee, including alternate members, please pay attention and do your work meticulously. You must be meticulous in this matter; carelessness is not an option; carelessness often leads to mistakes. In some places, too many people have been arrested, which is not good. [The text then abruptly shifts topics.] They haven't killed anyone, set a fire, or poisoned anyone. I say, as long as they haven't committed these offenses, don't arrest them. As for those who commit capitalist-roader errors, they should be arrested even less. They should be allowed to work in the factory and participate in the mass movement. Mistakes people make are simply past ones, such as joining the Kuomintang, committing some bad deeds, or recent mistakes, making them so-called capitalist-rovers. We need them to be part of the masses; if we don't allow them to be, that's bad. Some people have been imprisoned for two years, locked up in "cowsheds," oblivious to worldly affairs. When they're released, their words are no longer consistent, repeating the same things they said two years ago. They've been detached from life for two years. We need to help these people. We need to organize study sessions and explain history to them, the history of the two-year Cultural Revolution, so that they can gradually regain their sense of self.

Unite for one goal: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. This must be implemented in every factory, village, government agency, and school. Don't roll it out across the board at the beginning. You can roll it out, but don't just ignore it. Don't leave it unattended for six months or longer. We must summarize our experiences factory by factory, school by school, and government agency by agency. Therefore, Comrade Lin Biao's report [3], states that we should carry out this work factory by factory, school by school, commune by commune, Party branch by Party branch, and work unit by unit. The issue of the entire League branch and the League itself was also raised.

Furthermore, as we've said before, we must prepare for war. Regardless of the year, we must be prepared for war. People may ask, "What if he doesn't come?" Whether he comes or not, we should be prepared. We shouldn't require the central government to distribute materials

just to make hand grenades. Hand grenades can be made everywhere, in every province. Rifles and other small weapons can be made in every province. This refers to material preparation. The most important thing is moral preparation. Moral preparation means having a spirit of readiness for war. This applies not only to our Central Committee, but to the majority of the people. I'm not talking about the targets of dictatorship, like landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, or bad elements. Because those people are very happy when imperialism and revisionism come. They think that if they come, the world will be turned upside down, and they can turn around. We must also prepare for this. The socialist revolution also requires this revolution.

If they attack us, we won't fight back. We won't fight back. I say we won't be provoked. Even if you invite me, I won't go. But if you do attack, I'll have to respond. It depends on whether you want a small or large-scale attack. If it's a small attack, we'll fight along the border. If it's a large-scale attack, I suggest we cede some territory. China is not a small territory. If they don't gain some benefits, I don't think they'll come in. We want the whole world to see that our war is justified and to their advantage. If they come in, I think it's more advantageous—not only justified, but also advantageous and easier to fight. We'll trap them in the midst of the people. As for things like airplanes, tanks, and armoured vehicles, experience everywhere has proven that they can be dealt with.

To win, we need more people, right? People from all walks of life, regardless of which faction or province you're from, whether in the north or the south, is it better to unite more or fewer? It's always better to unite more. Some people may not agree with us, but that doesn't mean they're enemies. I don't believe it. For example, specifically, there's talk of Yang Dezhi [4] and Wang Xiaoyu [5] being enemies. Is your relationship between you two enemies, or is it a conflict within the people? It seems to me that it's a quarrel among the people. The central government is a bit bureaucratic, not focusing on you, and you haven't brought it up for discussion. Shandong is such a large province, and this is a conflict within the people. Why don't you take this opportunity to discuss it? I think East China has this internal conflict, too. And Shanxi, too, is among the people. You support one faction, I support another. Why all the bickering? Then there are the issues in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan. Every place has its problems, to varying degrees. But compared to last year and the year before, things are much better. Isn't your comrade Xu Shiyu [6]? The year before last, when we were in Shanghai, it was a terrible time—July, August, and September. Things are a little better now, after all! I'm talking about the overall situation. Your "Red General" emerged from Nanjing, and after his work, the result was still cooperation. There was the "August 27th Incident," and there was the "Red General" incident [7]. Isn't that still cooperation?

I say the main problem is our work. Didn't we say this before? Local problems lie in the military, and military problems lie in our work. If it's not a life-and-death feud, then why bother? There's no need to dwell on personal grudges; that's not a big deal. In short, I think

there's no grudge in past lives, no hatred in this life, but when we meet, we have some disagreements. Perhaps someone criticizes or opposes us, and we retaliate, resulting in a conflict. Those who oppose us are not necessarily bad people. One of the figures Beijing often targeted was Xie Fuzhi [8]. Later, his policy was this: whenever he encountered groups that wanted to overthrow him, he would say, "There's nothing wrong with you." And those who supported him weren't necessarily good.

So, I'm still talking about the same old things: unite and strive for greater victory. This has specific content: what to do, what specific victory to achieve, and how to unite.

I believe in some of the veteran comrades who made mistakes in the past. Originally, there was a large list of over thirty people, and we thought it would be enough to elect all of them to the Politburo. Later, someone proposed a smaller list of a dozen or so, but that was considered too small. Most people were centrists, opposing both the large and small lists, and favouring a moderate list of around twenty. This left us with no choice but to elect representatives. It's not that alternate Central Committee members are inferior to full members in terms of political level, work ability, or moral integrity. That's not the issue. There's an unfairness here. You say it's fair, but I don't think it's fair or impartial.

