**Siraj Sikder Works**

**Some Problems of Building an Armed Force
Under the Leadership of the Political Party of the Proletariat of East Bengal**

**(30 April 1974)**

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[Famous as 30 April document, it is one of the most important documents produced by Comrade Siraj Sikder published as the statement of the Supreme commanders of the Armed Patriotic Force of East Bengal on the occasion of its third anniversary of formation — Sarbaharapath]

**1. Introduction**

In 30 April 1971, the East Bengal Workers Movement—the preparatory organization of establishing a political party of the proletariat of East Bengal led in forming a regular armed force in Payarabagan (Atghar, Kuriana, Bhimruli, Dumuria and other villages in the adjacent areas of Barisal Proper, Banaripara, Jhalokhathi, Kaukhali and Sworupkathi) in Barisal [Payarabagan is a riverine guava forest area — Sarbaharapath].

Thus, for the first time in the history of East Bengal, a regular armed force developed under the leadership of the proletarian revolutionaries.

The force developed under the direct guidance and personal initiative of comrade Siraj Sikder. It developed in such a time when all the resistances of the Awami traitors collapsed in face of severe strategic offensive the Pak military fascists. By throwing people of East Bengal in helpless condition, the Awami traitors fled to India to save themselves.

Then, no forces remained in East Bengal to resist the Pak military fascists.
At that time, in Payarabagan, the Liberation Force (The National Liberation Force led by the East Bengal Workers Movement led by Comrade Siraj Sikder — Sarbaharapath) heroically carried national liberation war of East Bengal and developed huge resistance against the Pak military fascists, established Base Area by liberating vast areas, achieved important experience in armed struggle and organizing people and restored confidence among people.

In the course of that armed struggle, the Proletarian Party of East Bengal came into being in 3 June 1971.

The Armed Patriotic Force of East Bengal developed by following the heritage of armed activities in Payarabagan led by the Proletarian Party of East Bengal.

The Armed Patriotic force led by the Proletarian Party is incessantly carrying armed struggle to defeat and smash enemies of East Bengal to liberate the people of East Bengal.
We achieved very much valuable experience in that course that made us able to build armed struggle and party and guide people.

**2. The necessity of building armed force of people**

The Indian Expansionism, the Soviet Social Imperialism, the US-led Imperialism, the Bureaucratic Capitalism and the Feudalism are carrying ruthless exploitation and repression over the people of East Bengal. They are the owner of the Production system of East Bengal, and the state, politics and culture of East Bengal are occupied by them

People want to establish own ownership by overthrowing their ownership over the production system of East Bengal.

The owners of production system are hindering that effort of people. They, by the main element of superstructure the state machinery—the armed force, are suppressing people and defending themselves.

Therefore, we are bound to struggle against superstructure, mainly state and its main component—armed force.

So, we must defeat the armed force to smash the old state machinery. We have to build new state machinery, its main component the armed force in order to defend the interest of people and suppress the enemy.

Hence, we have to capture the state power.

With the help of that new state system, we have to establish new production relation that is compatible with people.

A strong armed force is needed to defeat and smash the armed force that protects the interest of the reactionaries, to smash the old state machinery.

As we have no armed force, so the problems of building armed force arises.

To establish production relation compatible with people, we have to overthrow the Indian Expansionism, the Soviet Social Imperialism, the US-led Imperialism and their lackeys by national revolution.

Feudalism has to be overthrown by democratic revolution.

Between national and democratic revolution of East Bengal, it is national revolution that is principal because all the people of East Bengal regardless of groups, views, nationalities, religions and classes want the overthrow of the Indian Expansionism and its collaborator the Awami traitors.

This is why the present form of revolutionary war of East Bengal is National Liberation War.
In course of that National Revolution and National Liberation War, we have to meet the targets of Democratic Revolution step by step.

We have to take steps of overthrowing of feudal, distributing their lands among agricultural workers and poor peasants, reducing interest-share cropping of patriotic feudal, distributing ceiling above lands etc. land reform.

Consequently, it will be easy to drag the peasant masses to revolution and guide them.
Thus, we have to combine national and democratic revolution.

The Moni Singh-Mojaffar revisionists are saying about seizure of state power via parliamentary election and carry national democratic revolution. Thus, they are deceiving people and proletarian revolutionaries and making futile attempt of sustaining reactionaries.

The neo revisionists have been opposing the building of armed force by making the excuse that time has not matured and organization has not been built etc. They have hindered the process of building armed force by following the left adventurist line or right opportunist line.

The proletarian revolutionaries affiliated to the East Bengal Workers Movement and later the Proletarian Party of East Bengal carried incessant struggle against various forms of revisionists. Always they paid proper emphasis on building armed force to carry and complete the National Democratic Revolution.

**3. The revolutionary War of East Bengal and the role of various classes**

The enemy of revolution of the East Bengal is the Indian Expansionism, the Soviet Social Imperialism, the US-led Imperialism, the Bureaucratic Capitalism, the Feudalism and the reactionary intellectuals dependent on them.

