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- North Vietnam -

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
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This publication contains translations of articles from the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap (Studies), No 12, 1964. Complete bibliographic information accompanies each article.

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PARTY LEADERSHIP
OVER PEOPLE'S ARMY

Following is a translation of an article by Song Hao in the Vietnamese-language publication Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No 12 December 1964, pages 17-36/

Our army was born and grew up in the crucible of the people's revolutionary struggle; its mission was to fight for the nation's independence, to win land for the people's cultivation, and to bring socialism and communism to our country.

Under the banner of the Party our army has for the past several decades been bringing into play the nature of the proletariat and the nation's traditional courage in struggle; it has surmounted every difficulty and hardship during the barbarous war against the nation's and class' enemies, defeated the Japanese fascists, French imperialists, and U.S. interventionists and their stooges. It has become an extremely powerful striking force that makes the people's foes tremble but heartens those nations in struggle for self-liberation.

The source of our army's strength is first and foremost the leadership of the Party. Without party leadership our army would not have accomplished anything and would never have become a genuine people's army.

Throughout the period of formation, fighting, and during the coming of age of the army the strengthening of the leadership of the Party has always been a question of prime importance and a determinative factor. It constitutes the army's guiding principle whether for building itself up or in combat.

The Party of the Vietnamese working class is the creator, organizer, trainer, and leader of our army. This fact amounts to an objective law and a requirement of our nation in this phase of its history. Ever since the

capitalist way of production was established around the world, two antagonistic classes took shape: the capitalist class and the proletarian class, the life-and-death struggle between which demanded that each had its own political party. Leading the capitalists is their party while the proletariat is under the leadership of its vanguard -- the Marxist-Leninist party.

Toward the middle of the 19th century French capitalism perpetrated aggression against our country. Our ruling feudalists first went down in surrender then colluded with the French bandits and helped them oppress our people. Vietnam became a semifeudal colony. To exist and develop themselves our people had to rise up and fight for freedom and independence. This is for the nation a question of survival and also a law governing its history.

With the victory of the Russian socialist October Revolution a new era began for mankind: the transitional period from capitalism to socialism on a worldwide scale. In Vietnam the national liberation revolutionary struggle could be accomplished only if it was an integral part of the Vietnamese proletarian revolution. For this reason the leading role of the Vietnamese revolution must be assumed by the Vietnamese working class. This background provides the answer to the question why the Vietnamese working class, although young and immature, found itself in the leading role of the Vietnamese revolution when it first appeared on the political scene.

Looking at its economic and social background we can see that only the working class is genuinely revolutionary in nature, only it shows absolute loyalty toward the laboring people and possesses the capability of leading the Vietnamese revolution and our worker-peasant army in its decisive war against the class and nation's enemies. Like all other world countries' working classes, the Vietnamese working class is blessed with particularly favorable factors in waging the revolution for liberating itself along with all oppressed people, because it is bound by nothing to a society built on exploitation. Leading a life of joblessness and privation, with bare hands as its only assets, the Vietnamese working class realizes more acutely than any other classes the wretchedness of the oppressed and exploited and the humiliation of people without a country of their own. The interests of the class and nation have created in their heart an extreme hatred of imperialism and feudalism, and animated in them a determined revolutionary spirit.

Born at a time when world capitalism was well on its way toward bankruptcy and when the Russian October Revolution has scored complete success, the Vietnamese working class inherited the valuable experience of the first victorious proletarian revolution under the leadership of Lenin, the great successor of Marx and Engels. Perfectly aware of its own strength and confident in its future, it unhesitatingly went ahead with the task of eradicating the imperialists and feudalists. The working class was not the only one to have realized its own leading role in the revolution, the entire Vietnamese people, drawing from their own experience, had indeed come to conclusion that only under the leadership of the working class would they be able to win total freedom.

With a historic mission devolving upon it, with the specific historical conditions of the country, with a most revolutionary standpoint, with the great revolutionary doctrine of Marx and Lenin, the fact that the Vietnamese working class, through its Party, is providing leadership to the Vietnamese revolution is entirely consistent with the objective law and necessary requirement of history.

To achieve power is vital in all revolutions. In order to seize and maintain power the working class' party had to build up, organize, and lead a revolutionary armed force -- the principal instrument of the revolution's physical strength. The greatest, most important fact in a capitalist society is that the bourgeois class is armed from top to toe against the proletariat. For this reason, unless the proletariat possessed its own armed forces and relied on the people to wage a revolutionary struggle, it would not be in a position to secure leadership, to free itself along with all other laboring strata, to eradicate classes, and to eliminate the very root cause of war. No political objectives whatever would have been attained by the proletariat had it been without the means of revolutionary violence or without armed forces in its hands. The experience of the revolutionary struggle of the French proletariat in 1848 has taught us that, when the people were without armed strength, even though they were represented in the bourgeois government, their representatives were in the end but "high priests" whose only "responsibility consisted of discovering paradise and explaining the new testament."

There are two kinds of politics in a society where classes still exist: the politics of the oppressor-exploiter class and the politics of the oppressed-exploited classes. War is the continuation of politics and the army is the main instrument for the prosecution of war. It follows that whatever aim an army is fighting for must serve the political line that has brought it about. There has never been such thing as a war without political aim and there likewise has never been a supraclass, politically independent army. On the basis of this theory our Party has, ever since our people's revolutionary struggle became an armed one, always considered the organization, building up, and leadership of the armed forces as vital tasks. Facts show that the Party has set up the people army and that, from the outset, it has always had a firm leadership over the revolutionary army.

The experiences of history have demonstrated that, if an army is in the hands of the exploiting class, it sooner or later will betray the interests of the laboring people.

In 1775 the American people organized an army to oppose the rule of English imperialism. Once the war of liberation had ended the American bourgeoisie set out to oppress and exploit the people with every known trick; what followed was that the laboring people of the north rose up in opposition. But the northern American bourgeois in collusion with the southern landlords and slaveowners used the army to repress and quell the uprising. Today the American army has become an effective tool in the hands of American imperialism which uses it against the American people and revolutionary people the world over.

In 1789 the French bourgeoisie formed an alliance with the peasants, set up an army, overthrew the feudal autocracy, and built a bourgeois republic. With the success of the revolution, the capitalist regime was set up. The bourgeois class thereupon used the said army as an instrument to safeguard its "inviolable rights of ownership," to oppress its former allies the French peasants and laboring people, and to perpetrate aggression against other nations.

In 1911 a Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution overthrew the feudal regime and established the "Republic of China." But in its wake the contributing armies now under bourgeois leadership became bourgeois tools for the oppression of the laboring people and against the revolutionary movement.

Another lesson of experience is that, even if it is composed of an absolute majority of oppressed and exploited men, an army which is not led by the working class becomes but a tool in the hands of the exploiting class to oppress the laboring class. We still remember that in February 1848 the proletariat chased the royalist troops from Paris and set up a bourgeois republic. The bourgeois provisional government thereupon organized 24 battalions of special guards comprising 24,000 brave men recruited from among the proletariat. Lacking experience and a seasoned staff of its own, the proletariat failed to seize command of these battalions, convinced as it was that these armed laborers were in effect proletarian troops. It consequently cheered the guards when they paraded through the streets of Paris. Barely 4 months later these very guards, on bourgeois orders, pitilessly repressed a proletarian uprising side by side with the bourgeois national guards.

In 1925, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, men from the warlords' armies of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan who had rallied to the cause of the revolution were reorganized into a national army. But Chen Tu-Hsiu, who held party leadership then, chose to compromise and surrendered to the bourgeois. He therefore failed to consolidate the party's leadership over the army and allowed the latter to eventually become a tool in the hands of the feudalists and bourgeois for oppressing the proletariat.

In some peculiar historical circumstances our Party, too, entered alliances with other classes to form a united national front or administration with a view to eliminating the enemy; it however never shared its leadership of the revolution with any other classes. The Party never held its absolute leadership over the revolutionary forces firmer. In the complicated political situation during the first days of the August Revolution when our administration was still in its infancy, the reactionaries who called themselves Vietnamese Nationalist Party and who came on the heels of the Chiang Kai-Shek troops contrived to station their men in key positions in our army hoping that they would turn it into a tool of counterrevolution. Some others sought to take advantage of the situation and set up bourgeois-style rules according to which our army was to be taken away from party leadership. The Party fought back resolutely against all schemes of sabotage on the part of the class enemies, all rightist views and unprincipled compromises, holding on firmly to its absolute leadership over the revolutionary armed forces.

The leadership of the Party is the factor that determines what the political nature of the army and what its goals of struggle should be. Formed during the climax of a national liberation revolution in a backward agricultural country, the cadres of fighters of our army are generally imbued with patriotism, revolutionary fervor, and the sense of sacrifice, and they are courageous and endure hardship well, all of which does not mean that they were already holding a good fighting standpoint, a correct revolutionary viewpoint, and a lofty ideal of struggle when they first entered the army. While they could easily see in the enemy a national enemy, they seldom saw in him a class enemy. They could have accomplished the national democratic revolution more consciously than they would the socialist revolution. Only under the leadership of the Party could our army -- composed mainly of uniformed peasants -- have acquired a thoroughly revolutionary spirit, the determination to exterminate all class and nation's enemies, an unconditional loyalty toward the Party and the people, and only under Party leadership could it have become a modern proletarian army. As Lenin has said: "Only the proletariat can create the nucleus of a powerful army -- powerful because of its ideal, discipline, and heroism in combat (1)."

In order to give the army its absolute leadership, the Party constantly educates the men on what they must fight for, on the political tasks of the Party which vary with the circumstances, and on the proletarian line for conducting war and building up the army. It unremittingly arms the cadres and soldiers with the Marxist-Leninist ideological standpoint and approach for dealing with all questions relative to war and army building. Organizationally, there has been set up an entire party system from party chapters at the unit level to party committees in divisions, military zones, etc. The Party has also set up various leadership and operation rules for party committees at all levels and trained a body of cadres and party members to serve as the core for combat and army building duties.

Thanks to the Party's leadership the army progressed from being nothing to being something, from small to large, from weak to strong, and it won victory upon victory. Experience tells us that the key to solving all questions relative to building the army and conducting war is to strengthen party leadership. Wherever and whenever party leadership weakens, errors crop up in great number and in all respects. All inclinations toward curtailing or weakening party leadership over the army are therefore erroneous and harmful to the Party and people's cause of the revolution.

So that the Party may perform its historic task and so that the army may be unconditionally loyal to the interests of the class and nation we in our effort to build the army must bear in mind the following basic points:

(1) Lenin: "Between two Wars," complete Russian edition, Political Literature Publisher, Moscow, 1947, Vol 9, page 431.

- The Party's absolute, direct, and total leadership over the armed forces must be maintained.

To maintain an absolute leadership over the army, the Party must first of all refrain from sharing its rights of leadership with any other classes. Because the army is the working class' sharpest instrument of struggle, it is imperative that it should be led by the working class' party if it is to remain loyal to the revolution of the class and nation.

The importance of the leadership of the Party can be felt in the fact that individual authority should not be allowed to be stressed lest it weaken party leadership. Our party-created army came into being and grew up during the revolutionary movement; it fought for the liberation of the nation and class. Building it up is a task devolving on the entire Party and people. Absolute leadership over the army should therefore be the collective leadership of the Party represented by the Central Executive Committee and party committees of all levels. Any tendencies toward promoting the authority of individuals or reducing the Party's collective leadership are contrary to the Party's principle of army leadership. Enlargement of an individual's authority in any sector of party endeavor is always conducive to despotism, arbitrariness, bureaucratism, and estrangement from the masses, all of which is contravening the Party's collective leadership principle with evil consequences upon the revolution. Allowing individuals to build up their authority at various levels of leadership and command of the army, which is "military organization, would mean militarism and arbitrariness; internal relations would be adversely affected and troops could even be caused to go astray. It is for this reason that our Party has always consistently been applying the regime of "two commanders sharing responsibilities under the collective, unified, and centralized leadership of the Party committee," which is regarded as the only principle for the leadership and command of the army.

Politically, the Party has laid down its political and military lines and is using them as the guideline and principle for building the army and for combat and other party duties. The lines currently followed by our army consist precisely of socialist revolution in the North and people's national democratic revolution in the South. The military line of the Party consists in "building up the people's armed forces and waging a people's war," it is the correct and creative integration of the Marxist-Leninist theory on war and armies with actual experiences in class and armed struggles. Its content is permeated with the spirit of revolution to the bitter end, the scientific touch of the doctrine of Marx and Lenin, and the courage and creativity of our Party, and it faithfully mirrors our country's concepts on armed struggle. In order then for the cadres and soldiers to thoroughly understand the Party's military line governing all actions taken whether in combat or army building, it is necessary for them to have a firm class standpoint and a good realistic viewpoint. Our experiences in combat and army building have proved that, to carry through its military line, the Party had to wage a persevering struggle against all influences left by bourgeois military thinkings -- overemphasis on individual talent, weapons, technology; downgrading of the role played by the masses, man, and politics within the military realm. The Party had to abide by and go through

on its realistic viewpoint, fighting dogmatism with all its manifestations -- overlooking the military and combat tasks of the army, taking no account of our country's possibilities and actual conditions, and disregarding our army's experience and magnificent traditions.

Ideologically, the Party regard Marxism-Leninism as the leading ideology for the army, it has never ceased to fight nonproletarian ideologies of all kinds which are trying to make inroads into the army. The army's standpoint and viewpoint must be those of the working class, its only ideological method must be the dialectic materialist method. All cadres and men, no matter from what class they come, must be made to consider Marxism-Leninism as the compass course of all their actions, to learn and acquire the Party's class and vanguard character, and to resolutely carry out all party political and military lines. Consequently, if a man joins the army by does not learn and train in accordance with the proletariat's standpoint and viewpoint, if he does not carry out the Party's political and military lines, he can never become a cadre or a soldier of the people's revolutionary army.

In organization, the Party adapts its own organizational principle to the army. It made the workers and peasants the core of the cadres, it strengthened the proletarian component when echelon party committees in the army were reorganized, it recruited party members from among the workers, peasants, and members of the Labor Youth Union. Such is the content of the class line of the Party as regards the organizational aspect of army building. Other leadership principles which the Party applies to the army are the principles of democratic centralization and collective leadership. Criticism and self-criticism should become a rule and a routine in the army's political life.

The army is the main instrument through which the revolution's physical strength manifests itself. It is the most potent tool in the hands of the dictatorial proletarian state for maintaining power, for safeguarding and developing the achievements of the revolution. As a result, every move and every combat action on the part of the army is entirely consistent with the Party's political line. Organizationally, our army is a very tightly knit body. It is highly centralized and unified according to a vertical system of command; it is operationally very efficient, and its sphere of action covers the entire country. For this reason, not only must the Party assume absolute leadership over the army but it also must assume direct command of it as well, not going through the intermediary of party organs as it does with the people's groups. From the point of view of the Party AND ARMY, THE Central Executive Committee of the Party alone is the supreme echelon with the authority to assume direct command of the army. The Central Committee directly instructs, inspects, and supervises the building of the army in accordance with the class line of the Party and sees that the army always acts in conformity to the Party's political task. It determines ^{the} combat objectives and the strategy and tactics of each phase; it maps out plans for building up or using the armed forces which will fit each particular situation and perform specific task. Regional military organizations (provincial, municipal, district, and village units) as well as the

entire regional armed strength, the people's armed police and self-defense militia must submit to the direct command of various echelon committees (provincial, municipal committees, etc.) In the main force, party organizations command directly all units and make all decisions concerning army building and combat duty.

Only through such direct, top-to-bottom leadership can the Party provide a centralized, unified, firm, and efficient leadership consistent with the nature and peculiarities of the armed forces, and only then can it secure a constant, unconditional loyalty on the part of the army for the revolution and people.

Any inclinations toward making the Party's leadership over the army an indirect one, that is, having it go through intermediary organizations, are incompatible with the nature and peculiarities of the army, would hamper smooth functioning when assignments are being implemented, especially when these are army combat assignments from the Party.

Beside being absolute and direct, the Party's leadership over the army must also be total if the army is to develop harmoniously in all respects and to heighten its combat ability and readiness.

To insure that party leadership is total we must well understand that building up the Party, strengthening the army ideologically, scientifically and technologically are the three main aspects of army building. Consequently, we must combat all contentions that the Party only needs to and only can lead the army politically and ideologically but that it need not and cannot lead it as to science and technology. This is a tendency toward pure and simple technological specialization, toward severing science and technology from the Party's leadership. Science and technology are essentially classless, using them for the promotion of certain classes' interests implies, however, a class motive particularly when military science is put to work for class struggle. Moreover, technical equipment is an indispensable element of the army's fighting strength. For all these reasons, should the Party confine itself to political and ideological leadership while forgoing leadership on military science and technology, not only would it fail to impart to the army the physical strength with which to carry out the Party's political tasks, but military science and technology themselves could deviate from party military line and run counter to the Marxist-Leninist view on war and army and, at worst, they could stray into and adopt the view of the bourgeois class. Whenever military science and technology are not under party leadership, they can never be revolutionary military science and technology. In summary, the Party must assume total leadership over the army with stress on military science and technology. In this respect our Party is entirely capable of performing its task.

The Party's total leadership over the army is also reflected in that full party leadership must be provided politically, ideologically, and organizationally. The political and ideological sectors are considered the most vital and far-reaching; the organizational aspect helps the ideological one, which in turn helps implementing the political tasks.

Ideological leadership consists in educating the masses to think correctly and act consciously and in the right direction. Organizational leadership, on the other hand, channels all the masses' conscious actions into a single objective as prescribed by the specific rules and principles for creating physical strength. Without organizational leadership, ideological leadership would result in uncoordinated actions on the part of the masses and, hence, failure to achieve the concerted, powerful strength expected of the army as a whole. Ideological leadership and organizational leadership are therefore two closely interwoven aspects neither of which can be overlooked.

The Party must see that total leadership is provided to all revolutionary armed forces from the main body to the regional forces, the people's armed police, and the self-defense militia none of which is to be neglected. Only by coordinating all these troops can the Party consolidate its entire revolutionary armed forces steadily, develop them harmoniously, and generate a strength large enough to overwhelm any enemy.

For each of its armed forces the Party must reaffirm its leadership both when it is building itself up and in its combat duty. In building up and training the troops, attention must be paid to meeting all requirements for combat readiness and combatability -- the objectives of all building and training works. As regards combat leadership, the Party must know how to use combat itself to keep the army expanding and training, to raise its ideological, political, technological, and tactical levels, and to make it possible for the army not only to fulfill its tasks well but also to grow and mature in every respect while in combat.

