

# **Revisionists Are Revisionists And Must Not Be Supported, Revolutionaries Are Revolutionaries and Must Be Supported**

**Report on China by Bob Avakian, Chairman of  
the Central Committee of the Revolutionary  
Communist Party, USA, Adopted by the 3rd  
Plenary of the 1st Central Committee of the  
RCP, USA (1977), Affirmed and Adopted by  
the 2nd Congress of the RCP, USA (1978)**

## **Introduction**

The question of the developments in China since the death of Mao Tsetung and what direction China is taking, what class the present leadership as opposed to the so-called "Gang of Four" (or rather the Four) represent—this is the most important question of line now confronting the international communist movement, including our Party. There is no way we can, or should want, to ignore this question or fail to make a scientific analysis of it. Nor is there any lack of objective possibility of making a basic analysis of this question.

Further, as the Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 3 stressed, ". . . how our Party deals with the situation in China will have a very profound effect on the entire development of our Party. The struggle in China is a life and death question for the proletariat and has tremendous implications for the working class and its Party in

every country. And the attitude and approach every Party takes in understanding and evaluating the events in China will have much to do with determining whether or not that Party remains a Marxist-Leninist Party or degenerates into one kind of opportunism or another." This is certainly correct and very important.

#### Basic Assessment, Basic Approach

It has been my opinion, since it became clear that in fact the Four had been arrested by Hua Kuo-feng and Co., that this represented a right-wing coup and a serious blow against the proletariat in China and its revolutionary leadership. To sum up the struggle there and its culmination in a certain stage with the arrest of the Four, one phrase can put it simply—"The wrong side won."

This initial opinion of mine was not based on intuition but on the fact that the articles put out by and under the direction of the Four, as well as what I knew about the Cultural Revolution and the overall role of the Four up to the time of their arrest, indicated clearly that they were revolutionary leaders of the proletariat carrying out and fighting for Mao's line with whatever mistakes they may have made, and that in the midst of a major and (then) continuing struggle against the right, the Four were put down by Hua Kuo-feng—a man whose speech to the 1975 Tachai Conference, a major statement of position, was in my estimation a deviation from and opposed to Mao's line and identified Hua in my opinion with those whipping up the right deviationist wind.

Of course, given the momentous nature of the developments in China and the necessity of arming our whole Party with, and uniting it around, a correct line on this most decisive question, it was not only correct but especially necessary to adopt a serious, scientific attitude of studying further events after the arrest of the Four, and in particular to identify and concentrate on the main questions of line, in order to arrive at a more definite and deep-founded understanding. But I believe that these developments and such an approach have long since confirmed the fact that the present leaders are implementing a revisionist line and that the Four's struggle against them was in the main and decisively a righteous struggle for a correct line to continue China on the socialist road toward communism. And the more that comes out about the situation the more, in my opinion, it confirms this.

This is because of the truth pointed out in the article, "Capitalist-Roaders Are the Bourgeoisie Inside the Party" (*Peking Review*, No. 25, 1976):

"Some people are of the opinion that it is not easy to discern the capitalist roaders inside the Party because they not only have the title of 'Communist Party members' but are leading persons and some of them have very high posts. It should be admitted that since the capitalist-roaders, who are the bourgeoisie inside the Party, are in power in the Party and have a variety of political 'protective colors' and since they invariably resort to all sorts of wiles and intrigues to deliberately put up a false front, it is therefore much more difficult for us to detect them. But dialectical materialism tells us that all objective things can be known step by step in the course of practice; agnosticism is both idealist and metaphysical. No matter how crafty the capitalist-roaders in the Party are in disguising themselves, they are bound to expose their true colors since they oppose Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and pursue a revisionist line. So long as we really have a good grasp of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought—the telescope and microscope in political affairs—we will be able to distinguish between right and wrong on cardinal issues from the viewpoint of political line and recognize the reactionary bourgeois essence of the capitalist-roaders." (pp. 10, 24)

Along with this, we should keep in mind what Mao himself wrote to Chiang Ching in 1966, speaking of the danger of a right-wing coup in China and the fact that if this should happen the genuine left could and should rise up and overthrow the right—the bourgeoisie. Specifically, Mao noted (prophetically) that after he died, if the right should come to power, then "The right in power could utilize my words to become mighty for a while. But then the left will be able to utilize others of my words and organize itself to overthrow the right."

This has direct relevance for the situation today. Certain statements attributed to Mao, which are at the least torn out of the overall context in which they were made and blown all out of proportion, are used by the right in power to attack the left they have overthrown. And meanwhile, the main thrust of Mao's words—his line as he continually developed and deepened it as well as the specific guidance he gave to the struggle in China during the last few years of his life—are either omitted or chopped up and distorted by the right in power.

It is definitely true that the right in power has the necessity to use some of Mao's words to cover up its revisionist line. This is because, as those in power put it, the "Gang of Four" (they really mean the "Gang of Five," including Mao) have "spread a great deal of confusion" (they really mean "have spread a great deal of

Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought"), so it is necessary to spread a lot of their own confusion in fact in order to carry out their revisionist aims. And in their use of Mao to oppose Mao two things stand out: one, overwhelmingly the things they cite from Mao are taken from his speeches and writings from before the Cultural Revolution, and in the main even before the Great Leap Forward (1958), and even those are distorted and misused; and two, those which are from the more recent period are more blatantly distorted ("tampered with" is the current phrase, I believe).

Therefore it is especially important for us to have a discerning eye and concentrate exactly on the "cardinal issues," the main questions of line, and to view things in terms of their actual development and how the opposing sides line up on these matters. And it is particularly important to determine how Mao's words are being used—i.e., whether they are being used in the service of creating public opinion for and implementing a revisionist or revolutionary line.

But how can Mao's words be used by the bourgeoisie in the Party for its purposes? The answer is, as Lenin pointed out, "Opportunism can be expressed in terms of *any doctrine you like, including Marxism.*" (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 363, emphasis Lenin's.) And unfortunately there has been a tendency on all levels of our Party to fall into accepting the use made of Mao's words and Marxism generally in the service of opportunism and to forget, ignore or even oppose the use made of Mao's words and Marxism generally in the service of socialist revolution.

This is important because in order to sort out right from wrong and revolution from counter-revolution it is necessary to go beyond the appearance of things to their essence and to look beyond the mere pronouncement of words or phrases to see what the whole thrust of a statement of position is. For example, the OL (or CP-ML) in its articles on the international situation rarely fails to say that the U.S. working class should overthrow the bourgeoisie in this country; they usually talk about the "special responsibility" of the U.S. working class to oppose our own ruling class and they even make noises about turning an imperialist war into a civil war in this country. On that account we do not say, "Well, they talk about these things, therefore how can we say there is anything wrong with their line on the international situation?" No, we go on to analyze the overall position they put forward and expose the fact that its essence and whole thrust is in direct contradiction to proletarian internationalism and to the correct line of especially opposing our own imperialists and making all

necessary preparations to actually turn an imperialist war into a civil war in this country.

Similarly, it is unthinkable that, at this point at least, the current rulers of China can overtly fail to talk about "class struggle as the key link," and the principal contradiction as being between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in China, etc. They certainly cannot call for an end to the dictatorship of the proletariat, as Khrushchev was able to do 20 years ago. But the fact that they find themselves forced to talk about these things should not keep us from examining and analyzing the essence and thrust of the line they put forward to see if it actually conforms to Mao's revolutionary line and Marxism-Leninism. If we apply the telescope and microscope of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought to the line put forward by the current rulers and to that of the Four and subject each to Marxist critical analysis, it becomes clear that the line of the Four is Mao's line while that of the current rulers is in fact directly opposed to it.

One other important point on this: the subject of China and particularly the possibility that it is going revisionist is bound to generate a great deal of emotion. This happens in every struggle over major events and questions of line in the revolutionary movement. For example, in the struggle against the Franklin opportunists, in order to cover up the central questions of line, they played up the sentiment that if you supported the Black Panther Party and the Black people's struggle, you had to side with them. Similarly, during the struggle against the Bundists they attacked the RU for trying to "keep the niggers in their place," with the same purpose. And now there are people—the OL and others—who attempt to get over with the same kind of thing, raising "support for China" as some kind of religious duty divorced from and above class and Marxist analysis. As pointed out in the polemics against the Franklins (see *Red Papers 4*), especially at times like this, in considering such literally soul-stirring questions, it is all the more important to put science above emotion and to be "ruthlessly scientific," or else there is no way to arrive at correct conclusions.

This takes us back to the all-important truth that the decisive thing is ideological and political line. And in order to come to and unite around a correct position on the events in China it is necessary to concentrate on the major questions of line, which the bulk of this paper will address itself to. Of course to answer all the crap that has come out of China in the last year and more, which has found certain echoes in our Party, would require a long book. But fortunately, that is not necessary here. Instead I will present a

summation of my position in opposition to what I see as the essence of the incorrect line on the main points and leave the rest for further study and discussion within the Party according to the guidelines set by the Central Committee, which will make it possible to go into the main questions much more deeply and thoroughly.

The remainder of this paper will contain the following major sections: The Line of the Current Rulers and the Four's Line in Opposition to It; Refutation of Certain Erroneous Arguments in Defense of the *Status Quo* and Against the Four; Why Did the Revisionists Triumph in This Battle and What Lessons Should We Draw?; What Do We Do Based on a Correct Understanding of What Has Happened? and The Problem of Bad Tendencies in Our Party Connected with the Line Questions in the Struggle in China.

#### I. The Line of the Current Rulers and the Four's Line in Opposition to It

To put it simply and in the terms of the struggle in China itself, the present rulers have reversed or are reversing the correct verdicts of the class struggle in China, specifically but not only the verdicts and achievements of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. And in so doing they are taking the capitalist road. This is clear on any number of questions of line and policy as well as in the purging of many revolutionary forces on various levels of the Party and the restoration of numerous leading people who were justly and correctly cast down as die-hard rightists and capitalist-roaders, not only Teng Hsiao-ping himself but also Chou Yang, Lo Jui-ching and many others, including associates of Peng Teh-huai who went down in 1959, whom Mao fought to knock down—and keep down once they had clearly shown that they were hell-bent on carrying out a revisionist line.

To see how far and how fast the current rulers have departed from Mao's line, comrades should go back and read the article in the October 15, 1976 *Revolution* on China and the statement by the Chinese Party Central Committee right after Mao died, which laid out the "behests" of Mao's that the Party and people were pledged to carry out, including among other things, a denunciation of the "counter-revolutionary revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping," (*Peking Review*, No. 38, 1976, p. 7) and the statement that:

"We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman

Mao and consolidate the great unity of the people of all nationalities under the leadership of the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping, continue the struggle to repulse the Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts! consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, enthusiastically support the socialist new things, restrict bourgeois right and further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country." (p. 10)

Hua and Co. have carried out none of these—in fact they have done just the opposite.

It is also significant to note that the current rulers are even reversing the verdict on Yugoslavia. The question of whether Yugoslavia is a capitalist (revisionist) country was one of the first major subjects of polemics by the Chinese Party against the Soviets, as far back as 1963. Since then, in recent years, the Chinese have made efforts to establish ties with Yugoslavia as part of the general policy of uniting with forces opposed to Soviet hegemonism. But recently Hua & Co. went a step further, essentially re-establishing Party to Party relations with the Yugoslav revisionists. (See *PR*, Nos. 42, p. 30 and 49, p. 3) This goes along with reports in the *New York Times* and elsewhere that the Chinese are studying the Yugoslav system of management, which is a model for "motivating" workers to produce under capitalist conditions in a fairly backward economy—a model which the revisionist rulers of China no doubt find worthy of study!

The "Three Poisonous Weeds" that were sharply criticized, while Mao was alive and giving at least basic, general guidance to the struggle against the right deviationist wind, are now upheld as 'fragrant flowers.' They are still poisonous weeds.

And, of course, the whole struggle against the right deviationist wind has not been just stopped but reversed—the right deviationist wind is now the good wind to those in power—which makes perfect sense since they were the ones responsible for whipping it up in the first place. But as the saying goes, a rose by any other name still smells the same, and this wind still smells like a fart to the proletariat and Marxist revolutionaries.

Mao's teachings on the bourgeoisie in the Party and the danger of capitalist restoration are perverted so that they lose their materialist and dialectical basis and life and death character. And in this way, under the conditions of today, the theory of "dying out of class struggle" is promoted.

Mao's line of "grasp revolution, promote production," is replac-

ed with the "theory of the productive forces"—and this will be true no matter how many times the current rulers whine that any time they talked about promoting production they were stuck with this label, because all their talk, their line, about promoting production is in fact the theory of productive forces. The reason these revisionists make loud noises about such charges is because they are stuck pigs, and stuck pigs squeal.

As an article put out under the direction of the Four—and attacked by the current rulers—points out, "However, many living facts show that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a strong motive force in the development of China's productive forces. Mass criticism of the revisionist line and the theory of the productive forces has promoted substantial development of socialist production and has produced solid fruits. Is it right for the masses of people to label Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao and their like as 'revisionists' and 'promoters of the theory of the productive forces'? Absolutely right! Lenin said it well: 'The negation of revisionism is aimed at covering up one's own revisionism.' The negation of the criticism of the revisionist theory of the productive forces by that unrepentant capitalist roader in the Party and by his 'General Program' is aimed at inheriting the mantle of Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, at continuing to push the counter-revolutionary revisionist line and theory of productive forces." (from an article by Cheng Yueh in *Study and Criticism*, published in Shanghai, April 1, 1976.)

#### Capitalist-Roaders Are the Bourgeoisie in the Party

But let's back up a second and look at a few particulars of the current rulers' line and the Four's struggle against it. A most important question at issue is the nature, and target, of the class struggle under socialism. Much was already pointed out in the last bulletin (Vol. 2, No. 4) on the question of the bourgeoisie in the Party, but since that bulletin itself represented a compromise and was not supposed to deal with the overall line of Hua and Co., some more remarks should be made here.

Apparently, some confusion has arisen around the question of whether class contradictions in socialist society are concentrated in the Party as opposed to merely reflected and also around the concept of "agents" of the bourgeoisie in the Party—i.e., whether the capitalist-roaders in the Party are the commanders or tools of the bourgeois elements outside the Party. To get at this question more deeply, let's look at an article by Hua Kuo-feng printed in

*PR*, No. 19, 1977—an article which, by the way, gives no attention to the "theory of the productive forces," while claiming to uphold Mao's line on continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Here Hua does say that "the two-line struggle in the Party remains a reflection, and a concentrated reflection at that, of the class struggle in society" and he does talk about "wavering elements inside the Party [who] have been hit by the material and spiritual sugar-coated bullets of the bourgeoisie and have degenerated into agents of the bourgeoisie." (p. 22—it should be noted in passing that in his article Hua basically dismisses the question of bourgeois democrats turning into capitalist-roaders as false "labelling" by the "gang of four"—and I will have more to say about other aspects of this article of Hua's a little later.)

But how does Hua treat this question of "concentrated reflection"? He still presents the bourgeoisie outside the Party as the commander and bourgeois agents inside as the tools. And he does not spell out what the "material" "sugar-coated bullets" of the bourgeoisie are. In other words he does not link the bourgeoisie in the Party directly to the existence of *capitalist productive relations* in socialist society. This is what the Four—and Mao—consistently did, pointing out that where a revisionist line leads and leadership is not in the hands of Marxists and the masses, bourgeois relations of production will actually exist, even in the collective form. The capitalist-roaders in the Party as the representatives of these capitalist relations—this is what the Four and Mao gave emphasis to and what gives the question of the bourgeoisie in the Party its material basis and shows how the capitalist-roaders can turn socialist society into its opposite.

This question of the persistence of capitalist productive relations in socialist society, and the revisionists in the Party as representatives of them, was also given great emphasis in both *Red Papers 7* and the article in *The Communist* exposing Nicolaus (Vol. 1. No. 1). It is what makes clear the very real danger that the capitalist-roaders pose, for if they had no such material and social base for restoring capitalism, then indeed they would pose a minor Problem, as Hua wants to say. It is the persistence and constant re-emergence of these relations that explains why it would be quite easy" for people like Lin Piao to "rig up the capitalist system" if they come to power, something Hua does not like to talk about.

In other words, as Mao emphasized for several years before his 'tn, in many ways the new socialist society is not much different

than the old society, especially as regards inequality among the people, the mental/manual contradiction, worker-peasant differences, differences in rank and pay, etc. This provides the basis for capitalist relations and bourgeois elements representing them to constantly emerge. With a revisionist group usurping power and a revisionist line in the leading position, tremendous social forces can be easily unleashed for capitalist restoration.

And, especially at this point in the development of Chinese society, who are most of the people who are in a position to turn their relations with those under their leadership into bourgeois relations?—overwhelmingly it is Party members. As the Bulletin pointed out, it is overwhelmingly Party members who are managers, directors, heads of farms, ministries, institutions, etc. As explained in *RP7* people of this type at the lower levels form a big part of the social base for capitalist restoration while revisionists at the top are the ones strategically placed to unleash this social base around a revisionist line for capitalist restoration. Of course, none of this is "automatic"; it exactly depends on what line leads, but given a revisionist takeover at the top and a revisionist line in command, many forces—strategically placed Party members as well as old and new bourgeois elements outside the Party—can and will be mobilized for capitalist restoration. This is the grave danger Mao warned of and which the Four, taking up his call, mobilized people to combat. (To get a deeper grasp of this, comrades should study over *RP 7*, especially pp. 13 and 21 and the article criticizing Nicolaus in *The Communist*.)

It is all this that is at the heart of the matter and which gives meaning to the question of "concentrated" and to the capitalist-roaders in the Party as the commanders of the social forces in society that can be mobilized for capitalist restoration.

Hua, in opposition to this, puts forward a line that evades the essence of these vital questions. He does this because to make a correct analysis would require him to say, as the Four did, that the capitalist-roaders "are the representatives of the capitalist relations of production which have been vanquished but have not yet been eliminated... As individuals, they may not necessarily own capital, run factories and operate banks like the former capitalists, but their political line which energetically upholds the capitalist relations of production reflects in a concentrated way the economic interests and political aspirations of the bourgeoisie." And " *the power to allocate and manage means of production and the power to distribute products are expressed in a concentrated way as the power of political leadership.*" (from an article by Chuang Lan in

*Study and Criticism*, June 14, 1976, emphasis added) This is exactly why, in opposition to what Hua and Co. insist, the new ruling bourgeoisie, or the main force of it, does indeed emanate from the Communist Party, especially its top levels.

From what has been said it should be clear that the question of analysis of classes in socialist society, and particularly the analysis of the bourgeoisie, is much more complicated than under capitalism. In capitalist society if someone occupies a certain material position—for example president of a corporation, or head of the finance department of the state—it is easy to identify such a person as part of the bourgeoisie. But in socialist society the matter turns not only and not even mainly on social position, but on line—that is, the head of a ministry or manager of a big plant is certainly not part of the bourgeoisie by mere virtue of occupying such a position, but becomes part of the bourgeoisie only if and when he implements a revisionist line, and more than that, persists in taking the capitalist road. Even with those who do take the capitalist road, it is correct and necessary to struggle to win them back to the socialist road. But it is also true that while many can be won over at any given time there will also be some who cannot, and these constitute the bourgeois elements, or bourgeois class, that must be overthrown by the masses. And in general the fact that economic units—and the economy as a whole—can be turned from socialist to capitalist is a result of the fact that the means of production under socialism are still not completely the common property of all of society and that the masses of people still have not yet completely become masters of the economy and society as a whole. These contradictions will exist all the way throughout the long socialist period of transition to communism and will provide the material basis for capitalist restoration and point to the grave danger that revisionism poses, especially as it emerges at the top of the Party, which as Mao often stressed, is "quite likely" for all the reasons spoken to in this paper and the last Bulletin.

Hua basically avoids this whole thrust of Mao's on this question and the emphasis the Four put on the fact that the power of leadership is in fact concentrated power over allocation and management of means of production and distribution, because Hua is a representative of those who want to make use of this power to give free rein to capitalist productive relations—all in the name of "Promoting production" and "modernization" and "building a Powerful socialist country" of course (more on this later). The article in *^ u . o t t c \* J o u r n a l* above from Shanghai makes a very important point citing how Engels in *Anti-Duhring* analyzed the way in which

classes and the state first arose. In primitive society, the author notes, "the work of safeguarding public interests, 'though it was under supervision by all of society, could not but be carried out by individual members.' (*Anti-Duhring*)" Further, the author notes, Engels pointed out that " 'With the appearance of disparities in distribution, class differences also appear. Society is divided into the privileged and under-privileged, the exploiter and the exploited, the ruler and the ruled.' (*Anti-Duhring*)" What is being stressed here is, as Engels also stated in *Anti-Duhring*, "Distribution, however, is not merely a passive result of production and exchange; it has an equally important reaction on both of these." (See the chapter "Subject Matter and Method.")

And the author (Chuang Lan) goes on to make the following very correct and important point: "Because these 'individual members' took advantage of the opportunity accorded by their management of public property and exploited their power to distribute articles of consumption and products to make private gains and own more surplus product than others, sprouts of private ownership appeared on the land under the clan system of public ownership and, as a result, those who were originally 'servants' of society became rulers enjoying all sorts of privileges. Although the birth of capitalist roaders is much more complicated, there are also similarities. When later Engels summed up the historical experience of the Paris Commune, he again stated that after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it was necessary to 'prevent the state and state organs from turning from servants of society into its masters' and 'pursuing their own special interests.' ('Engels' Introduction to the 1891 edition of the *Civil War in France*)"

The author of this *Study and Criticism* article points out that Mao further developed Marxist theory and practice on this question and that these teachings of the revolutionary leaders of the proletariat "hit the Party capitalist roaders where it hurts most." He notes that in socialist society, "To extend bourgeois rights in distribution actually smacks of allowing a section of people to possess the labor of another section of people without compensations, which means extending class differences. The historical lesson of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union fully shows how important it is for a socialist state, while consolidating the proletarian dictatorship and public ownership of the means of production, to strive to restrict bourgeois rights in the field of distribution in order to prevent the Party and state from changing color."

What is wrong with this line? To the proletariat and its revolu-

tionary leadership, absolutely nothing—it is fine indeed. But to Hua Kuo-feng and his cohorts it is deadly; or to borrow from Lenin, in regard to such an analysis, Hua and Co. "are like petty thieves who stay away from the place where they have stolen." (See *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*.)

This is why, in his report to the 11th Congress, Hua presents the perverted line that the Four "confounded the differences in distribution between the leading cadres of the Party, the government and the army on the one hand and the broad masses on the other with class exploitation." (See *PR* No. 35, 1977, pp. 35-36.) With this broad statement Hua hopes to write off the real question raised by the Four—and really by Mao, with his whole emphasis on bourgeois right, differences in pay and rank, etc. as important material bases for capitalist restoration. Isn't it obvious that the Four's analysis is right in line with Mao's while Hua's is a repudiation of it?

This is clearly shown in an article by the current rulers in the August, 1977 issue of *Red Flag*, the theoretical journal of the Chinese Party CC, where Mao's line on bourgeois right is not only tampered with but trampled on. The article starts by juggling around a quote from Mao of several years ago, where he stressed that, except for the change in the ownership system, China was not much different than the old society. This article quotes Mao out of context and out of order and even leaves out the statement by Mao that before liberation China "was much the same as a capitalist country," all for the purpose of downplaying the danger of capitalist restoration and the danger posed by expanding rather than restricting bourgeois right. Then this article tells us that in speaking of bourgeois rights under socialism Mao's "brilliant idea" was that they can only be restricted! The whole purpose of this article is essentially to say, not much can be done about bourgeois right under socialism so don't worry about it (this is a consistent line of Hua & Co. which will be examined again later, in analyzing Hua's speech at the 1975 Tachai Conference in particular).

This is why Hua & Co. raise such a stink about the fact that the Four—and Chang Chun-chiao in particular—had the audacity to want to make an analysis of the question of classes in socialist society. Several times in the last year the *Peking Review* has earned blasts at Chang Chun-chiao for saying that even after reading Mao's "Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society" (written in 1926!) and the rest of Mao's four volumes he was "still not clear" on the question of class relations in socialist society and therefore more study and investigation of this should be done. What is wrong with that? Nothing, unless such study and investigation will ex-

pose you as the bourgeoisie in the socialist period, as is the case with Hua and the others now ruling China.

Mao Tsetung would be the last one to say that his 1926 analysis of classes in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial China was a sufficient guide to understanding class relations in China today—how could it be!—or that there was no need to study and investigate this question. In fact, Mao stressed just the opposite, saying in 1961, for example, "Now that we have entered the socialist period, a series of new problems has emerged. If we do not produce new writings and form new theories to conform with new needs, it also will not do." (From "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union's 'Political Economics' " printed in a U.S. government collection of Mao's post-1949 writings, speeches and talks.) And Mao would certainly be the last one to suggest that only he should make such analysis and develop such "new theories!" In reality Chang Chun-chiao (and the Four in general) are being attacked by Hua & Co. for nothing other than doing exactly what Marxists should do—and again, this is because to make a Marxist analysis can only expose Hua and his cronies. Comrades should seriously ask themselves—doesn't the material produced by the Four and their followers enrich our understanding of important questions, especially on the nature of classes and class struggle in socialist society? Of course Mao set the basic line, but they did their part in elaborating it as well.

Instead of a Marxist analysis of the question of classes in socialist society and the bourgeoisie in the socialist period in particular, what we get from Hua and Co. is an attempt to write off the danger of capitalist restoration, of capitalist-roaders being the bourgeoisie in the Party and in a strategic position to restore capitalism. What we get is lots of insistence that after all the capitalist-roaders are only a mere handful and are constantly being exposed and weeded out.

Comrades should think over their own discussions with workers and others about the question of socialism. Isn't one of the first and main questions they raise, "Yeah, but how do we know that you guys will be any different once you're in power?" How would they take it if we answered them by saying, "Don't worry about that, the people in power who turn out bad under socialism are only a mere handful and they are constantly being exposed and weeded out"? Wouldn't they tell us to get the hell away from them and come back when we were serious? Wouldn't they think we were trying to put something over on them and sucker them? And they would be right! But this is what we get from the

present rulers.

And we get lots of statements such as the following: "In socialist society, the contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base continue to find expression in class contradictions which consist of contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, although *most are contradictions among the people themselves*. This accordingly requires us to persist in taking class struggle as the key link and make a strict differentiation between the two types of contradictions which are different in nature." (*PR* No. 12, 1977, p. 12, emphasis added)

Here we have a good example of eclecticism—different contradictions are in fact mixed together and there is no distinguishing as to which is principal. This is a way of actually writing off class struggle as the key link and denying the principal contradiction while pretending agreement with it. It is, as Lenin said, "a perfect example of base renunciation of Marxism in practice, while hypocritically recognizing it in words," and as Lenin also noted in that same work (*The State and Revolution*), "Substituting eclecticism for dialectics is the most frequently seen and the most universal phenomenon in dealing with Marxism in the journals of the formal social-democratic parties at present."

In the quote from *PR* above it stresses that "most are contradictions among the people." The question, however, is not "most" but what is principal—what is the principal contradiction in socialist society? On this Mao was very clear—it is the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which is an antagonistic contradiction as even this *PR* article admits. To talk about "most" is to try to confuse quantity with quality and direct people away from what is the main problem—the principal contradiction—which will remain the principal contradiction until communism is achieved, regardless of how "many" contradictions there are among the people.

To see how the principal contradiction is being subtly tampered with, compare the following two statements (characterizations, not actual quotes), the first which could serve as a summary of Mao's line and the second of the line of Hua & Co. as expressed in *the Peking Review* and elsewhere: 1) The basic contradictions in socialist society give rise to contradictions among the people on a vast scale but the main contradiction they give rise to is the antagonistic contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; and 2) The basic contradictions in socialist society give rise to the antagonistic contradiction between the proletariat

and the bourgeoisie but most contradictions they give rise to are among the people. Isn't there a world—or world outlook—of difference between these two statements, don't they represent two different class interests, even though on the surface they may seem to be somewhat similar? Aren't Hua & Co. perverting Mao's line on this most important question?

And the political purpose of this becomes even clearer if we pose the all-important question: how will the contradictions between the forces and relations of production and the base and superstructure principally be resolved? According to Hua & Co., as expressed in this article and many other places, by "adjusting that part of the relations of production in disharmony with the productive forces and that part of the superstructure in disharmony with the economic base, and uphold [ing] the principle of grasping revolution and promoting production." The article even sounds very serious about this, for it adds immediately, "On this issue, there must not be the slightest shilly-shallying or else we will lose our bearings." (*PR* No. 12, 1977, p. 12)

But actually those who put forward this line have already "shilly-shallied" into revisionism with their "adjusting" (and their "grasping revolution and promoting production" which really means smashing revolution in the name of promoting production, as I'll show later). Their line is opposed to Mao's correct line on this question. This is in large part because they treat the question of "adjusting" not as principally and essentially the question of class struggle against the bourgeoisie—antagonistic class struggle. In "Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," Mao does say that the contradictions between the forces and relations of production and the base and superstructure are "not antagonistic" in socialist society—but he means something very specific by this—that they can "be resolved one after another by the socialist system itself." In other words, to resolve these contradictions in socialist society it is not necessary for the *system itself* to be *overthrown* as in previous systems—though it is ultimately necessary for the system to make the final transition to communism, when there will still be such contradictions, but of a different nature, *not* in the nature of *class* distinctions.

And it should be remembered that at that time (1957) Mao was only beginning to develop his thinking on this question. As he developed it further he formulated the line that throughout the socialist transition period there are classes and class struggle and the danger of capitalist restoration, and that in order (as he said in "Correct Handling") to "resolve all such contradictions" as be-

tween forces/relations, base/superstructure, it is necessary to wage the class struggle against the bourgeoisie and *overthrow those portions of power* it will continually usurp until it is eliminated. This was exactly what the Cultural Revolution was for—as much as the present rulers may want to deny it (more on their attitude towards and roles in the Cultural Revolution later).

In short, resolving these contradictions requires not mere "adjustment" but antagonistic class struggle against the bourgeoisie which will at each step stubbornly resist further transformation of the relations of production and the superstructure. This is the line of Mao—and the Four—in direct opposition to Hua and the gang (or gangs) ruling China now.

While they occasionally feel the need to talk about the proletariat overthrowing the bourgeoisie, even in socialist society, it is most significant that the current rulers of China have written this out of the basic programme of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party. Comparing the paragraph in the 10th Congress Constitution dealing with the basic program with that in the 11th Congress we find the following striking difference: in the 10th it is stated that the Party's basic programme is "the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the triumph of socialism over capitalism." The corresponding part in the 11th Constitution, reflecting fundamental changes, says that the basic programme "for the entire historical period of socialism is to persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, *eliminate* the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes *step by step* and bring about the triumph of socialism over capitalism." (see *PR* No. 36, 1977, p. 16, emphasis added)

Again, this at first may not seem like a significant change, or may even seem more in accordance with present conditions, since it may appear that the task of *overthrowing* the bourgeoisie has already been accomplished in China. But that is not in fact the case—it is a repudiation of Mao's line that, as he said to Mao Yuanhsin ("sworn follower" of the "gang of four") as early as 1964, "At present, the task of the revolution has not yet been completed; it has not been finally determined who, in the end, will overthrow whom. In the Soviet Union, is not Khrushchev in power, is not the bourgeoisie in power? We, too, have cases in which political power is in the grip of the bourgeoisie; there are production brigades, factories and *hsien* committees, as well as district and provincial committees, in which they have their people, there are deputy heads of

public security departments who are their men. Who is leading the Ministry of Culture?" (See Stuart Schram's *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, p. 243)

And Mao was very clear and emphatic that one Cultural Revolution could not solve this problem, that class struggle must consistently be waged against the bourgeoisie, that there would be a need for many Cultural Revolutions and that throughout the entire historical period of socialism who would win out, who would overthrow whom, could not be finally settled, until the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes were eliminated and communism finally achieved. Eliminating the bourgeoisie, Mao stressed, meant repeatedly *overthrowing* it, by mobilizing the masses to overthrow *from below* those portions of power the bourgeoisie repeatedly usurps.

It is this that the current rulers, despite any cover elsewhere, have thrown out with their changes in such a key document as the Constitution—specifically its "basic programme"—replacing it with the notion of simply eliminating the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes step by step without overthrow from below. In other words, they present it as all a question of struggle against the bourgeoisie *from the top down*, which is completely consistent with their attempts to write off the real danger of the bourgeoisie in the Party and the fact that bourgeois headquarters will not only repeatedly emerge within the Party but will repeatedly usurp large portions of power, a situation that can only be dealt with by mobilizing the masses to seize back that power *from below*. This top down character of the present rulers' line runs throughout their whole presentation of what socialism is and how it must be built (more on that later).

