

Summing Up Our Experience After Three Years

Communist Party of the Philippines

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Introduction

On the whole, the revolutionary work of the Communist Party of the Philippines since its Congress of Re-Establishment has been exceedingly vigorous, militant and fruitful. It is wrong, however, to appraise our work either from the viewpoint that everything is positive or from the viewpoint that everything is negative.

We should be analytical in summing-up our work and the undertakings of the masses. We have to know our achievements, difficulties and shortcomings in the context of historical development. In that way, we can have a full grasp of our situation. We can draw lessons from our experience and rectify errors and weaknesses. As a result, we can muster greater strength and take up new tasks in the revolutionary struggle for people's democracy against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

The Propagation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought

We have won great ideological victories. The single most important of these is the re-establishment of the Party on the theoretical basis of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. We have cast away modern revisionism projected from the Soviet Union and practised locally by the Lava revisionist renegades. We have also rejected modern revisionism cowering behind centrism. We have kept a firm grasp of the most comprehensive, most advanced and most powerful ideological weapon in the present era and have managed to put on the correct road the glorious Communist Party of the Philippines.

To the best of its ability and as far as its limited circumstances can permit, the Party has attended to ideological building as the first requisite in rebuilding itself. It has taken the lead in the propagation, that is to say, in the study and application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought in a living way in the Philippines. In so short a time, it has become a formidable ideological and political force against U.S. imperialism and all its reactionary stooges. The enemy fears us most. The broad masses of the people regard us today as the most significant and consistent revolutionary force.

We have re-opened in an unprecedented way the great treasury of Marxism- Leninism to Filipino revolutionaries. We have made available to them as constant reference in their daily work the Five Golden Rays and Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung and as texts for more extensive and profound study Chairman Mao's works under the seven headings of philosophy, class analysis and social investigation, party building, armed struggle, united front, economic work and land reform, and culture. We have also circulated the works of the great predecessors of Chairman Mao: Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. As the great communist works are increasingly made available, especially in Pilipino translation, we can expect the ideological foundation of our Party to become stronger; we can expect the Party cadres and members to improve their grasp of the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, viewpoint and method.

To give a national form to the universal theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought or to link the world proletarian revolution with the concrete practice of the Philippine revolution, we have had the Guide for Cadres and Members of the Communist Party of the Philippines since the early part of 1969 and Philippine Society and Revolution since the late part of 1970.

The Guide for Cadres and Members of the Communist Party of the Philippines contains the basic documents of the Party Congress of Re- Establishment and those pertaining to the formation of the New People's Army. The document of rectification, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party", upholds the most advanced theory of the proletariat, unfolds the history of the Party and the grave errors of the Lava revisionist renegades and states the three main tasks of the Party. The Party programme correctly defines the people's democratic line for the Philippine revolution and states our general and specific tasks. The Party Constitution elaborates on the principle of democratic centralism and guides our work of rebuilding the Party.

The document for rectification for the people's army, "Statement for the New People's Army", repudiates the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique as a historical ramification of Laviate opportunism and paves the way for the formation of New People's Army. The Basic Rules of the New People's Army recognizes the absolute leadership of the Party and lays down points for building the people's army.

The Philippine Society and Revolution is a comprehensive study on Philippine history, on the basic problems of the Philippine Revolution and on the people's democratic revolution. It presents the basic character, motive forces, targets, tasks and perspective of the Philippine Revolution. It has served as a basic textbook for Party mass education. At the same time, it has served to guide further study and investigation of Philippine conditions.

The Party Central Committee has adopted and circulated the political reports of the Political Bureau and has put out statements and comments on current national and international issues. These have been popularized through Ang Bayan, publication of the Central Committee. Towards the establishment of regional Party organizations, the Party Central Committee has time and again dispatched and urged Party cadres to make surveys and investigations of varying scope, from the regional to the barrio level. Local Party organs have also issued statements and manifestoes on local and current issues to arouse and mobilize the masses. Party groups in various mass organizations, large and small, have caused revolutionary propaganda to spread on an unprecedented scale throughout the archipelago.

Struggling through to the end against modern revisionism, the Party Central Committee has put out Report on Lavaite Propaganda for Revisionism and Fascism to smash the slanderous filth of the Lava revisionist renegades and expose their utter degeneration into fascist puppets of Soviet social- imperialism and the U.S.-Marcos clique. Recent articles of such scoundrels as Jesus Lava and Luis Taruc against the Party have been subjected to effective counterattack. We have undertaken thorough criticism and repudiation of William J. Pomeroy's noxious works which express most the counterrevolutionary line of Soviet modern revisionism and social-imperialism and are much circulated by the Lava revisionist renegades. Our critical and repudiatory articles are now being compiled under the general title, Pomeroy's Portrait: Revisionist Renegade.

In firmly upholding the correct ideological guide and combating modern revisionism, the Party as a whole has succeeded in avoiding ideological errors of such gravity as to prevent its steady and consistent advance. But still the shades of grave errors, shades that can become disastrous if unrectified and magnified through time have appeared within the Party. In certain parts of the Party certain times, grave errors have also made their full appearance. In general, we may say that mistaken ideas or erroneous tendencies have cropped up within our ranks.

Subjectivist trends of the dogmatist and empiricist type are most likely to beset a Party that is actually still in the process of formation. We may even say that our Party has just been reborn and is still in the stage of infancy. The cadres and members, except a very few, are new in the revolutionary struggle and are liable to commit many errors and shortcomings. We have our weaknesses in being a newly established party and furthermore, we live in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. We are surrounded by the pernicious influence of the ruling classes as well as by the petty-bourgeoisie which is of considerable number and influence. Within the Party itself, there are many Party members of petty-bourgeois origin and many of them are most likely to bring in bourgeois or petty-bourgeois "tails". We have a basis for saying that within the Party there is class contradiction and class struggle and there are currents and countercurrent of ideas. Our Party members have different class backgrounds and have been exposed to various negative influences. Because it is impossible for anyone to be born Red, even our Party members of workers and poor peasant origin—like those of petty-bourgeois origin—have ideological weaknesses and have to undergo an unremitting process of remoulding themselves through revolutionary study and work.

There are comrades who are smugly satisfied with the thought that they have read a few or a big number of Marxist books and that they can memorize quotations and utter certain phrases to impress people. They do not care to learn from the masses, investigate local conditions and relate through concrete analysis whatever general principles they may know to concrete reality. When inevitably they are confronted with certain conditions, they fail to see through the surface in order to reach the truth or they try to distort and force the facts to support their preconceptions. They feel lost when they cannot find in their books an explicit explanation for a specific problem or situation that arises before them. We speak here of the dogmatists. In the Party today, most of them have a distinctly petty-bourgeois background. It is also the characteristic of some of these to use their old learning from the bourgeois universities as support for their stereotyped learning. They know more about foreign lands than their own country.

There are also comrades who carry their disdain for booklearning to the point of refusing or being reluctant to raise their theoretical knowledge. They even go around bragging that their experience alone can make them good revolutionaries. We speak here of the empiricists. They do not care to relate their limited experience to the general principles and the rich experience of the world proletariat. They do not even care to relate their limited experience to conclusions derived from research into the economic, political, military and cultural history and current situation of their own country. They forget that the experience of a single man or a small group can be nothing but partial, narrow and one-sided if unrelated to or isolated from the totality of the revolutionary movement. Even in their own units, the empiricists fail to sum up and draw lessons from their own experience and they act in the most slipshod and unplanned manner.

Because the Party has set the correct ideological and political line and has continued to struggle resolutely against modern revisionism, whose main advocates and spokesmen in the country are outside the Party, we have to be most alert within the Party to the current of dogmatism that is “Left” in form but Right in essence. It has been observed that at a level as high as the regional there are certain comrades who try to beat down each other by simply calling each other “opportunists” without so much as providing concrete facts and concrete analysis and without using the method of persuasion towards erring comrades. There is evidently an erroneous tendency to duplicate the same methods of struggle that we have employed against Lava revisionist renegades; it must be borne in mind that the Lava revisionist renegades have been called to account and have been repudiated for lines and policies having disastrous effects on the old merger party through more than three decades.

