Zinoviev, Grigorii

LENINISM
OR
TROTSKYISM

BY

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PRICE 20 CENTS

PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 1925
FOR THE
Workers Party of America
BY THE
DAILY WORKER PUBLISHING CO.
1113 W. WASHINGTON BLVD.,
CHICAGO, ILL.

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Nothing Is Bigger Than the Party of Lenin

A PREFACE

The controversy between Trotskyism and Leninism is not a new thing in the Russian Communist movement. It is nearly as old as the struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism, and forms an important part in the history of the revolutionary movement of Russia. For over two decades Lenin and the Bolshevik Party waged a determined struggle against the political outlook and conceptions of Comrade Trotsky and his followers. And it was only by defeating ideologically Trotskyism as well as Menshevism that the party of Lenin succeeded in finally establishing itself as the only party of the workers and poor peasants of Russia.

Comrade Trotsky joined the Bolshevik Party on the eve of the November revolution. In doing so he tacitly acknowledged the fact that in the struggle between Trotskyism and Leninism the latter was proven correct. This was how the Russian party and later on the entire Communist International interpreted and understood Trotsky's joining the party. Unfortunately, however, Comrade Trotsky himself did not so understand his coming into the party. As was proven by later events, and particularly by his recently published book "1917" and the preface to it, the position that Comrade Trotsky takes is the very opposite of what one would expect. Very guardedly, very cautiously, in a sort of a roundabout way, Comrade Trotsky attempts to convey the impression that it was not Trotskyism that was proven wrong by history but Leninism.

Now, this is a very serious proposition. If the events of the Russian revolution have confirmed the correctness of Trotsky's position as against the Leninist position, which is the position of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, then why doesn't Trotsky say so openly and frankly? Why doesn't he demand in so many words a fundamental revision of the principles of the Communist International which are based upon Leninism and not Trotskyism?

Since 1903 Lenin and the whole Bolshevist fraction of the social-democratic labor party of Russia have been fighting Trotsky on every important problem that arose in the revolutionary struggle of Russia. Trotsky's position between 1903-1905 was a sort of a middle of the road position between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. This center position, according to Lenin, was always helpful to the Mensheviks and detrimental to the Bolsheviks.

In 1905 Lenin developed the historic slogan of the revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and peasants. As against this slogan Trotsky developed the theory of "permanent revolution" with the slogan: Without a czar but a workers' government. These were two diametrically opposed conceptions of the nature of the Russian revolution and the tactics to be pursued by the revolutionary party of the working class. Lenin never made peace with Trotsky's theory of "permanent" revolution nor with his slogan of a purely workers' government. One of the basic principles of Lenin was that the revolution in Russia could succeed only thru an alliance between the workers and peasants, led by the working class thru its revolutionary party (the Communist Party), and expressed in the slogan: The revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and peasants, Leninism and Trotskyism never fought each other in a battle more bitter and more fruitful than on this issue. Since the revolution of 1917, this conception of a revolutionary alliance between the workers and poor peasants became a fundamental principle of the Communist International—a principle which is applicable to every country with a large peasant or farming population. On the other hand, Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, which he still believes to be correct, is a complete negation of the above Leninist principle. The conflict between Leninism and Trotskyism on this point is irreconcilable.

From the recent discussion in the Russian Communist Party, the following facts become outstanding:

Comrade Trotsky has never relinquished his old position.

He still believes in the correctness of his theories as against the teachings of Leninsm.

He will not make peace with the fact that the Russian Communist Party and the entire Communist International are led by the old Bolshevist guard along the road of Leninism as against Trotskyism.

Comrade Trotsky's struggles in the Russian party are a constant danger to the integrity of the Communist movement.

The discussion in the Russian party has proven that the whole party is solidly opposed to Comrade Trotsky's attempt to revise the Leninist basis of our movement. The same is the position taken by most of the parties of the Communist International.

Naturally, the enemies of the Russian revolution and of the working class generally are attempting to exploit this controversy (which, by the way, is now closed and settled), to undermine the Soviet government and the prestige of the Communist International. To this we say: Let them go to it. If they can derive any comfort **from the way in which this controversy had been settled,** the pleasure is all theirs.

Really, what are the most outstanding facts in the outcome of this controversy as far as the non-Communist worker is concerned? They are these. First, that the International Communist movement will not be separated from the proven revolutionary path of Leninism. Second, that no man in the Communist movement is big enough to override the will of the movement.

The three articles by the Comrades Zinoviev, Stalin and Kamenev, published in this pamphlet, present an exhaustive treatment of the issues involved in the struggle between Leninism and Trotskyism. The study of these issues will give the reader a deep insight into the fundamentals of Leninism and of the Communist International. It will enable the American workers to understand and thus come closer to the greatest movements in human history—the Russian revolution and the Communist International.

ALEXANDER BITTELMAN.

Chicago, Feb. 8, 1925.

Bolshevism or Trotskyism?

Where the Line of Trotskyism is Leading

By G. Zinoviev

Some Facts Regarding Brest and the First Party Conference after October.

The Differences of Opinion in October and My Mistake at That Time.

To replace Leninism by Trotskyism, that is the task which Comrade Trotsky has set out to accomplish. In this respect he had already in 1922, in his book, "1905," attempted "to attain something by allusions." So long as Comrade Lenin held the threads in his hand, Comrade Trotsky decided not to undertake a direct attack. Comrade Trotsky has now obviously decided that "the moment has arrived." According to all the rules of strategy, before one strikes the decisive blow, one must prepare the way by artillery fire. The attack upon the so-called right wing of Bolshevism is intended as a smoke screen, particularly regarding the October failures of the writer of these lines.

It is an actual fact that at the beginning of November, 1917, I committed a great error. This error was freely admitted by me and made good in the course of a few days. As, however, these days were not ordinary days but very fateful days, as this was a time of extremest tension, the error was highly dangerous.

In any event I will not minimize the extent of this error.

It was precisely because of the extraordinary tension of these times that Vladimir Ilyitch so energetically opposed our error. All these extremely draconic punitive meansures, which he at that time proposed against us, all the passionate chastising which he infilicted, were of course thoroly justified. In the shortest time after these events, some weeks afterwards, at the commencement of the disputes over the Brest peace, Vladimir Ilyitch, as the whole C. C. and all the leading circles of the party are aware, regarded these differences of opinion as completely liquidated.

In his speech on "Trotskyism or Leninism," Comrade Stalin very rightly remarks that in the September-October period as a result of a number of circumstances, the revolution endeavored to carry out every step under the form of defense. This was to be understood after all the shilly shallying connected with the Kornilof period. I, who at that time was living illegally, fell a victim to my failure precisely owing to this peculiarity of that phase of October.

When Comrade Lenin reverted to our error, three years after it had been committed, he wrote as follows:

"Immediately before the October revolution, and soon afterwards, a number of excellent Communists in Russia committed errors, of which one does not like to be reminded. Why not? Because it is not right, except on a special occasion, to refer to such errors, which have been completely made good. They showed hesitations in the period in question in that they feared that the Bolsheviki would isolate themselves and undertake too great a risk in holding aloof too much from a certain section of the mensheviki and of the social revolutionaries. The conflict went so far that the com-

rades in question, as a demonstration, resigned from all responsible posts, both in the party and in the Soviet, to the greatest joy of the enemies of the social revolution. The matter led to the most bitter polemics in the press on the part of the C. C. of our party against those who had resigned. And after some weeks, at the most after some months, all these comrades perceived their errors and returned to their responsible posts in the party and the Soviets." (Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XVII., Page 373.)

Comrade Lenin makes no reference whatever to a "right wing."

For myself, I endeavored more than once, before the party and before the whole Comintern, to deal with my error. I spoke of it, for example at the opening of the 4th World Congress of October as follows:

"Allow me to say a word regarding a personal matter. It seems to me that I, particularly now on the 5th anniversary of the revolution, am called upon to say that which I am about to say. You are aware comrades that five years ago I, along with some other comrades, made a great mistake, which, as I believe, was the greatest mistake I have ever made in my life. At that time I failed to estimate correctly the whole counter-revolutionary nature of the mensheviki. Therein lies the nature of our mistake before October 1917. Altho we had fought against the mensheviki for over ten years, nevertheless, I, as well as many other comrades, could not at the decisive moment get rid of the idea that the mensheviki and S. R., altho they were only the right fraction and the right wing, nevertheless formed a portion of the working class. As a matter of fact they were and are the "left," extremely skillful, pliable and therefore especially dangerous wing of the international bourgeoisie. I therefore believe, comrades, that it is our duty to remind all our comrades. . . etc."

I spoke of our error in the most widely circulated book from my pen, in the "History of the R. C. P." and on numerous earlier occasions.

To consider the writer of these lines as belonging to the "right wing" of the Bolsheviki, is simply absurd. The whole of the Bolshevik Party is aware that I, working hand in hand with Comrade Lenin in the course of nearly 20 years, never once had even a sharp difference of opinion with him, except in the one case mentioned. The epoch of the years 1914-1917, from the commencement of the imperialist war up to the commencement of the proletarian revolution in our country, was a not unimportant epoch. Precisely in these years there took place the decisive regroupings in the camp of the international labor movement. The books, "Socialism and War" (1915) and "Against the Stream," are sufficient witness that during that time I in no way came forward as representative of a right wing of Bolshevism.

At the April conferences of 1917, the importance of which Comrade Trotsky misrepresents, I had not the smallest difference of opinion with Comrade Lenin. In the dispute between Comrade Trotsky on the one side and Comrades Kamenev, Nogin and Rykov on the other side, I was wholly on the side of Comrade Lenin, as was to be seen from a number of my reports and speeches at the April conference. The whole dispute was naturally confined within the limits of Bolshevism — as Comrade Lenin and the party regarded it—and only under the pen of Comrade Trotsky does it assume the form of a struggle of a "right wing" against the party.

Not the least differences of opinion occurred between myself and Comrade Lenin during and after the July days. We had the opportunity to test this at our leisure in the course of several weeks as long as I lived together with Vladimir Ilyitch in hiding. The difference of opinion was noticed by me at the beginning of October, after the liquidation of the

Kornilov period, after the article of Comrade Lenin, "On Compromises" (in this article Lenin proposed, under certain conditions, an agreement with the mensheviki and the S. R.). My error consisted in the fact that I endeavored to continue the line of the article "On Compromises" some days later. In all only a few days, but the days at the time counted as months.

In the famous sitting of the Central Committee of the 10th of October, at which the revolt was decided on, and at which for the first time differences of opinion regarding the time to be fixed for the revolt and as to judging the prospects in the constitutional assembly arose between me and Kamenev on the one side and the rest of the members of the C. C. on the other side, the first political bureau of the C. C. for the leadership of the revolt was created. The seven following comrades were elected to the politbureau: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Bubnov. In the no less important joint meeting of the Central Committee and a number of Petrograd functionaries on October 16, after the debates between Comrade Lenin and ourselves, 19 votes were cast for the motion of Comrade Lenin in its final form; 2 were against and 4 neutral; while my motion was introduced by Comrade Volodarsky as an amendment to the motion of Comrade Lenin. My amendment read that "in the next five days before meeting our comrades and before discussion we must not arrange any revolt." My written motion, which was submitted to the vote at this meeting, read: "Without postponing the measures for investigation and preparation, it be decided that no action be permitted before consultation with the Bolshevist section of the Soviet Congress."

It was at this time that Comrade Lenin wrote his famous article against us. I continued to work diligently for the Pravda. When the action was finally decided on, in order to silence the exaggerated rumors which had appeared in the press regarding our differences I wrote a short letter to the editor which was published by the central organ with a comment of the editor that the dispute was ended and that in essentials we were and remained of one mind. (Pravda, Nov. 21, 1917.)

The unsigned leading article which appeared in our central organ, Rabotshi Putj (The Path of the Workers), which appeared in place of Pravda, on the day of the revolt, Oct. 25, was written by me. The second article was likewise written by me and was signed by me. In this last article we read:

"It is a great task which confronts the second Soviet congress. The events of history are following each other with breathless speed. The final hour is approaching. The least further hesitation brings the danger of immediate collapse. . ."

"The last hopes for a peaceful solution of the crisis are past. The last peaceful hopes which—I must confess—up to the last days were cherished by the writer of these lines, have been dispelled by facts."

"All Power to the Soviets.—It is here that everything is being concentrated at the present historical moment."

In the number of our central organ, Rabotshi Putj, which appeared on October 26, a short report was published of my first speech after the period of illegality in the sitting of the Petrograd Soviet on Oct. 25, the day of the revolt. Here we read as follows:

The Speech of Zinoviev.

"Comrades, we are now in the period of revolt. I believe however that no doubt can exist regarding the outcome of the revolt—we shall be victorious!

"I am convinced that the overwhelming portion of the peasantry will come over to our side as soon as they become acquainted with our proposals regarding the land question.

"Long live the social revolution, which is now beginning. Long live

the Petrogard working class who still achieve the final victory.

"Today we have paid our debt to the international proletariat and delivered a terrible blow to the war, a blow at the breast of all imperialists, the greatest blow at the breast of the hangman, Wilhelm.

"Down with the war; long live international peace!"

Sharp differences arose in our circle again in the first days of November (according to old calendar) at the moment when the right S. R. and mensheviki were already shattered and when it was the question whether we would not succeed in bringing over the left S. R. and the best section of the mensheviki to the side of the Soviet power. In these days I had to take part with other comrades in the famous negotiations with the then existing organization of the railwaymen. These negotiations led to a complete agreement of the C. C. of our party with the then Central Executive Committee of the Workers' and Peasants' Councils. These differences lasted actually from two to three days, but during this time they were exceedingly heated.

On Nov. 2, 1917, the C. C. of our party, in the presence of Comrade Lenin, adopted a resolution which, among other things, stated:

"The C. C. confirms that, without having excluded anybody from the Second Soviet Congress it is even now fully prepared to note the return of the Soviet members who have resigned (as is known the right S. R. and the mensheviki withdrew from the Second Soviet Congress) and to recognize the coalition with those who have withdrawn from the Soviets, that, therefore the assertions that the **Bolsheviki will not share power with anybody are absolutely devoid of foundation.**

"The C. C. confirms that on the day of the formation of the present government, a few hours before its formation, it invited to its session three representatives of the left S. R. and formally invited them to participate in the government. The refusal of the left S. R., even tho it was only limited to a certain time and subject to certain conditions, places on them the full responsibility for the agreement not being arrived at." (Pravda, No. 180. Vol. 4, Nov. 17, 1917.)

This paragraph of the resolution, which was doubtless written by Comrade Lenin, must be specially noted by the reader in order the better to understand that which follows:

In the Pravda (the central organ of our party was on October 30 again named the Pravda) we read in No. 180, of Nov. 4, the following extract from my speech which I delivered at the session of the Central Executive Committee of the S. R. and of the social democrats on Nov. 2, 1917:

"In the name of the C. C. of the Russian social democratic labor party (at that time our party was not yet a Communist Party), I declare that the comrades of the S. R. (it was the question of the left S. R. whom the C. C. of our party, with Comarde Lenin at the head, tried at that time to induce to participate in the first Soviet government) should not have started to criticize us Bolsheviki while events were taking place in the streets of Moscow regarding which our Moscow delegates have reported today. (At this time the struggle for the Soviet power was still going on in Moscow.) On this occasion we remind the comrades of the S. R. that before we published the composition of our government we called upon them to take part in the government, but they declared that they would take part in the work of the government, but for the time being would not enter the government."

At the session of the Petrograd Soviet of Nov. 3, 1917, the writer stated:

"Comrades, there are among us comrades from the Red Army, soldiers and sailors, who in a few hours will hasten to the aid of our Moscow comrades and brothers. (Loud and

prolonged applause.) The revolutionary military committee wished two days ago to send help, but met with obstacles precisely from those quarters from which one could only have expected support. I speak here of some leading circles of the railway employes, who in these hours so fateful for the revolution have adopted a 'nuetral' attitude. In these terrible hours, however, one cannot be 'neither hot or cold'—I do not wish to speak too sharply, but you yourselves will understand comrades, how the future will judge the facts.

"Just recently a transport of troops to Moscow was held up. When the leaders of the railway workers' union were asked how they act in this manner, they replied: 'We have also held up transports from the other side.'

"We must appeal to the lower sections of the railwaymen and explain to them what 'neutrality' means under present conditions. I do not doubt that 99 per cent of the lower sections of the railway employes and workers will side with the fighting soldiers and workers. A whole number of central committees are sitting on the fence. Unfortunately, among these is the central committee of the railway workers. No one could have foreseen that the leading organ of the railway workers would preserve 'neutrality' whilst workers and soldiers were fighting on the barricades. This state of affairs must be ended. The railway proletariat must stand like one man on the side of the fighting workers and soldiers, they must help them to break the resistance of the bourgeoisie and of the landowners. . .

"Greetings to the comrades who are hastening to the help of the revolutionaries in Moscow (long and stormy applause). Now we are giving back to Moscow what it gave the revolution in 1905. At that time the Moscow proletariat began the revolt, and delivered the first blow against despotism. We are happy that we are now able to help, that we now have the possibility of throwing our victorious troops on the Moscow front.

"Long live the comrades proceeding to Moscow—all Russia is watching them."

On the evening of Nov. 3, and on the morning of the 4th, our negotiations with the left S. R. and with that conference which had invited the leaders of the railway workers' union, arrived at the most critical stage. At this moment we committed the greatest errors. The famous declaration of some comrades, among them myself, in the C. C. of the Bolsheviki and the Council of the People's Commissaires (regarding the resignation of our responsible posts owing to the obstinacy of our C. C.) was signed on Nov. 4, 1917, and on Nov. 7, 1917, my "Letter to the Comrades" was published in the Pravda (No. 183). In this letter we said: (I quote the most important part.)

"The Central Committee of the All-Russian Soviet Congress placed in the foreground a definite plan of agreement (the resolution of Nov. 3), which I fully agree with, as it demands the immediate recognition of the decrees regarding the land, peace, workers' control, and the recognition of the Soviet power.

"In reply to the resolution of the C. E. C. the mensheviki submitted a number of preconditions. The C. E. C., as it did not wish to place any difficulties in the way, adopted a resolution proposed by us which removed the hindrances in the way of these negotiations.

"In spite of this the other side would not make any concessions to the C. E. C. The conditions submitted by the latter were rejected by the mensheviki and the S. R. The attempt to arrive at an agreement was consistently carried out in spite of all obstacles; it led, however, to no result. It is now evident that the mensheviki and the S. R. did not want an understanding and only sought for a

pretext to wreck it.

"Now all the workers and soldiers will know who bears the responsibility for the wrecking of the agreement. Now—I am convinced—also the left S. R. will throw the blame for the wrecking of the understanding upon the mensheviki and into our government.

"In the present state of affairs I adhere to the proposition of the comrades and withdraw my declaration regarding resignation from the C. C.

"I appeal to my immediate comrades. Comrades. We made a great sacrifice when we openly raised a protest against the majority of our C. C. and demanded the agreement. This agreement, however, was rejected by the other side. We are living in a serious, responsible time. It is our duty to warn the party of errors. But we remain with the party, we prefer to commit errors along with the millions of workers and soldiers and to die with them than to stand aside from them at this decisive historical moment.

There will and shall be no split in our party.

Since Nov. 8, I participated as previously in the work of our C. C. On Nov. 9, I spoke in its name at the All-Russian Peasants' Congress, and on Nov. 10, at the session of the Petrograd Soviet. Here I said that we would recognize the constituent assembly, "if the constituent assembly would give expression to the actual will of the workers, soldiers and peasants."

Naturally, now after seven years, it seems monstrous to every member of our party how one could deceive himself with regard to the real forces of the leaders of the railwaymen and those alleged internationalists from the camp of the S. R. and mensheviki grouped round the railway leaders. Of course, in order to understand the situation one must place oneself in the position obtaining at the time.—It was not until six months after the October revolt that it became evident that the left S. R. had also become a counter-revolutionary force. In October, 1917, however, they were expressly invited by Comrade Lenin and our C. C. to participate in our first Soviet government, as they were then connected with a large section of the peasants and with a portion of the workers. In fact, even the negotiations with the leaders of the railwaymen's union were, as the reader has seen, conducted with the approval of the C. C.,

The result of the exposure of the mensheviki and of the S. R. on the occasion of the railway workers' conference was, that the left S. R., whom Comrade Lenin had formerly in vain called upon to participate in the Soviet government, now entered into it; altho some days before the left S. R. had the intention even to resign from the C. E. C., which under the conditions then existing would have meant a severe blow for the Bolsheviki and would have hindered the winning of the peasantry.

In Pravda, of Nov 4, we read:

"The fraction of the left S. R. in the C. E. C. submitted an ultimative declaration regarding the necessity of drawing up of a platform in the name of the C. E. C. The C. E. C. agreed to this demand and in the name of the C. E. C. a platform was drawn up."

It was just the rejection of this platform by the mensheviki and the S. R. at the conference convened by the railway leaders which led to the change in the tactics of the left S. R. in favor of the Soviet power.

At this time there was published in the Pravda a number of resolutions from the most important in which we find the following:

"Whilst we regard the agreement of the socialist parties as desirable, we workers declare that the agreement can only be reached on the basis of the following conditions. . . " (These conditions were practically the same

as our representatives had submitted to the railway men's conference.)

In our attitude during these days there was again reflected the hesitation of these workers—in this respect our error was not a personal, not an accidental error.

Now, seven years afterwards, do not the words in the resolution of our Central Committee that "the assertion that the Bolsheviki would not share power with anybody is devoid of all foundation" sound monstrous from our present standpoint? And yet these words were written down by Comrade Lenin on Nov. 3, 1917, and approved by our C. C. Everyone who reflects over these facts, everyone who remembers that the left S. R. at that time represented an important section of the peasants, everyone who reflects at all over the conditions at that time, will understand the extent and the character of our error. It was a great, but nevertheless not a "social democratic" error.

We, of course do not say that in order to prove that our error was a small one. We stood outside of the C. C. of the party only for three days —from the 4th to 7th of November. In spite of this error, as we already said at the opening session of the 4th World Congress of the Comintern, was the greatest error we made in our life. The only thing we wish to prove is that it is not correct to draw from this error the conclusion that there existed a "right wing" in Bolshevism.

Every one who experienced those historical days knows that these differences, how much they strained the relations of such near comrades and friends, left no bitter feeling behind. Everybody adopted a sincere attitude towards the others without attempting to "make use of" these errors for "diplomatic," fractionist purposes. Everybody understood that only the exceptional moment led to exceptional means of solving differences, which arose like a whirlwind but which, like a whirlwind soon calmed down without causing great damage.

These differences were swept away by the avalanche of fresh events—they remained isolated with the leading circles of the party. A few days passed and the error was admitted by those who had committed it and the general staff of the party and the whole party could proceed to the solution of actual tasks. These differences have left behind such little traces in the party that at the first party conference (seventh) which took place after the October revolt (which dealt already with the question of the Brest Peace), nobody mentioned a single word regarding these differences.

Nobody reproached us regarding this error, altho it so happened that I, on behalf of the C. C., had to fight energetically against Comrade Trotsky and the "left," (*) and it is clear that the party under the fresh impression of the differences, would have attacked the guilty ones if they had estimated this guilt as Comrade Trotsky does now.

Comrade Trotsky now says in the "Lessons of October," seven years after these events, that our attitude to the question of the Brest Peace was one of capitulation. What did Trotsky himself say on this 7th party congress some weeks after the October differences:

"Before the last journey to Brest-Litovsk we discussed during the whole time the question of our further tactics. And there was only one vote in the C. C. in favor of immediately signing the peace: that of Zinoviev. (We assert that there was not only one vote, but also Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov said the same thing; Comrade Kamenev was arrested in Finlond. G. Z.) What he said was, from his standpoint, quite correct. I was

(*) It is interesting to mention the result of the election of the new C. C. at this party conference. The writer of these lines received only one vote less than Comrade Lenin.

fully in agreement with him. He said, that hesitation would only render worse the peace conditions, and that they must be signed at once." (Minutes of the 7th Party Conference, Page 79.)

If the proposal to sign the Brest Peace was a "capitulation," then Comrade Lenin was a "capitulator." (As a matter of fact, the tactics of Trotsky at that time would have led to the downfall of the revolution, i. e., to an actual capitulation.) If Comrade Trotsky himself spoke in the above mentioned way as to this affair, who can give credit to his present ultrapolemic remarks? Is it not evident that all this has been discovered afterwards?

At the 7th Party Congress the debates turned upon quite other questions. It was Comarde Trotsky this time who submitted a declaration regarding his resignation from all responsible posts.** (Minutes Page 147-148.) Against Trotsky and against the "left" Communists, there was directed the resolution of Lenin and Zinoviev (Minutes Page 3), and as regards resignation from the C. C. in general, Comrade Lenin said the following words:

"I also found myself in a similar situation in the C. C. when the proposal was adopted not to sign the peace, and I kept silent without closing my eyes to the fact that I could not take over responsibility for this. Every member of the C. C. is free to repudiate responsibility without resigning from the C. C. and without creating a scandal. It is, of course, permissable under certain conditions, and is sometimes even unavoidable; but whether that was necessary just now, with this organization of the Soviet power which enables us to control in so far as we do not lose contact with the masses, there can only exist one opinion."

At the 7th Party Congress Comrade Trotsky, who at that time had only been six months in our party, provoked the first Trotsky crisis. Since that time, unfortunately, these crises occur periodically.