Absolute, direct, and total leadership constitutes the fundamental principle of party leadership over the army and the immutable principle for building a modern proletarian army. To struggle for reaffirming and consolidating this principle is the all-important task devolving on all party organizations within the army.

- Building a strong network of party organizations.

To establish and strengthen its leadership over the army, the Party takes the general principles on party building and the nature and peculiarities of the army as the bases for establishing within the army echelon party committees and party chapters which would serve as the nuclei of a unified, centralized leadership and, at the same time, uphold the system of "two commanders sharing responsibility under the collective leadership of the party committee" for the fulfilment of all tasks confronting the army.

Strengthening the Party's absolute leadership over the army consists in stepping up the construction of a network of party organizations within the army and in struggling against misconceptions tending to minimize this job or to separate party building and army building.

The army is strong so long as its party organizations are -- an

experience, learned from actual army building and combat, that has all but become a principle.

The Party provides the army with political, ideological, and organizational leadership of which the political and ideological aspects are the primordial ones. Each party organization and each party member must therefore have a good political and ideological understanding. Our Party is strong chiefly because its organizations and members have a firm viewpoint, standpoint, and ideology. Consequently, strengthening the Party ideologically has always been first and foremost in party building. A strong echelon committee calls for good members, and this calls for exemplary masses, revolutionary, class-conscious, and first of all deeply aware of the proletariat's rights and obligations. Good, exemplary masses in turn call for party members firm in their standpoint and ideology to educate and guide the masses all of which demands that all party organizations focus on strengthening the Party ideologically. Only through field training in army building and through the test of actual combats can good members and echelon committees be formed and party organizations tempered into powerful ones. The stronger the Party and its organizations are, the better the education of the masses, and the larger the exemplary masses will become; as a result, party building will have more favorable factors working for it. Therefore, strengthening the Party ideologically always serve as the basis for stepping up the building of the Party organizationally. The more carefully we educate the party members and masses ideologically, the more favorable factors we shall have working for us in the setting up of the party organizations.

In our effort to strengthen the Party ideologically, we should adhere to our class line thoroughly when setting up party organizations, that is, when building up the Party and its committees we should follow the class line and enlarge the proletarian element in the Party and particularly in the party committees. We have brought up this question of increasing the worker and peasant element within the Party not because we want to stress the doctrine of party composition, but because we must implement correctly the class line in building up the Party organizationally in order to strengthen it and bolster its fighting potential. Here, the class line is identical to that which guides us in the selection of our cadres or new members for the Labor Youths. It is therefore entirely consistent with the class line in party building and army building to select cadres from among the best party members and new party members from among the outstanding, front-rank members of the Labor Youths, to select for the armed forces the best young men whose class composition is clean and whose personal history is clear, and to train them into soldiers of talent and strict morals.

To have a strong network of party organizations it is paramount that the Party's principle of centralized democracy be thoroughly adhered to in all aspects of party organizational or other activities in the army.

Centralized democracy is the Party's fundamental principle of organization. It is based on the fact that unity in organization is conducive to unity in party action and ideology. It transforms the Party into a well disciplined army with high fighting ability, and it gives full play to party members' initiative and creativeness.

Of the above principle democracy and centralization are the two inextricably interwoven elements. A noncentralized democracy would preclude unity, it would disperse our strength and stifle people's minds and talents. On the other hand, centralization without democracy would not result in true unity either, it would not bring the strength of the collective to the fore and it would turn into arbitrariness and onesidedness.

Applying thoroughly the principle of centralized democracy in party organizations within the army consists primarily in maintaining and consolidating the system of "two commanders sharing responsibility under the collective leadership of the party committees." Actual experiences in army building have borne testimony to the soundness of this system for maintaining the Party's absolute leadership over the army -- a system fully embodying the Party's fundamental principle of organization, which is centralized democracy, and its uppermost principle of leadership, which is collective leadership with individual responsibility. Under the system the collective leadership of the party echelon committee is total, it works closer to the masses and to realities. The system is also able to coordinate all party pursuits within the army and to insure that unity prevails in ideology and action -- the source of the Party's strength. It brings to bear the commanders' initiative, ingenuity, and sense of responsibility.

This system, which leaves leadership to the party committee and responsibility to the commanders, not only does not weaken in any way the orders or directives issued by the commanders, but it insures that these orders or directives are correct and fully implemented. It does not get in the way of scientific and technological pursuits, but it helps science and technology develop more vigorously and in the correct direction. The Party committee's leadership does not downgrade the role of the modern regular army in army building and actual combat, on the contrary, it is very much needed and all the more so where joint operations are essential and commanding becomes a complicated job.

To perfect the system, it is first necessary to constantly strengthen the principle of collective leadership by the party committees. The reason is that only the party committee's collective leadership can insure that party lines and policies are correctly laid down and implemented. This makes it possible for opinions from the party members and masses to be centralized; subjective, onesided errors to be reduced; the sense of responsibility, the positiveness and creativeness of party members to be brought into play; and the unity within the Party and army to be enhanced. This collective leadership must also be centralized and vested in the party committees which represent the Party. All endeavors must spring from the decisions of party committees of various echelons, all authorities must be centralized and vested in the party committees. Centralization here should be aimed at the party committees as collectives, not at individuals. It follows that all inclinations toward minimizing the party committees' collective leadership in favor of individuals' authority are contrary to the principle of centralized democracy and in violation of the principle of collective leadership upheld by the Party. Ambitious thinkings aimed at power and position, paternalism, and militarism often are the root causes of such

inclinations as upgrade individual authority and downgrade party leadership. On the other hand, the absence of democracy-consciousness, ignorance of the masses' viewpoint, and lack of the sense of responsibility, initiative, and creativeness displayed by some commanders are factors that hinder collective leadership by the party committees.

While emphasizing the party committees' collective leadership we are not overlooking the responsibility of the commanders, because collective leadership must be coupled with responsibility, otherwise we shall fall into the mistake of empty talk and not follow them up with action. Conversely, sharing responsibility not backed by collective leadership will

lead to dispersal of strength, dogmatism, despotism, and inability to summon the total strength of the organizations.

A correct relationship between the party committees and the commanders calls for the party committees, on the one hand, to supervise closely the commanders' implementation activities and, on the other, to strive to bolster them, making them bolder, more active and more creative, and to provide them with every possibility for fulfilling their tasks. Only in so doing will party committees avoid monopolism and routinism and be able to deal with more vital, decisive questions. The party committees should always serve as fulcrums for the commanders in decision making. Consequently the commanders must realize what their duty^{is} toward the Party's collective leadership, they must obey the party committees unconditionally and ask to be rigidly controlled by them. However, they must also know their responsibility which is to serve as experts for the party committees. They must heighten their sense of responsibility, give fuller play to their creativeness, and contribute ideas useful to the committees' collective leadership.

Abiding by the Party's leadership system, we must establish a correct relationship between the leadership and the commanders consistent with the revolutionary character of the army and the fact that it is becoming a modern regular army. Party leadership is absolute, direct, and total over the army; its political goal is the army's combat target, its resolutions are the directives of action for all cadres and fighting men. A commander, whether he is a party member or not, must therefore assume the duty of conscientiously implementing all resolutions arrived at by the party committee of his own or higher echelon; he must respect the Party's army leadership and command systems.

Under the leadership of the Party, we now have rules, orders, regimens, etc. governing the responsibility and authority of each commander. To carry them out thoroughly is essential for making the army system of command stronger. The party committee's leadership not only does not hamper in any way the commander in the execution of the prescribed regulations within his authority, on the contrary, it helps the commander fulfill his duty and carry out orders and regulations to the letter. Orders and regulations are but codified decisions concerning organization aimed at unifying our actions. So that they may be fully carried out it is necessary that their ideological and political contents are well understood. The resolutions arrived at by the party committee are ideological and political bases to insure that all

orders and regulations are rigorously carried out, which in effect helps strengthen the command system. Moreover, the resolutions reached by the party committee have a much broader scope, they determine the unit's political tasks and directions of action taking into account the unit's political and ideological situation and current task. No matter how specific regulations and orders may be, they can never replace the leadership of the party committee; organizational rules cannot replace the latter's political and ideological leadership, nor can military command replace the Party's leadership. Only on the basis of strengthening the party committee's leadership can military command be asserted and all regulations and orders be carried out rigorously.

The army's role is to fight. To insure that every battle is won is the highest goal of all party organizations within the army as well as all cadres and soldiers. From this principle, all army activities and all specific regulations governing leadership and command must be derived. Whether in army building or in combat duty, the principle "all for victory over the enemy" must be observed thoroughly and the party committees must always strive to make it possible for the commanders to assert their authority, discharge their responsibilities, and fulfill the tasks assigned to them by the party committees. Such is the political responsibility of the party committees of all echelons. In view of the same requirement -- to triumph over the enemy -- the party committee must help the commander achieve the tasks on which he believes some initiative is necessary, and it must hold firm its leadership to insure that military command is performed correctly. All this shows that leadership and command not only do not hinder or undercut each other but that they are tightly interlocked and mutually beneficial, provided everyone concerned abides rigidly by the highest principle -- to triumph over the enemy -- and regards it as the goal of all actions.

In specific circumstances, particularly during the climax of a battle, our leadership and command system must be used in an appropriate manner. A distinction must be made between means and principles. Whether the commander informs the party committee of his intentions before or after the fact depends on the situation. In any case, the principle must be upheld that a commander is responsible to the party committee and subjected to its control, and that he must carry out its decisions. A party committee being the united leadership organ of a unit, nothing lies outside the sphere of its control. All technical assignments or tasks must be controlled by the party committee if technology is to serve politics, help the troops perform their job, and avoid blundering. The directives and orders issued by a higher echelon reflect the lines and resolutions of that echelon's party committee, lower echelon party committees must see that they are carried out correctly. Commanding and organizing the implementation of these directives and resolutions are always in close coordination with leadership and leadership system. It can consequently be said that, to qualify as the Party's army, a well commanded army must also have party leadership and that, to qualify as a revolutionary army, it must do active political work when its masses are themselves active.

The party branch is the basic element that insures that the Party's leadership over the army is absolute. It is deeply and firmly implanted in all army installations and constitutes the bridge between the Party and the masses, the nucleus of unity and party leadership in every army unit and installation. Strong party branches assert the role of leadership of the Party. There are no strong companies without strong party branches -- a fact as cogent as a principle. The party branches' part is never more prominent nor more decisive than in time of difficulty and crisis, when commanders who know how to get help from party branches and to look up to their leadership always deal successfully with problems and fulfill their tasks. Such has become a tradition with our army. Building up and consolidating the party branch is, therefore, the key to building the Party itself. All thinking or opinions tending to overlook the consolidation of the party chapter are erroneous and contrary to the basic principle on army building -- to strengthen the Party's absolute leadership.

Consolidating the party branch comprises many aspects the most important of which is the education and training of the party members, for the branch is powerful only when its members are good ones. The member must constantly be made to improve in all respects; he must be ahead of the masses not only in viewpoint, standpoint, and ideology but he also must understand the Party's line concerning the army. He must further learn and lead the masses as to technology or other endeavors. In so doing he will become a model shock element with at the same time a good persuasive power over the masses. In effect, the party branch is at once the core and the brains, it is suitable and proper that it be the supreme leadership organ of a company.

It is obvious that, to have a firmly established network of party organizations within the army, a good deal of work is necessary of which, it should well be borne in mind, the most basic points are the following: it is basic to build the Party up ideologically; adhere to the class line in building the Party up organizationally; the system of leadership by the party committee and responsibility shared by the commanders must be constantly perfected; party branches -- the key elements -- must be built up and strengthened.

- Building an elaborate, well coordinated political network.

The Party's absolute leadership over the army is obtained through the setting up of an elaborate and well coordinated political network; for political work belongs with the Party, it stirs up the masses' awareness of the revolution and it helps thoroughly establish the Party's leadership within the army.

The Party has clearly defined the purpose of political work in the army as: to educate the cadres and soldiers as to the working class' viewpoint, standpoint, and ideology thereby making the army well understand and resolutely implement the Party's political and military lines; to strengthen unity in the army; and to struggle against the enemy on the political and

ideological fronts. The entire political task being aimed at building up the Party's leadership over the army, all political work past and present must be geared to strengthening the Party ideologically and organizationally and consolidating the party committee and party chapter's leadership, all of which if for the purpose of bolstering the leadership of the Party over the army. In another connection, those who are in charge of political work must pay utmost attention to training the troops as to standpoint, viewpoint, and ideology of the proletariat, regarding these as firm bases for building and expanding the army, for making it possible for it to fulfill its missions.

Thanks to the Party's leadership and its political work our army is now magnificently revolutionary and absolutely loyal to the cause of the revolution and the interests of the class and nation. It has built for itself glorious traditions -- heroism in combat, stamina, surmounting difficulties, living a simple life, practicing internal unity, military-civilian solidarity, international solidarity, and so forth.

Thanks to political work, our army has successfully been built, it has won many battles, scored great achievements and glorious victories.

Experiences gained in the coming of age of our army have clearly demonstrated the far-reaching effect and the great role of political work, and underscored the fact that it is the source of the army's vitality and strength. Moreover, the achievements as well as the excellences of the army point up the indispensability of political work, for without political work the Party's leadership over the army would have been impossible and the masses in the army would not have been revolutionary in their actions.

Our revolutionary army completely different from no matter what other armies whether they are the imperialists', the feudalists', or the bourgeois' in that ours has a political work system, that is, a party or working class leadership. That it is utterly loyal to the interests of the people and the cause of the revolution, completely revolutionary, possessed of a high, indomitable fighting spirit is thanks to political work and party leadership. The regime of political work is what differentiates the working class' army from that of any other class, and a revolutionary from a counterrevolutionary army. For this reason our Party asserts that political work, whose purpose is to realize the Party's absolute leadership over the army, is paramount and is in effect the very soul of the army. It has become the deeprooted tradition of our army in the task of building itself, in combat, in its daily life and other endeavors. It is the basis for pursuits of any importance. Anything tending to minimize and downgrade the role of political work or antagonize it with other works is the product of misconception as to the leadership of the class, revolution, and Party over the armed forces. If not resolutely checked, such errors would lead us to building our army in the bourgeois way, with disastrous consequences affecting our efforts to build the army and consolidating our defense.

With a view to performing its political task, the Party has set up a political network with political organs and political agents at every echelon, it has laid down rules regulating the political committees and political workers. This has made the Party's leadership over the army

ever stronger, and the Party's lines and revolutionary tasks are being imparted more and more fully to the cadres and soldiers.

The Party also asserts that political education and ideological leadership are essential to political work, it in fact regards them as permanent, central elements of political work.

Taking the Marxist-Leninist view on the importance of the revolutionary theories and on the morale being the determinative factor in war as a basis, keeping in mind its own political task, the army's combat target, and the ideological situation prevailing among the cadres and soldiers, the Party maintains that army building must be founded upon political and ideological structures. An immutable principle in army building is: politics as the base and ideology in the lead. In whatever form war is fought, under whatever circumstance the army is built, whether it is dispersed or concentrated, composed of guerrillas or organized as a modern regular army, the human factor is still the determinative one and the political and ideological factor still occupies primordial positions. The more difficult and complex the situation and the tougher the job, the more necessary a political buildup will become. Any inclinations to minimize or weaken ideological work are errors of principle. Experience has taught us that, no matter when and where and whatever the size of the unit and the importance of the task all army pursuits and activities must be based on ideological work if good results are to be accomplished. Conversely, neglecting ideological work will lead to difficulties and even failure in the performance of our tasks.

Ours is a people's army under the leadership of the Party. It wages a struggle for national and class liberation. It must be class-conscious before it can be receptive to the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and bring to bear the revolutionary nature of the working class. Moreover, the workers account for but a small percentage of the troops while the absolute majority belongs to the peasants and patriotic petty-bourgeois. But their class-consciousness is found to be generally merely skindEEP or not well understood; the line is sometimes hazy between foes, friends, and ourselves; the old class concept still persists and nonproletarian thinking still leaves its mark. Under these circumstances, unless the Party works to bolster the proletarian standpoint on a permanent basis, to inculcate the revolutionary philosophy of life in the troops, and to resolutely and perseveringly struggle against all nonproletarian standpoints and concepts among the cadres and soldiers, then our army will not be receptive to and implement correctly the Party lines and policies. Without full class-consciousness it will not acquire a thoroughly revolutionary spirit, a spirit of sacrifice and courage and the determination to conquer difficulties and to fulfill its missions. For these reasons our Party must take class-consciousness as the fundamental content of political and ideological work, attaching importance to constantly promoting the troops' class-consciousness. Whatever the nature of education, its foundation must be class-consciousness and the proletarian ideology. Facts prove that each time class-consciousness high in the cadres and soldiers, with class hatred boiling inside them and class emotions well stirred up, we can witness the troops overcome all obstacles and hardships, fighting heroically, and fulfilling all party-entrusted missions.

Inculcating class-consciousness and standpoint in an army such as ours constitutes a full, constant, protracted, and tough struggle. This consists first and foremost in putting the army on the working class' standpoint where it can distinguish between enemies, friends, and ourselves -- a paramount question in revolutionary struggles. Only on that basis can the cadres and soldiers: clearly see the nature of the army and its goal of struggle; thoroughly understand the Party's revolutionary lines; analyse the complex problems of class struggle and determine the relationship between the individual and the collective, between the interest of the class and that of the nation; and enhance their revolutionary fervor and insure that the army never strays from the Party's revolutionary lines.

Aside from teaching the troops to distinguish between enemies, friends, and ourselves, we also have to improve their methods of thinking and raise their theoretical level. Only then can they thoroughly understand such complex questions as unity between standpoint and policies, strategy and overall design, and so forth and only then can they avoid subjectivism and bias, tell right from wrong, and be truly firm in their class standpoint.

We already know that the Party's task of political education and ideological leadership within the army consists, on the one hand, in raising the level of perception of the cadres and men as regards the Marxist-Leninist theories and the basic questions concerning the Party's political and military lines and tasks; on the other hand, in staying close to the troops in their daily life and trying to solve real building, training, and combat problems. The two aspects are closely interlinked; while the former, which is basic, serves as foundation for the latter, the latter complements and strengthens the former. Failing in or neglecting questions of political and ideological education while solely concentrating on solving problems, or vice versa, will be detrimental to political work.