Hua & Co. continually pose as big upholders of "non-antagonistic contradictions" among the people. This is for one purpose—to prevent the proletariat from waging class struggle against its enemy, the bourgeoisie, represented right now by Hua & Co. themselves. Meanwhile, they themselves are waging fierce class struggle against the proletariat, as shown by their arrest of the Four and their suppression and purging of anyone who opposes them—I am not complaining about arrests or purges in general and certainly not about suppression of any kind; dictatorship is dictatorship and must be carried out resolutely, but the question is always who is suppressing and dictating to whom? Comrades should study the new fascist Constitution adopted at the 11th Congress, and compare and contrast it with the 10th Party Congress Constitution, especially on the question of ideological strug-

gle within the Party, to see just how "benevolent" the new rulers of China are in fact, how like Confucius theirs is the benevolence of the slave-master.

The key point with regard to this is the fact that in the tasks of the primary organizations of the Party, the Constitution is specifically changed from the 10th Party Congress to *take out* ". . . wage an active ideological struggle so as to keep Party life vigorous," which is replaced with the instruction to report the opinions and demands of the masses to higher Party organizations and to be concerned about the masses' political, economic and cultural life, (*see Peking Review* No. 36, 1977, page 22, Article 18, point 4 in particular) This is dialectically related to other changes in the Constitution, such as instituting "commissions for inspecting discipline" at various levels of the Party, re-instituting one-year probationary requirements for new members—something previously dropped from the Constitution as a result of the Cultural Revolution—and the direct tying of going against the tide to upholding the "three do's and don'ts," which really means that the last two are the basis for defining the first—that is, anyone who goes against the tide is splitting and conspiring and is therefore a revisionist.

Again, it is the taking out of ideological struggle as a requirement of basic units which most makes clear that what is being called for is absolute obedience to higher levels and unquestioning compliance with orders from above. There is no justification on any basis for this, even if we were to assume that the "gang of four" did all the things accused of them and created anarchy and conspiratorial cliques in the Party. Lin Piao certainly did do this, on a large scale, and yet the 10th Constitution retained the requirement of basic units to wage active ideological struggle and even added going against the tide, without directly tying it to the 'three do's and don'ts,' and in fact raising it as a principle on the same level with carrying out these three principles. Again, comrades should carefully study over the 11th Constitution and compare and contrast it with the 10th on the points mentioned here, and others, to see clearly how it is a fascist Constitution of a Party guided by a revisionist line.

Hua & Co. are waging class struggle against and suppressing the proletariat and, to cover that, they are putting out a line of: everything is non-antagonistic, you're fine, I'm fine, everybody's fine, we're all "positive factors"; the only problem is that those dirty gang of four" and their followers keep waging antagonistic struggle, and if we just smash them everything will be fine. In

other words, if we just get rid of this "bane" of the proletariat waging struggle against the bourgeoisie we can get on with the real task—boosting production—which means reducing the workers to wage-slaves producing for their new rulers.

But isn't it important to correctly distinguish and handle contradictions between the enemy and the people and contradictions among the people? Didn't Mao stress this many times? Yes, of course, but Mao never meant that this should be used to write off the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, for as he pointed out so many times, so long as it still exists, the bourgeoisie will never for a minute stop waging struggle against the proletariat.

And how did the Four handle this? Undoubtedly in practice they made some mistakes—it would be almost impossible not to, especially under the conditions of such acute class struggle as existed over the past several years and, for example, at the high point of mass upsurge in the Cultural Revolution. Mao himself remarked during this high tide that one of the most difficult things about the Cultural Revolution was that the two different types of contradictions were very hard to sort out. But the point is that the *line* of the Four on this question was correct.

To cite just one of many examples, in another article from *Study and Criticism* also by Chuang Lan, in addition to a basic analysis of the bourgeoisie in the Party, the question of how to deal with people who take the capitalist road and how to unite all who can genuinely be united against the enemy is presented this way:

"Practice proves that the vast majority of Party members and cadres who made the mistakes of capitalist roaders during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution returned to Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line after seriously studying Chairman Mao's theory on continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and with the criticism and help of the masses. Only a very few unrepentant capitalist roaders such as Teng Hsiao-ping and his ilk, continue to stubbornly stick to the capitalist road, and their contradiction with us eventually becomes an antagonistic contradiction. In our struggle against capitalist roaders, we must take account of different conditions and isolate to the maximum extent and strike at a handful of diehard capitalist roaders until they are completely discredited."

What is wrong with this—isn't it quite correct? If anything it's too lenient.

But isn't it possible to say one thing and do another, and isn't

that possibly the case with the Four on this question? In fact this is a major charge against the Four, especially on this point. Yes, there are certainly cases where people say one thing and do another—and the present rulers of China are a good example of that, specifically on the question of "non-antagonistic contradictions." But over any period of time it is not possible to consistently propagate an overall correct line and carry out an overall incorrect line. And it is a truth that in order to carry out an incorrect line it is necessary to create public opinion for such a line and it is necessary for opportunists to deviate from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought in word as well as deed—even while claiming to uphold it.

Such can definitely be shown to be the case with Hua & Co. But with the Four it cannot be shown that their stand deviated from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought and that they created public opinion for an opportunist line that they were attempting to carry out. The public opinion they created was for a correct line—as in the article quoted above at length. And it should be remembered that this article was written in Shanghai, where according to the present rulers of China, "things they [the Four] dared not say in Peking they said in Shanghai and from there it was disseminated to the rest of the country." (see *China Reconstructs*, November, 1977, page 4)

I would like to call comrades' attention to what was written 20 years ago, by a comrade about Stalin, in the face of denunciations of him by Khrushchev, since I at least believe it applies in essence to the Four, especially in the face of attacks on them by Hua & Co. today:

"In addition, Stalin authored some of the best attacks on the 'cult of the individual,' and his articles on collective work are inspiring. Then what do we have—someone who preached well but practiced badly? Maybe so. I can postulate that a great theoretical physicist might beat his children, but I find it difficult to comprehend that a genius in social science can produce sound and original work dedicated to human advancement without a genuine love for humanity, with self-glorification as his guiding impulse, with a care for self above his fellow. On this basis it is possible that the next great advancement in Marxist science will come from a thorough scoundrel. I do not see it—there is a unity to the whole man; to be great in this field seems precisely not possible for a villain. Of course, as well as unity, there is diversity to the whole man, and even the greatest will have faults, perhaps serious ones." (See *Red Papers* 7, page 154).

Stalin specifically made mistakes, even serious ones, in the sphere of correctly distinguishing and handling contradictions between the enemy and the people and contradictions among the people, but he was, overall, a great Marxist-Leninist, and certainly denunciations of him for being a "tyrant," etc. by Khrushchev should have been and have been repudiated by genuine Marxist-Leninists. Similarly, the Four undoubtedly made *mistakes* in this sphere, as well as others (I will speak to what I see as some of their errors later); perhaps they were not as good as Stalin, and certainly they were not as good as Mao. But overall they fought for and carried out Mao's line on this as well as all other major questions; as with Stalin they should certainly be upheld as Marxist-Leninist leaders of the proletariat, and denunciations of them as "fascists," etc. by Hua Kuo-feng & Co. should certainly be repudiated as well.

Here it should be stressed that Stalin's basic error with regard to contradictions under socialism is that he failed to grasp the persistence of the *antagonistic* contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Stalin certainly did recognize the existence under socialism of non-antagonistic contradictions among the people—for example between workers and peasants. But he failed to recognize the persistence of capitalist productive relations and the fact that even the contradictions among the people contained the seeds of contradictions between the people and the enemy and if not handled correctly would grow into such antagonistic contradictions. Failing to recognize *this* Stalin failed to wage the class struggle correctly and to distinguish between the two different kinds of contradictions. He treated people who represented the bourgeoisie in the Soviet Union as simply agents of foreign capital and often treated people who made serious errors as the same as enemy agents, because he did not correctly grasp how the contradictions existing in socialist society created the basis for capitalism to be restored, for new bourgeois elements to emerge and for people, including even some who could be won over, to take the capitalist road.

Further, on the question of the two different types of contradictions, glossing over the differences among the people—for example between intellectuals and the masses of manual workers—means allowing these contradictions to grow into antagonism. Such contradictions not only exist in socialist society but do indeed contain the seeds of antagonism and do tend to become antagonistic, unless correct leadership is given to narrowing step by step these differences in opposition to "left" and right errors on this question. In China it was the Four, following Mao, who recognized that

such differences must be restricted and who gave correct leadership to narrowing these differences in accordance with the material and ideological conditions. It was not they, but the current rulers, who are turning these relationships into antagonistic ones by expanding rather than restricting such differences, putting technicians, intellectuals, etc., in command over the masses (more on this later). Again, comrades should think about their own experience with such contradictions in capitalist society, keeping in mind Mao's insistence that especially with regard to such contradictions China was not much different than capitalism, and ask themselves whether or not these contradictions tend to become antagonistic when the intellectuals, technicians, etc. are allowed, as they are under capitalism, to lord it over the masses of workers.

It would be possible to go on for pages on this one question of class struggle under socialism and the bourgeoisie in the Party. But if comrades study what has been written so far, together with the last Bulletin on this question and the material provided and cited as reference, and apply the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method, it will be clear that the Four's line on this question is correct, is Mao's line, while that of Hua & Co. is a repudiation of Mao's line. To sum up in one sentence the essential points on this question: Hua Kuo-feng & Co.'s line on this is nothing but the line of "dying out of class struggle" in the form in which it has to be put forward in China today (in no small part because of the public opinion created for the correct line by the Four), it opposes the dialectical and materialist analysis of the question of the bourgeoisie in the Party, deliberately downplays the danger of capitalist restoration, and distorts the target and tasks of the proletariat in waging the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat; the Four's line on this question is correct, it is Mao's line.

#### Putting Revolution First Is the Only Way to Promote Socialist Production

Another major question at issue is the relationship between class struggle and the struggle for production, or revolution and Production. In the past year it has been repeatedly charged by the Present rulers of China that the Four talked only about revolution and not about production, or that they said that production would "go up automatically" if revolution were carried out well and that all the talk about revolution only served the purpose of sabotaging production.

Is there any truth to this? From all I know and from the investigation I have done—and especially by focusing on the question of line—there is no truth to it at all. The truth is that the Four steadfastly upheld the correct principle of "grasp revolution, promote production," while those now in power really have an "automatically" line—that is, they say that if production goes up that will solve the problem of revolution, and further they equate production with revolution so that boosting production becomes the way to carry out revolution.

Again, this was dealt with in some specifics in the last Bulletin which comrades should study over again on this point, but since that Bulletin was not supposed to deal with the overall line of the Four on the one hand and the present rulers on the other, it is necessary to go into this question, in a deeper and more all-around way here. What is the so-called "automatically" line of the Four? From what I can tell, and from what has been said by some echoing this charge against the Four, it is the line expressed in statements such as the following: "Man is the most important productive force. As long as proletarian politics is placed in command and man's enthusiasm for socialism is fully aroused under socialist conditions, production will flourish at a swift tempo." (From Cheng Yueh's article in *Red Flag*, April 1, 1976).

Is this incorrect, is it opposed to Mao's line? Just the opposite—it is exactly Mao's line, exactly a Marxist-Leninist position on the question. It was Mao, not the Four, who said, "Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed. . . We believe that revolution can change everything, and that before long there will arise a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products, where life will be abundant and culture will flourish." (See "The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. 4, page 454.) Imagine poor Mao, even when attacking idealism he is so infected with the "gang of four idealism" and their metaphysics that he talks about "miracles" and "revolution can change everything"!

The Four's position was *not* that the class struggle can *replace* the struggle for production or revolution can *replace* production, but that class struggle is the key link and everything—production included—hinges on it (as Mao said) and that revolution must *command* production, not the other way around. Repeatedly, during the struggle against the right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts, the articles written under

the direction of the Four stressed that not only was it very necessary to promote production but that specifically, "We have always attached importance to economic accounting and accumulation and opposed such erroneous ideas as not estimating the cost, neglecting accumulation and being extravagant and wasteful. Teng Hsiao-ping, however, attacked the criticism of putting profits in command and material incentives as 'one-sided opposition to the making of profits.' " (*Peking Review* No. 24, 1976, page 10). And this article goes on to quote that idealist and metaphysician who said, "Ideological and political work are the guarantee for accomplishing economic work and technical work, and they serve the economic base. Moreover, ideology and politics are the commander, the soul. If our ideological work and political work slacken just a little, economic work and technical work are bound to go astray." (The statement is by Mao, of course—imagine, "*guarantee*" for "accomplishing economic work and technical work"—how "automatically" can you get!)

Along the same lines, the article by Cheng Yueh quoted above stresses that, "The difference between Marxism and the revisionist theory of the productive forces is not the question of whether or not it is necessary to grasp production and do a good job in economic construction. Marxism has always attached great importance to the development of the productive forces, but it has also held all along that the development of productive forces cannot be separated from the reform of the relations of production and the superstructure, and that only by grasping revolution will it be possible to promote production. And the adjustment in the relations of production will pave the way for the development of productive forces." (Of course, there is "adjustment" and "adjustment" and "reform" and "reform"—in this article by Cheng Yueh, as in all the Four's material, it is clear that such transformations in the relations of production and superstructure fundamentally and principally depend on class struggle against the bourgeoisie and overthrow of diehard representatives of the bourgeoisie who hold portions of power in their hands—and in fact it is for promoting such struggle that the Four are repeatedly attacked by the present rulers.) /

But is this just a question of "covering your ass" with a few general statements about developing production in a few articles? Again, all the evidence points to the fact that the opposite is the case. Comrades can study, for example, the series of articles in *Peking Review* 16-19, 1976 on "Socialist Industry," where I think the question of the concrete relation between grasping revolution

and promoting production is put forward very well (these articles were reprinted as a pamphlet).

More, in practice, in Shanghai, in Liaoning Province where Mao Yuan-hsin, Mao's nephew and a "sworn accomplice" of the Four, played a leading role, and in other places where they had influence the Four gave correct guidance to and led the development of production under the command of revolution (more on that and some history around it a little later). Even the present rulers have to backhandedly admit that. For example Li Hsien-nien (now number 4) said in an interview with foreign correspondents that in Shanghai under the Four production was not disrupted (see *New York Times*, Aug. 30, 1977).

Of course the present rulers, as stated by Li in that interview, and in a number of *Peking Reviews*, try to say that the Four created a stable situation where they had power and chaos where they didn't. But the important fact is that the Four and the present rulers have fundamentally different lines on how to develop production, and where the Four were able to carry out their line production actually went ahead on a socialist basis, and where they didn't they waged struggle for the correct line to keep production from "going astray" because it was not guided by a correct ideological and political line (see Mao's statement on this general question above). Naturally such struggle is bound to cause temporary "disruption" in many places but not as much disruption to *socialism* as the carrying out of an opportunist line (and of course in a situation of complicated and acute struggle many undesirables, including the right deviationists, are bound to get involved and much disruption will result from various forces; it is quite wrong to make the Four the cause of all the disruption as is being done now—more on "disruption" later). So again we are back to the question of line, but in any case it cannot be honestly stated that the Four paid no attention to the concrete problems of developing production, it can only be said that they had a line on this opposed to the present rulers' line. And they should have—the present rulers' line is revisionist, and not to oppose it would be criminal—and the Four certainly did oppose it, with a correct line.

As for the Four's basic line on this question, I have studied over several hundred pages of *Fundamentals of Political Economy* printed in Shanghai, which clearly puts forward the Four's line and criticizes right and "left" opportunist lines on the question. It should be noted that this textbook was printed in 1974, before the right deviationist wind had been whipped up on a big scale (though certainly not before the right deviationists were

making real attempts at reversing correct verdicts). It positively and strongly puts forward the need to accomplish the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology (which came to be called the "four modernizations")—and again, this is put forward positively and strongly, that is, not by way of simply saying, "Of course, we want modernization but not at the cost of selling out revolution."

I find the line promoted in this textbook not only correct but enlightening and thought-provoking, not only on the general question of the relation between revolution and production but on a whole series of questions involving how to actually develop production under the command of revolution. The need for enterprises generally to make profit is stressed—but not as an absolute—and "profits in command" is well refuted. There is a whole chapter on "Frugality Is an Important Principle in the Socialist Economy," where among other things it is stated that "all frugality is in fact the economizing of live and embodied labor, or the economizing of labor time... In socialist society saving labor time assumes an immense significance... To violate the law of frugality is to violate the basic requirement of socialist economic development. . . To practice frugality is an important way to increase accumulation through self-reliance. . . The socialist country can only rely on the diligent labor of its whole laboring people and internal frugality for accumulation... To practice frugality is especially important to China's socialist construction. China is a big country but is also an economically backward and poor country. . . Only through diligence and thrift can the laboring masses create wealth and play the greatest possible role and can China soon be developed into a big and strong socialist country. To practice frugality is also necessary if a socialist country is to discharge its obligations to internationalism. Only by saving more can we contribute to world revolution." And, as opposed to the current rulers, the Four, in this textbook and elsewhere, stress that the key to achieving socialist frugality, as well as developing the socialist economy in general, is to mobilize the masses and rely on them as the masters to solve such questions, under the guidance of a correct line, certain fundamental general statements, but very correct ones, indicating lack of concern for the problems of developing production and modernizing China. And there are every specific policy statements not only in this chapter but in relation to socialist production relations and their operation; commodity production and the operation of the law of value under socialism and the relations bet-

ween different economic units, regions, etc.; different forms of socialist ownership and the means for resolving the contradictions that arise on this basis; how to carry out the general line for socialist construction; planning (short term and longer term); the relations between agriculture and industry and the worker-peasant alliance and the policy of agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor, grain as the key link in agriculture and steel as the key link in industry; the relation between production and consumption, the state, collective and individual and so on. The textbook also puts forward a correct line on trade, calling for actively developing it while subordinating it to self-reliance and stresses that achieving equality and mutual benefit in trade with non-socialist countries is also a question of *class struggle*, something we hear very little, if anything at all, about from the current rulers.

And all of these are dealt with in terms of how they relate to the ultimate goal of achieving communism in China and worldwide. To me it is clear that those whose line guides such a major work are Marxist revolutionaries and that charges that they only talked about revolution and not about production or that they cared nothing about developing the economy, in fact only wanted to sabotage it, etc. etc. *ad nauseam* are utterly groundless and base attempts to do what Lenin said of Kautsky when the latter tried to cover his own revisionism by distorting the position of the genuine revolutionaries—to attribute to your opponent an obviously stupid position, and then to refute it (Lenin said), is a method used by none too clever people—and none too Marxist either.

Fortunately, in evaluating the two different lines—that of the Four and that of the present rulers—on this all-important question of the relation between revolution and production, we have a good deal of material available to us, on both sides. And the more we compare and contrast it the more it becomes obvious that the line of the present rulers is revisionist trash while that of the Four is correct. Again, to go into all of this would require a long book, so let's look at a few questions in some depth and contrast the two lines on some other points more briefly.

The "Three Poisonous Weeds" (now called "fragrant flowers" by the present rulers) all share in common the position sharply criticized at the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party—that the main task now is to develop production, which was then (1973) correctly called "revisionist trash." (See page 5 of the 10th Congress documents.) One way this "revisionist trash" is put forward in these three documents is in the formulation (directly or

indirectly stated) that the "three directives" of Mao's are the "key link." In some cases this is said straight up, in others it is put this way: "The three directives cannot be separated" (or another translation, "are an inalienable entity,"—found in both the "Outline Report" on science and technology and the "20 Points" on accelerating industrial development).

Here is the perfect example where "metaphysics is rampant." Mao always insisted that there is no such thing that "cannot be separated." Everything is divisible, everything divides into two. (If the elementary particle can be separated, why can't the three directives?) But here we have two (or three) into one. And for what purpose?—simply to deny the leading role of class struggle and to put developing the economy on the basis of stability and unity on a par with—in fact above—the class struggle. Again, of course, there is "separated" and "separated." If these documents only meant that the three directives are inter-related and should all be carried out, then there would be no real problem. But clearly they mean that they should be put on a par as one "key link"—an eclectic formulation which serves, again, the purpose of actually raising production above revolution and stability and unity above class struggle—and in fact waging class struggle against the proletariat. This is the whole line that runs through these documents, of that I don't see how there can be any doubt.

The "General Program" starts off by saying that the three directives are the "general program for work in all fields" and that they will "also be the general program in the whole course of struggle for achieving the grand objectives of the next 25 years"—i.e., the "four modernizations." And then we are told, "Carrying out these three important directives is tantamount to carrying out the Party's basic line, the Party's line of unity for victory, and the Party's general line for building socialism."

So this "general program" is no small matter, no incidental thing, and this "three directives are the key link" is no accidental formulation—it is *the line* for the next 25 years. And it is a completely incorrect, revisionist line, specifically repudiated by Mao, as we know, in his blast at "taking the three directives as the key link." Now Mao is no fool, and no hot-headed sectarian who would just jump on one mistaken formulation if it were an isolated thing—no, Mao clearly recognized that this formulation was part of a whole revisionist program, the "general program," and that is exactly why he denounced it so strongly. Mao might have made an offhand blast among comrades against an incorrect formulation without regarding the whole line as rotten, but the point is that he

would not allow such a statement of his to be made public in a way that would tag its author(s) as revisionist unless he regarded such a statement, "taking the three directives as the key link," as part of a whole revisionist line, which it clearly was (and is).

But Hua & Co. steadfastly uphold the "General Program" and unabashedly promote and implement its revisionist line and its whole revisionist "vision" if we can call it that. Hua even goes so far as to formulate a new "historical mission of the Chinese working class and the Chinese people to accomplish in the rest of this century"—"making China a powerful and modern socialist country." (See *Peking Review* No. 35, 1977, page 39 and also No. 21, 1977, page 13, both of these are from major speeches by Hua.)

What the "vision" is here is further indicated in an article by Hua where he quotes Mao saying that in agriculture if the capitalist rather than the socialist road is taken production can increase but it would take more time and be more painful, and Hua says the following on the subject of which road to take: "Capitalism enabled many countries to industrialize. . . Socialism is far superior to capitalism. It enables us to go faster than capitalism in expanding production, industrialize the country in a comparatively short period and surpass capitalism in labor productivity step by step." Hua throws in that modernization should be done "in keeping with the orientation of socialism and communism," but this is really quite incidental to and treated essentially as external to the question of promoting production and modernizing. (See *Peking Review* No. 19, 1977, page 24.)

This reminds me of the Bundists that we struggled against several years ago, before the Party was formed; as we pointed out then, to them self-determination was the highest goal and revolution was simply the means to that end and subordinate to it. Similarly, for Hua & Co. industrialization and modernization are the highest goal and "socialism" simply a means to get to them, and revolution is definitely subordinate to them. Since in China capitalism can't bring about rapid industrialization and modernization, then we will have to have socialism—this is the outlook of Hua & Co. And what is the logical extension of Hua's statements when applied to the capitalist countries—since there it "enabled many countries to industrialize" then there is no need for socialism and revolution in these countries. This is really what comes through, despite window dressing about "in keeping with the orientation of socialism and communism."

Hua and Co.'s "orientation" is not in keeping with socialism and communism, and their "socialism" is not socialism at all—it is

the revisionist view of socialism which essentially equates it with simply a greater development of the productive forces, essentially does not deal with socialist production as the unity of productive forces and productive relations, essentially ignores the dynamic role of the superstructure and divorces socialism from the real historical mission of the working class, to transform society through socialist revolution and achieve communism, to abolish classes. When we define what communism is, what do we say is the essence of it—that there will be a high degree of development of the productive forces or that classes will be eliminated—both are true but which is the main thing, the essential thing? For a communist, the abolition of classes, but for a revisionist philistine and the "practical men" who promote "goulash communism" and make a fetish of production, it is industrialization and modernization that are essential.

The productive forces in our country are much more highly developed than those in China and this is likely to remain so for many decades—and surely in the years since 1956 (when Mao talked about overtaking the U.S. economically in 50-60 years) Mao came to recognize this. But does that make the system in the U.S. "higher" and "superior" to the socialist system or will it be "superior" until the socialist countries surpass it economically? And will socialism in China be a failure if its economy is not more developed than here by 2000? I remember that after an acquaintance returned from a trip to China he was asked by a worker how it was, and he replied, "It was like going through a time machine." The worker, on the basis of bourgeois spontaneity and prejudices said, "Yeah, they're still a long ways behind us, so it's really like going back in time." "No," the acquaintance replied, "it's like going forward!"

Hua and Co. would find themselves in agreement with the worker in this discussion. Their whole outlook is that of the bourgeois democrat who has turned to "socialism"—i.e. public ownership—because it can bring about modernization faster in their opinion. If this seems unfair or anyone is still unconvinced, listen to the following statement by Yu Chiu-li, in a major speech at the 1977 Taching Conference: "To build our socialist country under the dictatorship of the proletariat into a still more powerful state and catch up with and surpass the most developed capitalist countries economically—*this* is the great call of our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao, the long cherished common aspiration of the people of the whole country and the *lofty ideal* for which countless revolutionary martyrs fought to the last drop of their

blood." (*Peking Review* No. 22, 1977, page 16, emphasis added).

Well, if it is wrong to say that the ultimate historical mission for the working class is modernization, can there be such a "historical mission" for the next 23 years in China to achieve modernization? No, there cannot, for this is just another way of saying that modernization, developing production, is the main task—just more "revisionist trash." And fundamentally it is a way of separating the tasks of the proletariat in socialist society from the ultimate goal of communism, a way of walling off the next 23 years from the real historic mission of the proletariat and erecting a "new period of development in our country's socialist revolution and socialist construction," in which the Cultural Revolution is finished (thank Confucious! say Hua and Co.) and we can get on with the real task of promoting production. (See Hua's report to the 11th Congress, *Peking Review* No. 35,1977, page 39.)

In short, to make modernization the "historical mission" from now till the end of the century, while talking about "socialist revolution" and trumpeting the totally eclectic "key link" of bringing great order across the land in the course of acute struggle against the "gang of four," is just another way of resurrecting the line of "three directives as the key link"—after all, there is more than one way to skin a cat, and as we know, to the present rulers it does not matter whether that cat is black or white so long as it promotes the "historical mission" of modernization. And in fact the "new period" Hua & Co. are gloriously proclaiming is nothing other than the period when Mao's line is being overthrown—the time when the old "era of Chin Shih-Huang" (a well-known reference to Mao Tsetung) is "gone forever," as those reactionaries who hoisted their banner in the Tien An Men incident in April 1976 proclaimed.

In fact and in essence, Hua & Co. have thrown out Mao's correct line on the principal contradiction under socialism and replaced it with the revisionist line that the principal contradiction in China now is between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces. They don't say this straight up, of course, since that exact formulation was long ago denounced and exposed in China. As was pointed out at the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, when Lin Piao came out with this line in 1969, he did not present it in exactly the same form in which it had previously been presented—and repudiated. Instead he just said that the main task then was to develop production, which might have seemed "reasonable," coming off the mass upheaval of the Cultural Revolution in the three previous years. But, as was

pointed out at the 10th Congress, Lin's line in 1969 was "*a refurbished version under new conditions*" of the "same revisionist trash." (See again p. 5 of the 10th Congress documents, emphasis added.) So, too, the line of Hua & Co. today is a *refurbished version under new conditions* of the line that the principal contradiction is between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces.

The way Hua and Co. formulate it is that the problem in China is that they have the "superior socialist system" but have not surpassed the advanced capitalist countries economically. In other words, the principal contradiction is really between the "superior socialist system" and the lack of modernization—or the backward productive forces. The same "revisionist trash" but a "refurbished version under new conditions." It is not possible to read over any major statement by the current rulers on the situation in China without seeing that this is, despite talk about the class struggle, the way they present the main problem in China, that this is how they actually put forward the principal contradiction. Anyone who is not convinced of this should read over major statements from the current rulers with this question in mind—such as Hua's article in *Peking Review* No. 19, his speech to the 11th Congress, his speech at the Taching conference this year, etc. (see *Peking Review* Nos. 35 and 21)—and apply the Marxist method to get beyond the appearance to the essence of what is being put forward.

But didn't Mao say that building a modern socialist state is a great task and can't you find statements from Mao in which he says "our aim" is to build a powerful or modern socialist country? Yes, such statements can be found, especially from the period before the Cultural Revolution, particularly the 1950s. But two things on this: first, Mao never meant such statements to be used to say that modernization should be put on a par with or raised above revolution and the ultimate goal of communism worldwide; and second, especially through the Cultural Revolution and in the last years of his life in particular, the question of modernization, while certainly not abandoned in Mao's thinking, was most definitely not the uppermost thing on Mao's mind, not the greatest goal that he put forward nor the thing he focused attention on.

In fact in the directives of Mao's that came to be referred to as his "three directives" the one on socialist construction was, as far as I can tell, limited to a general call for "pushing the national economy forward," and was certainly not meant to be put on a par with his instructions on the class struggle, and the theory of pro-

letarian dictatorship and combatting and preventing revisionism in particular, which was the main and decisive directive. When Mao said that class struggle is the key link and everything hinges on it, he meant that it determines the direction of everything else, including along what lines, which road, the economy would be developed—i.e. whether socialist or capitalist development would take place.

Beyond that, it should be pointed out that these "three directives" were not all issued at the same time and under the same circumstances; in other words they were not issued together as one "general program." It was Teng Hsiao-ping—along with Hua Kuo-feng and others—who threw them together as one program and tried to put them on a par in form in order to wipe out the decisive role of class struggle in essence. Certainly nowhere in Mao's different directives and most definitely not in his response to this eclectic trick of putting them on a par together as one "general program" is there any indication that Mao agreed with making modernization the "historical mission" that Hua & Co. are now braying about.

It is most interesting and significant that with all the propaganda of Hua & Co. about how the four modernizations are the "historical mission" of the present era, they have not been able to cite one statement by Mao in recent years which supports this or even one that lays stress on the four modernizations. The most they can come up with is Chou En-lai's statement at the 4th People's Congress that at the 3rd People's Congress 11-12 years earlier Mao set forth the general proposal for modernizing the country in two stages by the end of the century. Chou's speech neither says that this is the most important task nor does it actually say that Mao has recently reiterated the call for the implementation of this plan. Certainly Mao did not agree that the four modernizations were some sort of overriding and almost magical plan that everything else should be subordinated to, or that in order to achieve these modernizations it was necessary and correct to throw out the class struggle and abandon the correct line on developing the economy by adopting a "major policy" of selling out China's resources for advanced technology and other revisionist measures that Teng Hsiao-ping and his fellow right deviationists had cooked up. In fact Mao emphatically said quite the opposite.

In *Peking Review* No. 42, 1977, it is stated that in 1975 Chang Chun-chiao said that the four modernizations "means no more than growing several hundred million tons of grain and producing

tens of millions of tons of steel.' " Assuming Chang said this, I think he is right in line with Mao. His remark sounds to me very much like what Mao said about the arrogance of the Soviets and how they "are blinded by material gains and the best way to deal with them is to give them a good dressing down." Mao insisted: "What are the material gains? Nothing but 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of coal, and 80 million tons of petroleum. Does this amount to much? Not at all. Now at the sight of this much their heads are swelled. What Communists! What Marxists! I say multiply all that tenfold, or even a hundredfold, it still doesn't amount to much. All you have done is to extract something from the earth, turn it into steel and make some cars, planes, and what not. What is so remarkable about that?" (Vol. 5, p. 365) Chang Chun-chiao's meaning, assuming he made this statement, could well be—and in my opinion would be, since it is consistent with his line—the four modernizations after all are not something so great that we should subordinate everything else to them, not something in whose name we should give up revolution and socialism.

Does this mean that striving for modernization by the end of the century is in itself wrong—how should we view this and what was the view of the Four on this matter? No, striving for modernization in itself is not wrong and, if guided by a correct line and under the command of revolution, is a very important and necessary endeavor. But at the same time, it has to be recognized that everything should not be staked on achieving this modernization by the year 2000 and that making a big push for modernization is bound to unleash a lot of forces favoring and favorable to capitalist restoration and, for that reason, it is especially important to insist on the leading role of revolution and to devote special attention to the struggle against revisionism.

This basic stand was laid out clearly by Chang Chun-chiao in an article (pamphlet) written right after the 4th People's Congress in early 1975, where the goal of modernization by the year 2000 was set out in general terms in Chou En-lai's report. Chang begins his article by saying, "Our country is in an important period of its historical development"—note "important period," not "new period" whose "historical mission" is modernization. And Chang goes on to say that "full of militancy, all our people are determined to build China into a powerful socialist country before the end of the century." And then he stresses what is absolutely necessary and correct to stress: "In the course of this effort and in the entire historical period of socialism, whether we can persevere all the way in the dictatorship of the proletariat is a cardinal issue for China's

future development. Current class struggles, too, require that we should get clear on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat." (*On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie*, pp. 1-2)

And in criticizing the "Three Poisonous Weeds" the Four and their followers pointed out that in Chou En-lai's report to the 4th People's Congress it is stressed that " 'Only when we do well in revolution is it possible to do well in production.' " (Quoted in an article in *Study and Criticism*, April 14, 1976—1 will speak to the "Chou En-lai question" later) This line of the 4th People's Congress is exactly the opposite of that of the "General Program," where the relationship between revolution and production is reversed to say that, "In a place or unit where production is carried out with bad results, it would be deceptive to say that revolution is an excellent success." Instead of the correct principle that only when revolution is carried out well is it possible to do well in production—*socialist* production—the authors of the "General Program" reverse things to say, only when we do well in production can we say we are doing well in revolution.

