

# *Rebolusyon*

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**COMPLETE THE VICTORY OF THE SECOND  
GREAT RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT!  
RESOLUTELY CARRY OUT OUR TWO  
IMPORTANT TASKS IN THE CITIES!  
FIVE-YEAR ASSESSMENT OF THE SGRM AND OUR TASKS  
Summing-up of the Manila-Rizal Regional Party Committee**

We have firmly advanced the Second Great Rectification Movement in the national capital region and are certain to secure its complete victory in the immediate future. We have overcome our manifold internal problems and the obstacles created by the enemy and the counterrevolutionary renegades. We got stalled and off the focus of rectification several times, but we eventually pointed ourselves in the right direction and thus achieved significant progress. The Party and revolutionary movement in the region are now in a position to seize the favorable conditions and carry out their two major tasks.

Rectification has not been easy. Initially, the general summings-up of our Party and our clarification and exposure of the bankrupt line and poison spread by the counterrevolutionary renegades and propaganda offensive of the ruling class had sufficed. We were able to rally and maintain on our side the upright revolutionary forces and masses in the region. But somewhere midstream we lost steam and had to accelerate the thorough ideological building of our Party to fortify the foundation for our further advance. We had to sharply delineate the right from the wrong in our specific experience and draw up the lessons to overcome the recurrence of ideological, political and organizational weaknesses.

The new organization of our Party in the region which is the result of firm ideological building has been established. It has sufficient breadth and depth among the masses in the region and is effectively advancing the expanding and deepening revolutionary and legal democratic movement which coordinates with and supports the armed struggle and mass movement in the countryside. The regional, national and world situation is becoming more and more favorable for

broadly advancing the urban struggle to win over millions of people to the side of the revolution, to further aggravate the crisis of the reactionary ruling system and deliver the numerous cadres and personnel needed in the countryside.

The current task of the Party and revolutionary movement in the region is to resolutely and all-roundedly expand and gain strength while firmly advancing the SGRM to complete victory. Let us boldly advance and strengthen the anti-imperialist, antifeudal and antifascist movement and struggle; accelerate the exposure and isolation of the US-Estrada regime; firmly and boldly advance and gain strength in the midst of severe crisis and fierce struggle; further expand and strengthen the secret organization of the Party at the core of the broad and open mass movement; intensify support for the Party, people's army and mass movement in the countryside.

### **In the Field of Ideology**

In the past four years, we have painstakingly rebuilt our Party organization in the region from the ashes of the destructive anti-rectification and anti-Party campaign of the counterrevolutionary renegade Lagman clique, through ideological building within the framework of the SGRM. We have striven to complete the first phase of the rectification movement and have reached a level of consolidation sufficient for our continued revitalization. We are about to complete the victory of the rectification movement despite the long delay caused by the anti-Party campaign from 1993 to 1994, the enemy attacks of 1994, and the loss of focus from 1995 to 1996.

We have given principal stress to the study of the basic documents of the SGRM and the three-level course and are continuing their study. The final draft of the comprehensive summing-up and assessment of our revolutionary practice in the region is now ready for the approval of the Second Regional Conference. We have applied the Marxist-Leninist principle of concrete analysis of concrete conditions in completing the regional social investigation and class analysis and in militant criticism and self-criticism for proletarian revolutionary remoulding.

We are continuously deepening our rectification and overcoming the tendency to regress to former weaknesses and to fall into new ones. Now, our task is to further strengthen our ideological foundation so as to thoroughly consolidate and strengthen our Party, ensure the dominance of the correct line in the two-line struggle within the whole process of the revolution, so that we can undertake our enormous tasks in advancing the revolution in the cities and the countryside.

***Summing-up and Criticism and Self-Criticism.*** We have completed the final draft of the summing-up of more than a decade's experience in the national capital region which is ready for the approval of the Second Regional Conference. The summing-up clearly lays down the main lessons from both our positive and negative experiences, defines their historical context and circumstances, and sharply criticizes the errors, deviations and resulting disorientations in our long practice of advancing the revolutionary movement in the capital region. After this, we can further advance the rectification movement till completion and be further revitalized on the basis of a strong foundation in ideology and practice.

It took us almost four years to carry out our principal task of summing-up within the framework of the SGRM despite every plan to finish it in a year. When the Provisional Executive Committee (PEC) was formed in 1993, its principal task was to sum up our experience. (Another was the comprehensive assessment and evaluation of Party cadres in the NCR for the purpose of building the regional committee.) This task could not immediately be undertaken because our whole Party had to face a life and death struggle against the anti-Party and annihilative campaign of the revisionist renegade Lagman clique and had to defeat it decisively.

Our first attempt at summing-up in 1994, even as it was not given principal stress in practice, was further disrupted by the enemy's attack against the provisional leadership of our region. When the PEC resumed its work in January 1995, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee reiterated our two principal tasks and the one year period for its completion. From then till the first half of 1996, we missed an excellent opportunity to finish our summing-up, given that the summing-up of urban struggle was already through and there was already an outline for summing-up our experience in the NCR. In addition, there were no more major organizational disruptions and we were already making use of the guerrilla zones to safely undertake our said tasks. But the process of summing-up was not initiated nor even a crude draft written because of the serious negligence and vacillation (supposedly due to lack of confidence to carry out the task) of the comrade assigned to the task despite sufficient necessary material. The expanded meeting of the PEC repeatedly criticized this weakness but no decisive step was taken to solve the long delay.

It was in the second half of 1996 that the remaining cadres in the PEC-Expanded seriously began the summing-up after it was abandoned by the previous PEC secretary. A draft outline was written, the necessary data and documents collated, and prompt commentary was given by the central leadership. The summing-up process was assessed in 1997 and more intensive efforts were exerted to finish it within the year. Under the close guidance of the higher Party organ, the first and second drafts of the summing-up were finished within the specified time. Also, our several years practice within the framework of the SGRM became a rich and concrete basis for delineating right from wrong in the period of disorientation, on the one hand, and in identifying what needed to be criticized and corrected within our last four years practice, on the other. Even before the whole summing-up process could be completed, many things were concurrently being set aright based on the lessons already gained. After the approval of the summing-up, it is our duty to speedily disseminate its lessons to our whole organization and revolutionary movement to deepen our rectification and serve as a guide for the summings-up down to the basic level.

***Education in the Basic Documents of the SGRM.*** In general, there has been extensive study of the basic documents of the SGRM within our Party organization in the region. All cadres and fulltime members were promptly educated on the three basic documents of the SGRM, the main resolutions of the Tenth Plenum of the CC, and the tit-for-tat documents which clarified and exposed the bankrupt line of the documents spread by the factionalists.

From 1993 to 1994, there were lively discussions on the basic documents of the SGRM in the face of the anti-Party campaign of the Lagman clique and the blatant attack against Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (MLM) and the basic principles of the people's democratic revolution and protracted people's war. These discussions became an effective weapon for winning over a

significant number of legal and underground forces and consolidating them for the reestablishment of the Party in the NCR. Through the combined efforts of all those with the capacity to discuss the rectification documents, almost all the available cadres and members at that time finished the said studies. These discussions continued even after the factionalists were declared to have been defeated. Efforts were made to ensure the education of all members down to the basic level.

A big percentage of our Party members have studied "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors" and "General Review of Important Events and Decisions", along with the discussions on the main points in exposing the factionalists. But only a small number of Party members have studied "Stand for Socialism Against Revisionism" because we failed to come out with a simplified study and discussion guide with the result that only a few dared to discuss the topic.

In 1994, the corps of trained instructors failed to sustain their task even while the few cadres assigned to the task forces and one district organizing committee became overly preoccupied with the growing demands of the mass movement. This weakness was further aggravated by major disruptions in the last quarter of 1994 up to the first quarter of 1995. The result was a slowdown in our SGRM education campaign. In 1995, we reinstated a program to complete the education of all members at the basic level. But until 1996, we were unable to complete the education among those in the various basic units who had been left behind in the studies (one district ceased its education campaign).

These weaknesses were identified in the 1997 assessment, and again, education at the basic level was given stress and focus. Still, we were unable to meet our target because of the lack of instructors (especially in "Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism") for the basic level, while capable cadres were preoccupied with giving studies in the Basic Party Course (BPC), administration work, mass campaigns, etc. We could have formed capable groups of instructors at the district level while simultaneously carrying out studies in the BPC.

No less than 70% of our membership, most of whom were recruited during the SGRM period, have finished studying "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors" and the "General Review of Important Events and Decisions" (not included are those who have completed the studies earlier on but have eventually been dropped from the rolls). Meanwhile, only 35% have studied "Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism" while those who have studied the assessments of the SGRM and its subsequent substantiation as contained in the CPP and NPA anniversary statements are even less than this number. Immediate steps must be taken for the completion of these studies at the basic level, especially "Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism", by drafting a light and simple study guide for their study. We should ensure the sustained study of the SGRM documents alongside the study of the BPC by newly recruited members.

***The Three-Level Party Course.*** Education in the Basic Party Course has already gained momentum while studies in the Intermediate Party course are being initiated.

Since the second half of 1997, around 40% of our Party members have finished the BPC. Though the BPC studies were programmed for 1994, these could not immediately be implemented

because of our focus on the SGRM documents which was disrupted in turn by the events of the last quarter. In addition, there was the objective pull of our struggle against the splittist campaign of the old and new yellow unionists in the mass movement, particularly in the workers movement, up to the middle of the year. Meanwhile, in 1996, we failed to systematize our education work in general, and education in the BPC and Basic Course for Party Cadres (BCPC) in particular, on the wrong assumption that these need no longer be taught while awaiting the new BPC text. Instead, we shifted to the references of the BPC (Guide for Cadres ..., OUT, SCPW, Mass Work, etc.). The basic studies were made ponderous and as a result, efforts in the different parts of our organization were haphazard and uneven.

Only 25% to 47% of our whole membership finished the said courses which eventually could not be sustained. The significant factors which contributed to this were: negligence in carrying out the set plan; technical snags, difficulties regarding student attendance, the absence of a simplified study guide and instructor's guide; availability of instructors; some cases of resignation from instruction work due to the pull of mass campaigns (the seminar style undergone by candidate members was an added limitation and security problem).