However, when we are solving actual problems under specific conditions, those doing ideological work must handle as correctly as possible all problems encountered in the everyday life of the troops. There are views recently that there are at present newer and more complicated issues which warrant our attention and they are the issue of modern military science and technology, that of the putting in effect of the orders for regularizing the army, that of responsibility, regimes, etc. and that ideological work must concentrate on this particular area and handle the question in a proper manner. The foregoing view is correct, for on its way toward becoming a modern regular army, our army has found the points raised above extremely important as they contribute to speeding up the process of regularization and modernization. They have been getting our attention for the past several years and even today ideological work is being stepped up with a view to resolving them in a more satisfactory way. Nevertheless, if we confine ourselves to such new and complicated things without taking into account the equally new and complicated political, ideological, and emotional problems confronting the cadres and soldiers as the present fierce class struggle is in full swing within and without the country and as the army assumes a formidable combat duty, then our ideological work will be without a direction and

without strength.

Political education currently consists in making the cadres and soldiers take further cognizance of their combat targets. While the targets were national independence, land for the tillers, preparation toward socialism, they now are socialist construction in the North, national independence and land for the peasants in the South, and steps toward national reunification, nationwide socialism and communism. Only if they are imbued with these great targets will our army possess the noble ideals, the strong will and unmatched power for annihilating all enemies of the nation and class.

Ideological work in the army must at present concentrate on stamping out negative, rightist thinking which is weakening the cadres and soldiers' fighting will, paralyzing their revolutionary alertness, causing the men to waver in their faith, to balk at difficulties in reconstruction, and to shirk danger and sacrifice in combat. Individualism, too, is a great obstacle. It is the enemy of collectivism and socialism. It causes the cadres and men to literally shrink, to think of themselves first in every endeavor, to lose sight completely of the ideal they are fighting for, and to utterly lack the soldier's aims and ambitions. Freedom is an equally great plague. It makes a confusion of the distinction between right and wrong, leaves truth unprotected, weakens discipline and organization, and saps the fighting strength of party and army organizations. All these erroneous conceptions must consequently be resolutely combated.

Ideological work must also delve in military science. Military science is the science of class struggle, it belongs to the category of social sciences, hence, it calls for a thorough understanding of the Party's ideology, lines, and guiding principles. Consequently not only must we educate the army in Marxism-Leninism and party lines and policies, but we must also prompt the cadres and men to strictly adhere to discipline, rules, and orders. At the same time, we must have a good knowledge of military science and technology, concentrate on the building and managing of the material and technological basis of the army, putting everyone firm on his feet on party standpoint, and use Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and ideological methods to understand and utilize the technical equipment and to resolve all problems pertaining to army building and combat duty.

Clearly, only by understanding the fundamentals of the Party's political and military lines and tasks, considering them as the essential elements for building up the army ideologically, and only by working closely and in every phase of army building and actual combat can we enhance the absolute leadership of the Party over the army through political and ideological work and insure that the army remains forever the sharpest instrument of struggle in the hands of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

- Forming a body of skilled cadres to serve as the core of army building and combat duty.

Ideological work, a network of party organizations, a good leadership

setup are vital for establishing the Party's leadership over the army. However, they are by no means enough, a strong body of cadres is also necessary. The cadres must have a firm standpoint, a deep awareness of the Party's political tasks and the army's combat targets, a thorough understanding of the Party's viewpoint on armed struggles and armed forces building. They must have a good knowledge of theoretical military science, a high technical level, the ability to organize the masses for carrying out party-entrusted tasks, and a good working style. In order for such a body of cadres to materialize, it is necessary that first of all the Party's class line regarding the cadres be well understood: to select workers and peasants as core cadres. This derives from the Party's political and organizational lines.

Ours is a people's army and a worker-peasant army. It is the sharpest instrument in the hands of the dictatorial proletarian state. The Party's class line on organization must be made the organizational line for army building, and its class line on the cadres must be made the army's line on the cadres. If we grasp the Party's line on the cadres we shall also hold the main direction to the source of cadres, that is, we shall select and train our cadres from among the workers and peasants, who form the most determinedly revolutionary classes. The workers constitute the leadership class, the peasants the main force of the revolution, and the majority of our army consists of workers and peasants. Clearly, the latter constitute the greatest reserves of army cadres both in quantity and quality. The army cadres must therefore come from these fighting masses of laboring people, which is consistent with the Party's political and organization lines as well as with reality. Adhering to the line on the cadres -- workers and peasants as core cadres -- means that we must train the good worker and peasant elements, constantly forming them into cadres and bringing their qualities to the fore, relentlessly strengthening their standpoint and raising their political, scientific, and cultural level. Under the old social regime the workers and peasants were the oppressed classes to whom cultural opportunities were denied. This was worsened by the fact that our country was a colony with a backward agriculture. To bring them to the point where they can master science and technology we must impart to them the necessary knowledge. This shortcoming must be pounded home to our cadres of whom great efforts will be demanded if the slogan "intellectualizing the workers and peasants" is to be realized.

With the line making workers and peasants core cadres as a basis, we should also train and educate those cadres who do not belong to the worker and peasant classes, intellectuals who have voluntarily chosen to fight for the cause of the Party and the rights of the laboring class, who have stood the tests of the revolution and who possess close ties with the masses. We should develop their excellences and overcome their defects especially regarding their standpoint and viewpoint, and make good the slogan "worker-peasant-izing the intellectuals," and make better cadres out of them.

Selecting and training cadres must chiefly be done among the workers and peasants in order to raise the percentage of these elements and enhance the revolutionary political nature of the cadres. By stepping up political

education and conducting ideological reform on a permanent basis, we should further affirm the cadres' standpoint. Cadres from all classes must try hard to reform themselves ideologically and to strengthen their working class standpoint, because the ideological standpoint of the working class and of Marxism-Leninism did not by any means come about effortlessly and, moreover, remnants of bourgeois and nonproletarian ideologies are affecting our cadres everyday and every hour. As a result, if we concentrate solely on enlarging the worker-peasant component without reforming them ideologically, we shall show a lack of revolutionary viewpoint; conversely if we concern ourselves only with making ideological reforms with no thought for the worker-peasant component, we are losing sight of objective reality.

There are contentions to the effect that the class line is no longer suitable for cadre recruiting in a society such as the North's where the exploiter class has been obliterated, and that it does not answer the requirement for building a modern regular army either. Such views are completely wrong, for the army and State are themselves products of a class society and as long as they exist the class line should be maintained in our task of building the army and recruiting cadres. Moreover, our country is performing two simultaneous jobs -- a socialist revolution and a national democratic revolution -- and needs only more emphasis on the class line. Right here in the North, the struggle has not ended between the working and bourgeois classes whether in the political, economic, ideological, or cultural fields. The fact that the exploiting class and its private ownership system are no longer in existence does not mean that their ideology has been eradicated along with them, it is on the contrary still very much alive. Facts from the history of the proletarian dictatorship have confirmed this point.

We cannot regard knowledge of science and technology as the content of or basis for our organizational line, because science and technology are not political in nature whereas class is. They can serve only as means for class struggle but they can never replace class struggle itself. Under socialism technology serves man's welfare, it extends man's capability in his struggle against nature and his class enemy. Under capitalism on the other hand technology tends to replace man and turn him into a slave. Technology springs from labor. Theory is born of practice. The worker and peasant are laborers and they have more practice than anybody else and, what is more, the worker-peasant cadres are culturally and scientifically no longer what they used to be. If helped, the worker and peasant can and will master science and technology. Should we deem them unfit for a modern regular army, we would be lacking revolutionary viewpoint and confidence in the great possibilities of the worker and peasant. That precisely is the viewpoint of the bourgeoisie, and that also is a way of rejecting the class line in recruiting cadres. Such a rejection points up a lack of class struggle viewpoint and the failure to grasp the key to the building of the armed forces; it would result in the impossibility of building a strong body of cadres for carrying out the Party's leadership, and would cause our army to be anything but a people's, revolutionary army, or a sharp instrument in the hands of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

To carry out the class line in cadre recruiting and to form a body

of good cadres who will act as the core of the armed forces, the Party has set moral and proficiency standards to serve as direction of training and improvement for all cadres. Morals and talents are closely related and, in character, this relationship is that between politics and technology, and between standpoint, ideology and skill. A cadre must have both morals and talents, but while morals are essential, talents are only very important.

Morals mean political qualities, which are absolute loyalty toward the Party's revolutionary cause and the people's interests, determination to struggle for the annihilation of all enemies, courage in combat for the cause of the revolution, diligence in work, willingness to place public interest above personal one, the sense of organization and discipline, close ties with the masses, the spirit of unity in struggle, of criticism and self-criticism, and the desire for progress and advance. In public and personal life, the cadre must prove a person of high morals, he must be industrious, thrifty, honest, upright, impartial, humble, and simple, he must consider the common laborer's as his own standard of living. Our nation and Party have magnificent traditions, we work hard and lead a simple life. These are good qualities that must be developed. We shall not fall into other people's vices and we shall not indulge in the decadent life of the exploiter class.

High morals are not enough, however. It is also necessary for the cadre to be capable. Capability means a good knowledge in Marxist-Leninist theories, ability and experience in organization and leadership, the necessary professional proficiency and technical know-how, a sense of initiative, all of which is required for resolving the cadre's problems and performing his job. The cadres and party members in the armed forces not only must understand Marxism-Leninism in a general way, but they also must be versed in the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on war and army. It is not enough for them to know the general outline of this viewpoint, they must understand well the problems confronting the nation in the field of war and army and resolve them in conformity to the Party's military thinking, line, and task and the realities of the country. For in our country class struggle and armed struggle, beside being governed by a general law, have also their own peculiarities. Knowledge must be transformed into skills and abilities and turned to account for resolving problems relative to war and armies. Complacency with the knowledge already acquired, unwillingness to learn, reluctance to go ahead in the face of difficulties and hardships when seeking new knowledge, absence of forbearance, lack of training, actions not motivated by the army's revolutionary requirement, non-adherence and refusal to learn from the theory and practice of armed struggles, all of them are contravening the proper viewpoint and attitude of a learning, fighting, creative Marxist. Nor is learning theories enough. Experience has abundantly proved that, he who goes deep into reality, taking pains to stay close to troops in combat, and showing a high fighting spirit will distinguish himself more and more everyday, show great creativeness and an ability to promptly cope with all circumstances. Conversely, he who strays from reality and actual combat will make no progress whatever, he will see his abilities gradually reduced, become destitute of intelligence, lack creativeness and quickness of thinking; he will never become a good leadership cadre or commander of the Party's armed forces.

To be a good cadre of the Party, we must also have a good work style, that is, we must connect theory to practice, follow the mass line, and practice criticism and self-criticism. Only with a good work style can we make the masses adopt the ideology, viewpoint, lines, and tasks of the Party as their own ideology, viewpoint, lines, and actions. The basic spirit of a good work style consists in staying close to the actions of the masses and having a revolutionary fighting spirit in work. Practice is the standard of truth, and the masses create everything. In real life, the new, positive always multiplies itself and stimulates progress whereas the old and negative hinders it. For the new and positive to triumph over the old and negative thereby developing the masses' creativeness to the highest degree, it is necessary to raise the revolutionary fighting spirit of the cadres in their leadership work. Facts have proved that the struggle for enforcing the practice of party work style and eliminating bad work style is in reality an ideological struggle because work style is tied to ideology and is the manifestation thereof. Lacking the Party's mass viewpoint our work style will not be one that follows the mass line, on the contrary, it is one that prefers using highhanded methods and personal authority. Without a profound, realistic viewpoint, it is impossible to speak of a work style that could connect theory to practice; more often than not theory is unsupported and empty. Without a strong revolutionary fighting spirit we would not be bold enough to make self-criticism and criticism that seek out the truth and stamp out errors. For this reason we must resolutely fight bureaucratism, the tendency to drift away from the masses, estrangement from reality, lack of revolutionary fighting spirit, absence of criticism and self-criticism especially criticism directed upward, and we must oppose suppressions of criticism within the Party, because all these are in complete contradiction to the Party's and army's work style.

Only by struggling in the foregoing direction can we become a good cadre, and only with a body of skilled cadres will the Party be in a position to carry out its tasks of leadership over the army.

- Handling all army relationships correctly and bolstering party leadership.

Under party leadership magnificent relations have taken shape in our army such as can never be found in any exploiter class armies.

Depending on their morals, ability, and the requirements of the task, our cadres and soldiers are assigned different jobs and receive different treatment. All of them voluntarily stand up for revolutionary duty under the leadership of the Party, however, and fight for a common goal -- national liberation, class liberation. Here lies the political basis of unity, unity of ideology and unity of action within the army. The relationship between the cadres and soldiers, upper and lower ranks, party and nonparty members must and can be a relationship between comrades -- a relationship founded on political equality and class love among comrades who share a common responsibility before the Party and people. Thus, ours is totally different from the exploiter classes' armies in which the relationship between the officer and the soldier is one between the oppressor-exploiter and the

oppressed-exploited.

Internal unity, cadres and soldiers in full agreement, upper and lower ranks in complete accord have always been magnificent traditions in our army, they have pervaded its policies and rules and become an unshakable force. In protracted fighting, sharing the sweet and the bitter, joys and sorrows, life and death cadres and soldiers have further tightened the mutual bonds. Nevertheless, our army was born and brought up in a country for generations ruled by imperialists and feudalists, in a society in which the class concept had left heavy marks and the remnants thereof had by no means been eradicated. We therefore always emphasize political equality and make continuous efforts toward correct relationship and internal unity. No matter what his position or job is and whatever his task, the cadre must be an ordinary laborer first, then at once a commander and a comrade in arms to the soldier.

The principle of internal unity, with cadres and soldiers, upper and lower ranks in complete agreement, is expressed in many ways the most important of which is in the relationship between democracy and discipline. In this respect, the cadres must have a correct viewpoint and they must handle the above relationship properly. Unity between discipline and democracy is reflective of the principle of centralized democracy, it is a relationship showing the class nature of our army. Discipline must be founded on democracy and aimed at promoting the interests of the revolution and people. Democracy must be guided. Both democracy and discipline's goals are to see that leadership is properly implemented and command obeyed, and that all tasks are successfully performed. Both discipline and democracy are aimed at boosting the fighting strength of the army. Reinforcing discipline must always be parallel with expanding democracy. Only in so doing shall we obtain a strict discipline and keep it in a correct direction. Democracy is at the same time a political and organization principle and a prime factor in strengthening discipline. It essentially consists of political equality, conscious and voluntary performance of obligations, discipline based on unity between leadership and command, upper and lower ranks, and cadres and soldiers, and conscious adherence to discipline by the masses through persuasion by political education. It can be said that discipline is never rigorous when democracy is not properly practiced. In our effort to enhance internal unity, we therefore resolutely reprove all acts tending to impair the dignity of persons of lower ranks or that of soldiers, along with all manifestations of dogmatism and imperiousness, and all attempts to establish personal authority, because they are contravening the very nature of our army and the principle of leadership and command of the armed forces. Parallel with efforts to combat undemocratic practices we must also fight all displays of freedom-ism. Overcoming the above-mentioned errors will result in a stronger discipline based on democracy, stronger unity between leadership and command, upper and lower ranks, and cadres and soldiers.

Proper handling of the military-civilian relationship in effect strengthens the revolutionary nature of the army and the leadership of the Party. If ours is a true people's army as the Party has decided, the

unconditional support of the people will constitute an inexhaustible source of power that enables the army to accomplish anything. As President Ho has put it, "... we must remember that the people are the masters. The people are the water in which we, the fish, swim. All strength stems from the people." The political basis for all army-civilian relationships is a complete, mutual agreement as to rights. Our army belongs to the people and particularly the laboring people, and fights for their interests; this differentiates it from the feudalist and bourgeois armies which are tools for the oppression of the people.

For all these reasons the army finds in the people its strongest support, an inexhaustible reserve of manpower, wealth, political and moral strength. A politically and economically strong home front and political and moral unity among the people always constitute a determinative factor in victory in case of war. The history of the building of our army and its combat experiences bear testimony to the fact that no victory was ever won without the help of the people. Without the benefit of the people educating, bringing up, caring for, trusting, guarding, and protecting it, the army would never have accomplished anything. An army away from the people is tantamount to a fish out of water: the army will become sinewless. This is one of the Party's principles of army building.

Accordingly, our army always considers, and will continue to consider, the principle of complete unity between the army and the people as the basic principle in political work, party work, and other pursuits of its own. Thanks to our army-people unity, under the Party's leadership, the people and army fought and won victory in the war of resistance, they then carried out a successful land reform. Today the army's goal of fighting has changed, so has the task of building a modern regular army especially regarding its organization, regimen, etc. We must constantly enhance the army-civilian solidarity and place it on a new basis, which consists of the successful building and safeguarding of socialism in the North, struggling for the liberation of the South, and achieving national reunification.

With the people, the army must show very close ties. It must be exemplary in action and strict in discipline. It must respect, love, and help the people, show respect for the administration, and carry out conscientiously the law of the State. It must constantly gauge its relationship with the people by the yardstick of the principle of army-civilian solidarity. Looking down on the people, seeing no farther than its own province, and regarding itself as the "savior" of the people, belittling the people's part in war, in army building and defense strengthening, and so forth are all inconsistent with the Party's view of a "people's war and people's armed forces."

Strengthening international solidarity and the solidarity between our army and the armies of the countries of the socialist camp is another principle for building the army, it is an important task of the Party. Preached upon a Marxist-Leninist view that, under capitalism and feudalism, the working class and all laboring people are oppressed and exploited; that the common enemy of the working class and laboring people the world over is

imperialism the mainstay of which is U.S. imperialism and its henchmen; that the victory of the revolution in each country is linked with the common cause of the world revolutionary movement, our Party has never ceased to hold aloft the banner of proletarian internationalism.

Ours and the armies of the sister countries are armed forces led by the working class. All of them are struggling for the interests of the proletariat and laboring people and share a common, noble ideal -- to struggle for the complete, absolute triumph of socialism and communism around the world.

Socialism has become today a powerful world system. The imperialists led by the United States are nevertheless feverishly carrying out their scheme of wrecking the socialist countries, enslaving their people, preparing for war, and undermining the peace of the world. Unity based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism among the socialist countries in general and that among their armies in particular are the surest guarantees for the victory of the world revolutionary movement.

In the struggle against imperialism and for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism not only do we regard the people and armies of the socialist countries as comrades-in-arms fighting for a common ideal, but we also regard the working class and laboring people of the capitalist, colonial, and dependent countries as our comrades in arms. As a result, we are constantly strengthening our solidarity with the working class and laboring people of those countries in the struggle for national independence, democracy, and socialism. This, we consider our international obligation. Speaking about the international obligations of a dictatorship of the proletariat Lenin said: "The victorious proletariat of that country (a country which has successfully carried out a socialist revolution -- S.H.) having confiscated the property of the bourgeois and organized socialist production, will stand up and oppose the rest of the world, that is, the capitalist world by involving the oppressed classes of the follower countries, by urging them to rise up against the bourgeois, by using, if necessary, even military force against the exploiter classes and their state (2)." To forget this teaching is tantamount to fall into the quagmire of the doctrine of national selfishness.