The current of empiricism is due mainly to the fact that the Party has just been re-established and it is normal for new Party members, who are in overwhelming numbers, to grope because of limited experience. Furthermore, we have quite a number of Party members of peasant origin who barely fulfill the basic literacy requirement for Party members. They can develop the habits of reading and study, especially now that we can provide them with Marxist- Leninist works in Pilipino. In this regard, we are determined to break what appears to be some monopoly of higher knowledge by the dogmatists. All Party members should learn from each other such that those who have more theoretical knowledge can learn from those who have more practical experience and those who have more practical experience can learn from those who have more theoretical knowledge. United together, all our Party members should draw lessons from the toiling masses and from revolutionary practice with them. Learning from each other with modesty will certainly strengthen our unity. Party cadres who can handle study classes are steadily increasing in number and are expected to conduct ideological study in a lively way.

Study classes and programmes of reading are supposed to be carried out at the three levels of the primary, intermediate and advanced. At all levels, it should never be forgotten that we must consistently develop among Party cadres and members their ability to keep to the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, viewpoint and method in dealing with the problems of the Philippine revolution. The primary course is aimed at making all Party members and candidate-members grasp the basic Marxist-Leninist principles of the Party and their application on the general practice of the people’s democratic revolution. The intermediate course is aimed at making all Party members relate Marxist-Leninist theory to their own practice, sum up their experience and exchange experience with one another. The advanced course is aimed at developing among Party

members an all-around knowledge of the basic teachings of the great communist teachers. Political-military trainings in the New People's Army is being conducted by Party cadres. This entails the primary and intermediate courses of study plus military training.

The biggest shortcoming in our ideological building during the last three years was the failure to put out a definite educational plan. Even only the definition of the three courses of study and the listing of study materials for the primary and intermediate levels were made only in September 1970. In the countryside, the holding of study classes was too shifty, irregular and sporadic due to the difficulties peculiar to guerrilla zones and to the scarcity of political instructors for the people's army. In the Manila- Rizal region, where political instructors could have been drawn for the countryside since 1969, the system and methods of educating Party members were too complicated and reading requirements were so heavy and difficult to fulfill. In this light, it is clear why we have been very slow in developing Party members from the ranks of workers. From early 1969 to the end of 1970, there were also too few cadres who could be assigned as political instructors in the New People's Army and in rural areas. Also, we had difficulties in providing enough reading and study materials.

Since the beginning of 1971, ideological study has been intensified by a rapidly increasing number of Party members and candidate-members. There have been such favorable conditions as the upsurges of the revolutionary mass movement and the increased ability of our Central Publishing House to produce reading and study materials. The number of copies of our publications have leaped from a general average of a few hundreds in previous years to a general average of several thousands, varying from a minimum of 2,000 copies to a maximum of 10,000 copies per publication. Of course, this count does not include the far bigger volume of newspaper copies and manifestoes of various mass organizations which carry the Party line. To serve our Party members and the broad masses of the people who cannot read foreign languages, translation work into Pilipino principally and local dialects secondarily has accelerated and is bound to further accelerate.

We are aware that so far only the primary course has been fulfilled on a wide scale. This course can easily be fulfilled in Party branches and groups or by individual Party members who are responsible for the ideological and political education of applicants for Party membership. But, whereas before we were worried about fulfilling the primary course, our worry now is to deepen the understanding of the primary course among all Party members and to fulfill the intermediate course on a wide scale. Our problem now is to select competent political instructors to conduct the primary and intermediate courses. In the meantime, we pin our hopes on all Party members taking the initiative to read and study the materials that we are distributing in advance. With regard to the advanced course, the Party Central Committee is expected to take the lead in conducting it among Party cadres through the higher Party school, the Revolutionary School of Mao Tsetung Thought.

For this years, an educational plan has been submitted by the Party Secretariat and endorsed by the Executive Committee to the Central Committee; it is synchronized with an organizational plan. This plan seeks to heighten ideological study among several thousands of candidate-members and full members of the Party. It seeks to actually improve the grasp of the entire Party rank and file of the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, viewpoint and method. Materialism and

dialectics should always be their powerful weapons for solving problems. We expect that our Party cadres and members will become better-equipped ideologically to integrate theory and practice, undertake criticism and self-criticism and link themselves with the masses more closely. In the final analysis, we engage in thoroughgoing study only to apply what we have studied in the service of the people.

If ideological building is not seriously undertaken, there can be no organizational building and there can be no victory of the revolution for that matter. We have to make sure that our Party cadres and members have an adequate and deep understanding of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and apply it creatively in the course of the revolutionary struggle for people's democracy. The enemy cannot be defeated without a powerful unity that springs from ideological unity and conscious discipline. Problems cannot be solved by us if we do not keep to the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, viewpoint and method. The Party has from the beginning adopted a correct ideological and political line. But in saying so, we cannot rest assured that all problems have been solved. There are so many problems always arising at various levels and in various areas of work. As old problems are solved, new ones keep on arising. Old problems become more complicated when they are overtaken by new ones. All of these can be dealt with only if we have a good grasp of the Marxist- Leninist standpoint, viewpoint and method.

The Organizational Growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines

In reestablishing the Party, we started practically from scratch. The Lava revisionist renegades had for decades done great damage to the organization of the old merger party and had tried might and main to prevent the advance of the revolutionary mass movement and of a genuine proletarian revolutionary party. Despite our limited number, it is basically our correct ideological and political line that has made it possible for our Party to rebuild itself and continue to lead the revolutionary mass movement. We have been able to consolidate the small yet fresh ranks of proletarian revolutionaries to isolate the stale and far smaller number of Lava revisionist renegades and as a result we have been able to march forward at the vanguard of the revolutionary masses.

Since December 26, 1968, we have grown into an organization of at least 2,000 members and candidate-members. If only a few scores of Party members in 1969 and a few hundreds in 1970 and 1971 could lead great mass struggles in the countryside and cities, we can be optimistic that as we grow into several thousands more this year and the next we will be able to exert greater revolutionary efforts and achieve greater revolutionary victories. What makes our Party distinctive today is that majority of its members have cadre quality and are in leading positions in the New People's Army and in various mass organizations (urban and rural) whose membership is relatively large.

Based on the last count at the beginning of this year, about 55 per cent of our membership are in the countryside and about 45 per cent are in the Manila-Rizal region and other urban areas all over the archipelago. About 53 per cent of the Party membership are of peasant origin, about 4 per cent of worker origin and about 43 per cent are of petty-bourgeois origin. Only recently, there

has been some considerable increase in the membership of peasant origin. And we expect that soon we can draw even more Party members from the ranks of the toiling masses as we intensify the revolutionary armed struggle in the countryside and build up the revolutionary workers' movement in factories and workers' communities. In the Manila-Rizal region, where the working class is most concentrated in our country, only 20 per cent of the regional Party membership are of worker origin; this fact proves that we have plenty of work to do in order to draw Party members from the ranks of workers.

If we recall the Party Congress of Re-Establishment, there were three delegates of worker origin and nine of urban petty-bourgeois origin. In its First Plenum, the Central Committee was able to add to its ranks eight members of worker-peasant origin who could open wider the field for building the Party in the countryside.

It is to the great credit of the Party that it was able to establish in three months' time on March 29, 1969, the New People's Army and at the same time repudiate and isolate the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique. The First Plenum of the Central Committee in May 1969 ratified the establishment of the New People's Army as the main form of organization and filled up the Party central organs with more personnel. But in this plenum, those who assumed posts in the Party central organs were not as yet very clear about the particular tasks that they had to carry out and also about the methods by which to carry these out.

What may be considered the most serious error incurred within the Party during the last three years is sectarianism, which greatly hampered the organizational building of the Party. Though the revolutionary mass movement had advanced rapidly during the whole of 1970, it was not until the September 1970 meeting of the Political Bureau and then the Second Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1971 that it became clear to all, especially among leading cadres, that thousands of advanced elements could be chosen and recruited into the Party within a short period of time from the revolutionary mass movement in both countryside and cities. In the previous years, a considerable number of cadres, including leading organs, seemed satisfied with our small membership and the slow rate of recruitment. Yet we had taken up the gigantic tasks of the revolution which call for large masses of Party members. And indeed, there were so many possible Party members accumulating rapidly in the ranks of the revolutionary masses. Sectarianism aggravated and complicated such difficulties as lack of experience, limited size of membership and scarcity of resources that were peculiar to a Party starting from scratch.

