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TRANSLATIONS ON NORTH VIETNAM

No. 1025

Hoc TAP, No. 8, 1971



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
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
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No. 1025

Hoc Tap, No. 8, 1971

Complete translation of the monthly theoretical and political journal of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party published in Hanoi.

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FULLY UNDERSTAND LINES ON INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY, UPHOLD REVOLUTIONARY HEROISM, AND BE DETERMINED TO TOTALLY DEFEAT THE U.S. AGGRESSOR

[Editorial; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 8, August 1971, pp 1-10]

The successful August Revolution opened a new era in our national history -- the era of independence, democracy and socialism. The emergence of the DRV manifested our people's steel-like determination to be masters of their own fate. The success of the August Revolution and the formation of the DRV opened a series of successes of historic importance for the Vietnamese revolution. The resistance against the French colonialists ended victoriously with the Dien Bien Phu feat of arms which resounded throughout the world. By carrying out land reform and destroying the bases of the feudal regime that had existed for thousands of years in our country, the socialist revolution eliminated forever the system of "exploitation of man by man," thus opening the way for the North to advance toward socialism. The southern compatriots' "general uprising" led to the collapse of the dictatorial, fascist regime of Ngo Dinh Diem -- a lackey of the U.S. imperialists. Our people throughout the country are now conducting a great resistance against the U.S. imperialists -- the greatest international exploiters, the number one enemy of progressive mankind and the international gendarme of our era.

The successes of the Vietnamese revolution during the past 26 years are extremely significant. These successes have completely changed the face of our country and have contributed to changing the balance of forces in the world in favor of national independence, democracy and socialism.

The extremely great successes of the Vietnamese revolution during the past 26 years were achieved primarily because our party possesses proper lines of independence and self-governing and because our people possess a spirit of self-reliance.

Our party, which was formed and trained by President Ho, has creatively applied the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of our country and set the proper lines to lead our national revolution. These are the people's national, democratic, revolutionary

lines that lead toward socialism by bypassing the phase of capitalist development. These are the lines of the people's war and people's national defense and building the people's armed forces. Our party's political and military lines have been set forth on the basis of the scientific study and analysis of the situation in the country and the internal situation of the Vietnamese revolution. Our party has continued and developed our people's fine traditions. Our party has recapitulated the rich experiences of the Vietnamese revolution in order to incessantly revise and perfect its revolutionary lines. Our party has not acted in complete conformity with any existing formula. Selectively using the revolutionary experiences of fraternal parties, our party has constantly and independently reflected on its work in order to determine the characteristics of our national revolution and has creatively set forth the proper revolutionary lines, policies, aims and methods to lead our national revolution to success.

Our party's proper anti-U.S. national salvation lines are a brilliant manifestation of the spirit of independence and self-governing. The party's nationwide third congress of delegates, which was held in September 1960, pointed out that the Vietnamese revolution then comprised two strategic missions: 1) to carry out the socialist revolution in the North, and 2) to liberate the South from the dominating yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, achieve national unification and achieve independence and democracy throughout the country. These two strategic missions are closely related to each other and have stimulated each other. To carry out the socialist revolution in the North is the most decisive mission vis a vis the development of the entire Vietnamese revolution and the undertaking of national unification. The southern revolution is dutybound to decisively and directly overthrow the dominating yoke of the imperialist United States and its lackeys in order to liberate the South. The revolutionary missions in the two parts of the country belong to two different strategies. In the situation in which the country has been temporarily split, our national revolution has two strategic missions with each mission being aimed at solving the concrete requirements of each part of the country. The two missions are both aimed at solving the common contradictions in the entire country -- that is, the contradictions between our people and the imperialist United States and its lackeys -- and at achieving the immediate, common objective of liberating the South, protecting the North and advancing toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

The people in both parts of our country have strengthened their unity, struggled firmly and stepped up the socialist revolution and building of socialism in the North, while accelerating the people's national, democratic revolution in the South and advancing toward peaceful national reunification. The North is determined to advance toward socialism. This is the urgent requirement of the northern laboring people and the inevitable tendency of development of the northern economic and social bases, following the liberation of the North from the colonialist and feudal regime. This also is the requirement of the undertaking of liberating the South and unifying the country.

The North must be strong in all fields in order to protect itself and the common revolutionary base of the entire country and to be able to contribute, together with the South, toward defeating the imperialist United States and its lackeys. The South must arise to wipe out the imperialist United States and its lackeys because the dissension between them and the southern people have become extremely acute and will inevitably lead to revolutionary flare-ups. From the "general uprising" in which they overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem's country-selling regime, the southern compatriots and the heroic southern combatants advanced to defeating the U.S. imperialists' "special war."

Beginning in 1965 the imperialist United States sent its troops en masse to wage the "limited war" in the South and at the same time, used its Air Force and Navy to wage the "war of destruction" against the North. Our party pointed out that to wage the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance is the sacred duty of our people throughout the country. Our party also pointed out that the South is the vast frontline and the North is the vast rear base of the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance. The party implemented the policy of reorienting economic construction in the North in conformity with the wartime situation and, at the same time, asserted that under all circumstances the socialist North must be consolidated and protected, must defeat the U.S. aggressors' "war of destruction" and must provide aid wholeheartedly and to the best of its ability to the vast southern frontline.

Setting forth the two strategic tasks for the Vietnamese revolution and, at the same time, correctly settling the relationship between these two strategic tasks is a creative development in our party's revolutionary line. This is the key to success for our people's anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking.

Owing to the correct revolutionary line, the North rapidly healed the wounds inflicted by the war during the 9-year resistance against the French colonialists, devoted time to building socialism, strengthened its economic and military potentials, and, as a result, stood firm and defeated the U.S. imperialists' extremely fierce "war of destruction," provided aid for the South, contributed to the South's struggle to defeat the imperialist United States and its lackeys and developed the vast rear base's effect on the vast frontline.

Developing their initiative, the southern compatriots have staged limited uprisings and have been waging a revolutionary war against the imperialist United States and its lackeys in order to liberate the South and contribute toward protecting the North. The southern compatriots' present resistance against the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys represents a people's war developed to a high degree. This people's war represents a process of coordinating military struggle with political struggle and coordinating the revolutionary war with mass uprisings. This is also a process of staging uprisings and launching attacks, launching

attacks and staging uprisings, annihilating the enemy in order to regain control, regaining control in order to annihilate the enemy and partially toppling the enemy, repulsing him step by step, achieving partial victories and proceeding toward winning total victory.

The coordination between the political struggle and the military struggle in the southern revolution has been effected throughout the three strategic areas -- mountain, rural delta and urban -- with proper methods and in line with the development of the revolutionary movement and balance of forces in each region and in each period of time. The revolutionary movements throughout the three regions have simultaneously developed and have stimulated each other. Sometimes the rural movement exerted an impact on the urban movement and stimulated its development. Sometimes the urban movement reached a climax and created conditions for the rural people to arise, destroy enemy-imposed bondage, develop their own right of collective ownership and enlarge the liberated areas. The growth of the military and political forces of the revolutionary people throughout the three strategic regions has created favorable conditions for launching attacks and staging uprisings.

The coordination between the revolutionary armed forces, which consist of three troop categories -- main-force units, regional troops and militia and guerrilla forces -- and the masses' political forces has created a combined strength. It was on the basis of this combined strength that the southern revolution adopted its offensive strategy and extensively developed its absolute political and moral superiority -- which represents the southern revolution's basic strongpoint -- in order to defeat the professional army of the world's wealthiest and most powerful imperialist power.

In the aggression against our country, the imperialist United States has been waging an extremely cruel and large-scale war. To date, it has poured more than 10 million tons of bombs and ammunition on our country -- a tonnage five times the total tonnage of bombs and ammunition it used in World War II and 11 times the total tonnage of bombs and ammunition it used in the Korean war. To date, the imperialist United States has spent a total of more than 200 billion dollars on its war of aggression in our country -- an amount that is more than 10 times its total spending on the war of aggression in Korea. Except for nuclear weapons, it has used all types of modern weapons and other war equipment in our country. The aggressive war which the imperialist United States has waged against our people is the greatest war since World War II and the greatest, most protracted and bloodiest war in U.S. history.

Why has the imperialist United States stubbornly pursued the policy of aggression in our country and poured American money, blood and bones into the war of aggression in our country, as it has done? It has done so because our country is very important strategically. Following the successful August Revolution and the victorious anti-French resistance, Vietnam

became a bridge linking the world's socialist system with Southeast Asia, which has been seething with revolution, while serving as a banner of vigorous encouragement to the national independence movement in the third world. The imperialist United States has schemed to use its great material strength to subdue the Vietnamese revolution, not only to take our rich national resources and exploit our people's abundant labor forces, but also to extinguish the national independence movement, check and threaten the socialist camp, protect the world capitalist system and play its role as international gendarme. The present war in our country not only reflects the acute dissension between our people and the U.S. imperialists but also reflects the contradictions between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp, between the national independence movement and imperialism, between the revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries throughout the world and between peace and war. In conducting the anti-U.S. resistance, the Vietnamese working class and people are accomplishing their very important and glorious historic mission of defeating the international gendarmes of the present era.

The U.S. imperialists have incessantly invaded our country during several U.S. presidents' terms of office. However, their aggressive plans have been repeatedly doomed by the strength of our people's staunch struggle. Following the August Revolution, the Truman clique schemed to use the Chiang Kai-shek army to occupy our country, but that clique failed. After 1950, the U.S. imperialists strove to aid the French imperialist aggressors in invading our country, shouldering more than 80 percent of the war expenditures, but they could not save the French imperialist aggressors from being disastrously defeated at Dien Bien Phu. After the French imperialists were defeated by our people, the U.S. imperialists replaced them and subsequently directly invaded our country, becoming the most dangerous enemy for our people. Since 1954 our people have repeatedly dealt heavy blows to the dominating cliques in the White House and their aggressive plans -- the Eisenhower clique with its plan to use Ngo Dinh Diem's lackey, dictatorial, fascist machinery to carry out neocolonialism in the South; the Kennedy clique with its "special war" plan; and the Johnson clique with its plan to wage "limited war" in the South and a "destructive war" in the North.

The "general uprising" in late 1959 and in 1960, the Binh Gia victory late in 1964, and the general offensive and uprising during the Mau Than Tet early in 1968 constitute important milestones that have marked the success of the southern compatriots and combatants in dooming these strategic plans of the U.S. imperialists. The Nixon clique assumed power at a time when the U.S. imperialists had been heavily defeated in Vietnam and when the balance of forces in the world was unfavorable for the Americans. The Nixon clique advanced the "Vietnamization" plan aimed at using Vietnamese people to fight Vietnamese people and Indochinese people to fight Indochinese people with U.S. bombs and bullets. Painfully defeated, the U.S. aggressors have been forced to deescalate the war, but with its "Vietnamization" plan the Nixon clique has stubbornly refused to end the war and has, conversely, sought to prolong and expand it. The

imperialist United States has escalated and then deescalated its aggressive war in our country. It has deescalated the war then prolonged and expanded it throughout Indochina. It has advocated strengthening the puppet army, consolidating the puppet administration and intensively "pacifying the rural areas" in an attempt to create conditions for withdrawing part of the U.S. troops and reducing the U.S. casualties and war expenditures. The Nixon clique's "Vietnamization" plan is aimed at waging a war with the local people's forces equipped with U.S. materiel, fostered and directed by the Americans, supported by U.S. Air Force and supplied by the Americans.

The "Vietnamization" plan is part of the "Nixon doctrine" and represents the concrete application of this doctrine to Vietnam. The "Nixon doctrine" represents the U.S. imperialists' present, counterrevolutionary global strategy. Despite the fact that it was born at a time when the Americans were being defeated in Vietnam and weakened in the world, the "Nixon doctrine" does not abandon the United States' role as an international gendarme, but rather, has continued to have the United States play this role through other measures. Relying on the United States' military and economic forces, the "Nixon doctrine" advocates forming regional alliances among the counterrevolutionary forces and forcing the United States' allies and satellites to partially shoulder the burden resulting from the preparations for and the waging of aggressive war. Regarding the socialist camp, the "Nixon doctrine" advocated administering the insidious scheme of carrying out provocations against and sowing disunity among the socialist countries, putting one component of the socialist camp against another, and, depending on the actual situation prevailing in each area and each period of time, carrying out subversive measures through violence or adopting the "peaceful evolution" measure in order to restore capitalism. Regarding the countries in the third world, the "Nixon doctrine" advocates accelerating the implementation of neocolonialism and luring the reactionary native landlords and bourgeoisie into serving as U.S. lackeys in order to oppose the movement for national independence, democracy and social progress. Regarding the peace and democratic forces in the world, the "Nixon doctrine" resorts to the trick of intimidating these forces with nuclear weapons and fooling them with the slogans of false "peace" and "democracy."

The "Nixon doctrine" used South Vietnam as its initial testing ground. However, confronted by the realities that have emerged on the South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia battlefields during the past 2 years or more, the "Nixon doctrine" has revealed its inability to overcome the challenges. Nixon's "Vietnamization" strategy is faced with the danger of bankruptcy. Through their victories in the Route 9-southern Laos area, in northeastern Cambodia, in Snuol, and in Ngoc Rinh Rua -- here a substantial part of the Saigon puppet army's main-force units were annihilated -- the liberation forces and the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia directed fatal blows at the backbone of Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan. The Saigon puppet administration has been plagued by an internal crisis and chaos. The Americans' lackeys are engaged in a violent squabble. The Americans' and puppets' "rural pacification" plan has encountered difficulties,

sustained setbacks and has been extensively thwarted. The U.S. servicemen in the South have become weary and afraid of death and have indulged in using narcotics in the hope of forgetting the daily and hourly threat of death.

To oppose the Vietnamese and other Indochinese people, the imperialist United States has been waging a very fierce, large-scale war. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese and other Indochinese people have continued to stand firm and are winning. The Vietnamese and other Indochinese people have won extremely great victories in their anti-U.S. national salvation resistance.

Our people's anti-U.S. resistance has had a strong impact on the general situation and international posture of the United States. For the first time in its history U.S. imperialism has been seriously defeated by a small country. Faced with this predicament, the Nixon clique has made feverish moves. It has stepped up its perfidious diplomatic activities in the hope of pressuring our people into accepting a solution that is advantageous to the United States. Obviously, the imperialist United States has refused to renounce its aggressive policy against our country and has stubbornly continued to administer its scheme to maintain neocolonialism in the South. However, no matter what demarche the Nixon clique may make, it can in no way save the United States from total defeat.

Human society is developing progressively, and the Nixon clique definitely cannot reverse the wheel of history. Gone for good is the era in which the imperialist powers ruled the roost in the world, divided it among themselves into spheres of influence and arranged at will the affairs of the various nations. In the 2 September 1945 proclamation of independence, the great President Ho Chi Minh pointed out: "All people in the world were born equal. All people have the right to live, the right to happiness and the right to freedom." The present era is one in which various people have arisen to become masters of their own destiny. The Vietnam experience proves that even if a nation is small it can defeat any imperialist aggressors -- including the U.S. archimperialists -- if it follows a correct line and is united and determined to fight and win for the sake of its independence and freedom. During the past 26 years our Vietnamese people have arisen to become masters of their own destiny. Today the Vietnam problem is a problem between the Vietnamese people, who oppose aggression, and the U.S. imperialist aggressors. The imperialist United States is being seriously defeated in Vietnam. To solve the Vietnam problem, it must stop its war of aggression, totally and unconditionally withdraw the U.S. and satellite troops from South Vietnam, forsake the country-betraying and people-harming puppet Nguyen Van Thieu administration -- lackeys of the Americans -- and truly respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. The only way for the Americans to disengage from the Vietnam war honorably is to seriously respond to the PRGRSV's seven-point proposal that has been fully supported by the DRV delegation and that has been

warmly welcomed by broad segments of public opinion in the world, as well as in the United States. If the Nixon administration truly wants to find a solution to the Vietnam problem, there is no alternative but to talk directly with the genuine representatives of the people of South and North Vietnam. Only those who are fighting the Americans can raise the decisive voice regarding the future of their own country.

The imperialist United States is the greatest international exploiter and aggressor in the present era and the Vietnamese people's number one enemy, as well as the number one enemy of all progressive mankind. The people throughout the world are united in the anti-U.S. struggle.

The Vietnamese people are standing on the frontline to oppose the U.S. imperialists' aggression. The Vietnamese people have had the great honor of being the shock forces standing on the frontline of the world peoples' struggle against U.S. imperialism. The Vietnamese people's just undertaking has enjoyed the sympathy and support of all progressive mankind. Many fraternal parties have asserted that their attitude toward the Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. national salvation resistance is a touchstone of proletarian internationalism.

In the present anti-U.S. national salvation resistance, our people have mainly relied on their own strength, while paying great attention to the moral and material support from the fraternal socialist countries, first of all the Soviet Union and China, and from the communists' and international workers' movement, the people now opposing U.S. imperialism, and the world people, including the American progressives. The wholehearted support from our brothers and friends throughout the world is a great source of encouragement for us. We have unswervingly and firmly maintained the policy of international unity and have fought the common enemy -- the U.S. imperialists -- and built socialism in the North. International unity is one of the victorious factors of our national revolution. We have incessantly strengthened our unity with the fraternal parties and countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

In fighting and defeating the Americans, our people have fulfilled their sacred duty toward the nation, while fulfilling our noble obligation toward the world revolutionary movement. In fighting and defeating the Americans, we have positively contributed toward protecting the socialist camp, the independence of various nations, and world peace.

The U.S. imperialists are being severely defeated in Vietnam and Indochina, are being weakened in the world and are encountering many cumulative difficulties. The Nixon clique is in a distressed, embarrassed situation and is being seriously isolated. More than ever, it is necessary to develop the impetus of our revolutionary offensive, accelerate even more vigorously our struggle against the U.S. imperialists, completely defeat them in Vietnam and Indochina and make them unable to play their role as international gendarmes in the world. The Nixon clique is using every

crafty diplomatic trick in an attempt to mislead world public opinion, divide the revolutionary forces, gain time to readjust its forces, patch up its combat position, gain a period of respite and prepare a new offensive wave against the Vietnamese revolution, the Indochinese revolution, and the world revolution. We are determined not to be deceived by the enemy. We are determined to step up our offensive on the military, political and diplomatic fronts in order to defeat the enemy.

"Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom." The Vietnamese people are determined to act upon President Ho's teaching which said that "As long as a single aggressor remains in our country, we must fight on to wipe him out." United around the party Central Committee, our entire party, army and people are striving to implement President Ho's sacred testament, heighten our revolutionary heroism, and persevere in and step up the resistance against the U.S. aggressors. Firmly maintaining our party's proper lines of independence and autonomy, heightening our people's spirit of self-reliance and strengthening our unity with other people, let us bravely advance! Final victory certainly will be won by the heroic Vietnamese people!

CSO: 3909-F

FULLY UNDERSTAND PARTY LINES, STUDY PROGRESSIVE SCHOOLS, AND LEAD EDUCATION
AHEAD IN FORCEFUL AND STABLE PROGRESS

[Speech* by To Huu; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 8, August 1971, pp 11-30]

I

The Status and Revolutionary Mission in Education

The entire party and all of the people are striving currently to comply with the resolution issued by the 19th plenum of the Party Central Committee. The plenum emphasized that the anti-United States mission for national salvation is the primary mission of the entire party, the whole army, and all of the people at this time. The plenum also outlined the goals and direction for North Vietnam in its effort to restore and expand the economy along the lines of progress toward the establishment of large scale socialist production.

In order to totally apply the resolution of the Party Central Committee to education, we base ourselves upon the major requirements put forth by the revolution and upon the expansion of the education sector in the past. We must learn the lessons of that great undertaking and in that way, assert a course of action, goals, and plans necessary to carry out education in the best possible way, mainly in the next three years, and to pave the way for education to move toward a larger scope and higher quality.

In the past 26 years since the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, education in North Vietnam has made some very significant accomplishments in spite of the fact that the economy was very undeveloped and a constant, difficult, and heroic struggle was being waged against U.S. aggression.

*Speech by To Huu, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Chief of the National Commission on Science and Education, in a conference reviewing educational experiences of progressive units convened by the Party Central Committee Commission on Science and Education.

General education has rapidly developed on a large scale, especially in the past 15 years. The number of people attending classes grows constantly, including both children and adults. The percentage of children from 6 to 15 years of age attending classes increased from 20 percent to more than 80 percent in the period from 1955 to 1965. Kindergartens have been opened and level I and level II education is becoming universal. There has also been forceful expansion in level III education. Illiteracy has been virtually eliminated in the delta and every year approximately 1 million people attend supplementary education classes. Of special significance is the fact that the percentage of those attending level II and level III classes is very large (in 1970, 45 percent attended level II while 12 percent of the total student population was attending level III classes). One-third of the population is attending classes and that is a high and very encouraging percentage. Females represent nearly one-half of the total general student population. In the mountains, the number of ethnic minority group students has also expanded and in 1955, represented 3 percent of the population as compared with 12.3 percent of the population in 1969. The ranks of teachers has grown in the past 15 years from 20,000 to 180,000, not counting the 60,000 currently studying in normal schools.

Those accomplishments have obviously made an important contribution to an acceleration of the ideological and cultural revolution and as Lenin said, will enable "all of the fruits of education to become the property of all of the people" (1). Raised educational standards have helped to raise political awareness standards and to improve the production and economy management capabilities of the working people. They have helped to strengthen the combat posture of the army and to provide forces with education from among the workers and peasants for the schools that train scientific, technical, and economy management cadres, thereby allowing those ranks to increase from 3,000 people with a university or middle level vocational school education in 1955 up to 260,000 people in 1970.

Fundamental changes in the quality of education have allowed secondary schools to become socialist schools and an important tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Improvements in subject matter based upon Marxism-Leninism, scientific accomplishments, the assimilation of party political lines into education, the combination to some degree of education with productive labor and social activity, the participation of the masses and of youth and children's groups in education, the ever-closer leadership at all party organizational levels, and the considered attention of all echelons of local governments from the national to the grass roots level with education, and the active revolutionary campaigns of all of the people have trained the younger generation into a new class of people who are ardently patriotic, hate the enemy, and are loyal to the party and the socialist system. At the same time, they possess educational standards helpful to production and the war. President Ho often commended young people by saying that they were generally good and that had no small effect upon the new schools.

The brilliant accomplishments of the education sector have a greater meaning in that they represent a marvelous thing for our country which had

to experience countless difficulties and had to rely on creating its own experiences to find its appropriate direction.

However, when compared to the great requirements of the revolution in the future, the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and the party line on education our current educational efforts still show many shortcomings and there are still some fundamental problems which must be resolved before forceful and stable progress can be made.

The anti-United States resistance for national salvation by our people has won many great victories but a long and difficult struggle remains. Although the United States has been severely beaten, it remains obstinate and has not abandoned its aggression against South Vietnam. Its plots are more insidious than ever. The anti-United States mission for national salvation demands that the schools strengthen education in depth and teach the students that "there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom." They must have an ironclad determination so that together with the entire army and all of the people they will be determined to fight and win and they must be gradually prepared so as to acquire the ability to fight, readiness to enlist in the army, and support the battlefield. Following the victory over the imperialist United States, because of its strategic position, as the outpost of the socialist camp in southeast Asia, our country cannot decrease its vigilance over the destructive plots and aggression of imperialism. Therefore, teaching the younger generation of Vietnam ardent patriotism, hatred for the enemy, and an attitude of brave and determined defense of the fatherland will always be a primary and longterm requirement rather than merely an immediate requirement.

Vietnam must become a powerful socialist country. That will ensure victory for today, strengthen independence and freedom, and create happiness for all of the people. The party and the people have a great determination to rapidly and forcefully build socialism with stability. However, in order to build socialism, as President Ho said, "We must have socialist men." That means workers who have a high sense of collective ownership which is primarily illustrated in their unselfish and arduous labors in the interests of the people. They are the workers of the largescale socialist production and as a result, require organization and discipline, education, technology, economic understanding, an ability to perform technical work, and good health in order to show high productivity. We are still in the initial period when living conditions and working conditions are still low. Therefore, every worker in the country must strive to overcome difficulties, bear difficulties, attack nature as bravely as he attacks the enemy, and be thrifty and creatively intelligent if we are to push the economy ahead to rapid expansion.

We must teach the younger generation so that when they grow up they will have become workers who possess such ethics and capabilities. That is an objective demand made by the revolution. However, the present quality of education in the general school has not yet met that demand.

Many of the students who have graduated from our secondary schools have become heroic soldiers, outstanding workers or cooperative members, or trained as skillful and good socialist intellectuals. That is the great pride of the education sector and the teachers in the socialist schools. However, among the students, there are also many indications of erroneous motivation and a bad attitude toward study: they lack a dedication to effort, lack loyalty, and some children even lack courtesy and discipline. They acquire bad habits under the influence of the bad elements of society, especially in the cities.

The greatest shortcoming of today's generation is that it is not fully prepared for the production front. Even though the great majority of children, especially in the countryside, have participated in production labor since they were very young, they do not consider productive labor as their responsibility, ideal, way of life, happiness and honor. Therefore, not just a few of them disdain manual labor, are fond of leisure and afraid of difficulty, and prefer living in the city to living in rural areas.

Those shortcomings are deeply interwoven with the inactive influences remaining in society, especially erroneous viewpoints concerning the goals and methods of education and improper attitude toward productive labor. However, the primary and direct reason is the shortcomings of education in our secondary schools today.

First of all, the goals of education are not clear or complete. Political, ideological, and ethical education is still superficial. The teaching of basic education is not yet stable; scientific, technical, and economic knowledge does not yet receive proper attention and is rarely tied to actual experience; labor skills are not yet taught; and health is not yet properly looked after. The concepts of education still lean toward the study of culture. They are separated from actual practice and education is not yet combined with productive labor. Teaching and studying methods are still heavily tainted with passiveness and "rote learning" and do not develop activeness or creative intelligence.

In short, because of a failure to clearly understand the goals and the concepts of education, as well as the contents and methods of teaching and studying, the results gained from education are still limited in many respects. Those are fundamental problems which must be properly resolved in order to increase the quality in today's general schools.

On the other hand, the scope and speed of expansion in the general education sector has generated major problems which must be resolved: kindergartens expand slowly and only attract approximately 25 percent of children between the ages of 3 and 5; only 60 percent of kindergarten children move up to the first grade; while students who complete level I and move up to level II is nearly 90 percent, as many as 20,000 children have not yet gone into the fifth grade; less than 30 percent of students completing level II go on to level III. Of more concern is the fact that the number of people attending supplementary education classes has greatly reduced in recent years (from 1 million down to 400,000); some people have returned to illiteracy; and the

quality of cultural education is low. Meanwhile, the obligation to increase labor output, improve theoretical standards, and increase technical and economic knowledge is making an urgent demand upon education.

