

Soviet- Chinese Relations

What Happened in the Sixties

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Over the past several years the Maoist propaganda media and the capitalist propaganda machine have been busy trying to distort the relations between the Soviet Union and China, rewrite glorious chapters in the history of the two nations, foster doubts in the minds of the Chinese people and other people, regarding the sincerity of the internationalist policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state towards the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China.

In accordance with the decisions of its congresses, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been working continuously to improve relations with China. In the days when Mao Tse-tung was alive, the Soviet Union unceasingly strove to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations. The Soviet side not only openly declared its intentions, but also took practical steps in this direction and translated its desires into the language of practical proposals. At the 25th Congress the CPSU again pointed out that if China returned to a policy which was genuinely based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, renounced policies hostile to the socialist countries and embarked upon the road of co-operation and solidarity with the world of socialism, there would be an adequate response from the Soviet Union and it would be possible to build Soviet relations with the

People's Republic of China on the principles of socialist internationalism.

The Soviet Union pursues an active, constructive policy with respect to China, and is doing all it can to create conditions for the present Peking leadership to begin to build Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations on the basis of good-neighbourliness and co-operation. It was precisely with this aim in view that, after Mao's death, the Central Committee of the CPSU launched a number of initiatives to demonstrate to the People's Republic of China the goodwill of the Soviet Union and its readiness to improve relations. On the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR sent warm and friendly greetings to the Chinese people. In an article on China's national holiday published on October 1, 1976, *Pravda* reaffirmed previous constructive proposals and the desire to restore good-neighbourly relations and co-operation between the Soviet Union and China.

Back in 1971 the USSR proposed a treaty on renunciation of the use of force. Under the terms of this treaty both sides were to pledge not to use armed force against each other, not to use any types of weapons: conventional, rocket or nuclear. Later, in 1973, the USSR proposed a non-aggression treaty. In 1978, shortly before the session of the National People's Congress in China (in March), the Soviet Union again took important initiatives which could well have become a basis for normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. The Soviet side displays readiness to expand trade between the two countries on a mutually advantageous basis every year, and proposes negotiations on the resumption of border area trading operations. The Soviet proposals to re-

sume contacts between friendship societies, co-operation between the academies of science of the USSR and China and exchanges in the field of public health service are well known. All these proposals are still valid, despite China's negative response.

The October plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1976) attempted to improve Soviet-Chinese relations. In his speech at that plenum Comrade Leonid Brezhnev said that "there are no issues in relations between the USSR and the PRC that could not be resolved in the spirit of good-neighbourliness," and that everything now depends on the attitude of the Chinese side.

On the initiative of the Soviet side, another round of border negotiations was held in late 1976 and early 1977. In the course of these negotiations the Soviet delegation restated earlier constructive proposals.

At present the only barrier to the normalization of the Soviet-Chinese relations is the position of China's leadership. The present Peking leaders are continuing Mao's anti-Soviet policy. Since the new leaders of the PRC are trying to establish themselves as the faithful heirs of Mao's political concepts, the friendly Soviet political actions have not met with a positive response.

The post-Maoist leadership of the PRC has failed to produce any initiative to improve Soviet-Chinese relations. It is against expanding trade and co-operation in the fields of science and culture. China's leaders have failed to respond to a proposal to establish contacts between seismologists in the two countries.

In the documents of the highest bodies of power of the PRC and in statements by its leaders the Soviet Union is depicted as the main ideological, political and military enemy of China.

As the history of Soviet-Chinese relations has shown, there are no objective reasons for alienation, to say nothing of conflict, between the people of these countries. There are all the necessary conditions for the development of friendship and co-operation.

The Maoists and their supporters abroad are busy falsifying the causes and the character of the difficulties in Soviet-Chinese relations. They are trying to prove the alleged "guilt" of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Such distortions are always readily picked up and exaggerated by anti-communists of all stripes.

While Mao was still alive the Peking rulers developed an actual "programme" for increasing tension with the Soviet Union. This is the only explanation of why the repeated proposals of the CPSU beginning in the 1960 to take practical steps to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations met with no response or were deliberately buried under a mountain of ridiculous accusations, distortions and fabrications.

Until the 1960s, the Peking leaders kept silent about their intentions, camouflaging them with what they called "theoretical discussions". But the real facts reveal the falsity of attempts to blame the CPSU for the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations, to present the "phasing out of Soviet assistance to China" and "the recall of specialists" from China in the early 1960s as "sanctions" by the CPSU taken in retaliation to the CPC leaders' "independent line". The Mao group staked everything on their policy of escalating anti-Sovietism when close, friendly ties between China and the Soviet Union obstructed their hegemonic plans. The Peking leaders tried to hide their own departure from principled positions with claims that they are the only "revolutionaries", while the CPSU are "revisionists".

In the interests of truth, we have examined Soviet-Chinese relations in the early 1960s to correct the falsifications still being promulgated both within and outside China.

Against a Co-ordinated Policy of the Socialist Countries (in the 1960s)

As we all know, co-ordination of the foreign policy of the socialist states for the purpose of securing peace and freedom is the most vivid expression of proletarian internationalism. Such co-ordination contributes to the security of the socialist countries, enhances their prestige in the international arena, and enables them to exert greater influence on the entire course of world development in the interests of peace, democracy, national independence and socialism.

A clear definition of a co-ordinated foreign policy of the socialist states is contained in the Declaration of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries and in the Peace Manifesto (1957), and in the Statement and the Appeal to the Peoples of the World adopted by these parties in 1960. In its struggle for peace the world socialist system has scored notable successes and has been able to frustrate the aggressive designs of imperialism. The co-operation in the foreign-policy field between the two biggest socialist states—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—had played an important role. This co-operation had a firm legal basis under international law in the form of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded on February 14, 1950.

However, in the late fifties and early sixties, i.e. when Peking developed its great-power aims in the international arena, the PRC government began to undertake unilateral actions which ran counter to the common policy of peace of the socialist community. "The cold war and international tension," proclaimed Mao Tse-tung in the early sixties, "have greatly helped us in educating our people." The Chinese leader laid special emphasis on the fact that aggravation of international tension was "advantageous to us". "In conditions of international tension," declared Mao Tse-tung, "the communist parties can develop faster, the pace of their development can be stepped up. . . I, for one, welcome international tension."

The Chinese representatives at the session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, held in June 1960, launched a vicious attack against the positions of the Marxist-Leninist parties on questions of war and peace, peaceful co-existence and disarmament, and tried to impose Peking's adventurist foreign-policy line on the socialist countries. The Chinese representatives urged the delegates to build their relations with other states on the "spearhead to spearhead" principle; they denounced negotiations as a means of settling controversial issues, declaring that "to sit down at the negotiating table with the imperialists would be to deceive all mankind", and reviled the co-ordinated efforts of the socialist countries in the struggle for disarmament as "fruitless and even harmful".

At the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963 the CPC leaders launched a new ideological offensive against the CPSU and the world communist movement. The Chinese government violently attacked the foreign policy of the socialist countries. This time the Peking leaders tried to sabotage the meas-

ures taken by the socialist states to solve the most pressing world problem—the problem of averting a thermonuclear war.

Peking's readiness to sacrifice any ideals and values, including world peace, to its political schemes was clearly seen in the Caribbean crisis in 1962.

At the time when Cuba was threatened with invasion by American troops and the world was on the brink of thermonuclear war, the Chinese leaders made undisguised attempts to precipitate a major international conflict.

In the period between the 23rd and 28th of October, 1962, when tensions in the world were at their highest and when it was particularly necessary to form a united front against US imperialist aggression, the leaders of the CPC thought it unnecessary to take active measures in support of Cuba, as the USSR and other countries did. The Chinese leaders preferred to maintain a wait-and-see attitude to be able to have the last word whatever the outcome.

After October 28, 1962, when tensions abated and the crisis had reached its turning point, China erupted with a noisy campaign "in resolute support of the struggle of the Cuban people for their independence, sovereignty and dignity". Significantly, Chinese propaganda hinted widely that the Soviet position had injured Cuba's interests. At the same time China's leaders, demonstrating their disapproval of the settlement of the crisis by peaceful negotiation, urged both the USSR and Cuba to unleash a military conflict and, using the events in the Caribbean as an example, sought to prove the correctness of their own "views" and discredit the policy of peaceful co-existence. China's spokesmen at international democratic organizations and various international forums also spread anti-Soviet fabrications about the Caribbean crisis.

The Maoists' ultimate objective was to precipitate an armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States and to cash in on the ensuing war conflagration.

During the dangerous events in the Caribbean, China's leaders made no practical, constructive proposals to safeguard the interests of Cuba and prevent war. Peking not only failed to contribute towards the settlement of the crisis, but, precisely in those crucial days, began military actions on the Indian border, creating another hotbed of international tension. These actions showed the true intentions of China's leaders. Taking advantage of the fact that the attention of the whole world was riveted to a dangerous international conflict, the Peking leaders sought to employ their nationalistic plans. One can clearly see that the stand of the Chinese government played into the hands of the most aggressive imperialist forces.

In their attempt to disparage the Leninist foreign policy of the socialist countries, the Chinese leaders came out against the Moscow Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), which represented the first success scored by communists and broad popular masses throughout the world in their long struggle against the danger of a nuclear war. The treaty was an important step forward in the search for ways of settling controversial issues between states with different social systems. The Moscow nuclear test-ban treaty was acclaimed throughout the world. The PRC government, however, launched a savage attack against the treaty, ignoring worldwide assessment as a major success of the policy of peaceful co-existence.¹

¹ This hysterical position became clear in October 1964 when the PRC tested its first atomic bomb.

The activities of the Peking leaders in the international arena—their attempts to bring about a split in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement and to set this movement against the socialist community, and their unprincipled rapprochement (and on some issues direct alliance) with the imperialist powers—show that the question was no longer one of isolated instances of deviation from the co-ordinated foreign policy of the socialist states, but represented a major reorientation of the People's Republic of China's entire foreign policy. It became clear that the PRC government was abandoning class positions in foreign policy, undermining the united front of struggle against imperialism and striving to turn this front against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The attitude of the Peking leaders towards their ally, the USSR, which was sparing no efforts to help China build a socialist society, seemed strange indeed, all the more so since it was well known that the Soviet Union, observing the principles of internationalism, consistently defended the interests of the People's Republic of China.