In the 1997 assessment, these weaknesses were criticized and corrected; at the same time, the central Party leadership released Book One of the new BPC. We started disseminating the BPC and training instructors only in the middle of that year. The delay was caused by problems in reproduction and the time needed to set up the district structures and instructors' staffs which took three months. More could have finished the BPC at the basic level and among the candidate members had we exerted more effort to set up adequate instruction machineries in the districts, thus enabling us to continue our work whether there were mass campaigns or not.

Except for the limited initiative of a small part of our organization, the BCPC was almost entirely neglected and up to 1997, only 20% of our membership have studied it. Majority of those who have taken the course did so even prior to the SGRM. Since 1995, there has been no conscious campaign to propagate the BCPC because we failed to grasp its value considering that the IPC was still unavailable. In addition, studies in the BPC, which is a pre-requisite to the BCPC, were discontinued for a considerable time. This was pointed out in the 1997 assessment but we still had to prioritize the study of the BPC for old members and new recruits while cadres undertook the study of IPC.

In general, we have gone a long way in invigorating the study of the basic principles and theory of MLMZT and in applying these to the people's democratic revolution and the protracted people's war, considering the gravity of the miseducation of our Party members prior to the SGRM. Among our cadres up to the section level, we have conducted additional studies from 1995 to 1997 in the following: Lenin's "State and Revolution"; Mao's "On Contradiction" and "On Practice"; Semifeudalism; The General Crisis of Imperialism; Socialism: Theory and Practice; Marx's "Das Kapital"; Some Important Lessons on Mass Work in the Urban Areas; Outline for Summing-up Urban Struggle; Trotskyism; etc.

There is a need to give principal weight to Party education (MLMZT) at all times and build an adequate and strong education machinery, from the regional level down to the basic level, to be able to respond to, sustain and expand our education.

***MLMZT Readings.*** Programmed reading is now being developed especially among cadres in the regional, district and section level. Documents, texts and reference materials are being reproduced using different means, and materials are being collated to develop our system of library.

In the last part of 1996 and again in 1997, the reading of IPC references based on the list given by the central Party organ was programmed for cadres of the PEC-Expanded and the next lower organ. Diskette copies and some hardcopies were also reproduced and distributed to units and organs up to the section level. Some cadres finished reading the references, some only partially and others have not started yet. At the PEC level, the cadres' individual reading program was included in the assessment and we stressed the need for greater effort, perseverance and the correct allocation of time given our heavy work load. At the lower level, there is a need for a keener consciousness to include individual reading in the cadre's daily program of work, under the close supervision of their respective collectives and higher organ. Such supervision should include the systematization of priority readings.

In 1997, the reproduction and distribution of reading and reference materials and Party publications gained impetus. This is a big advance relative to the scarcity and neglect prior to the rectification movement, though we still have a long way to go to improve our capacity and systematize our reproduction, distribution and maintenance (library system).

Since 1994, the PEC has collected texts and important Party documents, the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao and other communist teachers, for reproduction and distribution, in order to invigorate the education of Party cadres and members. A number was collected but no reading program was instituted. In 1995, there was a downpour of materials from the central Party organ and we started to reproduce and distribute xerox and diskette copies for the purpose of building a library at every level. Still, we were unable to program, supervise and guide the individual readings which were left to the initiative of the cadres, though the invigoration of the practice of reading was set as a task. From 1995 to the first quarter of 1997, limited copies of selected issues of Rebolusyon were distributed, outside of diskette and hard copies from other regions. An issue of Ang Bayan was distributed and also several sets of references for the IPC. In 1997, BPC Book One of BPC references and issues of Rebolusyon and Liberation were reproduced in limited quantity.

From 1995 to 1997, we thrice allotted resources and deployed forces for the reproduction and distribution machinery. This machinery was also tasked to devise a library system. The indexing of collected materials was started but not completed. It also failed to draft a concept paper on a system of library at every level. The first two attempts at building this machinery were initiated under the education staff but they failed to operate. The last was projected to be a distinct group but it failed to materialize due to some problems in staffing. We should give proper weight and resolutely pursue the systematization and formation of an education arm and deploy appropriate cadres and personnel to the reproduction and distribution machinery; finish the concept paper and initiate the practice of a system of library at every level.

***Social Investigation and Class Analysis (SICA).*** We are completing the second draft of the social investigation of the capital region which is a synthesis of the accumulated knowledge of

old and new cadres on the concrete situation of the region, its towns and cities, down to its localities. The draft is still tentative and subject to the amendment and approval of the first plenum of the Regional Committee that shall be elected by the Second Regional Conference of Metro Manila. Subsequent to this, it shall be periodically enriched and deepened at the regional level. It shall serve as an outline and guide for similar efforts at succeeding levels, down to the localities.

In 1994 and 1995, the SICA of several towns and cities was programmed and the gathering of data was initiated, but no serious and concrete step was taken to write the documents and encourage its practice at every level. On the other hand, there was a stepped up study of the mode of production and semifeudalism in the Philippines among the majority of Party cadres and members in response to the attacks by the revisionist renegades and other revisionist and reformist grouplets against the analysis of Philippine society as semifeudal. But this was not maximized to counter their attacks at that time. We did not fully comprehend its importance, especially its value to the rectification movement with regard to understanding the correct line and theory of the Philippine revolution in general, and the orientation of the struggle in the capital region in particular, that is based on a systematic knowledge of the concrete condition of the region and its localities, which could have sharpened and made more concrete our struggle against the line of the revisionist and Trotskyite renegades.

The task of conducting SICA was not promptly attended to initially. Party organs and units at all levels had to go through the process of deepening their understanding of the importance and place of SICA in the SGRM and in revitalization. Since the last half of 1996, we seriously started to attend to it, a guideline (improved in 1997) was disseminated and conscious effort was exerted at all levels, especially while our cadres and basic units were engaged in the process of mass work in the localities. All that is needed is for the document of the Initial SICA of the National Capital Region to be finalized, approved and disseminated, to serve as an outline, model and concrete guide for the SICA of towns, cities and localities. Committee secretaries are responsible and in a position to document their SICA within their respective areas.

***Assessments and Programming.*** In general, assessments and programming were regularly undertaken every six months and every year, from the regional level down to the basic level. Though we started out with great limitations and failings, we were gradually able to surmount these and improve our ability to conduct assessments and programmings that were more comprehensive and faithful to the correct orientation and focus of work.

In 1994, our ideological, political and organizational assessments were clearly non-comprehensive in terms of adequacy and depth of data, in the analysis of weaknesses and strengths, advantages and disadvantages, and on this basis, we drafted a program that did not reflect our actual strength and focus of work in accordance with the rectification movement. Considering the fact that we started out with reassembled forces and cadres who have long been mired in disorientations, the said limitations and weaknesses are understandable. The three assessments and three plannings from 1994 to 1996 were noticeably shallow and did not strike at the main issues, thus resulting in a loose framework and the loss of focus in carrying out our key tasks in advancing the rectification movement in the whole region.

These were criticized in the 1997 assessment and we strove to correct them in an effort to complete our work in the SGRM. We also noted and tried to correct differences in our knowledge of the national standards on matters of IPO, to serve as the basis of our assessments and programming and even the specific process of conducting an assessment. We also criticized the method of assessing our work mainly on the basis of our program without also taking into account our initial situation and level of development (within the time frame being assessed). This led to a tendency to belittle our progress and magnify our setbacks or deficiencies on the basis of frequently high targets in our program.

Our failure to review guidelines, basic documents and Party references like the Party Constitution, Organizational Guide, etc., was a factor in our deficient assessments. The long delay in completing our comprehensive summing-up and education in the three-level Party course was itself a major factor in our failure to more sharply assess the progress of our IPO work and formulate appropriate plans in the process of rectification. Also, we had long been negligent in doing preparatory work like written reports and drafts of assessments and programs. Since 1997, we have made great strides in overcoming these weaknesses and we hope to completely surmount them through continuous rectification.

Alongside the validation of our Initial SICA, when we next enrich and update our social investigation and class analysis, it is our task to improve our assessment not only of the condition and progress of our revolutionary forces but also of the objective condition and development of the region and its towns and cities. Our level of assessment and programming has sufficed for the period of building and regularizing our Party organization in the region. Subsequent to this, we can and should improve our assessment of our subjective forces and the objective situation of the region at all levels.

***Criticism and Self-criticism (CSC).*** In general, we have resumed the lively practice of regular criticism and self-criticism in the region as opposed to an acute avoidance of it during the period of disorientation. In general, every comrade now has the correct attitude regarding the necessity and importance of CSC in ideological building. We are continuously developing our skills in conducting CSC that is directly anchored on our IPO work for the purpose of advancing our work.

From 1993 to 1994, the regular practice of CSC was not promptly revitalized and was not made part of our comprehensive assessments though there were CSCs conducted in an unsystematic and sporadic way. Regular CSCs were only initiated along with our regular assessments (every six months) in 1995, and we endeavored to anchor them on the main concerns of our IPO work. At the regional level, our assessments were marked by repeated criticisms and the absence of any decisive change in rectifying the weaknesses and errors pointed out. Prominent among these was the continuing operation and influence of yellow unionism in the union movement, the bureaucratic methods of some leading cadres (one was eventually expelled while others were dropped from the rolls); next was the poor style of work of a relatively large number of cadres which hindered thoroughgoing mass work and proletarian-revolutionary self-remoulding to raise our consciousness and commitment to the revolution and the people's war. As the process of summing-up, education and CSC is being completed, we are generally decisively overcoming our weaknesses and are certain of complete success.

## **In the Political Field**

We have been able to sustain the gradual strengthening of the revolutionary movement in the region while deepening our rectification within the framework of the SGRM. The solid strength of the basic forces movement in the cities is now being built in an all-round way after achieving a dramatic expansion in the underground movement and the organizations of the toiling masses. The expansion was dramatic relative to the modest size of our initial forces and our more than a decade's failure at solid organizing among the poor in the communities, and considering that we were in the midst of struggle against the persistent vestiges of disorientation. The workers' movement which was renewing its strength became a reliable base for sustaining and expanding our mass mobilizations and struggles against the Ramos regime and the severe onslaught of the crisis. We quickly learned to forge alliances with the middle forces and even tactical alliances with some sections of the reactionaries based on the strength of our basic forces, in order to expand the scope of our mass work and mobilize millions of people against the chief representative of the ruling system. In the midst of all these, cadres and activists have taken the initiative and responded to the call for deployment to the people's army and the mass movement in the countryside.

