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Principles of the Theory of the Historical Process in Philosophy



PROGRESS PUBLISHERS

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ОСНОВЫ ТЕОРИИ ИСТОРИКО-ФИЛОСОФСКОГО ПРОЦЕССА

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Preface

Historical philosophical studies have always had a significant place in the development of philosophy in the USSR. Lenin's work *On the Significance of Militant Materialism*, which was a testament of this brilliant continuer of the work of Marx and Engels, oriented Marxist philosophers on critical assimilation of the classical philosophic heritage so as to take dialectical and historical materialism creatively further. His *Philosophical Notebooks* are a remarkable example of a scientific, philosophical reworking of pre-Marxist philosophy, above all of Hegel's dialectical idealism, which he evaluated as a theory closer in essence to the philosophy of Marxism than the preceding metaphysical materialism.

Monographs had already been published in the 1920s by Soviet historians of philosophy on the main historical forms of pre-Marxist materialism and the history of dialectics. The number of publications grew constantly in subsequent years. The discussion on G. F. Alexandrov's *History of West European Philosophy*, held in 1947, brought the methodological problems of philosophical historiography to the fore, which naturally became a matter of special consideration in the six-volume *History of Philosophy*, 1957-65, and in a number of group works and individual monographs published in recent years. Development of the history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and of Russian and Soviet philosophical thought, and a critical analysis of contemporary Western philosophy, all made a comprehensive substantiation, concretisation, and further development of the methodological principles of historical studies in philosophy particularly necessary.

In 1967 the first international symposium on methodological problems of the history of philosophy was held in Moscow, on the initiative of Soviet philosophers. Other symposiums on these matters have been held since in several other socialist countries, in which Soviet philosophers have regularly taken part.

The methodological studies in this field have not, of course, exhausted the analysis of the principles of Marxist study of various philosophic theories. The work of recent years has been mainly devoted to a detailed clarification of the specific features of philosophic knowledge, and of the specific patterns of the evolution of philosophy. This new stage in methodological studies can be described as development of the theory of the historical process in philosophy.¹ The need for them is particularly obvious in the light of the task of a theoretical generalisation of the history of philosophy posed by Lenin as one of the conditions for comprehensive development of the theory of knowledge of Marxism.

Preface to this book has been written by Academician T. I. Oizerman and Professor A. S. Bogomolov; Introduction, chapters I, II, V and Conclusion by T. I. Oizerman; chapters III and IV by A. S. Bogomolov.

¹ We would cite the following in particular (all in Russian): V. U. Babushkin. *On the Nature of Philosophic Knowledge* (Moscow, 1978); B. V. Bogdanov. *Lenin's Principles for Analysing the History of Philosophy* (Moscow, 1970); G. A. Brutian. *Essays in the Analysis of Philosophic Knowledge* (Erevan, 1979); M. T. Iovchuk. *Leninism, Philosophic Traditions, and Today* (Moscow, 1970); V. A. Malinin. *The Theory of the History of Philosophy* (Moscow, 1976). A. V. Potemkin. *On the Specific Character of Philosophic Knowledge* (Rostov-on-Don, 1970). The authors of the present work have also published several studies in this range.

Introduction

Historicism, dialectical materialist historicism, it goes without saying, differs in principle not only from that of the idealists who were forerunners of Marx and Engels, but also from modern irrationalist, and relativist-pluralist conceptions of 'historicity'. It is a scientifically substantiated historicism; not just the theoretically summed-up experience of world history but also historicism confirmed by the subsequent development of mankind.

Scientific socialism became possible through a scientific demonstration of the historically transient character of the capitalist formation. In contrast to the utopian socialists, who condemned capitalism as an unjust social system incompatible with human nature, Marx and Engels scientifically substantiated the objective, historical necessity of the transition from capitalism to socialism. They demonstrated the insolvency of the main ideological dogma of classical capitalist political economy, according to which capitalist relations were natural and rational, and in essence the sole possible ones, at least in civilised society. The founders of political economy had therefore made the economic relations of capitalist society the subject matter of their science. To that illusory, dogmatic notion Engels opposed the following thesis:

Political economy is therefore essentially a *historical* science. It deals with material which is historical, that is, constantly changing; it must first investigate the special laws of each individual stage in the evolution of production and exchange, and only when it has completed this investigation will it be able to establish the few quite general laws which hold good for production and exchange in general.¹

Historical materialism is the consistent philosophical development of the dialectically understood principle of historicism. Its

opponents often claim that this principle is applicable only to history in the narrow sense of the term, i.e. to the history of society. They counterpose the natural to the historical, thus interpreting historicism as a partial principle whose applicability is very limited even in sociology. But the basic fact that development is universal and absolute is thereby ignored.

Development does not, of course, exhaust the whole variety and diversity of social and natural processes. Historicism does not exclude other principles of investigation; it only excludes a metaphysical mode of thinking incompatible with the theory of development, whose universal significance is constantly being confirmed by the development of science as well as by historical experience.

The philosophical and methodological significance of the principle of historicism is particularly obvious when we study the history and historical past of mankind. The historian is not a witness of the events he describes; he describes them as phenomena of another time which he must treat differently than events of the present day. But in order to comprehend the present we turn to the past, because there can be no scientific understanding of today through isolated consideration of a given historical existence. Understanding of the present presupposes comprehension of the preceding stages of social development. Understanding is by no means a direct process, whatever the beliefs of the adherents of intuitionism. The subject of knowledge is such just because he disposes of certain knowledge, convictions, and experience of research, etc. But the subject matter of knowledge is a mediated object, if only because it exists in a variety of relations with other things, is the result of previous development, and becomes the object of study only in relation to a certain level of development of knowledge. The universal significance of the principle of historicism also gets its necessary expression in the fact that knowing thought itself, and research activity, are considered historically, i.e. as developing and changing both their content and their form.

In every epoch, and therefore also in ours, theoretical thought is a historical product, which at different times assumes very different forms and, therewith, very different contents. The science of thought is therefore, like every other, a historical science, the science of the historical development of human thought.¹

It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that this thesis of Engels's is not only directly related to logic (and of course to dialectical logic as well), but also has a bearing on the history of science (and, it goes without saying, the history of philosophy), since it is a matter in both cases of history, of the development of cognising thought.

Science is discovering new, previously unknown phenomena, disclosing the relations between them, and finding the patterns that determine these relations and enable us to foresee the course of events. The empirical statement, and sometimes simplified interpretation, of that fact often lead to an underestimation of the history of science as a discipline; it is allegedly concerned only with study of what has already been investigated and is known, i.e. with what can no longer interest the researcher. The history of physics (or of any other science) differs in its methods from physics; that circumstance is employed as the 'basis' for considering that the history of science is a secondary matter. It is one thing to discover the laws of nature, and another to describe how it was done. That consideration, quite correct in itself, is based however on a false idea that the history of science simply describes what science has already done, surpassed, and sometimes refuted.

There are various levels of investigation and exposition of the history of science of course. Some of them, possibly, present no interest to the scientist engaged in research, i.e. in tackling still unresolved problems. But that does not justify a scorning of the history of science, or of research that is of essential significance for posing and solving its latest, urgent problems, even when these are not directly linked with the preceding development of science. And it is not just that scholars who have studied the various points of view, conceptions, and theories about the matters that interest them, and have analysed them critically, are insured to some extent against the mistakes their predecessors made, against the one-sided approach that is quite often a consequence of ignorance or lack of information about other points of view, and against dogmatism, the cliches of which are eroded by critical, historical inquiry. The new facts, discoveries, and advances of science throw new light on old problems that seem already solved, thanks to which a kind of negation of the negation occurs, i.e. a return to an earlier posing of the question

or solution at a new level. But that is not the main point. The greatest value of study of the history of science is above all the historical education of the scientist himself, his critical assimilation of the acquisitions of science, and his analysis of the many conceptions, points of view, and approaches to the solution of problems, and of the struggle between various theories and hypotheses. By broadening the scientist's outlook, and enriching him with the experience of the preceding development of scientific thought, study of the history is a school of scientific thinking, of whose need in the realm of theoretical research there is no doubt.

Many historians of science, seemingly as a consequence of an inherent modesty and consciousness of the greatness of the scientific discoveries about which they write, limit themselves mainly to stressing the propaedeutic value of their discipline³. That point of view is inadequate, in our conviction, because it is oriented in fact on the student and not on researchers, who sometimes undervalue the history of science. From our point of view it is much more important to stress another circumstance, namely that the history of science is of interest for its contradictions, the dialectic of the interpenetration of truth and error, the struggle of opposing views, and for its quests, irrespective of whether they were successful or not. The French historian of science, Alexandre Koyré, justifiably remarked:

One must, finally, study the mistakes and failures as carefully as the successes. The mistakes of a Descartes or a Galileo, the failures of a Boyle or a Hooke are not just instructive: they are revelations of the difficulties that had to be overcome and the obstacles that had to be surmounted.⁴

The real significance of the history of science as a special study whose results, like those of any research, cannot be determined in advance, does not consist at all in study of the already known that will be found in school textbooks or, on the contrary, has been dropped from them. It consists, rather, in knowledge of what is still unknown, and that is not seen precisely by those who suppose that the results of historical study of science are known in advance, because it is the discoveries that are described in textbooks. What is not cognised, however, is not the discoveries set out in textbooks but the historical process itself of

the investigative quest, comprehension and generalisation of which constitute the subject matter of the epistemology of dialectical materialism as the theory of the development of knowledge.

In order fully to grasp the significance of the history of science for the progress of scientific knowledge and mankind's mental development in general, it is necessary, of course, to reject the metaphysical concept of development (in the spirit of which most studies in this field have been written). It is necessary, in particular, to reject the notion of an absolute opposition between truth and error, having in mind, of course, errors of substance (which must be distinguished from simply absurd statements, logical mistakes, and groundless denials of truths). It is no less important, as well, to reject such a concrete form of metaphysical thought as the neopositivist epistemology that seems to be scientific in spite of the fact that its notion of science clearly ignores the actual process of development of scientific knowledge. The sciences, wrote Hans Reichenbach (and this quotation is worth taking as an epitaph for all neopositivism), are a 'realm of well-established truth'.⁵ It is striking that this idea was expressed by a thinker who was by no means a dilettante in science.

The real processes, whose totality forms science as developing knowledge, completely discredit this sterile, standard conception of scientific knowledge that the neopositivists have developed, clearly oblivious that realisation of their utopia would mean the ending of science, in which (as in all spheres of activity) only those make no mistakes who do nothing. What the science is in fact, and what its history represents, was well shown from the example of mathematics by the French mathematicians (and historians of mathematics), writing under the collective pseudonym of Nicolas Bourbaki. Mathematics is

a great city whose suburbs do not cease to grow, in a rather chaotic fashion, on the land around, while the centre is rebuilt periodically, each time following a clearer plan and a more majestic order, demolishing old quarters and their maze of streets in order to drive ever straighter, wider, and more convenient avenues towards the periphery.⁶

The idea of a constant perfect reconstruction in science has nothing in common with the positivist, purely cumulative conception of the growth and multiplication of scientific knowledge.

The dialectical materialist conception of the development of scientific knowledge brings out the unsoundness of the metaphysical interpretation of this historical process. Development is contradiction, a struggle of opposites, and negation, concrete (of course) and positive. All these characteristics of the dialectical conception of development are inherent in the history of science. And since quickening of the rates of scientific progress, crises, and revolutions in science are increasingly bringing out the dialectic of its development the history of science is beginning more and more to attract eminent scientists. It is still impossible, unfortunately, to say that of the narrow specialists who, because of the increasing differentiation of scientific knowledge, constitute the majority in the scientific community.

In 1910 Max Planck wrote, noting the existence of a crisis in physics:

No physical theorem is at present beyond doubt, all and every physical truth is considered disputable. It often seems almost as if theoretical physics is about to be plunged again into chaos.¹

He did not, however, draw subjective, agnostic conclusions from that statement. Philosophers of an idealist trend, continuers of the same 'physical idealism' whose philosophical insolvency was demonstrated by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, followed another road. Unable to grasp the objective dialectic of developing scientific knowledge, they interpreted its contradictions, spontaneously being revealed, in a spirit of denying the very possibility of the propositions of science having a character of objective truth.

The 'postpositive' conception of the history of science, 'critical rationalism', is especially indicative in this respect. Take the views of Kurt Huebner, a West German adherent of this trend, for example. In his article on the historicity of empirical science, he first of all criticised the 'dogma' of the knowability of the world in principle, claiming that its boundless optimism was based on myths that

the sciences (and only they) have the right approach to truth, and that they have either already partly recognised it or are always coming closer to it.²

According to him the truth or falsity of a theory is unprovable in principle. Even a theory's approximation to an adequate rep-

roduction of reality cannot be demonstrated, because we do not dispose of the original needed for the comparison. The basis of scientific knowledge is formed not by facts but by a certain historical situation which gives a corresponding vision of reality, as a consequence of which some facts are accepted or some not by science.

The dependence of facts on theory [he writes] leads, furthermore, to their changing when the theory of them changes. They are also by no means the same facts with which the sciences are concerned in ever improved form.⁹

Huebner clearly distorts the well-known fact that scientific research never embraces an unlimited number of facts. The scientist has to concentrate on certain ones and consequently to abstract others. Huebner subjectively interprets theoretical workers' remarkable capacity to 'establish', i.e. to discover, previously unknown facts that, owing to theory, become indirectly accessible to observation, if not directly. Theory often refutes illusions that have been taken in at the level of everyday experience as self-evident facts. That circumstance, too, is interpreted idealistically by the 'critical rationalists'.

This is not the place to go into a more detailed examination of the dialectical link between a scientific theory and the arsenal of facts at its disposal. It is important to stress something else. From Huebner's standpoint it is not so much science as the history of science that refutes scientists' claims to objective truth. The history of science, according to him, witnesses that all theories recognised as true and substantiated are sooner or later refuted. Hence, he concludes, the role that science plays at present is comparable with that which theology played in the Middle Ages; and this role is governed not by the advances of science, but by historical circumstances; the development of science is not inevitable, since there is no formal basis of rationality, so that belief in scientific progress is historical narrow-mindedness, a kind of fanaticism that is no better than any other kind.¹⁰

Thus, in the guise of a critical attitude to science, which is necessary and justified only as competent self-criticism of it, a historically outdated counterposing of philosophy to scientific research is revived that assumes the illusory form of an epistemological investigation of the history of science.

Investigation of the history of science, we thus see, is also needed in order to defend science against the latest kind of agnosticism, dolled up in a learned dress, which attacks the science's leading role in modern society and the world outlook based on scientific data.

The traditional scorn of the history of science mentioned above, we must note, incidentally, finds 'justification' at present in idealist philosophy, which disparages science by discrediting its history. A conviction that was characteristic of mathematicians and naturalists, has been transformed into the anti-science thesis of modern idealism. An example of this attitude is the following statement of the American Neothomist Mortimer Adler: 'A much larger portion of the scientific past has only an antiquarian interest for scientists today.'¹¹ That is far from a chance remark. The modern philosophical theological outlook on the world discredits the philosophical value of scientific knowledge by depicting the history of science as a kind of museum of antiquities. According to Adler, only the historical past of philosophy is undying, and does not become obsolete; only it includes something permanent within itself. It must not be thought that Adler's position is simply due to the fact that Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century thinker, was the founder for him of the 'eternal philosophy'. A counterposing of the philosophic to non-philosophic research, in particularly scientific studies, is typical of most idealists, who regard the natural sciences, and rightly so, as the unshakable foundation of materialist philosophy. Hence the attempt, as well, to discredit the history of science. The French historian of philosophy, Henri Gouhier, proclaims it an axiom of the history of philosophy, quite in the spirit of Adler, though independently of him, that

what would seem indisputable, in fact, is that the science of today discredits the science of yesterday, while a philosophy of today does not discredit the philosophies of yesterday.¹²

It is obvious from this statement, that idealist devaluation of the history of science, and its counterposing to the history of philosophy, mean denial of the possibility of a scientific, philosophical outlook.

In the final analysis depreciation of the history of science is depreciation of science itself; its achievements are treated as hav-

ing no necessary correspondence with objective truth. No one denies the advances of the sciences in our day, but idealism denies the existence of objective truth in the propositions of science. 'Critical rationalism', too, tries to substantiate that same thesis; its founder, Karl Popper, claims that science evolves through permanent 'falsification' of scientific theories. His falsificationism is a logical supplement of the modern theories of the history of philosophy that (in contrast to 'critical rationalism' counterposing the history of science to science *qua* science, i.e. at every stage of development reached by the latter) counterpose the history of philosophy to that of science. The history of philosophy is treated as the sole sphere of the intellectual history of mankind, each of whose achievements preserves a permanent value. The Bergsonian Gilbert Maire says:

On the contrary one philosophical system never replaces another. All continue to exist after the death of their authors and will seemingly continue to exist so long as human thought lasts. The arguments they borrow from the science of their day lose their value, without the ideas they nourish undergoing the same depreciation. The physics of Aristotle and of Descartes is dead, but Aristotelianism and Cartesianism continue to flourish. Philosophy uses science as kind of springboard or aircraft that enables it to reach a summit where the most contradictory doctrines, and those whose experimental bases have been wrecked by the renewal of discoveries, none the less retain an eternal interest."

After what we said above, the arguments of this French idealist do not need special consideration. We have cited them simply as an illustration of what the idealist denigration of science inevitably leads to, namely to denial of its true content at any stage of the scientific process. In our day, when the pace of scientific development has essentially quickened, this form of revising the history of science needs to be made the subject of a systematic critique, not only a philosophical critique, but also a specially scientific one based on concrete research in the history of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and other fundamental sciences. But how is such a special scientific critique of idealist discrediting of the history of science possible, if spokesmen of the fundamental sciences do not attach substantial importance to their historical study?

The question is by no means rhetorical. For when the today of science becomes its yesterday, then only the history of science will maintain the time connection and make the historical perspective clearer through retrospective study. And if the present is historically prepared by the past, and the future by the present, does that not indicate the immense role, not only of the historical process, but also of its study? The future is not to be found outside the present. It is rooted in the present. But the present, as will be readily understood, does not exist irrespective of the past. Those who suppose that the past is what no longer exists are deeply mistaken. And how inconsistent are those scientists who, while fully recognising the significance of the principle of historicism, in fact (i.e. against their convictions) undervalue the history of science. Meanwhile the history of science realises ideally, i.e. in mankind's social consciousness, what the historical process of scientific development does *de facto*. It seems to us that one of the principles of knowledge (since the psychology of understanding and social psychology exist not only as scientific disciplines but also as the definite social processes studied by them), is memory, which must not be regarded simply as a phenomenon of the individual human life. Memory is like an iceberg, three-quarters of which is under water. What we remember, what actually exists in consciousness, is only a small part of what there is in our memory, what rises to the surface of consciousness by chance or necessarily, involuntarily, or as a consequence of cognitive efforts, in particular, unrealised by us, in the course of the work of an investigative quest, and the tackling of theoretical or practical tasks.

Memory, apparently, does not lose what is fixed in it, though it may be that some facts of consciousness and knowledge are hidden away in it so deeply that we do not succeed in finding them later, and it seems that they have, so to speak, been effaced from memory. It is possible that this also happens because we search clumsily, do not know the secrets of memory, or do not have the capacity. One thing alone is clear, that history *qua* science (and the history of science in particular and especially) is the social memory of mankind, whose significance cannot be overestimated.

History often provides the answers to questions that arise in the present, so different from the past. The common belief that no one has even learned anything from history means in fact

only that history does not provide ready-made solutions and prescriptions. And those who seek recipes and answers from history that rule out any alternative cannot in fact get anything from it. That applies equally to the history of science.

Our study is devoted to theoretical problems of the history of philosophy, and the reader may be puzzled why we have spent so much space on substantiating the value of the history of science, i.e. a field of knowledge whose consideration is not, at least directly, the subject of our book. But the fact is that undervaluation of the history of philosophy, though not among philosophers, is usually motivated by references to the history of science having no essential value compared with what science is occupied with at the present time. But those who consider the history of science a second-rate affair, undervalue the history of philosophy even more. Even in philosophy faculties study of the history of philosophy is sometimes considered neglect of the urgent problems of philosophical science.

It goes without saying that it is not our aim to prove that study of the history of philosophy is as important as study of the history of physics, biology, and other fundamental sciences. Study of the history of philosophy is undoubtedly of even greater value because, as Engels said directly, 'there is as yet no other means than the study of previous philosophy' for the development of theoretical thought.¹⁴ Lenin apparently started from that thesis when, planning a fundamental programme of philosophical studies, he made his first task a theoretical summary of the history of philosophy. He pointed out, furthermore, the need to investigate the history of all the fundamental sciences, the mental development of children and animals, and the history of language, and to make inquiries in the fields of psychology and the physiology of the sense organs.¹⁵ Returning to this point in another place in the *Philosophical Notebooks*, he stressed:

The history of thought from the standpoint of the development and application of the general concepts and categories of the Logic—voilà ce qu'il faut! (That's what is needed!).¹⁶

The point of that is brought out in other statements of Lenin's, in particular about the relation of the logical and the historical. In *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* he remarked that change, and the history of the concept of causality, i.e. investigation of

how that category took shape, altered, developed, differentiated, and became enriched with new content, was an essential contribution to the theory of knowledge. And that, of course, applies to all philosophic categories, and not just to causality.

The theory of knowledge is thus the history of knowledge, theoretically summed up as a system of categories that are developing concepts that in turn sum up the development of theoretical thought. This principle can and must be traced in the history of each fundamental science (which operates with its own specific categories as well as with philosophic ones).

Insofar Hegel's dialectic is a generalisation of the history of thought. To trace this more concretely and in greater detail in the *history of the separate sciences* seems an extraordinarily rewarding task.¹⁷

In that connection Lenin turned to Marx's *Capital*, interpreting the logical, epistemological sense of his great work as 'the history of capitalism and the analysis of the *concepts* summing it up'.¹⁸ That definition brings out the essence of Marxist theoretical study of the historical process in general. From that angle the history of philosophy as a science presumes not only historical, but also theoretical examination of the historical philosophic process, which is only possible by analysing its summarising concepts.

Unity of the logical and the historical is the principle of historical research in philosophy. The logical connection of ideas must be understood as an expression of the historical development of philosophy, knowledge of which is not attained by description of the facts but presupposes theoretical analysis and comprehension of them.

N. G. Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), an outstanding Russian revolutionary democrat, insisted with profound correctness that there was no history without theory, and no theory (at any rate social theory) without history. At first glance it may seem that the empirical description of history is quite free of theoretical premisses of any kind determining the choice of facts one way or another, or the mode of describing, comparing and evaluating them. When a historian is not specially engaged in theoretical studies, he usually considers his work a chronicle of events, a chronicle of history, a story based on documents and surviving evidence. But that evaluation only means that he has no system-

atically developed theory of the historical process (which by no means excludes any unconscious theoretical premisses of his research). There are, of course, first of all, his philosophical convictions. Take the circumstance that the pre-Marxist historians, ignored, or clearly undervalued, the history of material production, economic relations, the class struggle and the liberation movement of the working people. Those fundamental facts did not come into the field of view of historians because they interpreted history idealistically. Only a materialist understanding of social affairs allows the investigator of the historical process to 'see' these facts and comprehend their significance.

We must once again stress that, while some facts are preconditions of theoretical investigation, others on the contrary are brought out and established only as its result. Empirical research, too, consequently, does not manage without theoretical premisses, assumptions, and beliefs. And the establishing of facts of one kind or another in this field (or, on the contrary, their denial) has a certain relation to the researchers' theoretical position. One of the main fallacies of empiricism is its lack of understanding of the dependence of empirical description on its open or hidden non-empirical assumptions.

This is the place to recall Engels' words that the materialist conception of history

is above all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after the Hegelian manner. All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be examined in detail before the attempt is made to deduce from them the political, civil-law, aesthetic, philosophic, religious, etc., views corresponding to them"

All history needs to be studied afresh! That is the categorical imperative of historical materialism, by which the most important dimensions, motive forces, and principles of the world historical process have been discovered. This methodological imperative applies, above all, as well, to the process of the history of philosophy, in which the dependence between the description of the facts and the writers' theoretical positions is specially essential because the facts concerned are ideas, conceptions, and doctrines. The basic task of our book is to investigate the specific characteristics of this process. It is therefore quite sufficient in

our introduction to limit ourselves to pointing out the fact that a host of philosophies whose principles are incompatible with one another exist simultaneously, and that moreover is by no means a situation, as a rule, in which it can be said that one philosophy is true and all the rest simply fallacious.

