Concentrate Total Force to Raise Preparations for the Offensive to a New Height Through Correct Handling of Contradictions

(Supplementary Resolution to “Present Situation and Our Historic Task” adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPN (Maoist) in October 2003.)

i. Review of the World Situation
ii. Review of the Domestic Political Situation
iii. Review of the Military Situation After the Breakdown of Ceasefire
iv. Refinement in the Practice of Military Actions
v. On the Future Military Plan
vi. On the Presentation of the People’s State Power

This meeting of the Politburo has been organized with a view to introduce necessary refinement to the policy & plan for the coming days by making a general review of the political and military situation after the last plenum of the Central Committee (CC), in general, and after the breakdown of ceasefire, in particular.

1. Review of the World Situation

The analysis and conclusions of the CC (meeting) on ‘World Situation’ have been all the more relevant and correct today. After the Iraq war, the US imperialism has been, with every passing day, isolated politically and caught in the quagmire of greater crisis militarily. This is getting confirmed not only by the contradictions manifested in the recent United Nations General Assembly meeting and the world conference of the W.T.O. held in Cancun, Mexico, but also by the increasing resistance against US troops even in Iraq and Afghanistan and the bankruptcy of the so-called ‘Road Map’ for peace in the Middle East. In the background of this crisis its (i.e. the US’s) strategy to tighten its hegemony in South Asia is also facing newer problems. In this context, the objectivity of our policy to concentrate ideological, political and military attacks on the US imperialism and the royal military dictatorship surviving on its (i.e. the US’s) leftovers has been proved in a grand manner. As a result of the initiative of the (Party) Center on the basis of the above policy, not only our relations with the communist revolutionaries and anti-imperialist masses the world over have been strengthened and expanded but also the diplomatic relations with reactionary forces having different levels of contradictions with the US imperialism are getting expanded. Hence, the Party should stress on to make the
implementation of the said evaluation of the world situation and the formulated policy more extensive and effective.

2. **Review of the Domestic Political Situation**

   The Party has attained a new offensive position politically, due to the flexible tactical stand of making the masses sovereign through a Constituent Assembly and the overall initiative taken for this during the negotiation process. Party’s political supremacy has been established not only within the country but also outside along with the declaration of cessation of relevance of ceasefire & negotiations and appeal to go ahead with the resistance (struggle) after the presentation of the retrograde “Concept Paper” by the old state during the third round of negotiation and the massacre at Doramba at the same time. In this whole process the Party has been successful to exercise its strategic firmness and tactical flexibility from a new height.

   The political existence of the old state, which has become a puppet of Western imperialism, particularly the US imperialism, is now reduced into a royal military terrorism against the people. The Party’s analysis and conclusion that the old state has degenerated into military fascism dictated by imperialism after the palace massacre, has now been vindicated all the more sharply. The fact that the so-called commitment of the feudal elements towards multiparty democracy is nothing but hypocrisy is thoroughly exposed by their unwillingness to co-opt even the parliamentary political parties begging for their co-option even within the old state. By exhibiting the extremity of imperialist and feudal obstinacy, the old state is now making utterly ridiculous nominations to the so-called local bodies and is insanely advocating the organization of parliamentary elections. It is clear that a crafty conspiracy to put a veil of legitimacy to the military fascism of the old state by obliterating the existence of even the parliamentary political parties is inherent in all this. The political inaction of the major parliamentary parties is gradually turning into a cause of their own extinction. The political extinction of such elements that cannot gauze the impossibility of constitutional monarchy in the specificity of the present world situation of the 21st century and the development of civil war in the country are quite natural. The inability to grasp the fact that in Nepal there is no other alternative to either rally behind the leadership of the proletariat to complete the bourgeois democratic revolution or to completely capitulate to the military fascism based on the coalition of feudalism and imperialism has become the destiny of the parliamentary forces. The decision of the last CC that even though it may appear triangular in form but in essence and in class terms the political struggle in the country is bipolar, has been proved correct.

