CPN(M) - Worker #10
The Worker, #10, May 2006
News and Views: International
ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MASSES REGARDINGBy The Maoist Communist Party
TURKISH FASCIST REGIME'S MASSACRE IN MERCAN
To the proletariat and the oppressed masses ofthe world and to our oppressed people of all nationalities in Turkey and North Kurdistan.
The massacre in Mercan was a big blow to our Party, people, the people of the world and North Kurdistan, and, therefore, a big blow to our international movement. Among the 17 fallen comrades were our leading cadres and delegates attending the Second Congress. This extremely important event and its exploitation by the enemy has been a matter of concern for our Party, people, relatives of the martyrs and all revolutionary and democratic parties, groups and individuals. Our Party feels obliged and it is our duty to report on this massacre and to elaborate on it to the masses and the relations of the martyrs. We could not make any announcement prior to revolutionary and serious investigation. Now we can report on our preliminary investigations. In relation to our preliminary investigation we seriously evaluated the knowledge and reports of our Party, friendly organizational groups and individual's, as well as documents obtained from the enemy and other materials. Our preparations for the Congress and all documents obtained were seriously analyzed.
What follows is a brief summation of the preliminary investigation regarding this situation. Our Party feels obliged to convey our knowledge to relatives of the martyrs and to the masses.
During its second meeting, which was held in June 2004, our Central Committee decided to hold the Second Congress. According to that meeting, the congress would have happened in ... place during the Spring of 2005 in the Erzincan area. The Party decided on that area because our delegates would not attract the attention of the enemy and it is relatively easy to transfer relatively disabled comrades from there and make them disperse. The task of preparing for the Congress was given to the Erzincan Regional Committee, which was under the leadership of Comrade Ali Reza Sabur (known as Cem and killed during the operation). The Central Committee had decided that Erzincan Regional Committee should find a suitable place and start the preparations for the Second Congress over a period of one year. To achieve this aim the necessary resources were allocated and provided. After the preparations were completed all the delegates and Central Committee members were supposed to go there with the support of couriers and without using telephones. The other delegates from the guerrilla zone (Dersim) were to attend with a sufficient number of fighters, leaving other fighters behind to continue their activities.
Although the Erzincan Regional Committee had started the preparations and divided the work for the Congress preparations during the Summer of 2005, Comrade Ali Reza Sabur decided to change the area to be used for the Congress. Responsibility for the preparation work was given to another comrade, who was a member of the Regional Committe by Comrade Ali Reza Sabur, however, the enemy got information about the Congress preparation area, therefore, the Regional Committee changed the place once more. [The reason for the change of venue was that] during the avalanche season in the Winter time two fighters had been killed by being buried under an avalanche, and because the other fighters had tried to find the comrades in the Springtime, the enemy found their footprints. There was a clash and two more fighters lost their lives when they were leaving their mountain hideout. Naturally this guerrilla unit's force was reduced and weakened. So as a result of this clash, the place had to [again] be changed and preparations made for another place. Therefore, the Erzincan Regional Committee made an evaluation and divided up the work. According to the work division they split into two groups, one group started to prepare a place for the Congress, and the other group went to collect the Congress delegates from a village. The group that had responsibility for the Congress zone fulfilled its task and waited for the delegates to arrive. But the group who had to pickup the delegates arrived several weeks later than the appointed time. There was not daily communications and appointments. While the 17 delegate comrades were on their way there was a clash. The area where the clash took place was neither the rest area nor the meeting place. Because comrades could not reach the rest place they had to stay where they were and were involved in the clash. It is not possible that anybody knew that area where it happened, neither someone from the Party nor a Party supporter. The resting points, which were known by the couriers, had already been past by the delegate comrades, so the areas known to the Erzincan couriers were the areas that the 17 had already left.