Everyone must be cautious and careful, whether you're an alternate member of the Central Committee, a member of the Central Committee, or a member of the Political Bureau. Don't get carried away when things get exciting. Since Marx, there's never been a need to calculate merit. You are a Communist Party member, a relatively conscious section of the people, a relatively conscious section of the proletariat. Therefore, I support the slogan "One, don't fear hardship; two, don't fear death," but I do not support the slogan "Even if there's no merit, there's still hard work; even if there's no hard work, there's still fatigue." This slogan contradicts "One, don't fear hardship; two, don't fear death." Look at how many of us died in the past. The veteran comrades who still exist are survivors, who survived by chance. Comrade Pi Dingjun [9], how many people were there in your Hubei-Henan-Anhui region back then? How many are left? There were many people back then, but not so many now. At that time, the Jiangxi Soviet Area, the Jinggangshan Soviet Area, northeastern Jiangxi, western Fujian, western Hunan and Hubei, and northern Shaanxi had suffered heavy casualties after the war, leaving little behind for the elderly. This was called "not self-inflicted hardship and not fearing death." For many years, we received no salary. There wasn't an eight-grade wage system, and we only had a fixed amount for food: three qian of oil, five qian of salt, and a jin and a half of rice. As for food? Where could we get it wherever the army marched? Now we've entered the city. Entering the city is a good thing; if we don't, Chiang Kai-shek will dominate these areas. Entering the city is also a bad thing, as it will make our Party less effective. Therefore, some foreigners and journalists say that our Party is rebuilding. We've even raised the slogan of "rectifying the Party and Building the Party." The truth is, reconstruction is necessary. Every branch must be reorganized among the masses. This must be done through the masses, not just a few party members; non-Party members

must participate in meetings and comment. For those who truly can't handle it, we should persuade them to withdraw. For a very small number of people, disciplinary action may be taken. That's stipulated in the Party Constitution, isn't it? It also needs approval from the branch committee meeting and higher authorities. In short, we must adopt a cautious approach. We must do it, we must certainly do it, but we must adopt a cautious approach.

This National Congress seems to have gone well. In my opinion, it was a congress of unity and victory. We adopted the method of issuing communiqués, so now foreigners can't get our news and say we're holding secret meetings. We're both open and secret. I don't think those Beijing journalists are very good either. We've probably caught most of the traitors and spies they've infiltrated among us. In the past, every time we held a meeting, the news would be leaked immediately and picked up by the Red Guard tabloids. Ever since Wang, Guan, Qi [10] , Yang, Yu, and Fu [11] stepped down, they've been unaware of the Central Committee's news.

That's enough, let's adjourn!

[1] This speech and Mao Zedong's speech at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on April 1, 1969 were distributed by the CPC Central Committee to all localities on May 9, requiring them to be "read to all cadres above the level of members of the Revolutionary Committees in factories, people's communes, schools, and government agencies, and cadres above the level of platoon leaders in the army, to study them earnestly, and to implement them resolutely."

[2] Enlai is Zhou Enlai. Kang Sheng and Chen Boda were both elected members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth CPC Central Committee.

[3] Refers to the political report delivered by Lin Biao on behalf of the Central Committee to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on April 1, 1969.

[4] Yang Dezhi was then the First Deputy Director of the Shandong Provincial Revolutionary Committee and Commander of the Jinan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[5] Wang Xiaoyu, then director of the Shandong Provincial Grassland Committee and first political commissar of the Jinan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, was dismissed from his post in June 1970.

[6] Xu Shiyu was then the director of the Jiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee and commander of the Nanjing Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[7] The "August 27th" and "Red General" groups were two mass rebel organizations in Nanjing at the time.

[8] Xie Fuzhi was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Director of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee.

[9] Pi Dingjun was then the First Deputy Director of the Fujian Provincial Revolutionary Committee and Deputy Commander of the Fuzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

[10] Wang refers to Wang Li, formerly a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine. In August 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to place him under incommunicado investigation. In 1980, a special tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China confirmed him as an accomplice of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique. Guan refers to Guan Feng, formerly a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine, deputy head of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group, and deputy director of the General Political Department. In August 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to place him under incommunicado investigation. In 1980, a special tribunal of the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China confirmed him as an accomplice of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique. Qi refers to Qi Benyu, formerly a member of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and deputy editor-in-chief of Red Flag magazine. In January 1968, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to place him under incommunicado investigation. In July 1980, Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau arrested him on charges of counter-revolution. In November 1983, the Beijing Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to 18 years in prison and deprived him of his political rights for four years.

[11] Yang refers to Yang Chengwu, formerly a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and Deputy Secretary-General, Deputy Head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the PLA, and Acting Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army. Yu refers to Yu Lijin, formerly Political Commissar of the Air Force of the People's Liberation Army. Fu refers to Fu Chongbi, formerly Commander of the Beijing Garrison of the People's Liberation Army. In March 1968, Lin Biao and Jiang Qing conspired to fabricate and persecute Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi, known as the "Yang, Yu, and Fu Incident," and dismissed their military positions. In July 1974, with Mao Zedong's approval, they were rehabilitated and their reputations restored, and their jobs reassigned. On March 28, 1979, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a notice titled "On the Public Rehabilitation of the 'Yang, Yu, and Fu Incident,'" stating that the incident was "purely a false accusation fabricated by the anti-Party clique of Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four;' the charges they imposed were pure fabrication." The notice stated, "The Central Committee has decided to publicly rehabilitate the 'Yang, Yu, and Fu Incident.'