II. Revision of Leninism under the Flag of Lenin.

The last attack of Comrade Trotsky (the "Lessons of October") is nothing else than a fairly open attempt to revise—or even directly to liquidate—the foundation of Leninism. It will only require a short time and this will be plain to the whole of our party and to the whole International. The "novelty" in this attempt consists in the fact that, out of "strategical" considerations, it is attempted to carry out this revision in the name of Lenin.

We experienced something similar at the beginning of the campaign of Bernstein and his followers, when they began the "revision" of the foundation of Marxism. The ideas of Marx were already so generally recog-

(**) "The party conference, the highest authority of the party, has indirectly repudiated the policy which I, with other comrades from our Brest-Litovsk delegation followed, and which from two sides had a certain international repercussion; both among the working class and among the ruling class. This policy rendered the name of the members of this delegation the most hated by the bourgeoisie of Germany and Austria. Today the whole German and Austro-Hungarian press is full of accusations against the Brest-Litovsk delegation, and particularly against me personally; they declare that we are responsible for the collapse of the peace and for all the further unfortunate results. Whether this is the view of the Party Conference or not, it has by its last vote confirmed this assertion and I therefore resign every responsible post with which the party has hitherto entrusted me." (Speech of Comrade Trotsky at the 7th Party Conference, March 1918.)

nized in the international labor movement, that even their revision, at least at the beginning had to be undertaken in the name of Marx. A quarter of a century was necessary before the revisionists could finally throw aside their mask and openly pronounce that, in the field of theory, they had entirely broken away from Marx. This took place in a most open manner, in literature, only in the year 1924, in the recently published collection of articles devoted to the 70th birthday of Kautsky.

The ideas of Leninism at present predominate to such an extent in the international revolutionary movement —and particularly in our country— that the "critics" of Leninism consider it necessary to have recourse to similar methods. They undertake the revision of Leninism "in the name of Lenin," citing Lenin, emphasizing their fidelity to the principles of Leninism. This "strategy" however does not help. It is already seen through by the Leninist party. It only needs a few weeks and all the sparrows on the house-tops will be twittering over the collapse of this remarkable strategy. Comrade Trotsky has overlooked one trifle: that our party is so Leninist and so mature that it is capable of distinguishing Leninism from Trotskyism.

The attack on Comrade Trotsky is an attack with inadequate means. Nobody will succeed in liquidating the foundations of Leninism, or carrying out even a partial revision of the principles of Leninism, or even succeed in getting Trotskyism recognized as a "justifiable tendency" within Leninism. Nobody will succeed in convincing the party that we now need some sort of synthesis of Leninism and Trotskyism. Trotskyism is as fit to be a constituent part of Leninism as a spoonful of tar can be a constituent part of a vat of honey.

What is Leninism? Leninism is the Marxism of the epoch of the imperialist wars in the world revolution, which began in a country where the peasantry perponderate. Lenin was from head to foot a proletarian revolutionary. But he knew at the same time that he had to work in a country in which the peasantry predominated, and in which the proletariat therefore can only be victorious when it adopts a correct attitude towards the peasantry. After Lenin already in the revolution of 1905 had issued the slogan of "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and of the peasantry," he did not cease for a single moment to be a proletarian revolutionary; he made no concession to bourgeois democracy (the mensheviki, among them Comrade Trotsky, accused Comrade Lenin at that time that he, who called himself Marxist, was an ideologist of bourgeois democracy), but he was the only one who not with mere words, but by deeds, prepared the way for the socialist revolution in a situation when bourgeois democracy was still a force and was capable of shattering czarist despotism.

Lenin felt himself at that time to be the recognized leader of the proletarian revolution—and this he was in fact. He knew and believed that the Bolshevik Party, that is, the genuine advance-guard of the proletariat, would help the working class as far as possible on the road to the realization of its class aims, that is to proceed on the road to the victory of the proletarian revolution. He knew that he and his party, in every country, would do everything possible to extract from this situation the maximum for the final aim of the proletarian revolution. He so understood the connection between the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian-socialist revolution, that the first precedes the second, that the second solves in passing the questions of the first, that the second confirms the works of the first.

And as Lenin knew this, he maneuvered with the mastership of a genius in three revolutions, always at the

head of the working class, always concretizing his tactics so that every suitable historical situation is used to its fullest limits in the interests of his class. Lenin was, on Oct. 24, 1917, not the same man that he became on Oct. 26, 1917. "Who laughs last, laughs the longest" wrote Lenin some days before the October revolution in an article on the party program.

Therefore Lenin defended at that time among other things the necessity of retaining the minimum program. But on the morrow, after the victory of the October insurrection, the ingenious commander of the working class was not the same as he was one day before this victory. My class has become stronger, the enemies of my class have become weaker, the forces of the workers' revolution have increased, hence therefore, more pressure, more boldly forwards! That is the real Lenin! He knows that it is a very difficult way along which one has to lead millions of workers, behind whom, if we wish to be victorious, there must follow the millions and millions of peasants of our country.

From the great slogan: "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and of the peasantry" (1905-1907) via the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasants" (1917) to the actual "dictatorship of the proletariat" which will be realized on the basis of "alliance with the peasantry" —that is the road of Leninism.

From menshevism of the Axelrod type (1903-1905) via the "permanent" (1905-1907) variation of menshevism, to the complete abandonment of the revolution and its substitution by the menshevik free coalition (1909-1914), to the policy of vacillations (block with Tzeidse and fight against the Zimmerwald Left) during the war (1914-1917)—that is the road of old Trotskyism.

If one considers the literary history of Bolshevism, one can say that it is essentially contained in the following works of Lenin: From "The Friends of the People," along with "Development of Capitalism," to "What is to be Done?" along "Two Kinds of Tactics" to the "State and Revolution" with "The Renegade Kautsky." These are the most important literary sign posts of Leninism.

Let us consider what these sign posts indicate? "The Friends of the People" and "The Development of Capitalism" constitute a penetrating analysis of the theory of Marxism and the most concrete, profound study of economics and of the social structure of that country in which Bolshevism commences to come into action. "What is to be Done?" along with "Two Kinds of Tactics" is the incomparable criticism of social democratic optimism, the unsurpassed elucidation of the role of the workers' party in the revolution together with the laying down of the tactics of the proletariat in a peasant country on the eve of the bourgeois-democratic revolution which one must endeavor so to carry thru that it begins as soon as possible to develop into the socialist revolution The "State and Revolution" and the "Renegade Kautsky" are the application of Leninism to the world arena, are along with the book "Imperialism, the Latest Stage of Capitalism" the most profound analysis of the latest imperialism and the laying down of the tactics of the already beginning socialist revolution, which grows out from the first, i. e., the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Compare all this with Trotskyism! If Lenin is the classical type of the proletarian revolutionary, Trotsky is the "classical" type of the intellectual revolutionary. The latter has of course certain strong features, he succeeds sometimes in combining with the proletarian mass, but that which forms the nature of his political activity is the intellectual revolutionarism.

We give below a compressed political description of the life of Trotsky-

ism which possesses the authority of coming from the pen of Lenin:

"He, Trotsky, was in the year 1903 a menshevik, left this party in 1904, returned to the mensheviki in 1905 and paraded round with ultra-revolutionary phrases. In 1906 he again abandoned this party; at the end of 1906 he again defended the election alliance with the cadets and in the spring of 1907 he stated at the London Conference that the difference between him and Rosa Luxemburg rather constituted a difference of individual shades of opinion than a difference of political tendency. Today Trotsky borrows some ideas from the one fraction and tomorrow from the other and therefore considers himself as a man standing above both fractions." (Lenin's Collected Works, Vol. XI, Part II. Page 308-309.)

"Never in a single serious question of Marxism, has Trotsky had a firm opinion, he always squeezes himself in a division between this or that difference of opinion and always runs from one side to the other. At present he is in the company of the 'Bund' and of the liquidators."

Thus wrote Lenin in an article in the revue, Enlightenment, published in 1914.

"However well meant the intentions of Martow and Trotsky may be subjectively, objectively they support by their tolerance Russian imperialism."

Thus wrote Lenin in the Socialdemokrat, No. 1, October, 1916.

Let us compare the literary sign posts of Bolshevism with those indicating the road to development of Trotskyism. These are the following books of Comrade Trotsky: "Our Political Tasks" (1903), "Our Revolution" (1905-1906), then his collaboration to the liquidatory journal, Nasha Sarja (Our Dawn), then a bright moment—the book over Kautsky (1919) —which was followed by the "New Course," and "The Lessons of October" (1923-1924). The retrograde development of Comrade Trotsky finds particular sharp expression in the two last named works.

What was the book: "Our Political Tasks?" This book which appeared with the dedication of the menshevist patriarch, P. A. Axelrod, was the most vulgar menshevist book which the history of menshevist literature has ever known. In this book Comrade Trotsky came to the conclusion of a liberal labor policy.

And what was the book: "Our Revolution," the most left of the books of Trotsky in the first epoch? In this book (see also his book "1905") there was laid down the notorious theory of the "permanent revolution" which Comrade Trotsky is now attempting to impose upon Bolshevism. This "theory" was regarded by Comrade Lenin and all the Bolsheviki as a variety of menshevism. Not everybody will remember that in this "left" book in which Comrade Trotsky to a certain extent defended the "workers" revolution against the Bolshevik idea of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Trotsky wrote:

"But how far can the socialist policy of the working class go under the economic conditions of Russia? One can say one thing with certainty: it will much rather encounter political hindrances than be supported by the technical backwardness of the country. Without direct state support of the European proletariat the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain power and transform their temporary rule into a long enduring socialist dictatorship. One cannot doubt this for a moment." (Trotsky: "Our Revolution," 1904. Russian edition, Page 277-288.)

What is the meaning of the state support of the European proletariat? In order to possess the possibility of affording state support to the Russian revolution, the European proletariat would first have to capture power in Europe. In the year 1905, and in general up to the war 1914-1918, there

could be no talk of this. But Trotsky preached the "permanent" revolution in the year 1905.

What is to be inferred from this? Only this that Trotsky in the year 1905 either did not seriously believe in any permanent revolution or that he preached the permanent revolution in 1905 only under the condition that the European proletariat afforded us "state support," which meant that Trotsky "postponed" the workers revolution in Russia until the victory of the proletarian revolution in Europe. In the latter case Trotsky appears as the representative of the most stereotyped social democratic standpoint: Let "them" first make the revolution and then "we" will "immediately" make the workers' revolution.

Trotsky wrote in those times a great deal as to a victorious Russian revolution being only possible as a part of a victorious international revolution, for western European capital supported czarism with loans, etc. There was a grain of truth in this and here Trotsky only repeated that which the Bolsheviki said. But Trotsky as usual conceived this connection of the Russian revolution with the international revolution too mechanically.

Comrade Trotsky did not grasp the concrete way of the revolution in our country. He does not even yet grasp the actual importance of the peasantry in our revolution. If any proof were necessary for this, Trotsky has provided this in his last work, "The Lessons of October." We quote the following:

"It was precisely the unripeness of the revolution under the thoroly unique conditions created by the war which delivered the leadership over to the petty bourgeois revolutionaries which consisted in the fact that they defended the historical claim of the bourgeois to power. This, however, does not mean that the revolution could only follow that road which it followed from February to October, 1917. This last road resulted not merely from the class relations but from those temporary conditions created by the war.

"As a result of the war the peasantry appeared in the organized and armed form of the army comprising many millions. Before the proletariat could organize itself under its own flag in order to draw the masses of the village behind it, the petty bourgeois revolutionaries found a natural support in the peasant army exasperated by the war. With the weight of this army of millions which everything immediately depended the petty bourgeois revolutionaries exercised pressure upon the proletariat and at first drew it after them. That the course of the revolution could have been different with the same class bases is best proved by the events which preceded the war." (Lesson of October, Page 18-19.)

The road from February till October 1917, resulted, as you can see, not only from the class relations, but also from those temporary (!) conditions created by the war. What is the meaning of this brain wave? It assumes that the war did not arise from the class relations, that is to say it was a mere chance event. Now, the Russo-Japanese war, out of which grew 1905, the general rehearsal of 1917—was it also a chance? Was that not also created by the temporary conditions? What profundity of thought!

If there had been no imperialist war—and Leninism teaches that the imperialist war is the inevitable outcome of imperialism, as the latest stage of capitalism, therefore of the course of the class war; if Russia had not been a peasant country and therefore its vast army had not been a peasant army of a dozen millions; if this peasant army had not been rendered desperate by the imperialist war which the bourgeoisie had to conduct; if the weight of more than hundred millions of peasants had not exercised pressure upon the whole course of

the social-political life of the country —then the development of the revolution would have proceeded according to Trotsky and the astonished humanity would have experienced the apotheosis of Trotskyism.

It apparently has never occurred to our author that "if ifs and ands were pots and pans" if there had not been an imperialist war with all its inevitable consequences, there would probably never had been the revolution of 1917, and no such relatively easy victory. Our author is also obviously unaware that precisely the development of the revolution from February to October, 1917, confirmed "in passing" the already obvious truth that the whole Trotskyism with its theory of its "permanent" revolution was nothing else than a cleverly thought-out intellectual scheme which was cut according to the requirements of menshevism.

Let us refer once more to Comrade Lenin:

"Hence their (the mensheviki) monstrous, idiotic, renegade idea that the dictatorship of the porletariat and of the peasantry contradicts every course of economic development. With us there appears at every crisis of our epoch (1905-1909) a general democratic movement of the mushik and to ignore this would be a profound error which in fact would lead to menshevism." Thus wrote Lenin in December, 1909.

But Comrade Trotsky even in the year 1924 does not understand that the role of the mushik in such a crisis as 1917 was not by chance not removed from the course of the class struggle.

It is obvious that it has also never occurred to our author that the course of the great revolution between February and October, 1917, wonderfully confirmed Leninism, among other things in that section in which Lenin with the theoretical ruthlessness peculiar to him, deals with the Trotskyist variety of menshevism.

A collaborator of Comrade Trotsky and the "editor" of his book, 1917, Comrade Lenzner, asserts in all seriousness that already in the articles written by Trotsky at the beginning of March, 1917, in America in the paper, Novy Mir (New World), he anticipated the attitude to the questions taken by Comrade Lenin in his famous "Letters from Abroad." Comrade Trotsky did not even know what the question was whilst Comrade Lenin in his truly famous "Letters from Abroad" already submitted to the Russian working class the scheme of the real October worked out in almost all details.

But this is only half the trouble. The present trouble is that Comrade Trotsky can say nothing better than if there had been no imperialist war and if the peasantry had not predominated in our country, then Trotskyism would have been right as opposed to Leninism.

Is any further proof necessary that Comrade Trotsky understood the Bolshevist attitude to the question of the peasantry as little as he understands it now?

The "Lessons of October" have clearly shown one thing: that even now in the eighth year of the proletarian revolution Comrade Trotsky has not grasped the true nature of Leninism, and that he now as previously is revolving round in the same circle—in the question of the peasantry—in the question which is the chief source of the false conclusions of Comrade Trotsky beginning from his error of Brest to his error in the question of the trade unions in 1921, ending with his errors at the present time.

* * *

In the "Lessons of October" there are almost as many erroneous assertions as there are assertions at all. Therefore the Communist Youth had little difficulty in detecting that Comrade Trotsky confounded Lenin with Hilferding (in the question of the constituent assembly and the so-called

combined type of the constituent assembly and the Soviets.* Hence it comes that Comrade Sokolnikov demonstrated to Comrade Trotsky that the "left" errors of Comrade Bogdatjev were ascribed by the esteemed author of the "Lessons of October" to Comrade Lenin (the history of the demonstration of April 1917.) Hence it comes that Comrade Kuusinen can easily prove by means of documents that Comrade Trotsky in the question of the German revolution** said the exact contrary in January, 1924, to what he now says in the "Lessons of October."

(*) For the rest we learn from the second part of "1917" that as late as Oct. 29, 1917, Comrade Trotsky himself on behalf of the Council of People's Commissionäres wrote in an appeal: "The only thing which can save the country is the constitutional assembly which consists of representatives of the working and exploited classes of the people." It is permitted to ask in which respect this is better than the "combined type?" ("1917," second part page 133.)

(**) One example suffices: "We have seen there (in Germany) in the second half of the past year a classical demonstration of the fact that a most extraordinary favorable revolutionary situation of world historical importance can be missed," thus wrote Comrade Trotsky in September, 1924, in the "Lessons of October."

"If the party (the C. P. of Germany) had declared the revolt in October (last year) as the Berlin comrades have proposed, it would now be lying with a broken neck." We read these words in the draft thesis of comrades Radek and Trotsky in January, 1924.

In such a question one cannot have two opinions, one in January, 1924, and another in September, 1924. If however, one has two opinions regarding such a question, one must not so attack the E. C. C. I. as Comrade Trotsky has done.

Hence it comes that such important episodes of the revolution as the question of the July demonstration, as the fight for Kronstadt and even the question of the July days are described by Comrade Trotsky after the manner of Suchanov and the paper, Denj (The Day, bourgeois), and not as they actually occured. Hence it comes that the question of the tactics of the Bolsheviki with regard to the preliminary parliament and the democratic conference are dealt with in an equally incorrect and biased manner.

These "small" errors have been sufficiently refuted by authoritative witnesses of the events. Perhaps we shall be able on another occasion to give an exact description of some of the very important episodes of the revolution.

III.

Was There a Right Wing in the Bolshevist Party?

We must give a clear answer to this question. Everybody who is familiar with the real history of Bolshevism will, without hesitation, give the following answer: **There was none and there could be none.**

There could be no right wing because the Leninist fundamental principles of the structure of the Bolshevist party excluded every possibility of a right and of a left wing.

There could be no right wing because the first split between Bolsheviki and mensheviki had already taken place in 1903 on the eve of the first revolution of 1905.

Comrade Lenin wrote regarding the Italian socialist party that even its first splitting from the extreme chauvinists which took place some years before the world war—that even this superficial split which was far from being complete, helped it in the first

period of the imperialist war, in the year 1914, to adopt a more commendable standpoint than the standpoint of those social democratic parties who up to the year of 1917, and even later remained united. Every one who has read the articles of Comrade Lenin from the years 1914-1915 on German social democracy ("Against the Stream") will remember how passionately Lenin advocates the splitting of the German social democracy, what great hopes he placed on this split, how he explained the complete collapse of German social democracy among other things as being due to the belated split between the left and right wings.

"The type of the socialist parties of the epoch of the Second International was the party which tolerated opportunism in its midst, which during the ten years of the period of peace continually grew in numbers but which hid itself and adapted itself to the revolutionary workers from whom it took over its Marxist terminology and avoided every clear definition of principle. This type outlived its time.

"In Italy the party was an exception for the epoch of the Second International; the opportunists with Bissolati at the head were expelled from the party. The result of this crisis was excellent . . . We, in no way, idealize the Italian socialist party and do not guarantee that it will prove to remain firm in the event of Italy coming into the war. We are not speaking of the future of this party, we are speaking now only of the present. We affirm the indisputable fact that the workers of the majority of the European countries were deceived by the ficticious unity of the opportunists with the revolutionaries and that Italy is a happy exception—a country where at the present moment there is no such deception. That which for the Second International was a fortunate exception, must and will be a rule for the Third International. The proletariat will always—so long as capitalism exists—be in contact with the petty-bourgeoisie. It is unwise, sometimes to reject a temporary alliance with them, but to unite with them, to be united with the opportunists can at present only be defended by the enemies of the proletariat in the present epoch." ("Against the Stream" p. 36.)

Whoever thinks over these words will understand why in a party which was formed by Comrade Lenin in the fight against the mensheviki and against Trotsky there could exist no right wing.

"Our Russian party has long since broken with the opportunist groups and elements . . . The dead weight of opportunism was not able to drag down our party into the deep. And this circumstances rendered it possible—as the split of the Italian party —to fulfill its revolutionary duty."

So wrote Lenin in "Socialism and War." (Second chapter.)

Comrade Trotsky must understand all this and then he will understand why one cannot speak of a right wing of the Bolshevist party which was created by Lenin in a "fierce" struggle against all non-Bolshevist fractions, groups and tendencies.

Whoever understands anything of the theory, of the tactics and of the organizatory principles of Leninism cannot claim that a right wing existed in the Bolshevik party. Bolshevism differed fundamentally in that it could not permit and did not permit the party to be organized as a block of all possible tendencies, as a block of a right, of a left wing, of a center, etc.

Think over what Comrade Lenin

has written for example regarding the period of the emigration time of the party. He said: The great variety of political tendencies in emigration—mensheviki, S. R. anarchists, maximalists, which were again divided into sub sections, had the effect that all non-Bolshevist elements were withdrawn, as by a plaster, from the body of the party. The same was the case in the period of legal and illegal existence of our party between February and October, 1917. At that time we saw the same variety and multiplicity of political parties, fractions and minor fractions, which inevitably absorbed everything that was not thoroly Bolshevik. In this manner the Bolshevik party became a crystallization point only for Bolsheviki. Hence our party was one indivisible whole.

It involves a complete ignorance of Lenin and of Leninism to admit the possibility that Lenin, even if only for a short time, had tolerated the existence of a right wing in the Bolshevik party. And what is still more important is, that Leninism is irreconcilable with the existence of a right wing in the Bolshevist party.

It could be argued that there were Bolshevik "reconciliators" who greatly resembled a right wing of Bolshevism.

Yes, that is a fact. The Bolshevik "reconciliators" played an episodal role at the commencement of the split between the Bolsheviki and the mensheviki (1903-1904), and then also in the years of the counter-revolution (1910-1911). But at the moment of this hesitating attitude of the Bolshevik "reconciliators" it came essentially to a direct split between us and them. The Bolshevik party, under Lenin's leadership, was ready to amputate this small fragment from its body, and this it did in order to remain a homogeneous Bolshevik party.

The overwhelming majority of these reconcilors are at present in our ranks and nobody thinks of asserting today that they recollect there being in any way a sort of right tendency in the party. Their most prominent leader was I. F. Dubrovinsky, and nobody who knew him would pretend that he represented in any way a right wing. From one prison to another, from one banishment to another, went such comrades as Dubrovinsky and Nogin; and in the period between the one prison and the other they made many passing errors regarding questions of organization. Of course, these comrades could have fallen victims to opportunism if their errors had undergone a logical development. This however, did not happen. Lenin put the question bluntly: Either expulsion or submission to the decisions of the Bolshevik leadership.

That does not mean that in the long years of the history of Bolshevism there were never any differences and various tendencies between the most prominent functionaries of the party. There were, of course, such differences. In 1906 Kamenev advocated the boycott of the Duma (a "left" attitude), while Comrade Lenin recommended participation in the Duma. In the plenum of the C. C. in 1910 (the last joint plenum with the mensheviki) a section of the Bolsheviki attempted unity with Trotsky, whilst Comrade Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders, (among them the present writer) were emphatically against this attempt. These, however, were only episodal differences of opinion.

But the differences which we had with the people grouped round the paper "Vperjod" (Forward) in 1908 and which lasted for some years, could not be regarded as episodal. These alleged "left" people, as a matter of fact, defended opportunist tac-

tics, that is, they abandoned the fundamental basis of Bolshevism. The group was expelled from our organization and only those have returned who have thoroly recovered from the "Vperjod" sickness.

Also those differences cannot be characterized as being episodal which arose in connection with the war, and which extended only to a few prominent Bolsheviki at the beginning of the imperialist war. Bolshevism as a whole adopted a thoroly correct attitude towards the imperialist war and was conscious of the world-historical slogan: "Conversion of the imperialist war into civil war." A few important Bolshevist functionaries, for example, I. Goldenberg, vacillated regarding the question of the character of the war, and it came to an organizatory break with these comrades. Goldenberg was not able to return to the party until 1921, after he had thoroly recognized his fault.

What is the explanation of some of the errors committed in the first days of the February revolution? The general staff of the Bolsheviki, after years of imperialist war and white terror, came together from various parts of the earth, after the central functionaires of the Bolsheviki had lived separated from their best friends. All were overwhelmed by the world historical events. Many things turned out differently from what had been expected. In the first days of the revolution the Bolsheviki themselves were in the minority among the Petrograd workers. The mood of the soldiers, whom Lenin later called "honest defenders of their country," created great tactical difficulties for us. We asked ourselves how we could approach these masses, how we could at least get them to listen to us. All this led to those difficulties which were responsible for the errors of the "Pravda" in the first days after the February revolution, before the arrival of Comrade Lenin.

Can one from this infer the existence of a right wing in the Bolshevist party, which Comrade Trotsky attempts to represent as a "social democratic," "semi-menshevist" wing. Only he who does not know the Bolshevist party can say such a thing, who judges the party from the outside, who for fifteen years has fought against this party, and who in 1924 again declares war against the party.

There were serious differences among the Bolsheviki in the period from April to September, 1917. Groups could have been formed out of these differences if the comrades who had erred had not confessed their errors, if events had not quickly liquidated these errors, if the party had not unanimously repudiated these errors, if the party had not had a Lenin. Then a split would have occurred, but in no event would a right wing have been formed.

There were sharp differences among the Bolsheviki in October and November, 1917. During this time the present writer was among those comrades who had erred. If the errors had not been immediately recognized as such, if the party had not unanimously corrected these errors, and again, if the party had had no Lenin, then these sharp differences could have led to serious results. But as a matter of fact the contrary of all this occurred.