Therefore, another very important problem which must be resolved is that we must expand education so that it is appropriate to the conditions in our country, a country which is fighting against the United States for national salvation, continue to strengthen national defense for a long time, and strive arduously to implement the industrialization of socialism and the successful building of socialism. If this conflict is not properly resolved, a major imbalance will exist between education and the economy. We have two choices: either we continue to expand education according to current concepts without regard to the limitations of the economy and thereby make education a heavy burden to the economy or we must limit the expansion of education and in that way, fail to respond to the ideological and cultural demands of economic development.

Neither of those two choices is right. The hard truth of the matter is if education continues to expand along current lines, it will have a rapid but slight effect upon economic expansion. Then, not only will the state budget be insufficient, but even the contributions from the people. On the other hand, it must be understood that we require education very much as a basis for technical expansion and improving labor output. The present educational level of the people, and especially cadres, is totally inadequate to respond to the needs in many respects relative to the building of a large scale socialist production. Key cadres at the township level all have level I educations while the cadres at the district and province level have level II educations. That is a great obstacle, not only to improving economy management and state management standards but also to the acceptance of Marxist-Leninist theory and party lines and policies. A relatively large number of cadres are limited in their work capabilities and cannot fully complete their missions primarily because they lack educations and scientific, technical, and economic knowledge.

Our cadres and people, especially the young people, now must have a stable and effective education that is closely tied to technology, the economy, and other activities of society. That is why we cannot look lightly upon the quality of education and cannot limit the expansion of education.

Therefore, the expansion of education on a large scale, quickly, under various forms, and with ever-increasing quality in a direction that will effectively support production and the war is totally necessary. That fact has become a pattern of the expansion of education in our country.

II

The Meaning of Progressive Educational Models

Briefly, the revolution has placed before us two fundamental problems in education which must be resolved:

First, what must be done to attain the goals of education, which are: training the younger generation and helping to train the working people into new men, workers who own their country, are aware of socialism, possess education and technology, have actual skills and good health, and are prepared to fight and work skillfully to defend the fatherland and build socialism.

Secondly, what must be done to expand education on a large scale and quickly with a view primarily toward universal education for children and improved educational levels for cadres and young people while the country is still poor.

Those two major problems demand a total reform of education. That is a difficult and complex undertaking requiring the collective thoughts and participation of many people, sectors, and groups under the united leadership of the party and the state. Therefore, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee has issued a very important resolution. It set up a commission to research general education reform and a commission to research university and middle level vocational school educational reform. That is good news for us.

Another encouraging fact is that through the actual building up of education during the past 26 years, we have created valuable experience. We have had solid progressive models for more than 10 years which can help us to find the proper course necessary to resolve the above-mentioned fundamental problems. Those models are: the Bac Ly level II general school, the Hoa Binh socialist labor youth school, and the Tam Binh township education system. The party and the state have devoted attention to those models for a long time and have often commended them. The Ministry of Education has carried out a critique but because review methods were not centralized and lacked depth, the answers have not yet been forthcoming; nor have major lessons relative to problems dealing with principles. They are vital models which know how to creatively apply educational principles of Marxism-Leninism to the actual conditions of Vietnam and to comply with the party line and viewpoint on education. They are the brilliant results of revolutionary determination, the will to overcome every difficulty, and the self-reliance and creative intelligence of teachers who enjoyed the great assistance of local party organizations and people.

The great significance of these models is: they create a capability to improve the quality of education in accordance with the educational goals put forth by the party and to expand education on a large scale, while at the same time they can make a direct contribution to the revolution in general and economic development in particular.

The most basic experience of the models is that they strictly complied with the educational principles espoused by the party: education must support the political mission; education must be combined with productive labor and social activity; education is the revolution of the masses and is led by the party.

Each of the models fully applied those principles creatively and in a manner appropriate to the kind of students and the economic and the social conditions in its locality.

The Bac Ly level II general school is a new type general school, which can provide universal level II education for all children in the township. Within the framework of today's general school, it can make an overall improvement in the general quality of education and train children to be obedient, love the fatherland, love their birthplace, study diligently, and be anxious to work. The conditions at the Bac Ly school in Trung Ly Township, Ly Nhan District, Nam Ha Province are no different than those in other schools in rural areas of North Vietnam. In the beginning, there were many problems over the standards and number of teachers and material bases. Also, the school is located in a shallow fifth-month ricefield township which is still poor. However, for the past 10 years, since Bac Ly became the standard bearer of the education sector, that banner has been continuously flown high by the students of Bac Ly whether they remained to work in their birthplace, went on to the university, or went into the army. They all retained the fine qualities they were taught as children.

Bac Ly continues to comply with the educational principles of the party and is acquiring a ever-growing store of experience in improving the quality of education, ensuring that most students fall into the good or excellent category, teaching productive labor and managing the after school activities of the students, building up the organization of the school, and creating model systems. At the same time, it is making an active contribution to "the three revolutions" in the locality.

Although many changes have been made in the teaching staff over the years, it still maintains the tradition of "everything for beloved students," stays close to the people and the township party organization, bears the difficulty of studying, and strives to provide itself with political and vocational training.

All general schools can study the major experiences and methods or specific systems in use at Bac Ly. In evaluating the accomplishments of Bac Ly during a conference to motivate the "two goods" emulation campaign in October 1961, Truong Chinh, member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, said: "The success of the Bac Ly school lies primarily in the fact that it asserted that the educational lines and concepts of the party can be totally implemented, and in doing that, it showed us how to have a socialist school under current conditions in our country."

The Hoa Binh socialist worker youth school is also a general school and its students are young people of various nationalities who have reached working age. The glorious accomplishments of this school are: under the extremely difficult conditions of the mountain area with its hills which have been abandoned because of infertility, it established a new type school and trained young people to have ideals, ethics, culture, technology, and a capability for productive labor. With little knowledge about economy management,

it gradually improved natural conditions, built a "new economic zone" with agriculture and industry, attained high productivity in a number of crops, and made an effective contribution to the economy of the province.

The "work-study" formula of the school is a high form of combining education and productive labor. It allowed for the attainment of high quality in education in accordance with the educational goals of the party. Hundreds of young people of various ethnic groups have set foot in this school and from very low educational levels, have had an opportunity to rapidly progress through level II and level III; and some have gone on to the university. The salient characteristic of this school is that it has truly practiced political and ideological education and taught revolutionary ethics, actual technology, and productive labor, with organization, discipline, technology, and high output to the students. As a result, the school has provided the locality with good ethnic minority cadres and has provided the army with brave soldiers.

Educational expansion under this form obviously does no harm, but rather is very advantageous to the economy. In North Vietnam, there is no school such as the Hoa Binh socialist worker youth school, which has engaged in relatively large scale production with a fixed asset base of 1.5 million dong. It has contributed 400,000 dong to the state, created valuable technical experience by cultivating manioc which produced a yield of 20 tons per hectare, and cultivating corn which produced a yield of 4300 kilograms per hectare in the mountain area. That is really interesting. Schools are usually thought of as a place where money is spent but here, the school has become a force for production of material goods. Educational activity in this regard has become an element of economic activity. This a major lesson for educational expansion in our country in that it is an implementation of a Marxist theory: "Education combined with productive labor," and an active way with which to resolve the conflict between education and the economy.

President Ho had highly estimated the value of this school right from the beginning. On 17 August 1962, he visited the school and commended the work-study concept. He directed the teachers and students to follow this course. On 18 March 1969, Le Duan, First Secretary of the Party Central Committee, said at the school: "This school has created a new type of person who works and studies well. It is the cornerstone of communist construction and the fastest way to reach communism."

Cam Binh Township is a different kind of model with special characteristics. It has acquired valuable experience in creating for education a stable expansion based upon active and willing participation by the people under the close leadership of the local party organization. Cam Binh is a very poor township, poorer even than Trung Ly, and the soil is very dry because of a serious water shortage. The people of Cam Binh early recognized the proper role of education as it relates to production. That meaning was crystallized by the slogan, "Production is the lock, education the key."

First of all, key cadres anxiously accept education and technology. There are presently some men going to level III schools and some taking university level correspondence courses. These men have motivated the entire party and all of the people toward study and have created a situation in which education is expanding on a large scale, totally, and with balance. All of the young people, children, and workers of school age, (under 40), go to school. Fifty-nine percent of the people are going to school and that is a rare record. Level I and level II education has become universal among children in the proper age bracket. There are many forms of level III education. The supplemental education sector now has classes only from the 6th to the 10th grade because there is no one left who has not been to at least the 5th grade.

Education has expanded in Cam Binh in a stable manner because it relied upon three voluntary forces: direct control by the people; a main force military unit, that is, united and active teachers; and close and determined leadership by the party organization. Education in Cam Binh gradually improved in quality and manifested its effect upon production, the war, and living conditions in the township. Therefore, in Cam Binh, while being skillful in education, they were also skillful in many other areas. They surpassed 21 of 22 guidelines in various areas of activity assigned by the district. In addition to all other aspects, it is generally conceded that because all "three revolutions" in the township made progress, an atmosphere of education advantageous to everyone, especially the younger generation, took shape. It illustrates the Marxist truth: "Man is the sum total of his social relationships" (2). The fine social relationships here must surely give birth to the finest people.

In February 1969, Le Thanh Nghi, member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee and Deputy Premier, visited Cam Binh and commended "Cam Binh Township as a worthy model and a good example of education efforts." Of special significance, he highly evaluated the mass nature of the campaign and the great role of education in building socialism in the township. He said, "The people of Cam Binh have a tradition of diligent study and as a result, when it conducted a campaign the entire township went to school. The people have clearly recognized that education is intimately related to production and their living conditions."

The above-mentioned three models are called the three brilliant standard bearers of the education sector. In addition, we should at this time study the experiences of the Hanoi Industrial General School. Unfortunately, in the past several years, the school has been taken lightly and gradually lost its former position. Previously, it trained students to become general workers with a level III education and knowledge about industrial techniques. Some students gained enough experience to be classed as grade 1 workers. These students worked in enterprises or went on to technical schools and were all more outstanding than the students from other general schools. The form employed was a combination of education with productive labor appropriate to the city and the industrial zones.

The four progressive models in education have outlined for us a capability to resolve all of the fundamental problems of education in a manner appropriate to the economic conditions in our country. Together with such other progressive units as the Hai Nhan level I school, the northern Quang Trach level III school, and so forth, those models have given us many valuable lessons.

III

Major Lessons

The experiences of the typically advanced educational units are very rich and we have not yet thoroughly learned from them. However, on the basis of the present review, we can find in these experiences the solution to a series of fundamental problems and also the practical solutions to many concrete problems that other schools have encountered. The review of the versatile experiences has helped us strengthen our unanimity in implementing the party's educational viewpoint and line.

Struggle to Overcome Hardships on the Basis of the Spirit of Self-Reliance and Implement the Party's Educational Lines in a Serious and Creative Manner

The first, great lesson for us to learn is the spirit of responsibility of the principals, teachers and masses in the progressive schools, their revolutionary, creative militant spirit, spirit of self-reliance and determination to apply the party's lines and the Marxist-Leninist principles to the practical conditions of the localities and base themselves on their real, modest capabilities in the first steps to create the present glorious status.

Each of the progressive schools, like any other progressive unit, had to undergo very hard initial steps. Noteworthy is the fact that the typical models have this point in common concerning their initial steps: poverty and need in every respect; a very difficult situation in which the only favorable condition was the revolutionary feelings and spirit of responsibility of the cadres; and teachers and party chapters who were determined to implement the party's educational lines. At the beginning, the Bac Ly level II general education school did not have land for building its classrooms. The people had to fill in marshy land before building a school and gradually developing it. Cam Binh village lacked money and, moreover, was one of the areas fiercely raided by the U.S. imperialists. The Hoa Binh socialist labor youth school was in a more difficult situation. There, teachers and pupils had to do everything. They built roads, chopped firewood and reclaimed land in order to accumulate money for continuing their educational activities and building their school. For a period of time, the cadres and teachers worked without pay. Naturally, their material lives were very poor.

When Premier Pham Van Dong visited the conference to review and publicize the experiences acquired by the advanced typical models of the educational sector, he stressed the creativeness and expressed confidence in the people's heroism, the youths' capability and the elan and riches in experiences in the educational sector. This is the guiding ideology of the party Central Committee and the state.

To overcome difficulties and hardships and undertake great enterprises is the path of the Vietnamese revolution. We have engaged in many grand tasks never seen before in history: a small country defeating two big empires and a poor country -- where there is only 3 sao of land per person -- determined to rapidly advance its socialist construction to industrialization. Consequently, it is impossible for us to blindly imitate the experiences of other countries or start our construction tasks only after we have all the necessary material conditions. To fully understand the revolutionary objectives and the party's policies and lines, firmly grasp the Marxist-Leninist principles of education, develop the heroic traditions and the right of collective mastership of the masses, endeavor to overcome all difficulties and hardships, and gain experiences while studying are the great lessons of the progressive models of education.

These progressive models of education have outlined the features that a typical school should have. Although these experiences are not yet perfected, they are useful suggestions for solving a number of fundamental problems concerning the educational task, such as the purposes of education, educational patterns and contents of education, methods of teaching and learning, teachers, material facilities and school management.

The Goals of Education

The most fundamental problem of each school is the goals of education. Only by clearly and correctly conceiving the kind of man that a pupil will become, what he will do and how he will live his life after his graduation can we correctly solve other problems. The party's third congress set forth for the Education Branch the goal of creating workers who are masters of the country and who have socialist awareness, good cultural and technological knowledge and good health, that is, comprehensively developed men, in order to build a new society. President Ho instructed: "Pay solicitous attention to training the youngsters to be good citizens, good workers, good combatants, and good cadres of the country." (3) Thus, the aims of our education were defined long ago and apparently need not be discussed further. However, through reports of model schools's activities and through the comparison of progressive schools with other schools, we think it is important to discuss the matter further.

The progressive schools' "secret" is that they know how to closely link the aims of education and the party's concrete revolutionary lines and tasks with the versatile realities of the revolution in each period of time and locality. Our teachers have the habit of thinking abstractly and

inflexibly, thus they think that because the aims are embodied in the curricula, one need not do anything but adhere to the curricula. Therefore, they have taught the same lessons and applied the same methods, without appropriately linking them to the rapid changes in the realities of the revolution. Of course, we live in accord with communist ideals throughout our lives. However, each period of time of our lives has its concrete political lines and tasks. Therefore, it is necessary to know how to determine all the relationships between what we have to do and the political tasks. It is necessary not only to have general concepts about the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance, socialist building and the three revolutions, but also to become aware of the concrete demands of the revolution in a certain period of time and prepare students for life, serving a certain political task and living in a certain historic situation.

Presently, only by clearly understanding the resolution of the 19th party Central Committee plenum and adhering more closely to the party's educational lines and viewpoints can we correctly define the aims of education.

We know that the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance is our entire people's main task in the present period, that the South, one-half of our fatherland and the great front of the country, is requiring the greatest and most comprehensive mobilization of the great rear, which is the socialist North. Also, the Indochinese battlefields are requiring us to satisfactorily fulfill our international duty. "Everything for the front, everything for defeating the U.S. aggressor!" This slogan is the *raison d'etre* and a daily feeling of every one of us. How deeply have our schools educated our students about this *raison d'etre* and feeling? Have we clearly understood what we have to do now and in the future? Have we carried out our activities with the necessary intensity? These are important problems to be solved. We can be proud of our past success, but we know that we have not yet thoroughly developed our potential. We must endeavor more satisfactorily in order to bring into full play the patriotism and revolutionary heroism of the young generation and our people in order to liberate the nation and defend the fatherland for a long time.

The present socialist building is aimed, first of all, at strengthening the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance. How should the young generation learn, work and live in order to make its greatest contributions to the common revolutionary undertaking? They will not live a useless day. They must not yield or become lazy, careless or inferior, because this is not the way of life of a new man, a heroic Vietnamese. Revolutionary heroism, which has been brought into full play in the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance, must also come into full play in socialist building.

The ideal of our young generation must be to strive to turn our country into a rich and powerful socialist country as is often said by our party, a country with a modern agricultural, industrial, cultural and scientific level. It is necessary to teach our youngsters this great

raison d'etre and to see that it is reflected in their will, feelings and daily activities. Especially, teach them to learn and work satisfactorily as was taught by Uncle Ho and to do whatever is demanded by the revolution, in order to help to eliminate poverty and backwardness in their country and birthplace.

A great task of general education schools is to educate the students to become aware of these aims and enable them to implement them. The Bac Ly level II general education school began to clearly teach socialist principles to its pupils right on a marshy field in the village. On this occasion, it educated them to feel badly about the poverty of their families and relatives and, from there, to become strongly motivated to act to change such living conditions. Also, the Hoa Binh socialist labor youth school has educated youths of minority nationalities to become deeply aware of the source of the provincial people's poverty that has been handed down from generation to generation and become determined to study sciences in order to serve the highlands people. The most important aim of education is to enable students to shift from patriotism to socialist awareness and the love of labor, engage in collective labor with discipline and work on the basis of satisfactory technological knowledge and self-sacrifice. Students at the Bac Ly school, the Cam Binh village school and the Ho Binh socialist labor youth school were thoroughly imbued with this aim. They have studied enthusiastically along with actively participating in labor and production, thus becoming a trustworthy force of the mass movement to build new rural areas to make practical contributions to stepping up the "three revolutions" in the localities.

However, in order to reach these satisfactory aims, it is not enough to carry out general ideological tasks. It is necessary to organize them to become clearly aware of each concrete step to be made, that is, to know what is required by the revolution concerning their thoughts, knowledge and skills in each step.

It is necessary to provide students with a good educational level, necessary technological and economic knowledge and skills for practice and labor, knowledge of how to coordinate their fundamental cultural and technological background with the practical knowledge they acquire on the basis of a close relationship with their localities and to coordinate scientific knowledge with the masses' experiences.

Students must also be satisfactorily trained physically and, at a certain age, militarily. All youths and teenagers must have the awareness and habit of developing their physical stamina, observing hygiene, organizing a scientific life and coordinating study, labor and recreation. Military training is aimed at increasing the youths' physical strength and preparing them to participate in the armed forces, become acquainted with basic military activities and common weapons and insure military-type disciplines in their daily lives.

In short, education must serve the political tasks. This is our path and aim. Only by basing ourselves on political tasks can we correctly assess the quality of education. The quality of education is not based only on cultural knowledge but on a man's comprehensive capability, which includes aspects of ideology, knowledge, skills and health, and in his ability to use this capability in realistic revolutionary acts. Political tasks do not have general concepts. Political tasks are concrete. Each citizen must carry them out conscientiously. Each teacher must actively strive to understand political tasks. We must not consider ourselves to be sellers whose role is just to satisfy the customers' demands. The cadres of the party and government cannot always set forth appropriate tasks in time. No one can replace teachers when it comes to introducing politics into lesson plans. We must have clear aims in teaching both social sciences and natural sciences. Each teacher must think of this when he prepares and delivers his lectures. That is one of the great achievements of the teachers at advanced schools.

Educational Concepts

After determining the educational aims, we must work out correct educational concepts -- that is, the concepts aimed at linking the application of educational principles with productive labor, national defense and other social activities.

A hundred years ago, Karl Marx said: "Factories are the first place where the embryos of future education are hatched. Education must associate productive labor with study and physical education for all children of a certain age. This method is aimed not only at developing production, but also at forming comprehensively-developed persons." (4)

Marx advanced this principle after studying the implementation in various factories of the system of associating study with work, a system advocated by Robert Owen, a Utopian socialist.

Marx' creativeness lies in the fact that he linked this system of associating study with work to the task of forming comprehensively-developed communist persons. In the part entitled "Machines and Heavy Industry" of his book Das Kapital, Marx devoted many pages to discussing the necessity of associating education with productive labor. (5) Marx maintained that associating education and physical training with manual labor is necessary for the harmonious development of children's intelligence and physical strength. "Under the system of associating labor with study, when a task of either of these two branches is being fulfilled, the tasks of the other branch are suspended: thus, children feel more comfortable than when they are obliged to always fulfill the same tasks." (6) Marx criticized the capitalist countries' division of labor system which transforms workers into being parts of a machine. He added that this is not only inhumane, but also hampers the development of heavy industry. Marx maintained that through associating education with productive labor,

it is possible "to replace workers who suffer while fulfilling one sort of task by comprehensively-developed workers who are able to fulfill different categories of tasks." (7) According to Marx, "this is a life-or-death problem" for heavy industry.

These important views of Marx were often stressed by Lenin. In 1898, in an article entitled "The Typical Points in the Utopian Plan of the Popularist Group," Lenin wrote these famous sentences: "One cannot imagine a future ideal society in which education will not be associated with the young generation's productive labor. If one does not associate study and teaching with productive labor or conversely if one does not associate productive labor with study and teaching, one cannot create favorable conditions for developing techniques and applying scientific methods." (8) Later, after becoming head of the Soviet state, Lenin often issued instructions on the education problem, in which he formulated the educational content and combined techniques of the Education Branch. He stressed the importance of having youths and teenagers actually engage in manual labor with workers and peasants.

In our country, President Ho often talked about labor education. He instructed: "If a white collar worker cannot do the work of a blue collar worker and if a blue collar worker works without using his intellect, they are both crippled." (9) Uncle Ho said that a socialist school is a "school in which learning is accompanied by labor, theory by practice and industry by thrift." (10) In 1958, he instructed various educational sectors to give a place to productive labor in the program of political and cultural education.

After having studied the great Marxist-Leninist educational thoughts and President Ho's instructions, we admire the advanced schools for having persistently endeavored in linking education with productive labor not only because of their poverty but also because of the principles. Such an education is completely in line with Marxist-Leninist educational principles.

Because we originate in a colonialist and feudal society, we are profoundly influenced by the prejudice that "intellectual labor is worth more than manual labor" and that "every kind of labor is lowly, except for intellectual labor which is esteemed." Therefore, it is not easy for us to apply Marxist-Leninist educational principles, or if we work, it is likely that we work "perfunctorily" and do not make real contributions to the economy.

It is necessary to point out that the bourgeois class, because of its aim of exploiting workers, has taken great advantage of and devoted considerable attention to the introduction of practical techniques, economic knowledge and labor and productivity to education and training. However, concerning this problem, the present fundamental difference between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is the kind of man that the coordination of education with productive labor will produce: a working

man with a collective mastership of the socialist regime, or a working man who works for a capitalist regime for a salary? A comprehensively developed man, or a man who is but a "part of the machinery"? Will the differences between intellectual labor and manual labor be abolished or will they last forever?

In coordinating education and productive labor, the advanced units have demonstrated the following:

Only through productive labor can we comprehensively develop a worker and enhance the cultural level steadfastly and in accord with good plans.

Productive labor must aim mainly at educational goals but must also produce material wealth in order to make contributions to the local economy.

Productive labor must be organized, carried out with good discipline and technology and reach a high output in order to have an educational effect.

At present, various schools have made good progress in that direction. Schools that have not made much progress have built classrooms and participated in local production. Schools that have made good progress have had students learn while working, have operated with a self-reliant spirit and have contributed toward developing the local economy. However, a number of our teachers have been afraid of difficulties, have lacked the spirit of working and have not created favorable conditions as have the teachers in the advanced schools. Some teachers have had erroneous thoughts such as "underestimating manual labor and overestimating intellectual labor" and have believed that "technology is unnecessary for handicraft production" and that "the function of general education schools is to teach academic subjects." To coordinate education with productive labor is a great revolution in the schools. It requires that we struggle persistently and learn from experiences while working. First of all, it is necessary to carefully study the experiences gained by the advanced schools and form a body of teachers and managerial cadres who are thoroughly aware of the educational principles and are strongly determined to practically engage in producing material wealth in accord with the situation of the local economy. Then, on this basis, we will set forth regulations that will insure satisfactory relationships between learning and working.

Educational Content

The models of education have in fact partially improved their educational content and methods of teaching and learning.

To understand these problems, it is necessary to review their situation more thoroughly. At the same time, it is necessary to study the advances made in the world -- particularly in the field of modernizing scientific subjects and teaching methods -- with the aim of further

developing the students' intellectual potential. The educational content in advanced schools still follow a program containing many shortcomings, but efforts have been made to improve it.

This is a characteristic easily discernible in advanced schools: teachers there have paid great attention to the students' political, ideological and ethical education. They have developed in the students' hearts their intense love for the fatherland and their pride in the Vietnamese people's tradition of heroism as well as communist ideals. They have awakened in their minds the dream of building the country, developing friendship among students and between teachers and students in an atmosphere of sincere comradeship and building a simple, healthy and happy life. It is for this reason that after their graduation, almost all students have become good combatants, good cadres, good workers and good cooperative members.

Concerning cultural and technical knowledge, advanced schools have endeavored to associate fundamental cultural knowledge with solving practical problems, associate modern sciences with the people's experiences, make the teaching of technology and economics regular subjects and make practical skills an important requirement.

Advanced schools have supplied us with valuable experiences. Bringing technology and participation in productive labor into the curriculum is one of the important reforms of socialist schools. Karl Marx foresaw that "after seizing power -- and it will surely seize power -- the working class will surely bring the teaching of technology, theoretically as well as practically, into the people's schools." (11) However, this is a difficult problem. We must study it carefully in order to draw up a suitable, well-balanced and high quality curriculum.

We must pay attention to a new problem: in general education schools, we have paid improper attention to the characteristics and needs of girls. In ideological education, physical exercise and feminine hygiene, school-girls require special care. In the fields of technical education and manual labor, it is necessary to correctly understand the physical conditions, physiological constitution and psychological conditions of girl students in order to guide them into suitable branches and professions, save them from work that is too difficult and teach them needlework as a main subject.

It is necessary to pay attention to another matter: we should soon finish the planning of curricula and teaching and learning methods suitable to people of minority nationalities. We should avoid a stereotyped application of methods in the schools in the delta. We should guarantee the observance of basic principles in the socialist schools in order to insure a firm and steady basic-echelon cultural and technical study to enable gradual progress.

Teaching and Learning Methods

New subjects require new teaching and learning methods. Regarding methods, our schools still present many backward points; still pay attention to the old cramming method; lay heavy stress on rote memorization and do not bring into full play the students' intelligence and initiative; and lack a practical relationship between teaching and learning and lively and concrete activities. Teachers at progressive schools have achieved important successes in improving the methods to intensively develop the eagerness, initiative, independent thinking and creativeness of the students. These schools use teaching aids and the lively experiences of the students themselves. Teaching should be carried out properly among all students. The degree of understanding of students in each class varies, thus requiring various teaching methods. Therefore, at the Bac Ly level II general education school and the Hoa Binh socialist school, the students are classified into three categories: good, average and poor. Proper teaching has been devised for each particular group. Advanced teachers have also paid attention to improving learning methods, particularly independent study for students, thus thinking not only of the near future but also of preparing the students for further study when they leave school to earn their living. Independent study can be realized only if the student has a desire to study. It can be done when the situation permits. Students should know how to arrange their study time and how to properly coordinate their activities with those of the community.