On the other hand, there is still a need to further reinforce and consolidate the strength that we have built. Political education is still insufficient, especially the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist grounding of our forces and organized masses which is needed to sharply guard against the poison and deception of the revisionist renegades and other reformist-reactionary forces and to advance the two-stage revolution and protracted war. We still have a long way to go to gain strength among the petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals and we have not yet sufficiently made use of our strength among the basic masses for this purpose.

It is our task to combat the vestiges of disorientations in mass work which slows down our all-rounded ideological, political and organizational advance in the workers movement and among the poor in the communities and in the youth and student movement. We must boldly expand and consolidate these revolutionary forces and mass movements of the basic forces of the revolution while effectively disseminating the lessons of a decade's experience and completing the victory of the rectification movement. We must temper the legal and underground democratic forces in the sustained and increased momentum of the vigorously advancing protests and struggles through more frequent mass mobilizations. We must swiftly muster our gains from bigger mobilizations and expansion, in the form of added revolutionary strength. We must expand this even more by learning to forge alliances with all progressive and democratic forces, by boldly taking advantage of and aggravating the factional strife among the reactionaries in order to concentrate the just anger of the people against the narrowest possible reactionary target. From these victories, we must further increase our support for the countryside in the form of propaganda, cadres and mass activists and other essential support services to the armed movement in the countryside.

***Building Solid Revolutionary Strength.*** The expanding underground movement encompassing mass activists is now firmly entrenched under the close leadership of Party branches and groups. From an undetermined number and quality of mass activists in 1993 and 1994, the one thousand mass activists that were recruited have increased and been consolidated in the process of

rectification and collectivized in organizing groups and committees in the factories, communities, schools and other areas where the masses can be found. This is a vast improvement over the situation when Lagman liquidated our revolutionary strength by deploying mass activists aboveground and "formed four Party machineries"; and even over the loose forces resulting from the economistic union committee-union group and "CO" style of organizing.

From 1995 to 1996, those considered as activists, even if not organized into groups, were consolidated into organizing groups and committees, core groups and other activist cells, while they were recruiting and organizing new groups. There was a dramatic increase of activists by 205% from March 1995 to January 1997 equivalent to a 90% increase if we include the previously unorganized activists. There was a 34% increase up to the third quarter of 1997 exclusive of the area turned over to Southern Tagalog. There are no more unorganized activists and the unconsolidated and inactive ones have been dropped from the rolls. The number of activists in each group has also increased from three to four members to six to seven members per group.

The main factor for this development is our return, starting 1995, to the correct framework of step by step solid organizing, as outlined in Our Urgent Tasks, and our dissemination of the important lessons of mass work in the cities and the subsequent guidelines on step by step organizing in the region. But our cadres and organizers have not yet fully mastered these as we continue to overcome the bad style of life and mass work that we have grown accustomed to. For some time and in several cases, remnants of uneven sweeping organizing and mobilization, economism and obsession with the self-dynamism of mass campaigns also persisted. These were decisively criticized and resolved in the 1997 assessment.

All activists have finished the study of Philippine Society and Revolution (PSR and Short Course on PSR) while only 23% have finished the course for mass activists. Less than this number have studied "Critical and Creative Tasks", "Socialism and the New World Order", Padepa series, "Wage, Price and Profit", Semifeudalism and others. There is still a lot to be done to extensively and systematically raise the revolutionary consciousness, commitment and struggle of activists, which is a major factor in the high rate of drop outs relative to the increase in recruits and organized groups. As a result, we have not been able to sustain our dramatic expansion overall.

It was only in 1997 that "Critical and Creative Tasks" and "Socialism and the New World Order" were programmed for study but the setting up of a legal machinery for extensive open education was delayed for a long time. This machinery has now been set up and is conducting open education but it is still inadequate for the widespread propagation of Marxist-Leninist education. It has not also been maximized for the extensive education of mass activists and the members of unions, community and school associations. This is due to the districts and sections' lack of close supervision in the formulation of plans and in the mobilization of student attendance. In addition, close coordination between the legal machinery and the district committees has not been established.

This underground movement serves as the backbone of the revolutionary and progressive unions, the community associations of the urban poor, the associations of youth and students, teachers, church people, office workers, professionals and others from the petty bourgeoisie. There are a

few hundred of these mass associations with tens of thousands of members in hundreds of factories, communities and schools in the whole region. These associations have immediate access to a hundred more unions and mass associations and more than 200,000 workers, other poor people in the communities and students and teachers in schools.

In general, this is already a great advance considering the number of solid mass organizations squandered by the counterrevolutionary renegades. In 1993, we started out with only some scores of unions and a few community associations of the urban poor (in 12 towns and cities) which firmly stood up and opposed the splittist and annihilative campaign of the combined forces of the revisionists and the Ramos regime and its minions in the mass movement. After decisively defeating their offensive, we were able to consolidate the revolutionary and progressive mass associations and swiftly expanded. In January 1994, we had more than a hundred unions with a few tens of thousands of members; and less than three scores of community associations with more than ten thousand members. In 1996, these went up to nearly 40,000 members in more than 200 associations in factories and communities. But we were unable to maintain many of these and eventually lost quite a number (besides factories that closed down and communities that were demolished) because we were unable to promptly overcome our mainly sweeping style of organizing which resulted in loose mass organizations. Meanwhile, we can still maximize our accumulated forces and mass base to further expand into numerous and more strategic factories, communities and schools.

From this mass base we are able to mobilize up to 14,000 workers and urban poor, hundreds of youth and students, and scores of middle forces in nationwide protest actions undertaken twice or thrice a year. There are smaller and more frequent mass actions outside of these. Because of these nationwide protest actions, we are able to mobilize thousands of additional unorganized masses in marches and rallies and link them to the broad people's struggles (like the anti-Charter Change mobilization of 1997).

From a total of only a few thousands of participants (almost all of whom were workers) from 1994 to 1996, at a frequency of once or twice a year, we improved our capacity for mass mobilizations, though initially, we did not firmly grasp the correct relationship between mobilizations based on our accumulated solid strength, on the one hand, and the mustering of new forces from among those mobilized to serve as additional solid strength, on the other. This weakness was reflected in our relegation of the task of mobilization to the relatively independent legal machinery while the underground forces remained on the sidelines; instead we could have combined the efforts of the legal machinery and the underground forces under the Party's direction and correct stress within the year. We also contented ourselves with mobilizing only the directly available organized masses instead of combining their strength with the allies and masses that they were capable of mobilizing. These weaknesses were criticized in our 1997 assessment and we have endeavored to correct them. There is still a need to improve our capability and method of mustering the gains of our expanding mobilizations in the form of additional revolutionary forces, to further strengthen the democratic movement and the flow of support to the countryside.

***Mass Campaigns.*** We are now capable of launching major mass campaigns at the regional, town and city level while ensuring our participation in national campaigns, big or small. We were able

to contribute substantially to the vigorous advance of the regional and national mass protests and struggles in the face of the worsening crisis of the ruling system. Our exposures and struggles against the Ramos regime and its anti-people schemes and policies, against its foreign monopoly capitalist master, the local big comprador bourgeoisie and landlords, were timely and sustained. There were militant actions against such schemes as imperialist globalization, denationalization, deregulation, liberalization, privatization, etc.

From small, few and far between, our mobilizations grew bigger, became more frequent and mobilized hundreds, thousands, up to more than 10,000 workers, urban poor, youth and students, organized in mass associations. Thousands more spontaneously joined in the actual marches and rallies. We achieved this while rejecting the bureaucratic, one-sided method of mobilization that relied on bused-in participants, paid advertisements and subsidies from Party funds.

From 1997, we were able to launch three major mass campaigns in the region on our own initiative (Kalbaryo 96, Lakbayan and Kalbaryo 97; at the town and multi-town level, PNR2000). We participated in eight national campaigns and mobilized thousands of workers and urban poor, and hundreds of students and middle forces, outside of our participation in small propaganda actions like picket rallies. Various forms of propaganda were undertaken in these campaigns with written manifestos reaching anywhere from several thousands to 100,000 copies.

In Kalbaryo 97, a couple of thousands were mobilized in the march-rally-cultural action towards Mendiola. We were able to make public the suffering and oppression of the people perpetrated by the ruling class.

The combined PEC-RCST Lakbayan (supported by CL and the national organs in NCR), sustained the vigour of the toiling masses' protest actions and struggles and carried the antifascist, anti-imperialist and antifeudal line. It advanced the workers demand for a reasonable living wage. It also served as an example of militant protest and struggle to the numerous people mobilized on the basis of a relatively lower level of unity like anti-CHACHA. No one can dispute the vigour, scope and intensity of our education and propaganda within our organized mass base as well as among a big number of unorganized masses. From the period of preparation up to the actual march, we made full use of different forms of propaganda and education like written manifestos, OD-OP, posters, placards and streamers, murals, mass meetings, symposia, march-rallies, cultural presentations, and even the multi-media. All this was accomplished within a short span of time. There were tens of thousands of posters, legal manifestos and copies of an underground newspaper (special issue). There were also thousands of songbooks printed.

Outside of the days for preparation, we were able to mobilize the majority of our subjective forces and legal mass organizations three days in a row. Nearly 3,000 organized masses were mobilized on the first day of convergence and many more thousands on the last day in Mendiola. In the process we were able to muster the support of the masses, unions and other mass associations, middle forces and allies. We raised a significant amount of funds and food supply.

In Kalbaryo 98, we launched extensive propaganda actions in the form of march-rally-cultural actions in ten areas covering scores of communities and participated in by around 100 people per area; and converged into a central rally in Mendiola where thousands massed. We mobilized

mass organizations and cultural groups and more than a hundred cultural activists. We came out with more than 10,000 copies of a manifesto at the local level and twice that number at the regional level. In general, we were warmly welcomed by the masses in the communities we passed and they were given an additional venue for supporting and participating in protest actions. On the basis of some of our failings, we learned the importance of build-up actions, the need for propaganda in the communities along the route, and the utilization of the bourgeois media in mobilizations of this type.