The guerrilla units who were in Dersim had some clashes, which resulted in some loses of fighters in autumn and winter of 2004, they could not, therefore, regroup in the Spring of 2005. Because of these losses, the [other] delegates in the Dersim area had decided to go to the Congress zone with all the fighters instead of just the elite. One group of TKP/ML were also alongside us. In order to go to the Congress zone in Erzincan cromrades from TKP/ML were trying to complete their final tasks before leaving. The arrangement was made to meet them on the way. Just about to start their journey, they heard about the incident while they were in Mamike area in Dersim. While the incident occured the comrades in Dersim did not know the situation of the delegates. Apart from the Ovacik area's couriers, units in Dersim did not have any daily communications or appointments with other units in Erzincan. The person responsible for communication with other units was Comrade Aydin Hanbayat (who was also killed during the operation). Once Aydin Hanbayat's telephone was silent [i.e. no one phoned to say there was a problem] that meant the green light was given for them to move, however, they were occasionally making contact [by phone]. Therefore, they do not know whether Comrade Aydin and the others arrived or not. When they unsuccessfully tried to telephone Comrade Aydin, they realised that those who were killed must have been partisans [MKP delegates]. They adhered to the arrangements agreed in advance.
The enemy already knew that the Congress was going to take place. Apart from other means, the enemy understood that we were in the process of preparing for the Congress, because of the documents they captured during the clashes in the Autumn and Spring. It was also possible for the enemy to easily know by reading the Party's Constitution. However, the information from the telephone conversations took place in different cities, some of the delegates were followed and so the absence of the delegates who came from the cities, provided concrete information for the enemy of when and where it would take place. They were identified through photographs. By telephone conversation some delegates talked to the comrades in the rural area about their planned arrival. Through our investigations we learned that some delegates from abroad were involved in farewell gatherings. The enemy could have captured a few of the comrades on route to the delegation if they had wanted to, however in order to massacre all of them, the enemy consciously avoided this but watched them. The enemy was not sure which way the delegates were going to go to the meeting, therefore, the enemy mobilised its reconiseence teams in Erzincan whilst having huge operations in the Pertek and Cemisgezek areas of Dersim. When the enemy was asking people to show their ID, they also asked "anyone from abroad". At the same time they ambushed Comrade Alaaddin Atas (known as Comrade Serif)'s house in the Hozat area of Dersim. His family were threatened that he would be killed if he was caught. The enemy probably thought that guerrilla units in Hozat-Cemisgezek in Dersim would pick up the delegates—they, therefore, had operations there. Because of this, the enemy lay ready to ambush and attack, and as our guerrillas realised their presence, they changed their route to avoid clashes. It is possible that as the enemy couldn't control all the delegates in Dersim but could to a certain extent control the area of Erzincan, they had operations in the Dersim area to try to intimidate the delegates in order to make them go to Erzincan, which is fairly under their control.
The enemy also thought that the Congress would take place in Munzur in Dersim because our political bureau had mistakenly said that the First Congress of the Party had taken place in that area, however the enemy had become sure after the delegation tried to come to the Congress place through Erzincan and also because of their telephone conversations with Comrade Cem [Ali Reza Sabur] who was Erzincan's Regional Committee Secretary. It has also been possible to obtain various other information. We have been informed that some delegates, who came by coaches and had rested in some places, had used their telephones.
The delegates who had arrived in villages in Erzincan had asked for horses from couriers because some delegates were disabled. The couriers obtained two horses. They took one horse from the owner with permission but the other without permission from someone else. The owner of the stolen horse had informed the security forces that his horse had been stolen on 15 June 2005. The horse's owner was again called to the gemdarme post regarding his stolen horse on 16 June 2005. With the information obtained from the horse's owner, the enemy first contacted the Erzurum authorities and then the Tunceli authorities. The military chief for both areas said that, "If possible capture one or two senior persons from an organisation, but if you cannot, definitely do not let them run away." The enemy was saying that their operations should include second guerrilla units but they thought it was going to be too late. The night that the couriers went back to the village, along with the person's horse, however the courier killed the horse whilst he was on his way. When the courier arrived in the village the enemy arrested him. The enemy realised that the delegates had left; therefore, the enemy started their operations. On the same night the helicopters that came from Mameki centre to Ovacik were flying and dropping soldiers where they thought the 17 comrades had left traces. At that point it was clear that the enemy did not know in which direction the comrades had gone. Helicopters dropped soldiers in different places. The enemy also attacked for about a week guerrillas that could have come from the Dersim area. When the 17 comrades were walking in Maden Valley, one of the PKK units saw them. First the PKK thought that they were enemies but later realised they were partisan [MKP]. Because at that time helicopters were flying, the PKK's responsible person reminded their other units who were near to tell our 17 comrades not to move [but they continued their journey]. According to the PKK the time [of this advice] was 23:00. Because our 17 comrades were in a deep valley and the sound of waterfalls was so loud, they could not hear the sound of the helicopters. By this time the comrades had reached the spot at which they were all killed. When they reached the spot that the incident took place, there was the morning light, when they were walking in Maden area, they had been seen by people who were in the area and, therefore, the enemy got second concrete information. Until that time, the enemy dropped its forces in many places but after they obtained this second concrete information, they concentrated their forces in Haramidere. The comrades were spotted at 10 am by the enemy. It was said that the PKK's second unit was also there. Their responsible person had an appointment at 10 am, therefore, he set his watch alarm for 10 am, when the alarm went off, he looked at his watch in order to make contact. Because of that, he remembers when the helicopters hit the comrades. According to him, Supercobra helicopters started to fire on the comrades at 10:10 am.