In order to implement these goals, concepts, contents and methods of education, the advanced schools have unremittingly struggled to create favorable necessary conditions. The four most necessary conditions are: to have a corps of good teachers and managerial cadres, to have necessary material bases and equipment, to have the active and voluntary participation of mass organizations, especially of the Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Union and teenagers' groups, and to have close leadership and management by various echelons of the party and state.

The Corps of Teachers and Managerial Cadres

The corps of teachers is always the core force in education as was viewed by our party's third congress. A teacher directly determines the trends and aims of his lectures and educational features. Obviously, in the educational undertaking teachers must be the ones who propagandize and organize the masses toward its realization. The teachers at the Bac Ly level II general education school, at the Hoa Binh socialist labor youth school and at Cam Binh village, have worked like vanguard revolutionaries on the path of the new education system. They have worked while organizing and have undergone countless hardships. While striving to build new schools, they have become the new teachers who know how to teach, how to guide students in engaging in productive labor, and how to motivate youths. Teachers must also contribute toward explaining current events and policies on building new ways of life in the localities.

"Everything for the benefit of the beloved students." Their noble ideal is that all the students will become new people possessing excellent ideals, clear minds, vivid intelligence, and good health. These teachers have attained the noble significance of their profession. Le Duan has often said that, "They have crystallized the essence of man" and "The more a person loves other people, the more he loves his profession." The personnel of teachers schools should follow the examples of these advanced teachers in order to improve the contents of their lessons. Hundreds of thousands of other teachers should also follow their examples in improving themselves.

Such managerial cadres at the various schools as schoolmasters, deputy schoolmasters, party chapter secretaries, secretaries of the youth group chapters and secretaries of educational trade unions -- who are responsible for strengthening the unity and assuming leadership over the teachers contingent and for the education of the youths and children -- should cooperate with the schools and people and serve as staff members of the various party committees and local administrations in order to advise them on educational matters. It is clear that in the progressive schools, these people have effected a change in every respect, particularly in the maintenance of the party policy of manifesting concern over education. They have endured the greatest hardships, thought a lot, studied a lot and worked a lot. They are worthy of setting examples for the managerial cadres from other schools to study and follow so that they may rapidly improve themselves in the performance of their missions.

Material Bases and Equipment

In general, we are seriously short of schools because our country is poor. However, we have to admit that in building socialist schools, if we had attached due importance to the future of our children and brothers, the situation in which schools and classrooms were not properly built would not have happened. Our schools are socialist schools where academic and technical study is carried out along with productive labor. Therefore, not only is it necessary to have enough classrooms, tables, benches, and blackboards but also to have steel filing cabinets, instruments for experiments, training aids, production tools, and so forth.

Why have we let such school shortages happen? This has mainly been due to the fact that many party committees and administrations at various levels, many associations and the people have not given due attention to the education undertaking or to the essential requirements for socialist schools. In particular, this has been due to the fact that necessary building materials have not been given to schools. We know that bamboo, wood, tiles and bricks do not exist in sufficient quantities, but in various localities, particularly at basic echelons, the use of these building materials has been somewhat arbitrary. After building the necessary production bases, can we give priority to building schools and hospitals?

Can housing construction, especially for cadres, be slowed a little so that more building materials can be used for building schools for our children?

In addition, we should step up the production of paper and training aids and print more teachers' and students' textbooks. This is an urgent educational requirement. For the sake of the revolutionary undertaking and the health conditions of and responsibility toward our children and brothers, I suggest that the various party committees and administrations and associations, particularly the Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Union pay more attention to building schools so that in a few years our children and brothers will be able to study in sufficiently large and well-lighted classrooms equipped with necessary facilities for teaching and learning. I suggest that a working youth trade union be set up in general education schools which will play the role of a shock force in building schools in rural areas as well as in urban centers. With its intelligence and strength -- the strength of both teachers and pupils -- and with its labor force, it will alleviate the load borne by schools and the contributions by the people. Only then will the educational task have the material conditions to develop itself and improve its quality day by day.

Voluntary Participation by the People

In the models of education, we clearly realize the following truth: education is a revolutionary task of the masses. The masses (including students) voluntarily participate in building school premises, look after teachers and students and voluntarily engage in study. They constitute a force that exerts great influence upon the educational task. The masses are confident in our party and socialist system; they have enthusiastically engaged in revolutionary activities, production and combat; they have actively built a new life, reformed customs and habits and created favorable conditions for developing the youths' education. People's organizations, branches and pupils' parents have contributed to the educational task. The youth group and children's unit play a very important role among the masses. Pupils are conscious early of their ownership of schools thanks to the fact that they have participated in the self-management of their group and unit. Advanced schools have paid attention to the group and unit and actually helped them further strengthen pupils' unity, educate and train youths and teenagers and cleverly associate the teachers' guiding role with the activities of this group and unit. Here it is necessary to cast more light on the following point: schools should avoid organizing "study well" or "work well" groups or teams which coexist with the aforementioned group and unit and which have the same role. On the contrary, it is advisable to let the group and unit organize their activities under the guidance of experienced and enlightened teachers. Only by insuring that the group and unit exercise their self-management role over all school activities will it be possible to fully develop the pupils' consciousness, spirit of initiative and creativeness.

Leadership at All Echelons of the Party and State

As is the case in all sectors of revolutionary activities, party leadership is the factor deciding victory. Only when party organizations keep a firm hold on the party's political line and educational line will they be able to associate education with the revolution in general, and in the localities in particular; and on that basis, cause the education to closely follow the socialist line. The educational level of many people in various party committees is still low.

All party committees are able to lead the educational task. The experiences of Bac Ly, Cam Binh and Hoa Binh demonstrate that only when party committees pay attention to leading in education will education be able to progress steadily, the masses actually participate in developing education, and the corps of teachers perseveringly struggle for new educational methods. It can be said that without the concern of the party Central Committee and the persevering leadership of the Hoa Binh provincial party committee, the Hoa Binh socialist labor youth school would not have survived until now. In Cam Binh, the role of the village party committee has been very important. Its comrade members have not only kept a firm hold on the educational task, but also set a good example by attending classes. It is the same at the Bac Ly school. The concern of the party Central Committee, the Ministry of Education and the provincial, district and village echelons is very great. Thanks to this concern education has developed widely, acquired a mass character and developed its influence upon the three revolutions in the villages. The administrative authorities in these localities have given the education sector valuable aid, satisfactorily implemented the policies toward teachers and paid special attention to the schools' legitimate needs, especially concerning money and materials.

We are convinced that if all echelons of party committees and local governments pay deep and equal concern to the educational task, they will surely create favorable conditions that will enable our schools to develop more vigorously, quickly and steadily.

IV

Step Up the "Two-Goods" Emulation Movement and Learn from the Experiences of Progressive Schools!

In learning from the experiences acquired by the progressive schools, it is necessary to firmly grasp the nature of these experiences and, thereby, creatively devise ways of carrying out the educational task more satisfactorily. It is necessary to firmly grasp the problems that I discussed earlier. It is necessary to base ourselves on the political tasks in setting forth the specific objectives of training, in devising educational methods, in determining the contents of education, in improving the methods of teaching and learning, and in proceeding toward solving the basic problems -- such as that of teachers, material facilities and equipment, party

leadership, management by local governments, assistance by the people, and self-management by the youth group and the children's unit. In learning from the progressive schools' experiences, it is necessary to learn from these basic problems, as well as from the spirit with which these problems have been solved -- that is the revolutionary offensive spirit, the spirit of self-help and creativeness, and the spirit of working while creating favorable conditions, learning from experiences, and training cadres.

I have said that only by firmly grasping the political tasks for each period of time and in each locality can we correctly solve the educational problems. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly realize the revolutionary requirements and reality that prevail in each locality. It is necessary to avoid stereotyping experiences. For example, a number of schools only learned from a few aspects of the progressive Bac Ly school's activities -- such as learning how the Bac Ly school developed its biological garden or how it erected its barometer. We should deter localities from growing manioc and maize in imitation of the Hoa Binh socialist labor youth school. Such imitation produces no satisfactory results.

Nearly 10 years have elapsed since the progressive schools came into existence. Therefore, we definitely can improve on these schools because we are more comprehensively mature, and the requirements of the revolution are greater. The premier emphasized: "A major issue that I want to discuss is the need to further improve on the models that we have developed. Don't you cherish such a great ambition? Don't you possess a strong determination to do that? Aren't you confident in the country, the people and our young generation? Can you embark on an undertaking of such great dimensions?" (12)

In leading the movement, it is necessary to conduct it on a gradually spreading basis. This is a very important method of exerting leadership and an art that is instrumental in stimulating the steadfast development of all movements. Each province and each district must begin to conduct the movement in a few pilot areas and, subsequently, extend the movement therefrom. Which areas should be selected as pilot areas? Pilot areas must be selected on the basis of the following three main factors:

1. A corps of good teachers -- this is the most decisive factor. First of all, it is necessary to train a number of teachers who are deeply imbued with our educational view, are enthusiastic and have attained certain professional standards. The most important requirement is that they possess enthusiasm and determination and are eager to learn while working.

2. Close leadership exerted by the local party chapters and the local administration. Specifically, the party committees must clearly realize the educational task and exert leadership over the movement by relying on the teacher corps.

3. At the initial stage, in selecting pilot areas, attention must also be paid to the areas where favorable economic, political and social

conditions prevail. In these areas, the people are good, the revolutionary movement has a seething impetus, production is fairly satisfactory, and firm material bases are available. These factors provide many favorable, basic conditions for developing education.

These are the general factors on the basis of which pilot areas must be selected. The two-good emulation movement will be extended on the basis of the experiences drawn from these pilot areas. It is also necessary to select some areas where a special situation prevails, which are better than other areas, or which cannot rely solely on the experiences acquired by other areas -- for example, the areas inhabited by the Catholic compatriots and the highland areas in the mountain region. In these areas, it is necessary to strengthen the corps of good party cadres and good teachers capable of combating bad influences, satisfactorily educating the young generation and contributing toward improving the masses' revolutionary enlightenment. At the same time, it is necessary to pay special attention to the industrial zones and cities, gain new experiences and further perfect the experiences that have been acquired by the existing general industrial schools.

The two-good movement must be conducted rapidly, vigorously and steadfastly. The revolution requires that we satisfactorily carry out the educational task. We are capable of rapidly improving the educational situation. The premier was right when he pointed out the following favorable conditions that we possess:

1. The tasks that we advocate are very consistent with the present, revolutionary situation and with the coming trends at home and abroad. Therefore, these tasks have a great, persuasive power.

2. Our education sector possesses adequate forces and experiences. Therefore, we can naturally outdo the existing model progressive educational units.

3. Eagerness to learn is a longstanding tradition of our people. The experiences acquired by Cam Binh village require us to develop the districts and provinces into progressive educational units like Cam Binh.

4. The party's leadership on the cultural and educational front has become increasingly close and experienced.

To satisfactorily conduct the two-good movement, it is necessary to firmly grasp the significance of each typical educational unit and the extent to which we can apply the specific lessons of experience. At the same time, the capacity to conduct the movement must be fully assessed. It is very important to satisfactorily conduct the movement because we cannot use our children as guinea pigs, but, rather, must insure that they make progress and that general education be gradually improved. Moreover, we are vigorously conducting the movement along the trend of coordination between education and productive labor. Therefore, precautionary measures must be

taken against unorganized actions that may waste human and material resources. The schools where the students practice "work-study" must work out sound economic plans, gradually extend the scope of production and educational activities, and achieve a balance between studies and work.

In content, a typically advanced educational unit may provide us with lessons of universal value. However, as far as the organizational form and content of this unit's activities are concerned, the lessons it provides may only be applicable to certain categories of schools. As pointed out in the guidelines established by the Ministry of Education, the Bac Ly school is a category of school that is most widespread and can be a suitable model for all general education schools. The Hoa Binh socialist labor youth school is a suitable model for the schools for the youths of ethnic minorities, schools of pedagogy and a number of level III schools that have mature students and possess conditions for carrying out production. The Hanoi general industrial school can serve as a model for a number of level III schools in the industrial zones and cities. Cam Binh village can serve as a model for all townships (and wards).

Acting upon Premier Pham Van Dong's instructions, let us unleash a two-good emulation movement following the examples set by the advanced schools. This movement adds a new content to the two-good emulation movement initiated by President Ho. This new content reflects another step forward in educational reform. This new development requires that the Education Branch make efforts, that all the people participate in the movement and that the party chapters exert close leadership over the movement.

First of all, it is necessary to effect an ideological change in line with the educational objectives, principles and guidelines set forth by the party. Therefore, the present dissemination of experiences acquired by the model educational units must be carefully carried out within the party ranks and the education sector and, subsequently, among the masses.

Teachers must be improved ideologically, culturally, technically and professionally so that they can assume the new tasks.

The Ministry of Education and the educational services and divisions must strengthen their leadership over the typically advanced educational units. The existing model educational units must be further improved. The Ho Chi Minh Lao Dong Youth Group must intensify its activities at the schools and, on the basis of the experiences acquired by the model educational units, further improve the responsible cadres and formulate action programs for the grassroots level. The various economic sectors and the production establishments must realistically help the education sector.

The guidelines set forth for conducting this movement are: be positive, persevering, steadfast and creative.

To be positive means to rapidly adopt a correct policy and measures, resolutely develop pilot areas and exert leadership over them, devote efforts to creating within the next 3 years a tangible change at the local schools, and combat a hesitant or skeptical attitude.

To be persevering means to endeavor to overcome difficulties and hardships, make untiring efforts, patiently work while drawing experiences and eliminate the tendency to become impatient or to "initiate a project without accomplishing it."

To be steadfast means to work out plans and take specific measures to gradually create conditions for achieving success, increasingly improve the quality of education and combat unorganized working methods and formalism.

To be creative means to base ourselves on the different objectives and on the different situations and capabilities so as to properly apply the experiences acquired by the progressive educational units, adopt new measures and forms that conform with the requirements of each locality and avoid mechanical stereotypes.

While applying and developing the experiences acquired by the advanced schools, we must attach importance to reviewing the experiences acquired in each period of time. This review of experiences will contribute toward accelerating the performance of the immediate educational tasks and, at the same time, toward developing Vietnamese educational science.

We are convinced that, together with the great victories on the battlefield and in production, our educational undertaking -- carried out in conformity with the line set forth by the party -- will certainly develop vigorously, will lead to a comprehensive educational reform and will support more satisfactorily the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle and the tasks of protecting the fatherland and building socialism.

Soon after the DRV was founded, President Ho, with boundless confidence and love, said:

"Whether or not Vietnam becomes glorious and whether or not the Vietnamese people can gloriously stand shoulder to shoulder with the big powers throughout the five continents depends largely on the assiduous studies of our children." (13)

President Ho's solicitous teaching has unceasingly motivated our people, our cadres, and our Vietnamese youth to enthusiastically advance.

July 1971

FOOTNOTES

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2. Marx and Engels: "Dissertation on Pho Bach," Collected Works, Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1962, Volume 2, p 657.
3. Ho Chi Minh: "Letter to the Nationwide Conference on Education, March 1955," President Ho Discusses Education, Giao Duc Publishers, Hanoi, 1962, p 131.
4. K. Marx: Das Kapital, Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1960, Volume II, p 231.
5. Ibid., pp 226-249.
6. Ibid., p 230.
7. Ibid., p 237.
8. Lenin: "Discussion on Education," Giao Duc Publishers, Hanoi, pp 14-15.
9. Ho Chi Minh, op. cit., p 193.
10. Ibid., p 212.
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DEVELOPING GREAT SUBJECTIVE EFFORTS BY ALL ECHELONS OF THE PARTY COMMITTEES
IN GUIDING LOCAL MILITARY EFFORTS

[Article by Chu Van Tan; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 8, August 1971,
pp 31-41, 77]

The anti-United States resistance for national salvation of our people, the people of Laos, and the people of Cambodia has won great victories and is in its most violent phase.

The process of expanding the war is a process in which the entire party, the whole army, and all of the people constantly develop their great and continuous efforts to progressively defeat the enemy. Of special significance is that during this phase, we are making even greater subjective efforts to secure total victory.

Once the proper political and military line of the party is established, motivating and organizing the masses toward the implementation of those lines has a decisive meaning with regard to the success or failure of the revolution and the war. However, whether the forces of the masses are properly and fully developed depends to a great extent upon the subjective efforts of all echelons of the leadership and party committees. If the subjective efforts of the leadership and party committees bring about the greatest possible results, the forces of the masses will become an extraordinary power which can transform difficulty into advantage, and if those forces are developed to the highest degree, it will allow the forces of the revolution to rapidly gain strength and take advantage of or create opportunities to win ever-growing victories.

The local military effort is an important part of the overall military mission of the party and it holds an important position within the party mission in general. This is greatly influenced by all other areas of activity in society and in return, has a profound influence upon these activities.

Therefore, many party committees have devoted a great deal of attention to these efforts.

Understanding the Political and Military Lines of the Party and the Pattern of the War in Order to Do Well in All Aspects of Local Military Efforts

The great subjective efforts of all echelons of the party committee in guiding local military efforts must be illustrated first of all by staying on top of and fully understanding the political and military lines of the party, the patterns of the war, and the strategic concept of the people's war and by fully applying them to the environment and special conditions in each locality in order to manifest the great power of local military efforts. This is the most important key issue necessary to ensure success and it is a very basic guiding principle and a compass for each of our actions. Because of the revolution, the war is a great, longterm, complicated, and violent campaign. In order to be victorious, it is necessary to constantly combine revolutionary ardor with a calm scientific attitude in order to fully understand the pattern of the struggle and to fully and properly apply revolutionary strategy. As Lenin has pointed out, "In the great revolutionary struggle, we can (and must) combine the greatest degree of ardor with a high degree of calmness and the most mature and thoughtful evaluation of the insane struggles of the capitalist class."(1)

The military line of the party is an integral and vitally important part of the party political line. It is the people's war line of our nation during this period. It has as a fundamental premise that all of the people fight under the leadership of the working class. That line is illustrated by the following primary issues: motivate and organize all of the people to fight the enemy and establish political and armed forces; build a political base, and build a base and a rear area for the people's war; fully and creatively apply the concept of carrying out the war and practicing the military arts of the people's war.

In the anti-United States resistance for national salvation, on the basis of the proper political line of the party and President Ho, our military line made great expansion in many respects. It was constantly adjusted and it was rich and creative, especially with regard to the concept of carrying out a people's war in opposition to all types of war waged by the enemy and in regard to the military art of the people's war and nationwide national defense. Therefore, all echelons of party committees and military cadres, especially high and middle level cadres, should not only stay on top of the political party line but must also continuously be involved in studying the party military line in order to better understand and apply them with the best possible results.

The way in which wars are conducted is constantly and vitally expanding. Each war has its own special characteristics. We cannot rest with the experiences that we have gained or with the general pattern of righteous wars during current times. We must rather devote attention to understanding the particular patterns and new experiences of present day war in order to constantly expand the party military line and promptly improve leadership in war. There are patterns of activity in war common to the enemy and the people's war, particular patterns on the front lines, particular

patterns in rear areas, and patterns concerned with the relationship between the front lines and the rear area. The anti-United States resistance for national salvation of our people has defeated in order the various enemy strategy of "special war," "limited war," and "the war of destruction." This has created a new situation on the battlefield that is to our advantage rather than to the advantage of the enemy. However, the imperialist United States is an enemy with great military and economic potential and it is very obstinate, reckless, and insidious.

Since Nixon became president, the imperialist United States has been forced to gradually withdraw U.S. troops but it has also hastily implemented the strategy of "Vietnamization" of the war. It had to implement a defensive strategy while carrying out limited counter attacks, scale down the war while holding to its desire for a position of military strength, and it continued to prolong and expand the war. Recently, it strove to accelerate the "pacification" program, to strengthen the puppet army, and to prepare for new adventures. At the same time, it pursued insidious diplomatic plots.

In order to defeat the enemy, we must study the enemy's pattern of war. Only by understanding this pattern can we understand his specific plots and actions. At the same time, only by clearly understanding our requirements and problems can we make proper forecasts, be prepared to fully respond to the general requirements of the entire country, and establish regular coordination between the rear area and the front lines with a view toward defeating the enemy. Every inclination toward a lack of vigilance or localism presents an obstacle to the forceful and integrated development of the people's war.

In leading war today, we must understand that one of the major strategic concepts of the resistance is the longterm fight and on that basis, we must strive to create opportunities and to take advantage of time to win ever-growing victories.

The resolution issued by the 19th Plenum of the Party Central Committee emphasized: "The resistance of our people will be long and difficult but it will surely end in total victory." The resolution also pointed out: "It is necessary to motivate the greatest efforts of the entire party, the whole army, and all of the people in both areas of the country; to strive to comply with the sacred will of President Ho; to persist in and accelerate the resistance; to uphold a determination to fight and win; to move toward total victory; to liberate South Vietnam; protect and build up socialist North Vietnam; move toward the peaceful unification of the country; and at the same time, fulfill international obligations." Therefore, the tendency to overestimate the enemy and to fail to see the clear-cut deterioration of the enemy as compared with previous years is not appropriate to the situation. On the contrary, to underestimate the enemy and to fail to see all of his plots and capabilities is also incorrect.

The process of the longterm struggle is the process of continuously attacking the enemy, progressively repelling him, gradually defeating his

strategic plots, and moving toward the total defeat of the enemy. At the same time, it is a process of gradually interspersing the revolutionary war with great expansive moves. Therefore, it is necessary to make great subjective efforts in order to be able to fight for a long time and to continuously defeat the enemy in the long run, while at the same time, taking advantage of creating opportunities and moving ahead to win total victory.

The above-mentioned strategic concepts must be fully understood and applied to all organization and ideological efforts of the resistance. It is necessary to fight, to be combat ready and to strive to build up and expand forces in every respect. On that basis, it is necessary to promptly study the recent experiences of the front lines in order to improve the quality of our armed forces and to strive to expand and strengthen the rear area, thereby fully and properly completing the mission to provide the manpower and material for the front lines and to ensure the ever-growing power and force as the fighting goes on.

When applying the above-mentioned concepts, it is also necessary to devote attention to fully understanding the intimate relationship between the fundamental longterm requirements and immediate, and immediate specific requirements. Each longterm, fundamental requirement must be established with a high degree of accuracy and with a forceful combat nature in mind. Each specific requirement must totally reflect the guiding ideological integrity of strategic determination, be totally objective, be highly ideological, and well carried out. Only with a real determination can longterm success be guaranteed. On the other hand, we must also distinguish between the urgent and strategic significance and the tactical significance of each category of requirement in order to have a proper course of action and to attain continuous and stable action.

Moreover, in local military efforts, in order to be highly active, we must devote a great deal of thought to, and fully understand and properly apply, the party lines and patterns of the war to the situation in each locality during various time periods. This is true because each locality has special political, economic, cultural, social, traditional, and local characteristics, in addition to general conditions, especially now when each province has become a unit for local economic expansion and the conduct of the people's war in the localities.

Strengthen the Overall Leadership of All Party Committee Echelons and Properly Resolve the Primary Relationships in Local Military Efforts

In war, we must have skillful military leadership in order to totally exploit and highly develop all subjective and objective factors to our advantage, discover those factors which are disadvantages to the enemy, and move toward winning victory for us.

In the art of military leadership, it is necessary to devote attention to many complicated relationships, such as: the relationship between the two strategic missions of the revolution, that is, resistance against the

United States for national salvation and the building of socialism; the relationship between military efforts and other efforts; the relationship between building up and combat; the relationship between the economy and national defense; and the relationship between the rear area and the front lines, and so forth. Properly resolving the above-mentioned relationships primarily creates a position of strength for strategic leadership and develops the great combat strength with which to directly cope with the enemy. At the same time, it accumulates combat forces, which ensure the success of immediate goals, as well as the longterm requirements of the revolution. Therefore, throughout the process of war, strategic leaders must regularly be concerned with properly resolving those relationships and promptly correcting discrepancies with a view toward creating a balance among the relationships that is constantly appropriate to the requirements of military leadership. All relationships in war are intimately related and interact upon one another. The more stable the balance among the relationships, the more vital will be military leadership. If any relationship is not properly resolved, it can reduce either the immediate or longterm combat posture and can adversely effect the other relationships; and can even nullify them.

War consumes potential. The relationships in war are constantly changing because war always has a tendency to destroy balances among the relationships and any relationship must bear the effect of both sides pushing in the opposite direction. Whether the changes in the relationships during war expands the balance, or whether the advantage is great or slight, or whether there is any advantage at all depends upon the objective conditions of the war and to a great extent, depends upon the subjective efforts made by military leaders.

Within the framework of leadership over local military efforts, we must look closely at the following primary relationships:

1- The relationship between establishing an overall campaign in the rear area and accelerating local military efforts.

The fundamental and primary course of action necessary to accelerate local military efforts is the proper resolution of the relationship between establishing an overall campaign in the rear area and accelerating local military efforts. Establishing an overall campaign in the rear area is basically necessary to stimulate local military efforts toward competent support for the political and military missions of the party. In turn, developing the strength of local military efforts effectively and forcefully stimulates the overall campaign of the rear area.

The strength of local military efforts stems from the strength of the overall campaign in the rear area. As the strength of the overall campaign increases, local military efforts gain greater stability and acquire a capability for forceful expansion. A lack of strength is the primary reason for the development of complicated problems in local military efforts. Every advantage or difficulty encountered in local military efforts is mainly due to their strength, and to a lesser degree, to the nature of the military

efforts itself. Therefore, the leadership of party committee echelons over local military efforts, in addition to providing vocational and specialized military leadership, has another very important function: to provide close leadership over all social activity with a view toward competently supporting the requirements of local military efforts. It can be said that leadership over local military efforts is in substance leadership over one "changing" effort, which transforms the overall strength of the rear area into the unbeatable strength of the people's war. Therefore, with regard to the responsibility of a party committee echelon to provide leadership over local military efforts, there are two points requiring attention:

First, doing what is necessary to increase the overall strength of the campaign.

Second, doing what is necessary to "change" that overall strength into specific combat strength for all of the people.

Those two concepts are intimately related. As the overall strength of the campaign grows, greater advantages will be gained in the effort to "change" that strength into power for the people's war. It is like a tree in that only with strong roots can the top be healthy. However, if the overall campaign is strong but attention is not devoted to the "change," the strength of the people's war will be very limited and the overall campaign will not be able to maintain its strength in the long run.

