

AGAINST MAOISM

DOSSIER

BEIJING'S EXPANSIONISM
AND
HEGEMONISM

Published by
VIETNAM COURIER
Hanoi - 1980

17
**AGAINST MAOISM
DOSSIER**

17
**BEIJING'S EXPANSIONISM
AND
HEGEMONISM**



Published by
VIETNAM COURIER
Hanoi - 1980

AGAINST MAOISM
DOSSIER



CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
- Editor's Note	7
- The Reactionary Nature of Maoism	
NGUYEN DUC BINH	9
- Beijing's Hegemonic and Expansionist Strategy	
PHUC CUONG	91

APPENDIX

Abridged version of the White Book of the SRV
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

- <i>The Truth about Vietnam - China Relations over the Last Thirty Years.</i>	143
--	-----

EDITOR'S NOTE

Maoism, which has wrought great havoc to China, is now a great danger to world peace and the independence of other peoples, Southeast Asian peoples in particular, especially when Beijing is entering into overt collusion with Washington and other imperialist forces.

We begin our dossier "Against Maoism" with this book on Chinese hegemonism and expansionism. It includes two articles published in Tap Chi Cong San (Communist Review), the theoretical and political organ of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and as an appendix, an abridged version of the White Book published by the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1979 entitled "The Truth about Vietnam - China Relations over the Last Thirty Years".

Hanoi, June 1980
VIETNAM COURIER

EDITOR'S NOTE

Maoism, which has become a world-wide phenomenon, is a product of the Chinese Revolution. It is a product of the Chinese Revolution, which has been the most successful revolution in the world since the Second World War. It is a product of the Chinese Revolution, which has been the most successful revolution in the world since the Second World War.

The book on Maoism, published in 1965, is a product of the Chinese Revolution. It is a product of the Chinese Revolution, which has been the most successful revolution in the world since the Second World War. It is a product of the Chinese Revolution, which has been the most successful revolution in the world since the Second World War.

VIETNAM COURIER

THE REACTIONARY NATURE OF MAOISM

NGUYEN DUC BINH

Maoism, disguised under revolutionary slogans and Marxist phrases, has revealed its true colours as an extremely reactionary ideological and political current. It has openly adopted a hostile attitude towards Marxism-Leninism, to socialism, to the genuine interests of the Chinese people and to the development of the three revolutionary currents in the world.

To expose the reactionary nature of Maoism is, ideologically and theoretically, a necessary requirement of the struggle to defeat it.

I. Origin and nature of Maoism

Maoism is not a perfect, consistent and logical system. It is rather a mixture of quite different and often conflicting concepts and ideas. In that mixture, *petty-bourgeois and bourgeois nationalism which has developed from Great-Han chauvinism into great-nation expansionism and great-power hegemonism*, constitutes the essence, the nucleus. Around this all the borrowed elements are mixed and associated; and the skin is painted with Marxist-Leninist phrases.

At a given period, Maoism cannot help having certain deformations, as changing circumstances force it to adapt itself. And because of its pragmatic character it can easily adapt itself to circumstances. However, behind those deformations, the core has not changed — that is great-power chauvinism, expansionism and hegemonism. As for the Maoists, they are not homogeneous. They split into several factions with more or less different views. There are even differences of

views, even contradictions between those factions and Mao himself, in one respect or another. Despite that fact, the *common ground* on which they are standing is great-power nationalism, expansionism and hegemonism. That common, unified basis has its focus in Mao. It uses Mao as a symbol. That is why despite the sharp and antagonistic contradictions which sometimes render them incompatible, they all hold high Mao's banner to accuse their opponents of being anti-Maoists.

After overthrowing the "gang of four" the present Beijing leadership declared themselves the only people loyal to Mao. In the resolutions of the XIth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (August 1977) and the National People's Congress, 5th legislature (February 1978), the present Beijing leadership affirmed that Maoism is still the political-ideological foundation of the Chinese Party and State. In the meantime, under the pressure of the situation, they had to repair the conspicuous blunders of practices under Mao and "the gang of four", and start an apparently

"de-Mao-ization" process in home policy. So, it is true that they are now holding high Mao's banner to eliminate Maoism? At first, some people thought that the Hua-Deng clique were gradually coming round to the right path, that the logic of home policy would eventually force them to put right their foreign policy too. But that prediction was soon shown to be unfounded.

Of course, we do not rule out the possibility of "de-Mao-ization" in certain aspects and to a certain degree. A series of events which have been going on in Beijing recently have led to that opinion. The "Practice is the only criterion of truth" debate; the acquittal of many people who were unjustly sanctioned under the "great proletarian cultural revolution"; the rehabilitation and admission into the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of a number of former personalities; the reversal of the assessment of the Tien An Men incident; the appearance of a number of articles critical of Mao in the wave of wallpapers, etc. Isn't it

true that all those events are gradually knocking down the idol of Mao Zedong?

Yes, the logic of the scramble between the present factions in Beijing inevitably affects Mao himself, even Mao's teachings. But, those questioned teachings of Mao are after all only of secondary importance. And basically the present Beijing leadership remains Maoist, for it still stands on the foundations of Maoism, that is great-power chauvinism, expansionism and hegemonism.

In fact, Deng Xiaoping, twice a victim of Mao himself, nurtures a deep hatred for Mao. Yet, ideologically, he remains a Maoist, because together with other people he is the guiding spirit of the "four modernizations" aimed at creating a material basis for carrying out his ambitions of great-power chauvinism and expansionism. Despite his change of heart—today he may praise Mao to the skies because he cannot do otherwise and because he considers it beneficial to do so, and tomorrow he may throw away that torn umbrella into the dustbin of history—Deng Xiaoping, the typical

pragmatist, is objectively Maoist, because he is standing on the foundation of Maoism.

Lenin said: "Naturally, we must take as our basis, not individuals or groups, but a class analysis of the content of social trends, and an ideological and political examination of their essential and main principles" (1).

So far as the assimilation of the great-power chauvinistic and hegemonistic goals — which are the nucleus of Maoism — are concerned, we can say that the present Beijing leadership is more Maoist than Mao.

Maoism is not a one-off phenomenon or accident. *Its appearance and evolution are linked with the Chinese social and historical conditions in the first half of the 20th century, with the social structure and the degree of development of China, with the Chinese ideological and psycho-social traditions.*

The prime condition for the emergence and existence of Maoism is the economic, social and political backwardness of Chinese society, the obscurantism, darkness, superstition and

feebleness left by the feudal autocratic regime in the Chinese masses of people. We know that the history of China is the history of millennia feudalism. On the basis of a backward agricultural economy and a patriarchal system, it developed into a type of Oriental despotism. At the end of the 19th century, capitalist relations emerged in China. These relations accelerated the decay of feudalism, but the backward and patriarchal agricultural production remained the main production. Corresponding to the backward economy was an under-developed social structure, and inadequate class differentiation. In 1949, out of a population of 450 million there were only 2.5 — 3 million factory workers. The petty-bourgeoisie was overwhelmingly predominant, especially the peasants who accounted for 90% of the population. Small traders, artisans, and urban lumpen proletariat accounted for a rather high percentage. The Chinese bourgeoisie had scarcely had a chance to grow up during the time of penetration of foreign capital, and the bourgeois revolution which broke out in 1911 was

too weak, and was unable to destroy completely the solid citadel of feudalism. That is why after the revolution, Yuan Shikai proclaimed himself Emperor and the warlords fiefs mushroomed in the immense mainland China.

The backward socio-economic structure checked the development of the working class, the growth of its class conscience and its political independence. Despite its stubborn struggles in the '20s, despite the fact that it had already started to co-ordinate its actions with Marxism-Leninism which had come to China in the wake of the Russian October Revolution, the Chinese working class had just begun its history. The working-class movement was not mature enough to hold high the banner of national independence, whereas the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois movement had been emerging since the beginning of the century and was already very strong. Voytinsky, the Comintern representative, wrote in 1923: "In the present situation of China, the working class movement is far from becoming a factor strong enough to attract the

national movement in its struggle against imperialism".

Under those circumstances the Chinese Communist Party came into being. It was not fully prepared ideologically and therefore was not strong enough to fight and defeat the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist viewpoints. It had no definite political programme. Mao Zedong admitted: "At the time my thinking was a strange mixture of liberalism, democratic reformism and utopian socialism!" He added: "Then... I did not know anything about Marx and did not know about Lenin either. Therefore, I had no idea about organizing a Communist Party. I believed in Confucian idealism and Kantian dualism." (Talk with representatives of the Japanese Social Party in Beijing, 1964).

However, the Chinese Communist Party had at that time great advantages offered by historical necessity. These advantages created the objective conditions for the Chinese revolution to reach an epoch-making turning point—to

advance directly from the democratic revolution to socialist revolution. Sun Yat-sen's three great policies (Alliance with Russia, alliance with the Communist Party and support to the workers and peasants) was an objective admission of the incapability of capitalism and the capitalist road in China. Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)'s betrayal in 1927 further revealed that incapability. Those events, on the other hand, helped strongly affirm the position and role of the Chinese Communist Party.

Mao Zedong joined the Chinese Communist Party immediately after it was born, but so far as his position and viewpoints are concerned, *he was never a Marxist*. At most we can consider him as a petty-bourgeois revolutionary, but a very cunning one, disguised as a Communist. He tried to rely on the objective current of history for his existence and to take advantage of toiling masses' aspirations for revolution and socialism to further his personal ambitions. Owing to the relative weakness of the Marxist nucleus within the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, to the

general low theoretical level of the Party, owing to the very complex state in the Party regarding class composition and ideology; owing to Mao's special manoeuvres, etc. Mao gradually escalated to the position as "leader" of the Chinese Communist Party, and built and imposed his own "doctrine"—Mao Zedong Thought.

Mao Zedong Thought is in essence petty-bourgeois nationalism and takes on the characteristics of great-nation chauvinism and hegemonism. It is petty-bourgeois ideology with deep traits of feudalism, and in its development it tends to change over to the stand-point of bourgeois nationalism.

Maoism has grown up on the ground of a petty-bourgeois, chiefly peasant, society in a China still imbued with medieval ideas, and poisoned by the heavy traditions of Pan-Hanism. Lenin wrote: "On the other hand, the more backward the country, the stronger is the hold of small-scale agricultural production, patriarchalism and isolation, which inevitably

lend particular strength and tenacity to the deepest of petty-bourgeois prejudices, i.e. to national egoism and national narrow-mindedness." (2)

The deep hatred of the Chinese people for the imperialists, landlords and bureaucratic comprador capitalists is fertile ground for the dissemination of Marxism-Leninism. "The Eastern lion," once awakened, would be invincible if it were led by Marxism-Leninism. However, opportunism which came into being at an early date, dislodged the Chinese people's revolutionary movement from the orbit of Marxism-Leninism. Under the deep influence of old prejudices, and deceived by demagogic opportunistic manoeuvres, the broad masses of the Chinese people were unable to differentiate between Marxism and Maoism. This was also due to the indistinct frontier between revolution and opportunism, which was covered by the high tide of revolution which included all tendencies of nationalism. Thus the temporary victory of Maoism in China (of course this is not a destiny) has its deep causes.

Besides the economic and social causes, Maoism has its definite theoretical and ideological premises. Here we can see clearly the hallmarks of Chinese traditional ideologies, from the primitive dialectical elements in the theory of Yin and Yang, in Laozi's "Book of Virtues" to the sophism of the Zhang Zhou group. We see in Maoism the clear influences of Confucius and Mencius with its "respect for the monarch", with its severe "three tasks" and hypocritical "five virtues", with its line which consists in four points (self-improvement, running one's family, ruling over the country and pacifying the world), and its conception of "looking on people outside China as barbarians", considering China as the centre of the "world".

In Maoism we also see the reflection of the political ideology of the Legalist group whose embodiment was the savage autocracy of Qin Shi Huangdi, an ideology which preconised violence and oppression, militarism, warmongering, vandalism and disregard of human life. At the Beidaihe Conference in 1958 Mao himself

spoke about how to "combine Maoism and Qin Shi Huangdi's methods" in order to rule over Chinese society. As Mao admitted, he was an "on-the-spot philosopher". Mao learned mainly from the history of China, he learned from the models of autocratic emperors to the targets of great-Han hegemonism, from the insidious and barbarous measures to the cunning tactics to usurp the throne, such as "entering into alliances and establishing axes", "allying with distant countries in order to attack neighbouring countries", "sitting on the mountain to watch two tigers fighting", etc. These lessons are very rich in the history of incessant wars in China.

However, it is erroneous to consider Maoism as a purely Chinese phenomenon. A political pragmatist, Mao was also versed in the art of acting according to the times. He knew how to stick to the ground of "modernism" to make use of old traditions. He not only knew how to use the ancient to serve the modern, but also to use "external factors to serve the national interests". Thus the bourgeois political

ideology which entered China at the beginning of this century was not alien to Mao. Moreover, Mao learned about that ideology in its "sinized" form, that is when it had been remoulded in the spirit of traditional Great-Han chauvinism through the reformist bourgeois nationalism of Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen and even through the reactionary bourgeois nationalism of Dai Jitao and Jiang Jieshi.

What is most important is this: *Maoism is not only the product of Chinese socio-historical conditions, but also a product and important manifestation of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism on a world scale.* So far as its content is concerned, Maoism touches on matters which not only concern China but are of universal concern. The fact that Mao and his followers had to put on the cloak of Marxism-Leninism and socialism, indicates that Maoism is not a purely Chinese phenomenon. The victory of Marxism-Leninism and socialism compelled its enemy to "wave the red flag to attack the red flag", that is also of epoch-making

significance. Among the ideological currents which affected Maoism, there are anarchism and Trotskyism.

All the above-mentioned factors and influences, whether they originate from Chinese history or from foreign countries, were moulded by Mao and his followers into their own *under the decisive influence of petty-bourgeois ideas and through the prism of petty-bourgeois nationalism.*

Maoism essentially reflects the position and inherent characteristics of the petty-bourgeoisie. Of course it does not represent and cannot represent the genuine interests of the petty-bourgeoisie in general, of the peasantry in particular. As a class "falling between two chairs" (Lenin), the petty-bourgeoisie cannot defend its own class interests. In the present times, the real, genuine interest of the petty-bourgeoisie consists only in following the working class. As Maoism is basically opposed to the standpoint of the working class, not only can it not represent the real interests of the peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie, but it runs

counter to the interests of those classes. The relationship between Maoism and the petty-bourgeoisie lies only in the fact that it reflects the go-between role of the petty-bourgeoisie and the inherent characteristics created by the position of that class.

The go-between role of the petty-bourgeoisie is clearly reflected in Maoism through the loutvoyage tactics between classes, the "Bonapartian tactics". Indeed, in seeking social backing, Maoism makes use of various classes and strata, now this clique, now that one, and usually relies on the co-ordination of various social forces, often directly opposing ones, under the signboard of serving the interests of the whole nation. Pretending that its narrow-minded interests are the common interests of the whole nation, "standing over" all classes, is typical of the petty-bourgeoisie.

The petty-bourgeois nature of Maoism, which is closely linked with the above-mentioned characteristic, is the tendency to seek "the third road". Before 1949 this characteristic manifested itself in "new democracy".

By means of "new democracy", Mao wanted to create a special road, an original one for China and bring a "new contribution" to the world, which would be quite different from the road of the October Revolution, different from both capitalism and socialism. Here, with "the united dictatorship of many classes", Mao wanted to carry out the dream of "having rice for everyone to eat" (Mao's own words), and thus once again we see again the petty-bourgeois illusion about "the whole people's interests", "standing over" all classes.

Mao's highest political ideal is "new democracy", the essence of which is bourgeois democracy, "renewed" to conform to the age of proletarian revolution (this will be carefully analyzed in the following part). However, when "new democracy" was overtaken by historical necessity, Mao was forced to accept the transitional road to socialism. He was not pleased with the "socialist pattern" worked out by the October Revolution and which was essentially reflected in the resolutions of the 8th Congress (1956) of the Chinese Communist

Party. Mao rejected that road and sought an "original" road taking China to socialism: the road of "three red banners". Here, with all his petty-bourgeois illusion, with his fanatic vehemence and petty-bourgeois adventurism, Mao and his followers thought that they could with one leap reach "communism" before the Soviet Union, and economically outstrip first of all Great Britain, then the United States, and carry out their dream of world hegemony.

However, the petty-bourgeois character of this psychology lies in the swift shifts from one extreme to the other. When "The three red banners" were torn "the clarion call to advance to communism" immediately changed its tune, and became a funeral music. If in the past they thought that they would wake up one morning to find communism in China now they realize that it is so far away. And Mao said: "Communism will not necessarily come after tens of generations!"

