Defeat Oplan Bantay Laya 2 completely

The fascist reactionary army could not conceal the fact that the New People’s Army (NPA) remains widespread and strong and capable of dealing powerful blows on their forces.

Thus, the fascist puppet AFP could not avoid admitting that Oplan Bantay Laya 2 (OBL2) has failed to meet its target of crippling the NPA and the revolutionary movement in time for the counterrevolutionary campaign’s deadline by the end of the US-Arroyo regime’s term in June 2010. But it persists in trying to deal powerful blows or even a knockout punch before its deadline or even beyond it.

To achieve this, the fascist enemy is currently implementing the following:

The AFP has narrowed down its focus to the top priority guerrilla fronts. To be able to concentrate a bigger force on each target, the AFP has reduced the number of priority targets of each area command from the former 10-12 to only five to six guerrilla fronts (Nolcom – Kalinga, Abra, Aurora, Bataan, Zambales; Solcom – guerrilla fronts in Quezon, Sorsogon and Masbate; Cencom – guerrilla fronts in Negros and Samar; EastMinCom – guerrilla fronts in the Davao provinces). Fronts that were formerly targeted have been relegated to second priority.

The AFP has added combat forces to achieve a minimum of one battalion for every priority area to two battalions for every guerrilla front in focus. For this, it has, since 2009 formed seven new infantry battalions and two battalions of Scout Rangers and Special Forces. It has also recruited CAFGU forces that are no longer confined to camps but actively utilized to scour priority areas.

Due to the failure of the AFP’s strike forces, it is now strengthening its CMO units and operations in the hope that these would be effective in deceiving, spying on and terrorizing the people, weakening their revolutionary spirit and clearing the way for combat forces. It has set up one battalion for each division and deployed one CMO company to each cluster of priority guerrilla fronts.

The CMO focuses on intensifying psywar and black propaganda against the revolutionary movement in the target communities. A large part of the CMO’s activities involves recruitment for the Barangay Intelligence Network (BIN) and CAFGU and organizing surrenderees into chapters of CADRE (Confederation of Advocates for Development and Reforms). The CMO also arranges regular radio broadcasts for quite a number of Philippine Army battalions.

Through the CMO and utilizing the BIN, CAFGU and CADRE, among others, the AFP strengthens its intelligence operations in order to determine the NPA’s movements. The objective is to ensure that military operations have definite targets and reduce resource-intensive operations that do not have definite targets.

Intelligence activities are also being intensified against identified Party and NPA leaders on the provincial and regional levels; persons suspected of being active in, or supporting the, revolution in the target bases; and the revolutionary movement’s support net-
work such as communication and supply lines, among others.

In partnership with other units, CMOs also play a big role in killing identified cadres, leaders, organizers, activists and sympathizers of the revolutionary movement and the legal democratic movement, harassing families of known cadres and members of the revolutionary movement, and similar dirty jobs. Also utilized for such activities are recruits of the BIN, CAFGU, CADRE and others.

The AFP has likewise been coordinating more closely with local governments, agencies and non-government organizations (NGO) for support for their CMO, intelligence and combat operations.

The “Area Clearing” model has been propagated nationwide. “Red Area Clearing” is implemented in guerrilla fronts in the countryside (as what was done in Central Luzon) and “White Area Clearing” is implemented in urban areas (as what was done in the Southern Tagalog Region).

“Red Area Clearing” (RAC) involves deploying one battalion to each target guerrilla zone. It is the brigades that take charge of and draft plans for RAC. RAC likewise involves the use of the “keyhole approach” in the suspected guerrilla base to be targeted. The “keyhole approach” begins with the simultaneous and concentrated deployment of Special Operations Teams (SOT) to the guerrilla base area in the cluster of contiguous barrios and sitios.

The SOT deployment is long-term and repeated multiple times, with patrols scouring areas within, around and between villages. These operations are a combination of 60% combat, 30% intelligence and 10% CMO operations. The CMO operations will comprise a bigger part once it is believed that the NPA is no longer in the area and RAC shifts to the support stage. In implementing this combination, the enemy hopes that the revolutionary forces will not be able to easily recover guerrilla zones that have already been “cleansed” by RAC.