The first split between the Bolsheviki and the mensheviki began in 1903. Since about 1910 the Bolshevist party has had a completely independent organizatory life. Between 1903 and 1910 Bolshevism experienced a period of insufficient organizatory growth. From 1910 to 1917 this could no longer be the case. There was

and could be no right wing in the Bolshevist party.

IV.

Is the Formation of a Right Wing in the R. C. P. Possible at the Present Time?

A really serious question. Our reply to this is: Yes, an attempt is now being made to create such a right wing in the R. C. P. and in the Comintern. The leading figure in these efforts is Comrade Trotzky. The real problem is whether we can tolerate the formation of such a wing, and if not, how we can avoid it.

From whence can a right wing, a right fraction, a right tendency arise? It would be absurd to explain this by the personal responsibility of this or that comrade. No, there exist indisputable objective pre-conditions therefor.

What constitute the essential differences between the present state of affairs in our party and the position of our party before the October revolution?

First: The mensheviki, the S. R. the anarchists and the remaining groups have disappeared from the open political life of our country. In the interest of the successful carrying out of the proletarian dictatorship, the victorious working class, under the lead of our party, had to render illegal the S. R. the mensheviki, the anti-Soviet section of the anarchists, and other groups opposed to the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only the Russian C. P. is legally active. Today it cannot be otherwise. With such a state of affairs it is unavoidable that many elements enter our party, who, in the event of the existence of other legal parties, would not be with us.

Second: We have ideologically shattered two important parties which during two decades were our rivals; the S. R. and the mensheviki. Some ten thousand members of these parties have come over to our party, among them many very active members, as for instance Comrade Trotzky. A considerable portion of these comrades have been completely assimilated by our party and now are good Bolsheviki. But we must not disguise the fact that the annihilation of the S. R. and the mensheviki as legal parties does not serve to promote the homogeneous composition of our party.

Third: Our country is passing thru a transition period. Up to October, 1917, the situation was in many respects more difficult, but clearer. The party was confronted with an immediate task: the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. The present situation is more complicated. The Nep, the bourgeois environment, all these factors render our situation extremely complicated. Never in the history of the struggle of the international working class was a workers party in such complicated transition period.

Fourth: The social composition of the party has become heterogeneous. Up to October, 1917, our party was almost entirely a party of workers. After 1917, the situation has changed. We have at present over a hundred thousand peasant members, some thousands of members from the higher educational institutions, and many thousands of Soviet employes.

What is the meaning of all our efforts to purge our party, the Lenin recruitment? The aim of all these efforts is to render the composition of the party as homogeneous as possible, to prevent a dilution of its social composition.

All these together create the prerequisites under which the formation of a right wing is possible in the party created by Lenin—and is now without Lenin.

When we deal with the attacks of Comrade Trotzky upon the Bolshevist C. C. with the greatest objectivity, then we see that their content is the following: During these years Comrade Trotzky gave expression to ev-

erything which is not strictly Bolshevist, and which feels itself cramped within the frame of the old Lenin tactics. Trotzky is sincerely convinced that the old methods of Leninism can no longer today fulfill their task, when the party is acting in such a vast arena. According to his opinion, the party must become a block of various tendencies and fractions.

We all know that all those processes which are developing in our country are reflected in our party, which is in possession of power and which has suppressed all the other, anti-Soviet parties. We Leninists draw from this the conclusion that it is all the more necessary to preserve the greatest possible homogeneity of the party, the greatest firmness of leadership and the greatest possible devotion to Leninism. To maneuver, sometimes even to make concessions, is unavoidable. But it is necessary that the party shall always remain Bolshevist. Trotzky, on the other hand, draws different conclusions from the complexity of our present situation. It seems to him that the earlier "sectarianism," steel-firmness, is leading the country to the edge of the abyss. According to his view, the party must become a combination of various tendencies and fractions, and that it shall not immediately conduct the state and economic apparatus, but leave more scope for bourgeois specialists, etc.

This idea of Comrade Trotzky would in the present international and inner-political situation, logically lead in the best case to the substitution of the Bolshevik Party by a "broad" "labor party," after the model of the English MacDonald labor party in a "Soviet edition." It is quite possible that Comrade Trotzky has not thought out his idea to its logical conclusion, but he is steering in this direction, unless he returns to Bolshevism.

A party which has to work under such conditions needs a number of transmission belts to secure its influence upon the peasantry, upon the employees, upon the intelligenzia, etc. The system of levers which secures the dictatorship of the proletariat is complicated (Soviets, trade unions, etc.). But it does not follow from this that the party can become a block of tendencies, a sort of "parliament of opinions."

It is a matter of course that the Bolshevik Party in the year 1924, cannot simply copy the Bolshevik Party of, say 1914, or even of 1917. We cannot limit ourselves merely to admitting workers into our party as members. By means of the Lenin recruitment we did everything possible in order to increase the number of industrial workers in our party. For some years we held back the influx of peasants into our party. But we have now come to the conclusion that we must again admit a considerable number of peasants. A workers party which governs the state in a peasant country, must have among its members a certain percentage of peasants.

The regulation of the composition of our party is a complicated and difficult task. It is closely connected with the most difficult and sometimes the most delicate political problems. The party must maneuver in this connection. At the present epoch the party cannot be so homogeneous as it was before the seizure of power.

Therefore, the policy, and also the leadership of the party, must be as Bolshevik as it has been hitherto, as Lenin has taught us. The working class realizes its hegemony in the revolution, and the party is the leading advance guard of the class possessing this hegemony.

From this there arises the question of the inner orientation of the party. The Bolshevist Party of 1924 **must base itself upon the picked troops of its members, upon the workers.** No other section outside the workers can serve as the barometer for the policy of our party.

Must we therefore permit the existence or the formation of a right wing in our party?

We must not!

It does not in the least follow that because we have to be content with a non-sufficiently homogeneous social composition of our party, that because we have to attract a certain number of non-workers into our party, we can water down the policy of the party, that the leadership of the party must also be heterogenous. On the contrary! Precisely because the party, under the present conditions, cannot be so homogeneous in its composition as it was before the seizure of power, the policy of the party must, more strictly than ever, base itself upon the workers; and precisely therefore, the leadership of the party must be specially firm and Leninist.

The objective conditions under which our party must work at present are such that there exists the danger of the formation of a right wing. He who wishes to remain true to the spirit of Leninism must exert all his forces in order to help the party to withstand these tendencies. With a skillful and correct application of the principles of Leninism to the present situation, we will succeed in preventing the formation of a right wing in our party.

Those comrades, however, who, like Comrade Trotzky, not only do not resist these tendencies, but become their representatives, those comrades who oppose the Leninist central committee which clearly perceives the danger and has to maneuver in a complicated situation, thereby become the enemies of Leninism.

Whether this is their intention or not, it is all the same. Whether they clearly recognize this or not, it is also all the same.

Let us take, for example, two prominent comrades (let us say comrades A and B). Both comrades are the most disciplined and excellent comrades. Comrade A, however, came over to Bolshevism at another time and by other ways than comrade B. Comrade A came from the peasant movement. Comrade B came from the workers' movement, he has been a Bolshevik for twenty years. Our party needs both. When, however, comrade A begins to develop within the party in a certain manner, as so often happens, and begins to demand that the policy of the party shall be based, not upon the workers but upon the peasants, or when he begins to demand that the general staff of the party should be transformed into a block of various groups—what would our party say to this comrade A in this event?

Something similar, but in a more serious form, is now being done by Comrade Trotzky. He is giving expression to everything in the party which is not Bolshevik.

Can the party tolerate this? Is it to be wondered if the party administers such a severe rebuke to Comrade Trotsky?

V.

Whither is the Present Development of Trotsky Leading?

Comrade Trotsky, as an obvious individualist, has of course many features of character which are only characteristic for him personally. Comrade Trotsky often sets up such a political platform that only one person can stand on it: Comrade Trotsky himself, as upon this platform there is no room for anybody else. It would be a mistake, however, to see in this standpoint of Trotsky only the individual. There is no doubt that he represents a fairly broad section of the factor of our situation.

Since 1922, but even more since 1923, there has been an indisputable increase in the prosperity of the country, an indisputable improvement in the material situation and the mood of the workers. At the same time we see from all the expressions of Comrade Trotsky that precisely during these years his political mood has become worse. The curve of the political mood of the broad masses of the workers of our country is in an upward direction, the political mood of Comrade Trotsky is in a downward direction.

Comrade Trotsky is beginning to see things in ever darker colors. He prophesies the decline of the country on the eve of an indisputable improvement in the economic situation, he makes false diagnoses and proposes wrong remedies, he loses more and more of his followers, etc. Let us call to mind that Comrade Trotsky, at the time of his first encounter with Comrade Lenin and the Leninst C. C., at the time of the dispute over the Brest peace, still had a considerable portion of the party on his side. At the time of the second encounter with Lenin, in 1921 (trade union discussion), Comrade Trotsky still had about a fifth of the delegates to the party conference on his side, and this in the presence of Lenin. During last year's discussion Trotsky's following was already much smaller, but nevertheless there were still hundreds of comrades who were prepared consistently to defend his platform. In the present attack of Comrade Trotsky against the C. C. the comrades defending the platform of Comrade Trotsky can be counted on the fingers. And this is not a mere chance.

This fact alone shows that Comrade Trotsky in recent years, of course without wishing it himself, has given expression, not to the mood of the proletarian masses, but often involuntarily to the mood of other sections of the population.

If we pursue the line of development of Comrade Trotsky, if we test his latest political evolution in all its details during the last two or three years, it is not difficult to encounter apparent contradictions; and sometimes it may seem as if Comrade Trotsky were criticising the C. C., not from the right but from the left. Was it not Comrade Trotsky who accused the C. C. and its representatives in the Comintern that they had "missed" the German revolution? Is that then not a "left" criticism? But when we bear in mind that along with the "left" phrases of Comrade Trotsky there stands the fact that Trotsky, during the whole of 1923, supported the right wing of the C. P. of Germany, and on the other hand the fact that the right elements of all sections of the Comintern during last year's discussion supported the standpoint of Trotsky then the question is seen in quite another light. When we remember that even in January, 1924, the draft resolution of Comrade Trotsky, Radek and Piatakov contained passages, according to which if the C. P. of Germany in October, 1923 had entered upon a revolt it would today be a heap of ruins, then it becomes clear that Comrade Trotsky here, as in all the other questions which he deals with in the "Lessons of October", has not been in any way consistent.

In the activity of Comrade Trotsky there is much that is individual, much that is the mere reflection of passing moods, much that is brilliant. His platform is not yet finally settled. His political standpoint shimmers in all the colors of the rainbow. Our task consists in understanding what substance there is in all this, what is the basis of all this; and we maintain that the basis consists of something which is not Bolshevist and not Leninist.

From whence comes this variety of that Comrade Trotsky's political development is not yet ended, and that it is taking place in a time of transition, in the period of the new Economic Policy.

Through all the variety, through all

the improvisations of Comrade Trotsky there comes to light one definite tendency.

Let us imagine for a moment what would be the state of our country if our party, instead of energetically resisting the proposals of Comrade Trotsky, had accepted his most important proposals since 1921. This would have meant:

1. The trade unions would have become state institutions, there would have taken place the notorious "fusion" of the trade unions with official state and economic organs. The trade unions, which today constitute our broadest basis and embrace 6 million workers and employees, would have been converted into a bureaucratic appendage of the official machine. In other words, we would have created a basis for menshevism and undermined with our own hands the dictatorship of the proletariat.

2. The party would have become excluded from the immediate leadership of the economic and state organs. The Soviet apparatus would have become more independent. "The emancipation of the Soviets from the party" would not merely have remained on paper, in the writings of the emigrants, but would have been partly realized. It is hardly necessary to point out to a Bolshevik that such a tendency would have had innumerable fatal consequences.

3. The bourgeois specialists would have won a far greater influence in all branches of our work, and not only on the military field. It is almost superfluous to point out that that was one of the most important features of the political platform of Comrade Trotsky, and one of the most important points of his differences with our party.

Of course it is absolutely necessary that we attract honest specialists into our work, and that we create such an atmosphere as will enable them to render useful service for our cause. If, however, the question of specialists had been solved, not according to Lenin but according to Trotsky, it would have meant the greatest political concession to the new bourgeoisie

4. In the questions of the inner life of the party we would have had to recognize that, not the workers at the benches but the youths in the high schools constitute the barometer of the party; the youths in the high schools, among whom there are excellent proletarian elements, but among whom there are not a few people who are connected by a thousand social ties to the petty bourgeoisie and, through them, to the Nep and the new bourgeoisie.

5. We should not have carried out the currency reform because, according to Trotsky, "first" industry had to be restored, and then the currency reform was to be taken in hand. It is not necessary to mention that if we had accepted this "ingenious" proposal, the weight of the socialist element upon the economy of our country would only have been reduced and the new bourgeoisie would have thereby become stronger.

6. As regards the question of our relation to the peasantry, we should have committed the greatest errors. Instead of the beginning of an alliance with the peasantry, we should be altogether estranged from them. The peasantry, alienated by our errors, would have sought another political leader, and of course would have found it in the new bourgeoisie.

No comrade will be able to say that we have invented the above six points. Every serious Bolshevik will have to admit that the struggle between the Leninist C. C. and Comrade Trotsky turns precisely upon these points, and not upon the question of "personal prestige", as the philistines think.

What would be the state of affairs in our country if, in these six questions, we had followed the road urged by Trotsky? It would have become a Russia of the Nep, in the sense and to the extent which the ideology of the new bourgeoisie reckoned upon. And

the prospects of the transformation of Russia of the new economic policy into a socialist Russia would have been very remote, and would even have entirely vanished.

If we add to all this the opportunist errors of Comrade Trotsky in the questions of international politics, (over-estimation of the democratic-pacifist era, over-estimation of the miraculous peace-making quality of American super-imperialism, under-estimation of the counter-revolutionary nature of social democracy, under-estimation of the duration of fascism) and the fact that he supported all right, semi-social democratic elements in the various sections of the Comintern, then it is clear in what direction Comrade Trotsky is drawing our party.

In this heaping up of one error upon another Comrade Trotsky has his own "system". As a whole that system is: right deviation.

The new bourgeoisie of our country is precisely a new and not the old bourgeoisie. It has seen a variety of things and has also learned something from the "Lessons of October". It saw the masses in action. It saw the ruthless handling of the bourgeoisie by the Bolsheviki in the first period of the October revolution, and the concessions of the Bolsheviki to the bourgeoisie in 1921, when these same ruthless Bolsheviki were compelled to introduce the new economic policy. It now knows the value of the real relation of forces which, among others consists in the international bourgeois environment of the first Soviet country. It has its new intelligenzia, educated for the most part in our educational establishments. It has learned to penetrate into the struggle of tendencies within our own party, it has learned to take advantage of Soviet legality.

It is a bourgeoisie which has passed through the fire of the greatest revolution; a bourgeoisie which understands how to bring about its alliance with the leaders of the international bourgeoisie. In one word, it is a bourgeoisie with a keen class-consciousness; an adaptable bourgeoisie, which has become more clever through the experiences of the revolution and better understands the importance of the workers' party and the currents within this party.

We must not disguise the fact: the social composition of our state apparatus is such, that an important part of the personnel of this apparatus must be considered as an agency of this new bourgeoisie. The same must be said regarding a certain section of the students and of the intelligenzia in general.

To demand from the Bolshevist Party in the years 1921 to 1924, in the period of transition, the before mentioned six points, means nothing less than to help, even if unwillingly, the new bourgeoisie.

Comrade Trotsky has taken a wrong turning. He wants to fight against the exaggerated "sectarianism" of the old Bolsheviki, which appears to him as "narrow-mindedness", and in reality he is fighting against the bases of Bolshevism. As a matter of fact, of course without wishing it, he is rendering the class enemy an invaluable service.

We ask the former and present followers of Comrade Trotsky, whether they are aware that every attack of Comrade Trotsky against the Bolshevik C. C. since 1921 has been hailed throughout the whole of the non-bolshevik camp with ever-increasing joy?

Marx has already said that one can express the feeling of the petty bourgeoisie without oneself being a small shop-keeper. Of course, Comrade Trotsky has the best intentions. But the way to hell is paved with good intentions. Comrade Trotsky must once and for all give up "saving" our party from alleged errors. He must understand and admit his own political errors, which for the greater part arise from the remnants of his political ideology of the time from 1903 to 1917,

when Comrade Trotsky was an open opponent of Bolshevism. He must cease from stirring up periodical "crises", with the regularity and the punctuality of a calendar, every year, and recently every six months. He must understand that nobody will succeed in crushing Leninism by force under Trotskyism. In one word, it must be understood that **Bolshevism remains Bolshevism.**

What is to be done? Split? Nonsense! There can be no talk of such a thing! Our party is more united than it ever was.

Disciplinary measures? That is also absurd! Nobody needs this; something else is necessary at present.

It is necessary that the party secure itself against a repetition of the "attacks" upon Leninism. Serious party guarantees are necessary that the decisions of the party shall be binding for Comrade Trotsky. The party is not a debating society, but a party, which moreover is in a very complicated situation. The slogan of the present day is:

Bolshevizing of all strata of the party! Ideological struggle against Trotskyism!

And before all: enlightenment, enlightenment and again enlightenment!

Our party consists for the greater part of relatively new members. It is necessary that the party study the question of Leninism and Trotskyism. It is necessary that the party clearly see that here it is a question of two fundamentally different systems of tactics:

It is not merely a question of the past history of the party. It is here a question of two methods of dealing with present-day politics, which are closely connected with such cardinal questions as the question of the relation between the working class and the peasantry. And we cannot avoid thanking Comrade Trotsky that he has at any rate provided the party with a good opportunity of analysing a deviation from Leninism and thinking more deeply into the fundamentals of Leninism.

Of course, the party must insist that party discipline is also binding for Comrade Trotsky; and we are convinced that the party will be able to insist on this. The more clearness there is in the party regarding the question of Leninism and of Trotskyism, the less ground there will be for such an attempt as Comrade Trotsky has undertaken. The less response there is in the party to this attempt, the less desire he will have to repeat it. And the response this time is very small. Comrade Trotsky has so changed the form of his "platform" that there is only room for one man upon it—Comrade Trotsky himself.

During the last discussion Comrade Trotsky declared the student youth to be the reliable "barometer". We did not agree with him then and we do not agree with him now. But it must be stated that even this, not entirely ideal, barometer has not responded this time as in recent years, which proves that the student youth do not wish to replace Leninism by Trotskyism.

The best means to hold Comrade Trotsky back from further errors, which will estrange him still further from Bolshevism, is for the whole party as one man to repudiate his deviation, and then we hope he will soon retrieve his errors.

It is to be hoped that Comrade Trotsky, when he perceives the harmfulness of this tendency and the unanimity of the party against his enormous errors, will turn back from his wrong path.

Comrade Lenin more than once formulated the "law" of the political evolution of Comrade Trotsky. If things are going well, Comrade Trotsky approaches the Bolshevist line; when things are going bad, then Comrade Trotsky inclines to the right. In order to keep him back from turning

to the right, the ideological defense of the whole party is necessary.

The party will say its final word, and once again the premature hopes of the enemy will be disappointed. The Bolshevist party will receive a new and more powerful steeling, and true Leninism will become the ideological equipment of the whole party down to the last member.

Speech by Comrade Stalin

At the Plenary Meeting of the Communist Section of the Central Trade Union Council on November 19, 1924

COMRADES! I will confine myself to unmasking a few legends which have been spread by Comrade Trotsky and others of the same opinion as to the October revolution, the part played by Comrade Trotsky in the revolution, as to the party and the preparations for October, etc. In doing so I shall treat Trotskyism as a singular ideology which is quite irreconcilable with Leninism, and speak of the duties of the party in connection with the recent literary undertakings of Comrade Trotsky.

The Facts as to the October Revolution.

First of all as to the October revolution. Strong rumors are being spread among the members of the party, that the C. C. as a whole is said to have been opposed to the insurrection in October, 1917. The tale usually goes that on Oct. 10, when the C. C. passed a resolution regarding the organization of the revolt, the majority of the C. C. pronounced against the revolt, but that just then a workman forced his way into the committee and said: "You have passed a resolution against the revolt, but I tell you that it will take place in spite of everything." The C. C. is said to have been alarmed by these threats, to have discussed anew the question of the revolt, and to have decided to organize it.

This is no simple rumor, Comrades. The well-known John Reed, who was not connected with our party and naturally could not know the history of our conspirative meeting on Oct. 10, so that he fell into Mr. Suchanov's trap, writes about it in his book "Ten Days That Shook the World." This tale is printed and repeated in a whole series of brochures which originate from the pens of Trotsky's adherents, among others in one of the latest brochures about October written by Comrade Syrkin.

These rumors are supported in an increased degree by the latest literary enterprise of Comrade Trotsky. It is hardly necessary to prove that all these and similar "Arabian Nights" do not correspond to the facts, that nothing of the sort happened or could have happened at the meeting of the C. C. We might therefore pass over these rumors, for indeed many unfounded and silly rumors are manufactured in the studies of persons in opposition or not connected with the party. We have, as a matter of fact, done so until recently, for instance, by paying no attention to the mistakes of John Reed and not troubling to correct them. But after the recent enterprises of Comrade Trotsky, it is really impossible to pass over these legends for efforts are being made to educate the youth on the lines of these legends which have unfortunately already met with some success. I feel therefore, compelled to confront these silly rumors with the actual facts.

Let us take the minutes of the meeting of the C. C. of our party from Oct. 10-23, 1917. Present: Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Trotsky, Swerdlov, Uritsky, Dzershinsky, Kollontay, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov. The question to be discussed is the situation at the time and the insurrection. After the debate, a resolution of Comrade Lenin's as to the revolt, is put to the vote. The resolution was passed with a majority of 10 votes against 2. It seems therefore perfectly clear that the C. C. resolved by a majority of 10 against 2 votes to proceed immediately with the practical work for the organization of the insurrection. At this meeting, the C. C. chose a political central committee with the title of a political bureau, consisting of Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sokolnikov and Bubnov to lead the revolt.

These are the facts.

These minutes immediately destroy several legends. They destroy the legend that a majority of the C. C. pronounced against the insurrection. They also destroy the legend that the C. C. was faced by a split on the question of the insurrection. It is evident from the minutes, that the opponents of immediate revolt—Comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev, joined the organ for the political direction of the revolt, just as did those who were in favor of it. There was not and cannot be any question of a split.

Comrade Trotsky asserts that in the persons of Comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev we had in October a right wing, almost a wing of social democrats, in our party. In view of this it seems difficult to understand how it could happen that the party escaped a split; how it could happen that, in spite of the differences of opinion, the comrades in question were placed by the party at the most important posts, were elected to the political central committee of the insurrection, etc. Lenin's intolerance of social democrats is well known in the party; the party knows that he would not for a moment have agreed to have comrades with social democratic leanings in the party, let alone in the most important posts.

How is it to be explained that the party escaped a split? It is explained by the fact that these comrades were old Bolsheviki who stood on the general foundation of Bolshevism. In what did this general foundation consist? In a conformity of views as to the fundamental questions, the questions as to the character of the Russian revolution, as to the driving force of the revolution, the role of the peasants, the principles of party leadership, etc. Without such a general foundation, a split would have been inevitable. No split took place and the differences of opinion only lasted a few days, and that because Comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev were Leninists, were Bolsheviki.

Let us now pass on to the legend as to the special part played by Comrade Trotsky in the October revolution. Comrade Trotsky's partisans vigorously spread rumors that the inaugurator and the only leader of the October revolution was Comrade Trotsky. These rumors are specially spread by Comrade Lenzner, editor of Trotsky's works. By the fact that Comrade Trotsky systematically neglects to mention the party, the C. C. and the Petrograd committee, and is silent as to the leading part played by these organizations in the work of the revolution, putting himself in the foreground as its central figure, he himself, intentionally or unintentionally, promotes the spread of the rumor as to the special part played by him in the revolution.

I am far from denying the undoubtedly important part played by Comrade Trotsky in the revolution. I must however say, that Comrade Trotsky neither did nor could play any special part, that he, as chairman of the Petrograd Soviet only carried out the will of the party authorities in question

who supervised everyone of his steps. To member of the petty bourgeoisie, such as Suchanov, all this may appear strange, but the facts, the actual facts completely confirm my statement.

Let us take the minutes of the following meeting, of the 16th of October. Present: the members of the C. C. plus representatives of the Petrograd committee, plus representatives of the military organization, of the factory committees of the trade unions, of the railwaymen. Among those present were, besides the members of the C. C., Krylenko, Schotman, Kalinin, Volodarsky, Schlapnikov, Lazis and others. The question for discussion is the insurrection from the purely practical point of view of organization. Lenin's resolution as to the insurrection was passed by a majority of 20 votes against 2, 2 refraining from voting. The practical central committee for the organizing direction of the revolt was elected. Five comrades were elected to this committee: Sverdlov, Stalin, Dsherhinsky, Bubnov, Uritzky. The duties of the central committee consisted in directing all the practical organs of the insurrection in accordance with the instructions of the C. C. As you see, something "terrible" happened at this meeting of the C. C., i. e. the "inaugurator," the "central figure," the "only leader" of the insurrection, Comrade Trotsky, was not elected a member of the practical central committee, whose duty it was to direct the insurrection.