We were also able to correctly position and coordinate the regionally initiated mass actions with the national campaigns by drafting a two-month plan for every campaign. Their relation to consolidation work was also in accordance with the targets set (full engagement of legal and underground machineries twice a year).

From 1995 to 1996 (the period of a comprehensive putting-into- order of various fields of work), we one-sidedly relegated the administration of campaigns to the legal machineries while the underground machineries were made to concentrate on consolidation work. Overall, the legal machinery was able to respond to all the major national mass campaigns and in fact, the region was a major force in these campaigns. Several thousands were mobilized for national issues such as SONA, APEC, Oil Deregulation, Centennial, and others. For Mayo Uno, we mobilized thousands. We also failed to lay down the correct relationship between national campaigns and consolidation work and even between major and small campaigns, though it has been our practice to concentrate all our forces only on the Mayo Uno mobilization. This has resulted in the absence of a programmed development of our capability in launching mass campaigns that are correctly linked to consolidation work.

We started to systematize the conduct of mass campaigns in 1997, after this was pointed out in our assessment. The regional mass campaign committee was set up in November 1997, after it was determined that the previous system used during the Lakbayan no longer sufficed. In addition, we had an immediate need for it as our capacity for mass mobilization expanded with the more favourable conditions in our region and the whole country.

Learning from our experience in Lakbayan, our succeeding campaigns also made use of dispersed mobilizations and propaganda actions that culminated in centralized protest actions like Kalbaryo and Mayo Uno. Such a conduct of campaigns develops our capability in direct propaganda and mobilization within a broad area in NCR through small but numerous march-rallies which attract a greater number of people and project widespread vitality and militance. This also overrides the disadvantages of our past mobilizations which were limited to a few main and short routes on the way to the central rally such as: limited propaganda scope, contraction of the number of participants who had to be gathered at converging points from different distances and failed to take advantage of the spontaneous participation resulting from numerous routes of march, and additional expense for renting transport vehicles.

In numerous cases in our past campaigns, illegal propaganda in the form of OD-OP was carried out but this was not widespread and effective. We can and should undertake synchronized and widespread OD-OP on traditional anniversary celebrations of the CPP, NPA and NDF.

Our task now is to sustain the frequency of our mass campaigns, further expand the number of those mobilized and improve our capacity while developing our skills in swiftly mustering and making use of our victories by expanding the revolutionary forces for the cities and the countryside. We also need to further develop our ability in combining with other progressive and democratic forces and allies to expand our mobilizations beyond our own strength.

***Advancing the Workers Movement.*** We have been able to renew our strength. The revolutionary workers movement in the region is continuously consolidating and expanding while vigorously launching the rectification movement. Since 1993, we have increased the number of our unions by 40 percent and the number of unionists by 27 percent. We are in contact with and conducting organizing work in scores of additional unions covering tens of thousands of workers.

Our progress in building or transforming unions into revolutionary unions with a broad underground movement has been slow particularly in the large and strategic enterprises. It has been noted that 47 percent of the enterprises where we have unions have less than 200 workers. Only 13 percent of our unions have more than 500 workers per union. Many big and small unions are in the hands of the old yellow and revisionist renegades and for a long time we made no effort to organize them or seize their leadership. In our 1997 assessment, we criticized the persistent economistic framework of the Union Committee-Union Group concept and in particular, the concept of union capturing which prioritized organizing work in friendly unions or unions with easy to win over leaderships while work in other unions not falling within this category was deferred even if they were big and important for swift expansion and revitalization. The decision was taken to expand into many manufacturing, service and transport enterprises with more than 200 workers, into those more strategic and the bulwarks of the revisionists. Cadre teams were deployed and relatively strong factory branches were also given expansion tasks but expansion has yet to take off since our main stress has been in the consolidation and putting into order of our organization in the whole region.

The transformed or set up revolutionary and progressive unions are continuously being consolidated and tempered in militant union struggles and street actions. (These have in fact been the wellspring of a big majority of our mobilizations since 1993.) Within these unions there are Party branches and groups leading hundreds of activists in organizing groups and circles. These are still extremely few relative to the number of the union members, and especially in relation to the size of the whole labor force. We still need to exhaustively combat the influence of economism, further consolidate the leading Party branch and fill up the underground movement and the ranks of the mass members within the union structure, and recruit fulltime revolutionaries for the different people's movements and the people's army.

Many of these unions have freely been disseminating studies on Philippine society and revolution and other timely topics along the national democratic line through big and small study meetings and discussions. But we still need to increase their frequency in every union and invigorate studies and discussions on socialism and the introduction to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; train instructors and reproduce more reading materials.

After several years of relative silence, there is now an upsurge of militant struggle in the factories. The workers are firmly opposing the suppression of their right to unionize and right to

strike, low wages, and the absence of job security (contractualization). The fight for a P100 across-the-board increase in daily wage continues to be pursued. Overall, workers are making use of the strike as their effective weapon. We have decisively overcome the capitulationist and collaborationist influence of the old and new yellow unionists and some corrupt leaders and cadres who have served as the brokers of the capitalists within the ranks of the progressive block from 1993 to 1996.

Up to the present, we have not significantly made use of our open and underground forces in the factories to lead in the expansion and revitalization of the revolutionary movement in the poor communities and other sectors. Progress in this task in the immediate future will serve as a gauge of our level of consolidation in the workers movement in the region.

The central regional union and its chapters in the towns and cities have been consolidated and continue to expand. They played a crucial role in repelling and defeating the revisionist renegades and collaborationists and the old and new yellow unionists, and in consolidating the progressive bloc, in the midst of the severe onslaught of the crisis and the offensive of the US-Ramos regime and the comprador-big bourgeoisie and the foreign monopoly capitalists. They also played a major role in sustaining propaganda-education work and in mobilizing the workers while the underground movement was revitalizing and consolidating itself from 1995 to 1996. They were particularly effective in the four big mass campaigns from 1997 to 1998 which were participated in by the revolutionary forces in the region based on their accumulated strength after a level of consolidation.

Since 1993, the central regional union has twice rearranged its organization and machinery to further strengthen itself and sift out the leaders who were no longer willing to advance (after participating in the tug-of-war with the renegades and reaching out to those who could be won over). There is still a need to improve the central regional union's capability in propaganda-education, expansion and alliance work, in fighting and mobilizing for the interest of the poor in the communities and peasants in the countryside. Meanwhile, in the several years past, some of the chapters in the towns and cities had a hard time maintaining themselves due to the weakness of the mass base in the local unions and insufficient help from the territorial Party organs. There is a need for closer cooperation on this matter to further maximize our consolidation and expansion at the town and city level.

In 1997, we saw the urgent need for a legal education machinery at the regional level which would eventually be extended down to the district level. Due to the lack of personnel and resources, we have not yet been able to set this up. There is an immediate need to attend to this and deploy fulltime staff and instructors to vigorously launch and sustain extensive Marxist education during and outside the periods of mass campaigns.

***In the Urban Poor Communities.*** The revitalization of our revolutionary work in the poor communities was relatively swift from 1995 to 1997, a feat which the Popoy clique failed to do from 1987 to 1992. The urban poor, youth, women's and cultural associations that we are transforming have a membership of 13,300 in 115 communities with a population of 97,000. This is exclusive of the 157 associations with 27,500 members that we can reach through the legal alliances and federations where we have a presence. We started out with 15 urban poor

organizations in Navotas, Caloocan, Makati and Muntinlupa; these increased to 30 organizations with 4,760 members (with the addition of Paranaque, Tondo and Quezon City) in 1994. From dispersed mass activists and Party members, we were able to build the underground movement within these mass associations which now have 15 local Party branches and 135 groups of activists (COG, COC, KM group) with more or less 700 activists (from 75 activists and 15 groups in 1995).

We have been able to maximize the burning issues and spontaneous struggles of the poor in the communities (in particular, the issue of actual or imminent demolition) thus allowing us to swiftly link-up with their associations, do propaganda work and recruit activists and Party members from the ranks of workers, semiproletariat, youth, women, and even from the teachers, nurses, church layworkers and others from the lower petty bourgeoisie living in the poor communities. On the other hand, we were unable to swiftly overcome the dispersedness and shallowness of our underground movement in the communities which was a result of our mainly sweeping style of organizing.

Though in the last part of 1993 we raised the call to go back to step by step organizing in the communities as outlined in OUT, its practice was not widely undertaken in revitalizing our revolutionary work in the communities. We did not immediately grasp the need to concentrate on criticizing and overcoming the deeply rooted influence of the CO Approach and other reformist and reactionary lines among those being organized and among the organizers themselves, to advance truly solid organizing — a feat which has not been repeated in the NCR since the last part of the 70s.

Since 1993, we have used the regional alliance of the urban poor as our framework in linking with, conducting propaganda, organizing and mobilizing the urban poor, and even in winning the support of the middle forces. Initially, this machinery played a positive role in reaching and winning over the urban poor associations in the midst of the splittism and confusion sown by the Popoy clique. But eventually, there grew the tendency to load all mass work in the communities onto this machinery in furtherance of the concept of a separate sectoral movement of the urban poor, coalitionism, NGOism and corruption similar to the TOMANA experience. We criticized and strove to correct this in 1996, but in 1997 we simply decided to dismantle the regional alliance and redirect its forces and efforts into painstaking mass work at the basic level, as we prepared the way for the setting up of urban poor alliances at the town, city and multi-area level that are based on the solid strength of our mass base. At the regional level it was pointed out that the PDC had the capacity and should take over the task of propaganda-education and the mobilization of support for the urban poor struggle. These policies and decisions were proven to be correct by the swift advance of our work in the communities, the emergence of numerous community alliances, and the invigoration of struggles that were effectively made public and supported by the PDC. Correspondingly, by negative example, this was also proven by the vehement opposition of some of the principal leaders of the old alliance, to the point of disrupting alliances in some communities and eventually committing political suicide by going over to the side of the factionalists.