And in his desperation the petty-bourgeois suddenly loses his temper. He destroys everything in a fit of anger. In the name of "culture"

he screams: "Revolution! Revolution!" and "Proletarians! Proletarians!" With these words he hopes to say that "one should overthrow the ruling group which is taking the capitalist road". But in reality he wants to smash the whole system of proletarian dictatorship. With his typical anarchism, with his hue and cry about "ultra-left" revolution, with the backing of the army and Red Guards, with the chauvinistic ideas and the cult of Mao verging on fanaticism, etc., the practice of "great proletarian cultural revolution" which lasted for many years is the symbol of the unparalleled petty-bourgeois craze which Maoism has stirred up in Chinese society.

Maoist ideology clearly reflects petty-bourgeois psychology. The petty-bourgeoisie has not an independent ideology. This is determined by its intermediate position. As it has no independent character, petty-bourgeois ideology often sides with bourgeois ideology, and is inevitably turned into bourgeois ideology. This is seen clearly in Maoism.

In fact, the "new democracy" which Mao intended to carry out after the victory of the democratic revolution as a whole historical stage before advancing to socialism, if carried out is certainly not a third road between capitalism and socialism, but only the capitalist road, the capitalist system itself.

The doctrine on "new democracy", against Mao's will, is nothing but bourgeois political ideology.

Likewise, the aim of Maoism to find a "Chinese-type" socialism, that means one which does not obey the universal laws of the whole world, and which is opposed to those laws, can only be a denial of scientific socialism; that path inevitably leads Mao and his followers to shift gradually to the reactionary standpoint of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. The logic here is: *from petty-bourgeois nationalism Maoism has become bourgeois nationalism, even reactionary bourgeois nationalism. It has gone to the lengths of colluding with imperialism, and officially opposing Marxism, opposing socialism, and all the forces of revolution and*

progress in the world. That process which started with the advent of Mao has been accomplished with the Maoist clique within the present ruling circle.

II. The main content of Maoist political ideology

With its core as great-power chauvinism, expansionism and hegemonism, *Maoism is first of all a political ideology and political practice.* As for its philosophy and theory, they are only tools serving the reactionary viewpoint and political line of Maoism. They are the means for realizing the great-Han chauvinistic expansionist and hegemonist political ambitions and schemes. Of course their relationship is not completely one-way. Theory and philosophy in Mao — he took a fancy to philosophy — are not only the tools and means for demonstration, they also play a definite role as a basis for Maoist methodology, line and political practice. However, this aspect is not so remarkable as the other. Thus, when criticizing Maoism we overlook criticizing its

political ideology and political practice, and when criticizing its philosophy we do not consider its political schemes, then we will fail to point out its real nature.

As a political ideology, Maoism is remarkable first of all in the fact that it pays lip service to, but *denies in practice, the historic role and mission of the working class*, the vanguard class which takes the lead in the cause of eliminating capitalism, building socialism and communism.

Mao Zedong was not a Marxist who betrayed Marxism and became a revisionist. The truth is that Mao never was a Marxist because, in practice, Mao always consistently denied “the most fundamental point in Marxism” (according to Lenin), that is the historic mission of the working class.

Mao proved himself to be a non-Marxist ever since the publications of his first works, after he joined the Chinese Communist Party. In the article “The Political Upheaval in Beijing and the Traders” published in July 1923, Mao officially considered the bourgeoisie

as "leader" of the revolution. And in the original text of the work entitled "Analysis of the Social Classes in China" published in the review "Chinese Peasant" of February 1926, Mao considered the working class only as "a friend of the revolution", on the same footing as the petty-bourgeoisie and the semi-proletarians. When it was introduced into his Selected Works in 1951, the passage was corrected as follows: Only the semi-proletarians and the petty-bourgeoisie were "the closest friends" of the proletariat, then called "industrial working class", and considered as the "leading force of our revolution". Despite those amendments, the work "Analysis of the Social Classes in China" is, by its nature, non-Marxist.

So is the work "Survey of the Peasant Movement in Honan" (1927). In its original text, the role of the peasants was exaggerated, as for the working class, which Mao called "city dwellers", they were insignificant; the leadership of the working class and the Chinese Communist Party were not mentioned at all.

The passages related to the working class and the Party were added later. Even in the most typical work of Maoism "On New Democracy" (1940), the fundamental principle of Leninism on the right to leadership of the proletariat in the bourgeois democratic revolution in the era of imperialism was not initially referred to.

In the history of the Chinese Communist Party in the '20s and '30s this situation arose: despite their supremacy, the Marxist-Leninists failed to analyse thoroughly the characteristics of China, a society in which peasants accounted for the vast majority of the population. They only paid attention to workers, to the movements in the cities. Their shortcoming consists in overlooking the peasants and the countryside. Mao Zedong took advantage of the shortcoming and used it in his scramble for power.

To set great store by the role of the peasants and the countryside, to advocate building base areas in the countryside in the national democratic revolution in a country like China is not a mistake. It is a necessity. We are fully on

the Marxist-Leninist standpoint if we understand that in specific historical conditions (as in China or Vietnam), to build revolutionary base areas in the countryside is a concrete form aimed at realizing the leadership of the working class over the peasantry, in order to set up a worker-peasant alliance; that the Red Army, though selected mainly from the peasants, was by its political nature an army of the workers and peasants and placed under the leadership of the working class (but not simply "peasants wearing uniforms" as Mao thought); that the revolutionary movement in the countryside is not the product of the peasants alone but that of both the working class and peasantry; that the peasant movement, judging from the whole revolutionary process, from its origin and end, cannot be divorced from the struggle of the working class and the urban working people; that therefore both the working class and peasantry are the main forces of the revolution, in which the working class plays the leading role. The following thesis of Marxism-Leninism is absolutely correct in all circumstances: "The

communist movement can never start from the countryside, but it always starts only from the cities." For communism can only be born from big industry and from the class which is the special product of big industry—the working class.

The main experiences of the Chinese revolution, if analysed and valued in an objective manner, from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, may make an active contribution to the common treasure of the theory and practice of revolution. However those experiences were seen by Mao and his followers from the standpoint of petty-bourgeois nationalism, through the prism of so-called "Chinese-style Marxism". Universal laws are overlooked and particular events become principles. Thus, the stress on the role of peasants and the countryside, the attack on dogmatism became a means by which Mao underestimated and denied the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism, the historic role and mission of the working class.

It may be asked *why the Chinese revolution was successful in 1949 if Mao was opposed*

to the most fundamental principle of Marxism?

In fact, the birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was a great victory of the Chinese people; it was the victory of the leadership of the Chinese working class through the Chinese Communist Party which was then basically a Marxist-Leninist party. That was the victory of Marxism-Leninism in China, the victory of the historical trend in China which was then in complete conformity with the trend of the times. Another decisive factor which brought about that victory was the extremely great assistance of the Soviet Union, and first of all the fact that the Soviet Union routed the Japanese fascists' Guandong army in 1945, liberated the northeastern part of China, and the fact that the Soviet Red Army subsequently left over to the Chinese revolution all its weapons and military equipment as well as those captured from the Japanese.

The developments of the Chinese revolution in the '30s and '40s which led to the great victory in 1949 had in fact occurred against

Mao's secret objectives and schemes. Thus we can explain how right after the victory of 1949, and the outstanding achievements of the first years of the socialist revolution, Mao was demoted in 1956 at the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao's thought was erased from the Party Constitution which had been adopted by the Seventh Congress in 1945.

Not only in solving the problems of the Chinese revolution did Mao make the role of peasants into an absolute one and deny the role of the working class. That anti-Marxist viewpoint was also incorporated by Mao and his followers, including the present rulers, into *their theory about the process of world revolution*. The "encirclement of the cities by the countryside" thesis has been developed into "encirclement of the world cities by the world countryside". As for their theories on this epoch and its contradictions, on the "three worlds" theory, they also spring from a basically anti-Marxist source which consists in denying the world historic mission of the working class.

The Marxist-Leninist viewpoint holds that the international working class, whose main achievement being the world socialist system, is the centre of the present times, that in the alliance of anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary forces, the leading role belongs to the world working class and the world socialist system. Only in those conditions can the anti-imperialist movements be radical in character, fulfil the causes of liberating their nation and their class in the socialist way. Through their members in every country, through the existing socialist system, by the resolute and thorough embodiment and defence of the fundamental and vital interests of the working masses and the oppressed peoples, the world working class is rallying in a natural and evident way around them all the progressive forces on our planet. This helps their movements of struggle follow the right direction, and involve them in the struggle against the common enemy, that is capitalism and imperialism — the sources of social injustice, of oppression, of unjust wars of aggression of our times.

In radical opposition to Marxism-Leninism, the core in the Maoist theory about the process of world revolution is the denial of the working class's historical mission of world significance. While stating that our time is the "time of imperialism and proletarian revolution", Maoism has in fact "blotted out" the existence of the socialist system, the main achievement of the world working class. If in 1960 in the article entitled "Long Live Leninism" and in 1963 in the "Suggestions About the General Line of the World Communist Movement" (both these articles are full of anti-Marxist-Leninist contentions), that denial was hidden in the definition of the epoch, in 1974 Deng Xiaoping made it public at the United Nations.

By denying the existence of the socialist camp, Maoism, of course, denies the most fundamental contradiction of our times — that between socialism and imperialism. Instead, it raises the contradiction between imperialism, and first of all "social-imperialism", on the one hand and the

oppressed peoples on the other. Hence the "three worlds" theory. So in the view of the reactionary clique in Beijing, the Soviet Union (in fact they mean the world socialist system in general) has become the "main enemy". Opposed to it are the two and a half worlds in which "the third world is the main force"; "the second world" (including the East European socialist countries — except the Soviet Union — and developed capitalist countries in Western Europe, Japan and Canada) is the intermediate area which can be allied with, and a half world is the United States (which belongs to the "first world" comprising the two super-powers). The United States, in the opinion of Maoists, may be won over because "our enemy's enemy is our friend". And for the Beijing reactionary rulers whoever opposes the Soviet Union is their friend !

With this analysis of the world political forces, Maoism actually stands on the position of the most reactionary classes, and sides with imperialism to oppose the world working class and the world socialist system which are the

social forces standing in the centre of our times. As for "the third world" it is considered by Mao as the "main force" of the world revolution. This is bluff and demagogy, aimed at using "the third world" as a jumping-off place for Maoism to achieve world hegemony.

In a nutshell, the whole reactionary content of Maoism is determined, in the final analysis, by this fundamental point: not only does it deny but it opposes the working class's world historic mission — that is to eliminate capitalism, and build socialism and communism — and replaces it by great-power nationalism and hegemonist objectives.

One of the most important parts of Maoism's political ideology is "new democracy".

Beijing propagandists affirm that in his work "On New Democracy", Mao Zedong developed Lenin's theory about the transformation of bourgeois democratic revolution into socialist revolution. In reality, if we compare it with the original edition in Mao Zedong's Selected Works published in Dairen in 1946,

we can see that Mao's "New Democracy" has nothing in common with Leninism.

From the standpoint of the proletariat, Leninism considers the anti-imperialist revolution for national liberation as part of the struggle against world capitalism and the first step towards the struggle against local capitalism. Lenin wrote: "It is perfectly clear that in the impending decisive battle in the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism..." (3). That means, to fight imperialism and liberate the nation is to prepare the prerequisites for the socialist revolution. Likewise, the fight against feudalism is not only aimed at developing capitalism, but mainly at blazing the trail for the socialist revolution. The more thorough-going the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks, the clearer the road to socialism is swept. That is why Marxism-Leninism holds that "the successful end of the national democratic revolution also means the beginning

of the socialist revolution". There is no interval between those two revolutions.

Maoism essentially considers the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution as aiming to create favourable conditions for the development of capitalism in China. In his work "On New Democracy" published in 1940, Mao Zedong, in his heart of hearts, denied the change from the Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. And in the work "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (Chapter II, point 6), when speaking about the prospects of the Chinese revolution, Mao wrote: "After the victory of the revolution, as it has removed all obstacles on the way of development of capitalism, the capitalist economy in the Chinese society will be rather developed. That can be easily imagined and is no surprise".

The fundamental difference between Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought can be seen in the question of the conditions which decide the possibility of shifting from the bourgeois democratic revolution to the socialist revolution

bypassing the stage of capitalist development. Leninism holds that those conditions are: at home, there must be the leadership of the proletariat; internationally, the aid of the proletarian dictatorship of the country or countries which have achieved the revolution. But Mao Zedong never recognized those two conditions. It is obvious that Mao denied the leading role of the working class. As for the second condition, right at the beginning of the '40s, Mao nurtured the intention of not relying on Soviet aid, and wanted to get the backing of the Americans after the second World War. In August 1944, talking with the second secretary of the American embassy in China, Mao said: "We do not expect aid from Russia... Chinese and US interests are similar... so we'll have to co-operate with each other." Then, Mao also told an American journalist: "We don't want to advance to communism on the Soviet pattern..."

In April 1945, in his report "On the Coalition Government" at the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong

stated: "Capitalism in our country is still too weak and small", "the struggle for new democracy will be long". He affirmed: "Without the development of the private capitalist economy and other economic sectors one cannot build socialism." In March 1949, at the second plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (7th legislature), Mao Zedong expressed certain reservations to the effect that after the victory of the democratic revolution in China, there must be a long period for building a "new democratic society". In Mao's opinion, the "new democratic society" is a whole regime with a comprehensive structure including new democratic politics, new democratic economy and new democratic culture. The new democratic economy is an economic structure comprising many sectors including the capitalist one. And what about new democratic politics? In his article "On People's Democratic Dictatorship" published in June 1949, Mao affirmed that it was not proletarian dictatorship but "a coalition dictatorship of four classes: the working class,

the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie."

Is there anything in common between that stand and Leninism? Absolutely not. We should not think that it is the development, the enlargement of Lenin's notion about revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Lenin did affirm that dictatorship was always the dictatorship of one class. In fact, as long as the political line belongs to a class, as long as that class owns the means of coercion, dictatorship belongs to that class. Those cannot be shared, cannot be coalised.

The dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry referred to by Lenin should be understood as essentially a form of premise for the proletarian dictatorship which is to carry out the tasks of the transitional period from the bourgeois democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. Once the first revolution is successful, we should shift over to the second revolution; there cannot be, and in fact

never has been a period of dictatorship of the workers and peasants.

Once the bourgeois democratic revolution is accomplished, either we can advance to socialism with proletarian dictatorship, or we can establish capitalism with bourgeois dictatorship. There can be no third way. Mao Zedong's "new democratic society" is in fact nothing but capitalist society; as for the "coalition dictatorship of four classes", it will not be a "form of State belonging to the third category" as Mao said, but can only be bourgeois dictatorship. As a matter of fact Mao Zedong's "New Democracy" does not go farther than Sun Yat-sen's "Sanminzhuji" (three principles of the people). *It does not go beyond the framework of bourgeois political ideology.* Moreover, Sun Yat-sen was great because he advanced from "Sanminzhuji" to "Three Great Policies" (Alliance with Russia, alliance with the Communist Party and support to the workers and peasants), because he declared (indirectly and in an objective manner) the incompetence and outdatedness of bourgeois political ideology

and the necessity of its replacement by the proletarian political standpoint. As for Mao Zedong, he was very dangerous for he tried to disguise his "new democracy" as Marxism-Leninism. We can say that he was reactionary for he was not practising what he preached and attempting to distort history. And while he declared he was following the proletarian path, he actually took the bourgeois road.

If for a long period of time Mao was able to hide his anti-Marxist nature under the guise of Marxism-Leninism, he could not do so when the revolution shifted to the socialist stage. This is because, unlike in the national democratic revolution where the petty-bourgeois standpoint or even the bourgeois standpoint could be tolerated, in the socialist revolution, owing to its proletarian nature, this is impossible. Only the socialist revolution can help distinguish the proletarian and the non-proletarian standpoints, genuine Marxist ideology and non-Marxist ideology. Of course there is still a problem there are many kinds of socialism, and Mao himself took advantage of

socialism, managing to deceive many people. But, it is obvious that Mao revealed his true colours in the turning-point of the Chinese revolution as it shifted to the socialist stage.

So, what can we say about *the viewpoints of Maoism on the problems of socialism?*

The most essential point here is that Maoism makes use of the ideal and method of socialism to serve his great-power chauvinist and hegemonic objectives. To all intents and purposes, Mao and his followers have never been Marxist socialists. They found in socialism not a science, a theory, a platform, a revolutionary path aimed at radically transforming society, but a means which is particularly attractive for the masses of the people. They made use of and relied on the Chinese people's revolutionary and socialist aspirations for their existence.