Though Party members in the Manila-Rizal region had the headstart over those in the countryside in recruiting Party members, they persisted in a "small group" mentality, complicated the methods of increasing their membership and failed to recruit several hundreds of mass activists into the Party. They failed to relate the organizational growth of the Party to the revolutionary mass movement. They failed to recruit more Party members from the ranks of the workers and even from the ranks of the revolutionary youth. The result was that Party cadres could be sent to the countryside in mere trickles. In the New People's Army, the demand for political officers could not be met from early 1969 to the late part of 1970. Without a strong Party organization at its core, the New People's Army is weak and cannot do well its work of all-around consolidation in the barrios that it reaches. It then becomes easy for such erroneous trends as the purely military viewpoint, roving rebel ideology, commandism and conservatism to

merge. Because the Party leadership is not asserted and reinforced, the people's army would tend to rely only on the thin existence of the barrio organizing committees. Before the Party could provide cadres and before the work of all-around consolidation could be done well in our first guerilla zone in Tarlac, the enemy stepped up its campaign of bloody suppression and consequently we had to suffer grave difficulties there.

The September 1970 meeting of the Political Bureau in Isabela clarified how the Party and the New People's Army could establish barrio revolutionary committees as organs of political power and mass organizations at the barrio level. In this regard, the necessity and possibility of hastening the organizational building of the Party in the countryside were stressed.

It was, however, in the Second Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1971 that we were able to discuss more extensively and approve the comprehensive Organizational Guide and Report Outlines. This guide shows how the Party organization can be built in the New People's Army, the mass organizations and localities. In the New People's Army, the Party branches are to be based temporarily on the regular platoons because regular companies are still to arise. Party groups at the squad level are to be consolidated and they are to engage in Party building in the localities. Party groups are to be created from the advanced elements in barrio organizing committees and in the mass organizations (for peasants, workers, youth, women and cultural activists) and in local guerilla and militia units. These Party groups can be subsequently consolidated into a local Party branch. The local Party branch will then be in a position to lead and participate in the barrio revolutionary committee.

The Organizational Guide and Report Outlines also shows how Party branches can be established in factories, urban communities and schools and Party groups in urban mass organizations. The leading activists or advanced elements in people's organizing committees, trade unions, youth organizations, women's organizations and other mass organizations can be recruited into the Party and these can be deployed to establish local Party branches in town centers and urban areas.

The Second Plenum of the Central Committee decided to implement the policy of expanding the Party boldly and not letting a single undesirable in. It stressed the principles of expanding the Party on the basis of the revolutionary mass movement. Every Party member was expected to recruit six other members before the end of 1971. It was noted that the target for recruitment could be easily overfulfilled because there were so many possible Party members that had already accumulated in the ranks of the revolutionary masses. Indeed the target for recruitment would subsequently be overfulfilled and we would still observe that there was still a considerable number of possible Party members who had been waiting in vain for recruitment.

To make sure that the Party would expand on a national scale, the Second Plenum also pressed for the appointment or election (as the case may be) of regional Party committees to build up regional Party organizations in Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Southern Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. As a result, we now have relatively stable regional Party organizations in all regions except Mindanao where Party cadres are now working hard to form a stable Party organization. Our strongest regional Party organizations are in Northern Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Central Luzon and Southern Luzon which account for 30 per cent, 18 per cent, 16 per cent and 7

per cent of our membership, respectively. Our regional Party organizations in Western Visayas and Eastern Visayas account for 6 per cent and 2.5 per cent of our membership, respectively. Deployed at various points in Mindanao are 2.5 per cent of our membership who are coordinated by a provisional revolutionary secretariat. It may be noted that two regional Party organizations, one for Eastern Visayas and another for Western Visayas, have been established in the Visayas. Because of its large population and land size, Mindanao may also be divided into two or three regions.

The regional Party committees are an effective instrument for observing collective leadership in the various regions of the archipelago. However, there are still tendencies here for one or two cadres to monopolize decisions. Another erroneous tendency that may arise here is bureaucratism, which appears in the form of building bureaus down to the level of the district committee at the expense of the urgent task of establishing Party branches and groups at the base of the regional Party organization. Such a tendency goes against the principle of letting the Party take roots among the masses.

The establishment of the regional Party organizations and their corresponding leading organs will eventually solve the problems of extended period of time between plenums of the Central Committee and also between the meetings of the Political Bureau. Because of the small number of Party cadres, most members of the Central Committee and also of the Political Bureau have had to attend to so many tasks at distantly separated places. In due time, it will be quite easier to convene plenary meetings of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. To carry on collective leadership on a daily basis, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee has been acting in the name of the Party Central Committee and the Military Commission has been supervising the New People's Army and directing the Party organization therein.

Central organs directly under the Party Central Committee and all bureaus under the organization and education departments of the General Secretariat have become better staffed as a result of the efficient recruitment of Party members after the Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee. The Party Central Committee now has adequate apparatuses for performing a wide range of work and can attend to solving problems in a more concentrated way than before when the central staffs and offices were grossly inadequate. The staff members of all offices of the Central Committee, including the Secretariat, absorb 18 per cent of the total Party membership; this is exclusive of the 82 per cent deployed in various regions.

There have been no serious violations of the principle of democratic centralism, except in certain cases which have been properly dealt with. The Central Committee has maintained its overall leadership within the Party. On the whole, leading organs at every level have conducted themselves well. It is to the credit of the Party rank and file that they have exercised their freedom to speak up and make proposals and criticisms and at the same time to accept the discipline required in implementing collective decisions and instructions from leading organs. Most, if not all, infractions of the principle of democratic centralism whether big or small have come under criticism and discussion by Party organs or Party organizations concerned.

Because of its iron discipline and unity, the Party has been able to build its organization severalfold and has been able to defend itself from every attempt of the enemy to subvert or

smash it. We have completely frustrated the enemy's vile hope of "nipping it in the bud". In the countryside, we have withstood campaigns of "encirclement and suppression". Even in the cities where we are supposed to be most vulnerable, the Party was able to function smoothly even at the height of the anti-communist white terror following the Plaza Miranda massacre of August 21, 1971. In the countryside or in the city underground, we have effectively foiled many enemy attempts to destroy our organization from within or from without. The most important effect on us of enemy attacks is that we have become tempered and we have learned much. We are confident that all Party cadres and members are determined to face all hardships and sacrifice to win victory.

For this year an organizational plan has been submitted by the Party Secretariat and endorsed by the Executive Committee to the Central Committee. The Executive Committee has also improved on the first edition of the Organizational Guide and Report Outlines on the basis of experience and has put out the second edition to guide overall organizational work. Under the organizational plan, the Party membership is expected to increase sevenfold on the basis of the revolutionary mass movement in the countryside and cities. The regional Party committees and the regional Party organizations are called upon to fulfill this plan conscientiously by establishing more Party branches and Party groups. Adjustments in certain regions may be made on the ground that the general target is too high or too low in different regions. But we are confident that the general target will be overfulfilled. We expect that Party members of workers and peasant origin will increase. We are determined to make such an increase.

To win victory in the Philippine revolution, we need several hundreds of thousands of Party members. Out of these there should be tens of thousands of Party cadres capable of leading the masses in the rural areas and urban areas. On the basis of the number of barrios in the entire country, we need at least 35,000 cadres to be able to create more powerful tidal waves on a nationwide scale. We do not yet have hundreds of thousands of Party members and tens of thousands of Party cadres. But surely we are going to have them and even now we have become a significant revolutionary force. That is because we have the correct ideological and political line.

Perseverance on the Road of Armed Revolution For People's Democracy

The Communist Party of the Philippines has correctly adopted the general line of people's democracy. In carrying out this line, we are waging armed struggle as the principal form of revolutionary struggle and we are working hard to fulfill the main content of the revolution which is peasant struggle for land. By waging armed struggle and agrarian revolution, we can establish and consolidate revolutionary base areas from which to advance to win nationwide victory. In a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, there is no other place but the countryside where to build the people's army, develop the main force of the revolution and have enough space to maneuver in before uprising can be successfully staged in the cities. We, therefore, have to apply Chairman Mao's line of using the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture them.