While any investigation of the historical process does not simply appeal to the facts but is guided in relation to them by certain theoretical ideas and beliefs, investigation of the history of philosophy is simply inconceivable without some conceptual understanding of the essence of philosophy, and a definite philosophic point of view. The historian of philosophy does not stand outside philosophy; the object of his attention is both the philosophies being examined and the subject matter of their investigation itself, which may also be regarded independently of the doctrines. Claims to freedom from a preference of any kind, to a capacity to rise above the diversity of philosophic positions, and to hold the court of reason dispassionately, are nothing more than an illusory appearance of the researcher's non-partisan position (because of certain historical circumstances or a simplified understanding of partisanship, he believes his own position to be extrapartisan, above party, non-partisan, etc.). But philosophical inquiry is above all a conscious choice of philosophic position, and that of course is a partisan point of view in the broad sense of the term. This partisan position also has epistemological roots, as well as social and class ones.

A belief is often expressed in non-Marxist literature that a history of philosophy as a science is essentially impossible since the historians of philosophy understand and evaluate doctrines differently, being guided by their own philosophic views. Hegel, of course, wrote his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* from definite, idealist positions that naturally could not help being reflected in his evaluation of various doctrines, especially materialist ones. Nevertheless his study played an epochal role in establishing the history of philosophy as a science. It would therefore be an oversimplification to suppose that meaty philosophical investigations are impossible from an idealist, i.e. obviously false, standpoint.

The partisan position of the historian of philosophy, which Western ideologists interpret as a departure from objective truth, is, in fact, a definite line of investigation, an ideological, political,

philosophical attitude. Consistent pursuit of that line, its defence and substantiation in opposition to other trends, and its demarcation in principle from them (which does not rule out a scientific appreciation and critical assimilation of their achievements), is the principle of partisanship in its Marxist understanding. Eclecticism, of course, is always prepared to interpret principled, ideological consistency as one-sidedness, subjectivity, dogmatism, and so on. But the great philosophers proved, by their own theories and teachings, that this consistency is the true path leading to real discoveries (Lenin spoke in that sense of the brilliantly consistent idealists). Characterising Marx's partisan position in philosophy, Lenin wrote:

In reality, this refusal to recognise the hybrid projects for reconciling materialism and idealism constitutes the great merit of Marx, who moved forward along a sharply-defined philosophical road.²⁰

The vulgar understanding of partisanship to be found in Western literature reduces this social phenomenon to the researcher's preconceived notions while partisanship in fact means refusal to introduce personal preferences, tastes, and sympathies into scientific investigation, i.e. a capacity to take a certain social stand (class, party, philosophical trend, etc.). Hegel caught this aspect of partisanship to some extent when he wrote that the philosophic method required 'an effort to keep back the incessant impertinence of our own fancies and private opinions'.²¹

The concept of *interest* specifically characterises man and his difference from animals. The concept of social interest forms the content of a party position, in particular a historically progressive one expressing the needs of society's development. Partisanship, support of principles, consequently, means a capacity to rise above personal, subjective interests, and also above the interests of a narrow group, for the sake of the interests of a certain class, social movement, or ideological (in particular, philosophical) trend. This rising above must not be understood as self-abdication but as a unity of the personal and social. In that sense partisanship not only does not contradict the objectivity of research but on the contrary ensures it ideologically. Lenin unmasked the 'objectivism' of those opponents of Marxism who ignored the real social forces, some of which realised an objective historical need, while others counteracted it. He counterposed that pseudo-ob-

jectivity to the genuine objectivity of Marxist partisanship. It was in that connection that he formulated the principles of partisanship and party loyalty as a *conditio sine qua non* of scientific social research.

We must mention that Chernyshevsky had already, in essence, counterposed partisanship to subjectivism, when he wrote:

the first duty of a thinker is not to retreat from any results; he must be prepared to sacrifice his most cherished opinions to truth.²²

He correctly stressed the content of the party interest (foreign to subjectivism) of those thinkers who defended truth while fighting error and delusions. He pointed to Hegel as a philosopher who rejected the position of thinkers who

began to philosophise in order 'to justify their cherished convictions' i.e. they sought not truth, but support for their prejudices... Hegel fiercely denounced this idle and pernicious pastime.²³

Chernyshevsky's citing of Hegel was not accidental. Hegel, in spite of his panlogistic understanding of philosophy as absolute consciousness and knowledge, to which he ascribed a substantial content and infinite power, well understood that a research in the history of philosophy bore an imprint of the historian's party loyalty that was not at all subjective. He criticised thinkers who demanded that the historian be 'absolutely non-partisan'. That demand, he said,

used to be made in particular on the *history of philosophy*, that no sympathy should be shown in it for a notion and opinion, just as a judge should not have a special interest in either of two contending parties. At the same time, it would be supposed that a judge would perform his duty stupidly and badly if he did not have an interest in right, even an exclusive interest, and if that were not his object and sole purpose when giving judgment. This demand on a judge can be called *partiality* for right, and one knows very well how to distinguish it from *subjective* partiality. But the impartiality demanded of a historian would wipe out any distinction in shallow, self-complacent chatter.²⁴

Hegel thus counterposed subjective, unscientific partiality to a partisanship that was objective and scientific. He was right,

of course, to distinguish between partiality and partisanship, but he did not link the difference with definite social positions, and did not see different classes, social movements, and trends of society's development behind the different forms of partiality.

The fathers of Marxism not only exposed bourgeois 'impartiality' but also showed that it was an unavoidable form of the partisanship of that class' social consciousness, and thus demonstrated its historical limitedness.

During its historical youth the bourgeoisie rose to scientific investigation of the economic relations of production and exchange. English classical political economy was a science, but as an ideology it had an unscientific character. Marxism united science and a scientific ideology for the first time, which also found expression in the scientific partisanship of Marxist theory as a whole and the philosophy of Marxism in particular. The theoretical basis was thus established for surveying all preceding history scientifically and creating a science of the history of philosophy in the strict sense of the term.

Any historical study, we said above, presupposes certain theoretical premisses, assumptions, and beliefs. That applies in particular to studies in the history of philosophy, the subject-matter of which is theory. But theoretical premisses, quite often unconscious or not reduced to a system, are one thing, and a scientific theory of the historical process, a materialist conception of history, is quite something else. The same must be said in principle about the scientific theory of the process of the history of philosophy, which it became possible to form thanks only to Marxism.

Marxism has thus provided the theoretical basis for a scientific, philosophic study of the history of philosophy, i.e. a study that forms an integral element of the creative development of Marxist philosophy. The work of the fathers of Marxism on the history of philosophy convincingly brought out this unity of philosophical research and studies in the history of philosophy. A particularly clear example of that is Lenin's analysis of Hegel's *Science of Logic* and *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. It witnesses that Lenin did not consider the materialist reworking of Hegelian dialectics a completed affair; in that respect he continued the work of Marx and Engels, enriching dialectical and historical materialism with new theses. Hegel, as we shall show

later, developed a theory of the history of philosophy, a theory of the development of philosophic knowledge. That was his dialectical theory in the main, which refuted the metaphysical conception of the history of philosophy. Hegel showed that philosophy did not just have a history but that it developed, and that its development ultimately had a progressive character. The most important trend in this onward process is the formation of a scientific philosophy.

The idea of a necessary connection and contradictory unity of philosophical theories, the dialectical understanding of historical continuity (which also includes a relationship of opposites), the study of philosophical doctrines as self-knowledge of historically determined epoch of mankind's development—are all remarkable insights of the Hegelian theory of the history of philosophy. But these brilliant insights were not formed in Hegel's system as rationally substantiated truths; on the contrary, they were transformed into idealist errors.

The philosophy of Marxism debunked Hegel's doctrine of the history of philosophy and so made obvious both the great errors of idealism and the discoveries of dialectical idealism. Critical assimilation and reworking of these discoveries on the basis of the materialist conception of history and creative development of the whole scientific and philosophical outlook of Marxism made it possible to build a scientific theory of the history of philosophy.

¹ Frederick Engels. *Anti-Dühring* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p. 170.

² Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p. 43.

³ Walter Sawyer, for instance, writes: 'To present the mathematics of this century without any reference to the previous century is like presenting the third act of a play without any explanation of what is supposed to have happened in the first two acts' (W. W. Sawyer. *A Path to Modern Mathematics*, Cox and Wyman, London, 1966, p.8). This witty, and methodologically correct remark leaves unexplained the obvious fact that in our day Euclidian geometry, Newton's mechanics, and other discoveries of the past are not studied from their works, but from textbooks in which the discoveries are set out in a neater and more scientific way, from today's standpoint, allowing for the subsequent achievements of science. But does it follow from this that the history of science has no real significance for the scientist? In our view it follows,

rather, that the history of science is no longer so essential for the school or college student who assimilates only its achievements.

⁴ Alexandre Koyré. *Études d'histoire de la pensée scientifique* (PUF, Paris, 1966), p. 4.

⁵ Hans Reichenbach. *Modern Philosophy of Science* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959), p. 136.

⁶ Nicolas Bourbaki. *L'architecture des mathématiques. Les grands courants de la pensée mathématique*, présentées par F. Le Lionnais (Blanchard, Paris, 1962), p. 45. As a supplement to the thesis cited, we would add the following from Louis de Broglie: 'People who do not themselves practice sciences very often imagine that they always attribute absolute certainty to us; they picture scientific researchers to themselves as basing their deductions on incontestable facts and irrefutable arguments, and hence as moving forward with sure step with no possibility of mistake or retreat. But the spectacle of actual Science, just like the history of Science in the past, proves that it is nothing of the sort' (Louis de Broglie. *Sur les sentiers de la Science*, Albin Michel, Paris, 1960, p. 351).

⁷ Max Planck. The Place of Modern Physics in the Mechanical View of Nature. *A Survey of Physics. A Collection of Lectures and Essays* (Dutton and Company, New York), p. 42.

⁸ Kurt Huebner. Von der Geschichtlichkeit der empirischen Wissenschaften. Andre Mercier and Maja Svilar (Eds.). *Philosophers on Their Own Work*. Vol. 1 (Herbert Lang, Bern and Frankfurt on the Main, 1975), p. 77.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁰ See, for example, *ibid.*, p. 84.

¹¹ Mortimer J. Adler. *The Conditions of Philosophy. Its Checkered Past, Its Present Disorder, and Its Future Promise* (Atheneum, New York, 1965), p. 173.

¹² Henri Gouhier. Note sur le progrès et la philosophie. In *Études sur l'histoire de la philosophie en hommage à Martial Gueroult* (Librairie Fischbacher, Paris, 1964), p. 111.

¹³ Gilbert Maire. *Une régression mentale. De Bergson à Jean-Paul Sartre* (Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1959), p. 19.

¹⁴ Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 43.

¹⁵ See Lenin's conspectus of Lassalle's *The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus* in V. I. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks (Collected Works)*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 351).

¹⁶ See Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic* in his *Philosophical Notebooks*, p. 177. In another place in the *Notebooks*, Lenin formulated this same basic idea as follows, but stressing new aspects: 'Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the *dialectical* elaboration of the history of human thought, science and technique' (p. 147).

¹⁷ See Lenin's plan of Hegel's dialectic (logic) in his *Philosophical Notebooks*, p. 316.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

¹⁹ See Engels' letter of 5 August 1890 to Conrad Schmidt. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Correspondence* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982), p. 393.

²⁰ V. I. Lenin. *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 326.

²¹ *Hegel's Logic*, being Part One of the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), translated by William Wallace (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975), p. 294.

²² N. G. Chernyshevsky. *Essays on the Gogol Period of Russian Literature. Essay Six. Belinsky, Selected Philosophical Essays* (FLPH, Moscow, 1953), p. 464.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ H. G. W. Hegel. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Vol. 10, Part Three* (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970), p. 349.

World Outlook as a Phenomenon of Society's Spiritual Life

The concept of world outlook (or outlook upon the world, attitude) is generally accepted both in ordinary language and in scientific (and philosophical) literature. When natural scientists speak of outlook they usually have in mind systematic unity of the theoretical premisses of their research, a unity formed in the course of comprehending the principles and achievements of the sciences of nature.

Karl Marx described outlook as a special form of social consciousness and a necessary element of the ideological superstructure.

Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire superstructure of different and distinctly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life.¹

In this context he had in mind the views of life of various classes and social groups. Frederick Engels described the aggregate of bourgeois views of the position of the individual in society as a *juridical view of life*, a necessary element of which was, in particular, bourgeois-democratic illusions. Marx and Engels called their theory the communist outlook of life, which joined philosophy, political economy, and the socialist theory of Marxism.

The concept of outlook (*Weltanschauung*) is used, in the works of Lenin, for philosophy, the basic social attitude of certain classes and social groups, and the most general theses of principle of the natural and social sciences. He pointed, in particular, to the existence of a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology. Anarchism, for example, 'takes its stand on the bourgeois world outlook, in spite of all the "fury" of its attacks on the

bourgeoisie'.¹ In counterposing bourgeois nationalism to proletarian internationalism, Lenin stressed that the opposition expressed 'the *two* policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question'.²

In the resolutions and documents of the CPSU the concept has to do both with the philosophical principles of Marxism-Leninism and Marxism-Leninism as a whole. In its analysis of the contemporary ideological struggle, the CPSU constantly stresses that the problems of outlook on the world are coming more and more to the fore in this great battle of ideas.

The statements referred to (of which we could easily give many more) far from exhaust the spectrum of possible meanings of the term 'world outlook' (*mirovozzrenie*, *Weltanschauung*). The system of Copernicus, counterposed to Ptolemy's geocentric one (accepted as Christian dogma), is usually called (not without grounds) the heliocentric view of the world. In everyday life, and in science, philosophy, and art, one often speaks of an optimistic outlook, and of its contrary, pessimism. Voluntarism and fatalism are also ideological positions. A mechanistic outlook is generally accepted to have prevailed in science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Engels characterised the metaphysical mode of thought as an outlook as well as a method. Hegel used the concept 'theoretical world outlook' (*theoretische Weltanschauung*) to define the artist's ideological, aesthetic position.⁴ In that connection he treated outlook as the intellectual centre of gravity of man's spiritual life, governing a variety of experiences, moods, beliefs, knowledge, and intentions.

The concept 'view of life' is thus polysemantic and many-sided. It has penetrated deeply into everyday, scientific, political, and philosophical consciousness. Hence its certain indeterminacy, which makes it impossible to give it an unambiguous, simple definition.

Some attempts to exclude the term from the lexicon of science and philosophy are connected to a certain extent with that fact. Their source, of course, lies outside the semantic difficulties; they are rooted in the crisis of bourgeois consciousness. But the striving to eliminate the term is justified directly by references to the impossibility of defining it simply, so that a desire of this kind is even typical of certain Marxist philosophers. Those who would like to suppress the concept 'view of the world' (world outlook,

mirovozzrenie, *Weltanschauung*) usually claim that it is not needed at all in science. It is sometimes even proclaimed that there is no such phenomenon in the spiritual life of society; according to that view, quite different spiritual notions cannot be united in a single concept. References are sometimes made to the fact that there is no term in English, French, and other dictionaries that adequately renders what is called *mirovozzrenie* in Russian and *Weltanschauung* in German. The arguments adduced to throw doubt on the existence of the concept's content also include a claim that the word 'world' is too polysemantic, so that other terms should be substituted for it, whose meaning can be fixed unambiguously. The point of view of P. V. Kopnin is close to that:

Modern science is gradually replacing this polysemantic word by other, strictly defined terms. The world is a concept of philosophy and science of the time of their origin, when there were still no other, more mature concepts of astronomy, physics, and philosophy.¹

Unfortunately Kopnin did not name the 'other, more mature concepts' that could replace the actually polysemantic term 'world'. He also did not name the new, 'strictly defined' terms that could replace the term 'outlook on the world' or 'world philosophy'. And that is not fortuitous. There are no adequate grounds in science for replacing this term by others. We can quite justifiably say that the concept 'world outlook' is being recognised more and more in the natural sciences, in which it proves of real help when the hidden assumptions and methodological bases of scientific quests are being analysed.² As for the undoubtedly polysemantic nature of the term 'world philosophy' (*mirovozzrenie*), that circumstance should hardly be regarded as evidence that it is unsatisfactory. The history of science shows that the most meaningful concepts of science are inevitably polysemantic, which manifests the normal dialectical contradictoriness of the process of knowledge. We could substitute other words, meaning various things bearing on it, of course, for 'mirovozzrenie' (*Weltanschauung*), but such an artificial operation would entail even greater complication of the *problem* of world outlook.

The proposals to reject the term, or even the concept, 'miro-

vozzrenie' (world outlook) leave out an essential circumstance, namely, that a *religious outlook* has existed for millennia. Is religion the sole possible outlook on the world? If so, then world outlook would essentially be a religious phenomenon, a matter of faith, and not of knowledge. Any attempt to deprive world outlook of scientific or philosophical status is therefore indirect, if not direct, justification of a religious interpretation of the world and a denial of the possibility of replacing the religious view of it by a scientific interpretation of the world or understanding of reality.

Most neopositivists consider any world outlook or ideology an aggregate of *beliefs*—religious and non-religious. World outlook is consequently interpreted as a subjective vision of reality, to which the intersubjective theses of science are counterposed. The world-outlook aspects of science, which are interpreted as foreign to the latter, introduced from outside, are thus left out of account. Neopositivists proclaimed a programme to cleanse science of 'metaphysics', and considered any outlook a variety of metaphysics. They treated the idea of the development or substantiation of a scientific outlook as a pernicious striving to underpin an unscientific system of views by scientific arguments.

Philosophers of an irrationalist stamp, unlike neopositivists, while demonstrating the necessity of a world outlook, nevertheless claimed that any outlook is, in principle, unscientific. But irrationalism passes off the unscientific character of a world outlook for its sovereign independence of science and its capacity to comprehend what is allegedly inaccessible in principle to 'limited' science. The irrationalist thus accepts the neopositivist thesis of the unscientific character, in principle, of a world outlook, in part, interpreting it, however, in the spirit of a religious lauding of belief above knowledge.

Scientists, while opposing neopositivism on the one hand and irrationalism on the other, consider an outlook an integral component of scientific knowledge (when it is based on and confirmed by the data of science).

This belief of scientists has had a certain influence on philosophers who claim to develop a 'philosophy of science'. Some spokesmen of the postpositivist 'philosophy of the history of science' (Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, T. S. Kuhn, and others), who are joined by certain neopositivists who have changed their

former views, have now already substantiated a thesis of the possibility of and need for a scientific outlook, but they interpret it as *purely* scientific, i.e. allegedly relating only to the community of scientists and their special research problems and tasks; any link between world outlook (*scientific* outlook) and philosophy, on the one hand, and social practice, on the other, is in fact denied. In other words the scientific outlook is understood as a denial of philosophy, or rather, a denial of the possibility of a scientific, philosophic world outlook.

It is typical of all these theorists (who are essentially occupied with philosophic problems of the history of science) that they have no interest in the fact that there is a variety of world outlooks, qualitatively different from one another; yet that fact has a direct bearing on scientists' outlook, which cannot always be defined as scientific. Only by allowing for the diversity of outlooks can we understand the unsoundness of the subjectivist interpretation of world outlook and the illegitimacy of an abstract asking whether world outlook is scientific or, on the contrary, an unscientific system of views. The existence of qualitatively different outlooks, including ones incompatible with each other, makes such a posing of the matter unsound in principle. The fact of a diversity of outlooks on the world makes a general definition of the concept 'world outlook' particularly important. As this general concept embraces all types of view of the world, it thereby excludes the essential differences between them. It consequently does not characterise the scientific, or the religious, or any other type of outlook specifically. Only subsequent concretising of the general concept leads to clarification of the specific character of the separate types of outlook. In that way, as we shall try to show in the next chapter, can the specific features of the philosophic outlook upon the world be brought out.

Unfortunately no scientifically substantiated typology of outlooks has yet been made. The attempts made in Western philosophical literature (Heinrich Gomperz, Wilhelm Dilthey) have been unsatisfactory since a depreciation of the scientific outlook has been characteristic of them, or even a denial of the possibility of such. For Dilthey, for instance, the source for defining world outlook was an irrationalist conception of life in accordance with which outlook was defined as subjective awareness of the sense of life, the individual's spiritual state, whose forms al-

tered historically, so forming the principal content of each epoch of world history. He drew a line between poetic, metaphysical, and positivist outlooks, without distinguishing the fundamental opposition of science and religion, and the scientific and religious outlooks. He identified the scientific outlook with a positivist orientation, to which the metaphysical view of the world was opposed.

We find a development of Dilthey's conception in modern existentialism, which is one of the latest variants of the 'philosophy of life'. Karl Jaspers, for example, wrote:

When we speak of world outlook (*Weltanschauung*), we think ideas, man's final and total, subjective as experience, strength, and views, objective as the objectively formed world.¹

The existentialist clearly counterposes outlook (*Weltanschauung*) to theoretical knowledge. At the same time, he distorts its real relation to the external world, depicting the latter as an objectivisation of human experience, aspirations, and ideas. The dialectical materialist analysis of the phenomenon of world outlook, when rejecting the idealist interpretation of it, starts from a scientific, philosophical understanding of knowledge as active reflection of objective reality, and from social consciousness, which is determined, with objective necessity, by social being. It considers, of course, that the reflection of objective reality (both natural and social) is not always synonymous with understanding, as is particularly obvious from the example of religion, which is an alienated form of social consciousness. Understanding and investigative activity are also not coincident processes, since investigation is specialised activity, while understanding (knowledge) is realised by people from infancy.

Without making a further demarcation of knowledge and consciousness, we would simply stress that the dialectical materialist approach to these phenomena of society's spiritual life allows us to explain the historical inevitability of a variety of outlooks scientifically, and likewise the historical necessity of a scientific (including a scientific philosophic) outlook.

The development of a Marxist typology of outlooks presupposes special study (which is beyond the scope of our book), but some very cogent differences can be established between them without such inquiry.

The existence of an anti-scientific (e.g. religious) outlook is an obvious fact. In addition, some workers consider mythology a typical anti-scientific outlook on the world. But mythology reflects not only man's enslavement by the spontaneous forces of nature in the conditions of pre-class society but also his striving to master those forces, a striving that took the form of a myth because of certain historical conditions. The term 'anti-scientific' could only be applied to the mythology of primitive man in an arbitrary sense, since there was still no scientific view then, and consequently no negation of it. From that angle mythology would be more properly characterised as a pre-scientific outlook.

The outlook built on people's everyday experience, both the personal experience of individuals and the experience of other people assimilated by them, should also be considered unscientific, but it is not anti-scientific, even though it may contain anti-scientific views. The existence in this outlook of notions drawn from science does not make it scientific, because it is characterised on the whole by ill-considered (or inadequately considered) beliefs, an absence of their unity, and an absence of conscious principles. But that does not rule out the possibility of a certain approximation of the everyday, common sense outlook to the scientific.⁸

The scientist's outlook has a scientific character since it systematises generalisations about the world built up in the sciences of nature.⁹ But when this outlook includes certain religious and idealist ideas dominant in an antagonistic society, it is not quite scientific. Engels pointed that out in connection with his characterisation of science in the first half of the eighteenth century:

Science was still deeply enmeshed in theology. Everywhere it sought and found the ultimate cause in an impulse from outside that was not to be explained from nature itself... The highest general idea to which this natural science attained was that of the purposiveness of the arrangements of nature, the shallow teleology of Wolff, according to which cats were created to eat mice, mice to be eaten by cats, and the whole of nature to testify to the wisdom of the creator.¹⁰

Scientific character, or non-scientific, was thus affected in certain historical conditions, by the characteristics of one and the same outlook formed in the sphere of science.

The typology of outlooks is not exhausted by demarcating their scientific, non-scientific, and anti-scientific forms. The scientific outlook, despite the convictions of certain philosophers and sociologists, is directly related only to natural phenomena. Attempts to transplant Darwinism to sociology led, as we know, to anti-scientific world-outlook conclusions. That does not mean, of course, that science does not play a role in the ideological comprehension of social reality. The most important ideological basic principle of natural science, namely to explain nature from herself, rejecting references to supernatural causes, played an immense role in the development of social doctrines. The anti-theological principle, that people themselves make their own history, arose under the direct impact of the natural sciences.

Alongside the scientific outlook there are various types of social outlook relating only to social phenomena. But there is also a type that embraces both nature and society. It can be characterised by Engels' well-known definition 'general outlook'. Philosophy, as will be shown below, is just such an outlook.