In a situation where the country is carrying on a national salvation war, every locality in the great rear area of North Vietnam can acquire a stable strength only when all of its potential is constantly changing and changing well to become the overall strength of all of the people. Our fine system itself contains a great capability to create the invincible combat power of all of the people. It is necessary only to strive to develop those capabilities properly so as to be able to motivate the all-people and overall war with all of its meaning. We cannot believe that only on the front lines, the place where the violent war is taking place, do these patterns of the people's war develop effectively and forcefully, while in the rear area, that pattern is limited in its effect. The above-mentioned idea is totally wrong from a standpoint of both theory and practice because the rear area is tightly interwoven with the front lines to become a united strength and as a result, the pattern of the people's war develops effectively and forcefully not only on the front lines but also in the rear area.

Actual experience has shown that in those places where the party committee echelons provides overall and close leadership and skillfully develops the mutual effects of local military efforts and other efforts, such efforts as: party building, economic expansion, cultural expansion, and so forth, are done well; and local military efforts are also performed well. On the contrary, in those places where the party committee echelon is not fully aware of the above-mentioned things, it is impossible to avoid administrative problems and passiveness in the accomplishment of missions relative to local military efforts.

Recent experience has also shown that in those places where they are striving to build high quality local forces, are concerned with the overall campaign in the rear area, constantly look to the elements, and stay close to these elements they create an eager revolutionary atmosphere among all of the people, thereby allowing the townships, enterprises, and neighborhoods to gain political stability, military and economic strength, and a poor campaign changed into a good one. Places that have been good become better and at the same time, local military agencies get closer to their units and train cadres realistically. Only by following that direction can we build a strong self-defense and militia corps which will serve as the foundation of the armed forces, build a stable foundation for the people's war, and build a large reserve force that will ensure a constant supply of manpower and materials for the front lines under any and all conditions. Indications of military deterioration, inactiveness and fear of difficulty, must be overcome.

In order to help all party committee echelons provide total and constant leadership over the elements and various other activities in the rear area, it is necessary to constantly and actively coordinate with local military agencies, and to become deeply involved in and provide competent support to every requirement relative to local military effort while at the same time, doing well in all other efforts in the localities. Every sector and every force must actively coordinate with one another in order to work together in support of the common goals, and to develop to the highest possible degree the strength of the all-people and overall war against the United States.

2- The relationship between building up forces in the rear area and mobilizing combat support forces.

In war, this relationship changes rapidly because it is subject to the most forceful and direct actions of the war. Also as a result, its conflicts often are born and develop quickly. In order to properly resolve this relationship, it is necessary to be very active and farsighted. This is a very fundamental idea in military leadership. That fact means that it is necessary to rely upon the basis of fully projecting the requirements of the front lines in order to carry out the building up and accumulation of forces in the spirit of total activeness, urgency, meticulousness, and overall perfection. It is necessary to skillfully bring every capability to bear upon this matter and the earlier it precedes the requirements of the war, the better. All problems of passiveness, administration, and assembly in mobilizing forces stem from a far reaching cause: a failure to actively work at building up forces and a failure to fully understand the position on the longterm fight and the aggressive revolutionary spirit within the strategic concepts of the party.

Maintaining the highest degree of activeness in building up and accumulating forces is not limited to the period prior to the war, but must continue when the war starts and throughout the war as well. Especially upon entering the final and decisive period of the war, we must strive even more to build up and accumulate forces. This is a longterm problem which exists even after the war has ended because it has a vital meaning to the nation as

long as imperialism survives in the world. Within the relationship between building up and accumulating forces and mobilizing all forces directly in the war, the building up and accumulation of forces is a most fundamental and decisive aspect. If resources for the accumulation of forces are abundant, the relationship between building up and accumulating forces and mobilization gains a stability necessary for ever-increasing balanced expansion as the fight against the enemy continues.

In war, there is an ever-growing mobilization of combat forces. As a result, it becomes more necessary for us to continuously increase the rate of building up and accumulating forces. Of course, the potential of all sides participating in a war diminishes during the war. However, according to the line of the people's war, war also presents an excellent opportunity to expand the active factors among the people and to constantly expand our overall potential at a very high rate. Therefore, the building up and accumulation of forces on our part is possible and must be done far and away in advance of the requirements of mobilization.

The building up of forces must be aimed at meeting the immediate requirements of the war and accumulating the forces necessary to meet the longterm requirements of the war. If we do not systematically, scientifically, and totally build up forces in the long run, it will be impossible to achieve results in accumulation of forces.

To address the accumulation of forces is to address the problem of resources of those forces for the long run. As the war grows longer, those resources must become greater. In building up, we must fully understand the position on the accumulation of forces. Accumulation is one of the important contents of building up and is a direction and a requirement of building up. If building up is not done well, accumulation will not be done well.

With regard to military leaders, their greatest fear is not a powerful enemy because we have the unbeatable people's war under the skillful and creative leadership of the party. Neither are we afraid of inactive elements arising during the war because we have the invincible strength of Marxism-Leninism. Our greatest fear is that we might allow the difficult and complicated environment of war to limit the regular progress, or interrupt the advance, of the process of building up and accumulating forces. If the advance in building up and accumulation of forces is interrupted at any time or any place, it means that we have temporarily given in to impulsive factors, the source of inactiveness during war, at that time and in that place.

When committed, main force units initiate one or more battles which are interspersed with periods of building up. However, in the building up and accumulation of forces during wartime, we cannot use individual or special periods, but must rather open the attack continuously and forcefully on all fronts. The continuous force in building up and accumulating forces in the rear area is the primary resource from which the battlefield obtains the strength for continuous attacks.

The forces used in this building up and accumulation during war include manpower and material, technical, and combat support elements. But man is the primary and the most important force because he directly takes part in the war and creates and develops the strength of technical, material, and combat support elements.

The largest goal of creating manpower during war is to establish manpower with a strong combat posture, with the conditions necessary for ever-improving response to the requirements of an all-people, overall war, and with modern characteristics. The combat posture of manpower during war is first of all dependent upon the overall training process of that manpower of all ages and from various backgrounds. Therefore, we cannot take training lightly for any age group, (including teenagers on up), and in a particular age group, we cannot ignore any aspect of training.

We must devote attention to forging, applying, and developing the most progressive manpower training experiences, both on the front lines and in the rear area in order to constantly build up the active factors in men of all ages, as well as for each man in every age group, to ensure that we create the best possible combat posture for each citizen of the fatherland. We also have a responsibility to provide in-depth education for every citizen, from youths to old people, so that they will do anything, hold any position, work on the front lines as well as in rear areas, and strive to make a significant contribution to the war for the independence and freedom of the fatherland and the happiness of the people. Those people approaching military age and those who are old enough to belong to the people's armed forces must especially be totally and well prepared so that they will stand ready to provide unconditional service as required by the fatherland.

Therefore, the building up and accumulation of combat strength for the broad masses in war is an extremely urgent and important requirement, which must be carried out in an urgent and regular manner in order to maintain and expand the capability for continuous attacks during the war.

In order to do this, it is necessary when guiding toward accomplishment to rely upon the combined strength of all aspects of activity, every force, and every organization in society and to apply every measure effectively and with determination. It is necessary to have coordination between political, economic, cultural, and educational activities; between party, government, and mass organizations; between military agencies and all sectors and groups; between the front lines and the rear area; between families and societies; and between ideological efforts, organizational efforts, and the establishment of policies. It is also necessary to implement it throughout the party and among all of the people and the entire army.

The building up and accumulation of forces must also be closely tied to support for all combat readiness and combat requirements in a specific and effective manner. There can be no excuse for letting up on the mission to mobilize forces in support of the front lines. At the same time, it is necessary to employ the mobilization of combat support forces as a check on

the process of building up and accumulating forces and on that basis, to make even greater efforts to do well in this area, thereby rapidly improving our combat posture even as we experience the violent challenges of war.

3- Properly resolve the relationship between the economy and the national defense.

The economy is the foundation of social life and the "leading element of personal violence."⁽²⁾ It is also a fundamental condition necessary to building up a stable rear area in the people's war. Economic expansion ensures that the people enjoy a full life. As a result, the people become more enamored of the system and more determined to hold on to the country. It also ensures rear services for the armed forces: grains, weapons, medicine, equipment, communications equipment, supplies, and so forth. In modern warfare, armies are large and mobile and as a result, generate an increased demand for a source of abundant manpower and a large, strong, very scientific rear services system.

Under the socialist system in North Vietnam, because of the ever-growing accomplishments of the three revolutions, we can use many new political, spiritual, ideological, organizational, material, and technical elements to develop the integrated strength of the people's war and the superiority of proletarian military science over capitalist military science.

The strengthening of national defense and of the revolutionary violence apparatus in order to carry on the class and national struggle aimed at protecting the fruits of labor, the fatherland and the system is one of the fundamental responsibilities of the dictatorship of the proletariat throughout the transition from capitalism to communism. Our country is the outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia and maintains a vitally important strategic position. It must therefore often oppose powerful imperialists, and as a result, must be concerned with strengthening national defense.

During the current anti-United States effort for national salvation, along with developing the absolute political and spiritual superiority of our people, we must constantly strengthen economic and national defense potential and use it in accordance with the party line on the people's war with a view toward totally defeating the imperialist U.S. aggressor. Only by relying upon the basis of a proper combination of the economy and national defense can we rapidly and properly develop both economic and national defense potential, avoid going in circles, and conserve manpower and materials in war.

There can be no conflict between the economy and the national defense. If in fact a conflict does erupt, it means that we have not tightly or accurately coordinated them. We cannot give special preference to either the economy or national defense. On the contrary, whatever is in the interests of the economy must also support the interests of national defense; and the reverse is also true. The necessary thing is that coordination must be skillfully calculated in order to constantly bring about the greatest common interest for both the economy and national defense, in the immediate future as well as in the long run.

In order to be certain of the proper guidance and to closely organize coordination between the economy and the national defense, we must fully understand the party lines on politics, military affairs, and economic expansion. At the same time, we must study and fully understand the patterns of the revolution, the war, and the economy, especially the patterns of the socialist economy and the relationships among those patterns. On that basis, we must fully study the profound effect of the pattern of war and revolution in our country as they relate to the relationships between the economy and national defense. At present, we must devote attention toward using manpower in such a way as to obtain a balance that will ensure production, the war, and full support to the front lines under any and all conditions. The assignment of important production elements must ensure that the requirement for expanded production is met while at the same time, guarding against enemy attacks. On the other hand, we should not believe that it is only necessary during wartime to acquire a close relationship between the economy and national defense because the accomplishment of that relationship is aimed at supporting both immediate and long term requirements. Depending upon their special characteristics and specific missions, all localities must establish both immediate and longterm requirements relative to coordination between the economy and national defense.

The conduct of war is usually very complicated and as a result, establishment of the longterm and immediate requirements of the relationship between the economy and national defense is also a regular process which is constantly undergoing adjustment. We should not believe that there will be an entirely definite coordination throughout the long period of time. This would be an estrangement from the realities of war and revolution. However, it is also necessary to fight against all indications of extended indecision when establishing the direction of specific coordination during specific periods.

In the process of coordinating between the economy and national defense, we always use longterm requirements to clarify immediate requirements, overall requirements to clarify limited requirements, and the political and military mission, and the direction of economic expansion to clarify the framework of coordination between the economy and the national defense. On that basis, it is necessary to fully study and guide the framework of specific coordination between production and the war and combat readiness, between production and training and building up the armed forces, and between overall economic planning and overall national defense planning. We must fight against two deviations: first, oversimplifying the economy while considering national defense lightly; and secondly, oversimplifying military affairs while devoting little attention to the economy. Both of these deviations harm the common interests of the economy and national defense and present the creation of the greatest integrated strength necessary to defeat the enemy. On the basis of carefully calculating every actual and objective condition, party committee echelons must establish plans for each locality. Economic and military agencies must play the role of a competent staff which helps the party committee echelon in establishing specific plans. The process of implementing courses

of action and plans for coordination between the economy and national defense is a continuous struggle process necessary to overcome erroneous ideological concepts, as well as faulty ideas about the specific framework of the coordination. This is a very complex area of leadership and in order to promptly uncover and overcome those deviations, all party committee echelons must on one hand regularly control the direction of general ideology and leadership and on the other hand, be determined to uphold theoretical and scientific knowledge. At the same time, they must be deeply involved in attempting to fully understand specific economic and military problems. Only in this way can they avoid anxiety and passiveness.

Experience has shown that only when we establish a coordinated longterm direction can we properly establish a direction and plans for specific coordination in the short run. Therefore, with regard to anxiety over immediate direction and coordination, it is necessary to find a way first of all to clearly overcome problems in establishing a fundamental and longterm direction for that coordination. All of the problems relative to direction and guidance, as well as specific planning for coordination between the economy and national defense, must be united along the lines of the general guidance provided by the Party Central Committee. They must be fully understood at all echelons and in all production elements and military units.

In order to strengthen the overall, absolute, and direct leadership of the party over local military efforts, all party committee echelons must strive to devote attention to ideological and organizational leadership. The leadership of the party over local military efforts presently encompasses a profound scientific and a totally ideological nature. It is based upon party lines and positions and the party's guidance over the people's war which is full of the determination and abundant experience in guiding armed conflicts of the party.

We must first of all regularly establish a truly proper guiding ideology over local military efforts, especially with regard to resolving the primary relationships mentioned above. We must provide widespread education throughout the party and among all of the people and the entire army about the anti-United States line for national salvation, the line on the building of socialism, the line on the people's war and overall national defense, and especially the resolution issued by the 19th Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the resolution recently by the Standing Military Committee of the Party Central Committee on local military efforts, and the various resolutions and directions issued by the Council of Ministers and the Premier on enforcing the laws on military obligation. On the other hand, we must bring a general guiding ideology to local military efforts to clarify the local situation and find the weaknesses, strengths, and leadership experience necessary to transform ideological awareness within the party and establish a specific guiding ideology for all party committee echelons and grass roots party organizations in the area of local military efforts.

In order to unite the guiding ideology of all workers of the party, the government, the military, and the people, and to transform that ideology

into revolutionary action, the most important thing is that we must do well in party building efforts and mass campaign efforts, with the emphasis on party building. With regard to the framework for building up the party, we must give special attention to improving the quality of party members at the grass roots level with a view toward ensuring that the anti-United States mission for national salvation and the building of socialism is carried out well. In building up strong party committee echelons, one of the important factors is the regular concern for leading local military efforts in accordance with the proper lines, positions, and ideology of the party.

On the basis of ensuring unity of ideological guidance and fully understanding the framework and requirements of the overall local military mission, all party committee echelons must become involved in the organization of specific guidance aimed at accomplishing the following two points:

1- Closely guide military agencies at all levels to perform their mission well and to fulfill their function as the staff which helps the party committee echelon in local military efforts.

In order to do this, the party committee echelon must strive to study and better understand the function of military agencies, and on that basis, regularly establish specific and effective requirements for party committee echelon leadership over all local military missions.

In developing the staff role of military agencies, it is necessary to make those agencies skillful in military affairs and knowledgeable about joint action with other sectors and groups. A factor worthy of attention at present is the necessity to rapidly bring the management and building up of reserve forces into the scheme of things from the grass roots level. It is also necessary to prepare specific plans and guidelines, to ensure constant and active support for the front lines under any and all conditions, and to surpass requirements for quantity, quality, and time.

2- Closely guide the organization for specific joint action between military agencies and other sectors and groups with a view toward accomplishing the military actions well. The party committee echelon provides guidance to the various sectors in accomplishing their mission and work well and it guides those sectors in developing a spirit of cooperation in active military agencies.

With regard to the above-mentioned joint action, there is an element of coordination between some definite sectors during periods of emergency and during short periods but there is also an element of coordination among many forces in many areas over a long period of time.

It is necessary to study the overall relationships that exist among all areas of activity and to avoid an overemphasis on concern only for the military affairs of military agencies while taking lightly the concern for leadership over joint action or regular and joint leadership over special military activities and overall, all other large and small activities of society.

At present, the all-people and total war against the United States for national salvation is being pursued with an evergrowing strength. With great subjective efforts, determination, and training to improve the art of leadership over the people's war, all party committee echelons will surely and rapisly lead local military effort ahead in great progress, thereby making the most worthy contribution to leading the anti-United States undertaking for national salvation of our people to total victory.

(1) Lenin: The disease of maintaining "Leftist tendencies" in the communist movement, Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1970, p 125.

(2) F. Engels: "Against Duy-Rinh, Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1960, p 291.

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PHUC LE GRADUALLY ADVANCES TO LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION

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Phuc Le is one of three township-sized cooperatives in Thuy Nguyen District (in the outskirts of Haiphong). It has little land, an average 1 sao 10 meters per capita, nearly all of which is salty and sour. However, after several years of hard and determined work, Phuc Le Cooperative has recorded several noteworthy victories. With its very small amount of fields, the cooperative has insured its people of a supply of grain and expanded the cultivation of industrial crops and livestock feed, thereby transforming livestock raising into an important production sector, and, at the same time, expanded many other sectors and trades with a resultant increasingly greater output. In 1970, the cooperative's total output value reached 1,007,616 dong. The trade goods supplied the state (including cooperative member pork) were valued at 295,600 dong. The amount of money accumulated by the cooperative equalled 79,341 dong. Despite this rather high amount of accumulated capital, cooperative member income was also high. The average monthly income per laborer in Phuc Le was 36.5 dong, including distributed profits, while the average for Thuy Nguyen District was only 11.8 dong.

For many consecutive years, Phuc Le has not only been the leader in cooperative construction and the expansion of production, but also a model progressive unit in the establishment of a new life, the maintenance of order and security, and the building up of militia forces and the various mass organizations in the city of Haiphong.

What has Phuc Le Cooperative done to gain such success?

Enlarging the Cooperative Scale to Meet the Need to Expand Production and Raise the Standard of Living

Phuc Le Township, from 1958 to 1963, had seven cooperatives, from 1964 to 1966, three cooperatives, and since 1967, one township sized cooperative. Phuc Le's collectivization and production developed as follows:

	Unit of measure	1963		1966		1970
		All 7 Coops	Avg per Coop	All 3 Coops	Avg per Coop	Township Size Coop
A. Cooperative Scale						
1. Coop member						
families	families	640	91	772	257	775
- % in the coop	%	79	79	98	98	99.9
2. Returned laborers	people	1,350	193	1,394	465	1,228
3. Farmland	ha.	226	32	279	93	280
B. Material-Technical Base:						
1. Total capital						
dong		196,684	28,097	453,053	151,017	719,333
- Capital/laborer	dong	145	145	325	325	585
2. Value of the material-technical base						
dong		116,684	16,526	252,616	84,205	603,887
- Average/laborer	dong	86	86	181	181	491
C. Labor Components:						
1. Cultivation						
people		1,117	168	1,135	378	763
- %	%	86.1	86.1	80	80	62
2. Livestock raising						
people		13	2	18	6	49
- %	%	0.9	0.9	1.3	1.3	4
3. Trades						
people		41	6	57	19	202
- %	%	3	3	4.1	4.1	16
4. Water control						
people		45	6	65	22	56
D. Income and Distribution:						
1. Total output value						
dong		387,354	55,336	631,579	210,526	1,007,616
- Product val/laborer	dong	286	286	453	453	820
2. Total new value						
dong		273,836	39,119	435,742	145,247	594,010
- Average/laborer	dong	202	202	319	319	483
3. Dist. to members						
Monthly income/laborer (including distributed cash)	dong	15.7	15.7	21.5	21.5	36.5
- Monthly income/person (including distributed cash)	dong	5.8	5.8	7.6	7.6	10.35
4. Coop accumulation						
dong		23,097	3,229	67,328	22,442	109,011
- Accumulated funds	-	18,723	2,674	53,704	17,901	79,341
- Public funds	-	4,374	624	13,624	4,541	29,670
5. Product value of goods supplied state						
-		34,535	4,933	107,554	35,851	195,606
- Average amount supplied state/laborer	dong	25.5	25.5	77	77	159.2

When Phuc Le consisted of seven small cooperatives, each averaged only 32 hectares of farmland. This small amount of land was, in addition, mixed with the lands of many neighboring cooperatives; consequently, the construction of water control projects for use at each cooperative encountered numerous difficulties. The average laborer within each cooperative was equipped with only 145 dong in capital for carrying out production (of which, 86 dong was spent on the material-technical base). Therefore, although Phuc Le had become collectivized, production was, due to its backward material-technical base, highly dependent upon nature; consequently, the yield and output of its various types of cultivation remained low. Although the majority of cooperative laborers concentrated on grain production (primarily rice), there was still not enough grain to eat and the income and standard of living of the cooperative member was low.

In 1964, in order to gradually overcome these difficulties, Phuc Le merged its seven small cooperatives into three cooperatives of larger scale. Each cooperative then had an average 93 hectares in farmland and 465 laborers, each equipped with 181 dong in capital for his material and technical base (if mobile capital is included, each laborer had 325 dong). As a result, the cooperatives of Phuc Le were able to change their adjoining banks and field areas, construct fields, and effectively institute water control. Half of their sour, salty fields were improved into good farmland. Consequently, the cooperatives were able to plant 16 percent more of their area with rice and 39 percent more with sweet potatoes. They also established additional fertilizer production and processing units. In 1966, because intensive cultivation could be carried out with greater effectiveness, their rice yield averaged 5.794 tons per hectare (on fields transplanted with two rice crops during the year) and their sweet potato yield averaged 10 tons per hectare. Each person produced an average 310 kilograms of grain (unhusked rice), 25 percent more than when the township consisted of seven cooperatives.

However, the soil conditions, capital, and material-technical base described above still did not put them in position to bring about significant change in the cooperatives' organization of production and labor. The number of laborers producing grain comprised 80 percent of the total labor force (or 93.7 percent of those engaged in direct production) of each cooperative, the number of laborers engaged in livestock raising comprised only 1.3 percent and those in the other sectors and trades made up only 4.1 percent of the total labor force of each cooperative. Although the living standard of cooperative members had improved in the area of grain, their earnings were still low due to their one crop cultivation (monthly income per person averaged slightly more than 7 dong); contributions

to the state and cooperative accumulation were also low. This situation demanded that Phuc Le advance directly to a larger scale cooperative before it could expand production.

When it expanded to township size, the Phuc Le Cooperative had 1,228 laborers (1) and 280 hectares of farmland. A total of 1,125 dong was invested in the material and technical base of each hectare. Each laborer was equipped with 585 dong in capital for production. Phuc Le Cooperative's production and standard of living underwent relatively rapid change, thus enabling it to engage in large-scale production.

In 1970, Phuc Le Cooperative had capital assets of 719,333 dong (70 percent of which was earned by the cooperative). Due to this large supply of capital, the cooperative was able to carry out the construction of comparatively good material-technical bases for cultivation (315,094 dong), livestock raising (101,426 dong), the other sectors and trades (108,608 dong), etc. These are very important material conditions for insuring that Phuc Le Cooperative successfully carries out intensive cultivation and increases the number of crops cultivated per year and, on this basis, resolves its grain problem while strongly expanding the cultivation of industrial crops and livestock feed, expanding collective hog raising to large scale, and expanding the other trades and sectors in order to efficiently employ those laborers freed from farming.

In 1970, Phuc Le Cooperative recorded surpluses in cultivation, livestock raising, and the other sectors and trades. Its total output value for the year equalled 1,007,616 dong, a 68 percent increase over 1967 (its first year as a township size cooperative). Product value per laborer in 1970 was 820 dong, a 66 percent increase over 1967. Agricultural product value (comprised of the products of cultivation and livestock raising) per hectare of farmland was 2,521 dong, 43 percent more than in 1967. Laborers received 456,396 dong, 58 percent more than in 1967. The commodities and goods (primarily food products including pork from cooperative member families) supplied to the state was valued at 295,600 dong. Cooperative accumulation amounted to 109,011 dong.

These results prove that, although it has little land (an average 1 sao 10 meters per person), Phuc Le has, with its present scale fields, deployment of labor, and material-technical base, been able to successfully organize large-scale collective

1. All labor data in this article regards primary laborers.

production, more effectively and efficiently deploy and utilize cooperative labor, make more thorough and economically effective use of its fields, and, as a result, can produce a large supply of products for the cooperative and raise labor productivity and field efficiency.

Gradually Implementing Established Production Guidelines and Efficiently Deploying Labor Within the Cooperative

Phuc Le is one of several cooperatives lying in the food production region in the outskirts of Haiphong; therefore, as regards the direction of its production, the production of food products (hogs, vegetables, and fish) is also of primary importance. The cooperative has focused its attention upon intensive cultivation and increasing the number of crops cultivated per year in order to successfully expand the cultivation of industrial crops as well as the cultivation of food products and livestock feed in order to provide an ample supply of grain to its people and step up the production of food products -- the cooperative's primary production sector.

To implement the above guidelines, Phuc Le Cooperative has concentrated its efforts upon cultivation. It excavated nearly 1 million cubic meters of dirt for the construction of a relatively complete water control network in its fields (consisting of various pump stations, a network of irrigation and drainage canals, canal bridges and locks, etc.) which provides ample irrigation water to 80 percent of its field area for periods of drought lasting approximately 3 to 4 months. At present, only about 10 percent of Phuc Le's extremely marshy area is threatened by floods during the season of heavy rains. The cooperative has also directed its attention to strongly expanding livestock raising and now averages 3.3 hogs per cultivated hectare and has, as a result, rapidly increased its supply of livestock manure. Its sources of green manure, particularly duckweed, have also been strongly expanded. The cooperative also produces enough lime for its fields and buys much chemical fertilizer. In 1970, an average 21 tons of fertilizer (livestock manure) were applied to each hectare under grain cultivation. The effect of water control (fresh water for irrigation and the desalinization of fields), fertilizer, and other intensive cultivation techniques has transformed the majority of the cooperative's salty and sour fields into good farming land. A planned allocation of plant varieties was also devised; the cooperative planted many new, fast growing, high yield varieties. As a result, in 1970 the cooperative's rice yield averaged 6.1 tons per hectare (on two season per year rice fields) and its sweet potato yield averaged 9.8 tons per hectare. Although the amount of Phuc Le's area under grain

cultivation remained the same as every other year, grain (unhusked rice) output, due to the higher rice yield, was much higher, 1,443 tons, thus providing a successful solution to the cooperative's grain problem with an average 22 kilograms of grain per person per month.

Instituting good water control and improving its fields were effective measures which helped Phuc Le Cooperative transform one season fields into two season fields and two season fields into three season fields, thus raising the coefficient of field use above 2.2 and increasing the amount of cultivated area per person per year to 4 sao. Primarily as a result of expanding its area under cultivation by successfully cultivating more crops per year, Phuc Le now has to allot only 70 percent of its area under cultivation to grain in order to have an adequate supply. Also as a result, Phuc Le Cooperative had 63 hectares under vegetable cultivation and nearly 60 hectares cultivated with livestock feed. This land comprised 18.5 percent of the cooperative's area under cultivation. The cooperative's income for vegetables in 1970 reached 149,757 dong. In 1970, the cooperative produced 111 tons of grain and 674 tons of green vegetables as feed to support collective livestock raising. In addition, because grain output was much higher in 1970 than in any other year, the 2 percent of the unhusked rice allotted to household livestock raising amounted to more than previously as did the 50 percent of the miscellaneous grain appropriated for livestock raising. As a result, Phuc Le had enough feed to raise a collective hog herd of 1,000 head and a household hog herd of 1,600 head; in addition, it also raised laying ducks and other domestic fowl. In 1970, the cooperative's earnings from its collective livestock raising was 92,312 dong while family livestock earnings were 227,307 dong.