All false accusations against Comrades Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi must be refuted."

On the Issue of Grasping Typical and General Work [1]

(April 1969)

1

We must focus on setting good examples.

2

We must first do a good job on one-third of the work.

[1] Parts 1 and 2 of this item are two opinions Mao Zedong expressed during the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in April 1969. These two opinions were quoted in boldface in the editorial "Welcoming the Great Seventies," published on January 1, 1970, in People's Daily, Red Flag magazine, and Liberation Army Daily.

Requirements for Newly Elected Grassroots Cadres of the Central Committee

(April 1969)

We must ensure that they remain detached from the masses, do not abandon their work, and continue to work. [1]

[1] This is what Mao Zedong said during the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in April 1969, when he was discussing some grassroots cadres who had been newly elected to the Central Committee. On November 21 of the same year, the People's Daily published this statement on its front page.

Opinions on the Investigation of the "May 16" [1] Incident [2]

(May 1969, February 1970)

1

Aside from those responsible for murder, arson, and poisoning, no one else will be executed, and most will not be arrested. When I say poisoning, I mean food poisoning, not politically.

2

The counter-revolutionary "May 16" conspiracy group was a secret organization, small in number. It was quickly discovered, exposed early, and the leader was imprisoned. Don't dig around too hard, and don't be too broad-based. Criticism is still necessary, but don't force confessions. Forced confessions are unreliable.

[1] The "May 16th" group was originally a small reactionary organization in Beijing called the "Capital May 16th Red Guards." They exploited the publication of the "May 16th Notice" in newspapers in May 1967 to establish a secret organization and conduct clandestine activities under the banner of implementing this notice, distributing and posting reactionary leaflets attacking Zhou Enlai. This reactionary organization was quickly uncovered, and its leaders arrested by public security authorities, essentially resolving the issue. However, in 1968, a special Central Leading Group for the Investigation of the "May 16th" Case was established, headed by Chen Boda. During the investigation, many cadres and people who opposed Lin Biao and Jiang Qing's group were labelled "May 16th" elements. In some localities and units, the two factions accused each other of being "May 16th" elements. The investigation campaign was severely escalated, creating confusion and ultimately came to nothing.

[2] The first part of this item is a passage from Mao Zedong's remarks on May 3, 1969, when discussing the cleansing of the class ranks and the investigation of the "May 16" incident. The second part is a passage from Mao Zedong's remarks in February 1970, when he again addressed this issue. Both passages are quoted from the "Minutes of the Central Committee's Symposium on Security Work," forwarded by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 7, 1972. Mao Zedong once commented on the Central Committee's forwarding of these minutes: "Agree."

Comments on the Central Committee's Draft Instructions on the Implementation of Policy Materials for the Beijing North Suburbs Timber Factory [1]

(May 1969)

Distribute as is.

[1] This comment was written on a report Zhou Enlai submitted to Mao Zedong and others on May 7, 1969, approving the document "Beijing North Suburbs Timber Factory's Conscientious Implementation of the Party's Policies toward the National Bourgeoisie and the Petty Bourgeoisie." The report stated, "We read and discussed this document, which the Chairman had assigned us, on the evening of the 5th. We agreed that after verification and revision, the Central Committee would circulate it to all localities for reference, and hoped that pilot projects would be implemented in major cities." The draft of the Central Committee's comment and its attachments are now submitted to the Chairman for approval. The draft Central Committee's commentary states that this document "concretely analyzes the issues and addresses them differently. This document is now being sent to you for your reference. We hope that Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and other places will conduct investigations and research based on their specific circumstances, conduct pilot projects, and differentiate between the various situations of capitalists, small business owners, and independent workers. You should also report to the Central Committee on your experiences in earnestly implementing Chairman Mao's policies through these pilot projects." During his review, Mao Zedong changed the phrase "Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, Guangzhou," after "and other places," to "and other large and medium-sized cities." On May 8, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded this document. The specific approach taken by the timber factory in the northern suburbs of Beijing to implementing the Party's policies toward the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie was: 1. Adhering to the policy of "unity, criticism, and unity" with the majority of capitalists; 2. Resolutely fighting and thoroughly criticizing the very few reactionary elements among the capitalists, treating them differently and offering them a way out; 3. Separating those who were not sufficiently capitalist; 4. Enabling small business owners to return to the masses and undergo self-education and transformation through the mass movement of struggle, criticism, and reform.

Beware of Soviet Revisionism

(to the tune of Music of Peace)

(May, 1969)

To the north of my poor friend,
the waves of the sea are surging and desolate.
The bear crouches and howls at me,
Its coward's heart is shattered.

The warriors unite as one,
Temporarily ceasing the in-fighting.
The Soviet revisionists are still harbouring evil intentions.
How can we be the Southern Ming?²⁷

²⁷ As a remnant of the Ming Dynasty, the regimes of the Southern Ming Dynasty were loosely connected and did not support each other, thus facilitating the victory of the encroaching Manchu armies.