The AFP identifies and prepares one or a number of “engagement areas” (areas where the enemy has deeply planted intelligence operatives and merely waits for opportunities to clash with the NPA) and “Venus flytraps” (nearby areas where the enemy has deeply planted intelligence operatives but where the AFP purposely refrains from conducting frequent operations so that retreating NPA forces who choose to flee to these areas can be encircled and besieged).

The AFP also identifies one or a number of “constriction areas,” (areas where the enemy has a weak military presence and intelligence network and thus may become targeted by the NPA as expansion areas away from the AFP’s current area of focus. The AFP therefore tries to block the NPA from expanding to these areas). It deploys troops to engage in battle NPA units that enter or pass through these areas in order to trap them or force them to flee to areas that have been designated as “Venus flytraps” where they can be encircled and forced to engage in a decisive battle.

Alongside the conduct of RAC, the AFP also conducts “White Area Clearing” (WAC), where it prioritizes the destruction of regional white area machineries, the neutralization of identified cadres and organizers in various sectors, the conduct of counter-insurgency seminars and the formation of intelligence networks in various sectors as well as the setting up of organizations to serve as counterparts to open democratic organizations.

CMO operations are also being intensified in town centers within priority fronts and urban centers of regions where the targets are organized communities, persons suspected of operating in these communities, legal activists and allies and supporters.

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**Analyzing and addressing the enemy's entire plan**

Areas being prioritized by OBL2 are those where guerrilla fronts have been established in strategic areas encompassing a broad part of the region.

To be able to focus more closely on its fewer target areas, the enemy is obliged to spread itself thinly over a broader area. Thus, vulnerable parts in the enemy’s deployment emerge even in targeted regions. The more guerrilla fronts there are within a region, where many or the majority are of company-strength, the more room for maneuver and the more opportunity the NPA has to seize the initiative even in targeted areas. This will also ease the military situation for regions that are of secondary priority to the AFP.

The enemy’s bloody crimes and dirty methods remain obvious despite its attempts to deceive the people and deodorize its image through more massive and intense CMOs. The AFP’s true fascist and puppet character and its antipeople and counterrevolutionary goals can never be covered up. Its psywar has no effect on the majority of the people. The revolutionary forces’ closeness to and empowerment of the people and the people’s witnessing of our strong and
effective resistance to the enemy’s deceptions and fascism can effectively neutralize the enemy’s terrorism and intimidation.

If those who rabidly side with the enemy are determined to cripple the revolutionary movement, the revolutionary forces and the revolutionary people are even more determined to defeat the enemy and advance the people’s war to a higher level.

We continue to enhance our ability to learn and progress from our own experiences and in accordance with the correct principles, strategies and appropriate tactics. Our experience has proven the importance of flexibility in the disposition and movement of forces, and that of linking and setting up continuous guerrilla fronts and clusters of guerrilla fronts. We have learned valuable lessons on the need for regional and subregional military leadership, and the importance of inter-front assistance and coordination. We have learned lessons about the greater need for appropriate vertical formations on the regional and subregional levels, in combination with the widespread deployment of horizontal forces in order to more swiftly adjust to changing military situations, and to serve the all-out advance of our guerrilla warfare and revolutionary base expansion. There is also the appropriate combination of terrain and guerrilla front disposition. We are constantly reminded of trading space for time, of defeating counterrevolutionaries, of extensively dealing blows on isolated enemy troops, of putting horizontal guerrilla forces on an offensive military posture, of the importance of military forces in attritive warfare and in the overall strengthening of the people’s army, of achieving more room for initiative through partisan operations on the enemy’s supply, communication and transportation lines up to the enemy’s very rear. We continue to hold fast to our political superiority, to the importance of solid and alert leadership, and coordination on the regional level of the forces and struggles in white areas, in town centers up to the national center. We also value assistance to the armed struggle from the local to the national level and even from overseas, including seeing to and improving our ability to meet the economic, logistical, medical and other needs of the people’s army and the masses.