Thus, in 1949-50, at the request of the PRC government, the Soviet Union dispatched a number of troop formations to China. Soviet pilots protected the air space of the People's Republic of China and curbed the piratical air raids of American and Chiang Kai-shek troops on its cities and towns. In September 1958, at the time of the crisis in the Formosa Strait, the Soviet government publicly warned the government of the United States that the Soviet Union would regard an attack against China as an attack against the USSR. The Peking leaders themselves had in the past made numerous statements on the great importance of Soviet-Chinese friendship for the People's Republic of China. "The signing of

the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between China and the USSR," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "not only means tremendous aid in the building of a new China, but is also a powerful guarantee against aggression, and of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world."

Such were the words. But did the deeds match them?

China began to violate the provisions of the Treaty signed on February 14, 1950. Thus, it consistently failed to observe Article 4 of the Treaty which calls for consultations "on all major international questions affecting the common interests of the Soviet Union and China". The PRC government concealed from the Soviet Union its intentions of shelling the offshore islands in the Formosa Strait in 1958; and it did not inform the Soviet government about its plans to launch an offensive against India, about the Sino-American talks, held at the ambassadorial level, which had been going on since 1955, and about its intentions concerning a number of other questions.

The Soviet government firmly adhered to the provisions of the treaty on mutual consultations and exchange of information in the foreign-policy field. The Soviet side systematically provided the CPC Central Committee and the PRC government with extensive materials relating to major internal issues and the foreign policy of the USSR. Between 1960 and 1963 alone, the Soviet government handed over to the Chinese side (and for all practical purposes unilaterally) more than 140 communications of this type, both in written and oral form.

In their relations with Peking in the field of foreign policy the CPSU and the Soviet government invariably adhered to a position of trust and genuine interest in co-ordinating the efforts of the two states in the international arena.

Curtailment of Economic Ties

The CPC leadership carried its ideological differences with the USSR and other socialist countries to the sphere of inter-state relations, and this was clearly seen in the field of economic co-operation. This aspect of Peking's policy became obvious in 1960, when the Maoists began to promote their "special platform" in the world communist movement.

The Chinese government demanded a revision of all the existing agreements and protocols on economic, scientific and technical co-operation between Peking and Moscow; it would not accept a considerable part of the planned deliveries of Soviet equipment, and began to curtail Sino-Soviet trade.

On October 31, 1960, Yeh Chi-chuang, then Minister of Foreign Trade, and Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Lo Kuei-po informed the Soviet government through the Soviet Ambassador in Peking that China intended to revise the agreements on Sino-Soviet economic, scientific and technical co-operation signed earlier. In June 1961 Ku Cho-hsin, head of a Chinese economic delegation sent to Moscow for talks, declared that the Chinese government intended to decline Soviet technical aid in the construction of 89 industrial enterprises and 35 production shops, installations and other facilities. In August 1961, during a meeting with the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Chou En-lai, referring to "difficulties which had arisen in the national economy of the People's Republic of China as a result of natural calamities", proposed a two-year postponement of the deliveries of Soviet plant equipment and materials, although the agreement on these deliveries had been concluded only two months before. There was nothing the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government could do but agree to such

a postponement, although the bulk of the equipment worth tens of millions of roubles was already in the production stage or had been ordered in other countries.

On the request of the Chinese side deliveries of Soviet equipment and materials for enterprises which were being built with Soviet technical assistance were put off for two years. This was stated in a protocol signed on May 13, 1962.

In December 1962 the Soviet government proposed that negotiations be held to specify the volume and type of equipment for future deliveries to China. No answer was given by the Chinese government to this proposal.

Facts show that the Chinese leaders took deliberate steps to curtail economic ties with the Soviet Union, with total disregard for the interests of the Chinese people and to the detriment of friendship and co-operation between the two countries.

The Soviet Union tried time and again to check this process, putting forward concrete proposals for the development of economic co-operation and trade between the two nations. Unfortunately, however, none of these proposals met with any response. Peking continued to reduce its economic ties with the USSR. As a result, the total volume of trade (including technical assistance) between the Soviet Union and China in 1962 dropped to 36.5 per cent of the 1959 level. The volume of economic co-operation and trade between the two countries continued to plummet in 1963-64. The trade turnover in 1963 decreased by 23 per cent compared to the 1962 figure, and in 1964 it fell by yet another 20 per cent.

At first Peking explained the curtailment of its economic ties with the USSR and other socialist countries by referring to "China's serious economic difficulties". Statements to this effect were made by

Ku Cho-hsin, head of the Chinese government delegation, during the Soviet-Chinese talks on February 10, 1961, and by Chou En-lai in August 1961. Later, however, in complete contradiction to this explanation, Peking tried to shift full responsibility for the curtailment of economic co-operation to ... the Soviet Union.

The construction of many enterprises in China, carried on with Soviet assistance, was halted. These projects were turned into "museums" for discrediting Soviet economic aid. To this end name-plates were torn off Soviet-made machine-tools, and Soviet equipment was deliberately damaged and dismantled. They were then "exhibited" to convince the Chinese people and foreign visitors that the Soviet Union was "unscrupulous" in its aid to China.

Many similar instances could be cited, but it is sufficiently clear that the Chinese organizations did not act in good faith and that this attitude was deliberate and premeditated. However, this did not stop the Chinese propagandists and officials from issuing slanderous statements to the effect that the Soviet Union had unilaterally suspended deliveries of equipment to Chinese enterprises.

It is now clear that the political aim behind the policy wrecking Soviet-Chinese co-operation was to belittle the USSR in the eyes of the Chinese people, whip up anti-Sovietism and consolidate the great-power course.

In an official letter addressed to the CPSU Central Committee of February 29, 1964, the CPC Central Committee stooped so low as to assert that there had, in fact, never been any Soviet aid to China, that there had merely been ordinary "trade operations". Such an assertion was undoubtedly needed by those who sought to justify the Maoist policy. However, one cannot blot out the facts of history

even if these facts do not suit the Chinese leaders. It would be pertinent to recall a number of facts relating to the history of Soviet-Chinese relations which prove that the Soviet Union had rendered friendly, disinterested aid to the People's Republic of China.

In 1952, in accordance with the agreement signed between the USSR and China on February 14, 1950, the Soviet government granted the Chinese government, without compensation, the rights to the joint management of the Changchun Railway together with all its assets.

In October 1954 the Soviet government turned over to China without compensation the installations of the Port Arthur naval base which the Soviet Union had repaired or built anew.

More than 200 large modern enterprises were reconstructed and rebuilt in China with Soviet assistance, among them the Anshan, Wuhan, Paotow and Penki iron and steel works, the alloy-steel mill in Tsitsihar, and major centres of the chemical industry in the cities of Kirin, Taiyuan and Lanchow. In 1959 the industrial enterprises built and reconstructed with Soviet aid accounted for 35-40 per cent of China's total output of cast iron, steel and rolled metal, 85 per cent of lorries and tractors, 40 per cent of electric power and up to 35 per cent of the products of the heavy engineering industry.

There was a time when Peking spared no words in praising the fruitful scientific and technical co-operation between the Soviet Union and the PRC and the training of Chinese national personnel in the USSR.

Indeed, the Soviet Union rendered China tremendous scientific and technical aid. China received about 50 per cent of all the technical documents which the USSR placed at the disposal of the social-

ist countries. By July 1, 1957, China had designed 159 projects and started more than 300 important new types of production using Soviet technical specifications. Over a period of about ten years the Soviet Union furnished China (for all practical purposes gratis) with 24,000 sets of scientific and technical documents. According to foreign experts, had China bought these documents on the world market it would have cost her thousands of millions of dollars.

More than 900 Soviet instructors were sent to China in the 1949-59 period, some 500 of them specialists in the technical sciences. Soviet specialists trained about 17,000 young Chinese teachers for the country's educational establishments and research centres. Nine hundred laboratories were organized at Chinese institutions of higher learning with the help of Soviet scientists. In addition, a large army of Chinese specialists improved their skills as a result of working with Soviet experts. These are only a few instances of Soviet aid to China which was once widely acclaimed in the People's Republic of China. And here is what Mao Tse-tung said in 1957: "Let us see who designed and equipped so many important plants for us. Was it the United States or Britain? No. Only the Soviet Union agrees to do this, because it is a socialist country and our ally." *Jenmin jihpao (People's Daily)* said in February 1959: "Soviet aid to economic construction in our country, both in its quantity and scope, is unprecedented in history."

The question of Soviet credits to China is often talked about in Peking. The CPC leaders present the matter in such a way as to suggest that the long-term Soviet credits were of no importance for China.

Is this so? The USSR had granted China long-term loans amounting to 1,816 million roubles. The

loan of 300 million U.S. dollars (at one per cent interest) granted to China by the Soviet Union on February 14, 1950, was earmarked and used for paying for deliveries of Soviet machines, plant equipment and materials. In 1954 the Soviet Union turned over to the People's Republic of China its share of property in the Soviet-Chinese joint-stock societies and granted China a long-term interest-free loan of 62.6 million roubles to pay for this property. In 1960 Soviet organizations delivered equipment, materials and other commodities to China to the sum of 288 million roubles on the basis of an interest-free loan. A major part of the Soviet credits was intended for China's economic development, primarily for the development of the heavy industry.