Comments on the Report on Technological Innovation in the Air Force

(June 6, 1969)

I was very interested after reading it. For each specific technological reform, it is sufficient to call it a technological innovation, and there is no need to call it a technological revolution. A technological revolution refers to a major technological reform in history, such as replacing manual labour with a steam engine, then inventing electricity, and now inventing atomic energy. [1]

June 6

[1] On May 4, 1969, the Party Committee of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force submitted a report to the Central Military Commission's Office. According to incomplete statistics, the Air Force had completed 230 major innovation projects since the Cultural Revolution, with over 80 projects under research, and had trained a number of key technical personnel. The report detailed progress in five areas: major improvements to existing fighter jets; improvements to surface-to-air missile anti-jamming circuits and anti-aircraft gun performance; the development of high-anti-jamming aircraft radars, ground-based radars, and communications security technology; research on universalization, miniaturization, and mobility; and the frugal use of obsolete equipment for scientific research. The report used the terms "technical revolution" and "technical innovation" together twice, beginning and ending with the phrase "mass technological innovation and technological revolution are unprecedentedly active" and ending with "using revolution to drive technological innovation and the work of technological revolution." Mao Zedong's comments were directed at these points.

The Airborne Corps must be taken seriously. [1]

(June 26, 1969)

The airborne troops must be taken seriously. If we're going to do it, we must do it properly, and we must strengthen it if it's not substantial enough.

[1] This is part of a conversation between Mao Zedong and Zeng Siyu, commander of the Wuhan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and Liu Feng, political commissar.

Comments on the Central Committee's 'Several Issues to Note in Promoting the Image of Chairman Mao' [1]

(June 1969)

As instructed.

[1] This document issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 12, 1969 pointed out that since the "Cultural Revolution", in the issue of promoting Chairman Mao's image and Mao Zedong Thought, there have been problems of not highlighting proletarian politics, pursuing forms, and exaggerating and wasting in some places. For this reason, the following suggestions for improvement are put forward: First, leaders at all levels should actively guide the masses to learn and apply Mao Zedong Thought in a flexible manner, do a good job in ideological revolution, do not pursue forms, and pay attention to effectiveness. Second, reiterate the Central Committee's "Instructions on the Construction of Chairman Mao's Statue" on July 13, 1967. In the future, the construction of Chairman Mao's statue must be strictly implemented in accordance with this instruction. Third, Chairman Mao's badges cannot be made without the approval of the Central Committee. Fourth, newspapers should not use Chairman Mao's image as the front page painting. Fifth, all kinds of items and packaging, etc., should not print Chairman Mao's image; quotations from Chairman Mao should also be appropriate; it is forbidden to print Chairman Mao's image on porcelain. 6. The word "loyalty" has class content, so don't post it randomly or abuse it; don't launch a "loyalty" movement; don't build feudal-style buildings. If you do, you should deal with them appropriately. 7. Don't engage in formalistic activities such as "asking for instructions in the morning and reporting in the evening", reading quotations before meals, and saluting the Chairman's statue.

Comments on the Proposed Streamlining Plan for Central and State Organs [1]

(July 3, 1969)

Agreed in principle.

July 3, 6:00 PM

[1] On July 3, 1969, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao Zedong, stating that before the Chairman's departure, he had reported on the reorganization of the State Council's working group, the merger, abolition, and streamlining of various State Council ministries and commissions, and the preparations for establishing revolutionary committees and leading groups in various units. He also raised the question of how the various units of the Party Central Committee should be reformed. The Chairman then instructed that the agreed-upon principles be followed. Regarding the Party Central Committee, the Central Cultural Revolution Group (which was later not retained as a permanent central agency), the General Office, the Organization Department, and the Liaison Department were to be retained. The Propaganda Department, the Investigation Department, and the Supervisory Commission were to be decentralized, merged, or abolished. The State Council's working group consisted of nine people: Zhou Enlai, Xie Fuzhi, Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, Li Desheng, Li Fuchun, Yu Qiuli, Su Yu, and Su Jing. Zhou Enlai was the group leader, with Li Xiannian and Ji Dengkui serving as deputy group leaders. Li Zhen, Qiu Guoguang, and Liu Xiyao were in attendance. The 62 departments under the State Council were to be merged into 21 units, with a total of 210,000 administrative personnel to be decentralized. In accordance with the Chairman's instructions, the military control leaders from six units—the United Front Work Department, the National People's Congress, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Ethnic Affairs Commission, the Religious Affairs Bureau, and the organs of the democratic parties—are combined into a single group. I will send one person to liaise with them. Mao Zedong's comments are inscribed on this report by Zhou Enlai.

Comments on the report of the leadership group of the Military Commission Office on the establishment of the People's Liberation Army Newspaper [1]

(July 21, 1969)

Xiao Liji was demoted and should not hold this position.

[1] On July 3, 1969, the Central Military Commission's office group wrote a report to Mao Zedong and others, stating: "Based on the current situation of the PLA Newspaper in promoting revolution and production, we consider it necessary to establish a leadership group to provide unified leadership for the newspaper's revolution and production. To this end, the PLA Newspaper, after repeated deliberation and thorough consultation, has proposed fifteen comrades as members of the leadership group." "The Military Commission office group discussed and agreed. Regarding the leadership group leader, we recommend that Comrade Xiao Li continue to be the best choice." Xiao Li, also known as Li Na, Mao Zedong's daughter, was the former editor-in-chief of the PLA Newspaper and had been sent to the grassroots level for training.

Comments on the Central Committee's July 23rd Announcement [1]

(July 1969)

Implement accordingly.