Educated in the principle of proletarian internationalism our army has been giving from the outset and throughout its many hard, heroic struggles, and it will continue to give in the future, full play to the spirit of international proletarian solidarity in conjunction with true patriotism. Facts and the Party and army's experiences prove that, in order to hold aloft the banner of proletarian internationalism, it is necessary to keep our guard up against all displays of nationalism, great power chauvinism, and narrow nationalism. Should we belittle or look down upon sister nations and sister armies, as is practiced by great power chauvinism, narrow nationalism would lead us to factionalism, schism, and national selfishness. Both

(2) Lenin: "On the Slogan of European Federation," Tuyen Tap (Selection), Vietnamese language, Su That (Truth) publisher, Hanoi, 1959, Vol I, part II, page 390.

the above tendencies are contrary to the nature of party-led people's armies and to the Party's principle of international solidarity based on Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism.

Being an instrument of struggle in the Party's hands the army must be made to clearly realize the relationship between the enemy and ourselves. The Marxist-Leninist theories and actual revolutionary struggle so far have pointed out that the distinction between the enemy and ourselves has always been the basic problem for the revolution and in determining its strategy and overall policy. Only when the enemy has been pinpointed can a goal be determined for rallying the masses, and only when the masses have been so rallied can the enemy be isolated and annihilated. For the armed forces -- the main instrument for waging the most decisive, violent form of class struggle -- the identification of the enemy is of particular importance because the slightest confusion over the boundary drawn between the enemy and ourselves could make it impossible for us to chart a correct course of action.

The principle governing the relationship between the enemy and ourselves, as far as the army is concerned, is to safeguard ourselves -- the revolution, people, Party -- and exterminate the enemies of the nation and class. We have worked out, however, a specific policy dealing with the enemies both as individuals and as a class. The individual can be reformed into a laborer, but from a class point of view the enemy class must be eradicated pitilessly.

Regarding the enemy army, our policy also deals differently with the soldier than with the officer-ringleader. The latter is the political representative of the enemy class, and the contradiction between him and us is an antagonistic one. As for the soldiers, they are the brothers and sons of the laboring people, forced and duped into the mercenary army; their interest essentially conflicts with that of their rulers and converges with that of the oppressed and exploited class. We therefore can use justice to put some sense into them and we can attack them politically in order to make them disintegrate. Those who lay down their weapons to surrender will be treated generously, but those who strike back at us will be resolutely exterminated.

Facts have shown that it is not a simple matter to identify the enemy, stir up hatred against him, and build up the will to exterminate him. Our army easily recognizes the enemies of the nation because they are the imperialists and feudalists who invaded our country, occupied our land, and enslaved our people. Overthrow them and we win our independence back along with the land for the tillers. It is not so easy when dealing with the class' enemies -- the exploiting bourgeois system -- and many of us are rather slow to understand. An enemy is easy to spot on the battlefield but not in a political and ideological struggle. He is readily recognizable when he harshly suppresses the revolution, but to many the difference between friends and foes becomes hazy and confusion prevails when the enemy resorts to ruse, works under the false label of nationalism, and uses demagoguery.

Consequently, if we are to draw a clear line between friends and foes, build up the determination to eradicate all national and class enemies espe-

cially when, in this complex class struggle, they are using perfidious and machiavelian tricks of all kinds against us. We must, by political work, educate the troops and instill in them the Marxist-Leninist theories on class struggle, put them on a firm proletarian standpoint, teach them the method of class analysis for finding out the nature of the enemy and guarding themselves against the outward appearances behind which he is hiding. The basis for the hatred of all reactionary classes can spring only from class consciousness. In colonial countries the masses usually progress from national consciousness to class consciousness to socialist consciousness, but only when founded on class and socialist consciousness will patriotism and the will to fight for national liberation be firmly established. As a result, an education aimed at promoting class consciousness constitutes the basic content of political education and ideological leadership. Class consciousness is the ideological basis for examining and solving correctly all problems of army building and armed struggles. Only with a deeprooted class consciousness can we heighten the positive spirit and creativeness of the army, raise its fighting potential, make it possible for it to surmount difficulties of all kinds and to fulfill all tasks. Only with it can we build up our determination to fight and to win, eliminate all class and national enemies, protect the socialist North, liberate the South, struggle for national reunification, and safeguard peace in Southeast Asia and the world. Such are the practical meaning of and correct viewpoint on the relationship between the enemy and ourselves.

The relationship between politics and technology in the army is an extremely important one. Properly handled, it boosts the fighting strength and combat readiness of the army, because the army is the result of the combination of two elements: men and weapons, politics and technology.

The essential content of politics is class struggle of which the army is the instrument. Politically the army has to deal with its own class nature, the Party's absolute leadership, its degree of political and ideological consciousness, its political life, and so forth.

For the army technology means weapons, equipment, skill of using and servicing these weapons and equipment, knowledge of military science and technology, professional proficiency of the cadres and soldiers, and so on.

Thus, politics are tied to society's class struggle, and technology to the development of the economy and production. Unified, politics and technology heighten the army's fighting strength for class struggle, with politics always in the leading role. Politics lay down the task for technology, act as its basis, bring out its potential for politics' interest, that is, for the revolutionary mission of the class. Technology adds to man's power, boosts the army's combat potency, serves the revolution effectively.

The coming of age of the army follows the progress of the relationship between politics and technology as this relationship is handled correctly. Today our army is becoming a modern regular army, its equipment has improved, its organizational structure has undergone many changes, but the principle

of the politics-technology relationship -- politics leading, technology obeying -- has not altered in the least. Our Party always holds firm the creative political and ideological principles to serve as bases, it at the same time strives to improve the technological equipment of the army. It regards politics and man's revolutionary consciousness as decisive factors in war, while other very important factors are technology, equipment, and weapons. Without revolutionary conscious men there can be no revolutionary army, and without technology and weapons there can be no armed forces. As a result, building the army means waging two simultaneous revolutions: an ideological and a technological revolutions, with the latter depending completely on the outcome of the former.

While resolving the politics-technology relationship we must smash all arguments which upgrade and show undue respect for weapons especially nuclear weapons, and which downgrade the part played by politics and men and render men the auxiliaries of weapons; and we must shatter all inclinations toward pure technology or technology's independence from politics, and so on. these -- the viewpoints of the bourgeois class and other reactionaries -- are in complete conflict with the Marxist-Leninist theory on war and armies and the Party's viewpoint on the relationship between politics and technology and on army building and armed struggles.

Having created and organized a people's army and holding firm the leadership over it, the Party of the Vietnamese working class has performed and is performing a historic mission. Without the Party there could have been no revolutionary, people's army. That the people's army has come of age and won victories is thanks to the constant consolidation and strengthening of the Party's absolute leadership.

Thanks to the Party's leadership, our people's revolutionary struggle has been victorious; our army has become a genuine people's army and a powerful force, it has overcome thousands of difficulties and hardships, and won glorious victories. It is worthy of being the reliable instrument in the hands of the Party and people.

In its efforts to achieve the Party's aim, which is to eradicate classes and end wars, our army has barely completed the first leg of this ten thousand-league highway. The revolutionary task of the Party and the combat task of the army loom formidable. For the present we must build the army up into a people's modern revolutionary regular army, ready to fight for and to safeguard the North, to fulfill its obligations toward the revolution in the South, and to contribute to the peace of Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world.

The army's experience gained over decades of building up, fighting, and growing up has proved that efforts must be made in all respects, and that party branches in the army must acquire a firm proletarian standpoint, a rigid organization and discipline, an adequate military scientific and technological leadership, and a good understanding of the Marxist-Leninist theories if we are to guide the army toward the fulfilment of all tasks entrusted by the Party.

FOR A BETTER FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION

[Following is a translation of an article by Hoang Anh in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No 12, December 1964, pp 10-16.]

Under the clear-sighted leadership of the Party during the past 10 years our people were able to develop their traditional industriousness and courage to achieve great victories in rehabilitating, reforming, and developing our economy and in promoting culture. Gradually, socialism was brought about in North Vietnam. Today hunger and privation are no longer seen there and brick-built housing is little by little replacing thatched huts and their mud walls. In remote rural districts and mountain regions there have sprung up factories, state-farms, capital construction camps, and department stores. Whereas the peasants, craftsmen, salt makers, and fishermen had to work very hard throughout the year in efforts to stave off hunger and cold, they are now organized in cooperatives and using their energy for production, for making the collective sector of the economy more prosperous and their own life fuller. Each man's lot is no longer dependent upon his individual luck but tied to that of the collective and entire nation. Never has the people's life been so secure as it is today.

As compared with 1955 the total value of our industrial output in 1964 has increased 8 times, production materials 12 times, and consumer goods more than 8.5 times. We are now in a position to turn out almost all commodities essential to the people's daily life, with initial steps taken in manufacturing machines and equipment for production and transport. State revenue in 1964 was four-fold that of 1955. Whereas in 1955 our revenue was only enough to cover about 60% of the outgo of the state budget, it now covers all of it. Most of the money we borrow is being used for importing

machinery and equipment to bolster the material and technical basis of socialism.

While our great victories of the past decade are attributable in part to the assistance given us by the sister socialist countries, they are won mainly by ourselves through diligence and industriousness. They are the confirmation of the soundness of the Party's line on socialist industrialization and "self-reliance for an independent economy," and a conclusive evidence that we have enough capability to build up ours from a backward agricultural country to a prosperous socialist country possessing modern agriculture and industry bypassing the capitalist development stage.

However, our accomplishment constitutes but an initial step if viewed in relation to what we need for building socialism's material and technical basis. While our industry has clearly scored great advances it is still unable to put out most of our machines, equipment, and materials necessary for production and for our everyday life. The major part of our manufactured products are turned out by craftsmen. In agriculture, labor productivity is generally excessively low although production relation has changed, and the state-farms are still unable to play its role as the models of production management and technical leadership. Average cultivated acreage is extremely low. Almost all cooperatives rely on manual labor more than on semi-mechanized and mechanized tools, the latter accounting for only a very small part of the job. This has seriously reduced our possibilities in improving productivity and output. Agriculture as a result is not in a position to fully meet the demands of industry and export in farm products nor to supply the people's daily consumption. Fishery, salt making, and the timber industry are slow to expand and unable to satisfy the growing need of society.

The above-described situation demands that we make greater efforts if we want to step by step build up the material and technical basis of socialism in our North. Not only must we have a powerful state-operated economy but also a prosperous collective economy equipped with modern machinery. But we are lacking in machinery and equipment, our technical level is low, and we are inexperienced in economic and financial management. In order that we may advance it is necessary that we deal with all these problems, and each of them is a difficult and costly one in the beginning.

Moreover, we are building socialism in the North at a time when our country is temporarily divided in two parts one of which is experiencing considerable trouble. The U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in the South are trying hard to step up their brutal war against the southern people. Dealt fatal blows and confronted with the uninterrupted victories of the people of the South, the imperialists and their henchmen are frantically preparing to attack the North in an attempt to save the perilous situation in which they are finding themselves in the South.

Faced with such a situation we must step up socialist construction, heighten our revolutionary spirit, strengthen our defense, and be ready to smash every adventurous move on the part of the imperialists and their hench-

men if they dare to violate our North.

To be in a position to carry out this glorious mission, we must make the greatest effort covering all fields and strive to build up our socialist finances. Lenin has said: "The task of strengthening Soviet finances is one of the hardest, it now stands in the very front. Should we be unable to solve this problem, progress of any importance would be impossible in our effort to safeguard the independence of Soviet Russia against international capitalism, nor to develop the nation's economy and culture." (1) Lenin said this in a context of a newly won socialist revolution, a capitalist-encircled Soviet Union, and the aftermath of years of destructive war. Our North today has more factors working in its favor than had the Soviet Union then, since we are adjacent to the socialist camp and the recipient of the sister countries' assistance, and we have gone through a period of economic reform and development. On the other hand our country is small in area and poor in resource, it is split asunder, its northern part going from an agricultural country to a socialist one bypassing the capitalist development stage. Our people are at once performing two strategic tasks -- building the North into a socialist country and struggling for the liberation of the South. The revolution demands a good deal of us, and the task of building up our finances to meet the growing needs of the Party and State is a tough, complex one.

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It is well known that under socialism finance holds an important role in distributing and redistributing national revenues in such a way that the individual producer's and all public needs are satisfied. Finance is also instrumental in keeping a balanced state plan and promoting thrift. Under socialism, goods are still produced and circulated. As a result, the products put out by society are not only reckoned in kind but also in terms of money. Keeping accounts in terms of money is the more general method. In cooperatives, state enterprises, basic construction work camps, administrative or other agencies all expenses and receipts are calculated and recorded in kind or in cash. As a general rule all expenses must be well justified and must show economy in manpower, resources, and money for highest economic results. The foregoing is in substance the chief financial task of the cooperative, factory, work camp, state agency, etc. By means of its budget, the socialist state allots and builds up various funds with the money it has concentrated in its hands. This is aimed at satisfying financial demands in economic and cultural development as well as any other demands. Since socialist relation of production holds the ruling position in the national

(1) Lenin: "Letter to the All-Russian Conference of Financial Cadres," complete Russian edition, Political Literature, Moscow, 1955, Vol. 33 page 342.

economy of the North, the state budget is closely linked with all facets of the national economy, hence, instrumental in the rational utilization of the nation's resources. By concentrating and distributing funds the State in effect controls all activities of all branches of the economy through the medium of money, spurring production, expanding the circulation of goods, and promoting thrift -- a function of the state's financial administration.

Under socialism the interest of each individual is tied to that of the entire community, and each man's livelihood is secure only insofar as the collective sector of the economy is growing and strengthening. This in turn calls for an ever stronger state-operated sector. Conversely, if the community member's living remains unimproved, his working spirit and capacity allowed to lag and the collective sector to stagnate, then the state-operated sector of the economy will not be able to expand. This goes to prove that the interests of the individual, the collective, and the nation are one and the same under our system, and that correlation between the cooperative's and the factory's finances and the State's budget. Everything is designed to serve the best interests of the people and socialist state. For this reason the role of cooperative, factory, and state finance administration is reflective of the requirement of the Party and State, namely, to plan cooperative, factory, and national consumption of resources in the most rational manner possible.

As the socialist economy expands, the socialist relation of production becomes daily stronger while production potential becomes higher, and the laws of socialist economy assert themselves more and more in the realm of national economy. Consequently socialist finance broadens its scope rendering the financial administration more and more difficult and complicated.

When the collective sector of agriculture evolved from the work-exchange system to the setting up of small cooperatives, only a limited number of lines and occupations were practiced involving little income or public property and the cooperative's financial task was not a particularly urgent one. Now that the cooperatives have grown larger, their labor force and assets have multiplied in proportion, and the cooperatives have gone into more and more lines of business, all of which makes the management of the cooperatives a much more complicate job. Also more involved are the drawing up of initial production programs, the supervision of production and business operations, the administration of cooperative assets and finances, the computation of work points, the distribution of dividends, etc. Under these circumstances the cooperative's accounting and financial administration, which are objective, indispensable requirements, become much more intricate. Lacking efficient accounting and financial organizations the cooperative would find itself deprived of a good instrument with which to plan, supervise, and control all cooperative activities. Consequently, it would be impossible to manage the cooperative properly, to encourage hard working, just, and skilled people, to curb greed, laziness, irresponsibility. The result would be waste and corruption.

The same can be said of a state-operated enterprise, a capital construction work camp, or a sale store under the trade service. Here, account-

ing and finance consist essentially in properly directing all business activities initiated by basic units and working out a concrete overall plan based on the situation in individual units. In large units, the task is more elaborate and more troublesome than in the smaller ones. At any rate, whether it is larger or smaller, a unit generally needs a financial and accounting system that contributes to a better unit management chiefly in the following respects: as accurate calculations as possible must be made when drawing up the initial plan; all cash transactions of the enterprise in question must be controlled; watchful eyes must be kept on the administration and utilization of all state assets under the management of the enterprise; all economic activities of the enterprise must be supervised through its financial transactions; plans must be kept balanced; thrift must be fostered. Accounting and finance should reflect fully, accurately, and promptly every economic activity of the enterprise.

The administration of the state budget has undergone many changes. From the role of a supplier whose chief purpose was to perform all money transactions and to keep the state machine running, state finance has gradually emerged into its real function of socialist finance, serving socialist construction and socialist reform, helping to plan our national economy, and so forth. The main source of income of our state budget used to be taxation and most budget outgoes were for administrative and defense expenses. Now over 90% of the budget's income comes from the state-run sector of our economy while close to 75% of budget outgo goes to economic construction and cultural development. The current task of the state finance no longer consists in administering a few income policies and, accordingly, allotting and supervising outgoes to insure that the State met specific expenses. It now has gradually become closely related to the economic activities of all fields. The source of income is now production, but this income goes right back to promote production making it develop more and faster, and stepping up and expanding goods circulation. Only on the basis of a large output and an extensive goods circulation will state income be enlarged and in a position to satisfy all demands in economic and cultural development, as well as all other large demands from the State.

Ours being a country poor in resource, with a low technical level and scant managerial experience, everything in the beginning is expected to be difficult and costly. We must strive to improve our economic and financial administration, streamline our methods, promote thrift, reduce waste to a minimum, and effectively curb corruption -- the vestigial evils of the old society. From their vantage point and by their handling all incomings and outgoings and their supervising all economic activities of all fields, the financial cadres are in a position to uncover the good points as well as the bad points in the economic management of all fields. They can then discuss them with the responsible cadres and suggest better methods toward a more effective and more economical use of manpower, resources, and money.

The financial service of Thai-binh province worked in close cooperation with the commercial service and, controlling the latter's incomes and outgoes, was able to uncover flaws in its dealings in foodstuffs. It thereupon made suggestions to the Trade Bureau for reorganizing the hog husbandry

and transport department which took the animals from the hog farms to pens in cities for delivery to the central authorities. Excellent results have been obtained in this way. The Nghe-an provincial finance service took the trouble to watch the operations of the regional transport enterprise very closely. It then helped the latter to improve its management and business methods, the result was that the enterprise now handles more freight with much less waste and is able to augment budget income by hundreds of thousands of dong. The finance office of Thanh-mien district, Hai-duong province, likewise uncovered many cases of corruption and waste by keeping close watch on the district's farm cooperatives and their methods of management and business. It then helped the cooperatives to reorganize their management and make more profit, which results in the cooperative members' increased enthusiasm for productin work and in more tax for the State. Other examples are the finance services of Hiep-hoa hamlet, Thai-binh province, and many other hamlets, which now pay greater attention to their sources of income urging the people to bring up local latent resources, turning swamps into fish rearing ponds, transforming cemeteries, bare hills, and village roads into orchards or tree farms thereby beautifying the hamlets themselves while boosting their income.