Up to 1995, the collaborationist framework of holding on to the coat-tails of reactionary politicians and embracing government projects persisted particularly in Marikina, Quezon City

and Caloocan. Cadres, organizers and numerous forces were enlisted into these community and urban poor programs to implement the schemes of politicians in targeted urban poor communities in exchange for meagre wages. Most of the activists and Party members involved in these programs have either dropped out or been totally absorbed by the programs of the politicians. And even among the mass alliances with which they associated, there are only a few in which they still remain active.

In our March 1997 assessment, these weaknesses and errors were criticized (including the concept of a separate workers organization in the communities which was not implemented by most) and we clarified the correct application of step by step organizing as outlined in OUT. In the process of completing the summing-up of more than a decade's experience, we deepened our analysis of the roots of our deviations and disorientation in community organizing, thus positively benefitting the systematization of our work and rectification of errors, and allowing us to draft a guide on step by step organizing in the communities of the NCR in accordance with OUT.

At present, the cadre teams which are carrying out solid organizing are widely deployed and continuing to master the conduct of step by step organizing. We are continuously forming COCs and COGs in the communities and in the various mass associations in order to transform them into the solid base of the revolution in the cities. Alongside this, we are setting up the alliances of the community associations for cooperative struggle at the level of a cluster of communities and at the town and city level. The militant struggle of the urban poor continues to be invigorated while mobilizations for national protest actions are expanding. From less than 1000 average participants, we were able to mobilize several thousands from poor communities for the marches and rallies of the anti-CHACHA, Lakbayan, Kalbaryong Bayan, Mayo Uno and others. Several scores of activists and Party members have been sent to the countryside for integration and deployment to the people's army.

We still need to sustain and accelerate our expansion and consolidation through the initiative of our forces in the factories and cover all the communities of the poor in the NCR, especially those big and strategic. We need to expand political and Marxist education through the mass alliances and associations by harnessing the strong support of the legal machinery of the workers movement and the PDC. We are also initiating the task of building alliances based on issues and cooperative struggle at the regional level, for example PNR2000, or even on the basis of a higher level of unity among the communities along the railroad track.

**The Revolutionary Movement of Youth and Students.** We have started organizing work in more schools in the region and we are now present in 29 schools (including five highschools) with a total population of 90,000. On the average, we are still at the contact level among students, teachers and employees, in the process of building organizing groups and penetrating traditional and political academic organizations, as we conduct social investigation at the same time. In some schools, we have reached the level of SOC and established Party branches, we have won seats in the student councils and have established the chapter of our legal political organization and KM cells. We are active in eight legal organizations with more than 8000 total members. There are 30 Party members in these schools (8 FM and 22 CM) and 100 student, teacher and employee activists.

It was in 1997 that we initiated organizing work in schools, when the national youth and students bureau turned over 11 colleges and universities and the newly created districts started their expansion work after having laid down a sufficient base in the factories and communities. Within that year, we were able to come out with a guide on step by step organizing in schools while at the same time disseminating the main lessons of the summing-up of a decade's experience in the revolutionary youth and students movement which was published in REBOLUSYON.

At present, our cadre teams and forces in the schools are continuing to master the conduct of solid organizing, to serve as the base of the revolution and people's war, as they continue to combat the remnants of past disorientations. Among these disorientations was our concentration on LPO organizing rather than all-roundedly working within all the possible academic and traditional organization of students and seriously endeavoring to organize teachers and employees. What is needed is for us to gather the cadres experienced in school organizing and combine them with new forces, to enable us to deploy numerous cadre teams in schools while the district committees study the appropriate means of administering this work. We also need to maximize the organized communities for the swift expansion and consolidation of newly recruited students and teachers.

In the communities, there are a significant number of youth associations which we have set up, are working within or in contact with. From these we have been able to recruit activists, Party members and forces who have been deployed to the countryside. Since the basis for establishing the regional alliance of youth associations already exists, it must now be set up so it can serve as a major force in advancing the revolutionary movement of youth and students in the region and the country. Through this we can accelerate and expand our organizing and mobilization of the youth and other poor sectors in most of the communities in the region.

***The Middle Forces and Alliance Work.*** Alliance work and work among the middle forces is revitalizing from the regional to the basic level. There are increasing opportunities for tactical alliance and cooperation with temporary allies including sections of the class enemy. Our revolutionary forces are slowly but profoundly learning how to reap the gains of our alliance work based on the strength of our basic forces for the advance of the revolution in general and the mass movement in particular. On the other hand, our structure for attending to and sustaining this advance is still skeletal.

We are now active among the teachers in four public and private schools at the town and city level; in one association of scores of doctors, nurses and midwives in one municipality; among church people in three Catholic parishes; and professionals and businessmen in three patriotic organizations, outside of individual contacts among elements of the middle class and political personalities. With the exception of the teachers, the aforesaid are being developed and mobilized within the framework of the regional PDC, since the districts were unable to maintain them after we dismantled the regional structure for alliance work and the middle forces in 1997.

We started our work among the middle forces in June 1995, by setting up a regional staff for the middle forces and alliance work. However, we failed to indicate which sectors should be the focus of our organizing work and instead concentrated on the professionals in Ayala. Nevertheless, along the way we were forced by conditions and our practice to work among the

ranks of the principal sectors though this was done haphazardly. We decided to dismantle the staff and turn over the results of its work to the territorial units to help build our strength among the basic masses and set up groups of the revolutionary organizations like KAGUMA, CNL, MASAPA, and others. The cells that were formed preparatory to the formation of these organizations were not maintained and were lost in the turnovers between territories.

It is now our task to propel our revolutionary organizing among teachers, church people, and professionals in the health sector to advance their sectoral struggles and convince them to serve the basic masses in the cities and the countryside. We must recruit the biggest possible number of activists from their respective revolutionary organizations.

In 1997, with the invigoration of mass struggles and national protest actions and after a certain level of consolidation in the region, we were able to vigorously mobilize our allies and forces in the protest actions against CHACHA and in the Lakbayan, and we were able to reach and regain the support of former allies and personalities who were active in the anti-dictatorship struggle in organizations such as ATOM, NA, and others. We were able to maximize these allies to expand our mass mobilizations, resources and opportunities for new contacts. From these, conditions for setting up multisectoral alliances at the town and city level have again opened up to receive our allies and expand our mobilization of the people. Meanwhile, the accumulated solid strength of the territorial units is sufficient for this task which will result in additional strength.

Our regional PDC, though still provisional, has been able to effectively administer the mass campaigns of the region and our propaganda-education work, and establish relations with allied organizations, forces and personalities in support of the workers struggle and the struggle of the poor in the communities. After setting it up in 1994, we tried to consolidate the PDC in 1996 and 1997, in order to transform it into a full council. But we were unable to convene a congress since we still lacked the basic requisites and had to attend to big mass campaigns. In 1995, heavier requisites like the setting up of the regional organization of youth and students, women, teachers and others were demanded of the PDC. There are now four chapters of the PDC at the town and city level. All that is needed is for us to push ahead with the convening of a congress and continue to build its chapters in the towns and cities.

In the last half of 1997, we initiated the formation of the legal machinery for human rights and the lawyers group. We were able to form a secretariat and launch its first activity (photo exhibit) and participate in two campaigns (PNR2000 and Kapayapaan ng Abril 17). Our HR machinery still remains an arm of the PDC but in the immediate future it shall be a separate entity. Meanwhile, our work among lawyers is still at the level of bringing together those who can help. We can now accelerate the regularization of these machineries and initiate the joint machinery for human rights, the struggle of political detainees and others (in the form of desks and documentation work).

Through the PDC, we were able to establish relations with 15 small and medium-sized businessmen and three organizations in three towns and one city, for purposes of advancing the movement for the national protection of the economy. Conditions for continuous cooperation also opened up, based on such issues affecting them like the rising interest rates of banks, the increase in oil prices, trade liberalization, and others. These can still be painstakingly expanded

and eventually raised to the level of supporting or cooperating with the revolution and the mass movement.

In dealing with the reactionary elections of 1995, there were several cases of right opportunism among some cadres and forces who trailed behind reactionary politicians and neglected the task of exposing the futility of elections and propagating the need for revolution as the solution to the decaying semifeudal and semicolonial system. This even aided the bourgeois politicians in their dissemination of reformist illusions among the masses, confused local forces and eventually corrupted several forces while in the midst of the rectification movement.

These errors were manifest in the system of individual maneuvering and support for a candidate who was impetuously considered to be an ally, in the enlistment of forces for the politician's campaign machinery, in the herding of organized masses into the squabble of politicians in exchange for money pilfered from the campaign and promises of future favor in case of victory. Among the prominent cases are those of Marikina, Quezon City, Caloocan, Makati and Rizal where the ringleader dropped out of the Party and failed to rectify despite criticisms, while others who were drawn in and involved committed themselves to rectification and remained in the revolution. Since the leading regional collective was still in the process of regrouping after the enemy disruption of 1994, it was unable to closely monitor these activities and promptly criticize errors and repair the damage. In addition, it was sidetracked by its omission to criticize a similar error of one of its leading cadres who decided on his own to support a candidate in a province of ST to earn money and obtain individual benefits and influence from the provincial government.

These weaknesses were assessed and criticized in March 1997 and the correct policy of revolutionary dual tactics and the united front framework were stressed. In the barangay elections of this year, we came out with a memorandum to guide our forces in dealing with the elections and a plan on how to maximize it in line with the framework of revolutionary dual tactics, though we did not have high expectations because of our actual situation. Overall, implementation has been relatively smooth in the whole region. In the process of completing our summing-up, the lessons on dealing with the elections were further clarified with the help of the documents and memorandum on the elections from the EC-CC which serve as a guide on advancing in this field while the solid revolutionary strength of the forces in NCR continues to be built.

In the past elections of 1998, based on the level of our strength and capability in the united front, we harnessed our whole strength in the region to achieve enormous advantages and benefits for the Party and the mass movement from less reactionary candidates. We were able to aggravate the contradiction between factions of the reactionaries while different types of relations and cooperation with tactical allies emerged. From this rich experience we can draw lessons which could immediately benefit us in our continued accumulation of strength.

***The Women's Liberation Movement.*** The vigorous organizing and advance of the struggle of toiling women in the region is continuing. Among the women workers, the revolutionary and progressive unions are actively advancing the struggle against women's double exploitation as workers and as women. They serve as the solid backbone of the revolutionary women's movement in the NCR and the wellspring of women leaders, activists and mass mobilizations on

women's issues and national issues. Meanwhile, we have also gone forward with the organizing of toiling women within the framework of the all-rounded organizing of the urban poor communities.