[1] This proclamation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, dated July 23, 1969, stated that the current situation in Shanxi Province, like that of the entire nation, was favorable. However, in Taiyuan City and parts of central and southern Shanxi, a small group of class enemies and bad leaders, infiltrating various mass organizations, exploited bourgeois factionalism to deceive a section of the masses and committed a series of extremely serious counter-revolutionary crimes. To this end, the Central Committee has decided: 1. "The Central Committee reiterates the July 3rd and July 24th proclamations and other circulars, orders, and notices issued previously. All organizations and individuals must resolutely, thoroughly, and completely implement them; no disobedience is permitted." 2. "Both sides must immediately and unconditionally cease armed conflict, disband all forms and names of professional armed combat teams, remove all armed combat bases, and surrender all weapons and equipment. Those who lay down their weapons must either return to their original units or undergo centralized training with the People's Liberation Army." "Those who forcibly occupy territory, refuse to implement this proclamation, or stubbornly resist will be subject to a military encirclement by the People's Liberation Army, a political offensive will be launched, and forced to surrender their weapons. Those who flee and try to run away will be pursued and brought to justice by the People's Liberation Army." "Concealing or transferring weapons, or using state-owned factories and materials to privately manufacture weapons, are all serious crimes and must be dealt with according to law." Third, "No one is allowed to infringe upon the PLA's weapons, ammunition, vehicles, or other equipment and supplies. All equipment seized from the PLA must be unconditionally returned. Class enemies who sow discord between the military and the people must be resolutely dealt with." Fourth, "Immediately and unconditionally restore rail and road transportation. Cancel the illegal 'March 18th' train on the southern section of the Tongpu Railway." "Attacking stations, attacking trains, sabotaging rail and road transportation, looting station supplies and vehicles, and searching and seizing passengers' property are all acts of banditry. The very few bad leaders and counter-revolutionaries must be arrested and brought to justice." Fifth, "No one is allowed to occupy or loot state property, including banks, warehouses, and stores. The ringleaders of the state property robbery must be severely punished, and all looted state materials and funds must be recovered." 6. "Current criminals who commit murder, arson, and other heinous crimes should be reported by the masses. For those with solid evidence, their crimes should be listed and discussed by the local community, and they should be punished according to law." 7. "Those who incite or

threaten workers to leave their jobs and production facilities must be punished according to law. As for those who have been deceived into leaving their jobs and production facilities, they should be educated and mobilized to return to their units to promote revolution, production, and work. From the date of this announcement, workers and staff who do not return to factories or government offices within one month will have their wages suspended. Those who continue to resist and do not return for an extended period will be instructed by the Shanxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee to impose disciplinary sanctions, up to and including dismissal, depending on the circumstances." "Those who return to their units should be welcomed, their personal safety guaranteed, and no discrimination or retaliation permitted. Any persecution will be investigated and dealt with severely." 8. "Any action that splits the great revolutionary union or undermines the three-in-one combination of the revolution will be punished." Any new factions are illegal and will not be recognized by the Central Committee. Any newly formed factions will be immediately disbanded and unified under a unified leadership."

Comments on the Editorial Draft of Two Newspapers and One Magazine, "The People's Army is Invincible" [1]

(July 1969)

1

To be distributed.

2

This adjective is too long; it can be removed.

[1] This first part is a commentary on a draft editorial submitted by Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Yao Wenyuan, a member of the group, on July 23, 1969. This editorial was written by People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily to commemorate the 42nd anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The original title was "The People's Army Armed with Mao Zedong Thought is Invincible." During his review, Mao Zedong changed the title to "The People's Army is Invincible" and included a commentary, which forms the second part of this item. This editorial was published in People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily on August 1, 1969.

Comments on the Draft Order of the CPC Central Committee [1]

(August 1969)

Implement as is.

[1] This comment was written on a report submitted to Mao Zedong for review by Zhou Enlai and others on August 22, 1969. The report stated that, based on recent developments in border provinces, regions, and districts, it was necessary to issue such an order following the Central Committee's "July 23" proclamation, which would be beneficial to stabilizing the situation. The draft order submitted by Zhou Enlai and others for review stated: "The borders of our great motherland are sacred and inviolable. Defending the motherland is the sacred duty of the entire people. The military and civilians in the border areas bear a particularly direct responsibility." To defend the motherland, the frontiers, and the great achievements of our "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, and remain ready to crush armed provocations from U.S. imperialism, the Soviet Union, and Myanmar, and prevent their sudden attacks, the Party Central Committee orders you: 1. Resolutely respond to Chairman Mao's great call to "heighten vigilance, defend the motherland," and "prepare for war." Cultivate a keen awareness of the enemy situation, overcome peacetime paralysis and underestimation of the enemy, fully prepare for anti-aggression war, strengthen joint military and civilian defense, and be ready to annihilate the invading enemy at any time. Second, facing a formidable enemy, all soldiers and civilians must unite as one to jointly confront the enemy. Strengthen internal unity within the army, strengthen unity between the army and the people, between the military and the government, and strengthen the unity of the revolutionary people of all ethnic groups. Consolidate the leadership of revolutionary committees at all levels. Resolutely oppose all separatist activities, all acts that undermine unity, and oppose bourgeois factionalism. Class enemies who instigate and undermine unity between the army and the people, and between nationalities, must be resolutely attacked, and the ringleaders must be punished according to law. Third, officers and soldiers of troops stationed in border areas must remain steadfast at their combat posts, resolutely execute orders, obey commands, strictly observe discipline, make all combat preparations, closely monitor enemy movements, and act immediately upon a single order. "No violation of discipline shall be tolerated among military personnel." No one is allowed to leave their posts without permission or to collude outside. Those who fail to correct their behaviour after education will be severely punished. Fourth, all revolutionary mass organizations must resolutely implement the instructions of our great leader, Chairman Mao, and practice a grand revolutionary unity based on systems, industries, departments, and units. All cross-industry mass organizations must be disbanded immediately. Any attempt to establish a new faction or reorganize a new group is illegal and