We can thus distinguish three relatively independent principles for delimiting world outlooks. The first can be called the epistemological, since it refers to scientific, unscientific, and anti-scientific types of outlook. The second principle has a material object character; it is a matter of reality (natural or social), which gets its generalised expression in an outlook of some sort. The third principle should be defined as universal and synthetic; through it a general or philosophical outlook becomes possible. In that connection we would note that it is impossible to agree with the demarcation of outlooks that certain Marxist researchers have drawn. V. G. Ivanov, for example, claims:

Having based the typology of an outlook upon the world on the level of thought it is developed to, we obviously immediately distinguish two main types of outlook—empirical and scientific.¹¹

In our view an epistemological delimitation of outlooks is inadequate in principle. With a one-sided approach, which leaves outlook aside as a form of social consciousness determined by social being, religion must be classed as an empirical or theoretical outlook, which is completely incorrect of course. It is also impossible, in our view, to agree with V. F. Chernovolenko, who distinguishes 'in each integral ideological system at least three

sides or aspects: natural, humanitarian, and epistemological'.¹² The naturalistic aspect clearly does not exist in most idealist doctrines, let alone religion. The communist outlook upon the world opposes its materialist conception to a naturalistic interpretation of social life.

It is necessary to draw a line between qualitatively different outlooks, of course, not in order to isolate them from one another, but in order to bring out their interconnection. In actual fact, the different forms of outlook are interwoven, sometimes even merged, so that features of other outlooks, sometimes its very opposite, are found in an outlook upon the world. A mixture of scientific, unscientific, and anti-scientific is characteristic, for example, of all pre-Marxist social theories. A scientific social outlook and a scientific ideology were only created by Marxism, which became possible through the creation of a general, scientific, philosophic world outlook.

The scientific outlook, on the one hand, and the social, on the other, are in constant interaction. The Copernican revolution had an immense influence on the whole historical process of the moulding of a lay, secular, bourgeois outlook in those historical conditions. The scientific outlook of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fostered secularisation of the social views of consolidating bourgeois society, and the moulding of a naturalist (then historically progressive) understanding of social affairs. There was also undoubtedly an influence of the social outlook on the scientific. The world-outlook conclusions that are sometimes drawn, for example, from the second law of thermodynamics are largely determined by the moods of social pessimism characteristic of modern middle-class ideology. The main source of the technocratic outlook, like the ideology of 'technical pessimism', is not simply data of the natural and technical sciences (which are usually referred to directly), but also certain socio-political, ideological, world-outlook orientations.

A differentiation of various types of outlook is essential not just because it methodologically prevents a confusing of scientific and anti-scientific views, socialist and capitalist ones, etc., but primarily because, by fixing the real variety of outlooks, and classing them by both their form and their content, it makes it methodologically correct to pose the question of the unity of this variety, i.e. the unity of the world outlook. The first premise for

a proper posing of this matter (which finds its solution in the existence and development of philosophy) is precisely this demarcation of types of outlook, since that brings out the subject field or the epistemological boundaries of each type. The weakness of most definitions of the concept of world outlook in the Marxist literature is an unjustified striving to unite attributes characterising all types of outlook in one definition. It is then, however, a matter not of an actually existing outlook but of some general idea that has little reality as an animal in general, society in general, and so on.

Take the definition of *mirovozzrenie* in the Soviet *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*, where it is defined as

a generalised system of man's views on the world as a whole, on the place of separate phenomena in the world, and on its own place in it, man's understanding and emotional evaluation of the sense of his activity and the fate of mankind, the aggregate of people's scientific, philosophic, political, legal, moral, religious, and aesthetic beliefs and ideals.¹²

The merit of that definition is that it points out that an outlook is built up from *beliefs and convictions*, not just from knowledge as is sometimes claimed. In some cases these are scientific beliefs, in others religious ones, in other cases still moral convictions, and so on. The concept of belief or conviction, which we shall undertake to examine below, embraces a different type of opinion or view: scientific and anti-scientific, theoretical and non-theoretical. Beliefs may be real knowledge or, on the contrary, pseudo-knowledge (for example, a simply subjective conviction lacking any objective basis, or a belief not based on facts, etc.).

The drawback of the definition cited above is that it unites what is incompatible in actually existing world outlooks into one whole, namely the specific features inherent in the different types. According to it an outlook is 'the aggregate of people's scientific, philosophic, political, legal, moral, religious, and aesthetic beliefs and ideals'. But such an aggregate does not exist in actual reality, in which a scientific outlook is opposed to a religious one, and a socio-political outlook is by no means necessarily scientific or philosophic, let alone aesthetic. Since this definition includes the whole variety of possible modes of spiritual assimilation of the world in the concept 'outlook', it is too universal.

That fact needs to be stressed, since an outlook is not the birthright of educated persons only (at least, even of highly educated men); everyone in fact has an outlook, but by no means as a correlate of universal knowledge. In order to define the *fact of an outlook on the world* as it exists in real life, therefore, it is necessary to refrain from trying to unite together all the features inherent in all types of outlook.

The author of the cited entry himself felt it to some extent unsatisfactory, because he proposed, after the passage quoted, to delimit world outlook in the broad and the narrow senses of the term. He thus actually recognised that in its broad sense it was only the concept of world outlook in general. But he took actually existing outlooks as such in the narrow sense, in which he included philosophy, religion, political outlook, etc. But philosophy cannot by any means be called an outlook in the narrow sense.

The existence of fundamentally incompatible outlooks, it may seem, makes it impossible to try and find some common, essential feature in them all. Of course, if we understand by common (and, of course, essential) something identical as regards its *content* in the various ideological systems, then the scientific outlook and religion cannot be compatible within the context of a general concept. But outlook is not characterised just by content, but also by form (the significance of which is beyond doubt). One must consequently single out this essential, specific *element of form, common* to all types of outlook, the formal element, so to say, which, however, like any form, is full of content. This formal element of any outlook, as we already pointed out in connection with our analysis of the entry in the *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*, is *conviction (belief)*. In that sense any outlook (either scientific or anti-scientific) is a *system of beliefs*. This stating of the fact is still inadequate as a definition of the concept but is the starting point, in our view, for the sought-after definition.

The term 'conviction' ('belief') evokes a natural caution, especially when it is singled out, and so gets the significance of a concept or category. The term is welcomed by those philosophers who reduce world outlook to a subjective frame of mind due, say, to a person's mentality. To view as a scientific outlook a system of beliefs means (so it may appear at first glance) to be-

little its significance and to call its main quality, i.e. its scientific character, in question.

Convictions can really be subjective, based, for example, on a preconceived attitude to facts, personal inclinations, etc. Firmly established facts, ideas verified by long experience, and reliable evidence are justly opposed to convictions of that kind. All that is so, and we do not intend to dispute the statement of the facts, which, it is true, characterise *certain* convictions, rather than convictions in general. The point lies precisely in the term 'conviction' having civil rights in science too (in which the scientist sets out his convictions as scientific conclusions derived from and confirmed by facts, and not as judgements of taste). Albert Einstein said that there were underlying scientific convictions without which research was impossible; 'the basis of all scientific work is the conviction that the world is an ordered and comprehensive entity'.¹⁴ It will readily be noted that this statement has a materialist character. Lenin described such philosophic convictions of the scientist as *natural-scientific materialism*:

the instinctive, unwitting, unformed, philosophically unconscious conviction shared by the overwhelming majority of scientists regarding the objective reality of the external world reflected by our consciousness.¹⁵

In spite of the claims of neopositivists and other spokesmen of the idealist-agnostic 'philosophy of science', scientists' materialist convictions are being reinforced, substantiated, and enriched more and more as the sciences of nature and society develop.

In spite of the claims of certain philosophers, the term 'conviction' has thus not been discredited in any way as regards its inherent content (which is not always scientific, of course, and may sometimes even be anti-scientific). And logical conclusions, incidentally, often turn out to be unscientific.

Convictions are primarily characterised by the force, persistence, and resolution with which they are expressed, substantiated, defended, and counterposed to other convictions. From that angle a conviction is not simply an expression about what one considers true, useful, etc., but is an active form of expression, i.e. a certain intellectual (and also, depending on the content of the expression, political, moral, aesthetic, etc.) *position* for or against certain others.

Lenin pointed out that it was Marxists' job

to bring definite socialist ideals to the spontaneous working-class movement, to connect this movement with socialist convictions that should attain the level of contemporary science.¹⁶

One of the principal tasks of scientific socialist enlightenment and communist education is to convert the knowledge on which the scientific socialist ideology is built into firm convictions and active, impelling motives in the struggle to realise communist ideals. A theoretical mastering only of the truths of Marxism-Leninism is not sufficient to make one a real Marxist; communist conviction is needed. In his lecture on the state, Lenin stressed the paramount importance of this point, and directly linked it with the moulding of a communist outlook on the world as a system of convictions:

Only when you learn to find your way independently in this question may you consider yourself sufficiently confirmed in your convictions and able with sufficient success to defend them against anybody and at any time.¹⁷

From that angle convictions (of course, when they are true) function as a higher, more developed form of knowledge than any statement of truth, but one must distinguish real convictions from superficial and illusory ones. Lenin ridiculed those people whose 'convictions are very often not more deeply seated than the tip of their tongues.'¹⁸

The fact that an unscientific, or even anti-scientific, outlook upon the world is also built up from certain convictions thus does not in the least depreciate the concept of conviction, any more than the fact that there are many errors in science, along with real discoveries and advances, disparages science. The term 'scientific' does not, of course, coincide with 'truth'; and words like 'knowledge' and 'truth' are also not synonyms.

There are not only anti-scientific, subjective convictions, but also scientific, objective, substantiated ones, that should be treated as specific forms of knowledge, true knowledge. We also stress the specific nature of the concept 'conviction' because statements that are a direct conclusion from logical premisses are not convictions. We cannot, of course, say: we are convinced that the diameter cuts a circle in half. That truth is a logical conclusion,

demonstrated by a certain theorem. But we must not repeat the error of the seventeenth-century rationalists who considered statements of that kind to be truths of the highest order. Mathematicians prefer to call proven propositions *regular* logical conclusions.

There are a great many scientific truths that are directly or indirectly related to established facts obtained not by deduction but from observations, experience, experiments, generalisation of the data of practice, and so on. We must consequently get rid of bias in regard to the term 'conviction'. Convictions are not prejudices or preconceived notions, in spite of the latter's being represented as a quite definite variety of unsound convictions. The meaning of convictions in science (including mathematics) can hardly be overestimated. Lobachevsky, for example, was convinced that his non-Euclidean geometry was not simply a formal mathematical construction but a theoretical anticipation of still undiscovered physical facts. His conviction was brilliantly confirmed by subsequent discoveries in physics.

Hypothesis is the main form of development of science. But a hypothesis, incidentally, like any thesis, is a systematically constructed conviction, based, of course, on facts. It is a scientific conviction that may or may not be confirmed.

The concept of scientific conviction is incomparably broader than that of a hypothesis, since it relates to all propositions of science that are not deductive conclusions, the direct results of measurements, observed facts, or statements in the broadest sense of the term. That is why general scientific propositions, constantly confirmed by facts, may be limited, or even doubted, in the formulations in which they are recorded. They are conviction-truths in contrast to other scientific truths. Such are all well-founded extrapolations that are necessary and inevitable in any theoretical scientific formulation of general truths, insofar as science does not have the facts to limit them, or does not provide any guarantee of the firmness or immutable truth of theoretical propositions, the limits of whose value have not been determined by scientifically fixed conditions.

The history of knowledge has shown that classical mechanics (which, like mathematics, was considered a system of absolute truths in the final instance) included convictions whose truth has been confined to certain limits by relativistic physics. Truths

that were counterposed to convictions as quite independent of the conditions of space and time have thus turned out to be conviction-truths. They have consequently remained truths, but are relative truths, in spite of the illusions of the fathers of classical *mechanics*, which does not, however, call their objectivity in question¹⁹. Truth is a process, and precisely the process of the development of knowledge. That does not deprive the concept of immutable truth of sense, but strictly limits it to those stated truths whose limits can be distinctly fixed in space and time. All other truths are changing, developing ones, although they may, at some stage of the development of scientific knowledge, function as seemingly completed and final, independent of subsequent development of knowledge. In other words, the development of truth is not a permanent process, but has moments of intermittence and continuity, temporary intervals, etc.

Not only convictions thus undergo certain transformations, but also truths (including those that have been established axiomatically or experimentally). When we delimit true and false convictions, we must at the same time see that the relation between truths and truth-convictions completely conforms to the dialectical formula of the unity of identity and difference.

Lenin explained that science, like materialist philosophy, starts from a *conviction* of the existence of objects of knowledge independent of the knowing subject: 'Natural science leaves no room for doubt that its assertion that the earth existed prior to man is a truth.'²⁰ That conviction of the scientist, a scientific conviction, has as its basis man's varied practical activity from everyday experience to production, scientific research, and of course socio-political practice.

Idealists try to discredit the concept of an objective, external world by reference to the fact that such a notion of the object of knowledge excludes it from the sphere of knowledge. They also cite the fact that conviction of the existence of an external world arises primarily in 'uncritical' common sense, remote from scientific research. But common sense is moulded by everyday practice and constantly retains an intimate link with it. It (common sense) hourly comes up against external things and objects, and is immersed in them, so to speak. This limited character of it does not lack a certain epistemological value. As Lenin emphasised:

The conviction of the 'naive realists' (in other words, of all humanity) that our sensations are images of an objectively real external world is the conviction of the mass of scientists, one that is steadily growing and gaining in strength.²¹

Here he uses the concept 'conviction' as a correlate of truth.

The question naturally arises why, if convictions are a necessary element of scientific knowledge, do they characterise a world outlook in a specific way that is not necessarily scientific. The nub of the matter is (1) that convictions are not specific characteristics of the special sciences (whose content is largely formed by observations, logical inferences, conclusions based on experiments, and empirical descriptions and suppositions). (2) The convictions contained in sciences relate for the most part to a certain, distinctly limited range of facts. Certain advanced scientists of the nineteenth century, for instance, were convinced of the possibility of building heavier-than-air flying machines. That conviction was confirmed by the practice of aircraft-building. Such convictions, however important, do not have an ideological character, in spite of the arguments advanced to defend (or oppose) them having possibly been drawn from a certain outlook upon the world. We must therefore draw a line between ideological convictions and those of the special sciences (e.g. of physics, biology, mathematics, etc.). Magellan was convinced of the existence of a strait connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans; it was a special scientific conviction, based on separate, partial facts.

Convictions that can be called ideological are characterised as follows: (1) as notions of the relatively *general substance* of natural and social phenomena; (2) as opinions expressing people's *interested attitude* towards certain phenomena; (3) as generalisations that go beyond the special fields of research.

An essential understanding of phenomena, on the one hand, and an attitude to or evaluation of their substance from the angle of people's interests, on the other, are thus what specifically characterise an ideological conviction. The Soviet philosopher P.N. Fedoseyev, for example, writes:

By ideology we mean a system of generalised concepts of the world as a whole, of the natural and social processes within it and of man's attitude to the surrounding reality. The specific aspect of ideology is

that it provides an integral and conscious reflection of reality passing through the prism of social and individual requirements, interests, tasks and ideals. Ideology expresses and orients human consciousness within the system of social relations and natural interconnections, and provides a set of initial values and tenets which influence the behaviour and way of life of social classes, groups and individuals. The concepts and ideas which make up an ideology become a man's convictions and take an active part in shaping his attitude to all the vital phenomena and events in the world. Consequently, ideology is a substantial phenomenon in man's individual and social life. One could say that it is a unity of individual and social consciousness. Through this unity, the individual's consciousness, while retaining its characteristics, links up with social consciousness and in a sense expresses it.¹²

This definition, unlike that considered above, by indicating the general features inherent in all types of outlook, excludes our reducing all the variety of types of outlook to one, in fact non-existent, outlook upon the world that allegedly unites the scientific and religious, philosophic and aesthetic, empirical and theoretical, etc. Its merit is also that, by pointing out the general features of any outlook, it helps us to understand that these features are realised to a different degree in various types of outlook; they are best expressed in the scientific outlook, especially the scientific philosophic one. Finally, this definition correctly characterises outlook on the plane of the unity of the subjective and objective. There is such a unity, of course, in any process of understanding, but a world outlook, unlike other forms of people's spiritual activity, is a unity of individual and social consciousness. It is understandable, in that connection, that those Western theorists who depict it as subjective human self-knowledge are only absolutising one aspect of it, which really does not exist outside social consciousness or independent of it.

We said above that ideological inferences are not imported into science from outside. Analysis of the history of science, and of the structure of scientific knowledge, indicates that certain ideological conclusions take shape within the context of each of the fundamental sciences which go far beyond the limits of the special field of knowledge in which they are expressed and substantiated. The example of astronomy is not the only one. The

immense ideological significance of the main tenets of Darwinism is well known. Modern anthropology, which has demonstrated that racial differences do not determine people's level of intellectual, cultural, and social development, counterposes convincing ideological arguments to the ideology of racism. All this indicates the insolvency in principle of counterposing science to world outlook, because the former can and should only be counterposed to an unscientific or anti-scientific world outlook. And the fact that science refutes this kind of outlook is evidence that ideological generalisations are immanent in it. If science did not include such generalisations, and did not develop them in the course of its special investigations, it would have been powerless against the religious outlook and any other anti-scientific one. The neopositivist thesis that science does not refute religion starts precisely from the notion that outlook upon the world has nothing in common, by its nature, with science. Neothomism's doctrine of 'harmony' between religion and science interprets the latter as a system of empirical statements that have no ideological significance.

The scientific outlook, which systematises ideological theses generated by the development of scientific knowledge, is a necessary form of the integration of the sciences. Science without an outlook, science neutral in the struggle of outlooks, is probably a myth. Science of that kind, rejecting philosophic generalisation stemming from its own data, borrows unscientific ideological conclusions from outside. Its freedom from an outlook, and its neutrality in the struggle of ideologies, consequently, prove to be only apparent.

A description of ideological convictions as generalisations of the highest order, generalisations embracing fundamental forms of universality (nature, society, man, knowledge, culture) far from exhausts their essence. Insofar as they are mediated by certain social interests, and express people's material and spiritual interests, not only do fundamental forms of universality become their subject-matter, but also separate, special, natural and social phenomena. Man, for example, like all living creatures, is mortal. What relates to man in that statement has ideological significance. The empirically stated fact of human mortality, which characterises people's behaviour in an essential way, has long been the source of various ideological conclusions. Pheno-

mena like natural disasters, wars, and social inequality, have constantly prompted various ideological conclusions (and still do).

It is not difficult, when grasping the facts that form the basis of ideological convictions, to see that they are linked in an essential way with the vital, vested interests of people, social groups, classes, society as a whole, and mankind. This relation between people's interests and certain natural or social facts so characterises these convictions that even the broadest theoretical generalisations do not mould them unless they affect people's interests. Such, for example, are the many statements of mathematics and the natural sciences that possess the most universality. It is also clear that certain facts that were long the property of only certain special sciences have been acquiring ever increasing ideological significance because of changes in conditions. In the nineteenth century the pollution of nature and the environment by production wastes was discussed in the specialist literature, evoked the concern of sanitary inspectors, and so on. Today, because of the growing ecological crisis, defence of the environment has become not only a socio-economic matter but also an ideological problem. Some workers speak in particular, in that connection, of an ecological outlook.

Thomas Hobbes claimed that the propositions of geometry did not cause dispute because they did not touch people's interests. But he did not draw a consistent conclusion from his statement, since he was trying to build a doctrine of society, by a method similar to mathematics, whose theses would be just as indisputable as the axioms of geometry. He did not, of course, cope in essence with that utopian task, but we must stress, in passing, that the conviction of the relatively stable indisputability of the propositions of geometry is already obsolete. With the rise of non-Euclidean geometry, a struggle of opposing *convictions* began in that field which have an ideological character to some extent.

When we speak of convictions that essentially affect people's interests, we have in mind, of course, not the interests of separate individuals but those common to groups of people, classes, society, and mankind. And it is not only a matter of economic, political, and national interests, but also of scientific, aesthetic, and other ones. The variety of ideological convictions is due, on the one hand, to the diversity of natural and social phenomena, and,

on the other hand, to the diversity of people's interests. Natural and social phenomena are realised and comprehended as ideological problems only when humanity's essential link with them is distinguished. The link of natural or social phenomena in itself, while the subject of scientific investigation, still does not constitute the content of ideological generalisations by virtue of that.

Since first some, and then other interests, needs, and aspirations predominate in various spheres of the spiritual and practical assimilation of the world, an outlook upon the latter gets a special social orientation or typological characteristics. The need in principle to draw a line between the outlooks of the various classes of society is understandable from that. The communist world outlook is fundamentally opposed to the capitalist one, not only because of its orientation on a different material field but above all because of its fundamentally opposed evaluation and interpretation of the same phenomena.

Any world outlook (unlike individual ideological generalisations taken separately) fulfils a historically determined ideological function. Its social orientation indicates its partisan character which is not, however, directly revealed. The partisanship of the religious outlook, for instance, is concealed as it were by the circumstance that it is inherent in both exploiting and exploited classes, and even more so in the latter. The religious outlook thus reflects the position but not the interests of the exploited masses. The partisanship of the bourgeois outlook is a fact that is resolutely denied by its ideologists. Bourgeois partisanship has an appearance of being non-partisan. The ideologist of the capitalist class, enthralled by this appearance, denies the undoubted fact that it is a bourgeois ideology. Even more, he generally considers himself simply a theorist, thinker, scholar, or objective researcher, and not an ideologist.

The Western ideologist performs the role, as a rule, of a critic of ideology. He declares any ideology to be unscientific, since the one that he is a spokesman of (although he denies the fact) cannot, by its nature, be scientific. Even when the bourgeois thinker rises to the level of science in his special inquiries, he remains a spokesman of an ideology alien to science. Classical capitalist political economy was a scientific system, as Marx remarked many times, but as a capitalist ideology it remained, for all that, unscientific. A scientific ideology, consequently, is

something more than just a scientific system of views on certain social matters. It is scientific social consciousness, a scientifically substantiated social programme, a scientific reflection of the position and interests of the working classes, and of the historic necessity and real prospects of mankind's development.

History knows only one scientific ideology, viz., Marxism-Leninism. A scientific outlook, insofar as it goes beyond the context of natural phenomena and comprehends the position and interests of people, is consequently only possible, too, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. That, of course, does not exclude scientific ideological convictions within the context of the separate sciences, in particular when natural phenomena become the subject-matter of ideological generalisation.

Examination of the ideological intentions of a world outlook enables us to understand more deeply the root principles of the bourgeois denial of the possibility of a scientific, and in particular of a scientific philosophic outlook. In the last analysis it boils down to denial of the Marxist world outlook, because Marxism, as a unity of philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism, is a single integrally scientific outlook, i.e. one embracing social as well as natural reality. So the very motives that prompt the bourgeois thinker to deny the possibility of a scientific ideology make him an opponent of a scientific world outlook.

An outlook, any one, is thus a systematic *unity* of a variety of general *convictions* about the *essence* of natural or social phenomena, or about the *aggregate* of one and the other, convictions that are directly connected with men's conscious *interests*. We have not employed the word 'world' in that definition, not because we think it inappropriate, vague, etc., but because, in our view, the concept 'world', i.e. the concept of natural and social reality, and its mental and practical assimilation, is one of the most all-embracing, significant, and content-rich concepts of science and philosophy. Its explanation therefore has directly to serve the business of substantiating the definition of world outlook, and in particular of the scientific, including scientific philosophic, outlook.

Herakleitos said that the world was not created either by gods or men. Leukippos and Demokritos discovered the world of atoms. Modern physicists investigate the world of elementary particles. Plato drew a line between the world of things and the

world of ideas. Subsequent idealist philosophy, continuing the Platonic tradition, counterposed the sense-perceived world to the idea of an intelligible world. The religious outlook put forward and developed the myth of the creation of the world. Mediaeval thinkers argued about the beginning of the world in time and space. The materialism of modern times proclaimed that the world has existed forever. The systematic development of the underlying epistemological principle of the knowability of the world is due to materialism.

The birth and tempestuous development of the natural sciences were linked with recognition of nature (the world of natural things) as the only existing world. That conception of the world found authentic reflection in materialist philosophy.

At the dawn of capitalism the new, content-wise scientific outlook upon the world had already characterised the Universe as an infinite multitude of worlds. Science has introduced a sweeping differentiation into the concept 'world'; macroworld and microworld, visible world and invisible, but by no means transcendental; the world of animals, the world of plants, the world of inanimate things and man's spiritual world (i.e. the world of art, world of science, world of everyday experience, world of technique). Man, said Marx, is the world of man, society, the state. 'The philosophers,' he stressed, 'have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is, however, to *change* it.'²³ The idea of a rational transformation of the world, first formulated by progressive, bourgeois philosophy in the seventeenth century, found systematic, scientific philosophic, economic, and sociological substantiation in the world outlook of Marxism.