Our tasks in completely defeating OBL2

In the face of the fascist and puppet AFP’s mad attacks and rampage up to the very last moments of OBL2, we must implement the following urgent and immediate tasks in order to completely defeat it:

1. Swiftly and solidly unite the Party, people’s army and the masses on the reactionary and evil character of OBL2, study and identify the enemy’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses while seriously discovering and preparing for the dangers and setbacks it is still capable of inflicting. Raise the revolutionary forces and the masses’ determination to resist and defeat OBL2’s new schemes.

2. Ensure and strengthen further the capability for political and military leadership at the regional, provincial/subregional, inter-front and front levels. It is the responsibility of the centers of leadership on these levels to closely monitor the overall situation in their respective areas of operation; promptly analyze and assess the enemy’s plans and objectives; constantly study the enemy’s strengths as well as his weaknesses and vulnerabilities; draft necessary political and military plans appropriate to the situation; swiftly take action and adjust to rapidly changing situations to guide the revolutionary forces and the masses on what actions to undertake and how to wage resistance. The responsibility to swiftly bring to the attention of the leading organs concerned the reports and analyses on the situation in their respective areas as well as plans, decisions and requests for instruction lies with the leadership on these various levels.
Give full play to the territorial operations command from the regional and subregional to the front level. Make sure that the militia command in the area has a representative in the front operations command (this may be composed of a combination of cadres or officers of the front's center of gravity assigned to the militia unit and selected cadres from the militia unit in the area).

Form a unified political command in the white area that relies on a broad and deep underground movement and has close and secure links with underground and open white area forces. It is this command's responsibility to ensure and continually strengthen regional leadership and coordination in white area tasks and struggles. This will ensure and strengthen coordination with the legal democratic movement in the city centers and national level.

Maintain an offensive military posture in order to actively defend against renewed enemy attacks and swiftly take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses and weak parts. To accomplish this, we must ensure the following:

• Draft a comprehensive military plan for active defense and resistance from the regional to the guerrilla front level.
• Issue and implement a standing policy to actively deal blows on the enemy's weak parts anywhere within the guerrilla front, near roads and highways, in the forests as well as in town centers and cities.
• Mobilize regional and subregional guerrilla units as true centers of gravity in military work by taking the lead in dealing blows on the enemy's weak parts (those on foot, on vehicles and in quarters, among others). Intensify tactical offensives on the enemy's weak parts on its flanks and rears.
• Pay greater attention (up to 70-80%) to military work among horizontal units. This may take the form of freeing half or more than half of such forces for military work.
• Expand and strengthen militia units to enable them to become the lead forces in launching mass guerrilla warfare. Train and guide them to actively and systematically engage in intelligence work, suppress counterrevolutionary elements and support tactical offensives and other military tasks of fulltime guerrilla forces. Expand and encourage the use of command-detonated land mines to deal intense blows on rampaging fascist troops.
• Intensify partisan operations along the enemy's major supply, communication and transportation lines in town centers and cities to oblige the enemy to tie down a big number of forces to guard his rear.
• Expand and intensify tactical offensives and other guerrilla actions to take advantage of gaps and weak and thinly spread parts of the enemy and stop him from easily going on a rampage in a few selected areas of concentrated attack.

Strengthen the initiative, flexibility and dynamism of guerrilla forces. It is the duty of all guerrilla forces to seize on the vulnerability and weaknesses of the enemy, launch tactical offensives based on their capability and contribute to the overall intensification of guerrilla warfare and the defeat of the fascist and puppet AFP's evil attacks. Thoroughly struggle against passivity which can only cause loss of initiative, more intense difficulties, attrition and greater danger of suffering casualties and total defeat. Only by battling passivity can we actively defend ourselves against the enemy's offensives, see to the welfare of our forces and the mass base and more vigorously expand and strengthen them. By intensifying attacks on the enemy in the broadest possible area and wherever guerrilla and militia forces can be found, we deprive the enemy of places and opportunities to feel secure. Let us keep him guessing and anxious about where and when he will be hit by the NPA and the people's counter-attacks.