How can this be reconciled with the opinion in general circulation as to the special part played by Comrade Trotsky? It is indeed somewhat "strange" as Suchanow or Comrade Trotsky's adherents would say. Strictly speaking, there is however, nothing "strange" in it, for Comrade Trotsky, a comparatively new man in our party at the time of October, neither did nor could play a special part, either in the party or in the October revolution. He, like all the responsible functionaries, was only an agent of the will of the C. C. Anyone who knows the mechanism of the party leadership of the Bolsheviki will understand without much difficulty, that it could not have been otherwise, for had Comrade Trotsky begun to act contrary to the will of the C. C., he would have been deprived of his influence on the course of things. All the talk about the special part played by Comrade Trotsky is a legend which is spread by officious "party" gossips.

This, of course, does not mean that the October revolution did not have its instigator and leader. But this was Lenin and no other—the same Lenin whose resolutions were accepted by the central committee in deciding the question of the revolution, the same Lenin who was not hindered by illegality from becoming the instigator of the revolution in spite of the assertions of Comrade Trotsky. It is foolish and ridiculous to endeavor by gossiping about illegality to erase that indubitable fact that the leader of the praty, V. I. Lenin, was the instigator of the revolution.

These are the facts.

Granted, they say, but it cannot be denied that Comrade Trotsky fought well in the October period. Yes, it is true, Comrade Trotsky really fought bravely in October. But in October, not only Comrade Trotsky fought bravely, so did even the left social revolutionaries who at that time stood side by side with the Bolsheviki. Altogether it must be said that it is not difficult to fight bravely in a period of victorious insurrection, when the enemy is isolated and the insurrection is growing. In such moments even the backward ones become heroes. But the battle of the proletariat is not always an attack, not always exclusively a chain of successes. The fight of the proletariat has its trials, its defeats. A true revolutionary is one who not only shows courage in the period of victorious insurrection, but who fights well in a victorious attack of the revolution, and the same time

shows courage at a moment of retreat of the revolution, in a period of defeat of the proletariat; who does not lose his head nor fall out, if the revolution fails and the enemy succeeds; who, in the period of the retreat of the revolution, does not fall a victim to panic and despair.

The left social revolutionaries did not fight badly in the October period when they supported the Bolsheviki. Who however, is not aware that these "brave" warriors were seized with panic in the Brest period when the attack of German imperialism threw them into despair and hysterics? It is a sad but indisputable fact that Comrade Trotsky, who had fought well in the October period, lost his courage in the Brest period, the period of temporary failure of the revolution, to such an extent that in this difficult moment he was not steadfast enough to resist following in the footsteps of the left social revolutionaries. There is no doubt that the moment was a very difficult one, that it was necessary to display an iron self-possession so as not to be worn out, to give way at the right moment and to accept peace at the right moment, to protect the proletarian army against the thrust of the German imperialism, to preserve the peasant reserves and, after having in this way attained a breathing space, to strike out at the enemy with renewed force. But alas, Comrade Trotsky did not display such courage and such revolutionary steadfastness at this difficult moment.

In Comrade Trotsky's opinion, the chief lesson of the proletarian revolution of October is "not to run off the rails." This is wrong, for the assertion of Comrade Trotsky contains only a small part of the truth as to the lessons of the revolution. The whole truth as to the lessons is to avoid "running off the rails," not only in the days of the revolutionary attack, but also in the days of retreat of the revolution, when the enemy has gained the upper hand and the revolution is suffering defeat. The revolutior is not exhausted with October. October is only the beginning of the proletarian revolution. It is bad to run off the rails when the revolution is in the process of development, it is worse when it happens in the hour of severe trial of the revolution, after power has been seized. It is no less important to hold fast to the power on the day after the revolution, than to seize it. Since Comrade Trotsky ran off the rails in the Brest period, the period of severe trial for our revolution, when it was almost a case of yielding up the power, he ought to understand his pointing out the mistakes made by Kamenev and Zinoviev in October, is entirely out of place.

The Party and the Preparations for October.

Let us now pass on to the question of the preparations for October. If one listens to Comrade Trotsky, one is tempted to think that the Bolshevist Party during the whole period of October only did just what turned up, that it was devoured by internal dissensions, and that it hindered Lenin in every possible way and that, had it not been for Comrade Trotsky, no one knows how the revolution might have ended. It is rather amusing to hear these strange statements of Comrade Trotsky about the party, who in the same "preface" to volume III. states that "the chief weapon of the proletarian revolution is the party," that "without party, beyond the party, independently of the party, by a substitution of the party, the proletarian revolution cannot win," from which argument Allah himself could not understand how our revolution could have been victorious, since "its chief weapon" was inadequate and yet no victory is possible "independently of the party." It is not however, the first time that Comrade Trotsky serves us up such strange fare. We must take it for granted that the en-

tertaining speeches about our party belong to the usual peculiarities of Comrade Trotsky. Let us glance briefly at the preparations for October according to the various periods.

1. The Period of Re-Organization of the Party (March—April).

The fundamental facts of this period are: a, the fall of czarism; b, the formation of the provisional government (dictatorship of the bourgeoisie); c, the rise of soldiers' and workmen's soviets (dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry); d, the double government; e, the April demonstration; f, the first crisis of power.

The characteristic feature of this period is the fact that side by side, concurrently and simultaneously, there exist both the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat and the peasantry, the latter showing confidence in the former, believing in its efforts for peace, voluntarily conferring the power on the bourgeoisie and thus turning itself into its appendage. Serious conflicts between the two dictatorships had not yet arisen. Instead of this there was a "contact commission."

This was the greatest change in the history of Russia and a hitherto unexperienced turn in the history of our party. The old pre-revolutionary platform of the direct overthrow of the government was clear and definite, but was no longer suited to the new conditions of the fight. It was now impossible to aim directly at the overthrow of the government, for it was bound up with the Soviets which were under the influence of the social patriots, and the party would have had to carry on an unbearable fight against both the government and the Soviets. But it was also impossible to carry out a policy for the support of the provisional government for this was a government of imperialism.

A re-orientation of the party under the new conditions of the fight was necessary. The party (its majority) approached this re-orientation very cautiously. It adopted the policy of a pressure of the Soviets on the provisional government in the question of peace, but did not at once make up its mind to take the further step from the old slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry to the new slogan of the power of the Soviets. This double-faced policy was calculated to convince the Soviets thru the concrete questions of peace of the genuinely imperialistic nature of the provisional government, and thus to tear them away from the latter. This was an entirely mistaken policy; for it produced pacifist illusions, supplied water to the mills of social patriotism and rendered the revolutionary education of the masses difficult. This mistaken attitude I shared at that time with other members of the party, and I only renounced it altogether in the middle of April after I had subscribed to Lenin's theses.*

A re-orientation was necessary. This re-orientation was given to the party by Lenin in his famous theses of April. I will not enter into detail as to these theses, as they are known to everyone. Were there at that time differences of opinion between the party and Lenin? Yes, there were. How long did these differences of opinion last? Not more than a fortnight. The conference of the organization of the whole town of Petrograd (second half of April), which accepted Lenin's theses, was a turning point in the development of our party. The state conference at the end of April only completed the work of the Petrograd conference in a measure appropriate to the state gathering, by the united

*It is well-known that Comrade Zinoviev, whom Comrade Trotsky would like to turn into an "adherent of Hilferding" entirely shared Lenin's point of view.

attitude of the party, nine-tenths of the party round itself.

Now, after seven years, Comrade Trotsky shows malicious joy at long passed differences of opinion among the Bolsheviki, by representing these differences of opinion almost as a fight of two parties within Bolshevism. But first of all, Comrade Trotsky exaggerates in an outrageous manner and inflates the whole subject; for the Bolshevist Party has outlived these differences of opinion without being in the least shaken. In the second place our party would be a caste and not a revolutionary party if it did not admit different shades of opinion in its midst, but it is well-known that there were differences of opinion amongst us also in the past, thus for instance, in the period of the third Duma, which however, did not interfere with the unity of our party. Thirdly it will not be superfluous to ask what was Comrade Trotsky's attitude at that time, he who now takes malicious pleasure in long past differences of opinion.

The so-called editor of Trotsky's works, Comrade Lenzner, maintains that the American letters of Comrade Trotsky (March) "completely anticipate" Lenin's "Letters from Abroad" (March) which form the foundations of Lenin's April theses. He writes verbatim: "completely anticipate." Comrade Trotsky makes no objection to this analogy, so evidently accepts it with thanks. But first of all, Comrade Trotsky's letters "in no way resemble" Lenin's letters, either in spirit or in their conclusions, for they fully reflect Comrade Trotsky's anti-Bolshevist slogan: "No czar, but a labor government," a slogan which means the revolution without the peasantry. It is only necessary to look thru these two groups of letters to convince oneself of this fact. Second, how can it be explained in this case that Lenin thot it necessary two days after his return from abroad to draw a line of separation between himself and Trotsky?

Who does not know of Lenin's repeated declarations, that Trotsky's slogan "No czar, but a labor government" is an attempt to "overlook the peasant movement which is not yet out of date," "that this slogan is playing with the seizure of power by the labor government"?* What can Lenin's Bolshevist theses have in common with the anti-Bolshevist scheme of Comrade Trotsky, with his "playing with the seizure of power"? And where do these people get the passion with which they compare a miserable hovel with Mont Blanc? Why did Comrade Lenzner have to add, to the many legends about our revolution another legend about "the anticipation" of Lenin's famous "Letters from Abroad," by the American letters of Comrade Trotsky?**

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*See Lenin's works, vol. XIV. page 31-32 (Russian edition). See also the reports at the conference of the whole of Petrograd and at the imperial conference of the R. C. P. (Middle and end of April, 1917).

**We must consider as one of these legends the wide-spread version that Comrade Trotsky was the "only" or the "chief organizer" of the victories at the fronts in the civil war. In the interest of truth, comrades, I must declare that this version is absolutely contrary to the truth. I am far from denying the important part played by Comrade Trotsky in the civil war. I must, however, declare with all firmness, that the honor of being the organizer of our victories falls on no individual but on the great community of the advanced workers of our country, the Russian Communist Party. Perhaps it will not be superfluous to quote a few examples. You know that Koltschak and Denikin were regarded as the chief enemies of the Soviet re-

2. **The period of the revolutionary mobilization of the masses (May-August).** Fundamental facts of this period: a. The April demonstration in Petrograd and the formation of a coalition government with the participation of the "socialists"; b, the demonstration on May 1, in the most important centers of Russia with the slogan of the "democratic peace"; c, the June demonstration in Petrograd with the chief slogan: "Down with the capitalist ministers!"; d, the June offensive on the front and the failures of the Russian army; e, the armed July demonstration in Petrograd and the resignation of the ministers of the cadet party from the government; f, the bringing up of counter-revolutionary troops from the front, the destruction of the editorial office of the "Pravda," the fight of the counter-revolution against the Soviets and the formation of a new coalition government with Kerenski at its head; g, the sixth party session at which was given the slogan for the preparation of an armed insurrection; h, the counter-revolutionary imperial council and the general strike in Moscow; i, the unfortunate attack of Kornilov on Petrograd, the revival of the Soviets, resignation of the cadets and formation of the "directorium."

As the characteristic feature of this period we must regard the sharpening of the crisis and the destruction of that unstable equilibrium between the Soviets and the provisional government, which in the previous period had, for better or worse, continued to exist. The double rule was unbearable for both sides. The fragile construction of the "contact commission" saw its last days. The "crisis of power" and the "ministerial leap frog" were at that time the most fashionable expressions. The crisis at the front and the disintegration behind the front did their work in that they strengthened the extreme wings and wedged in the social compromisers and social patriots on both sides. The revolution was mobilized, which brot about the mobilization of the counter-revolution. The counter-revolution on the other hand fanned the flame of the revolution by intensifying the revolutionary conflagration. The question of the transference of power to a new class became the question of the day.

Were there at that time differences of opinion in our party? There were. But, contrary to the statements of Comrade Trotsky who attempted to discover a "right" and a "left" wing of the party they were of a purely objective nature. That is to say, they were differences of opinion of a kind without which no active party life and no real party work can exist.

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public. You know that our country only breathed freely after the victory over these enemies. And history says that our troops defeated these two enemies, Koltschak as well as Denikin in opposition to Trotsky's plans. Judge for yourselves!

1. Re Koltschak. It was in the summer of 1919. Our troops attacked Koltschak and operated before Ufa. Meeting of the C. C. Comrade Trotsky proposed to stop the attack on the line of the Bjalaja river (before Ufa), to leave the Urals in Koltschak's hands, to remove part of our troops from the eastern front and to throw them on to the southern front. Heated debates took place. The C. C. did not agree with Comrade Trotsky and found that the Urals with their works, their network of railways, should not be left in Koltschak's hands, because he could there easily bring his troops into order, collect large farmers round him and advance to the Volga, but that first of all Koltschak should be driven back over the ridge of the Urals into the Siberian steps, and that only then should the transference of troops to the south be proceeded with. The C. C. declined Comrade Trotsky's plan. The latter resigned. The C. C. did

Comrade Trotsky is wrong when he maintains that the April demonstration in Petrograd brought about differences of opinion within the C. C. The C. C. was in this question absolutely unanimous and condemned the attempt of a group of comrades, to arrest the "provisional government" at the moment when the Bolsheviki were in the minority both in the Soviets and in the army. If Comrade Trotsky had not written his "history" of October according to Suchanow's material but on the basis of the actual documents, he could easily have convinced himself of the incorrectness of his assertion.

Comrade Trotsky is undoubtedly wrong when he asserts that the "right" members of the C. C. designated as an "adventure" the attempt, at "Lenin's initiative" to organize a demonstration on June 9. If Comrade Trotsky had not written in accordance with Suchanow's information, he would certainly have known that the demonstration of July 9 was postponed in complete agreement with Lenin and that Yenin defended the postponement in an important speech at the well-known meeting of the Petrograd committee (see minutes of the Petrograd committee).

Comrade Trotzky is entirely in the wrong when he speaks of the "tragic" differences of opinion within the C. C. in connection with the armed July demonstration. Comrade Trotzky is simply using his imagination when he assumes that some members of the leading group of the C. C. "must have regarded the July episode as a harmful adventure." Comrade Trotzky, who at that time was not yet a member of the C. C. but only our Soviet representative in parliament, could not of course know that the C. C. only regarded the July demonstration as a means for getting information about the opponent, that the C. C. (and Lenin) did not wish to turn nor think of turning the demonstration into an insurrection at a moment when the Soviets of the chief towns were still in favor of the social patriots. It is quite possible that some of the Bolsheviki actually pulled long faces in connection with the July defeat. I know for instance that some of the Bolsheviki who were arrested were even ready to leave our ranks. But to draw conclusions from this against some who are said to have been "rights," to have been members of the C. C., is to distort history in a reckless manner.

Comrade Trotzky is wrong when he declares that in the Kornilov days,

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not accept his resignation. The commander in chief, Wazetis, a partisan of Comrade Trotsky's plan, retired. His place was taken by a new commander in chief, Comrade Kamenev. From this moment onward, Comrade Trotsky declined any direct participation in the transactions on the eastern front.

2. Re Denikin. The affair took place in autumn, 1919. The attack against Denikin failed. The "steel ring" round Mamontow, (the storming of Mamontow) was an obvious failure. Denikin took Kursk. Denikin approaches Orel. Comrade Trotsky was called from the southern front to a meeting of the C. C. The C. C. declared the situation to be disquieting and resolved to send new military functionaries to the southern front and to recall Comrade Trotsky. These functionaries demanded "non-interference" on the part of Comrade Trotsky on the southern front. Comrade Trotsky withdrew from immediate participation in the action on the southern front. The operations on the southern front, up to the taking of Rostow on the Don and of Odessa by our troops, proceeded without Comrade Trotsky.

some of the heads of the party showed a tendency to form a block with the social patriots in order to support the provisional government. Of course the same so-called "rights" are meant, the comrades who disturb Trotzky's sleep. Trotzky is wrong; documents exist, such as the central organ of the party at that time, which upset Comrade Trotzky's statements. Comrade Trotzky refers to a letter of Lenin's to the C. C. with a warning against supporting Kerensky. But Comrade Trotzky fails to understand Lenin's letters, their significance, their object. Sometimes Lenin purposely anticipates in his letters and places in the foreground those possible mistakes which might occur, criticises them in advance, so as to warn the party and deter it from mistakes, or he sometimes exaggerates a "trifle" and "makes a mountain out of a molehill" for the same educational purpose.

A party leader, especially when he is in an illegal position cannot act otherwise, for he must see further than his companions and it is his duty to warn against every possible mistake, even "trifles." But to draw a conclusion as to "tragic" differences of opinion from these letters of Lenin (and there are plenty of such letters) and to blazon it forth, shows a lack of understanding of Lenin's letters, a lack of knowledge of Lenin. This no doubt explains the fact that Comrade Trotzky sometimes entirely fails to hit the mark. To resume: There were in the days of Kornilov's advance, as a matter of fact, absolutely no differences of opinion in the C. C.

After the July defeat, it is true, a difference of opinion did arise between the C. C. and Lenin as to the fate of the Soviets. It is well known that Lenin, who wished to concentrate the attention of the party on the preparations for the insurrection outside the Soviets, warned it against allowing itself to be seduced by the Soviets as in his opinion, the Soviets which had already been rendered nauseous by the social patriots, had become hopelessly barren. The C. C. and the 6th party session took a more cautious line and decided that there was no sufficient reason for thinking it impossible to revive the Soviets. Kornilov's advance showed that this decision was right. In any case, this difference of opinion had not actual significance for the party. Lenin subsequently admitted that the line taken by the 6th party session had been the right one. It is interesting that Comrade Trotzky did not cling to this difference of opinion and did not exaggerate it to a "monstrous" degree.

A united and consolidated party which stands in the center of the revolutionary mobilization of the masses, this is the picture of the situation of our party at that period.

3. The Period of the Organization of the Attack (September-October). The fundamental facts of this period are: (a) the summoning of the democratic council and the collapse of the idea of a block with the cadets; (b) the going over of the Soviets of Moscow and Petrograd to the Bolsheviki; (c) the Soviet Congress of the northern district and the resolution of the Petrograd Soviet against the transfer of troops; (d) the resolution of the C. C. of the revolutionary military committee of the Petrograd Soviet; (e) the resolution of the Petrograd garrison regarding the system of the commissoners of the revolutionary military committee; (f) the formation of

armed Bolshevist fighting forces and the arrest of members of the "provincial government"; (g) the seizure of power by the revolutionary military committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the formation of the Soviet of the people's commissioners by the second Soviet Congress.

As the characteristic feature of this period we must regard the rapid growth of the crisis, the complete con fusion of the ruling circles, the isolation of the S. R. and of the menshe-viki and the wholesale going over of the vascillating elements to the Bolsheviki.

An original pecularity of the revolutionary tactics of this period must be pointed out. This peculiarity consists therein that the revolution attempted to carry out every, or almost every step of its attack under the appearance of defense. There is no doubt that the refusal to permit the transfer of troops was a serious aggressive act of the revolution; nevertheless this attack was undertaken under the slogan of the defense of Petrograd against a possible attack of the external enemy. There is no doubt that the formation of the revolutionary military committee was a still more serious step in the attack against the provisional government; nevertheless it was carried out under the slogan of the organization of the Soviet control over the activities of the military staff. There is no doubt that the open going over of the garrison to the revolutionary military committee and the organization of the network of Soviet commissioners indicated the beginning of the insurrection; nevertheless these steps were taken under the slogan of the defense of the Petrograd Soviets against possible attacks of the counter-revolution.

It is as though the revolution had hidden its acts of aggression under the cloak of defense so as to attract all the more easily the undecided elements into its sphere of influence. This must also explain the apparent defensive character of the speeches articles and slogans of this period, which none the less, in their intrinsic value, bare a throughly offensive character.

Were there at this period differences of opinion within the C. C.? Yes, there were, and those not unimportant ones. I have already mentioned the differences of opinion as regards the insurrection. They were fully explained in the minutes of the C. C. of October 10, and 16. We must now give more attention to three questions: the questions of the participation in the "preliminary parliament," of the part played by the Soviets in the insurrection and the time for the insurrection. This is all the more necessary because Comrade Trotzky, in his eagerness to put himself in a conspicious place, unintentionally misrepresents Lenin's attitude towards the last two questions.

There is no doubt that the differences of opinion as to the question of the preliminary parliament were of a serious nature. What was, so to speak, the object of the preliminary parliament? That of helping the bourgeoisie to push the Soviets into the background and to lay the foundations of bourgeois parliamentarism. Whether the preliminary parliament in the revolutionary situation which had become so complicated, was able to carry out this task, is another question. Events have shown that this object was unattainable, and the preliminary parliament itself represented a miscarriage of the Korniloviad. There is however, no doubt that this was the aim pursued by the menshe-

viki and the social revolutionaries when they created the revolutionary parliament. What can, under these circumstances, have been the share of the Bolsheviki in the preliminary parliament? Nothing else than the intention to deceive the proletariat as to the real charactetr of the preliminary parliament. This chiefly explains that passion with which Lenin, in his letters, scourges the adherents of the preliminary parliament.

The participation in the preliminary parliament was doubtless a serious mistake. It would however be wrong to take for granted, as does Comrade Trotzky, that the partisans of participation entered the preliminary parliament with the object of organic work, to "guide the labor movement into the channel of social democracy." This is quite wrong. This is not true. If it were true the party would not have succeeded in correcting this mistake by the demonstrative exit from the preliminary parliament. The living force and the revolutionary power of our party were expressed, among other ways, in that it was able so speedily to make good its mistake. And now allow me to correct a slight inexactness which has crept into the report of the "editor" of Trotzky's works, Comrade Lenzner, concerning the committee of the bolshevist fraction which decided the question of the preliminary parliament. Comrade Lenzner states that at this meeting there were two reporters, Kamenev and Trotzky. This is untrue. As a matter of fact there were four reporters: two for the boycott of the preliminary parliament (Trotzky and Stalin) and two for participation (Kamenev and Nogin).

But Comrade Trotzky is seen in a still worse light when it comes to Lenin's attitude towards the question of the form of the insurrection. Comrade Trotzky makes it appear as tho had Lenin been followed, the party would in October have seized power "independently of the Soviet and behind its back" (Trotzky "On Lenin," page 71 of the Russian edition). In the subsequent criticism of this nonsense which is ascribed to Lenin, Trotzky "dances and plays" and finally ends with the condescending sentence: "This would have been a mistake.' Comrade Trotzky here tells a lie about Lenin; he misrepresents Lenin's view as to the part of the Soviets in the insurrection. We quote a heap of documents which prove that Lenin proposed the seizure of power by the Soviets, by those of Petrograd or Moscow, and not behind the back of the Soviets. For what purpose did Comrade Trotzky need this more than strange legend about Lenin?

Comrade Trotzky comes off no better when he "expounds" the attitude of the C. C. and of Lenin to the question of the date for the insurrection. Comrade Trotzky communicates facts with regard to the famous meeting of October 10, and maintains that at this meeting "a resolution was passed to the effect that the insurrection should take place not later than October 15" (Trotzky "On Lenin," page 72. Russian edition). It looks as tho the C. C. had fixed the day of the revolution for October 15, and had then itself made the resolution of no effect by postponing it to October 25. Is this true? No, it is untrue. In this whole period, the C. C. only passed two resolutions altogether concerning the insurrection, one on the 10th, and one on the 16th of October. Let us look at these resolutions.

The resolution of the C. C. on October 10 is as follows:

"The C. C. finds that for the follow-

ing reasons an armed insurrection is on the agenda: the international situation of the Russian revolution (mutiny in the German navy, the increasing growth of the socialist world revolution in the whole of Europe, the fear that the imperialists would make peace in order to choke the revolution in Russia), the military situation (the unquestionable determination of the Russian bourgeoisie and of Kerensky & Co. to hand over Petrograd to the Germans), the conquest of a majority in the Soviets by the proletarian party, all this in connection with the peasant insurrection and with the transference of the confidence of the masses of the people to our party (elections in Moscow), finally the obvious preparations for the second Kornioviad (removal of the troops from Petrograd, transfer of Cossacks to Petrograd, the encircling of Minsk by cossacks, etc.).

"The C. C. thus finds that the insurrection has unavoidably and completely matured, and therefore calls upon all organizations of the party to act accordingly and to judge and solve all practical questions (concerning the Soviet congress of the northern territory, the removal of troops from Petrograd, the coming into action of those from Moscow, Minsk, etc.) from this point of view."

The resolution of the conference between the C. C. and the responsible functionaries on October 16 is as follows:

"This assembly welcomes and warmly supports the resolution of the C. C and calls upon all organizations and all workers and soldiers to support the armed insurrection in every way and with all intensity, and to support the central committee which has been appointed for this purpose by the C. C., it expresses its full conviction that the C. C. and the Soviets will in due time make known the right moment and the suitable means for the insurrection."

You see, that Comrade Trotsky's memory played him false as regards the date fixed for the insurrection and the resolution of the C. C. concerning the insurrection.

Comrade Trotsky is absolutely in the wrong when he maintains that Lenin underestimated the legality of the Soviet, that Lenin had not understood the serious significance of the seizure of power by the All-Russian Soviet Congress on October 25, that just for this reason Lenin had insisted on the seizure of power before October 25. This is untrue. Lenin proposed the seizure of power before October 25 for two reasons. Firstly, because it was to be feared that the counter-revolutionaries might at any moment hand over Petrograd to the Germans, which would have cost the rising insurrection blood, and that therefore every day was precious. Secondly, because of the mistake of the Petrograd Soviet in fixing and publicly announcing the day for the insurrection (October 25), which could only be made good by the insurrection actually taking place before the day legally fixed.