The Party and the New People's Army have already establish 735 barrio organizing committees and 60 barrio revolutionary committees. These people's committees govern a total population of about 400,000 and are found in a total of eighteen provinces: seven in Northern Luzon, five in Central Luzon, four in Southern Luzon and two in Western Visayas. We have been able to reach so many provinces by two methods of expansion: 1) by advancing wave upon wave and using border areas of several provinces, and 2) by leaping over White areas and sending single cadres or teams to separate strategic points. Northern Luzon has 515 barrio organizing committees and 50 barrio revolutionary committees and Central Luzon 150 and 10 respectively. Southern Luzon has 60 barrio organizing committee and Western Visayas, 10.

The establishment of a barrio organizing committee signifies that a regular squad or an armed propaganda team of the New People's Army has already conducted thorough social investigation, has held general meetings for pouring out grievances and discussing problems along the people's democratic line and has already grouped together the relatively most advanced elements among the masses for committee membership. The barrio organizing committee is a preparatory committee for setting up the barrio revolutionary committee; it is an instrument for transforming an unstable area into a stable area. Under the barrio organizing committee, the reduction of land rent, the elimination of usury and the practice of simple forms of cooperation are achieved. The people support the annihilation of enemy troops and the elimination of landlord despots, enemy spies and such bad elements as cattle rustlers, extortionists, robbers, murderers, arsonists and the like. The officers and members of the committee serve as the embryo of the organization, education, economic, defense and health committees of the future barrio revolutionary committee and can initiate the creation of these committees and also of the local mass organizations for peasants, workers, youth, women, children, cultural activists and the like.

The barrio revolutionary committee is inaugurated to replace the barrio organizing committee when the peasants are well assured of their ownership of land and continue to engage in simple forms of cooperation, when the people's armed forces are already well developed and the barrio has been cleared of the enemy, when the various mass organizations have been actively performing their tasks, when the five committees which are actually governmental departments of the barrio revolutionary committee have been fully organized and when a local Party branch and several Party groups have already arisen from the mass movement. The single most important task of the barrio revolutionary committee is to train the people in self government and develop the barrios into political, economic, military and cultural bastions of the revolution. So far, we have been most successful in building the barrio revolutionary committees in areas that are hilly and forested or are remote from concentrations of enemy strength. But they have also arisen to some extent in plains.

The main instrument of the Party in establishing the barrio organizing committees and the barrio revolutionary committees is the New People's Army. We started to establish the barrio organizing committees when within the months of March and April 1969 we were able to form nine squads and field them over the entire second district of Tarlac and certain limited parts of Pampanga, Zambales and Nueva Ecija which were all adjacent to Tarlac. During the same period, we also started to dispatch cadres to Northern Luzon and other strategic points in the country. From the outset, we were keenly conscious of the fact that the faggots were extremely

dry in Northern Luzon and a single spark here would kindle the fire of the people's democratic revolution. At the same time, we were also concerned with preserving and expanding our forces and source of means in Central Luzon.

After three years, we now have in the New People's Army the strength of 72 regular squads or 800 regulars armed with modern weapons. These should be equivalent to eight full regular companies. But we are still in the general process of bringing squads into regular platoon formations. There are now ten regular platoons. Apart from these platoons, we have one regular company and are in the process of building another one. It is only a matter of a short period that we shall be able to adequately put up commands at the company level. In Northern Luzon, we have 51 squads in such various formations as one regular company, seven regular platoons and 21 separate regular squads. In Central Luzon, we have 15 squads in such various formations as three regular platoons and 6 separate squads. In Southern Luzon, we have four regular squads. In all regions, including Eastern Visayas and Mindanao, we have cadres with political-military training and their propaganda teams can be easily transformed into fighting units at the appropriate time.

The armed strength of the people's army includes not only its regular fighters but also about 1,500 local guerilla fighters armed mainly with old single-action rifles and homemade rifles of the shotgun type and about 16,000 militia members (estimated conservatively at 20 members per barrio) armed mainly with homemade handguns and such indigenous weapons as bolos, spears, bows and arrows, hidden spikes and traps, and others. Local guerilla units vary in strength from one full squad to a full platoon in a barrio; full guerilla platoons are characteristically found in forest regions. As we are now systematically manufacturing shotguns, we can build local guerilla units faster. As we are now launching the explosives movements in the countryside, both the local guerilla and militia units can become a more powerful auxiliary force and reserve force. The widespread use of homemade grenades and land mines can cause incalculable casualties and damage on the enemy and strain his morale.

The New People's Army has engaged in a wide range of military operations against enemy troops and military establishments, landlord despots, informers and bad elements. These operations include arrests, ambushes, raids, sabotage and others. We have inflicted some 1,700 casualties on the enemy in the process. Of these, about 800 were enemy troops who were either killed or seriously wounded. About 900 informers, landlord despots and bad elements were killed. So far, only 22 U.S. military officers have been killed. On the basis of these figures, our armed struggle takes the form of the agrarian war or civil war. Though U.S. military advisers and U.S. military planes occasionally accompany the local reactionary troops, direct and large scale actions by U.S. military personnel are not yet being undertaken against us. However, whenever the occasion arises, we always attack major Philippine and U.S. military installations and command posts. Among those that we have attacked are the main administration building of the JUSMAG in Quezon City and command posts of the Task Force Lawin in Central Luzon and Northern Luzon. We have successfully raided the Philippine Military Academy in order to seize arms. We have destroyed or damaged six enemy aircrafts, including five helicopters; military trucks, jeeps and armored cars; communications equipment; and various military supplies.

We have also taken steps to disintegrate the enemy armed forces. We have disseminated revolutionary propaganda among officers and men in the regular enemy service, military trainees in schools (ROTC and PMT) and in “home defense” centers and students in the Philippine Military Academy. The revolutionary examples of two comrades in leaving the reactionary armed forces and joining the New People’s Army have given rise to the Corpus-Tagamolila Movement. Under the direction of the Party, this movement is secretly and systematically conducting political work among enemy officers and men.

We have made considerable headway in disintegrating the “barrio self- defense units”. Without firing a single shot, we have managed several times to dissolve entire “BSDUs” by persuading their personnel to turn their arms against their P.C. “supervisors”. A great number of “BSDU” men are secretly in contact with us and are cooperating with us. Our policy towards the “BSDU” is to exert every effort to frustrate its establishment and, if the enemy still succeeds in establishing it through coercion, to maintain secret contact with the “BSDU” men (some or all, as the case may be), get information from them about the enemy and then instruct them to join the people’s army with their arms at an appropriate time. The fundamental weakness of the “BSDU” is that it serves the people’s enemies, it is created through coercion and it is actually a form of dispersal for enemy strength. Since it is imposed by the enemy on the people who have started to rise up, the key to disintegrating it is to make full use of the good relations between the Party and the people’s army on the one hand and the people on the other hand. Only the few real enemy diehards among the “BSDU” men are singled out for punitive action.

There is no doubt that the New People’s Army has achieved brilliant successes under the leadership of the Party. But these are still small in comparison to what is still to be achieved. It is of great importance to consider our difficulties, shortcomings and mistakes so that we can advance further. Since the Party had correctly defined the road of armed revolution as the road of winning victory, there is less danger within the Party and the New People’s Army of Right opportunism than of “Left” opportunism. There is definitely no serious trend in the Party to abandon the armed struggle and take up parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle. But bourgeois reactionary ideas can take “Left” forms to advance the essence of Rightism even as we are steadily advancing. At the moment, we have to be most alert to “Left” opportunism as the main internal danger.

It should be clear at the outset, however, that we speak only a danger and that so far not a single “Left” opportunist error of such gravity as to seriously damage or totally wreck the entire revolutionary movement has yet occurred. Even as we cite actual cases of adventurism committed by certain units or certain cadres of the Party, our criticism would have nothing in common with the babble of the Lava revisionist renegades that the Party as a whole has bogged itself down in “Left” opportunism. They pretend to attack “Left” opportunism only to defend the Right opportunism promoted by Jesus Lava from 1955 onwards and then bequeathed by him to them. In fact, they also defend the “Left” opportunism represented in the past by Jose and Jesus Lava. This ties up with their present anti-Party and anti-people revisionist fascist activity in connivance with the reactionary state. Modern revisionists, who have even become fascist agents, are absolutely incapable of determining what is “Left” opportunism and what is not.