In almost all of the member unions of our central union, women's committees have been set up. In these unions more than 2000 women workers can be mobilized in the mass campaigns of the RWM (for example on March 8).

There are now no less than 11 women's associations in the communities with more than 200 members (outside of those directly organized by the national women's bureau which coordinate with the Party units of the region). Generally, these associations are composed of mothers and some women from the youth. Meanwhile, a large number of the members of the traditional organizations wherein we are active are women, and many of them are active and serve as leaders.

In schools, women students are also very willing to join the local women's LPO. What is needed is for us to move ahead with the formation of LPO chapters within the framework of our overall work in the RYSM.

In the early part of 1994, we formed the RWM staff and the Party group in the central union to oversee the setting-up of women's committees, the dissemination of studies and the mobilizations particular to the sector. Jose Maria Sison's "Message to Makibaka" which is contained in SND, was designated as a required reading for women. The decision was also taken to set up the regional women's LPO in the immediate future. But we could not sustain the process of its formation until the concerned staff disintegrated due to organizational problems.

In the last quarter of 1995, we decided to defer the formation of the regional organization or alliance of women's associations while we were still building our foundation at the basic level. Meanwhile, we have not yet disseminated the lessons from the summing-up of our experience in the women's movement in the cities which we consider to be crucial in uniting our forces to advance this work.

We need to persevere in expanding the women's associations in the communities considering that our overall organizing in the communities has already greatly advanced. We must propagate the lessons of the summing-up of the RWM and the study materials on advancing it based on the SGRM. We also have to start building MAKIBAKA groups and chapters in the communities. Among the workers, we must sustain and expand the women's committees and take the lead in arousing, organizing and mobilizing their mothers, sisters and daughters in the communities. We now have the capacity to set up the regional alliance of women's associations (inclusive of the unions and traditional community organizations) that will advance the liberation movement and accelerate organizing among women in the factories, communities, schools and offices.

***Support for the Party, Armed Struggle and Mass Movement in the Countryside.*** The deployment of cadres and personnel to the people's army in the countryside, which we started to push since the last part of 1995, is gradually invigorating. Up to the last quarter of 1997, a total of 25 Party members have been deployed to the countryside; 27 went for three to six months

integration and several scores went for exposure to the guerrilla zones. Several (about 10) have even taken the initiative to seek their own means of connecting to the movement in the countryside for deployment. These numbers are still small but they are a good start considering that that we are still in the process of revitalizing and all-roundedly consolidating our Party and movement in the region after the destruction wrought by the Lagman clique. In the future, the number of those deployed to the countryside will be one of the measurements of our advance.

From the very start, it has been the general rule of the region to grant permission and immediately arrange the deployment of all those who declare themselves ready for deployment to the countryside. In 1996 and 1997, we adopted a program for the rural exposure and integration of numerous Party members and activists as we simultaneously established our lines to the regions in the countryside through the "adopt a region/adopt a front" program. But this could not immediately take off because of the objective problem of communication with the said regions, on the one hand, and the inadequate perseverance of our districts, on the other. Not a few forces were stalled for quite a time as they awaited their travel arrangements to the guerrilla zones. We have established our lines to two regions (one is more developed) but failed to sustain our lines to two others. With the development of the STUs of the regions, we can speed up the implementation of our program in supporting the countryside.

It is our task to further invigorate the revolutionary education of activists and Party members, our internal propaganda and detailed planning down to the groups of activists at the basic level, in order to sustain and expand the number of recruits for the people's army and the cadre needs of the countryside. Let us strive for and revive the shining tradition of our movement in the region which considered deployment to the guerrilla zones and fronts a "badge of honor".

***Propaganda Work.*** We are now slowly being able to sustain and expand legal and illegal forms of propaganda from its initial infrequent and irregular character as we concurrently develop its content and form.

Since the last quarter of 1997, we have been able to regularly come out with our regional paper, Kuryer ng Bayan, after its publication was stopped in 1994. KB has a regular circulation of 3000 with two special issues of 10,000 copies each. It is warmly welcomed by our forces and organized masses; it has united and guided them in their struggle and is being used as a material for discussion and propaganda. It has a capable editorial, production and distribution staff.

It took two years before we could reorganize a machinery for propaganda work as we continued to train writers at the basic level. We still need to raise the quality and content of every issue by stimulating correspondence (inclusive of collecting Feedback s) and mutual-assistance with our central Party organ (Ang Bayan). We should also ensure the regular flow of AB to our region, its distribution, the sending of Feedback s, reports and important events and developments within our scope.

At the same time, we need to invigorate other forms of illegal propaganda at the basic level (written manifestos, OD-OP, balatengga, posters, etc.) in addition to the verbal forms (lightning rally), which develop the boldness and daring of our mass activists.

The legal newspaper of the regional workers movement is now being published, though irregularly. We must strive to come out with it more often and increase its readership. In the meantime, since 1993, we have made sure to come out with manifestos for every mass campaign. Written propaganda from the unions and mass associations at the basic level are once more proliferate and thousands of copies are released and distributed at every mass campaign, exclusive of local struggles. The writers trainings of 1997 and 1998 have greatly contributed to this positive development. Let us sustain and further expand our legal and illegal propaganda at all levels.

***Cultural Work.*** We have made great strides in developing our revolutionary cultural work in the region relative to the period before the SGRM when cultural work almost had no place or was regarded as entertainment, an intermission, or a finance project. Starting from a few cultural groups in schools, revolutionary activism in culture was spread as a mass movement among the workers and urban poor. We were able to organize and activate scores of performance groups with more or less 100 cultural activists who actively participated in performances while undertaking mass work and mass campaigns. In addition, we had the support of individual and groups of artists in the theatre, music and visual arts and in literature. We relate with them through the artist circles in the region and even on an individual basis at the town and community level and exhort them to join the struggle of the basic masses and hone and harness their talent in arts and letters in this way.

Within only a year's time, cultural work has become a major component of big mass campaigns the likes of Kalbaryong Bayan, Mayo Uno and Lakbayan. We have also started the propagation of revolutionary songs, poems and scripts through tapes, songbooks and training workshops in the localities. Among the artists and cultural activists, we have already initiated discussions on MLMZT studies on culture, and on arts and letters.

Our efforts in cultural work, which we seriously started in the last half of 1995, became fruitful after we criticized the wrong concept of big productions which prevailed among cadres and forces in cultural work. Pending projects requiring enormous expenses, forces and effort were discontinued. Generally, these projects did not contribute to the rectification and revitalization of the revolutionary movement in the region but instead engulfed our scanty forces in petty-bourgeois traits and weaknesses. We then redirected the deployment and work of our forces into the propagation of cultural activism among the basic masses and this was warmly received by the good cadres and activists who were seriously advancing the rectification movement. Initial groups for cultural work were formed in the districts to undertake cultural activities and propagation work from time to time.

In 1997, a plan was made to undertake trainings and workshops for the workers and the youth. And in the early part of 1998, the PEC-NCR propitiously came out with the orientation of cultural work and a guideline on building the revolutionary organization of cultural activists (ARMAS). These developments further reignited the interest of many cultural activists and enlivened the cultural mass movement even more. We were able to hold 10 training sessions and three workshops in songs, poetry, dance and skits. In the successive mass campaigns that were launched thereafter, many new cultural groups were formed. What we need to do now is sustain these groups, further propagate studies on culture, disseminate the old and new works of

revolutionary art and literature, undertake more trainings and workshops and build numerous ARMAS chapters.

### **In the Field of Organization**

The Party organization in the region has been established and we are about to convene the Second Regional Conference of Metro Manila. We have an adequate presence in the whole territory and numerous branches at the basic level to be sufficiently rooted among the toiling masses. From the ashes of almost total destruction after the Trotskyite Lagman clique split off, we have established our presence in the region in the midst of a life and death struggle against the anti-Party campaign of the renegades and the annihilative attempt of the reactionary puppet state despite the heavy internal problems that we had to go through. We were able to build and preserve our organization by maximizing the advantage offered by the countryside as the rear base of the urban movement. In this way we foiled the repeated attempts of the enemy to destroy our Party organization in the region. We are now ready to seize the favorable conditions and take the lead in implementing the two important tasks of the movement in the NCR.

Our Party is now assiduously completing its ideological building and attaining relative stability. Democratic centralism has been upheld and has generally prevailed in our various organizational tasks. When we were just starting to rebuild our organization, the practice of democratic centralism went through twists and turns, but the good cadres and members persevered and were able to overcome weaknesses and errors. On the other hand, the sectarian tendency is weighing down the continuous and swift expansion of our Party and the extension and deepening of our roots among the people. This should be severely criticized, rejected and decisively combatted until it is completely overcome.

Our current task is to consolidate, further expand and strengthen our Party which is at the core of the broad, open mass movement to enable us to carry out our enormous tasks in the face of the unprecedentedly favourable conditions in our country and region. We should uphold the key and decisive task of continuously consolidating and raising our theoretical, political and organizational level. In the performance of this task, we must recruit thousands of candidate and full Party members from the ranks of workers, other toiling masses in the communities, youth and students and intellectuals; build and strengthen hundreds of Party branches and groups which are deeply rooted in the factories, communities, offices and schools, until they crowd the region; develop and multiply the hundreds of cadres and fulltime forces to strengthen the leading committees at the regional, district and section level; further improve the system of reports and short but productive meetings at all levels; tighten discipline and the methods of clandestine work by strengthening and deepening our underground movement in order to ensure the security of our Party in the face of rising state fascism; methodically develop finance work and attain the capacity to be self-reliant.

***Recruitment of Party Members.*** The expansion of our Party membership has not been dramatic but continuous and gradual (10% average net increase per annum in 1995 and 1996). It has doubled in number (more than 600) compared to its initial size in 1993, in spite of the big number of those who we were unable to maintain in the process of advancing the rectification movement. More than 300 candidate members were recruited since 1994, while 140 were dropped from the

rolls because they have either stopped being involved, were given disciplinary action, or were kept in the list even if they have not been performing their tasks for a long time. (This number is exclusive of those members who were turned over to another region or have opted to be deployed to the countryside.)