The fact is that Lenin regarded the insurrection as an art and must have known that the enemy who (thanks to the lack of caution of the Petrograd Soviet) was informed as to the day of the insurrection, would undoubtedly make every effort to prepare for this day, that it was therefore necessary to steal a march on the enemy, i. e. to begin with the insurrection necessarily before the day formally fixed. This chiefly explains the passion with which Lenin in his letters upbraids

those who regard the date, October 25, as a fetish.

Events have shown that Lenin was entirely in the right. It is known that the insurrection was begun before the All-Russian Soviet Congress. It is known that the power was actually seized before the opening of the All-Russian Soviet Congress, and that it was seized, not by the Soviet congress but by the Petrograd Soviet, by the revolutionary military committee. The Soviet congress only took over the power from the hands of the Petrograd Soviets. For this reason Comrade Trotsky's long dissertations on the significance of the legality of the Soviets are certainly quite superfluous.

A living and powerful party, at the head of the revolutionary masses, who storm and overthrow the bourgeois power, this is the condition of our party at that period.

This is the truth as to the legends regarding the preparation for October.

Leninism or Trotskyism.

We have already spoken of the legends about the party and about Lenin which Comrade Trotsky and his followers have disseminated. We have unveiled and refuted these legends. Now, however, the question arises: for what purpose did Comrade Trotsky want all these legends as to the preparations for October, as to Lenin and Lenin's party? Why were the recent literary attacks of Comrade Trotsky on the party necessary? What is the sense, the purpose, the aim of these attacks, at present when the party does not wish to discuss, when the party is overburdened with a large amount of urgent tasks, at present when the party needs united work for the restoration of its internal economy and not a new quarrel about old questions? Why does Comrade Trotsky want to drag the party back to new discussions?

Comrade Trotsky declares that all this is necessary for the "study" of October. But is it not possible to study the history of October without once more attacking the party and its leader, Lenin? But what kind of a "history" of October is this which begins and ends with the dethronement of the chief leaders of the October revolution, with the dethronement of the party which organized and carried out this revolution?

No, this is no case of the study of October. This is not the way to study October. This is not the way the history of October is written. There is obviously another "intention." And according to all evidence, this "intention" is, that Comrade Trotsky is, with his literary attacks making another (one more!) attempt to prepare the conditions for replacing Leninism by Trotskyism. Comrade Trotsky feels it "absolutely" necessary to divest the party and its cadres, which carried out the revolution, of their glory so as to pass from the dethronement of the party to the dethronement of Leninism. The dethronement of Leninism is, however, necessary in order to represent Trotskyism as the "only" "proletarian" (no joke!) ideology. All this of course (yes, of course!) under the flag of Leninism so that the process of being dragged over may be "as painless as possible."

This is the essence of Comrade Trotsky's most recent literary attacks.

For this Comrade Trotsky's literary attacks strain the question of Trotskyism to breaking point.

What then is Trotskyism?

Trotskyism has three distinguishing features which place it in irreconcil-

able opposition to Leninism. What are these characteristic features?

Firstly. Trotskyism is the theory of the "permanent (uninterrupted) revolution." But what is Trotskyism's conception of the "permanent revolution"? It is the revolution without consideration of the small peasantry as a revolutionary force. Comrade Trotsky's permanent revolution is, as Lenin says, the "neglect" of the peasant movement, a "game for the seizure of power." Where does the danger of this lie? In that such a revolution, if one took the trouble to realize it, would end with a complete breakdown, as it would deprive the Russian proletariat of its ally, the small peasantry. This explains the fight which Leninsm has been carrying on against Trotskyism since the year 1905.

How does Comrade Trotsky estimate Leninism from the point of view of this fight? He regards it as a theory which contains in itself "anti-revolutionary" features. (Trotsky "1905", Russian edition, page 285.) On what is this angry remark against Leninism based? On the fact that Leninsm always has defended and still does defent the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Trotsky does not confine himself to this angry remark. He goes further when he states:

"The whole construction of Leninism is at present built up on lies and contains the poisonous germ of its own disintegration" (See Comrade Trotsky's letter to Tscheidse of Feb 25, 1913).

As you see we are confronted by two opposed lines.

Secondly. Trotskyism is a distrust of the doings of the Bolshevist party, of its unity, of its hostility to the opportunist elements. Trotskyism is, in the sphere of organization, the theory of an association of revolutionaries and opportunists, of their groups and grouplets in the bosom of one united party. The history of Comrade Trotsky's "August block" is surely known to you, in which Martov's adherents and Otsowists (those in favor of the withdrawal of the duma delegates) liquidators and Trotskians, having formed a "real" party, work comfortably together. It is known that the aim of this strangely patched party was the destruction of the Bolshevist party. What then were at that time our "differences of opinion"? In that Leninism saw the guarantee of the development of the proletarian party in the destruction of the "August block," whereas Trotskyism saw in this block the foundation for the creation of a "real" party.

Again, as you see, two opposed lines.

Third. Trotskyism is a mistrust of the leaders of Bolshevism, an attempt to discredit and dethrone them. I know no current in the party which could be compared with Trotskyism in its discrediting of the leaders of Leninism or of the central institutions of the party. What for instance is Comrade Trotsky's "amiable" remark about Lenin worth, when he describes him as a "professional exploiter of every backwardness in the Russian workers' movement?" (See the already quoted letter to Tscheidse.) This is however by no means the most "amiable" remark of all the "amiable" remarks of Comrade Trotsky.

How was it possible that Comrade Trotsky who bore such an unpleasant burden on his back, yet found himself during the October movement in the ranks of the Bolsheviki? This happened because Comrade Trotsky at that time relieved himself (literally relieved) of his burden and hid it in a cupboard. Without this "operation,"

serious co-operation with Comrade Trotsky would have been impossible. The theory of the "August block," i. e., the theory of unity with the mensheviki had been destroyed and cast away by the revolution, for how could there be any question of unity when there was an armed fight between the Bolsheviki and the mensheviki? Comrade Trotsky had no alternative than to recognize the fact of the usefulness of this theory.

The same unpleasant affair "happened" with the permanent revolution, for none of the Bolsheviki thought of seizing power immediately on the day after the February revolution; Comrade Trotsky should have known that the Bolsheviki, to quote Lenin's words, would not allow him "to play with the seizure of power." Trotsky had no alternative but to acknowledge the policy of the Bolsheviki in the question of the struggle for influence in the Soviets, the struggle for the conquest of the peasantry. As for the third characteristic of Trotskyism (the mistrust of the Bolshevik leaders) it of course had to retire into the background in view of the obvious breakdown of the first two characteristics.

Could Comrade Trotsky in such a situation do anything but hide his burden in a cupboard and go to the Bolsheviki, he who, without even the pretence of a serious group behind him, came to the Bolsheviki as a political bankrupt, robbed of his army? Of course, he could do nothing else!

What lesson is to be learned from this? There is only one lesson: The long co-operation of the Leninists with Comrade Trotsky was only possible thru his completely renouncing his old burden, thru his completely identifying himself with Leninism. Comrade Trotsky writes on the lessons of October but he forgets that in addition to all the other lessons there is one more lesson of October which I have just told you, and that this is of primary importance for Trotskyism. It would do Trotskyism no harm to pay attention to this lesson of October.

But this lesson, as we have seen, has not agreed well with Trotskyism. The point of the matter is that the old burden of Trotskyism, which was hidden away in a cupboard in the days of the October movement, has now been dragged to light in hope of disposing of it, all the more so as the market here has widened. Undoubtedly, we have in the recent literary attacks of Comrade Trotsky an attempt to return to Trotskyism, to "overcome" "Leninism" and to drag forward and apply all the special peculiarities of Trotskyism.

The new Trotskyism is not a simple continuation of the old Trotskyism, it has become somewhat ragged and threadbare, it is in its spirit incomparably milder and in its form more moderate than the old Trotskyism, but without doubt, it retains fundamentally all the peculiarities of the old Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism does not make up its mind to fight openly against Leninism, it prefers to work under the general flag of Leninism and protects itself under the slogan of the interpretation, the improvement of Leninism. This for the reason that it is weak. We cannot regard it as an accident that the rise of the new Trotskyism coincided with the moment of Lenin's death. Under Lenin he would not have dared to take this step.

What Are the Characteristic Features of the New Trotskyism?

1. **The question of the permanent revolution.** The new Trotskyism does not consider it necessary openly to defend the permanent revolution. It "simply" affirms that the October revolution has fully confirmed the idea of the permanent revolution. From this it draws the following conclusion: The correct and acceptable features of Leninism are those which existed since the war, in the period of the October revolution, and on

the other hand the incorrect and unacceptable features are those which existed before the war, before the October revolution. Hence the theory of the Trotskians as to the division of Leninism into two parts: The prewar Leninism, the "old," "worthless" Leninism with its idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and the new post-war Leninism of October, which they intend to adapt to the demands of Trotskyism. Trotskyism needs this theory of the division of Leninism as a first, more or less "acceptable" step which should facilitate the subsequent steps in the fight against Leninism.

But Leninism is no eclectical theory which is cemented together out of various elements and which permits of being divided. Leninism is an indivisible theory, which arose in the year 1903, has experienced three revolutions and now marches forward as the war banner of the world's proletariat. "Bolshevism," says Lenin, "has existed as a current in political life and as a political party, since the year 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism in the whole period of its existence can satisfactorily explain how it could, under the most difficult conditions, work out and preserve the iron discipline which is necessary for the victory of the proletariat" (see Lenin "Infantile Sickness.") Bolshevism and Leninism are essentially one. They are two names for one and the same object. Therefore the theory of the division of Leninism in two parts is a theory or the destruction of Leninism, a theory of a replacement of Leninism by Trotskyism.

We need not waste words in proving that the party cannot reconcile itself to these strange theories.

2. **The question of the nature of the party.** The old Trotskyism undermined the Bolshevist Party with the aid of the theory (and practice) of unity with the mensheviki. But this theory has so utterly become a scandal, that one does not care to be even reminded of it. Modern Trotskyism has invented a new, less scandalous and almost "democratic" theory of the opposition of the old cadres to the youth of the party, in order to undermine the party.

Trotskyism recognizes no unified and indivisible history of our party. Trotskyism divides the history of our party into two unequal parts, the part before, and the part after October. The part of the history of our party before October is in reality no history, but a "preliminary history," an unimportant or at least only slightly important period of preparation for our party. That part of the history of the party after October is the really genuine history of our party. There "old," "prehistoric," unimportant cadres of our party, here the new, real, "historical" party. It is hardly necessary to point out that this original scheme of the party history is a scheme for the undermining of the unity between the old and the new cadres of our party, a scheme for the destruction of the active Bolshevist Party.

We need not waste any words in proving that the party cannot reconcile itself to this strange theory.

3. **The Question of Bolshevism.** The old Trotskyism made efforts to belittle Lenin more or less openly without fearing the consequences. The new Trotskyism proceeds more cautiously. It makes efforts to carry on the part of the old Trotskyism in the form of praising Lenin, of praising his greatness. I think it worth while to quote a few examples.

The party knows Lenin as a ruthless revolutionary. It also knows, however, that Lenin was cautious, did not love intriguing politicians, and not infrequently held back too sharp terrorists, including Trotsky himself, with a firm hand. Comrade Trotsky treats this theme in his book "On Lenin." But from his characterization it would seem that Lenin only

pretended, as "he emphasized on every suitable occasion the inevitability of terror." (Page 104 of the Russian edition.) The impression resulting is, that Lenin was the most bloodthirsty of all the bloodthirsty Bolsheviki. Why did Comrade Trotsky need this unnecessary and in no way justified laying on of color?

The party knows Lenin as an exemplary comrade who did not care to answer questions on his own responsibility, impulsively, without the leading committee, without carefully feeling his way and after cautious examination. Comrade Trotsky deals with this side of the question also in his book. But he gives us a picture not of Lenin, but of some Chinese mandarin, who decides at random the most important questions in the silence of his study, as tho he were illuminated by the holy spirit.

You wish to know how our party decided the question of the dissolution of the constituent assembly? Hear Comrade Trotsky:

"The constituent assembly must of course be dissolved," said Lenin, "but what then about the left social revolutionaries?" Old Natanson reassured us, however. He came to us "to talk things over," and said immediately after the first words:

"Well, if it comes to that, as far as I am concerned, dissolve the constituent assembly by force."

"Bravo," cried Lenin, full of joy, "what is right, must remain right. But will your people agree to it?"

"Some of us are vacillating, but I believe that in the long run they will agree," answered Natanson. (See Trotsky "On Lenin," page 92, Russian edition.)

Thus is history written.

You want to know how the party decided the question of the supreme war council. Listen to Comrade Trotsky:

"Without serious and experienced military leaders, we shall not emerge from this chaos," said I to Vladimir Ilyitsch, every time that I visited the staff.

"That is obviously true; but they will certainly betray us."

"We will attach a commissar to each of them."

"Two would be better still," exclaimed Lenin, "but stalwart ones. It is surely impossible that we have no stalwart Communists."

Thus began the formation of the supreme military council. (Trotsky: "On Lenin," page 106, Russian edition.)

That is how Comrade Trotsky writes history.

Why did Comrade Trotsky need these Arabian night entertainments which compromise Lenin? Surely not to magnify the party leader, V. I. Lenin? We can hardly think so.

The party knows Lenin as the greatest Marxist of our time, the profoundest theoretician and the most experienced revolutionary who was not guilty of even a shade of Blanquism. Comrade Trotsky treats this side of the question also in his book. His characterization however, reveals no giant Lenin, but some kind of a Blanquist dwarf, who advises the party in the October days "to seize the power with their own hands independently of the Soviet and behind its back." I have already said that this characterization does not contain a word of truth.

Why did Comrade Trotsky need this glaring . . . inexactness? Is it not an attempt to slight Lenin "just a little"?

These are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism.

Wherein lies the danger of the new Trotskyism? In that Trotskyism, according to its whole inner content, shows every sign of becoming a center and meeting place of non-proletarian elements, which are striving to weaken and disintegrate the dictatorship of the proletariat.

When then? you will ask. What are the immediate duties of the party in

connection with the new literary attacks of Comrade Trotsky?

Trotskyism now steps forward with the object of dethroning Bolshevism and undermining its principles. The duty of the party is to bury Trotskyism as a line of thought.

Reprisals against the opposition and the danger of a split are spoken of. This is nonsense, comrades. Our party is strong and powerful. It will admit of no splits. As for reprisals, I am distinctly opposed to them. We need no reprisals now, but a developed battle of ideas against the resurrection of Trotskyism.

We did not desire this literary discussion nor did we strive for it. Trotskyism forces it upon us by its anti-Leninist attacks. Well then, comrades, we are ready! (Loud applause.)

Speech by Kamenev

The following is a written version of the speech given by me on Nov. 18, at the session held by the Moscow committee, enlarged by the active party functionaries, and repeated on Nov. 19, at the session of the Communist fraction of the trade union council, and on Nov. 21 at the conference of military functionaries.—L. K.

Comrades!

The subject of my speech will be Comrade Trotsky's latest publication the article which appeared on the eve of the seventh anniversary of the October revolution, and entitled by its author, "The Lessons of October,"

Trotsky presents the party with books fairly frequently. Hitherto we have not thought it necessary to pay much attention to these books, although it is not difficult to find in many of them various deviations from Bolshevism, from the official ideology of our party. But this book must be accorded special attention, and subjected to a thoro analysis, the more that Comrade Trotsky has selected the theme of the Lessons of October for his last publication.

As our whole party, the whole Communist International, the whole international labor movement, and the whole working youth, are learning the lessons taught by the October revolution, and will continue to learn them it is not possible to consider the interpretation of these lessons as the private affair of this or that writer. As the Lessons of October appears with the countenance of the party, and the political bureau of our party, which—and this is no secret—is the leading party in the Comintern, then it is perfectly clear that we are threatened by the danger of having such proclamations, such "lessons," accepted as text book by not only our youthful members, but also by the whole Comintern And the form assumed by Comrade Trotsky's work shows it to aim at being a textbook for the Comintern.

All who have read the article are bound to see that it appeals not only to our party, but the international proletariat as well, and to the Communist Parties of all countries. And thus it is not a matter of private opinion but a political conflict concerning the whole party. Should any comrades maintain that the conflict aroused by Comrade Trotsky's book is merely a conflict between Trotsky, Bucharin, Zinoviev, Stalin and Kamenev, a difference of opinion between literates, these comrades would prove that they are unable to grasp the real interests of the party. Comrades holding such an opinion can only do so because they would like to utilize the party

conflicts for the purpose of forming some third group based on the slogan: "The literates are quarreling among themselves, but it has nothing to do with us."

No one has the right to stand aside in this conflict. It concerns one of the most far-reaching questions of our inner life, and of the life of the Comintern. The question is: Can the party recommend the proletariat to accept the lessons as taught by Comrade Trotsky's book, or should the party exercise the whole of its authority in warning the proletariat against the teaching of the "Lessons of October"?

I am not desirous of here entering into a long controversy with this article of Comrade Trotsky's. Comrade Trotsky is an excellent writer, and his gifted pen has done the party much valuable service. But here it serves interests hostile to the party, here it does not serve bolshevism, but the cause of those seeking to disintegrate and discredit Bolshevism—both the Bolshevism embodying the ideology of the proletarian revolution and the Bolshevism organizing the fighting force of the proletariat. And Comrade Trotsky does this by means of an exceedingly artistic, but essentially incorrect and inaccurate description of the whole of the events between February and October. I have no doubt but that the party will call upon a number of its writers, among those who participated in the events of this period and took immediate part in the struggle leading up to the October revolution, and that these will refute the various misrepresentations made by Comrade Trotsky with reference to decisive moments in the history of our party during this epoch.

The April demonstration is misrepresented, the April conference is misrepresented, the events in June and July are misrepresented, the events in connection with the preliminary parliament are misrepresented and finally the course taken by events in October itself are misrepresented. Here I cannot dwell upon the details required for the restoration of historical truth, or on the confronting of Comrade Trotsky's assertions by documentary evidence. What I want to deal with here is the general question of the social and political import of the attitude adopted by Comrade Trotsky, and the significance of this attitude when considered in the light of the previous positions taken up by Comrade Trotsky, and of the role played by Comrade Trotsky.

We have hitherto abstained from putting this question, for easily comprehensible reasons. But now we can avoid it no longer for Comrade Trotsky, in thus raising the question of October, the question of the role played by our party and by Lenin in the creation of the ideology underlying the October revolution, himself forces us to deal with the question from all the standpoints which have been adopted by Comrade Trotsky during the history of the Bolshevist Party.

I am thus obliged to deal with the concrete question of Trotskyism and Bolshevism, and in doing this I refer to Comrade Trotsky's latest utterance merely as one of the clearest and most instructive examples of the general line pursued by Comrade Trotsky.

We must first of all ask ourselves: Does any general line really exist? What do we understand under the term "Trotskyism"? Is it a question of Comrade Trotsky's personality, or of general and by no means personal phenomena pertaining to the history of the labor movement in Russia during the last twenty years? What have we to deal with here? With a personality, with an individuality, or with some generalization, some trend called into being by the general conditions of the evolution of the labor movement in a petty bourgeois country? With an accidental phenomena or with a phenomena based upon a

past which we cannot forget? If you turn to Comrade Lenin's works for a reply to this question, you will find that up to the time of the February revolution, and again, with a brief interruption, after the year 1918, scarcely a work appeared from Comrade Lenin's pen in which Trotskyism was not dealt with systematically. Why?

I.

Trotskyism and the Party Before the Revolution of 1917.

Our party originated in a petty bourgeois, capitalistically backward country. Our proletariat existed under more backward conditions than any other proletariat in Europe. It was surrounded by more agrarian and petty-bourgeois elements than any other proletariat. And the question of how this proletariat succeeded in the midst of czarist despotism, in creating and welding together a party destined to lead the whole international labor movement, this is the main question of the self-knowledge essential to the party.

This question of our origin and development has frequently been raised in the party itself, and the party has made it clear to itself why and in what manner the proletariat of Russia (to use the old word), in a backward agrarian country, and under the despotism of the czar, has been enabled to create that Leninism which today is the guiding star of the whole international proletariat, of the proletariat of countries much further developed in capitalism and much further advanced in economics than Russia. One thing is certain: Under these conditions the party of the revolutionary proletariat, the party of the Bolsheviki, could only originate in the form of constant, systematic, and unceasing struggle against the petty bourgeois element striving to subordinate the working class. Bolshevism in its innermost essence signifies a struggle in the sense that it originated, grew and attained its firm foothold in the midst of an uninterrupted and constant struggle against every influence exercised by the bourgeoisie on the proletariat.

The most concentrated expression of the policy of bourgeois influence on the proletariat is afforded by menshevism. The thirty years of the history of Bolshevism is the history of thirty years of struggle against menshevism Leninism is the teaching of the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Precisely for this reason Leninism is therefore at the same time the teaching of the struggle against menshevism.

The forms in which the bourgeoisie has exercised its influence over the proletariat have changed with the changes of the historical epoch. And the forms and methods of menshevism have changed accordingly. What has remained unchanged is the "wild" Leninist struggle against menshevism Lenin's ability to distinguish the true character of menshevism in very changing form, and to recognize the essential hostility of menshevism against the Bolshevist ideology and the development of the Bolshevist Party. Everyone knows this, or at least it may be assumed that everyone ought to know it. Everyone comprehends that those who are not fully conscious that Bolshevism signifies a systematic struggle against menshevism, understands nothing whatever of Bolshevism, nothing of the history of Bolshevism, and nothing of the reasons why Bolshevism has been victorious. But everyone does not know, though it has been assumed till recently that everyone was bound to know it, that precisely as Leninism originated, grew, and conquered in a constant and systematic struggle against menshevism; it originated, grew, and conquered in a constant and

systematic struggle against Trotskyism.

Why? Because Trotskyism, during the whole of the period in which our party was preparing for the decisive class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and in which Leninism was the source of the teaching of the proletarian revolution and welded the party together as leader of the revolution—during the whole of this time Trotskyism played no other role than that of an agent of menshevism, a glossing over of menshevism, a masking of menshevism.

Everyone who studies the history of the party in the works of the party in the works of Lenin—and we have not, nor shall we ever have, a better and profounder textbook on the history of the party and the revolution, or one richer in matter and the conclusions to be drawn from it—will be inevitably convinced that during the whole of his struggle for the party and for the revolution, and during the whole of his struggle against the mensheviki, Lenin regarded Trotsky (taking the line followed by him for decades in its totality, and his separate actions) exclusively as an agent of menshevism, as a servant of menshevism, as a tool employed by menshevism for the purpose of gaining influence in this or that section of the working class. To Lenin, Trotsky and Trotskyism were characteristic and not accidental phenomena, caused by the pressure exercised by the bourgeoisie, in precisely the same manner as the other phenomena hostile to the really proletarian party, the many other groups and sub-groups, fractions and sub-fractions, whole and semi-tendencies, which the working class have had to combat when creating their own party.

To Lenin, Trotsky was entirely uninteresting as a personality after the year 1903. For Lenin and for the party he has been the typical embodiment of one of those historical currents which have run counter to the creation of the Bolshevist Party, and to the development of Bolshevist ideology, the ideology of proletarian revolution and Bolshevist proletarian organization. To Lenin, Trotsky was the wordy embodiment of an element hostile to the proletariat, an element showing talent at times and at other times entirely superfluous and extravagant; he regarded Trotsky as little as a personality as he regarded Martov, Tschernov, and Axelrod as personalities. To him these were again simply the embodiment of certain social phenomena. This systematic struggle against Trotskyism and anti-Bolshevist current is to be found in every volume of Lenin's works up to the time when Trotsky joined our party. At this point there is an interruption, followed by the resumption of this struggle—in another form.

The Period of the First Revolution (1905).

Up to the time of the 2nd Party Congress, up to the split between Bolsheviki and mensheviki, Comrade Trotsky worked for the Leninist Iskra, like Martov, Potressov and other mensheviki. Comrade Trotsky's zeal for the execution of Lenin's plans even led to his receiving the nickname of "Lenin's cudgel," at the first meetings of the party congress. An honorable role! But for Comrade Trotsky's political history this role is less characteristic than the fact that he immediately changed roles as soon as the mensheviki appeared on the scene at the later sessions of this same congress.

The organizatory rupture between the mensheviki and the Bolsheviki took place at the Party Congress on the question of the election of the Central Committee of the party.

Three members had to be elected to the C. C. With respect to two members the mensheviki and the Bolsheviki were in agreement. As third member the mensheviki wanted the "Lenin's cudgel" of yesterday, but

Lenin would not agree at any price. The mensheviki would not give way at any price. It is probable that Lenin and Martov had both formed a correct estimate of the degree in which the "cudgel" was "Lenin's." Lenin had the majority at the congress and Trotsky was not elected. Upon this, Comrade Trotsky, in collaboration with Martov, Axelrod, and others, formed the fraction of the mensheviki, broke the decisions of the party congress, headed the boycott against the central authorities of the party under Lenin's leadership, and wrote a political pamphlet against Lenin—one of the most arrogant and offensive productions in menshevist literature, in which Lenin's whole policy is explained as mere greed of power on the part of a "candidate for the post of dictator." The whole set of mensheviki, headed by Martov, Dan, and others, recommended the press to propagate this pamphlet as far as possible. This was the beginning of the history of menshevism, and of the history of Comrade Trotsky in the party.