   In this context it is clear that it is necessary to carry forward firmly the Party policy of concentrating attacks on military fascism by making political exposure of parliamentary capitulationism presenting itself as a middle-roader and by uniting with the broad masses and classes.
3. **Review of the Military Situation After the Breakdown of Ceasefire**

The strategic plan chalked out by the last CC as part of the preparations for strategic offensive and general insurrection is still in the process of implementation. Hence it is not possible to have its comprehensive review right now. However, as the initial stage of the new initiation projected in that plan has been completed, it is both possible and necessary to make an initial summing-up and to refine & concretize the plan for the future.

It may be recollected that the main spirit of the plan devised by the CC was to carry out decentralized actions in the first phase, relatively centralized ones in the second and big centralized ones in the third. As part of the decentralized actions in the first phase the stress was on inflicting damage to and blocking the speed of the enemy through small or big ambushes in rural areas and small or big raids, commando attacks and small or big sabotages in the cities and the Madhesh (plains).

As per the said forms and goals of the actions fixed for the first phase of the new initiation, this part of the plan has been a complete success. The decentralized but a countrywide chain of varied, intensive and daring actions has shocked and disarrayed the enemy and forced it to remain in a defensive position. The most important and gainful aspects of the new initiation were the successful and daring commando attacks, raids and sabotages in the capital, Madhesh and small & big cities. As a result of these intensive actions, it was amply testified that the enemy was not secure even in the capital and other cities and the rural areas in the Terai (Plains), as in the hills, were cleared (of the old state machinery). This consequence of the new initiation is an important achievement towards the goal of preparing grounds for the insurrection.

Road mining and ambushes have been carried out as per the expectations in numerical terms. However, the expectations of some qualitative ambushes have not been as much materialized except in the Seti-Mahakali region. In terms of accidental positional skirmishes, the encounters in Handing and Korchawang in Rolpa were noteworthy.

In totality, the new initiative under the new strategic plan has been accomplished successfully. In view of the big shock-oriented attacks in a centralized form carried out in the beginning of every new plan in the past and even the enemy and the people having been accustomed to them, this new strategic plan has been a matter of surprise for everybody. Despite its own heavy loss internally the enemy has made false propaganda of self-indulgence on this new process in the form of ‘weakening’ of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and the ‘success’ of its own (royal) army. On the other side, as a result of the deliberate propaganda of the enemy and the ignorance about the essence of our plan, a section of the masses, particularly urban middle class intellectuals, are seen to be in some confusion and apprehensions. Even some revolutionary cadres seem to be disappointed in the absence of big shock-oriented actions.

In spite of some such illusions and confusions, what we should be clear about is that, in view of the entire national & international context after the breakdown of the ceasefire, our own political initiative, a definite kind of preparation by the enemy and our strategy
of preparations for a nationwide counter-offensive, our policy of decentralized actions in the first phase was quite correct and objective. We should be clear that there was the danger of a negative consequence both politically and militarily if we had proceeded in the old fashion in the given context. The contrary propaganda of the enemy that it is “winning” and in the “offensive” while it is in the process of defeat and in the defensive, will ultimately benefit the People’s War.

However, in the new context the existing forms of actions should be continued and stress should be placed on organizing centralized big actions, so that it may exercise a qualitative role in the preparations for counter-offensive and insurrection.

4. **Refinement in the Practice of Military Actions**

Not only in the hills but also in the plain areas of the Madhesh the old state power in the entire rural areas of the country has been basically destroyed. All such areas have come under the leadership and influence of the Party. This reality has been acknowledged not only by us but also by our enemies inside & outside the country.