Consequently, today, with its 1 sao 10 meters of land per person, Phuc Le has to use only slightly more than two thirds of its land for grain cultivation in order to meet the grain needs of its members. The nearly one third remaining is used primarily to raise food products and livestock feed. The total product value from livestock raising and vegetable cultivation comprises 24.2 percent of the cooperative's total output value. If cooperative member family livestock raising is included, the value of the cooperative's food products is much greater. The products and cash income of the cooperative greatly depend upon these food production sectors. This fact proves that Phuc Le's food product sector has now become one of the several primary sources of cooperative prosperity.

On the basis of establishing the above mentioned profitable allocation of cultivation, Phuc Le Cooperative has been able to efficiently deploy and utilize its labor.

The increased yield and output of all crops resultant from the good growth of its cultivation sector caused the labor productivity at Phuc Le to increase greatly. In 1970, each worker engaged in cultivation at Phuc Le produced 1,863 kilograms of grain and 1,001 kilograms of vegetables, 2.2 times more grain and 3.4 times more vegetables than produced per farm laborer in 1963 and 1.5 times more grain and 2.8 times more vegetables than produced by one farm laborer in 1966. As a result, only 62 percent of Phuc Le's total labor force is engaged in cultivation. (If those engaged in the production of pure hog feed on the "5 percent" plot allotted for collective hog raising are excluded, the number of laborers engaged "solely" in cultivation comprises only around 55 percent).

The laborers freed from cultivation and deployed into collective livestock raising (which consists of a livestock raising unit and a team producing green feed for hogs) comprises 4 percent of the cooperative's total labor force. If those in cultivation units engaged in the production of pure feed for hogs are included, the total number of laborers directly supporting hog raising is 129, or 10 percent of the cooperative's labor force. If these people engaged in the production of pure feed are put under the management of and utilized by the collective livestock farm, it will be possible to practice the intensive cultivation of livestock feed and thereby insure an ample supply of standard quality feed for livestock and the good development of livestock as well.

The Phuc Le Cooperative has experience in large-scale hog raising and has earned a profit at it. Each of the cooperative's laborers engaged in hog raising annually produces products worth 600 dong at the new rate (each laborer engaged in cultivation produces only 487 dong). Therefore, the more laborers that are absorbed into profitable livestock raising, the higher the cooperative's income; this is also a way by which low-productivity laborers still engaged in cultivation can be transformed into higher productivity laborers, a way consistent with the basic need of redeploying the labor within our present agriculture in order to advance to large-scale production.

However, the amount of laborers shifted to the Phuc Le Cooperative's livestock sector has been held at a certain number. The majority of the laborers freed from cultivation have been used to expand the other trades and sectors. At present, the number of laborers engaged in the blacksmith, carpentry, masonry, lime, brick, tile, boat transportation, bean curd processing, weaving, ready-made clothing, and other service trades at Phuc Le comprises 16 percent of the cooperative's labor force. The products and jobs produced and performed by

these sectors and trades have, first of all, had the effect of providing comparatively good support of the need to expand the cooperative's production and construction, promptly meeting the everyday needs of cooperative members, and supplying the state approximately 55,000 dong worth of lime, bricks, and tiles per year. The average sector and trade laborer annually earns 800 dong (at the new rate) and the earnings of Phuc Le's sectors and trades presently comprises 26.3 percent of the cooperative's total output value.

The above change in the organization of labor at Phuc Le recorded initial success because it created a high output value (1,007,616 dong); product value per laborer during the year was also high: 820 dong (the equivalent of 2.7 tons of unhusked rice), an 87 percent increase over the product value per laborer during 1963 and an 81 percent increase over 1966, years during which the cooperative still engaged in one crop cultivation and had yet to undertake the new division of labor. These results reflect the necessary development of an agriculture progressing from subsistence production to the production of many goods and commodities and gradually advancing to large-scale agricultural production.

Successfully Managing the Cooperative's Collective Economy

Phuc Le now has a rather large amount of fields, labor, and capital, but the cooperative's good management of them has had a good effect upon its production and construction.

The cooperative has tightly managed and made good use of its land under collective ownership. During the past several years, there have been very few cases of cooperative land being taken for private use. There have also been very few sharp disputes over labor or fertilizer between the subsidiary household economy and the collective economy, thus, the cooperative has been in a better position to deploy collective labor and draw up collective production plans. The cooperative has assigned people the responsibility for all of its materials and all are carefully stored, consequently, they are rarely lost or damaged; however, the use of materials (such as tools, seeds, and fertilizers) is still not marked by high efficiency. A number of cases of violations of collective property regulations have been promptly detected and appropriately handled. In addition, there have been no major cases of corruption or theft of cooperative property. At Phuc Le the daily, monthly, and quarterly receipts and expenditures are rather high and the accounts somewhat complicated; however, due to the cooperative's relatively strict compliance with financial regulations, rules, and procedures, there has not been

one major case of corruption or loss during the past several years. The workpoints awarded cooperative members are clearly recorded and publicly announced at fixed times. The distribution of commodities and goods is fair, rational, and democratic. Recently, the new production relations established at Phuc Le were strengthened in many other townships within Thuy Nguyen District primarily because the cooperative had managed its land, property, and capital comparatively well and had instituted fair and rational distribution, thereby making its cooperative member farmers confident about earning a living collectively.

In its use of property and capital, Phuc Le Cooperative weighs the pros and cons involved, conducts careful audits, and avoids operating "regardless of cost." The majority of its capital has been efficiently used to give the most effective support possible to the cooperative's production and standard of living. The capital used in the construction of the other areas within the cooperative comprises only about .6 percent of the value of the cooperative's fixed assets (3,539 dong). The material-technical bases which Phuc Le has built are stable in nature, relatively large in scale, and can be used for many years. This strong operating position has made cooperative members more confident and more involved with the cooperative's construction and development. Phuc Le has many production sectors and its income and expenditures are high; however, each source of income, from its primary to secondary production regardless of how much income they produce, is fully accounted for down to the very last item. Each expenditure and deduction is carefully calculated and expenditures to each sector and for each job are recorded in full detail. This method of clear economic accountability has made it possible for Phuc Le to avoid considerable loss and waste of materials and money and stimulated profit making production improvements in cultivation, livestock raising, and the other sectors and trades, consequently, sectors no longer show the losses they once did. As a result, Phuc Le today produces 2.4 dong in product value with every dong of capital. However, Phuc Le Cooperative's financial management is not as good as it can be. Production expenditures still make up over 41 percent of the cooperative's total output value. Consequently, product costs are still high and labor productivity is restricted. At present, Phuc Le Cooperative's largest financial problem is figuring a way to raise labor productivity and cut production costs. Only when this is accomplished will Phuc Le Cooperative's business earn high profits. In the area of labor management, the various regulations regarding work and compulsory labor at Phuc Le are put before the cooperative's members for their discussion and decision, afterwhich each component within the cooperative is tasked with strict compliance with them. Phuc Le Cooperative has also

focused its attention upon managing and urging its members to fully comply with the various regulations regarding compulsory labor. As a result, everyone works the stipulated number of hours per day and days per month. During their primary hours of work, all cooperative members engage in production for the collective and all work done in the subsidiary household economy is performed during free hours or on days off. These work regulations have put the production labor of Phuc Le's members on a regular basis. The daily distribution and deployment of the productive labor of cooperative members to fields, the collective livestock farm, and the other sectors, trades, and areas of activity at Phuc Le is carried out according to plans and is coordinated and effective.

Phuc Le Cooperative has also organized various forms of specialized production within cultivation, livestock raising, and its other sectors and trades. The largest result of this specialization of labor has been that the cooperative has been able to develop the potential of each source of labor, economize on the use of labor, and, at the same time, increase the amount of work done by everyone. In 1970, the average laborer at Phuc Le worked 473 days, 421 of which were shared days at an average wage of .82 dong per day (the average in 1966 was only 325 workdays with 318 shared days and an average income of .7 dong per day; in 1963 the average laborer worked only 221 days with 216 shared days and an average income of .77 dong per workday). In general, the amount of work and products currently performed and produced by one laborer at Phuc Le has increased 2 to 3 times over 1966 and 1963.

Phuc Le's Cooperative's "contracts" are, in actuality, not very good and some jobs are not done exactly as they should be; for example, labor quotas and workpoint standards are frequently set very low (particularly within cultivation and non-contract work), which has led to the situation in which a person can average more than 1.5 workdays per day. This will naturally create sharp contradictions regarding distributed workpoints between the various production sectors within the cooperative and make it difficult to prevent the practice of "free workdays and workpoints" from developing and exercising a negative effect within production. However, in contrast to this shortcoming, Phuc Le's "three contracts" have generally included bonuses and rewards and, therefore, encouraged a spirit of active participation in productive labor on the part of its cooperative members and heightened their sense of responsibility to the work of the collective.

Looking After the Welfare of Cooperative Members, Actively Nurturing Labor Strength

On the basis of its expanded production, Phuc Le Cooperative has gradually organized the material and spiritual life of its members not only in order to meet the daily rising needs of its collective farmers and bring them closer to the cooperative, but also to maintain their ability to work and build new people.

In the struggle to organize the lives of its members well, Phuc Le has, first of all, focused its attention upon satisfying the essential needs of its members for food, shelter, improved health, and child care.

In order to improve the daily meals of its members, the cooperative has, in addition to encouraging and organizing the expansion of livestock raising and the cultivation of vegetables by each family, allocated some of the collective economy's vegetables, hogs, and fish for sale to families. The cooperative's marketing store not only supplies industrial goods, but also many types of food products to the cooperative's members. To solve its housing problem, the cooperative has expanded its brick and tile kilns, allocated a portion of its brick and tile output for sale to cooperative members, and, at the same time, established carpentry and masonry units which build homes at stipulated costs according to the needs of members and under the guidelines of "those who need houses now, receive them now, those who do not, receive them later; those with the necessary money, pay immediately and those without, have it deducted from their annual income." Due to the cooperative's help, 94 percent of the families at Phuc Le have had houses built, 90 percent have tile roofs, and 81 percent have water tanks.

In the area of cooperative member health care, the cooperative has one infirmary with 16 beds staffed by eight public health cadres, three of whom are physicians. Since it considers disease prevention of primary importance, Phuc Le has stepped up the morning physical education movement, the nucleus of which is its youth, and its movement to construct sanitation projects. Seventy-six percent of the cooperative's families now have wells, 65 percent have bathrooms, and 95 percent have standard two-compartment privies. Phuc Le Cooperative has given particular attention to safeguarding the health of mothers and children. In addition to organizing regular gynecological examinations, the cooperative offers specific forms of help to women giving birth. For example, each female laborer who gives birth or has a miscarriage receives 15 kilograms of unhusked rice and 15 days wages from the cooperative. Children born after the distribution of grain and unable to be

registered as part of the agricultural family, receive 5 kilograms of unhusked rice. Child care centers have received the cooperative's special attention. In 1963, Phuc Le had only three child care centers and its members did not want to send their children to them. Determined to overcome this situation, the cooperative appropriated public funds to repair its existing child care centers and build a number of new ones and, in addition, suggested to the party organization that it assign a number of young, capable, and enthusiastic female party members to take charge of them. Phuc Le now has 13 child care centers in nine production units, all of which are clean and have play yards, wells, bathrooms, and the toys children need. Of these 13 child care centers, six have a collective dining hall. Because the cooperative supplies its child care centers with meat, fish, sugar, and milk each month and sets aside a small amount of land to be used by attendants to raise extra vegetables for the children, the children still eat two comparatively good meals a day even though their parents contribute very little (only enough rice to feed the child and 1 dong per month). Each month, a physician or public health assistant examines the children and checks their growth.

In the past, women with children in child care centers, nurseries, or kindergartens had to annually contribute a certain number of workpoints. When the cooperative's public funds began growing steadily and rapidly, it assumed the responsibility for all child care center, nursery, and kindergarten expenditures, including the workpoints of their attendants. In 1970, Phuc Le took another step forward in the care of children by assuming the school expenses of all elementary students. This action had the effect of encouraging cooperative members to enthusiastically engage in productive labor. However, Phuc Le's public funds are presently limited; therefore, they must, first of all, be allocated for the expansion of public welfare projects.

The more production increases, the more it demands that man not only work with enthusiasm, but also have a new attitude toward his work and the necessary knowledge. Therefore, Phuc Le Cooperative has been particularly concerned with improving the spiritual welfare and deepening the cultural and technical knowledge of its members. The reading and club activities movement, as well as the mass art movement, have been accelerated. The cooperative has built a broadcasting station and installed nearly 500 loudspeakers in homes. Each production unit receives a subscription to the Nhan Dan and Haiphong newspapers. Phuc Le also has new countryside agreements designed to make everyone accustomed to a civilized life style and gain their voluntary participation in opposing backward customs and habits. Exorcism, fortune telling, and outmoded funeral and marriage customs have

practically been abolished. Supplementary education has been given special attention. At Phuc Le, which has both elementary and junior middle school supplementary education classes, all classes are held regularly, even during the transplanting and harvest seasons. Course contents are continuously being improved to be consistent with the actual needs of local production.

The educational level of Phuc Le's cadres and people has risen markedly. Of the 410 essential people needing further education (party members of all age groups, youth group members, and people between the ages of 15 and 30), 37 have only an elementary school education and 373 have a junior middle school education, 204 of whom have finished 7th grade. Of the 413 youth group members in Phuc Le (including those in its various schools), 20 have an elementary school education, 375 have a junior middle school education, 16 have a senior middle school education, and 2 have a college education. Of the total number of youth group members, 65 percent have finished 7th grade.

Each year, Phuc Le carefully estimates how many technical cadres its future development will require and in which sectors, after which it selects people to send to agricultural technical schools operated by the district or city. After their classes have concluded, the cooperative has those who attended them disseminate what they learned to the mass of cooperative members and find ways to apply it. The cooperative has also sent many groups of cadres to study the operational experiences of model units in Haiphong and other locations throughout North Vietnam and regularly conducts technical training drives and holds meetings to deliver special reports on matters concerning agricultural technology. For example, the cooperative recently conducted a training drive in the new method of transplanting and held many meetings at which special reports were delivered on spring rice, commercial cross-bred hogs, etc. When the decision has been made to expand a particular sector or trade, Phuc Le first of all focuses its attention upon training the necessary skilled workers.

In addition to the technical cadres assigned by the authorities to help the cooperative for short periods of time, Phuc Le has 17 middle level technical and economic management cadres (4 middle level farming cadres, 3 middle level hog specialists, 2 middle level fish specialists, 1 middle level water control cadre, and 7 middle level economic management cadres) and 3 middle level public health cadres. The technical level of the cooperative's members has undergone a distinct improvement. Nearly the entire female labor force is now skilled in plowing, harrowing, transplanting, and harvesting; more than

200 women can transplant more than 2 sao per day, some have even won prizes for fast transplanting from the district and city and one was selected to participate in the national fast transplanting contest. Approximately 70 women are skilled in selecting seeds, raising duckweed, processing hog feed, etc. The trades of lime baking, brick baking, tile making, and boat transportation all have the necessary amount of skilled labor.

In its work of looking after the living standard of the masses, one of the good experiences gained by the Phuc Le Cooperative was in closely coordinating the proper use of public funds with strongly encouraging a spirit of love and mutual help among cooperative members.

The cooperative's public funds are primarily used for general welfare projects, not for such non-policy expenditures as banquets and "parties"(2). All social subsidies allocated from public funds are governed by the proper rules and regulations; everyone within the cooperative can, when seeing the need for a subsidy for someone, suggest that the cooperative consider their case and thus avoid the loose, unfair allocation of subsidies.

Phuc Le Cooperative also regularly educates its members in considering one another as children of the same house in

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2. In 1970, Phuc Le appropriated public funds for the following:
- 9,494.80 dong for the construction and repair of a number of child care centers, nurseries, and kindergartens.
 - 14,759.40 dong for maternity allowances, welfare items for child care centers, nurseries, and kindergartens (consisting of allowances for attendants, the purchase of additional utensils and toys, additional food for children, etc.), and the school fees of elementary school students.
 - 5,103.30 dong for cultural and social activities.
 - 3,460 dong for various social allowances.
 - 560 dong for the protection of labor.
 - 243.90 dong in allowances for labor accidents.

The above expenditures amount to more than was appropriated for public funds in 1970 because of the existence of surplus funds carried over from 1969.

which "the haves help the have nots and those with few difficulties look after those with many." Under this teaching, the farmers at Phuc Le have performed jobs filled with meaning for one another. They have taken excellent care of the families of wounded and slain soldiers and families with people on remote battlefields by sending people during the harvest season to help families with few workers cut straw or by carrying their rice to their houses; when someone falls ill, cooperative members take turns preparing their medication and rice gruel. During the past several years cooperative members have given their time, materials, and supplies to help 21 families of wounded and slain soldiers build tile homes. The care provided families short of help around the house and the elderly and disabled within the cooperative by Phuc Le's members is quite thorough. They have helped three families with few workers each build a small tile house. When necessary, production units send people to take care of elderly people without anyone to depend upon.

Due to the thorough care provided them by the cooperative, cooperative members have confidence in the collective and the new production relations. The attitude of "one foot inside the cooperative and one foot outside" no longer exists and everyone works to truly become aware, technically skilled collective laborers. Phuc Le's practices help prove that combining ideological education with the expansion of production and effectively caring for and supporting man in all areas results in a higher sense of collective ownership on the part of cooperative members.

Building an Increasingly Stronger Party Organization in Order to Meet the Needs of the Political Task

The deciding factor underlying the above mentioned achievements by the Phuc Le Cooperative has been the correct leadership provided by the Phuc Le party organization.

The strength of the Phuc Le party organization is first of all seen in its correct policies.

In answer to the rightful question of how the people of Phuc Le could, with their 1 sao 10 meters of land per person, live, prosper, and fulfill their obligation to the state, the party members of Phuc Le determinedly led the masses in earning a collective livelihood. During the first several years, when the awareness of the masses was low and decadent elements were still plotting acts of sabotage, the agricultural collectivization movement in Phuc Le experienced several difficult stages and, at one point, nearly 150 families submitted requests to leave the

cooperative. During these "stormy" days, the Phuc Le party organization encouraged and taught its members to display exemplary concepts and be resolved to maintain the new production relations and, at the same time, knew how to coordinate the maintenance of order and security with heightening the awareness of the masses. When the cooperative's situation stabilized, the party organization promptly directed it in stepping up water control and improving its fields in order to expand the amount of area under cultivation and initiate intensive cultivation while gradually building the cooperative's material-technical base. Under the leadership of its party organization, the cooperative, having developed its spirit of self-reliance, worked to become self-sufficient in grain, expanded its livestock raising, vegetable cultivation, and other sectors and trades, built seacoast dikes, and established new production areas. The Phuc Le party organization also promptly directed the cooperative in expanding its scale to be consistent with the need to expand production. In addition, the party organization also regularly concerned itself with training a corps of technical and economic management cadres and actively looked after the people's health while paying attention to building a new man.

These correct policies of the Phuc Le party organization were the result of its strict, yet creative, application of the agricultural collectivization policy of the party and government to the situation existing in Phuc Le. These correct policies advanced both the Phuc Le party organization and cooperative to one victory after another; however, of value is the fact that the Phuc Le party organization was not satisfied with its achievements, rather, it continuously thought and worked to move the cooperative ahead more each day. One of the excellent expressions of this revolutionary-offensive spirit is that now, when each area of the cooperative is comparatively well developed, the Phuc Le party organization still leads the people of Phuc Le in building seacoast dikes and plans to open a new production area of approximately 350 hectares in order to further enrich the cooperative. Actual results have shown that the policies of the Phuc Le party organization have received increasingly stronger support from the masses. The deep confidence the masses have in it has encouraged the Phuc Le party organization to overcome each of its difficulties and move steadily forward.

While struggling to carry out its task, the Phuc Le party organization has also focused its attention upon strengthening itself, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in all areas.

When peace was reestablished, the Phuc Le Party Chapter consisted of only four party members. During the process of agricultural collectivization, it paid constant attention to party development. In 1963, as a result of its increasingly greater membership, the Phuc Le Party Chapter became a party organization. The Phuc Le party organization now has 185 members (58 men and 127 women) who comprise approximately 4.3 percent of the population.

Due to its increasingly greater membership, the Phuc Le party organization has been able to deploy leaders into practically every area of production and business within the cooperative. All cultivation units, sector and trade units, public health units, marketing stores, and schools are under the direct leadership of party chapters. The number of party members deployed into the various primary production sectors is as follows: 136 (73.5 percent of all party members) are in cultivation units and 29 (15.6 percent of all party members) are in livestock units or units within the other sectors and trades. Although the number of party members in a number of chapters (particularly those within the sectors and trades) is not fully in keeping with their assigned tasks, party chapters must, due to the needs of the situation, thoroughly understand and promptly resolve the various problems arising within the production unit or installation under their charge; consequently, the party organization's leadership is, generally speaking, far reaching and timely.

In order to truly make its members the key assault forces in the construction and development of the collective economy, the Phuc Le party organization has regularly educated them in the concept of setting examples for the masses, specifically, by heightening their ethics of diligence, frugality, honesty, integrity, and selflessness and resolutely opposing the dangerous "enemies" of cooperative construction such as leaving work or production, corruption, drunkenness, bureaucracy, and conservative thinking. To oppose these vices, the Phuc Le party organization adopted several active and effective measures. In addition to placing emphasis upon regular political and ideological education, the key cadres on the party committee and the party chapter executive committees have worked hard to uphold their role of setting examples for party members. Each month, or after each work drive, all party chapters hold self-criticism and criticism meetings so that their members can help one another improve and, at the same time, take a close look at and criticize the leadership of the party committee and the various party chapter executive committees. The Phuc Le party organization has held many meetings at which the masses have criticized cadres and party members.

The Phuc Le party organization's educational and ethical improvement work has been carried out under many appropriate forms. For example, whenever a party member spends little time engaged in production in the fields, those of the party chapter executive committee remind him of his duties and promptly suggest to the production unit command that they assign him specific jobs. When a party member borrows money from the cooperative and fails to repay it on time, those within the party chapter remind him to promptly repay his debt and, in addition, try to learn his family circumstances; if it is found that he is encountering numerous difficulties, they provide him with help in the form of personal loans with which he can repay the cooperative. This rational, understanding method of teaching has made it easy for party members to learn. However, when a party member has made a serious mistake which affects the general welfare, the party chapters in Phuc Le have enforced stern discipline. For example, when one party member was found to be embezzling public funds, his party chapter suggested to the cooperative management committee that it fully calculate the amount embezzled, force the party member to make full repayment, and, at the same time, appropriately discipline him. Thanks to cadres who set examples and party members who truly love, help, and have true concern for one another, those who do make mistakes generally quickly realize and rectify them. As a result of being regularly and thoroughly educated, almost every party member in Phuc Le has gradually rectified his incorrect thoughts and actions and upheld his exemplary assault role. In each field of activity within the cooperative party members "shoulder the responsibilities" and have the confidence of the masses. At present, each party member in Phuc Le(3) works more than 400 days per year, some as many as 450 days.

The Phuc Le party organization has also focused special attention upon heightening the theoretical understanding, cultural level, and the level of understanding of technology and economic management of its cadres and party members. In addition to making its members responsible for setting examples in studying culture and technology along with the masses, the Phuc Le party organization sends its cadres and party members to attend the classes conducted by the district and municipal party committees. The Phuc Le party organization also uses preliminary and final work evaluations in order to successfully

3. Excluding leading cadres and key management cadres.

carry out the party's political campaigns to improve its members. Many of the party organization's key cadres have set good examples in the study of culture while directly participating in the supervision of supplementary education classes and, as a result, have both encouraged and closely checked the spirit and attitude of party members toward their studies.

The overall level of the party members in Phuc Le has risen markedly:

Politically, nearly every party member has received training in the immediate situation and task and the basic task of the party member in short courses conducted by the district party committee. All party chapter executive committee members have attended the district's party school and all party chapter secretaries and party committee members have attended the municipal party school. Culturally, according to statistical data recorded at the start of 1970, 13.5 percent of Phuc Le's party members have an elementary grade education, 84.1 percent have a junior middle school education, and 2.3 percent have a senior middle school education. Experience has shown that the party members in Phuc Le, due to this high level of education, are able to learn science and technology more readily. In the area of economic and technical management, there are presently 15 middle level party members, 38 elementary level party members, and more than 100 who have received training in short courses on the fundamentals of economic and technical management. Due to their possession of this necessary knowledge, Phuc Le's party members are able to delve deeply into guiding the everyday work of the cooperative and can avoid the situation in which party members provide only general political and ideological leadership. A number of party members have both demonstrated ability and made noteworthy contributions in the area of cooperative management.

Naturally, in comparison to the requirements of the task of advancing to large-scale socialist production, the political, cultural, technical, and economic managerial level of Phuc Le's cadres and party members must be raised even more quickly. Worthy of attention is the fact that some of the members of the party committee and the various party chapter executive committees have not been very successful in their studies due to their inability to skillfully coordinate them with their work. This has and will put certain limits on their ability to lead. However, the initial educational achievements recorded by the Phuc Le party organization have helped bring about the victories it has recorded in the area of leadership. They have also helped affirm our party's contention that in order to rapidly move agricultural production

forward rural party members must, in addition to possessing revolutionary fervor, rapidly increase their revolutionary knowledge.

The leadership ability of the Phuc Le party organization has been increasingly strengthened because the organization has continuously strengthened its close relationship to the masses and upheld their right of collective ownership. All the party organization's policies which have a bearing upon the cooperative's work are put before the masses for their discussion in order to gain everyone's clear understanding and determined implementation of them. In addition to conducting drives to encourage the masses to contribute their ideas on party construction, the Phuc Le party organization also regularly listens to the opinions of the masses so that it can promptly improve its leadership. The party organization has frequently given its opinions on the activity guidelines of youth group and Women's Federation chapters, assigned enthusiastic, competent cadres to lead them, and, at the same time, directed its attention to training progressive members of the masses to be youth group and Women's Federation cadres in order to strengthen the role played by mass organizations.

One problem presently facing the Phuc Le party organization is that of further strengthening the role played by the local government, particularly in the supervision of plans and production. If, at a township sized cooperative such as Phuc Le, this problem is not actively resolved, it can very easily lead to the situation in which party and cooperative management cadres undertake everything, thus making it impossible for the local government organization to fulfill its proper role or be as effective as it should be.