In our previous statement of facts regarding the barrio organizing committee and the barrio revolutionary committees, there is a noticeably great disparity between the number of the latter and the number of the former. This signifies a great disparity between consolidation and expansion, between guerilla base areas and guerilla zones or between stable and unstable areas. Certainly, consolidation can easily fall behind expansion; there is the law of uneven development. But it is not good to keep consolidation too far behind expansion at the ratio of less than one barrio revolutionary committee for every ten barrio organizing committee. What would certainly be a better situation than now is to have one or two revolutionary committees for every five barrio organizing committee. The general view that we wish to bring out is that consolidation work should be done well even as we boldly expand so that small units of the New People's Army do not flounder in too large an unreliable and unconsolidated area.

It is easy for the ideology of the roving rebel bands to gain ground where consolidation work is not done well. There is the danger of related mistaken ideas like the purely military viewpoint, ultrademocracy, disregard of organizational discipline, absolute equalitarianism, subjectivism, individualism or putschism to arise. Without consolidation and, therefore, adequate Party leadership and powerful mass support, our fighting units are susceptible to losing the correct direction. There is always the danger of adventurism, of launching offensives even only of a tactical character with no rear base to rely on.

The great disparity between the number of barrio organizing committees and that of barrio revolutionary committees is not the result of a willful design or gross negligence by any leading organ. Rather it arises mainly from certain objective conditions that a newly re-established Party has had to face. Our ideological and political line has been comprehensively laid down in the basic documents of the Party as well as of the New People's Army from the very beginning. But during the last three years, especially from 1969 to 1970, the number of Party cadres and members was grossly inadequate for conducting all-around consolidation. Furthermore, those few who were available for revolutionary work in the countryside were still lacking in experience. Thus, the original squads that the Party fielded in Central Luzon tended to rely on their previous experience. They had to rely mainly on the barrio organizing committees, without a clear view of what to do next. They keep on creating the barrio organizing committees because they were most acquainted with this form of organization and thought that it was the best way for guaranteeing mass support in the face of intensifying enemy campaigns of "encirclement and suppression".

The second district of Tarlac, where we fired the first shots to reopen the road of armed revolution, had the specific advantage of having a large mass of people with a fine revolutionary history. But at the same time, it has the specific disadvantage of being the site of large U.S. military bases and Philippine military camps and of being on the plains. There is no barrio here which cannot be reached in a few minutes' time by armored car or helicopter. Further making our situation difficult from March 1969 to the later part of 1970, the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique tried to block us from the south in Pampanga and the Eduardo Cojuangco clique also did the same from the north in the first district of Tarlac. We were not only hemmed in by these two reactionary cliques; the Monkees-Armeng Bayan-Masaka gang of the Lava revisionist renegades at first surreptitiously and then openly assisted the Task Force Lawin in perpetrating crimes of bloody intrigue calculated to discredit us.

From March to June 1969, the reactionary armed forces made probing attacks against us with the use of platoon-size patrols and a considerable number of spies. We had no alternative but to wipe out these spies and prevent the enemy troops from becoming effective against us. We also picked off isolated enemy troops in order to seize arms. Intensifying his platoon-size operations, the enemy was able to intrude into the office of the Central Committee, disrupt our work and seize a number of documents on June 9, 1969. From this day, Task Force Lawin started to field and concentrate a full battalion against us in every “search and destroy” operation. By July 1969, the reactionary armed forces started to station P.C. troops at the fringes of our guerilla zone and undertake “clear and hold” operations. By September 1969, they were already forcing large numbers of “barrio councils” to set up the “barrio self-defense units” in an attempt to move in on us and deprive us of area for maneuver.

Certain barrios, mainly those in the center of our guerilla zone, and also the scarcely wooded Tarlac part of the Tarlac-Zambales mountain range were deliberately left open for us by the enemy who had the intention of making these his “killing zones”. At the same time, he fielded “civic action” teams (spy and deception teams) in some of the barrios here, especially along the national highway. He, therefore, conducted counterrevolutionary dual tactics. Throughout 1970 and 1971, he tried to make use of his predetermined “killing zones” by conducting surprise raids and savage abuses here in regimental or divisional strength through the combined forces of the Task Force Lawin and the Tabak Division. By early 1971, the reactionary military authorities boasted that the New People’s Army had already been crushed in Central Luzon and that its last remnants had either fled to Isabela or were hiding themselves in the Tarlac-Zambales mountains. Puppet chieftain Marcos echoed his fascist henchmen in his January 1971 state-of-the-nation address.

But the truth is the opposite of the enemy’s claims. We have never been crushed in Central Luzon. By employing flexible tactics and effective underground methods, we have managed to preserve ourselves here and we have repeatedly attacked the enemy despite his constant heavy pressure. It is true, however, that most of our barrio organizing committees collapsed for a time; unconsolidated areas gave way to the enemy and our squads became more easy prey for enemy attacks. Also, it is true that in the face of an overwhelming enemy force on a terrain not so favorable to us we have had serious difficulties and shortcomings in giving full play to battles of annihilation against the enemy. But on the whole in Central Luzon, we have advanced although not as rapidly as in Northern Luzon. Since the second Plenum of the Central Committee, which analyzed and summed up our experience in armed struggle, we have proceeded to steadily recover temporarily lost ground in Central Luzon and to deploy units of the New People’s Army far beyond the confines of the first district of Tarlac. We have also been favored by the disintegration of the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique in September-October 1970.

Our Tarlac experience of 1969 to 1971 cannot be taken in isolation of our overall efforts on the road of armed revolution. Tarlac was the best possible place where to establish a people’s army and start revolutionary armed struggle in early 1969. By starting with the revolutionary forces there, we were able to arouse the entire nation for the people’s democratic revolution and to create a larger scale for people’s war in Luzon. Now, we do not only have Central Luzon but we also have Northern Luzon and other areas. By paying too close an attention to such a narrow area as the first district of Tarlac, the enemy paid scarce attention to the emergence of guerilla base

areas and guerilla zones in Northern Luzon. From the beginning, we were aware of the difficulties that we have had to face in Central Luzon and we did immediately exert efforts to open new battlefields.

In our efforts at nationwide expansion, we have also suffered some serious but temporary reverses. It is important to cite the most glaring cases in the Visayas during the last three years in order to emphasize the point that there is great need for doing consolidation work while doing expansion work. It is obvious why in areas distant from the Party headquarters in Luzon there is even greater need for such. It is difficult to replace our very new and very few cadres in Visayas and Mindanao if they should be encircled and crushed by the enemy before they can have some rear base to rely on. If we recall our Negros Occidental experience of 1969, we can easily see how grossly erroneous it was for a small group of armed men to seek battle with the enemy even without having organized a single barrio organizing committee in the area. In the case of the Capiz experience of 1971, the armed propaganda team had been able to organize five barrio organizing committees but these proved to be insufficient for coping with an enemy campaign of "encirclement and suppression". These negative experiences are educative for anyone if they were analyzed and summed up. As we have long ago stated, the archipelagic character of the country is at first a disadvantage for us. But through expansion and consolidation, and vice-versa, the guerilla base areas and guerilla zones that we can create in the Visayas and Mindanao will cause in the long run a more serious dispersal of enemy forces favorable to all revolutionary forces.

The Party and the New People's Army in Northern Luzon are now getting the concentrated attention of the enemy. Though revolutionary forces here are relatively larger and more advanced than those in other regions, it should be borne in mind that these still have to pass so many severe tests, especially as the enemy keeps on intensifying its campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" here. The regional organization and particular units of the Party and the New People's Army also have had their mistakes and weaknesses. Most of these spring from the great disparity between consolidation and expansion. A squad or a platoon which covers tens or scores of barrios and which does not do well its consolidation work is susceptible to the mistakes and weaknesses of a roving rebel band. However, it is to the great advantage of the Party and the New People's Army in Northern Luzon that before the enemy could exert pressure on the area in the same manner that he had done in Central Luzon our Party cadres and Red fighters have already learned much from the Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee, from the concrete experience of their comrades in other areas and from their own experience and study. Furthermore, there are in Northern Luzon such specific conditions favorable to the revolutionary forces as the extreme impoverishment of majority of the people, a mountainous and hilly terrain and a highly diversified agriculture.