The Soviet Union provided invaluable, virtually gratuitous aid to the new republic in strengthening its defences. This assistance was not confined to the sale of weapons as the Maoists are insisting today. During the Korean war the existence of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance, and the fact that the Soviet Union had alerted its armed forces in the Far East (in Port Arthur and Dalny) served as the main deterrents preventing the United States from expanding its aggression and intervening directly against the People's Republic of China. During the Korean war, the Soviet Union dispatched a number of air force divisions which protected the air space of China's northeast area against American air raids at the request of China's leaders. Many Soviet pilots lost their lives defending the sovereignty and independence of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Union's assistance to China in strengthening its defences serves as an example of genuine internationalism and loyalty to allied duty. The So-

viet Union met the numerous requests of China's government by helping build a large number of arms manufacturing plants in the 1950s. In the period between 1950 and 1963 about 100 large arms manufacturing establishments were built and launched in China with Soviet participation. The government of the Soviet Union apportioned from its own available reserves a large amount of weapons and material to re-equip infantry divisions of the People's Liberation Army of China. The USSR also handed over to China equipment at Port Arthur. In the 1950s the Soviet Union dispatched a large number of its specialists to help China organize production and master the use of weapons brought from the Soviet Union specially for China's armed forces. Thanks to the military assistance received before 1960, China was able to spend less than 10 per cent of her budget for military purposes.

In the 1960s the PRC government, acting on its own initiative, stepped up repayments on Soviet loans to clear its debt to the Soviet Union before the specified time. This action was contrary to common sense since the Chinese economy was experiencing grave difficulties. This was repeatedly pointed out to Peking by the Soviet government. At first such irrational actions on the part of Peking were somewhat puzzling. But subsequently it became clear that this was done to discredit the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Chinese people. Maoist propaganda began to spread absolutely unfounded allegations; it contended that the USSR, ignoring China's difficulties, had "demanded repayment of the loans before the specified time", thereby causing additional hardships for the Chinese people, and that it was "striving to use the credits as a means of punishing China for its ideological opposition to the CPSU". Thus, little by little the Maoist leadership built up an "ex-

planation" for the growing difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations.

In the early sixties Peking began to misrepresent the nature of trade relations between the two countries, asserting that the Soviet Union was using trade to "exert political pressure on China", although only a short time before the CPC leaders had described Soviet-Chinese trade as a form of "selfless aid to China on the part of the USSR rendered in the spirit of internationalism".

In the letter of the CPC Central Committee of February 29, 1964, and in numerous articles in the Chinese press the amount of food and ore which China had delivered to the Soviet Union in exchange for equipment and materials was stated.

Since the Chinese side continues to speculate on these facts, it would be appropriate to point out certain details. If one looks at the structure of Chinese exports to the USSR in those years, one sees that in addition to important commodities China delivered to the Soviet Union a large quantity of goods which she could not have hoped to sell on the capitalist market. Much of the Chinese exports to the Soviet Union consisted of consumer goods, such as household articles, clothes, handicraft wares, sports equipment, etc. The share of these commodities in the total volume of Chinese exports to the Soviet Union in 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 was 39, 46, 63, 67 and 70 per cent respectively. The USSR was the main buyer of this type of Chinese goods, and accounted for 60 per cent of the total volume of such commodities exported by China in 1962. It cannot be said that these goods were of vital necessity to the Soviet Union and that Soviet industry could not meet the requirements of the Soviet people for these commodities. In importing these Chinese goods, the USSR was motivated by a sincere desire to alleviate

the economic difficulties of the People's Republic of China.

Soviet exports to China until 1963 totalled 7,655 million roubles, with machines and equipment accounting for 2,790 million roubles, and raw materials and manufactured goods accounting for 2,674 million roubles.

In other words, the Soviet Union spared no efforts to help China become an industrially developed state, supplying her, on the request of the Chinese side, with modern engineering equipment and the most up-to-date industrial technology.

However, despite these facts, Peking maintains that the CPSU "opposes the industrialization of fraternal states" and allegedly tries to preserve their status as agrarian countries.

Today we raise the question of Soviet aid to China, not to brag or to reproach Peking, but to demonstrate the provocative nature of Peking's charges that the USSR is pursuing a policy of "discrimination and pressure" towards China, and to expose attempts to distort Soviet economic policies in respect to China, the socialist states and the developing nations.

The contention of Chinese propaganda that the Chinese food deliveries to the Soviet Union in the early sixties were one of the reasons for the grave economic difficulties experienced by the Chinese people in the period following the failure of the policy of "leaps", is also groundless. In actual fact, the share of food products in the total volume of Chinese deliveries (previously agreed on) to the USSR in 1960 was a mere 20 per cent. Soviet purchases of Chinese food products in 1960 accounted for an insignificant share of the total volume produced in China: 0.6 per cent of the rice crop, 3.7 per cent of

the soya beans, 2.7 per cent of the vegetable oil, and less than 3 per cent of the meat and meat products. It is difficult to believe that this amount of food would have saved the Chinese people from hunger and privation which actually resulted from the adventurist policies of the Peking leaders. Therefore, this propaganda is nothing but an attempt to put the blame for their own failure on somebody else.

And it is not accidental that Peking remains silent about the fact that in late 1960, in connection with the famine in China caused by the "three red banners" policy, the Soviet Union waived Chinese food deliveries which were already under contract, and subsequently stopped all purchases of food products from China. And it was only in 1964, in response to urgent demands by the Chinese government, that the Soviet Union agreed to include a certain quantity of food products (about 8 per cent of the total volume of Chinese exports to the USSR) in the list of imports from China.

The letter of the CPC Central Committee (February 29, 1964), which completely misrepresented the causes of the difficulties in Soviet-Chinese relations, asserted that the price of Soviet goods delivered to China was "much higher" than the world prices. It should be noted here that each year, at the start of the negotiations with Chinese representatives on the trade protocol for the following year, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade asked the Chinese side to express its views on the prices of Soviet commodities. The Chinese representatives invariably replied that they saw no reason for a revision of the prices. Such was the case with the talks held in May 1964, or two months after the appearance of the above-mentioned letter of the CPC Central Committee. It was not surprising that the Chinese side had declined to review the prices, since they were, as a rule,

set in favour of China, and this was also a form of aid to the Chinese people.

Having taken the course of aggravating Sino-Soviet relations in the early sixties, the Chinese government began to evade fulfilment of the commitments which it had taken under the agreements on the joint construction of economic projects necessary both for the Soviet Union and China. The two sides had undertaken to build the Lanchow (China)-Aktagai (USSR) railway. The Soviet Union fulfilled its commitments on schedule, completing its section as early as 1958. But the Chinese side suspended all construction work on its section after 1960 without even giving a reason for its actions. The construction of the Soviet section of the railway entailed considerable expenditure. And the section of the railway line on Chinese territory remains uncompleted.

In April 1962 the Soviet Union proposed that the two countries jointly work out concrete measures for large-scale development and utilization of the natural resources in the Amur river basin. The Chinese side rejected the proposal. Later it became clear why the Chinese government declined to take part in peaceful projects in the river Amur basin: subsequent developments showed that Peking wanted to use this district for quite different purposes, for carrying out provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border.

While casting aspersions on the policies of the Soviet Union in the field of economic co-operation and trade, the Chinese leaders keep silent about the numerous proposals made by the USSR on the development of trade and economic ties between the two countries. These proposals in 1963-64 included the granting of easy-term credits to China over a period of 15-20 years to help China develop her export resources, exchange of information in the field

of foreign trade, and co-ordination of foreign trade operations on the capitalist market, which would have been to the advantage of both countries. The Soviet Union repeatedly proposed the conclusion of a long-term trade agreement and long-term trade contracts under which the Soviet Union would deliver to China some traditional commodities. Unfortunately, however, all these proposals were left unanswered.

On the Question of Soviet Specialists in China and Scientific and Technical Co-operation

Peking continues its attempts to use the question of Soviet specialists in China to discredit the internationalist policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government and thus to blame China's economic setbacks during the period of "leaps" on the Soviet Union. The CPSU and the Soviet government have time and again, referring to documents and facts, explained the real reasons why the question arose.

Until 1960 more than 10,000 Soviet specialists were sent to the People's Republic of China. These specialists readily shared their experience with the Chinese people.

The work of the Soviet specialists must have been useful since the Chinese leaders themselves highly praised it and urged the Chinese people to study the Soviet experience. In his report to the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China Chou En-lai said: "Specialists from the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy working in our country have made an outstanding contribution to our socialist construction." And Deputy Premier of China's State Council, Li Fuchun, had this to say

(May 29, 1959): "Our assessment, and it is a firm one, is as follows: the enterprises designed and built in our country with the help of the Soviet Union indeed embody the most up-to-date and best that the USSR has at its disposal. These enterprises are the backbone of our industry, not only in terms of volume, but also in terms of the advanced level of technology. . . We have always known, and facts confirm that all the Soviet specialists, and designing organizations really exerted every effort to make these enterprises the best in the world, to make them an embodiment of the experience of the Soviet Union. And they have achieved this aim. Such is our assessment of the aid rendered to China by Soviet organizations and specialists." Similar statements were made by other Chinese leaders.

The Soviet Union carefully followed the development of relations between the Soviet specialists and the local personnel. Seeking to promote the rapid growth of a technical intelligentsia in China, the Soviet side made sure that the specialists from the USSR did not hamper the progress of the Chinese personnel. That is why in 1956, 1957 and 1958 the Soviet side officially raised the following question with the Peking leaders: was it not time to recall the Soviet specialists? In reply to this question the Chinese leaders invariably requested that the Soviet specialists be permitted to continue their work in China.

In 1958-59 there were numerous indications of a change in Peking's attitude towards the Soviet specialists. At the time Peking was carrying out the Maoist policy of the "three red banners", and since the Soviet specialists could not support the adventurist proposals which ran counter to technological standards, they were derided and regarded as bearers of "technological backwardness" and "conservat-

ism", and their suggestions and recommendations were ignored. Maoist adventurism in the field of technology and production frequently led to serious accidents in which people were killed or maimed.

The Soviet specialists were treated with unconcealed mistrust and suspicion. Their belongings were secretly searched and they were subjected to various forms of harassment. This attitude on the part of the Chinese authorities was an insult to the Soviet specialists, and they protested against such treatment. Thus, a Soviet specialist, Zosimenko, told Wan Tao-han, Deputy Minister of the First Engineering Ministry: "When I worked in Germany in 1937 my suitcase was searched quite frequently, and that was understandable. But I cannot understand why the same thing is happening here."

Having set the aim of forcing the Soviet Union to recall its specialists from China and thus further aggravating Sino-Soviet relations, the Maoist leadership tried to impose their anti-Leninist views on the Soviet specialists and incite them against the CPSU and the Soviet government. Such actions evoked the just indignation of the Soviet specialists who asked the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government that they be permitted to dispute these provocative activities or that they be sent home.