In 1971, the East Bengal bourgeoisie, by depending on Indian Expansionism carried armed resistance. When that armed resistance broke down, they fled to India. At last, in greed for power like Mir Jafar (a historic traitor of Bengal who in collusion with British colonialists made the defeat of Bengal to British in 1757 — Sarbaharapath), they mortgaged East Bengal to India.
The Indian forces, by defeating the Pak military bandits, occupied East Bengal and established its colony here. They formed puppet government by the Awami traitors.

It shows that in some historic moments, the class bourgeoisie may take part in national resistance war. But due to their selfishness and lack of economic independence, they are unwilling and unable to carry revolutionary war forward towards complete victory.

The peasants and petit bourgeoisie masses are willing to join revolutionary war and carry that forward up to complete victory. They are the main force of revolutionary war. But due to the characteristics of small production, their political outlook is short (some unemployed people have anarchic outlook too).

They are guided by one-sidedness, superficiality and subjectivism in thought and action.
Politically they are vacillating in left and right. In military, they are conservative or adventurist. In organization, they are split-ist or factionalist.

So, revolutionary war can never be guided and victorious under their leadership. They cannot be correct guide of revolutionary war.

Therefore, in an era when already the class proletariat has already entered in political arena, the responsibility of carrying revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulder of the proletariat and its political party. In this time, any war that lacks leadership of proletarian class and its political party or goes against that leadership, inevitably will fail.

This is because among the strata of society of East Bengal and various political parties, the proletariat and its political party are the ones that are most free from narrow-mindedness and selfishness, politically they are the most far sighted, the best organized and readiest to learn with an open mind from the experience of the vanguard class, the proletariat, and its political party throughout the world and to make use of this experience in their own cause.

Hence only the proletariat and its political Party can lead the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, can overcome the narrow-mindedness of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, the destructiveness of the unemployed masses, and also (provided the party does not err in its policy) vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie — and can lead the revolution and the war on the road of victory.

The proletarian class political party must wage remolding of the ideology of the inside party petit bourgeoisie and carry struggle against the revisionists and enemy agents, and unite outside petit bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie and other patriots.

The Political party of proletariat must form National Liberation Front to unite other classes under its own leadership, and establish national based unity. At the same time, it must always struggle against the inability, vacillation and such other acts of other classes that may hinder in carrying revolution.

Correct line is of fundamental importance, on the basis of which, broad masses can be united and carried in struggle.

Not only political line but military, organizational, ideological and other lines also must be correct.

When line is correct, weaker forces get stronger, if there is no armed force, it develops, if there is no political power, then, it is achieved. When line is erroneous, the pre-achieved gains are lost.
Therefore, the political party of the proletarian class must be able to correctly determine political, military, organizational, ideological and other lines, and carry cadres, soldiers and people to implement that.

The political party of the proletarian class of East Bengal is mobilizing people and carrying national revolutionary war by depending on them.

This is why this war is People’s War.

Only the political party of the proletariat of East Bengal is able to carry people’s war to defeat and smash the enemies to carry and complete the national democratic revolution.

**4. The Armed Patriotic Force of East Bengal is the force of the proletariat and people**

In a class society, each and every organization serves a particular class.

Armed organization also serves interest of a particular class.

After the division of society among classes, the state machinery and its main component—the armed force emerged to sustain the class that is in power.

The aim of forming Bangladesh Army, BDR, Raxi [Raxi Bahini was an infamous genocidal counterrevolutionary paramilitary force created by the then Awami regime — Sarbaharapath] and Police force is to sustain Awami League and its masters.

The aim of forming the Armed Patriotic Force is to defeat and smash the state machinery and its main component the armed force — that the reactionary class had formed to defend themselves and to suppress the masses — and establish and defend state power of the proletariat and people and suppress the enemy.

Therefore, armed force remains under a particular class and its political party and serves their interest.

There can be no armed force above class and politics.

Can an armed force built without the leadership of the political party of proletariat serve the interest of people?

An armed force built without the leadership of proletariat, inevitably that will serve the class base of its members.

As the armed force does not have leadership of a proletarian party, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, feudal, petit bourgeoisie will infiltrate in it and there will be no need to change their classes.
As a result, that armed force will protect the interest of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, feudal, petit bourgeoisie and will not protect the interest of the proletariat and people.

That force will be a reactionary militarist force.

On the other side, our force developed under the leadership of the political party of proletariat, its members are transforming into proletariat, and party is leading and guiding the armed force.
At present era, only the proletarian class is able to protect the interest of people, lead them against the enemy and liberate them.

This is why proletarian class led armed force protects the interest of proletariat and people.
Party leadership is being provided in army and the principle that party commands the gun, not otherwise is being implemented by establishing political department in army, company level party branch, appointing political commissar, each army is under local organization etc.