must be forcibly disbanded. 5. Resolutely implement the Party Central Committee's "July 23" proclamation, immediately and unconditionally cease factional fighting, disband all specialized armed groups, remove all armed strongholds, and surrender all weapons. Where armed groups forcibly occupy positions and stubbornly resist, the People's Liberation Army will implement a military encirclement, launch a political offensive, and force them to surrender their weapons. 6. Absolutely no one is allowed to attack the People's Liberation Army, seize its weapons, equipment, and vehicles, interfere with its combat readiness operations, or leak or steal military intelligence. Any violation will be treated as an active counter-revolutionary. Resolutely protect key military locations and combat readiness facilities, strictly guard national defense secrets, and support the People's Liberation Army in its combat readiness. 7. Protect transportation and ensure smooth communications. Any sabotage of railway, road, or waterway transport, disruption of communications, or severing of power lines is a counter-revolutionary act and must be investigated and punished. 8. Firmly grasp the revolution, vigorously promote production, and vigorously support the front. Observe labor discipline, stick to production posts, and strive to improve industrial and agricultural production. All those who leave their production or work posts must immediately return to their units to "grasp the revolution, promote production, promote work, and promote war preparedness." Those who fail to return on time will have their wages suspended for workers and staff, their work points suspended for farmers, and, depending on the severity of the offense, will be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal. Those who incite or threaten workers or farmers to leave their production or work posts must be punished according to law. 9. Resolutely suppress counter-revolutionaries. Counter-revolutionaries who collude with foreign countries, plot to flee, disrupt public order, rob state property, sabotage production, commit murder, arson, poisoning, or exploit religious superstition to incite rebellion must be resolutely suppressed. Landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists who have not been reformed must be strictly controlled by the revolutionary masses and subjected to labor reform. On August 28, 1969, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this order to all revolutionary committees at all levels in border provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, to all revolutionary people of all ethnic groups, and to all officers and soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army stationed in the border areas.

Comments on the Military Commission's Working Group's Draft Instructions on Strengthening the Organizational Discipline of the Entire Army [1]

(August 1969)

Issued in the name of the Military Commission.

[1] The draft of the "Instructions on Strengthening the Organizational Discipline of Our Army," submitted to Mao Zedong and others for review by the Central Military Commission's Office on August 16, 1969, pointed out that while the current military situation was excellent, "a few units, a few personnel, and even some middle and senior cadres still exhibit serious anarchism, bourgeois factionalism, and a lack of organization and discipline." To this end, the following requirements were put forward: 1. The entire army must closely adhere to Chairman Mao's great strategic deployment and resolutely oppose the "theory of multiple centres equals no centre" and any actions that undermine centralization and unity, organizational discipline, and the practice of each doing its own thing. 2. Education on organizational discipline and laws and regulations must be conducted throughout the army to raise awareness among all personnel of the importance of discipline and to dispel any erroneous ideas and muddled concepts. 3. Individuals who seriously violate laws and discipline and refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonitions must be subject to necessary disciplinary sanctions. 4. Cadres at all levels, especially middle and senior cadres, must strengthen their leadership and take the lead in observing and upholding discipline. Conscientiously implement the principle of combining strict management with patient persuasion, and strictly distinguish between the two types of contradictions. Fifth, strengthen organizational discipline as a key component of the revolutionary development of the troops, constantly and repeatedly addressing it. When Mao Zedong reviewed this directive, he changed the signature from "Military Commission Working Group" to "Central Military Commission" and wrote this comment. The Central Military Commission issued this directive on August 22.

Comments on Jiang Qing's letter regarding the title change of the Peking Opera "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy" [1]

(August 31, 1969)

The implications are too great. At least for the time being, the title of the play and the names of the main characters should not be changed. The place names should also not be changed. Criticism of the novel's author [2] should also be moderated.

Mao Zedong

August 31

[1] On August 28, 1969, Jiang Qing, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, wrote to Mao Zedong: "We have changed the title of 'Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy' to 'Taking Feigu Mountain by Strategy', because we now know for sure that the author is writing about himself, a true story." "The main tendencies in 'Lin Hai Xue Yuan'²⁸ are also bad, manifested in: not highlighting the Party's leadership; not distinguishing between the just and unjust nature of war; mystifying reconnaissance work; and portraying Yang Zirong²⁹ as even more of a bandit than a bandit, etc." The letter also suggested that "Yang Zirong's name be changed to Liang Zhitong."

[2] Refers to Qu Bo, the author of the novel "Lin Hai Xue Yuan".

²⁸ "Lin Hai Xue Yuan", ("Lin Hai Snow Field"), is a novel depicting the People's Liberation Army's battle with Nationalist government supporters in northeast China during the Second Kuomintang-Communist Civil War. Linhai Snow Field was created by Qu Bo in 1954 and completed in 1955. It was submitted to the People's Literature Publishing House, and officially published in 1957, and was translated into English, Japanese and other languages. The plot of "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy" in this book is very famous in China, and was adapted into Peking Opera and became one of the eight model plays. Lin Hai Snow Field is based on Qu Bo's real experience of personally leading a People's Liberation Army detachment deep into the deep mountains and old forests of the Mudanjiang area in the winter of 1946, and taking the real experience of eliminating the local armed forces of the pro-Nationalist government in half a year as the background, which can be described as his representative work.