Trotsky, now become sword-bearer to Martov and Axelrod, lost all interest as a political figure in the eyes of Lenin. Lenin entered into lengthy and systematic conflicts with the mensheviki, with Plechanov, Martov, Axelrod, Martinov; he explained and revealed their standpoint to the workers; but he held it to be superfluous to lose time in contentions with their co-worker, Trotsky.

"Plechanov must be combatted, Martov's arguments must be refuted, and we can contend against the extreme opportunist, Martinov, but it is not worth while to lose time in contending against Trotsky"—so said Lenin at that time to his fellow workers. But when, in the summer of 1905, Comrade Trotsky tried to draw himself out of the menshevist bog by presenting the ideas of Parvus on "permanent revolution" in his own wording, then Lenin entered into a detailed discussion on the ideas and slogans brought out by Parvus, and rejected them. With reference to Trotsky's pamphlet he merely expressed his regret that the "revolutionary social democrat," Parvus should deem it possible to concur "with Trotsky" and his "revolutionary phrases." Lenin had not another word to say about Comrade Trotsky and his "original" theory. (See Lenin, complete works, Russian edition, Vol. 7, page 130.)

And now Comrade Trotsky is endeavoring to lay precisely this pamphlet before the party as certificate of his revolutionary past, and is trying to prove that Lenin was only right in so far as he shared the standpoint of Trotsky's pamphlet. We shall deal with this in detail later on.

During the whole period of the first revolution, when the working masses had for the first time the opportunity of testing in action the various theories of the Russian revolution and their resultant tactical methods, and when Lenin defended the Bolshevist scheme of revolution in desperate battle, he did not think it once necessary to add anything to his characterization of Trotsky's principles, or to the designation of "revolutionary phrases."

Lenin knew that Trotsky's "left phrases" on the "permanent revolution" would certainly have no effect upon the actual course taken by the labor movement revolution, and would not in the least prevent Comrade Trotsky from remaining in the menshevist organization, co-operating in the menshevist central organ, and collaborating politically with the mensheviki. Lenin had the Marxist habit of judging people, parties and fractions according to their deeds, and not according to their words.

During the whole epoch of the first revolution (1905 till 1907), which gave the proletariat its first opportunity of appearing in the arena as mass force and of expressing its class policy and relations to other classes by actual action, there was a bitter struggle

between two tactics only, between two political trends only, between two schemes of Russian revolution only, between menshevism, which under-estimated or neglected the peasantry and aimed at an understanding between the working class and the bourgeoisie, and Bolshevism, which called upon the peasantry to support the working class, both in its struggle against czarism, and in its struggle against the bourgeoisie on behalf of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. This struggle between Bolsheviki and mensheviki during the first revolution, essentially a struggle for the direction to be assumed by the revolution, as also the whole of the first revolution itself, contained all the elements of the struggle ended in the second revolution in 1917. The Parvus-Trotsky theory played no part whatever in either the first or the second revolution. It remained the empty phrase foreseen by Lenin, and had nothing to do with the actual course taken by the class struggle. It has not been preserved in the living events of the actual struggle, but solely in the dusty files of old menshevist newspapers. Therefore Lenin never lost a word, during the revolution, in the refutation of this theory.

The Period of Counter-Revolution.

The tide of revolution ebbed. The party reorganized for diffcult and tedious work in the atmosphere of counter-revolution. The "left phrases" entirely lost effect. The foundations for new tactics had to be saved—the banner of the revolutionary tactics of the proletariat and the principles of their illegal organization—from the counter-revolutionary pogroms, the destruction of proletarian organizations, the orgies of apostasy, the atmosphere of exhaustion in the working class, and the treachery and malicious joy at the failure of the revolution. The banner of the revolutionary policy of the working class, derided and trodden in the dust by all the mensheviki, had to be defended. At this moment, the most difficult of all for the Bolshevist Party, since the whole atmosphere engendered by the crushing of the revolution took effect against the Bolsheviki, and aid was given on all sides to menshevist and liquidatory tendencies (liquidatory both with regard to party and the revolution)—at this moment Comrade Trotsky, who at the time of the rising revolution combined with Parvus in wanting "to be absolutely more revolutionary than the others," should obviously have rushed to the help of the Bolsheviki. At least this was the course taken by Plechanov, who had been our opponent in principle from 1905 till 1907; the old revolutionist could not bear to stand aside, and in the face of general apostasy he rushed into the fight side by side with the Bolsheviki, under the slogan of "General Differentiation," that is, a general separation of proletarian revolutionists from the menshevist liquidators.* Trotsky acted differently.

During this period of beginning counter-revolution, Comrade Trotsky stepped forward for the first time at the London party Congress. At this congress the Bolsheviki were fighting against the menshevist liquidators, especially against the fraction of the second Duma, headed by men now well known to us, Dan and Zeretelli. The Bolsheviki criticised this Duma fraction as a fraction which, representing the menshevist standpoint, was attempting to tread the path of West European social democratic parliamentarism. We are only too well aware that this is a hothouse in which the most poisonous fruits of treachery against the working class find the most fertile soil. The Bolsheviki

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* Plechanov's revolutionary enthusiasm was however not maintained for very long. L. K.

criticized severely the very first step being taken in this direction.

Comrade Trotsky of course defended the menshevist fraction against the attacks of the Bolsheviki. Lenin characterized his standopint as follows:

"Trotsky spoke on behalf of the Center; he expressed the views of the 'federation.' (The federation is the most opportunist and unprincipled organization which ever existed in the party; lack of principle is even more characteristic of it than opportunism. It was the organization of the artisans, and reflected their unproletarian spirit.) He attacked us for submitting the draft of an 'unacceptable' resolution. He threatened with an actual split. Is this not monstrous? . . . The fact that it is possible for a question to be put in such a manner shows in itself that our party contains something foreign in it. . . This is not a standpoint based on principles, it is the lack of principle characteristic of the 'Center'— and at the same time, naturally, of its defender, Trotsky." (See Lenin, complete works, vol. 8, pages 387 to 388.)

Comrade Lenin found equally trenchant terms in which to characterize Comrade Trotsky's standpoint at the time when our party summed up its experiences won in 1905, and established on this basis the foundation for the whole future of the party. The words uttered by Lenin at this time reached into the future, and foresaw the role which Comrade Trotsky was destined to play in our party during the next decade.

This was Comarde Trotsky's first deed after the revolution of 1905. From this time onwards until the year 1917 Comrade Trotsky acted unceasingly as defender of the mensheviki against the Bolsheviki, as adversary of the Bolshevist Party steeling itself in the struggle of that time; and he was invariably regarded by the party as an adversary.

Let us follow Lenin still further, and see how he characterized the role played by Comrade Trotsky during the difficult process of creating a Bolshevist Party, that is, during the process of creating the theory and organization for the leadership of the proletarian revolution.

May, 1910.

This is the date of the formal separation of the Bolsheviki, the final mental and organizatory withdrawal of the Bolsheviki from the supporters of bourgeois influence upon the proletariat, from the menshevist liquidators headed by Martov and Axelrod, and from the "Otsovists," led by the subsequent renegade, Alexinsky. Lenin writes (Complete works, XI.-2, pp. 49 to 53):

"The representatives of the two extreme tendencies, both of which are subject to bourgeois ideology, and both of which are equally hostile to the party, agree with one another in their contest against the Bolsheviki. . . . The resolution proposed by Trotsky differs in form only from the effusions of Axelrod and Alexinsky. Its terms are exceedingly 'cautious' and aim at expressing a 'super-fractional' justice. But what is its actual import? The 'Bolshevist leaders' are to blame for everything—this 'philosophy of history' does not differ in any way from that of Axelrod and Alexinsky. . ."

"It is not difficult to see," continues Lenin, "how the empty, hollow phrases of Trotsky's resolution serve for the defense of the same standpoint as that adopted by Axelrod and Co., and Alexinsky and Co. Here lies the great and abysmal difference between the conciliatory pose of Trotsky and Co., in reality the most faithful servants of the liquidators and Otsovists, and forming the more dangerous evil for the party that they are skilled at concealing their true character behind clever and artificial phrases, and behind apparently anti-fractional and pro-party declarations, and between

that really party standpoint which stands for the purging of the party from all liquidators and Otsovists."

The irreconcilable struggle for the principles of Bolshevism continued. All the enemies of Bolshevism joined hands and attacked the Bolsheviki, the party, and its central authorities. Lenin, dealing with the significance of this struggle and Trotsky's part in it, wrote as follows at the end of 1910 (XI.-2, pp. 182, 183, 187):

"Martov's article and Trotsky's resolution are backed up by certain practical actions directed against the party. Martov's article is merely a literary form clothing the campaign undertaken by the mensheviki for the purpose of causing schism in our C. C. Trotsky's resolution pursues the same menshevist aims: the destruction of the central authorities (of the Bolsheviki) so hated by the liquidators, and with this the destruction of the party as an organization. It is not sufficient merely to expose these anti-party actions on the part of the mensheviki and Trotsky; they must be combatted."

You will see, comrades, that many things have happened in our party and many of the things which may appear new to our younger comrades are by no means so new to older ones, or to the younger comrades who have studied Lenin's works attentively. "There is nothing new under the sun."

Lenin continues:

"We therefore declare, on behalf of the whole party, that Trotsky is carrying on an anti-party policy, that he is undermining the legality of the party and entering on a path of adventure and schism. . . Comrade Trotsky preserves silence on this incontestable truth (about the anti-party groups), because the real aims of his policy cannot stand the truth. These real aims are: an anti-party bloc. Such a bloc is being supported and organized by Trotsky. . . It goes without saying that Trotsky supports this bloc, for the anti-party elements here get everything they require: liberty for their fractions, glorification and concealment of their activity, skillful advocacy defending them before the working class. It is precisely from the standpoint of 'fundamental principles' that we have to regard this bloc as adventurism in the exactest meaning of the word. Trotsky does not venture to assert that he finds in the mensheviki, in the Otsovists, real Marxists, real defenders of the established principles of social democracy. But it is just this necessity of continual dodging which is characteristic of the adventurer. The bloc formed by Trotsky with Potressov and the group around the Vperjod (Forward) is just an adventure judged from the viewpoint of 'fundamental principles.' This assertion is no less important from the standpoint of the tasks of party politics. . . The experience of a year has shown that in reality it is precisely the Potressov group, precisely the Vperjod set who incorporate the influence exercised by the bourgeoisie on the proletariat. . . Thirdly and finally, Trotsky's policy is an adventure in an organizatory sense."

1911.

The struggle for the party and its ideas continued. Trotsky continued his anti-party policy. Lenin supplemented his characterization. In June, 1911, Lenin writes as follows (XI-2. p. 322):

"All Bolsheviki must now gather more closely together, strengthen their fraction, determine their party line with greater accuracy and clarity, collect all scattered forces, and take up the fight for the R. S. D. L. P. (Russian social democratic labor party) purged of the supporters of bourgeois influence upon the proletariat."

And he immediately adds:

"Such people as Trotsky, with his

puffed-up phrases on the R. S. D. L. P., with his kowtowing to the liquidators who have nothing whatever in common with the R. S. D. L. P., are now the 'disease of the age.' In reality they are the bearers of capitulation to the liquidators, who are anxious to form a labor party on Stolipin's lines,"

After the lapse of a new months. Lenin wrote as follows in a special circular addressed "to all party organizations, groups, and circles":

"Let us merely mention one feature the most characteristic and general one, in the utterances of Trotsky's little group: In the question of tactics and of differences of opinion on principles within the party, Trotsky's arsenal can only supply weapons against the left wing of the party. It need not be said that such a policy is grist to the mill of the adherents of the 'Golos' (the menshevist newspaper, the Voice) and to all the other various degrees of opportunists." (XI-2, pp. 335-338.)

Trotsky continued his policy, and Lenin continued his characterization:

"The real liquidators conceal themselves behind their phraseology, and make every endeavor to frustrate the work being done by the anti-liquidators, that is, the Bolsheviki. . . . Trotsky, and the Trotskyists and opportunists like him, are more harmful than all the liquidators, for the convinced liquidators state their views openly, and it is easy for the workers to recognize the errors of these views. But Trotsky and those similar to him deceive the workers, conceal the evil, and make it impossible to expose and remedy it. Everyone who supports Trotsky's group supports the policy of lies and deception of the workers, the policy concealing liquidatory aims. Full liberty of action for Messrs Potressov & Co. in Russia, and the clothing of their actions in 'revolutionary' phrases for abroad—this is the essential character of Trotsky's policy." (XI-2, pp. 359-360.)

This chracterization: the disguise of right actions in left pseudo-revolutionary phrases, was for Lenin the distinguishing feature of Trotskyism, repeating itself from year to year in different and progressive forms. And Lenin was never weary of pointing out this feature to the party as the most important and characteristic, and at the same time most dangerous feature of Trotskyism. A few months after writing the characterization here quoted, Lenin wrote as follows on Trotsky:

"One trifle has been overlooked by this poor hero of phraseology: A social democrat (in our present terminology a Communist) is not a revolutionist unless he recognizes the harmfulness of anti-revolutionary pseudo-socialism in a given country at a given time, that is, unless he is able to recognize that liquidatory and Otsovist aims are harmful in Russia, and unless he knows now to combat similar unsocial democratic tendencies."

A few months after this (December, 1911) Lenin wrote:

"Trotsky calls himself an adherent of the party principles, but on the basis of almost total disregard of the Russian party central, which was called into existence by the overwhelming majority of the Russian social democratic organization. . . . The revolutionary phrase serves to conceal the tendency of liquidators and to throw sand into the eyes of the workers. . . . It is not possible to discuss essentials with Trotsky, for he has no views. It is only possible to contend with convinced liquidators and Otsovists; but we do not care to enter into discussion with a man who plays at concealing the errors of either group; we merely expose him as a diplomatist of the meanest description." (XII-2, pp. 446-448.)

It is not difficult to prophesy that these party historical documents here quoted will presently be explained away in the most convenient and philistine manner, by references to:

Anger, heat of the contest, accidental collisions, etc. I thus consider it to be my duty though a disagreeable one—since Comrade Trotsky has now forced the party to occupy itself with the history of the relations between Trotskyism and Bolshevism—to follow Lenin's utterances, and the characterization made by Lenin of the relations between the party and Trotskyism, not only for a single year, not only with regard to any single question, but systematically during the whole period of fifteen years which have passed since the party became acquainted with Trotskyism.

If a definite relation has existed between Trotskyism and our party for a number of years, cropping up systematically at every turning point of party history, and not merely becoming apparent on one single question or on one single occasion, then even the more philistine and sluggish mentality cannot explain away this circumstance by reference to momentary anger, accidental conflicts, and the like. Even the most sluggish mind must recognize that if Lenin continued for fifteen years to enlighten the party on Trotskyism, and his characterization proved correct at every turning point of party history, whether the tide of revolution was rising, falling, or rising again, then it is not a case of animosity, of personal opinion, but it is perfectly obvious that Trotskyism represents a trend of policy which reappears systematically, and that the foundation of Bolshevism as theory and practice of the proletarian Communist revolution can only be laid down by fighting against this trend of policy.

Comrade Trotsky confined himself to defending to the Russian workers the standpoint which I have above characterized in Lenin's words. The position held by the Bolsheviki in the Second International is well known. Even at that time the Bolsheviki, especially Lenin, were hated by the leaders of the Second International. Even at that time these leaders felt that Bolshevism, and again especially Lenin, represented some new force destined to supplant them, and therefore the press organs of the Second International opened their pages to every slander against the Bolsheviki and Bolshevism. But during the whole period of Lenin's exile, during the whole period of the revolution and counter-revolution, Lenin was never given even one single opportunity of appealing to the workers from the tribune of the press organs of the Second International, and of telling the German, French or Austrian workers the truth about Bolshevism.

In actual fact we were boycotted by the Second International. But on the other hand Lenin's opponents, Martov, Dan and Trotsky were given every opportunity of expressing their views, and these were able to spread abroad any amount of lies and slanders, since they were assured in advance that Lenin would not be permitted to reply. Trotsky availed himself of this opportunity to lay the "philosophy" of Bolshevism before the international labor movement in something like the following form: The Leninist clique of intellectuals who, under the leadership of Lenin, a man who shrank at nothing, were holding the Russian proletarian movement in their hands in some obscure manner, whilst it was only the ignorance and backwardness of the Russian proletariat which made it trust the Bolsheviki. The most important task was to rescue the proletariat of Russia from the power of this clique and its leader, Lenin.

This is the conception of Bolshevism which Comrade Trotsky forced upon the International at that time. This is the manner in which he represented the historical victory of the inner party struggle in Russia, the import of the struggle between the Bolsheviki and the mensheviki, to the socialist workers of Europe. With reference to the articles sent on this

subject to the International by Martov and Trotsky, Lenin wrote the following in the year 1911:

"Martov expresses the view of the menshevists; Trotsky clings to the mensheviki and hides behind particularly sounding and hollow phrases. For Martov the 'Russian experience' meant that the 'Blanquist and anarchist unculture had won the victory over Marxist culture' (read Bolshevism over menshevism). Russian social democracy had been too zealously Russian (that is, revolutionary. L. K.) as differentiated from the 'general European' (that is, parliamentary) methods of tactics. We find Trotsky representing the same 'historical philosophy.' The 'sectarian spirit, intellectual individualism, ideological fetishism' are placed in the foreground. 'The struggle for influence over the politically immature proletariat'—that is the core of the matter to him."

After describing the views thus presented to the German workers by Comrade Trotsky, Lenin continues:

"The theory that the struggle between Bolshevism and menshevism is a struggle for influence over an immature proletariat is by no means new. We find it in innumerable books, pamphlets, and articles published by the liberal press since the year 1905 (if not since 1903). Martov and Trotsky lay liberal views, trimmed with Marxism before the German comrades.

"'It is an illusion to believe,' declares Trotsky, 'that Bolshevism and menshevism have struck deep roots in the proletariat.' This is a typical example of the sounding but empty phrases of which our Trotsky is master. It is not in the 'depths of the proletariat' that the differences lie between Bolshevism and menshevism, but in the economic conditions of the Russian revolution. Martov and Trotsky, by ignoring these conditions, have deprived themselves of the possibility of comprehending the historical import of the internal party conflict in Russia. . . To talk about various trends in the Russian revolution, and to label these 'sectarianism,' 'unculture,' etc. (the terms employed by Trotsky against the Bolsheviki, with the idea of alarming the German philistines. L. K.), without according a single word to the most important economic interests of the proletariat; the liberal bourgeoisie, and the democratic peasantry, is to sink to the level of the most vulgar journalism."

Comrade Lenin explained the matter to Comrade Trotsky:

"Martov defends the education of the peasantry (who are carrying on a revolutionary struggle against aristocracy) by the liberals (who betrayed the peasantry to the aristocracy). This is nothing else than the substitution of liberalism for Marxism, it is nothing more nor less than liberalism disguised in Marxist phrases. . . The struggle between menshevism and Bolshevism is indissolubly bound up with this actuality, for it is here the struggle between the support lent to the liberals (on the part of the mensheviki) and the overthrowal of the hegemony of the liberals over the peasantry (by the Bolsheviki). Thus the attempt to explain away our dissensions by the influence of the intelligenzia, the immaturity of the proletariat, etc., is merely a naive and childish repetition of liberal fairy tales."

We see that "Trotsky came to Lenin" by means of telling the international proletariat liberal fairy tales on Leninism.

"A chasm lies between our standpoint and Martov's standpoint, and this chasm between the views of various 'intellectuals' merely reflects, despite Trotsky's opinions to the contrary, the chasm which actually existed in the year 1905, between two classes, that is, between the revolutionary fighting proletariat and the treacherous bourgeoisie."

This is what Comrade Trotsky, according to Lenin, did not comprehend

about Bolshevism. But if he did not comprehend this, did he comprehend anything about it at all?

"Trotsky distorts Bolshevism, for he has never been able to form any definite views on the role played by the proletariat in the Russian bourgeois revolution."

Comrade Lenin, after characterizing Trotsky's whole representation of Bolshevism to the uninformed German workers as a "refined breach of faith," closed his characterization with the following words:

"In 1903, Trotsky was a menshevist, he left the mensheviki in 1904, returned to the mensheviki in 1905, brandishing ultra-revolutionary phrases the while, and again turned his back upon the mensheviki in 1906; at the end of 1906 he defended the election alliance with the cadets (thus actually siding with the mensheviki again), and in the spring of 1907 he declared at the London congress that 'the difference between him and Rosa Luxemburg was rather a difference of individual shading than of political tendency.' Trotsky plagarizes today from the ideas of one fraction, tomorrow from those of the other, and thus he regards himself as a being superior to both fractions. Theoretically, Trotsky does not agree with the liquidators and Otsovists on any single question, but in actual practice he is entirely in agreement with the Golos and Vperjod group (that is, with the supporters of bourgeois influence over the proletariat. L. K.). I must declare that Trotsky represents his fraction only, and enjoys a certain amount of faith exclusively on the part of the Otsovists and liquidators.' (Compl. works XI-2, 292, 293, 296, 307 308.)

1912.

The year 1912 was a year of changes. In January the Bolsheviki broke off the last remains of organizatory connections with the mensheviki, and formed their own purely Bolshevist Central Committee at their own Bolshevist conference (at Prague). They excluded the liquidators from the party and proclaimed a program of revolutionary action. After the blood bath on the Lena, a stormy wave of proletarian movement arose, for the first time since 1905. This movement appropriated the program and tactics of the Bolsheviki in their entirety. The "Bolshevist epidemic" (to use the malicious term coined by the mensheviki at the time) began to spread, and presently gained the final victory. The awakening labor movement removed the liquidators systematically from every position which they had contrived to gain during the previous sorrowful years of counter-revolution. This was the beginning of the revolutionary attack under th slogans of the Bolsheviki, under the leadership of the Bolsheviki—an attack which led to barricade fighting in Leningrad as early as the middle of 1914.

What was the attitude adopted by Comrade Trotsky with regard to these decisive events? Did this wave of revolutionary uplift, this strengthening of the labor movement, perhaps induce Comrade Trotsky to abandon the standpoint of an agent of menshevism, held by him during the prece ing years of disintegration and decay? Did his ultra-left theory of "permanent revolution" after lying unused for years in his drawer, perhaps aid him to break the bonds fettering him to counter-revolutionary menshevism?

No. Comrade Trotsky remained true to himself and—to the menshevist liquidators.

He replied to the organizatory development and establishment of the Bolshevist Party by a closer alliance with the mensheviki in their struggle against Bolshevism. It was due to his endeavors that the so-called "August bloc" came into being; this bloc was the alliance and organizatory mustering of every non-Bolshevist and anti-Bolshevist group and sub-group.

"This bloc," writes Lenin, "is composed of lack of principle, hypocrisy, and empty phrases. . . . The basis of this bloc is evident. The liquidators receive full liberty to proceed as before and Comrade Trotsky covers them by the revolutionary phrase, which costs him nothing and binds him to nothing." (Compl. works, XII-1, p. 94, April 1912.)

On the orders of this bloc Comrade Trotsky spread abroad even more slanders than before against the Bolshevik leaders of the proletarian advance then beginning. Comrade Lenin characterized Trotsky's writings at that time as "deceiving and misleading the whole working class." With regard to an article written by Trotsky for the German workers, Lenin wrote that it represented "such a compilation of unconsidered self-praise and sententious lies that there can be no dobut but that the liquidatory commission to write this article was placed in competent hands." (Ibid. p. 93.)

But perhaps Comrade Trotsky was only in agreement with the enemies of the Bolsheviki as far as the Bolsheviki organization was concerned, perhaps there was still some difference between him and the mensheviki, the servants of the liberals, in questions referring to the tasks, the aims and the tactics of the rising proletarian movement, in questions referring to the tasks, aims and tactics of the new revolution? Let us ask Lenin again:

"Trotsky abused the conference in every key, and assured the good people that 'the struggle for the right of combination' was the basis of the events on the Lena and their after-effects that 'this demand stands and will continue to stand as central point of the revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat.' Scarcely had a week passed away, and these miserable phrases, ground out of the same machine which supplies the liquidators with their phrases, were blown away like dust."

"It is only the liberal chatterboxes and the liberal labor politicians," continues Lenin, "who are capable of placing the right of combination in 'the center of the revolutionary mobilization.'"

Lenin then compares the policy pursued by the liquidators and by Comrade Trotsky with the revolutionary Bolshevist policy of the Petersburg proletariat:

"The proletariat of Petersburg," writes Lenin, "has grasped that the new revolutionary struggle is not to be carried on for the sake of one single right (the right of combination. L. K.), but for the liberty of the whole people. The proletariat of Petersburg has grasped that the evil must be attacked at its center, at its source, that the whole system of czarist reactionary Russia must be destroyed. The proletariat of Petersburg has grasped that it is a piece of ridiculous stupidity to make this demand for the right of combination. . . . There is no greater lie than the liberal invention, repeated by the liquidators and immediately afterwards by Trotsky, that the 'struggle for the right of combination' lay at the root of the tragedy on the Lena, and of the mighty echoes awakened by this event all over the country." (Compl. works, XII-1, pp. 183, 185.)

The difference is very obvious between the Bolshevist conception of fundamental tasks and that of the mensheviki and Comrade Trotsky. But Lenin explains again and again the counter-revolutionary trend of Comrade Trotsky's conception of these tasks.