Up to 1996, there was no systematic campaign to educate activists so as to raise their revolutionary consciousness and introduce them to socialism and MLM in preparation for their recruitment into the Party. Instead, in many cases, heavier requisites like the study of the basic documents of the First Rectification Movement and the reestablishment of the Party were imposed on prospective candidate members. This was criticized in our March 1997 assessment and promptly corrected through our decision to launch studies on the Party Constitution, "Critical and Creative Tasks" and "Socialism and the New World Order", to prepare activists for Party recruitment. We identified and criticized many instances of the sectarian tendency in the slow expansion of our Party membership. A plan for the extensive recruitment of candidate members was drawn. But in 1997, Party recruitment remained at 10%. It is a fact that the one thousand activists who have long been active are just close at hand and hundreds of them, especially among the workers and the urban poor, are simply waiting to be recruited into the Party.

At present, one-third of our total membership are full Party members, up from 22% in 1994. From 1995 to 1996, we seriously neglected the development of candidate members and there was a long delay in their advance to full membership because of a widespread lack of understanding of the importance and place of this work in building the Party. In reality, the processing and swearing in for full membership of not just a few cadres and developing cadres was stalled. This was aggravated by the discontinuation of our education program on the Basic Party Course especially for candidate members, which is a basic requisite for raising their proletarian consciousness to become worthy full Party members. This was criticized in our assessment and a decision was made to accelerate BPC studies and the processing of BPC graduates for full membership. Two hundred forty five members finished the BPC, 167 of them only in the last six months, but most have not yet been formally sworn in as full members. This delay was due to our traditional requirement for a biodata and an interview for purposes of reassessment, which imposed unnecessary requisites, considering that we knew these forces well and their full membership had long been affirmed.

Sectarianism in the form of the complacency of cadres (in the leading committees at the section and district level) over the slow recruitment of candidate and full Party members is the reason for the slow expansion of our Party over several years. An example of this is the biding of time for the submission of biodatas instead of guiding and helping the activist write his biodata or even taking over the task since the recomendee knows the recommended person well enough. Another form is the section and district committees delayed supervision of the program and plan of recruitment which could have identified the snags and made decisive actions to correct them. There is also the tendency to consider the minor weaknesses of those formerly listed for recommendation as a diminution of their worthiness. As a result, standards become more steep and the recruitment process becomes protracted.

If we do not combat and overcome this promptly, we can be sure that the Party's link to the broad masses will constrict and weaken in the coming years. This greatly affects our advance because the members of our basic Party units are few while there are quite a number of activists vigorously at work and the mass movement continues to advance.

It can do great damage to our efforts to restrengthen ourselves in a big way and to lead the struggles of the broad masses of our people.

It is our duty to combat sectarianism in order to accelerate and increase the recruitment of members from among the workers and urban poor, while ensuring that not a single enemy agent gets in. There is a need to draw up and implement a carefully planned campaign to recruit candidate and full members from the long list of long-standing recommendees.

***Branches and groups at the basic level.*** The overall number of Party branches at the basic level has only increased by about fifty percent from 1994 to reach up to the present sixty (from 1995, the number remained almost the same due to cadre transfers, factories being closed and communities being temporarily abandoned). Most of these are provisional branches (with no EC, having none or an insufficient number of full members; only three are regular), and the majority have thin membership. Generally they are capable of leading mass struggles but they have the tendency to be overly absorbed or tied down to the routine of legal work at the factory or community and to mobilizations that are launched from time to time.

In the past, there was a lack of planning in systematic expansion in places where branches can be set up and in consolidating and expanding existing branches. Later, we identified and targeted the strategic factories, communities and schools where Party branches were to be set up. From these an additional 112 have been covered by our work and are now at the initial stage of organizing.

We have also stressed the need to speed up the regularization of the existing branches especially the long-standing ones, and the task of developing the conditions for promoting the branch meetings and the practice of elections within the branches. For so long, this task has not been grasped well and carried out and this has hindered the development of the basic Party organizations.

The development and formation of Party groups have also been stunted—an extension of the problem of forming regular branches and strengthening them.

Starting in 1997 a considerable number of cadre teams were formed as basic units for expansion work up to the building of branches. This was an offshoot of what were called up to 1996 as expansion branches. On the whole, these teams were able to carry out their assigned tasks although some were limited in their effectiveness because they had many part-timers.

The problem of the slow growth in the number of Party branches and groups is an extension and manifestation of the problem of sectarianism. Because there is a failure to recruit many activists as candidate members no branches and groups can be formed in large numbers. Because there is

no growth in the number of full members there is no way for the existing branches to be regularized.

It is also necessary to bring to completion the rectification movement up to the level of Party branch, carry out summings-up and criticism and self-criticism among the long-standing branches to combat economism and to revitalize themselves in a comprehensive manner in making revolution. We must combat and overcome sectarianism in order to recruit into the Party thousands upon thousands who will form hundreds upon hundreds of Party branches and groups in an ever increasing number in factories, communities and schools.

**Expanding the ranks of fulltime revolutionaries.** There is at present 142 members working fulltime. Not included here are those who have decided to work fulltime in the countryside in the process of their integration there. Of this number, thirty have turned fulltime only in 1997.

We started with 119 in 1995 and up to 1996 we gained 41 but we also lost 16. There was an increase in the number of those who turned fulltime but there was still no net increase because of losses including those who were deployed in the countryside. It is relatively easier to persuade youth in the communities to turn fulltime. There is a big dearth of those coming from the workers. Moreover, a great number of cadres in training have yet to be persuaded to go fulltime to fill up many positions.

There is a good number who are ready to go fulltime but we are unable to provide for the needs of their family. There are also those who are not yet sufficiently prepared ideologically to go fulltime and accept greater responsibilities.

On the whole, our fulltimers can accept on the level of principle the readiness to be assigned anywhere and anytime the Party decides. Their readiness has been tested in reality especially those who have actually accepted deployment to the countryside.

The holding of the 3-level course must be speeded up (even if up to the Intermediate Party Course only) among those being targeted for fulltime work. We should also prepare the needed family support from the regional and district levels at the earliest time possible. We must pay attention to these if we want to enlarge the pool of fulltime forces.

**Cadres.** We succeeded in developing a sufficient number of cadres in a relatively fast and bold manner to fill up the positions from the regional to the basic level in the process of regularizing a regional organization that is undergoing revitalization. From 1996 our cadre force at the basic level increased by one-third and now numbers 100; at the section level by two-fold; and at the district level by four-fold. From the situation of using different criteria in assessing cadres, we have made the assessment of cadres and formed the regular committees at the intermediate level based on a unified set of criteria appropriate for NCR and based on a certain degree of knowledge about each individual cadre.

We developed our cadres through the practice of boldly assigning tasks to comrades who are advancing, and willing to take on and learn new tasks. On the other hand, we did not do enough to consolidate them ideologically and produce the needed support to those who have families to

enable them to work fulltime. In any case, the cadres we developed on the whole remained steadfast and determined with only a few losses for various reasons which is quite normal in a difficult struggle.

From 1994 to 1996, the assessment of cadres was not seriously undertaken to rectify a long-running weakness on this very point. There was a smug reliance on superficial knowledge and on the recommendation of those that endorsed them. As a result, no accurate assessment of their capabilities could be formed which is important for proper tasking at the appropriate level. In the worst cases, a few undesirables were able to smuggle themselves in at the "task force" level which is equivalent to the level of district. Thus in our assessment in 1997 and in those that followed, we allotted a good amount of time and attention in studying and assessing the cadres in the region.

What is most needed at present is to raise the theoretical level of the cadres, to carry out intensive proletarian self-transformation and to prepare them for any task in the revolution especially for deployment to the countryside. It is also necessary to speed up the assessment and training of potential cadres in order to strengthen the existing cadre force in every leading committee and fill up the second and third line of cadres at all levels, especially at the basic level.

***Party Committees.*** We have made great strides in laying down and setting up the regular Party committees at the regional, district and section levels enabling us to cover all the towns and cities in NCR. In the near future, many regular branches will be set up in the localities including their executive committees.

From the section organizing committees (SOC) in 1996, \_\_\_\_\_ regular section committees and \_\_\_\_\_ section organizing committees were formed after the district committees had completed the assessment of cadres at this level. Although the cadre force in these sections remain thin, they have already helped a great deal in overseeing the expanding work and territory under the district and in consolidation and expansion work at the basic level.

In 1995, it had to be clarified to the leading committees at the district level what territorial Party organizations were needed to be set up in accordance with the constitution in order to rectify the erroneous concept and practice of forming "sectoral committees" at the district level (Committee for the Trade Union Movement; Committee for Work in Communities; etc.) except in D1 and D4. Another error is the task force mentality, (equivalent to the concept of cadre team) which started at the time of "reaching-out" for those who had been misled by the factionalists. In setting up the task forces in areas equivalent to a district, this form was misconstrued as appropriate also for the town and city level and the same process was envisioned for building the organization at the section level including its leading committee.

Four regular district committees have been set up and are functioning effectively covering all the towns and cities in the whole region. These were set up last year from the District Organizing Committees (DOCs) through a well balanced disposition of the district cadre force in the region. The executive committees and secretariats have been constituted for effective leadership and

administration. We also solved the problem of one DOC (D2) that could not effectively lead and another (D5) that was almost paralyzed because of cadre losses which included the secretary.

The problem in D2 was the result of wrong combination of cadres in the leading committee and the secretary's weakness in leadership and administration. In D5 meanwhile, the problem arose when the secretary was given a new assignment a decision made taking into account the interests of the whole. The one who replaced him could not rise up to the task until reorganization became necessary to finally resolve the problem. Compounding the problem was the delay in resolving the contradiction between the former committee and the SOC that was later dissolved (which spread to and affected our work in the legal organizations) and which weighed down heavily on the cadres involved. Two DOC members who were directly at odds with three cadres from the SOC unnecessarily blew up the struggle out of proportion. In 1997, the PEC decided to assign them far from the area and organizations that were adversely affected so as to cut off the source of trouble and restore a measure of calm among our forces.