The place the incident happened has been investigated. The underground shelter where the comrades stayed was beside a road between three hills and was a bad place. It was not a secure place to stay. Even though it was not a good place to stay, we understand that they had to stay there because some comrades were disabled and some others were not used to the rural areas, therefore, they reached that point and stayed there. If they could have walked 1-2 hours more, then they would have reached a secure area. But there was snow around there. Comrades tried to hide themselves in between the snow and the steep rocks. During the clash, some comrades went south of the incident point where there were also steep rocks there. Some used bullet casings and some clothes were found that belonged to the comrades. The comrades fought with the enemy until the end. The clash continued until the morning of the next day, by which time the enemy had killed all the comrades. The nine comrades to the south were killed during the first day and the enemy got their bodies under the cover of darkness. Pieces of clothing that belonged to the other comrades were found behind a rock that was on the side of the road. At the same place there was a bloodstain from when, at the beginning of the clash, the comrades had killed the horse to prevent it from panicking.
We were told that the enemy used chemical weapons. We also had the same thought. But it was a very bad place for our comrades and it was impossible to protect themselves from the helicopters and the gunfire from the ground. It can be expected from the Turkish Republic that they used chemical weapons but we did not find any evidence during our investigation. We, therefore, cannot claim this. However, some of our comrades were captured whilst injured and killed by the enemy. In order to get rid of any proof, the enemy burnt clothes and other stuff that belonged to the comrades but there were some things not burnt at the place the incident happened. The enemy's aim was to dispose of any proof, thereby making an unknowable situation and having psychological influence. If the 17 comrades had tried to walk, even in the early hours of the morning, in order to reach a more secure place, it could have prevented their being killed.
Our guerrilla unit that was responsible for meeting the delegates and taking them to the Congress point were weak. The unit should have postponed taking them until either they were able to ask for help from other units in Dersim or until asking the unit making the Congress preparations who were already in the Erzincan area. Although they had thought about getting help from the units in Dersim, they had not taken any steps to do so. The guerrilla units in Dersim did not know any of the details of the Congress preparations.
At the time, the enemy had very general operations all around Dersim. Over the last year, the enemy was concentrating on our guerrillas and aimed to finish them off. To try to hold the congress in that situation put the Party into a situation of taking big risks. Also, the winter was very heavy that year. Even in June it was muddy and snowing in some parts of the Munzur area of Dersim. To postpone the Congress for a while was crucial. None of the Party's leading organs had analysed the situation and taken steps. Apart from this, there were other things that could have been done and tactical mistakes were made. But all of these were secondary mistakes. The biggest mistake was to gather the Congress at an incorrect time and with a weak force.
Our Party ignored security questions and the enemy's special concentration of forces aimed at us. We also ignored the natural conditions. They did not do the necessary reconnaissance in Erzincan to determine the best place; and also they changed the Congress meeting place without even having a Central Committee decision. The benefits of the chosen place were exaggerated and were not reviewed and they did not rely on the solid and reliable supporters. If the situation had been checked before, the route taken by the delegation could have been changed. To ignore the enemy and to rush [to hold the congress] led to the Party receiving a big blow and brought the Party to a low level.