²⁹ Yang Zirong (January 28, 1917 - February 23, 1947), whose real name was Yang Zonggui, was a native of Yuxiahe Village, Ninghai Town, Muping, Shandong Province (now Muping District, Yantai City). Yang Zirong worked as a child labourer in a private silk mill in Andong. In 1932, the factory laid off people, and Yang Zirong was kicked out of the factory gate. He joined the Eighth Route Army in 1945 and served as a soldier, squad leader, and regimental reconnaissance platoon leader. He was a cadre of the Mudanjiang Military Division of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army and then joined the Eighth Route Army. On February 23, 1947, when Yang Zirong was chasing and annihilating bandits, his gun was frozen due to the cold weather and he was killed.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and others congratulating the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on its 24th anniversary of independence

(September 1, 1969)

Hanoi Comrade Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam;

Comrade Truong Chinh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Tongyi Association;

Comrade Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

On the 24th anniversary of the declaration of independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China, we extend warm congratulations to the Vietnamese people, the Workers' Party of Vietnam, and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The heroic Vietnamese people have a glorious tradition of revolutionary struggle. In recent years, under the wise leadership of President Ho Chi Minh, they have persisted in people's war, carried forward revolutionary heroism, and fought against the world's most vicious U.S. imperialism. They have achieved great victories in the war against U.S. aggression and saved the country, making significant contributions to the anti-imperialist struggles of oppressed peoples and nations worldwide.

US imperialism suffered a crushing defeat in its war of aggression against Vietnam, but its aggressive nature will not change. Currently, the Nixon administration is intensifying its two-pronged counter-revolutionary strategy, attempting to achieve its goal of permanently dominating South Vietnam through political deception and the so-called de-glorification of the war.

The Soviet revisionist traitor clique has consistently colluded with U.S. imperialism to sabotage the Vietnamese people's war to resist the U.S. and save Vietnam. This was true of Khrushchev [1], and even more so of Brezhnev [2] and his ilk. To achieve their conceited ambitions of colluding with U.S. imperialism and redividing the world, the Soviet revisionist traitor clique has recently intensified its collusion with U.S. imperialism, blatantly engaging in a scheme of feigned support and actual betrayal in a vain attempt to extinguish the fervent revolutionary flames of the Vietnamese people. The Soviet revisionist traitor clique has committed countless evil deeds. They are one and the same with U.S. imperialism and are the common enemy of the Vietnamese people and the people of the world.

We believe that the heroic Vietnamese people, under the leadership of President Ho Chi Minh, will persevere in a protracted war, uphold independence, and persist in self-reliance. They will undoubtedly overcome the difficulties on their path forward and completely drive U.S. imperialism from Vietnamese territory.

The Chinese people have always considered supporting the Vietnamese people in their war against the U.S. as their internationalist duty. In this great war of resistance against the U.S. and for national salvation, the Chinese people firmly stand with the Vietnamese people and firmly support them in carrying this war to the end and achieving final victory.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, September 1, 1979

[1] Khrushchev, former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was dismissed from his leadership positions in October 1964.

[2] Brezhnev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Comments and Revisions on the Draft Slogan for the 20th Anniversary of National Day [1]

(September 1969)

1

A slogan has been added, please decide.

2

The people of the world, unite and oppose any war of aggression launched by imperialism or social-imperialism, especially one using atomic bombs as weapons! If such a war breaks out, the people of the world should eliminate it with revolutionary war. Be prepared now!

[1] The "Slogans Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China," submitted by Zhou Enlai and others for review on September 8, 1969, consisted of 28 articles. During his review, Mao Zedong added an article (the second in this section) after Article 21, making it Article 22. Articles 22 through 28 were subsequently changed to Articles 23 through 29.

Instructions on Wartime Evacuation [1]

(October 14, 1969)

It is not good for all the central leadership comrades to be concentrated in Beijing. An atomic bomb would kill many people. They should be dispersed. Some veteran comrades can be evacuated to other places.

[1] This was Mao Zedong's instruction on war preparedness evacuation in response to the Soviet Union's threat of nuclear war against China.

Telegram from Mao Zedong and others congratulating Albania on the 25th anniversary of its liberation

(November 28, 1969)

Tirana

Comrade Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania;

Comrade Hanci Rehi, Chairman of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania;

Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania,

Dear comrades:

As the fraternal Albanian people celebrate the 25th anniversary of their motherland's liberation with victorious pride, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the entire Chinese people, we extend our warmest congratulations to you, the Party of Labor of Albania, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, and the entire Albanian people.

Twenty-five years ago, under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, the Albanian people took up arms, marched forward bravely and unyieldingly, and after a protracted struggle, relying on their own strength, defeated the Italian-German fascist occupiers and liberated their homeland. This was a great victory in the history of the Albanian people's revolutionary struggle.