Further, as the article referred to above also notes, the "General Program" in particular, while taking off from the call in Chou En-lai's report to the 4th People's Congress for modernization by the end of the century, does not base this on what Chou En-lai's report stresses first: " 'Socialist revolution is the powerful engine for developing the social productive forces.' 'While tackling economic tasks, our leading comrades at all levels must pay close attention to the socialist revolution in the realm of the superstructure and keep a firm grasp on class struggle and the struggle between two lines.' " (from the same article in *Study and Criticism*)

Further, another article criticizing the "General Program" points out why on the one hand modernization is an important task but why on the other hand it cannot be the main task. It says, quite correctly in my opinion:

"Therefore, the basic task for the whole Party and the people of the whole country not only at present but also throughout the entire historical period of socialism, including the next 25 years, is to fight for nothing but the realization of our Party's basic program [see the Constitution of the 10th Party Congress] and the execution of its basic line. Should we develop the national economy? Should we achieve all-around modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology in two stages before the end of the century? Of course we should! However, this is only a task we should

fulfill in order to realize the basic program of our Party. Although it is a magnificent task, it is not the basic task of the Party, still less the whole task of our Party. Originally the 'four modernizations' were set forth as a plan in connection with the task of developing the national economy. However, to pull off a monumental hoax, the 'General Program' sets forth the realization of 'four modernizations' as a major premise for all work both at present and in the next 25 years, a premise on which all of our work must be based. This fully shows that, in the eyes of that unrepentant capitalist reader in the Party, at present, the only task is to undertake production and construction, there being no need for class struggle, proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. This then completely negates our Party's basic program and thoroughly tampers with the basic task and the orientation of advance for the whole Party and the people of the whole country." (from Cheng Yueh's article in *Study and Criticism*, April 1, 1976)

In sum, then, the Four were in favor of striving for the four modernizations in accordance with Mao's line on revolution and production but they were against what the right deviationists tried to make the "four modernizations" stand for. They were very aware of the danger that making a big push for the four modernizations would give the green light to "production first" revisionists and they were very concerned that in the effort to fulfill the task of modernization, the basic task—class struggle—not be thrown overboard and that in the name of promoting production to achieve modernization the commanding role of revolution not be thrown out. Is there anything wrong with this? No, it is not only not wrong it is very necessary to take such a stand. In fact this is exactly how Mao approached the problem and no doubt a major reason why, at the time when the call for modernization by the end of the century was being made, Mao issued his most important directive—on studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combatting and preventing revisionism. The line promoted and implemented by the present rulers of China in the name of modernization shows precisely how justified the great concern of Mao and the Four was.

One final note on this specific point. To set up the four modernizations as an absolute, as the basic task for the whole next 25 years is automatically (!) to have a wrong and disastrous line in regard to the class struggle, both in China and internationally. Won't a big upsurge of class struggle, or a war involving China, disrupt the achievement of these four modernizations? And can it be said that neither will be a necessity in the next 25 years? The on-

ly answer, to be true to the four modernizations as the basic and actually only task, is to capitulate—to the bourgeoisie in China and to the imperialists internationally. This is no answer at all.

If it is argued that in fact the four modernizations are necessary exactly in order to get prepared for war, then it can only be said that talk of the "next 25 years" is extremely dangerous and/or a hype to get the Chinese people to produce without being armed with a real and deep understanding of the actual objectives of that production—which by definition will lead to revisionism and to bourgeois principles and practices in command of production. And in any case, if the line is that, by undertaking the four modernizations as the key link China can actually catch up to and surpass the major military powers—specifically the Soviet Union—so as to be able, so to speak, to "fight them on their own terms," this is not only erroneous but will bring disaster to China. Of course China should modernize, of course she should have the most up-to-date weapons possible and be in the strongest position to defeat aggression, but that can never be accomplished by throwing out the class struggle and disarming the masses politically, leaving them in a very weak position to fight the only kind of war they can win—a people's war where they pit their strength—a class conscious politically motivated people—against the enemy's weakness which flows from its aggressive and imperialist nature.

Here a statement by Mao as early as 1961, where he draws a link between modernization of the economy (and national defense) and military line, is most relevant. He says that:

"We will adopt advanced technology. But we cannot, because of this, negate the inevitability of backward technology in a certain period of time. Since the beginning of history, in revolutionary wars, it has always been people armed with inferior weapons who defeated those with superior weapons. During the civil wars, the anti-Japanese war, and the War of Liberation, we did not exercise power over the whole country and we did not have modernized arsenals. If we must have the newest weapons before we fight, then this is tantamount to disarming ourselves."

And after saying that it will take several decades to achieve overall mechanization in the economy, Mao goes on to insist that:

"In the coming period, due to a shortage of machinery, we will still be advocating semi-mechanization and reform of tools. At present we are still not advocating universal

automation. We should discuss mechanization, but we should not do it excessively. Excessive discussion of mechanization and automation will make people have contempt for semi-mechanization and production by native methods. There have been such tendencies in the past. Everybody one-sidedly went in for new technology and new machinery, massive scales and high standards. They looked down upon native methods and medium and small-sized enterprises." (From the U.S. Government collection of Mao's post-1949 speeches, writings and talks)

Here Mao is not advocating backwardness and denying the need for modernization. He is opposing one-sided stress on modernization and *reliance* on modernization either in the economy or in warfare. Can anyone honestly say that the present rulers of China, with their consistent one-sided emphasis on "modern, modern, modern" and "advanced, advanced, advanced" are doing anything other than repudiating Mao's line on these crucial questions? If anyone is confused on this, they should read over the stuff coming out of China, especially on the economy and on science and technology in particular, and use the statements by Mao cited just above as a standard for evaluating the line coming out of China now on these questions.

For all these reasons, while it is correct to strive for the four modernizations this cannot be the basic task or aim, and the general program of the current rulers of China is wrong and, worse, it is revisionist and will bring great harm to China and the international proletariat. The Four were entirely correct in opposing it and they opposed it correctly—with a correct line.

#### Basic Summations of the Opposing Lines on Other Important Points

In *Peking Review* No. 42, 1977 there is an article whose title asks the question, "Why Did the 'Gang of Four' Attack 'The Twenty Points'?" The answer is simple—the "20 Points" is revisionist. Supposedly a program for accelerating industrial development, it is actually a program for accelerating capitalist restoration. To characterize the "20 Points" it is only necessary to repeat the statement attributed in that *Peking Review* article to Chang Chun-chiao, who is quoted as saying that the "20 Points" has "put forward a revisionist line, complete with principles and policies; it peddles rubbish that has long ago been criticized, such as material incentives, profits in command, direct and exclusive control of enterprises by the ministry concerned, reliance on

specialists to run factories, the 'theory of the all-importance of the productive forces,' the 'theory of the dying out of the class struggle'; and its application of eclecticism is really unsurpassed." (See pp. 12-13.)

I have read over a version of the "20 Points" and am convinced not only that it is authentic but is authentically revisionist and that Chang's characterization is right on time. The "20 Points" has to be looked at not only in its particulars, but also in how they fit together into one revisionist line for developing the economy—the line that is being implemented now and has been since Hua & Co. pulled their coup. The basic line is this: to develop the economy and industry especially we must put overwhelming emphasis on and rely on the big, modern and advanced; to get modern and advanced equipment we must rely on the advanced, capitalist countries; we must sell off what we have, raw materials, for what we need from them, advanced technology; to utilize this advanced technology we must rely on specialists, and technicians must be in command; and there must be more not less centralized control (which is what the "20 Points" actually calls for despite double-talk on this point); to repay the advanced countries we must make a big profit in every enterprise, especially, though not exclusively, those using this equipment; and to make such profits we must have "scientific management" that puts managers in command at the enterprise level, under the whip of the central, higher authorities, and we must institute rules and regulations that get the workers to stick to one specific production post to produce this profit, making use of piece-work and luring the workers with bonuses, etc.; and most of all we must have an end to the situation where factories are not only production units but first of all battlegrounds of the class struggle. This is what runs throughout the "20 Points" and gives it its integral character as a line on industrial development—a revisionist line.

More specifically, flying in the face of Mao's directive and guidance on the question of studying the theory of proletarian dictatorship and combatting and preventing revisionism and on restricting bourgeois right and the three great differences, the "20 Points" makes an absolute out of the division of labor in production and society and seeks to expand rather than restrict bourgeois right. It seeks to lure workers with promises of wage increases for harder work, and openly talks about raising the wages of a section of the workers who have more skill and work harder. This policy is now openly proclaimed, for example in *PR* No. 49, 1977 where the policy of bonuses for harder work and wage increases especially for

more skilled and intellectual workers, specifically in science and technology, is trumpeted, (see page 3)

The "system of responsibility" called for in the "20 Points," as well as the "General Program," is one which clearly goes against the breakthroughs made by the workers through the Cultural Revolution, where they reformed rules and regulations and achieved a more rational division of labor which broke down conventions and the enslavement of workers to one production post, so that each worker had both a particular post and also many abilities—policies which pushed forward production, along socialist lines, and enabled the masses to further their mastery over production and place it under the command of proletarian politics.

Beyond this, as indicated, the "20 Points," promotes the policy of tying China's industrial development to the coattail of imperialist countries—in the name of trade for "mutual benefit" and "equality" it calls for long-term deals in which foreign imperialists will provide China with complete plants or complete sets of equipment to be repaid with the materials produced with this equipment. If that is implemented—which it is now—it will mean that the basic socialist economic principle of planned and proportional development can not be carried out, that China will be vulnerable to imperialist political pressure and that the Chinese people will be forced once again into the position of working for the imperialists and their Chinese compradors. This is not a line on trade—certainly not Mao's line—but a line for capitulation and restoration of the old system. And again, while this particular policy jumps out as one of the clearest deviations from the line of Mao—who consistently fought against this kind of reliance on importing technology, especially when it is directly tied to repayment with the products produced with it—it is necessary to see this policy as part of the whole line running through the "20 Points," as summarized above, a line which enslaves the workers to production, enslaves the whole economy to the foreign and advanced and is bound to cause tremendous dislocation and ultimately stagnation in all spheres of the economy, including agriculture as well as industry.

There are many other parts to the "20 Points" which indicate its revisionist nature, a few of which I will touch on below. But as a general characterization of the "20 Points" we have not only the statement attributed to Chang Chun-chiao but the statement by Mao on Teng Hsiao-ping which clearly had the "20 Points" as well as other "poisonous weeds" in mind: "This person does not grasp

class struggle; he has never referred to this key link. *Still his theme of 'white cat, black cat,' making no distinction between imperialism and Marxism.* " (see *PR* No. 23, 1976, p. 16, emphasis added) Again, Mao is no fool and no sectarian hot head, and with this shot, which he clearly allowed to be made public in the context of combatting the right deviationist wind, he was obviously blasting not just a statement—"white cat, black cat"—but a whole line, the line of the "20 Points" as well as the line of the right deviationists in general. Comrades should study over the "20 Points" and major statements of policy coming out in the *Peking Review* now, keeping in mind the above blast by Mao, as well as his other statements hitting back at Teng and the right deviationists, together with the summation attributed to Chang Chun-chiao on the "20 Points," to see if the "20 Points" as well as the whole line coming out now are not well summarized by these statements.

#### On Rules and Regulations

The line of the present rulers is to enforce rules and regulations that put production above all and reduce the workers from masters to slaves of production—and of those who control production, the capitalist-robbers. The Four fought to establish and transform rules and regulations so that the workers would be increasingly enabled to master production and develop it according to socialist principles and in accordance with the advance toward communism.

The current rulers even try to deny that rules and regulations have a class character and reflect production relations. In *PR* No. 14, 1977 they attack the article by Cheng Yueh (quoted before in this paper) for saying that " 'Rules and regulations reflect the relationships among people in production and are of a clear-cut class nature.' " To this the present rulers answer: "But the fact is that while some of the rules and regulations reflect the relationships among people engaged in production and have a class character, others reflect relations between the producers and nature and represent the laws of production technology and therefore have no class characteristics." (p. 25) This is the kind of sophistry that only a very naive person or a philistine would find convincing. Its method is well exposed by a statement in an article by Liang Hsiao (a pseudonym for a writing group under the Four's direction): "Is it possible to say that the struggle for production and scientific experiment carried out by people can break away from certain relations of production and social relations? Can it be said that the struggle for production and scientific experiment are so 'par-

ticular' as to be free from the restraint of class struggle? The repudiation of the universality of contradiction by means of exaggerating the particularity of contradiction is precisely an important characteristic of revisionism."

The point is that rules and regulations as a whole, as any kind of system, exactly reflect production relations and in class society have a clear-cut class character, and all rules and regulations—even those which "reflect the relationships between the producers and nature and represent the laws of production technology"—have to be applied within the general framework of class relations in class society and the relations among people in production in all systems (this will even be true in classless communist society). Actually the present rulers let the cat out of the bag when they say (in both the "General Program" and the "20 Points") that "the system of responsibility forms the core of rules and regulations in an enterprise." If this forms the "core"—and here it should be said in passing that this "core" as presented is meant to replace the conscious activity of the producers themselves (read the "General Program" and "20 Points" again if you don't think so)—if this is the *core* then how can anyone argue that rules and regulations don't reflect production relations and have a clear-cut class nature?

And what kind of "rules and regulations" do the present rulers promote and implement, what principles guide them in formulating these rules and regulations? As pointed out in the last bulletin they are "only" those "required for the daily development of the production struggle" and those "in accordance with the objective laws of the developing production struggle." Contrast this with the following statement from the Shanghai textbook on political economy referred to earlier:

"Any social production requires certain regulations and systems. But the type of regulations and systems instituted is determined by the production relations in a society. Participation of the masses in management primarily refers to the participation of the direct producers, the worker-peasant masses, in management. The masses who participate in enterprise management must not only direct production, technical know-how and accounting, but more importantly, they have to help and supervise the cadres in thoroughly implementing the Party line and general and specific policies

Under socialism, the textbook continues, rules and regulations must be "favorable to the masses" and this "is the most fun-

damental difference between socialist regulations and systems and capitalist regulations and systems." And they go on to explain that "systems favorable to the masses" "means that such systems have to be favorable to the masses' role as masters, to the improvement and development of interpersonal relations in the enterprise [i.e., relations between people in production], to the exercise of socialist activism by the masses, and to the development of the Three Revolutionary Movements of class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experiment. Regulations and systems which are favorable to the masses will certainly be favorable to the development of production as they mobilize the activism of the masses. Under the influence of the revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, the regulations and systems of some enterprises often restricted the masses. The worker's criticism was that 'there are too many systems and regulations and they are either for the purpose of punishment or coercion.' Under good leadership, the masses should be mobilized to revise, phase by phase, the systems and regulations which are irrational, and alienating workers. Meanwhile, on the basis of the experience acquired in practice, a new set of healthy and rational systems and regulations which correspond to the need for socialist interrelations and the development of the productive forces should be established."

This same line was repeatedly stressed by the Four during the struggle against the right deviationist wind, and I would like to ask—which of these two totally opposed lines is a Marxist-Leninist line—which is in accordance with Mao's line and with the objective of transforming society to advance toward communism? And whose irrational, restrictive and coercive rules and regulations were abolished in the Cultural Revolution to be replaced by rules and regulations more "favorable to the masses" and socialism—none other than Teng Hsiao-ping, in particular, who in the early '60s concocted a "70 Points" similar to the recent "20 Points." It is these rules and regulations that Teng and the other right deviationists want to restore—and certainly are restoring. And this is why they raise a hue and cry about "anarchy," make clumsy attempts to deny the class character of rules and regulations and even talk about how it is necessary to learn from the "positive aspects" of the Taylor system—quoting Lenin's statements from the first few, desperate years of the Soviet Republic to cover their revisionist line (see *PR* No. 14, 1977—more on their use of Lenin from those years and similarities with the Soviet revisionists on this later).

(Someone may want to point out that in his speech to the

Taching Conference in 1977 Yu Chiu-li actually did call for "rules and regulations that reflect the new socialist relations of production and objective laws of production"—see *PR* No. 22, 1977, p. 15. But this is nothing more than a ruse, a concession in passing to the consciousness of the masses—raised by Mao and the Four—and it is in no way central to or consistent with Yu's whole speech. In fact, with its one-sided emphasis on the "responsibility" of the "chairman of the revolutionary committee" in an enterprise, on opposing "the phenomenon of having no one accepting the responsibility" and "Special attention must be paid to selecting and appointing the two top leaders in each enterprise" and so on, Yu's speech is in no way in conformity with developing *socialist* production relations which rely on the masses as masters. Significantly, in relation to this point, according to people recently visiting China there is serious talk in China now about eliminating or greatly reducing the role of revolutionary committees, which were another "new thing" achieved through struggle in the Cultural Revolution and which were institutionalized officially at the 4th People's Congress, where their strengthening was called for. Eliminating or seriously reducing their role follows the line of the "20 Points," where in discussing enterprise management, the call is made for setting up production "command systems," with no mention made at that point of the role of the revolutionary committees. This sheds light on what Yu Chiu-li actually means in stressing the role of the two top leading people, etc., despite reference to the role of revolutionary committees. And overall, like the "General Program" and the "20 Points," Yu's Taching speech is revisionist from top to bottom in its outlook and political line.)

Finally, to get a clearer view of the revisionist "theory of the productive forces" line of the current rulers, comrades should study over *PR* No. 39, 1977, where in a major policy statement by the State Council a number of totally wrong and outrageous statements are made, including this one: "Transformation in the relations of production and the superstructure is conditioned by the development of the productive forces and must help promote it and not vice versa." (p. 11) Even without adding the last phrase "and not vice versa" this would be metaphysical and mechanical materialist—but that last phrase is added just so no one misses the meaning, so the point is clear that production is the main task. Compare the statement above by the current rulers with the following statement from the Shanghai textbook:

"Marxism holds that productive forces develop under the constraint and impetus of production relations. In class

society, production is always carried on under certain class relations. Even though changes and developments in social production always start from changes and advances in the productive forces, big advances in productive forces always occur after big transformations in production relations."

Is it not very clear that, in opposition to the revisionism of the current rulers, the position of the Four as expressed above is the dialectical materialist one, which conforms to the principle of "grasp revolution, promote production"?

#### On Science and Technology

The position of the current rulers is to divorce science from the masses and from their experience in production in particular, to deny in fact the leading role of Marxism, to give free rein and the leading role to "experts" and promote the "white and expert" road and put "technique in command" of production. (Here comrades should study especially *PR* Nos. 40 and 44, 1977.)

The Four's line was that the principal aspect of scientific and technical work should be geared to serve China's developing production needs and be under the command of Marxism and proletarian politics and the leadership of the Party implementing Mao's line, and that theoretical research and study of the "basic sciences" while important should be secondary. They fought for the line of "red and expert" and for carrying out the principle of "open-door scientific research," a new thing emerging out of the Cultural Revolution, which means combining study and work in the laboratory with investigation and work in relation to productive labor and scientific experiment by the masses and combining the role of professional scientific and technical workers with movements of the masses in scientific experiment. The Four said the masses, organized on a broad scale to carry out scientific experiment, were the main force in this struggle, in opposition to the present rulers who say clearly it is the professionals who are the main force in scientific experiment. (For an idea of the Four's line comrades can study *Pi?* No. 18, 1976 and No. 47, 1975, p. 30 as well as Nos 8 and 11, 1976.)

A few comments on this. I have been able to find only part of the third "poisonous weed"—the "Outline Report" on science—but the part I have read puts forward the revisionist line summarized above. But we do not have to have the "Outline Report" to see the revisionist line of the current rulers. The

statement by the Central Committee printed in *PR* No. 40, 1977 can serve very well for an exposure of this line. There we are told that "It is imperative to *install as Party committee secretaries those cadres who understand the Party's policies and have enthusiasm for science*, to select *experts or near-experts to lead professional work* and to find diligent and hard-working cadres to take charge of the supporting work." (p. 9, emphasis added) Note that Party secretaries are to be those who have an understanding of the Party's policies and have enthusiasm for science—here clearly the Party's "policies" referred to are the policies on science; there is nothing about an understanding of the Party's *basic line*. And this combined with what follows, about experts or near-experts leading professional work, makes clear that expertise, not politics, is to be put in command. In case, however, there is any doubt, comrades should continue reading this section of the CC statement in particular, where it is said that "Titles for technical personnel should be restored, the system to assess technical proficiency should be established and technical posts must entail specific responsibility." (p. 10)

This is then followed by the most revealing and most vicious statement of all: "*Just as* we ensure the time for the workers and peasants to engage in productive labor, *so* scientific research workers must be given no less than 5/6 of their work hours each week for professional work." (p. 10, emphasis added). One could hardly ask for a clearer statement that the division of labor—specifically between mental and manual workers—is to be made an absolute and everyone is to "keep in their place." This is exactly the Confucian doctrine of "restoring the rites" and completely in line with the Confucian—and generally the exploiting class—notion that those who work with their minds govern while those who work with their hands are governed. It is an out front declaration not only of expert over red but of experts in command over the masses; or as one comrade put it, with regard to the differences left over from capitalist society, the soil engendering capitalism and the bourgeoisie, it is a proclamation of "vive la difference!" (long live the difference!)

Mao was very emphatic in opposing exactly this line. As early as 1958 he insisted: "The non-professional leading the professional is a general rule. Last year the rightists brought up this question and created a lot of trouble. They claimed that the non-professional could not lead the professional. . . . Politicians handle the mutual relations among men; they promote the mass line. We must study this issue carefully, because many engineers and scien-

tists do not respect us, and many among us do not respect ourselves, arbitrarily insisting on the difficulty of non-professionals leading professionals. We must have the ways and means to refute them. I say that non-professionals leading the professionals is a general rule." (from the U.S. Government collection of Mao's post-1949 writings, speeches and talks) And we can see that once again, "Last year the rightists brought up this question and created a lot of trouble." Unfortunately, however, this time the rightists won out, reversing Mao's correct line.

What is the importance of this question of non-professionals leading professionals, what is the heart of it? It is the question of politics in command and the leading role of the Party's Marxist-Leninist line. As was pointed out by the Four, "Dialectical materialism holds that it is a universal law for non-professionals to lead professionals. Anyone who maintains that only those with scientific and technical knowledge can lead a certain branch of work is not only negating the leadership of politics over vocational work but is actually denying any possibility of giving unified leadership over various departments of vocational work. Of course, this does not mean that comrades engaged in Party work on the scientific and technical front should not learn scientific and technical knowledge at all. Our Party has always maintained that cadres should learn the vocational work they lead and strive to be both red and expert . . ." (*PR* No. 18, 1976, p. 9) In other words, without politics in command and the leadership of the Party's line, departmentalism and many different lines will be the inevitable result and there is no way revisionism can be prevented from taking hold. This is inevitably where the line of non-professionals cannot lead professionals and "experts or near-experts" must lead professional work will lead and is certainly leading in China today—all in the name of developing science and technology to "advanced world levels," of course.

Another note on this—the Central Committee statement claims that "The modernization of science and technology is the key to the realization of the four modernizations." (*PR* No. 40, 1977, p. 7) This view treats science as science and production as production and negates class struggle as the key link, whether in developing production or science. Further, this line is another way of putting forward the principal contradiction as between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces. If we look at another major statement on science and technology by the current rulers, this will become even clearer. In *Peking Review* No. 30, 1977 there is an article whose title is a tip off that it takes this

line—"We Must Catch Up With and Surpass World's Advanced Levels Within This Century." This article goes on to describe, with undisguised envy, the development of science and technology in the advanced capitalist countries and then says that on the other hand these advances are held back there because of the system of private ownership. China, by contrast, the article says, is in exactly the opposite position: it has the system of socialized ownership, the "superior" socialist system, but it lags far behind in scientific achievement and technology. In other words, the contradiction in China is, once again, between the advanced socialist system and the backwardness of technology, the backward productive forces.

The article goes on to say that this can be overcome because "Scientific and technical work in China is carried on under the leadership of the Party according to a unified plan. This makes it possible for us to organize the forces from all quarters to make energetic and concerted efforts, extensively unfold mass movements and bring into full play both the collective strength and individual talents and abilities." (*PR* No. 30, p. 11) What is missing here, characteristically, is the question of class struggle within the collective form, after the question of socialization of ownership has been settled (in the main).

In light of the above it is very interesting to look at a comment by Mao on the Soviet Political Economy Textbook (referred to before). Mao first quotes the Soviet textbook as follows: " 'In a socialist national economy, the latest achievements in science, technical inventions and advanced experiences all can be popularized in all enterprises without the least hindrance.' " This is indeed very similar to what was quoted just above from the *Peking Review* article (No. 30).

But note how Mao criticizes the Soviet statement: "This is not necessarily so. In a socialist society, there are still 'academic lords' who are in control of scientific and research institutions and suppress newborn forces. For this reason, the latest achievements in science cannot find popularization without the least hindrance. To say otherwise is not to recognize the contradictions in a socialist society." (from the U.S. Government collection of Mao's post-1949 speeches, writings and talks) Is not this statement by Mao in direct opposition to the article in *PR* No. 30 and is not the line of that article, representing those "academic lords," exactly the line of the Soviet revisionists Mao is taking to task? Of course, this *PR* article tries to put on a cover of talking about "class struggle" and "modernization. . . under the command of revolutionarization." (p. 11) But, again, comrades should carefully study this to get beyond

the appearance to the essence and ask themselves whether this talk is more than just that and whether in fact this article really bases itself on the class struggle as the key link, in science as well as other spheres. In fact, a Marxist analysis of this article, and the whole line of the current rulers on science and technology, as well as other questions, will make clear that class struggle is not at all presented as the key link and the principal contradiction is not at all presented as between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but in terms of the revisionist notion of the "superior" socialist system vs. the backward productive forces.

Returning to the CC statement (*PR* No. 40, 1977) we find the two-into-one formulation that "Technological revolution is an important aspect of the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." (p. 6) It is true that one of the main tasks of the proletariat in power is to develop production, including technological revolution as a key part of this. But this is not the same thing as continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, which refers to waging the class struggle. Look, for example, at the statement of the "General Programme" of the Party, as found in the Constitution of the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, where the existence of classes and class struggle and the danger of capitalist restoration throughout the socialist period are summarized, along with the threat of aggression by imperialism and social-imperialism; and then it is said that "These contradictions can be resolved only by depending on the theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and on practice under its guidance." (p. 62 in documents from the 10th Congress)

In line with this Mao says in "On Contradiction" that qualitatively different contradictions are resolved by qualitatively different means, and that, for example, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is resolved by the method of socialist revolution while the contradiction between society and nature is resolved by the method of developing the productive forces. Of course, these contradictions and the methods for resolving them are inter-related and this is especially important to grasp with regard to socialist society. But nonetheless they are separate contradictions resolved by different means, and between them the contradiction between the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is decisive for the question of developing the productive forces, including technological revolution as a crucial part of this, along socialist lines. To merge together the two contradictions and the methods for resolving them is another way of denying and attempt-

ing to obliterate the principal contradiction, the key link of class struggle and the commanding role of revolution over technological development.

But even leaving all this aside, the CC statement that the modernization of science and technology is the key to the "four modernizations" is still wrong. It is what the current rulers mean when they say science and technology must "precede production." They mean that "Only by learning what is advanced can we catch up with and surpass the advanced." (p. 9) In other words, they mean that it is necessary to rely on experts, studying foreign experience in isolation from the actual struggle for production in China and the actual masses who carry out that struggle, in order to develop "new techniques" that will bring about "great increase in labor productivity." (p. 7—if anyone thinks that is not what they mean, study over this CC statement again and see if the few stock phrases about combining with the masses or the emphasis on experts in command is the actual essence of this statement)

Is it wrong to study foreign experience and to be acquainted with and attempt to make use of the most advanced techniques? Of course not. But it is completely wrong to rely on this, because, in the main, scientific and technical breakthroughs have to come on the basis of advancing from the actual production base and production conditions in your own country—unless you want to sell out for foreign technology as the "20 Points" advocates, and even then you can only bring about lop-sided "development." And furthermore, as an article criticizing the "20 Points" stated very correctly, "foreign technology must be divided into two. Technical designs of capitalist countries serve the pursuit of the highest profits by the monopoly bourgeoisie and bear a clearcut class coat of arms. How can we use them without distinguishing the 'white cat and black cat'?" (from an article in *Study and Criticism*, April 14, 1976) The current rulers may talk about independence and self-reliance and "China's own road of developing science and technology," but their "own road" is the capitalist road and their real line is "crawling behind at a snail's pace," relying on experts and the bourgeoisie of other countries.

Their line is well criticized by the following statement from the Shanghai textbook:

"Advances in science and technology and innovations in production tools play a big role in developing production and raising labor productivity. But science and technology are discovered by people, and production tools are created by people [the revisionist line] deals with

production as production and opposes revolution under the pretext of developing production. It even attributes the development of production wholly to the development of science and technology and the improvement of production tools, to a reliance on bourgeois experts."

It would be possible to go on for several more pages just criticizing the line of the current rulers on science and technology and the Central Committee statement in PR No. 40, but that is not necessary here—this statement is a rich vein of revisionism and this should be obvious if comrades study it seriously and subject it to Marxist-Leninist analysis.

It is possible that on this question of science and technology, while overwhelmingly fighting for a correct line in the face of a genuine hurricane to reverse correct verdicts, the Four may have erred a little in the direction of not giving quite enough emphasis to "science in its own right," to basic research and the study of advanced experience. It cannot be said, however, that they did not give any weight to this—they certainly did—though perhaps not quite enough. Still, even on that aspect, their line was overall correct and certainly when weighed against the right deviationist wind they had to combat, their errors are relatively minor. There can be no comparison between their overall correct line and the revisionist line of the current rulers and there definitely cannot be any justification for the revisionism of the current rulers on the so-called basis that the Four made errors. The fact is that the Four were waging struggle to uphold new things, sprouts representing the advance to the future communist society, which had been developed through struggle and were under attack, while the current rulers were and are attacking and attempting to root out these new things in order to drag things back to the old society.

#### On Education

This question is obviously closely related to the question of science and technology. The line of the current rulers is that the Cultural Revolution and the transformations it brought in education have brought disaster and that the old educational system, which led in the direction of creating an intellectual aristocracy, must be revived—all, again, in the name of "modernization," especially modernization of science and technology. So now in a "major reform" of education (*PR* No. 46, 1977, p. 16) we see already that the practice of having educated youth go mainly to the countryside—and some into factories and the PLA—and hav-

ing them selected for college mainly on the basis of recommendations from their fellow workers, peasants, soldiers—this system is now being "revised," so that instead of this at least a certain number of people on the basis of their high examination scores will be selected to go straight to college. Along with this we hear increasing emphasis on "promising youth" and "talented young people" (see *PR* No. 46, 1977, pp. 16-17) who are obviously to be relied on to change the situation where "education has failed to keep pace with the needs of the country"—that is, it has "failed" to be based on modernization above all. This is nothing but reversing the gains made during the Cultural Revolution and deliberately widening the gap between mental and manual labor, and picking such a "select" group in this way is bound to give rise to an intellectual aristocracy. Along with this, of course, changes are being made in the educational system to restore more emphasis on study divorced from productive labor and the masses, and regulations and examinations are being reinstated of the kind that students in the bourgeois countries are all too familiar with.

In *Peking Review* No. 46, 1977 we are left with the impression that Mao had a few minor criticisms of the educational system before the Cultural Revolution—for example he was "against the kind of examinations which posed tricky questions or were sprung on students by surprise as if to deal with enemies." (p. 17) True, Mao did make such criticisms, but more than that he called attention to the fact that before the Cultural Revolution education was under the influence of a revisionist line and was turning out bourgeois intellectual aristocrats. He issued the call that "The length of schooling should be shortened, education should be revolutionized, and the domination of our schools and colleges by bourgeois intellectuals should not be tolerated any longer." It is exactly such domination by bourgeois intellectuals that is now being re-established and the bourgeoisie is once again seizing control of education, which is an extremely important part of the superstructure and has a tremendously important reaction on the economic base and society as a whole.