The Soviet Union was faced with the following choice: either to permit the Soviet specialists to argue their point, which would inevitably further worsen the situation, or to recall them and thereby prevent clashes. Before taking a decision on this matter, the Soviet government appealed to the Maoist leadership to create normal conditions for the work of Soviet specialists in China. Otherwise, it warned the Chinese side, it would be compelled to recall the specialists. Since the Chinese side failed to respond to these numerous requests and appeals,

a note was sent to the PRC government on July 16, 1960, stating officially that given the existing circumstances the Soviet government had no other alternative but to recall its specialists from China.

The Chinese government did not even consider it necessary to reply to this note. And it was only after the first groups of Soviet specialists had left China that the Peking foreign ministry formally requested that they remain. At the same time the Chinese side insisted on its "right" to carry on work among the Soviet specialists directed against the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

The stand taken by Peking only proved once again that the Chinese leaders did not really want the Soviet specialists to remain in China. It shows that after 1958 the presence of these specialists was a source of embarrassment for the Maoists, and they tried to create an atmosphere which would make it impossible for the Soviet specialists to stay. They did everything in their power to have the specialists recalled. It should be noted that in subsequent years Peking turned down repeated Soviet proposals for the return of the specialists to China provided normal conditions were created for their work. Such a proposal was stated, for instance, in the letter of the CPSU Central Committee of November 29, 1963 to the CPC Central Committee.

Meanwhile, Chinese propaganda clamours that the ill-intentioned recall of the Soviet specialists created serious difficulties for China.

It became clear that the question of the Soviet specialists had from the very start been deliberately used to carry on the schismatic, anti-Soviet struggle which the leadership of the Communist Party of China had unleashed in the early sixties. The above-mentioned letter of the CPC Central Committee of February 29, 1964, and other Chinese publications

maintained that the departure of the Soviet specialists had adversely affected the implementation of China's economic plans. This is a groundless assertion since Peking's national economic plans (if we can speak of economic planning at all with respect to the country that formulated the "great leap" policy) were a failure in such sectors as agriculture, coal mining and transportation, where there were either no Soviet specialists at all or their number was so small that their work could in no way have had any decisive effect on the course of events.

Out of a total number of 1,390 Soviet specialists in China in that period 977 worked in the engineering ministries and 110 in the metallurgical industry; together they accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the total number of Soviet specialists working in China. Judging even by Chinese figures, the operation of China's modern metallurgical and engineering enterprises proceeded in a more or less satisfactory manner. It was the so-called "small metallurgy" and the "traditional" (cottage) industry that failed to produce any results. And the Soviet specialists had absolutely nothing to do with these branches of China's national economy.

How many Soviet specialists were engaged in those branches of China's economy which had had the worst setbacks? Four Soviet specialists worked in the coal-mining industry, 4 in the ministry of transport, 4 in the ministry of light industry, 3 in the state-farm ministry, and 1 in the ministry of agriculture. A large number of specialists (140) were engaged in work which had nothing to do with economic development. They worked in the field of culture, the health services and other non-productive spheres. Thus, no one can seriously say that China's grave economic setbacks were caused by the departure of the Soviet specialists.

The letter of the CPC Central Committee of February 29, 1964 stated frankly that China, in general, had no need for any Soviet specialists. But if this is so, why then has Chinese propaganda raised such a hue and cry about this issue? Why has Peking invented the myth that the recalling of the Soviet specialists from China affected the country's economic situation and was the reason for the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations? It is quite obvious that the question of the Soviet specialists, created by the Maoists, was a pretext for inciting and fanning anti-Soviet sentiments among the Chinese people.

The letter of February 29, 1964 and subsequent statements made by the CPC leadership contended that the Soviet government had "struck off 257 subjects from the list of topics for scientific and technical co-operation" between the USSR and China. However, documents pertaining to this question show exactly the opposite. It was the Chinese side that introduced a proposal on October 31, 1960 on the revision of all existing agreements and protocols on scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries. Then on February 12, 1961 the Chinese representatives at the talks on scientific and technical co-operation submitted the draft of a letter to the Soviet delegation proposing that the following documents be regarded as invalid: the agreement on scientific and technical co-operation between the USSR and China signed on October 12, 1954; the agreement concluded between the Soviet and Chinese governments on January 18, 1958 on important joint research work in the field of science and technology and on Soviet aid to China in this work, and other agreements and protocols on scientific and technical co-operation concluded between the ministries and departments of the con-

tracting parties on the basis of the above-mentioned agreements. In taking these actions the Chinese government annulled the commitments of the Soviet Union to provide China with technical documentation (on 1,129 subjects) and invite Chinese specialists to the USSR to study Soviet achievements in the field of science and technology (on 26 subjects); and it also annulled China's commitments to provide the Soviet Union with technical documentation (on 159 subjects) and play host to Soviet specialists (whose work in China would cover 68 subjects).

Thus, the Soviet Union cannot be blamed for the curtailment of scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries. The curtailment was due to the actions of the Chinese government, and the reason for this was the same: Peking was in the process of reorienting its policy, turning it from one of friendship with the USSR to one of hostility and confrontation.

In those years China was also curtailing its economic ties with the other socialist countries. Thus, in 1962 Peking's trade turnover with the CMEA countries decreased 2.8 times as compared to 1959, and in 1963 it dropped by another 20 per cent.

Border Blackmail

The policy of the petty-bourgeois nationalists in the Chinese leadership, aimed at creating tension in relations between China and the USSR, can be clearly seen in Peking's attitude to the question of the Soviet-Chinese border.

For a period of ten years after the formation of the People's Republic of China, peace and tranquillity reigned along the Soviet-Chinese border

which stretches for more than 7,500 kilometres. The two sides rendered each other assistance in coping with natural calamities in the border zone; the Soviet authorities always complied with all the requests of the Chinese side to allow Chinese citizens to graze cattle, chop wood and fish in some Soviet border areas. Extensive research was carried on in the joint exploration and utilization of the resources of the border rivers.

In the sixties, the Chinese government increasingly tried to aggravate tension along the border and create a so-called "territorial problem". Naturally, the Soviet government did not fail to notice that Chinese claims to Soviet territory which had been reported in some Chinese newspapers in 1957, had not met with any condemnation in China. Subsequently, Chinese officials openly began to repeat the charges made by bourgeois elements in China during their anti-socialist campaign in 1957.¹

Documents published in the press show that in the early sixties Chinese citizens and border-guards were instructed to enter and settle in border areas on Soviet territory and on Soviet islands in the rivers Amur and Ussuri. Acting on direct orders from Peking, Chinese border-guards and citizens began to provoke incidents: they threatened to use weapons against Soviet residents, staged provocative attacks on border posts, and tried to kidnap or capture Soviet border-guards. Peking's aim was to create tensions on the border and provoke retaliation on the part of the Soviet border-guards, which would have been a pretext for fanning chauvinistic sentiments among the Chinese people and imbuing them with hatred for Soviet people. Subsequent de-

¹ In those years during the campaign of "the struggle with the Right" China openly declared her claims to Soviet territory.

velopments, especially the events on Damanski Island in 1969, revealed more fully the designs of the Maoists.

Their immediate aim was to establish anti-Sovietism as a long-term party and state policy. This was done at the 9th, 10th and 11th CPC Congresses, and also at the adoption of the PRC Constitution (1975). The more distant goal was to call in question and, if possible, challenge the legality of the existing borders between the USSR and China and thus to "substantiate" Mao Tse-tung's statement, made during a meeting with Japanese specialists in 1964, about the "seizure of 1.5 million square kilometres of Chinese territory by Russia."

Proceeding from the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet government displayed patience and restraint in the face of the numerous provocations staged by the Chinese authorities in the border areas. From the very beginning the Soviet government expressed its readiness to hold friendly consultations with the Chinese side on the adjustment of certain sections of the border and normalization of the situation. This was stated in a Soviet foreign ministry note of November 29, 1960. The Chinese government did not even reply to this note. And it was only on April 19, 1963, after numerous Soviet proposals on consultations, that the Chinese foreign ministry expressed a willingness to hold talks with the Soviet Union. These consultations were held in Peking in 1964 and yielded almost no result due to the stand taken by the Chinese side.

For nearly four years (1960-64) the Maoists staged provocations and border incidents, stirring up tensions along the frontiers and finally turned the border issue into a "major political and territorial problem". The number of deliberate Chinese prov-

ocations steadily increased. In 1960 there were about 400 border incidents engineered by the Chinese; in 1962 there were more than 5,000 such incidents. And in 1963 more than 4,000 provocative incursions into Soviet territory by a total of more than 100,000 Chinese citizens, acting in accordance with written instructions from Peking, took place in the vicinity of the rivers Argun, Amur, and Ussuri alone. It should be noted here that in the early sixties the Chinese leaders themselves had absolutely no doubts about the correctness of the Sino-Soviet border demarcation.

At a press-conference in Katmandu on April 28, 1960, Chou En-lai was asked whether there were any disputed sections of the border between the USSR and China. Chou En-lai replied that there were "insignificant differences on the maps. It is very easy to resolve them by peaceful means".

The Maoists often refer to the fact that the tsarist government imposed unequal treaties on China. But it is common knowledge that the Soviet state abrogated all the unequal treaties which the tsarist government either independently or jointly with other imperialist powers imposed on China. Soviet Russia renounced the spheres of influence which tsarist Russia had had in China, cancelled the extritorial rights and consular jurisdiction, handed over to China Russia's share of the indemnity due it as a result of the Boxer Uprising to be used for the development of education in China, abolished the concessions, and returned to China the right of way of the Chinese Eastern Railway. All elements of inequality in the relations between Russia and China were completely eradicated. This fact was noted not only by Sun Yat-sen but also by Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders. It should be stressed that neither in the works of Len-

in, nor in any other documents of the CPSU and the Soviet government can one find even a single word about any intention to revise the border treaties and agreements.