**5. The concrete condition of East Bengal**

**And**

**The strategy and tactics of Revolutionary War**

All the strategies and tactics that are not compatible to the concrete condition of East Bengal are bound to fail.

If any foreign experience that is not compatible to our concrete condition is applied by blindly copying, that is bound to fail.

What is the particular condition of East Bengal?

East Bengal is a small country, there is very few forested hilly region but riverine plain land is more. Geographically East Bengal is encircled by India. The bay is also controlled by India. Apart from that, East Bengal does not have border with any country that may help us.
People have common culture and language. Economically East Bengal is equally developed. People want the overthrow of Bangladesh puppet government and their masters.

Apart from various civil forces, the Bangladesh puppet government has Police, BDR, Raxi and Army. There is Indian Force, Soviet and probably US Force also to help them.

On the other side, we do not have any strong armed force to liberate and defend people of East Bengal.

People have firm morale to overthrow enemy. Here lies the basis of building an armed force — that protects peoples’ interest — from zero.

Our guerrilla force has developed from zero. They have few arms and ammunition, they do not have regular supply, nor do they have training.

On the other side, the enemy force is experienced, trained, more in number and the state assistance is with them. The geography of East Bengal is favorable to them.

There is Indian force, Soviet and even probably US force to help them.

So, the enemy is strong and we are weak.

Therefore, we have to carry war for long days to defeat the enemy. In that course, our weaker force will transform into stronger while on the contrary, enemy’s stronger force will get weaker and they will be defeated and smashed.

This is why our strategy of war is Protracted People’s War.

But if we take the protracted line of war in concrete battle and engage in that with enemy for many hours, the enemy will easily be able to mobilize their force and smash us.

So, concrete battle and fighting should be of quickly decisive, that is, we have to complete fighting within a short span of time, so, enemy will get no time to mobilize their fore.

That quickly decisive battle generally will take form of surprise attack. Consequently, enemy will not be able to use its strength and superiority. He will remain unprepared and even he will not be able to use weapon.

For example, in the Rainy Seasonal Strategic Offensive of 1973, we successfully captured many Police Stations and Outposts because of our fighting tactics of surprise attack and quickly decisive battle. In many cases, enemy could not even get any chance to use weapons.

Our strategy is to wage quickly decisive battle in protracted war.

Our force is weaker and enemy force is stronger. Wherever he finds us, mobilize force to attack us.

That is, the enemy is in the stage of strategic offensive, and we are in the strategic defensive stage, that is, the stage of sustaining and developing ourselves.

But, our actual attack form is offensive. That is, we attack the enemy while he is in defense.
If we fight merely for self-defense, we shall be smashed by strong enemy.

Of course, we take tactical defensive step to resist any section of enemy and encircle isolated enemies.

Therefore, our strategy is to carry attack in strategic defense.

Bangladesh is the country that is occupied by the enemy. He can gather force anywhere to attack us.

That is, enemy is in strategic outer line.

On the contrary, we are carrying defensive war. That is, we are fighting in strategic inner line.
In real attack, we are in attacking position, that is, we carry activities in outer line though our encirclement in outer line is small (a Police Station, Outpost or smaller mobile unit).

Therefore, we are carrying outer line fighting in inner line.

Our principle of war is:

Carry quickly decisive battle in strategic protracted war, carry offensive battle in strategic defensive and carry outer line fighting in inner line.

We have to carry that war until enemy is unable to carry strategic offensive. When the enemy will reach strategic defensive stage, we shall be able to carry strategic offensive against enemy to defeat and overthrow them.

It is the most difficult, ruthless and protracted stage of guerrilla war when we reach countrywide carrying of strategic offensive from strategic defensive.

**6. Experience of Payarabagan**

The rebellion of East Bengal Regiment, BDR and Police and the people’s mass movement had forced the Pak military force to defensive position for some days (Except Dhaka) in March 1971.
They were confined in various cantonments. Soon they made counter attack to break the barricade over cantonment and carried strategic offensive to establish its control over the whole East Bengal.

Awami League and its various rebel forces under its control, by not taking tactical defensive line in face of that attack, took inactive self-defense in actual war. They prepared for positional protracted war and resisted enemy in cities and ports. Due to inexperience, lack of number and supply and low standard tactics, they were defeated, smashed and fled.

Then the strategic offensive of the Pak military fascists were limited in capturing cities. It had not reached to broad rural areas yet.

At that time, our force was formed in Payarabagan and we carried restructuring of the force, recruitment, arms recovering, national enemy annihilation and work of arousing and organizing people.

The Pak military bandits expanded their attack up to villages. As there was no resistance, they carried severe encirclement-suppression over Payarabagan by mobilizing huge forces.

We had to retreat from Payarabagan in face of severe encirclement-suppression.

Till the last of June, the strategic offensive of the Pak military fascists were carried. As the rainy season started in the meantime, they completed strategic offensive and reached to the stage of strategic defense to consolidate their gains.