In the present time, when China is so poor and backward, is there any other banner more attractive and inspiring for the people than the banner of socialism! How useful it is to use it as a mask for great-power chauvinist and hegemonic objectives. Thus it is completely

reasonable to call Maoism social-chauvinism. It is chauvinist in essence but disguised as socialism!

We must say that Maoism did not infiltrate the lines of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1956, which were essentially Marxist-Leninist. To carry out socialist industrialization and socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and private capitalist industry and commerce, to improve the people's living standards, to unite with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, to struggle against imperialism, etc., these were correct elements in the lines of the Eighth Congress, that is the Congress which pushed back the influence of Mao Zedong's thought.

But Mao refused to retreat. He tried by every means to counter-attack right after the Congress. The result was that in 1958, at the second session of the Eighth Congress, he managed to reverse the situation: to annul the correct lines worked out by the Eighth Congress in 1956 and to impose his "general line" about socialist revolution and building socialism

which consists in "exerting all ardour, trying to march in the van, and building socialism in great quantity, rapidly, well and with economy". Later Mao had two more "initiatives", namely "people's communes" and "the Great Leap Forward". Thus the so-called "*three red banners*" came into being.

We shall not elaborate on "the three red banners", but confine ourselves to pointing out the basic point that "the three red banners" are the curious products of a crazy ambition begotten by Mao Zedong's great-power chauvinism and hegemonism. Indeed, it is not difficult to see the motive behind the "three red banners" — to catch up with and outstrip Great Britain in 15 years, then catch up with and outstrip the US, and advance towards carrying out Communism before the Soviet Union. It was only wishful thinking which arose from a desire for hegemony. It is well known how as a result disaster befell China and the Chinese people.

After the fiasco of the "Great Leap Forward", the session of the Central Committee of the

Chinese Communist Party held in Lushan in 1959 pushed Mao into the background. But he refused to acknowledge defeat and bided his time for a comeback. Anyhow, Mao was not really defeated, because there was no victory yet in this battle. There was not a person who was really right within the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. No real Marxist-Leninist was in a position to defeat Mao completely. Total victory would have meant eradicating Mao's thought: great-power chauvinism and hegemonism. Yet this thought did not belong to Mao only, but was the foundation for the political line of the Chinese leadership. That thought was very strong and getting stronger. Mao managed to use the anti-revisionist banner, and the serious counter-revolutionary events in Hungary and Poland to raise China's prestige. Against that background, there was little difficulty for Mao to rally his forces, and rearrange them for a new attack on the Chinese Communist Party and socialism in China. He himself started the "*Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution*".

In fact it was not a revolution, but a counter-revolutionary coup d'état. It was called a "Cultural Revolution", but it was the destruction of culture, it was called a "Proletarian Revolution", but it was the worst anti-communist action ever. So we can see that the essence of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was great-power chauvinism and hegemonism.

Its primary task was to replace Marxism-Leninism with Mao Zedong's thought, to restore the ideological position of Mao Zedong's thought, which was recognized at the Seventh Party Congress but later rejected at the Eighth. Mao and his clique of followers estimated that if the 800 million Chinese were armed with Mao's thought—the "apogee" of human intellect in our times—they would be able to do everything, even to submit the world to their will.

In the fervent chauvinist spirit of the "Cultural Revolution", Mao's followers did their best to canonize Mao and his thought, not only in China, but also on the world as a whole. At home, in order to carry out their

crazy ambitions, they raise the banner of "Opposing the capitalist roaders". This was aimed at crushing the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese proletarian State and the whole political structure of the system of proletarian dictatorship. Abroad, they tried to raise China's prestige and Mao's ideological role in "leading the whole world". On the one hand, they demagogically claimed to oppose imperialism, because in reality they were gradually taking side with the imperialists. On the other hand, they concentrated on opposing "the social-imperialist power—the Soviet Union". But in fact they opposed the world socialist system, the world communist and workers' movement, and sowed division in the world revolutionary movement, in a bid to set up a separate Communist International headed by the Maoists.

The eleven years of the "Cultural Revolution" brought untold sufferings to the Chinese people and serious losses to China in all fields of social life: economically, it brought China to the verge of collapse. The losses caused by

the "Cultural Revolution" were much heavier than those caused by the "three red banners" movement.

Are the present "*Four Modernizations*" a denial of the Cultural Revolution, a "de-Mao-ization", a return to Marxism-Leninism? Absolutely not. They are the continuation of Maoism by other means. *The essence of the Four Modernizations is still chauvinism, that is, they are still based on Maoist ideology.*

The real motives and objectives of the Four Modernizations remain those of the "Cultural Revolution" and "the three red banners"; that means there is still consistent application of Mao's instruction: "Such a situation should not be allowed to happen in which, our country after many decades, still does not become the first power in the world." In 1956, when declaring that China had to outstrip the US economically in the 50 to 60 years to come, Mao said in tones full of chauvinism: "That is a duty. You have such a large population, such an immense area, you have such rich natural resources; you are said to have built

socialism, and are maintaining superiority. The fact is that if after 50 or 60 years, you fail to outstrip the US: you are good for nothing! Thus, you will have to erase yourself from the earth. So, not only you have the ability of outstripping the US, but it is necessary that you should do it, it is a must. If you fail to do so, our Chinese nation will be no longer worthy of the world's peoples, and our contribution to mankind will not be great".

In the preface to Mao Zedong Selected Works Volume V recently published, Hua Guofeng conveys that instruction of Mao's to the Chinese people in this excited chauvinist way: "Is there any Chinese, beside the "Gang of Four", who can remain indifferent after reading those words by Chairman Mao? Is there any Chinese who does not fight with ardour?"

We must say at once that modernization on the basis of socialism and following the socialist orientation is an objective requirement of China. The Chinese people's aspirations to build a great socialist China, with modern

industry, agriculture, national defence, culture, science and technology, and a happy life for the people, are entirely legitimate. Those aspirations have won our sympathy, respect and full support as well as that of all the communists in the world, for they will bring happiness to the Chinese people and at the same time increase the prestige of socialism. They will meet the need of increasing the strength and influence of world socialism. What a good thing for the SRV to have common borders with a great, prosperous and strong socialist China!

Yet, the clique of traitors and Mao's followers in the Beijing ruling circle think differently. They take advantage of the justified aspirations of the Chinese people and under the banner of socialism follow their own great power chauvinist and hegemonic aims: "To build China into a modern socialist country, into one of the mightiest powers in the world by the turn of the century". That is a most demagogic catch phrase. Here, the nationalist view that China is the center of the world has been adapted to

modern times with socialist rhetoric. The strength and the greatness of the country is the englobing political task, and the Four Modernizations are only the means to carry out that great-power chauvinist objective.

The final objective is always the most important part in a political line. It shows the nature of the line. It determines the nature of the tasks and measures set out in the political line. The "Four Modernizations" slogan preserves Mao's ideas on economic development. Economic development must serve firstly the strengthening of China's military potential so as to help China gain its "superpower" position and not to improve the Chinese labouring people's material and cultural life. *To all intents and purposes Maoism allows the great-power chauvinist, hegemonic objective to replace the objective of building socialism and communism which is the historic mission of the working class.*

An extremely reactionary and anti-Marxist theory in Maoism is the so-called "theory on the continuation of the revolution under proletarian dictatorship". Beijing propagandists

continually make a eulogy of it? This is "a systematic summing up of the historical experience of proletarian dictatorship in both positive and negative respects", it is "the greatest lesson of the world communist movement for over half a century". They affirm that with this theory Mao had "developed in a brilliant way the Marxist-Leninist theory on class struggle and the concept of proletarian dictatorship, and had created a third great landmark in the history of Marxism development". They claim that it is the "greatest contribution", the "greatest creation" made by Mao Zedong.

To use extreme leftist revolutionary phrase to hide an extreme rightist viewpoint, a counter-revolutionary line, that is a salient characteristic of Maoism. This characteristic of course has been revealed in the so-called theory of "continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship". Here the pseudo-revolutionary character lies in such phrases as "revolution", "proletarian dictatorship" that Mao and Mao's followers used to serve objectives which have nothing to do with socialist revolution or

with the real nature and mission of proletarian dictatorship, the instrument of that revolution.

Indeed, Maoism considers proletarian dictatorship only as suppressive violence, as for its task of organizing and building — the most fundamental function of proletarian dictatorship — it is completely dropped. (See *How to Correctly Solve Contradictions Among the People* by Mao Zedong). The function of “repressing the reactionary classes and factions”, in practice, has been distorted by Mao’s followers, just as they distort the Marxist theory on class struggle in general under proletarian dictatorship and turn it into a continuous scramble for power among various factions. We do not mention the fact that, as a system of organization, a machinery, proletarian dictatorship in China is no longer proletarian dictatorship but has been turned into the power machine of the Maoist clique of traitors, who consider the “army as the mainstay of proletarian dictatorship”. In essence, it is a militarist and bureaucratic dictatorship.

Apparently, after the proletariat has seized power, class struggle does not disappear. It continues in new conditions, in new forms and of course with new contents. The proletariat must continue the class struggle in order to transform the old society, build the new one, and advance towards the final aim — to build communism, a classless society, a society without class struggle.

To achieve this, it is not enough to overthrow and suppress the exploiting, reactionary classes. There still is a task, and the most essential one. It is to transform and rebuild the whole social economy on the basis of socialist collective mastery and a modern large industry with an ever improving technical level, which ensures an unceasing development of production aimed at satisfying ever more fully the growing material and cultural needs of the people. Yet, the Maoists do not consider that task as class struggle. They speak of three movements: class struggle, struggle in production, scientific experimentation, in which “class struggle is the kingpin”. They say: “to hold

firmly the revolutionary task and step up production”.

By separating the struggle in production and scientific experimentation from the class struggle, from the revolution under proletarian dictatorship and opposing them, Maoism, in fact, does not consider the task of building socialism as class struggle while this task is in reality the most essential content of the class struggle, of the revolution under proletarian dictatorship. In the article entitled “To Carry to the End the Continuation of the Revolution under Proletarian Dictatorship” as a preface to Volume V of Mao Zedong’s Selected Works, Hua Guofeng affirms Mao Zedong’s thought as follows: “*Chairman Mao demands that we should not, even for a minute, forget the struggle, and hold firmly the task of class struggle, to do the socialist revolutionary work and the building of socialism well and step by step... Chairman Mao demands that each of us should do so; we must do so, in a firm and unbreakable way*” (*Hongqi—Red Flag—Review*, No. 5-1977).

To separate class and class struggle from the mode of production, from the definite level of development of production is entirely alien to Marxism. That is Maoism. It argues that “in the socialist society there still exist contradictions, classes and class struggle”, and from this starting point develops the theory of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship. That “starting point” is a completely abstract affirmation.

First, there are contradictions everywhere and at any time, not only under socialism.

Second, Mao and his successors want to specify that these are “contradictions between relations of production and forces of production, contradictions between the economic base and the superstructure”. Those contradictions exist in any society, not only under socialism. Even under communism those contradictions still exist.

Third, trying to be more specific, they say: these are “contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, contradiction between the capitalist road and the socialist road”. Yet this is still abstract. Indeed,

socialist society is a very long historical stage lasting from the establishment of proletarian dictatorship to communist society. In that stage, socialism has its own transition period of birth, formation, and its period of growth on the basis of its own strength, and its period of perfection and maturation in which it is turned into a communist society. How the class structure, the nature of the classes, the fate of each class have changed through those periods under the decisive influence of the changes in the forces of production and relations of production: these highly complex problems require "a concrete analysis of the concrete situation". For example, how can one imagine the bourgeoisie still existing and existing as such through all the periods of development of socialism! How can contradictions between two classes and two roads still exist and exist as such from the beginning to the end without resolving the question of "which one will win"?

In disregard of complicated historical reality, Maoism replaces the concrete by the abstract,

and causes confusion in the question of "continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship". *Maoism has distorted Marxism in all matters, yet we can say that no problem has been so confused by it as the problem of class of class struggle under proletarian dictatorship, of the so-called "continuation of revolution under proletarian dictatorship"*.

Starting from this abstract assessment, Maoism considers class struggle as an eternal phenomenon. Mao said: "Later, once imperialism has been toppled all over the world and classes have been eradicated, do you think there will still be revolution? In my opinion, there must be revolution." And he added: "In ten thousand years, there will be contradictions, struggle and revolution". (Excerpts from Introduction to Volume V of Mao Zedong's Selected Works by the Editorial Board of *Hongqi* (Red Flag) Review, No. 7, 1977).

In the report on the Amendments to the Party Constitution at the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Ye Jianying

recalled Mao's idea in 1966: "We do not know in what year communism will be realized, even if at that time imperialism has been completely toppled, and the whole world has become socialist. For, even though the bourgeoisie has been toppled, it is not completely dead. It will try, by every means, to rot the communist party".

Long live class struggle! Long live poor peasants and lower middle peasants! Since the shameful defeat of the "three red banners", its illusion of an overnight transition to communism dashed, since it has no more hope of snatching the banner of communism from the Soviet Union, Maoism has been trying to sow mistrust in the victory of communism. And when the Maoists speak of building "socialism" and "communism" in China, they do so for demagogic and deceitful purposes only.

"To continue revolution under proletarian dictatorship", in the practice of Maoism, means continuous fighting between the various factions in their scramble for power; it means

coups d'état, liquidation of one faction by another; it means "creating rebellion", "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution having the character of a great political revolution". All those ambitious schemes have been covered by sweet pseudo-revolutionary, pseudo-scientific theoretical concepts, such as "to carry to the end the class struggle under proletarian dictatorship", "to continue the revolution under proletarian dictatorship", "to forestall the revival of capitalism", "to ensure that proletarian dictatorship will never change colour", etc.

In his article entitled "To Carry to the End the Continuation of the Revolution under Proletarian Dictatorship", Hua Guofeng wrote: "In 1965, Chairman Mao put forward a scientific concept: the faction in power was taking the capitalist road within the Party, through it he pointed out the main danger of reviving capitalism, coming from the fact that the faction in power had taken the capitalist road within the Party". Hua Guofeng added: "The enemy within the fortress is the most dangerous one."

In fact, the "scientific concept" which Hua spoke about was a very confused concept that Mao had drawn from a similarly confused analysis. Mao said, for example, "You are carrying out socialist revolution and you do not know where the bourgeoisie is! It is inside the Communist party." He added: "A political party is a kind of society, a kind of political society; the first category of political societies is political parties". He also said: "There is a non-party faction within the party".

It is utter confusion! A kind of crazy dialectics. By that dialectics (which is in fact sophism), Mao and his followers have turned friends into foes, foes into friends, have turned black into white; they are inconsequent, deceitful.

Carrying out "uninterrupted revolution" in which "the battlefield is both inside and outside the party", Mao and his followers have so far overthrown three "bourgeois general headquarters": Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and the "Gang of Four". However, the fascinated

masses are exhausted and fed up with the "uninterrupted revolutions". They only want to live in peace. Partly because of mass pressure, partly because they have to concentrate on the Four Modernizations, and also in order to alleviate the contradictions within their ranks, to win the confidence of the imperialist powers, and finally to maintain their ruling position, the Beijing leadership has declared a switch from the "great chaos" policy to a "stability and unity" one, advancing towards the "great domination" policy. But will they be able to achieve "stability and unity" and realize the "great peace" policy? Hua Guofeng himself warned at the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party:

"To achieve stability and unity does not exclude class struggle. The fact that the first great proletarian cultural revolution ended successfully does not mean that class struggle is over; it does not mean the end of the continuation of revolution under proletarian dictatorship. In the whole historical stage of socialism, there still exists the struggle between

the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist one. This struggle is drawn-out, crooked, and at times even very bitter. The great political revolution with the character of a great cultural revolution must be carried out many more times. We must absolutely abide by Chairman Mao's teaching and carry on to the end the continuation of revolution under proletarian dictatorship."

III. The inevitable bankruptcy of Maoism

The history of the world working class movement since the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" was first published has never known a greater sabotage or a greater treason than Maoism. Maoism has caused disasters thousands of times more serious than any other opportunist movement or betrayal. That is because it not only controls a State, but this State happens to be the world's biggest country in population and area, a country rich in natural resources. Maoism has therefore got hold

of huge material means which have been produced by the labour of nearly one thousand million inhabitants. These means it uses to implement its anti-Marxist political programme against the Chinese people's genuine national interests, against socialism and against the forces of revolution and progress the world over.