The struggle around this actually reached a high point in the fall of 1975, November in particular. Some officials at Tsinghua University wrote to Mao calling for the kind of changes that are now being instituted. Mao sent their written requests to the students and staff at the University and initiated in this way a big debate around the line on education. It was very clear that Mao was (correctly I believe) opposed to these proposed changes and wanted mass criticism of them. It was in small part in response to

these proposals that Mao declared, "Reversing correct verdicts goes against the will of the people." And Mao recognized that these proposed retrogressions in education were part of the whole right deviationist wind being whipped up—"The question involved in Tsinghua," Mao said then, "is not an isolated question but a reflection of the current two-line struggle." (See *PR* No. 17, 1976, p. 12—1 certainly hope that no one will try to claim that this statement by Mao meant anything other than that he opposed the line of the officials at Tsinghua, the line now being implemented; if anyone does want to say that, I can assure them that they would be most welcome as a guest lecturer at Tsinghua University now, specializing in twisting logic. In any case it should be pointed out that this statement by Mao has not been taken up by the current rulers, they have just stopped mentioning it, again like petty thieves staying away from the place where they have stolen.)

It should be emphasized once again that education is an extremely important part of the superstructure and plays a very crucial role in maintaining and re-enforcing one kind of class relations or another in society. Comrades should think about their own experience and how the educational system plays such a role in this country in the hands of the bourgeoisie. It is not by accident that the all-out battle against the right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts began with a great debate on the educational front. In launching this debate Mao was consciously initiating a big struggle against the whole right deviationist wind, and his comment that the struggle at Tsinghua around educational policy was a reflection of the current two-line struggle shows he was well aware of and was calling attention to the fact that how opposing forces lined up on this question was indicative of how they lined up on every major question in society—on all the different fronts where the two-line struggle was raging. And, again, it is clear that the current rulers lined up on the bourgeoisie's side, while the Four stood with Mao in the proletarian camp.

The Four, and Chang Chun-chiao in particular, threw themselves into the thick of this "farrago on the educational front" as it was called then, fighting for Mao's line. Chang made a speech at Tsinghua where, according to the present leaders, he said, "'Bring up exploiters and intellectual aristocrats with bourgeois consciousness and culture, or bring up workers with consciousness but no culture: which do you want? I'd rather have workers without culture than exploiters and intellectual aristocrats with culture.'" (see *Pi?* No. 8, 1977, p. 11) According to the present rulers this showed that Chang didn't want the workers

to learn anything, that his statements represented "an attempt to stop laboring people from acquiring cultural and scientific-knowledge their predecessors had created, a futile scheme to keep the workers and poor and lower-middle peasants for ever in a state of ignorance and without culture." (p. 13)

Perhaps Mike Klonsky believes this but I certainly do not. The Four consistently fought for Mao's line that education should enable people to "become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture." Innumerable articles written under the Four's direction not only state but give great emphasis to both aspects of this. That was not the issue. The issue was that the rightists were declaring that working class leadership in the universities and the great increase in workers and peasants who came to the universities as students as a result of the Cultural Revolution were ruining everything because the masses' cultural level was "too low." The charge that the Four wanted to keep the masses dumb, that they wanted to do away with all examinations, etc. is once again the method of attributing a stupid argument to your opponent and then refuting it in order to cover up your own opportunism. What the Four opposed were examinations in command and examinations that required cramming and rewarded rote memorization instead of encouraging the linking of theory with practice and the application of Marxist theory to the subject matter.

To get an idea of what the Four's line actually was, and what kind of educational policy they promoted, comrades should study over an article in *PR* No. 25, 1974, "No Mark Can Do Justice to This Examination Paper" (p. 14 and following), which presents the relationship between policies and vocational work according to the correct dialectical view—emphasizing both aspects but showing how politics is the principal aspect and must be in examinations; it does not call for the elimination of exams but their reform to serve proletarian politics and the training of working class intellectuals with culture but first of all with socialist consciousness. It is these transformations that the current rulers are reversing and their slander of the Four's (and Mao's) correct line is an important part of creating public opinion for this reversal.

Further, the current rulers, at the time of the debate on the educational front (as well as before and since) were opposing the general orientation set down by Mao during the Cultural Revolution and fought for by the Four. "It is essential to have working class leadership" in the colleges and universities, Mao said, adding that "The workers' propaganda teams should stay permanently in

the schools and colleges, take part in all the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation there and will always lead these institutions." And Mao and the Four stressed, of course, that working class leadership meant leadership by the Party relying on the workers—and the poor and lower-middle peasants in schools in the countryside, (*see PR* No. 11, 1976, pp. 6-10)

Once again, this issue was very closely related to the struggle in the scientific and technical circles, especially the question of non-professionals leading professionals. It is to this question—and to the slanders of the rightists that the workers' cultural level was too low and was ruining the universities—that Chang Chun-chiao was addressing himself.

Anyone who has ever been involved in a struggle of that kind knows very well why and in what spirit Chang Chun-chiao made the statement in question (assuming he did). And again, the statement sounds very much like the following: "Some people have high cultural and technical levels, but they are neither industrious nor positive. Other people have relatively low cultural and technical levels, but they are very industrious and very positive. The reason is that the former kind of people have a lower level of consciousness, while the latter kind of people have a higher level of consciousness." (Mao, "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union's 'Political Economics,' " cited earlier) Can it be said that here Mao is praising the virtues of ignorance and trying to discourage the workers and peasants from learning culture? I don't think so. Nor can the same be said of Chang Chun-chiao. What Chang was doing was debunking the arrogant bourgeois notion of "culture," which counts the workers' vast knowledge, including their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought, as nothing and worships the sterile "culture" of the exploiting classes. No more than Mao did Chang mean that workers should not acquire book knowledge, but the key question is still consciousness—line. This, as I said, was stressed over and over and handled dialectically in many, many articles by the Four and their followers.

In short, what Chang Chun-chiao and the Four were doing was fighting to uphold the gains of the Cultural Revolution and the correct line in opposition to the onslaughts of the revisionists. It is clear where Mao stood on this: and it is also very clear where the current leaders stood and stand as well—in opposition not just to the Four but to Mao and Mao's correct line, which the Four fought for. Should Chang Chun-chiao and the others be criticized or condemned for the way they threw themselves into this battle and the

line they took in it—no, they should be cherished and praised by the proletariat and all who stand with and for it. It is possible that they made some errors in dealing with the very acute struggle on the educational front—which, as stressed several times, was a crucial front of the two-line class struggle—perhaps they came down too hard on particular intellectuals who took an essentially bourgeois stand and played a bad role but were not diehard rightists. But that does not change the fact that overall and overwhelmingly the Four's line on this whole question was correct and their role in this struggle was to uphold and fight for the interests of the working class against the attacks of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectual aristocrats.

#### On Culture, Literature and Art

The current rulers' line is to "let a hundred poisonous weeds bloom," even to promote "art for art's sake" and other trash repudiated long ago in the Chinese Revolution—anything so long as it unleashes the social base of bourgeois intellectuals and contributes to their bourgeois line. The line of the Four was to create proletarian models of literature and art and to popularize these, transforming art to serve the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

To get an indication of the kind of line pushed by the current rulers on this question it is only necessary in my opinion to read "A Big-Character Poster That Denounced the 'Gang of Four' " (*PR* No. 4, 1977, pp. 22-26). The current rulers make a big deal of this poster, calling it a "fine bombardment." I think it is nothing more nor less than the arrogant bellowing of an outraged bourgeois intellectual, bridleing at proletarian leadership and declaring, for example, "A work can be good or bad, refined or crude artistically and so on and so forth. But what is right and wrong in art? Who can make this clear? What a splendid view of aesthetics, which has never been heard of before." (p. 26)

Here we have nothing but "art for art's sake," under the pretense that form cannot have "errors." This, again, is to metaphysically separate form from content, declaring that there is no such thing as "right and wrong in art." If an artistic work incorrectly portrays the masses or the class enemy, not only in the words spoken but in their actions, in the prominence it gives to each on the stage, etc.—is this not a question of "right and wrong," does not this inter-penetrate with the question of content? Of course it does. To argue otherwise, as this "fine bombardment"

does, is simply to promote the line that "anything goes" in art and that the question of form is only such things as whether it is "refined or crude"—a classless concept, which actually is not classless at all but serves the bourgeoisie.

It is extremely difficult to develop models of proletarian art, and this sphere has long been the domain of the bourgeoisie and exploiting classes. It was not without reason that Mao blasted the Ministry of Culture before the Cultural Revolution as the Ministry of "foreign mummies" and of Emperors, Kings, Generals, Talents, Beauties, etc. It is not by accident that the Cultural Revolution was called that—though not limited to the question of culture, one of the sharpest battlefields was certainly in this sphere. And no matter what ridiculous lines the present rulers cook up there is no doubt that the Four, and Chiang Ching in particular, played a big, and overall very positive, role in transforming art. Nor is it any accident that the revolutionization of art was launched in 1964 in Shanghai, which at that time was under the leadership of Ko Ching-shih, a consistent supporter of Mao's line and the "mentor," so to speak, of Chang Chun-chiao in particular, who served as a deputy secretary of the Party committee under Ko (more on that later).

It is true I believe that in this field in particular the Four—and I presume Chiang Ching especially—did make errors. There was a certain tendency under their leadership to insist so strongly on correctness that to some degree initiative was stifled, along with a tendency not to make full use of everyone, including some people who had made errors, even serious errors, but were not counter-revolutionaries. Some people in this category were apparently sent off to the countryside and kept there after they probably should have been allowed to resume some work in literature and art. This, I believe is true to some extent, at least in regard to professional art workers.

On the other hand the Four, including Chiang Ching especially, pushed very hard for the correct policy of integrating art workers with the workers and peasants and developing their roles in art works on that basis. It should be remembered that bourgeois individualism and resistance to proletarian politics in command and integration with the workers and peasants is very pronounced among professional artists, performers, etc. I remember that after visiting China and giving talks after returning here it was almost always the case that artists in this country put up great resistance to the idea of subordinating "individual creativity" to proletarian politics and the needs of the masses and the three great revolu-

tionary movements (class struggle, struggle for production and scientific experiment). Even after the Cultural Revolution the spontaneous tendencies of the professional artists in China were not that much different. And, given encouragement to their bourgeois aspect—which was definitely forthcoming from rightists in powerful positions in the Party—it is even more difficult to lead such professional artists in taking the socialist road.

Further, as Mao pointed out in his talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, the reactionaries pit quantity against quality in attacking proletarian art. That is, those who oppose the revolutionization of culture seize on the fact that it is very difficult to produce works that are both correct politically and popular and on the fact that in China in particular the relatively low level of development of the productive forces makes it difficult to turn out large quantities of works—such as film and large productions—and make them accessible to the masses of people. In China's conditions the reactionaries point to the works produced in the bourgeois countries—and the large quantity of them—and use this to attack the revolutionary art works produced in China. This is precisely what the rightists have done for years in China in opposing the revolutionization of culture, and they stepped up such attacks in recent years as part of their wind to reverse correct verdicts and the Chinese revolution as a whole.

All this makes the two-line struggle on the cultural front extremely intense. And despite errors which I believe the Four—and Chiang Ching most specifically—may have made, there is no doubt that she and the Four stood with Mao in representing the proletariat in this sharp struggle, while the current rulers stood and stand for the bourgeoisie. Any errors the Four made do not nearly outweigh the fact that under their leadership—Chiang Ching's in particular—literature and art were revolutionized, and in a way not true in any socialist country before, a proletarian line guided literature and art workers and brought concrete results in creating proletarian models and popularizing the line of combining revolutionary realism with revolutionary romanticism, Mao's line. Of course it was Mao who set the basic orientation for literature and art, but the Four—and Chiang Ching specifically—carried this out, produced some fine new works and correctly transformed some old ones, such as the "White Haired Girl" (where she eliminated the suicide of the heroine's father and replaced it with heroic struggle on his part, among other changes)—transformations which, I understand, are now being reversed. And all of this was accomplished, as stressed several times, only through protracted and

acute class struggle in a sphere where the bourgeoisie has long held sway and is still very strong.

Can criticism be raised of the fact that not enough works were being produced and not enough "flowers" were blooming? Yes, in my opinion, it can; but here we have to ask who is raising this criticism and with what objective. Are they uniting with the revolutionary advances made and on that basis calling for adjustment or are they using the notion of adjustment to attack the revolutionary advances? Mao is supposed to have criticized lack of quantity and variety of cultural works and called for adjustment, but assuming he did so his aim, I am sure, was not negating the revolution in literature and art and saying "the present is not as good as the past" like the right deviationists, but building on, strengthening the advances made. (This method of raising "adjustment" to carry out *reversal* is one employed by the current rulers on many other fronts as well.)

On the other hand, the current rulers have not only criticized lack of "variety" and numbers of cultural works under Chiang Ching's leadership, but have attacked and suppressed good works—such as "Breaking with Old Ideas." It is clear that their criticism is exactly to negate the revolution in literature and art—to attack a weak spot in order to kill the whole revolution in culture. And why not, since they represent the forces who want to carry out a revisionist line and in many cases have carried it out for some time. When Teng Hsiao-ping complained that not enough "flowers were blooming" in culture—what do you think was his purpose, what was he trying to promote?

The restoration of Chou Yang—and along with him Hsia Yen—long-time peddlers of the revisionist line in culture, is further evidence of the current rulers' line on this question. Chou and Hsia were overthrown during the Cultural Revolution, after having promoted a bourgeois line in culture for over 30 years: Chou at least was resurrected in 1975 when the right deviationists were whipping up their wind, and he was knocked down again in the course of the struggle against that wind, only to be resurrected once again along with Hsia Yen in recent months. These resurrections are another signal that the old bourgeois lines, such as "art for art's sake" and other such crap are being revived and that the bourgeois intellectuals in this as well as other fields are being unleashed.

With all the emphasis on tailing after the foreign and advanced—i.e. capitalist countries—it is not surprising that this takes shape in the cultural field as well. So now it is reported in the capitalist press that such things as Shakespeare, Greek

mythology, the piano compositions of Beethoven, Chopin and Bach, the drawings of Rembrandt, etc. are being allowed into China and disseminated among the intellectuals, who are, of course, the ones who have special interest in these things. Is it wrong to study and even learn from certain aspects of these works? No, but as the Four repeatedly stressed in the last several years in sharp struggle over this very question, such works must be subjected to Marxist analysis and *critically* assimilated—they cannot be accepted wholesale or used as they are, for they have a clear-cut class character and as such represent exploiting class ideology. But now, with the whole line of relying on intellectuals and urging them to catch up with the "advanced" to modernize China, it is inevitable that these intellectuals will also strive to "catch up" in appreciating and uncritically swallowing down bourgeois works of art like their counterparts in "advanced" countries. In short, if the policy is to develop bourgeois intellectual aristocrats with capitalist culture—which most definitely is the current rulers' policy—then bourgeois works of art, foreign as well as Chinese, must be made available to them and actually upheld as the "model." This is clearly the direction of things on the literature and art front under the current rulers.

Finally, it should be emphasized that with whatever problems and errors there might have been in dealing especially with professional art workers, there is no doubt that under Chiang Ching's leadership there was a tremendous proliferation of revolutionary cultural works produced by and spread among the broad masses in the cities and countryside. And this creates a powerful social base for genuine proletarian art. Now, however, in the name of not disrupting production (what else?) workers' and peasants' cultural groups are to be disbanded, along with theoretical and propaganda contingents, etc. or allowed only so long as those who take part in them are not "divorced from production," a policy set forth in the "20 Points" and reiterated by Yu Chiu-li at the Taching Conference. Meanwhile the "20 Points," that "fragrant flower," says that technicians should be counted as productive laborers—so naturally there is no need for them to take part in productive labor, they are already doing so by being technicians! The activities of the masses which develop political and cultural life—the class struggle—are to be suppressed in the name of not divorcing the masses from production (!), while technicians are to be divorced from production in the name of developing production. Isn't it very clear?—the line is to create the situation where technicians and managers are in command and the workers are to be "treated

as pure labor power in the production process by the 'head.' The laboring masses will no longer have the right to question whether this production process serves the interests of the proletariat and the laboring people. This way, socialist enterprises will gradually slide into the mudhold of capitalism." (Shanghai political economy textbook)

Many of the reversals that have taken place in China already, including many of those focused on in this paper, are in this realm of the superstructure. These are, as noted, closely linked to changes in the economic base and have a tremendous reaction (and "reaction" is doubly correct here) on the economic base. In fact, it is impossible to carry out such reversals in the superstructure without this being part of a reversal in the economic base, in the relations of production and the nature of how the economy is run and according to what principles. Mao attached great importance to the role of the superstructure, recognizing that at times the struggle in this realm was decisive in determining the direction of the whole society. The current rulers have learned well from Mao—just as the revisionists in the Soviet Union learned well from Lenin, as we point out in *RP7*—in order to betray his revolutionary line and reverse the revolution.

The current revisionist rulers of China are in fact acting in exactly the way Yao Wen-yuan predicted in his pamphlet, written in early 1975:

**"Once in power, the new bourgeoisie will start with sanguinary suppression of the people and restoration of capitalism in the superstructure, including all spheres of ideology and culture; then they will conduct distribution to each according to how much or little capital and power he has, so that the principle of 'to each according to his work' will become an empty shell, and the handful of new bourgeois elements monopolizing the means of production will at the same time monopolize the power of distributing consumer goods and other products. Such is the process of restoration that has already occurred in the Soviet Union." (On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique pp. 8-9)**

And such is the process that is now being carried out in China. That Yao was able to predict this is not at all because he is a "genius," but because he was deeply involved in the class struggle in China, and the line and intentions of the capitalist-roaders were already very clear—the struggle between restoration and counter-restoration was then raging over essentially the same attempts of

the same revisionist forces in power now to reverse correct verdicts and the Chinese revolution as a whole.

And along with such reversals goes and must go the tampering with Marxist theory and Mao's revolutionary line, which is a most important part of the superstructure. As noted several times, the ideological line of the current rulers is characterized especially by eclecticism, which was repeatedly exposed and criticized by the Four. And it is most significant that in attempting to answer this criticism the current rulers only expose their line, and its eclectics in particular, even more.

Take for example, the article in *PR* No. 48, 1977, "Criticizing Eclecticism or Attacking the Theory of Two Points?" This article is itself an example of rampant eclecticism. It starts off at great length to prove that it is all right to say "on the one hand and on the other hand," as if this is the heart of the matter. And then it gets around to the real heart of the matter—the Four's criticism of the "Outline Report" on science and technology, the one of the "Three Poisonous Weeds" which Hua Kuo-feng was most *directly* responsible for. It lists five contradictions, which it presents as on the one hand this and on the other hand *"equally"* that.

As we know, dialectics teaches us that in any contradiction there is a principal contradiction. But what does this article do after listing these five contradictions, how does it address the question of principal contradiction and principal aspect? Instead of providing an answer as to which is principal, it suddenly starts talking about how "to grasp the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction is by no means easy: very often it can be achieved only through repeated practice and a long process of cognition. This is because the conditions involved are complex, the scientific knowledge so far acquired is limited and the investigations and study done are not adequate enough." Therefore, the article warns that "we should not jump to hasty conclusions but should make further studies so as to determine which is the principal and non-principal." (see p. 13)

The purpose of the current rulers here is immediately to obscure the specific question—which has to do with the relationship between politics and vocational work—and to raise vocational work above politics without openly saying so. At the same time the more general purpose is to create confusion around questions like principal contradiction, which is very useful to the current rulers since, as shown before, they are actually adhering to a revisionist line on the principal contradiction while covering this with empty words about the real principal contradiction between the

proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Such distortion of Marxist theory goes hand in hand and is an important component part of creating public opinion for and carrying out a revisionist line and capitalist restoration.

The whole revisionist outlook of the current rulers, which comes through in all their documents and propaganda, takes form as a bourgeois-bureaucratic approach to every question, including the crucial question of developing the economy. Instead of the Marxist-Leninist line, developed and enriched by Mao and fought for by the Four, which relies on and scientifically sums up the experience of the masses and unleashes their conscious activism, the current rulers' whole approach, as stressed before, is top down—at most the masses' role is to carry out the plans set at the top by methods and people divorced from the opinions, demands and experience of the masses and from Marxism-Leninism. This line and method and where they will inevitably lead was summed up in *Red Papers* 7 in analyzing the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union:

**"It is impossible for some classless group of 'bureaucrats' to rule society in the name of the proletariat, because in order to maintain such rule these 'bureaucrats' must organize the production and distribution of goods and services. If bureaucratic methods of doing this prevail and come to politically characterize the planning process under socialism: and if a group of bureaucrats, divorced from and not relying upon the masses, makes the decisions on how to carry out this process; then inevitably this will be done along capitalist lines.**

**"In the final analysis, the revisionists can only fall back on the law of value as the 'lever' which organizes production. They must reduce the workers to propertyless proletarians, competing in the sale of their single commodity—their labor power—to live. They must appeal to the narrow self-interest of the worker in this competition, backing this up with the power of the state, as a force standing above and oppressing the workers, a weapon in the hands of the owners of the means of production. They must do this because they must find some way to organize production which they cannot do consciously in a planned way by themselves. They have no choice but to become a new bourgeoisie." (pp. 55-56, emphasis in original)**

All this is what is happening in China today with the revisionists, the new bourgeoisie, in power.

Just compare the Chinese press under the Four with what it's like today. Before it was full of the life of the masses, their con-

scious struggle and daring to transform society and nature, their determination to reach for the heights, shatter convention and conquer the "unconquerable." Now it is heavy with the stuffy air of bourgeois bureaucrats and intellectual aristocrats.

#### On the International Situation, War and Military Policy

This is the subject about which I know the least concerning the two-line struggle, mainly because it is, by definition, the area where the least will be put out for public view. But there are indications of real differences between the Four and the current rulers on this. For example, in *Peking Review* No. 45, 1977, in a major statement on the international situation, it is said that the Four "cursed" the "three worlds" analysis, that they "opposed China's support to the third world, opposed China's effort to unite with all forces that can be united, and opposed our dealing blows at the most dangerous enemy," the Soviet social-imperialists, (see p. 18)

I think it would be a mistake to simply dismiss this as a routine denunciation of the Four and the usual attempt to say that they were against everything you are supposed to be for. This article not only makes the above accusations but goes on to emphasize that "The 'gang of four' in no way represent the Chinese people. They are traitors disowned by the Chinese people." (p. 18) I take this to be a statement to the numerous political parties and whatever diplomatic personages the Four had contact with that these people should not take whatever the Four told them on international affairs as the line of the Chinese. This suggests that there were, in fact, some real differences over this.

It is not clear to me at this time exactly what all these differences may have been, but some things do provide an indication of some of these differences. One is the fact that since the Four have been knocked down the "three worlds" analysis has been really pushed out as "the correct strategic and tactical formulation for the world proletariat in the present era and its class line in its international struggle." (from Hua Kuo-feng's report to the 11th Congress, *PR* No. 35, 1977, p. 41, see also the major article in *PR* No. 45, 1977) Part of the reason that this has been pushed in this way over the past year especially are, of course, the recent attacks on the "three worlds" analysis by the Albanians. But it may well also be the case that the Four, while agreeing with the general analysis of the division of the world into "three worlds," did not go so far as the present rulers in calling it *the* "strategic concept" for the international proletarian struggle.

What is more clear is that the Four, while agreeing with the policy of "opening to the West" to make use of contradictions in the face of the threat of Soviet aggression against China, also fought against any "major policy" of importing and relying on Western technology as the basis for developing the economy and national defense and definitely fought against importing uncritically the culture and ideology of the Western bourgeoisie. These were key points of struggle between the Four and the current rulers, as noted already.

It is also clear that on the question of war and military policy there were significant differences between the position of the Four and the present rulers—which would only make sense, since they have fundamentally opposed lines on all other questions. The Four, from what I can tell, regarded the danger of war as being more or less imminent, that is, the danger of the outbreak of war, including presumably an attack on China as at least a real possibility, was seen by them in terms of a brief period of years—as opposed to, say, 25 years. From certain polemics they carried out in the form of the "Lin Piao and Confucius" campaign—and the Legalists vs. the Confucianists in particular (more on that later)—as well as in some other more direct ways, it seems that they felt that primary attention should be devoted to agriculture and preparation for war, as opposed to a policy of extensive trade—that is, presumably, major trade to get modern arms. This is in line with the concept of storing grain everywhere and being prepared against war—as well as natural disaster—that is, preparing to fight a people's war, on Chinese territory and in circumstances in which, like the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation that followed, there would be the necessity for relatively self-sufficient base areas. This is one of the main reasons—besides the fact that they had a weak base in the regular army—that the Four put stress on building up the militia, which plays an important role in a people's war of this kind.

The Four were not opposed to modernizing China's armaments, but they were opposed to putting main emphasis on this. This, I believe, is both because they thought that such a line is in conflict with fighting a people's war—which *reliance* on modernization is—since such reliance dictates a different kind of strategy and different kind of army—and because they did not think that China could hope to achieve anything like parity in weaponry with the imperialists, most specifically the Soviets, in the time before war would break out—they were also correct on this in my opinion.

In a nutshell, the Four felt that to put the main stress on

modernization and to base military policy on this would actually lead to disaster for China and that in order to "buy time" and "modernize" the present rulers would capitulate to imperialism and/or social-imperialism and in a war would follow a military line that would bring tremendous defeats.

That the present rulers are taking the road of modernization first and actually abandoning Mao's line on people's war is very strongly indicated by the restoration of Lo Jui-ching as well as associates of Peng Teh-huai, whom Mao knocked down in struggles which centered in large part over this question. Recent reports from not totally unreliable bourgeois sources indicate that Lo and others who now play a key role in the Logistics Department of the PLA have been proposing plans for fighting a pretty large-scale battle on or very near the border with the Soviets. This is opposed to the line which Mao put forward and which he—in opposition to these revisionist military "experts" in power now—did not consider "outdated."

Mao stressed that if attacked or invaded on anything but a small scale, the correct and necessary thing would be to pull back and lure the enemy in—and he stressed that this would be possible. In 1969, in summing up the Ninth Party Congress—a time, it should be remembered, when there was not only massive U.S. presence in South Vietnam and continued aggression against the North but also great tension on the northern Chinese border caused by Soviet provocations—Mao argued with powerful forces in the Chinese Communist Party (perhaps including Chen Yi) that "Others may come and attack us but we shall not fight outside our borders. We do not fight outside our borders. I say we will not be provoked. Even if you invite us to come out we will not come out, but if you should come and attack us we will deal with you. It depends on whether you attack on a small scale or a large scale. If it is on a small scale we will fight on the border. If it is on a large scale then I am in favor of yielding some ground. China is no small country. If there is nothing in it for them I don't think they will come. We must make it clear to the whole world that we have both right and advantage on our side. If they invade our territory then I think it would be more to our advantage, and we would then have both right and advantage. They would be easy to fight since they would fall into the people's encirclement. As for things like airplanes, tanks and armored cars, everywhere experience proves that they can be dealt with." (from Stuart Schram's collection, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, pp. 285-6)

Abandoning this line as "outdated" and relying on moderniza-

tion and fighting a "modern war," which is a "war of steel," as Teng Hsiao-ping said in recent years, this is to follow a course that will bring disaster to China. And this, from all I can tell, is the line of the present rulers.

From this it is clear that, as touched on earlier, the argument that, "never mind if the modernizations are being made everything, China has to modernize to defend itself"—an argument which, I believe, is a last refuge for pragmatists on events in China—such an argument is self-defeating. Far from China's salvation in the face of admittedly difficult conditions, this line, the line of writing off revolution and subordinating everything to modernization, can only lead to serious setbacks and—if it is not reversed—defeat for the proletariat at the hands of the bourgeoisie both within China and internationally. In 1974, at the UN, Teng Hsiao-ping said that "If capitalism is restored in a big socialist country, it will inevitably become a superpower." (see *Peking Review*, No. 15, 1974, special supplement). This, I believe, should actually be considered wishful thinking on Teng's part. The line of Teng and the others who now rule China will lead not to its becoming a superpower—and certainly not to its becoming a powerful *socialist* country—but in various ways will lead it to being reduced once again to a country subjugated by various means by imperialists.

Only upholding and implementing a revolutionary line, on military policy as well as other questions, will enable China to defeat the enemy at home and internationally and to continue on the socialist road. This overwhelmingly is the line that the Four fought for in opposition to those in power now.

I should say that as for the general line on the international situation, the "three worlds" analysis, the Soviet Union as the main danger, most dangerous source of war, etc. I do not and our Party has not agreed with what I understand to be the line of the Four—and Mao—on every aspect of this. However, it should be said also that it is not at all clear that Mao or the Four dealt with the "three worlds" analysis as the great "strategic concept" in the way it is being put forward now. In fact the statement by Mao, quoted in *Peking Review*, No. 45, 1977, where he describes the division into "three worlds" to a third world leader, does not present this as a strategic concept and in and of itself at least sounds more like the way our Party has treated the "three worlds analysis"—as a general description of the role of countries in the world today and one part of the line of developing the international united front against the two superpowers. (See p. 11; it is also in-

teresting to note, in passing here, that another quote from Mao in that same article actually goes against the idea that Mao expected China to surpass the advanced countries economically in a relatively short period, even within the next 23 years—"China belongs to the third world," Mao is quoted, and he continues, "For China cannot compare with the rich or powerful countries politically, economically, etc. She can be grouped only with the relatively poor countries"—see *Peking Review*, No. 45, 1977, p. 28)

Our Party does have disagreement with what seems to have been the line of the Four and Mao over the role of the Soviet Union. It is correct, as our Party has consistently pointed out, for the Chinese to target the Soviets as the main danger to them and to make use of certain contradictions on that basis; but there does seem to have been a tendency on the part of the Four and Mao (as well as the line of the latest major articles from China) to take this as far as saying the Soviets are the most dangerous source of war, the main danger to the world's people, etc.

With this our Party does not agree—while we do agree with the fact that the Soviets are overall on the offensive in the contention between the two superpowers, we do not go along with the idea that this makes them the main danger, most dangerous source of war, etc. Still I must say that the policy of lining up all possible forces against the Soviets has more justification, even if it involves some erroneous formulations such as main danger, etc., if the danger of war is viewed as being rather immediate, as the Four apparently saw it—as compared to the present rulers who seem to cherish hopes at least of being able to forestall it for some time, perhaps even 25 years.

In sum on this specific point, the line of the Four on this question, which was essentially the line of Mao, while in my opinion not correct in certain aspects, was certainly not a revisionist line. It was not a line like that of the present rulers which will, unless it is reversed, lead to the destruction of socialism in China.

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From all that has been said I believe it is very clear that the present rulers of China have betrayed Mao's line and are implementing a revisionist line. As for how to view the Four, on a certain level that should be very easy in light of what has been shown. The present rulers of China have proclaimed a thousand times over that only by knocking down the Four—and their many followers throughout the country—is it possible to carry out the current line.

Therefore, on that basis alone, we should uphold the Four as revolutionary heroes. However, I believe that it has been shown in a deeper, more thorough way, by examining the line of the Four themselves in opposition to that of the current rulers on a number of crucial questions, that the Four were carrying out a correct line and fighting for the interests of the proletariat. Having, I believe, established this on the basis of examining major questions of line, it is now possible, and no doubt necessary, to examine and refute certain other questions and other arguments which are raised to justify or apologize for the present rulers and discredit and attack the Four.

## II. Refutation of Certain Erroneous Arguments in Defense of the *Status Quo* and Against the Four

Here I would like to mainly pose and answer some of the main arguments raised by those who can't help but agree that there are some bad lines being taken by the people now running China, but say that somehow these should be excused or at any rate are justified or unavoidable because of the worse line and role of the Four or because of the situation and problems in China and other such nonsense.

At the start it should be said that, in my opinion, most of these arguments are rooted in a thoroughly pragmatic method that proceeds from the assumption that since the Four lost in the latest struggle therefore they must be bad. Flowing from such an assumption the approach is to try to find fault with the Four and justify the *status quo*, even inventing arguments and twisting facts to make things fit and to avoid the obvious conclusion which has to be reached by analyzing the actual two-line struggle that went down over the past few years and the role of various forces in that struggle—the conclusion that the Four represented, along with Mao, the proletarian headquarters while the current rulers, including most definitely Hua Kuo-feng, represented and still represent the bourgeois headquarters. Having said that as a preface, let's turn to the arguments.

"The 'gang of four' would not unite with anyone else, they broadened instead of narrowing the target, and so they had to go down."

Wouldn't unite with anyone else? Then why did a quarter of the Central Committee, including most of the representatives of mass organizations and forces who came to the fore in the Cultural Revolution, have to be purged, as well as perhaps as many as half

of the Provincial Secretaries and thousands of leading cadre throughout the country?