Similar accomplishments are multiplying in financial agencies and units under the central and regional authorities. Now well aware of their responsibility, many financial cadres strive to improve themselves ideologically and morally, to make further study and gain higher proficiency. Accordingly their working efficiency is enhanced. The comrades who have a position of leadership in party committees and regional administration now concentrate on guiding and helping the financial cadres to improve themselves professionally and discharge their tasks well. There are, however, a good many cadres who still confine themselves to mere cashier work. In so doing they divorce financial work from economic activities, from the political task of the Party and State, and from the realities of the unit in which they work. Some of them are always busy with account books scarcely knowing why they must do that job. Other comrades are responsible for entire financial organs but do not know what the cadres under them are doing and whether or not their daily work answers the Party and State's requirements. They have become ordinary clerks without being aware of it. Among the above mentioned people, there are a few who believe that the job they are doing is adequate and that there is no need for altering anything. A few others always admit that what their own organizations are doing is not very fruitful, that money control is still lax, and so on, in summary, that they are well aware of their shortcomings and deficiencies, but beyond such admissions these people do nothing about them.

A law of physics tells us that a thing exists because it is in a state of equilibrium, that is, the force that tends to destroy it is weaker than the force that tends to preserve it. A tall tree in the middle of a plain is able to keep from falling because the roots that anchor it can withstand the combined forces of the wind and the tree's own weight, both of them tend to pull the tree down. This can be applied to all things. But how shall we explain the following phenomenon in the field of financial work: everybody without exception concedes, when reviewing his work, that he is not doing a good job handling transactions of money, that his

working method is outdated, routinist, bureaucratic, and so forth; and then he leaves everything exactly as it was. What is it that prevents us from rising up and fulfilling our obligations and our tasks? Such a question must be brought up and properly solved. It seems obvious that we can never find an answer and a solution common to all cases. However, delving more deeply into the problem and examining a few specific cases, we found that, in some instances, most cadres do want to do things properly but lack a detailed plan and are at a loss to know where and how to begin and that, involved in everyday routine, they are simply swept on passively. In other instances the cadres failed to see the need for improvement since they believed that their work was by now well organized and would soon yield good results. Underlying these cases are many factors. A factor common to all of them is the fact that ascendancy does not belong to the few enthusiasts who want to go forward and to constantly improve and fulfill their job, but that it rests with those who want to follow "the beaten path." In order therefore to spur our financial work forward, we must ferret out and destroy this equilibrium which is working against us.

Financial and economic administration is extremely complicated and it is new to us. Facts have proved however that we can handle it well. Under the leadership of the Party and Government the financial department has been striving to fulfill its mission and to serve the cause of the revolution of the Party and the State. In this respect considerable progress has been made. The beginning of 1964, in particular, saw the financial department initiate an extensive emulation movement for improving financial management in application of the resolutions of the 8th and 9th conferences of the Central Executive Committee of the Party and in response to the appeal of President Ho for "each man to work as two in gratitude for our kith-and-kin compatriots of the South."

In this connection we should keep the following points in mind:

One, the importance and role of our financial work under our system must be pounded home to all. Improving our financial management is an objective requirement for socialist construction. In order that all activities of society may be properly managed, that the North be brought swiftly, vigorously, and surely under socialism the State demands specific accomplishment of the finance department. These demands reflect the task or mission of the finance department in general and that of individual finance services or cadres attached to various enterprises, work camps, and state agencies, in particular. To be well aware of the importance and role of their financial task is the prime basis for each financial cadre to determine his viewpoint, the attitude he must assume as he works and serves. This is the yardstick of each man's sense of ownership. The cadres who lead echelons and departments must be the first to understand the foregoing, they must guide and help all cadres to do exactly what the Party and State demand of them. Cadres who are in charge or who perform financial work must know their responsibility and the importance of their job, they must heighten their sense of revolutionary struggle and perform their work properly. Each man must constantly examine and gauge his and others' work on the purpose of the financial task, and help others to discharge their duty well and to promptly fulfill all require-

ments of the revolution.

Two, we must be professionally more proficient, make our work yield better results, and perform our Party-entrusted mission more fruitfully. Financial work is a technical one. A particular work is aimed at handling a specific requirement and demands that a good way be devised to do it. The cadres are expected to improve themselves professionally to do a good job. Working routinely, separating finance from economics and politics, performing a task with no idea why we must do it, unable to guide ourselves on the requirements set forth by the Party and State, working to solely meet objectives roughly and midcourse paying no attention to detailed steps, all those are harmful inclinations in financial work. Nor can we demand that all beginner cadres be experts in the financial field. But before becoming an expert, each of us must learn on the job in efforts to improve himself; and having mastered a few skills he should not be complacent or consider himself proficient enough. He should be humble and learn from others, never ceasing to improve himself and his work; he should raise his efficiency and make his own work, his unit's, and his agency's yield more results; he should be determined to serve the revolution well, never afraid of difficulties and never trying to conceal his own shortcomings.

Three, financial work must be performed in close connection with the unit's economic work, account taken of actual conditions. All economic activities of all fields are intimately linked with financial work and are reflected in the resulting balance of incomes and outgoes. Conversely, financial work is aimed at helping all economic and political tasks assigned by the Party and State. The financial cadres must watch very closely every activity of every department, scrutinizing and uncovering latent possibilities in our economy and helping exploit them. From the time the initial plan is established to the time it comes to a conclusion, the job of the financial cadres consists in carefully calculating, inspecting, and managing with a view to spurring production and intensifying goods circulation, and promoting thrift. All manpower and resources are consumed at the basic, plant level. In order therefore to coordinate financial work and economic work, it is necessary that the cadres themselves work closely with the plants, checking the results of their jobs and those of all departments handling money incomes and outgoes against actual results achieved by the plants.

Four, extreme importance must be attached to numerical data processing in all organizations doing financial work.

It is often said that financial work is the barometer of the economy. Through financial work we can assess any department's economic activity because all activities are reflected in the balance of accounts. Whether this assessment is accurate or not does not depend solely on the assessor's skill but in large measure on whether or not such activities are reported accurately, promptly, and fully in books -- a job for the numerical data section. This is what accounting and statistics essentially consist of. Lacking the necessary accurate and prompt data from the plants, we shall lack the main basis for sizing up the entire situation, making calculations toward an overall plan, and properly managing and supervising the activities of all

branches of the economy. Establishing numerical data is the basic task of the financial department, and it is impossible to strengthen financial work in a region or an enterprise without properly organizing this important link.

Five, we must exert a rigid supervision upon the financial cadres, giving them permanent political and professional training, deploying them and utilizing them rationally for a smoother operation.

All facets of the financial work are closely interlinked, from the central to the regional authorities and in every financial organization and sector. Should a single link of this chain fail in its job, the repercussion would be felt at all links throughout the entire department. Moreover, financial work is all-inclusive, it keeps account of the Party's, the State's and the cooperative's money. Failure in this task would mean that we shall also fail in many other jobs entrusted us by the Party and State. If we are unable to handle a cooperative's financial and accounting work accurately, we shall make it difficult for the cooperative's administrative committee to organize its operations, the upshot of it all will be doubt and lack of enthusiasm on the part of the cooperative members. And if this happens in an enterprise or a sale store, then proper examination of its books will be difficult if not impossible. The result will be waste and corruption. Good management in cooperatives, enterprises, government agencies, etc. demands that the greatest attention be paid to financial and accounting work. From the individual units in plants to the regional and central controlling agencies we have organizations handling finances. We must have good, right thinking cadres who are professionally equal to the task at every level and department. Should we not attach importance where it is due or should we neglect to exert tight supervision over the financial cadres, to constantly inspect and assist them in their tasks, then we would lack an effective tool for the management of our economy and our finance. Positioning a cadre at a particular place must be done so that the job suits his ability and vice-versa. All cadres must have political, ideological, and professional training on a permanent basis, they must be encouraged to improve themselves in their own fields and to gain more experience. This in substance is our task with respect to our organization and our cadres in the field of finance.

Six, we must strive to do a good ideological job, including campaigns of policy explanation and propaganda for the benefit of the people, and the political and ideological education of the cadres.

Like cadres in all other state departments, the financial cadres live in their own environment, have their own thoughts and aspirations aside from devoting themselves to discharging the tasks assigned them by the Party and State. Faced with the requirement of the revolution and in actual working conditions, each of them assumes a distinct attitude and shows a different degree of perception, which is natural. The problem here is not to allow their differences to affect their work, to channel all their efforts into fulfilling their tasks; to help them strengthen their will for revolutionary struggle on the job; to improve themselves ideologically and morally; and to be ready to perform properly all Party and Government assignments. This constitutes the political and ideological task in a financial agency or organization; it

must pervade the cadre's thoughts and perception and it must hold true for any job, anywhere, at anytime. Only so will it genuinely help the cadres to overcome their specific problems and only so shall we be able to mobilize them and stimulate them forward. Actual experience has taught us that, when the cadres and masses are ideologically motivated and when they are animated by a high fervor, they are resolved to fulfill their part of the task and complete it no matter how hard it may be. If we neglect our ideological task then, whether we want it or not, everything we do will fall into the category of routine administrative work.

The task of building up a socialist North to serve as the sturdy base for our reunification struggle, and that of safeguarding it against any schemes of sabotage on the part of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen are demanding great things of our people. More than ever before we must give full play to our traditions of industriousness and courage in struggle; heighten our revolutionary alertness; contribute our time and strength to socializing the North rapidly, vigorously, and steadily; safeguard our peaceful labor; and support effectively our southern compatriots' struggle. How each man, each cadre loves his country and socialism and how he hates the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen must be reflected in his everyday work in production, in his sense of thrift, and in his positive contribution to building up our finances. Each cooperative member must work hard to produce and economize to the best interest of himself, his family, his cooperative, and the State. Each factory worker in state-operated enterprises must make greater effort toward higher labor productivity, greater economy of raw materials and other resources, lower production cost, and more, faster, better, and cheaper products. Each office employee or cadre in state agencies must strive to improve their work and their efficiency, and to serve our economic and financial administration and all other tasks undertaken by the State better and more economically. All this will contribute to potentially increasing state income and reducing state outgo, and to making it possible for the State to do more and better with limited revenues. As far as we are concerned, those are the most pressing requirements.

There at the present time prevails in the North a buoyant atmosphere of emulation from the cities to the countryside, from the lowlands to the highlands, and extending as far as the remotest islands. In paddyfields, factories, work camps, villages, government agencies, schools each man is emulating to "work as two to show our gratitude toward our countrymen in the South." Millions of people are responding enthusiastically to the above appeal from President Ho. In the financial field alone, the emulation drive is expanding which spurs all of us forward. The effort of the entire people for accomplishing our historic task constitutes an inexhaustible latent source of power that will strengthen the State's finances. The financial cadres as well as all cadres in charge of all levels and all departments must drive themselves hard doing a better economic and financial job, turning latent possibilities into realities, building up a strong financial base thereby meeting all important requirements of the Party and State.

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POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS WITHIN
THE ARMED FORCES TO BE PERPETUATED

[Following is a translation of an article by Tu Van
in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap
(Studies), Hanoi, No 12, December 1964, pp 37-42.]

Marxism-Leninism holds that people make history. In leading the revolution, our Party adopted the same view, concentrated its attention in manipulating people and always considered political and ideological awakening of people as a prerequisite for revolutionary stands and procedures. When organizing armed forces, one of the pillars of the revolution, our Party instituted political commissars and political agencies at various levels to carry out the political task, that is, of leading and manipulating people to the armed forces.

Thanks to the political task, our armed forces have been continuously growing and have won many victories in the hard struggle before the August Revolution, during the long resistance war and during the years of socialist construction in the North. Thanks to the political task, our armed forces have been absolutely loyal to the Party and people, have had a high spirit of bravery and determination and have been always ready to carry out any mission assigned by the Party however difficult.

Now that our army-- backbone of the people's armed forces--is becoming a regular and modernized one, it is more important than ever to perpetuate the splendid achievements in the political task so that the Party's leadership over the army is strengthened and the revolutionary

character of the army keeps developing. Our experiences in the political task with armed forces are numerous. Following are the most important ones.

Careful treatment of human beings, ideological and political formation of the army are essential to fighting potency of the army.

Our country has been a colonial semi-feudal country. We suddenly rose against a powerful imperialist country. Our armed forces were born under extremely difficult conditions. In its infant stage and with very crude weapons it had to face enemy adequately armed with modern weapons and thorough training. In these circumstances our Party adhered to the Marxist-Leninist view on the important role people could play in war and in conformity with this view it established methods for building revolutionary armed forces and defined its tactics and strategy. Lenin's teaching was: "In any war, the ultimate victory is determined by the state of mind of the people who die on the battle field" (Lenin's Speech at the Conference of the Red Army of the People in Rogo-sko-Xi-mo-nop, 13-5-1920m Collection in Russian, edition of Political Literature, Moscow 1950, Vol.31 p.115). Our Party always infused in the mind of cadres and soldiers the conviction that "it is the people, not the weapons that decide the outcome of a war". Our Party also taught them to destroy the enemy, to win victories by being determined, by using weapons that they had, by seizing weapons from the enemy. From the beginning our Party gave utmost attention to the ideological and political training of the armed forces and considered this training as the basis of military strength. With this correct line of action, the political task with the armed forces had first priority. Our Party holds that the political task is the leading idea in any other task, no matter how big or how small and that political training must be the basis of organization and professional work.

The Party's line of action has a class character. It is Marxism-Leninism applied to the specific situation of the Vietnamese revolution. Therefore our Party devotes major efforts to raising the degree of class awakening of cadres and soldiers in the armed forces so that they distinguish friends from foes and understand whom and what goal they fight for. Class awakening of cadres soldiers is the only means to build their patriotism, their spirit of international proletarianism, their will to fight, to fully develop their potentials so that they fight with bravery and intelligence, defeat any enemy however strong.

Supported by the just cause of the revolution and by absolute confidence in the people, our political task with the armed forces has been proceeding with regularity and continuity. Our Party's political task has made cadres and soldiers deeply feel the hardship of the class, of the nation, has nurtured their hate against the enemy, deepened their love for the people, for the Fatherland, heightened their spirit of international proletarianism, at the same time made them understand the reason of fighting under the flag of the Party, built up their pride and their faith in the proletarian revolution. The oath to be taken by cadres and soldiers in their initiation ceremony, has been formulated in terms of patriotism and devotion to the interests of their class : "To sacrifice everything for Fatherland Vietnam, to fight for democracy and socialism under the leadership of the Vietnamese Workers' Party and of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam", to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic and powerful Vietnam..."Since they have learned about the interests of the class and the nation, cadres and soldiers understand that to fight for the revolution of the Party and the people is the only meaning of their life. Thus, the political task has helped everyone understand the relationship between the interests of the individual and the interests of the group, of the class and of the nation. In all situations, cadres and soldiers have a correct attitude toward life. "They are ready to sacrifice for the Fatherland and for the revolution". The determination "to fight and to win" and the spirit of "self-sacrifice for the people" constitute the source of the invincible power of our armed forces. So many examples of sacrifice have shone during the resistance war : Cu Chinh Lan threw grenades to destroy enemy's tanks, Tran Cu plugged the muzzle of a gun with his body, stopped the enemy's fire allowing his unit to advance, and capture the enemy's camp, Be Van Dan supported guns on his shoulders so his squad fellows could fire at the enemy and countless other examples of heroism in the historic battle of Dien Bien Phu. Most recent are the fabulous examples of bravery and endurance during the battle against American planes invading the skies of North Vietnam on 5 August. The source of this splendid heroism is love for the Fatherland, the people, socialism and hate for the enemy, love and hate that the political task has been developing in the heart of every cadre and every soldier. This love and this hate have given our armed forces a fighting capability which surpasses any modern weapon. By using the means of living education such as telling family stories, recalling sufferings of their fathers or their own sufferings, the

political task has excited in the hearts of cadres and soldiers a strong feeling of resentment and indignation against the exploiting class and this feeling has been poured out through gun muzzles. With inferior weapons, how can we defeat the enemy if hate against the enemy of the class and the nation does not impregnate the bones of our cadres and soldiers. Stalin said "we cannot defeat the enemy unless we hate our enemy with all our soul"(Stalin : "Daily Order from The People's Commissar in the Defense of Moscow". On the great defense of the Soviet Fatherland, in French. Edited by Foreign Languages, Moscow, 1952, p. 46). By nurturing hate of the enemy in the heart of cadres and soldiers the political task gives them a strong will to fight. Tanks, cannons and all modern weapons are powerless before the invincible spirit and determination of our troops. This living experience has demonstrated the truth of Lenin's words when he said : "It will never be possible to defeat a nation in which the majority of workers and peasants are convinced they are defending their political rights, the political rights of soviet workers, that they are defending a cause which if victorious will allow them and their children to enjoy all the culture and inventions of the human race(Lenin : "Speech at a conference of railroad workers in Moscow, on 16 April 1919". Complete series in Russian. Edited by Political Literature, Moscow, 1950, Vol.29, p.292).

Therefore our army will become a regular and modern army, ready to fight and determined to win if in the political task we pay more attention to human beings, devote more effort to class education, incessantly intensify political awakening, patriotism and love for socialism in cadres and soldiers.

Cadres and Soldiers Must Thoroughly Understand the Revolutionary Course of the Party, Must have Correct Political Attitude, so that Our Troops are an Efficient Instrument of The Party.

To lead the revolution successfully to a final establishment of socialism and communism in Viet Nam, our Party has adopted such policies and strategies as to unify all revolutionary forces and has gradually struck down all enemies of the nation and of the class. If in the long and difficult revolutionary struggle people do not adhere to policies and strategies chosen by the Party in each stage, they would lose orientation, make mistakes in their actions and become confused. Consequently revolutionary spirit would waver and decline. This is why

thorough understanding of Party policies in each stage of the revolution is extremely important for people, especially the armed forces.

Being an instrument used by the Party in waging class struggle and acquiring proletarian political power, the armed forces must absolutely follow Party's revolutionary policies and their entire effort must serve the political aim set by the Party. The armed forces must be the strongest, the most resolute revolutionary organ and must always be the vanguard in all revolutionary movements. To fulfill their mission, the armed forces must understand and follow the Party's policies including policies regarding military struggle and policies regarding organization of armed forces. Deviating from the Party's policies the armed forces would lose political direction, misunderstand class relations, their actions would be incompatible with politics and would lose the revolutionary character.