Over the past 25 years since liberation, the heroic Albanian people, under the wise leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, have held high the red banner of Marxism-Leninism, undaunted by hardships and violence, crushed the subversion, trouble-making, and sabotage attempts by class enemies at home and abroad, safeguarded the independence of their motherland, and upheld the socialist path. Upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat and adhering to the socialist path, the Albanian people have achieved brilliant successes in socialist revolution and construction. Albania's revolutionization movement has pushed the socialist revolution into a deeper stage, profoundly transformed the people's outlook, and further promoted the vigorous development of socialist construction. The Albanian people have waged a heroic struggle against imperialism headed by the United States, modern revisionism centred on the Soviet revisionist leadership, and various reactionary forces, making outstanding contributions to the revolutionary cause of the people of the world. Today, socialist Albania has become a staunch bulwark supporting the proletariat and revolutionary people of the world in their struggle for liberation.

The glorious victory achieved by the Albanian people is a victory for the proletarian revolutionary line of the Albanian Party of Labor, headed by the great Marxist-Leninist Comrade Enver Hoxha. The Albanian Party of Labor and the Albanian people have enriched the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism through their glorious revolutionary practice.

The Chinese people and the Communist Party of China are immensely happy for the brilliant achievements and great victories achieved by their close comrades-in-arms, the Albanian people and the Party of Labor of Albania. Our two parties, two governments, and two peoples have forged a profound revolutionary friendship through their long common struggle. Our friendship, founded on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, has withstood the test of storms and trials. The continued growth of China-Albania friendship will undoubtedly have an increasingly profound impact on the international communist movement and the revolutionary cause of the peoples of the world.

The revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the world have now entered a new historical period. No matter how frantically imperialism, modern revisionism, and various reactionaries struggle, they cannot save themselves from their inevitable destruction. Their days are numbered. Let us unite closely with the proletariat of the world and the oppressed peoples and nations of all countries to strive for greater victory!

Long live the heroic Albanian people!

Long live the eternal and unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Albanian peoples!

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

November 28, 1969

Telegram from Mao Zedong and others congratulating the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on its ninth anniversary

(December 19, 1969)

Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam:

On the ninth anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, on behalf of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people, we extend our warmest congratulations to the heroic people of South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam who stood at the forefront of the anti-US struggle.

For nine years, the people of South Vietnam, united as one under the glorious banner of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, have braved violence and waged a protracted and arduous struggle against U.S. imperialism, plunging it into isolation and hardship. The great victory achieved by the people of South Vietnam has laid the foundation for the final defeat of U.S. imperialism and the accomplishment of the great cause of the Vietnamese people in resisting U.S. aggression and saving their nation. It has made a significant contribution to the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle of oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world. The Chinese people pay you the highest tribute.

Although the U.S. imperialist war of aggression against Vietnam suffered a disastrous defeat, it was not yet completely defeated. After the Nixon administration came to power, it pursued a counter-revolutionary two-handed strategy even more blatantly. It verbally talked about "peace" and advocated the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam in order to deceive the American people, but in reality it was intensifying the war of aggression against Vietnam, attempting to save its inevitable fate by so-called "Vietnamization" of the Vietnam War, that is, strengthening the puppet army and the Nixon regime. Facts have proven that the Nixon administration's policy of aggression against Vietnam was no different from that of its predecessor, the Johnson administration [1], but was a continuation of the same line. No matter what tricks they played, they would never give up their arrogant ambition to permanently occupy South Vietnam and divide Vietnam.

We believe that the time-tested people of South Vietnam, under the leadership of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, will heed the legacy of President Ho Chi Minh [2], carry forward the revolutionary spirit of "decisive battle and decisive victory," persist in a protracted war, uphold independence and self-reliance, and achieve victory through protracted struggle. They will undoubtedly crush the machinations and schemes of U.S.

imperialism and its accomplices, overcome all difficulties on the road ahead, and achieve complete victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and save the nation.

The peoples of China and Vietnam are close brothers and comrades-in-arms. The 700 million Chinese people are the staunch supporters of the Vietnamese people. The Chinese people will always stand with the Vietnamese people and firmly support them in carrying the great war against the US and saving the nation to the end.

Final victory will surely belong to the heroic Vietnamese people.

Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Beijing, December 19, 1969

[1] Johnson, President of the United States from 1963 to 1968.

[2] Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, died in September 1969.

Comments on the Central Committee's forwarding of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee's draft notice regarding the unauthorized transmission of Chairman Mao's instructions regarding the inspection report [1]

(December 25, 1969)

Do this.

[1] The draft notice, submitted for review by Zhou Enlai and others on December 25, 1969, pointed out that the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee's unauthorized printing and distribution of Chairman Mao's important instructions on Hunan work, without prior approval, was a mistake and a violation of previous Central Committee notices and decisions. The Central Committee reiterated: The private compilation, printing, and distribution of Chairman Mao's and Vice Chairman Lin's speeches, inspection talks, and speeches and talks by other Central Committee members, as well as biographies, transcripts, documents, books, poems, albums, and pictures related to Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin, and other Central Committee members, are strictly prohibited. All localities should take measures to immediately recover and destroy all such records, documents, pictures, and albums. Any further violations of this notice will be subject to disciplinary action and severe punishment. Those counter-revolutionaries who fabricate rumours to mislead the public and deceive others for counter-revolutionary purposes and commit heinous crimes must be sentenced accordingly. The revolutionary committees of all provinces, cities, and autonomous regions must strictly control the printing plants affiliated with each region and unit, and strictly control the distribution and use of paper. Mao Zedong's comments were written on the report submitted by Zhou Enlai and others for review. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued this notice that same day.

1969: Writings and Speeches

Mao Zedong

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