As of now, the National Operational Command of the New People's Army cannot easily meet very often inasmuch as its composites, including the commander-in-chief and his deputy commanders, are tied down either to the Northern Luzon Operational Command or the Central Luzon Operational Command. The Military Commission of the Central Committee therefore performs so many functions which in the future can be passed on to the National Operational Command as a whole. The Party as a whole should exert more efforts to develop more military commanders and more Party cadres adapted to work in the New People's Army. As a result of

these efforts, we shall be able to set up capable military subcommissions and regional operational commands. Through intensified political-military training and through actual revolutionary armed struggle, more Party cadres and military commanders will certainly emerge to cover wider battlefronts and fill up the command structure of the New People's Army.

To prepare for the next important stage of development in the growth of the people's army, we need to develop vigorously a sufficient number of cadres who are ideologically, politically and technically competent to lead and command at least twenty regular companies. Our success in developing a strong leadership in the revolutionary armed struggle depends on our success in arousing and mobilizing the people and, of course, on correctly undertaking consolidation and expansion in our mass work. Our Red fighters are drawn from the ranks of the masses and the great bulk of our regular mobile forces will continuously be drawn from local guerilla and militia units. Our army will march forward victoriously and accumulate strength along the way so long as it can rely on the broad masses of the people.

Building the Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Feudal United Front

The Filipino proletariat as the leading class in the Philippine revolution has sent its most advanced detachment, the Communist Party of the Philippines, into the midst of its most reliable, most oppressed and most numerous ally-the peasantry. An alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry has been forged. This alliance of the toiling masses who compose the vast majority of the Filipino people is the basis for the national united front for people's democracy against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. It is an alliance built by indefatigable mass work in the countryside and tempered by armed struggle under the leadership of the Party. It comes into force in the unity of the proletarian cadres and the peasant fighters in the New People's Army and also in the unity of the proletarian cadres and the peasant masses in the localities.

To develop the peasantry as a powerful force and ally in the revolutionary struggle, we are carrying out a revolutionary class line in the countryside and we are in this regard building an anti-feudal united front. We rely mainly on the poor peasants, win over the middle peasants and neutralize the rich peasants in order to isolate and destroy the feudal tyrants and the reactionary armed forces. We also work hard to unite with the agricultural workers in the haciendas. In the forest and mountainous regions, we pay special attention to developing the revolutionary movement among the logging and mining workers and the national minorities. Along the long coastlines of our archipelagic country, we also exert vigorous efforts to arouse and mobilize the poor and middle fishermen.

It is often the case that when we set up the barrio organizing committee there is not a single Communist in the locality and therefore it is only the relationship between the Party in the New People's Army and the peasant masses that bears out the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. In due time, however, the various organizations for workers, peasants, fishermen, youth, women and cultural enthusiasts emerge to give comprehensive support to the barrio organizing committee. Subsequently, Party members are recruited from the mass activists of both the barrio organizing committee and the mass organizations. When a local Party branch arises in

the barrio, the barrio organizing committee easily matures into the barrio revolutionary committee and the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry becomes firm.

The barrio organizing committee is merely a preparatory committee for the barrio revolutionary committee. The barrio revolutionary committee serves a full organ of political power and has the character of a local united front government. Party representatives take only one third of the committee membership. The next one-third goes to the representatives of the poor peasants and the lower middle peasants; and still the other one-third goes to the representatives of other progressive classes and strata. Communists do not monopolize discussions, decisions and activities in the overall barrio revolutionary committee as well as in the five governmental committees on organization, education, economy, defense and health. They also encourage the mass organizations to take initiative. In other words, Communists have faith and trust in the masses and work hard on order to unite with them.

Of course, all barrio revolutionary committees and barrio organizing committees in a municipality are led by the Party section committee or by some higher Party organ functioning in a particular area. But, when circumstances permit, higher levels of the people's government are established. As a matter of fact, we are now on the threshold of establishing people's councils at the municipal level through municipal conferences of delegates from the barrio level. From the municipal level, it will again be possible to proceed to the establishment of the provincial people's councils through provincial congresses. But before this, the provincial Party committee will directly supervise the municipal people's government at every level will embody our united front policy of "three-thirds". Our barrio revolutionary committees are the foundation of our national united policy and are the embryo of the national coalition government or the people's democratic republic of the future.

In the countryside, the proletarian revolutionaries have maintained close alliance with the petty bourgeoisie. The middle peasants are encouraged to join the simple production, marketing and credit cooperatives set up and controlled by the poor peasants under Party leadership. Intimate relations have been developed with both barrio and town school teachers, high school students, college students, professionals artisans and merchants. Many activists of these petty bourgeois groups, especially the teachers, students and professionals are very articulate in promoting the general line of the Party and are very much interested in purchasing and reading our Party literature. Party members have been recruited from the most advanced mass activists of petty-bourgeois background.

We rely mainly on the voluntary contributions of the poor peasant masses and also on production plots of the people's army and the local mass organizations. But aside from these, we are also getting some supplies from the rich peasants, national-bourgeois elements, merchants and logging, plantation and mining enterprises. Their support for us and our support for their legitimate interests are expressions of the national united front. As our political and armed struggle continue to rise and win more victories, we are increasingly in a better position to apply a fair policy of taxation to support the people's government and the people's army. Our united front with and policy of fairness towards the middle bourgeoisie in the countryside is a good preparation for future relations with the middle bourgeoisie in the cities.

We have closely studied and used the contradictions between the reactionary parties and cliques at the provincial, district and municipal levels. There are also contradictions between the lower reactionary leaders and higher reactionary leaders. We have also made practical use of these contradictions to favor the revolutionary mass movement. It is characteristic of the reactionary parties and cliques to control and base their strength on the “barrio councils”. By having alliance with some of the reactionaries against the diehard reactionaries, we have been able to neutralize or win over so many “barrio councils” which are ordinarily dominated by rich peasants or upper middle peasants and consequently we have been able to conduct independent mass work among the peasant masses with less danger of being reported to the reactionary armed forces or to an antagonistic local police force.

The more violent and bitter the contradictions among the reactionaries, the graver are the abuses committed against the people and the bankruptcy of the reactionary government becomes more exposed. Contradictions among the reactionaries are sharpening every day, every month and every year. These merely widen our area for maneuver, encourage the broad masses of the people to move to us and split the local police force and the reactionary armed forces into warring factions. The consistent rise of “private armies” serves to aggravate the internal split among reactionaries. The call for “peace and order” hypocritically made by the U.S.-Marcos clique is nothing but a call for its monopoly of arm and the fascist suppression of all democratic forces. The reactionary elections held every two years have irreversibly led to the concentration of arms in the hands of the reactionary cliques. Since the second Plaza Miranda massacre, the rise of “private armies” has been accelerated and the U.S.-Marcos clique has further tightened its grip on the reactionary armed forces.

The danger of Right opportunism has been minimized in the firm efforts of the Party to build a united front that is for armed struggle. But as stated before, our inadequacies in arousing and mobilizing the peasant masses as the main ally and main support for the revolutionary struggle have created “Left” opportunist tendencies which involve mainly the failure to base our military actions on our actual political strength. In two years of the past three years, we relied mainly on the thin existence of the barrio organizing committees; there was a tendency among us to think that it was enough for armed squads to create and link up these preparatory committees over large unconsolidated areas. In the relationship between the armed squads and the barrio organizing committees, it was often the case that the squad leader simply gave orders to the chairman or the local head for defense on matters that could have been settled through consultations with the local people’s committees and through mass meetings and mass mobilization.

There were great shortcomings in mobilizing the people for the agrarian revolution; the implementation of even our minimum land reform program of reducing land rent and eliminating usury was grossly uneven in areas where we had already an armed force. In our relationship with allies other than the peasantry, there was a discernible tendency to rely solely on the coercive value of our small armed strength. A great deal more of propaganda and organizational work among the petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie in the countryside could have been done. However, there was no design or line at all to lessen mass mobilization or shunt away possible allies. The Party was simply short of cadres; and those few who were available were

lacking in experience. Even now that the number of Party cadres and members has significantly increased, tendencies of the recent past persist.