Being aware of this, we have carefully taught the armed forces methods and policies of the Party. As a result, cadres and soldiers have come to a higher level in ideology and politics, have thoroughly understood their role in the revolution, therefore have gained correct political attitude, strengthened the stand of the workers' class and have had complete confidence in the success of the revolution. Since they adhered to Party's methods, understood Marxist-Leninist viewpoints on war and military matter and Party's military plans, the armed forces have been quickly prepared in ideology, have correctly understood the stand of the class. Consequently at every stage of the revolution they have been absolutely loyal to the Party. During the long revolutionary struggle, cadres and soldiers have been always confident in the ultimate victory of the revolution. They have been excellent in executing Party's policies and directives, have always attempted to improve themselves technically, to fulfill their function as a tool for the Party. Consequently they not only fight but also do production work, wage campaigns, carry out psychological war among enemy soldiers to break these ranks, unifying all forces to defeat the enemy.

**We Must Make Full Use of the Ideological Weapon
Promote Proletarian Thinking, Combat Unproletarian Viewpoints and always Assure a Revolutionary Character for Our Armed Forces.**

Thought directs action. Action cannot be correct without correct thinking. Therefore to fight to the end for the

revolution of the proletarian class requires that our troops be trained in proletarian ideology, be determined to carry on the revolution until socialism and communism are established and oppose any non-proletarian thinking. This ideological struggle reflects the difficult and complex class struggle in society. The outcome of this struggle will profoundly affect all aspects of the constructive or military activities of our troops.

Among our troops proletarian ideology always plays a dominant role. Besides this orthodox ideology, however, there exist in individual cadres and soldiers, non-proletarian viewpoints and ideas with various nuances. These non-proletarian viewpoints and ideas have created considerable difficulty in building a revolutionary spirit and a strong will for our troops. From this experience, the political task has made use of the ideological weapon, has armed our troops with proletarian ideas and with Marxist-Leninist dialectic. At the same time it has continuously combatted any tendencies to petty bourgeois and bourgeois thinking, for example pure militarism, military bureaucracy, idea of armement and various forms of individualism such as relaxed and uninvolved living, rightist and passive attitude, appeasement for enjoying life, favoritism... Using the efficient weapon of criticism and self-criticism, in the ideological reform, the political task has continuously broadened and reinforced the sphere of action of proletarian ideology among the armed forces. This is why cadres and soldiers after receiving political and ideological training and gaining some practical experience have assimilated proletarian thinking, have understood all policies and methods of the Party and have quickly become good revolutionary soldiers with strong determination to fight for the revolution; all this in spite of the fact that most of them are from bourgeois origins and that when first joining the armed forces they were only at the stage of national and democratic awakening.

Besides proletarian ideology, the political task also develops revolutionary zeal and communist ethics in cadres and soldiers. Revolutionary zeal has its foundation in a thorough education on the rights of the class, hence it possesses a spontaneous character, it enables cadres and soldiers to react correctly and promptly in all circumstances. Consequently cadres and soldiers are always willing to sacrifice themselves for anything that serves the cause of or protect the revolution and people. Furthermore, cadres and soldiers when driven by revolutionary

zeal, can absorb quickly and thoroughly all revolutionary knowledge.

The revolutionary ethics of our troops is loyalty to the country and to the people. It is the communist doctrine of "self-abnegation for others". Thanks to this revolutionary doctrine, cadres and soldiers in their hard struggle have accepted sufferings, shared sorrows and happiness with each other. This ethic has generated so many stories : one shared a potato or a manioc with his fellows, another gave up a medicine pill, a piece of blanket for a fellow who needs it more. In danger they sacrificed themselves to save their fellows or their leaders. Perfect unity and revolutionary heroism flourished in every unit. With this beautiful revolutionary doctrine, cadres and soldiers respect older people, love youngsters, behave themselves correctly with women, observe all military regulations when working with the people. Due to their profound love for the people, our troops do their best to help and protect the people and are always ready to give up their lives for the people in danger. Due to their training in proletarian, ^{thinking} to their beautiful revolutionary sentiment and to their communist ethics, our troops always keep the character of the revolution intact, fulfill the requirements for the build-up of the people and the armed forces, that is unity among the troops themselves, unity between the troops and the people, unity between cadres and soldiers, unity among various ranks, love and cooperation among cadres and soldiers, unity among the units, unity between the regular army, the local armed forces and the militia, perfect coordination of the forces in action. It is because of these beautiful ideas, feelings and ethics that our troops have won the love and the cooperation of the people. The people have expressed their profound love for the troops in the words that they use to address them : "fellows of the Old Ho's army".

We Must Assure That The Troops Assimilate
The Military Thinking Of The Party, Master All
Military Doctrines And Build Up Their Fighting
Capability.

While working at the fundamental task which is the political training for our troops, the Party never neglects their technical training. The Party always sees to it that our troops assimilate the Marxist-Leninist thinking in military matters so that they can apply this thinking to the specific situation of our country and build up a modern and scientific military art. Since this military art is an

art of people's fighting under existing conditions of our country, the development of this art requires that our troops have ideological and political formation.

One of the goals of the political tasks is to help the armed forces to master the Party's military thought with respect to training and fighting. Thanks to the development of military democracy and of the "people-based" methods of military training, our cadres and soldiers have quickly mastered the military art and strategies; what is more, they can apply this art and these strategies expertly and creatively. Before each battle, the political task puts the military democracy in action: together cadres and soldiers exchange ideas, try to understand the intention of the upper rank and to find the best way to obtain results. After each battle they review the leading ideas of the plan, comment on the command, on the fighting and draw practical conclusions. Through military democracy, the political task has helped the majority of cadres and soldiers thoroughly understand the orders of the upper ranks, has made good use of the collective mind, at the same time has given opportunity to each individual to use his initiative. On this basis, our troops have assimilated our Party's military thinking which puts emphasis on the people. Our troops know how to turn ideology and politics to their advantage, how to invent and creatively utilize various forms of combat, strategies, fighting techniques, how to get the most out of weapons they have and accomplish difficult military missions.

Based on the Marxist-Leninist viewpoints on the decisive role of human beings in military problems, the political task always makes sure that cadres and soldiers understand the principle "of utilizing all the power of ideology and all the power of the available weapons for defeating the enemy". The thorough knowledge of military theories and strategies has enabled our troops to invent many ingenious forms of combat and fighting plans such as ambush, surprise attack, attack on scattered units of the enemy forces, mock attack, special offensive, simultaneous attack from within and from without, attack on fortresses, elimination of reinforcements... with various forms of ambush: land ambush, water ambush, mobile ambush; and many techniques for close-in attack, night attack and simultaneous attack on many fronts. Consequently our troops have scored many spectacular victories, and from pure defensive have gradually gotten the upper hand and finally defeated the enemy.

The political task has also contributed to our troops' bravery, readiness, ingenuity, zeal, initiative, swiftness, punctuality, discipline, unity, discretion about military secrets, endurance and constant bellicosity. These splendid military qualities have been built upon a solid foundation of political awakening and have been thoroughly forged by practice. They have enabled our troops to creatively apply the techniques and strategies and given them the strength to defeat the enemy.

At this stage, our troops are being organized into regular and modernized armed forces. The political task has assured that our troops continue to progress in unity and organization, in discipline, self-awakening and in modern military science. It has also built in cadres and soldiers a strong will to fight and capability of destroying any enemy with weapons available at the moment.

Emphasis On The People Constitute The Fundamental Method And The Beautiful Tradition Of The Political Task With The Armed Forces.

The fundamental method of the political task is characterized by an emphasis on the people. This method is based on an absolute confidence in the capability, the intelligence and the revolutionary spirit of the people. This is the most efficient method.

The political and military plans of the Party, the missions that the Party assigns to the troops as well as specific directives of the Party are motivated by the immediate and long range interests of the people. Therefore the people and cadres and soldiers are willing to accept these plans, missions and directives and regard them as originating from their own initiative. Thus the Party's political task has only one method, the "people" method. We oppose any method based on oppression, bribery and deception as used by bourgeois troops. We always emphasize the democratic principle and the Party's method of persuasion by trusting the people in every military task, including the military task. This is why the political task has become a task of conscience, a voluntary task for everyone in the armed forces.

The power of the political task originates from its emphasis on the people. We positively promote popular organizations such as Youth Groups, People Troops Association, Clubs..., urge everyone to comply with all stands and policies of the Party and consider them as their own.

Due to the unity between the Party and the people, the political task is carried out by everyone; cadres and soldiers urge, educate and help each others. Emphasis on the people has widened many beneficial areas in the political task and made the political task proceed regularly. Since the political task exists everywhere and at every moment, deserving individuals and deserving acts are always cited and praised, violations and mistakes are always denounced and corrected. Consequently the military life is always wholesome and smooth. Adhering to the Party's thinking and to the "people" method, the political task has tightened the bond between the Party and the People, changed the ideas, intention of the Party into ideas and intentions of the majority of cadres and soldiers. This is why the political task is always realistic. Not only it foresees future problems but it devises specific methods for solving these problems. This is according to the principle of thinking ahead in the political task.

Adhering to the Party's thinking and to the "people" method, the political task has trained our cadres and soldiers to the long-range revolutionary mission and to urgent problems that need immediate solutions and has given them the qualities that the revolution requires. Using the "people" method, the political task lets the people educate themselves, lets them find out solutions to their problems. Thus the political task has a high sense of reality, always satisfies construction duties and war duties, thereby enriching the life of our troops. By using the "people" method, the political task has intensified cadres and soldiers' sense of responsibility to the armed forces, to the revolution, has fully developed their initiative, broadened the collective mind. These results in turn have increased the efficiency of the political task and have given it a dynamic character.

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Our troops' experience in combat and in construction work has shown that the growth and the power of our armed forces cannot be separated from the political task. The political task is the lifeline of our troops. Therefore while our armed forces are being modernized, we must enlarge the role of the political task and make full use of

the experiences and the achievements of the political task. Furthermore we must carefully learn the experiences of the political task of the Liberation troops in the South and the troops of friendly countries, thereby assuring more results and more victories for the construction work and military effort of our armed forces.

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SHIFTING SMALL MERCHANTS INTO PRODUCTION WORK

[Following is a translation of an article by Tran Ngyuen in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No 12, December 1964, pp 43-49.]

Prompted by the transition to socialist regime, by the continuous growth of national business and of trading cooperatives, by the reform of private business enterprises according to socialist principles, we have started the socialist reform of small businesses. Before the end of 1960 90,000 small merchants have been placed in cooperative cells at various levels. A small number of small merchants have been taken in as laborers by public and private enterprises. Approximately 30,000 have been shifted to production work; 30,000 have become agents of state stores. During 3 years from 1961 to 1963 more than 40,000 small merchants have changed to production work or to half-production half-business occupation. This change has contributed to the socialist awakening of small merchants and has made their living more stable. The idea of serving the people and of conforming to Party's and Government's policies regarding business and market organization has produced more results than when these merchants were doing private business. The production front has more manpower.

Nevertheless the socialist reform of small merchants and the current situation in business present many complex problems that require careful investigations.

The Transfer Of Small Merchants To
Production Work Contributes To The
Redistribution Of Labor Force And
Constitutes The Final Stage Of Soc-
ialist Reform.

At present, free market and retail business of small merchants are still widespread, there are still too many small merchants. On free market, besides the peasants and handicraftsmen selling their products and buying their necessities, there are approximately 130,000 small merchants operating regularly on a private basis. Among these, 57.9 percent are not legally registered. It is worth mentioning that from 1959 to 1963, 75,000 new merchants started their business whereas only 70,000 were shifted to production work. From the beginning of 1964 until now, the reform of small merchants has received more impetus. However the number of merchants shifted to production (mostly to agriculture) is still too small compared with the total number of these merchants.

This situation is due to many complex factors.

Our country was a colony, producing a wide variety of small merchandise and serving as a consumption market for products from the imperialist country. Most bourgeois in our country were business bourgeois, operating as dealers for imperialists. There was a large surplus of labor force in metropolitan and rural areas. This economy and this society produced a large class of small merchants. In the processes of restoration, of economic reform and development according to socialist principles, we have tried to build an independent economy, to provide our country with an advanced industry and economy and to pull more and more labor force into various branches of production. However the process of redistributing labor force is a long one and small merchants represent a considerable section of labor force. Therefore reform of small merchants, essentially their shifting to production cannot be accomplished in a short time. Agricultural and industrial production has made considerable progress but it does not meet the requirements for socialist industrialization and for improvement of living standard. Control of sources of merchandise, organization of state stores and trading cooperatives, distribution of merchandise have not reached a stage where ever-growing needs of society can be met. These factors are responsible for wide circulation of free market merchandise and for slow pace in the reform of small merchants. Furthermore shortcomings in production management,

business management, materials management in Government economic and business installations, especially in handicraft centers constitute a fertile ground on which free market and small businesses flourish. What is more, we have for a certain length of time discontinued socialist reform of small merchants and neglected reform and management of the market. Consequently the number of small merchants multiplied, hindering the reform, construction and development of the national economy.

At present, the distribution of labor force has many weak points. In highland and midland areas, where land and resources are abundant, there is a shortage of labor force for development although some manpower is idle. At the same time population is greatly concentrated in flatlands, in agricultural areas and cities. Large surplus of manpower in metropolitan and rural areas should be used in the economic development of highlands, of coastal areas. Instead, a large number turn to small businesses. This irrational distribution in turn has produced another difficulty : demand for consumers' goods continue to grow while production of merchandise lags behind demand and behind socialist industrialization.

To reduce the imbalance between production and consumption or between demand and offer, first, we must boost volume of production, second, we must plan distribution of merchandises and put centralized control in the hands of the Government. Unfortunately numerous small merchants continuously search for Government channels of merchandise . Their buying and selling make market and prices unstable. Due to large number of these middlemen, merchandise is excessively scattered, shortage is more keenly felt, relation between supply and demand is strained, often artificially. Difficulties in distribution, consumption and in price control are certainly due to many causes. One of the most important and most direct causes however lies in widespread free market and numerous small merchants.

Spontaneous activities of small merchants in cities and countryside have stimulated spontaneous circulation in agricultural production cooperatives, handicrafts and illegal actions in Government factories and economic organizations. Wherever small merchants and free market exist difficulties set in against expanding production, strengthening agricultural cooperatives and handicrafts, stocking merchandise, controlling Government channels of merchandise , stabilizing prices and slow down of raising

of people's living standard. Excessive number of small merchants is not consistent with the principle of planned and balanced economic development, with requirements for economic reform and construction according to socialist principles. The basic approach in socialist reform for small merchants is to transfer them from circulation domain to production domain. This will help organize and rationally redistribute labor force, provide more labor force to new economically developed areas or to areas having high economic potential. The goal is to boost production and improve people's living standard including small merchants. Experience in reform of small merchants has shown that trading cooperatives or trading and producing cooperatives are only transitional organizations for initiating these merchants to production work. If we maintain these organizations permanently, reform of small merchants must stop before insurmountable obstacles. The objective of socialist reform of small merchants is not to shift from private and scattered business to collective business but to remove them completely from small business and "gradually transfer most of them to production work"(Proceedings of the General Conferences. Edited by the Central Executive Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, 1960, Vol.I page 182.) thus, providing more labor force to production front and reducing current surplus of labor force in circulation and distribution work.

At present, the transfer of small merchants to production work is hampered by a number of problems most of which concern ideology. Many small merchants are afraid of difficult work and hard life. They think that commerce is easier and more profitable. Besides, some agricultural cooperatives are not willing to accept small merchants, because they are not confident in the latter's labor capability and are afraid that their presence would jeopardize the income of the cooperatives. Some cadres directing local cooperatives as well as some cadres in charge of reforming small merchants believe that transfer of small merchants to production work, especially agricultural production is too difficult because of "land shortage"; therefore they hesitate or give up entirely.

Production work intended for small merchants is essentially agricultural production work. Many cadres however have not understood this point. In some places many small merchants are being transferred to production work in handicrafts and are not directed to production of items for which raw materials and consumption market exist locally;

instead petty items are produced for immediate income without prospect of building permanent trades. Consequently, the reform encounters numerous difficulties. Cadres tend to protract the commerce-production combined situation while conditions are favorable for a complete change to production. They also attempted to boost merchants' income at the expense of those who do production work. These mistakes originate from an incorrect understanding of production, of the basic approach to production task, from insufficient confidence in the capability of small merchants and in the feasibility of their reform, from lack of determination and lack of a complete and detailed plan.

To shift small merchants to agricultural production is not a simple problem especially in areas in which land is insufficient for the population but neither is this impossible. For areas where small merchants are many and land is scarce, the solution is to move them to highlands or midlands where they will participate in the economic development or to newly developed areas. It is frequently possible to keep these merchants in their areas even if land is scarce. We must in these cases assign them to agricultural trades that are important and have a promising future according to the situation of local agriculture. For example, Hanoi is suffering a land shortage and has more small merchants than any other areas. Nevertheless Hanoi has transferred a great many merchants to production work. The district Dong Da has a program for relocation of small merchants in highlands for economic development; it also provides small merchants with jobs that suit existing conditions of local agriculture. Thus in a short time, 200 small merchants were transferred to highlands and 1,077 more found jobs in vegetables growing, animal husbandry in suburbs or in handicrafts and other economically important trades. Another example : During the 5 years from 1959 to 1963 we transferred only a little over 70,000 small merchants to production, of which a very small number went into agricultural production. By contrast, from beginning of 1963 to April 1964 we transferred 34,000 small merchants to production of which 20,000 to agricultural production. This shows that with steadfast effort in the reform and with correct method, it is possible to transfer small merchants to agricultural production.

It has been said that the basic approach to reform of small merchants is to transfer them to production, preferably to agricultural production. This means that a small portion of merchants may occupy themselves in handicrafts and other types of trades. If however, too many are

assigned to non-agricultural production or if new trades are not carefully selected with regard to raw materials and consumption market, it will be difficult for them to make a living and finally they must be transferred again to agricultural production.

Thus with a correct understanding of production, of the necessity of redistributing labor force, of the basic approach to socialist reform of small merchants, with confidence in the capability of these merchants and in the feasibility of changing their occupation and with a complete and detailed plan, we absolutely can accelerate the process of transferring small merchants to production work.

The Transfer Of Small Merchants To Production Work Is One Aspect Of the Struggle Between Two Systems.