The policy of rejecting the historical border line between our countries and creating an artificial "territorial problem" is a very dangerous policy. Lenin pointed out in his time: "Let the bourgeoisie start their filthy petty squabbles and their trading over frontiers, the workers of all countries and nationalities will not fall out over that sort of thing."¹

It may be recalled that Chou En-lai once told Edgar Snow (October 1960) that if everyone began to settle old scores dating back to historical times, the world would be plunged into a state of chaos. Thus the United States, for example, would again have to submit to British domination since it had become independent less than 200 years ago.

Peking never tires of emphasizing that it has successfully settled its border issues and signed border treaties with nearly all of its neighbours: Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Mongolia. However, one cannot help noticing that the Maoists have not ceased provocations on the borders with their neighbours, and have deliberately left unresolved the border questions with India and the Soviet Union. In analyzing the Maoists' stand on territorial questions, one should turn to China's history and consider the expansionist aspirations of the Chinese emperors and the chauvinistic claims of the Chinese nationalists who dreamed of the return of the "golden age" of the Chinese empire when many of China's neighbours were her vassals. Incidentally, if one were to follow the sinister logic of Peking,

¹ Lenin, *Coll. Works*, Vol. 26, p. 344.

which is based on such dreams and aspirations, it would be necessary to recarve the map of present-day Asia. Thus, the question of which period of history should be taken as a basis for the revision of the map of Asia arises—the period when the entire Chinese state occupied a small territory, or the period when feudal China attained heights of power and spread its influence to neighbouring areas and nations? It is crystal clear that in pressing their territorial claims the Maoists pursue far-reaching expansionist aims which can be summed up as great-Han hegemony, and this explains the Maoist incitement of anti-Sovietism.

The policy of artificially creating tensions on the Sino-Soviet border led to the mass crossing of residents of the Sinkiang autonomous area into the territory of the USSR. More than sixty thousand residents of Sinkiang, mainly Kazakhs and Uigurs, crossed the border into the Soviet Union in the spring of 1962. They said that they took this step because they could not accept Peking's policy of national discrimination and oppression.

The stream of ragged and hungry refugees, among them many old people and children, which unexpectedly began to cross the border into the USSR, presented the Soviet government with a difficult problem. The Soviet authorities spared no efforts to alleviate the plight of the refugees. Simultaneously, they asked the Chinese government to take urgent measures to stop the mass border violations. They suggested that Peking send its representatives to the area who, jointly with Soviet representatives, would persuade the people who had crossed into Soviet territory to return to China.

The question seemed to be quite clear: there had been a gross violation of the Soviet border. Regarding China as a fraternal country, the Soviet govern-

ment offered to settle this incident in a friendly manner. What attitude did the Chinese leadership take to this question? Peking brusquely rejected the proposed consultations and a humane settlement of the question. Declining to take any measures to stop the mass crossing of Sinkiang residents into Soviet territory, which, incidentally, continued for more than one month, the Chinese government demanded that the Soviet border-guards "use force to turn back the refugees".

One may well ask: why did not the Chinese authorities, which could not but know that scores of thousands of Sinkiang residents were preparing to flee the country, take steps to prevent this? Why did the Chinese border authorities, which witnessed the massing of thousands upon thousands of refugees and their movement towards the Soviet frontier, do nothing to stop this, but, instead, according to the refugees, give them every possible assistance? Chinese officials in Kuldja and Chuguchak told those who asked for permission to go to the Soviet Union that they "could go without visas", i.e. that they could cross the border without official permission. The Chinese authorities freely sold tickets to people who wanted to go to the border posts by motor transport, and the luggage of the refugees followed them in postal vans specially provided for the occasion. Every day 10-12 lorries, carrying 40-50 people each, left Kuldja in the direction of the border. Several kilometres from the border the passengers disembarked and, with the encouragement of the Chinese authorities, crossed the border on foot.

It is quite obvious that the mass border crossings took place with the direct connivance of the Chinese authorities who hoped to use this as a convenient pretext for further aggravating Sino-Soviet relations; at the same time this "cleared" the future

atomic testing ground (into which Sinkiang has now been turned) from the presence of undesirable witnesses—citizens of non-Chinese nationality. The implementation of this design was both provocative and sinister.

It should be noted that whereas at first the PRC government officially described the exodus of Sinkiang residents as an "unfortunate incident", in its subsequent documents it accused the Soviet Union of "subversive activities in China's border districts", of "provoking the flight of tens of thousands of Chinese citizens to the USSR", etc.

The CPC leadership failed in its attempts to mislead its own people and the people of other countries; it also failed to shift the responsibility for the gross blunders in its domestic policy which led to the mass flight from China of thousands of people, mainly from among the national minorities, onto the Soviet Union. The years 1960-62 witnessed the flight of tens of thousands of Chinese citizens not only to the Soviet Union, but also to other countries bordering on China. Is the Soviet Union "responsible" for this too? Or perhaps it is Soviet representatives who are to blame for the fact that people have fled and continue to flee from China to, say, Hong Kong or Macao?

Meanwhile the Soviet authorities tried to persuade those who had crossed the border from Sinkiang into the Soviet Union without permission to return to China. As a result of the stand taken by the Soviet side, more than 500 of the refugees who had illegally crossed the border, expressed the desire to return to China in the summer of 1963. This could have served as a good example for the others and marked the beginning of the gradual return to China of a considerable number of the people who had

crossed the border in the spring of 1962. But the Chinese authorities refused to receive the refugees. Moreover over a period of two years the Chinese government stubbornly turned down Soviet proposals to hold consultations to discuss the matter; the Chinese authorities also refused to conduct talks and meet with people who had gone to the USSR. In response to the Soviet proposal on June 19, 1964 the PRC foreign ministry again refused to admit individuals wishing to return to China, and demanded that the entire group of "more than 60 thousand people" be unconditionally handed over to the People's Republic of China. The PRC government insisted that the Soviet government "resort to force" and use arms to make the thousands of refugees return to China. Peking was well aware of course that the Soviet people would never take such a criminal, inhumane course. At the same time, the PRC foreign ministry rejected the Soviet proposal to send Chinese representatives to do explanatory work among the people who had crossed the border, and declared that the PRC government "would never agree to this". It is clear that in this case, too, the Maoists were not interested in a settlement of the question, but did everything possible to confuse the issue in pursuance of quite definite political aims.

Gross Interference

The hostile policy of Peking toward the USSR was most clearly seen in its open attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the early sixties. Such interference runs counter not only to the principles of relations between socialist states and the principles underlying the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of February 14, 1950, but

also to the generally accepted norms of relations between states.

The CPC leadership decided that it had the right to engage in anti-Soviet propaganda not only in China but in the Soviet Union as well. It took upon itself the task of "educating" the Soviet people. Maoists flaunt slogans such as the "party-the father", etc., and pin labels on others. But these phrases refer to Peking's pretensions, great-Han actions. In the early sixties, accredited representatives of Chinese organizations in the Soviet Union, Chinese students, tourists, attendants of the Peking-Moscow express train and members of Chinese delegations began hostile propaganda on the territory of the USSR. They tried to distribute slanderous publications among Soviet people and to spread provocative rumours and fabrications. The same aims were served by the broadcasts in the Russian language beamed to the Soviet Union by Radio Peking. These broadcasts were full of "advice" to the Soviet people on how to "build socialism", how to "defend the revolution", etc.

In the West "Sovietologists" rubbed their hands in glee and watched while Peking and its representatives abroad did everything in their power to spread the most appalling fabrications about the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet people, about the "degeneration" of Soviet society, the restoration of capitalism in the USSR, etc.

In response to official protests about the gross violation of the sovereignty of the USSR, the PRC foreign ministry, in its note of March 7, 1964, declared, that the Chinese authorities "reserved the right to continue such work."

For almost 20 years now Peking has been stubbornly striving to incite the Soviet people against

the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Chinese broadcasts contain numerous provocative appeals directed against the Soviet government. When our class enemies engage in such activities, Soviet people regard them as the most shameful provocations. So how are they to regard such activities when they are carried out by those who profess loyalty to socialism? One can only express surprise that the Peking leaders have still not realized the fruitlessness of their attempts to alienate the Soviet people from the CPSU, and the mass of party members from its Central Committee. The Soviet people have time and again voiced their strong protest against the subversive activities of the Maoists.

Due to their very nature, the Maoist activities against the Soviet Union cannot be regarded as the result of ideological differences between the CPSU and the CPC, as Peking tried to present the matter in the sixties. It has now become clear that these differences were of secondary importance to the Chinese leaders who used them primarily to justify their anti-Soviet activities. The Maoists have long forgotten the debate over the vital problems of our times; the debate was only a pretext devised by Peking for inciting conflict in the early sixties.

Indeed, can anyone really think that ideological differences justified, or even explained, the armed provocations on the Sino-Soviet border, the subversive activities against the Soviet Union in the international arena, etc.? Political struggle against the USSR and other socialist states, involving the use of a wide range of the most underhanded means and methods, constitutes the true "platform" of the Maoists, and no amount of denial will enable them to conceal this fact. In their exposition of the "theory of three myths" the Peking leaders speak directly about the need to form a "broad front" of na-

tions, including imperialist countries, to launch an "all-out campaign against the Soviet Union".

The Chinese leaders never tire of saying that they are ready to wage an uncompromising struggle "for ten thousand years" for their "general line", and will continue their attempts to impose it on all the revolutionary forces of our times. The Soviet Communist Party and the fraternal parties of the whole world, true to the ideas and views outlined in the documents of the Moscow Meetings which they jointly drafted, will not compromise on questions of principle; they will not retreat an inch from Marxism-Leninism, and will consistently strive for the consolidation of the socialist community and the entire world communist movement on the only true basis—Marxist-Leninist teaching. But no matter how sharp the ideological differences have been, the Soviet Union has never permitted them to affect inter-state relations between the USSR and China.

When difficulties first appeared in relations between the CPSU and the CPC, the Soviet Communist Party did not merely issue general statements but, acting in the spirit of internationalism, put forward concrete proposals for restoring and developing economic and cultural ties and for co-ordinating the foreign-policy activities of the USSR and China. In the letter of the CPSU Central Committee of November 29, 1963 and in other documents of the CPSU and the Soviet government an extensive programme was outlined for the development of Sino-Soviet relations. We will not treat the later period which was given detailed treatment in a number of Soviet publications.