Several Problems Lying Ahead of the Phuc Le Cooperative

In the process of its development, Phuc Le Cooperative has also experienced some shortcomings and, in examining each area and job, some are found to be of less than excellent quality and some even of lesser quality than those at a number of other cooperatives in Thuy Nguyen District. However, Phuc Le Cooperative has several basic strongpoints and has made steady progress and is deserving of being a progressive cooperative. The cooperative's operation is good and the path it has taken has been a correct one. Research into the development and experiences of the Phuc Le Cooperative will yield much useful information, particularly for those cooperatives in similar circumstances.

However, in order to become a true large-scale producer, Phuc Le Cooperative must undergo new and stronger stages of development. In Phuc Le's present stage of development, a number of problems exist which demand good solutions. Below we have presented what we consider to be the basic problems:

Phuc Le Cooperative has established guidelines under which the production of food products is primary. Such a guideline is correct. For, only by following this guideline can the cooperative prosper and, at the same time, fulfill the obligation of a cooperative located in the outskirts of Haiphong. The problem raised is how can this production guideline be better implemented? At present, income from food production (livestock and vegetables) comprises only 24.2 percent of the cooperative's total output value. Therefore, in order to further expand its food production, Phuc Le must rapidly increase its hog herds (both those of the collective and those of cooperative member families) and expand its area under hog feed and vegetable cultivation. But, success in this area actually depends upon the cooperative's grain output. At present, many more efforts are needed just to insure the people of Phuc Le of a stable supply of grain. Due to its poor fields and the shortage of fresh water for irrigation, particularly during the winter-spring season, Phuc Le's rice yield, although it increases annually, is not genuinely high or stable. In 1970, Phuc Le's rice yield averaged only slightly over 6.1 tons per hectare. During the 1970-1971 winter-spring season, due to an 8 month drought, Phuc Le's rice yield was even lower. Therefore, Phuc Le must, in order to provide a stable supply of grain for its people and feed for its hogs so that it can rapidly increase hog herds and, at the same time, in order to be able to expand the amount of area under vegetable cultivation, research a more suitable allocation of crops, do a better job of intensive cultivation, and allocate additional land for livestock raising and vegetable cultivation (particularly vegetables of export value). With regard to technical measures, Phuc Le must pay special attention to quickly creating abundant fresh water sources so it can provide irrigation water during droughts regardless of their length.

To help Phuc Le successfully implement its production guidelines, the various state agencies in Thuy Nguyen and Haiphong should adopt reasonable regulations regarding the cooperative's grain and food products obligation. For example, they can permit Phuc Le to pay its agricultural taxes in pork instead of unhusked rice or vegetables instead of unhusked rice calculated according to the amount of land the cooperative has under the cultivation of vegetables for sale to the state and, once the cooperative has sold the state more goods and commodities

than required, the state can help the cooperative by supplying it with some grain.

Another problem related to implementing and expanding the cooperative's production guidelines is that of making more efficient use of Phuc Le's labor. At present, each farm laborer in Phuc Le works only .82 cultivated hectare. The reason for this situation is surplus labor. With the exception of such very busy seasons as the transplanting and harvest seasons, labor is not efficiently used to create new value. In order to meet the standard of one laborer per cultivated hectare per year, the problem of expanding the sectors and trades must be faced in a more positive manner. This does not mention the necessity of mechanizing its principle jobs in order to raise labor productivity and cut production costs. In past years, on the basis of calculations of its financial capital, labor, and management ability, Phuc Le expanded its production by employing measures which efficiently organized labor and using improved rudimentary tools. This resulted in several areas of efficiency for Phuc Le. However, in order to truly advance to large-scale production, the cooperative must, without fail, actively improve its tools and gradually mechanize its various production elements and, as a result, must make good use of labor freed in the process. To accomplish this, Phuc Le Cooperative must adopt a more specific plan for investing more labor and capital into water control, field improvement, the allocation of intensive cultivation areas, and heightening the coefficient of field use in order to further increase grain output. This is a matter which cannot possibly be overlooked. However, the cooperative cannot just depend upon its extremely small amount of land to gain prosperity and, particularly, to eliminate its surplus labor. Therefore, it must adopt a plan for strongly expanding the various sectors and trades. During the past several years, Phuc Le Cooperative has opened many sectors and trades outside of farming and livestock raising. Some sectors and trades, such as forging, carpentry, masonry, ready-made clothing, and haircutting, support the internal operation of the cooperative. Some are of a temporary nature such as the coarse cloth weaving trade. Other sectors and trades are of a self-sufficient production nature such as the brick, tile, and lime trades. Generally speaking, Phuc Le has opened its various sectors and trades on the basis of both the need to expand production and its own favorable conditions in order to support the cooperative and have products to sell on the outside. These sectors and trades have recently yielded realistic economic returns. However, they have yet to meet the cooperative's large business needs. Therefore, with regard to its present sectors and trades, Phuc Le Cooperative must conduct research into how it can expand and technically equip them so that they can absorb additional labor and labor productivity can be raised.

At the same time, on the basis of its special characteristics and conditions, the cooperative should also research the possibility of opening additional sectors and trades, for example, such as those of export vegetable cultivation, fishing, the raising of laying ducks, fresh and sweet water fish cultivation, etc.

Only when the above problems are concretely defined and researched can the Phuc Le party organization successfully organize the supervision and management of the cooperative and the cooperative adopt positive measures for preparing the capital, human, and technical conditions required for new stages of development. However, some of the problems raised above cannot be resolved by the cooperative itself. Therefore, Phuc Le must receive more active help from Haiphong and Thuy Nguyen District. With the cooperative's spirit of self-reliance and the help of the authorities, Phuc Le will most certainly be able to successfully solve the problems described above and move forward more strongly in the years to come.

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THE HEROIC TRADITIONS OF OUR NATION

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Heroic Traditions and Historic Responsibilities

Carrying out the sacred last testament of President Ho and the appeal of the Party Central Committee and Government, our people everywhere are courageously fighting and unselfishly working in determination to complete every mission, surpass every difficulty, and defeat every foe. The words of President Ho constantly urge us, "No matter what the difficulties or hardships, our people will surely be totally victorious. The American imperialists must surely leave our country." (President Ho's last testament).

The bellicose and brutal American invaders have perpetrated extremely barbarous crimes in our country. Chemical poisons have destroyed the vegetation on tens of thousands of hectares but cannot reduce the combat will of our people. Millions of tons of enemy bombs have constantly poured down on our villages and homes, murdering countless compatriots, but can never shake the determined-to-fight-and-win spirit of our people.

Where do these unusually high heroic qualities originate? President Ho taught us, "There is heroism because of the heroic collective. There is a heroic collective because of a heroic people, nation, and party."¹ Our people and nation have attained extremely great accomplishments mainly because our party has put forth a political line and correct organization, stimulating, training, and developing to the highest degree the spiritual capabilities of our people in combat. On the other hand, these accomplishments are also due to the fact that our party for 40 years has given special concern and sought understanding of the heroic traditions of our nation and developed these traditions on a basis of Marxism-Leninism. "Only when Marxism-Leninism has blended with the revolutionary traditions of the nation and become a national strength will conditions exist for the revolution to become easily more victorious."²

At the very beginning of the war of resistance, President Ho said to a suicide unit, "You are representatives of the self-respecting and independent spirit of our nation over thousands of years. This obstinate spirit has

been passed to you through the two Trung sisters, Ly Thuong Kiet, Tran Hung Dao, Le Loi, Quang Trung, Phan Dinh Phung, and Hoang Hoa Tham. You are now stubbornly continuing this immortal spirit to pass it on to countless Vietnamese generations in the future."³ President Ho also made a statement concerning the characteristic of our party of adeptly inheriting and developing the heroic traditions of the nation, "Our party is truly great. For example, our history records the story of Thanh Giong, a national hero who used a bamboo tree root to drive out foreign aggressors. During the first days of the war of resistance, our party has led thousands and tens of thousands of heroes following the example of Thanh Giong by using bamboo canes to strike the French colonialists."⁴

Each heroic action of our people is carried out in accordance with the requirements of the present revolution but all have a deep origin in the ancient traditions of our forefathers forged from one generation to another. These heroic qualities are constantly maintained, developed, and under the leadership of our party, elevated to the highest point. We are carrying out resistance against America for national salvation with qualities forged during the present combat and a continuous strength from 4,000 heroic years of our nation. It is possible to state that these 4,000 years have been roused by our party to accompany us in combat.

"Four thousands years of history stand to resist America." So said Pham Van Dong as he analyzed, "It is true that this is reality. All our forefathers, countless generations, and an entire nation with its past, culture, extremely glorious history, and all its traditions have stood up to accompany those engaged in resistance against America for national salvation with their flesh and blood."⁵ Le Duan also emphasized these traditions in our undertaking, "The resistance against America for national salvation spirit of our people at the present time is actually a continuation and high development of the spirit of struggle to build and maintain the nation of our forefathers. It is an inheritance and dialectical development of the nation's stubborn traditions."⁶

Actually, the 4,000 years of our nation are an epic poem of resolute and indomitable combat to build and maintain the nation. Our nation from one generation to another has upheld a spirit of incomparable courage, creativity, and strategic ability, using love and righteousness to defeat cruelty, weakness to defeat strength, and short commentaries to win long battles, simultaneously attacking and training to destroy many of the strongest aggressors in the world.

Our forefathers left us a beautiful country. We think of the spirit of labor diligence, optimism, and sagacity of our forefathers who poured countless amounts of sweat and blood into every field, hamlet, dike, stretch of road, and street corner belonging to us at the present time! These qualities live constantly in each Vietnamese, splendidly illustrated in our heroes and outstanding emulators and most beautifully personified in President Ho. "The strength of the Vietnamese nation and of President Ho at the present time is a strength which has developed from ten thousand generations. We feel this exciting strength in our people, stimulating us to fight."⁷

We understand that tradition consists of the prolonged habits formed in the way of life, thoughts, and actions of a nation. Tradition is a necessary condition in the process of maintaining and developing social life. Our people from their earliest beginning in relations with nature and society have gradually accumulated experience in production, combat, and daily activities aimed at supporting their own lives. This precious experience has gradually entered the psychology of man and been passed down from generation to generation to become tradition.

With tradition, social mankind accepts the achievements of those before, shortens the time, and does not grope and start over from the beginning. We are born in society and cannot choose for ourselves a separate way of life. Man must enter the orbit of history with the production formulas, social relations, and methods of living, behaving, thinking, and acting which are presently available and those passed down from previous generations. In the long history of our nation, countless fine traditions have been formed, stimulated by the public opinion of all society, and become the conscience and honor of each individual. They are expressed in diligent labor, courageous combat, loyalty, and indomitable resistance to the enemy. These qualities did not suddenly appear. They have been forged over many years in the fire of combat by the nation to become tradition.

Due to their formative conditions, traditions have both an active and passive effect.

The passive effect of traditions is revealed at times in which the historic situation and mission has changed and the old traditions are no longer appropriate but are still repeated, becoming obstructions to life.

In the old society, the traditions of the people could not help but be influenced by the ruling exploiter classes. The corrupt ethics of feudalism and the methods of thinking and working of the bourgeoisie could not help but leave profound remnants in the beginning of the new society. We understand why Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin expressed a most resolute attitude concerning such passive traditions. "The traditions of all generations past press heavily on those now living."⁸ The worker class with its thorough revolutionary spirit must make a "total break with the traditional ideologies."⁹ Naturally, we understand that this total break concerns the ideologies holding a commanding position in old society and obstructing the progress of new society.

Beginning to build socialism in the Soviet Union, Lenin deeply analyzed the harmful effects of backward traditions on every phase of activity. He said, "The strength of the habits of millions and tens of millions of people is most formidable."¹⁰ Stalin additionally stated, "These ancient customs and habits control millions of the laboring masses and occasionally envelop all levels of the proletariat."¹¹

The proletariat is the most advanced class, representing new society and thoroughly struggling against the old world. Nevertheless, when the worker class entered socialism, it carried some backward and odious traditions from capitalist society. Lenin emphasized this when speaking of education and ideology, "Workers building a new society have not become new men unhindered by the mud of the old world but are still standing up to their knees."¹²

President Ho also once criticized the improper attitude toward old origins which restore even the corruptions. He said, "In restoring old origins, the good should be restored but the bad must be gradually eliminated. It appears that something relatively good can be restored from last year but in doing so, the peculiarities and sacred ceremonies are also restored. Because of such restoration in the rural areas, many locations forget production and continue to beat the drum, sing, and loaf. Some townships contributed several million dong (old currency) to purchase clothing, hats, and boots. Is it correct to say that this is restoration of old origins? The good we must restore and develop while the bad we must eliminate."¹³ In several speeches on culture and literature, Truong Chinh also constantly recalled the above problem, "Vietnamese national culture consists of ancient characteristics and ethics of the people. It must be advanced by developing fine and beautiful things while eliminating the peculiarities and imperfections."¹⁴ However, how can we differentiate between the good and the imperfect or the beautiful and the bad? The best attitude is that based on the viewpoint of the worker class because "the workers class is unique, inheriting the fine traditions in history and standing on the pinnacle of man's intelligence in scientific invention and art creativity."¹⁵

Illuminated by Marxism-Leninism and the ideology of our party concerning traditions and standing firmly on the revolutionary and creative viewpoint of the worker class, our people are resolutely struggling to repel every outmoded tradition obstructing our progress but are also wholeheartedly upholding appreciation and developing the fine traditions which are stimulating us like a great power.

The most outstanding of our nation's precious traditions is the heroic tradition. This tradition has been maintained and upheld from generation to generation to become a profound feeling, a way of life of all the people, and a noble pride of each individual. We not only accept the heroic traditions of the nation but also the correct attitudes and conscientious concepts of our forefathers concerning these traditions.

Because heroic qualities must first of all be formed on the basis of production and combat, any society and nation has its own heroes. In our nation, the heroic qualities are consciously cultivated, forged, and continued among our people.

Heroes, heroic thoughts and actions, and heroic accomplishments in labor and killing aggressors have become the precious and respected things in our nation. Heroism is worshipped in the temples, praised in art, and recalled in every daily activity.

The profound feeling of our people toward heroism has been crystallized in works of art from the very first myths.

Everyone should treasure those who have used their intelligence and abilities in national salvation to maintain national independence. Phu Dong and scores of other hamlets worship Thanh Giong. Thanh Giong has entered a great many folk legends from one generation to another first of all because he was a national salvation hero.

Everyone should additionally treasure those who have merit in resisting natural disasters and protecting production in this country of yearly floods. The legend of "Son Tinh and Thuy Tinh" reflects the violent struggle of our people in the process of subduing a severe nature. Son Tinh, this precious spirit, was first of all a hero in production.

The two Trung sisters and Madame Trieu have lived for 2,000 years in the admiration and love of all our people. Throughout the Dinh, Le, Ly, and Tran reigns to the present time, has there ever been a period in which the Vietnamese have not recalled these resolute and indomitable examples for encouragement?

Living, studying, and following the example of heroism are traditions which have continued from one generation to another. From Ly Thuong Kiet and Tran Hung Dao through Le Loi, Nguyen Trai, and Quang Trung to President Ho and our people at the present time, every hero has recalled a previous hero to study, follow the example, and rise even higher. Tran Hung Dao used the example of ancient heroes to his own generals and men, "What generation hasn't had classes of loyal subjects and righteous men who sacrificed themselves for their country? If these classes had stubbornly followed the normal womanly habit of dying of old age in the corner, how could they have left a reputation in the chronicles of history which has remained eternal for countless generations?" (Proclamation to Officers and Men). In their "Binh Ngo Announcement," Le Loi and Nguyen Trai also recalled the traditions of the country that "Every generation has heroes" to "nurture independence" and "occupy one direction." Faced with the aggression of the Thanh Dynasty, Nguyen Hue also took the example of our heroes from previous periods to stimulate the army and people, "The Han reign had Trung Nu Vuong, the Tong reign had Dinh Tien Hong and Le Dai Hanh, the Nguyen reign had Tran Hung Dao, and the Minh reign had Le Thai To, men who did not unfeelingly sit and observe the brutality but gained the agreement of the people and raised a revolutionary army to attack, defeat, and pursue the enemy back to the north." (Imperial Ordinance of Unity). With the heroic bearing of those before and he himself, Quang Trung advanced with a determined-to-win spirit, "Let us celebrate Tet beforehand, waiting until the seventh day of the first lunar month to enter Thang Long where we will hold a great banquet. Mark our words to see if they are correct." (Imperial Ordinance of Unity).

The heroic examples of those before were constantly recalled by Cao Ba Quat and Phan Boi Chau, revolutionary fighters against France. These heroic examples were especially emphasized and upheld by President Ho and the

leaders of our party. President Ho upheld our pride for our national heroes, "We have a right to be proud of the glorious pages of history during the eras of the Trung sisters, Madame Trieu, Tran Hung Dao, Le Loi, Quang Trung, etc. We must remember the merit of our national heroes because they are symbols of a heroic nation."¹⁶

Appreciation for the heroic traditions of the nation has created among our people a legitimate pride, becoming a spiritual force which constantly urges us with great actions to save the people and country and causes us to disdain selfish, petty, and lowly behavior. When Ly Thuong Kiet spoke of "the southern part of our Fatherland," when Nguyen Trai recalled "our great Vietnam from before," and when our party leaders speak of the traditions of 4,000 years, we recognize in these words the great strength of national pride. This pride reminds our people how to live and act to be worthy as Vietnamese in order to avoid losing face with the heroes of before.

It is primarily due to this great strength that we must seek understanding, establish heroic traditions on a scientific basis, and ascertain the origins, characteristics, and patterns of these traditions.

Only in this manner can the heroic traditions of each Vietnamese be further developed to answer the challenges of the present revolution and the requirements of future society. With this spirit, we are confident that the heroic torch burning for 4,000 years will flame even higher during our age and will remain eternal in the hands of our children.

Rich Expressions of Vietnamese Heroic Tradition

The rich expressions of Vietnamese heroic tradition through countless generations of building and safeguarding the nation must be deeply studied by a great many philosophers, historians, and sociologists. These expressions stand out in the abilities of the Vietnamese to think, act, fight, and produce.

Revolutionary traditions do not give us an interest and pride solely for us to feel complacent over these traditions. Heroic traditions must be roused in each Vietnamese, becoming a great strength in everyday undertakings. Therefore, the problem is not solely to recount the expressions of heroic traditions but to seek the profound origins, formative patterns, and inexhaustible development capabilities of these traditions.

Vietnamese are not born with the characteristics of heroic tradition. The finest spiritual values are not endowed but must be created from the capabilities, intelligence, will, and actions of the individual. The heroic traditions of our nation have a profound significance in that they were not granted by God from the beginning but were the product of prolonged crystallization of sweat and blood under an environment of extremely difficult and arduous life, labor, and combat.

Spiritual qualities and stable characteristics of psychology are always formed and developed on a basis of social practice. However, it is a complex

changing process from social practice to psychological characteristics. It is impossible to simply explain these occurrences like a mathematical formula. It is impossible to eliminate or to stop with legends, folk literature, chronicles, etc. Marxism-Leninism demands an examination of the spiritual phenomena from the great social relations of production and combat, social economic structure, the effects of practical activity and realizations, the foundation and upper stratum, the individual and society, the objective demands of the medium, and the reciprocal capabilities of the nation.

First of all, the Vietnamese must adapt to fertile but extremely natural conditions. It is truly correct that "the right hand of these natural conditions gives while the left hand takes away."

The natural conditions granted us are extremely numerous. Yearly, 80 million cubic meters of silt from the Red River are spread over the delta in a layer 50 millimeters deep, banked up for rice, corn, potatoes, manioc, etc. However, the Red River also takes back what it gives. Each year when the rainy season arrives, it becomes extremely ferocious. With suddenly rising water levels, it causes terrible floods, sweeps away crops, houses, chickens, pigs, etc., and brings death, hunger, and cold. In the history of Vietnam, how many years have we escaped floods and broken dikes?

The climate of Vietnam with the rainfall and sunshine of the tropics has created a nation with four green seasons. The healing air from the Pacific Ocean, fresh breezes along the rivers, coast, and slopes of Sa Pa, Tam Dao, Ba Vi, and Da Lat, the scenery of Ha Long Bay, and the endless basins of the Mekong and Dong Nai Rivers regularly restore the health of the people. However, this climate also creates days of pouring rain and harsh sunshine with unbearable moments of bone chilling cold and hot and muggy weather. It also produces epidemics and disease which steal countless lives of men and animals, destroy trees and crops, etc.

The hills and mountains of Vietnam with their endless amounts of vegetation and metals supply our people yearly with valuable raw materials to build houses, repair dikes, promote production, raise the standard of living, etc. However, these hills and mountains have also taken the blood and sweat of our forefathers with ferocious animals, great rapids, thick jungles, swamps, etc.

The sea of Vietnam is an endless storehouse of marine products which recedes yearly to contribute additional land to the Fatherland, creating additional wide salt fields. However, this sea has also smashed countless boats and has numerous times risen to take life and property, pour salt water on the rice fields, and produce disastrous consequences for production.

The fields of Vietnam have nurtured our people for countless generations. During good years, these fields have produced sufficient food, warm clothing, and joy. However, "a bowl of rice in exchange for a bowl of sweat," the Vietnamese farmer has undergone extreme hardship to obtain rice.

The natural conditions of Vietnam are the first and most formidable challenge to our nation. Vietnam was one of the earliest cradles of mankind. Here, from the beginning, natural conditions have presented a challenge to mankind. If the difficulties can be overcome, maturity will come with glory and happiness but if they are not, heads will be bowed before the weather conditions with eternal destruction.

Natural conditions are a filtering medium. The history of mankind attests to the destruction of countless tribes because they could not overcome the difficulties or adapt to the environment, had to move from one place to another, and finally wasted away and perished. The people of Vietnam have remained close to and stood on this land because they have overcome the difficulties and dangers presented by natural conditions. However, it is not the difficult and dangerous circumstances which have trained mankind in the fine qualities but his subjective efforts and realistic capabilities in practice to train himself in the necessary qualities to survive and be victorious.

When speaking of the rich development of Greek society, Marx noted the characteristic of the Greek nation as a nation which matured like a robust child. The Vietnamese nation is also a robust child which has overcome the initial challenges of nature. Overcoming these difficulties, affirming a proper action attitude, and determinedly leveling every obstacle to maintain its own life and tribe are the initial subjective conditions allowing our nation to live, fight, and develop. From this, each success in labor creates additional experience and further increases determination. From this, every new difficulty stimulates thought and joins the people in mutual combat efforts. Under these conditions, the severity of nature is a flame which burns up every flimsy and weak element but forges the steel in life and struggle. Under these circumstances, if the left hand of nature takes back, it is mainly to allow us to collect much more from its right hand. If nature only treated us generously and allowed us to eat our fill, we would become sick and weakly, resembling a reed falling before the tempest and a candle flame extinguished before exposed to the wind. The challenging difficulties have caused our nation to mature like a tree which is no longer afraid of the wind and a flaming torch which can never be extinguished!

"Son Tinh and Thuy Tinh," the first myth of Vietnam, profoundly reflected the harsh nature of natural conditions and the struggle will of our nation against floods. The Red River became a monster and an evil spirit (Thuy Tinh) which yearly attacked with all its formidable force. However, our nation determinedly fought back in mutual efforts to stop the leaks and block the river. The higher the water became, the stronger the dikes. The more overbearing that Thuy Tinh became, the higher the struggle spirit of the people and Son Tinh. Son Tinh symbolizes this will against nature and Ba Vi Mountain, the home of Son Tinh, stands erect like a great statue of indomitable spirit.

Nature was subdued and steadily made more beautiful under the resolute will and creative abilities of the people. The Vietnamese people divided their natural conditions, established thought and ability, and closely coordinated their flesh and blood with nature to consider it as a fine work of

their own. Nature became a shining mirror in which the Vietnamese people could see themselves, their strengths, and their hopes. From the great mountains and rivers, the vast ocean, the endless rice fields, the egret wings fluttering in the afternoon, moonlight along the streams, and clumps of bamboo at the end of the houses, all are intimately and closely connected to the Vietnamese standing to maintain and protect this land.

The Vietnamese must constantly cope with the largest and most dangerous aggressors.

The Vietnamese built their own Fatherland with an extremely early civilization. The existence and growth of our nation has occurred in an environment regularly threatened from the outside. When the Au Lac nation was invaded by hundreds of thousands of troops, they thought it would be easy to raze the land and force our forefathers to kneel. However, the Vietnamese facing that existing crisis resolutely fought, smashed the invading army, and upheld an obstinate and indomitable will.

Throughout nearly 1,000 years of domination by feudal powers, our nation faced two roads, either to eliminate its status as a nation, become a prefecture of a foreign country, destroy its civilization, and totally obliterate its language, customs, habits, and every traditional characteristic or to determinedly and perseveringly fight from one generation to another, continually rising after suppression until final victory. Our nation has chosen the second road.

The Trung sister uprising opened a glorious page of history of our nation in struggle to achieve independence and freedom. Throughout 1,000 years of domination, the heroic flame kindled in the Trung sister uprising was constantly extinguished but constantly blazed up never to be put out!

Following that was a period of national independence lasting thousands of years. Throughout this historic period, our nation encountered new challenges.

Countless times, the existence of the Fatherland appeared extremely fragile before the strongest aggressor armies in the world. Kneel and submit or resolutely fight, dying rather than willingly losing the country? Our nation determinedly followed the second road, unafraid of the enemy, arduousness, and death, overcoming every difficulty to win victory.

Our proverbs state, "Fire tests gold, difficulty tests strength." Here, the difficulties of history not only tested the strength of our nation but were also conditions forging the very beautiful qualities of heroism.

Our nation was not born as a marvelous country with every invincible capability. In the field of social struggle as well as the struggle with nature, our nation at first overcame the initial challenges with its robust development. These were favorable conditions for it to fearlessly mature and to further temper the pure gold of its soul and will.

When the aggressor army arrives, "the people attack." In our nation, to attack the aggressor is natural to all, including the old men, women, and children. The heroic strategy of the Trung sisters and Madame Trieu, the resolute will of the elders during the Tran reign, and the impressive bearing of Tran Quoc Toan were present in every generation.

If any place in the country was occupied, the entire nation rose, "When one horse is sick, the entire stable will not eat." If any compatriots were massacred, "blood ran and tempered flared" as the entire people determinedly took revenge. With still weak forces, "three bundles tied together," everyone joined in thought and action. Determination-to-fight-and-win became a glorious national tradition.

The requirement to remain close together to live and fight has caused our people to regularly strengthen their intimate mutual relations, unceasingly upholding a spirit of national solidarity and a Fatherland concept.