The word 'world' is really polysemantic, and we have by no means exhausted all its many, diverse meanings. One can say that the world consists of worlds; that applies not only to natural reality, but also to social (the world of socialism, the capitalist world, the 'Third World'). Its polysemantic character is a reflection of the infinite variety of natural and social reality, an expression of the untiring striving of man and humankind to understand the infinite variety of the real in its unity. It is far from fortuitous, of course, that the idea of the unity of the world is an underlying idea of philosophy.²⁴

World outlook thus has to do not just with the world but with worlds, from which a single, and at the same time infinitely

varied, world is built up. These are not simply the worlds of the universum that lie beyond the parts of the Universe accessible to us at the present time; they are the worlds of nature and society, the natural and social worlds, i.e. the various aspects of the whole aggregate of nature, human history, and personal life, which are somehow linked together, depending on the level of social development. Each of us lives in many worlds in that sense, and they are all worlds of this life, even if it is a world from the past that no longer exists, or is a world of the future which still is not. It occurs to us that, being conscious of the polysemy and, we would also say, polysignificance, of the word 'world' that are distinguished, so far as we know, in the languages of all nations, we are aware *ad oculos* of the meaning of the concept 'world outlook' and the unsoundness of all attempts to discredit it or counterpose it to scientific knowledge.

In order to complete our analysis of the concept 'world outlook' we must pose the question of the sources of outlooks. In popular scientific literature oversimplified views are often expressed on this matter which, as it is not difficult to show, are essentially alien to the materialist conception of history. Some writers claim, for instance, that the religious outlook is based on prejudices and the scientific on facts established by science. But the religious outlook (like religion in general) is a reflection of historically determined social being. Prejudices, of course certain prejudices, are not the basis of this outlook but its content. The real basis of any outlook upon the world is social being, because an outlook is a special form of social consciousness. The scientific outlook, whose content is the historical development of understanding of natural reality, integration of the diversity of the natural sciences, and generalisation of their principles, is also undoubtedly conditioned by social being, development of the productive forces of society, the character of relations of production, the advances of material culture (an integral element of which is the continuous perfecting of means of instrumental observation, measurement, and analysis). The moulding of the mechanistic world outlook thus not only has theoretical premisses but is also historically linked with the forming of the capitalist mode of production. Empiricism and its orientation on scrupulous description of separate, consciously isolated phenomena, objects, species of plant and animal, geographical zones, minerals,

etc., was brought into being as a definite methodology by the urgent needs of capitalist production, although it of course has theoretical roots.

People's social being moulds the everyday experience of every individual, which plays no small role as well in science, even in modern physics, in spite of the fact that it has gone far beyond phenomena accessible to direct observation. Louis de Broglie drew attention to that when characterising quantum physics:

We construct our images and our concepts drawing on our everyday experience; we draw certain aspects from this experience, and starting from that forge certain simple images by simplification and abstraction, and certain apparently clear concepts that we then try to use to interpret the phenomena.¹⁴

The value of everyday experience in the moulding of an outlook upon the world comes out particularly clearly in social development. As Lenin wrote:

No number of pamphlets and no amount of preaching can enlighten the proletariat, if it is not enlightened by its own struggle against the dark forces of capitalism.¹⁵

The proletariat's struggle against the dictatorship of capital moulds its class consciousness, which is a necessary premiss for the rise of a socialist outlook on the world. But however great the role of the proletariat's everyday economic struggle, that in itself could not lead to awareness of the historical need to overthrow capitalism. That revolutionary socialist consciousness was substantiated, of course, only by Marxism, which critically summarised the whole wealth of the preceding development of social thought, experience of social development, and experience of the working-class movement. The Marxist world outlook is organically linked both with the development of the theory and with practice of the socialist movement, namely the struggle against capitalism in some countries and the building of socialism in others where the dictatorship of capital has already been put an end to.

The expression 'scientific outlook' is sometimes understood in a one-sided way, and therefore incorrectly, only a generalisation of *scientific* data being seen in it. However great the significance of science (which, as we have already stressed above, constantly

moulds ideological generalisations), it is not and cannot be their sole source. The history of science indicates that its own ideological generalisations are largely determined by the objective social conditions of its development. Humanist, democratic, and atheist ideas, which form an essential aspect of the ideological generalisation of science, were conditioned by social development and social progress, the driving force of which was the workers' emancipation movement. That is why to reduce the scientific outlook to an aggregate of the most general scientific propositions means to take up a limited scientific position that remains confined to an idealist understanding of history. The scientific outlook, P. N. Fedoseyev emphasises, is not reducible

to mere comprehension of the results of science alone. Ideology is a product of the epoch as a whole and takes shape as a result of the summing-up and comprehension not of some single aspect of human activity, but of human existence as a whole, in all the diversity of its manifestations."

There was a time when the existence of slavery was represented as not only necessary but also natural, stemming from the allegedly immutable nature of man. Aristotle considered it a permanent condition of the life of society. And if slaveowner relations were abolished during subsequent social development, and slaveowner convictions discredited, the reason was the development of the productive forces, and the slaves' struggle against the slaveowners. The same must be said, as well, about the historical fates of serfdom and the ideological prejudices associated with it anent the age-old nature of class or caste inequality and the superiority of the nobility and clergy over the 'simple' people. Those prejudices were the dominant ideas of feudal society, because they represented the ideas of the dominant estates.

The development of capitalism put an end to feudal, serf relations, since they had ceased to correspond to the level and character of the productive forces developing in the womb of feudalism. But capitalist society, which also has an antagonistic character, generated its own ideological prejudices. Convictions that private property and competition are natural conditions of the free development of the individual must be ranked first among them. Socio-economic conditions, historically determined and progressive at a certain level of social development, were sancti-

fied as an eternal law of nature and source of human prosperity. Abolition of barriers between the feudal estates was interpreted by bourgeois ideologists as the establishment of social equality, though capitalism in fact increased social inequality even more when its basis was private ownership of the means of production.

The historical experience of building socialism is demonstrating in practice that free development of the members of society toward full social equality is only realised through liquidation of the capitalist mode of production and the building of a society free of antagonistic contradictions. The development of world outlooks, and transition from unscientific ideological convictions to scientific ones, thus represent social progress, the driving forces of which are diverse. This is an objective process of socio-economic and political development, ideological struggle, and understanding. The scientific outlook created by Marxism unites scientific facts (the ideological conclusions of the natural and social sciences) with the facts of everyday and historical experience, which in turn become the object of scientific analysis, and synthesises them by critical analysis, selection, and generalisation.

When the scientific outlook is regarded just as a summing up, albeit theoretical, of already available knowledge, it naturally functions not so much as a continuation of the inquiries made in the sciences, as their completion. Such an understanding of the scientific outlook, and in particular of the scientific, philosophic one, is one-sided, and in essence incorrect. First of all, a theoretical (and consequently critical) summing up of the scientific data, and even more of everyday and historical experience, is a specific form of research and inquiry, the results of which are new conclusions and deductions. The ideological conclusions that Engels drew from a philosophical generalisation of the great discoveries of science in the middle of the nineteenth century, differed essentially from those of Schleiden and Schwann, Mayer, and Darwin. And, what we must stress in particular, his generalisations, unlike their conclusions, authentically expressed the real content of their great discoveries. We must also stress that principles are worked out and developed within the context of a scientific (especially scientific philosophic) outlook that are not contained in the data of science and practice (at least directly) which form the basis of a world outlook. The significance of a scientific outlook consists, briefly, in its constituting the methodological

basis of research work, promoting determination of the general directions of inquiry, and bringing out the conditions and prerequisites for coping with its tasks.

It is commonly known what an outstanding role the mechanistic outlook played in the development of the natural sciences; it not only brought out the significance of mechanical processes in spheres well outside the subject-matter of mechanics, but also excluded false investigative approaches from science, and also the pseudo-problems corresponding to them (theological, teleological, organismic, etc.) The scientific, philosophic outlook of Marxism, in contrast to the mechanistic outlook, is free of one-sidedness, metaphysical limitedness, and absolutisation of the results achieved by knowledge.

One can hardly exaggerate the significance of a scientific world outlook both for inquiry and for practice. In opposition to the latest Western philosophy, which belittles or in general denies its significance, we must stress that world-outlook problems are constantly coming to the fore in the present-day ideological struggle. It is impossible in principle to cope with the global problems of today without an ideological analysis of them, and without trying to understand and generalise them. The modern scientific outlook is a powerful intellectual driving force of social progress.

¹ Karl Marx. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983), pp. 40-41.

² V. I. Lenin. The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion. *Collected Works*, Vol. 15 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982), p. 410.

³ V. I. Lenin. Critical Remarks on the National Question. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 26.

⁴ See G. W. F. Hegel. *Ästhetik*. Vol. 2 (Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin and Weimar, 1976), p. 364. This view of Hegel's was a development of a thesis of Kant's who first put the term *Weltanschauung* (view of life) into scientific circulation in his *Critique of Judgment* (1790). J. G. Fichte used the term in his first work *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung*, in which he counterposed a rational, in essence irreligious, philosophy to the religious view of the world.

Translator's note: the Russian word *mirovozzrenie* is defined in Smirnitsky's Russian-English Dictionary (Moscow, 1969) as 'world outlook; ... ideology, attitude; ... *Weltanschauung*'. In Ozhegov's *Dictionary of the Russian Language* (in Russian), it is defined as 'a system of views or opi-

nions on nature and society'. It is identified with *Weltanschauung* in Moskalskaya's *Big German-Russian Dictionary* (Moscow 1980). Tsarev's *Short English-Russian Philosophical Dictionary* defines 'world outlook' as *mirovozzrenie* and *Weltanschauung* as 'a conception of the development of events and aims of the world'. The *Oxford English Dictionary* does not list *Weltanschauung*, but *Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary* (London 1974) does, defining it as 'outlook upon the world, world philosophy'. Finally the *German-English Dictionary* (18th edition) published by the Verlag Enzyklopädie, Leipzig (1977), defines *Weltanschauung* as 'view of life, philosophy, ideology'. In view of what the authors call the 'polysemantism' of *mirovozzrenie*, I have rung the changes on the various English versions in the translation in order to convey its breadth of meaning. What we get, in fact, is something like the meaning of 'outlook' as Bertrand Russell used the term in his *The Scientific Outlook* (London, 1931).

¹ P. V. Kopnin. *Vvedenie v marksistskuyu gnoseologiyu* (Introduction to Marxist Epistemology), Naukova dumka, Kiev, 1966, p. 10.

² It is not fortuitous, for example, that the 16th World Congress of Philosophy (Düsseldorf, 1978) was devoted to the theme 'Philosophy and the World Views of Modern Sciences'. Eminent scientists, as well as philosophers, took an active part in discussion of this theme.

³ Karl Jaspers. *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, 5th edition (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1960), p. 1.

⁴ On this theme see, for example, T. I. Oizerman, *Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982), especially the chapter 'Philosophy and Everyday Consciousness'.

⁵ I. S. Shklovsky points out, as a counterweight to neopositivist claims, that the conclusions of a world outlook are introduced into science and are not generalisations based on scientific data, that 'with all the immense terrestrial technology, it had, and has, decisive significance for the moulding of a world outlook. In our day the ideological significance of astronomy is particularly great' (*Voprosy filosofii*, 1969, 5: 61). One cannot agree with this claim about the decisive importance of astronomy in the moulding of a world outlook, since it leaves out of account social being, which determines social consciousness, and also does not indicate what type of outlook (or ideology) is referred to. But the singling out of astronomy as a science that plays a special role in mankind's ideological development, is quite legitimate.

⁶ Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), p. 25.

⁷ V. G. Ivanov. *Fizika i mirovozzrenie* (Physics and World Outlook), Nauka, Leningrad, 1975, p. 79.

⁸ V. F. Chernovolenko. *Mirovozzrenie i nauchnoe poznanie* (World Outlook and Scientific Understanding), Kiev University Press, Kiev, 1970, pp. 58-59.

⁹ *Filosofskaya entsiklopediya*. Vol. 3 (Soviet Encyclopaedia Press, Moscow, 1964), p. 454.

¹⁴ Albert Einstein. *Cosmic Religion with Other Opinions and Aphorisms* (Covici-Friede Publishers, New York, 1931), p. 98.

¹⁵ V. I. Lenin. *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 335.

¹⁶ V. I. Lenin. Our Immediate Task. *Collected Works*, Vol. 4 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 217.

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin. The State. *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 471.

¹⁸ V. I. Lenin. Notes of a Publicist, *Collected Works*, Vol. 13 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p. 72.

¹⁹ Classical mechanics, Louis de Broglie noted, is characterised by the conviction that 'every physical event can, in principle, be strictly localised independently of all the dynamic processes that develop in it' (*La physique nouvelle et les quanta*, Flammarion, Paris, 1937, pp. 6-7). Things are different in quantum mechanics. In that connection de Broglie made a statement whose dialectical character is obvious: 'Precise localisation in space and time is a kind of static idealisation that rules out all evolution and all dynamism; the idea of a state of movement, in pure form, is on the contrary a dynamic idealisation that is contradictory in principle to the concepts of position and instant' (*ibid.*, p. 7).

²⁰ V. I. Lenin. *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, p. 108.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

²² P. N. Fedoseyev. Philosophy, World View, Science. *World Marxist Review*, 1978, 21, 12:50.

²³ Karl Marx. Theses on Feuerbach. In Marx, Engels. *The German Ideology* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p. 199.

²⁴ It must be stressed that neopositivism, too, which usually casts doubt on the concept 'world outlook', does not manage without the concept 'world'. Wittgenstein, for example, said: 'Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits' (Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949, p. 149). In another place in the same book, he declared: 'Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world' (p. 169). Even subjectivist, agnostic philosophy consequently, cannot get along without the concept 'world'.

²⁵ Louis de Broglie. *Op. cit.*, p. 242.

²⁶ V. I. Lenin. Socialism and Religion. *Collected Works*, Vol. 10 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p. 86.

²⁷ P. N. Fedoseyev. *Art. cit.*, p. 52.

2

The Specific Features of the Philosophic World Outlook

Philosophy as the Most General Theoretical Outlook

In the previous chapter we examined types of world outlook differing in their subject-matter and epistemological characteristics. How is philosophy related to them? Is it a special form of outlook? We gave a positive answer then, in general form it is true; that answer, however, needs special substantiation, since philosophy has functioned as an all-embracing 'science of sciences' (*scientia scientiorum*). Most philosophers have correspondingly not regarded their doctrines at all as a world outlook. Special substantiation is all the more necessary since the concept of outlook, as already indicated, was only formulated in the eighteenth century. It does not follow, however, as we shall try to show, that philosophy only became a world outlook then. It was a matter, rather, of awareness of a fact whose existence has been confirmed by the whole history of philosophy.

Philosophic doctrines were usually created as systems that included the whole theoretical content of scientific knowledge. Aristotle's system was physics, biology, psychology, and political science, in spite of the fact that a certain scientific specialisation already existed in his day. Outstanding mathematicians, astronomers, geographers, and historians of antiquity (who were by no means philosophers) are known to us. Aristotle's doctrine is an encyclopaedia of the scientific knowledge of antiquity, from which he, however, already singled out the 'first philosophy', subsequently called metaphysics. Analysis of the philosophic part of his doctrine proper outlines his philosophic outlook upon the world, which is not reducible to his physics, biology, psychology, etc.

The metaphysical systems of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries were also not, at least directly, ideological systems about

the world. Hegel's 'encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences' included all the fundamental sciences, which were subordinated to the imperatives of absolute idealism by a speculative, idealist interpretation that singled out their most general tenets. With that understanding of the sense and significance of philosophy, it seemed to Hegel that not only world outlook (*Weltanschauung*) but also traditional 'love of knowledge' were quite incompatible with the real essence of philosophy.

Hegel suggested that philosophy was not only the science of the absolute but also an absolute science from which all others derived their supreme underlying truths. It was not for nothing that he stated that

it is commonly held to be a formal kind of knowledge devoid of all substantial content. There is a general failure to perceive that, in the case of any knowledge and any science, what is taken for truth, even as regards content, can only deserve the name of 'truth' when philosophy had had a hand in its production. Let the other sciences try as much as they like to get along by ratiocination or *raisonnement* without philosophy, they are unable to keep alive without it, or to have any spiritual significance and truth in them.¹

In the Hegelian hierarchy of absolute knowledge there is no place, as may seem at first glance, for the sciences. The point is not, of course, that Hegel undervalued scientific knowledge, but rather that he absolutised science. For him the only science in the proper sense, however, was philosophy; all the others became part of the philosophic system as soon as they attained the appropriate speculative level (philosophy of nature, philosophy of history, philosophy of law, and so on). Hegel did not draw a line between science and world outlook (*Weltanschauung*), although he always distinguished problems of the latter in his examination of the scientific (and philosophic) problematic, and had a quite scornful attitude to concrete, especially the empirical scientific knowledge. The clearest synthetic expression of the basic ideological thought of his philosophy was his famous dictum: everything real is rational, and everything rational real.

Development of the special sciences, the differentiation of which is a driving force of scientific progress, makes it inevitable to draw a line between philosophy and the sciences of nature

and society, i.e. between the philosophic outlook and the knowledge of the special sciences. That is not fortuitous therefore that the concept of world outlook was formulated in the eighteenth century, i.e. in an age of intensive demarcation among the special sciences. The rise of positivism in the 1830s reflected that situation. Comte and Spencer interpreted philosophy as the theory of science, combining its most general theoretical premisses and results. Philosophy was accordingly treated as a scientific outlook, although it was not scientific in its positivist interpretation.

Modern positivists, unlike their predecessors, usually see only method in philosophy and not theory, i.e. a certain means of analysing scientific and unscientific ('metaphysical') statements. To reduce philosophy to a set of formal, 'technical' procedures is to deny its character as a world outlook, but that does not mean that neopositivism denies the existence of a world outlook, and even more of various ones. Its supporters have usually also recognised that most philosophic doctrines are ideological constructions. Neopositivism also claims, precisely, to break with this tradition alien, in its conviction, to science. Neopositivists counterpose a special methodology to philosophy as a world outlook, a methodology to solve philosophic problems by establishing the 'fact' that they lack scientific sense. Analysis of neopositivist doctrine nevertheless brings out its subjective, agnostic ideological orientation. That conclusion does not need special substantiation, since the evolution of neopositivism has led its followers to a conviction that their 'philosophy of science' implicitly presupposes certain 'metaphysical' ideological premisses.

In contrast to positivism, the irrationalist 'philosophy of life', one of whose founders was Wilhelm Dilthey, considered a world outlook the essence of philosophy. Dilthey counterposed a 'science of mind' (*Geisteswissenschaft*) to the natural sciences, clearly undervaluing the cognitive significance of the latter. According to him a philosophic outlook formed the deepest foundation of the 'science of mind', and was nothing else than understanding of life, man's self-comprehension of his essence, fundamental life experiences, and strivings within the framework of a historically determined epoch.

Philosophy [he wrote] has, finally, a relation with the practical world, its ideals and its order of life in the

context of the history of civilisation. Because it is the consciousness of will, and its rules, objects, and goods.'

The subjectivist interpretation of practice as a life-asserting complex of experiences and acts of will, the counterposing of the philosophic outlook to scientific knowledge (in particular to that of the natural sciences) and the claim that psychological introspection is the direct and therefore reliable knowledge from which philosophy springs, all gave Dilthey's conception of the philosophic outlook a fundamentally unscientific character.

Husserl, who suggested that phenomenology was absolutely incompatible with any kind of outlook, since it was a strict science, took a categorical stand of denying a philosophic outlook. The latter was unavoidably anthropological and psychological, i.e. subjective; it should be bracketed in the same way as empirical knowledge and discursive thinking. Real, true being was outside the empirically existing; it was ideally given and grasped by an intuitive, essential vision. The ideological character of his phenomenology is nevertheless obvious, whatever his subjective position.

We have thus established a contradiction between the actual content of philosophy (specific world outlook) and its inadequate form of expression (denial of the possibility or necessity of a *philosophic* outlook). That contradiction is apparently one of the source of the difficulties that philosophers constantly come up against when they try to define the concept 'philosophy'. Some have considered a theory of being the specific definition of philosophy, others the theory of knowledge, and still others a doctrine of values. Some philosophers insist that philosophy is a science, others, on the contrary, claim that it begins where science leaves off. In the opinion of a third group philosophy is a 'No Man's Land' somewhere between theology and science. But the different definitions can be put in their place (in historical retrospect, of course) when we examine them as different, sometimes even mutually exclusive descriptions of the philosophic outlook, whose content is by no means given to start with. This outlook changes, develops, passes from one definition to another, opposite one, negates its former content while remaining a specific philosophic outlook upon the world. And whatever position a philosophy adopts in relation to world outlook (whether it substantiates one or rejects any world outlook)

we always discover a system of ideological generalisations in it. The fight against a world outlook is only one against a certain philosophic (and non-philosophic) outlook, and denial of a philosophic outlook is a definite ideological, philosophic position. It is important to stress that the more philosophy moves away from claims to create a comprehensive science of sciences, the more obvious its ideological essence becomes.

The line between philosophy and the special sciences, which is sometimes inexactly described as the 'hiving off' of the sciences from philosophy, by no means signifies its conversion into a special scientific discipline, as neopositivists suggest. It is a process of the discovery, development, and confirmation of its specific ideological essence. Dialectical materialism, while rejecting in principle any counterposing of philosophic inquiry to special scientific research (and so negating philosophy in the old sense of the word) defines the philosophic doctrine created by Marxism as follows:

It is no longer a philosophy at all, but simply a world outlook which has to establish its validity and be applied not in a science of sciences standing apart, but in the real sciences [Engels].³

It would be distortion of Engels' thought if we interpreted it in the spirit that pre-Marxist philosophy was not a world outlook since it was built as an all-embracing, absolute science. That fact undoubtedly glosses over the ideological characteristics of philosophy but in no way abolishes them. Materialism and idealism, mechanism and teleology, rationalism and empiricism, like all other philosophic trends and doctrines, is always an ideological system. Marxism's negation of philosophy in the old sense of the term is a dialectical negation that brings out and confirms the real ideological essence (and function) of philosophy. That is why Engels, developing the thesis above, said:

Philosophy is therefore 'sublated' here, that is 'both overcome and preserved', overcome as regards its form, and preserved as regards its real content.⁴

This real content of philosophy, in contrast to its varied ideological, historically conditioned forms of expression, has the character of a world outlook; our job is to characterise its specific features.

it is true, also have a theoretical character, but they cannot (by their nature) be general outlooks, whose subject-matter is not just natural, not just social, but a unity of the two.

The specific features of a general world outlook also determine the specific features of *philosophic thinking*, which comes out clearly enough in the doctrine of categories, mentioned above.

Engels frequently stressed that philosophy taught how to think theoretically and that there was still (in the middle of the 1870s) no other, non-philosophic school of theoretical thought. Without going into that thesis here (we have already examined it in a special history of philosophy study⁸), we would simply note that, according to it, philosophy adequately expresses the essence and main distinguishing features of theoretical thinking. It is not simply a matter, too, of philosophy's having been historically the first form of theoretical thought, or of natural science's beginning to be theoretical (and not just empirical) inquiry only in the latter half of the nineteenth century (and that not in all its main branches). The fact is that theorising, with all its negative (speculative) and positive aspects, has had its broadest development precisely in philosophy. It is in philosophy that the theoretical forms the content as well as the form or mode of inquiry. Its essential content lies in its investigation of forms of theoretical thought (we have in mind not just logic as a part of philosophy, but also the doctrine of categories as forms of thought characterising the forms of universality intrinsic in objective reality).

In order to appreciate this specific characteristic of philosophy properly, we must analyse the features of theoretical thought that were (so to say) primordially inherent in it, while they took shape in science only at the stage of transition from descriptively empirical study of phenomena to abstract theoretical investigation of idealised objects. Let us consider the teaching of Thales from this angle; according to him water was originally the universal essence of everything that existed; everything arose from water and everything was converted into water.