However, the CPC Central Committee did not show the slightest desire to respond to the initiative of the CPSU. The letter of the CPC Central Committee of February 29, 1963 ignored all the con-

structive Soviet proposals; the Maoists invented new pretexts for the aggravation of Soviet-Chinese relations, and resorted to the most shameless falsification of facts. All this showed that the Chinese leaders were not in the least interested in a normalization of the situation. On the contrary, they did everything in their power to heighten tensions between China and the USSR, and pursued an increasingly hostile policy with respect to the Soviet Union.

This was vividly demonstrated by the "eighth" and "ninth" articles in the series of so-called replies to the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee of July 14, 1963, which were published in *Jenmin jih-pao* and the magazine *Hungchi* in 1963. These articles were full of absurd lies and fabrications about the Soviet social and state system and abounded in insulting remarks about the CPSU. Their authors, in a paroxysm of hate, failed to notice that they were slandering not so much the USSR as the fundamental ideas and principles of socialism: public ownership of the means of production, the leading role of the communist party and socialist democracy. Peking continues to escalate its anti-Soviet policy.

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A prominent place in the Maoists' arsenal of fabrications is their allegation that the Soviet Union sought to put China under its "military control". They allege that in 1958 the Soviet Union proposed to China the creation of a "mixed Sino-Soviet navy" and even insisted on setting up a joint command of this navy. The Maoists also spread such falsifications through official channels. Thus, in October 1973 China's Minister of Foreign Affairs told this lie at the UN General Assembly. It is also a standing theme of Chinese officials in their talks with foreign visitors.

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What are the true facts? In 1958 the government of the People's Republic of China officially requested that the Soviet Union help strengthen its navy. Since the nature of this request was not quite clear, and since the problems it raised were complicated, the Soviet side proposed holding consultations to study the possibility of helping China build its navy, and then find a solution by joint efforts. Thus, the matter in hand was not the creation of a "joint Sino-Soviet naval force" or the formation of a "joint command", but the setting up of a joint fact-finding mission to see what should be done to re-equip China's navy and what part the Soviet Union could play in this project.

However, Mao Tse-tung and his retinue grossly distorted this Soviet proposal and apparently decided to use it as a "time bomb" in their anti-Soviet policy and a pretext for heightening tension. And today, the Maoists have turned this question into a dangerous propaganda device.

At one time Mao Tse-tung admitted that the request for the construction of a naval force for the People's Republic of China had come from China's side. He even said that it was precisely the Chinese who had "drafted a project to this effect, discussed it and then sent their request to Moscow". At that time the Soviet side pointed out that in view of the complexity of the problem it would be better to discuss it in Moscow. It was made quite clear to the Chinese side that the question of who commanded whom, just like the question of Soviet bases, would not even be brought up.

After repeated explanations Mao Tse-tung was compelled to say that "all the black clouds have been dispersed" and that "the question has been closed". Thus the question of a "mixed naval force"

was inspired by China's leadership for a clearly provocative purpose.

The Maoists present the question of the construction of a radio station to provide a radio link between ships in the Pacific ocean in the same way. In their statements, like the statement to the Japanese press, the Maoists describe this episode as a Soviet attempt to "violate the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China".

It is true that at the Soviet-Chinese consultations held in 1958 the Soviet representatives emphasized that the Soviet Union made no claims on this station, and that it "must be the property of China". The Soviet side proposed to reach agreement on the building of this station on equal terms and expressed the view that the Chinese could use Soviet radio stations in the Far East for defence of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese representatives did not object to the building of the station and said that it could be constructed "with the money of the Chinese government" and "could be used jointly" by the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet proposal did not at all prejudice the interests of China's national sovereignty, but showed a desire to help the People's Republic of China. And as soon as China's representatives expressed their doubts (which they later built into an assertion about "the violation of China's sovereign rights"), the question of the building of the radio station was closed.

This and other episodes in the history of the Soviet-Chinese relations clearly show that the Maoists used various aspects of our inter-state relations for provocative purposes presenting China as an "injured party", or, more precisely, to create excuses for unleashing anti-Soviet campaigns.

Efforts of the CPSU to Normalize Soviet-Chinese Relations After the October Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1964)

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Important constructive work was carried out by the CPSU Central Committee in the field of Soviet-Chinese relations following its October 1964 Plenary Meeting. The CPSU Central Committee proceeded from the belief that although there were serious ideological differences it was nevertheless necessary to strive for unity in practical activities, above all in the struggle against imperialism, and to develop interstate ties. Supported by the other Marxist-Leninist parties, the CPSU unilaterally suspended its criticism of the views and activities of the CPC leadership in the press. This opened prospects for a resumption of direct contacts between the CPSU Central Committee and the CPC Central Committee. However, Peking did not reciprocate, and continued to engage in anti-Soviet propaganda. Nevertheless, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government invited a Chinese party and government delegation to come to Moscow for the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1964, hoping that top-level contacts would provide an opportunity to seek for ways to normalize Sino-Soviet relations.

The behaviour of the Chinese delegation in Moscow, which included Chou En-lai and Kang Sheng, showed that Peking tried to exert direct and gross pressure on the CPSU and make it abandon its principled positions. The Chinese delegation invented numerous "facts" which allegedly showed that the CPSU was "unfriendly" towards the CPC, and it tried to brainwash the leaders of other fraternal parties and countries who had come to Moscow, using

slogans such as "the bankruptcy of contemporary revisionism" and "the victory of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung", and to sow strife within the socialist community and the world communist movement.

The Chinese side demanded, unprecedented in the history of relations between sovereign parties, that the CPSU revise its policy based on the decisions of the 20th, 21st and 22nd congresses, the Programme of the Soviet Communist Party, and the documents of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Meetings, and adopt the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung", accept the notorious "25 points" of the Chinese "general line" as a theoretical basis, etc. In insisting on a revision of CPSU policy as an indispensable condition for the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, the CPC leaders tried not only to subordinate the CPSU to their influence, but also to clear the way for the establishment of their domination within the socialist community and the world revolutionary movement.

These attempts ended in failure. The Chinese delegation was told quite firmly that the political line of the CPSU Congresses and the Programme of the Soviet Communist Party expressed the will of the entire party and the Soviet people.

As for the concrete aspects of Soviet-Chinese relations, the CPSU clearly and explicitly outlined its position at the talks: it believed that it was in the common interest of the CPSU and the CPC to proceed not from the issues that divided them, but from those that united them, and that the right approach was to recognize the need to seek ways to normalize the situation once differences had arisen. The CPSU held that it was necessary to cease open polemics, discuss the question of joint measures which the CPSU and the CPC could take to strengthen the anti-imperialist front, and exchange views

of the practical aspects of Sino-Soviet inter-state relations.

The CPC leaders turned down the proposal on the suspension of open polemics. They also flatly rejected the CPSU proposal to keep the polemics within the boundary of comradely discussions.

However, the constructive proposals of the CPSU Central Committee were of no use to the Maoists who were pursuing quite different aims. The representatives of the CPC tried to poison the atmosphere of the meeting, using every possible pretext for this purpose. Under Peking's instructions they made every attempt to disrupt the work of the fraternal parties in preparing for an international meeting and in strengthening the unity of the world revolutionary movement.

The CPC delegation declined to consider concrete measures to consolidate the anti-imperialist front, and, as was subsequently revealed, it was not accidental that the Peking representatives were reluctant to discuss the question of Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations and did not put forward any positive proposals for their normalization.

The Soviet delegation then advanced an important new proposal: it called for holding a top-level meeting of representatives of the CPSU and the CPC (as soon as the Peking leadership was ready for such talks) to exchange views on a number of issues, restore relations of trust between the two parties and countries, and strengthen unity. The Soviet side was ready to convene such a meeting either in Moscow or Peking. But the CPC leaders did not support this proposal.

The Soviet side has made a number of constructive proposals to China, the realization of which could markedly ameliorate the climate of inter-state

relations. A list of some of these initiatives is sufficient for an unprejudiced person to see that the Soviet Union has been acting in good faith. The Soviet Union proposed on July 8, 1970, a joint statement of the principle by the governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China that they have no territorial claims and that they are determined to preserve the status quo and a normal border situation. This proposal was followed by the Soviet-sponsored draft treaty on the non-use of force, which was presented to the Chinese government on January 15, 1971, and by a proposal to sign a non-aggression treaty between the USSR and the PRC which would include a pledge not to attack the other party, not to use any weapon on land, sea or in the air, and not to threaten to make such attacks. The draft treaty was presented to the Chinese government on June 14, 1973. This and a host of other proposals on the development of co-operation and exchange in the fields of science, technology, public health service, sport, on Soviet and Chinese friendship societies, on the improvement of the conditions of navigation on the border sections of the rivers of the Amur basin, on the development of border area trade were made by the Soviet Union to China, in the last few months as well.

Thus the Soviet Union has shown, in word and in deed, that there are no problems dividing the USSR and the PRC that could not be resolved in the spirit of good-neighbourliness. The Soviet Union has always been ready to meet any constructive initiative coming from the Chinese side with understanding. However, no such initiatives have been forthcoming. Nor has there been any positive response to the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union. Many of them have been ignored and others rejected without any valid reason.

The Maoist leaders are compelled to dodge and prevaricate and invent all kinds of excuses to justify its reluctance to improve the Soviet-Chinese relations to world public opinion. The Peking leaders have invented what we might call two Chinese "vicious circles".

The first "vicious circle" consists of the following: they make even the slightest hint of improvement in the relations contingent on the settlement of the border problem. They also say that progress in the settlement of the "border problem" takes precedence over all other questions of Sino-Soviet relations. To them progress means Soviet acceptance of a number of their absurd and unacceptable demands, such as the recognition by the USSR of China's claims to thousands of square kilometers of Soviet territory even before the start of talks. And since the Soviet side rejects all these groundless claims, the Peking leaders refuse to discuss any other questions relating to Soviet-Chinese relations.