The great disaster Maoism has wrought affects first of all the Chinese people and revolution. It has aroused and incited the mentality of great Han chauvinism among a large part of the population. And therefore it has pushed back the influence of Marxism-Leninism, of scientific socialism and proletarian internationalism in China. It has made the Chinese Communist Party and the State of proletarian dictatorship in China degenerate. Within the ruling party in China and in the present Chinese State, there certainly is an increasing number of genuine revolutionaries, genuine Marxist-Leninists. But judging from their organizational character, that Party no longer remains a Communist party, nor that State a State of proletarian dictatorship.

The whole superstructure of Chinese society has degenerated, it is no longer a socialist one. It is full of contradictions and has many elements which are still revolutionary and socialist and contains many elements and factions which are opposed to the Maoist dictatorship. But in general in that superstructure, the non-socialist, anti-socialist factor prevails.

As everyone knows, Engels pointed out the reaction of superstructure on the development of the economy. He wrote: "The reaction of the state power upon economic development can be of three kinds: it can run in the same direction, and then development is more rapid; it can oppose the line of development, in which case nowadays it will go to pieces in the long run in every great people; or it can prevent the economic development from proceeding along certain lines, and prescribe other lines. This case ultimately reduces itself to one of the two previous ones. But it is obvious that in cases two and three the political power can do great damage to the economic development and cause a great squandering of energy and material." (4)

The second and third cases mentioned by Engels apply to the Chinese People's Republic. China should have been able to make great strides along the path of economic and cultural development over the past twenty years, starting from 1958. But the continuous "great chaos" caused by Maoism has pushed China into a tragic state of affairs in all aspects of social life. According to Hua Guofeng, from 1974 to 1976, owing to "the troubles and destruction caused by the 'gang of four', China lost about 100 billion *renminbi* worth of industrial production, 28 million tons of steel, 40 billion *renminbi* of financial income and *the whole national economy was on the verge of collapse.*" (5)

So what has happened to the relations of production? Are they still socialist ones? What is the damage? Those are complicated problems which require detailed objective and scientific study. What is certain is that once the superstructure has essentially lost its socialist nature, it will inevitably have a negative effect on the infrastructure. It is impossible to

say that the economic infrastructure in China now retains its socialist nature. The relations of production there, which at one time had a socialist nature but were still fragile under the negative influence of the superstructure, are now completely deteriorating, first of all in the State sector.

We know that under genuine socialism, State ownership is the ownership of the whole people. Under capitalism there is also State ownership, but it is by no means ownership of the whole people, but ownership of the "national capitalist" in Engels' words (6). And what about China today? It would be too hasty to say that here we have also a "national capitalist", that here the bourgeoisie again controls the State and economy. However we cannot fail to make this affirmation: the present Chinese State is no longer the State of proletarian dictatorship, therefore State ownership is no longer ownership of the whole people and is in the process of deterioration. Here it is not the working people who are real masters through two forms of ownership, State and

collective; but the clique of bureaucratic militarists who are masters of the State, taking advantage of those two forms of ownership. They are getting hold of the labour force and the basic means of social production and using them for great-power hegemonic and anti-popular purposes. The voluntarist economic policy of that State is distorting the process of enlarged production, diverting it from its goal of fulfilling the requirements of the fundamental economic law of socialism, and using it to create the material base for satisfying the hegemonic needs of Maoism.

Under the rule of Maoism the socialist achievements of the Chinese working class and working people were seriously affected. Even the remaining achievements are facing the danger of total destruction. Of course it would not be true to affirm now that they have been completely destroyed. Firstly, we must clearly understand a law of development: changes in the infrastructure are slower than those in the political superstructure — the State. Secondly, the Chinese working class and people will not

allow the obvious socialist achievements to disappear overnight, these achievements are closely linked to their daily vital interests. Thirdly, the Beijing ruling clique must take the people's reaction into account, and after all they have to rely on socialism for their own existence, even though it is a kind of socialism which they are planning to destroy.

The damage caused by Maoism to the world revolution is obviously great. If the Chinese People's Republic had taken the right path these last two decades and worked shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries in the united ranks of the revolutionary forces of our times, wouldn't the face of the world be very different today? But to make such a supposition is not a correct procedure. For the detours of history taken individually are accidental, but taken as a whole they are a necessity. Lenin said: "... it is undialectical, unscientific and theoretically wrong to regard the course of world history as smooth and always in a forward

direction, without occasional gigantic leaps back." (7)

Although they have seen through the catastrophe caused by Maoism itself to the country, all the reactionaries among the Beijing rulers have to worship Maoism, because it is the general, perfect and irreplaceable symbol of their great-power nationalism and hegemonism. The needs for upholding an ideological banner, for setting up a Chinese as the "greatest Marxist-Leninist of our times" are needs organically linked with the ambition of raising China and its thousand million inhabitants to world hegemony. That is why the 11th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party reaffirmed: "To hold high and preserve the banner of Chairman Mao is not only important for the victory of the revolutionary cause in China, but also for the common destiny of the world people." (8)

Maoism can only be eliminated at the same time as great-power chauvinism, expansionism and hegemonism. That is the only course for genuine Marxist-Leninist forces, the Chinese

working class and people who have been awakened, organized and led by those forces. As for the reactionaries within the Beijing ruling circle, they cannot eliminate Maoism for the simple reason that they would thus eliminate themselves. However the country is so upset that the "lower strata" could no longer endure the situation and therefore the "higher strata" — the Beijing ruling clique — could no longer rule over the country if they did not change their rule. That is why they have brought in some changes. That is the reason why, after the 11th Party Congress there was the process of "great readjustment" in the fields of economy, culture and education, science and technology, etc. This explains why there is a shift from the strategic policy of "great chaos" to "stability and unity" and then to "great peace", why the third plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (11th legislature) "decided to end the nation-wide mass movement aimed at denouncing and criticizing Lin Biao and the "gang of four" and shift the Party's central

task and the attention of the whole people to socialist modernization." (9)

The above-mentioned developments indicate the gravity which the all-sided crisis of Maoism has reached. They also show the schemes of the present Beijing leadership who are looking for a way out of the crisis. Generally speaking, the way out they have chosen is not de-Mao-isation but to making Maoism more vital, more effective and more successful. And in trying to save Maoism, the present Beijing clique is turning it into the most reactionary doctrine.

However, turning Maoism into the most reactionary doctrine will mean to bring it deeper into crisis and lead it gradually to complete collapse. There are a lot of contradictions in the nature of Maoism. In the practice of Maoism these contradictions gradually reveal themselves, develop and sharpen. They will inevitably bring Maoism to collapse. The most fundamental of them is one between the goal and the ambitions of Maoism on the one hand and the objective laws of history on the other.

The history of China over the last few decades can be described as the history of development through the sharp antagonism between the objective law of development of Chinese society in the new era and the theory and practice of Maoism. The founding of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949 marked primarily the victory of the trend: the Chinese revolution entered the orbit of our times. This means that the democratic revolution in China advanced straight away to socialist revolution, and thus "the third way" advocated by Maoism — new democracy — was not taken. During the period from 1949 to 1957 China advanced towards socialism in conformity with the general trend of the whole socialist camp, Maoism was of course driven back by the political programme of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. From 1958 onwards, when Mao managed to impose his "general line" which replaced the line charted by the Eighth Congress (1st session), the whole Chinese economy and society entered a period of continuous trouble; the forces of production

were seriously shaken. That was at the same time a severe penalty and a violent rebuff by objective laws against the Maoist superstructure which was imbued with subjective idealism and voluntarism.

Mao and his followers so indulged in subjective idealism that they failed to understand the truth that Lenin once pointed out (by transforming the Hegelian viewpoint on the basis of materialism): "The 'objective world' pursues its own course, and man's practice, confronted by this objective world, encounters 'obstacles in the realization' of the End, even 'impossibility'..." (10)

Is it true that the Beijing ruling circle have been awakened and seen through that stubbornness of the objective world? Is it true that through accusing Lin Biao and "the gang of four" of being unrealistic, subjective, idealistic, solipstical, metaphysical, etc., they are criticizing Mao himself? The daily *Renmin Ribao* in one of its issues in June 1978, cried out: "During the past few years, whether spiritually or materially, we have in

practice tasted so much bitterness of unrealistic style! It is impossible to say that has been a useful lesson for us."

It is mincing words to say "unrealistic"! In fact, the voluntarism of Mao and his followers is tantamount not only to disregarding objective reality, but also to concocting, turning up the truth and forcing it to conform to one's will and subjective needs. The magazine "Philosophical Studies" (March 1980) denounced the "gang of four" in these words: "In a nutshell, when they needed any facts, they just concocted them, if they needed any models, they simply concocted them... all depending on their will and objective needs." Was this a criticism of the "gang of four" who had "betrayed Chairman Mao", or was it a confession of Maoism itself? Was it Maoism's self-criticism or the critique of Maoism?"

Together with theoretical criticism, there is "rectification" in practice. Emphasis is laid on "abiding by economic laws". There is stern criticism of the fact that "up to now ideology

is still persistently regarded as the primordial factor". Much has been said about distribution according to work done, about economic levers, profits, production cost, markets and planned control, etc. And on all problems. Marx and Lenin have been quoted. Once again the question is posed: is there a real process of de-Mao-isation? Especially by affirming that "practice is the only criterion of truth", by "daring" to say that "Mao Zedong Thought should still be tested in practice", does one question not only isolate "principles" but also Mao Zedong Thought as a whole?

It is not difficult to see that behind all these philosophic discussions on "practice being the only criterion of truth" there is a political argument between the different groups in Beijing. However, there is one question: is all this a contradiction between those who persist in adopting Maoism and those who stand for de-Mao-isation. Or only a contradiction between Maoist groups? It seems that the second is more likely. For of all those groups not a single one has renounced great-power

nationalism and hegemonism—the foundation and nature of Maoism.

Thus the aims and subjective ambitions of Maoism remain intact in the line of the present Beijing leadership; they obviously continue to work counter to the objective laws of development of Chinese society.

Trying to pursue more effectively their great-power chauvinistic and hegemonic aims and ambitions, the present rulers in Beijing are compelled to make changes in their methods and forms of rule. Some mistake these changes for de-Mao-isation, a return to materialism, to historical laws, to the scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism. But one must not confuse materialism and pragmatism. Pragmatism is in the end a form of idealism, of voluntarism. Through methods and forms put forward in a pragmatic spirit, the present Beijing leadership seems to be in a better position to carry out its aims and ambitions (which are also those of Maoism) and to give

the impression that it is following the correct path. *This shows that the clique of Maoist renegades within the present ruling circle are more dangerous and reactionary than the "gang of four" and Mao Zedong himself.*

They are more dangerous and reactionary because this pragmatism in pursuing its chauvinistic aims will take the Beijing leading clique deeper and deeper into reactionary bourgeois ideology and bring China closer to imperialism, and cause it to oppose socialism more openly and frenziedly. And there is an increasing danger of losing all socialist achievements made by the Chinese people. It is the pragmatism inherent in Maoism—which is being carried out by the present Beijing ruling clique, notably, the Deng Xiaoping faction—which has given Maoism very "flexible" possibilities to go from one extreme to another.

In fact, the debate on the question of "practice being the only criterion of truth" has revealed that they are moving from seeing the role of ideology as absolute to seeing practice

as absolute. This is done to such an extent that all fundamentals and principles become meaningless. And if the truth consists in considering that "it doesn't matter whether the cat's black or white so long as it catches mice" (Deng Xiaoping) then socialism and capitalism do not make any difference, as long as "modernization" can materialize, as long as China becomes a superpower and achieves hegemony. The Beijing ruling clique is following that very logic (although Hua has tactfully reminded Deng that China should be "revolutionized" before it can be "modernized"). Is it not for the purpose of becoming a power and gaining great-power hegemony that they have hurriedly sent envoys to Western capitals to ask for the money and technology necessary for carrying out the "four modernizations" (chiefly "modernization of national defence")? Is it not true that they are interested in management experiences of Yugoslavia, of the West, and even of South Korea and Taiwan? Of course, it is entirely possible and necessary to learn from capitalist experiences in management

and apply them in accordance with the principles of socialism and for the purpose of building socialism. But socialist principles and purposes have been betrayed by the Beijing leaders.

We must watch with great vigilance their emphasis on material incentives, profits, the production of commodities, markets, etc. If each of these considerations is taken separately it is difficult to see anything wrong; they even seem to be a kind of "rectification". But taken as a whole they obviously show that these economic categories have been taken as absolute. What would they lead to is easy to envisage. They blame the "gang of four" for having made many things absolute: the role of ideology, of politics, of subjective factors. But they do not criticize the "gang of four" from scientific materialist viewpoint, but from the other extreme. They make the criterion of practice into an absolute one and do the same thing with the economic factor, material incentives, etc. And both sides accuse each other of being "bourgeois-minded", of "attempting to

restore capitalism". In fact they are standing on the common ground of Maoism. However, we can add: the present Beijing ruling clique—owing to their deep rooted pragmatism—may take China to capitalism faster than the "gang of four". And this will sharpen the inherent fundamental contradiction between Maoism and the objective law of development of Chinese society.

Maoism is fundamentally antagonistic to the law of development of all history, not only Chinese history but also world history in the present era. While the "four modernizations" strategy is still able to deceive a number of people, the global strategy based on the "three-worlds" theory is finding it difficult to conceal its counter-revolutionary nature. The great-power chauvinism, expansionism and hegemonism pursued by Mao and the present Beijing ruling circle have revealed themselves most directly, clearly, blatantly and fully in the "three-worlds" theory and in the practice of Beijing's foreign policy.

In the present historical conditions when the three revolutionary currents are running high all over the world, Maoism is likely to go bankrupt chiefly because of its foreign policy. The iron law of our times inflicted on Maoism a shameful defeat in Kampuchea and dealt it a thunder blow on Vietnam's northern frontier. Heavier defeats are waiting if Maoism persists in running headlong against the law of history. The defeats in foreign policy on China's affairs have had a strong impact and will sharpen the contradiction between Maoism and the law of development of Chinese society and people. Finally, the Chinese people will decide the total collapse of Maoism.

NOTES

1. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1964, p. 154.
2. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1966, p. 150.
3. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1965, p. 482.

4. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence, Progress Publishers, Moscow, First Printing 1965, p. 422.

5. Hua Guofeng, Report on the Work of the Government at the First Session of the National Assembly (5th legislature), 26 February 1978.

6. Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 330.

7. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 22, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 310.

8. Report on Amendments to the Constitution of the Party, Ye Jianying.

9. Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (11th legislature), December, 1978.

10. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, Philosophical Notebooks, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1963, p. 214.

BEIJING'S HEGEMONIC AND EXPANSIONIST STRATEGY

PHUC CUONG

The People's Republic of China was founded 30 years ago. Thirty years is a very short period in the history of a nation and that of international relations. In that short span the world has witnessed very fundamental, deep and sudden changes in Beijing's global strategy. From an anti-imperialist revolutionary force, Beijing has become an ally of imperialism and other reactionaries against the world's people. This article is a look into the essence of these changes and an assessment of Beijing's strategy in the future.

The substance of Beijing reversing its alliances and changing its friends into foes.

During the fifties, China regarded the Soviet Union as its strategic ally, and the United States as its implacable enemy with a dyed-in-the-wool imperialistic nature. Since the late sixties Beijing has considered the Soviet Union its most dangerous foe and US imperialism its strategic ally. Following that reversal Beijing has reconsidered its position vis-à-vis all other forces: the revolutionary forces, China's former allies, became its enemies, while the reactionaries, who were its enemies, became its friends.

To explain those strategic changes and its views of friends and foes Beijing has put forward different theses and theories on quick succession. From 1963 to 1973, within a period of only ten years, it changed its analysis of fundamental contradictions and the distribution of forces in the world no fewer than three times. In 1963, in a 25-point proposal on the general line of the international communist

movement, Beijing pointed out four contradictions of the time. These are on the whole—except for certain points—conformable to the Resolutions of the Meetings of World Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and 1960. Barely six years later, in 1969, in the Resolution adopted by the Chinese Communist Party's Ninth Congress, it denied the existence of the world socialist system, regarded the Soviet Union and imperialism alike as enemies, the Soviet Union being considered the most dangerous enemy; the European socialist countries were lumped together with the capitalist countries as political regimes to be eradicated. Only China and some of its close allies were to be regarded as socialist countries. In the early seventies, Beijing put forward the "three-worlds" theory according to which the struggle of the world's people against the imperialists is a struggle against two super-powers, the Soviet Union and the USA, which are themselves contending with each other for hegemony. It ignores the class struggle in the world in the period of transition from

capitalism to socialism. It only speaks of nationalism and considers itself a member of the Third World. It calls upon the latter, which includes medium, small and poor countries to unite with the Second World, which includes in its view the socialist as well as the small, medium and rich capitalist countries, to cooperate with one superpower—the USA—in a world front against the Soviet Union.