In such a situation resulting from the development of the great People’s War the general masses would naturally expect from us all the more seriousness and sense of responsibility. On the contrary, the practices of certain forms of our military actions in certain contexts have now been inconsistent with the level of development of the movement, (our) responsibility and expectations of the masses. If we are not able to refine the practices of forms of military actions in time, it will ultimately give rise to negative consequences. Hence, it is necessary to clarify our concept & practice in the context of immediate military actions as follows:

A. **On Destruction & Construction**

The principal goal of a revolution is to destroy the old state power and to construct a new one. Until the old state power is completely destroyed or until the revolution is successful, strategically the destruction is the principal (aspect). However, tactically and practically in areas and levels where the old state power is destroyed, the construction (aspect) gains priority in those areas & levels. Generally the process of construction starts with the destruction and there is a dialectical relationship between the two. Nevertheless, in the context of our practices of some forms of military actions, this dialectical relationship between destruction & construction has not been properly expressed. For example, continuation of activities like setting fire to the earlier Village Development Committee (VDC) buildings in rural areas already in our control and influence, blasting the buildings vacated by the enemy police forces with no chance of their return, sabotaging the economic establishments of traders, small industrialists and others willing to follow our policies & rules, etc, smack of assuming, destruction in an absolute sense. This raises the danger of increasing people’s grievances against us and the enemy’s capitalization on it.
Hence it is necessary that we take the responsibility of development and construction activities and security of physical infrastructures and natural resources in the rural areas where the old state power has been destroyed and mobilize the masses for it. We should stress to carry forward the developmental and construction activities in a new style by making use of the buildings, land, forest and other economic establishments utilized by the old state & its functionaries in the past, for the new state power, and by standing against their possible sabotage by the enemy. It is essential to prove this through both our words and deeds in the rural areas in the coming days.

B. On Annihilation of Class Enemies and Spies

As per the physical liquidation of class enemies and spies, our Party’s policy has been: to practice it on the selected ones and to the minimum, by informing the masses and obtaining their consent as far as possible and by not resorting to any ghastly methods. The current need of the development of the movement, particularly in the rural areas, has necessitated introducing refinement even in this method. Of course, we should not be unduly carried away by the vicious propaganda of the enemy and the opportunists about the physical annihilation of the enemy. However, while annihilating somebody if we fail to develop and observe concrete policy on class analysis, nature of his/her crime, democratic legal process to establish the crime and the method of annihilation, it may have negative consequences. It can’t just be dismissed as a baseless charge of the enemy & the opportunists that in the past some of the annihilations have taken place flimsily on the grounds of not giving enough donations, not providing shelter & food, having politically opposed our movement, suspicion of being a spy, or having enmity with our local team members. Hence, if one has to resort to annihilation in the rural areas henceforth, it is essential to ensure that it is not done directly by a particular team or its definite members but a certain minimum legal method is adhered to. It should be strictly expressed in both our policy and practice that red terror does not mean anarchy.

C. On Action Against Enemy Soldiers and Police Forces

It is axiomatic and there is no question of any debate that the central and highest function of any revolution is to destroy the armed forces acting as the main organ of the old state through the People’s War. However, while practicing common and known forms of military actions we do and should apply different methods in different situations. For example, during encounters in actions of ambush, mining, raid, commando attack etc, it is, and should be, stressed on defeating the enemy by inflicting maximum damage. Nevertheless, our known policy towards the surrendered enemy soldiers and policemen is to deal honorably with the prisoners of war, to convince them and provide them opportunity either to join us in the fight or to return home. It is against the principle and practice of the People’s War to liquidate someone when encountered alone, or at home on
leave, or anywhere on the spot just because he happens to earn a living in the enemy’s army or the police force, and ultimately its consequence is to unify rather than disintegrate the enemy. Hence, primarily in the rural areas, when someone serving in the enemy’s army or police forces returns home on leave he should not be terrorized or annihilated but indoctrinated and persuaded to abandon the (enemy) service. The manifestation of a correct policy, as we have been hammering since the beginning, is to enlighten the family members of those serving in the enemy’s army and police force, to organize them and protect them. From now onwards we should strive to assure and make them realize that their family members would be safe when at home either after or without leaving the (enemy) service.