That statement was based on sense observed facts but it came into conflict at the same time with everyday experience, which taught that bread and wine were not water. Thales' basic thesis was partly a logical conclusion, partly an assumption confirmed by certain facts. Its general premiss was also the ab-

sence of knowledge about essential differences between phenomena. Thales' conclusion was nothing else than a leap from direct observation to a universal theoretical generalisation. But the theoretical, even in its most limited forms, is not reducible, in principle, to the sense data on which it is built up. It can be supported only by new empirical data, which it often becomes possible to obtain precisely through this theoretical position. The leap from empirical statements to theoretical generalisations may consequently be a guess, as often happens in science, which must incidentally be regarded not simply as chance (in the psychological sense of the word) but as a normal form of theoretical quest that is necessarily displayed in assumptions, conclusions by analogy, and hypotheses. 'No logical path leads from observation to the principles of theory,' Einstein said.⁹ That should not be interpreted as an admission of the alogical; it is rather what the well-known contemporary physicist Richard Feynman writes:

In general we look for a new law by the following process. First we guess it. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then we compare the result of the computation to nature, with experiment or experience, compare it directly with observation, to see if it works.¹⁰

Suppositions, guesses, and hypotheses are usually generalisations made from limited data of observation, insufficient in number. Such, in particular, are inductive inferences, since they are based on an inevitably incomplete series of observations. These conclusions are consequently leaps from vagueness of indefiniteness to definiteness, which is initially only a conviction that is subsequently confirmed or, on the contrary, refuted by new facts. Arguments about the illegitimacy of inductive generalisations are unsound unless, of course, we forget that this kind of generalisation is no apodictic and that its universality may be very limited or even imaginary. But, however problematical the universality of inductive conclusions, the scientist who formulates a certain pattern from observations and experiments cannot limit its universality, however much he wants to, unless he has, of course, the necessary factual data for it. Feynman's following statement is therefore quite understandable:

We must, and we should, and we always do, extend as far as we can beyond what we already know, beyond those ideas that we have already obtained. Dangerous? Yes. Uncertain? Yes, But it is the only way to make progress.¹¹

We may not agree with his over-categorical statement about the only way to make progress in science, but there is no doubt that extrapolation of scientific conclusions obtained from limited factual data to new, still uninvestigated phenomena is both expedient and inevitable, in spite of its being undoubtedly fraught with errors. And Feynman is right when he concludes: 'It is necessary to extend the ideas beyond where they have been tested.'¹²

Theoretical inquiry is theoretical precisely because it goes beyond experience (available experience, of course, and not experience in general). But, since empirical research also crosses the boundaries of available experience to some extent, his characterisation of theoretical inquiry is still inadequate. Any generalisation rises above already available experience precisely because it is an abstraction of identification. What is it then that specifically characterises theoretical generalisation? (1) First there is extrapolation not limited to the available data and based on investigation of a necessity, relation, or process that is interpreted as universal. The universal is inseparable from necessity, and the latter cannot be established empirically. As Lenin said:

Theoretical cognition ought to give the object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement, *an-und für-sich* (in and for itself).¹³

(2) Theoretical generalisation is entry into a sphere inaccessible to sensory reflection of reality (at least at a given level of knowledge), a transition from sense perception to the 'supersensory', not in the metaphysical sense, of course, but in the dialectical one that Lenin pointed out:

Sensuous representation cannot apprehend movement *as a whole*, it cannot, for example, apprehend movement with a speed of 30,000 km per second, but *thought* does and must apprehend it.¹⁴

Theoretical thought is capable of judging the past, and the future, i.e. what is already not and what is still not. But it of

course has limits, at least relative ones, namely those of possible experience. The statement must not be understood in the Kantian sense, linked with a subjectivist conception of time and space. A graphic example of the limit of possible experience in modern physics is the so-called 'mental experiments' that usually suppose optimal, in practice unachievable conditions and technical possibilities of the experiment.

Unlike Kant, Lenin interpreted the difference between the thing-in-itself into the thing-for-us dialectically. Knowledge is the transformation of the thing-in-itself into the thing-for-us. Since that process takes place in practice, it is the transformation of necessity-in-itself into necessity-for-us, i.e. into freedom. The thing-for-us, i.e. knowledge, is part of the thing-in-itself, i.e. the unknown. And theoretical knowledge is the extension of knowledge embracing the field of things-for-us to the still not understood field of the thing-in-itself. It is not, of course, an arbitrary extension of knowledge about some things to others, still unknown; it is done on the basis of standards and perspectives given by accumulated experience, and is corrected by the subsequent practice of inquiry.

Let us now examine the philosophy of Thales so as to bring out the specific character of thought fully, as it is realised in philosophy. Thales' thesis about the special nature of water, which was the absolute essence of all things for him, was of course erroneous, but it was an error *full of content* that implicitly includes certain ideas that could not in any way be appraised as false. They were the idea of primary matter, the idea of substance as the universal essence of things, the idea of the unity (material unity) of the world, the idea of universal change in nature, universal transformation, and the universal link of all things, the idea of the self-motion of matter. None of these ideas was directly expressed by Thales, of course, at a time when such terms as 'substance', 'matter', 'self-motion' still did not exist. But that is not of decisive importance, for it was a matter of the implicit thought and meaning of his basic proposition, and of the conclusions that logically followed from it.

Thales' conception meant, epistemologically, recognition of the knowability in principle of the world, a conviction that the world should be explained from itself, excluding the supernatural, and from consciousness of the substantial character of sense

data for knowledge both of individual things and their universal essence. Thales distinguished philosophic conviction from the notions of everyday consciousness, which in embryo presupposed a demarcation (and even counterposing) of the theoretical and the empirical, and recognition of the inevitability of a contradiction between them.

Thales said that the gods had originated from water. That dictum (as it appears, in any case, at first glance) was not amenable to evaluation in general as true or false. Theologians cannot help being indignant at such a naturalistic 'theology'; atheists do not agree either with the recognition of the existence of gods or with the attempt to deduce the notion of their existence from some fact of nature. Nevertheless, Thales' thesis was brilliant, and included truths that should seemingly be called *intentional*, because there was obvious error in it, but it included profound, in many ways true, ideas in covert form, and (what is no less important) rational methodological precepts.

The thesis of the natural origin of the gods is evidence of Thales' amazing consistency. Having recognised water, i.e. a certain substance of nature, as the original cause, he deduced not only all other natural things from it but also what was traditionally considered supernatural. The gods were converted into natural beings, and that was undoubtedly a turn in principle toward an atheistic outlook. There was nothing supernatural; everything had natural causes and a natural explanation. It is worth stressing that the naturalistic world conception that began with Thales only triumphed in science in modern times.

The amazing consistency of the conclusion drawn by Thales brings out one of the most essential features of philosophic thought. Readers of philosophical works are often startled by the extravagant conclusions that philosophers ultimately come to, which can only be properly understood when one traces the inner logic of the philosophic system that inevitably leads to them. From that angle, too, the inconsistency of the final conclusions may prove to be a consistent conclusion from ambiguous premises.

We also know that Thales discovered magnetism, or rather the property of certain substances to attract iron. He even tried to explain this property, which he apparently considered so essential that he thought it possible to suppose the most unbeliev-

able thing, namely that a magnet attracted iron filings because it had a soul. An essential feature of philosophic thought comes out here, namely, sweeping analogies, intrepid extrapolations, assumptions that lack adequate grounds, and even the use of the prejudices of everyday consciousness.

Thales did not know, of course, that this 'soul' was consciousness. But everyday experience, from which he set out, indicated that living matter was capable of 'attracting' things to itself. A magnet did not have an adaptation in order to 'seize' iron filings; but our hands pick fruit because consciousness, the 'soul', 'tells' them to do so. That means that it is a matter not of an adaptation for seizing, but of a 'soul' that is itself the 'cause' of the seizing movement.

It goes without saying that our reconstruction of motives of Thales' conviction about the properties of a magnet is just a guess. It is based on his main principle, that only natural things, explicable by natural causes, exist. His argument about the source of the properties inherent in a magnet is also remarkable in this respect, that it brings out the root peculiarity of theoretical thought pointed out above, namely to leap from the empirical to the theoretical and from the stating of facts to their explanation.

One of the jobs of epistemology is a concrete inquiry into the leap-like passage from the data of observations to theoretical generalisations. The history of science and philosophy reveals a diversity of such dialectical transitions, which are scientifically justified in some cases, but turn out to be mistakes in others, and in others still have a 'mixed character'. Epistemologically this transition is a negation of sensuous authenticity, a mental assumption, stimulated by imagination, about the reality of what has not yet been established by observation or cannot, in general, be the object of observation.

The materialists of antiquity asserted that nothing came from nothing. That principle, in spite of its obvious tautological character, was full of content. Christian theologians and supporters of creationism in general are very well aware of that. Spinoza confirmed the principle of the substantiality of nature. John Toland and the French materialists of the eighteenth century put forward the principle of the self-motion of matter. Engels, characterising one of the great discoveries of nineteenth-century

science, having these results of the development of philosophy in mind, said: 'The unity of all motion in nature is no longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural-scientific fact'.¹⁶

Philosophy arose in general as natural philosophy, in which brilliant scientific insights had already been formulated in antiquity. In modern times natural philosophy, fulfilling the function, to some extent, of theoretical science (and seemingly preparing the way for its rise), developed a number of broad natural-science generalisations. Engels pointed out that it

could do this only by putting in place of the real but as yet unknown interconnections ideal, fancied ones, filling in the missing facts by figments of the mind and bridging the actual gaps merely in imagination. In the course of this procedure it conceived many brilliant ideas and foreshadowed many later discoveries, but it also produced a considerable amount of nonsense, which indeed could not have been otherwise.¹⁶

The first cosmogonic theories were created by natural philosophers. Giordano Bruno's natural philosophy was based on Copernicus' heliocentric system and was a further development of it. Descartes took Copernicus' ideas into his own cosmogony, based on a proposition about the origin of the solar system. The idea of the transformation of animal and plant species was developed by eighteenth-century natural philosophers. Schelling's natural philosophy was an outstanding attempt to comprehend and unite, theoretically, in a single whole, the doctrine of electricity, the discovery of oxygen, and the achievements of biology in the second half of the eighteenth century. The physicist Oersted discovered electromagnetic induction under Schelling's direct influence. Lorenz Oken, a supporter of Schelling's natural philosophy, anticipated cell theory.

Engels categorically condemned the unhistoric approach to natural philosophy, and the scornful attitude to it that was common among quite a few naturalists in the nineteenth century, pointing out that empiricist naturalists often fell into theoretical errors that were a step back compared with natural philosophy.¹⁷ It was in this connection that he stressed that natural philosophy

contains a great deal of nonsense and fantasy, but not more than the unphilosophical theories of the empiricist.

rical natural scientists contemporary with that philosophy, and that there was also in it much that was sensible and rational began to be perceived after the theory of evolution became widespread.¹⁸

The development of the natural sciences led to their gradual emancipation from limited empiricism as well as to their separation from natural philosophy. Empiricism, by rejecting theoretical generalisation, had proved incapable of comprehending facts that were evidence of the existence in nature herself of objective forms of universality that natural philosophy had tried to discover by speculation. The counterposing of natural philosophy to natural science became a historical anachronism because natural science itself had taken the road of broad theoretical generalisations. Engels, summing up this historical process, wrote:

Today, when one needs to comprehend the results of natural scientific investigation only dialectically, that is, in the sense of their own interconnection... today natural philosophy is finally disposed of. Every attempt at resurrecting it would be not only superfluous but a *step backwards*.¹⁹

That of course did not mean that philosophy had lost its function of anticipating natural scientific discoveries in our time. On the contrary, this anticipation has become the business, as a rule, of philosophically thinking naturalists. That circumstance indicates that philosophic thought is also necessary in the special sciences of nature, by virtue of its special theoretical character, not to mention the social sciences in which its absolute need was brilliantly demonstrated by Marx's *Capital*.

Theoretical discoveries (of which forecasting is a type) are epistemologically a negation of direct data. The same must be said of theoretical errors, since there is no special capacity for error different from cognitive activity. Knowledge is increased by discovery of the truth, depending on the circumstances, or falls into error. Epistemological inquiry into the process of knowledge is at the same time also inquiry into error. The opposition of truth and error is not absolute. The dialectic of understanding does not eliminate either their opposition or their relative character. Unity of these opposites is (in certain conditions, of course) a specific phenomenon of knowledge.

The investigator is constantly trying to delimit and counterpose truth and error but that opposition is limited, by virtue of necessity, to certain contexts. In natural philosophy truth and error are interpenetrating opposites that can only be demarcated by going beyond the limits of this abstract, speculative form of philosophising. The source of both the insights and errors of natural philosophers is (as Engels said) their 'extravagant theorising'.²⁰ This essential feature of speculative philosophising merits special examination, since it expresses the nature of theoretical thought, though inadequately.

The Marxist negation of philosophy in the old sense is a repudiation of extravagant theorising. But it is a dialectical negation, a repudiation of the force of abstraction that had become its weakness, a rejection of abstracting that had got out of touch with the facts and overstepped all limits. Without abstraction there is no thinking, of course, even at the empirical level; theoretical thinking means to pass from the facts to abstract objects (lines in geometry, ideal gas or an absolutely black body in physics), including concepts that can get empirical application only through their empirical interpretation. The existence in science of concepts that are not amenable to empirical interpretation, just like the existence of concepts that have only an operational significance, remains an open question as regards their objective content. There are also abstractions that, overstepping any limitation, ignore the real properties of objects, claiming to know their underlying basis. The speculative philosopher, Marx pointed out, digresses from what distinguishes one fruit from another (e.g. an apple from a pear) and examines the general concept of fruit not as the result of abstracting thought or as abstraction, but on the contrary as the supreme reality, the substance of real apples and pears, which are thus the product of the 'self-motion' of fruit in general. The concept is transformed into the ontological basis of real things, i.e. is interpreted idealistically.

The speculative philosopher, depriving real things of their properties, obtains an abstraction of a thing, an abstraction of movement that he substitutes for the real things and their motion. As Marx wrote:

If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we

are right in saying that in the final abstraction, the only substance left is the logical categories."¹

We must stress that the Marxist critique of extravagant abstraction has nothing in common with disparagement of the significance of scientific abstraction or limiting of its level. For example, neither chemical reagents nor other means of inquiry of the natural sciences are applicable in political economy; it all admits of being replaced by the force of abstraction. That can also be said of certain other sciences that have attained a high level of abstraction. The more scientific abstractions depart from the empirical object of inquiry, the more they lead to deeper knowledge of it.

When Galileo was studying the laws of falling bodies, he abstracted their shape and weight and the fact that they fell in a certain gaseous medium. He compared the results obtained mathematically with the data of observation and experiment. The comparison indicated that the abstraction, which made a mathematical description of the law of falling possible, was justified, at least within certain limits. It goes without saying that aerodynamics takes the shape and weight of bodies into account when studying their free fall, and also the medium, since this science studies the optimum conditions of the movement of flying machines.

Science did not immediately take the path of experimentally controlled abstraction. The history of scientific thought in antiquity and the Middle Ages provides many examples of unjustified assumptions and unsubstantiated abstraction. It was only gradually, as reliable scientific information was amassed and the experimental foundation of research laid, that it became possible to surmount uncontrolled abstracting. And the greater the advance made by science, and the bigger the stock of facts and knowledge it disposed of, the more substantiated were the abstractions employed by it and the techniques of abstraction.

The limitations of the process of abstraction amassed by the content of science and the experience of its development do not signify any weakening of the power of abstraction. The bans relate only to extravagant theorising. And even they should not be taken as a categorical imperative.

The progress of science has removed scientific propositions further and further from everyday experience and the directly ob-

served phenomena. The transition from phenomenon to essence, from one essence to another, deeper one, is an intensification of the scale of abstraction, penetration of abstracting thought into new realms of reality, and development of the power of abstraction. Subordination of abstracting activity to certain norms signifies at the same time a change of those norms, and a development of the power of abstraction within new limits.

When we draw a hard and fast line between substantiated and unsubstantiated theorising, extravagant abstraction, etc., we should not take the path of counterposing them absolutely. The relation of these opposites is not reducible to an antithesis of scientific knowledge and unscientific thinking. They exist in science as well, which cannot (and sometimes should not) avoid insufficiently unsubstantiated, risky abstraction and theorising, the more so that we can far from always say whether the philosophical abstractions are substantiated or adequately substantiated. The initial propositions of materialist philosophy are substantiated by the whole aggregate of the data of practice. It is consequently more correct to speak only of inadequately substantiated theorising predominating in speculative (pre-Marxist and non-Marxist) philosophy, and sometimes even extravagant abstracting, with which the natural sciences had already finished in the main in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The substantiation of abstractions is always relative, of course. Some scientific abstractions only became truly scientific during the development of science; in their original form they are not adequately substantiated and are sometimes rejected as arbitrary assumptions. The fate of many hypotheses that have become proven theories with time fully confirms that truth. New ideas that revolutionise science do not win recognition for a long time not simply through inertia and addiction to the old, but also because they come into conflict with old, well substantiated, yet at the same time limited theoretical notions. It also often happens that new theoretical propositions are a breakthrough into a still uninvestigated field; that makes them lack substantiation up to a certain time. The substantiation or non-substantiation of a theoretical proposition does not of itself coincide with its truth or falsity. The groundlessness or insufficient grounding of a theoretical proposition may also be due to its

one-sided development, absence of conditions for its practical application, etc. Some fully substantiated propositions become false through overestimation of the limits of their applicability. Even a truth may turn out to be error if it is pushed beyond certain limits, which cannot usually, however, be established in advance.

Niels Bohr made a witty remark, which became widely accepted, about the scientific fruitfulness of crazy ideas that come into conflict with traditional notions and convictions that have acquired the solidity of prejudice. He had in mind revolutionary scientific ideas that it was impossible to translate immediately into the language of common sense, to make agree with existing scientific knowledge, or to back by many partial inquiries. They therefore seem queer, though subsequent development lends them the character of new, generally accepted scientific standards, which with time also begin to be shaken (or limited) by new crazy ideas.

The history of philosophy presents a host of such ideas to our mental gaze, most of which have subsequently become established as the property of everyday consciousness as well as of science. It should not be thought that a philosophy loses this capacity to revolutionise theoretical thinking when it becomes a scientific, philosophic outlook. On the contrary, rather. The sciences with which philosophy becomes integrated give new impetus to its inquiries.

So, when we characterise philosophy as a general theoretical world outlook, we thereby point out both its *differentia specifica* and its features that are inherent in all sciences that have reached the level of theoretical inquiry. What distinguishes philosophy from these sciences is at the same time also common to both of them. The difference includes identity, because it is a dialectical difference. But this common element is inherent in philosophy and the sciences to substantially different degrees. The quantitative differences pass into qualitative ones. In order to understand philosophy correctly, therefore (or, incidentally, any phenomena in general), we have to grasp both the features that distinguish it from other phenomena and those they have in common. The specific and the non-specific are linked together, as opposites whose unity is also the essence of the phenomenon.

The Marxist definition of philosophy that we want to end this section with must, of course, be applicable to all philosophic doctrines in spite of the fact that they quite often diverge not only in their understanding of the essence of philosophy but also in the direction of inquiry, which means that our definition should not be made a standard. It only indicates what philosophy was over the ages and what it remains in our day, in spite of all the changes that it has undergone. On the other hand, this definition may only be correct insofar as it reflects, on the one hand, the centuries-old counterposing of philosophic knowledge to unphilosophic inquiry and practice, and, on the other hand, registers the fact of Marxism's overcoming of this opposition by creating a scientific, philosophic world outlook. In short, our definition should be a theoretical summing up of the historical, philosophic process.

Philosophy is a system of convictions that forms a general theoretical outlook upon the world which comprehends, critically analyses, and generalises scientific knowledge, everyday practice, and historical experience, investigates the diversity of the forms of universality intrinsic in nature and society, and on that basis develops the principles of knowledge, evaluation, behaviour, and the practical activity in general with which people link their vital interests in different historical epochs.

The main concepts that our definition of philosophy was built up from have already been examined above. It remains for us, in conclusion, simply to touch briefly on two moments not considered above. Philosophy is a *system* of definite convictions, and that distinguishes it from philosophic thought (reflection), which has its place in fragmentary form in any field of knowledge, artistic creation, or everyday life. Owing to this reflection the unity of philosophy with all forms of mental assimilation of the world, and the unsoundness of counterposing it to unphilosophic activity becomes obvious. Philosophy, of course, presupposes philosophic thought, but the latter also exists outside philosophy, and sometimes independently of it, which means that it is not just philosophers who think philosophically.

Philosophy must be regarded as a system not just because systematic exposition is characteristic of most philosophies. Some, on the contrary, are expounded fragmentarily, aphoristically, since their founders categorically rejected the concept of a phi-

losophic system. Analysis of these doctrines nevertheless indicates that absence of the external signs of a system does no rule out the existence of premisses that agree with one another, and of philosophic deductions that also agree with them. The contradictions that are sometimes discovered in these feigned anti-systems are evidence in part of the inconsistency of their creators and partly of their attempts to overcome this inconsistency.

Dialectical materialism is the negation of traditional philosophic systems built up as closed systems of knowledge, once and for all completed, independent of the subsequent development of knowledge. The philosophic system created by Marxism is a developing system overcoming the limited character of each of the degrees of philosophic knowledge already attained. In that respect, consequently, the scientific, philosophic outlook on the world fully overcomes unsound counterposing of philosophy to scientific knowledge.²²

The unity of philosophic and special scientific inquiry, which could not be broken down by the centuries' old counterposing of philosophy to non-philosophic inquiry, is convincingly demonstrated in the fact that philosophy constantly comprehends and tackles the most general epistemological problems of scientific quest. Philosophy performs a special ideological function that neither the individual, specific sciences nor the aggregate of concrete, scientific knowledge in general takes on, or can take on.

The sciences, when performing their special investigative tasks, do not bother to analyse the concepts they operate with, if these are not special ones of that field of inquiry. The sciences discover laws, establish certain truths, and develop hypotheses, theories, etc., but they do not answer the questions: what is a law? what is truth? what is a hypothesis, a theory, science? The concepts with which they operate (having in mind sensuously observed facts, or notions quite clear to the scientist) become objects of the special analysis that philosophy concerns itself with. The naturalist studies material bodies but does not ask 'what is matter?'. His theoretical activity does not in itself interest him; it serves him as a means or mode of inquiry, a special mental state that gives profound satisfaction. And when Descartes, for example, asked 'What is thought',²³ or Fichte asked 'By what authority does man call a certain part of the physical world his body?',²⁴ they posed specifically philosophic prob-

lems. When philosophy answers these questions it is concerned with methodological matters as well as ideological problems. The general philosophical methodology, in contrast to the methodology of the inquiries of the special sciences, coincides in the main with a world outlook. Dialectics is not only a method, but also a theory, viz., the theory of development.

In our day the immense methodological and ideological significance of dialectical materialism is also often recognised by scientists in capitalist countries who, being aware of the unsoundness of the idealist outlook, are attracted to Marxism's scientific, philosophic outlook upon the world, which reflects the real trend of development of science.²⁵ That fact is supremely indicative when one allows for the ideological atmosphere of capitalist society, hostile to Marxism.

A scientific understanding of philosophy as a specific form of *scientific* knowledge, insofar as it has in mind the philosophic doctrine of Marxism, helps us more deeply to comprehend the place of philosophy in the system of scientific knowledge, and its relation to practice, in particular and especially to the practice of the socialist reconstruction of society.

The Basic Question of Philosophy. The Unity and Diversity of the Philosophic Problematic

The definition of a philosophy as a general theoretical outlook upon the world is directly linked, as Engels pointed out, with the answer to the basic philosophic question, i.e. with analysis of the main, and at the same time most differing, forms of universality, viz., material and ideal. The concepts of the material and the ideal embrace the whole aggregate of really existing and mental phenomena.

These [Lenin said] are the ultimate, most comprehensive concepts, which epistemology has in point of fact so far not surpassed (apart from changes in *nomenclature*, which are *always possible*).²⁶

That which is material is not spiritual, and vice versa. But at the same time the spiritual is linked with the material, does not exist without it, is its product and a property of highly organis-

ed matter. That is the basic premiss of materialist philosophy. Idealism, on the contrary, insists that the material is only a manifestation of the spiritual. The main philosophical trends are thus agreed that the concepts material and spiritual are the ultimate general concepts, signifying two main classes of phenomena that have a certain causal relation with one another.

The concepts of the material and spiritual are abstractions at a very high level. The line of principle between them, which was already drawn in antiquity, is largely an achievement of the philosophy and science of modern times. Plato differentiated the material and the ideal as the corporeal and non-corporeal. Aristotle suggested that form differed from matter as an immaterial principle. Plato also introduced the concept of a transcendental 'soul' or 'spirit' that only temporarily resided in the body, leaving it after man's death. The main substantial form of the spiritual, according to Plato, was the idea, i.e. concepts of all existing things, which formed another world independent of them.