Trotsky followed Axelrod. He found himself superior to the "uncultured," "barbaric," "sectarian," "Asiatic" Bolsheviki in that he, Trotsky, is a "European," and fights "beneath the tactical flag of European social democracy." But what is the meaning of this confrontation of "Europeanism" and

"European tactics" with Bolshevism? It means one thing only: renunciation of the fulfillment of the immediate revolutionary tasks in the Russia of the czar and the great landowners, and all for the sake of the parliamentary tactics of the European socialists.

"This famous 'Europeanization,'" writes Lenin, "is being talked about by Dan and Martov, Trotsky and Levitsky, and by the other liquidators, in every possible key. It is one of the main rivets securing their opportunism. Their opportunism lies in the fact that the moment which they choose for imparting a 'European,' parliamentary propagandist character to the party is precisely the moment when the party is not faced by European tasks, but by an immediate struggle on the spot. Their idea is thus to avoid the task of revolution, and to substitute revolutionary tactics by parliamentary tactics."

The little word "Europeanism," on the lips of the liquidators and Trotsky during the period between 1910 and 1914, further supplemented by the little word "barbarism" (of the Bolsheviki), served to conceal the renunciation of the revolutionary tasks and revolutionary tactics of the proletariat of Russia. Let us read what Lenin wrote in reply to such a "European" article from Comrade Trotsky's pen:

"This is the daydream of an opportunist intellectual who, in the midst of the difficult and non-European conditions facing the labor movement in Russia (Lenin wrote this article for the legal Svesda, and therefore employed legal terms; here we should read: under the conditions imposed by the revolutionary tasks facing the labor movement in Russia. L. K.) has worked out an excellent European plan, and because he has done this, boasts of his 'Europeanism' to the whole world." (Compl. works., XII-1, pp. 222, 223, July 1924.)

These tactics, actually implying approbation of the transition of the party from the path of revolution to the path of the then peaceful European socialists, were proclaimed at the time when the new wave of revolution following the blood bath on the Lena demanded an expressly revolutionary leadership. It is possible that someone will submit the question: "How is it possible that the theory of 'permanent revolution' did not restrain Comrade Trotsky from such unrevolutionary tactics? How could he, the representative of this ultra-left theory, lend his support to such anti-revolutionary tactics, side by side with the mensheviki, during the obviously revolutionary situation from 1912 to 1914?"

But anyone putting this question would only prove that he has not yet comprehended Lenin's characterization of Trotskyism: "Right politics disguised in left phraseology."

"Examine the standpoint of the liquidators," Lenin continued to explain to the naive in the year of 1913. "The essential character of their liquidatory standpoint is artifically disguised beneath Trotsky's revolutionary phrases. The naive and entirely inexperienced are still often deceived by this disguise. . . But the slightest closer examination immediately disperses this self deception."

1914.

Then came the year 1914. The revolutionary movement in the proletariat made rapid strides forward, the waves of the tempest of revolution rose higher and higher. Trotsky's viewpoint remained unchanged in the questions of the principles of revolution and the tactics of the proletarian movement. Let us read what Lenin wrote about him in the year 1914:

"Comrade Trotsky has never yet possessed a definite opinion on any single earnest Marxian question; he has always crept into the breach made by this or that difference, and has oscillated from one side to another." (Compl. works, XII-2., pp. 536, 537.)

"The liquidators have their own

viewpoint—a liberal and not a Marxian one. Everyone familiar with the writings of Dan, Martov, Potressov and Co. knows this viewpoint. But Trotsky has no viewpoint, never has had one; he has merely transitions and flittings from the liberals to the Marxists and back again, fragments of words and sounding phrases, swing here and there. . . In reality, Trotsky's resounding, confused and empty phrases, so misleading to the untrained worker, serve solely for the defense of the liquidators; Trotsky accomplishes this by preserving silence on the question of illegality (that is, of the revolutionary organization and policy of the working class. L. K.), by endeavoring to convince us that a labor policy does not exist amongst us at all (that is, no endeavor on the part of the mensheviki to subordinate the labor movement to the cadets, etc. L. K.) Comrade Trotsky addresses a special and lengthy sermon to the seven deputies, headed by Tscheidse, instructing them as to the cleverest methods of carrying out the policy of rejection of illegality and of the party." (Lenin, XII.-2, pp. 410 to 413.)

Then came the tempestuous months of the year of 1914. The labor movement advanced from political and economic strikes to armed demonstrations, only interrupted by the mobilization of the army. In July the workers of Petersburg were already at the barricades. It was necessary to strike a balance, it was necessary to show to the working class the political currents and tendencies emerging from illegality and from the influence of the refugees from abroad, in order that they might carry on their movement further. Lenin wrote a comprehensive article and had it published in May, 1914, in the Bolshevist periodical, Prosweschtschenje (Enlightenment). Here he drew the balance of the ten years of struggle between Bolshevism and Trotskyism, the struggle which we have followed in its various stages:

"The old participators in Russia's Marxist movement know Trotsky's figure very well; there is no need to say anything about him to them. But the younger generation of workers does not know him, for he represents a certain type. At the time of the old Iskra (1901-1903), people of this type oscillated between the economists and the Iskra group. . .

"When we speak of the liquidators, we so designate a certain ideological tendency rooted in menshevism and economism. . . a tendency closely bound up with the policy and ideology of a certain class, the liberal bourgeoisie.

"These people 'explain' that they are above the fractions, but the sole basis for this assertion is that they take their ideas from one fraction today, from another tomorrow.

"Trotsky was an open adherent of the Iskra from 1901 till 1903, and Rjasanov named the role played by Trotsky at the Party Congress in 1903 that of a 'Lenin's cudgel.' By the end of 1903, Trotsky was an open menshevist, he had deserted from the Iskra to the economists. He proclaimed that 'a deep chasm yawned between the old and the new Iskra.' In the years 1904-05 he left the mensheviki and maintained an irresolute attitude; at one time he co-operated with Martinow (an economist), at another time he dished up his left 'permanent revolution' again. In 1906-07 he approached the Bolsheviki, and in the spring of 1907 he declared himself in full agreement with Rosa Luxemburg.

"During the epoch of the decline he turned to the right again after lengthy 'anti-fractional' vacillations, and in August 1912, he joined the bloc of the liquidators. Now he leaves them again, but in all essentials he repeats their ideas.

"Such types are characteristic of the crumbling away of the historical formations of yesterday, when the mass labor movement in Russia was not fully awakened.

"The younger generation of workers must learn to recognize this type of person, who, without concerning himself about party decisions or . . . about the experiences won in the present labor movement in Russia, simply step forward with the most unheard of claims." (XII-2, p. 462.)

Lenin deemed it necessary to say this to the younger generation of workers on the eve of a fresh advance of the revolutionary movement in the working class; he here drew the balance of the ten years' struggle carried on by Bolshevism not only against menshevism, but also against Trotskyism.

It is comprehensible to everyone that when a characterization of this kind is repeated from year to year, and not merely with reference to this or that error, but with reference to the whole course pursued by Comrade Trotsky, it is not done for any superficial reason. Comrade Lenin saw in Trotsky the embodiment of a current, of a political tendency, harmful to Bolshevism. For this reason, and for this reason only, Lenin considered it necessary to warn the party against Trotskyism.

The War Period.

Then came the war, rightly designated by Lenin as an event of world historical importance in the life of humanity, and as the greatest test of international socialism, rendering apparent the impassable chasm between opportunism and revolutionary Communism. The moment came when everyone had to show his colors. The moment came when all vacillation had to cease once and for all, and when a definite end had to be put to what Lenin termed inferior diplomacy, the diplomacy of having one foot in each camp.

But did this really come about? Did the war induce Comrade Trotsky to break once and for all with opportunism and support of the right, and to renounce the role of defender and disguise for the mensheviki, in which role he had been exposed for ten years by Comrade Lenin?

Since the time when Comrade Trotsky entered our party, serving it well, and thereby adding many glorious pages to the history of his own life and to the history of the party, we have not considered it possible to enter into this question. But when he takes it upon himself to falsify the history and the ideas of Bolshevism, when he attempts to appropriate to himself the ideology of the party, when he endeavors to supplant Leninism by Trotskyism in the ideology of the Russian and international proletariat, then he himself forces us to put this question.

Did the war actually separate Trotsky from the opportunists? Did the "inferior diplomacy" cease in the face of these great events? Not at all. Just as Comrade Trotsky contrived to combine an arch-revolutionary "left" phrase with co-operation with the mensheviki in 1905, in the same manner he managed to combine his internationalism during the war with the support of opportunism.

1915

As early as the summer of 1915, Lenin wrote as follows:

"In a reactionary war, the revolutionary class is bound to desire the defeat of its government. This is an axiom, contested only by the conscious adherents or unskilled assistants of social democracy. . . Trotsky belongs to these last.

"Trotsky, who as usual does not agree in principle with the social democrats on any single question, coincides with them in every question in actual practice. . .

"Martov and Trotsky are anxious to combine the platonic defense in internationalism with the unconditional demand for unity with the Nasha Sarja (Our Dawn), with the organization committee (central committee of the mensheviki), or with the Tscheidze fraction."

At the end of 1915, Lenin wrote:

"In reality, Trotsky is supporting the liberal politicians of Russia, who, by their disavowal of the role played by the peasantry, really mean that they do not wish to raise the peasantry to revolution."

Again:

"Trotsky, and the company of foreign flunkeys of opportunism, are doing their utmost to patch up the differences, and to save the opportunism of Nascha Sarja group by the defense and praise of the Tscheidze fraction."

1916.

At the beginning of 1916:

"The powerless diplomatists, and such preachers of compromise as Kautsky in Germany, Longuet in France, and Martov in Russia, are most harmful to the labor movement, for they defend the fiction of unity and thus prevent the real and matured alliance of the opposition of all countries, the founding of the Third International."

In March, 1916:

"And Trotsky? He is entirely in favor of the right of self determination, but for him this is merely an empty phrase, since he does not demand separation of the nation oppressed by the 'fatherland' of the socialists in any given case. He preserves silence on the hypocrisy of Kautsky and his followers."

In October 1916, just twelve months before our October:

"However good the intentions of Martov and Trotsky may be subjectively, they are none the less aiding Russian social imperialism by their complaisance."

In December, 1916:

"As early as the year 1902, Hobson recognized not only the significance of the 'United States of Europe' (Kautsky's disciple, Trotsky, may take cognisance of this), but also the significance of a fact which the sanctimonious followers of Kautsky in every country are anxious to conceal: 'that the opportunists (social chauvinists) are co-operating with the imperial bourgeoisie for the creation of an imperialist Europe supported on the shoulders of Asia and Africa. . . . One of the conclusions which we have drawn from this is the necessity of separation from social chauvinism."

1917.

On Feb. 17, 1917. **(February, 1917!)**

"The name of Trotsky signifies: Left phraseology and bloc with the right against the aim of the left!"

Six weeks after the February revolution, on March 7, 1917, Lenin wrote:

"In my opinion, the matter of the greatest importance at the present juncture is not foolish attempts at a 'coming to an understanding,' on the lines projected by Trotsky & Co., with the social patriots or with the even more dangerous elements of the organization committee type (mensheviki), but to continue the work of our party in a logical international spirit."

There is one important point which must not be omitted here: During the whole of this period Comrade Trotsky was a decided adversary of the "Zimmerwald Left," whose leader was Lenin, and which formed the germ of the Third International. The Third International was not born only of the struggle against Scheidemann, Vandervelde, and their like, it originatetd and grew in strength at the same time in the struggle against the Zimmerwald "center," against Kautsky and Trotsky. The practical policy of this center was as follows: No final rupture with the Second International, no founding of the Third International, the aims striven for by Lenin as head of the Zimmerwald left.

Lenin never altered his characterization and opinion of the line taken by Comrade Trotsky, either at the time when the tide of revolution was at its highest, or at the time of its lowest ebb.

No Leninist taking the name seriously can admit even the thought that

Comrade Lenin, in thus systematically revealing Comrade Trotsky's standpoint for so many years in succession was influenced by any individual motives. In his systematic and impassioned fight against Trotskyism, Comrade Lenin was solely influenced by the fact that he saw in Trotskyism a certain current hostile to the ideology and the organization of the Bolshevist Party; a current which in actual practice served the ends of menshevism.

As Comrade Lenin would say, it is comparatively easy to combat menshevism, for its open and consisent anti-proletarian character, obviously liberal in essentials, **is at once comprehend**ed by only slightly experienced workers and is thus rejected by the workers. It is more needful to combat the concealed forms of menshevism, those forms which clothe opportunist policy in left revolutionary phraseology, the form which adapts menshevism to the revolutionary feeling of the masses. Those who fight against us with open visor are not our sole enemies, we have another foe in that group which disguises the efforts of open enemies by means of revolutionary phrases, and furthers the cause of the enemies of the party by exploiting the confidence felt in these phrases.

Lenin merely formulated the relations to Trotskyism, characteristic for the whole Bolshevist Party, altho Comrade Trotsky succeeded at times, in especially difficult moments in the life of the party, in drawing some few Bolsheviki over to him, if only for a brief period, by means of his phrases and inferior diplomacy.

II. Comrade Trotsky Enters the Party.

The above described relations between Bolshevism and Trotskyism were characterized by Comrade Trotsky himself in the words: "I came to Lenin fighting." This phrase not only evidences a desire to win approbation, but it is very well expressed. Comrade Trotsky is a master of elegant phraseology. But the matter in question is unfortunately much too serious in character to be settled by a well turned sentence.

In the first place this phrase is not strictly accurate, and in the second place it is calculated to carry away the reader by its beauty and to conceal Comrade Trotsky's real thoughts. This elegant phrase is a piece of hypocricy.

Is it then really true that the whole history of Trotsky's attitude as we have followed it here from 1903 till 1917, can be characterized by these words of his: "I came to Lenin fighting"? Trotsky is apparently extremely satisfied with the history of his relations to Bolshevism; at least he wrote in his book: "The New Course," which appeared a few months ago: "I do not consider that the road by which I reached Lenin is any less suitable or certain than other roads." For Trotsky this is very reassuring. But is it possible for the party, without deceiving itself, to regard the road upon which Trotsky reached our party as suitable or certain? If this road really was a "road to Lenin," then every one time menshevik and social revolutionist, of whom there are not a few in our party, can make use of Trotsky's words and declare: "In reality I was not a menshevik or social revolutionist, I was merely making my way, fighting, to Bolshevism."

One thing at least is evident: the party cannot recommend anybody to take Trotsky's road to Bolshevism.

The comrades who have come over to us from other parties have generally declared that they have been mistaken, that they have had a different conception of the interests of the working class and had thought to serve these interests in a different manner, but that they are now convinced that they have been on the wrong road. The party did not demand any such avowal from Comrade Trotsky, and was quite right in not doing so. Comrade Trotsky stood the

test, and stood it excellently. But this does not by any means signify that the party can permit Comrade Trotsky to designate his fifteen years of fighting against Bolshevism and Lenin as a suitable and sure path to Leninism. I maintain that Trotsky sees the road by which he approached Lenin from an entirely opposite standpoint to ours; that he does not believe Bolshevism to have proved right and Trotskyism wrong.

Trotsky came to the party with the conviction, not that he was going to learn anything from Bolshevism, but that he was going to reach the party from Trotskyism, and substitute Leninism by Trotskyism. In Trotsky's book, "War and Revolution," we read:

"There were three points in which the newspaper, Nasche Slovo (Trotsky's organ. L. K.) had not yet arrived at an agreement with the Social Democrat (organ of the C. C. of the Bolsheviki, conducted by Lenin and Zinoviev. L. K.) even after the former had finally passed into the hands of the left wing of the editorial staff. These points referred to defeatism, to the struggle for peace, and to the character of the approaching Russian revolutions, Nasche Slovo rejected defeatism (which Lenin had held from the beginning of the war to be the fundamental principle of really revolutionary internationalism. L. K.) The Social Democrat rejected the slogan of the struggle for peace. . . and opposed it by the slogan of civil war (rejectetd by Trotsky. L. K.) Nasche Slovo finally supported the view that it must be made the task of our party to conquer power in the name of the socialist revolution. The Social Democrat maintained the standpoint of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry."

A few lines before Trotsky informs us that the "differences" existing between the Social Democrat and the Nasche Slovo, considerable at first, had diminished. . . Not only Trotsky, but Martov, was at one time a member of the editorial staff of the Nasche Slovo; Martov, however, resigned his post later on account of the remorseless criticism exercised by Comrade Lenin, and of the increase of revolutionary Communist elements among the editors. After the paper had finally passed into the hands of the left wing of the editorial staff, that is, into Trotsky's hands, these three points of dispute remained: the question of defeatism, the question of civil war or peace, and the question of the character of the impending Russian revolution.

Lenin stood for the defeat of the national bourgeoisie, he impressed upon the workers the necessity of the defeat of their "own" bourgeoisie—Trotsky was opposed to this!

Lenin stood for civil war—Trotsky opposed it!

Lenin stood for the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry—Trotsky opposed it! Here, as Lenin pointed out, he caused great confusion with his left phrase on "permanent revolution." In this last point Trotsky gave the impression of being more left than Lenin. He was not content with the mere dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, but demanded permanent revolution. Here we have merely a further example of what Lenin impressed upon us for so many years with regard to Trotsky: a right policy with regard to daily questions of actual practice, but skilfully disguised in the phraseology of the left.

A fourth difference must however be added to these three, one not mentioned by Comrade Trotsky: the difference in the question of the Second and Third Internationals. Lenin, at the head of the Zimmerwald left, stood for immediate rupture with the Second International and with Kautsky, and for the founding of the Third International. Trotsky, and the pro-Kautsky center were against this.

But only a few months after the existence of these differences had been definitely ascertained, Trotsky joined the Bolshevist Party.

"The March revolution," he writes, "has wiped out all these differences."

Truly? All of them? And how? Trotsky does not say. Yet the party has a right to put this question, since Comrade Trotsky has obliged us to occupy ourselves with his history. Are we to understand the declaration that the revolution has erased all differences in such manner that we may assume Comrade Trotsky to have become convinced of his having been mistaken on all these important points? That he has adopted the viewpoint of the Bolsheviki? Comrade Martinov, one of the best of the menshevist theoreticians, declared candidly: "I have served the working class for thirty years in the way which I held to be the best. Today I see that I have been in the wrong. History confirms the correctness of Lenin's standpoint with regard to the Russian revolution, and I join Lenin." But Comrade Trotsky has given the party no such answer.

Trotsky on Himself and Leninism

Trotsky, in his book, "1905" (pp. 4-5) writes as follows:

"In the period between January 9, and the strike in October, 1905, I formed those views of the character of the revolutionary development in Russia which have received the designation of 'permanent revolution' . . . Despite the interval of twelve years, this estimate has been fully confirmed." (This was written in the year 1922! L. K.)

But during the whole of these years this theory was opposed by another theory, Lenin's theory, expressed in the formula: "Revolutionary, democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry."

"This idea," so wrote Comrade Trotsky in 1918, and wrote it again in 1922 without the slightest reservation, "this idea has been repeated unwearingly by Lenin since 1904. But that does not make it correct."

In this book ("1905"), Trotsky describes Lenin's fundamental idea as an empty abstraction, and writes that the Bolsheviki "arrive at the idea of a bourgeois-democratic self-limitation of the proletariat possessing state power."

He continues: "Whilst the anti-revolutionary features of menshevism are already visible to their full extent, the **anti-revolutionary features of Bolshevism** (I underline these words on account of their importance. L. K.) threaten to appear as mighty danger only in case of a revolutionary victory."

Comrade Trotsky, who caused this phrase on the dangers of the anti-revolutionary features of Bolshevism to be republished and confirmed in the year 1922, adds the following:

"As is already well known, this did not happen, for Bolshevism, under Comrade Lenin's leadership, changed its ideological equipment in this most important question in the spring of 1917, that is, before the conquest of power." (Trotsky, "1905," Russian edition, p. 285.)

Trotsky's idea is now clear. The standpoint held by Lenin and by the Bolshevist Party on the character of the revolution, as developed between 1904 and the spring of 1917, had not only been wrong, but even counter-revolutionary with respect to the socialist revolution. Lenin and the Bolsheviki were thus obliged to "change their equipment" in the spring of 1917, before the conquest of power, for the purpose of accomplishing the conquest of power. That is, they found themselves obliged to substitute the counter-revolutionary equipment of Bolshevism by the really revolutionary equipment which Trotsky had kept ready on hand for twelve years. It is Trotsky's conviction that Lenin came over to Trotsky after first building up the party for fifteen years on "anti-revolutionary" ideas."

Trotsky has proved to be in the right during the whole course of his intellectual conflicts with Bolshevism and with Lenin up to the year 1917—that is the import of all Trotsky's

latest books ("1905" and "1917.")

But if this is so, then we must state it openly. If Bolshevism contains anti-revolutionary features, if we have to change our equipment before a decisive battle, then what right have we to teach uncorrected Bolshevism to our proletariat and to the proletariats of all countires? Why do we not say anywhere, not in one single textbook read by the proletariat of our country and of the whole world: Comrades, we teach you Bolshevism, but do not forget that Bolshevism contains anti-revolutionary features, and as soon as the fight begins, then you will not be able to manage with the equipment of Bolshevism, but will have to replace it by another, the equipment of Trotskyism.

We must either teach Bolshevism, Leninism, as it is, without correction, as the real theory of proletarian revolution, or, if there is anyone who believes that this theory is not the true theory of proletarian revolution, but that it has to be supplemented by Trotskyism in order to become such, then he must state openly and straightforwardly what alterations he thinks should be made. Is there really something anti-revolutionary in the teachings of Bolshevism on the revolution? Then the works issued by Lenin before the spring of 1917 must not be made the scientific authority on proletarian struggle and proletarian strategy against the bourgeoisie. Or we must at least say: But the art of realizing proletarian revolution is not to be learned from Lenin's works up to 1917, but from Trotsky's works since 1905.

The October revolution was either accomplished beneath the banner of uncorrected Leninism, or it was accomplished beneath the banner of Trotskyism and its correction of Leninism. Here we are at a parting of the ways.

It was to be expected that Comrade Trotsky, in order to grant a certain amount of satisfaction to the party which he has thus benefitted, should willingly admit that he has committed certain organizatory errors in the past. What does such an acknowledgment cost, when it serves as a cloak for the unpunished assertion that Bolshevism, Leninism, contains anti-revolutionary features? Paris is worth a mass! If one can appropriate the role of intellectual and theoretical leader of Bolshevism and the October revolution, it is worth while to admit to even considerable errors in the past.

Trotsky, in his "Lessons of October," actually does make such a confession to the party. "I have acknowledged my real and great organizatory mistakes," he writes. But was the fifteen years' conflict between Lenin and the Bolsheviki on the one side, and Trotskyism on the other, concerned with organizatory questions? This is nonsense, an endeavor to distract from the point. The conflict was directly concerned with the fundamental questions of the revolution, with the mutual relations of the different classes during the revolution, with the question of "permanent revolution," or Comrade Lenin's theory, and this is the question of the role played by the peasantry in the revolution, the question of the paths leading to socialism in an agrarian country, the question of the methods and conditions for the realization of the proletarian dictatorship in a country in which the peasant population preponderates. This is no contention on abstract formulas. The theory of permanent revolution is based upon a complete underestimation of the role played by the peasantry; it replies to one question only; it tells how power cannot be seized or maintained under these conditions.

Trotsky's viewpoint, summed up from a study of the "Lessons of October," may be expressed as follows: "On the eve of the events of 1905, Lenin imparted a peculiar character to the Russian revolution by the formula: Democratic dictatorship of the

proletariat and peasantry. But, as later developments showed, this formula had only significance for one stage on the way." This is followed by a literary dissertation to the effect that this stage was a stage on the way to Trotsky's formula. And this is the actual intellectual kernel of all Trotsky's latest writings. Trotsky shuffles his Trotskyism beneath Leninism with the whole of the literary art and talent peculiar to him. This last book of his is not written for the whole party, but for the younger generation now growing up, for the youth who within a year or two will have to determine the destiny of the party.

The aim of Trotsky's latest book, "1917," is to take revenge for the twelve years in which Lenin exposed Trotsky's wretched policy, to prove that the revolution confirms his (Trotsky's) theory, and to poison the minds of the future leaders of the party, now studying in the Communist universities, workers' faculties, colleges, etc., by this shuffling of Trotskyism into Leninism. We cannot permit this aim to be realized.

In this book ("1917), Trotsky inveighs against Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov and others. I shall deal further with this, and with my own errors, but am of the opinion that the reproaches made in this book are not intended for us only. The names of Kamenev and Zinoviev are given, but Lenin is meant. The question of the fate of Bolshevism may be put in the following form: Lenin had an excellent theory, but the disciples of Lenin did not know how to apply it, they did not recognize the needs of the concrete situation. The formula was right, but it has been badly carried out by this or that Bolshevik. It is possible to put the question in this manner, but it can also be stated as follows: If we draw all the logical conclusions from the Leninist formula, we are bound to land in a bog. The formula itself is wrong, and this wrong formula has been employed logically, correctly. In the first case we have a justification of the Bolshevist theory and an indication of the errors of individual Bolsheviki, but in the second case, if we are told that Lenin's nearest disciples accepted his formula and landed in a bog thru applying it literally, then we see—enlightened as we already are by Trotsky's assertion as to the anti-revolutionary features of Leninism, and by his statement that Trotsky's theory, and not Lenin's has been "completely confirmed"—then we see that the blows struck are not directed against Kamenev and Zinoviev alone, but thru them at Lenin's main formula.