"Gourds loving melons" is the sincere feeling between fraternal people joined in the fate, joy, and adversity on this land. Throughout thousands of years of history, the great struggles against foreign aggression by our people were the overall undertaking of all nationalities. The Lac Viet and Au Viet people united under the leadership of An Duong Vuong. The Dao and Tay ethnic minorities participated in the uprising of the Trung sisters. All the people united under the leadership of Dinh Bo Linh. All fights from Mai Thuc Loan and Ngo Quyen to Ly Thuong Kiet, Tran Hung Dao, Le Loi, and Quang Trung have received the widespread participation of all fraternal nationalities. This spirit of solidarity is a long tradition which the aggressor armies for countless centuries have vainly attempted to destroy.

The spirit of national solidarity is closely related to the will of national unity. "Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one." This statement of President Ho not only refers to the iron determination of all our people at this time in their struggle to win reunification of the Fatherland but also expresses the profound feeling and long term hopes of our people concerning the integrity of the nation. Our territory, extending more than 1,600 kilometers from Ha Giang to Ca Mau, consists of a great many nationalities living in many different geographical areas with different climates, terrain, and vegetation and at times, different daily activities, habits, religious beliefs, clothing, housing, etc. However, all of these things through generations have not reduced the spirit of national solidarity or the will of national unity of our people. Our people fervently believe that every individual on this land has one origin and is a brother in one family and that every decimeter of land in the Fatherland is the sacred flesh and blood of the entire nation. This spirit is deeply ingrained in the overall psychology constructed on an extremely firm economic, territorial, linguistic, and overall combat objective collective aimed at building and maintaining the nation. The division into 12 legations, the division between Le and Mac and then Trinh and Nguyen and the division into three parts during the French period were only of a temporary nature, compulsory, and contrary to the profound feelings of the people. When To Huu wrote:

"We move forward without division
From Muc Nam Quan to Ca Mau
Our sky is only one overhead
North and south connect with one sea
Our hearts have no demarcation
Our hearts have only one Ho
One capital
And one Vietnamese undertaking"
(We Move Forward)

this "our heart" is not our heart at the present time but throughout 4,000 years of history.

The close mutual love between our people under extremely difficult circumstances to produce and fight has created the extremely unique features of heroic tradition.

To speak of heroism is first of all to speak of courageous ethics and sacrifice, unafraid of the enemy, hardships, difficulties, and death. These courageous ethics in Vietnamese tradition have become increasingly noble. They are expressed in an indomitable spirit, resolute will, and iron confidence.

The heroic traditions of the nation have become ingrained in the psychology of the people for countless generations to become a way of life, "It is better to die than to live kneeling." The bearing of both Tran Thu Do and Tran Quoc Tuan to protect independence is the overall bearing of all our people facing an aggressor army which has won from Europe to Africa. It was also the overall bearing of the nation when Tran Binh Trong shouted in the face of Thoat Hoan, "I would rather bury the South." This bearing is not only found in the generals and soldiers is widely distributed among the girls, boys, old, and young. It was given shape with the 3-year-old children in Phu Dong Village, "A debt to the nation unpaid for 3 years is long overdue and a sky rushing straight through nine levels of pregnancy is high" (Cao Ba Quat). This bearing manifests the "mount the wind and ride the waves" spirit of Madame Trieu, resounds in the shout of old Dien Hong, and is splendid on the banner of Tran Quoc Toan.

This impressive bearing is not one of empty words. It specifically expresses the resolute will in every situation. It is an attitude of never retreating despite difficult missions and powerful enemies. With floods, broken dikes, rice bugs, lack of rain, hunger, and cold from one year to the next, the farmers of Vietnam continue to quietly hoe and plow from early morning to late at night. Extremely powerful foreign aggressors and barbarous physical punishment as well as sugary flattery can never shake the spirit of a people who can only fight without surrendering. Through a thousand years of domination, aggressor armies sought every means to assimilate our nation, desiring to change every traditional custom, suppress every cultural value, destroy even the language and daily habits, and completely erase our country from the world map. However, they were defeated. Our people are overflowing

with a pride for the nation and their traditions in most stubbornly protecting every spiritual value and continuing to exist on the earth with an integral national disposition.

Courageous traditions are also expressed in a strong confidence in the future of the nation. Confidence is always a great strength of heroism. An army can be grandiose but if its confidence is lost, it cannot attack and will dissolve. Confidence spurs our people during the most difficult days. Confidence strengthened the determined-to-win spirit during the three attacks on the Nguyen army. Confidence created a steadfast and patient strength throughout 10 years of combat of the Le Loi army. This confidence is expressed in the optimistic laughter of our literature, jokes, satirical dramas, and folk paintings. This confidence has created the patience of our people through thousands of years, one man rising when another falls to continuously move toward the front. When misfortune reaches its limit, prosperity comes, happiness will follow hardship, and reunification will follow separation. The bitter and suffering will rise and the oppressors will be overthrown. Our people are confident that the day will come when the social order changes.

The courage of our forefathers was not only stimulated by an intense feeling for the Fatherland and compatriots but was also guided by wise and creative minds. In other words, the heroic traditions of our people are the firm unison of intelligence, humanity, and courage. The heroic feeling of our people has achieved an extremely profound level. The strategy of Tran Hung Dao which was closely connected with patriotism and hatred for the aggressor agitated him night and day with a state of mind, "Forgetting to eat during the day, forgetting to sleep at night, pouring tears, and cutting pain." The pain of Le Loi over the massacre of our people by the Minh army, the "worry first, happiness afterwards" spirit of Nguyen Trai, and the "cloth coat and peach banner assisting the people to build the nation" feelings of Quang Trung are the deep origins of incomparable heroic actions.

Our people clearly realize that patriotism is love for the people. Patriotism first of all is expressed in the feeling of sharing the bitter and the sweet between oppressed people. All national heroes who have risen and fought have been profoundly moved by the miserable, hungry, cold, mistreated, and persecuted condition of the people.

This state of mind was clearly expressed in the proclamation of Tran Hung Dao to his officers and men, the Binh Ngo announcement of Le Loi and Nguyen Trai, the soldiers' appeal of Quang Trung, and is overflowing in the heroic literature of Cao Ba Quat. This feeling naturally led to a unique humanitarian spirit and a singlemindedness in blind patriotism. The combat solidarity between nationalities in Vietnam, the mutual aid between laboring people in the two countries of Vietnam and China during the period of Nguyen resistance and Thanh destruction, and the leniency of Tran Quoc Tuan, Le Loi, and Quang Trung toward prisoners are all clear proof of this correct and liberal feeling.

The heroism of the people is also extremely fine in that it usually overcomes individual interests. It is oriented toward the greatest treasures

of the nation, independence and freedom. It respects the moral values, abilities, and qualities of man. It despises selfish and cowardly behavior. It demands a spirit of dying rather than living in exploitation. Such sentimental motives are the very initial origins of loyalty to the country and devotion to the people of which President Ho regularly taught us.

The heroic sentiments of our people are constantly coordinated with a wise and creative spirit before every difficult mission. In their struggle with nature, our people not only have an attitude of labor diligence but also contemplate and summarize precious experience in the use of water, fertilizer, necessities, seed, weather forecasting, dike building, and storm and flood control. In their struggle against foreign aggression, our people not only understand sacrifice but are unafraid of difficulty, arduousness, and death. The national heroism is also expressed in the extremely active and rich stratagems and plans to defeat different foes in different periods of history. To overcome difficulties and find methods of properly handling every circumstance, our people have unceasingly thought and studied. This study does not resemble the weighty learning of conservative Confucian scholars found within the covers of books written by saints and sages. The search for understanding of our people is constantly oriented toward life, collecting precious experience inside and outside the country to improve their own methods of work and combat. The military science summaries of Tran Hung Dao could not help but accept the achievements of Ton Ngo military tactics and every military lesson of those before. However, Tran Hung Dao was extremely creative in contemplating methods of attacking the aggressors of our people under conditions of a small country against the largest invading army in the world. Le Loi and Nguyen Trai under their new conditions, presented a method of prolonged attack with the most appropriate policies during their period of history. Quang Trung collected the experience of those before but his lightning methods of attack were a surprising innovation to which the enemy could not promptly respond.

This wise and creative spirit is not only found in the military aspects but is also revealed in every political and diplomatic field, daily life, and even literature and art, assisting to create the rich and perfect virtues of heroic tradition.

The Historic Limitations of Our People and the Prospects of Heroic Tradition

With their heroic tradition and their integrity of intelligence, humanity, and courage, our people have written their finest pages of history. This does not mean that our people do not have shortcomings and limitations.

Our people for thousands of years have shed their blood to safeguard the Fatherland. However, in escaping the oppression of foreign nations, our people were still miserable under the suppression and exploitation of the feudal class within the nation. Thousands of uprisings by the farmers broke out and were extinguished.

At the end of the 19th century, a new calamity came to our country. It was the occupation and rule of French imperialism. Eighty years of subordination to France were also 80 years of heroic combat by our people.

However, the flesh, blood, and tears of the people could not open the way to liberation.

Historical limitations were resolved for the first time with the appearance of great leader Ho Chi Minh and the birth of the party. The party and President Ho for the first time illuminated the road of Vietnamese history with Marxism-Leninism, elevated the patriotic traditions of our people to their highest level, and from this, opened a new period of heroism.

The revolution succeeded and our people for the first time were true masters of the country, simultaneously attacking the French and Americans while building a beautiful life in independence, freedom, and happiness.

Under the leadership of the party, our people have moved strongly forward with the incomparable qualities of new heroism. However, the past is still heavy on our shoulders. While the historic traditions of our forefathers continue to live in everyone and join us in combat, many outmoded ideological remnants, sentiments, and habits still persistently live and many times block our progress. Under the illumination of the party, we carry out an ideological and cultural revolution, resolutely eliminating hostile ideologies -- feudal and bourgeoisie ideologies -- which have poisoned and enslaved us for countless years. On the other hand, we must still wash outmoded ideologies from ourselves, the inherent ideologies of our people originating from small production, and the ideologies which are truly obstructing us while we build an advanced social system with modern industry.

Our people for countless generations have had a profound patriotism, ready to give their lives for their compatriots and Fatherland. However, when the black shadow of the invading army was driven out and the Vietnamese farmers returned to their old fields and thatched huts, the ideologies of small production with obsolete working methods, petty thoughts, and small sentiments easily returned.

In the struggle with nature, too familiar with the legendary farming methods, the small producers had few bold improvement ideologies, great programs, or long term plans. The small producer is familiar with a liberal and arbitrary method of work, leaving work for today for tomorrow, work from this morning for this afternoon, and if the family is busy with death anniversaries or visitors, time off may be arbitrarily taken. They cannot avoid difficulty when forced to enter a new labor organization which is extremely strict in labor regulations, working hours, and labor results.

In production relations, through thousands of years of familiarity with caring for and arranging for small plots, gardens, and each chicken and pig, the small producer cannot help but have definite difficulties when required to attain a profound collective concept, meaning a concept of close contact with public property and the overall interests of the collective. A narrow life within the confines of their family and hamlet has also easily created a limited, departmentalized, and localized mind.

In the ideological and cultural field, because small production daily and hourly gives birth to capitalism, individualism is easily born, creating great obstacles for the construction of new society and the new man. In daily economic life, the small producer usually gives concern to trivial interests, easily forgetting the immediate and long term overall interests. Therefore, if their ideology is not actively upheld, they are easily afflicted by the shortcomings of selfishness, corruption, and appropriation of property to serve themselves.

Small production for thousands of years has never had requirements for scientific standards or great knowledge. Under the new social conditions, the small producer cannot feel for a minute the requirement for advancing into and mastering modern science for introduction to production.

At the present time, our party and people are involved in three revolutions to build socialism in North Vietnam and are carrying out the mission of a great rear area in the resistance against America for national salvation. Struggle to liberate the entire nation and build socialism in North Vietnam is a crucible of combat to forge new men with new qualities. Eliminating the remnants of small production has an extremely great significance in stimulating the revolutionary undertaking and creating conditions for the extremely strong development of revolutionary heroism.

To resolve the limitations of history, smash the feudal and bourgeois ideologies, and eliminate the remnants of small production, our party has created a turning point in history aimed at raising the heroic traditions of the nation to the highest peak. Before he died, President Ho reiterated, "The war of resistance against America may be prolonged. Our compatriots may be forced to sacrifice much property and many men. No matter what, we must determinedly fight the American aggressors until final victory."

As long as there are mountains, water, and men,
Defeating the American aggressors, we will build more
than these 10 days!

"No matter what the difficulties and hardships, our people will surely win. The American imperialists must surely leave our country. Our Fatherland will surely be reunited. Compatriots of the north and south will surely reunite under one roof. Our country has great renown as a small nation which has courageously fought and defeated two great imperialist nations, France and the United States, and has made a worthy contribution to the national liberation movement." (Last testament of President Ho).

President Ho's reminder is the sacred responsibility and iron will of each of us. With heroic traditions, our people will surely carry out President Ho's last testament.

Under the leadership of the party, the incomparable qualities of revolutionary heroism will steadily become more beautiful and join the endless current of Vietnamese heroic tradition.

FOOTNOTES

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NEW SALES PROCEDURE CUTS CUSTOMER WAITING TIME

[Article by Tran Thi Xuan Dieu: "A New Grain-Selling Formula in Hanoi"; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 8, August 1971, pp 72-77]

In the past few years, grain stores have applied an unscientific formula of selling products that is very bureaucratic and not convenient for the consumer.

The counters organized according to this formula consisted of four steps: marking ration books, writing receipts, collecting money and giving the customer his purchase; this is done by five clerks. From the outside, this system appears to be rational, scientific and advantageous for close management, but in reality it is cumbersome and bureaucratic and creates problems for close internal management. Because business procedures and principles are impractical and are not carried out properly, determining the amount of grain sold each month is not accurate, not all the grain reaches the consumers, and mistakes cannot always be attributed to any one person. This method of organization and management certainly cannot serve the consumer. Grain is a special type of commodity that is sold in specific quantities and supplied during specific time periods. This is an important advantage for grain stores in serving the consumer. However, because the formula for selling grain is not good, many difficulties and troubles were created for the customer. When the customer wants to buy grain, he must wait for a specified time, must go back and forth many times, and must wait for long periods. Furthermore, he often does not get his full money's worth because the quality of the grain is poor, the grain often contains sand or mildew, and the clerks do not weigh it accurately.

The above formula for selling goods is obviously a major obstacle for both consumers and for internal management.

Therefore, it had to be improved in order to have one that could satisfy the requirements and tasks of circulation and distribution.

After a period of research, the Ministry of Grain and Food Products proposed a new selling formula; after testing it, this formula achieved good results and in July 1970, this formula was implemented widely in all the grain stores in Hanoi.

The new grain-selling formula is substantially a new organizational formula consisting of new management methods and a new organization for selling goods. The outstanding aspect of this new method is that it replaces bureaucratic management and selling methods with relatively scientific management and selling methods that can achieve good economic results.

The basic contents of this new grain-selling formula are:

1. Using grain stamps (consisting of rice stamps and wheat stamps, which are different from grain transfer stamps) as the basic daily record to replace the previous complex system of paperwork involving ration books and receipts.

2. On the basis of the above change, a new labor organization was created in the grain stores and the service counters were rearranged. Selling has become more orderly and service has improved.

3. The grain is prepackaged.

This new formula for selling grain has the following strengths and results:

1. It creates a new labor productivity. This is one of the most outstanding results of the new selling formula.

The counters have been rearranged and are no longer manned by five persons; each counter is handled by one clerk who collects the money and issues the grain. All unnecessary paperwork has been eliminated, such as marking ration books and writing receipts. To speed up sales, the grain is prepackaged in specific amounts: 2 kilograms, 3 kilograms, 5 kilograms, and so on. Therefore, the clerk can sell very rapidly: it takes only 2 minutes to record the transaction in the customer's grain book, collect the

money and grain stamps, and give the customer his package (the previous method took 30 minutes). Because of these changes in the selling organization, the number of personnel has been reduced and the stores' labor has been reorganized in a more rational manner. The stores have reviewed the entire work force and on the basis of the capabilities and health of each person have reassigned them to jobs of issuing stamps and selling goods and have shifted a large number of indirect workers to the prepackaging of the grain. The grain stores in the Hai Ba Trung Ward, prior to implementing the new formula, required 330 cadres and work personnel; since reorganizing, this number has been reduced to 270 without reducing any of the services. In addition, a prepackaging station has been set up to serve all of the stores. A number of stores have also set up teams specializing in the prepackaging of grain. At the Mai Hac De Grain Store, after reorganizing work and reassigning workers, the number of cadres and work personnel was reduced from 31 to 22 persons; not only is all the previous work still being done but the store serves two neighborhood blocks previously served by another store.

The labor productivity of the cadres and personnel of the store have changed as follows:

	<u>Old Formula</u>	<u>New Formula</u>
Average labor productivity per store cadre or worker	9.7 mt/mo.	11.0 mt/mo.
Average labor productivity per clerk	13.1 mt/mo.	22.5 mt/mo.

Besides the above-mentioned results, implementing the new formula in the stores also helps the clerks reduce selling time, increases selling productivity, and saves social-labor time. Shortening the time to serve one customer and increasing the number of customers served are requirements of a service sector and are indices for evaluating the economic efficiency of business operations. In grain stores, because the selling process has been improved and unnecessary paperwork has been eliminated, the period of contact between the clerk and the customer has been reduced from 30 minutes to 2 minutes; therefore, the customer does not have to wait as long to purchase grain. A customer spends an average of 20 minutes from the time he enters the store until he leaves. Very seldom does a customer have to wait over 30 minutes. In many stores, the customer can buy grain as soon as he arrives, and if the wheat is especially good or at the beginning of the rice-buying period when there are many customers, the stores will open up additional counters to serve the customers

more promptly and quickly. Reducing shopping time and actively opening more counters to serve the customers is the greatest advantage of the new grain-selling formula over previous formulas. Because the sales counters have been rearranged more suitably at the Mai Hac De store, no customer has to wait over 30 minutes and the emulation index of the store is: "Do not let the customer wait over 15 minutes." Since implementing the new formula, in one month the Mai Hac De store customer waiting time by one 1,875 workdays. In the entire Hai Ba Trung Ward, this has resulted in a reduction of 8,000 workdays of waiting and shopping time.

2. The new grain-selling formula has improved internal management.

First of all, reorganizing counters has delineated the responsibility of each individual, and each individual accepts full responsibility for all of his actions toward both the customer and the store. Although the work of the clerks is related, each individual transaction can be balanced, making it easy to assign responsibility when there are mistakes, which has improved the sense of responsibility of the clerks. The most complicated aspect of internal management is still managing quantity. It is very difficult to determine the amount of grain that has been issued in the previous month, so that the amount of grain to be sold in the following month can be determined; it is also difficult to determine if the grain issued during the month reached the hands of the consumer. Therefore, in previous years, errors in the quantity of grain were usually very large and even in closely managed stores such as Mai Hac De, the average margin of error each month in determining the quantity of grain was 200 kilograms in a total monthly sales volume of 342,000 kilograms. This does not include instances when the issuing of grain became inaccurate due to unawareness of changes in population. To resolve this problem, the stores have improved their management standards. The stores no longer rely entirely on initial quantity statistics but use the following economic accounting method to determine the amount of grain issued:

No. of stamps issued each month	=	Stamps remain- ing from previous month	+	Stamps re- ceived during current month	-	Stamps re- maining at end of month
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According to this method, the grain stores can compute fairly accurately the amount of grain issued each month, and if they want to check this, all they have to do is compare the number of stamps issued and the amount of grain issued. Since using this method to compute the amount issued, monthly errors have become insignificant. For example, at the Mai Hac De store, the previous error of 200 kg/320,000 kg has

now been reduced to only 4 kg/320,000 kg. In addition, since the implementation of this method, much unnecessary statistical work has been eliminated and paperwork has been simplified; therefore, each month the store saves 10 workdays in statistical work. Along with the above improvements, business principles and procedures have been reorganized; unnecessary jobs and work have been eliminated and necessary work has been supplemented. The stores have organized sessions to study business principles and procedures and have conducted extensive investigations on the implementation of accounting systems and periodic reports. Because the issuing of stamps is new, the clerks received specific instructions, were issued notebooks that were easy to understand, and their responsibilities and procedures were specifically outlined; therefore, receiving and issuing stamps in the neighborhoods and the daily balancing of accounts have gone smoothly without any major errors or mistakes. To manage grain standards closely, the stores still rely on the representative committees of the neighborhood blocks to grasp the population situation, adjust the grain supply promptly, and actively grasp the actual needs of the people.

Because a number of business principles and procedures have been reorganized, scientific analysis methods have been applied, and a good relationship has been established in the neighborhood blocks. In the past year, internal management in the grain stores of Hanoi has been improved, business management has become more scientific, and the amount of grain has been determined more accurately and more closely, which is advantageous for both the store and the customer.

3. The grain-selling formula serves the people better.

Supplying grain to the people is a part of circulation and distribution and has a large effect on the lives of the people; therefore, the people require of the grain sector that grain must be properly priced, properly measured, and of the best quality when it reaches the hands of the consumer.

The grain sector must satisfy these four requirements of the people. If this is done, the grain sector will have understood the direction of commodity distribution: "Fair, rational, democratic and convenient." The new grain-selling formula has improved the standard of serving the consumer and is therefore appreciated by the masses.

Selling grain by the package rather than by weight is a major reform. Prepackaging grain in specific amounts has resolved a series of problems: it helps internal management to be closer and overcomes the situation of buying in

large weights and selling in small weights between internal and external warehouses; it enables the accurate computation of the total amount of grain issued during the month; it enables clerks to sell more rapidly and it reduces waiting time for the customer. Prepackaging grain is also an advantage to the customer: it ensures quality because in the packaging process, the technical cadres of the packaging team can inspect the quantity and quality of the grain and can discover and eliminate packages that do not meet the necessary standards. When commodities need qualitative and quantitative standards, they are consistent with fixed prices and the consumer suffers no losses when shopping.

Since the grain stores began implementing the new selling formula, grain shopping by the people has become easier. The people no longer have to wait 2-3 hours as before but only 15-20 minutes; therefore, the number of shopping trips by the customers can increase an average of from 2.6 to 3.2 times per month per family (more shopping trips is suitable for large families and difficult financial situations).

4. The new grain-selling formula has helped to increase the political awareness and ideological standards of the cadres and personnel of the grain stores and has helped to tighten the relationship between the grain stores and the consumer.

Introducing the new selling formula into the grain stores has been a complex and difficult struggle between progressive thought and scientific working methods and backward thought and haphazard working methods. Basically, this is the struggle between the proletarian ideology and the non-proletarian ideology; in this struggle, the party chapters in the grain stores constantly manifested their leadership and educational role. Together with the administration and trade union, the party chapters organized the cadres and personnel of the stores to study the productive labor movement, the ethics of socialists trade personnel, and the requirements, contents and effects of the new grain selling formula in order to manifest their revolutionary enthusiasm.

Through these study sessions, many stores motivated the ideologies of cadres and personnel. Some persons said of themselves: "I did not sincerely implement the new selling policy because it made me take on greater responsibilities." Many clerks criticized themselves severely for being afraid of hardships and difficulties and fearing that the new formula would make them work harder.

On the basis that the ideology of everyone would be stimulated, the grain stores stepped up the implementation of the new selling formula and also held a meeting between the stores and customers. The praise and constructive ideas of the masses, together with the actual results of the new selling method, persuaded the people who still held out and stimulated everyone to implement the new formula enthusiastically.

In implementing the new selling formula, progressive units appeared, such as the Hai Ba Trung Ward Grain Bureau, the Thuy Ai "Three Responsibilities" Store, Mai Hac De Store, and so on. Labor productivity also increased. For example, at the Mai Hac De Store, labor productivity in counting and issuing stamps increased 25 percent, packaging productivity surpassed the plan by 30 percent, and clerks surpassed the plan by 100 percent in issuing stamps to the neighborhood blocks. Not satisfied with the new achievements made, the Mae Hac De store studied ways of rearranging the selling schedule to be more convenient for the consumer; therefore, at this store customers never have to wait more than 15 minutes. Also implementing the new formula, many grain stores in Hanoi established close cooperative relationships among the clerks and between the clerks and the customers. Through extensive contacts, the customers are more sympathetic toward the difficulties of the store, and when the clerks go to the neighborhood block to issue stamps, the customers create advantageous conditions for the clerks to complete their tasks quickly. In addition, the people also help the stores to discover people who sell grain stamps illegally. After spending some time in the neighborhood block, one clerk said that "the masses are very confident in us so we must therefore improve the quality of our service."

The above are the basic contents and the results of implementing the new grain-selling formula. However, this formula is not perfect. Using grain stamps as proof of purchase is an opening for black marketeers and creates difficulties for grain management in particular and market management in general. In improving the quality of service, the stores concentrate on ensuring the quantity of the grain packages; it has also improved trade standards which are manifested in grain packaging, in sales counters, and in the service spirit and attitude of the clerks toward the customers. With regard to management, we must set up a number of simple statistical and accounting charts that are suitable for the standards of the clerks and we must ensure the uniformity of these charts.

Despite shortcomings and weaknesses, the present grain-selling formula in Hanoi is rational, relatively scientific, convenient for the consumer and increases the management and activities of the stores. We are confident that with the efforts of the grain sectors and with the constructive enthusiasm of the consumers, the selling of grain will continue to be improved.

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AMERICA'S VIETNAMIZATION PLAN DOOMED TO FAILURE

[Article by Le Ba Thuyen: "The Saigon Puppet Regime in the So-called 'Vietnamization' of the War"; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 8, August 1971, pp 78-84]

Nixon's Guam Theory and the Saigon Puppet Regime

Nixon usually associates the policy to "Vietnamize" the war with his "new" theory that was announced in Guam in July 1969. However, is this so-called new global strategy and Asian strategy any different from the previous ones? Briefly, the content of this theory is to reduce America's direct involvement in other countries, but America's objectives remain unchanged; that is, America still wants to be master of the world and to rule the countries of Asia. America's fundamental measure is still to carry out neocolonialism and to set up U.S.-controlled lackey regimes. When the people of these countries rise up against these regimes and its lackeys cannot cope with them, America will claim that this is "aggression" and will use military force to suppress them. One thing is different with regard to the use of the tools of suppression: America advocates being the "selective" international policeman, which means that it will endeavor to use the armed forces of the lackey regimes as tools to implement its policy of aggression. In Asia, it will use Asians to fight Asians, while America will provide economic and military help, which means it will supply money and arms, and when necessary, it will bring in logistics forces and air force and naval support. The Nixon theory is being tested by the United States in Indochina.

Nixon had to fabricate this new theory because an American expeditionary army consisting of more than half a million men suffered heavy losses in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese war of aggression has created major political and economic difficulties for the United States. Nixon

is being criticized strongly by Americans and other people throughout the world. Faced with this situation, he has had to withdraw troops in order to appease this criticism while still attempting to achieve his dream of aggression by "Vietnamizing" the war. The substance of Vietnamizing the war which America has implemented and is implementing in South Vietnam is to enforce the policy of "using Vietnamese to kill Vietnamese" and to prolong and expand the war in the hope of achieving a military victory. This is merely a change in the method of using strategic forces in the Vietnamese war of aggression: from using puppet troops under the command of American advisors in the "special war" to use American expeditionary forces, with American infantry playing a primary role, in the "limited war" and now to their proposal of withdrawing American forces and using puppet forces to replace the American infantry, with American support, primarily in firepower and rear services, together with a number of American infantry units.