Who should they have united with that they failed to unite with? People like Hua Kuo-feng? But how could they unite with him when he was one of the leading people pushing the revisionist line and whipping up the right deviationist wind? Over the past month and more in the *Peking Review* it has been emphatically stated that Hua was very much involved in formulating the "Three Poisonous Weeds" (sorry, "fragrant flowers"). If it is true, which it is, that these are indeed "poisonous weeds" then how could the Four unite with someone playing a major role in pushing this line? To talk about "uniting" abstracted from line is exactly to raise unity above the class struggle and will end you up in unity with the bourgeoisie—on *its* terms!

Further, Hua's report to the 1975 Tachai Conference is, as I indicated at the beginning, another "poisonous weed." (I want to say here that my understanding of the revisionist nature of Hua's speech was deepened by a paper written by a comrade criticizing it, which was submitted to the Party center over a year ago, in accordance with the directives set by the center for approaching the China question.) This speech has all the right deviationist code words—"rectification," deal sternly with the "soft, lax and lazy" and resolutely with "bourgeois factionalism"—and it reads very much like the "General Program." First and foremost it is a plan not for developing agriculture, but for a *purge*.

But more importantly, it even goes so far as to cut off Mao's quote about how the country practices a commodity system, eight-grade wage scale, etc., deliberately omitting the conclusion Mao draws, the part that indicates the whole point and the life and death nature of the problem—"**Therefore if people like Lin Piao come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system.** That is why we should do more reading of Marxist-Leninist works." (emphasis added) Omitting this, as noted before, goes right along with the line of the current rulers which says, in essence, bourgeois right, the three great differences, etc., can only be restricted under socialism—*this* is Chairman Mao's "brilliant idea"—so why worry about them. But, as we've seen, they're not restricting them at all, but expanding them.

To give a speech during the very time of the campaign to study the theory of proletarian dictatorship (1975) and to cut off this part of Mao's quote, as Hua does, is, as already indicated, to deliberately fly in the face of Mao's most important instructions and tamper with the basic line of the Party. This makes the call in Hua's

speech for "Deepening Education in Party's Basic Line" (section 3) a mockery and explains why Chang Chun-chiao is reported to have said that Hua's version of the Party's basic line is not really its basic line at all—since that basic line stresses exactly the danger of capitalist restoration.

Along with this, Hua's speech rather openly promotes the "dying out of class struggle" line, saying that only in a few rural areas is class struggle very acute and that the class enemy is essentially defined by those who commit sabotage and that the main form of the capitalist road to be combatted is small scale capitalist production. This, again, is a speech made at the very time that the right deviationist wind is being whipped up on a big scale, yet the spearhead is directed downward, away from the revisionists in top leadership and their line. This is why the Four were supposed to have said that it attacks corrupt officials only and not the emperor (a reference to Mao's instruction on the novel "Water Margin," which he put out in August, 1975, to help the masses identify right capitulationists like Teng Hsiao-ping) and why the Four said that it does no good to assail foxes (corrupt officials and others at the local level) when wolves are in power (revisionists at the top of the Party).

Beyond this, Hua's speech gives no serious attention to the question of restricting bourgeois right and to combatting the tendency to do more work for more profit, less work for less profit and no work for no profit—which are serious tendencies that must be identified and combatted, especially in issuing a call for all-out competition among counties, communes, etc. to win the rank of "Tachai-type county." Nor, with all its emphasis on farmland capital construction contingents and increasing the scope of activity of brigade, commune, and even county level projects, does it address the problem of basically *equalizing* the income of the *teams*, which is an essential part of moving from the team to the brigade as the basic accounting unit, the next step in advancing the ownership system in the countryside.

About the same time as Hua's speech (probably a little later), Mao made the very important statement that "With the socialist revolution they themselves come under fire. At the time of the cooperative transformation of agriculture there were people in the Party who opposed it, and when it comes to criticizing bourgeois right, they resent it." Among other things what Mao is stressing here is that previously, if agriculture had not undergone cooperative transformation, capitalist polarization would have gone on in the countryside on a great scale; and now, if bourgeois right

is not criticized and restricted, within and between brigades, communes, teams, counties, etc., the same thing will happen. Comrades should ask themselves: is this the spirit of Hua's 1975 Tachai speech, in fact does his speech even deal seriously with this question at all?

As a general characterization of Hua's speech it can be said that it is boring—which is not merely a criticism of style but of political content and basic method. Mao's comment on the Soviet Political Economy Textbook (referred to several times before) is directly relevant here: "It lacks persuasiveness and makes dull reading. It does not start from making a specific analysis of the contradictions between productive forces and production relationship and the contradictions between the economic basis and the superstructure . . ." (From the U.S. Government collection)

Hua's speech mentions the Cultural Revolution very little and then essentially in the past tense. The whole point is that with the Cultural Revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius such "brilliant successes" have been achieved in the class struggle that really the class struggle is dying out and it is time to take up production as the main task so as to achieve the "four modernizations" by the end of the century. This is not said straight up, of course, but this is what really comes through. And according to Hua, anyone who doesn't agree with this view is a "bourgeois factionalism" is not uniting and being open and aboveboard and so should be smashed as a revisionist.

To get a clearer view of the revisionist line of Hua's speech comrades should compare it with especially the speech by Wang Chintzu, which was reprinted together with Hua's speech, and another by Kuo Feng-lien, in a (green) pamphlet in late 1975. I think it is clear that, whether subjectively (consciously) or not, this speech by Wang is objectively a polemic against Hua's and is in direct opposition to it. (I don't know at this time what has become of Wang, whether he supports the current rulers or has gone along with them, or has been dumped or demoted; Kuo Feng-lien has gone right along with Hua & Co., but that is not the point, anyway; the point is that Wang's speech in particular is, as stated, objectively the opposite line from Hua's and puts forward the line of the Four, and Mao—it even uses the phrase, "exercise all-around dictatorship over the bourgeoisie," which echoes the title of Chang Chun-chiao's 1975 pamphlet, a phrase which is now condemned in China.) Comrades should study over Wang and Hua's speeches in particular and compare and contrast the two lines in them.

Here I will make only a few comments of comparison and con-

trast between the two speeches. Wang stresses that "We must be able to recognize capitalism under the signboard of 'for the collective,' as well as obvious capitalism. If we know only how to struggle against obvious capitalism and not against capitalism disguised as socialism, we shall suffer defeats and fail to realize socialism." (p. 55, pamphlet) This is the opposite emphasis from Hua's speech.

Wang stresses that learning from Tachai "does not mean merely levelling hills and harnessing rivers, nor just raising grain production, but that it is one of continuing the revolution and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat." (see p. 54) This is not the emphasis Hua gives to learning from Tachai, despite some stock phrases about politics in command, etc.

Wang points out that "To realize farm mechanization involves a great revolution replete with sharp struggle between the two roads, two lines and two ideologies." (p. 64) This emphasis is missing from Hua's speech.

Hua's whole program for "rectification" is basically all top down. Wang, on the other hand, stresses that "Revolutionizing the county Party committee depends mainly on open-door rectification, i.e., arousing the masses to help it in this task." Hua presents the question as though somehow building Tachai-type counties will ("automatically") revolutionize the county Party committees (with purge and top-down rectification where necessary), while Wang puts the emphasis the other way around—"without revolutionizing the county Party committee there cannot be any sustained movement to learn from Tachai." (see p. 70, 71-2) It is Wang, in opposition to Hua, who puts forward the line of "grasp revolution, promote production," while the line running through Hua's speech is in essence, "grasp revolution—that is, promote production."

I could go on at much greater length analyzing the revisionism of Hua's speech, but if comrades go into it deeply and use the telescope and microscope of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought, and if they compare and contrast Hua's speech with Mao's line and directives, as well as with the speech by Wang Chin-tzu, it will become clear that Hua's speech at the 1975 Tachai Conference is yet another indication that he was part of the right deviationists then as he is now. Now, with Mao and the Four gone, Hua's revisionism is less disguised than before. But keeping in mind Mao's line and emphasis in late 1975, Hua's speech even at that time stands out as clearly opposed to Mao.

A note on the second Tachai Conference and Chen Yung-kuei's speech there in particular. Chen does include a number of

statements that are missing from Hua's 1975 Tachai speech and he does go into such things as capitalism in the form of the collective, the need to restrict bourgeois right, to pay attention to equalizing the level of the teams, and other things which are not wrong at all in and of themselves. But the first point that must be grasped is that the main purpose of this speech by Chen is to attempt to justify and to uphold Hua Kuo-feng's 1975 Tachai speech. And second, Chen's speech itself contains the totally incorrect formulation that the dividing line between Marxism and the "theory of the productive forces" is "whether one *attaches* the development of the productive forces to socialism or to capitalism," which is how we know what road one is really taking. (See *Peking Review*, No. 2, 1977, p. 12, emphasis added.)

This actually treats production not as the unity of productive forces and productive relations but as a thing which can simply be attached to one kind of production relation or another. It is metaphysical and in fact covers for the "theory of the productive forces." Hence, in the final analysis, despite many nice words to the contrary, Chen's speech actually promotes the incorrect line and is an accomplice of revisionism.

Similarly, the book *Tachai, The Red Banner*, while it contains a number of good things, also has the line running through it that basically the peasants on their own (sort of "automatically") can figure out the correct line and along with this it even promotes the idea that if you want to tell friends from enemies, look to see who lived in caves in the old society and who has callouses on their hands to tell who the revolutionaries are and then the counter-revolutionaries can be easily identified as those who attack such people. From reading this book it is quite possible to see how at least some people in Tachai and those following the line of the book itself could be taken in by a bad line if it was put forward by hard-working people seemingly dedicated to the interests of the masses. (For a flagrant expression of the same empiricist/revenge line, see interview with Chen Yung-kuei, *New China* summer, 1977)

This raises another very important point. There are two ways, not just one, to pull down the red banner of Tachai. One is to openly pull down the banner, but the other is to paint the banner white. In other words, it is quite possible to pervert the real lesson of Tachai, as Hua Kuo-feng & Co. have indeed done. As Marxists we cannot look upon Tachai as some kind of holy symbol, but must examine it, too, from the Marxist stand, viewpoint and method, concentrating on line. If the Soviet Union can be turned into its opposite, so can Tachai; and today we do not say "learn from the

Soviet Union"—except by negative example. This is why, after Hua & Co. had moved to turn Tachai into its opposite, Chang Chun-chiao was supposed to have said that there is no use in learning from Tachai *now*. The same holds true for Taching, the red banner in industry which Hua & Co. have painted white, turning it into a "model" for applying the line they laid out in the "20 Points" and other revisionist documents and articles. Once again, in going beyond appearance to grasp the essence of this we have to apply materialist dialectics and be "ruthlessly scientific." If we do this we will be able to discern how Hua & Co. are turning not just models in China but China itself into its opposite.

"But Mao picked Hua Kuo-feng as his successor and said 'With you in charge, I'm at ease.' First, from what I have been able to find out, this statement attributed to Mao does not say in the Chinese "With you in\*charge," it says rather "with you carrying out your work"—this is a much more accurate translation from what I have been able to learn. This expression "carrying out your work" is one commonly used with subordinates in a unit, department, etc. and does not at all carry the weight that a completely different expression in Chinese, "With you in charge," would carry.

But more importantly this argument that "Mao picked Hua" and the view it expresses is completely idealist and metaphysical. "Mao picked"—as though Mao had complete freedom to do whatever he wanted at any time.

To understand how Hua came to be Premier and first Vice Chairman it is necessary to keep in mind and analyze the overall situation, the different forces involved and how things developed up to the point where this decision was made and to view it from the standpoint of what lines different people and forces represent. It seems so clear to me that I find it difficult to believe anyone seriously doubts it—that Hua's appointment was the product of very sharp struggle which was very far from resolved at the time that Hua was appointed acting Premier (January, 1976) or when he was appointed Premier and First Vice Chairman (April, 1976).

What was going on then? Chou En-lai (about whom more in a little while) had just died and Mao had launched the struggle against Teng and the right deviationist wind. "Mao had launched"—am I falling into the same metaphysics and idealism I just criticized? No, because it is clear that no one but Mao could have launched such a movement. Before it was launched, Teng was riding high and he had plenty of powerful support. Who else but Mao could have made him the target of such a struggle and knock-

ed him down, kept him from becoming Premier? The Four alone? Hardly!

In fact there were, as subsequent events have made abundantly clear, powerful forces in the Chinese leadership who strongly opposed the campaign against Teng and the right deviationist wind—not the least of which were powerful military commanders. But exactly because Mao threw his weight behind this campaign, these forces had to beat a temporary and partial retreat and go along with knocking down Teng. But they certainly were not about to allow one of the Four to become acting head of the Central Committee and the country in effect. Therefore they backed Hua, someone who, as an analysis of his line and role has shown, was politically in their camp but was not such an easy target with long years of brazen revisionism to attack, like Teng.

Under these conditions, with the balance of forces being what they were, Mao had to go along with Hua's appointments. It has been stated in the bourgeois press that Yeh Chien-ying, in particular, insisted that Mao give personal authority to Hua's appointments, or else there would be no compromise at all. Whether these specific reports are true or not, it is obvious that powerful forces in the leadership insisted on Hua and that this was the necessity faced by Mao, which he tried to make the best of.

How did he do that? By continuing and giving guidance to the mass campaign against Teng and the right deviationist wind, which was politically a blow not only at Teng but at all those who had joined with him in whipping up this wind, Hua included. Teng was made the specific target for the same reason that the rightists had to agree to dumping him—he was someone well known for taking the capitalist road and it would be difficult, at least while Mao was still around, to make an all-out fight to back Teng. Mao knew that the deeper this struggle against the right deviationist wind went and the more thoroughly it was carried out, the harder the blows at the rightists and the more favorable the conditions for the left. But the right knew it too, which is why they seized on every possible basis to kill this struggle—including the earthquakes. And we have seen what happened to that struggle after Mao died—those who were actively leading it, the Four, were almost immediately smashed and the target of the struggle was shifted from the right to them, the (genuine) left. And as I said before the struggle against the right deviationist wind has not been just stopped but completely reversed.

The argument that appointing Hua as First Vice Chairman was unprecedented in the Chinese Party's history is not only ridiculous

but revealing. It occurs to me that there is a historical precedent for this—Lin Piao's enshrinement as Mao's successor at the Ninth Party Congress. And as became clear later, already at that time Mao had launched struggle against Lin and his line. I believe this is the same with Hua—Mao was forced to go along with and "officially endorse" his appointments, but the political movement he launched and led was aimed at the very line Hua, as well as others, upheld.

Mao's tactics here were actually masterful. What he did in the face of the necessity presented to him was to put Hua in the position where he had to go against the right deviationist wind and denounce Teng as a counter-revolutionary (see Hua's speech at the memorial for Mao, *Peking Review* No. 39, 1976, for another reminder of what Hua was forced to say in those days and also how far he has departed from, and how far he has gone in betraying Mao's line and actual last "behests"). Mao's tactics here were a way of creating a split in the ranks of the rightists. At the same time, no doubt Mao tried to win Hua over—but he did not rely on it. Most fundamentally through the movement he launched against the right deviationists' attempt at reversing correct verdicts and the specific direction he gave in this struggle, Mao made the conditions the most favorable possible under the circumstances for the genuine left, the Four, and for the masses in fighting to carry forward the revolution. The fact that despite this the right won out in this battle shows just how strong the right had become at that point and what powerful forces the right had in its camp.

Further, as to the question of Hua being Mao's "chosen successor," it is significant to note that it is widely reported that in late May or early June, 1976 (sometime after Mao's famous statement about being "at ease"—which, by the way, has to be one of the most ironic statements in political history, since Mao clearly was not "at ease"), Mao is supposed to have had a last meeting with most of the Politburo, including Hua. At that meeting Mao apparently talked about the question of succession, and he must have said something other than "With Hua Kuo-feng in charge, I'm at ease," because this last meeting is never referred to by the current rulers.

Am I saying that Hua and Teng have an identical line and that, except for the Four, there was one solid bloc of rightists on the Politburo? No, but from every indication there was indeed a rightist bloc, certainly with some divisions within it, and on the opposite side there were the Four (leaving Mao out of the picture for

the moment) and undoubtedly a number of "middle forces" not firmly wed to either side. But the point is that with whatever differences they may have had then and no doubt have now (more on this shortly) Hua, Teng and others, including at least Li Hsien-nien and Yeh Chien-ying, were united in reversing the verdicts of the Cultural Revolution, promoting production as the main task and whipping up a rightist wind to accomplish this. Even after Teng was nominally dumped, and right after Mao died, the rightists, with powerful military forces at their command, moved on the Four and confronted any "middle forces" with a *fait accompli*. Having done that, they moved to make a mummy of Mao's body (a Confucianist act the Four absolutely correctly opposed in my opinion) and did the same with his line and Thought.

As far as differences among these rightists, and Hua and Teng in particular, I do not pretend to know all of what they may be. But the Four themselves, before their arrest, made clear (by analogy) in a number of articles that these rightists were not all one solid bloc, but had formed an opportunist alliance in opposition to the continuation of the Chinese revolution. One thing seems evident to me—Teng would very likely want to openly, or at least much more clearly if indirectly, attack Mao, while Hua can by no means afford to do that; he must pretend to uphold Mao because his sole authority rests on his supposed appointment by Mao—other than that Teng has it all over him in terms of long-established contacts in key places, forces at his command, etc. Yes, there is no doubt opposition among them, based on both personal ambition and different notions of how to carry out the revisionist line—after all, while there is only one correct line, there are many different ways to carry out an incorrect line. But these differences among these revisionist leaders are, to borrow from Engels, opposite poles of the same stupidity.

This brings up another very important political point: far from creating stability and unity, the smashing of the Four and the victory of the revisionists means that there will be tremendous dissension and anarchy in China. This is not only because followers of the Four, who despite the current rulers' claims, number at least in the tens of millions, will find the ways to put up some form of resistance to the revisionist line—and indeed already are, as even the current rulers are forced to admit, at least indirectly. But it is also because it is only the correct line in command that can provide relative unity to the country. Once things are unhinged from the proletarian line, as they have been, all sorts of conflicting interests will greatly sharpen—differences between regional commanders,

heads of different ministries, the army and the agricultural sector, etc., etc. This anarchy will not mainly show up as mass upheaval—though this will occur, the rightists will unite to suppress it in the short run—but it will make itself felt very strongly all the same.

But back to the arguments in defense of the *status quo* and against the Four. "The 'gang of four' didn't just start attacking certain leading people at the time of the campaign against the right deviationist wind, they began these attacks as early as 1974, for example in the Lin Piao and Confucius campaign. And they didn't just attack Teng, they attacked good people as well, even Chou En-lai."

Did they attack certain leading people, by clear analogy, through the Lin Piao and Confucius campaign and the Legalists vs. Confucianists analysis in particular? Yes, they did. In fact these attacks by analogy began around the time of the 10th Congress in August, 1973. Were those they attacked this way good people?—let's look and see.

To gain an understanding of this we have to look at the events that led up to the 10th Congress and, again, to analyze the overall situation in its development, the different forces involved and the lines different people and forces represented. Of great importance to grasp is the fact that the Lin Piao affair was a truly traumatic one in China and caused tremendous turmoil—and it was also a signal for all those forces who opposed the Cultural Revolution to jump out on the basis of opposing Lin Piao. Further, even after Lin Piao died and his closest co-conspirators alive were arrested, his followers and the problems his camp created were far from cleared up, especially, but not exclusively, in the armed forces. It should be remembered that the PLA played a huge role during the Cultural Revolution up to that point—army people were everywhere, in every major institution, in city and countryside—playing a leading role, and this Mao had only begun to seriously curb when the Lin Piao affair happened (September, 1971).

Therefore, after the struggle with Lin came to a complete rupture, resulting in Lin's flight and death, there remained a monumental task of trying to restore order and clean up the mess that was inherited. In response to this, I believe, Mao and Chou En-lai had significant differences, though like all contradictions these differences went through a process of development, which ended up with Mao and Chou in fundamental opposition to each other.

What were these differences? While both agreed that the immediate task was to clean up on the remaining problems left by the Lin Piao affair and that a certain amount of "uniting all who can be united" against Lin's forces and line was necessary, they disagreed over how much this should go on and how far to take it. In substance, Chou felt the only thing to do was to bring back many people who had been knocked down during the Cultural Revolution and were bound to be strong opponents of Lin Piao, while Mao, agreeing probably to bring back some, did not want to go as far with this as Chou did. And besides just bringing back people, Chou wanted to push policies that would reverse the momentum of the Cultural Revolution and the continuation of the revolution. In substance, he wanted to put stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward as the main things. In other words he took the position that everything should be subordinated to stabilizing things after the Lin Piao affair and the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution and that a great number of people, and of things, that had been attacked by Lin Piao should be restored. (If it is asked, "how can that be, look at Chou's report to the 10th Congress," my reply is, look at Lin Piao's report to the 9th Congress, and now we can look back and see with whom and what Chou was increasingly aligned since after Lin fell.)

With some of this, I believe, Mao agreed, because he agreed that it was a necessity in the short run. But not all of it, even in the short run, let alone the long run. After all, Lin Piao had attacked not only many good people but many bad ones as well, and not all of the lines and policies he opposed should have been upheld—many should have been opposed. In short, Mao did not agree that everything should be subordinated to stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward—and specifically not that *correct* verdicts of the Cultural Revolution should basically be reversed. Here I believe, are the seeds of the struggle which broke out fully in the year before Mao's death with the campaign to beat back the right deviationist wind.

Prominent in all this is the question of Teng Hsiao-ping. I believe that Mao and Chou agreed that it was necessary to bring back Teng at that time—his return began in 1972, very shortly after Lin Piao crashed. But within that agreement between Mao and Chou there were, from all I can tell, the seeds of sharp disagreement. Chou thought Teng was basically good but had made some mistakes; Mao, I am convinced, did not trust Teng and recognized that upon returning to office Teng was likely to resume his old ways. Mao agreed to his rehabilitation for the reason that

Teng would be a powerful—and at that time necessary—force in cleaning up on the remnants of the Lin Piao forces, especially in the PLA where Teng has long and many close ties with key commanders. Thus, while Mao had the necessity to go along with rehabilitating Teng he took steps from the start to combat the revisionist influence—"tide" describes it accurately—that would inevitably accompany Teng's resumption of high office and the steps that went with it (more on this shortly).

This, I am convinced, is the main reason why the 10th Congress made such a big point of going against the tide, which was written into the Constitution at the 10th Congress. It is clear that the tide that was gaining momentum then was that represented by people like Teng Hsiao-ping—and ultimately Chou En-lai—who were bound to gain from the whole campaign to clean up right after the Lin Piao affair (criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work). The fact that Lin Piao, a big leader in the Cultural Revolution, turned traitor gave those who wanted to reverse the verdicts of the Cultural Revolution great initiative and momentum, and it was this that the 10th Party Congress documents were warning against—and clearly on Mao's insistence, for who else would both want to and have the ability to get this into the 10th Congress documents? Such principles in Chinese Party documents, it should be stressed, are never just the summation of past struggle but always bear directly on current struggles as well.

Also a part of the struggle shaping up around the time of the 10th Congress was how to sum up Lin Piao—that is whether to stress his overall rightist character, his promoting of the "theory of the productive forces," etc. or to call him "ultra-left." From what we have seen in the "General Program," those who are responsible for it, themselves promoters of the "theory of the productive forces," have insisted on calling Lin "ultra-left"—and no doubt these forces insisted on it at the time of the 10th Congress. (The fact that in public print now the present rulers refer to Lin and to the Four as "ultra-right" while all but saying explicitly that they were "ultra-left" is a dodge to confuse people and cover for the real right—themselves.) The characterization of Lin as right instead of "ultra-left" was a victory for the left—especially the Four—and indicated that Mao wanted to direct the spearhead toward such lines as the "theory of the productive forces"—without Mao's powerful backing it is extremely doubtful that the Four, themselves under attack from the right as being in Lin Piao's camp, could have won in the struggle to lay emphasis on Lin's right opportunism. (This question of whether the right or

"ultra-left" was the main danger from the time of the 10th Congress was, as stated, a very important and very sharp point of struggle for obvious reasons. In waging this struggle the Four, or some of their followers, did make some errors, stating in one article for example that the right is "invariably" the main danger in socialist society. This is an erroneous formulation—the right is overall and overwhelmingly the main danger in socialist society but not "invariably." It certainly, however, was the main danger then; other articles by the Four explained this more correctly and overall they handled this struggle in a quite correct way.)

It is obvious that by that time, 1974, the rightists in the Party, represented by the fast-rising Teng—backed ultimately by Chou En-lai—were beginning to make a big offensive. They were beginning to bring back many people who were justly and correctly knocked down as unrepentant capitalist readers—Chen Pei-hsien, former number 2 capitalist reader in Shanghai who was overthrown during the Cultural Revolution, is just one glaring example—and they were launching attacks on the new things that had been won through the Cultural Revolution—many of the same things they have now swiftly reversed after seizing supreme power.

It was not at all accidental or incidental to what was going on then that key themes running through the Lin Piao and Confucius campaign were how Confucius wanted to follow the principle of "restrain oneself and restore the rites" (feign benevolence to cover the restoration of the old order), how Confucius' program was to "revive states that were extinct, restore families that had lost their positions, and call to office those who had fallen into obscurity" (bring back the old order and its upholders and rehabilitate unrepentant restorationists), and that a rallying cry of Confucius and his followers was that "the present is not as good as the past." These were exactly the program and exactly the rallying cry of the right deviationists.

Can it be said that the emphasis given within the Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius campaign to the struggle of the Legalists Vs. the Confucianists was only the doing of the Four? No, it cannot. It seems very clear to me that Mao also pushed this, because as we know at that time he was very concerned with the grave danger of retrogression and restoration and recognized that the period of struggle between the rising landlord class and the declining slave class in China would hold valuable lessons for the class struggle to prevent restoration now. It is worth noting in line with this that at the 4th National People's Congress in January, 1975, Chou

En-lai's report says the following: "Our primary task is to continue to broaden, deepen and persevere in the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius," and that "We should go on deepening the criticism of Lin Piao's revisionist line and the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, and in line with the principle of *making the past serve the present*, sum up the historical experience of the struggle between the Confucian and Legalist schools and of class struggle and use Marxism to occupy all spheres in the superstructure." {See *Peking Review*, No. 4, 1975, p. 22}

I believe it is indisputably clear that this was Mao's line and that Chou included it in his report not on his own initiative but on the insistence of Mao. It would be very difficult to argue, I think, given the whole character of the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius and the Legalists Vs. Confucianists in particular, that Chou En-lai would be a big backer—or a backer at all—of all this. It is said by the current rulers that Mao insisted that Chou give the main report to the 4th People's Congress. This is probably true and the reason I think so is that, especially given the nature of the class struggle then and how the different forces lined up, Mao wanted Chou to be on record in support of the revolutionary struggle, including such things as were quoted just above from the report Chou gave. It is also no accident, and not simply because of attacks on him by the Four, I think, that the current rulers have built up Chou En-lai to such heights—clearly, in my opinion, elevating him far above Mao—and have insisted on the close ties between Chou and those in power now, including Teng in particular. Perhaps this is just slander on their part—but I don't think so, and the evidence points to the opposite conclusion, to the conclusion that Chou was tied in with and the powerful backer behind those now in power and their right deviationism.

The current rulers have given many clear indications that Chou and people like Hua Kuo-feng as well as Teng Hsiao-ping were all tied in together. In *Peking Review*, No. 50, 1977, there is an unmistakable identification of both Hua and Teng with Chou En-lai, in an article attacking the Four's writing group in Shanghai. This article gives us the following succession: The writing group attacked Chou En-lai, then "When Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping was in charge of the day-to-day work of the Party Central Committee and the State Council during Premier Chou's grave illness and following his death, he was made the prime target of the group's virulent attack".

Then the article immediately follows this by saying, "In 1976,

after Comrade Hua Kuo-feng was appointed Acting Premier and then Premier and First Vice-Chairman of the Party Central Committee, the group turned to attack Comrade Hua Kuo-feng" (See pp. 16-17).

What is being said here is obvious, in both form and content: Teng Hsiao-ping was Chou En-lai's "worthy successor" and then when Teng fell, Hua replaced him in this role. Even the order of Hua's appointments in April, 1976, is reversed from the resolution at that time (which put his post as First Vice-Chairman first and then his role as Premier) in order to make stronger the identification of Hua with Chou, and Teng.

And it seems very clear to me that by the time of Chou's death, when Mao was already launching the struggle against Teng and the right deviationist wind, Mao and Chou had come into clear and sharp conflict. Just one indication of this is the nature of the mourning ceremonies around Chou. His body lay in state not in the Great Hall but in the hospital where he died. For a leader of the stature of Chou in China this is indeed very strange and not at all in keeping with his position. To attribute this to Chou's "modesty," or some such thing is ridiculous, because obviously the question of what kind of "honors" to pay Chou was then a tremendously sharp political question and would be decided as part of the struggle then going on (look how Mao's body was dealt with, clearly against his personal and political inclinations). And it is even more ridiculous to think that especially with the forces lined up as they clearly were, the Four alone could have kept these ceremonies as low key as they were for a man of Chou's stature. They could play down reports of mourning of his death in the press, and no doubt they did, but there was only one person around who could keep the actual mourning ceremonies themselves as low key as they were—and you know who that is.

Further it is striking that, with Chou En-lai clearly under attack by the Four and the question of how to evaluate him such a very sharp point of struggle in China then, Mao neither said nor did anything to make a point of indicating support for Chou (neither made a statement at the time of Chou's death nor a special visit to the hospital where his body lay in state, nor any other similar act to indicate support for Chou at a time when, as stated, Chou's role was the focus of great struggle). But beyond that it is *obvious* that Mao and Chou were on opposite sides for some time before Chou's death, if we stop and think about how things developed over that period.

If this were not the case, if Mao and Chou were in basic

agreement during the last couple of years, then it is unthinkable that the Four could be taking shots at Chou repeatedly through analogy during this period and not be cracked down on for it. Yet during this period none of them was even demoted, let alone removed from key positions in the Party. If Mao and Chou were in basic unity and Hua Kuo-feng represented their common choice for successor, then the struggle would have gone down completely differently. The Four would have been at least demoted and very probably at a minimum had their control over the press taken away. Yet this did not happen. How could this be unless Mao was protecting them, and why would he do so if they continued to attack his close comrade-in-arms Chou En-lai who had united with Mao around a common line and common choice for succession to top Party leadership! Again, everything points to the *obvious* fact that Mao and Chou En-lai were basically not in unity but on opposite sides for several years and increasingly so in the period right before Chou's death.

If anyone wants to uphold Chou En-lai and "Chou En-lai Thought" then let them do so, but they cannot do so in the name of Mao and Mao Tsetung Thought. They can only do so by repudiating Mao and Mao Tsetung Thought—which is something I am confident our Party will not do.

Looking back, then, on the events right after the 10th Congress and especially the campaign to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, and the Legalists Vs. Confucianists in particular, what was Mao's line on all this, was it the same as the Four's exactly and were they simply carrying out Mao's line and in complete agreement with him, including in attacking Teng, Chou and probably others by analogy?

First, I believe the evidence points to the fact that Mao was obviously behind the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, including the thrust of the Legalists Vs. Confucianists material, and that he regarded the right, including at least Teng and perhaps Chou En-lai in the background, as the general target of this movement. Mao pushed this campaign to hit back at the attempts of the right, already gaining considerable momentum, to reverse the gains of the Cultural Revolution and the development of the Chinese revolution as a whole. The issues raised in the Lin Piao and Confucius campaign were essentially the same as those battled out later in more open form in the struggle to beat back the right deviationist wind.

This campaign was carried out on two levels, especially by the Four. The first, and principal aspect, was the use of historical

analogy and analogy with Lin Piao's rightism to arm the masses to fight against the right's current attempts to reverse verdicts. With this Mao was in full agreement, I am convinced. The second, and secondary, aspect, which the Four did get into pretty heavily, was to indicate, especially to their followers, through clear and sometimes rather blatant analogy, exactly how the forces were then lining up in the struggle and who was playing what role. With at-least some of this Mao disagreed, I believe—at the beginning at least (i.e. in 1974 and early 1975). Mao felt, I think, that it was better to concentrate on the line of the right and not focus so directly on specific people, and he no doubt held out the hope that he could resolve the question through struggling it out with Chou, and encouraged Chou to do right, though, as with Hua later, Mao did not *rely* on this. When, later, it became clear to Mao that Chou would not get up off the line he held and the backing he was giving to people like Teng and their right deviationism, Mao launched a more direct struggle against the right deviationist wind, with Teng as the main and clear target.