Even as the danger of “Left” opportunism exist, the danger of Right opportunism does not lurk far behind if we do not go deep enough among the peasant masses or if we do not fully mobilize them for the agrarian revolution. It is a fact that it is relatively easier for us to approach for the first time a barrio that is under the influence of some local reactionaries who ally themselves with us against the reactionary diehards. But to convert the “barrio councils” automatically into the barrio organizing committee or to dillydally in transforming the barrio organizing committees into barrio revolutionary committees is to allow the old influences of the reactionaries to persist. By being over reliant on temporary allies, we can easily make mistakes in our efforts to create our own independent strength and maintain full initiative. So, whenever our temporary allies betray us, our barrio organizing committees would collapse so easily. That means to say that we do not succeed in leading the peasant masses on a revolutionary course.

The national united front cannot be conceived without an understanding of the relationship between the cities and the countryside. The anti-feudal united front and the revolutionary armed struggle in the countryside inspire revolutionary mass activity in the cities and impress upon the allies that are centered in the cities to rely on the revolutionary party of the proletariat. Of course, we are in turn inspired by the revolutionary forces in the cities and we receive actual support from them. Revolutionary mass activity in the Manila-Rizal region had set off a chain reaction of revolutionary mass activity in other urban areas and has also influenced the vast number of people in the countryside throughout the archipelago. Since this carries the great red banner of the people’s democratic revolution, we have gained influence on a national scale far in advance of the actual armed strength that we have. Both the revolutionary workers’ movement and the democratic cultural revolution of a new type have produced and tempered so many mass activists to become Party cadres and members, capable of serving as seeds of the revolution all over the country in both cities and countryside.

The revolutionary workers’ movement is developing fast under the leadership of the Party. This is the logical result of small but steadfast efforts that we have exerted in the trade union movement before and after the re-establishment of the Party. In workers’ strikes where we have Party cadres as trade union members or where we have some other links with the strike-bound union, we have always worked to raise the level of the economic struggle to that of political struggle. In our desire to reach the masses of workers, we have not shirked doing political work within the reactionary trade unions. Since January 1971, in the course of the mass struggle against the U.S. oil monopolies, we have succeeded in bringing out workers from the factories to marches and demonstrations in several thousands — a number far exceeding workers’ participation in any anti-imperialist mass action during the last two decades. Since May Day of 1971, when once more several thousands of workers came out for mass actions under the red banner of the people’s democratic revolution, we have become convinced that a new level of revolutionary consciousness and activity has arisen among the workers. Undaunted by the May Day massacre, workers have continued to march forward in increasing number. What is more important is that they are doing so in opposition to the yellow labor bosses who have always tried to rein them in.

The resurgence of the revolutionary workers' movement has been spearheaded by the proletarian revolutionaries. But there is no doubt that mass activists of various youth and student organizations have also given valuable assistance to them. The joint efforts of workers and student activists go on today at the picket lines, in mass demonstrations and in study sessions. These signify the wonderful worker-student alliance, the biggest possible alliance of progressive forces concentrated in the city. Such an alliance is exceedingly important and should be developed further. We have yet as so few Party cadres who can work in the workers' movement and they certainly need the support of mass activists of various democratic mass organizations. These mass activists have contributed a lot by doing propaganda work on the programme for a people's democratic revolution in workers' communities as well as in factories where there are no trade unions yet or where reactionary unions reign. At the same time, we are aware of the danger that some wrong ideas and bad influences of the petty bourgeoisie have been brought into the workers' movement to some extent, especially in cases where the workers are not promptly disabused of the notion that only those with higher educational attainment in the reactionary schools can lead. On the opposite side, however, there is the erroneous trend to dismiss nonworker activists as incapable of giving assistance to the revolutionary workers' movement. It is the duty of proletarian revolutionaries to develop firm links between worker and student activists in line with the people's democratic revolution.

We have had to face enormous difficulties in developing the revolutionary workers' movement. The more than two decades that the Lava revisionist renegades have sabotaged its resurgence and also the more than two decades that such labor aristocrats as Lacsina, Cid and Oca have prevailed in the trade union movement have served as stumbling blocks. Yet our Party cadres who could work in the trade union movement have been few in number and many of those few have had to be shifted to the countryside time and again. Thus, for sometime before 1971, we were restricted to leading only a few unions directly and had to work mostly within some reactionary labor federations and unions.

The democratic cultural revolution of a new type in the cities has apparently gone far ahead of the revolutionary trade union movement because of the past more than two decades. However, this cultural revolution has assumed unprecedented magnitude, scale and depth only since the first quarter storm of 1970. Of course, this historical phenomenon was prepared for directly by a full decade of anti-imperialist mass actions launched mainly by the youth (coming from the urban petty bourgeoisie) and partly by the working class. Upon the advent of the widespread campus strikes of 1969 against the reactionary policies of school authorities, it was already evident that a powerful revolutionary storm would be unleashed by the youth against the entire ruling system. Our re-established Party has been responsible for bringing this democratic cultural revolution of a new type to heights never before witnessed in Philippine history. This propaganda movement carries the programme for a people's democratic revolution, and broadcasts on a nationwide scale the Party's line and slogans on particular issues against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

Aside from proving the leadership of the Party and bringing out the enthusiastic broad mass support for the general lines of the Party, the democratic revolution of a new type has unfolded in a big way the great alliance between the revolutionary proletariat and the urban petty bourgeoisie, especially the students, teachers and other professionals, and has also pointed to the

urban petty bourgeoisie as a basic force of the revolution with the special task of bringing all other middle forces towards the side of the revolutionary proletariat. The various mass actions for national freedom and democracy repeatedly launched in the Manila-Rizal region and other urban centers in the archipelago have tempered tens of thousands of mass activists and hundreds of thousands of organized and unorganized masses and have won the sympathy of millions of people throughout the country for the revolutionary cause. Repeated acts of massacre and other criminal abuses perpetrated by the U.S.-Marcos clique have not only failed to stop big mass actions but have served to make them even bigger. The revolutionary martyrs from the ranks of workers and students have always inspired fiercer revolutionary courage among the broad masses of the people.

From the crucible of the democratic cultural revolution of a new type, a significant number of mass activists have come forward to assist the revolutionary workers' movement and also to join the revolutionary armed struggle at several points in the countryside. It goes without saying that many of the mass activists have come forward to join the Party. The propaganda movement for a people's democratic revolution is guided by the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. This revolutionary theory of the proletariat is now at the core of the revolutionary thinking among mass activists in the cities today. But there is also quite a lot of chaffy and eclectic thinking among them. Quite often there are some mass activists from among the petty bourgeoisie who are still misled by social-democratic and other reactionary ideas. The policy of the Party is to win over all elements that have revolutionary tendencies through persuasion; this involves at the same time being on guard against all kinds of erroneous ideas being smuggled into the ranks of the revolutionaries.

Hard pressed by U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capitalism, which are now in the paroxysms of crisis and are desperately trying to suck more blood from colonies and semi-colonies, the national bourgeoisie is slowly coming to recognize the necessity and importance of allying itself with the revolutionary mass movement. The clamor being made by the left and middle wings of the national bourgeoisie for the nationalization of the economy and the broadening of diplomatic and trade relations is becoming more and more insistent. Nevertheless, the right wing of the national bourgeoisie entertains hopes of getting into "joint ventures" with the foreign monopoly capitalists and is being drawn by the big comprador bourgeoisie to support the sinister campaign for "incentives" and "national treatment" (another fancy legal phrase to replace "parity rights") to benefit these monopoly capitalists. Blinded by their loyalty to the big bourgeoisie, especially the Soviet monopoly bureaucrat bourgeoisie, the Lava revisionist renegades unite with the Trotskyites in attacking the entire national bourgeoisie. Cloaking themselves as "Left" in this respect, they actually support the big bourgeoisie.