The second "vicious circle" concerns Soviet proposals on the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force, or a non-aggression treaty. The Peking leaders say that there is no need to sign such treaties, because the USSR and the PRC signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950. But every time the Soviet side proposes that the Chinese re-affirm their commitments under this treaty, the Peking leaders refuse. At the same time, in their conversations with foreign representatives, China's officials describe the 1950 Treaty with the Soviet Union as a "scrap of paper". Such is the logic of the Maoists, if you can call it logic.

The PRC leaders are trying in every possible way to conceal the truth about the Soviet Union's policy towards China and the efforts the Soviet Union is taking to improve Soviet-Chinese relations. The pos-

itive steps on the part of the Soviet Union aimed at normalizing the situation and creating favourable conditions for the development of relations at the governmental level, have either been ignored or grossly distorted by the Chinese leaders.

After Mao Tse-tung's death the Soviet Union took a number of steps proving its sincerity and readiness to improve relations with the People's Republic of China.

At the 31st session of the UN General Assembly which opened at the end of September, 1976, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who headed the Soviet delegation, said that the Soviet Union has always attached great significance to relations with the People's Republic of China. Normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, he said, would have a positive effect on the general situation in Asia and on the international situation as a whole. "Our position here in relation to the PRC was clearly defined by the decision of the 25th CPSU Congress. It remains in full force today," he explained.

Friendly feelings for the Chinese people were also expressed in the message of greeting sent by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the creation of the People's Republic of China. It was pointed out in that message that normalization of relations between the USSR and China, their development on the basis of principles of equality, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs would serve the most vital interests of the peoples of both countries, who are interested in the building of socialism and communism, in the preservation and consolidation of peace and security in the whole world.

In October, 1976, the Central Committee of the CPSU held a plenary meeting at which the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev outlined the principled attitude of the Soviet Union to the development of relations with the People's Republic of China. It was also emphasized at the plenary meeting that China was undergoing complicated political processes and that it was still very difficult to predict exactly what foreign policy China would pursue in the future. However, it is quite clear today that the foreign policy the Peking leaders have pursued over the past 15 years has discredited China in the eyes of the whole world.

"As for the Soviet Union, it has consistently pursued a course of trying to improve relations with China. . . I would like to underline that, in our opinion, there are no issues in relations between the USSR and the PRC that could not be resolved in the spirit of good-neighbourliness. We will continue working towards this goal. The matter will depend on what stand the other side takes," said L. I. Brezhnev.

How did the new leaders in Peking react to the policy of the Soviet Union for normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China? The first few months of rule by the new leaders showed that they were following the old course and did not intend to abandon Peking's policy of anti-Sovietism. Moreover, the new Chinese leaders emphasized in every possible way their adherence to this policy and used every pretext for demonstrating their intransigence and hostility towards the Soviet Union.

On February 28, 1977, the head of the Soviet delegation at the talks on the border issue, Deputy Foreign Minister L. Ilichev returned to Moscow

from Peking. Once again, the talks yielded no results due to the Chinese side. Peking turned down all Soviet proposals without discussion. The Chinese pointed out that the conditions for their realization were not yet ripe. In reply to the Soviet proposal to halt polemics and create a benevolent atmosphere, the Chinese representatives said: "Arguments on questions of principle (which amounts to unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda and interference in the domestic affairs of the USSR) will inevitably continue and be carried on for another ten thousand years" until the CPSU has publicly admitted the "fallacy of its political line" and has provided safeguards against a repetition of these "mistakes" in the future. Of course these claims met with a fitting response.

One of the aims of whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria was to force the Soviet Union to abandon its principled position with regard to the People's Republic of China and gain fresh "facts" to strengthen China's "case" for struggle against the USSR. However, all these attempts came to naught.

The Soviet view on the development of relations with the People's Republic of China was given by Leonid Brezhnev in his replies to the questions from Shoryu Hata, the editor of the Japanese newspaper *Asahi*, published on June 7, 1977. "We are working for normalization of relations with China at governmental level. Restoration of genuine, good-neighbourly relations between our two countries would be of great importance not only for the USSR and the PRC but for the international situation as a whole," said L. Brezhnev.

"It is the other side that is responsible for lack of progress in relations between the Soviet Union and China. The new leaders of China are unfortunately pursuing the old, worn-out road. The fact

that the campaign against detente is continuing and that any measures to achieve disarmament are being obstructed is undeniable."

The third plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of the tenth convocation held on July 16-21, 1977, provided an official confirmation of the fact that the new leaders of the CPC are clinging to their old positions and continuing to follow Maoist precepts in the field of domestic and foreign policy.

The plenary meeting was a preview of the 11th Congress of the CPC which was held on August 12-18, 1977. At that Congress the Communist Party of China reaffirmed its loyalty to the foreign policy of Mao Tse-tung, endorsed his great-power and militarist doctrine, proclaimed its determination to fight against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the future, and carried on polemics against the Communist Party of the USSR and the Soviet Union.

The measures taken by the leaders of the PRC in 1978 and their foreign policy make it quite clear that they are following the Maoist line without Mao. The great-power, anti-Soviet platform of the Chinese leaders was further developed at the spring (1978) session of the National People's Congress and in the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

The most important aspect of the session of the National People's Congress for Soviet-Chinese relations is that as the highest state body of power in the People's Republic of China it reaffirmed the anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leaders as formulated at the 11th Congress of the CPC, integrated this political line in the fundamental law of the land, the Constitution of the PRC, and even developed this line further. Now the struggle against

the USSR and its allies, against "social-imperialism" is not only a norm in party life, as recorded in the CPC Rules, but a constitutional norm, binding not only on every member of the Communist Party, but on every citizen of the People's Republic of China. The Constitution was amended to bring its text in line with the documents of the 11th Congress of the CPC which labelled the Soviet Union as China's worst enemy.

At the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China Hua Kuo-feng accused the Soviet Union of "intending to subjugate our country", and drew the conclusion that the Chinese people "must be prepared for war", that it is necessary to "have not only a powerful army, but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy". At the session of the National People's Congress, Hua Kuo-feng repeated this accusation and directly linked military aims to the need for increasing economic development. Thus, anti-Sovietism was integrated with the "general task" of the domestic policy of the PRC.

Concerning direct relations with the USSR, Hua Kuo-feng reiterated the old position of Peking's leaders at that session. The only new element was that he put forth China's demands on the USSR from the rostrum of the National People's Congress, thus making them official. A central aspect of these demands is the falsified version of the "mutual understanding between the heads of government of China and the Soviet Union" at the meeting on September 11, 1969. On that day the heads of government agreed not to make public either the substance of their conversation at Peking's airport or the progress of the government level talks on the border issue. By making public their interpretation of "mutual understanding" at the session of the National

People's Congress and later, on March 13, 1978 in *Jenmin jihpao*, the Chinese side breached an important commitment. The need to clarify what actually took place at the meeting of the heads of government of the two countries in September 1969, arose.

At the meeting of the heads of government two groups of questions were discussed. The first group included questions on which there was agreement or near agreement; the second group included questions of disagreement and opposition.

The two sides agreed to restore ambassadorial relations, increase the volume of trade, etc. The heads of government also agreed that a negotiated border settlement was an important link in the normalization of inter-state relations. They arrived at an agreement not to allow armed conflicts to take place on the border, to begin talks on border settlement, maintain the status quo on the border (it was emphasized that the main feature of preserving the status quo is recognition of existing frontiers and both sides agreed to maintain the borders existing at the time of the meeting, i.e. September 11, 1969). That was what was agreed. And this was the main result of the meeting of the leaders of the two governments.

The second group of questions on which the sides held opposite views included the problem of the so-called "disputed areas", the deployment of military personnel and the regulation of economic activity in these "disputed areas". The two sides also failed to agree that, prior to the consideration of the details of the border question, it was necessary to conclude the so-called "Agreement on the maintenance of the status quo on the border" about which China's leaders talk so much today.

No communiques recording the points taken up during these conversations were signed. After the

meeting the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Premier of the State Council of the PRC *exchanged letters* stating their positions on all the questions raised on September 11, 1969.

In his letter of September 18, 1969 Chou En-lai outlined "temporary measures" to normalize the situation in the border area and avoid armed conflicts in the future. These measures included a demand for the recognition of the existence of "disputed areas" on Soviet territory, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these areas and the signing of an agreement on the status quo, i.e. precisely what the Soviet side had rejected at the meeting on September 11, 1969. In his letter Chou En-lai admitted that the heads of government had only "exchanged views" on all these questions and proposed that "if the above measures are affirmed in a letter of the head of the Soviet government, it will constitute an agreement between the two governments."

In his reply dated September 26, 1969, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR reiterated Soviet disagreement with the provisions put forward by the Chinese premier. The fact of disagreement was recognized by Chou En-lai in a letter dated October 6, 1969.

This is the real state of affairs as the Peking leaders know. Nevertheless, the Chinese side *lumped together all the questions which had been agreed upon and those on which the Soviet side had expressed its disagreement, i.e. the questions on which the two sides only exchanged views.* That is how the Chinese version on the "mutual understanding of the heads of government" was created.

What is the essence of Peking's demands? These demands, presented as an ultimatum, encroach on

the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the Soviet Union and fraternal Mongolia.

What Peking considers the mutual understanding of the heads of government is in effect that the Soviet Union, before the talks on the border issue began, was to accept the Chinese concept of "disputed areas" and in this way agree to the assumption that vast areas of Soviet territory (33,000 square kilometres, equal to the territory of Belgium or Holland) belong to China. The USSR was to unilaterally withdraw its armed personnel from these areas, agree to leave its borders unguarded and leave the Soviet population unprotected from possible Chinese provocations. The withdrawal of Soviet army units from Mongolia where they are stationed at the request of the Mongolian government would be tantamount to abandoning a fraternal state to China which has designs on the very existence of the Mongolian People's Republic as a sovereign state.

These demands are being made at a time when armed forces are being concentrated in increasing numbers in the Chinese border areas, when China is making territorial claims on both the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic and conducting subversive activities against these states. Such ultimatums are meant to bury the very possibility of normalizing relations.