In the case of those who have committed numerous and heinous crimes in the past, or higher officers in the enemy army or police force, they should be captured and dealt with as mentioned in Section ‘B’ earlier.

D. On Dealing with Opposition Political Leaders and Cadres

Generally our policy towards the various reactionary and opportunist political parties has been to give precedence to their political exposure. We have been asserting that any physical action against somebody should be not because of his/her membership of a particular political party but due to his/her crime against the people and the People’s War. Moreover, as the parties in power or in the opposition have different immediate tactical behavior, we have been accordingly dealing with them differently and should continue to do so. We should strive to have amicable relations with those political parties that are objectively closer to us politically even if it is only in the immediate and tactical sense.

In the past some of our actions have gone against the correct and total evaluation of the contradictions and the said policy of the Party. In the new situation we should on the one hand, strive to strictly implement the above policy and, on the other, strive to follow the earlier mentioned democratic legal process in the context of such persons deserving any kind of punishment or physical action. In case of somebody’s arrest the reasons for the same should be made public without delay.

E. On Collection of Donations

The enemy has been making a big issue of our method of collecting donations to spread illusion amongst the middle classes. To deprive the enemy of this weapon and to prevent the middle classes from getting mislead and terrorized, it has been necessary to make our donations policy more systematic and refined. In the past, while collecting donations there have been some lapses in making adequate class analysis of the related persons, organizations, etc, in studying their background and in dealing with them accordingly. As a result a lot of anarchy has been seen in the field of financial collections. Hence in the future this anarchy
should be ended and to make the financial collection process more systematic a concrete criteria for collecting donations from the people on a class basis should be fixed and, on the other side, a system of punishing and taxing the enemy should be developed.

It is essential that the (Party) Regional Bureaus should control the activities of collection of donations and taxes.

F. On Various National & International Non-Governmental Organizations

Even though in the past we made marginal differentiation in the context of ending the hegemony of the old state in rural areas, generally we had an offensive policy against all types of NGOs & INGOs. However, in the changed current situation it is necessary to refine this policy.

It is essential to deal positively with such NGOs, which are not straightway linked politically with the old state and are desirous of working in tandem with our policies and plans in the rural areas. Similarly, except for those INGOs directly financed by the US imperialism that has been most hostile towards the People’s War at the international level, we should not carry out any physical action or exercise coercion against the INGOs related with neutral countries or those not hostile against the People’s War like the European Union and others and should strive to solve the problem through dialogue, interaction and coordination.

It has been particularly essential to demonstrate maturity in this policy in the light of the global watch on our minor activities and the totality of the contradictions.

5. On the Future Military Plan

It has been already mentioned that the military plan prepared by the last meeting of the CC was correct and it is still in the process of implementation. As the use of ‘relative centralization’ terminology has objectively created some misgivings and pressure on the PLA, while refining this plan the policy of relatively centralized actions needs to be excluded for the time being. We should be clear that objectively relative centralization would be automatically present within the decentralized actions. Hence, in the coming plan decentralized actions should be resolutely carried forward without any pressure and preparations should be made for centralized and definite big actions.

6. On the Presentation of the People’s State Power

In the light of the current situation of the total rural areas of the country having passed on to the influence and control of the People’s War and a noteworthy rise in the
international publicity and influence, the following steps should be taken to raise the political intervention against the old state to a new height:

a. To appeal to the United Nations and other international forums for the representation of the people’s power while opposing the so-called representation of the military fascist old state.

b. To request through formal communication with all the countries of the world affiliated to the United Nations for support and cooperation to the new state power against the old state.

c. It is necessary to systematize the policy, plan and program of the new state power so as to assume responsibility for the entire rural areas in the country. For this, a concrete program of the people’s power in all the economic, political, social and cultural spheres should be implemented and the preparations for the final insurrection be hastened.