In fact, Beijing's 1969 thesis marked a fundamental turning-point in its strategy, the "three-worlds" theory put forward in the early seventies being only a more polished form. The core of the problem is that it has renounced its class stand and fallen into the mire of bourgeois nationalism. It no longer distinguishes socialism from imperialism, regards the Soviet Union as its enemy and considers the USA its ally. It no longer distinguished the Asian, African and Latin American countries struggling against imperialism and colonialism from the reactionary administrations subservient to imperialism in the Asian, African and Latin American countries. It renounces its

anti-imperialist objective and puts forward the anti-hegemonic thesis. It views the struggle going on in the world as one waged for hegemony between the two superpowers. Under the pretext of struggling against Soviet hegemony, it colludes with imperialism and supports the reactionary forces against the revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Since 1973, it has brazenly supported Pinochet's dictatorship against the Chilean people, the South African racists and other reactionaries against the Angolan revolution, Mobutu in Zaire, the Somali administration against the Ethiopian revolution, the Egyptian administration against the Arab and Palestinian peoples, the tyrant Pahlevi; it has opposed the Afghan revolution and supported the dictator Somoza in Nicaragua... It has impudently used Pol Pot—Ieng Sary clique, which is condemned by the whole of mankind, against the Kampuchean and Vietnamese peoples. Worst of all, it has staged an armed invasion of Vietnam. By attacking a country which stands as a symbol of struggle for

independence and freedom, the Beijing reactionaries have put down their mask of sham revolutionaries and revealed themselves as extremely dangerous reactionaries who oppose peace, national independence, democracy and socialism. Beijing's aggression against Vietnam came as a surprise to many. Yet, if put in the context of Beijing's reversal of its alliances, it is perfectly understandable.

Not only has Beijing reversed its alliances in the world, it has acted in the same way in the power struggle which has been going on within China itself.

From 1935 to 1977 continuous and violent purges and coups took place within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Even at present no one can forecast an end to those reversals of alliances.

Although the Beijing ruling circles' alliances constantly change, the objective of their counter-revolutionary global strategy remains the same. Over the past 30 years, their invariable strategy has been hegemonism and expansionism. In the first eight years of the People's

Republic of China, their hegemonic and expansionist aim was not fully uncovered. Their thesis was that the road of the Chinese revolution should be followed by the Asian, African and Latin American countries. However, with regard to Vietnam, Beijing's hegemonism and expansionism clearly revealed itself at an early stage. After their Dien Bien Phu victory, the Vietnamese people were in a position to completely liberate Vietnam. In fact the people of all three Indochinese countries were in a position to liberate their respective countries. France was doomed to defeat because the French colonialists were exhausted and the United States had decided not to intervene militarily. During the last years of the war of resistance against French colonialism, China was Vietnam's main supplier of weapons. In this conjuncture, France directly negotiated with China at the 1954 Geneva Conference for a solution which would be profitable to both France and China but detrimental to Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries. With regard to Vietnam, France and China agreed

on a Korean-style solution, that is a cease-fire and a partition of Vietnam into two zones. The political status quo was to be maintained, in other words Vietnam was to be kept divided for a long time. Both sides also agreed to recognize the Kingdoms of Laos and Kampuchea, that is to liquidate the gains of the wars of resistance conducted by the Lao and Khmer peoples. Only after reaching an agreement with China on basic issues did France negotiate with Vietnam on the concrete provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Beijing did not want the revolutionary forces in Vietnam and Indochina as a whole to win complete victory and their strength to increase, nor did it want the weakened French colonialists to withdraw from Indochina to be replaced by the imperialist ringleader — the United States. Beijing's aim was to maintain weak and contending forces in Indochina.

In the late fifties and early sixties, Beijing voiced its "determination" to oppose the United States and "revisionism" in an attempt to lower the Soviet Union's prestige while

clamouring that China was "the centre of the world revolution". Together with those political designs, it put forward an ambitious plan for a "great leap forward" which would allow China to outstrip the United States within a short period.

Starting in the mid-sixties, Beijing loudly boasted that Mao Zedong's thought was the apex of Marxism-Leninism, that it was Marxism in the era of the death of imperialism and victory for proletarian revolution. Throughout the world it worked for the founding of pro-Beijing organizations with a view to imposing Maoism upon the world revolutionary movement while sabotaging Communist parties everywhere.

In the early seventies, the United States found itself bogged down in its war of aggression against Vietnam and seriously weakened while the Soviet Union's economy and national defence were strengthened, and the world revolutionary movement made new progress, particularly in the Middle and Near East and in Latin America. An urgent strategic

requirement for Nixon was to withdraw US troops from Vietnam while maintaining the puppet regime in South Vietnam, to try to weaken the Soviet Union and to oppose the world revolutionary movement. Availing itself of its position in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in the Vietnamese people's war of resistance against US aggression, Beijing sought to advance its hegemonic and expansionist interests by playing the anti-Soviet card and trying to pressure Vietnam into accepting a solution favourable to Nixon. For his part, Nixon played the Chinese card to further US strategic interests. Thus a détente between China and the United States took shape, while China emerged as a third world power, eliminating the bipolarity which had existed since the end of the Second World War and establishing a tripolar situation in the world. At the same time, Beijing signed with the United States and Japan treaties which included a clause against hegemonism. Everybody knows that the United States and Japan are imperialist countries which have

attacked and sought to dominate other countries and that their imperialist nature has not changed in the least. Together with the signing of those treaties Beijing has called upon the United States not to withdraw its troops from Asia. It is crystal clear that the anti-hegemonic clause contained in Beijing's treaties with the imperialist countries means in fact its collusion with them in maintaining their domination and opposing the revolutionary movement, first of all the peoples of Asian countries.

Since 1975, Beijing has set for itself the objective of building China into a power which would outstrip all others by the end of this century, and since 1978 it has worked out a "four-modernizations" programme to achieve this objective.

Together with economic construction, Beijing has striven to build its strategic nuclear force since 1953. The nuclear weapons industry, being the only branch unaffected by the cultural revolution, strongly developed during that period. China developed its first atomic bomb

in 1964, its first hydrogen bomb in 1967 and its first space satellite in 1970. At present, China is the only Asian power besides the Soviet Union to have a strategic nuclear force.

While striving to build its economic and military forces and to become a world power, Beijing has made territorial claims. It regards as part of Chinese territory the East Sea up to the territorial waters of Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. It puts out territorial claims against nearly all its neighbours, occupying Vietnam's Hoang Sa (Paracels) Islands and considering to be within its sphere of influence those countries in Southeast Asia formerly under Chinese imperial tutelage.

Beijing's present ambitions of hegemony and expansion are the continuation of the hegemonism and expansionism of the Chinese feudal class in the past millennia and of the Chinese bourgeoisie in more recent times.

Its policy of alliances in the world is but a means to achieve its strategic objective of hegemonism and expansionism. However, in order

to serve this unchanging objective, Beijing's policy of alliances has had to undergo changes. For Beijing it does not matter whether it is to ally itself with the revolutionary forces or with the imperialists and the reactionaries. The most important thing in its eyes is great-power nationalism.

The reasons for Beijing's reversal of alliances

Generally speaking, over the past thirty years, the countries in the world have not changed their policy of alliances in any essential way, except for those who have changed their political regimes and consequently their strategic objectives in their external relations. For 60 years, the Soviet Union's policy of alliances has not changed; it remains a policy of alliance with the revolutionary forces against imperialism. On the other hand, the policy of the USA in the past 30 years has been to ally itself with the imperialist countries and the reactionary forces against the Soviet Union and

the revolutionary forces in the world. For its part, Beijing's policy of alliances in the past 30 years has undergone many deep changes. Here are the reasons:

First, Beijing's hegemonic and expansionist interests basically and in the long run clash with the interests of all countries. But within a given period, they may be in temporary agreement with those of some countries and at variance with those of others. Therefore, Beijing cannot have any long-standing allies but only temporary ones. In the fifties, when hegemonism and expansionism were not yet the dominant trait of their foreign policy, the Beijing ruling circles' interests basically fitted in with those of their allies — the socialist countries and the world revolutionary forces; on the contrary, their interests basically contradicted those of imperialism — China's enemy. Starting in the late fifties, when hegemonism and expansionism had become the dominant tendency in Beijing's foreign policy, its interests began to clash with those of its revolutionary allies. Since the late sixties, when Beijing's hegemonism and

expansionism had vigorously developed, its interests were in acute contradiction with those of its allies and paralleled those of imperialism. Since the late seventies, Beijing's hegemonic and expansionist interests have become strongly opposed to those of the world's people and closely tied to those of imperialism.

Second, Beijing's hegemonic and expansionist ambitions are out of proportion with China's very limited economic, political and military capabilities. This important contradiction cannot be solved within a short time. Beijing's immense ambitions spring from China's particular historical conditions: China is one of the cradles of human civilization; for thousands of years the Chinese feudal class regarded China as the centre of the world and carried out a policy of hegemonism and expansionism with regard to Asia and the lands bordering on the Indian ocean; China's population accounts for one-fourth of the world population; China is the only Asian power having a strategic nuclear force; the victory of the Chinese revolution constituted a strong encouragement for the Asian,

African and Latin American countries. However, China's capabilities are limited: although it has great economic potentials, its economy is still very backward; although it ranks seventh in the world in gross national product, it belongs to the developing (i. e. less developed) countries in per capita national income; in politics, China is continually rent by power struggles; its military forces have only a defensive capability; their capacity for large-scale offensive beyond Chinese borders is limited. Both economically and militarily, China lags far behind the Soviet Union and the United States. It cannot rely on its own forces to achieve its ambitions. And so it has to make use of any favourable opportunities in the world to carry out its hegemonic and expansionist aims.

Third, Beijing is deploying its strategy of hegemonism and expansionism while in the world two world systems have taken shape with the Soviet Union and the United States far outstripping China in the economic and military fields. In the absence of a world war, China cannot fulfil its ambition of surpassing

the Soviet Union and the United States by the end of this century. This dream will only come true if war breaks out between the Soviet Union and the United States, resulting in the destruction of most of their economic and military forces. Beijing, having stayed out of the war, can rapidly become the first world power. Beijing views with hostility any détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, and strives to undermine relations between these countries. Beijing's thesis is that the world is dominated by the contention for hegemony between the Soviet Union and the United States, that all-out war between these two countries is unavoidable, and that the risk is mounting of a third world war breaking out.

In the fifties, Beijing allied itself with the Soviet Union against the United States. This was due first of all to the US policy of hostility to China, seeking to encircle it militarily and economically, and isolate it politically. Beijing's alliance with the Soviet Union was aimed at getting Soviet help to defend China's peace and

security, and build its economy and national defence. For its part, the Soviet Union has always looked for allies in the protracted struggle against imperialism, in the interest of socialism in the Soviet Union and the world. Beijing hoped that its alliance with the Soviet Union and its revolutionary cloak would allow it to rally Asian, African and Latin American forces under its leadership. It also sought to undermine Soviet-US relations and sharpen contradictions between them. While siding with the Soviet Union against the United States, Beijing nevertheless tried to reach a compromise with the latter. It agreed to a cease-fire in Korea and a lasting partition of this country. In the mid-fifties, Beijing and the United States started negotiations in Warsaw. At the same time, Beijing prevented Vietnam and Laos from carrying out armed struggle in southern Vietnam and Laos for it did not want a war against the United States close to its border.

Since the late sixties, US imperialism was bogged down in its war of aggression against Vietnam, and was weakened both at home and

in the world. In the early seventies, capitalism entered a serious and protracted economic crisis from which it found no way out while the Soviet Union's might was on the increase and the world revolutionary movement vigorously developed everywhere. The United States found it necessary to play the Chinese card in order to prop up the puppet regime in southern Vietnam, oppose the world revolutionary movement and weaken the Soviet Union. At the same time it hoped that China's immense market could help solve the capitalist economic crisis. In the fifties and up to the mid-sixties, Beijing had failed in its attempt to use sham revolution to conquer leadership of the revolutionary movement, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Since the late sixties, the world revolutionary movement vigorously developed and directly threatened its hegemonic and expansionist interests in the world. Beijing also wanted to avail itself of the capitalist economic crisis to impel China's "four-modernizations" programme. It is obvious that the

interests of Beijing and US imperialism agree in many ways: first of all both seek to oppose the world revolutionary movement and the Soviet Union. Beijing also has an interest in undermining relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It maintains relations with the Soviet Union and uses the card of improved relations with the latter to bring pressure to bear upon the United States.

Fourth. Beijing is deploying its strategy of hegemonism and expansionism at a time when the three revolutionary currents are vigorously developing. Since the end of the Second World War, the world socialist system has taken shape. It vigorously develops with every passing day and exerts a decisive impact upon the development of human society. The national liberation movement throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America has brought about a serious crisis for neo-colonialism. The three revolutionary currents are allies of the Soviet Union in the struggle against the United States. At the

same time their existence is a source of weakness for the latter. Since the mid-fifties and into the sixties, Beijing strove to conquer leadership of the world revolutionary movement and a position of strength in the world. It tried to weaken the Soviet Union, undermine relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and use the world revolutionary movement as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the United States. In 1971, Beijing made a treacherous deal with the United States behind the Vietnamese people's back. This betrayal raised China to the status of third world power and created a tripolar situation in the world to replace the previous bipolarity. Beijing's treachery enabled the United States to procrastinate in its negotiations with Vietnam until 1973 and encouraged it to blockade Hai Phong port and send B.52 strategic bombers to attack Hanoi in 1972. However, Beijing has failed to conquer leadership of the world revolutionary movement because its hegemonic and expansionist interests clash with those of the world's people which

consist in uniting all revolutionary forces in the world against imperialism. Beijing wants to oust the Soviet Union and divide the world revolutionary movement so as to monopolize its leadership. Although Beijing's betrayal caused many difficulties to the Vietnamese people, it cannot prevent them from completely liberating their country in 1975, thus eliminating one of the bases for compromise between the United States and Beijing.

An outstanding characteristic of the world situation after the Second World War is the very rapid tempo of development and the deep qualitative changes as compared with the pre-war years. After the war, the United States became the mightiest imperialist country, stronger than all the other imperialist ones put together. It accounts for half the total world industrial production and possessed nuclear monopoly. However, 20 years later US imperialism found itself seriously weakened and was defeated in a local war, its war of aggression against Vietnam. The revolutionary movement has vigorously developed even

in the backyard of imperialism. The balance of forces has changed in favour of the revolutionary forces. Not only has Beijing been unable to use the world revolutionary movement as a bargaining chip in dealing with US imperialism, but the world revolutionary movement has developed on a scale that threatens Beijing's hegemonic and expansionist interests, particularly in Asia in the seventies. Hence Beijing's thoroughly hostile policy with regard to Vietnam immediately after its people completely liberated and reunified their country. Owing to Beijing's and the United States' concordant interests in opposing the world revolutionary movement, Beijing has played the card of opposing revolution, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Vietnam in order to win assistance from imperialism for its "four modernizations". This explains why Beijing has called upon the United States not to withdraw its troops from Asia. 1979 marks a setback for the collusion between Beijing and the United States. This collusion failed to save the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, to prevent the

collapse of the tyrant in Iran and that of Somoza in Nicaragua, to help Carter secure separate sham peace in the Middle and Near East as well as a compromise in Southern Africa...

Fifth, Beijing's reversal of alliances in the world is closely linked to the fierce and bloody inner struggle in China. Its internal power struggles are closely tied to its policy of hegemonism and expansionism abroad.

In the fifties, Beijing's policy of alliances in the world fitted in with the trend of the world revolution. At home, the political situation was basically stable and the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party took certain measures against the personality cult of Mao Zedong. Unlike the Party Rules passed at the Seventh Congress (1945), those passed at the Eighth Congress (1956) did not take Mao Zedong's thought as the Party's ideological basis. In this period, the Beijing authorities' interests were basically in agreement with those of the world revolution, because US imperialism was carrying out a policy thoroughly

hostile to China, seeking to isolate it while launching two wars on its borders: the Korean war and the Indochinese war. However, there already were some manifestations of great-power chauvinism in the policies pursued by Beijing. After the Dien Bien Phu victory was won by the Vietnamese revolution Beijing colluded with France behind the back of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea with a view to halting the revolution in Indochina, while creating there a situation favourable to Beijing by maintaining weak contending forces. Beijing had one million Chinese volunteers fighting in Korea, yet it had to accept a cease-fire on the 38th parallel and recognize the political status quo. There was in the armistice agreement no clause on Korea's eventual reunification, and its partition was thus perpetuated.