In modern times the concept of the spiritual, even within idealist philosophy, approximates to reality. For Descartes it was nothing other than thought, consciousness, i.e. by no means transcendental. But he opposed it absolutely to the material, which he reduced to extension. For all its unsoundness that dualistic posing of the basic philosophic question, contained a profound conjecture. The opposing of the spiritual to the material in the context of the basic philosophic question was really absolute. One of the two—either the material or the spiritual—could be the initial, primary one. There was no third. Descartes himself tried to avoid this alternative. The Cartesian assumption of two substances was refuted by Spinoza, who demonstrated that there was an absolutely primary one.

Even the antithesis of matter and mind [Lenin wrote] has absolute significance only within the bounds of a very limited field—in this case exclusively within the bounds of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is indubitable."

And science, in fact, after it had cleared up the substance of the delimitation of material processes, on the one hand, and

spiritual ones on the other, had already obtained the opportunity to investigate the relation of the spiritual and material, and their actual unity, in the biological form of existence of matter, which was fully realised in human life and society. Science, inquiring into material processes that possessed spiritual properties, brought out the dependence of the latter on certain states of matter, changes in which caused their disappearance and a transition from the highest form of the development of matter to the lowest. Materialist philosophy is thus a more general ideological summing up of the naturalists' inquiries.

As Engels wrote: 'Our consciousness and thinking, however suprasensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain.'²⁸ The spiritual/material relation (insofar as the spiritual, psychological is transformed through development of the biological form of existence of matter into a specifically human, social relation of consciousness to objective reality independent of it) becomes the cognitive process. That is the epistemological aspect of the basic question of philosophy, in contrast to its ontological aspect. And here consciousness and the external world (correspondingly, the subjective and the objective) function as extremely broad concepts embracing everything existing on the one hand and everything mental on the other.

Consciousness is always awareness of what is not consciousness; its existence presupposes a reality independent of it that it reflects. Self-consciousness, i.e. man's consciousness of himself, is an indirect reflection of the external world that is directly represented, however, as independent of it. Descartes erected this directness and unmediated character of self-awareness into an absolute principle of philosophy (idealist, of course). But Kant demonstrated that it undoubtedly posited a reality, an external world independent of it.

We thus see that the basic philosophic question registers the fact of human existence and its main premiss, the *sine qua non* of man's conscious, purposeful activity. Since consciousness is intrinsic in man, and since he is aware of objects around him, and distinguishes himself from the external world, he finds himself in a situation that is formulated by the basic question of philosophy. The relation of the spiritual and the material is a fact that exists independently of man's consciousness. At the

same time it specifically characterises human existence. Hence it is understandable why the question of the relation of the spiritual and the material (and correspondingly of the subjective and the objective) forms the basic question of philosophy. Philosophers did not dream it up; it arises from the whole of human practice, the history of knowledge, and human history in general. It is also clear, however, that the diversity of people's relations with the world around them is expressed in a one-sided way, abstractly and theoretically, by the basic philosophic question.

The psychophysical problem, and investigation of the evolution of life in general, are organically linked with the basic philosophic question. The materialist answer to it (realised or not) is the initial methodological premiss of any scientific research.

The basic philosophic question also includes other problems of philosophy whose significance cannot be exaggerated. The problems of substance, unity of the world, the thing-in-itself, the subjective and the objective, practice as the specific, active unity of the spiritual and material—all at bottom posit it. But it would be wrong to deduce them from it or to reduce them to it. The real content of all philosophic problems is derived from the development of science, practical activity, and historical experience. Attempts to interpret the problematic of philosophy as the result of logical development of the content of the basic philosophic question, i.e. identification of the subject-matter of philosophy with it, are mistaken. The subject-matter of philosophy does not boil down to which is primary, the material or the ideal. That point is no longer a problem today, i.e. it is already a resolved matter, even if idealist theories dispute the answer. The subject-matter of philosophy, and of any investigative activity, primarily comprises an aggregate of problems, i.e. questions subject to solution. Resolved questions are not, of course, excluded from the subject-matter of science, but they cease to be objects of inquiry.

The materialist conception of history rejects reduction of the evolution of knowledge to a logical process. The epistemology of dialectical materialism excludes a widening interpretation of the main philosophic question that glosses over its real significance and slurs over its alternative character. Engels stressed that it is a matter of 'which is primary, spirit or nature'.²⁹

Lenin attributed decisive importance to that formulation of Engels' when determining the trend of a philosophic doctrine:

Engels was right when he said that the essential thing is not which of the numerous schools of materialism or idealism a particular philosopher belongs to, but whether he takes nature, the external world, matter in motion, or spirit, reason, consciousness, etc., as primary.²⁰

Lenin consequently insisted that the spiritual/material question should be examined in a strictly determined aspect within the context of the basic philosophic question, since it was a matter

of the antithesis between materialism and idealism, of the difference between the two fundamental lines in philosophy. Are we to proceed from things to sensation and thought? Or are we to proceed from thought and sensation to things?²¹

The spiritual/material question (and the psychophysical problem as well) is not reducible to the basic philosophic question; it is much broader in its content since it presupposes inquiry into various forms of the psychic and spiritual on the one hand, and investigation of various forms of the material (e.g. biological, social) on the other, which usually goes well beyond the limits of philosophy.

While an absolute counterposing of the spiritual and material has its place within the basic question of philosophy, psychological inquiry treats these opposites as relative.

Extended understanding of the basic philosophic question, which may appear at first glance to stress its underlying importance, in reality glosses over the latter, since the profound sense and epistemological necessity of this question consist in its categorically formulated alternative: materialism or idealism. To ignore that alternative is to condemn any philosophising to eclectic groping.

Lenin wrote:

Whether nature, matter, the physical, the external world should be taken as primary, and consciousness, mind, sensation (experience—as the widespread terminology of our time has it), the psychical, etc., should be regarded as secondary—that is the root question which in fact continues to divide the philosophers into two great camps.²²

By stressing the significance of the alternative choice, he thus characterised the place of the basic question of philosophy in each philosopher's system of views, whether or not some was conscious of it or no. A materialist or an idealist answer to the basic philosophic question forms the starting point of philosophic inquiry, and theoretically predetermines its direction, the philosopher's position, and whether he belongs to one of the main philosophic doctrines. But the basic philosophic question does not coincide with the subject-matter of philosophy, even though it constitutes a very essential part of it.

While opposing underestimation of the basic philosophic question, we must at the same time not forget its specific content and in what sense it is basic. The problematic of philosophy, the themes of philosophic inquiries, the content of philosophic disputes, and the philosophic ideas that predominate in any historical period are all the product of social development, knowledge (understanding), and practice. To reduce the diversity of the philosophic problematic to one aspect, however great its significance for determining the direction of philosophic inquiry, means to tear philosophy out of the historical conditions of its development and the social functions that it performs. Dialectical materialism differs from other doctrines as the science of the most general laws of the development of nature, society, and knowledge, i.e. by its subject-matter. It is clear that the Marxist understanding of the most general laws of development posits a materialist answer to the basic philosophic question. But it cannot be reduced to that, nor deduced from it.

The subject-matter of philosophy, like that of any science, undergoes change. Problems that used to be the focus of attention retire to the background or even disappear in general from philosophy. New problems arise that did not exist in the past. And those who suppose that all the problems facing it in various historical periods are only variations on one and the same theme, wittingly or unwittingly ignore the actual development of philosophy, the changes in its subject-matter, the renewal of its problematic. To suppose that philosophers have sweated over solution to one and the same problem at all times, and that this question thus remains unchanged since it is also a subject of inquiry in our day, means willy-nilly to support those opponents of philosophy who have always maintained that it does not an-

swer a single question, does not pose new problems, and therefore has nothing in common either with science or with the pressing problems of social life.

To ignore the specific nature of the basic philosophic question and reduce the subject-matter of philosophy to it (to one problem, however important in general), is to forget that the doctrines of various historical periods differed from one another essentially in content. Identifying them impoverishes the wealth of ideas of philosophical development in the spirit of a positivist slighting of 'philosophising' as, in essence, fruitless scholasticism.

It is sometimes suggested that the subject-matter of philosophy should be identified with the basic philosophic question as a simple, unambiguous answer to a question around which disputes alleged to discredit philosophy never die. But this 'simple' answer to a very complicated questions proves on closer examination to be a form of avoiding a real answer that has an apparent persuasiveness. As P. N. Fedoseyev has correctly remarked:

There is much discussion around the question of the subject-matter of philosophy, and it has been going on for quite a long time. The impression is created that fruitful development of this problem is being prevented by a certain 'narrowness' and abstractness in its posing, and its consideration outside the concrete cultural and ideological situations in which the interconnection of philosophy and other spheres of knowledge is realized in practice.²⁸

Any philosophical system that is in any way developed is built up from several philosophic disciplines (ontology, epistemology, logic, natural philosophy, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, aesthetics, etc.). Each discipline has its own subject of inquiry. And philosophy as a system of definite disciplines is characterised by a complex field of inquiry. To consider all these disciplines as different aspects of the investigation of one and the same question is to impoverish their content. Even when we broaden the posing of the basic question, i.e. go beyond the limits of the alternative formulated by it and so pass to a more general range of questions about the relation of the whole variety of the spiritual to the diversity of the material, this problema-

tic, too, only partially covers the subject-matter of philosophic inquiries.

Every philosophic system is characterised not only by its inherited problematic but also by the fact that it makes new problems the object of inquiry. The problem *cogito* posed by Descartes, the problem of the phenomenon and thing-in-itself that occupied Kant, and the problem of the substance-subject discussed by Hegel, all went beyond the limits of the preceding problematic.³⁴

Some of those involved in the discussion of the subject-matter of philosophy suggest that the basic philosophic question is becoming the sole subject-matter of philosophy as it 'hives off' sciences of nature and society, so limiting its problematic. That point of view has been expressed by Kopnin (with certain reservations, it is true):

The basic question of philosophy has always been the subject of philosophy, but it has appeared in different forms in different historical periods, and occupied a different place in philosophy. When philosophy was a system of views about the world and of concepts about the phenomena and patterns of its motion, and there was not yet differentiation of scientific knowledge, the basic question really was only one of the problems it was concerned with.³⁵

We cannot agree with that opinion because it is not supported (in our view) by a historical philosophic inquiry that demonstrates that philosophies that are demarcated from the sciences of nature and society have nothing in common, i.e. do not have the same object of inquiry. It is sufficient, for example, to compare the positivism of Comte and his followers and Feuerbach's philosophical anthropology, or any other doctrine taken at random (Hartmann's 'new ontology', the philosophy of linguistic analysis, personalism, etc.), to be convinced that each of them has its own specific range of matters, and its own special theme (which does not, incidentally, of course, exclude their common problems; they, however, are in the background, i.e. do not characterise them in a specific way). Only an abstract notion of the subject-matter of philosophy, a notion that in fact ignores the problematic that distinguishes one doctrine

from another, can be satisfied by a statement that they have a common object of inquiry and that they differ from one another only in their different answers to one and the same question.

The problematic of dialectical materialism differs essentially from that of modern idealist philosophy, from which it is also obvious that it is quite unjustified to reduce the subject-matter of philosophy to one basic question, or even several major ones. It is also important to stress that dialectical materialism is concerned with investigating problems posed by non-Marxist doctrines. There are problems and themes that are common to various (even opposing) philosophies, just as there are essentially different, sometimes even incompatible, philosophic themes and problems. One can therefore establish only a relative, common element in the object of inquiry, mainly within the context of the same trend or current, or (in other words) a common interest in one and the same objects. This heterogeneity of the subject-matter of philosophy is not simply due to its having undergone certain changes historically. In each period there has not only been a different understanding of this subject-matter in the various, opposing doctrines, but also an actual difference in the real object of inquiry. We are far from wanting to exaggerate these differences; to underestimate them, however, means to veil the fundamental divergences, oppositions, and contradictions within philosophy.

The question of the subject-matter of philosophy is frequently discussed in a way that obviously does not correspond to the actual position of the matter, i.e. as though the methodological problem of the object of inquiry were a stumbling-block only for philosophy. But there is hardly a generally accepted, quite correct definition of the subject of any fundamental science, or at least a definition that would not need further development. Even when the objects subject to investigation are ascertained by observation, there are considerable difficulties in defining a science's subject-matter. Botany, for example, studies plants. But it does not concern itself with a very numerous class of plant organisms, viz., bacteria, whose study is the business of bacteriology, which is not considered a branch of botany. The point, clearly, is that the subject-matter of botany took shape before microscopic organisms were discovered, which had to be singled out as the subject of a special science because of their es-

stantial difference from the living substances known to and studied by botany.

The subject of a science is not just a description of what it studied and continues to study. The definition of its subject-matter also includes a standard element, since it has to indicate the range of the science's possible objects of inquiry and its directions, governed by the inner structure of the objects studied. It is not surprising, therefore, that scientists, while usually distinguishing the object of their inquiry from some other object of investigation, do not as a rule have a definition of it at their disposal that is theoretically meaningful and quite correct.

Many scientists consider definition of the subject of their science to be a secondary, even inessential matter. A science's development does not, of course, depend on whether there is a generally accepted definition of its subject, but, to how far its development raises a need to inquire into its theoretical foundations, a definition of its subject becomes one of the conditions for its further fruitful development. Philosophy is constantly inquiring into its own premisses and foundations, and its own position in the system of scientific knowledge. It is therefore specially necessary to comprehend the subject of its inquiry.

While irreconcilably opposed, mutually exclusive philosophic systems exist, there can be no generally accepted definition of the subject-matter of philosophy—either descriptive or normative. That does not, however, imply that it is impossible to define the concept of philosophy (although it, too, as is seen from the foregoing, presents considerable difficulties). It would be an error to identify definition of the concept of philosophy with definition of its subject-matter. The latter is conceivable only as a dialectical surmounting, a positive rejection of an unlimited variety of possible objects of inquiry. As for the former, it has, on the contrary, to show this diversity (including the diversity of doctrines), since it characterises the more than 2,000-year evolution of philosophy. From that angle the definition of the concept of philosophy formulated in the previous section can be supplemented by the following explanatory one:

philosophy is inquiry into the fundamental diversity of the universal whole of reality independent of humanity, and of reality transformed by man and

human activity, and of their mutual relation, unity, and basis from a standpoint of historically determined interests and sense of values.

The diversity of philosophic doctrines convincingly demonstrates that the subject-matter of philosophy is not amenable to rigid delimitation. Each doctrine limits its investigative tasks to a context set by the historical situation, the situation in science, and the character of the clashes in philosophy of its time. The line between philosophy and the special sciences, which excluded problems from philosophy that had become their subject by no means signified that philosophy rejected examination of the general problems that were divided among the sciences and so converted into special problems tackled by special methods. These general questions do not always drop out of philosophy; some of them retain their significance in that field. The psyche, for example, became the subject of a special science, psychology, but the problem of the psychic (consciousness, the unconscious) still engages philosophy. It is occupied with this problem now, of course, on the basis of the data of psychology, neurophysiology, and other sciences, and singles out its specifically philosophic, in particular epistemological content.

The problem of man has also ceased to be just a philosophic one. Man has become the object of inquiry of a whole series of sciences, whose data enable philosophy to repose this problem and find ways of answering it in a scientific, philosophic way.³⁸

Philosophy has long discussed cosmological problems. The concept of cosmos was developed by it. The problem of the Universe, i.e. of the world as a whole, was also posed by philosophy. The question of the finiteness or infinity of the world in time and space is historically linked with the basic philosophic problem. Today philosophy is again discussing all these problems, drawing on the advances of astronomy and astrophysics.

The subject of philosophy is very closely linked with the object of inquiry of the fundamental sciences. That does not, of course, mean, that it takes their place in any degree, or that, by studying the problems of other sciences from its own special standpoint, it thereby intervenes in their competency. Their general propositions, summing up their special inquiries, are largely ideological generalisations. They consequently cannot help interesting philosophy, since they provide the grounds for a new

posing of philosophic problems, and for developing and changing its form. That way new paths of interaction between philosophy and the special sciences are opened up.

The special, or particular, sciences divide the universal object of inquiry (nature and society) into separate fields and parts, each of which is thus turned into the subject of a special science. The number of sciences is counted in four figures in our day. So it is understandable that the progressive parcelling out of the universal object of inquiry is creating many difficulties for understanding the interdependence and unity of the qualitatively different forms of the universal, each of which is shared among various scientific departments. While the differentiation of the sciences originally corresponded in the main to objectively existing qualitative differences (animate and inanimate, plants, animals, man, minerals, heavenly bodies, etc.), the subsequent rise of new scientific disciplines was largely due to the creation of new scientific methods and instrumentation (microscopes, spectral analysis, radioactive methods, ultrasonics, lasers, etc.), the diversity of practical tasks, and so on. The classification of the sciences is becoming more and more remote from reflection of the objective, qualitative difference of natural and social processes. It is also multiplying the difficulties in the way of integrating sciences, the need for which is no less obvious than the fact of their progressive and progressing differentiation. As Max Planck said:

Science now forms objectively an inner closed unity. Its division into different fields is really not grounded in the nature of things but springs only from the limitations of human capacities, which leads of necessity to a division of labour. As a matter of fact a continuous band stretches from physics and chemistry through biology and anthropology to the social sciences and the arts, a band that cannot be cut at a point without seeming arbitrary."

The processes of integration in science reflect these facts of the unity of the world stated by Planck, which must be adequately reflected in divided, yet, at the same time, united science. And the subject of philosophy, above all of dialectical materialism, is organically linked with the powerful process of integration developing in science.

Philosophy strives to understand as a single whole what the sciences of nature and society have divided on one basis or another into various parts that are studied parallelly by various, usually inadequately interconnected disciplines (sometimes quite unconnected). The traditional problem of the world as a whole, which had a central place in pre-Marxist philosophy, rises again in a quite new way when philosophy (scientific philosophy, of course) bases itself on the whole aggregate of scientific data.

The concept of the world as a whole appeared together with the rise of philosophy itself. Engels stressed that Greek philosophy treated the world as a single whole, and that this was its superiority over the metaphysical outlook (and method) built up in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which had lost sight of the whole universal link of phenomena by orienting itself on inquiry into the separate and particular (which was undoubtedly necessary).³⁸ Theoretical natural science, on the one hand, and the dialectical materialist outlook on the world, on the other, are overcoming this limitation of the science and philosophy of the past, and so creating a synthetic picture of reality that brings out the unity of the individual and the universal, the part and the whole, the finite and the infinite. In that connection Engels stressed that theoretical science was not a science of final objects but 'a science of the processes, of the origin and development of these things and of the interconnection which binds all these natural processes into one great whole'.³⁹ In order to investigate phenomena scientifically it is necessary to pull them out of their general connection, isolate and study each one separately, and single out its special properties, inherent in it alone. But that task can only be realised insofar as the phenomena are examined not in isolation but in their connection and interdependences that ultimately determine the properties of the separate phenomena as well. Solution of this dual task within the limits of a separate field of phenomena is the task of a special science, its global posing and solution are the job of philosophy. Thus philosophy, as a scientific, philosophic world outlook, tackles the contradiction that inevitably arises and is repeated at all stages of the evolution of scientific knowledge. The dialectic of the whole and the part consists in these opposites' causing and determining each other. Understanding of the whole consequently not only becomes possible

through investigation of the parts forming it, but understanding of the parts also presupposes investigation of the whole, whose character is manifested in the properties of its parts, aspects, etc. If, as Engels stressed, 'all the processes of nature are systematically connected',⁴⁰ i.e. nature as a whole forms a system, then the latter cannot help determining the elements composing it.

Engels argued against Kekule, the distinguished chemist, who said (seemingly under the influence of the agnosticism prevalent in his day) that only knowledge of the individual, limited, and transient was accessible to science. In opposition to that metaphysical view Engels substantiated the dialectical thesis that, in understanding the individual, finite, and transient, we also thus understand the universal, infinite, and eternal. That, of course, does not imply that investigation of the individual directly signifies grasping of the general, that knowledge of the finite is equivalent to knowledge of the infinite. The dialectic of opposites does not wipe out the qualitative difference between them. The infinite is both knowable and unknowable, but understandable only in the sense that understanding never reaches the ultimate boundary, never attains the infinite whole. That is why Engels stressed, on the one side, that science and dialectical materialist philosophy developed the concept of the world as a whole, and insisted, on the other side, that this scientific (and scientific philosophic) concept always remained incomplete, unfinished, subject to further development, correction, and partial reconsideration, etc. He wrote that

[one] can present in an approximately systematic form a comprehensive view of the interconnection in nature by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself.⁴¹

But, while warning against making an absolute of the existing results of knowledge, and against interpreting them in an antidialectical manner, he also pointed out that, in knowing the world as a whole, we never achieve a full and final solution of the task. In that sense the task may be interpreted as an ideal to which we come closer and closer without ever reaching it completely.

The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent whole, but the knowledge of this system

presupposes a knowledge of *all* nature and history, which man will *never* attain.⁴³

So Engels criticised the extremes equally inherent in the metaphysical mode of thought, viz., denial of the real content of the concept 'world as a whole', on the one hand, and making an absolute of the real, but historically limited content of this concept, on the other. Kant, of course, had considered this concept an *a priori* idea of pure reason, of regulative significance for natural science but lacking any empirical content whatsoever. Present-day positivism has gone even further in subjectivist-agnostic interpretation of it. Victor Kraft declares that

the whole of the world remains outside science. There is therefore an insurmountable dualism of mechanism and determinism in nature on the one hand and creative development and freedom in life and consciousness on the other.⁴⁴

In fact, from the standpoint of the metaphysically thinking philosopher, freedom is incompatible with objective necessity, and the mechanisms of human actions exclude subjectivity. To save freedom and subjectivity, Kraft suggests, it is necessary to reject the idea of the world as a whole. In fact he rejects the idea of unity of the world which by no means coincides with rejection of the concept 'world as a whole'. A dualist, pluralist conception of the world, in contrast to monism, also represents a certain interpretation of the world as a whole.⁴⁵

Dialectical materialist monism differs in principle from metaphysical monism, whose premiss is a conception of abstract identity in accordance with which the whole world is interpreted as its homogeneity or very limited diversity. But the differences are diverse and essential, as with the forms of universality and identity. The diversity is not only the result of all processes of development, but also their precondition. The world as a whole, from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, is a contradictory unity of the diversity of phenomena of nature and society. In that connection it is appropriate to cite the following profoundly correct remark of S. I. Vavilov's (outstanding physicist and ex-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences):

One can hardly think of the world as a colourless conglomeration of one and the same essential nature in a great many copies. One can hardly imagine the world as a huge pile of identical objects.⁴⁶

The concept of the world as a whole is consequently an intensive one and not extensive; the world is not a simple totality of coexisting things. It is a matter of universal connections and interdependence of phenomena, of the unity of the world, which consists in its material nature, of the objective forms of universality that are investigated by the special sciences and philosophy. The concept of the world as a whole is one of the most important aspects of the subject-matter of philosophy. The problem of being, which is central to all philosophic doctrines, is above all that of the world as a whole and, furthermore, of the unity of the world. Philosophy has never been limited simply to a recognition that people, animals, plants, metals, minerals, stars, atoms, etc., exist. It has always striven to bring out the connection between the most varied phenomena, to single out what is common to them all, and to investigate their basis. Does substance exist? Are there primordial elementary particles from which all things are formed? Does the world have a beginning in time and space? Is the causal connection between things absolutely universal? Or are there phenomena that are not determined by others? All these questions are directly linked with the concept of the world as a whole. Its development is one of the most important expressions of the change in the subject-matter of philosophy and of the enrichment of its problematic.

A belief predominated in pre-Marxist philosophy that the world as a whole constituted the subject of philosophy alone. That belief was linked with the empirical character of natural science and with the opposing of philosophic inquiry to non-philosophic investigation. The development of theoretical science on the one hand, and the creation of dialectical and historical materialism on the other, dispelled that over-simplified notion. It became obvious that all sciences study the world as a whole within the context of their field. The progressing specialisation of research only seemed to oppose understanding of the world as a whole. In fact, both these lines of inquiry are interconnected. As S. I. Vavilov stressed:

It is impossible without differentiation of the sciences to deepen knowledge and also without understanding of the wholeness, and interconnected character of all the phenomena and processes of nature and society."