So far, only elements of the national bourgeoisie who are in areas where we are strong have directly given concrete support to the revolutionary armed struggle. The national bourgeois groups and personalities in the cities have deemed fit in the meantime to give concrete support only to the democratic mass organizations in the cities, especially in the Manila-Rizal region. In due time, the national bourgeoisie will extend support in greater amount to the revolutionary mass movement as they will recognize more the need for a national united front. The national bourgeoisie is weak and many of the present organizations it belongs to are dominated by the big bourgeoisie. The executive, legislative and judicial branches of the reactionary government and

the current reactionary constitutional convention are basically opposed to national-democratic demands. The national bourgeoisie has some representatives in both the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party but these parties are dominated by the powerful representatives of the big bourgeoisie and the landlord class. Since the national bourgeoisie does not yet have any close alliance with us, there is yet no immediate danger of being outwitted or smothered by them. What is even needed today is to gain more support from them for the armed revolution. The danger of political error at the moment lies in allowing some of our Party members to think that the national bourgeoisie is completely reactionary.

We employ national united front tactics on reactionaries not only at the local level but also at the national level. The Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party and various groups within each divide the ranks of the reactionaries in many ways. Should the ruling clique of the ruling party or any combination of cliques decide to launch an anti-communist onslaught, we can have some temporary alliance with the other reactionaries in order to parry off the blows of the enemy diehards and destroy our enemies one by one. It is well proven in history that whenever the reactionary diehards resort in desperation to fascism they try not only to destroy the illegal opposition but also all kinds of legal opposition. In this light, we can appreciate the correctness of our position in having some temporary alliance with all kinds of opposition that the U.S.-Marcos clique attacked after the second Plaza Miranda massacre of 1971. A temporary alliance with some reactionaries against other reactionaries is a necessary part of general efforts to immediately bring the majority of the people to a common front against the common enemy, as sharply shown in World War II in the national united front against the Japanese fascists.

It is at times when the national united front is broadened to the extent that some reactionaries are included that the danger of Right opportunism is most acute. For example, within the Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties during the period of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the reactionaries tried to monopolize the speakers' platforms and restrict all mass organizations to promoting only one official manifesto which misrepresented the revolutionary masses as beggars of concessions from the common enemy, the U.S.-Marcos clique. While the Right opportunist tendency of capitulating to the reactionaries surfaced, certain Party members went to the other "Left" extreme of immediately leading mass activists to denounce the leadership of a certain mass organization without any prior discussion and settlement of problems within the Party.

The armed struggle of the national minorities in Mindanao for self-determination and land is of national significance and of great importance to the Party. The emergence of this armed struggle has to some extent divided the attention of the enemy and lessened its capability of concentrating overwhelming armed forces in Luzon. Objectively, the armed struggle in Mindanao and our revolutionary armed struggle in Luzon help each other. In this sense, we have a united front with the national minorities in Mindanao. Though there is yet no formal agreement with them, their leaders do understand that revolutionary armed struggle elsewhere in the country helps their struggle for self-determination and democracy. A significant number of youth organizations from the national minorities in Mindanao have taken the line of people's democratic revolution and have allied themselves to revolutionary mass organizations, as well shown in their repeated joint mass actions in Manila-Rizal, Eastern Visayas and Mindanao. Some of the youth from the national minorities have also taken the initiative of requesting us to give them political-military

training and they have received such training in our guerilla base areas and guerilla zones in Luzon. In the process, a few Maguindanaos, Maranaos and Tausugs have become members of the Party.

To bring the armed struggle to a higher level in Mindanao, we have dispatched Party cadres there with the explicit instructions of having a united front with the present rebel leaders, especially on the question of self-determination and democracy, and of building our own independent strength by stressing the land question among the peasant masses of the national minorities and by uniting them with the poor settlers against the landlord and the land grabbers, irrespective of religious beliefs. We have also sent Party cadres to areas in Mindanao that are populated predominantly by poor settlers from Luzon and the Visayas. The U.S.-Marcos clique is deliberately fanning the flames of religious strife so as to obscure the real problems of Mindanao and impose its fascist rule. It has deployed there large armed forces under Christian chauvinist officers and has armed the “Ilagas” (lumpen proletarian elements of Christian chauvinist mentality) to split the national minorities from the poor settlers, drive them away from their lands and to massacre them repeatedly. The real targets of the revolutionary movement are U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

Because it is facing an avalanche of mass resistance all over the country, the U.S.-Marcos clique is frantically demanding bigger military appropriations for increasing troops and equipment of the reactionary armed forces under the pretext of a “self-reliant defense posture”. At the same time, U.S. imperialism is obsessed with providing war material for the reactionary government in line with the “Nixon doctrine”. It has become too clear to the broad masses of the people that U.S. imperialism and its local reactionary stooges protect their oppressive and exploitative system by armed force and that these can be overthrown only by revolutionary armed force. The brazen parasitism and brutality of the reactionary armed forces is daily exacerbating the people’s suffering from inflation, higher taxes, shrinking income, severe unemployment, bureaucratic corruption and so many evils of the ruling system. Under these conditions, the national united front is gaining strength rapidly.

We are vigorously trying to build the national united front of workers, peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. In all our efforts at building this, we are implementing the policy of developing the progressive forces and winning over the middle forces in order to isolate the enemy diehards. Our most important efforts are now being exerted in the countryside as earlier explained. The local organs of political power that we are setting up are the foundations of the future People’s Democratic Republic of the Philippines. Even as we are setting these up, we have created a special organ, the Preparatory Commission of the National Democratic Front, to help the Central Committee in winning over allies in the cities and to prepare the way for the National Democratic Front as an intermediate step towards the people’s democratic republic. However, we are not in a hurry to set up any formal national united front organization. The national united front is basically a policy of the Party regarding classes in Philippine society. The results of the work of the Preparatory Commission for a National Democratic Front are not surprisingly very limited at this stage because the revolutionary armed struggle has still to develop further.

In waging revolution in our country, we as Communists never fail to relate our efforts to the world revolution. We are both patriots and internationalists. The Philippine revolution is part of the world proletarian revolution. The broad masses of the Filipino people are in the world anti-imperialist struggle, and together with other peoples of the world they face common enemies. U.S. imperialism is the biggest foreign exploiter and oppressor of our people and is also the most vicious protector of the big bourgeoisie and the landlord class. Japanese militarism is resurgent and its zaibatsus have once more invaded our country under the sponsorship of U.S. imperialism. Soviet social-imperialism has the Lava revisionist renegades as its advance agents and these specialize in counterrevolutionary anti-Party and anti-people activities while donning the mask of anti-imperialism. We welcome anything in the world that serves to divide, weaken and destroy all these imperialist forces. All defeats suffered by them in the hands of the revolutionary peoples abroad are also our victories. In the spirit of proletarian internationalism, we are performing our own share of liberating mankind from the scourge of imperialism by fighting U.S. imperialism and all its running dogs in the Philippines.

The main trend in the world today is revolution. And, as we scan the world, we can also see that countries want independence; nations want liberation; and people want revolution. There is no doubt that the international united front is growing even stronger. Close to us, the Chinese people continue to advance in their socialist revolution and are even determined to liberate Taiwan. Close to us, the Vietnamese, Cambodia and Laotian peoples are fighting fiercely for national liberation and national salvation in the main battlefield against U.S. imperialism. We ourselves are actively in the midst of the revolutionary armed struggles of the peoples of Southeast Asia. In Northeast Asia, the Korean people are determined to reunify their fatherland and the Japanese people are vigorously resisting the resurgence of Japanese militarism and the scheme of making Japan the bugle men of U.S. imperialism in Asia. In the Middle East, the Palestinian and Arab peoples persist in their revolutionary struggle against Israeli Zionism and against the two superpowers, U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. In the Asian subcontinent, the Indian and Pakistani peoples also persist in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. All over Asia, Africa and Latin America, the people's anti-imperialist movement continues to cut down the areas for unhindered exploitation by the imperialist powers.

As the world anti-imperialist struggle reaps great victories, all capitalist countries are wracked by deep-going crisis and by the powerful revolutionary movements of their own people. They find themselves more and more at odds with each other as each one tries to relieve itself of its own crisis at the expense of the others. Their contradictions become more severe and disruptive of the old counterrevolutionary alliances as they continually maneuver against each other to redivide the world or that increasingly small part of the world which they can still redivide. Under such circumstances, the international united front against imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction can be easily broadened, strengthened and moved up to fight the imperialist monsters one by one while they are in disarray.

[From: <http://www.philippinerevolution.net/documents/summing-up-our-experience-after-three-years> (downloaded on Feb. 24, 2012)]