In the late fifties, Beijing initiated a "big leap forward" with the ambition of outstripping the United States within a short period. At the same time it put forward "revolutionary" slogans calling for thorough "opposition" to the United States and "revisionism". The

aim was to muster forces throughout the world and lower the Soviet Union's prestige with the hope of conquering leadership of the world revolution and turning China into the centre of this revolution.

From 1965 to 1969 China was the scene of a "cultural revolution", in fact a very fierce and bloody contention for personal power. In 1967 and 1968, in many Chinese provinces protracted armed conflicts broke out involving the use of heavy weapons, planes, warships and tanks. According to Western news reports those military clashes caused the death of five million people. Tens of thousands of high-ranking cadres of the Party, the administration and the Army were jailed. The Communist Party and its mass organizations were scattered. It was a true military coup through which the reactionary clique in the Beijing ruling circles seized power in China, and eliminated the revolutionaries and other opponents. At the same time, in the international arena Beijing stepped up the formation of pro-Beijing reactionary groups which frenziedly opposed the communist

parties, particularly in the Western countries. It also spurred pro-Beijing parties to wage armed struggle in Kampuchea, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma and the Philippines with the motto "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun". It should be noted that in 1965 Beijing helped their clients conduct a military coup in Indonesia. As a result of the "cultural revolution" in China, the Chinese Communist Party was wiped out and the international Communist movement split.

The "cultural revolution" marked a turning-point in China's political life. It opened up a period of deep political crisis lasting many years. It also signalled a turning-point in Beijing's foreign policy: the Soviet Union, from a strategic ally, became the number one enemy, while the United States, formerly the main enemy, became a very important ally. It is clear that after wiping out the Chinese Communist Party, causing ideological and political confusion at home and sabotaging the world Communist movement, the Beijing

ruling circles now proceeded to reverse their alliances in the world.

Mao's death led to the elimination of "the gang of four" and the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping and other high-ranking cadres who had been jailed during the "cultural revolution." In 1978, Beijing put forward a "four-modernizations" programme while stepping up its collusion with the United States and opposition to the Soviet Union and the world revolutionary movement. The aim was to win US and Western assistance in capital and technology. The Beijing ruling clique's reactionary line after Mao's death shows that the in-fighting going on among the Beijing leaders is but a struggle for personal power. There is only a difference in degree in their devotion to the strategy of hegemonism and expansionism.

Beijing's strategic manœuvres

Beijing's strategy and activities resemble those of the imperialists and other reactionaries

because it pursues similar objectives: to dominate other countries, acting against the interests of the peoples of other countries and even the Chinese people. Beijing aims to *exploit contradictions between its opponents and other countries; it practises deception and blackmail, it subverts foreign governments and tries to set up stooge administrations and vassal States, and to use the stick and carrot policy.*

It is clear that Beijing's ambitions are great but its economic and military strength is limited. While Beijing is pursuing its hegemonic and expansionist ambitions, the three revolutionary currents are sweeping across the whole world. So, China does not have many opportunities to use stooges and vassals or practise a stick-and-carrot policy – the main policy wielded by the other imperialists. So Beijing has to resort mainly to the use of contradictions to split countries apart. But its tactics may change if China manages to increase its military strength or if the world revolutionary movement falls into difficulties.

One can see this policy of *exploiting contradictions* in China's attitude to relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Chinese hope for a major war between these two powers is unrealistic, however. As the Soviet Union is a socialist country, war is alien to its nature. War is, on the other hand, bound up with imperialism and hence is in the nature of an imperialist country like the United States. But at present, US imperialism is being torn by a serious crisis of capitalism with no way out: if it was rash enough to start a world war, imperialism would be wiped off the face of the earth. Moreover, in view of the tempestuous development of the three revolutionary currents in the world imperialism can no longer rule the roost as it did in the past 30 years.

Part of the policy of the Chinese rulers at home and abroad is *deceit and blackmail*.

In the late fifties and sixties, China was most vociferous against imperialism and "revisionism". It was ultra-leftist in the latter

half of the sixties, but soon after took a reactionary line, colluding with the imperialists and sabotaging the world revolutionary movement. In the seventies, it has exposed its reactionary nature. Since 1958, it has called on the world people to wage a "tit for tat" struggle against the United States and "revisionism", but has not practised as it preaches. In 1958, it withdrew Chinese volunteers from Korea to avoid a showdown with the United States. On its southern border, it did not want an armed conflict between the Indochinese revolutionary forces and the United States. It advised Vietnamese leaders not to carry out armed struggle in South Vietnam although the Americans and Diem had massacred over 500,000 people. It also advised the Pathet Lao not to wage armed struggle and to return to a coalition government although the Pathet Lao leaders had been arrested and jailed by the Vientiane administration and half of their armed forces had been disarmed and disbanded. Yet at the same time, it strongly criticized the notion of peaceful transition. While condemning the Soviet-

US talks, it stepped up the Sino-US negotiations in Warsaw. From the middle to late sixties, China advised Vietnam to let the anti-US war drag on and fight to the bitter end, opposing Vietnam's search for a shortcut to victory through negotiation. Meanwhile, both China and the United States tried to avoid a military clash between them. US general Taylor assessed things in this way: China is determined to fight the United States to the last Vietnamese. Since the seventies, China has strongly opposed the Soviet Union. Western opinion thus rightly noted: China is resolved to fight the Soviet Union to the last Western European.

Beijing's home policy may shed light on its two-faced foreign policy. The slogan of great cultural revolution masked one of the most savage and bloody power struggles in Chinese history, with a probable death toll of 5 million. Different leaders got rid of each other by making charges of being "capitalist roaders". Various figures thus fell from grace or were rehabilitated. And by the same brutal and

slandrous manoeuvres they went at other countries.

Since the seventies, China's thesis has been that there are two superpowers which should be opposed; that one should oppose both Soviet and US hegemonisms. But China has signed anti-hegemonic clauses with the United States and Japan. By so doing, China has put a veneer on their imperialist nature and deceived the world's people. The principal purpose of this collusion has been to oppose the USSR. "Anti-hegemonism" has not prevented China from calling on the United States not to withdraw its troops from Asia the aim being to maintain US military occupation against the interest of the Asian peoples or criticizing the United States for its weakness in accepting revolutionary Cuba on its doorstep. Immediately after the signature of these clauses, China invaded Vietnam and made serious affronts to Laos's independence and sovereignty. The Beijing rulers echoed the threats of the US in its role as international gendarme - saying that they were punishing Vietnam and

teaching it a lesson and boisterously brandished a military umbrella allegedly to protect South-east Asian countries. Clearly, China's professed militant anti-hegemonism is a cover for its own hegemonic and expansionist aims; China may claim now to be the protector of Southeast Asia but it did not fulfil its pledge of 1965 to defend Hanoi with its airforce; in 1971 China also stood idle when its close ally Pakistan was defeated in a war with India and compelled to accept the establishment of Bangladesh as a State; in 1979, China also failed to save the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique—its zealous stooges — from total collapse.

Beijing is doing its utmost to carry out its policy of hegemonism and expansionism, but the wolf wants to disguise itself as a lamb. China claims membership of the Third World, understanding by this small and middle-sized poor countries. Yet China's new alliance with imperialism is completely opposed to the Third World's interests. Beijing's ideologues justify China's policies with alluring political and philosophical theories based on

metaphysical or specious arguments. They try to win over the middle strata and exploit the success of the movement for national independence by ultra-leftism and bourgeois nationalism. The "three-worlds" theory calls for struggle against the hegemonism of the two superpowers, interpreting all events in international affairs as the result of rivalry between the superpowers. This theory is used to try and divert the struggle of African, Asian and Latin American countries against imperialism for their cause of peace and national independence, and turn their efforts against the Soviet Union. These theories and theses are a complete distortion of the real state of affairs in the world. Moreover, the line twists and turns from year to year. What Beijing condemned as revisionism in the sixties is precisely what it praised in the seventies. In the early seventies, Chinese ideologues were reduced to inventing the "world chaos" theory to give some credibility to the bewilderingly sudden policy changes.

Although Beijing's economic and military capabilities are still limited, it has agents operating in other countries to promote its hegemonism and expansionism, that is why *internal subversion* is one of its main strategies.

In Southeast Asia, Beijing makes use of the large numbers of overseas Chinese, who control much of the economy in many Southeast Asian countries; and of the fairly strong pro-Chinese parties. It also tries to use the minority peoples whose territories straddle its borders. Beijing has often used Chinese residents to oppose the administrations of Southeast Asian countries, particularly during the "cultural revolution" period. Most noteworthy was the Hoà affair using people of Chinese origin in Vietnam: a prelude to the Chinese aggression. It has helped pro-Chinese parties in attempted coups d'état in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia in 1965. It supported the 1970 Lon Nol coup against Sihanouk in Kampuchea. In Laos, it aided several groups and built up a pro-Beijing party in order to overthrow the

leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party.

Beijing has used chieftains of national minorities existing on both sides of the border to lead armed forces against the regimes of several countries including India, Burma, Laos and Vietnam.

These Beijing's henchmen have sanctuaries in China. They are also trained and have radio stations there. Whenever they get into difficulty, they withdraw to China for safety and rest.

Beijing's coordinates its subversion with military, political and economic pressure against Southeast Asian governments.

Another strategy of Beijing is to practise *neo-colonialism*: to set up puppet administrations and vassal States. After the collapse of old-style colonialism, Beijing's hegemonism and expansionism have to take this form. US imperialism has made use of the national liberation struggle against old-style colonialism to drive other powers out of their colonies and, claiming to support independence, replaced colonialism with US neo-colonialism. In the fifties and

sixties, the Beijing rulers took up the cudgels from the US in supporting the struggle of the African, Asian and Latin American countries against colonialism with the aim of using these countries as pawns in their own expansionism. As part of its political scheme, Beijing extended economic and military aid to a number of countries, put advisers in key positions in the economic, political and military apparatuses, and sent road-builders to get down to grass-roots units. This was to make these regimes depend on China. During the past 30 years China never accepted the idea of a unified Vietnam, wanting, like the imperialists, to maintain partition indefinitely. China tried to gain a monopoly in aid. In 1964, it pressurized Vietnam to take only Chinese aid and reject Soviet aid. After Kampuchea was freed from US tutelage, China monopolized aid to the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. It exploited any contradiction between peoples to separate countries: the old imperialist trick of "divide and rule". Hostile to the solidarity between the three Indochinese countries, the Beijing rulers have

constantly been on the look-out for ways to prise them apart. Since 1965, they used the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique to undermine the solidarity between the Indochinese countries in the war against US aggression. Since 1975, they used the same clique to launch a war against the Vietnamese and Lao peoples. In Southeast Asia, they used to use the Indochinese countries as a base to attack other countries in the region, but since the seventies they won over the other Southeast Asian countries and turned them against the Indochinese nations. In South Asia, they befriended India's neighbours and pitted them against India. In Africa, they supported Somalia against Ethiopia. Within each country, Beijing played several cards at the same time with a view to winning control of that country. In many Southeast Asian countries, while trying to win over their governments, they continued to use pro-Beijing parties and Chinese residents to bring pressure to bear on those administrations. In Kampuchea, in the early seventies Beijing had five irons in the fire at once: Sihanouk,

the Pol Pot—Ieng Sary clique, Lon Nol, Son Sann and the Chinese residents.

Over the years the Beijing reactionaries have made many efforts to set up puppet administrations. There were many failures; the greatest success being Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.

Beijing's *stick and carrot policy* resorts to threats as well as bribery. Its ability to carry out such threats is limited. However, China's vast population allows it to maintain a huge army and this intimidates some of its neighbours. As soon as the People's Republic of China was set up, China embarked upon building strategic nuclear forces as a big stick to its hegemonic and expansionist policy. China's nuclear weapons are not meant to threaten other nuclear powers, for China ranks only fifth in the world nuclear club, but mainly to dominate other Asian countries. But China's recent war of aggression against Vietnam has revealed the weak points of the stick with which China is threatening the other Asian countries.

China's aid to abroad lags far behind that of other countries both in quantity and quality,

and fails to meet the requirements of Asian, African and Latin American economies. That is why it is extended to only a selected handful of countries. To gain a monopoly of aid to the countries it has chosen and to compensate for the weaknesses of its aid, China lays down easier conditions than most countries, while advising the recipient nation to be self-reliant. In the economic field China advises its protégés to make agriculture the basis of their national economies and build industry only on a small and medium scale; in military affairs it preaches people's war.

Chinese aid has a deceptive allure but when China cuts off aid to Vietnam and Albania, many countries realized Beijing's political motives behind the aid.

Where will Beijing's strategy lead

The following points should be considered in connection with Beijing's future strategy:

— Beijing looks forward to a large-scale war between the United States and the Soviet Union. China hopes to take advantage of these countries'

mutual defeat to emerge as the strongest power in the world;

— At present, China ranks seventh in the world as regards industrial production. According to experts' calculations, with favourable conditions China can climb to fifth place, and perhaps third place at best.

— Beijing has suffered heavy setbacks in its foreign adventures and has been weakened by internal disorders as shown in developments over the past 20 years, hence its major failures in implementing the "four modernizations" programme.

— Major setbacks may lead to changes in the political line or leadership of China.

To assess possibilities for the future, let us assess Beijing's successes and failures so far in implementing its hegemonic and expansionist strategy.

Thirty years have just elapsed since the People's Republic of China was founded. In its first eight years (1949—1957) hegemonism and expansionism were not yet in the forefront of

Chinese policy. Hence the great victories in the home and foreign affairs by the Chinese people. The prestige of the People's Republic of China in the world was very high, although some manifestations of hegemonism and expansionism had already appeared. In the following 22 years (1958—1979) hegemonism and expansionism moved into prominence to become Beijing's main objective but with many setbacks occurred on the way. From the late fifties to the late sixties, strong allegations against US imperialism and "revisionism" followed by ultra-left proclamations temporarily deceived a section of the middle strata and a number of African, Asian and Latin American countries. That is Beijing's greatest victory so far. However, Beijing failed to reach its strategic aim of drawing the entire world revolutionary force into the orbit of its hegemonism and expansionism and make China a match with the Soviet Union and the United States. Between 1970 and 1979 Beijing's policy turned openly reactionary by colluding with imperialism against the world revolutionary movement. In

particular, the recent war of aggression against Vietnam exposed Beijing's reactionary nature and tore off its revolutionary mask. Maoism fell into complete discredit in the eyes of the world. Solidarity within the international Communist movement and the world revolutionary movement was strengthened. Another great setback was that Beijing's hegemonism and expansionism were driven out of the Indochinese countries which were intended to serve as the main base for expansion into Southeast Asia. However, the greatest setback in the past 22 years has been that the reactionary foreign policy and the struggle for power between reactionary cliques seriously weakened the People's Republic of China economically and militarily, confused it ideologically and split it politically. The recent aggression against Vietnam has helped bring about a serious leadership crisis. China's failure to build its economic, political and military might has sharpened the contradiction between its over-ambitious hegemonism and expansionism, and its too limited strength.

The reasons for the great setbacks of Beijing's hegemonism and expansionism in the past 22 years are as follows:

Beijing developed this strategy at a time when the three revolutionary currents were sweeping through the world, old colonialism had collapsed and neo-colonialism had fallen into grave crisis, imperialism was weakening. Clearly enough, this hegemonism and expansionism had become outdated and Beijing is meeting with the same fate as imperialism.

Beijing's strategy has been running counter to the Chinese people's interests. It has caused countless difficulties for the Chinese people. Life was already hard but the reactionary clique of rulers have been using an important part of the national income to build up a strategic nuclear force, to help the Pinochet reactionaries, to prop up Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and other reactionaries against the peoples of various countries, and to wage wars of aggression against neighbouring countries. The Beijing reactionaries tried to hide the war against

Vietnam from the Chinese people because this war flouted the Chinese people's interests.

Beijing's ambitions are exceedingly great but China's political, economic and military strength is limited. During the past 22 years, this contradiction has not only remained unsettled but has in fact been sharpened by Beijing's foreign adventures and internal disorders.

Beijing is colluding with imperialism against the world revolutionary movement and particularly against the Soviet Union. It hopes to rely on imperialism to carry out the "four modernizations". The imperialists hope to "play the China card" against the world revolutionary movement and weaken the Soviet Union. Events of recent years have illustrated that Beijing's collusion with the imperialists will fail to change the balance of forces in the world and cannot reverse the unstoppable progress of the three revolutionary currents in the world. Even in Asia where US-China collusion can have the most direct effect developments in Indochina, Afghanistan, Iran and the

Middle and Near East show that the China card does not give the result expected by the imperialists. The imperialists keep using it, but their illusions to use it to defeat the world revolutionary movement and for weakening the Soviet Union have been exploded. On the other hand, they probably want a strong China but not one which will threaten their interests in Asia and the world. With the Beijing rulers following a policy of hegemonism and expansionism, a China of 1,000 million people achieving "four modernizations" will become an inconceivable threat to the imperialist countries. That is why 1978 and early 1979 witnessed a rush of imperialist countries to Beijing, but after Beijing's war of aggression against Vietnam, the imperialists are having second thoughts about playing the China card.