The philosophy of Marxism only continues, in that sense, completes, and sums up (within the context of the historically determined level of knowledge) the work being done in all fields of research. The task that philosophy tackles in this is not reducible simply to generalisation of the various scientific data. It is a matter of reproducing and theoretically reconstructing natural and social reality as a single whole. Suffice it, in this connection, to point to the problem of the unity of society and nature, which has acquired an importance in our day incomparable with the past, in order to make the truth obvious that philosophic inquiry in this field is directed to achieving new results. That is why the concept of the world as a whole has an *epistemological-ontological* character in Marxist philosophy, i.e. includes those notions of forms of universality, intrinsic in reality, that have already been developed by science, without excluding notions of other, still unknown forms of universality, whose discovery leads to the development of knowledge. From that angle the world as a whole is not, of course, the whole world. 'Being,' said Engels, '... is always an open question beyond the point where our sphere of observation ends.'⁴⁷ But the centuries-old experience of knowledge has already shown (and continues to demonstrate by each new scientific discovery and achievement of practice) that the material unity of the world is not an abstraction or a speculative idea but the real essence of the whole diversity of processes taking place in it. The drawing of a line between philosophy and the special sciences by no means eliminates the problem of the world as a whole from philosophy, but rather the contrary. It is because philosophy has ceased to concern itself with the special matters of natural history and social studies that the most general questions of the sciences of nature and society are acquiring a predominant place in it. The problem of the world as a whole no longer faces philosophy now in the form in which it was discussed in antiquity. The philosophers of that time started from everyday experience; we have in mind the universal patterns discovered by sciences (the law of the transformation of energy discovered by Mayer, the principle of the equivalence of mass and energy discovered by Einstein, which relate not only to already studied natural processes but also to all other processes taking place in nature). Science does not permit us to say

that *perpetuum mobile* is possible somewhere beyond the limits of the known, the studied, the investigated. In other words, existing knowledge enables us, within certain limits, of course, to say both what there is and what there is not, and also what is in general impossible. The concrete formulations of the universal laws already discovered by science may undoubtedly be altered, deepened, or concretised, but their main content will be retained. We have the right to say that on the basis of the whole aggregate of knowledge, experience, and practice, since their basic, most important content cannot be refuted precisely because it is confirmed daily by practice. As R. S. Karpinskaya has correctly noted:

The 'world as a whole' is not a fiction, nor an out-moded concept borrowed from previous natural philosophic systems. . . . It is as relative as the whole aggregate of scientific knowledge in each historical interval of time but as absolute in its integrative role expressing the undoubted existence of the Universe, as opposed to man and his science."

The development of scientific knowledge, especially today, is a unity of processes of differentiation (specialisation) and integration. Both these processes are equally necessary; they are opposites that pass into one another.

The integration of scientific disciplines is due, above all, to the fact that new problems, usually the most important ones, arise at the boundaries of the various sciences, and also new possibilities of tackling old problems that had previously been impossible. Hybrid sciences thus arise that unite sciences in a single whole that had previously been independent of one another. This 'merging' is one of the bases of the process of forming general scientific disciplines with a direct relation to the theoretical foundations in many sciences. Such, for example, is the general theory of systems, whose integrating function is generally recognised.

Integrational processes in science have found expression, as well, in new objects of inquiry that by virtue of their complexity and many-sidedness may be called complex objects of investigation. In other words natural and social processes themselves that used to be divided into parts in order to become the subject-matter of separate disciplines, are now, on the contrary,

being united, i.e. considered in unity, as a real whole, whose laws are beyond the comprehension of the separate disciplines, which have been successfully concerned with investigating its separate parts and aspects. The task of this integral research into the whole process is realised only through co-operation of different sciences, sometimes very remote from one another. This is interdisciplinary research, thanks to which not only are many tasks of the special sciences resolved that used to remain untackled, but also many complex ones. Cybernetics, for example, arose on the paths of interdisciplinary research; by studying self-governing systems that exist both in nature and in society, it has made a significant contribution to the integrating of scientific knowledge.

Since each fundamental science of necessity comes to certain ideological generalisations that in turn become an object of inquiry, there are undoubtedly problems that belong equally to these special sciences and to philosophy. The general problems posed, for example, by cybernetics, the theory of information, and the general theory of systems, are necessarily included in the subject-matter of philosophy when it, of course, is a scientific-philosophic world outlook. This outlook is becoming an active part of interdisciplinary inquiries, pursuing quite broad tasks of ideological significance. The role of philosophy in fundamental interdisciplinary research must grow as its subject-matter embraces more and more complex problems, in particular those that cannot be tackled by the natural sciences alone or the social sciences alone. B. M. Kedrov correctly wrote that

there are several problems that need to concern all sciences together in their interaction on one another, philosophy among them. These problems are not specifically philosophical or specifically scientific; they are general scientific ones in the full sense of the term. They include the following: the painting of a general picture of the world or 'system of nature as a whole' and the classification of the sciences; the general history of scientific knowledge; the doctrine of science and scientific knowledge; the doctrine of creativity and its various forms, etc. Investigation of the so-called 'world as a whole' (in its intensive aspect), or rather 'the unity of the world', is also numbered among this kind of problem."

Philosophy, converted into a scientific, philosophic outlook (called dialectical and historical materialism in our day), unites the ideological problems of both natural sciences and the social sciences.

Consideration of the subject-matter of philosophy has already enabled us to single out such a typical feature of it as its multidimensional character, which fully corresponds to the nature of a general, theoretical world outlook. This feature, however, is not only a characteristic of the subject-matter of philosophy but is also an expression of the diversity of philosophic interests, by virtue of which any attempt to limit the subject-matter of philosophy to some rigid framework comes into conflict with the 'practice' of philosophy. True, there is a constant tendency in both mathematics and natural sciences to go beyond the limits of their established field of inquiry. The limits of the application of mathematics have been so broadened, not only in natural sciences but also in the humanitarian sciences, that some workers consider it not so much a science with its own special subject of inquiry, as a universal scientific method. Physico-chemical methods of research have revolutionised biology and the technology of production, i.e. a very broad sphere of practical activity. All that indicates that philosophy's tendency to convert all sufficiently general problems of the special sciences and social practice into the object of its consideration is quite analogous to the tendency that is more and more distinguishable in the fundamental sciences.

Philosophy is converting non-philosophic problems into problems of philosophy insofar as it discovers ideological aspects inherent in them. Philosophic inquiry into scientific and technical progress, the problems of ecology, molecular genetics, cybernetics, and nuclear physics is an examination of scientific advances within the context of a critical analysis of the history of knowledge, and human history in general, from the aspect of today's level of social development and the outlook for mankind.

Philosophy is thus constantly going beyond the bounds of philosophy; in other words it is constantly incorporating new, non-philosophic problems into its field of inquiry. That fact should not cause surprise, let alone raise objections. Physics studies physical processes, chemistry chemical processes, but philosophic processes do not exist, at least in objective reality. There are

also, of course, no 'philosophic' laws, yet the diversity of the laws of nature and society is undoubtedly characterised by identity as well as by relations of difference. Philosophy by its very nature thus cannot help turning to various spheres of objective reality and different fields of knowledge. But unlike the other sciences, which also turn to various fields of knowledge and practical activity, philosophy is distinguished by a tendency to universalise the means of inquiry proper to it, and to comprehend phenomena, and that signifies the conversion of any sufficiently broad range of problems of science or of the personal life of man, and socio-political, historical, ideological, and other matters into an object of philosophic examination. Philosophers, for example, are engaged in inquiring into science and religion, morality and art, man's individual development and the socio-historical process, problems of the family, nation, war, peace, etc.

It is difficult to name any quite broad range of matters that could not (in certain conditions, of course) become the subject-matter of philosophy, but that does not mean they would. It is apparently necessary to delimit the subject of philosophy as the field of its sustained interests, and its application as a universal methodology to other fields of knowledge and practical activity. While the application of mathematics in biology, i.e. the conversion of certain biological processes into an object of mathematical inquiry, does not mean their incorporation in the subject-matter of mathematics as a science, the same can seemingly be said of philosophy in order to prevent muddling of its subject-matter with the various fields of its application as a method of inquiry.

No matter how important this demarcation of the subject-matter and sphere of application of science is, it should not be forgotten, just the same, that it has a relative character, since the application of a science outside the limits outlined by its subject-matter signifies that other objects are becoming the subject-matter of its inquiry. The point, however, is that these other objects are the special subject of another science, which has property rights in them, as it were. In other words, a philosopher can join in discussion of problems of cybernetics, molecular biology, or defence of the environment only with the help of specialists in cybernetics, biology, or ecology, and in collaboration with them. That is what distinguishes his concern with phi-

losophic aspect of non-philosophic fields of knowledge from his 'purely' philosophic inquiries.

The general conclusion to which exposition of the above considerations has led us comes to this, that philosophy, in addition to the problems comprising its specific subject-matter, is concerned with many other problems, insofar as they interest philosophers, present philosophic interest, prompt the posing of philosophical problems or philosophical discussion of non-philosophic questions. In that sense philosophy has a right of choice, which it is constantly exercising. The grounds for its right to discuss non-philosophic matters are also obvious from the fact that non-philosopher scientists themselves discuss philosophical problems of atomic physics, molecular biology, cybernetics, ecology, the scientific and technical revolution, etc. That fact should be considered an invitation to philosophers, and a proposal for joint discussion of these questions. The alliance of philosophy and other sciences, just like its involvement in socio-political practice, undoubtedly presupposes a corresponding evaluation of its subject-matter, one that takes into account the diversity of possible objects of philosophic inquiry. The last point, however, does not so much characterise philosophy in general as the scientific-philosophic world outlook of Marxism.

¹ G. W. F. Hegel. *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Translated by J. B. Baillie (Harper & Row, New York, 1967), p. 125.

² Wilhelm Dilthey. *Das Wesen der Philosophie* (Teubner Verlag, Berlin and Leipzig, 1907), pp. 65-66.

³ Frederick Engels. *Anti-Dühring* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p. 159.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ We therefore cannot agree with I. D. Panskhava, who writes: 'Philosophy is a world outlook, i.e. a system of the most general concepts and notions of the world (nature, society, man)' (I. D. Panskhava. *Dialekticheski materializm* [Dialectical Materialism], Uchpedgiz, Moscow, 1958, p. 7). If we were to agree with that definition, the religious outlook would also have to be considered philosophy, but the author cited would apparently not agree with that.

⁶ Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. In: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970), p. 349.

⁷ Albert Einstein. Remarks on Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge. In: *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Ill., 1944), p. 279.

⁸ See T. I. Oizerman. *Problemy istoriko-filosofskoi nauki* (Problems of Historical Philosophical Science), Mysl, Moscow, 1969.

⁹ Albert Einstein. *Mein Weltbild* (Querido Verlag, Amsterdam, 1934), p. 169.

¹⁰ Richard Feynman. *The Character of Physical Law* (BBC, London, 1965), p. 156.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ See Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic* in his Philosophical Notebooks (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980), p. 211.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

¹⁵ Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p. 197.

¹⁶ Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. *Op. cit.*, pp. 364-365.

¹⁷ In *Dialectics of Nature* (p. 206), Engels cited the English morphologist Sir Richard Owen, who wrote in 1849: 'The archetypal idea was manifested in the flesh under diverse modifications upon this planet, long prior to the existence of those animal species that actually exemplify it' (*On the Nature of Limbs*, London, 1849, p. 86).

¹⁸ Frederick Engels. *Anti-Dühring*, p. 16.

¹⁹ Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. *Op. cit.*, p. 365.

²⁰ *Idem.* *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 59.

²¹ Karl Marx. *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p. 99.

²² We specially examined the matter of philosophy as a system in Theodore Oizerman (*Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982). See the Chapter 'The Dialectical Materialist View of the Philosophical System'.

²³ René Descartes. *Les principes de la philosophie*. Part I (Belin Frères, Paris, s.a.), p. 43.

²⁴ J. G. Fichte. *Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten* (C. E. Gabler, Jena and Leipzig, 1794), p. 32.

²⁵ One of the greatest modern biologists C. H. Waddington, summing up an international symposium on theoretical biology, declared: 'The general system of notions that begins to come out from the discussion is quite close to the Marxist dialectical philosophy... These notions, it seems to me, correspond to the dialectical conceptions of Marx and Engels to a greater extent than to the ordinary, simplified materialist approach to the problems of biology' (Foreword to the Russian Edition of *Toward a Theoretical Biology. I Prolegomena*, made by Mir Publishers, Moscow, in 1970; retranslated from the Russian. Similar expres-

sions could also be met in the past from Paul Langevin and Frédéric Joliot-Curie, i.e. only those outstanding scientists who directly linked their fate with the communist movement.

²² V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973), p. 133.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²⁴ Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. *Op. cit.*, p. 348.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

²⁶ V. I. Lenin. *Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

²⁹ P. N. Fedoseyev. Results of the 15th World Congress of Philosophy. In: T. I. Oizerman *et al* (Eds.). *Filosofiya marksizma i sovremennaya nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsia* (Nauka, Moscow, 1977), pp. 14-15.

³⁰ Jean Wahl justly drew attention to this historically occurring change in the philosophic problematic, including the rise of new problems not previously discussed, in his article on modern problems of philosophy in *Annales de l'Université de Paris*, 1965, 2: 153-168.

³¹ P. V. Kopnin. *Vvedenie v marksistskuyu gnoseologiyu* (Introduction to Marxist Epistemology), Naukova dumka, Kiev, 1966, p. 14.

³² Some contemporary philosophers claim that man, as such, is the true object of philosophy. Such is the belief of most existentialists and a considerable number of philosophical anthropologists. From our point of view limitation of the subject-matter of philosophy to the problem of man indicates a clear underestimation of other philosophic problems (epistemological, social, etc.).

³³ Max Planck. *Vorträge und Erinnerungen* (Hirzel Verlag, Stuttgart, 1949), p. 270.

³⁴ See Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature*, pp. 45-46.

³⁵ *Idem.* Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. *Op. cit.*, p. 363.

³⁶ *Idem.* *Anti-Dühring*, p. 47.

³⁷ *Idem.*, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. *Op. cit.*, p. 364.

³⁸ *Idem.* *Anti-Dühring*, p. 386.

³⁹ Victor Kraft. *Einführung in die Philosophie* (Springer-Verlag, Vienna, 1967), p. 62.

⁴⁰ The following statement of Bertrand Russell's is typical in this sense: 'The most fundamental of my intellectual beliefs is that the idea that the world is a unity is rubbish. I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity and without continuity, without coherence or orderliness, or any other properties that governances love' (cited from John Lewis, *Science, Faith and Scepticism*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1959, pp. 34-35). While denying the concept of the unity of the world, and interpreting it as a simplification foreign to science, Bertrand

Russell in no way denied the concept of the world as a whole, attributing a pluralist (and in part irrationalist) colouring to it.

" S. I. Vavilov. *Lenin i sovremennaya fizika* (Lenin and Modern Physics), Nauka, Moscow, 1977, p. 70.

" *Idem. Sobr. soch.* (Collected Works), Vol. 3 (Izd-vo AN SSSR, Moscow, 1956), p. 187.

" Frederick Engels. *Anti-Dühring*, p. 55.

" R. S. Karpinskaya. The Ideological Significance of Modern Biology. *Voprosy filosofii*, 1978, 4: 104.

" B. M. Kedrov. *A propos* of the interpretation of the subject-matter of Marxist philosophy as 'the world as a whole'. *Voprosy filosofii*, 1979, 10: 36. Prof. Kedrov justly stressed that 'Marxist philosophy has a leading role to play in the complex of all the sciences that are concerned with this kind of task and problem' (*Ibid.*, p. 43).

3

The Origin of Philosophy

Philosophy took shape as a general theoretical outlook upon the world through generalisation of the knowledge and practice of a certain epoch, and *synthesis* of existing knowledge of nature, society, and mankind. But a certain level of development of knowledge was necessary in order to effect that synthesis, and also a certain social need for it. The problem of the origin of philosophy therefore implies at least three aspects; viz., questions of the social need for an ideological synthesis, of the available knowledge synthesised into a theoretical world outlook and of the character of synthesis itself.

The problem of the origin of philosophy is therefore one that has yet to be fully resolved by the history of philosophy. (1) It is difficult, if not, impossible, to define the 'moment' of the rise of philosophy. Although it is clear in general that its origin implied a cardinal turning point in the history of human thought and a real mental revolution, it is hard to draw a line between the first philosophies and pre-philosophic concepts that included ideological elements, all the more so that quite a lot of material promoting understanding of pre-philosophic and non-philosophic phenomena (mythological, religious, artistic, concrete scientific, etc.) has been amassed as philosophic phenomena over the millennia that have passed since its rise. (2) The objective vagueness of what is understood by philosophy also makes itself felt here. The undoubted continuity that exists between pre-philosophic and philosophic mental concepts, which comes out in their close kinship, or very near identity as a consequence of mythological and religious outlooks' developing both parallel to philosophy and interwoven with it, often prompt the scholar to blur the boundaries between these qualitatively heterogeneous

series of phenomena. (3) The almost complete loss of texts of the first philosophers has also had its effect. The difficulties of restoring them from extant fragments contained in texts of later authors, and therefore already interpreted more than once, have given birth to endless arguments among scholars, even as regards the reading of fragments that admits a host of versions (depending on the reader's initial precepts).

The complexity of the problem is also linked with the fact that we know three centres where philosophic thought began to form, leading to the rise of schools quite differentiated on the problem plane, and divided into different trends. These centres were Greece, India, and China, countries differing essentially in their cultural features, which naturally put its stamp on philosophy. Nevertheless we can discover certain common patterns in the moulding of philosophy, though it arose in purest form in ancient Greece, where a tradition took shape that led to the conception of philosophy which we have taken as our starting point.

When defining philosophy as a general theoretical outlook upon the world we wanted thereby to stress that it belongs to that mode of spiritual assimilation of the world, to that consciousness 'which regards the comprehending mind as the real man, and hence the comprehended world as such as the only real world'.¹ Unlike other modes of thought, 'the artistic, religious, and practically intelligent assimilation of this world';² the theoretical thought of philosophy starts from an independently existing world and reproduces it as a certain whole. That does not, however, by any means signify that the rich, colourful, moving world takes the place of the 'pure subject' of the theoretical outlook as something 'given' and recorded on the *tabula rasa* of its consciousness. The fact that this world is given to our vision as a premiss is evidence in the first place of the social character of this premiss (and this premiss of a general, theoretical, ideological comprehension itself comes forward as the result of forms of assimilation historically and logically antecedent to it, viz., material and practical, evaluative-emotional, religious-mythological, artistic, primordially scientific. At the same time this vision was expressed verbally, and appeared as linguistic assimilation and the 'verbal being' of the world.

The fact that philosophy signified a *new* form of spiritual assimilation of the social and natural world also meant a conflict between it and the old forms, and a critique of them. To everyday consciousness this critique was only an alienation of the 'patrimony', i.e. a breach of accustomed forms of thinking and life such as myth, religion, art, even language. But it was forgotten, as a rule, that these previous forms were far from always in harmony. Art, for instance, made the habitual objects of myth and religious cults strange to the point of unrecognisability; religion, with its organisation and cults, somehow regulated and formally structured, and so deformed and obscured the initial myth.

The rise of new forms of assimilating the world, furthermore, did not yet mean the automatic dying out of the old. Even in the sphere of material, practical assimilation and of direct social practice we meet a long coexistence of various structures in the socio-economic formations that succeed one another. Suffice it to point to the peasant community, that universal element of the gentile system, which was nevertheless preserved during the whole history of class society right down to the early stages of the development of capitalism. Even more natural is the coexistence of different forms of mental assimilation of the world and different forms of social consciousness arising at various times but performing their social functions in society and satisfying its differentiated spiritual needs. And when we take into account that these forms do not occupy strictly limited compartments in the aggregate body of spiritual culture but cut across and overlap one another, the difficulties surrounding inquiry into the early stages of the evolution of philosophy (and its origin, in particular) become obvious.

Theoretical analysis of the origin of philosophy therefore presupposes a high degree of abstraction from the concrete material of the history of culture, abstraction aimed at singling out the elements of progressive development from this complex whole that point to a perspective of theoretical, ideological, philosophical assimilation of the world.

Let us begin with the objective basis of this assimilation, viz., real life, within whose context, and in connection with whose changes, philosophy was born.

Whether it was by chance or not, philosophy originated almost simultaneously in Greece, India, and China, where it was

It goes without saying that, when defining philosophy simply as a world outlook, we have still not indicated thereby its *differentia specifica*, since not every world outlook is a philosophy.⁵ The concept 'world outlook' is broader than that of philosophy, which (unlike other forms of outlook) represents primarily a *general outlook upon the world*.

Engels pointed out that materialism was 'a general world outlook resting upon a definite conception of the relation between matter and mind'.⁶ There is no need to demonstrate that the same can be said about idealism. The concept of a general world outlook is brought out through analysis of the fact of the existence of various forms of outlook. Some are a system of generalisations from the natural sciences; others relate to social reality. Philosophy, by its very nature, cannot be just a natural-science outlook or only a social one. The philosophy of nature, just like the philosophy of history, is simply a section of philosophic systems.

It may seem that, when we characterise a philosophic doctrine as bourgeois (or feudal), we limit the object of its inquiry to one social reality only, i. e. exclude the concept of a general world outlook from the definition of philosophy. In fact one has in mind here the ideological form and ideological function of the philosophy, which does not, of course, exhaust its whole content. It is also that the historically determined (e.g. bourgeois) character of a philosophy is not only discovered in its doctrine about society but also comes out in its natural philosophy, epistemology, etc. Philosophy does not just synthesise various types of outlook; it finds its place through its attitude to **some one outlook** (e.g. religion) and also generalises, within the limits of its bias about the world, the facts and knowledge, events and awareness of them that form the basis of qualitatively different outlooks. That means that philosophy sums up historical experience theoretically (in the first place, the most important social changes), and also mankind's everyday experience, and the scientific data and sometimes even aesthetic perception of the world of its time. While differing essentially from religion as a theoretical outlook, philosophy comprehends the basis of religious consciousness, i.e. the dominance of blind, spontaneous forces of nature and society over people, often without an adequate notion of their essence, i.e. considering them a

affairs, the development of trade, which gave rise to money and the powerfully stimulated by it money capital, interest, and usury, private ownership of land, and mortgages, all fostered the development of class struggle between the landowning and military aristocracy on the one hand and the free urban population on the other. The latter, in turn, was far from homogeneous. It was in those conditions that philosophy took shape (not just once and as a single act, but during a long and complex process) in Greece, India, and China, and also in precolonial Mexico, where the process was interrupted (like the whole development of Mexican culture) by the Spanish conquest.⁶

The origin of philosophy in its classical form was not accidentally linked with Greek culture. Engels specially stressed that 'the manifold forms of Greek philosophy contain in embryo, in the nascent state, almost all later modes of outlook on the world'.⁷ Without in any way counterposing Greek and Oriental cultures, we nevertheless have the right (on the plane not of empirical, historical study but of theoretical, logical examination, which naturally takes priority in these matters) to take Greece as the 'purest' form of the social development within which philosophy was born, and the origin of Greek philosophy as the most general model of that process. The latter most fully expresses the patterns of the making of philosophy as such. That, of course, is an abstraction that does not rule out the possibility of a certain distortion, and calls for certain corrections or amendments when we come to approach Oriental philosophy.

The history of human society knows three forms of the alienation of man, born of antagonistic social relations: namely (a) alienation of the individual, when the leading form is the exploitation of slaves belonging personally to the ruling class and its representatives, based on capture (captivity) and sale, debt, or birth into a certain social group (class, caste, estate); (b) alienation of land, when the personal dependence and exploitation of the immediate producer is based on feudal lord's possessing large landed property; and (c) alienation of labour. They correspond to the three main socio-economic formations of antagonistic society, viz., slaveowning, feudal, and capitalist, qualified according to the predominant form of property and exploitation. In each of these formations, of course, there are also

(necessarily substantiated) world outlook. In other words, a philosophy is possible as a general outlook only insofar as it is a theoretical world outlook. Natural-science and social outlooks,

other, more or less developed forms of alienation, be it survivals or reminiscences, or anticipations. The image of a formation is determined, however, precisely by what organisation and mode of production are the leading ones determining the superstructure of society (including social consciousness).

We have no possibility here, of course, to go into the complicated and far from resolved problem of the formational classification of precapitalist societies.⁸ But the point of view based on the theory of the historical process developed in the works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels published in their lifetimes, and by Lenin, seems to us the soundest and most justified. Its essence was summarised in Lenin's lecture on the state, in which he singled out 'patriarchal, primitive society', then 'a society based on slavery', serfdom, capitalism, and socialism. The three middle forms make stages in the development of antagonistic society connected with its division into antagonistic classes.