The March session of the National People's Congress (1978) failed to make any positive changes in the relations between China and the Soviet Union, and exacerbated relations even further.

Relations have continued to be tense to this day. Hostility towards the Soviet Union underlies all aspects of Peking's policy and is being cultivated inside the PRC.

The Peking leaders are inclined not only to theo-

retically substantiate their territorial claims on the USSR, the same claims which Mao Tse-tung set forth in his notorious "roster" of July 1964, but also to make this "roster" practical policy. These claims on the USSR camouflage the expansionist encroachments of the Peking chauvinists on the territory of almost all China's neighbours. The total area of these territorial claims exceeds 3 million square kilometres, more than one-third of the territory of the PRC.

In its relations with China our country has firmly and consistently carried out the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU. These decisions, alongside the struggle against the policy and ideology of Peking's leaders, clearly show that the Soviet Union is prepared to normalize its relations with China on the principles of peaceful co-existence. Acting in accordance with the decisions of the 25th Congress the Soviet Union took an important step towards normalization by sending a message from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on February 24, 1978.

In that message the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR proposed that the two countries make a joint statement on the principles of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union proposed that both sides declare that relations should be built on the basis of peaceful co-existence and that they will abide by principles of equality, mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and the non-use of force.

On March 9, 1978, the Peking leaders rudely rejected these proposals. In its note the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,

acting on instructions from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, called the joint document on the principles of mutual relations between the two countries "an empty declaration". China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated the demands made by Hua Kuo-feng in a speech at the session of the National People's Congress as an ultimatum.

The position of the Chinese leaders shows that their words are not matched with deeds and that their statements about wishing to improve relations with the USSR are not backed by action. Apparently some top men in China consider the existing tensions in Soviet-Chinese relations and mounting anti-Sovietism more useful than normalization of relations.

Although the Peking leaders are stubbornly pursuing their anti-Soviet policies, the measures taken by the Soviet Union to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China retain their full significance because they undermine Peking's provocative plans and expose the anti-socialist content of China's policy. The Soviet initiatives, whatever the attitude of the Peking leaders, evoke a sympathetic response throughout the world from all those sincerely interested in the normalization of co-operation between the USSR and the PRC. The significance of the Soviet initiatives is also that they enable the Chinese people to see that the Soviet Union is doing everything possible to restore good-neighbourly relations.

Despite the frenzy of the anti-Soviet policy-makers in Peking and the gloomy forecasts of capitalist prophets of an irreversible split between the USSR and the PRC, the Soviet people, guided by Marxism-Leninism and proletarian and socialist internationalism, have always been firmly convinced

that Soviet-Chinese friendship will eventually triumph.

The policy of our party and our nation on the China question was clearly stated in the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at this Congress: "We should like to repeat once again that in our relations with China, as with other countries, we adhere firmly to the principles of equality, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and non-use of force. In short, we are prepared to normalize relations with China in accordance with the principles of peaceful co-existence. We can say with assurance that if Peking returns to a policy truly based on Marxism-Leninism, if it abandons its hostile policy towards the socialist countries and takes the road of co-operation and solidarity with the socialist world, there will be an appropriate response from our side and opportunities will open for the development of good relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China consonant with the principles of socialist internationalism. The matter rests with Chinese side." The many years of friendship and co-operation between the Soviet and the Chinese people proved that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the people of China, the Chinese revolution and China's socialist progress is one of good will and friendship. The USSR wants China to be a prosperous socialist state.



Communists and friends of socialism throughout the world have been asking: what are the basic reasons for the drastic turn in China's policy? Could it be that the Chinese leaders place a greater value on their national interests than on their international

interests and strive to secure special advantages for their country and people? Such a policy would at least be understandable, if hardly justifiable since it runs counter to the principle of internationalism. The whole question, however, is much more serious and complicated. The policy of the Maoists undermines primarily the national interests of the Chinese people, deprives them of the international support of their friends and creates additional economic difficulties for the Chinese working people.

Moreover, having adopted a policy of struggle against the USSR and the majority of other socialist countries, the Maoists are prepared to sacrifice the very cause of socialist construction in China to their designs. One cannot achieve socialism without building the country's productive forces. In severing their links with the socialist community, the Chinese leaders deprived their country of a reliable source of disinterested aid for carrying out the complex task of industrialization. Peking is apparently well aware of this. And it is not accidental that despite their former statements about accelerated, "direct" transition to communism, the Maoists, in subsequent documents, tried to substantiate the thesis that the building of socialism would require the efforts of scores of generations. This completely refutes the contention that the sharp turn in Peking's policy was dictated by China's national interests. This was confirmed by the Maoists themselves when they declared in the early sixties that their proclaimed policy of "self-reliance" in the building of socialism would call for new sacrifices on the part of the working people, additional austerity measures, etc.

What is the root of the matter? What are the aims which the Chinese leaders are pursuing and which make them risk such serious tension and sacrifice

the national interests of their country? To believe the Maoists, all is due to their "devotion" to the cause of the revolution, their determination to wage an "uncompromising struggle" against imperialism, etc. However, this is not borne out by facts.

In pursuing a separatist policy in the international arena, a policy hostile to the socialist community, the CPC leaders grossly betrayed the Marxist-Leninist principles of the foreign policy of a socialist state. The stand taken by Peking in the Sino-Indian border dispute in the 1959-62 period is a case in point. The Maoists were untroubled by the fact that the unleashing of a military conflict with India ran counter to the policy of peaceful co-existence pursued by the socialist countries, a policy which India had always supported. The Peking leaders took pride in their behaviour and expressed un concealed admiration for this "brinkmanship" policy. However, this was only the beginning, the first stage of the aggressive actions of Maoist China.

There are two aspects to any policy change: it is a change "from something" and a change "to something". In intensifying their struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, the Maoists also accelerated the development of overall economic and political ties with the imperialist powers, whose readiness to establish contacts with China was clearly payment for Peking's hostility to the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. Moreover, in these contacts Peking seeks compensation for the loss of the advantages which it had received from co-operation with the socialist camp and which it voluntarily forfeited.

Even someone who is not politically astute can easily discern the motives underlying Peking's policy change. Once the Maoists had decided that the socialist countries, and not imperialism, were their

main enemies, it was only natural that they should seek the support of the imperialists in the struggle against the socialist community. The Maoists could not afford to quarrel with everybody at once. So they made a choice.

Peking's policy reversal was not the result of its loudly vaunted "revolutionary ardour". Neither was it prompted by concern for China's national interests. There remains only one correct explanation of Maoists' motives and aims. They desire to achieve a dominating position, first in the national-liberation movement which Peking regards as its political reserve and then in the world at large. The Maoists claim the role of supreme leaders of a "wide front" of struggle against the "two super-powers"—the USSR and the USA, a front which they are striving to organize among the "medium-sized" and "small" countries, irrespective of class system. That is how the question was formulated in the reports at the 10th and 11th CPC Congresses.

Peking hopes to achieve its aims by exploiting the anti-imperialist sentiments of the developing countries. Peking must take into account the great prestige and influence of the USSR and the socialist community in the national-liberation movement. To counter this and prod the developing countries to pursue an anti-Soviet policy, the Chinese leaders have adopted a method which makes it possible to "kill two birds with one stone". The Soviet Union is declared a "social-imperialist" power. This, according to the Maoists, alienates the USSR from the national-liberation movement, while the people of the world opposed by imperialism could thus be exploited in the interests of Peking.

The Maoist propaganda machine turns out hundreds of articles attacking the "revisionist clique" and the "social-imperialists". But this cannot con-

veal the essence of China's policy, which has been completely refashioned by the Peking leaders and consists of a struggle against the USSR and most of the other socialist countries, aimed at undermining the unity of revolutionary forces. This plays into the hands of the most aggressive circles of imperialist reaction.

It is significant that Mao Tse-tung launched his offensive against the general line of the communist movement and the co-ordinated foreign policy of the socialist states under the cover of a "leftist" stand and struggle against "modern revisionism". At the first stage of their campaign, the Maoists hoped to "excommunicate" the CPSU and other fraternal parties which firmly adhere to the positions of proletarian internationalism from Marxism-Leninism. Today Peking puts the Soviet Union and the other socialist states in one camp with imperialism and international reaction and even declares the USSR the primary enemy.

The sharp zigzags in the policy of the Maoist leadership reflect the essence of this bellicose petty-bourgeois trend which prides itself on a complete lack of principles and unscrupulousness in the choice of means. The twists and turns of China's policy show that the Maoists will resort to any political means, however incompatible, to further their main task: the achievement of hegemonic, great-power goals in the international arena and the strengthening of their unchallenged rule in China.

The loftiest revolutionary duty and the most vital interests of the world communist movement compel genuine Marxist-Leninists to reveal to the world the ideological fallacy of the theory and practice of Maoism and its incompatibility with Marxism-Leninism. By exposing Maoism Soviet Communists are fighting for a socialist China, a Marxist-Leninist

party in China and the true interests of the trouble-stricken Chinese people.

The international communist movement is confidently mounting an offensive against imperialism, the forces of reaction and war. No attempts by political forces—Right or Left—have yet succeeded in pushing the communists from the correct path. The only true compass is the great doctrine of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the general course of the world communist movement and a clear anti-imperialist platform.

The communists are waging an ideological and political struggle against imperialist reaction and against both Right and Left opportunists.



The worsening of the Sino-Soviet relations is an unnatural process. All the prerequisites exist for friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, co-operation which benefited and would benefit both countries and the revolutionary process throughout the world.

The Soviet people have always treated the fraternal Chinese people with profound respect and sincere friendship. They do not identify the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China with the nationalists in the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Nor do they identify the venomous and slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement with the genuine attitude of the Communists and working people of China. Soviet people believe that the tragedy of China is a historically transient phase and that despite all difficulties the cause of socialism will triumph on Chinese soil.

Throughout their history, the Chinese people have proved that they are a great and heroic nation. There is no doubt that this nation will overcome its difficulties, succeed in retaining the gains of its revolution, and bring China back to the path of genuine socialist development.

Олег Иванов

ИЗ ИСТОРИИ СОВЕТСКО-КИТАЙСКИХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ

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
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