But it should be clear that Mao had been warning of the danger of a coup by people like Lin Piao (rightists) for several years. And it also should be clear that Mao did not only target Teng when he launched the movement against the right deviationist wind—he made specific reference to Teng and general reference to capitalist roaders, especially veteran leading cadres, with the *same line*. This is evident in Mao's statement that, "With the socialist revolution *they themselves* [note—not *he himself*] come under fire. At the time of the co-operative transformation of agriculture there were *people* in the Party who opposed it, and when it comes to criticizing bourgeois right *they* resent it. You are making socialist revolution, and yet don't know where the bourgeoisie is. It is right in the Communist Party—*those* in power taking the capitalist road. The capitalist roaders are still on the capitalist road." (emphasis added—it should be pointed out that at least at one point, around 1956, Chou En-lai was one of those who at the least wavered and took a conservative stand with regard to agricultural cooperatization—this is referred to by Mao in his 1959 speech at the Lushan Conference, in Schram's book, p. 138).

Overall, in my opinion, Mao's approach to this whole struggle, during the period from around the time of the 10th Congress to the time of his death, was better than the Four's where they disagreed with him and did differently. And I think that it is these disagreements that caused Mao to make certain criticisms of the Four for forming a "gang," especially during 1974 and early

1975—though, again, it should be stressed that they were never even demoted, let alone removed from leadership in the Party. And, further, as for the statements attributed to Mao against the Four, it is important to point out several things.

First, if we are going to consider them authentic, then it is just as reasonable to take as authentic the statement, in the form of a poem, which Mao is supposed to have written to Chiang Ching shortly before he died. What, according to reports of this, did Mao say in that statement? "You have been wronged," it says, and goes on, "Today we are separating into two worlds. May each keep his peace. These few words may be my last message to you. Human life is limited, but revolution knows no bounds. In the struggle of the past ten years I have tried to reach the peak of revolution, but I was not successful. But you could reach the top. If you fail, you will plunge into a fathomless abyss. Your body will shatter. Your bones will break." And Mao went on to warn her of the danger of the army backing the right—and if that should happen of the necessity to wage people's war again—something Mao had threatened to do himself, including at the Lushan meeting in 1959 during the very sharp struggle against Peng Teh-huai. (This letter/poem attributed to Mao was cited in the *Manchester Guardian*, November 7, 1976, also in a column by Jack Anderson and elsewhere—Anderson said he considered it authentic, though he didn't say exactly why.) It seems to me that there is at least as much basis for taking as authentic this statement of Mao's as there is for taking as authentic the statements attributed to Mao criticizing the Four.

In fact, exactly if Mao did make criticisms, including some sharp ones, of the Four and Chiang Ching in particular, that would be all the more reason for him to write a letter to her at the end indicating support for her and those aligned with her—assuming, as I believe I have shown, that Mao was in fundamental unity with them. Mao certainly knew that as soon as he went an all-out attack would be launched on Chiang Ching in particular and the Four generally and that, as he said, some of his words, including especially criticism of her and the Four, would be used by the right to attack them and the left they represented. This would be all the more reason why Mao would want to make a last statement "setting the record straight" and indicating with whom he basically stood and had fundamental unity, so that *these* words of his could be used, together with his basic line and overall political direction, by the genuine left, represented by the Four, to fight against the right.

Further, these statements attributed to Mao criticizing the Four, even if taken as authentic, were just that—criticism, even sharp ones in some cases—but in no way indicating that Mao wanted the Four knocked down or considered them the enemy or target of the struggle. These criticisms were certainly not the kind of statements he made—in public at that—about the right deviationists. And more than that, given everything that was going on and the thrust of the leadership Mao was giving as summarized before, if these statements were made and if this criticism was levelled at the Four, I see no reason to believe that even at that time Mao made such criticisms only of the Four. In short, I do not for a minute believe that there was only one "gang"; and I am convinced that even on the question of factional activities Mao must have criticized more than the Four, which is implied in the statement to the Politburo in May, 1975, where Mao is supposed to have said that "all present" should discuss the "3 do's and don'ts."

(As a general point, I would also stress that we should keep in mind that people in power certainly can suppress evidence against themselves, frame charges against those they have purged and claim that such and such is in so and so's "own handwriting," etc. What we make of the "evidence" presented against those purged has to depend, in the last analysis, on what we think of their overall line as opposed to the line of those who have purged them. In other words, we have to weigh charges and "evidence" on both sides against what we can see to be people's line—especially though not exclusively, on what they themselves put out as their line—and we have to put it in the context of what was going on overall, how things were shaping up, what the alignment of forces was, etc. to make any sense out of it and sort things out. For example, the charges now being made against the Four and "evidence" accompanying such charges were apparently circulated in China by those now in power even before Mao died. The Four denounced these as rumors at that time. On the other hand, today the current rulers now tell us that the Four framed up Teng Hsiao-ping, fabricated charges against him and, against Mao's instructions, launched a campaign against him. How are we to sort all this out? Fundamentally, I believe, by the criteria summarized just above, putting emphasis on line.)

Finally, on this point, with whatever criticisms Mao may have made of the Four, it is clear, I am convinced, that there is no way that he wanted them knocked down. He certainly knew that with them gone there would be no leading people who would carry forth

what had been accomplished through great struggle in the Cultural Revolution. After all, who are the people in power now and what was their role in the Cultural Revolution? The most prominent ones were either targets of, opposed to or wavering elements in the Cultural Revolution. Teng was a target. People like Li Hsien-nien and Yeh Chien-ying were part of the group of officials responsible for the "February Adverse Current," in 1967, where they tried to put a stop to the whole Cultural Revolution—of course, no doubt the verdict on this has been reversed too, and that "Adverse Current" is no longer considered adverse but fine. As for Hua Kuo-feng, at the start of the Cultural Revolution he was the Provincial Secretary in Hunan Province and he supported the wrong side—lined up with the "royalists" as they were called, with the people aligned with Liu Shao-chi. He was criticized and went down for this, though it is true that he made a self-criticism and was returned to office in the same year, 1966.

As to what the outlook of those in power now is toward the Cultural Revolution, even in its early stages, besides what we know of Teng's role as target, we have the following statement by Yeh Chien-ying: "The third comparatively major setback [in the Party's history] took place *immediately after* we had settled accounts with Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line." [*Peking Review*, No. 43, 1977, p. 12, emphasis added] This is the same line that led Yeh to play an important part in the "February Adverse Current"—that the Cultural Revolution once started should have been stopped as soon as Liu Shao-chi was exposed. At the very most Yeh is saying that by 1968 the Cultural Revolution had turned from a good thing into a bad thing—to say the least this was hardly Mao's line, it is a repudiation of the struggle-criticism-transformation that took place through the Cultural Revolution and brought, overall, very positive, tremendously positive, results.

It would not at all be exaggerating to say that people like Yeh actually *hate* the Cultural Revolution and hated it from the beginning. They regarded it as a horrible disruption, throwing the country into chaos and subjecting venerable veteran cadres to humiliation at the hands of upstarts (many being dragged through the street with dunce caps on, being forced to endure long criticism meetings in front of thousands, etc.). Such people regard and have for some time regarded Mao's ideas on the class struggle as out of keeping with the time and conditions and, more than that, extremely dangerous. According to a text reprinted as an appendix in a book about the Cultural Revolution by Jean Daubier, Mao is reported to have said about the top leaders around him at the start

of the Cultural Revolution (that is, the veteran leaders in top Party positions, which includes Chou En-lai), "Most people thought at the time that my understanding was out of date, and at times I was the *only person* to agree with my own suggestions." [*A History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, pp. 307-308, emphasis added] Chou En-lai in particular did go along with the Cultural Revolution after Mao struggled with him at the start, and during the early stages of it—up to the time of the Lin Piao affair—he played a good and very important role, overall. But, after the Lin Piao affair, Chou's role turned into its opposite. Further, the notion of many of these people that it was time to cut out all this class struggle and get down to business—the business of modernizing, building modern defense, etc.—was increased not decreased through the course of the Cultural Revolution; and, as noted, especially after the betrayal by Lin Piao, they jumped out all the more with this line.

How could Mao think that he could rely on such people to continue the revolution? Obviously, he could not—and events both before and since his death have proved this many times over, as shown in this paper. With whatever mistakes they may have made, and whatever disagreements with and criticisms of them Mao may have had, it is clear that he knew that the Four were the forces in top leadership who could be counted on to fight to carry forward the revolution.

Finally, while I think that overall on the question of how to handle the struggle after the 10th Congress Mao was more correct than the Four, I do think that in a certain sense they "caught" the extreme seriousness of what was going on before Mao did. Mao certainly recognized the real attempts of the right to reverse the revolution and, as pointed out, took steps to combat this politically, but I think that the Four ran smack up against the intensifying moves of the rightists to carry off restoration before Mao himself came up against this in such a direct way.

In other words, the Four were in the thick of the battle, they were under direct attack for defending the gains of the Cultural Revolution, while for a time those launching these attacks no doubt pretended to Mao's face to accept the very things they were attacking and talked differently to him than they acted in actually mobilizing their forces to oppose all that Mao stood for. Sooner or later, however, they were forced to go beyond just attacking those in Mao's camp, the Four and their followers, and to come into open, more direct conflict with Mao himself. (I have some experience with how this works and know that it sometimes, even

often, develops in this way in the course of two-line struggle. Often the Chairman even thinks at first that those who warn him about the development of another headquarters attempting to overturn his line, the line of the Party, are just stirring up trouble themselves, even though he is aware of real differences with one or more other leading people; it is only later in the development of things that such people go from indirect attack to direct attack on the Chairman and fully reveal their opposition headquarters, and does it then become clear that it is not possible for the Chairman to win them over just by arguing differences out with them.) So it was, I am convinced, with the developments of the differences between Mao and other top leaders, Chou En-lai in particular, in the last few years.

Still, on the whole, I think Mao's approach was more correct than the Four's and the criticisms he apparently had of the Four around this were, in the main—though not, in my opinion, entirely—correct. But these disagreements and criticisms were tactical—that is, they were among people in the same camp—and can in no way be compared to the fundamental differences between Mao (and the Four) on the one hand and the right deviationists on the other, and to the struggle that Mao (and the Four) waged against these capitalist roaders.

There is one other fact which makes very clear, indisputably clear in my opinion, that down to the end it was the Four that Mao had confidence in and fundamentally relied on. And that is the fact that for at least a year before and right up until his death Mao entrusted his nephew, Mao Yuan-hsin, to be in charge of his day-to-day affairs, including controlling access to Mao. Mao Yuan-hsin was the closest and most important "sworn follower" of the Four—he was, in effect, the fifth member of the "gang of five." And there is no doubt that at any time Mao could have removed Mao Yuan-hsin from the position of managing his day-to-day affairs with a mere flick of the wrist—after all, Hua Kuo-feng and Wang Tung-hsing (head of the PLA unit guarding the Chairman and the Central Committee and now a Vice-Chairman of the new Central Committee) would have been only too glad to get rid of Mao Yuan-hsin, if Mao had wanted it (apparently they have now quite literally gotten rid of Mao Yuan-hsin—he is reported to be yet another "suicide" in the custody of the current rulers). Yet, while signing treaties with Hua Kuo-feng ("With you carrying out your work, I'm at ease," etc.) Mao continued down to the end to entrust Mao Yuan-hsin with the crucial job of controlling access to him and continued to rely on the Four and their followers, in-

cluding their "sworn follower," Mao Yuan-hsin, to carry forward the revolution.

"But why would Chou En-lai want to go revisionist at the end, he was dying, and why would other long-time leaders of the Party, veteran revolutionaries, go revisionist?" I find it incredible—but such arguments have actually been made. Such an outlook makes the question of revisionism not a matter of line but of intent. As opposed to dialectical materialism, it is idealism and metaphysics. People go revisionist because there is a material and ideological basis for this and because in response to the situation they are confronted with they take an incorrect line, an incorrect road, in attempting to resolve these contradictions, and because the bourgeois aspect wins out over the proletarian. Why this happens with particular individuals is impossible to say precisely, but that it will continually happen with people, especially leading people, in a communist party so long as there is a party (so long as there are classes)—this is an inevitable law.

As a general guide to understanding this, we should look not to intent but to what Engels said about this kind of thing—revolution, he pointed out, develops in stages and at each new stage some people get "stuck." In addition, in the specific situation of China, the question of making the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution, both materially and ideologically, is an extremely difficult and complicated question. And the phenomenon of people who were revolutionaries in the democratic stage but turned into counter-revolutionaries with the advance of the revolution into the socialist stage—especially the deeper the socialist revolution goes and the more it hacks away at remaining bourgeois relations and ideas—this is a big phenomenon, as Mao himself insisted.

Were the Four correct in stressing this question and in targeting a number of veteran leaders? Yes, they were quite correct. Besides what he stressed on this point in 1976, already in 1967 Mao stated that at the start of the Cultural Revolution it was only through very sharp struggle that he got a slight majority of the Central Committee to go along with it, and he emphasized that the power-holders taking the capitalist road were the kind of people who:

"during the time of the democratic revolution actively participated in opposing the three big mountains [imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism], but once the entire country was liberated, they were not so keen on

opposing the bourgeoisie. Though they had actively participated in and endorsed the overthrow of local despots and the distribution of land, after the country's liberation when agricultural collectivization was to be implemented, they were not very keen on this either. Let's just say it is 'veteran cadres encountering new problems!' There are those who have committed errors of orientation and line in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and this has been said to be a case of 'veteran cadres encountering new problems.' But the fact that you have erred tells us that you have not thoroughly remolded your bourgeois world outlook. **From now on, veteran cadres are bound to encounter even more new problems.** To insure that you will resolutely take the road of socialism, you will have to undergo a thorough proletarian revolutionization, ideologically." (from the U.S. Government collection cited earlier, emphasis added)

(It should be pointed out that in this speech Mao is a little too optimistic about how well the current Cultural Revolution will resolve things, saying that "this Great Cultural Revolution, should consolidate things for a decade at least," and he also says that to launch such a revolution is possible only two or three times in a century—I will return to this last point, especially, a little later). If such people do not go through such ideological revolutionization they can only become the targets of the revolution.

Of course, such people rarely consciously recognize that they are going revisionist. Almost always they think that they are continuing to fight for socialism and that is why they don't stop fighting for their line until they breathe their last. Keeping in mind, however, what was pointed out earlier about how most of the very top veteran leaders tended very strongly to regard Mao's ideas of continuing the class struggle to be "outdated," and the fact that this tendency grew in many such people through the course of the Cultural Revolution, it is not surprising that in this last round a number of them, while intending to fight for what they saw as socialism, were actually fighting for all they were worth against the further development of the socialist revolution. And so, despite their intentions, they were transformed into targets of the revolution. Again, this is not surprising, for as Mao warned as early as 1967 (as cited above), "From now on, veteran cadres are bound to encounter even more new problems."

"But the Four did not just attack the leading people, including veteran cadre, during the recent struggles, they attacked them at the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, including people like Chen Yi and even Chou En-lai at that time. They were tied in with

Lin Piao and really played a bad role in the Cultural Revolution, and anything positive they did was just because they were at the right place at the right time and took advantage of the situation for their own ends."

It is no doubt true that in the Cultural Revolution, specifically during the peak of mass upsurge (1966-69), the Four made mistakes. So what? Revolutionaries cannot avoid making mistakes if they want to be revolutionaries. Chiang Ching sometimes associated herself with wrong tendencies in a particular battle, etc., but again, so what? Does this characterize her overall role or that of the Four? Most definitely not.

As for being associated with Lin Piao, what genuine leftist wasn't so associated during the high tide of the Cultural Revolution? Mao was certainly closely associated then with the man who was named his official "successor" in 1969. In fact, as Mao wrote to Chiang Ching in 1966, to make public criticisms of Lin Piao then would be "like pouring cold water" on the genuine left and "thus helping the right wing," and "at the moment all the left speaks the same language." (See Han Suyin's *Wind in the Tower*, p. 279) By this Mao meant then both the genuine left and "ultra-leftists" were temporarily united in fighting the main enemy at that time—the right (during this period, many of Lin Piao's actions and much of his line was "left" in form; as he reached the pinnacle of his power, however, his line became more and more openly right in form as well as essence). Therefore, naturally the genuine left, including the Four as leaders of it—and certainly including Mao—were linked with Lin Piao at that time.

Could this have once again been the case in the struggle against the right deviationist wind—that is, could Mao have been temporarily united with the "ultra-left" "gang of four," while making preparations to knock them down after defeating the more immediate enemy, the right deviationists? The facts point to the opposite conclusion. As I believe I have shown convincingly, the Four and Mao had fundamental unity on line and it was exactly the Four that Mao relied on down to the end—as shown by his relationship with Mao Yuan-hsin among other things. After Lin Piao fell, in going back over the line he put out, it was possible rather quickly to see the basic differences between Mao and Lin on fundamental questions of line. But today it is clear that it is Hua Kuo-feng and the others in power now whose line is in fundamental disagreement with Mao's, while the Four's line still stands as that of Mao. And as stressed before, if the Four and Mao were not in basic agreement, while Mao, Chou En-lai and people like Hua Kuo-feng were, the struggle would have gone down completely differently in the last couple of years. And finally it should be emphasized that the political guidance Mao gave to the masses right down to and especially at the end was to arm them to deal with the danger from the *right U* the right and the right again—in every campaign after the 10th Congress, from Lin

Piao and Confucius to the dictatorship of the proletariat campaign, to the instructions on *Water Margin* and finally the anti-right deviationist struggle.

It does seem true that Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan in particular did get drawn into some of the sectarianism promoted by Lin and Chen Po-ta in the early part of the Cultural Revolution, for which they later made self-criticisms. It is also true that at a certain point during the upsurge of the Cultural Revolution Chiang Ching, at least, raised the slogan "attack by reason, defend by force." But she did not raise this as a general slogan for the Cultural Revolution; it was raised in particular circumstances. The "ultra-left" group of "May 16" (or 516) was mnnng wild, making armed attacks, carrying out looting, burning, etc. In response to *this*, as Han Suyin told it in her book *Wind in the Tower*, "on July 22 (1967) at a Red Guard rally, Chiang Ching again told the Red Guards that they should attack only by words, but since Red Guards were being attacked, she conceded they could defend themselves. The slogan, 'Attack by reason, defend by force,' would lead to the formation of vigilante groups and provosts among the workers, to enforce order and to protect state property against hooliganism by the 516." (p. 311) So it is not all exactly as the current rulers tell us. I do think that there is a danger in this slogan, because anyone can say they were attacked first and use that as a pretext to attack others. But still, it cannot be said that Chiang Ching raised this slogan to promote anarchy or oppose Mao's line nor that the effect of this was overall to encourage anarchy, hooliganism, terrorism, etc.

And any mistakes made by Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan were clearly secondary to their overall very positive role. I have already mentioned the truly great achievements of Chiang Ching in the revolutionization of art, and her positive contributions to the Cultural Revolution were not limited to that, though they would be great even if they were. And it is a well known fact that, as Mao himself said, it was the article by Yao Wen-yuan attacking the rightists who were calling for the return of Peng Teh-huai to office, which was "the signal" for the start of the Cultural Revolution. Further, together with Chang Chun-chiao, Yao led the "January Storm" in Shanghai in 1967, the first upsurge in which the masses seized back power from the capitalist-roaders. Mao hailed this as a great event and called on the whole country to learn from it—and it is true that Chang and Yao played a tremendous role in this, fighting against both the right and the "ultra-left," and it will remain true no matter how many times the current rulers go through their farcical attempts to deny it. (Wang Hung-wen also played a big, heroic role in this upsurge and in consolidating proletarian power in Shanghai—more on Wang shortly).

And it is beyond doubt that once Lin Piao had clearly turned against Mao there was only antagonism between him and the Four. The "Outline of Project 571," drawn up as the Lin Piao clique's counter-revolutionary program, contains blasts obviously aimed at the Four, and Chang Chun-chiao is especially singled out for attack (by name). Wang Hung-wen in particular distinguished himself in the struggle against Lin Piao at the Central Committee meeting in 1970 where Lin's forces made their first big bid for power. And the Four in general played a strong role in the struggle against Lin's counter-revolutionary attempts to usurp power. Otherwise, why would they have been as high up in the Party as they were after Lin fell, especially given the fact that the rightists were unquestionably launching big attacks on them at that time trying as they are now to link the Four with Lin as counter-revolutionaries? It could only be because such charges could not get over—at least not while Mao was around—and clearly Mao wanted them in leading positions.

As for the question of Chen Yi and attacks on him, I believe the Four, or some of them at least, did make mistakes on this. From what I have been able to learn the Four, or *lome* of them, at first at least, did join in some of these attacks. It is true that not only Chou En-lai but Mao himself defended Chen Yi, against attacks from the "ultra-left" (represented especially by Wang Li in the Cultural Revolution Committee), though it was never said that Chen Yi should not be criticized. And it is also a fact that especially when it became clear that attacks on Chen Yi were being made as part of an "ultra-left" counter-current, the Four, and Chiang Ching most prominent among them, opposed the attacks on Chen Yi.

Chen Yi was popular among the masses generally and had respect among leaders because he had a history of backing Mao at crucial junctures in the Chinese revolution, and he was well-known for his straightforward, even blunt character—he was open about his views and frank in struggling things out.

These are, in and of themselves, good qualities but they are not the essential question. For example, much of the same could also be said of Teng Hsiao-ping. And as far as I'm concerned the question of Chen Yi is not a simple one. While he did many good things in the Chinese revolution and had many good qualities as described above, he also made some serious errors, and overall in the Cultural Revolution he did not play a good role. For example, he, too, was part of the "February Adverse Current," and it can be fairly stated that he never really supported, and definitely did not

promote, the Cultural Revolution. Not only was Chen Yi a part of the "February Adverse Current," but at that time he declared his support for Liu Shao-chi, and during the course of the Cultural Revolution he said things to the Red Guards like why didn't they go to Vietnam if they were such hot-shot revolutionaries (which is certainly not a justified statement, even granted that many of the Red Guards got into infantile left errors during the upsurge of the Cultural Revolution). He was certainly someone who should have been criticized, even sharply, in the Cultural Revolution.

From what I have learned the Four held that Chen Yi was a rightist—and that his remaining on the Central Committee at the 9th Congress in 1969 was as a representative of the right. (Mao is supposed to have said something like this in 1969, at the time of the 9th Party Congress, but supposedly as a joke to Chen Yi himself, after Chen jokingly complained that he could not be on the CC because people called him a rightist. Perhaps Mao was simply joking or perhaps his thinking was that Chen was someone who had made right errors but had also made contributions and could make them again, especially in the struggles then shaping up—against Lin Piao.) In any case, it is certainly true that Chen Yi made serious errors, especially during the mass upsurge of the Cultural Revolution, including at its earliest stages. And it is not surprising that the Four came into the conflict with him in the process of carrying out the acute and complicated struggle of the Cultural Revolution, especially at its high tide of upsurge. Nor is it surprising that, given his role in the Cultural Revolution, the Four, while opposing the "ultra-left's" attacks on Chen Yi, did not think of him as one who could be relied on to carry forward the revolution.

Much has been made of the fact that Mao attended Chen Yi's funeral, a rare thing for him to do in his later years. Yes, Mao did, but this too has to be viewed in context. Chen died (in 1972) very shortly after the struggle against Lin Piao came to a head. Chen had been a resolute fighter against Lin for some time—partly, in my opinion, for good reasons and partly for not so good reasons having to do with Chen's own errors during the Cultural Revolution. But in any case, Chen Yi was a big force in the military and had close ties with a number of key commanders who had to be united closely with to consolidate things against Lin's forces, even after Lin died. Further, from what I have learned, many of these commanders insisted very emphatically that Mao come to the funeral, and it was only after they made a big deal out of this that Mao came, at the last minute. This is not to say that politically

Mao did not want to come, but such events were even then very trying on him physically and he probably would not have come if it weren't for the insistence of these commanders. I do think that Mao at that time wanted to make clear that he was siding with the forces represented by Chen Yi—but again the main reason for that was the need for consolidation coming off the Lin Piao affair.

To return, then, to what I said earlier, the case of Chen Yi was not so simple. In my opinion Mao was more correct in his approach to this question than the Four and they did make errors on this. But it also has to be kept in mind that the present rulers, in rallying all opposition they could to the Cultural Revolution, have—for some time no doubt—made extensive use of Chen Yi's reputation and his mistakes for this purpose—not presenting them as mistakes but good things, of course.

Chen Yi opposed Lin Piao, the present rulers tell us. Yes, he did, but as I have said, that too must be divided into two. Chen Yi opposed the "gang of four" the present rulers also tell us. Yes, it is true that he and the Four came into conflict—but that was primarily as a result of the fact that Chen Yi's role in the Cultural Revolution was not on the whole good, and secondarily because the Four did make errors in dealing with the question of Chen Yi in the midst of complicated, on-going and acute struggle. Given all this, and especially the use the right deviationists were making of Chen Yi, it is not surprising and not altogether wrong I think, if the Four did not want to make positive mention of Chen in the press, etc.

"Well, that still proves that the 'gang of four' would not unite with people who made mistakes but were not counter-revolutionaries." It does not prove that at all. They united with a number of such people, not the least of whom was Ma Tien-shui, a veteran cadre in Shanghai, who at the start of the Cultural Revolution took the wrong stand and supported Liu Shao-chi's line. After Ma made a self-criticism, the Four united with him and in fact relied on him to keep things running in Shanghai on a day to day basis. Undoubtedly they made some mistakes in their evaluation of some people but in the main they did not and certainly they were overall correct—and I don't hesitate to say heroic—in the struggle against the right (and the "ultra-left" whom they were also locked in sharp battle with from the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, in Shanghai and elsewhere). And certainly they were correct in not uniting with die-hard capitalist-roaders such as those holding the reigns of power now.

One further note on this question of uniting with people who

make serious mistakes but are not counter-revolutionaries. It is a good thing to unite with such people, provided it is on the basis of a correct line. But it is generally the case that precisely in order to be able to accomplish this, it is necessary to subject such people to sharp criticism and get them to make serious self-criticism. This was obviously one of the reasons why Mao launched the Cultural Revolution—first it was to overthrow the revisionist headquarters of Liu Shao-chi, but a major purpose was also to administer a "shock" to many high officials who were taking the wrong road. In other words it is not so simple a thing as saying, "well you have made mistakes and why don't you just correct them and unite and everything will be fine."

And it gets even more complicated if people who have made serious mistakes feel that the balance of forces is in their favor and they don't have to criticize themselves, or unite for that matter. This applies especially to the struggle in the last few years in China. A number of people who were knocked down in the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. This was not wrong in every case, though in my opinion in many cases it was most definitely wrong. But even where people should be rehabilitated, this has to be done on a correct basis, not by glossing over the question of their making serious self-criticism and certainly not by encouraging them to resume the wrong road. There is a certain dialectic in many cases between knocking such people down and uniting with them—in other words, sometimes it is even necessary in some cases to knock them down *in order* to be able to get them to reform and unite with the correct line.

This was true in the Cultural Revolution in more than a few cases. Again, so long as their rehabilitation is done on a correct and principled basis and so long as they have not shown themselves to be unrepentant, it is not wrong to bring such people back.

But if they are brought back not on the basis of serious self-criticism but instead on an essentially unrepentant basis, this is very dangerous—and also makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to unite with them. This was the situation the Four were faced with, especially after the Lin Piao affair and with the restoration of many people on this unrepentant basis, besides the restoration of certain people who should not have been brought back at all because there was no basis for thinking that they would take the revolutionary road, regardless of what they might say right then.

Again, it should be remembered that many of the top veteran leaders of the Party actually hated the Cultural Revolution and

that this was especially true of many of those who were knocked down during it. Mao consistently encouraged such people not to bear a grudge but to learn from their experience in the Cultural Revolution and unite with the forward thrust of the continuing revolution, and a number did so. However, people like Teng Hsiao-ping, who was completely unrepentant, deliberately stirred up the resentment of veteran cadres while attacking new leading people who came to the fore in the Cultural Revolution, along with restoring other unrepentant capitalist-roaders like himself (the fact that people like Lo Jui-ching and Chou Yang could be brought back while Mao was still alive indicates how powerful the right had become even at that time).

As we wrote in the October 15, 1976 *Revolution*, Teng Hsiao-ping's policy was "driving out proletarian revolutionaries, including those who had come to the fore during the Cultural Revolution, and bringing back into the Party, and into leading posts, revisionists and degenerates of all kinds who had justly been cast down by the masses during the Cultural Revolution, who were still unrepentant and who wanted to 'settle scores' with the masses and their revolutionary leaders. In addition he tried to stir up people who had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution, but still had leading positions, to oppose and reverse the advances made through the Cultural Revolution. He also tried to sabotage Mao's line of training millions of successors to carry forward the revolution." (see p. 16) This is what Teng meant by "rectification"—and, as indicated before, what Hua also advocated and carried out and is carrying out now.

As for the statement that the Four attacked Chou En-lai as well during the early period of the Cultural Revolution, I do not think this is true. At that time Chou En-lai's role was overall a positive one, though in my opinion even then he went too far in protecting certain people who should not have been protected—Yu Chiu-li, who came under severe and for the most part correct criticism in the Cultural Revolution, is one of these. Further, it was exactly at the point that it became clear that the "ultra-left" attacks on various leaders, such as Chen Yi, were actually being aimed at Chou En-lai that the Four—and again, Chiang Ching most prominent among them—came out very strongly against such attacks. Undoubtedly the Four and Chou had differences even at that time but they were then not antagonistic and not dealt with as such by the Four.

Mao is supposed to have said that Chou En-lai was the "housekeeper" of China. This was true—in a major way he kept

things together and running. But a housekeeper is only fine so long as he serves the master of the house—the proletariat in socialist China. If he ceases to do that and tries to replace the masses as master then he turns into his opposite and all his organizational and political skills become bad things not good things. This was not the case in the early period of the Cultural Revolution, but it became the case near the end, and it was then that the Four opened fire on Chou.

As for the statement that the Four never really did anything good in the Cultural Revolution and were just in the right place at the right time—if this weren't a criminal statement it would be laughable. Long before the Cultural Revolution, Yao Wen-yuan had distinguished himself in the struggle against the bourgeois rightists in 1957. And, as noted before, it was Yao who took up the task, under Mao's direction, of writing the article that served as the opening salvo in the Cultural Revolution. This was not a question of being in the right place at the right time—there was a big struggle even to get this article published, and in putting it out Yao was opening himself up to bitter attack from the right, which had a lot of power, and which definitely did attack Yao. Further, as touched on before, the struggle in Shanghai was very sharp and complicated and Yao and Chang Chun-chiao as leaders of the left were viciously attacked by both right and "ultra-left" forces. They did a tremendous job of uniting broad masses around a correct line in the face of all this—and the reactionaries had their mass base then, too, as they do now (there are still classes in China, we should not forget, and there are still advanced, intermediate and backward among the masses).

Chang Chun-chiao was, more than anyone else, the overall leader of this struggle in Shanghai. And he did not appear out of nowhere. As noted before, for a number of years he served as a deputy Party secretary in Shanghai under Ko Ching-shih, a very popular leader and strong supporter of Mao's, who, for example, went all out in favor of the Great Leap Forward and came under severe attack along with Mao for this. Ko died in early 1965 and after that the revisionists, with Liu Shao-chi's backing, took over in Shanghai, pushing Chang Chun-chiao aside for all practical purposes, because Chang had been closely associated with Ko and the revolutionary line he represented.

Once the Cultural Revolution broke out Chang came forward to support it and play a leading role in it, not only in Shanghai but in the country overall. And once again he was sharply attacked by the right—and the "ultra-left." During the high tide of this strug-

gle, it is interesting and significant to note, all the charges now enshrined as truth about how Chang was a Kuomintang agent, etc., were brought up against him, were thoroughly gone into and refuted as the garbage they are. (It is true that over 40 years ago as a young man barely 20, and under the direction of bad leadership, Chang Chun-chiao did write an article under the name Ti Ke, attacking Lu Hsun and putting forward a bad line on literature. What of it? Does that make him an "out-and-out Old-time Capitulationist" as the current rulers say? Does it even compare to the important role he played in supporting the revolutionization of literature and art in China, beginning before the Cultural Revolution? Hardly, and if such are the criteria then there is not a single revolutionary in China today. And I find it extremely hypocritical and ridiculous to attack Chang Chun-chiao for this while resurrecting the man under whose leadership he wrote the article, Chou Yang!)

The attacks on Chang from the right and the "ultra left" were so sharp by the counter-revolutionaries that Mao emphatically stated at one point (in 1967), "If that meeting is held to bombard Chang Chun-chiao we will certainly take the necessary steps and arrest people." (see Schram's book, p. 278) No doubt if Mao had died and if the counter-revolutionaries had won out in China then, the various attacks like those on the Four now would have been printed as truth—and repeated as such by some people.