Small merchants are workers who circulate and distribute merchandise. Interests of their class are essentially in keeping with those of workers' class. Consequently, they are able to assimilate Party's approaches and policies of socialist reform. This is their positive disposition. On the contrary, since owners, and isolated retailers, they are still brain-washed with bourgeois thinking in business. Their thinking and their manner of doing business oppose socialist thinking and manner of doing business. This is their negative disposition. These two dispositions always conflict each other. The issue of this conflict is determined by the Party's task of educating and organizing them and by their attitude toward Party's policies of socialist reform. Experience has shown that socialist reform of small merchants (including transfer to trading cooperatives, to production, to economic development of highlands, coastal areas or to economic development of new areas) is actually a new form of class struggle, the struggle between socialism and capitalism. This struggle appears in the small merchants' choice between policies for socialist reform, production work established by the Party and isolated and independent enterprises. With regard to leadership and direction, it appears in the cadres' choice between tenacity or surrender in the task of reforming small merchants and transferring them to production work.

In recent years, the struggle between the two systems has taken many different forms in the reform of small merchants. From 1959 to 1963, while 70,000 small merchants

were transferred to production, there were as many as 75,000 who started their business. Among these new merchants, 30.7 percent had been previously reformed (including those transferred to production and to cooperatives). At present, individual and independent retailers represent 62.8 percent of small merchants. This situation was due to the fact that for some time we had neglected socialist reform for them. At the end of 1960, cooperativization of small merchants still lacked socialist character although most of these merchants had been reorganized. Small merchants did not receive adequate political education and the struggle between the two systems was not efficiently carried on in cooperative organizations of small merchants. Although reorganized and incorporated into trading cooperatives, they still retained the tendency to spontaneous and capitalistic manner of doing business because they were making a living by themselves and had been under the influence of capitalist business. This tendency was manifested in free market, in evasion from Government's control, direction and management. Their business activities were usually concentrated in merchandise that was not expensively handled by state stores and trading cooperatives such as foodstuffs; or in merchandise that peasants still had after sale to Government such as food supplies and other important agricultural products, or in industrial merchandise, raw materials, technical materials that leaked out of Government economic organizations due to negligence in management and distribution. These spontaneous, unorganized activities occurred both in cities and rural areas. Free market merchants not only bought and sold what was sold by state stores but also secretly obtained merchandise and raw materials from handicraft and agricultural centers and even from some Government economic organizations. There were merchants who speculated, smuggled. Many among these were bad elements, trying to avoid socialist reform and honest ways of making a living. Speculators and smugglers bribed and corrupted some staff and cadres in Government's economic organizations.

The same struggle has taken a different form when small merchants are urged to shift to production work. Some of them were most willing, many however were opposed to the idea and found all kinds of pretexts for not shifting. They hated to give their "one capital, four profits" way of making a living. They were afraid of difficulties and hard life in production work. Behind this fear however was a comparison between commerce and production work in which production work was misevaluated. They despised labor, considered production work as degrading or as a transient way

of making a living without a future. After being transferred to production work some of them still did commerce secretly. Whenever production management, labor management or market management are deficient, they felt a strong temptation from prices and market. In trading and production cooperatives, more members chose commerce than production work or tried to maintain the commerce-production structure even when conditions are suitable for switching to straight production. They wanted to step into socialism with two feet, the foot of commerce and that of production, the former being stronger and faster. At present the general situation is that in trading and production cooperatives, more members work in commerce than in production and the income from commerce exceeds that from production.

These considerations have shown that reform of small merchants is a class struggle of complex nature and long duration because there is an important relation between small merchants and the system of small production still lingering in cities and countryside. If this fact is not fully realized, we shall tend to underevaluate the problem of reforming market and small merchants. In the past, market management and transfer of small merchants to production work were usually neglected. This is a consequence of rightist thinking. This thinking slows down socialist reform of small merchants and reduce its effectiveness.

We must frankly discuss pros and cons with small merchants. We must definitely convince them that spontaneous and capitalistic business is outmoded and has no future and does not serve the cause of socialist reform and socialist construction. If we convince them that production work as indicated by the Party is most honorable and has brightest future, sooner or later they will accept it.

However the task of pushing small merchants toward production work and the task of the idea of spontaneous and capitalistic business must go hand in hand with problems in economic organization such as further expansion of state stores and trading cooperatives, efficient organization of gathering and controlling merchandise channels, better distribution of merchandise and materials in stores and Government economic organizations, of labor and production in agricultural cooperatives, handicraft cooperatives, of merchandise circulation on the market... Experience during recent years

has shown that if these tasks are well done, market and prices will be stabilized, free market limited and small merchants will not profit from buying nor selling. Then they can see that shifting to production work is the only solution. If economic progress is insufficient to assure satisfactory circulation of merchandise, if distribution of merchandise is not correctly organized..., the situation will move in the wrong direction and naturally small merchants will lose interest in production work. Therefore we must have a Marxist-Leninist understanding of all aspects of the problem, education, ideological struggle, development of economic capabilities of the Government, market management... We must consider these as indispensable methods that a proletarian Government must use in its effort to reform small merchants and to win victory in socialist revolution of the North.

The Party's Viewpoints And "People" Method
In Transfer Of Small Merchants To Production Work.

The Party regards small merchants as allies of the proletarian class in the previous national democratic revolution and in the current socialist revolution. Hence we have the duty of educating and persuading small merchants in socialist ideology, helping them and creating conditions favorable to their changing to production work, giving them a new living standard secure, permanent and improved. If in the process of urging them to change to production we must take a strong stand against their negative thinking, apply economic and administrative means, this should be in the interest of the socialist cause which comprises their own interests and should absolutely not originate from hate or intention to attack them. We must organize their economy and help them overcome difficulties in their changing to production. This is a class viewpoint and also a "people" viewpoint of our Party. The task of reforming small merchants and urging them to change to production will not fulfill political and economic requirements unless our cadres are thoroughly familiar with this "people" viewpoint and method. Good results are obtained wherever cadres are well trained in this respect. For example in the town of Vinh Yen (Vinh Phuc), its commission and other local agencies give good guidance and assistance in this task. Consequently, commercial organizations of the town have good connections with agricultural cooperatives. The latter provide land, advise small merchants who want to build granaries, drying yards, dig fish pools, cultivating

short-term and long-term industrial plants, buying cattle, raising hogs and other domestic animals. Production organizations of small merchants maintain good contact with agricultural cooperatives for learning techniques in plowing, seeding, planting, animal raising; with technical agencies for securing guidance in seeds, domestic animal and in equipment; with handicraft cooperatives for assistance in production means and equipment. These forms of alliance are very useful for helping small merchants to overcome difficulties that they must face in the initial stage. Help and guidance given to new production organizations to build their material and technical foundation are very important because not only small merchants can make a good start in production but they become permanently attached to collective economy and discard the idea that production is a temporary way of life for them. Authorities in Vinh Yen have also asked agricultural cooperatives, handicraft cooperatives to guide new production organizations of small merchants in handling manpower, in evaluating work points, in distributing revenues to stimulate members' interests in production. Vinh Yen has a rational system for distribution, manpower and labor. Work points for those who do commerce, are lower than for those who do production work. This heightens production work's appeal. Also the income from business is used to support agricultural production in its start. The proportion of income from agriculture gradually increases thus setting stage for a complete shift to agricultural production. When first transferred to agricultural production, small merchants thought that agriculture would be a temporary occupation for them. However, cadres promptly explained to them that this is the final change. Thanks to dedicated leadership of the Party Committee and local authorities, to small merchants' efforts to solve their own problems, the movement has made solid progress in Vinh Yen. So far all cooperative cells of small merchants in Vinh Yen have planted 100 "mau" of rice and vegetables, raised 100 head of cattle and nearly 1,400 pigs. In 1963 each member provided himself an average amount of food for 4 months. In 1964 this average was between 5 and 7 months. The income from handicraft production in 1963 was 200,000 piasters a quadruple increase over 1962. The income from production represents 60 to 70 percent of total income. The members' living is settled and gradually improved. Average monthly income of each member is 42 piasters. For some members the monthly income is as high as 53 piasters. These achievements have encouraged the members tremendously. Some families are doing both commerce and production but are anxious to change to production alone as early as

they can.

Besides Vinh Yen, other towns such as Ha Bac, Hai Duong, district of Dong Da(Hanoi) have seen the same results. In many areas however the transfer of small merchants to production work is less successful. Some cadres believe that this process is only convenient for market and price control. They have not understood the goal, the economic and political meaning of this task. Hence in their work with small merchants, they tend to use a compulsive and authoritative approach. They try to transfer as many merchants as possible to production work without considering how the merchants will manage in production and what difficulties they will encounter. The result is that production work is too difficult for small merchants and those who have not been transferred, lose confidence in production work. This is not consistent with the nature of socialism, with the "people" viewpoint and Party's approach. We know that socialist construction in the North consists of developing elements of state economy, of building the State centralized and unified business, of organizing a unified socialist market. Socialist construction is not to reduce small merchants and retailers to poverty as is the case with the capitalist regime. It involves changing small merchants into production workers. In socialist countries which have been previously under capitalist regime, this change is not a burden and hardly constitutes a problem because small merchants have been cruelly treated by big capitalist industries. In a country such as ours, however, with so many small merchants and retailers, socialist reform for them is a complex problem. Hence we can fulfill this task only by adhering to Party policies and by using the "people" approach.

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To organize small merchants into trading cooperatives or trading and production cooperatives is only an intermediate step in their socialist reform. This reform is achieved only when the majority of small merchants are transferred to production, especially to agricultural production, the few that remain being assigned to circulation, distribution of merchandise according to the Government plan, to other types of work, when state stores and trading cooperatives are capable of handling circulation and distribution of merchandise. A correct understanding of the goal and meaning of the task, of the Party's viewpoints on production, on class relations is a basic requirement for success. Without this understanding we cannot avoid mistakes in our judgement and in our work and we shall fail in our task.

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CORRUPTION IN LE THIEN VILLAGE HAMPERS PARTY ORGANIZATION

[Following is a translation of an article by Nguyen Van Kim in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No 12, December 1964, pp 63-66.]

The agricultural cooperative Phu Cuong, hamlet Kim Son, village Le Thien(Hai Phong) started an improvement program in management and techniques. But it stopped at stage 1. Some leading cadres in the village thought that cadres sent in by upper ranks listened to "bad elements" instead of to all concerned. A violent conflict broke out. The "huyen" Committee decided to replace cadres who had been sent in. However the improvement program still could not proceed. What caused this situation? An inspection of Le Thien provided an answer and at the same time gave useful lessons on how to build up the Party.

Village Le Thien of "huyen" An Duong is in the suburbs of Hai Phong and is adjacent to highway No.5. It has 5 hamlets, a population of 3,816. The average land per individual is 3 "sao" and 13 "thuoc". Agricultural cooperativization started in 1958. Until now cooperatives have captured 97.7 percent of peasant households. Until 1960, the village achieved considerable progress due to efficient leadership of the (Party)cell and to efforts of people. Agricultural production was good. People's living was on the upturn. Hence this village was considered one of the best in the "huyen" and received many awards. In 1960, however, things went wrong, leadership machineries of the village cooperative changed. Chuan, a bad Party member

appointed secretary of village cell and other bad individuals took control of the administrative committee of the cooperative. Chuan and other bad individuals inside and outside the Party seized all power and did many injustices to people. Those who denounced their corrupt and bureaucratic conduct were immediately punished. To deceive the upper rank, Chuan reported many fake achievements.

What kind of a person was Chuan ? Who were his followers ? Exactly, what did they do ? A Party member during the resistance war, Chuan defected to the enemy, helped the enemy to disorganize our plans. Due to his shrewdness, he was readmitted into the Party in 1959. In 1960, he was appointed secretary of the village (Party) cell. To consolidate this key role, Chuan ousted good comrades from leadership and admitted several bad elements into the Party and placed them in important posts : Giong, who had once defected to the enemy, was made director of cooperative Phu Cuong; Chung, a traitor who had denounced his fellows to the enemy and had directed the enemy to our quarters, was made assistant director; Ban, a former soldier for the enemy, became accountant; Bac, formerly a gambler and buffalo dealer, was treasurer...

Chuan and some cadres used repressive measures against the people and made up 53 cases for collecting fines. Those who missed classes in cultural study, meetings or were late at these gatherings, were fined. During harvest time Chuan gave order to construct sanitary facilities with new design. Before they were finished, Chuan sent his aides to knock them down and made people spend 6, 7 days to do the work over. In 1962, Chuan reported that cooperative Phu Cuong had fulfilled the food obligation with the Government and besides had sold 10 tons to the Government. Actually, Chuan purposely underevaluated the Cooperative's production; besides, he concealed more than 25 tons of rice and without permission increased by 20 percent the regular food share of each member. The production of non-member households were exaggerated in order to collect and buy in excess of these households' obligation. Chuan searched their houses and arrested them. Chuan also organized the so-called "dagnet of market management". Rice discovered in circulation was bought by compulsion and sold among cooperative members.

Many Party members protested against Chuan's actions and defended the Party's policies. Chuan threatened them of expulsion. Chuan also had the intention of ousting

two comrades of the cell committee for not taking side with him. Hence tension grew. The main cause of trouble was that Chuan wanted to have a firm grip on village organizations as instruments in service of his own interests. This was apparent from all serious dishonesties in cooperative Phu Cuong. This cooperative was established in 1958. Until 1961, it was under the direction of comrade Tru with two non-members as accountant and treasurer. The cooperative had a good reputation among the people. After Chuan became secretary and appointed some bad elements to the administrative committee of the cooperative, people became suspicious and sent many accusatory letters. Their suspicion and accusations were well founded. Of the 6 persons in Chuan's family, only one was worker. Yet he could buy Peugeot, bicycle, watch, Japanese tape recorder, spent money freely, had frequent drinking parties. Tieu, the assistant secretary of the (Party) cell, could afford thousands of piasters to buy bicycle, to construct a house with a yard although only one member of his family of 4 was worker. The families of the director, accountant, treasurer were classified as needy every year. A search later revealed that each family had about 6 piculs of rice in reserve. They had bought tables and cabinets and were preparing to build houses and yards. Where did the money and rice come from? Led by Chuan they had used many tricks to rob tens of tons of rice and 6 or 7 thousand piasters from the cooperative. Besides, they had concealed tens of tons of rice and had not had the chance for dividing it among themselves. Further, tens of tons of rice could not be accounted for and tens of thousands of piasters had been spent for unjustified or unrecorded purposes. The money and rice taken by this corrupt gang represented one-third of the cooperative's capital. People expressed their opinion in saying: "Be in the administrative committee and get rich quickly; be cooperative member and become beggar", or "cooperative members wear rags for cadres to build houses and gardens".

To deceive upper ranks, Chuan proposed to "huyen" authorities that cooperative Phu Cuong would start the first step of the program in management improvement. Before cadres were sent in to conduct the improvement program, Chuan and his followers got together and corrected the papers, legalized records. They took turn to keep close watch over cadres who conducted the program and those who inspected the work and tried to make the task difficult for them. They also intimidated people, saying: "Those who tell stories, will be blindfolded and we shall cram

rag into their mouths" or "you can talk only when the Party permits it". People, however, most willingly cooperated with the Party in inspection work and all of Chuan's crimes and his followers' were finally brought to light. Chuan, secretary, Tieu, assistant secretary, Giong, director of the cooperative were expelled from the Party and brought to court.

This thorough inspection uncovered the most clever wrongdoings. Once again people gained good morale and confidence. They admired the vigilance and sternness of the Party. A sum of 8,000 piasters of the robbed money was recovered and divided among members. Some members said: "This is one way for us to get rich". Since members are better informed, the general situation is improving in several respects. The cooperative completed the tenth month harvest 4 days earlier than expected; the food obligation with the Government was exceeded by 10 tons; the production increased by 36 tons over 1962. Members' income has considerably increased. The program for improvement in management and techniques received a good start.

The inspection of the Party cell of the village Le Thien has efficiently served the program for improvement in management and techniques. It demonstrated the superiority of collective production, and stimulated agricultural production. What is more important, however, is that during the inspection we have learned many lessons regarding building up the Party, especially regarding strengthening its organization.

As we know, a Party cell in rural areas is a bridge between Party and people. It is an agency of leadership for peasants. It executes all Party policies in rural areas. To fulfill this mission of leadership, the cell must be continuously tended in ideology and organization. Key cadres in the village, especially Party's commissioners must be of prime political standing, totally dedicated to the interests of people, capable of unifying and leading people in production work and executing Party and Government policies. The story of Party cell at Le Thien has proved the following: if leadership organ in the village is not healthy, if key roles in the cell and cooperative are held by bad elements, Party's policies will not be carried out, the cooperative will not grow, and the village in general will not make any progress. The restitution of Party membership to Chuan and his promotion to the post of cell secretary were great mistakes in organization since Chuan was given the opportunity to seize the

command. In fact after he became cell secretary, he admitted bad individuals into the Party and put them in key positions in the cooperative, he and his followers could do anything they wanted, they deceived superiors and inferiors, they abused their power, took bribes, extorted people openly. Although they did not belong to the exploiting class, these individuals were political failures, their minds were deeply imbued with the thinking of exploiting class, hence their actions were characteristic of the "new village bullies". If they were not expelled from the Party, how could class character, the vanguard role of the Party, be preserved, how could Party's sturdiness be increased? Furthermore, political and ideological education for Party members in this village was neglected. The Party cell of Le Thien became destitute of integrity for class struggle on the ideological front was not understood, Party members were not regularly awakened and trained in revolutionary ethics, integrity, thriftiness, dedication to public interests. For a long while, non-proletarian ideas dominated and did great damage. Under these conditions, the Party cell could not function as a leadership organs of socialist revolution of peasantry. We can now understand that in building the Party it is essential to adhere to Party class policies. Above all, great care must be taken when admitting new members into the Party. When organizing cadres and assigning them to various posts, we must thoroughly know their standards, background and past records. This matter is of utmost importance and is basic in organization of Party committees. If we overlook this principle, if we pay attention only to the current conduct of the candidate or the promotee, we shall certainly make mistakes in the admission of new Party members or in the promotion of cadres. To enhance the class character and vanguard function of the Party and Party cells and to strengthen unity of the Party, it is also important to maintain the political life in the Party, promote criticism and self-criticism, combat erroneous ideas and wrongdoings and emphasize the discipline of the Party.

In our revolutionary tasks, the Party has asked us to follow the "people" approach, to heed the ideas and aspirations of the people, to lean on the people in supervizing cadres, in inspecting the execution of the Party's policies. Chuan and his followers ignored the Party's policies, tyrannize the people, got rich from the sweat and tears of the people. Yet some members of the "huyen" commission, even after receiving more than 50 accusations against Chuan's and his gang's wrongdoings believed that

the village Le Thien was all right, that there was no serious problem. Clearly this was due to misunderstanding of class viewpoints and methods, to a serious degree of ignorance and indifference to the people's interests and aspirations.