A section of withdrawn force from Payarabagan initiated massive guerrilla war in Gaurnadi region in the Rainy Season. The other section kept continuing guerrilla war in surrounding areas of Payarabagan.

In the same rainy reason, we applied the experience of Payarabagan and our guerrilla war developed in Barisal, Faridpur, Patuakhali, Pabna, Dhaka and Tangail.

In October 1971, as a result of presence of Awami Force that returned from India, the problem of rivalry and internal betrayal against us became rampant.

The traitor Awami force used a part of people’s support to them against us. They motivated Awami opportunists and lumpens staying with us, took the opportunity of incautiousness of our cadres and guerrillas and endangered guerrillas in huge regions.

Thus, the Awami traitors made the setbacks which even the Pak military could not make. Our many comrades and guerrillas lost their lives and huge regions were lost.

Experience of during and after the Payarabagan proves that we should carry our strategic offensive when enemy is in strategic defensive, at a time when due to natural cause in rainy season, they take defensive position. That is the time when our war and organization develops.
We have to take strategic defensive position during the enemy’s dry seasonal strategic offensive and sustain ourselves. Huge pressure will come; we shall have less development and our area will diminish.

In order to break encirclement-suppression of enemy or to be safe from that, we need continuous work in areas one after another in vast region: We need Attack areas and rear areas and good work in cities and countryside.

Otherwise, a solitary pocket cannot sustain in face of severe encirclement and suppression campaign.

It is very difficult for the enemy to make their encirclement-suppression a success without informer. So, we need to eliminate the eyes and ears of national enemy government.

We must be very much careful in national enemy annihilation. We should annihilate such a few enemies who are judged after huge investigation as seriously hated and can be given death sentence; it must take approval from proper level. Huge national enemies should be surrendered.
Carry military activities by considering how much we can sustain in face of enemy encirclement-suppression.

We must always be cautious about the problems of rival, internal betray and lumpens, and take necessary pre-caution and steps.

**7. The Rainy Seasonal Strategic Offensive and our experience**

Enemy’s strategic offensive and strategic defensive is connected much extent with natural condition of East Bengal.

Generally, they start strategic offensive in winter and complete it by the beginning of rainy season. As it is difficult in rainy season to mobilize troops and movement, so, enemy remains in strategic defense to preserve achieved gains.

This situation is not unchangeable.

As the enemy is in strategic offensive as a whole, so, he can carry encirclement-suppression in Rainy Season too. Combing operation in Sundarbans in last Rainy Season is proof of that.
The Pak military had completed its strategic offensive before the rainy season started.
The Indian force also had started its strategic offensive in the dry season and completed before the rainy season started.

Considering that situation, we took the decision of the Rainy Seasonal Strategic Offensive.
During the Rainy Seasonal Strategic Offensive, the plan was taken to raise our armed activities from the stage of national enemy annihilation to the stage of capturing Police Stations and Outposts.

During that offensive, we extensively utilized past experience—attack area, rear area, continuous work in areas one after another in vast region, good work in cities and countryside etc.
We successfully captured a lot of Police Stations and Outposts by making surprise attack without giving enemy any chance to prepare, seizing enemy position based on courage and using smaller groups etc.

Thus, many arms were collected and experiences were achieved. Huge public opinion was created and we had huge development.

**8. Organizational consolidation and armed struggle**

Our experience proved that armed struggle developed better in those places where there was better organizational consolidation and gains could also be preserved in that course.
On the other side, armed struggle has not developed better or gains could not be preserved in those areas where organizational consolidation was not good.

The aim of consolidation is political, organizational, military, ideological and cultural improvement of cadres and guerrillas. In course of that, we have to collect cadre history and verify that, find out and eliminate lumpen, opportunist and degenerated enemy agents and strengthen discipline and security.

Before the Rainy Seasonal strategic offensive of 1973, during the winter consolidation, we carried anti-clique rectification movement.

Lumpen, bad and dirty elements were eliminated and good and green elements were collected and their quality got developed.

Rainy Seasonal strategic offensive developed better in those regions where that consolidation work was good.

To preserve achieved huge development as result of Rainy Seasonal Strategic Offensive of 1973, improvement and consolidation was carried in dry season.

In that course, we are carrying cadres’ improvement, collection and verification of cadre history and elimination of bad elements.

The areas that did not take that step rapidly, have suffered setbacks, arms has gone to the hands of the enemy; party cadres lost their lives and area suffered severe pressure and setbacks.
For example, in Munshiganj during the Rainy Seasonal Strategic Offensive, due to not being cautious in recruitment, some lumpens and degenerated elements infiltrated who later carried decoity, collected money by writing letter and finally conspired to capture arms by killing local cadres.

Party smashed their activities.

As a result of not collecting and verifying cadre history of cadres of Motlob area of Kumilla, lumpens and decoits infiltrated into party. They killed several cadres and guerrillas to steal arms.
In Faridpur, lumpens stole arms. Due to not keeping secrecy-security, arms were lost and works suffered setbacks.