Lenin in April, 1917.

Is it true that Bolshevism, in order to solve the problems of the revolution, was obliged to withdraw from its past? Is it true that the theory of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry proved inadequate? What were the actual facts, and how were these regarded by Lenin?

What really happened—as seen by Lenin as well as by us—was that the Bolshevist idea of the "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" was fully and completely realized in the Russian revolution, and, after its realization, began to develop into the Bolshevist idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

I here take the opportunity of referring to one of the works in which Lenin laid down his principles at that time: "Letters on Tactics," in which he comments on and explains to the party his famous theses of April 4. Lenin writes:

"The revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry has already been realized in the Russian revolution. . . The workers' and soldiers' Soviets are the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry as realized in actual life. We are still in the minority; we recognize the necessity of gaining the majority (in these organs of the dictatorship)." (Compl.

works, Rusian edition, vol. XIV-1, p. 29.)

If our theory has been realized, we must stride forward. How? In such manner that we gather together the proletarian elements of town and country against the petty-bourgeois elements, on the basis of the realized dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. This means the mustering and organization of the proletarian elements on the basis of this dictatorship, in order to proceed from the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the purely socialist revolution. For this reason, Lenin invariably adapted his tactics to the development of the mass movement in the peasantry, and he studied the "peculiarity" of the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which consisted of the fact that the latter, at the given stage of the revolution (April 1917), retained their confidence in the bourgeois government in the form of "defense of native country." After describing the views of the Bolsheviki contending against him (I was one of these), and after a sharp attack upon us, Lenin writes:

"A Marxist must never quit the firm ground of analysis of class relations. The bourgeoisie is in power. And is the mass of the peasantry not another bourgeoisie belonging to another stratum, of another description and character? Does it follow that this stratum may not seize power by the 'consummation of bourgeois democratic revolution? Why should this not be possible? Old Bolsheviki frequently judge in this manner."

I replied, "This is perfectly possible . . . it is quite possible that the peasantry seizes the whole of the land and at the same time the whole power. . ."

Lenin continues: "If the peasantry ceases to support the government in the social revolutionary and menshevist Soviets, if the peasantry, having deserted the bourgeoisie, seize the land and power in spite of the bourgeoisie, then we shall have a new stage in the bourgeois democratic revolution and one which will occupy us greatly."

This is much more complicated than Trotsky's theory, straight as the line in which the crow flies. For Trotsky, with his slogan of: "Off with the czar and on with the labor government," the matter was much simple. He simply ignored the whole peasantry and the conditions prerequisite to the realization of the dictatorship of tne proletariat in a capitalistically backward agrarian country.

The greatness of Lenin lies in the fact that he began to carry out the dictatorship of the proletariat under the given conditions of a given agrarian country, and actually did carry this out by means of constantly keeping in sight those real elements upon whose foundation this dictatorship can not only be proclaimed, but built up.

As a matter of fact, even in April it was not possible to judge whether there might not be a moment in the Russian revolution in which the peasantry would leave the social revolutionary and menshevist Soviets in the lurch and turn against the provisional government, before it could attain to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin, as real politician and mass leader, knowing that we pursued the policy of the proletariat under the peculiar conditions of an agrarian country, arranged his tactics for both possibilities.

Lenin would not have been Lenin, that is, he would not have been the practical leader of millions in class war, if he had really taken over Trotsky's equipment, for Trotsky's theory would have inevitably led to the breakdown of the proletariat and of the peasantry as well. In its pure form, the line taken by Trotsky is simply the ignoring of the peasantry, the ignoring of that transition stage during which the peasantry still places its confidence in the ruling bourgeoisie at

first, is disappointed and turns against the bourgeoisie, but still does not join the proletariat; this transitional stage which ends by theproletariat taking over the leadership of the peasantry in the form of peasant's risings, realizing the dictatorship, and endeavoring to bring about an alliance between workers and peasants in various changing forms.

Lenin, in the same pamphlet in which he wrote against the old Bolsheviki, states:

"In my theses I have secured myself against any leaps over agrarian or petty bourgeois movements which have not yet been overcome, against any playing with 'seizure of power' by the labor government. . . 'Trotskyism' 'down with the czar,' 'up with the labor government'—is wrong. The petty bourgeoisie (that is, the peasantry. L. K.), exists, and cannot be ignored."

Is this not the literal repetition, in the heat of revolution, of all that Lenin had long warned the party against? In 1910, Lenin had already said that: "Trotsky's fundamental error. . . is the lack of the smallest thought about the question of the transition from this (the bourgeois) revolution to a socialist revolution."

Trotsky's "original" theory takes from the Bolsheviki the demand for decisive revolutionary struggle on the part of the proletariat and the demand for the seizure of political power, from the mensheviki it takes the "denial" of the role played by thhe peasantry. . . Trotsky did not, however, reflect that when the proletariat induces the non-proletarian masses of the peasantry to confiscate the land of the landowners and to overthrow the monarchy, the national bourgeois revolution" in Russia is achieved and that this becomes a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Lenin criticized severely those comrades (including me) who had not observed that the revolution had already passed from one phase to another. He feared most that progress would be hindered by the party's falling into the rut of Trotsky's abstract theory, and again he accuses it of wanting to spring over the peasants' movement before this was in our hands.

There was no need for Lenin to change his equipment. The old Leninist theory, the old Leninist, Bolshevist conception of the character of the Russian revolution, and of the relations between proletariat and peasantry, were seen by Lenin to have proved fully correct. And now we had to advance further on the same lines. But the greatest care must be taken, in the advance, not to fall into Trotsky's mistaken footsteps. Twelve years before 1917 Lenin had prophesied that, after the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry had been realized, we should have to advance to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and must create conditions under which the peasantry co-operate with the proletariat, without simply ignoring the peasantry as Trotsky proposes. Bolshevism does not need to borrow weapons from the arsenal of Trotskyism.

At the same time, there were some Bolsheviki who did not advance so rapidly from stage to stage required by the tremendous acceleration of the revolution caused by the enormous pressure of the war. But this does not in the least signify that Bolshevism was on the wrong track, that it lead into a bog instead of to victory or that it had to be altered during the revolution. And this is just what Trotsky is trying to prove.

Trotsky has never grasped the essentials of the Leninist theory on the relations between the working class and the peasantry in the Russian revolution. Even after October he did not grasp it, and he did not grasp it when our party successfully maneuvered for the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat without separation

from the peasantry. His own theory, which in his opinion has proved entirely right, has prevented him from grasping the Bolshevist position. If Trotsky's theory had proved correct, this would signify that the Soviet power would long since have ceased to exist. This theory of "permanent revolution;" which does not trouble about the peasantry or provide any solution for the question of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, renders the labor government in Russia absolutely dependent upon the immediate proletarian revolution in the West. According to the theory the proletariat, after having taken over power, is plunged into the most hopeless contradictions. Its power is limited by objective social difficulties:

"Their solution is prevented by the economic backwardness of the country. Within the confines of a national revolution there is no means of escape from this contradiction." (Trotsky, "1905," Russian edition, p. 286.)

Under such conditions a delay or postponement of the proletarian world revolution would have inevitably caused the immediate collapse of the workers' dictatorship in Russia. Thus the adherents of the "permanent revolution" are bound to pass through stages of despair and profoundest pessimism to attempts at overcoming the economic backwardness of the country by force, with the aid of military commands.

Real Bolshevist policy, as pursued by Lenin from February to October, has nothing in common with either this policy or this psychology.

How did matters really stand in October and immediately afterwards? Seen from the standpoint of Marxism, from the standpoint of the analysis of the class forces of the revolution, was not the acceptance of the social revolutionary decree on landed property, the suplementation of the Sovet government by the left S. R., the designation of the government created by the October revolution as "Workers' and Peasants' government," all proposals of Lenin, was all this not a growing development of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry into a system whose actual essence was already the dictatorship of the proletariat?

It is possible to omit some of these facts of the October revolution; but then we do not arrive at any scientific analysis of Lenin's policy. And what about the transition from the war communism to the new economic policy, from the committees for the impoverished peasantry to Lenin's speech on the "medium farmers"? How can this be brought into harmony with that theory of permanent revolution which has proved so "perfectly correct"?

In 1916 Lenin wrote that life was already a decade ahead of Trotsky's magnificant theory. Now we can add another eight years. Does the circumstance that life has passed Trotsky's theory by for eighteen years justify Trotsky in claiming to be able to correct Leninism by Trotskyism?

Since life has passed Trotsky's theory by, Trotsky attempts in his books to not only correct Leninism, but life as well, and to prove by every art of which he is master that life follows Trotsky after all.

It is incumbent on the party to show precisely the contrary, and to prove to not only Trotsky but every new member the necessity of "Bolshevizing Trotsky." How far has the party succeeded in this?

III.

Trotsky in the Party. Our Errors. October According to Trotsky

We must differentiate between two aspects of Trotsky's activity. The one aspect in Comrade Trotsky as he carried out the instructions of the party strictly and accurately, leaning with

the other members of the party on the totality of common political experience in the party and on the whole party mass organization, and carrying out this or that task or command of the party. At this time Comrade Trotsky's deeds were splendid, and added many brilliant pages to his own history and that of the party. But since Comrade Trotsky has come forward as individualist, believing that he and not the party is in the right in the fundamental questions of revolution, and that Leninism must be improved by Trotskyism, we are obliged to see that other aspect of Comrade Trotsky which shows him to be no Bolshevik.

Four Attempts Made by Comrade Trotsky at Improving the Party

The party remembers four occasions upon which Comrade Trotsky has tried to instruct the party, and to force upon it his own Trotskyist deviations. The first occasion was a few months after Comrade Trotsky entered the party. It was at the time of Brest Litovsk. The party is adequately and accurately informed as to Comrade Trotsky's attitude at that time. He underestimated the role played by the peasantry, and covered this over by revolutionary phraseology. This was theroad to the defeat of the proletariat and the revolution. If we recollect the evidence brought at this time against Comrade Trotsky by Comrade Lenin, we see that Comrade Lenin brought no other evidence than the substantiation with which he had rejected Comrade Trotsky's general attitude during the course of the preceding decade.

Comrade Lenin reproached him with two political sins: Lack of comprehension for the relations between proletariat and peasantry, and liability to be carried away by apparently left, apparently revolutionary phrases. These two errors, typical of Comrade Trotsky whilst outside of our party, were repeated by him within it.

Then came the civil war, the epoch of war communism. Comrade Trotsky executed the task alloted to him. His participation in the direction of the general policy of the party was less than before. But now the revolution reached a fresh turning point. The relations between the classes shifted. The party anticipated, in the form of a discussion on trade unions, the question submitted a few weeks later at Kronstadt; the question of the transition from war communism to the new economic policy. What was Comrade Lenin seeking for at that time? He was seeking new forms for an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, new forms for leading the working masses by means of gaining their convinced adherence rather than by force. To what did comrade Trotsky look for salvation at that time? He advised us to tighten the screws of war communism. This was again and and again an underestimate of the peasantry, the liability to be carried away by externals, by methods of "pressure" and "administration from above."

And Comrade Trotsky's further attempts—even during Comrade Lenin's lifetime—the question of the "plan" according to his peculiar conception, his "formula" on the "dictatorship of industry," were not these again attemps to force petty bourgeois elementarity upon us from above with bonds of iron, did they not once more show that lack of comprehension of those concrete conditions under which it is alone possible to realize a dictatorship in an agrarian country with undermined industries at a time when the international revolution is retarded?

Beneath Comrade Trotsky's effective formula we can here easily distinguish the feelings inevitably involved by his original theory: On the one hand despair, pessimism, disbelief, and on the other hand exaggerated hopes in the methods of supreme administration (a term of Lenin's), in the competent subjection of economic difficulties from above.

The last discussion is still fresh in

our memories. It gave the party a graphic survey of the totality of Comrade Trotsky's errors, as dealt with above. But it also showed with special clearness another error, another feature of Trotskyism, and one far from being new. This is the attempt to undermine and weaken the main frame work of the dictatorship, the party. The same object was aimed at by the discrediting of the "cadres" of the party, by the resurrected menshevist conception of the party as a collection of "groups and currents," and the essentially liquidatory undermining of the authority of the leading institutions ("they are leading the country to destruction.") And has it not been under Comrade Trotsky's banner that the idea of greater freedom from party influence for extra-party organizations has flourished? Has not at all this, taken together, led to a weakening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and has it not all been based upon an underestimation of the conditions under which we—in an agrarian country—have to realize the dictatorship? Is it not a petty-bourgeois deviation?

So long as the party is perfectly sound and everything goes well, Comrade Trotsky quietly performs every task which falls to him; but as soon the party encounters any obstacle, as son as it has to adjust its rudder, then Comrade Trotsky at once springs forward in the role of savior and teacher of the party, but invariably points out the wrong way, since he has not absorbed the principles of Bolshevism.

Our Errors

Comrade Trotsky has another trump in his hand against Bolshevism. This trump consists of certain errors committed by some few Bolsheviki (above all by me and Zinoviev, then those of Rykov and Nogin) in October, 1917. The errors of the Bolsheviki are naturally invariably exploited by our enemies. Comrade Trotsky did not resort to his trump so long as he hoped to induce the party to deviate to the path of Trotskyism by means of the discussion of this or that practical question. But after four attempts—Brest, trade unions, discussion on the economic plan, and the last discussion —had shown that he cannot persuade the Bolsheviki Party to deviate from its path, after he had learned from the party at the XIII party conference that we, the Leninists, do not require our theory to be corrected by Trotskyism, then he brought forward this last trump.

He is of course not the first to do this. These errors have been exploited often enough already by our enemies, but both errors and exploitation were simply buried beneath the thunders of the proletarian revolution. At the time neither the errors themselves nor their being made use of by hostile quarters resulted in any practical consequences. It is only since then that these errors have been raked up again maliciously by those who had deserted communism: Levi, Frossard, Balabanova. Levi and Frossard are now being followed by Trotsky.

Vacillations were unallowable. Lenin armed himself against them with all the power and passion of a leader who sees that his co-workers are liable to carry confusion into their own ranks by vacillation at decisive moments. He exposed every vacillation relentlessly, and in critical and decisive moments he did not shrink from the severest words or propositions. And he was right, right to the end, without reservation.

But when the moment for calm discussion arrived, the moment for the avoidance of the repetition of similar errors in other Communist Parties, then Lenin characterized these errors very accurately. When Serrati attempted to cloak his withdrawal from communism by these errors of Zinoviev and Kamenev, Comrade Lenin wrote: "Before the October revolution in Russia, and immediately after it, a number of excellent communists com-

mitted errors which we do not like to remember now. Why do we not like to remember them? Because it is wrong to call to mind errors which have been made perfectly good, unless there is more special reason for doing so."

Special attention must be accorded to the manner in which Lenin formulated our errors: "In the period of which I speak they vacillated, fearing that the Bolsheviki were isolating themselves, were rushing too recklessly into a rising, were too unwilling to meet the advances of a certain section of the 'mensheviki' and 'social revolutionists.' The conflict went so far that the comrades named resigned demonstratively from all responsible positions both in the party and in the Soviet work, to the great joy of the enemies of the Soviet revolution. The affair culminated in a very severe criticism in the press, on the part of the C. C. of our party, against the resigning comrades. And after a few weeks, at latest after a few months, all these comrades recognized their error and returned to their responsible party and Soviet positions."

Is this description of Lenin in any way similar to the malicious attempt made by Trotsky—ridiculous in its malice—to twist this "right" wing into an actually "menshevist" wing in the Bolshevist Party? But this appears to be Comrade Trotsky's fate: In order to attain his objects he is invariably obliged to "overcome" Lenin, Leninism, and the Leninists.

Trotsky Writes Again about Himself and Lenin

Were we the only ones, in Trotsky's opinion, who made mistakes at the time of the October revolution? No, we were not the only ones. This book contains many sensations. But the most sensational sentence in the book is one referring to the October revolution. On page 50 of his "Lessons" Trotsky writes: "The rising on the 25 October was of supplementary character only." There are probably many here present who took part in the October events, and these will be surprised to learn, eight years after the October 25, 1917, that the rising on October 25 was merely of a "supplementary character." What did is supplement? We learn that it "supplemented" the events which had taken place on October 9.

The main data of the revolution are familiar to us. But when I mentioned events which occured on October 9, many will ask what happened on that date to which the October rising was nothing more than a supplement. On October 9, says Comrade Trotsky's book, a resolution was passed in the Petrograd Soviet, on the motion of Comrade Trotsky, ending with the sentence: "The Petrograd Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet cannot be responsible to the army for such strategy on the part of the provisional government, and especially for the removal of troops from Petrograd."

It need not be said that this was an important resolution; it united the garrison, which did not want to go to the front, with the Petrograd Soviet. But listen to how Trotsky describes and estimates this event of the October 9: "From this moment (October 9) onwards we were actually in a state of armed insurrection . . . The issue of the rising of the October 25 was already three part pre-determined at this moment. . . . In all essentials an armed insurrection had already been brought about . . . Here we had a 'quiet' and 'almost legal' armed insurrection, one which was two thirds, if not nine tenths, an accomplished fact . . . From this moment onwards we had a victorious rising in the capital city."

Thus it appears that October 25 was not more than a slight supplement to the great 9th. But now the question arises: If the "victorious" insurrection was already an accomplished fact to the extent of nine tenths on the October 9, what are we to think of the mental capacity of those who sat

in the Bolshevist C. C. and decided in a heated debate, on October 10, whether we should proceed to an insurrection or not, and if so, what then? What are we to think of people who on October 15 gathered together as plenary session of the C. C. together with the functionaries and co-workers from the military organizations, and still deliberated on the prospects of the insurrection, on the forces of the insurrection, and on the date of the insurrection. Had it not been all arranged on the 9th, quietly and legally? So quietly that neither the party nor the C. C. heard anything about it.

But this is merely a side issue. What is the party, what is the Petrograd Committee, or the C. C. when Trotsky writes a history of the October revolution? In this history neither the C. C. nor the party exist at all as real living powers, as collective organizers of the mass movement. And there is not a word to be learned from the "Lessons of October" with regard to what took place in Moscow, that not only in Petrograd, but in Moscow and Ivanovo Vosnesensk there was a proletariat which was also doing something. And with reference to Lenin the book informs us: "Lenin who was not in Petrograd, did not fully estimate the importance of this fact . . . Lenin, living lilegally, had no possibility of estimating the thoro upheaval," etc. We see that not one of us really knew anything about the October revolution. We had thought that it was precisely Lenin who led the October revolution, and that the C. C., the party, and the military organizations of the party organized it. But it appears that they did not appear on the scene at all.

In order to throw even more light on the part played by Lenin, Trotsky reports as follows: "If the insurrection had begun in Moscow (in accordance with Lenin's advice, L. K.), before the revolution in Petrograd, it would inevitably have dragged much more and the issue would have been very doubtful, and a failure in Moscow would have had a very severe effect upon Petrograd."

Whilst Lenin is engaged in imparting such "advice," Trotsky, with his "quiet" but "victorious insurrection" already in his pocket, is executing "an extensive maneuver." "We succeeded" he writes trumphantly "in luring our enemies into the trap of Soviet legality." Lenin, calculating much more upon the workers, sailors, and soldiers than upon Comrade Trotsky's "maneuvers," wrote at this tim "It is a crime to hesitate, it is a piece of childishness and formality to wait for the Soviet Congress, a betrayal of the revolution." But Trotsky refutes Lenin's words with an air of victory at the close of his description of the roles played by him and by Lenin in October: "It is one thing to organize an armed insurrection under the bare slogan of seizure of power by the party." Trotsky instructs Lenin: "but it is something very different to prepare and realize an insurrection under the slogan of the defence of the rights of the Soviet congress."

Here the figures are shifted from their actual positions: Lenin is illegal, unable to make a correct estimate of the situation, omits to observe that nine tenths of the insurrection has already been accomplished, advises that the rising be commenced in Moscow, although this obviously condemns the revolution to failure. Trotsky, on the other hand, brings about a "victorious insurrection" by October 9, carries out a definite but cautious maneuver by which he "lured the enemy into a trap," and "prepares and realizes the victory" under a slogan comprehensible to the broad masses, the slogan of "defence of the rights of the Soviet congress."

What do these "Lessons of October" endeavor to teach us? That in the spring Lenin was obliged to alter his attitude, to abandon his old theory, and that in October Lenin endeavored unsuccessfully to lead the insurrection which Comrade Trotsky was

destined to lead to victory.

We have to choose what we are to learn and to teach. Either this history of October, this history of Trotsky's, or of the history as given in the works of Lenin.

In the question of the Constituent Assembly Comrade Trotsky quotes my and Zinoviev's letter of October 11, in which we wrote: "The Constituent Assembly will be able to lean upon the Soviets only for aid in its revolutionary work. The Constituent Assembly and the Soviet form the combined type of state institutions towards which we are advancing."

Trotsky comments as follows: "It is extremely interesting for the characterization of the whole line adopted by the right to note that the theory of 'combined' state institutions uniting the Constituent Assembly with the Soviets, is one which was repeated one or two years later in Germany by Rudolph Hilferding, an opponent of seizure of power by the proletariat."

Zinoviev's and my letter was written on October 11, and I take Lenin's article written on October 6. Lenin writes as follows: "During the transition from old to new combined types are possible at times (as the Workers' Path rightly pointed out a few days ago), for instance Soviet Republic and Constituent Assembly."

What does this imply? It implies that in the case before us Lenin resembled Hilferding. Historical truth is of little importance to Trotsky. The alteration of tactics at moments when the situation alters from day to day is of no interest to him; what interests him is to discredit Bolshevism by every possible means.

A final example, again in two words. In this same letter of October 1917 we wrote: "These masses of the soldiery are not supporting us for the sake of the slogan of war, but for the slogan of peace... Should we find ourselves in a position, after seizing power, in which the international situation obliges us to resort to a revolutionary war, the soldiery will turn away from us. The best of the youth among the soldiers will remain true to us, but the great mass will leave us." The historian may judge in how far this estimate was justified. But what does Comrade Trotsky do? He writes: "Here we see fundamental arguments in favor of the signing of the Brest Litovsk peace."

Thus it appears that the Brest Litovsk peace, signed by the party on the urging and iron pressure of Lenin, against Trotsky, was substantiated by "fundamental arguments" supplied by us, the "right," the followers of Hilferding. It is not to be wondered at when our enemies, who have a very fine feeling for anything wrong, comment on such books about Lenin by remarking that it is difficult to distinguish whether they have been written by a co-worker or a rival of Lenin.

Leninism Against Trotskyism.

The results may now be summed up. We are the monopoly party in our country. We gather together in our ranks every organized worker in the country; but we must not forget for a moment that we are surrounded by elements foreign to our class, and that these elementary forces do not diminish, but will multiply and become politically more enlightened. They do not possess the form of legal organization. Petty-bourgeois intelligence will also grow on the soil provided by the development of industry, of the works and factories, and of trade. All these petty-bourgeois elements, finding no open means of expression in any social organization, are naturally endeavoring to further their aims thru the medium of our party itself. The petty bourgeois elements, in exercising this pressure upon our party, naturally seek the weakest link in the chain, and as naturally they find this weakest link where people have entered the party without being assimilated to it, and are possessed by a secret conviction,

leaving them no peace, that they are more in the right than the party, and that it is mere narrow-mindedness on the part of the party, mere conservatism, tradition, and adherence to this or that clique in leading positions, which prevents the pa ty from learning from its real saviors, such as Comrade Trotsky.

It is with great regret that I state this, and the whole party will echo this regret, but it has to be said: Comrade Trotsky has become the channel thru which the elementary forces of the petty-bourgeois find their way into our party. The whole character of his advances, and his whole historical past, show this to be the case. In his contentions against the party he has already become a symbol, all over the country, for everything directed against our party. This is a fact which it is most important for Comrade Trotsky to grasp. If he will grasp this and draw the necessary conclusions, then everything can be made good again. Whether he wants it or not (and assuredly he does not want it) he has become, for all who regard Communism as their greatest enemy, a symbol for emancipation from the thrall of the Communist Party. This is the regrettable but perfectly inevitable conclusion of all who are accustomed to judge political events from the standpoint of actual analysis of class relations, and not from the standpoint of mere words.

I am aware that in Moscow, a city particularly receptive for all manner of rumors, "perfectly reliable" information is already being spread abroad to the effect that firstly Comrade Trotsky's book has been prohibited, and secondly, that Trotsky's exclusion from the party is contemplated and Trotsky himself is no longer in Moscow. All this is naturally mere gossip. It has not occurred to anybody to prohibit Comrade Trotsky's book; no single member of the C. C. has raised the question of any reprisals against Comrade Trotsky. Reprisals, expulsion, and the like would not enlighten anybody, but would on the contrary render enlightenment more difficult and at the same time give opportunities to those brewers of confusion who would like to sow the seeds of schism in the party, and prevent the real fundamentals of Bolshevism being explained in their differentiation from Trotskyism; and it is this explanation which is of fundamental importance at present.

It must be perfectly clear to every conscious member of the party that for us, the Bolsheviki, and for the international proletariat marching forward to victory, Leninism is sufficient, and that it is not necessary to substitute or improve Leninism by Trotskyism. (Enthusiastic applause).