What have caused the past failure of Beijing's strategy will also decisively affect the course of Beijing's future strategy.

Today, favourable conditions for the materialization of Beijing's ambitions are disintegrating steadily. China's economic, political

and military strength was strongest between 1950 and 1957, and its present position in these fields is not good. This is particularly due to the disorder brought about by the lingering effects of the "cultural revolution", the "credibility gap", the leadership crisis, above all the war of aggression against Vietnam. The possibility of carrying out the "four modernizations" by the end of this century has become dimmer and dimmer. The 1976-1985 plan in which the "four modernizations" were embodied was cut by 30%. Over the past three decades, Beijing's prestige and its ability to deceive people and win over allies reached its peak in the span extending from the fifties to the mid-sixties. However, since the seventies, Beijing has thrown off its revolutionary mask and its prestige and ability to deceive have reached rock bottom since the aggression against Vietnam. Soviet-US relations were also most strained during the cold war of the fifties and sixties. Now the Soviet Union is much stronger; while the United States is sinking deeper into a serious, drawn-out and issueless

crisis. Soviet-US relations are characterised by both struggle and détente. The imperialists nurture many illusions about the China card, but the developments in many parts of the world prove that it cannot reverse the trend of the world revolution. Beijing has suffered a serious defeat in its policy of collusion with imperialism. Beijing's setback in Indochina (which it regards as its backyard) is the greatest one yet for its hegemonism and expansionism.

The British and French imperialists were weakened in two world wars and fell from world powers to European powers. US imperialism then became the mightiest imperialist power. However, the US apogee has only lasted 20 years. Since the sixties, the United States has been weakened, because of the general crisis of capitalism, the growth of the three revolutionary currents, and particularly by its war of aggression against Vietnam.

Like imperialism, Beijing's hegemonism and expansionism is meeting with increasing difficulties. It can be affirmed that China will not

be able to implement the "four modernizations" and become the world's number-one power by the end of this century. It could also suffer setbacks at home and abroad as it has in the past 20 years. Beijing may continue to indulge in great ambitions and dangerous adventures, although internal and external conditions are becoming ever less favourable. However, the more obstinate it is, the greater its setbacks will be.

In the immediate term, there is no possibility as yet of the serious failures Beijing has suffered at home and abroad leading to major changes in its line and leadership. But we believe that the Chinese people will certainly rise up and overthrow their reactionary rulers, for the Chinese people have a tradition of revolutionary struggle, for our time is a time of transition from capitalism to socialism, a time of collapse of imperialism and liquidation of colonialism, a time of victory for socialism and communism throughout the world.

APPENDIX

**THE TRUTH ABOUT VIETNAM —
CHINA RELATIONS OVER THE
LAST THIRTY YEARS**

*Abridged version of the White Book of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

How can we explain the sudden change of Beijing's policy towards Vietnam, manifested in recent years by acts of open hostility culminating in the February-March 1979 war of aggression?

This change is but the reflection of a world-wide strategy which the Chinese rulers have followed for several decades, aimed at a single objective: to turn China quickly into a first-grade world power and materialize its leaders' great-power expansionist and hegemonic designs towards other countries, above all the countries of Southeast Asia.

In 1936, speaking about his youth to American journalist Edgar Snow in Yenan, Mao Zedong told of how he felt after reading a pamphlet about Japan's conquest of Korea and Taiwan, and the loss of Chinese "sovereignty" over Indochina, Burma and other places.

"After I read this, I felt depressed about the future of my country and began to realize that it was the duty of all the people to help save it" (1)

This was before the triumph of the Chinese revolution in 1949.

In 1963, during talks with delegates of the Vietnam Workers' Party in Wu Han, Mao Zedong said, "I will be the Chairman of 500 million poor peasants sending their troops to Southeast Asia."

And, noticing that the Chinese province of Szechwan and Thailand were of the same size but that the Thai population was only half that of Szechwan and that Laos was a large but thinly populated country, Mao did not hide his intention to send his compatriots to settle in both Thailand and Laos.

In Southeast Asia, Vietnam occupies a truly strategic position. The Chinese feudal expansionists repeatedly invaded Vietnam, seeking to annex it and use it as a base for aggression against other Southeast Asian countries. Today the rulers of the Chinese People's Republic are trying by every possible means to take hold of Vietnam, and also Laos and Kampuchea, with a view to weakening and annexing them one after another in their march into Southeast Asia.

In a meeting in September 1963 in Kwangtung between representatives of the four Communist Parties of Vietnam, China, Indonesia and Laos, Zhou Enlai said, "Our country is a big one, but we have no way out. Therefore we hope that the Vietnam Workers' Party will open for us a new way to Southeast Asia."

Since Vietnam was not disposed to help the Chinese rulers realize their ambitions, the latter sought to do it by themselves. To this end, they operated a two-faced policy towards the Vietnamese revolution: to help it and to

contain it at the same time, to make Vietnam weak and divided, dependent on China.

After each Vietnamese victory, they dealt with the imperialists and made compromises against the interests of Vietnam. They shifted from covert opposition to open hostility against Vietnam, not flinching even from a war of aggression.

The history of the past thirty years has shown that they have betrayed the Vietnamese revolution three times.

The first Chinese betrayal: Geneva 1954

In 1954, the victories won by the peoples of Vietnam, of Laos (under the leadership of the Lao Resistance Government) and of Kampuchea (under the leadership of the Kampuchean Resistance Government), especially the Dien Bien Phu victory, drove the French imperialists into an extremely difficult situation. French Defence Minister René Pleven; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul Ely; Chief of Staff of the Army,

General Blanc; and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Fay, after inspecting the Indochinese battlefield in February 1954, came to this pessimistic conclusion, "A reinforcement of the Expeditionary Corps, however strong, cannot bring about any change. Moreover, the military efforts by the metropolitan country have reached their last limit. All that we can hope for now is to create the most favourable military conditions for a political solution to the conflict." (2)

The French people's movement against the "dirty war" was growing vigorously, and other serious difficulties in the economic, political and social fields assaulted the French administration. It was in such a situation that France entered the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. France tried to achieve there a Korean-type cessation of hostilities, that is to say one without any political solution, just to save the French Expeditionary Corps and maintain French colonialism in Indochina.

As far as Beijing was concerned, it also endeavoured to put an end to the Indochina

war by a Korean-type solution, creating a buffer zone South of China, preventing a replacement of the French by the Americans in Indochina to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States while checking the victory *élan* of the Vietnamese, Lao and Kampuchean peoples so as to prepare its own expansion into Southeast Asia.

It is clear that China's stand essentially agreed with that of France. On the other hand, it was totally different from Vietnam's position: cessation of hostilities across the whole Indochinese peninsula, to be accompanied by a political solution for each of the questions of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of each Indochinese country.

Taking advantage of the geographical position of their country, the main military supplier controlling the only supply route to Vietnam, and of French reluctance to talk with Vietnam from a weak position, the Chinese rulers allowed themselves to negotiate directly

with the French in the first phase of the Geneva Conference (from 8 May to 23 June 1954) through four meetings between the delegation heads of France and China.

Political concessions of a fundamental nature which sacrificed the interests of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea were made by Zhou Enlai himself at the third and fourth meetings, on 17 and 23 June 1954 respectively. These were: cessation of hostilities; political settlement spread over a rather long period, China to recognize the coexistence in Vietnam of two administrations and the division of Vietnam into two zones; China also to recognize the legitimacy of the Royal Governments of Laos and Kampuchea, withdraw its demand for the participation of the delegations of the Lao Resistance Government and Kampuchean Resistance Government at the Conference, and raise the question of withdrawal of foreign troops, including Vietnamese volunteers, from Laos and Kampuchea; China also to agree to settle separately the three problems of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.

China was disposed to recognize the three countries as members of the French Union and wanted to see Laos and Kampuchea with a new face in Southeast Asia, like India and Indonesia. In return, it only required the absence of US military bases in Indochina.

As early as May 1954, the Chinese delegation had already proposed a demarcation line between the two zones of Vietnam to be placed at the 16th parallel (while the Vietnamese suggested the 13th parallel). They even wanted Vietnam to make further concessions to the extent of abandoning Hanoi, Haiphong and Highway 5 connecting the two cities:

"As the plan (of the 16th parallel) is not likely to be accepted, it should be envisaged that Haiphong can be made a free port with a fixed number of French troops stationed nearby. If this too is not accepted, Highway 5, Hanoi and Haiphong can be made a demilitarized zone under joint control." (3)

So the Chinese and the French had agreed on the framework of an agreement for the settlement of Indochinese problems.

In the second phase of negotiations (from 23 June to 20 July 1954) the French delegation negotiated directly with the Vietnamese delegation which wanted to maintain its positions. But China increased pressure on Vietnam, especially in the ten days preceding the end of the Conference.

In a message dated 10 July 1954 to the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party, Zhou Enlai stressed the necessity to present "fair and reasonable conditions acceptable to the French Government, so that an agreement may be reached within ten days."

At the same time, the Chinese made use of the US threat of an expanded war to exert pressure on Vietnam.

In keeping with Vietnam's peace-loving traditions, and the general trend of settling disputes through negotiations, and under Chinese pressure, Vietnam accepted the solution which is well-known.

The Dien Bien Phu victory and the 1954 Geneva Agreements marked a victory of the revolutionary forces in Indochina and greatly

contributed to bringing about the total disintegration of the French Empire, announcing the irreversible process of collapse of world colonialism and imperialism. The Geneva solution, however, prevented the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea from winning complete victory in their war of resistance against the French colonialists, which was clearly a practical possibility, considering the balance of forces on the battlefield.

That was what the Chinese leaders knew better than anyone else, but they wanted to betray the revolutionary cause of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.

The second Chinese betrayal: to hamper the Vietnamese people's fight to liberate South Vietnam and reunify their country (1954-1975).

1954-1966 : Chinese obstacles to Vietnam's efforts for national reunification

After securing, through the Geneva settlement, a buffer zone south of their country, the

Chinese leaders could devote themselves to speeding up the fulfilment of their first five-year plan (1953-1958). From 1958, they started their "great leap forward" plan, and their plan to build up a nuclear strength.

In foreign affairs, they sought détente with the US imperialists, holding talks with the USA in Geneva as early as August 1955 and at the same time tried to expand their influence in Asia, especially in Southeast and South Asia.

In spite of Ngo Dinh Diem's refusal to hold elections for the reunification of Vietnam as provided for in the Geneva Agreements, while the patriotic movement in South Vietnam was being ruthlessly repressed, the Beijing rulers kept on trying to convince Vietnam that national reunification was a "long struggle" and could not be achieved by use of arms.

In November 1956, Mao Zedong told Vietnamese leaders, "The partition of Vietnam cannot be solved in a short time, it may take a long time... If 10 years is not enough, we should be prepared for a hundred years".

As early as July 1955, Deng Xiaoping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, warned, "Two possibilities may ensue from the use of armed force to reunify the country: either victory or loss of North Vietnam itself."

In July 1957, Mao again said, "The question is to defend the existing border, to defend the 17th parallel... It may take a long time, but I hope a long time will bring good results."

According to the Chinese rulers, in South Vietnam "the only appropriate line is a 'prolonged ambush', to gather strength, keep close contact with the people and wait for an opportunity". To follow the "prolonged ambush" line simply meant to renounce all revolutionary struggle and to leave the South Vietnamese population to US-Diem massacres.

Determined to follow the line of independence and sovereignty, the Vietnamese people chose to start, in late 1959 and early 1960, political struggle combined with armed fighting in South Vietnam. This option was naturally disapproved of by the Beijing rulers.

In May 1960, during talks with Vietnamese representatives, they said, "We should not try to decide which is more important: political struggle or armed struggle... Neither form of struggle means an immediate seizure of power; anyway, the struggle remains a long one.. Even with the collapse of the Diem regime, the reunification of the country cannot be achieved at once because the US imperialists would not allow it.."

"... North Vietnam may give South Vietnam political support, helping it to work out policies, but the most important thing is to encourage the spirit of self-reliance of the South Vietnamese... When it is sure of success, the North may give the South military aid, that is, when it is quite certain that nothing bad can happen, a quantity of weapons may be supplied secretly. But in general, no aid should be given."

Thus failing in their attempt to prevent the South Vietnamese people's "simultaneous uprisings" Beijing wanted the North Vietnamese people to forsake their obligation to their

South Vietnamese compatriots and leave them alone in the struggle. They refused to help the Vietnamese people to build up their regular army, and only agreed to give Vietnam some light weapons and logistical supplies, as they considered that the most appropriate form of struggle in South Vietnam was guerilla warfare, fighting small battles with small units such as platoons and companies.

Meanwhile, in foreign policy, the Chinese rulers began to practise an increasingly virulent anti-Sovietism to secure the "leadership of the world revolution" and to prepare actively for détente and collusion with US imperialism.

In their talks with the Vietnamese side in 1963, they tried to persuade Vietnam to accept their viewpoints, that is to deny the existence of the socialist camp and to open a way for Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia. Also in 1963, they put forward the so-called 25-point programme on the general line of the world communist movement and proposed to convene a Conference of eleven Communist Parties

to form a new Communist International dominated by Beijing.

Neither pressure, nor the promise of massive aid of one billion Chinese *yuan* if Vietnam refused all aid from the Soviet Union (offered by Deng Xiaoping on behalf of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party) succeeded in convincing Vietnam to follow Beijing's policy.

It should be noted that, during this period, Beijing applied to the revolution in Laos a policy similar to that applied to Vietnam: pressure was exerted on the Neo Lao Haksat to compel it to practise the "prolonged ambush" strategy, to abstain from combining armed struggle with political struggle, and to "re-establish the coalition government as soon as possible". In a talk with the Vietnamese side in August 1961, the Chinese said, on the question of Laos, "The greatest care must be taken to avoid getting directly involved in the war. If the US jumps into Laos, what will happen to North Vietnam, Yunnan and Kwangsi? We should think of the possibility of a US adventure."

Concerning the solution of the Lao question at the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference, the Chinese leaders advocated partitioning Laos horizontally into two zones: one controlled by the liberation forces in the North bordering on Southern China; and the other controlled by the Lao Royal Government in the South. This was a wicked design aimed at securing the Lao revolutionary forces' dependence on China and isolating the South Vietnamese revolution.

However, the leaders of the Lao revolution did not give up their own line of independence, which enabled them to win big victories over US imperialism and its Vientiane agents.

1965-1969: Green light to US aggression, red light to all international aid to Vietnam

As the "great proletarian cultural revolution" was announced in their own country, the Chinese authorities further colluded with the United States and stepped up the implementation of their policy of expansionism and big-nation hegemonism. They committed

themselves even more deeply to a course of betraying the Vietnamese revolution.

They gave the green light to Johnson to unleash the "local war" in South Vietnam with the participation of hundreds of thousands of GI's, and the air war in the North with all the might of the USAF. They reassured Washington that "if you do no harm to us, we will do no harm to you". In the calculation of Beijing, the US war of aggression against Vietnam, while weakening the two belligerent parties, would allow China to spend its time unharassed on the "cultural revolution". This is Mao's famous Machiavellian thesis: "To sit on a mountain and watch the tigers fight". Zhou Enlai told Egyptian President Nasser on 23 June 1965, "The more troops the US sends to Vietnam, the more delighted we are, for we know that we have them in our hand and we can bleed them. If you want to help Vietnam, you should encourage the US to send more troops to that country, the more the better." (4)

As they hoped the Vietnam war would be prolonged indefinitely, the Chinese leaders advised their Vietnamese counterparts to practise guerilla warfare and not to fight big battles. They limited their aid to light weapons and logistic supplies. A secret military agreement had been signed between the two countries according to which Chinese pilots were to be sent to Vietnam. This promise was not kept by the Chinese side which argued that "the time was not appropriate" and that "by doing so, we could not prevent the enemy from intensifying their air raids." (5) During talks with the Vietnamese side in August 1966 they also said, "China has not enough air power to help defend Hanoi."

In order to make Vietnam dependent on China, the Beijing rulers did their utmost to prevent any united action in favour of Vietnam by revolutionary and progressive forces in the world. All proposals in this connection, coming either from Vietnam (Feb. 1965, Feb. 1966), from the Soviet Union (March 1965, April 1965), or from third parties (proposal by

Japanese communists in May 1966) were brutally rejected by Beijing.