We have to properly complete the ongoing improvement and consolidation. We must eliminate dirt, bad elements and enemy agents to properly carry the upcoming Rainy Seasonal Strategic Offensive.

**9. The relation between organizational work and armed struggle**

**And**

**Unequal development**

Good organizational work is the primary pre-condition for building and developing our armed struggle.

Guerrillas are recruited through organizational work, shelters are developed and we find out target; we can gather before attack and disperse after attack.

The organizational work that is well disciplined and which keep secrecy and security is indispensable for developing guerrillas from zero.

Recruiting guerrillas via party work, verifying their cadre history, include the in unit, educating them in discipline, secrecy, security and party line, training them via armed propaganda and national enemy annihilation, thus preparing them to higher military activities etc. works are closely connected with organizational work.

In organizational field, usually not all the regions have good work; not all the sub-regions in a region have good work, nor do all the areas of a sub-region have good work.

In terms of development of work and consolidation, we can divide regions into advance, medium and backward. The same we can apply for sub-regions and areas too.

Similarly, in terms of military activities, we can divide regions, sub-regions and areas into advance, medium and backward respectively.

In organizational work, we have to concentrate on advance regions, sub-regions and areas. We have to collect cadres from advance regions to send to medium and backward places; collect cadres from backward and medium places to train them and utilize in making shelter places.
When carrying military activities, we have to consider the role of that place in total work and arising situation in possible enemy pressure etc.

For example, a place is working as the center of work in whole region, sub-region or area. Naturally, if we carry severe military activities there, we shall have to get lost by the enemy pressure and whole work will suffer.

Good organizational and armed activities may diminish or stop by severe enemy pressure or sabotage by internal enemies.

East Bengal is a small country where enemy can quickly mobilize. It is plain land and enemy can get foreign assistance etc. show us that if we carry armed activities as isolated pockets, it is not possible to sustain that.

It will not also be possible to sustain good armed activities in one/one more districts in East Bengal.

We have to carry guerrilla activities in all the districts of East Bengal, interrupt enemy in communication system, carry guerrilla activities in plain and hill and keep enemy busy in cities and countryside.

Hence, enemy, by being attacked everywhere, will be forced to divide its army and engage them in guarding activities. Then, he will have shortage of mobile force to carry encirclement-suppression in various areas.

Thus, Base Area will develop in many villages inside country.

**10. First stage of development of Guerrilla Force**

**And**

**Initiative-flexibility-plan**

Our experience proves that the first stage of development of guerrilla force is: Guerrilla force is developing from zero; they are irregular, they have lack of experience and number and arms; this is why they are not able to encircle mobile enemy to annihilate.

The second stage of development of guerrilla force is: The guerrilla force is experienced, plenty in number and arms and it is now regular. They are able to encircle mobile enemy to annihilate.
In some places, our guerrilla force is in first stage in its development while in some places, we have entered in second stage of development.

In the first stage of guerrilla war, we are maintaining initiative i.e. independence of activity via secret work method and dispersing.

After an operation, guerrillas go to own shelter to save themselves from enemy encirclement (because of secret work method he/she is unexposed) and exposed guerrillas take shelter in such areas where there will be no encirclement-suppression.

If it is difficult to sustain for the unexposed guerrillas in face of encirclement-suppression, they also disperse to safe place.

Thus, at present, main method of keeping initiative is dispersing.

This why we need to have continuous work in one after another areas in vast region and strictly maintain secrecy, security and discipline; and we should have good work in cities and countryside.

Besides, we should carry military work by dividing areas into rear areas and attack areas, so the enemy may not understand where our position is.

Initiative should be maintained in this method when guerrillas are new, inexperienced, few in number and arms; and they are not able to encircle and smash enemy unit.
Initiative concretely manifests in flexibility.

Flexibility manifests in gathering, scattering and changing places of guerrillas.
Due to secret work method, guerrillas can gather in secret shelter to carry any operation. Similarly, they disperse and take shelter after attack.

In face of severe pressure, guerrillas make necessary changing of place, that is, they take shelter or work in other areas. Later, they return when pressure reduces.

Guerrillas are scattered to start guerrilla war in other regions by sending experienced guerrillas there.

Guerrillas stay scattered because of lack of shelter, food, money, arms, their irregular character, presence of enemy informer channels in villages and their inability to break enemy encirclement etc.

Before changing place in face of huge pressure, they have to safely shelter weapons, fix contact-coordination system with local work and keep arrangement so that in absence of leadership, problems does not arise like theft, misuse or losing of weapons.

In primary or in any level, it is not possible to carry, sustain and develop guerrilla war without plan.

We have to advance by making plan on the basis of solving problems like sustaining in enemy encirclement-suppression and in sabotage of internal enemy, collecting arms and guerrillas, training-improvement, arranging money, food, shelter, regularizing guerrillas, work in vast region etc.