America's plan to "Vietnamize" the war proves the stubbornness and cleverness of the Nixon group and proves that it still nourishes the hope of achieving military victory and a strong negotiating position. Nixon's so-called "efforts to reach a negotiated solution" and a "fair peace" is merely a plot to use a position of strength to force our people to accept America's conditions. That he sent Saigon puppet forces to invade southern Laos and threatened "unlimited use of the strength of the United States Air Force throughout Indochina" and "do not reject the capability of an invasion of the Saigon Army to North Vietnam" (statements made by Nixon in a press conference on 17 February 1971 in Washington) further clarifies this fact.

Nixon's specific plans to Vietnamize the war are: gradually withdraw American forces from South Vietnam down to a number which he hopes the American people will accept; bring war expenditures in Vietnam down to a level which the critical budget capabilities and economic situation of America will allow; increase the puppet army to a million men, equip it with more modern weapons, concentrate forces to conduct the pacification program and attack more violently; and continue to engage in negotiation in Paris to give the appearance that it still wants peace in order to avoid becoming isolated before American opinion and world opinion and to conceal its plans to prolong and expand the war. To do these things, America requires a stable, obedient puppet regime in Saigon. This puppet regime is the primary tool for implementing its plan to Vietnamize the war and amass manpower and wealth in regions which it still controls in order to prolong the war and to achieve what it calls "changing the skin color of the corpse." This is a capable tool achieving its plan of

of expanding the war to all of Indochina in the hope of saving its hopeless plan to "Vietnamize" the war. This is also an important lesson which it hopes to use in bargaining with our people in a political settlement for South Vietnam with the aim of maintaining its power and continuing to destroy the revolutionary struggle of our people in South Vietnam in the future. Nixon has repeatedly stated that "the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their political future cannot be negotiated." This is merely a ploy which he uses in an effort to maintain the Saigon puppet regime and to avoid the serious negotiations for a correct political solution to the South Vietnamese problem. In the American Journal of International Problems, July 1970, R. Johnson said: "President Nixon wants to win the war in South Vietnam in his own way in order to leave a noncommunist government in Saigon that is capable of resisting every communist threat /patriotic forces in South Vietnam -- L.B.T./". From this standpoint, the Vietnamization strategy is a strategy to win the war." According to Johnson, two of the factors determining the results of the Vietnamization policy are "the stability and the survival capability in general of the Vietnamese Government /Saigon puppet regime/ and associated with this is the capability of the /Saigon/ government and the South Vietnamese armed forces /puppet army/ to cope with South Vietnam's problems on the American troop-withdrawal level." This demonstrates the vital importance of consolidating the Saigon puppet regime with regard to the plans of the Nixon faction. Therefore, the American imperialists are busily strengthening the Saigon puppet regime in every respect.

Militarily, they are fortifying and strengthening the regular puppet units and all arms and branches: air force, navy, armored, security forces, militia forces, self-defense people's armed forces, and so on, in order to make the puppet army strong enough to replace American forces and to provide protection to all levels of the puppet regime. They have turned over airplanes, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, warships, gunboats, and so on, in order to increase the firepower and mobility of the puppet army. On the other hand, they have begun the withdrawal of American forces according to a prolonged time schedule so that the puppet army and puppet regime will keep from collapsing rapidly and will have time to consolidate and rebuild themselves.

Politically, they are endeavoring to assemble pro-American political factions in the hope of establishing a "front" that will support the Saigon puppet regime and are competing for the so-called "third force" and religious forces to serve as a support for the puppet regime. During this period of Vietnamizing the war, they are making increased use of the label "independence" and are rigging "elections"

on all echelons in order to give a "democratic" appearance to the lackey regime that continues to expose its cruel, fascist face. Meanwhile, they are busily attempting to step up "accelerated pacification" and "special pacification." They are concentrating on destroying revolutionary bases, restoring strict control, concentrating the people, and seizing land.

From the economic and financial standpoint, each year they are providing millions of dollars of support, and applying a number of measures such as "land reform," "economic revival," and so on, with the hope of deceiving public opinion and restoring the critical economic and financial situation of the puppet regime. In conjunction with the Saigon puppet regime, they are also extorting and exploiting the people of South Vietnam in order to nourish the puppet army. On the other hand, they are preparing so-called national reconstruction plans after the war. These are the Lillianthal and Vu Quoc plans which will use billions of dollars in aid to South Vietnam to continue to implement neocolonialism through economic measures.

While the American imperialists are continuing to maintain the Saigon puppet regime, this regime is desperately clinging to its American masters. Faced with the heavy, total defeat of the Americans and confronted with American withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam, the above-mentioned traitors are becoming very frightened. They know that the defeat of America's war of aggression just hastens their death. Because of this, they are becoming animals, are resisting the revolution, and are terrorizing and suppressing the people to support America's war of aggression. It is no accident that in a press conference on 31 July 1970 in Los Angeles, Nixon declared that he and the Saigon puppet regime are "in entire agreement." Obviously, this is an agreement to prolong and increase the war to implement neocolonialism in South Vietnam, of which the most important tools are the puppet regime and the puppet army.

An Increasingly Fascist and Corrupt Puppet Regime

The Nixon clique and the American press claim that the government headed by Nguyen Van Thieu has been "standing firm" since 1965 in order to deceive American public opinion and the world that the Saigon puppet regime is "stable" and "firm." However, that the Saigon puppet regime still exists, even though unstable, is not difficult to understand. After being forced to kill Ngo Dinh Diem and after more than ten governments in Saigon collapsed in quick succession, the American imperialists realized that this unstable political situation

threatened their plans for aggression. Furthermore, after bringing in more than 500,000 U.S. forces to conduct the "limited war" in South Vietnam, America required a "constitutional" puppet regime (to obscure its extremely evident aggressive nature) and an obedient lackey administration that would follow its orders to control the puppet army and to create a relatively stable "rear area" so it could develop its expeditionary army safely in the hope of saving both itself and the puppet regime from failure. The Saigon puppet regime proved to be loyal lackeys who were suitable for the intentions of the Americans. From the class standpoint, the puppet regime represents the most reactionary pro-American elements of the compradore bourgeoisie and the landlord class in South Vietnam. Because this puppet regime includes professional military officers and sadists who want to avenge their class and defend the interests of the exploiter classes, they are extremely reactionary and will stubbornly resist the people to the end. This regime is entirely dependent on the United States. De Luce [transliterated from Vietnamese] deputy director of AP, wrote: "In South Vietnam, regardless of how small or remote, there is no district in which there are no American personnel. There are 259 districts and each has at least one unit of American advisors." The high-ranking puppet officers want to control the puppet regime in order to consolidate their position, power and pocketbooks. De Luce pointed out that puppet officers "control the structure of the government." This is a pyramid with Nguyen Van Thieu on the top. The vice president, prime minister and important ministers are military men. De Luce wrote: "Field-grade officers head 44 provinces and five cities, and in the 259 districts in South Vietnam, all of the district chiefs are professional military personnel, usually majors. At MACV. I was told that 'every Vietnamese officer has political capabilities and has aspirations in the army'. This is the basis of political power." Therefore, although Nixon claims there is a civilian administration in Saigon, it is substantially a highly militarized administration and a police state in which jails, concentrations camps, secret police, and police are abundant everywhere. Even Harriman, former head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Conference on Vietnam, in an interview with reporters of the Christian Science Monitor, 20-28 December 1970, accused the Saigon puppet regime of being a "suppressive government; it does not represent the majority of the people; sooner or later it will collapse." Harriman also pointed out: "Nixon allowed Thieu to reject negotiations and therefore enabled the Thieu government, a government that is not and cannot be supported by the people, to continue in power" (AP, 5 January 1971).

Faced with the attacks and uprising of our army and people in South Vietnam and faced with growing struggle of all classes of people in the cities, the Saigon puppet regime has become much weaker. It has been forced to cast off its false democratic mask demanded by neocolonialism. It is far surpassing Ngo Dinh Diem in cruel fascism. Along with the American army, the Saigon puppet regime, headed by Nguyen Van Thieu, has bombed, shelled and killed civilians, destroyed villages, carried out "pacification" and mass assassination activities in places such as Son My and Ba Lang An, and directly terrorized the struggle movement of the people. They have closed and confiscated many newspapers and have arrested many patriots who do not agree with them, throwing them into concentration camps and prisons similar to the "tiger cages" on Con Dao Island. They have blatantly suppressed "opposition forces" and terrorized and jailed anyone opposing them, including those who only mention "neutrality," "peace" and "unity." U.S. Senator McGovern also admitted that the Saigon puppet regime has established "a suppressive dictatorship in South Vietnam, a dictatorship that does not want to nor cannot administer their country in a democratic manner." This shows that the Saigon puppet regime is becoming extremely fascist. In the eyes of the South Vietnamese people, this regime consists of sadistic, bloodthirsty and infamous people who everyone hates. People in the upper classes know why they must be despised and resisted.

Such a bellicose, fascist, corrupt and isolated puppet regime cannot exist in the face of the hatred and struggles of the people of South Vietnam.

The Profound and Total Crisis of the Saigon Puppet Regime

Since the beginning of 1970, in his speeches, Nixon boasted that the Saigon puppet regime is being consolidated and is achieving victory. However, public opinion shows that it is sinking deeper into a more total, deeper, more entangling, and more tense crisis. This crisis is occurring in the military, political, economic and social areas.

Militarily, the U.S.-puppet regime is being defeated and is becoming more passive throughout the battlefield. The Nixon group is trying to reduce American casualties in the hope of alleviating political pressure in the United States. However, on the battlefield, American forces continue to suffer losses. Since America expanded the war to Cambodia, along with the invasion of Southern Laos by the puppet army, these casualties have skyrocketed. What about the puppet army? Although America is exaggerating the role of the puppet army in conducting the war, things are not going as well as America would like. The recent major defeat of the puppet army on

the Southern Laos battlefield demonstrated the weakness of the puppet army and its effectiveness on implementing American intentions of Vietnamizing the war. Key puppet units in Tay Nguyen and the Mekong Delta (key regions in the Vietnamization plan) and the puppet strategic reserve forces sent to Cambodia to rescue the Lon Nol puppet army and to invade Southern Laos are being hit the hardest and suffering the heaviest losses. Although the United States is trying to strengthen the puppet local forces so that they can maintain the role of hunting guerrillas, guarding roads and bridges and serving the pacification plan, the security, militia and civil defense forces are being attacked and suffering heavy losses on the border and rural defense lines. Despite America's attempt to improve the quality of the puppet army, its combat strength, from the regular forces to local soldiers, continues to decline: both its organization and moral are declining. In a recent issue, U.S. News and World Report stated: "The percentage of desertions in the South Vietnamese army rose from an average of 8,000 per month in 1969 to approximately 12,000 per month in mid-1970 during operations in Cambodia." In 1970, more than 160,000 puppet soldiers and officers deserted the U.S.-puppet ranks, including the mass desertion of 50 companies, 271 platoons, 50 squads and 6 pacification groups. Pointing out the situation of the puppet army during the past two years, the American newspaper, International News Forum, wrote on 16 February 1971: "After two years of Vietnamization, a large element of the South Vietnamese people have been armed, but the South Vietnamese army is still heavily dependent upon American protection. There is nothing to indicate that the Saigon government will be self-reliant." Obviously, America is trying to bolster the puppet army, but it is becoming weaker. Meanwhile, America has been forced to withdraw troops. This is causing the American and puppet armies to plunge rapidly into an abyss of defeat. When America pressured the Saigon puppet regime to send troops into Cambodia and Laos, puppet forces in South Vietnam were spread even thinner, causing them to suffer serious military and political defeats.

In the plan to Vietnamize the war, America regards the pacification program as a strategic program and an effective offensive measure. However, through violent, strong attacks and uprisings, the army and people of South Vietnam have struck accurately and painfully, causing serious damage to the malicious intentions of the enemy. In an article published on 30 December 1970, the French information service, AFP, pointed out that although the U.S.-puppet regime boasts about its pacification plan, the results are much different. According to the article, that which the American and puppet leaders call "progress," "in the opinion of all American specialists," this is just a "very thin progress." The article stated that "the lower ranks of the Viet Cong are still intact in both the cities and the rural areas."

Politically, faced with the total and great victories of the people of South Vietnam and faced with the growing failure of the enemy, the inherent conflict between the Americans and the puppets, within the puppet regime, and between the opposition factions and the Thieu group are becoming very tense. America is using the Thieu group to Vietnamize the war, withdraw American forces, reduce casualties, reduce expenditures, and so on. However, when this group of traitors becomes an obstacle to its policies, America will not hesitate to "change horses in midstream." Thieu and his followers know that without American dollars and arms they will collapse immediately. Therefore, they are trying to delay and prolong their day of reckoning and are sending gold and money to foreign banks and preparing false identities to be used when they are thrown out of power. It is no accident that the Western press has spoken of the Thieu clique's nightmare that America will withdraw its forces rapidly or will reduce its military and economic aid. The Thieu regime has often whispered its fears and resentment against being pushed aside by its masters. Therefore, it is suppressing other pro-American lackeys that do not agree with it. This causes the conflict within the puppet regime to become more serious. This conflict reached a high point during the public protest of many national assembly members against the Saigon puppet regime. Opposition factions in Saigon have often attacked Nguyen Van Thieu, demanding that he and his gang be overthrown. The French news service, AFP, stated on 1 November 1970 that the leaders of the opposition factions in the Saigon National Assembly organized a meeting to attack the Thieu regime at the An Quang Pagoda on the seventh anniversary of Ngo Dinh Diem's overthrow. Many retired officers and hundreds of famous people and representatives of many religions attended. Also according to AFP, on the morning of 31 October 1970, at the opening session of the newly elected National Assembly in Saigon -- which was attended by Thieu -- many members walked out to boycott Thieu as they had previously announced. At a meeting of the lower house, many members denounced the Thieu regime and stated that "this government must be overturned." As the puppet presidential election approaches (October 1971), the conflict within the puppet regime becomes more tense. On 13 January 1971, an American news service stated: "Taking advantage of his control over the puppet army, the puppet regime as well as the election organization, Thieu appointed one of his trusted friends to head the Supreme Court so that he would naturally become chairman of the election committee and would have the final veto power over candidates opposed to him. In a recent interview with AFP, Duong Van Minh publicly accused Nguyen Van Thieu of preparing a fraudulent presidential election this coming October and denounced Thieu for using the province chiefs, military commanders, police forces, pacification units and especially the "Phoenix"

group as tools to support his campaign; he also denounced the so-called "Presidential election law" (a law aimed at rejecting Thieu's opponents). Nguyen Cao Ky has often insulted Thieu. According to AP on 10 February 1971, when talking with puppet pilots and Saigon reporters, Ky criticized the U.S.-Puppet operations in Laos and criticized Thieu for indulging "corrupt" and "ineffective" lackeys. Ky also insulted Thieu for allowing the economy in the cities of South Vietnam to be "entirely dependent upon the United States." Recently, Ky attacked Thieu violently and demanded a "complete change of government." According to observers, this was a "slap in Thieu's face" (AP, 5 June 1971). These conflicts and insults further exposed the corruption of the puppet regime headed by Nguyen Van Thieu and proves that he has become extremely isolated. However, America's desire to assemble reactionary political factions as well compete for the so-called third force in Saigon as support for the Saigon puppet regime has disintegrated into smoke. The total and profound crisis of the Saigon puppet regime occurring during the continuous attacks of our army and people can only become more profound and eventually result in the defeat of the American Imperialists and the collapse of the Saigon puppet regime. None of Nixon's miracles can change the direction of this inevitable development in South Vietnam. The people of the cities of South Vietnam are violently demanding that America withdraw its forces and the bellicose Thieu regime be overthrown; are opposing the fraudulent presidential elections; and are demanding the establishment of a Saigon government that is genuinely peaceful, independent, neutral and democratic and that will hold serious talks with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam in order to resolve South Vietnam's problems in a spirit of widespread national accord. If Nixon really respects the right of self-determination of the people of Vietnam as he often claims, he must answer the new seven-point peace proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, stop supporting the bellicose Thieu regime, and cease every act, including the fraudulent elections, to maintain Thieu in power.

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ROMANIA'S 5-YEAR PLAN ACHIEVES GREAT RESULTS

[Article by Nguyen Thanh: "Romania's Economic Development Accomplishments"; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 8, August 1970, pp 85-89]

The completion of the 1966-1970 5-Year Plan had a great significance with regard to the economic development of Romania. During this period, every activity developed at a rapid rate, increased economic strength, and created capabilities to improve the living conditions of the people. Compared with previous 5-year plans, national income during this plan increased 45 percent.

During the past 5 years, social labor productivity increased and average of 7.5 percent per annum, while social labor productivity in industry increased 8.6 percent per annum. The rapid increase of industry's contributions to the national income enabled Romania to achieve a social labor productivity virtually equal to the most advanced countries of the world. Compared with 1965, industrial output during the 1966-1970 period progressed as follows:

1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
100	111	127	141	156	175

The basic sectors of industry had the most rapid rate of increased output: electricity, metallurgy, machinery and chemistry; this had a decisive effect on changing industry's production structure. The percentage of these sectors in total industrial output increased from 43.2 percent (1965) to 52.4 percent (1970). In 1970 electricity output reached nearly 35 billion kilowatthours (as opposed to 17.2 billion kilowatthours in 1965 and only 1.1 billion in 1938). The annual per capita electricity output has increased as follows:

1938	1950	1965	1970
72 kWh	130 kWh	904.8 kWh	1,700 kWh

The most significant result has been rural electrification. In the past 5 years, more than 4,000 villages have been electrified, increasing the total number of electrified villages to approximately 80 percent.

The metallurgy industry has developed both in quantity and quality. By 1970 Romania's steel output had increased 23 times and its iron output had increased 31 times over 1938. In the past 5 years, the output of the machinery industry doubled and now comprises 25 percent of the national industrial output. The value of machinery and equipment in 1970 was 108.9 percent greater than in 1965. The machinery industry has improved the structure of the sectors producing complex machinery, tools and equipment by giving priority to the development of sectors requiring high technical standards in order to create sophisticated, complex products. By the end of the 5-Year Plan, the output value of these sectors increased as follows: electronics, 175.4 percent; optical instruments, 106.4 percent; power tools, 147.6 percent.

In the past few years, the chemical industry has been worthy of its important task of increasing the value of domestic resources. By 1970 the 1965 output had increased 2.6 times. The average yearly rate of increase in the past 5 years was 21.5 percent. Romania's chemical industry currently produces 6,000 products. In particular, more than 55 percent of the capital invested in the chemical industry is used by the petroleum industry -- the primary sector in the chemical industry.

The building materials industry has been stepped up by rebuilding, expanding and modernizing existing installations. Between 1966 and 1970, the output of building materials increased an average of 13.3 percent per annum.

Light industry and the food products industry also developed quite rapidly during the recent 5-Year Plan. The average annual rate of increase was 11.4 percent.

In the 5-year period, the output of the food products industry increased 50 percent; meat increased 52 percent, butter increased 66 percent, milk increased 71 percent, and vegetable oil increased 64 percent. Each year food production installation process approximately 13 million metric tons of subsidiary food crops and meat into 4,000 products.

Agriculture, the production sector in which nearly half the population is engaged, contributed an important part to the completion

of Romania's 1966-1970 5-Year Plan. During this period, agricultural output increased 24 percent and satisfied the grain needs of the people. Even during 1968 and 1969, under unfavorable weather conditions, and in 1970, when agriculture suffered from a major flood, the average annual output was maintained at the same rate of increase of all previous periods. The following table shows the average annual development of crops during the 1966-1970 and 1971-1975 [sic] 5-year plans:

Primary crops	Yearly average (thousands of metric tons)	
	1961-1965	1966-1970
Wheat and buckwheat	4,416	4,748
Corn	5,853	7,211
Sunflowers	2,867	3,811
Potatoes and beans	3,962	4,583

In the 5-year period, grains increased 16 percent (an increase of approximately 1.7 million metric tons), beets increased 32.9 percent (an increase of nearly 1 million metric tons), sunflowers increased 44.2 percent, and potatoes and beans increased 16 percent.

Regarding food products, the following table shows a comparison between the two 5-year plans (annual average):

	1961-1965	1966-1970
Meat	982,000 metric tons	1,271,000 metric tons
Milk	31.6 million hectoliters	38 million hectoliters
Eggs	2.5 billion	3.2 billion

The great results achieved in agriculture are related to the amount of capital invested to increase the material and technical base of agriculture (in millions of lei):

1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
5,490	6,168	8,070	8,889	9,220

By the end of 1970, Romania's agriculture had 107,500 tractors (an increase of 32 percent over 1965), more than 50,000 combines (an increase of 25.4 percent over 1965), and many other modern machines and equipment.

The use of chemicals in agriculture has been widespread. In 1970, 700,000 metric tons of pure fertilizer was used (1965: 303,000 metric tons).

Under the special soil and climate conditions of Romania, the state has concentrated heavily on water conservancy. The 1966-1970 plan began implementing a large-scale program to build irrigation and drainage projects for 578,000 hectares. Water distribution systems are controlled by the most modern technical methods.

Romania has industrialized animal husbandry and has established many state and cooperative animal husbandry installations. Work in these installations is mechanized and automated. Following are a few pertinent figures: there are 22 dairy installations with 1,000-2,000 milk cows in each; there are 17 hog installations, each producing approximately 13,500 metric tons of pork per year; there are 25 chicken installations employing modern methods, and so on.

The strong development of the Romanian economy in the past few years is closely related to the completion of the capital investment program. Between 1966-1970, capital invested in the economy reached 289.7 billion lei, which was nearly five times more than during the first 5-Year Plan (1951-1955). In the distribution of investment capital, priority is given to industry (nearly one-half the capital), 12.7 percent is set aside for agriculture, and 11.5 percent is allocated to communications and transportation.

The amount of fixed assets in production during 1970 increased approximately 4.5 times over 1950, while the national income increased 600 percent. This shows that during the recent 5-Year Plan, the economic sectors have concentrated on adding new production means, which causes labor productivity to increase.

At the beginning of 1971, Romanian workers were very enthusiastic over the prospects resulting from the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party. The congress pointed out the national development program for the 1971-1975 period as well as the direction of national construction for the 1971-1980 period. During the first few months of this year, the industrial production plan was not only completed but surpassed, and industrial production increased 11.7 percent over the same period last year.

The above results confirm the fulfillment capabilities of the tasks and objectives proposed by the party. On this basis, the Plenum of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee confirmed and

increased the indices of the 1971-1975 5-Year Plan. Compared with the plan proposed at the 10th Party Congress (1960), all of the main indices of the plan have been supplemented:

Percentage of Increase of 1971-1975 Planned Indices
Over 1970 Levels

	Estimate of 10th Congress	Current Estimates
Total industrial output	50-57	68-78
Total agricultural output (yearly average during 5-year period)	28-31	36-49
Labor productivity per industrial worker	37-40	42
Reduction of expenditures per 1,000 lei of commodity production in state industry by 1975 (%)	6-7	11-12
Volume of foreign trade (1971-1975 compared with previous 5-year period)	41-45	61-72
Investment capital concentrated in state budget for 5-year period (billions of lei)	420-435	470
National income	45-50	61-82
Retail sales volume	30-35	40-46
Actual wages	16-20	20
Actual income of peasants directly engaged in agricultural production	15-20	22-30

In the 1971-1975 5-Year Plan, the proposed industrial production will increase approximately 12 percent per annum and will comprise nearly 65 percent of the national income. The outstanding feature of this new 5-Year Plan will be the rapid development of modern industries producing high-precision products.

Because of this direction of development, the machinery industry has an especially important task. The strong development of this industry — whose products must double in the 5-year period — will be achieved on the basis of expanding the industries that produce electrical and electronic machines, precision machinery, power tools, technical equipment, and so on, and the shipbuilding industry. The

output of electronic machines and precision machinery will increase 340 percent. This rate of development will enable this industry to equip all material production sectors and step up technical progress throughout the entire national economy.

This 5-Year Plan will ensure the expansion and modernization of the metallurgy industry. In 1975 it will produce 9.7 million metric tons of steel. The output of rolled steel will increase along with nonferrous metals. Attention will be given to the production of special types of steel, and by the end of 1975 the output of these will surpass the 1-million metric ton mark.

The chemical industry is one of the sectors with the highest rate of increase; output will increase 2.3 times in the 5-year period and the petroleum, synthetic fiber and plastics industries will receive special attention in their development.

The building materials industry will also be stepped up. By 1975 cement output will double and reach 16.5 million metric tons. Many local cement plants will be built to make full use of local capabilities.

This 5-Year Plan will ensure the development of the food products industry and light industry, will fully exploit the capabilities of local industry and handicraft cooperatives, and will step up secondary family occupations.

It is estimated that this 5-Year Plan will increase all agricultural products by 49 percent over the average annual increase of the 1966-1970 period. Approximately 80 billion lei will be invested in agriculture. One of the most important objectives will be increasing and modernizing machinery used in agriculture, regarding this as a solution to the problem of mechanizing agriculture. Agriculture will be supplied 2.3 times more chemical fertilizer than during the previous 5-Year Plan. By 1975 more than 2 million hectares will be under irrigation.

During this period, it is planned to utilize social labor to the highest and most rational extent possible. Over 1 million more workers will be employed during this 5-Year Plan (according to the estimates of the 10th Party Congress, this figure was only 400,000-500,000 persons). Labor in industry and other nonagricultural sectors will comprise nearly 60 percent of the total population. Labor productivity in industry will increase 42 percent. During this 5-Year Plan, the volume of foreign trade will increase more than 70 percent over the previous 5-Year Plan.

Concern for the material and spiritual lives of the people is a fundamental objective of the economic policies of the party and the state. The current minimum monthly wage is 800 lei; in 1972 it will be 1,000 lei and by the end of 1975 it will be increased to 1,100 lei. During this 5-year period, 2.5 million Romanians will be moved into new houses. Budgets for education, culture, art, medicine, and so on, will amount to 218 billion lei, which is equal to the entire national income of 1970. The income of peasants will increase nearly 30 percent per worker. By the end of 1975, the minimum income of the agricultural cooperative member will be 300-400 lei per month in cultivation and 400-500 lei per month in animal husbandry.

The great achievements of the recent 5-Year Plan are the results of the labor and creativity of the proletariat, collective peasants and socialist intellectuals under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party. These results and the results of the first year of the current 5-Year Plan are a good basis for fulfilling the objectives of the economic and social development program proposed by the 10th Congress and the Plenum of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee.

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