Yet through all this Chang played the leading role in Shanghai in advancing the Cultural Revolution and uniting the masses around the correct line. One particular action of his is most interesting and telling in light of current charges against the Four. At a certain point the counter-revolutionaries, especially those in "ultra-left" disguise, instigated the masses in Shanghai to "suspect all," insisting that only Chairman Mao was reliable. On that basis they mobilized large numbers of workers to leave the factories to go to Peking, under the pretext that they could deliver their complaints directly to Chairman Mao. At great personal risk to himself, Chang Chun-chiao intercepted the train and through long hours of struggle—in which counter-revolutionaries again instigated the masses, saying "don't listen to him, he's a counter-revolutionary"—he convinced the masses to send representatives to Peking while the bulk returned to the factories.

And what did Chang tell the workers, what line did he win them over with? He said—the counter-revolutionaries are luring you away from Shanghai so you can't make revolution there, and further, what kind of example would it set for the rest of the coun-

try if the workers of Shanghai (who led the first mass seizure of power from below in the Cultural Revolution) left their production posts and abandoned the task of production as the model for making revolution!

And once Chang assumed the leading role in Shanghai, production there boomed. You see, Chang Chun-chiao and the Four in general were concerned about production; that was not their difference with the right. But they did not raise it above revolution—*that* was their difference with the right, the difference between two opposing class stands and interests.

Wang Hung-wen also came to the fore in the struggle in Shanghai. At the early stages he led workers there in uniting to make revolution—and also came under heavy fire from the right, was branded a "counter-revolutionary" by Liu Shao-chi's forces, who still had considerable strength. This was no light matter—it meant putting your ass—and maybe literally your life—on the line. The same was true, by the way, of Mao Yuan-hsin, Mao's nephew and a "sworn accomplice" of the "gang of four." He was in Harbin at the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution and played a role similar to Wang Hung-wen and in the face of the same fierce attacks and the same risks.

I have already mentioned more than once Chiang Ching's great contributions in the field of literature and art, as well as contributions to the Cultural Revolution overall, despite certain mistakes. Here I would only stress again that this, too, was not accomplished without fierce struggle—she went right into a powerful lair of the bourgeoisie and overall did a hell of a job in making revolution. Chiang Ching, I believe, was capable of more than a little subjectivism, and no doubt she made enemies on this basis and gave her enemies a basis for attacking her. But, again, this is definitely secondary to her overall very positive role. And it should also be pointed out that, while she may have had certain "privileges" because of being the Chairman's wife, this was more than outweighed by the fact that she was a key target for all those who opposed Mao but could not attack the Chairman openly and so turned special fire on her as a way of getting at Mao—even as the current rulers are doing now. If it is said, as it is by the current rulers, that Chiang Ching wanted to be an "empress," I can only say that she is infinitely preferable to the Emperors now ruling from behind Tien An Men gate. (In any case I do not think that Chiang Ching was the political leader of the Four—that role was played by Chang Chun-chiao.)

"Well, if the 'gang of four' were all so great, then how do you

explain the reports that the masses were jubilant at their smashing?" First, I would say that the reports of the Four's political death are greatly exaggerated. By this I do not mean that I expect them specifically to make a comeback—that is extremely unlikely. I mean that they have a good deal of support in China—support not only for them personally, of course, but for the line they fought for, Mao's line. This is true especially among the class conscious masses and the revolutionary forces who came to the fore during the Cultural Revolution—leading people in this category have been purged, of course, but there are undoubtedly millions of such people among the masses. That there is resistance to the campaign against the Four and the purge of all their followers and supporters, and that it is widespread, is something even the current rulers cannot hide—much as they want to deny it, they are forced to admit it indirectly and sometimes directly.

On the other hand the Four definitely do have a number of enemies in China—they certainly did at a time when there can be no question about their overall very positive role, for example at the high tide of the Cultural Revolution, as noted before. As I stressed earlier, we can never forget that there are classes in China and that there are advanced, intermediate and backward among the masses—this is not just some abstract formulation but has real meaning. The Four insisted on the "high road," and this was bound to run them up against not only counter-revolutionaries but the inclinations of many "middle strata" and the prejudices and backward ideas of many of the masses themselves. Then, too, they did make mistakes and this could only aid their enemies. But I will say it again—the essence of the matter is that they fought for a correct line and overall their role was revolutionary and very positive.

Further, we must not be taken in by superficial phenomena. The large demonstrations to "celebrate the smashing of the 'gang of four'" prove primarily one thing—the present rulers can organize a demonstration. So can most reactionaries, especially if they have power. We still have to base ourselves on the fundamental question—what is the class content, the line, of those demonstrations, which class do they serve? If masses of people could not be organized around a reactionary line, how much simpler our tasks would be!—and that they can is true not only in capitalist countries but in socialist ones as well, even China, *in the short run*. (And let's not forget that there were also massive demonstrations when Teng was overthrown—the masses can certainly be mobilized around a correct line, too.)

"But the Chinese people have been through the Cultural Revolution and are very class conscious." Things are not as simple as that. Many of them are very class-conscious—the bulk of these are opposed to what is going on now, of that I am sure—how could they be otherwise? But many are not that class conscious—this is a fact Mao was well aware of and repeatedly took measures to try to deal with, recognizing that even under socialism it remains a long-term problem.

In addition there are a large number of cadres, intellectuals and others who enjoy a relatively privileged position in the division of labor in society, and these can form a powerful potential social base for revisionism. Under the leadership of a correct line the great majority of these can certainly be united together with the broad masses in the forward motion of the revolution. But if those representing the proletarian line are smashed in a coup, as has happened, and if appeals are made to the negative, bourgeois aspect of these social forces, while fascist military discipline is imposed on the masses ("Obey the Central Committee! Obey the Central Committee!" repeatedly blares the press, especially the *army* press), then these strata mentioned above can be unleashed as a social base for revisionism and many of the masses can be drawn in and or coerced to go along. This is no reason for us to go along with what is happening, no reason at all for us to support counter-revolution and counter-revolutionaries and oppose revolution and revolutionaries.

"Sure some bad lines are coming out now but that's not the point. The point is that the 'gang of four' just kept on causing disruption and there are lots of problems with China's economy, the threat of war and so on, and it is necessary to have an end to all the disruption and get things moving, so the 'gang of four' just had to be put down and we should support the people in there now and hope they can make things work. Sure the guys in there now don't say as much about class struggle and they put more stress on modernization, but that's what's needed; do you have to talk about class struggle all the time and if you don't does that make you a revisionist and if you do does that make you a revolutionary?"

On the last point first, yes, you do have to talk about class struggle all the time—Mao certainly said so; he said you had to talk about it "every year, every month, and every day," this was part of the Party's basic line he formulated. No, just talking about it doesn't make you a revolutionary, but correctly waging it does—and that's what the Four did, overwhelmingly. And not to

talk about it—yes, all the time—is a guarantee that you're going to go off the track. The point is, as Mao stressed in his last few years especially, in many ways the new society is not much different than the old. And it is not a static thing, it has to be moved one way or the other—forward through revolution toward communism or backward through restoration to capitalism. The class struggle is not an abstract, it actually determines this life and death question; and the bourgeoisie is waging it all the time so you have to talk about—educate people about—and wage it all the time: if you don't, if you rely on spontaneity, you will inevitably lose out to the bourgeoisie. This is why making production—or modernization—the main emphasis is not just wrong in the abstract but will lead to revisionism and capitalist restoration.

Second, on the question of "disruption." As I indicated before, it is not correct to lay all the disruption that undeniably went on at the doorstep of the Four. There is no doubt that in struggling against the revisionist line they and their followers caused some "disruption"—how could that be avoided?—but as I pointed out before this does not cause nearly as much disruption to *socialism* as the carrying out of a revisionist line. Communists are for order under socialism but not any kind of order, not "order" which means capitalist restoration—in other words, they do not raise stability and unity above the class struggle.

I also have no doubt that in the turmoil that was going on not only did order break down in some instances but there were cases more than usual where socialist economic relations were disrupted, people went in for capitalist practices, some profiteering, black marketing, etc., went on, and so forth. And further I have no question that bad forces jumped into the fray, some of them siding with the Four, and perhaps some good people were wrongly attacked—as far as I know it is not possible to make revolution without this happening. Doesn't this kind of thing happen in every major struggle?

These things are not the essence of the matter and to make them such does not help us at all in understanding and evaluating what went on. The disruption and disorder that occurred were not due to the attempts of the "gang of four" to "create anarchy" but to the two-line struggle that was raging, to the fact that there was not unity at the top and that both sides—not just the Four—were making an all-out effort to mobilize their forces to topple their enemy. Both supported certain forces and opposed others, both encouraged one side to knock down the other—isn't the "General Program" exactly a call for "daring" to knock down the Four and

their supporters, and does anyone seriously think that this call was issued only as late as Fall, 1975? In fact we know that this was not the case—the present rulers have repeatedly praised people who openly attacked the Four, going back many years. Who has ever heard of a serious struggle where such things do not happen, on both sides?

Our attitude toward such a struggle cannot be to wish it would go away or to say that whoever is calling for struggle and knocking down people is bad—both will call for struggle and for knocking down people, where they don't have the upper hand. As Marxists our approach has to be to examine what are the lines and class interests represented by the opposing forces and what is the balance of forces—and on that basis to evaluate matters. From all I have said, if we apply that standard there is no doubt that we should support the Four, and we could say that therefore the current rulers, the right deviationists, are really at fault for the disruption.

In fact in many cases at least the right was directly responsible for the disruption. This came down in two ways: (1) they instituted revisionist practices, including rules and regulations that did indeed control, check and suppress the workers, which brought forth resistance from the workers, especially the most class conscious; and (2) they instigated sections of the workers to strike for higher wages, promoting economism. According to the *China Quarterly*, Teng Hsiao-ping was responsible for a good part of the disruptions in Hangchow, especially in 1975, with policies like this, particularly the second, and it was in part in response to this that emphasis to the question of criticizing and restricting bourgeois right was given by Mao—and the Four. (It is repeatedly charged by the current rulers that the Four pushed the line of "don't produce for the wrong line." Perhaps in some cases they did, but this does not necessarily mean that this was a call in every case for a strike; in fact in most cases it may well have meant resist and refuse to implement the rightists' reversals on the industrial front—restrictive and repressive rules and regulations, etc.—but continue to produce according to the principles and rules and regulations established through the Cultural Revolution. I don't know the particulars in most cases but it would be very foolish to accept at face value the charges of the current rulers, since an examination of their line has shown that they raise the specter of anarchy, etc., as a cover for propagating and implementing their revisionist line. And, on the other hand, as indicated before, an examination of the line of the Four—and their practice where they had leadership—shows that they didn't pose production against revolution but developed pro-

duction under the command of revolution according to the correct dialectic, "grasp revolution, promote production." Again, of course, this is not to say that they didn't make mistakes in the course of extremely complicated struggle or to deny that in some cases bad elements jumped onto the bandwagon, from whom they were not able to distinguish themselves in the swirl of mass struggle; but as stressed before, this is not the essence of the question and to make it such does not aid us in getting to the heart of the matter.)

Overall, as stated before, we could say that the rightists, the current rulers, were responsible for the disruptions because of their line. But to put this forward as a general principle would be metaphysical—we might as well say that the bourgeoisie is at fault for being the bourgeoisie. Since it is, and since it will be around for quite a while, the only thing to do is to struggle against it and to support those everywhere who do the same—especially the proletariat and its leaders in a country where the working class is in power and is fighting to stay there and advance.

Mao never took the attitude, strategically at least, that disruptions, or disturbances, are bad things. Quite the opposite. And specifically, if Mao thought that there was so much anarchy that order was of primary importance, if he thought the disturbances at the factories were so terrible, etc., why was the right to strike included, on Mao's proposal, in the new Constitution of the Peoples Republic at the 4th People's Congress, in January, 1975, at a time when such disturbances were definitely going on? Was it included as window dressing with the intention that the masses would never be allowed to use it? — this was no doubt the intention of the current leaders but certainly it was not Mao's.

As for the economic situation, etc., it is true that there were problems in China's economy, including some poor harvests, a lack of at least some consumer goods, etc. The steel industry has had difficulty for a number of reasons, and there have been other problems—but there is nothing so new or startling about that. It is also true that whichever side won out, following this particular struggle there would have been increased emphasis on production. As I pointed out before, after Chang Chun-chiao assumed the leading position in Shanghai in 1967, production boomed ahead and he gave great emphasis to it. Revolutionary mass upsurges have repeatedly led to spurts ahead in production in the history of the People's Republic—that is, on the basis of transformations in the relations of production and superstructure achieved through revolutionary struggle, production has leapt ahead. If the Four

had won out, this would have happened. What would not have happened is the raising of production above revolution; instead it would have been based on the commanding role of revolution. And everything would not have been hinged on "modernization" but on class struggle, so the country could *continue* to advance—on the *socialist* road.

Further, to use the problems in the economy as an excuse for a revisionist line is not worthy of a Marxist. Revisionism will not "solve the problems" of a socialist country—except that it will transform it into not being a socialist country, so there will be no socialist country to "have problems." As an article put out by the Four pointed out, "in opposing Marxism, all revisionists first make a fuss about the 'situation' " (from a collection of articles criticizing Teng Hsiao-ping's revisionist line). And while it is true that there were problems in the economy in recent years, in essence the current rulers are slandering the masses, saying that they have made a mess of the economy, which is a complete lie. A clear indication of the depth to which the current rulers will sink to slander the masses and the Cultural Revolution is seen by the fact that Han Suyin, who is nothing if not a mouthpiece for the people in power in China, is now going around saying that the economy in China has been stagnant and in a mess for 10 years! This, of course, is a great slander and was directly refuted at the 4th People's Congress where Chou En-lai found himself having to say, "Reactionaries at home and abroad asserted that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution would certainly disrupt the development of our national economy, but facts have now given them a strong rebuttal." (See *PR* #4, 1975, p. 22.)

Reversing the verdict on this shows exactly what the right deviationists were up to in making a fuss about the situation in the last few years—they were seizing on certain difficulties to attack the whole revolution. And this was not the first time Teng, in particular, had done so.

It was around 1961 that he first came out with his infamous "white cat, black cat" formulation. Wasn't the situation very serious then? Several years of natural disasters, dislocations caused by some problems arising in the Great Leap Forward, the pull-out of Soviet technicians and blue-prints, hostile powers surrounding China on all sides, the recent experience of the reactionary revolt in Tibet and Indian aggression against China backed by the U.S. and the Soviets, and so on. It is always at such times that the revisionists jump out most boldly and aggressively.

It is significant that the "70 Points" dished up by Teng and

others in 1961 (reportedly Li Hsien-nien and Chou En-lai as well were also responsible for these revisionist regulations) make a point not only of seizing on the situation in general but specifically call for an end to "bitter battles" in the factories. Having read over a summary of the "70 Points," I can only agree with the Four that the "20 Points" was only a refurbished version under new conditions of the same revisionist trash. That we should go along now with the same rotten line, covered with the same "concern" about the situation, disruption, etc., as was repudiated more than a decade ago is something which I cannot comprehend and certainly cannot accept!

It is most significant that the current rulers, on the pretext of the "situation" and on the basis of totally distorting it, resort to Lenin's writings from the period of the first years of the Soviet Republic, including the period of the New Economic Policy. Such works as "The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments" (see Lenin Vol. 33, pp. 60 and following) and Lenin's speeches to the "The Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets" (Vol. 31, pp. 463 and following) where Lenin openly advocates allowance of some capitalist methods and concessions to foreign capitalists, are treated as the Bible by the current rulers and form the basis of their actual "general program, "—almost 30 years after China has entered the socialist period! Here, what was said in *Red Papers* 7 about the Soviet Union is of direct relevance:

"Since 1956 revisionist economists had scrounged around for quotations from the Marxist-Leninist classics which, taken out of context, might seem to justify their attempts to reintroduce capitalist economic methods and relations in the Soviet economy. They hit pay dirt in Lenin's writings dating from the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921." (p. 30.)

To argue that line does not matter now, things just have to get done—i.e., production, order, etc.—is precisely to promote revisionism. Mao fought Teng and others tooth and nail when they did this in 1961, and he fought them the same way, even more sharply, when they did it recently. That is exactly why Mao said, "Still his theme of 'white cat, black cat' "—and why he called for Teng's ouster. For the life of me I cannot see any reason why we should support revisionism, and I cannot see why any Marxist would wallow politically in the mire with Teng and the other right deviationists on the basis that this will "solve China's problems"!

Of course all of this revisionism will be carried out under the

banner of "concern for the well-being of the masses." This is exactly what Khrushchev did with his "goulash communism." And in this light, Mao's poems, reissued on New Year's Day, 1976, have direct bearing, poems which repudiate this "goulash communism" and in answer to whining about how terrible things are, that " 'This is one hell of a mess!' " reply, " 'Stop your windy nonsense! Look you, the world is being turned upside down.' " We know where Khrushchev's "goulash communism" led, and we should have no greater difficulty in understanding where the same line of those now in power in China will lead as well, unless the *present* situation is reversed.

"Yes, but you don't really take into account the 'gang of four's' errors, you just excuse them, but you won't allow for any errors by those in there now." As far as making excuses for the Four's errors, I do not make "excuses" for them. I have said what I think some of their errors were and at the same time tried to put them in context. The point is that their errors were exactly that—errors—the mistakes of revolutionaries, made in the process of carrying out complex and acute struggle and fighting in difficult circumstances for the correct line and the interests of the proletariat. For the Four their errors stand as the secondary aspect in relation to their overwhelmingly positive—and again I will say it, heroic—role.

As for the current rulers it is not a question of errors—their whole line is an error. Or, rather, it is not an error, but a line for restoring capitalism. Any errors they make we should be glad for, because it will aid the proletariat in struggling against them. Again, as in all matters, it is a question of line—assessing what is the overall line, what class it serves, and evaluating the question of errors from that standpoint. If we do that we can still only reach the by now oft-repeated conclusion—we should not support the current rulers and we should support the Four and those now fighting for the proletarian line and proletarian revolution, as the Four did.

"Well, it is true that the line of those now in power is no good, but neither was the 'gang of four's' line any good. Actually there were three lines: the correct line of Mao and Chou En-lai to put stress on modernization but to do it on the basis of revolution in command and class struggle as the key link, while the people now in power opposed this from the right and the 'gang of four' opposed it from the 'left.'

What "three lines"? I believe that actually I have answered this from many different angles already, but I will briefly answer it

straight on.

As I said earlier, there are certainly differences among the present rulers—opposite poles of the same stupidity—but what is principal is their unity in opposition to revolution and in agreement with a general line that will lead to capitalist restoration. And I think it is very clear that Chou En-lai stood with those in power now. His line, in essence, was their line, and he gave them backing with all he was worth—otherwise they would never have gotten as far as they did while Mao was still alive.

On the other side, as I have pointed out, there were some disagreements between Mao and the Four, but the principal aspect, the essence of the matter, was the unity between them. The Four's line was in essence Mao's line—otherwise they would have never been as high up as they were while Mao was still alive (can anyone doubt that if Mao had agreed they could have and would have been smashed or at least demoted long ago?!), and the struggle against the right deviationist wind would never have gotten as far as it did.

Mao's line was the line put forward in Chang Chun-chiao's article (pamphlet), quoted before—and I will quote it again,

"Full of militancy, all our people are determined to build China into a powerful socialist country before the end of the century. In the course of this effort and in the entire historical period of socialism, whether we can persevere all the way in the dictatorship of the proletariat is a cardinal issue for China's future development. Current class struggles, too, require that we should get clear on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat." (pp. 1-2, pamphlet)

This is how Mao, and the Four, saw the relationship between revolution and production, between the class struggle and the drive to build China into a "powerful socialist country."

And I would like to ask a question: if Mao and Chou En-lai, two extremely powerful and influential leaders, stood solid together, had fundamental unity, on the correct line, why is it that they could get none of the other top leaders to go along with them? This is a question that anyone putting forward this "three lines" argument must answer. And anyway it does not conform to facts—they each did have certain top leaders in the same basic camp with them—Mao had the Four (and for a time at least some wavering "middle forces") and Chou had those now in power, the right deviationists (who have also clearly put the "middle forces" in the position where they must go along, or be smashed, too). A

further note of interest on this point—Teng Hsiao-ping is reported by the *Far Eastern Economic Review* to have told the CC meeting where he was officially restored, right before the 11th Congress, that in early 1975 he, Chou, Li Hsien-nien and Yeh Chien-ying took steps to bring forward people to make sure the Four did not "inherit" leadership later. This seems quite probably true—and who did *this* "gang of four" promote as *their* "successor"?

Chou, Teng and others, being astute politicians if not revolutionaries at the end, sized up the situation and recognized very well that, especially if Mao outlived Chou En-lai, the chances of Teng succeeding Chou were extremely thin. Therefore, going back several years Chou in particular brought forward new people to be a "second line" of succession. Hua Kuo-feng was one of the more significant of these—he was (and remains) Chou En-lai's "man," not Mao's. Then, when it became clear near the end that Mao would indeed block Teng's ascension to power, and specifically when the struggle sharpened up through the battle to beat back the right deviationist wind, the right deviationists brought forward and insisted on Hua, faced as they were with the necessity of going along—for the time being—with the dumping of Teng and the anti-rightist struggle with him as the target. This may sound like a "power struggle," and indeed in one basic sense it was—a struggle for power between *two classes*, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, represented by two different headquarters within the Communist Party, with Mao, and the Four, leading one headquarters, and, at the end, Chou, Teng and others leading another, the bourgeois, headquarters.

Instead of inventing a "third line" that does not exist it is far more instructive to examine the two lines that did exist in direct opposition to each other. We have the "Three Poisonous Weeds" and the fact that Hua as well as Teng and the others in power now were responsible for them. We have Hua's 1975 Tachai speech which is in the same mold and puts forward the same basic line. And we have the material put out by the Four. Looking at all this, and especially in light of the revisionist nature of the documents with which Hua and the others are and have been associated, isn't it very clear that not only was the line put out by the Four correct, but that they obviously were not "inventing" a revisionist line to attack in order to "promote anarchy" and cover "ultra-leftism"?

Speaking of "inventing," and the whining of the current rulers that the Four took statements and documents by the current leaders, including drafts of the "Three Poisonous Weeds," and published them together with criticism of them—in relation to all

this, what Lenin says in *What Is To Be Done?* concerning the *Credo* of the Economists is very enlightening. This *Credo*, Lenin said, provided such an excellent self-exposure of Economism

that, had there been no *Credo*, it would have been worth inventing one. The *Credo* was not invented, but it was published without the consent and perhaps even against the will of its authors. At all events, the present writer [Lenin], who took part in dragging this new 'programme' into the light of day, has heard complaints and reproaches to the effect that copies of the resume of the speakers' views were distributed, dubbed the (*redo*, and even published in the press together with a protest! We refer to this episode because it reveals a very peculiar feature of our Economism, fear of publicity." (Lenin, Vol. 5, p.364)

"Well, the 'gang of four' may have served a useful purpose, while Mao was alive, in 'stirring things up,' and he may have wanted them around, as long as he was, for that purpose, but after Mao went the Four had to go, too."

First, this argument in essence admits that there were no other forces in the leadership who could be counted on to make revolution—at least not if it posed the danger of "stirring things up," which by definition it always does. If this argument is inverted it will have some aspect of truth—that is, actually *some* of those now in office could be kept in line as long as Mao was around, but after he went they went along with the hard-boned right.

Second, show me how the Four's line is essentially different than Mao's—we still get back to that. And third, who saw to it that the Four "went"? And what is their line?

As I have shown over and over the Four's line was Mao's line, while the line of the current rulers is completely opposed to Mao's line—and that was all clear well before Mao "went." So all this argument says is that it is right for the bourgeoisie to put down the proletariat because the latter can only "stir things up"—which in fact is the line of the current rulers. I do not think it is a Marxist line by any means, and I don't know why any Marxist would want to parrot it.

Finally, as I have also shown, the Four could not only "stir things up," they could and did lead in developing production under the command of revolution, in revolutionizing art and literature, and generally in transforming the material and ideological conditions to advance toward communism. That such people have to "go" is surely the line only of the bourgeoisie and most definitely not of the proletariat!

"The 'gang of four' wanted another Cultural Revolution and it wasn't time for one, so they had to be smashed and they were." Here we have a complete reversal of right and wrong.

Actually, the Four did not exactly want another Cultural Revolution—they wanted the *same* one—that is, they fought to prevent the reversal of the Cultural Revolution and of the Chinese revolution as a whole. Through the course of this struggle, had it been successful, new advances would have resulted, both in the economic base and the superstructure. Would that have been bad? Only to the bourgeoisie.

If this argument means that the Four were in favor of and did "stir up" mass struggle against the revisionists, then why is that bad? Do you want to say that they shouldn't have done everything possible to prevent a revisionist takeover?

Here I have to say that an extremely naive and idealist and metaphysical notion of class struggle, specifically in socialist society, is behind such an argument. It presents things as though the proletariat has complete freedom to choose when and how it will fight the bourgeoisie, and ignores the fact that the bourgeoisie is always waging struggle against the proletariat and that, as pointed out before, it will jump out even more ferociously when there are difficulties. This is proved by the whole history of class struggle in every socialist country, including the latest round in China which ended in the smashing of the proletarian headquarters led by the Four (after Mao died).

I should point out that to some degree the article in *The Communist*, Vol. 1, No. 2, "On the Relationship Between the Forces and Relations of Production and the Base and Superstructure," does feed this erroneous view to a certain extent—though it cannot be said to be the *cause* of this view or to present it as fully as the argument above does. That article was written the way it was because there has been struggle over the question of China, and the article reflects that and represents a certain compromise between opposing positions. Therefore, to a certain extent, it presents things as though the proletariat under socialism pushes production forward and then at a certain point it is time for a leap in the relations of production and the superstructure and so the proletariat carries that out, and so on. While the article does contain points which oppose this incorrect view, it does to a certain degree reflect and feed it as well—for the reasons just summarized.

From reading this article one could get the impression, for example, that at the time of the 9th Congress in China, in 1969, after three years of mass upsurge of class struggle, Lin Piao was correct

in calling for production as the main task. Still, on the other hand, the article, despite its weaknesses flowing from its compromise character, does point to the fact that the bourgeoisie is continually attempting to reverse the gains of the revolution and the entire revolution itself, and does make clear that class struggle is the key link. And, in fact, even with all its weaknesses, if that article—which includes an emphasis on the fight against capitalism in the collective form and puts stress on how the class struggle goes on after the means of production have in the main been socialized and which does make class struggle the key link—if that article is used as a standard to judge the current rulers they still come off as revisionist traitors. (Incidentally, having "personally" written that article, I think it is fair to point out that something "personally" done by a leader does not necessarily indicate that such a thing represents his "personal choice": it is often the product of sharp struggle and some sort of compromise between conflicting views—*apropos* the "personal appointment" and endorsement of Hua by Mao.)

Finally, on this point, to condemn the Four for "wanting another Cultural Revolution," that is for waging all-out struggle against those in power now, is to beg the issue. If, in fact, as I believe I have shown many times over, you are faced with the real threat of a revisionist takeover, it is absolutely correct to wage all-out struggle against this and those attempting to bring it about. In fact, to do otherwise, to fail to do so as fully as possible, would be criminal.

I believe we should be good for our word. By that I mean we should apply to the Four what we said about those who opposed Khrushchev at the time he made his coup. Specifically, in *Red Papers* 7, the following is stated, which I believe has amazing relation to and relevance for the situation in China and the struggle between the Four and the current rulers in the recent period:

"In the spring of 1957, a showdown came. V.M. Molotov and L. Kaganovich were able to assemble a majority in the Politbureau against Khrushchev. In fact, the majority may have been overwhelming. But Khrushchev, as ever a wily fox, held a hidden card. This was the support of the notoriously self-seeking and individualistic Defense Minister, Marshal Zhukov. When Zhukov apparently indicated that he would oppose the Politbureau majority with armed force, the more vacillating allies began to reach for a compromise. Soon Khrushchev had the majority. Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov were expelled as the so-called 'anti-Party group.' Bulganin and Voroshilov were to follow in the not too

distant future. As for Zhukov, Khrushchev, seeing in him a future rival, dumped him, too.

The members of the 'anti-Party group' *failed to bring the struggle out of the Politbureau and to the masses*. We do not know all the circumstances which prevented the proletarian forces from bringing the struggle into the open, *developing mass action*. Nor are we clear on exactly who did represent the proletarian line. Nonetheless, it can be stated that *this failure was a major factor contributing to the revisionist takeover*. " (p. 23, emphasis added).

Should we condemn the Four for *doing exactly* what we criticized the proletarian forces in the Soviet Union for *not* doing at that time? No, we should praise and cherish them for the struggle they put up.

Of course there are certain differences—a main one being that, exactly because the struggle was brought out into the open, we do know who the proletarian forces are and what the line struggle was. And that can be the basis for being a lot better prepared to deal with the setback than the international proletariat was after Khrushchev's revisionist takeover, providing we grasp the essence of what has happened and support revolutionaries while opposing revisionists.

One final point on this question of "wanting another Cultural Revolution." Mao said in late 1974 that it would be desirable after eight years of the Cultural Revolution to have stability and unity (this was the directive he gave on this question). But he said this, I believe, because he recognized that this would create the most favorable conditions for the left in struggling against the right. But he certainly recognized at the same time that the right had a lot to do with whether or not stability and unity could be achieved and to what degree it was not only desirable but possible to have stability and unity. And we know that Mao certainly did not raise stability and unity above the class struggle—he made that point abundantly clear.

Further, if Mao did not then "want another Cultural Revolution," he certainly did want a major struggle against the right. This is clear in the pamphlets by Yao Wen-yuan and by Chang Chun-chiao in particular, which openly declares that there is a major struggle going on and two lines within the Party leadership. I believe it is obvious that Mao not only agreed with but was behind these two pamphlets. Certainly I thought so at the time, and from what I know so did almost everyone I talked to in the RU at that time who followed events in China. But more than that, the

Chinese masses certainly must have thought so. Major articles signed by top leaders of the Chinese Party who had been closely associated with Mao, and specifically people whose articles before (at least Yao Wen-yuan's in late 1965) constituted a "signal" for big struggle—such articles were bound to be taken by the Chinese masses as an indication from Mao that a big struggle was necessary. And there is no evidence that Mao criticized Chang and Yao for these articles or for writing them under their own names, which suggests all the more that Mao was indeed behind them and the message they sent out that major struggle was called for.

It is true that Yao Wen-yuan's pamphlet emphasized the need to combat empiricism and that, in reference to some study material Yao had apparently prepared, Mao criticized one-sided emphasis on combatting empiricism. But two things should be said on this. First, as noted, Mao's criticism was not in reference to Yao's pamphlet itself but to study material produced a little later. And two, from all indications the Four did take up Mao's criticism and called for criticism of both dogmatism and empiricism. (See, for example, the article by Tien Chun in *PR* #20, 1975, p. 8, which is clearly an article written under the Four's direction and includes lines now condemned, such as the question "What are the new changes in class relations?" in China today. Further, it is my opinion that in calling for criticism of dogmatism as well as empiricism Mao was not denying that empiricism was the main problem then—he was warning against one-sidedness just as he avoided this one-sidedness in such works as "*On Practice*," where in laying stress on combatting dogmatism he also criticized empiricism).

Further, the Mao poems released on New Year's Day, 1976 unmistakably call for big struggle and oppose the line that everything should be or can be "smooth sailing." And, as pointed out earlier, it is also clear that Mao approved of and was behind the publication of these poems at that time. As we wrote about these poems in the October 15, 1976 *Revolution*, they were

"a sharp attack on the revisionists and their 'theory of the productive forces'—what the people want and need is not revolution to liberate themselves and the productive forces but just production with the promise of 'plenty to eat'—in other words that the masses of people are backward, are only good to work as slaves, can only think about the most narrow and short-sighted personal interests and certainly cannot transform society through class struggle. The publication of these poems struck deep at Teng Hsiao-ping's attempt to rally reactionary forces, promote backward sentiments and play on contradictions

among the masses; and it acted as a rallying call for the masses, summing up powerfully their own experience that through great struggle comes great advance and out of great turmoil and upheaval comes greater unity for the cause of revolution." (p. 17)

I believe this analysis in the *Revolution* article still stands and speaks directly to the question of "wanting another Cultural Revolution"—that is, how not only the Four but Mao as well saw both the necessity and desirability of waging "great struggle" against the class enemy, the right deviationists.

"The line adopted at the 8th Congress of the Chinese Party, in 1956, was a bad line and that didn't mean a revisionist takeover, so just because the line at the 11th Congress and in general is bad now, that doesn't mean there has been a revisionist takeover."