We have to build work in vast areas so that alternative shelter develops; we have to attack on weak enemy position to collect weapons, annihilate weak mobile enemy force, break enemy’s information collection system by carrying national enemy annihilation or making them surrender, making huge public opinion through armed propaganda team and train guerrillas in that process. Rural based collection of subscription, arranging shelter, building regular guerrillas etc. works are the target of the first stage of development of guerrilla force.

**11. Second stage of development of guerrilla force**

**And**

**Initiative-flexibility-plan**

For ever if we follow the method of keeping initiative by dispersing, we shall never be able to break the enemy encirclement-suppression; people will lose confidence; mobile force and Base Area will not develop and finally we shall collapse.

We have to transform the keeping of initiative through dispersing to keeping initiative through attack.

How can it be possible?

Surprisingly we have to encircle and smash the total encircling-suppressing enemy unit (if it is small and weak) or part of it, thus forcing him to leave area. Keep initiative through breaking his encirclement-suppression. That is, surprisingly encircle and smash mobile enemy.

It is familiar as ambush war too.

In this way when enemy units of five or ten members are destroyed, they will send bigger units. It is not possible for enemy to send bigger units to all the regions of the whole East Bengal to carry encirclement-suppression. He will have scarcity of number.

Consequently, many villages where enemy cannot go will transform into our Base Areas.
In order to encircle and smash mobile enemy units, we shall need to rapidly gather, scatter and change places.

It will be possible when members of regular force stay near to rapidly gather.
Enemy’s encirclement-suppression campaign and our counter encirclement-suppression campaign to smash enemy’s weak units is ‘Saw pattern war’ which will go on for long days in strategic defense of war.

Therefore, our guerrillas must achieve very much efficiency, and that will be the first step of our attack.

To encircle and smash weak enemy mobile unit or to have some important gains, we have to carry wavelike attack on them and accept some casualties of course.

Therefore, we have to recruit guerrillas huge in number so that despite losses our war effort may not hamper.

Yet, we must minimize losses.

In this stage too, we have to continue surprising attack on weak enemy position and seize that and thus carry on method of weapon collection.

In this stage, if it is not possible to break encirclement-suppression of enemy, there is possibility to fall in inactive condition.

In that situation, we must disperse to regain initiative.

When dispersing, keep small groups to resist the enemy by being united or separate.
On the eve of dispersing, fix when to re-gather and tasks of various units.

Apart from that, guerrilla force needs to divide in parts to carry propaganda among the people and organize them. It needs to divide and scatter due to lack of logistics, and to expand guerrilla war in vast regions.

Yet, concentration is indispensable to break the enemy encirclement-suppression so that we can apply huge force on a weak enemy unit, so we can achieve absolute superiority on each battle.
We have to train mobile guerrilla force in such a way so it can smash enemy units one after another, thus, smashing many units.

In encircling and smash enemy mobile units, we have to arrange work in planned manner. That is, to find out and annihilate the weaker enemy units, we have to bring it to a place that is favorable to us in terms of geographic terrain and public support, and then annihilate it. That is, we have to trap it.

We have to try to wage war in such a way that we are able to decide each battle.
To find out and trap weaker enemy unit, we need to have vast region so that guerrillas can get information about enemy movement and allure him to come to that particular area.

In this stage, guerrilla-in-charge has to do work like spreading guerrilla activities in a planned manner and widen the range of region, fill the gaps, collect arms-foods-money and other logistics, make primary information collecting system, build local guerrilla force, increase regular force, organize masses and guide them in mass struggle and make them take part in armed activities etc.

Those fall under plan.

**12. Recruitment of guerrillas**

**And**

**Formation of regular force**

Initially, guerrillas are recruited from cadres that are recruited via organizational work.
By collecting and verifying cadre history, the infiltration of enemy agents, lumpens and enemy classes as guerrilla is resisted.

Guerrillas are first sent to armed propaganda team and national enemy annihilation operation.
Guerrillas are made experienced and verified by night movement, arms training, and investigation and arousing masses through the activities of Armed Propaganda Team.

National enemy annihilation is as small guerrilla action. Through that, guerrillas are made experienced and verified in investigation, plan, mobilization, action, disperse and facing complex situation.

Classes are taken to improve and ideologically remold the guerrillas.

Thus, military personnel are recruited through organizational work in various sub-divisions of a district, Thanas in Sub-division, Unions in Thana and villages.

Initially inexperienced are appointed in operation with experienced guerrillas or in-charge to make them experienced.

We have to format guerrillas in section, platoon and company to raise guerrilla war to second stage. If those units are active, it will be possible to build battalion and brigade.
First guerrillas work as part timer, they became whole timer in course of development of guerrilla activities and local organizational work.

As at present, work spread among peasants, many peasants are being recruited as guerrilla.
When we shall be able to solve the problems of regularization and livelihood, then most of the members of the guerrilla force will be peasants.