The intensification of tactical offensives and guerrilla warfare will rouse the revolutionary forces and the masses' enthusiasm. We must take advantage of such a positive situation to rapidly organize and expand fullfledged mass organizations at the barrio, municipal and district levels and accelerate the expansion and strengthening of the people's army and militia. We must take advantage of the masses' enthusiasm and widespread sympathy and support, our deep and
widespread roots in many areas and our familiarity with the masses in many places in order to accelerate raising the people's organizational and political level.

7 Include the following in drafting military plans on the regional level:

• an analysis of the enemy's objectives and plans, and the latter's strengths and vulnerabilities
• the roles of the various parts of guerrilla forces and units in the region, including the people's militia
• plans on how to swiftly strengthen military initiative in relatively “easy” areas
• guides to territorial units and the people's army on how to identify well and in detail the “soft parts” of the enemy (CAFGU detachments; small units on foot, in vehicles or occupied with various tasks or activities outside their camps; private armed groups)

• giving attention to creating initiative in the form of partisan operations along supply routes (roads, rivers, town centers), communication and transportation lines; and dealing blows on the enemy's intelligence forces
• plans to identify and destroy the enemy's intelligence network in the countryside and cities
• military work of the militia, including explosives, booby traps and indigenous weapons
• projections on the enemy's particular focus of attack, likely engagement and constriction areas and tasks and appropriate modes of action in these areas

• citing and propagating various tactics in hitting the enemy, including how to counter counter-ambush and counter-raid regulations

• improvements in sniping, explosives, booby trap, ambush and raid techniques during daytime or nighttime
• strict adherence to plans and regulations against defensives and in keeping our movements, headquarters and other activities strictly confidential (as the People's Liberation Army of Vietnam said: “Walk without footprints, cook without smoke, speak without sound and cough without noise”)
• aggressive expansion of the NPA's membership and setting up more platoons as an essential part of a military plan.

In meetings and documents, avoid recording tactical information such as tactical military plans, area divisions, size, strength and disposition of units and the like. There is need for more carefulness and confidentiality in order to render the enemy blind and deaf to our plans and movements.

8 Improve flexibility and initiative by strengthening mutual assistance and coordination among fronts and between inter-fronts and subregions; stocking up on rice, salt and other basic needs in strategic places covered by the NPA's area of maneuver; assigning militia units to prepare secret routes or serve as the main forces responsible for receiving or meeting with NPA units that may pass through the area.

Swiftly change and adjust accordingly the deployment of forces and organization of tasks to avoid the enemy's heavy blows, avoid suffering excessive losses or attrition in one part and quickly take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses.

9 Make sure that units from the region down to the front are prepared for any orders and will strictly abide by them.

10 Thoroughly take advantage of the situation in regions or areas where the enemy is relatively thinly spread, in order to expand NPA units and the mass base and conduct agrarian struggles.

11 Strengthen propaganda and education work. Implement tit-for-tat propaganda work through Armed Propaganda Units, issuing statements and press releases and attending or calling up radio programs. Develop the use of modern means of propaganda, including uploading podcasts, videos and other propaganda materials over the internet, propagating DVDs with revolutionary or progressive content in the barrios and other means.

12 Promptly organize and advance the antifascist/anti-militarization mass movement and other mass campaigns and movements. Do not wait for fascist abuses to worsen before setting up organizations that would defend against them and reviving antifascist and anti-militarization movements and alliances. Other campaigns and mass movements (against hunger, landgrabbing, for land and livelihood and the like) are needed even more with the intensification of fascism and militarization in order to expand the masses' initiative and area of maneuver.

13 Take good advantage of the divisiveness of reaction and form a broad united front on various levels and in various forms in order to defeat the enemy's schemes to consolidate reaction against the revolutionary movement.

14 Let cadre, personnel, intelligence and material and logistical support flow from the cities to the countryside.