Why was there so much trouble in Le Thien, a village which had scored some achievements ? This is a question that no leader with a sense of responsibility before the Party and before the people can ignore. We have seen that to strengthen their position, Chuan and his followers used every means to deceive the people and the authorities, did not spare the most unscrupulous methods for forcing the people to carry out their orders and to produce certain results. In spite of these results the political consequence was very bad. The lesson is this : when evaluating the accomplishment of cadres, Party members and Party cells, we should not pay attention exclusively to tangible results. The methods by which these results have been obtained, the political influence they created are more important to consider. In other words, we must see whether cadres, and Party members have used the "people" method, where they have obtained approval, cooperation and affection of the people. To gather the information, to inspect the work top men in Party cells must rely on the people, because people are directly under the leadership of cadres and Party members and it is actually the people who supervise the cadres and Party members. In every revolutionary task it is a plain fact that if we spark the interest of the people, not only the specific mission is accomplished but the revolutionary spirit of the people is built up for future missions.

The central task of the Party in rural areas at present is improvement of management and techniques in cooperatives. The success of this task requires that cadres and Party members be perfect and capable. The story of the village Le Thien has shown that the improvement plan cannot be carried out unless the Party cell is in good shape. Therefore the present duty of the Party's inspecting committees is : they must tie the inspection task to the current central task so that the latter can progress smoothly. At the same time they must help strengthen the basic units of the Party. Since the inspection task is so important, Party committees must give special attention to this task and must associate it with the current central task. We must base on the central task to carry out inspection, supervision and education of Party members.

This is the only way the Party's basic units can be actually strengthened, the Party members can be thoroughly educated in organization, discipline and their sense of responsibility for execution of the policies of the Party and the Government can be intensified.

The success of the inspection of the cell of Le Thien was due to the fact that the municipal committee of Hai Phong was attentive to the inspection task and used the inspection task as a means to produce results in the Party's central tasks. From the experience at Le Thien, we have learned useful lessons in building the Party, in particular in strengthening its organization.

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EXPERIENCE IN LEADERSHIP
FOR AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
IN VIET HUNG

[Following is a translation of an article by Nguyen Thanh Luong in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No 12, December 1964, pp 66-69.]

Viet Hung is a mountain village of "huyen" Hoanh Bo(Quang Ninh). Due to sparse population, average cultivable area per capita is not too low(3 "sao", 7 "thuoc"). However, soil is poor due to natural contents, to idle periods during resistance war and to erosion. Cultivating techniques in the past were very crude. Only one yearly crop was grown. Weeding, fertilizing, irrigating were neglected. People were usually short of food and from 5 to 8 months each year they had to buy rice from the Government.

The cell of Viet Hung was established early in 1948 and operated well inside the enemy's territory since the village is near the highway 18, a very important communication artery for the enemy. Cadres and Party members had experienced much challenge, had been tempered by war. Since 1959 the village has established 9 cooperatives which included 91.4 percent of households. Under the leadership of the cell of Viet Hung, the cooperatives accepted hardship in building a collective living. They have overcome natural adversities and unfavorable conditions by using correct approaches. "Rice and vegetables had to be planted at the same time. Vegetables required care and rice production could not be neglected".

After 5 years of struggle, cooperatives of Viet Hung, in particular cooperative Viet Tien, scored significant achievements : cultivated area increased rapidly, production output climbed from year to year; average number of work days and average income per worker each year steadily rose (For the cooperative Viet Tien in particular, 1961, each worker put in 175 work days with an income of 0.80 piasters per work day; 1963, 205 work days with an income of 1.40 piasters per work day). Due to progress in production, there was no more food shortage, no more need for Government rice. Not only every member was well fed and warmly dressed, but there was food in reserve. All cooperatives fulfilled their food obligation : for 5 continuous years, these cooperatives sold more than their quotas (For the cooperative Viet Tien in particular, food obligation in 1962 was 5 tons of rice, 22 tons of vegetables; 10.6 tons of rice and 60 tons of vegetables were sold). Along with the living, accumulated capital also increased rapidly (For the cooperative Viet Tien in particular, the accumulated capital doubled from 1962 to 1963. It is now almost 40 thousand piasters). It is noteworthy that cooperatives of Viet Hung have shown much self-reliance, have built up their capital rapidly without borrowing from the Government. In addition each cooperative member could deposit considerable savings. What is most important, the cooperatives urged and instructed by the Party cell, were no more afraid of growing vegetables and during the last few years, area for vegetables as well as proportion of vegetable production increased rapidly (For the cooperative Viet Tien in particular, vegetables represented 49.36 percent of total food production in 1961, and 56.00 percent in 1962; in 1963 the vegetables value approached that of rice; 38,655 piasters for vegetables and 39,895 piasters for rice). Area yield and output for rice also went up each year. With fat crops of vegetables, the cell urged people to mix vegetables with rice in their consumption saving rice for sale to the Government. The cell of Viet Hung has given excellent leadership in agricultural production, realized big progress in vegetables growing and thus gradually improved the living for members, capital rapidly accumulated and the cooperatives contributed more and more to socialist industrialization. From the success of Viet Hung cell, we can draw following conclusions on leadership in agricultural cooperatives :

1- The cell must establish definite production plans for cooperatives. To carry out these production plans, all difficulties and obstacles especially those

concerning ideology, must be overcome. We have found that our peasants are fundamentally patriotic, have high endurance and are dedicated to public interests. Furthermore interests of socialist revolution match the basic interests of people. Therefore if peasants are awakened and informed, if their beautiful traditions and virtues are developed, we are certain that all backward and conservative thinking will be banished and progressive, revolutionary thought will win.

In cultivation and consumption of vegetables, in improvement of cultivating techniques, Viet Hung cell encountered some difficulty due to an attitude of dependence and lack of determination which were rather widespread among Party members and people. The idea of growing 3-month potatoes was discussed during meetings at the cell headquarters and at the cooperatives. People raised many arguments against it. The truth was that they worried about eating vegetables. Since they did not understand requirements of socialist industrialization and relationship between accumulation of capital for socialist construction and improvement of the people's living, the relationship between interests of the State and interests of individuals and their families, many cooperative members were not willing to accept a hard life to contribute to socialism, did not have self-reliance, still wanted to rely on Government rice, still liked to work in forests in the water...

The same situation also exists inside the Party cell. However after a few heated debates at the Party committee and Party cell, the final success was obtained. Decisions on the new production plan for the cooperative were unanimously passed by the Party cell. Following were collective discussions in the cooperatives. Committeemen and Party members led people's mind to the past, compared their poverty under the old regime with their present life, uncovered the bright future for them, explained about the goal of long struggle and the tortuous and difficult paths that our people must follow to arrive at that goal, helped them to understand the nature of our regime, the difficult role of our Party in socialist construction, the connection between interests of the State, interests of the cooperatives and those of members, responsibility of each citizen under socialist regime... The purpose of all this was to arouse patriotism, love for socialist regime, spirit of self-reliance, will to endure hardship, to overcome difficulties, courage to fight poverty and backward

attitude. After thorough discussion, questions from members were answered in detail and members' understanding improved greatly. Members were then encouraged to continue to exchange ideas on the production plan and on specific methods for improving cultivation techniques. As a result the decisions of the cell penetrated the members and became their own decisions. "We did not like to grow and eat potatoes because potatoes do not taste as good as rice. However, we did grow and eat potatoes because thus we could sell more rice to the State for socialist construction". These words reflected the attitude and awakening of the people and proved the success of the ideological task of Viet Hung cell.

2- The ideological and organization task must be closely associated. Methods of organization and supervision of the plans are important. This is one factor of the success of the Viet Hung cell.

In addition to initiating ideas, educating people in ideology, combatting backward thinking, the cell must always give attention to organization and consider organization task as a means for strengthening and developing results of the ideological task. After overcoming the attitude of dependence, fear of hardship, cadres directed people to discuss questions on organization : decisions of the cell, decisions of the cooperative, specific programs of each production team for potato areas, for potato cuttings, for fertilizers, time of completion for each job, assignment for each worker. In carrying out decisions of the cell and cooperative, those who did well were complimented and awarded; those who did not accomplish assignments were criticized and reprimanded. Everybody was mobilized, pushed, encouraged to fulfill his assignments. This task seems to be simple but in fact it is not well done everywhere : In many localities of this "huyen" collective discussions were not held after the ideological task was accomplished, or discussions ended without decisions, without specific job assignments, workers were not supervised and pushed; a just-talk situation resulted and revolutionary thinking did not go into revolutionary action.

The problem of vegetables "management" in this village was also brought up first by the cell and a plan was drawn right in the beginning. Hence significant results were obtained and cadres did not have to devote their entire effort to the problem of production and consumption of vegetables as usually occurred elsewhere.

In organizing the work, the cell of Viet Hung chose the cooperative Van Yen as a directing station. After the task of direction had been done properly and had satisfactory result, the experience was used in directing other cooperatives. While a number of Party cells in the "huyen" were negligent in their leadership letting people soften down in agricultural production and drift back to accessory trades, the cell of Viet Hung concentrated in labor management, urged people to manufacture fertilizers and to utilize all sources of fertilizers, strived for good yields in vegetables, and using good results stimulated the enthusiasts and convinced those who hesitated. The first crop of 3-month potatoes of the cooperative Van Yen (later merged with the cooperative Dong Dang to form the cooperative Viet Tien) brought 1,200 kilograms of potatoes to each of the 25 households. This result had a great impact on the thinking of every cooperative member in the village and completely conquered the worries about vegetable growing. Concerning irrigation, the cell of Viet Hung urged cooperatives to invest tens of thousands of work days in construction dikes for retaining water and always maintain aggressiveness and tenacity of people. With growing crops of potatoes, the cell induced people to save rice by introducing potatoes into their food, to find ways of processing and preserving potatoes and other vegetables.

To fulfill its function of leadership in work organization, the cell must properly distribute its forces. Almost all Party members held key positions in the village and cooperatives. Assignment of each comrade was based on his capability and specific situation. The cell also considered democratic discussions in administrative committees and production teams as an important means for elucidating the mind, promoting the awakening and intensifying sense of responsibility of everyone. With regard to production plans, technical methods, fulfillment of the food obligation... the cell and administrative committees of cooperatives always tried to obtain consensus of members. The cell did not neglect training people to be responsible individuals, to become Party members, training Party members to assume the affairs of cooperatives. This effort contributed significantly to the strength of the Party and to the capability of cadre forces.

3- Correct stand, determination, consistency between word and action : These are basic requirements for gaining approval and confidence of people.

The cell of Viet Hung took a correct stand : to consider vegetable growing and consumption as an important issue in leadership of cooperatives.

The cell of Viet Hung was also stubborn in conquering the thinking of people and used examples of Party members always to influence people. The committeemen and Party members always led people and drew a large crowd to them according the slogan : "Party members march in front, people come in the rear". Party members toiled night and day to protect the dikes from rain storms, volunteered to cut food ration, to sell rice and vegetables to the Government in excess of their obligation... The committeemen and most Party members worked hard and led a simple life. Their integrity and endurance were well known among people. They were proud of communist ethics and philosophy of life. The good examples of cadres always have a big effect. In this case, the secretary of the cell with several big responsibilities("huyen" committeemen, cell secretary, cooperative director, political cadre for village unit) and a big family, always maintained his zeal and revolutionary spirit in every task. He spent much time in cooperatives or among the teams discussing particular problems with people, always gave the affairs of cooperatives priority over private affairs. When the Party reached a conclusion, he carried it out with determination. Where there were difficulties, he came in person to direct the work. In financial crises he exhorted his family to accept sacrifice. His virtues and conduct had great influence upon Party members and people.

Correct stand, strong determination, ethical standards, consistency between word and action, simple living, honesty of comrades of the cell won people's confidence in the leadership of the cell.

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The ideological task and the organization task of the cell of Viet Hung were not one hundred percent perfect. Its leadership in animal raising, industrial plants, technical improvement was still weak. However the work described above was a useful experience in leadership of agricultural cooperatives.

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A BLOW AGAINST AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS

[Following is a translation of an article in the Vietnamese-language publication Hoc Tap (Studies) Hanoi, December 1964, pages 77-79]

The United International Conference with the Vietnamese People Against American Imperialists and for the Preservation of Peace met at Hanoi from 25 - 29 November 1964. This conference stated that the international responsibilities of the people of the world are to urgently struggle against imperialism, old and new colonialism, especially against the American imperialists, to preserve and strengthen national independence and to maintain world peace and the security of all the nationalities.

The conference met at the time the patriotic movement of our Southern compatriots is rising strongly and continuously with many clear-cut successes and at a time when the North is emphasizing production with the spirit of "every one doing the work of two" in order to build up socialism and to strengthen our institutions for the struggle to attain the unification of our country. The conference is a manifestation of the harmony and support of the people from socialist countries, of the people from nationalist countries, of oppressed nationalities and of people who love peace, freedom and justice in the entire world with the righteous struggle of the Vietnamese people against the American imperialists. The conference was not only a great stimulant to our people's cause and success, but is a strong encouragement to the oppressed people of the world who are struggling for independence and freedom and also is a contribution to the preservation of world peace.

A defendant of the imperialist American aggressors and warmongers was on the platform of the conference. The conference sternly criticized the aggressive and warmongering policies of the American imperialists of increasing the "special war" in South Vietnam, plotting to spread the war to encompass all of Indo-China, to oppress the security of all the Southeast Asian peoples and to threaten world peace. The conference also sternly criticized the American

imperialists for creating a tense situation in the world, for continuing their aggressive policies, and for suppressing the people's liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The aggressive and bellicose American imperialists are enemies of all the people of the world.

The experience of Vietnam and other countries in the world have shown that peace and national independence are inseparable. If national independence is violated, there can be no peace and in order to preserve peace we must struggle for national independence.

In Vietnam, after she was thwarted in her plots to prolong and enlarge the Indo-Chinese war, imperialist America expelled the French colonialists from South Vietnam and installed her lackey Ngo Dinh Diem as head of the government, thus causing a prolonged division of Vietnam. From 1955 to 1960, they supplied the Ngo Dinh Diem clique with three billion dollars to kill the Southerners, to terrorize, massacre and to change South Vietnam into a new type colony and an American military base. Since 1961, regardless of justice and the protests of the peace loving and democratic people of the world, imperialist America rudely conducted an armed invasion on the South under the form of a "special war", a war which has lasted four years and is the biggest hot war in the world today.

But, contrary to their wishes, the imperialist Americans have suffered one defeat after the other. Their insane efforts to hope to escape from the "inescapable trench" have not produced one iota of results. The situation for them is bad and is getting worse every day.

Because of its aggressive nature, although it has been soundly defeated, America still will not give up its ambitions. On one hand, they are continuing to escalate the war in South Vietnam more than ever, they plan to extend the war to the North, to destroy the neutral independence and peace of Laos and Cambodia, to destroy the security of the Indo-Chinese and Southeast Asian countries and to create a very critical situation in this region. On the other hand, they are striving to have the U.N. intervene in the Indo-Chinese countries in hopes that their vile intentions will be realized and that they can destroy the legal institutions of the 1954 Geneva Convention on Indo-China and the 1962 convention on Laos.

The Americans think that by doing this they can save their tragic situation in the South. But, they are grossly mistaken. The controversies between the people of the South and the Americans and their lackeys can never be resolved according to their subjective wishes. As long as the American imperialists continue to invade the South, our people will struggle against them. Even though America has tried thousands of methods, they cannot avoid total defeat.

Although the U.S. has much money and many weapons, but because of its colonialist policies and its various wars, it has been defeated many times in Red China, Korea, Cuba, etc. In the future it is certain that it will also lose out completely in South Vietnam.

The patriotic and righteous struggle of the people in the South is developing strongly. The continuous and resounding victories that the Southerners have won speak for the fact that in this day and age a nationality, even though small, but having proper concepts, having a spirit of determination to win, having the strength to unite all the people and fighting for the comradeship and support of the people of the world, it is certain that they will defeat the gang of imperialists, even though America is the ringleader. Sooner or later a viewpoint such as the one of our government respecting the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indo-China and the determination not to excuse any aggressive action of the American imperialists and their lackeys in regard to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. That clear and determined attitude of our government has been supported by peace loving people of the world. And primarily because we are concerned with national peace and independence our people are therefore determined to give our whole-hearted support to each struggle of the oppressed people of the world who want to liberate themselves, establish independence, freedom and peace.

On the occasion of this conference, the people of our whole country expressed gratitude for the precious support of the peace loving people of the world. Our people were grateful to the people of the world for previously supporting us during our resistance against the French colonialists and now for their support of the people of the South against the American imperialists and their lackeys, in order to liberate the South and advance towards a peacefully united Fatherland, as well as their past and present support of the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against the aggressive and bellicose American imperialists and for protecting the build up of socialism in the North. The people of Vietnam strongly believe that if the previous support movements of the people of the world contributed in bringing the resistance of our people to the historic Dien Bien Phu victory and the re-establishment of peace in Indo-China, today, the support movement of the people of the world, including that of the American people, will also have a great stimulating effect and would help to bring the war against the American imperialists of our people to a total victory.

The revolution of our people is an element which cannot be separated from the revolution of the people of the world. Every success of the people of Vietnam is a strong stimulation for the Asian, African and Latin American people struggling to gain national independence. Conversely, the struggle against imperialism by the Asian, African, Latin American people and by the revolutionary people of the entire world is also a strong support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people. More than ten years ago, the Southern patriots held fast in their patriotic struggle against the aggressive and bellicose policies of the American imperialists and their lackeys in order to have their sacred rights of national independence and to have a peaceful, united fatherland, but also at the same time they wanted to push back and weaken American imperialism, thus contributing

to the maintenance of peace in Indo-China, Southeast Asia and the world. Therefore, the people of the world whole-heartedly supported our people's heroic and righteous struggle.

The American imperialists have also confessed that their war of aggression in South Vietnam is an experimental war in order that they might conduct other similar wars against other nationalities struggling for independence and freedom. Primarily because the struggle of our people has an international significance, the peace and justice loving people of the world have given, are giving and will give their support to the righteous struggle of our people.

The conference met this time to express and increase the high level of international love of the people of the united world, to support the Vietnamese people against the imperialist Americans, to preserve peace, and to stop and defeat their bellicose and aggressive plots. "The conference has decided to celebrate 20 December, the anniversary of the foundation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, as the yearly day of international unity of the people of the world for the people of South Vietnam until the South Vietnamese people win the final victory" (Decision on Vietnam of the United International Conference with the Vietnamese People Against American Imperialists and for the Preservation of Peace). This conference is a strong blow to the aggressive and bellicose American imperialists, The success of the conference is an important contribution to the strengthening and consolidating of the unity of the people of the world in their common struggle against imperialism headed by the American imperialists because of peace, national independence, democracy and the advancement of society.

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