Most of the members of our regular forces that was formed in Payarabagan and other front areas were peasants.

In the Rainy Seasonal Strategic Offensive of 1973, our mobile force developed. This force was sent to different places in connection with organizational work to spread guerrilla activities in other regions.

The problems of making mobile force are the problems of guerrilla recruitment, arms, money, food and shelter.

Presently in East Bengal, we are being able to collect huge guerrillas; it is possible to solve the problems of money-food and shelter by collecting weapons through encircling weak enemy position or weak mobile unit; annihilation of national enemies, collecting subscription from mainly rural areas and organizing public opinion in favor of revolution.

Hence, all the problems can be solved via armed struggle.

Mobile forces need quick mobilization to encircle and annihilate weak and mobile enemy unit.
Therefore, they have to stay camping. They can stay in adjacent several houses.

In Payarabagan and other fronts and in last Rainy Season, the mobile force used to stay camping in people’s houses.

Local organizational works should be good for the sustenance and development of mobile force.
Without the help of local organization, it is not possible to have shelter, know enemy movement, get people’s assistance and overthrow the enemy.

Mobile and regular force, for their sustenance and development, should make local village defense force by taking part timer guerrillas of the village; and to carry activities in a particular region, they have to form regular regional force.

By training, verification and improvement, good elements will come out from defense force and regional regular force.

They should be included in Central Regular Force.

Hence, Central Regular Force will be able to form itself by experienced and good guerrillas.
Village Defense Force, Regional Force and Central Force are like right hand and left hand. One cannot go without other.

System should be established in mobile force to politically train and control the army by establishing political department, making party branch in company and appointing political commissar in various levels.

Besides regularizing guerrilla force, we have to arrange schools of various levels to provide political and military training to the commanders, cadres and soldiers.

Sometimes inter-regional and sub-regional coordination is needed to destroy big enemy unit or big encirclement-suppression or to disperse in face of severe pressure.

As a result of that coordination, we can gather guerrillas of more than one region or sub-regions or guerrillas of one region or sub-region will be able to disperse to another.

This is why we have to fill the gaps between various regions and sub-regions and good coordination should have to be developed among various regions and sub-regions.

**13. Problems of Base Area**

Base Area is indispensable to form an armed force, sustain it, strengthen it and finally defeat enemy by it. Base Area is strategic area, by depending on which, war is waged.

We have to solve the problems of building base areas by considering the particular condition of East Bengal. Except southern part of Khulna, Chittagong Hill Tract and part of Sylhet, the whole East Bengal is plain, riverine and without hill and deep forest.

Hence, here the problem of building base area is building base area in plan land.

From the very beginning, we have paid attention in building Base Area in forested hilly region. As those places are remote and have less communication with government, those are existing as natural bases.

Our effort is going on to organize people inside the hilly region to organize people inside the hilly regions of Chittagong Hill Tract and Sylhet to build Base Area.

One of the problems of building Base Area in hilly areas is that it needs work in adjacent Bengali areas so that enemy cannot isolate work of Chittagong Hill Tract to smash it.

We are emphasizing on that.

We should spread work in forested south.

In terms of building Base Area, the above mentioned places are very much favorable.
River delta and river islands are secondly important for building Base Area.

By eliminating local bandits and enemies, we should build base area and naval guerrilla.
The fundamental problems of Base Area is building strong armed force, making defeat of enemy and organizing masses.

Our Base Area develops in course of guerrilla activities.

Initially, the guerrilla region exists as a region where enemy has control and we have activities.
Village people are liberated from the chain of reactionaries by the annihilation of mass hated ultra-tyrant government agents and by making others surrender.

In that course, huge masses are aroused, guerrillas are organized and arms are collected.
Enemy is afraid to enter the area with small force.

At present, our huge activities are going on of building guerrilla region, expanding that and forming armed force.

Soon, massive activities will start of capturing weak enemy position and encircling and smashing of mobile enemy.

We have extensively start the process of encircle and smash mobile enemy units and our units should have to be made efficient in it.

With it, we have to add seizure of weak enemy post by surprise attack and the method of weave attack to capture important enemy posts.

To build Base Area, we have to carry guerrilla activities in all the districts, cities, villages, communication system, hills and plains and divide enemy troops.

Hence, enemy will be unable to carry encircle and suppress campaign in vast rural areas and our Base Areas will develop.

The regions that are near strong position of enemy (big cities, transport ways, industrial towns) will exist as guerrilla region for long days. In these areas, we have to force enemy to surrender to us or help us.

**14. Revolutionary war and mass struggle**

The Indian Expansionism has taken the line of suppressing Bengalis by Bengalis, and organized Raxi, Army, BDR, Police and other forces. Mass struggle will play very important role in stopping those forces composed of Bengalis from war, break their morale, inactivate them or bring them to our side.

Moreover, broad masses can be aroused and directed against the enemy in course of mass struggle.

Because of the particularities of East Bengal — small country, economically equally developed, same culture and language — here, mass struggle take the form of insurrection.