On hindsight, we should and could have set up the regular district committees much earlier in some territories if not in all instead of overextending our limited cadre force in many DOCs and maintaining the task forces in others. The result was that for a long time the Party units remained in provisional and unstable condition and this impeded their consolidation. This was mainly due to our lack of understanding with regard to territorial Party building and the proper disposition of cadres. It was also not immediately grasped that in 1994 after we had decisively defeated the factional anti-Party campaign of Lagman, the period of "reaching out" had also ended and thus the role of the task forces had likewise come to an end. We should have promptly addressed ourselves to the task of setting up the regional Party organization taking ideological building as the key.

The present situation calls for the strengthening of the cadre force, developing the machinery for consolidation in order to sustain consolidation work in the face of the growing demands of mass campaigns while continuously advancing the rectification movement, particularly ideological building.

The regional conference can now be held and the committees elected in the most democratic manner under the guidance of the central leadership of the Party and the framework of the Second Great Rectification Movement.

Before this, the Provisional Executive Committee and later the PEC-Expanded shouldered the leading role in rebuilding the Party organization in NCR after it was left in ruins by the renegade Lagman clique. Although it took five years, the PEC was successful on the whole in carrying out its assigned tasks of building the Party ideologically and organizationally as requisites for the holding of the second regional conference in NCR and which signals the end of its existence. At the same time, it strove to the utmost to wage struggle against the revisionist renegades, rebuild the strength of the revolutionary movement and advance the struggle against the US-Ramos regime.

On the whole, collective leadership prevailed and the principle of democratic centralism was followed. But the completion of the tasks assigned to the PEC was not a smooth road. In 1994,

after the factionalists had been defeated, there was looseness in the collective life and leadership of the first leading collective; it remained bogged down in a bureaucratic style of work detached from the masses. This gave way to many security loopholes that were later used by the enemy to attack it.

This greatly disrupted the work and generated some restiveness among our cadres and forces. In the period of the Caretaker Committee composed of the remaining cadres, a correct policy aimed at keeping the organization and forces intact while the central Party organ was in the process of implementing long-term measures, some issues were unnecessarily stirred up as a result of some unhealthy comments and actions coming from certain individuals and groups. These were mistakenly taken as the official position and measures of the concerned units and organs. These were further aggravated by irresponsible statements from certain degenerate elements who have since left the Party and which were echoed by comrades on the opposite sides of the controversy. This was promptly resolved by the action of the higher organ.

We summed up our experience and conducted criticism and self-criticism. The correctness of the policy of setting up the Caretaker Committee as well as its positive contribution to the task at hand was cited. Its weaknesses and shortcomings were also pointed out (even though the secretary of the Caretaker Committee was not present), as well as those of the members of the PEC and the lower units that were at odds with the Caretaker Committee. The issue was sufficiently resolved taking into account the circumstances prevailing at the time and considering that the rectification movement was only just beginning to be implemented in the region.

It was agreed that it was important for the summing-up to be put down in writing and disseminated to the forces affected by the controversy. The summing-up document was never written by the former secretary of the PEC and thus the task could not be completed.

After this, the reconstituted PEC tasked to continue the work could not perform its leading role because the majority of its members shirked their responsibilities (instead taking on other tasks in accordance with their own interests and personal comfort, at the worst even violating the Party's policies and principles).

In practice, it was the PEC-Expanded composed of the two remaining PEC members and the leading district cadres that exercised collective leadership. This committee was able to function continuously and shouldered the tasks of the PEC to the best of their ability. Between meetings of the PEC-Expanded, the lower organs exercised leadership at their own level. On the other hand, the violation of Party discipline and brashness of two leading cadres which were not immediately checked eroded the regional leadership's moral authority among the lower levels and forces. This was further aggravated when the secretary deserted his post and ran off with a mistress. Trust was only restored when these cadres were formally expelled from the Party, the circumstances explained and the appropriate measures taken. This raised our forces' confidence in the seriousness of the PEC to rectify their mistakes. From this time on, the leading collective strove to complete the tasks assigned to them and direct the overall efforts according to the correct stress and focus.

From 1997 up to the first half of 1998, the PEC-Expanded concluded its task in the Second Great Rectification Movement. To the best of its ability and under the close guidance of the central Party leadership, it completed the basic requirements for regularizing the regional organization, while performing the day-to-day administration and leadership in advancing the mass movement and in building the solid strength of the mass movement in NCR. It was able to provide leadership to the participation of its forces in the three major mass campaigns and issued timely guidance on nearly all areas of work that were needed by the units and organs at the lower levels.

It is our duty now to continuously strengthen and stabilize the leading committees at every level, develop the second and third line of cadres in order to take on without interruption the ever growing tasks in the revolution.

***System of Meetings and Reports.*** Generally, the great majority of organs and units can hold regular and special meetings for assessment and planning, for study and training in a manner that is short but fruitful. We have overcome the tendency to be endlessly drawn to waging mass campaigns, legal work and others, particularly at the basic and intermediate levels. On the average, regular meetings are held every three months at the section committee level aside from the more frequent special meetings. Some section committees are capable of preparing the draft assessments and programs but the greater majority do not yet have this capability. Most of them have yet to develop their capacity to prepare for and have more substance in their meetings.

At the district level, the plenary meeting is held every six months and between these either the DEC or the whole DC meets for particular purposes like holding study courses, mass campaign planning, and so on since the committees are still small anyway. For the regular meetings, the draft assessment and program are prepared. What still needs to be done is to improve on the preparation so as to ensure more substance and attention is focused on the more comprehensive, strategic and wide-ranging questions at their level.

At the regional level, from the hurried and superficial manner in which meetings were handled, we have progressed to shorter but more fruitful meetings because of the efforts we invested in preparation, in striving for substance, and in focusing on the important questions. We make it a point that in every meeting there is the prepared draft assessment, program, summing-up, orientation and so on. On the other hand there is still room for improvement in the matter of preparation especially in promptly gathering the reports from the lower levels.

In the past year, we criticized and strove to rectify the weaknesses in the system of reporting of the Party units and organs. We issued a standard guide for reporting by the districts and other units/organs and fixed the regular time of submission but not everyone could comply. The secretariats at the lower levels must be made functional so that the secretary can ensure the preparation of reports in the face of the numerous day-to-day work at their level. There is also a need to improve the system of record-keeping, filing, together with the careful study and analysis of reports; and the study and discussion of guides for reporting for every unit and organ. Education on theory and on the principle of democratic centralism will ensure that the importance and relation between the system of reports and shorter and more fruitful meetings will be grasped more fully by our cadres.

**Security.** We have made great strides in removing the serious vulnerabilities related to the security of the whole regional organization. However, we must still exert greater efforts in order to decisively plug the loopholes that can be taken advantage of by the enemy to do great damage against the Party in NCR.

The leading cadres in the region have effectively placed themselves out of enemy surveillance and can safely perform their day-to-day administration and strategic tasks by maximizing the use of the guerrilla zone as their base. This has helped in accelerating the completion of the requisites for regularizing the organization in NCR. Because of this, the major meetings and study courses of the regional cadres could be done in relative security.

The security of the regional leading committee particularly underwent many twists and turns. Its mode of operation and basing became a crucial issue in connection with its tactical task of accomplishing its mission in the rectification movement up to the holding of the second regional conference and in its long-term duty of leading the urban struggle. As in the past, we faced the question of how long the leadership can remain safe in the city. The option of basing in the guerrilla zone was raised in 1993 and especially in 1994 after the task of comprehensive rebuilding of the organization was defined after the defeat of the factionalists. Because no serious efforts were made to implement it, the enemy made a direct hit on the PEC. After the PEC was reconstituted, the decision and policy for the PEC to base in the countryside was firmed up. We exerted much effort until we could achieve a certain level of success in developing the concepts, systems and methods of basing in the countryside while leading the Party and mass movement in the cities. In fact, the regional leadership was far more effective in performing its tasks while based in the countryside than when it was based in the city.

The correctness of this decision and policy has been proven by our practice of three years which has brought us success in the Second Great Rectification Movement in the region. This demolished the basis of all opposing views and this was achieved for the first time in the whole history of the Party in the region. This has to be firmly upheld by all the comrades as the correct and most effective mode of basing and leadership of any leading committee of the regional Party organization in Metro Manila.

A corollary task is for the whole organization to develop the most effective system of coding and communication between the leaders and the led. We have to concentrate on nothing less than this.

There is still a considerable number of cadres known to the enemy and on the enemy watch-list who have not been deployed to the countryside. This is necessary to cut off the line of enemy surveillance on them and on the units and forces they come in contact with. We have to speed up the ideological preparation on the one hand and on the other the development of cadres who can still remain in the city to take their place.

In addition, there is still a good number of cadres known to the enemy who do not follow the policy of the underground and give the enemy fixed points of surveillance by basing with their families. Also, there are still violations of policy with regard to the use of legal offices and public

places, telephones for communication, and so on. But a number of model cadres have taken the lead in practising "deep UG" and they serve as examples for others to follow.

In completing the regularization of the Party in the region, we have also laid down the ideological basis for regularizing and strictly implementing the rules with regard to the security of the Party including the appropriate organizational and disciplinary actions.

**Finance.** In the past four years, we had been heavily dependent on the subsidy from the higher organ for the needs of our organization. On the other hand, the mass organizations and forces are self-reliant with regard to mass campaigns, open education and propaganda, far different from the situation during the period of disorientation. A substantial portion of our needs were also met through our own efforts but the sources could not be sustained.

We set one year as our target for laying down the conditions for achieving self-reliance. We succeeded in meeting more than half of our needs through legal projects, contributions from the masses, from legal institutions, and through our alliance work. But these could not cope up with the growing needs of a growing organization. An important factor also was our failure on several occasions to set up and sustain the machinery for raising our finances.

A major source of our funds in the past was the support from the unions (10% attorney's fees) based on the victory in the mass struggle. This source can still be availed of because the lawyers and federations continue to collect anyway. The voluntary contributions from the workers could not come up to the same level and this greatly reduced our capacity to become self-reliant. We need to develop our capacity in the matter of raising funds in the future.

In the immediate future, we have to decisively set up a strong machinery for finance work, pay greater attention to the urgent task of developing this line of work in order to achieve self-reliance. We must maximize the favorable situation in our region and the growth of the mass movement to develop our finance work. #

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