Any nonsense will do, apparently, to avoid drawing correct conclusions. The fact is that if the line of the 8th Congress had not been overturned, and if those whose revisionism was mainly behind it, Liu Shao-chi most especially, were not overthrown, then China would have been taken down the capitalist road. The 8th Congress did not lead to a revisionist takeover, but only because it did lead to a Cultural Revolution, which reversed its incorrect line and overthrew those—or at least the core of those at that time—who were bent on taking the capitalist road. I will be extremely happy to see a new revolution to overthrow those now in power and reverse their revisionist line, but such a revolution will not and cannot be led by those in power now (though they will undoubtedly continue to use certain forms of the Cultural Revolution, such as big-character posters, in their own bourgeois factional disputes). A genuine revolution now can only come from the "bottom," and frankly I don't expect to see such a revolution in the near future. These are bitter facts—but they are the facts. And that points to a key difference between the 8th Congress and now—after the 8th Congress Mao and other revolutionaries were still in key positions and overall the proletariat and its revolutionary leaders still held power, though the capitalist roaders were in a strong position and had usurped power in many places; today the capitalist roaders have usurped supreme power.

"The people in there now at least have a program for how to develop China, but the 'gang of four' had no program for this, so therefore the people in now should at least be given a chance."

All this amounts to is saying, "If you don't like the current rulers' plan for capitalist restoration, then what is your plan for capitalist restoration?" That's the first point—the current rulers'

"program" is a program for "developing" China along the capitalist road.

On the other hand, as I have indicated many times, the Four did have a program, a line—Mao's line. And they had specific policies, as indicated in the Shanghai textbook, in articles in the *Peking Review* and elsewhere, and in practice where they were able to implement their line—policies which flowed from a correct line, were based on the principle "grasp revolution, promote production," and which followed the general line for building socialism and a whole set of specific policies formulated by Mao—such as agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor, grain as the key link in agriculture, steel as the key link in industry, and so on. Not having a "program" only means that they didn't hinge everything on modernization and develop a whole set of principles and policies which are opposed to the correct line and would lead to capitalist restoration.

It is true that the Four put emphasis in the latest struggle on opposing the revisionism of those now in power and defending the gains of the Cultural Revolution. This was necessary and correct, and not to see that is to fall into the idealist and metaphysical view of the class struggle summarized earlier. There certainly have been times in the history of the communist movement in this country when it was necessary to take the same approach—for example the struggle against the Bundists, during which some people raised the same argument—well if you don't like our program for carrying out bourgeois nationalism, what is your program for doing so? We answered, and defeated, them not on that level, but by exposing and repudiating their incorrect line, and on *that basis* we have been able to make headway—if only beginning—in carrying out work among the oppressed nationalities guided by a correct line. (And certainly we made mistakes in that struggle, didn't we?)

So it was with the Four's struggle against the revisionist line and program of those now in power. And as I said before, had the Four won, production would have leapt ahead under their leadership, as it did, for example, in Shanghai and other places following mass upsurges and seizures of power in the Cultural Revolution. As also pointed out before, such leaps in the economy have generally followed such upsurges of mass struggle in China.

"The 'gang of four' were responsible for the earthquakes in China." So far this argument has not been raised, but it wouldn't surprise me if it were raised.

Again, when it is all said and done, we get back to the basic fact that the Four fought for, and implemented where they could, a

revolutionary line in opposition to the revisionist line of the current rulers. This fact will not change no matter how many phony arguments are cooked up to try to divert things from this central question.

Of course if the Four had mustered the necessary forces to take the first necessary step—bust Hua and his cronies—rather than the other way around, everything would not have been "rosy." In fact, there no doubt would have been upheaval right away, maybe even for a brief period something approaching a kind of "civil war," as the current rulers have blustered. That "civil war," however, would not be a rebellion by the masses but a revolt by certain commanders in the military. To put this down the Four would have to rely mainly on the masses, including the militia and masses in the PLA, as well as certain other commanders who they could win over. By definition discussing this takes us into the area of at least a certain amount of conjecture, but I think this is a roughly accurate picture of what would have happened. And I do not hesitate to say again that this situation, especially assuming the Four were able to carry it through and put down any reactionary revolt, would be infinitely preferable to the quick rightist coup and "slow death" of revisionism that the Chinese people have to confront now. In any case, even as things turned out, it is far better that the Four dared to "scale the heights" than if they had quietly submitted to revisionist betrayal of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese people.

### III. Why Did Revisionism Triumph in this Battle and What Lessons Should We Draw?

As to why the revisionists triumphed, that is obviously a big question to which a great deal of attention and study should be devoted. But certain things which contributed to this can be indicated now.

First, in general there is the truth that Mao stressed over and over again that socialism is a long period of transition from capitalism to communism and that all during this period there are classes and class struggle and the danger of capitalist restoration. More specifically there are the things Mao focused on in the last few years of his life as providing a powerful material base for capitalist restoration—the persistence of commodity relations, the three major differences (mental/manual, town/countryside, worker/peasant), of bourgeois right as well as other powerful rem-

nants left over from previous society in the material and ideological sphere. The events of the last year, the success of a revisionist coup, is bringing home more and more sharply how incisive Mao's directives on this were. And the results of this coup will show just how correct Mao was in saying that it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system.

All of us, I think, have had something of an idealist and metaphysical tendency in regard to these things in the past—we took these statements by Mao as "heavy thoughts" and didn't really grasp the life and death character of what he was repeatedly raising and stressing. Now the reality of what formed the basis for those "heavy thoughts" is slapping us in the face.

Further, as Mao also called special attention to, in a country like China, a backward country economically, where it is necessary first to go through the democratic stage and then to make the immediate transition to socialism, the problems of making that transition and continuing to overcome spontaneous capitalist tendencies are enormous (this doesn't mean, I don't think, that it will somehow be "easier" to stay on the socialist road after seizing power in an economically advanced country—the problems there will be enormous, too, but they will in many respects take different forms, though some will be the same or similar). The point is that as Lenin said on this question, the force of habit of millions and tens of millions is a most terrible force, and in a country like China the tendency toward small production and the small producer mentality is very great.

Further, there is the whole deep-rooted Confucian tradition in China, which along with the still backward conditions economically, means that many people are still strongly weighed down by the old spiritual fetters—superstition, etc., as well as the tendency to meekly follow those in authority. And there is still the legacy of colonialism and the colonial mentality—or rather, colonized mentality—which promotes the idea that what is foreign is better and that it is necessary to rely on the foreign and the "advanced." At the same time there is a tendency to nationalism, which has a strong material base in the still largely peasant character of the country and in the fact that the Chinese revolution in its first stage was not just democratic but national. This, I believe, led revolutionaries in China to a certain extent, and even Mao to some degree, to view the revolutionary movements in other countries, especially in the advanced capitalist countries, "through the eyes of the Chinese revolution," so to speak—even though Mao was aware and pointed out that the Chinese revolution had different

characteristics than those in the advanced capitalist countries. But much more important than any such tendency—which was most definitely a very secondary aspect in Mao and other revolutionaries in China, including the Four—was and is the tendency on the part of those who actually do get stuck at the democratic stage, or who degenerate ideologically, to take a bourgeois nationalist stand which, under China's present conditions, assumes the form of great power chauvinist views of China's relations with other countries and peoples and of China's need for "national development." (Again, in an imperialist country it can hardly be said that the problem of nationalism—specifically great nation chauvinism—will not be a tremendous problem, but it will take a somewhat different form.)

These then are some of the general problems, the general elements that provide the basis for a revisionist triumph and capitalist restoration in a socialist society and in China in particular. But beyond that there were some more specific and very immediate events which stand out. One is obviously Mao's death, an event long-awaited by the reactionary forces as the signal to make their big move. Another is the devastating earthquakes that struck China last year, causing tremendous damage and dislocation. And at the same time there were the deaths of several long-time leaders in China besides Mao, all in the space of a couple of years, and several within one year (which role these different people played in the most recent struggle is not the point here—the point is that such deaths were bound to cause uncertainty and anxiety among the Chinese people about the situation in the country, and this is magnified by the superstitious traditions referred to above, one of which links earthquakes with the end of an Emperor's reign, etc.).

And there is the fact that with all the twists and turns, back and forths, of the two-line struggle in China, and intensely so since the start of the Cultural Revolution, there was undoubtedly a section of the Chinese masses, and a larger percentage of cadres, intellectuals, etc.—though certainly not all and not the most class conscious—who were tired of it all and wanted an end to it. Here Lenin's words are of great significance:

"The misfortune of previous revolutions was that the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people, which sustained them in their state of tension and gave them the strength to suppress ruthlessly the elements of disintegration, did not last long. The social, i.e., class, reason for this instability of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people

was the weakness of the proletariat, which *alone* is able (if it is sufficiently numerous, class-conscious and disciplined) to win over to its side the *majority* of the working and exploited people (the majority of the poor, to speak more simply and popularly) and retain power sufficiently long to suppress completely all the exploiters as well as all the elements of disintegration.

It was this historical experience of all revolutions, it was this world-historical—economic and political—lesson that Marx summed up when he gave his short, sharp, concise and expressive formula: dictatorship of the proletariat." ("The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," Lenin, Vol. 27, pp. 264-65, emphasis in original).

Of special relevance in these words of Lenin, as far as the recent developments in China are concerned, is the fact that to a certain degree the "revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, which sustained them in their state of tension" was weakened in recent years. In short, some of them tired of the struggle. Does this mean it was wrong to wage the struggle, was it wrong to continually have campaigns aimed against opportunist lines—should we blame Mao and the left, especially the Four? No, we do not blame the proletariat for the existence and resistance of the bourgeoisie. There was no alternative but to wage this struggle, to carry forward these campaigns—the only alternative was to give in to the revisionists and allow capitalist restoration without a fight, to allow the bourgeoisie, the greatest force for the "disintegration" of socialism, to just take over.

The reactionaries, as Mao said, follow the law of make trouble, fail, make trouble again, fail again. . . until their doom. But they do not necessarily fail every time and their doom does not come about through a straight line process, but through long and protracted struggle, along the road of which there can be temporary setbacks, even serious ones. The revisionists in China were making trouble and being beaten back and then making trouble again, often in a new form. This made the struggle in China extremely complicated and frequently, no doubt, confusing to many of the masses, especially with the back and forth, up and down, character it assumed in recent years, when Mao's death and the question of succession was imminent.

In addition there is the very real threat of imperialist, especially Soviet, aggression against China and the international situation as a whole. While the internal class divisions in socialist society are the main basis for capitalist restoration, the existence of international capital is also part of the basis. And in recent years, with

the growing danger of an attack on China by the Soviets in particular, and with the necessity to make certain agreements and compromises with reactionary and imperialist governments, with the whole "opening to the West," and all the bourgeois influences that inevitably accompany this, there was bound to be a powerful "pull" away from taking the socialist road and toward taking the seemingly "easy road" of relying on and tailing after the imperialists, for economic development and defense. And the cultural and ideological corrosion that is bound to accompany increased contact with bourgeois countries certainly had no small effect on the Chinese masses. A big part of this was the fact that as they learned more about the imperialist countries many of the Chinese people could be deceived by the secondary aspect of the masses' situation in those countries—that they had a higher standard of living than in China—and not grasp firmly the principal aspect—the exploitation and oppression of the masses in these "advanced" nations.

All these factors—the earthquakes, the death of a number of long-time leaders, including Mao, the complicated and tortuous nature of the struggle, plus certain real difficulties in the economy, the growing danger of war and the necessary "opening to the West," etc.—all these made the situation favorable to "order" as Hua Kuo-feng boasted in his report to the 11th Congress. In other words, there was a strong current among some of the masses—and many of the cadres—to have order above everything. Clearly this is favorable to the revisionists, who can promise and in the short run deliver "order"—the order of bourgeois dictatorship and capitalist restoration, which over any period of time can only bring disorder and misery to the masses. And closely linked with this the line of modernization as the main task and "goulash communism" found a favorable following among the same forces who wanted order above all, and for the same reasons. This, in my opinion, had much to do with why the revisionists were able to triumph in this battle.

This most recent battle, of course, was not a self-contained thing but was a continuation of the two-line struggle that had been waged throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party and which became all the more intense after state power was captured. And more specifically, it was the continuation of the struggle that has been raging, in one form or another, since the late 1950s, from the time of the Great Leap Forward, the People's Communes, etc. This must be viewed dialectically, of course. On the one hand, the victories of the proletariat in those struggles led to

great advances in socialist revolution and socialist construction. On the other hand, the more there were advances, the deeper the socialist revolution went, the more it dug away at the soil engendering the bourgeoisie, and the more it called forth desperate resistance from the bourgeoisie. Along with this, as noted before, at each stage in this process, some people get "stuck," including especially, as Mao pointed out, those who have become high officials and want to protect the interests of high officials, as against the interests of the masses.

This does not mean that all high officials by mere virtue of their position are bound to become revisionists—that would be mechanical and not dialectical materialism. But as Mao said, there really is a problem here—people who have a higher position than others do tend to feel themselves superior and to take advantage of that position for personal, narrow interests—which in socialist society will lead to capitalist restoration if it is not struggled against and defeated. It is a bitter truth, but a truth nonetheless, that in the history of socialist countries large numbers of top leaders have sooner or later turned traitor to the revolution—not all by any means, but not just a few either. This is why Mao put such stress, and explicitly so in recent years, on combatting and preventing revisionism and studying the theory of proletarian dictatorship to get clear on *why* it is necessary to exercise dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, what are the material and ideological conditions that continually give rise to bourgeois elements and pose the real danger of capitalist restoration and how to deal with this through the exercise of proletarian dictatorship and class struggle, continuing revolution, under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Mao also paid special attention and gave great emphasis to the question of "bringing up revolutionary successors." I believe Mao approached this on two levels—one, bringing up large numbers of successors among the masses, that is, training large numbers of the masses, including basic level Party members, as class conscious revolutionaries through study combined with concrete struggles. And on the other hand, he fought to establish revolutionary successors at the top level—the Four and their supporters in top leadership. It is exactly because he relied on the Four strategically, I believe, that Mao was upset by some of their actions, their tactical errors—this is how I believe the criticisms he is supposed to have made of them have to be read, as Mao "chewing out" the people he knew had to be counted on to continue the revolution and the people who therefore, in a certain sense, he had

to be very hard on—in a qualitatively different way, of course, than those with whom Mao had fundamental differences of principle, the capitalist-roaders.

(One last note on this question of Mao's criticisms of the Four and how such things can be taken completely out of context, which is a real possibility when Mao is no longer around. In his conversations with Mao Yuan-hsin in 1964 and '66, Mao rakes his nephew over the coals. He tells him such things as, "In [the] future, if you do not become a rightist, but rather a centrist, I shall be satisfied. Isn't it true that you don't understand a thing about society? Your father was dauntless and resolute in the face of the enemy, he never wavered in the slightest, because he served the majority of the people. If it had been you, wouldn't you have got down on both knees and begged for your life?" and so on. To anyone reading these comments out of context it might well seem that Mao regarded Mao Yuan-hsin as someone on the brink of becoming a counter-revolutionary, or even already one, already the kind of traitor who would get down on his knees before the enemy. But in context it is obvious that Mao had high regard for Mao Yuan-hsin and considered him a successor to the revolution—and for that very reason Mao is "letting him have it" to help him to become a better revolutionary. I am convinced that Mao's attitude toward Mao Yuan-hsin, and the Four with whom Yuan-hsin was firmly allied, remained the same down to the end, and that the quotes we are seeing now from Mao taking the Four to task, assuming they are authentic, fall exactly into the same category as those cited above from Mao to Mao Yuan-hsin and are being shamelessly distorted and perverted by the current rulers to suit their counter-revolutionary purposes. Comrades should find these discussions between Mao and Mao Yuan-hsin very instructive, not only on the question being addressed here, but also on the question of class struggle, the relationship between politics and vocational work, Mao's line on educational affairs, some aspects of his military thinking, etc.—they are found in Schram's book, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, pp. 242-52).

In the fundamental sense, training millions of revolutionary successors among the masses is the main thing, because if that is done, even if there are defeats for the revolution, there will still be class conscious masses, and new leaders will emerge to replace those who fall in battle. On the other hand, in any immediate sense, the existence of a leading group at the top levels is decisive—a point the Four correctly stressed in the Legalists Vs. Confucianists articles and elsewhere—for without such leaders at a

given point, the resistance of the masses to revisionism cannot be successful—the current rulers know this very well and that is exactly why they smashed the Four as the first step in pulling off their restorationist moves.

What conclusion should we draw from all this? From the fact that the Four have been smashed in a revisionist coup and that those in power are taking the capitalist road, should we conclude then that "Mao failed?" Yes—and no. We must conclude that in the short run he did not succeed in the final battle of his life to prevent Soviet-style reversion. But he did certainly succeed in the policy of training millions of class conscious forces among the masses, and they are bound to wage struggle in very difficult circumstances against the capitalist-roaders and plant the seeds of their future overthrow.

Most of all we should not draw the conclusion that it is not possible to succeed in socialist revolution and not possible to achieve communism. Nor that it is impossible to build socialism and continue to advance toward communism in an economically backward country like China. Difficult to carry forward the revolution, even very difficult? Yes. Impossible?—not at all, in fact it is inevitable that socialism will eventually replace capitalism and communism will ultimately be achieved in every country, throughout the whole world. Nothing that has happened in China changes this.

We must keep in mind that the struggle of the proletariat is international and that this has real meaning. In particular, viewing things on a world scale, it is the case that in the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie is still the principal aspect—that is, taking the world as a whole the bourgeoisie still has the upper hand, though it is undeniably and irreversibly the proletariat that is strategically on the rise. The fact that the bourgeoisie still has the upper hand on a world scale does have real meaning and consequences and real effect on the class struggle in every country. This does not mean that until the proletariat has gained the upper hand on a world scale it is bound sooner or later to lose the upper hand in any particular country. But it does increase the danger of capitalist restoration in a socialist country, even though the main basis for this lies within that country itself.

Further we must not only view the class struggle in international but historic terms. The past 100 years, since the time of the Paris Commune, must be viewed as only the dawn of proletarian revolution and communism. It will indeed require a protracted

struggle, no doubt for at least several hundred years, and a struggle, even more than in the past, full of twists and turns, reversals and setbacks, before the great goal of communism can be achieved worldwide. But, again, this struggle, too, is made up of stages and takes particular form in different countries and at different times. At each stage, under all circumstances, the proletariat worldwide must seek to defend the gains it has made while at the same time fighting to make new breakthroughs. And where it suffers setbacks it must sum these up, learn the causes and seek to avoid them in the future. And in fact this is exactly what the proletariat has done—its struggle has developed in an upward spiral with each advance higher than the peak before, and this will continue to be true until the proletariat wins final victory over the bourgeoisie on a world scale.

We should keep firmly in mind what we wrote at the end of the Party's *Programme*:

"The proletariat in the United States and throughout the world faces a protracted and complicated task, for the objective of its struggle is nothing less than the complete transformation of all society and involves the complete break with all previous forms of society and all past traditions. But its triumph is inevitable, because the whole of human history and the development of society itself has prepared the conditions for it and only proletarian revolution can continue to move society forward in this era " (n 163)

Naturally it is very painful to accept the fact that, after the experience of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union, China is now being taken down the same road. And it is all the more painful because the Cultural Revolution in China provided such a powerful force for preventing the repetition in China of what happened in the USSR. And no doubt some will resist accepting it for that reason. But it is a truth, it is objective reality, and in order to change the world we must accept and analyse it as it is.

Further, it is wrong to look at the experience of the Soviet Union and China as the same. There are a number of differences, not the least of which is that at the time of Khrushchev's coup, denunciation of Stalin and repudiation of Marxism-Leninism, the masses in the Soviet Union and millions of revolutionary-minded people in other countries (though not all of them) were left confused, without an understanding of what was taking place, and this could only create large-scale demoralization. On the other hand, because of the Cultural Revolution in China, because of Mao's

great leadership and because of the heroic struggle put up by the Four, millions of people in China are armed with an understanding of what is going on, and millions more are debating and struggling over the questions involved, while those of us in other countries also have the basis for understanding not only what has happened but what is the basis for it.

Nothing in Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought tells us that once the proletariat has seized power and socialized ownership of the means of production it is guaranteed against capitalist restoration. In fact, it tells us just the opposite—that for a long time, throughout the entire transition period of socialism, there will be classes, class struggle and the very real danger of capitalist restoration. And it tells us that there are the means to deal with this and advance—though not without twists and turns, setbacks and reversals, even serious ones.

And certainly nothing in Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought tells us that if the ruling proletariat loses power and if capitalism is restored in one or more of the socialist countries—even if it should happen in all of them for a time—then socialist revolution is a hopeless dream. In fact, all of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought tells us the opposite of that, too. Fight, fail, fight again, fail again, fight again until victory—that is the logic of the proletariat, as Mao put it.

As an article put out by the Four explained, even the revolutions in which one exploiting system replaced another were full of twists and turns, advances and setbacks, and "The proletarian revolution which aims at completely eliminating the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and all exploiting systems will take much longer and will go through many more twists and turns and reverses," and that "The revolutionary optimism of the proletariat differs from blind optimism in that we understand the dialectics of historical development. Dialectical and historical materialism are the ideological foundations of revolutionary optimism. ("Proletarians are Revolutionary Optimists," *PR* #36, 1976) Despite what has happened in China, the statement from Mao, quoted at the end of the pamphlet by Yao Wen-yuan, remains true—"The conclusion is still the two familiar comments: The future is bright; the road tortuous"—and the sentence with which Chang Chun-chiao ended his pamphlet still carries full force—"The extinction of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and the victory of communism are inevitable, certain and independent of man's will."

#### IV. What Do We Do Based on a Correct Understanding of What Has Happened

I have put forward in blunt terms what I believe to be the undeniable truth about events in China. A revisionist coup has taken place, a serious blow has been delivered to the proletariat and its revolutionary leaders. The capitalist-rtfaders are not only still on the capitalist road, they have now usurped supreme power and are taking China down the capitalist road. This is a severe setback to the proletariat in China and worldwide.

But does this mean that I am saying capitalism has already been restored in China, that it is no longer socialist? No. It is true, as Mao said, that the rise to power of revisionism means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie, that the seizure of supreme power by the revisionists will, if not reversed, lead to capitalist restoration. But this does not take place in the manner that Monday the revisionists seize power and Tuesday the country is capitalist. Seizure of power is the first, decisive step, it marks a qualitative leap—backwards. But there is still the task for the revisionists of actually transforming society according to their world outlook and line, of destroying the socialist relations, including the ownership system, and restoring capitalist relations. This takes time and is bound to meet with resistance—and indeed already is in China today. Still, it remains true that, unless this situation is reversed, within a certain period of time—no one can say exactly how long, but we are talking in terms of a relatively short period of time as opposed to some abstract remote future—capitalism will be restored.

The situation presents us and genuine Marxists everywhere with many difficult and complicated questions. Here I will touch on only a few, but I believe we should devote considerable and careful attention to this question right away and as things further develop.

Should we come out now and publicly support the Four and denounce the current rulers? No, but we must arm our own ranks and advanced, reliable forces we are working closely with as to which class the Four and the current rulers represent, what has happened, why, to the best of our understanding, and so on.

Should we continue to put forward China as a socialist country? Yes, for now we should, because it is still an objective fact. But we should, in discussing China, put stress on Mao's line, the Cultural Revolution and the fact that in socialist society classes exist, class struggle is acute and the danger of capitalist restoration is ever-

present and great. At the same time we should use the achievements of the socialist revolution in China, especially those that have not yet been reversed, to illustrate the way socialism is actually superior to capitalism and how it eliminates many of the evils of capitalism. We should avoid as much as possible giving any support to the current rulers of China and certainly continue not to congratulate them on any posts any of them assume, and most definitely not on any of their victories over the proletariat—i.e., the smashing of the "gang of four."

As far as our public position on China we should take the following approach. With the "general public"—that is people not close to us, including opportunists—we should say that there are obviously reasons for concern about what is happening in China, there are some good things under attack—for example the transformations in education—but we should put this in the context that China is a socialist country and that the class struggle under socialism always goes on and at times becomes very acute. In short, we should uphold China as a socialist country while pointing to problems and areas of struggle and say that we are closely following and continuing to study events in China. On Teng Hsiao-ping, since our last public statements on him (correctly) labelled him a counter-revolutionary, but since he has since been restored to very high office, we should just say (to the "general public") that his return to office has to be viewed in the overall context of what is happening in China and that we are taking up the question of his return to office in that light and in the same spirit as we are following and studying events in China in general, as summarized just above. Comrades should keep in mind that what they say to workers and others whom we cannot count on as being completely reliable have to be put in the category of statements to the "general public," since they may very well become that (for example a worker may have contact with both us and the OL-CP(ML), and may not understand why he should not discuss with them what we tell him about our position on China).

At the same time, as stressed before, we must educate not only our own members but reliable advanced workers and others close to us (those who will understand why they should keep what we say to them about China confidential) about what is actually going on in China and give them the basis for grasping the real lessons of this. Otherwise there is no way we can carry out our duties as a Party or overcome demoralization that will inevitably set in as it becomes more and more clear what road China is taking. Further we should find the ways to do broader education on the crucial

questions related to developments in China without commenting directly on the situation there—for example articles about the process and lessons of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union, articles about the gains and lessons of the Cultural Revolution in China, etc.

Should we continue to work in U.S.-China? Yes, we should, but we must recognize the obvious fact that it will be an extremely difficult task to carry out. In particular it will be extremely difficult to balance building friendship for China as a socialist country, which is still correct at this time, with not contributing to building up the current rulers in opposition to the Four (not to go along with the Association's doing the latter will be impossible of course, and we should not put up struggle to try to prevent it from doing this, though we should try to keep it from being the main thing the Association does, and as much as possible we ourselves should not contribute to it—as I said this will be extremely difficult). Careful guidance must be given to comrades doing this work.

Similarly, our work among Chinese-Americans will be faced with many of the same kinds of problems and we must handle this case by case depending on the situation, the forces involved, etc. But, again, systematic attention must be paid to this and careful guidance given.

Does this change our analysis of the international situation? Since it is still objectively true that China is a socialist country our basic analysis should not change. We should continue, as we have in the past anyway, to put forward our own line on the international situation and to explain the actions of China to the best of our ability and in keeping with principle, and defend what can be defended while refraining from directly criticizing what we think is wrong.

There are obviously other important questions relating to this that should be taken up. These, as well as the ones I have briefly touched on, should be given considerable attention right away and as things further develop.

It is worth re-emphasizing that the most important thing is to come to and unite around a correct line on what has actually happened, as laid out in this paper. But having done that, and on the basis of being firm in principle, we should approach the question of what to do on this basis very carefully, keeping in mind always the interests of the working class, in this country and internationally. To sum this up, we should first unite around principle and remain firm in this principle, and adopt tactics flowing from this and in accordance with what will best serve the struggle of our class here

and worldwide.

#### **V. The Problem of Bad Tendencies in Our Own Party Connected With the Line Questions in the Struggle in China**

In the past year and more since the arrest of the Four a number of erroneous tendencies in our Party have developed around and in relation to events in China. Bad lines coming out of China were picked up, repeated and used as the basis for actions and even a frame of reference for struggle within our own Party. "Gang of Four idealism," "that's the 'automatically' line," statements equivalent to that made by Teng Hsiao-ping at the 11th Congress—what we need is "less empty talk and more hard work"—and other such stuff were heard in many places.

Suddenly the "Ten Major Relationships" was the greatest thing since color TV—actually it is far better, it is a very important work, but it is not, as the current rulers have claimed, "The Basic Policy for Socialist Revolution and Construction," not Mao's last word on these questions and not nearly as important a guideline as many of his later works on the question of socialist revolution *or* construction. And, unfortunately, in some cases no account was made of how the current rulers have tried to use this work of Mao's against the further development of his line and, in sum, against Mao's line itself.

The "Ten Major Relationships," written in early 1956, does not deal with the urgent questions to which Mao increasingly addressed himself in later years and intensely so in the last few years before his death. In particular, it does not deal with the class struggle and the danger of capitalist restoration after the socialization of ownership of the means of production has in the main been completed. This was obviously a big question and big point of struggle in China. As indicated in Chang Chun-chiao's 1975 pamphlet, there were then people in China who basically argued that after the socialization of ownership had in the main been completed, the danger of capitalist restoration and the regeneration of bourgeois elements was of no great consequence—in short people who under today's conditions in China promote the "dying out of class struggle" line. It is not difficult for me to understand why such people would want to raise the "Ten Major Relationships" up as the pinnacle and end point of Mao's Thought and works. That people in our own Party essentially did the same indicates that perhaps they share a common outlook with and agree with the line of the current

rulers, or at least that they have been seriously influenced by the same line and outlook.

In some cases the more that the current rulers' line came out the more it was picked up on and became a basis for reversing and even opposing correct conclusions that had been drawn about China and basic principles that have been a part of our Party's stand from the beginning (and the RU before it). Pragmatism was given a big shot in the arm by the line that narrow and immediate "results" are everything, which has streamed out of China since the current rulers took over. Regrettably, such stuff was welcomed in some quarters and a fundamental principle enunciated by Mao more than 30 years ago, and re-emphasized by the Four in the struggle against the right deviationist wind, was forgotten or cast aside:

"We are proletarian revolutionary utilitarians and take as our point of departure the unity of the present and future interests of the broadest masses, who constitute over 90 percent of the population; hence we are revolutionary utilitarians aiming for the broadest and the most long-range objectives, not narrow utilitarians concerned only with the partial and the immediate." (From "Talks at the Yen-an Forum on Literature and Art.")

All this and more has had a very unhealthy effect within our Party. It has flown directly in the face of and hampered the grasping and implementing of the line adopted at the last Central Committee, with its correct and important emphasis on the "high road."

In our Party, too, we have been infected with the widespread influence of a "white cat, black cat" line. What counts most to some people, I am afraid, is not ideological and political line, but how many people came to this particular demonstration, how many leaflets were passed out, how many posters put up, etc. All of these things can be very important but they cannot be the standard for judging our work, and to make them such is to lose sight of what we are doing our work for, in other words, to lose sight of the final goal.

What is worse, there have been more than a few cases where particular successes in work are turned into capital, and this merges with pragmatism and empiricism so that more or less success, greater or fewer numbers, at any given time determine whether or not one has the right to speak or at least how much weight should be attached to what one says. And, along with this, where successes are in fact made, there is often the tendency to

divorce this from the question of the Party's overall ideological and political line and to make it a question of the "organizing ability" of various "hotshots." Tactics is raised above, even substituted for, overall line.

All this has been coupled with metaphysics and eclecticism. Often line struggle is not promoted in a way that arms everyone with a deeper grasp of the correct line but in a way that builds up a few while keeping most in the dark. Theory is separated from practice in much the way the old CP did it even when it was basically revolutionary—rank and file Party members are often reduced to mere "implementers" of the line who hold no discussion of line and theory, while a handful of people study and discuss theory in a way that divorces it from the practice of the Party and the class struggle overall, so that the link between theory and practice and constant education in the Party's line are not maintained and in fact are interfered with. Or else Marxist theory and the experience of the international proletariat are presented as being embodied in so many scattered recipes for "how to do" this or that, with no unifying principles, so that, once again, the arming of the whole Party with theory and education in the Party's line are obstructed and interfered with.

These tendencies in our Party have a life of their own but they have grown in dialectical relationship with basically the same lines coming out of China since the current rulers have pulled their coup, smashed the proletarian headquarters and distorted Mao's line and Marxism-Leninism. And, in turn, the influence of such lines in our own Party has poisoned many people's ability to grasp the essence of what is going on in China and to correctly distinguish revolution from counter-revolution.

With the benefit of the line struggle put up by the Four and the whole legacy of Mao's thought and his revolutionary leadership, with the experience of the Soviet Union and Mao's summation of it, and with the line and history of our own Party (and the RU before it) and the two-line struggles involved in building it, we should have done much better than this as a whole in grasping the essence of what was going on in China and resisting the corrosion of tall tales and rotten lines coming out of China in the past year. And we will have to do much better to carry out our tasks and make revolution.

At the beginning of this paper I cited part of bulletin Vol. 2, No. 3 on China, including the statement that "the attitude and approach every Party takes in understanding and evaluating the events in China will have much to do with determining whether or

not that Party remains a Marxist-Leninist Party or degenerates into one kind of opportunism or another." In other words there is a dialectical relationship between one's line on China and on all other major questions. I also stated that the "China Question" is the most important question of line now confronting the international communist movement, including our own Party. Therefore we should concentrate first on deepening our grasp of and uniting around the correct line on China, as set forth in this paper. And then, unfolding out of that, we should pay particular attention to rectifying the incorrect ideological, political and organizational lines that have had a corrosive effect within our Party to a serious degree, as also summarized in this paper.

In this way what has undeniably been a severe setback for the international proletariat—the triumph of the revisionists over the revolutionaries in China—will not be compounded by us in our own Party and the struggle we have to lead in this country. Instead, in the face of difficult circumstances, our whole Party will be strengthened, advance, and fulfill our responsibilities and make our contributions to the revolutionary movement of the working class here and worldwide.