The mass struggle of 1952, 1969 and 1971 is proof of that.

So, we have to organize insurrection in course of higher level of mass struggle. Thus, we can occupy enemy areas, expand enemy areas and build armed force.

For mass struggle, we need work among rural peasants, youth, women and intellectuals; especially we need good work among women.

In the course of armed struggle, most of the youth will remain engaged in armed struggle, so rural women will remain for carrying mass struggle.

Moreover enemy’s suppressive activities over women’s procession, meeting and barricade will drag all the people of the whole area in favor of revolution and intensify hatred against the enemy.

Besides, women’s struggle will create intense repercussion among the mercenary force and people.

Moreover, women are the most backward section of society. If we are able to arouse women in the course of mass struggle, the victory of revolution will be assured.

We have to work among poor urban masses, workers, students-intellectuals, women and professionals. We have to transform their carried spontaneous mass struggle into countrywide combined mass struggle.

We have to carry mass struggle on various issues and against atrocities and suppression.
It will be kept secret that mass struggle is carried by our leadership. The struggling people are civilians abide by law.

**15. Concrete condition of East Bengal and self-reliance**

East Bengal geographically is encircled by India. The Bay of Bengal is also controlled by India. East Bengal has border with Burma but that also can be controlled by ‘Bangladesh’ government.
The Indian Expansionism is one of the enemies of revolution of East Bengal. Moreover, revolution is not strong there. So, there is less possibility for anti-Indian activities in East Bengal to get support (except people’s support).

The same we can say about Burma.

Moreover, there is no such common bordering country with East Bengal, which can help us (by giving training and arms).

Therefore, East Bengal revolution has to achieve victory by self-reliance and depending on people.

We have to be self-reliant on all aspects including arms and training and depend on people.
Bourgeoisie or no class but the proletariat of East Bengal is the only class that can carry revolutionary war by depending on self-reliance and people.

In 1971, the bourgeoisie took shelter in India and became Indian puppet; they sold the country.
In the past, Subhas Bose also followed the path of dependence on others and became Japan’s puppet.

There is no such country bordering with East Bengal that can provide shelter to the bourgeoisie or from where they can carry anti-Indian struggle or get help.

This is why the future of the bourgeoisie in East Bengal is dark.

The proletarians of East Bengal have to analysis concrete condition of East Bengal and on that basis, take the line of self-reliance and reliance on people.

We have to eliminate such mentality that we cannot make revolution without arms and support from China or any other fraternal countries.

We seek support from all the countries, people and nations of world including Socialist countries.

We support their struggle.

But to make revolution, we have to depend on own strength.

**16. Future of armed activities of various groups**

Isolated armed groups and their activities may come into being due to decentralization of petit production system of East Bengal and people’s support to the overthrow of the Awami traitors and their masters.

Those types of armed activities should be brought under the guidance of the political party of proletariat guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. Otherwise, those activities are bound to be collapsed and wiped.

If those groups do not accept Marxist leadership, they will fail to determine enemy and ally, consider condition of enemy and their own and take proper step regarding military, political, security, discipline and others. Consequently, they will be defeated and smashed.

The honest and patriots among those groups should unite under the leadership of the political party of proletariat and make their sacrifice and patriotism meaningful.

Some groups that claim themselves as Marxist are carrying armed activities.

Their political, military and other lines are not compatible to dialectical and historical materialism and the concrete condition of East Bengal.

As their determining of political line is wrong, so they are making error in determining enemy and ally, main and secondary enemy, recruitment, mobilizing and guiding people.

As they have error in determining enemy-ally, they take such steps in military field that make antagonism with middle peasants, rich peasants and patriotic section of feudal, other than making them ally.

They did not consider the stage of development of guerrilla force, encirclement and the way to defend from that, method of keeping initiative, continuous work in vast areas, good work in cities and countryside, the rainy seasonal strategic offensive, winter defensive, improvement, consolidation etc. or the fact that building and developing guerrilla from zero is indispensable for the concrete condition of East Bengal. They built isolated pockets.

Consequently, enemy easily and successfully encircled and smashed their isolated pockets.
It shows that without the leadership of a proletarian correct political party, guerrilla war cannot sustain, develop or attain victory.

**17. Conclusion**

By making analysis of the concrete condition of East Bengal, we see that under the correct guidance of political party of proletariat, it is possible to build a revolutionary armed force, develop it and finally defeat and smash the enemy.

Formation process of a revolutionary armed force has already started under the leadership of the political party of the proletariat of East Bengal ‘the Proletarian Party of East Bengal’. Many fundamentally important problems related to building that armed force have been solved.
By being guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, the Proletarian party of East Bengal must be able to determine correct political, organizational, military and other lines, build armed force that protects the interest of the proletariat and people, defeat and smash the enemies to capture state power and sustain power of the proletariat and people.

The victory of proletariat and people of East Bengal is inevitable.

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