The enemy wants to liquidate our Party with big and serial operations. The first of which was started in the second week of June 2005 against units in Dersim. Once the enemy understood that our units were in Kinzir zone in Cemizgezek-Hozat in Dersim, they dropped bombs and carried out operations on all the possible routes our units could pass, but our units were able to get past them and changed the place. Just after that, the enemy launched a second operation in Cerxat zone in Pertek. The third operation was from Erzincan to Ovacik towards Muzur and from there to Mamike and Hozat. They put ambushes on all the possible routes that guerrillas could pass. Our units lost one comrade in one of the operations but did not lose any in the others. The enemy carried out its constant operations, and told collaborators and the families of collaborators who were killed that there was only one unit left and that they can finish the terrorists if they help them. And later on there was a clash in Arman zone, where a Cobra helicopter was used, which could have been a second tragedy for our units.
These operations were carried out alongside propaganda against our Party and against the guerrillas that they had surrounded. This propaganda was aimed at isolating our fighters from the masses. Because of the crucial support in this difficult time of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, brother parties, conscious advanced people, our comrades, supporters and revolutionary organisations, we were able to, successfully overcome the enemy's attacks.
The enemy's aims were not accomplished, as Party activities continued ceaselessly and new fighters joined the guerrillas.
The incident [the massacre of the 17 comrades] was not an ordinary military mistake; on the contrary, it is the result of our organisational ideological-political mistakes. Our main aim is to overcome these mistakes and prevent new loses and to change the course to the benefit of the revolution and our Party. Our Party is trying to do these tasks. Our Party will investigate the incident from all aspects, including ideological-political and organisational causes and will announce the evaluation to the people and draw the necessary lessons from it and go in the direction of the revolution and persist in the people's war. This incident has produced important lessons for Turkey-North Kurdistan and for the world revolutionary movement. That is the secret of lessons that cannot be defeated. We believe that the new generations of revolutionaries will grow with those lessons and will win.
The 17 comrades incident has had a big impact on the broad masses. The task is to turn this suffering into an organisational force. Support from revolutionary organisations, the international communist movement, oppressed people and our own supporters, who have united with our Party, are the source of increased morale. Our comrades must have joint actions with other revolutionary groups on a common base. We would like to thank once more all friends and brothers, sisters and comrades from our international class, and once again we say sorry to our martyr's families.
Since the incident some people have used reactionary propaganda, which has come from the intelligence organisation called JITEM, with the aim of furthering their own political and organisational interests. We have to remind them that this kind of orientation and understanding makes the enemy's work easier and our friends must heal the revolutionary people's unity and must mobilise for these tasks.
Our Party has definitely acknowledged that some villagers and collaborators from Erzincan were used by the enemy during the operation, with some of them even taking a special role and from helicopters shown the points where the comrades were. We hate and condemn them. Again and again, we call on them to stop helping the enemy. Our Party does not think that we will definitely kill them. Our mistakes have allowed the enemy to have an easy victory. Therefore, instead of accusing someone, our Party aims to evaluate and draw lessons so as to prevent new losses in the future. To assassinate collaborators keeps the other side of the incident in the dark and does not help. Therefore, if those who have participated in the operation, either by force or in different ways, if they come to our Party and provide information about the incidents from all aspects, they will have amnesty and will not be killed.
The masses, especially our supporters, demand retaliation from us for the 17 comrades. But we are determined to prepare ourselves for the people's war, which is going to set fire to the base of the worst system. We will win the future and march with people's war, united under the leadership of the Party, with Kaypakkaya's line under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. People's war will win.
The 17 Comrades are Immortal! Down with the Facist Turkish Republic State!
For real liberation, continue the revolution to the end and fight until victory. Long Live People's War!!
Long Live our Struggle for Independence, People's Democracy and Communism!!!
September 2005
Maoist Communist Party (MKP)
Turkey and North Kurdistan
Congress Organisational Committee
"Be resolute, fear no sacrifice and
surmount every difficulty to win victory."
—Mao Tse-tung, The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains, [SW] vol.: 3.