The Chinese authorities not only refused to take into consideration a Soviet suggestion to set up an airlift via China and build airfields on Chinese territory to defend North Vietnam, but they also created tremendous difficulties for the transport of aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries via China. They tried all sorts of ways to re-schedule those supplies in an attempt to limit the Vietnamese people's ability to launch large-scale operations, particularly in the dry seasons.

They also disapproved of the setting up of an anti-imperialist front of the Vietnamese, Lao and Kampuchean peoples. On their instigation, the Hoa (people of Chinese origin) living in the liberated areas of Laos controlled by the Lao Patriotic Front tried in 1968 to bring about discord between the Lao and the Vietnamese.

In Kampuchea, after 1965, they urged Pol Pot to wage an armed struggle against the Sihanouk administration, which was allied at the time

with the resistance forces of Vietnam and Laos.

In 1969, they supported the views of Lon Nol, who had become Prime Minister of Kampuchea, and demanded that the South Vietnamese liberation forces withdraw from their bases in Kampuchea and refrain from using the port of Sihanoukville as a supply base. It is not mere coincidence that the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, during the same period, demanded that the South Vietnamese liberation forces withdraw from their Kampuchean bases.

After the 1968 Tet Offensive, the US aggressors were compelled to de-escalate the war and to hold talks with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Paris. After that, the struggle of the Vietnamese people on three fronts — military, political and diplomatic — was intensified. The first objective was to force the United States to end unconditionally their bombing of North Vietnam.

The Chinese leaders opposed this effort. From May to mid-October 1968, the Beijing

mass media carried no report about the negotiations between Vietnam and the United States, but kept on stressing that the Vietnamese people should decide the outcome of their struggle “not at the conference table, but on the battlefield.”

On 9 October 1968, a Chinese leader met a Vietnamese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade in Beijing and asked him to convey to the Vietnamese leaders China's view that the ending of US bombing against North Vietnam was “a Vietnamese compromise with the United States” and “a major setback and a great loss for the Vietnamese people, just like the negotiations for the 1954 Geneva Agreements which were a mistake.” He suggested that Vietnam “should let the US resume bombing and shelling all over North Vietnam. Thus the United States would be forced to scatter their bombing raids and a lessening of difficulties for the South could be achieved.”

The same Chinese personality pretended that in its decision to hold negotiations with

the United States. Vietnam had taken "Soviet advice". He asked the Vietnamese side to make a choice. "If Vietnam wants to defeat the United States it should cut off relations with the Soviet Union; if Vietnam wants to reach a compromise with the United States, using Chinese aid for the fight against the Americans with a view to negotiating with them, Chinese aid would then lose all its significance."

On 17 October 1968, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi met a Vietnamese representative to convey the Chinese leadership's view of the negotiations between Vietnam and the United States:

"Your agreement to hold four-party negotiations will help Johnson and Humphrey to win the election, leave the South Vietnamese people under the domination of the US imperialists and their puppets, South Vietnam will not be liberated and its people may suffer still greater losses. So is there anything for our Parties and States to talk about?"

Their threat to cut off relations between the two Parties was accompanied by other pressures, particularly a reduction of aid. Aid in 1969 was 20 per cent less than that of 1968. In August 1969, the Chinese arrogantly asked, "Do you want to continue fighting or to make peace? China must know the answer when considering the problem of aid." As a matter of fact, the amount of aid for 1970 was brought down by 50 per cent as compared with 1968.

Another form of pressure was exerted by the Chinese authorities: their embassy in Hanoi was instructed to instigate the Hoa in Vietnam to stir up trouble, oppose the Vietnamese Government, propagate "Mao Zedong Thought" and the "cultural revolution" and set up intelligence networks.

But the Vietnamese people's will was unshakeable. "The South Vietnamese people will fight the US aggressors to the end, and we will continue to uphold proletarian internationalism" replied the Vietnamese side to a threat by Deng Xiaoping in April 1966 to reconsider the problem of aid to Vietnam.

1969 — 1973: Sino-American bargaining against Vietnamese interests

In 1969, Nixon's first year in the White House, and also the year which saw the end of the "cultural revolution", the process of Sino-American rapprochement was stepped up. Washington and Beijing discussed not only problems of common interest, but also problems relating to the sovereignty of the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples.

February 1972: Nixon visited China and the Shanghai communiqué was signed. In early March 1972, a representative of the Chinese leadership informed the Vietnamese authorities:

"In order to normalize relations between China and the United States and to ease tension in the Far East, first and foremost, the Vietnam and Indochina problems must be settled. We do not demand that the Taiwan problem be settled first. Taiwan is for a later stage."

In fact, Beijing knew that if it wanted the withdrawal of US forces and military installations from Taiwan to be accelerated, it had to

press Hanoi to accept a compromise with the United States.

Accordingly Beijing used the "carrot" of aid. In 1971 and 1972, the volume of aid to Vietnam was the biggest ever. Meanwhile, pressure was continuously exerted to compel Vietnam to accept the American solution.

During talks with Vietnamese representatives in November 1971, the Chinese leaders declared, "Vietnam should take this opportunity to settle the question of withdrawal of US troops first and should consider the settlement of the POW issue. The overthrow of the Saigon puppet administration is a Long-term issue."

To withdraw US troops while maintaining the Thieu regime was precisely the objective of Nixon's "Vietnamization of the war" plan.

Assured of China's connivance, Nixon could indulge in all sorts of frantic activity against Vietnam. Bombing and mining of North Vietnamese ports were resumed and bombing stepped up in the South as from April 1972. Towards the end of October 1972 there was a

volte-face after the Paris Agreement was ready to be initialled. Then came the B.52 attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong at the end of 1972.

The Vietnamese leaders, however, were not intimidated by either the United States or China. They said frankly to their Chinese counterparts at a meeting, "Vietnam is our country, you have no right to discuss the Vietnam question with the United States. You have already admitted your mistake of 1954, so you should not commit another one."

Not only did the Vietnamese people refuse to make any concession to the US imperialists on matters of principle, they moreover meted them out due punishment, and the Paris Agreement was signed on 27 January 1973.

While increasing pressure on Vietnam, and trying to undermine the Indochinese peoples' front of solidarity so as to pave the way for its future expansion to Southeast Asia, Beijing from 1970 onwards sought to control Kampuchean forces.

After the 18 March 1970 military coup d'état in Phnom Penh, the Chinese authorities looked

sympathetically at the rise to power of Lon Nol, a Kampuchean of Chinese descent and an agent of the US. They wanted to drop Sihanouk. It was only after advice was given by Vietnam who gave total support to Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 Declaration, and after Khmer resistance forces supported by world opinion won victory after victory, that Beijing became resolved to support, and even to "monopolize" Sihanouk. At the same time they maintained secret links with the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique and actively used the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique gradually to turn the Khmer Communist Party into a Maoist Party. Beijing was trying to secure a good position in negotiations with Washington. So firstly it instigated the Pol Pot group to oppose a proposal by Sihanouk to convene a second Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples towards the end of 1971 so as to give a boost to the struggle against US imperialism. Secondly it suggested instead that a conference should be held in China of five countries with six parties (the two zones of Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, China and the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea) to oppose Japan. This ran up against opposition from Vietnam which supported Sihanouk's proposal and refused to consider Japan as an objective of theresistance. So the initiative was a fiasco.

The Chinese leaders were still seeking to take the whole Indochinese problem into their hands with a view to bargaining with the United States and to preparing a basis for their expansion into Southeast Asia. On several occasions up to 1972, they offered their help in building roads and transporting supplies from North Vietnam to the fronts in South Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They promised too to provide Vietnam with enough trucks and drivers and about 200,000 Chinese soldiers to ensure the fulfilment of this task. Of course, Vietnam rejected the proposal.

1973 - 1975 : Beijing against the total liberation of South Vietnam

The Paris Agreement on Vietnam was systematically violated by the United States and its agent Nguyen Van Thieu. As far as China was

concerned, in order to collude further with the United States in the spirit of Shanghai, and to weaken and subdue Vietnam, it made every effort to hinder the Vietnamese people's struggle which aimed at blocking the scheme of the US and Thieu to sabotage the Paris Agreement, and at liberating South Vietnam entirely and reunifying the country.

During talks in Beijing in June 1973, Mao Zedong told Le Duan and Pham Van Dong :

"It is necessary to stop (fighting) in South Vietnam for half a year or a year, or a year and a half or better still two years! The revolution in South Vietnam should be carried out in two stages. If you combine them into one, the United States won't just look on. The problem is that the Nguyen Van Thieu administration still has tens of thousands of troops".

For his part, Zhou Enlai said, "It would be best for Vietnam and the whole of Indochina to relax for some time, five or ten years, we cannot yet say precisely. In this period of relaxation, the peoples of South Vietnam, Laos

and Kampuchea will carry out a policy of peace and neutrality for some time".

At heart the Chinese rulers wanted Vietnam to do nothing, even when the Saigon administration launched land-grabbing operations against the liberated areas. Worse still, they sought ways and means to entice a number of generals and officials of the Saigon puppet administration to collaborate with them. They even sent a messenger to persuade General Duong Van Minh, President of the Saigon regime in its last days, to continue, with Beijing's support, to resist the general offensive of the South Vietnamese liberation forces.

From 1973 onwards, they increased their acts of provocation and territorial encroachment along the Vietnam-China border and drove the negotiations between the two parties on land borders and the Bac Bo Gulf into an impasse. On their own initiative, they forbade all surveying over an area of 20,000 square kilometres in the Gulf. Then, on 19 January 1974, Chinese forces occupied the Hoang Sa Islands which are part of Vietnamese territory

and were occupied by the Thieu administration at the time. US Ambassador in Saigon Graham Martin then rejected Thieu's request for help and the US Seventh Fleet in the Pacific was ordered to keep away from the Hoang Sa Archipelago.

In implementation of their policy of compromise with Washington, the Beijing authorities ceased supplying military aid to the three Indochinese peoples' revolution. They turned down a request for arms from the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. Instead, they asked Vietnam to loan weapons to Kampuchea promising compensation at a later date. In this way, Beijing managed to avoid trouble with the United States, satisfy their Kampuchean agents' demand and create more difficulties for Vietnam at the moment when that country was engaged in the general offensive of Spring 1975.

As for the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique it sought Vietnamese aid, but at the same time surreptitiously stirred up national hatred and aroused anti-Vietnam feelings among the Kampuchean people. They alleged that the signing of the

Paris Agreement was a new act of betrayal towards Kampuchea. Store of arms and food, hospitals and encampments of the South Vietnamese Liberation army in Kampuchea were often attacked and plundered by the Pol Pot troops.

Thus, from 1954 to March 1975, the Chinese rulers not only encouraged the US imperialists to extend and step up their war of aggression against Vietnam, but they did their utmost to exploit the resistance of the Vietnamese, Lao and Kampuchean peoples for their own strategic interests.

This was their second betrayal of the Vietnamese people.

The Third Chinese betrayal: from 1975 onwards

It was with bitterness and rage that China received the news of the great 1975 victory of the Vietnamese people. It began to apply a policy of systematic hostility against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in a more open way.

This was paralleled by a growing and less camouflaged collusion with imperialism, especially US imperialism — to oppose the world forces of socialism and progress.

Beijing's anti-Vietnamism, though particularly violent, was camouflaged at the beginning.

It used the Pot Pol-leng Sary clique in Kampuchea to wage an enormous propaganda campaign, alleging that Vietnam was "aggressing" Kampuchea, and "attempting to compel Kampuchea to join a Vietnamese-controlled Indochinese Federation". Finally it unleashed a border war against Vietnam.

It stirred up conflict inside Vietnam by using the Hoa (people of Chinese origin) and setting up spy networks and Hoa organizations to work clandestinely against Vietnam.

As regards Chinese aid to Vietnam, in 1973 the Chinese leaders promised to give aid to Vietnam at least for five more years, at the same rate as in 1973. But after 1973, they rejected all new requests for aid from Vietnam. As to the aid already agreed upon during the war

and not yet fully delivered, they delayed it under various pretexts. This included leaving projects unfinished, some of which were of great importance to the peaceful reconstruction of Vietnam.

The fight against Vietnam under camouflaged forms did not give the expected results, consequently Beijing resorted to an open course of action, using all possible means, including threats of force and the use of force.

The so-called problem of "victimized Chinese residents" was wholly fabricated in early 1978. In a few months, through pressure, promises and lies, Beijing caused hundreds of thousands of Hoa people to leave Vietnam for China. Many of those Hoa were later enlisted into "mountaineer divisions" or in reconnaissance units to be used in the war of aggression launched by China against Vietnam in early 1979.

Also in early 1978, Beijing declared unilaterally the cessation of all economic and technical aid to Vietnam, and withdrawal of all specialists and technicians. This blow was dealt

at a time when the Vietnamese people were having to heal the wounds of war and cope with the border war at their Southwest border unleashed by the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique, while overcoming numerous difficulties, especially those created by the most devastating floods and typhoons in a hundred years.

To add insult to injury, Beijing overtly invited other countries and international organizations to stop aid for the reconstruction of Vietnam.

At the end of 1978 and in early 1979, the Chinese rulers staged military offensives against Vietnam from two directions. The first was in the southwest by 19 divisions (out of a total 23) of the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary army on 22 December 1978; the second was in the North by 600,000 Chinese troops on 17 February 1979. Meanwhile Chinese military pressure was stepped up against Northern Laos, in preparation for an attack against Vietnam through Laos.

All these attempts were doomed to failure. The Chinese rulers were forced to withdraw

their troops from Vietnam (except in a dozen places) after suffering heavy losses. They had to accept negotiations with the Vietnamese side. The Kampuchean people overthrew the Pol Pot-Jeng Sary genocidal regime and founded the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The Lao people stood firm on their position of independence and sovereignty.

Negotiations between Vietnam and China recorded no progress, as the Chinese side refused to take into consideration Vietnam's constructive proposals and obstinately tried to compel Vietnam to give up its policy of independence and sovereignty. The Chinese armed forces concentrated near the border still indulge every day in acts of provocation and encroachment on Vietnam. The Chinese leaders repeatedly declare they will give Vietnam "a second lesson" and even "many more lessons". Together with the imperialists and international reactionaries, they continue to wage a violent propaganda campaign against Vietnam on the question of Vietnamese emigrants.

They are doing everything possible to oppose Vietnam.

* * *

Thus in the course of the last thirty years, the Chinese leaders have betrayed the Vietnamese people three times, each time more perfidiously than before. They have also betrayed the Lao and Kampuchean peoples.

To cover up their treachery, the Beijing rulers often talk of the Chinese aid to Vietnam.

The Vietnamese people will never forget that the Chinese people reserved part of the fruits of their labour for helping the Vietnamese people. This aid was used by the Chinese rulers as a political lever for their expansionism. Moreover, they themselves, on many occasions, said that, if one were to speak of thanks, it was the Chinese people who had to thank the Vietnamese people.

In connection with Nixon's visit to China in 1972, Mao Zedong told Vietnamese leaders in

June 1973, "Frankly speaking, the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and the world people must thank the Vietnamese people for having defeated the US aggressors. It was your victory, comrades, that forced Nixon to come to China."

From their concession at all costs at the 1954 Geneva Conference to their exploitation of the Vietnamese people's anti-US resistance, from their setting up of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime to their armed aggression against Vietnam and threat of aggression against Laos, the Chinese leaders have been motivated by:

- one guiding thought: great-nation chauvinism;
- one policy: national selfishness;
- one strategic objective: great-nation expansionism.

And to attain this objective they have made fallacy and deception their strategic means and State policy. They continually attribute to

others what they do themselves, falsify and distort history, and turn the truth upside down.

Beijing's anti-Vietnamism threatens the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity not only of Vietnam, but also of other Southeast Asian countries. It is also a serious threat to world peace. The Vietnamese people are deeply attached to friendship with the Chinese people and to normalizing relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China. But we will never allow any expansionist and hegemonic force to harm our country.

The Vietnamese people's just struggle against the reactionary policy of the Beijing ruling circles is aimed not only at defending their fundamental national rights, but also at maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the world. This struggle will be long and difficult but will inevitably end in victory. There is no doubt that the Vietnamese and the Chinese people will eventually live in peace, friendship and cooperation.

1. *Edgar Snow in Red Star Over China*, Penguin Books, London, 1972, p. 159.

2. *Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers in La fin d'une guerre*. Editions du Seuil, 1960, p. 62.

3. Zhou Enlai's message dated 30 May 1954 to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (a copy of which was forwarded to the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party).

4. Retold by Mohammed Hassanain Heikal in *Les documents du Caire*, Flammarion, Paris, 1972, p. 238.

5. 16 July 1965 message from the General Staff of the Chinese Liberation Army to the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army.