Each of these great periods in the history of mankind, slaveowning, feudal, and capitalist... presents such a mass of political forms, such a variety of political doctrines, opinions and revolutions, that this extreme diversity and immense variety (especially in connection with the political, philosophical and other doctrines of bourgeois scholars and politicians) can be understood only by firmly holding, as to a guiding thread, to this division of society into classes, this change in the forms of class rule, and from this standpoint examining all social questions—economic, political, spiritual, religious, etc.⁹

In dealing with our task, viz., clarification of the conditions and social causes of the origin of philosophy as a branch of spiritual production, Marx's singling out of two stages of development in slaveowning society (already mentioned), viz., an early, patriarchal system of slavery and a mature system of slaveowning, is of substantial help. The key to solution of the problem of the 'Asiatic mode of production', it would seem, is also contained in this difference; the 'Asiatic mode' is in fact only an early slaveowning society, which rapidly became obsolete in Greece and Rome, but which was preserved to one degree or another in the Orient.¹⁰ But here we also observe substantial social changes in the period under consideration that have perhaps not been sufficiently characterised historically (be-

cause of the extremely limited nature of the factual material), but that have been distinctly fixed during comprehensive analysis that combines investigation of all the main factors characterising the level of social development, i.e. the productive forces, social relations, and above all property relations, the class structure and political superstructure of society, and ideology.

The seventh and sixth centuries B.C. in Greece were marked, in fact, by a real turning point in development of the productive forces, which 'went at such rapid rates that a picture of an abrupt break and a high flight was created, whose equal was not observed even in the Hellenistic period'.¹¹ Approximately at the same time, the consequences of India's passage to the 'iron age' made themselves fully felt (Walter Ruben dates this to the eighth century B.C.).¹² The progress of the productive forces in China in the sixth to fourth centuries B.C. displayed, according to V. N. Nikiforov,

such a stormy growth of production (transition from stone and bronze to iron, opening up of virgin lands, growth of towns and commerce, and money relations) that one can, with every right, speak of a revolution occurring in those centuries in the productive forces.¹³

This revolution so raised the productivity of labour that a new type of exploitation proved possible, namely exploitation of slave labour so as to obtain surplus value. That also signified, naturally, a substantial shift in social relations and an even more substantial shift in ideology.

Early slaveowning society was still permeated through and through by survivals of the primitive communal, gentile system. The description of the social structure of Athens given in Aristotle's book on the Athenian constitution allows us to say that the basic structural unit of Attic society in the seventh century B.C. was still the agricultural community, which was breaking up rapidly as a result of concentration of land in the hands of the big gentile nobility, the Eupatridae. Their lands were worked by poor sharecroppers, who were known as *Hectemori* (i.e. those who paid a sixth portion), 'because they cultivated the lands of the rich at the rent of a sixth part of the produced'¹⁴; in the event of non-payment of the rent they were converted into debt-slaves. Non-payment of a loan also led

to debt-bondage, or sale of the debtor or member of his family. Between the Eupatridae and the poor and slaves dependent on them were the peasant Geomori, i.e. small proprietors and craftsmen-demiurgi who were gradually losing their connection with the land. Alien elements, who remained free but had no political rights and few property ones (they could not own land on the territory of Attica, or their own house in Athens, etc.), occupied a special place in society.¹⁵

The social system of Sparta, Thessaly, and Boeotia was even more archaic. The dominant class in Sparta was divided into three phratries of gentile groups, then into five territorial groups or 'villages'. The Spartans, as a single, united, military-political-economic organisation, exploited the rightless helots, the Perioeki (who lacked full rights) and the slaves proper.

However complicated it is to restore the picture of the social system in Oriental countries at that time, there are indications that something similar was observable there. G. M. Bongard-Levin and G. F. Ilyin note the existence in India (when characterising the first stage of the development of class society there as a slaveowning one) of such categories of immediate producers as free members of peasant communities, slaves, and hired labourers. The last-named were workers who lacked means of production and were therefore forced to work for others, but had not yet become slaves.¹⁶ In other words, this social structure (quite clearly distinguishable even from the scanty data on the history of social relations in India) corresponded essentially to what we see in Greece. For there, too, there were free members of the peasant community, slaves, and wage labourers, whose position was very close to slavery.

A similar situation is apparently observable in China. Nikiforov writes:

For all the incompleteness of modern knowledge of the history of the Western Chou Dynasty and Middle Kingdom [seventh to fifth centuries B.C.—*Ed.*] a certain minimum of facts can be taken as indisputable. First of all, there are the existence of slaves, recognised by all historians; and then the significant role of the communal-clan organisation; and finally, the high degree of direct coercion in exploitation of the immediate producers.¹⁷

While slaves were still employed in a patriarchal way in early slaveowning society, mainly in the household, freeing the hands of the owner for more important, honourable employments or agricultural work demanding personal self-interest, the number of slaves occupied in crafts, mining, building, and later agriculture, increased with the transition to developed slavery.¹⁸

The clearest, and fastest transition to developed slaveowning society and production in Greece, however, was in the colonies. Colonisation was carried out by the most active elements of the Greek *polis*, often dissatisfied by conservative social orders of the metropolises (mother cities). In the colony cities, therefore, especially those in Asia Minor like Ephesus, Kolophon, and Klazomenai, non-traditional employments of the population developed rapidly, viz., crafts, shipping, and commerce, and that means, also, shipbuilding and the iron industry. In colonies where agriculture was mainly developed, as in Magna Graecia, the produce was intended mainly for export, which called for development of commerce. The craft and commerce encouraged the establishing of closer links with the countries and peoples around, and broadening of the social outlook of the Ancient Greek, and an undermining of established stereotypes of culture, behaviour, social relations, and thought. The breaking of old stereotypes and forming of new ones naturally took place in acute struggle, and caused conflicts in all spheres of public life, from primary class and social ones to the ideological.

With the aggravation of social contradictions all former illusions about the 'naturalness' of the traditional society associated with the gentile system, and already in fact outlived, collapsed. The development of civilisation was being accomplished through contradictions; it

has accomplished things with which the old gentile society was totally unable to cope. But it accomplished them by playing on the most sordid instincts and passions of man, and by developing them at the expense of all his other faculties. Naked greed has been the moving spirit of civilisation from the first day of its existence to the present time; wealth, more wealth and wealth again; wealth, not of society, but of this shabby individual was its sole and determining aim."

All that found rapid reflection in social consciousness.

It is typical that in the extant Greek literature we primarily find condemnation of money and of wealth, which demoralised nobility. The poet Theognis (second half of the sixth century B.C.) expressively bewailed the old order:

The nobleman does not scruple to marry a low-born wife, so long as she brings him money, nor will a woman refuse a low-born suitor, preferring riches to nobility. What they value is money. The nobles marry into base families, the base into noble. Wealth has blended birth.*

As if in answer to him Cleobulus of Lindus said: 'marry [a girl] from an equal [clan]; because if you take from a noble clan, you acquire lords and not relatives'.²¹

The ancient Indian epic, the direct forerunner of philosophy, is full of reflections on changing times and morals, on the calamities and contradictions of earthly life associated with wealth and poverty. People were the same; they consisted of 'five elements' (space, earth, water, air, and fire); they had the same cognitive capacities or *indriyas* (hearing, smell, taste, sight, and touch); none were free of weariness, hunger, worry, sorrow, fear, and anger; they all alike excreted sweat, urine, faeces, blood, bile, and mucus. Why then did *varnas* exist? The *Mahābhārata*, rejecting the mythological explanation of the origin of *varnas* by their formation from various parts of the body of the first man, *purusha* (*Rig-Veda*, X, 117), says that Brahma created this world without *varnas*, but people who were all Brahman, deviated from the laws of morality and their deeds split them up into *varnas*. Thus the lovers of violence and lust who forgot their duty and stained their hands with blood fell into the state of *Kshatriyas*, the avid and the unrighteous, who lost their purity, became *Sudras*.

The thinking man is even more defeated by the contradiction between the eternity and inviolability of the law proclaimed by the Vedas, and the fact that it is being constantly broken in fact at every step.

The absolute answer of the *Mahābhārata* would seem to be found in the 'golden rule' of morality: the thug robs, the thief rejoices in the absence of law when he robs a stranger, but when someone else fleeces him, he appeals to the rajah for defence. The law says: 'Thou shalt not steal', but the strong con-

sider that it was the weak who thought it up. 'Help one another' says the law, but the rich consider that the have-nots proc-
laimed it. And only when they become powerless or fall into pov-
erty do they begin to understand these laws. There is only one
thing to do: to accept the moral law that demands of man that
he do unto others as he would have others do unto him.

Nevertheless lawlessness existed and it had to be explained.
So reflection or meditation was born, i.e. *anvishiki*, philosophy
as originally called, which was condemned as false wisdom com-
peting with the Scripture. For the Scripture gave a universal
principle of behaviour, not subject to discussion; reflection, con-
stantly meeting breaches of that principle, asked and answered the
question, by developing an argument that inserted human ac-
tion into theological and cosmological laws. But did it get a
real explanation?

From that standpoint one of the most important sources of
the birth of Indian philosophy, the *Bhāgavad-Geeta*, presents
great interest. Its start, expressed in its oldest part (Chapters
I-III, line 35) tells of the 'despair of Arjuna' before the battle
in which two related tribes, the Pandavas and the Kauravas
fought as enemies.

And Arjuna saw, face to face, fathers, uncles and
grandfathers old,
Teachers, cousins, sons, grandsons and comrades
bold.

And friends and fathers-in-law in armies both,
Arrayed for battle...

Arjuna said:

'Seeing these kinsmen, O Krishna, with their hands
on the arrow,

'My limbs fail, dry is my mouth and my body
shivers

'My hair stands on end and my hand unconsciously
quivers.

'Gaandeeva, the goodly bow, seems to slip from my
hand,

'With the skin burning and mind reeling, I am
unable to stand.

'I see evil omens, O Krishna, nor do I foresee

'In killing kinsmen in battle any glory or glee.

'For I desire not victory, O Krishna, nor kingdom
nor pleasure,

'What is kingdom to us, O Krishna, or joys of a
life of leisure?

Arjuna's inner conflict was thus a conflict generated by the clash of the systems of morality: the ethic of the gens had inevitably to give way to the ethic of the class, *varna*, and the duty of the *Kshatriya* had been converted into a world law that would prevail even against the will of the individual. That, of course, did not in the least lessen either the significance of the conflict or the depth of the man's sufferings. But the main point was still that new and powerful social impulse to comprehend the world and the fate of man in it, which gave rise to profound reflection and a critical attitude towards the world, and underlay philosophy. The fact that Arjuna took the road pointed out by the ideal *Kshatriya*, Krishna, without special resistance and without being embarrassed by the latter's sophistical justification of murder,²⁶ is evidence of two things: (1) that we have here not the primitive communal, gentile system, but its survivals in a class society that did not correspond in its structure either to the gentile system itself or to its morals,²⁷ (2) that here there was still not philosophy as such—it was only being born and posing questions whose answers would be found in the religious-mythological sphere.²⁸

The history of China gives us roughly the same social picture. For all the scantiness of the historical data, scholars agree that

a counterposing of 'noble' people and 'base' is constantly met in the works of Chinese thinkers of the sixth to third centuries B.C., and communications about a significant social differentiation and sharp clashes of the interests of the various strata."

But there, too, there were considerable survivals of the gentile system, in particular preservation of the cult of ancestors, these being ancestors of one's own clan, since the spirits of other clans did not accept one's sacrifices. At that period a codification of law arose similar to that created by the written laws in Greece or the *Manu* laws in India. Bykov, describing the theoretical substantiation of these legislative acts in China, wrote:

Two opposing conceptions built up in the realm of law. One of them defended old norms of ruling the people in the interests of the aristocracy, based on observation of the principle of 'li' (a complicated

set of unrecorded traditional norms of behaviour and mutual relations of the 'nobles' and the 'base'. The other conception was aimed at justifying the interests of the new social strata taking shape during the development of norms of private property. In accordance with this conception, the introduction of unified laws was envisaged, and legal registration of the new relations.³⁰

The economic, social, and legal changes required them to be given an ideological dress—a critique or justification, a repudiation of them or their legitimization. Philosophy, too, arose in the struggle of these opposing trends as a rational comprehension of the new, changing, and internally contradictory world. But the heterogeneity and contradictoriness of philosophic thought itself was already coming out. Mankind never breaks with its past in a simple way, damning the old and lauding the new, or vice versa. The images of the 'whining' Herakleitos and the 'laughing' Demokritos did not become typical of philosophy by chance. Its ambivalence expresses an initial striving to hear the other side, to develop as comprehensive an analysis as possible, which would lead the thinker to an unambiguous stand on 'earthly' and 'heavenly' matters.

But social transformations only created the conditions for the rise of philosophy, posing the task of justifying and legitimising the nascent social relations. At the same time there was an objectifying and consolidation of the latter in the social institutions and structures of society and the state.³¹ Initially, in early slave-owning society, a nation of the divine origin of these structures and institutions prevailed. The 'genealogies' of the nobility and 'noble families', tracing them back to gods or heroes, were the clearest expression of that. In developed slaveowning society ideological legitimization of institutions predominated by way of bringing out their 'natural' character, their *physis* (nature or origin); only subsequently was that replaced by their correlation with the human sphere ('custom', 'law', 'art').

The corresponding content-wise aspect of the rise of philosophy was linked one way or another with the existing abstract material. In the period when philosophy arose, its origin was specially affected by the fact that this 'prehistoric stock, found already in existence by and taken over in the historical period',³² was

not only reinterpreted but also assimilated and preserved in the nascent philosophy. But that is also the question of the *sources* of philosophy.

Myth, Epic, and Scientific Knowledge. The Problem of the Sources of Philosophy

The 'prehistoric stock' that Engels spoke about was represented mainly as myth when philosophical thought was still only awakening. This unusually complicated, contradictory, and variously explained phenomenon interests us mainly in its ideological and 'epistemological' aspects, as a world outlook and as a specific form of thought. But at its rise philosophy did not find myths any longer in their original form. Myth had already been transformed, systematised, and largely reinterpreted in the *epic* and *theogonies*, which give us the direct image of the myth that preceded philosophy. Furthermore, that image was being more and more transformed through the effect of the development of art and of the elementary scientific knowledge that characterised the epoch. The interaction of these main elements also gave rise to philosophy of content as a *new* form of social consciousness.

To sum up, philosophy originated through *resolution of the contradiction* between the mythological outlook upon the world and the forming system of developing elementary scientific knowledge of nature and society. It was a quite long process, during which myth gradually decomposed as a result of its naturalistic, allegorical, and symbolic interpretation. Though using all these means in the struggle against myth, philosophy nevertheless preserved its integral, world outlook direction, but realising it on the basis of new, elementary, scientific facts and mainly of new conceptual forms of thoughts not reducible to the old form, mythological in the narrow sense of the term, or to the allegorical-artistic, or symbolic-religious, or concrete, scientific forms, although containing something from each of those styles of perception.

Myth is a multilayered, multifunctional product. Taking shape in the conditions of the primitive communal formation, whose undivided, elementary collectivism gave rise to a transference of the relations of gentile society to all reality, it was present-

ed as a description of a certain, ordered set of fantastic beings. Myth can therefore be defined as 'a generalised reflection of reality ... in the fantastic form of animate creatures of some kind'.⁸⁸ The latter were put into order in a certain way, forming a community of blood relationship and embodying certain natural-cosmic, social, and production function.⁸⁴

The mythical subject takes the mythical narrative as true, no matter how improbable it was. In other words the world of myth appears real to him but, at the same time, is an alienated world, separate from the everyday world. It is simultaneously graphically and sensually given, and is magic, miraculous, unusual; individually sensuous, and abstractly generalised; obviously authentic and supernatural. Its main function is to regulate the corresponding society, and it functions in society as life itself, in which the production, social, ideological, and even biological aspects are merged together.⁸⁵ But this syncretism of the primitive myth implies the implicit presence of other aspects in it, viz., symbolism allegorisation, generalisation. Myth thus contains the preconditions for the development from it of religion, relying in the main on the symbolic function, of art related to the allegorisation, and of a philosophic outlook based on generalisation.

Precisely that occurred over the long period that completed the evolution of the primitive communal formation and opened the epoch of early slaveowning. There was then a transition from a food-gathering and hunting economy to a producing one, from stone to metal, from matriarchate to patriarchate, and from fetishism to animism and chthonian mythology to the heroic.⁸⁶ The further development of myth and passage to other forms of social consciousness more proper to developed slaveowning also necessitated the accumulation of man's manifold experience (within myths and outside them), including positive knowledge of natural and production processes and of society and its conflicts. On the other hand this knowledge needed to be distinguished from reality itself, which was still missing in myth, i.e. the possibility, consequently, of seeing in myth, too, an imperfect (if not quite false) 'explanation' of nature and society, a symbol of 'supernatural' reality, and an allegory of real human qualities and social relations.

The decomposition of myth and transition to other forms of

social consciousness is most clearly traceable in Greece. Its starting point was mythology, represented already in substantially transformed epic form (the heroic epic of Homer, the didactic epic of Hesiod, and the latter's *Theogony*, with which the many extant fragments of the theogonies of other authors are associated). The general image of his mythology is as follows: the world (earthly, heavenly, subterranean, and marine phenomena and elements, and likewise man's production and social actions) is ruled by the Olympian gods. They themselves are already the third generation, with their own pedigrees, originating either from Okeanos and his wife Thethys (Homer) or from Chaos (Hesiod). Okeanos is the quite well personified beginning, the 'ancestor of the gods', 'from whom all we gods proceed'.³⁷ Chaos is an unpersonified beginning. While the theogonic process does not come out clearly enough in Homer, it is depicted in an ordered way by Hesiod: 'First of all Chaos came into being, and next broad-bosomed Earth (Gaia), everlasting foundation of all things, and misty Tartaros, and Love (Eros), fairest among the immortal gods.'³⁸ A consistent pantheon was developed as an outcome from that stage. The heroes were born from the amorous relations of the gods and goddesses with mortals.

Hesiod depicted the life of human society in his *Works and Days* as a succession of four 'ages'; golden, silver, bronze, and iron. The reasons for the death of the people of the golden age were not known; the silver age came to an end because its people paid no due honours to the blessed gods³⁹; the people of the bronze age perished in internecine struggle. It is not clear whether the fourth generation, 'the generation of hero-men' belonged to the bronze age or opened the iron age. The people of that generation perished in the fighting at Troy and Thebes of the seven gates.

For here now is the age of iron. Never by daytime
will there be an end to hard work and pain, nor
in the night.⁴⁰

It was an age of cares, discord, envy, and violence.

Several characteristic features distinguish the image of ancient Greek mythology. (1) The Olympian mythology was an internally ordered system that had the function, vitally important for society, of preserving, utilising, and accumulating skills, prac-

tical habits, social relations, and natural-cosmic aetiological explanations.

A possibility of doing without the Olympian system of names could only develop after the formation of a new semiotic system capable, like Olympus, of preserving, utilising, and amassing knowledge and habits.⁴¹

i.e. the new system represented by philosophy.

(2) This system had already been subjected to a high degree of literary treatment. Hence its imagery, which apparently forced not just the contemporary reader of Homer and Hesiod to see in 'rose-fingered Eos' a poetic image of the dawn rather than a beautiful goddess. But the embryo of allegorisation was already rooted there in the conception of myth, i.e. its interpretation as a designation of the general through the particular, and, moreover, a sensually visual particular. At the same time relations between the gods were too like the ordinary relations of people, i.e. had been converted into something strange and unaccustomed. The initial mythological reality proved strange precisely because of its similarity to the everyday life of people, so creating a need to see in the mythological image not reality but a symbol of it, and to see in the sensual image an idea directly merged with it but still different from it.

(3) The epic and theogonistic notion of the gods and their mutual relations had already reached a considerable degree of unequivocal, formal order, and that on a double plane, genetic and rational. The genetic orderliness of the epic mythologising was already opposed to the primordial myth and its notion that everything could spring from everything. The universal 'determinism' of the myth, and of the magic notions and actions associated with it, was already a thing of the past.⁴² The rational orderliness was linked with limitation of the functions of the divine creatures and the orderliness of their mutual semantic relations, since the elemental plural semantics of the myth were more and more giving way to a simple, synonymous one. Because

Pallas Athene had previously been what you liked; now, however, she was the goddess of war, artistic and technical wisdom, and a firmly organised patriarchal community. Now she was no longer the owl and the snake, but the one and the other had be-

come her attributes. Zeus was no longer thunder and lightning; he was the custodian of the heroic order, and thunder and lightning were simply his attributes.⁴³

These ordered semantic relations gave rise to a possibility of etymological comparison and a striving thereby to bring out the 'true' content, corresponding to common sense, of the improbable stories told by the ancients.

(4) Finally, the epic works, especially those of a didactic nature, contain immense material characterising production—handicrafts, farming, hunting; later war, commerce, and household affairs; later still, the gradually accumulating physical, medical, geographic, historical, and other knowledge was clearly counterposed to mythological, magical notions.

Medicine is already at a high level of development in the Homeric poems. Only once are magical formulas for staunching blood recalled in them (*The Odyssey*, XIX, 457); in all other cases quite rational means are employed to treat wounds... The many descriptions of the wounds ... are evidence not only of precise knowledge, based on experience, of how dangerous various wounds are but also of such exact observations and such astonishing acquaintance with the anatomy of the principal organs of the human body that a German military surgeon quite seriously hailed the author of the *Iliad* as his colleague.⁴⁴

Farming, cattle-raising, and handicrafts are described in detail in the Homeric poems.⁴⁵ More than 300 verses in Hesiod's *Works and Days* (386-723) describe production processes, quite unrelated to magic of any sort; only from stanza 724 do magical formulas begin, of the type of 'never pour a libation of the dark wine to Zeus at dawn', but they are alternated with simple hygienic prescriptions—the phrase quoted is completed by 'with unwashed hands'.⁴⁶ The obvious, mutual 'indifference' of these opposing elements, i.e. practical, production prescriptions and mythical, magical formulas could not be stable; with time their demarcation became necessary, and that already meant a decomposition of the myth and the forming of new mental concepts.

Myth, which was, still in the epic form, a syncretic, generalised reflection of reality as an assemblage of fantastic beings,

was only potentially allegoric, symbolic, and semantically organised. The actualisation of these possibilities meant not only their development but also decomposition of the myth and the establishing of other forms of social consciousness differing from the latter, viz., art, religion, elementary science, and finally philosophy. The process is clearly traceable in the history of Greek culture in the eighth to fourth centuries B.C.

Take art. The rise of a literature reproducing mythological subjects in abundance, precisely as subjects developed by means of specific literary techniques, led to a new understanding of 'word', 'talk' (*mythos*). The use of allegory, metaphor, typification, and personification had already led, as artistic tropes, to a differentiation of myth and reality to the point of their counterposing instead of their identification. In literature, for instance (especially in a genre like the fable), allegory was widely employed, i.e. the attributing of a meaning to the story only conventionally related to it. An allegorical interpretation of the myths arose at once. Initially it was a kind of literary, critical technique that came to be called 'means of defence [of the poet]'—*tropos apologias*. Tradition linked it with the name of Theagenes of Rhegium, who 'lived in the time of Cambyses' (at the end of the sixth century B.C.), who used it to defend Homer against an accusation of the 'obscurity' of his stories of the gods and heroes. Homer's depiction of the mutual hostility of the gods in Book 20 of the *Iliad*, which they vented in battle in which they took sides with belligerent human tribes, prompted Theagenes to represent the gods of the Greek pantheon as opposed natural forces—he personalised the elements, calling 'fire Apollo, and Helios, and Hephaestos, water Poseidon and Skamandros, next the moon Artemis, air Hera, and so on'. Then comes the direct allegory: 'The names of the gods are then considered as designations: (name) Athena—wisdom, Ares—imprudence, Aphrodite—passion, Hermes—talk'.⁴⁷

What had been a technique of inquiry with the 'literary scholar' Theagenes, and a justification of the writer's creativity, got another sense in the writing of history, which was also born in Greece in the sixth century B.C. Behind the stories of events supposedly happening to gods or heroes, and taking the form of 'tall stories', history saw a distortion of historical events. Allegorisation passed into what has come to be called the rational-

list interpretation of myth. Its sense lies in attributing a meaning to a myth acceptable to common sense; a myth is taken to be a historical event, a mistakenly interpreted allegory or metaphor, a deification of a historical person, and so on. The originator of this approach, the historian Hekateios of Miletos, proudly declared at the beginning of one of his works (seemingly in his *Genealogies*): 'I write what seems to me to be true. Because the stories of the Hellenes, it seems to me, are contradictory and laughable.'⁴⁸

Hekateios considered it impossible to present the true history of the past and the genealogies of the clans of his people without a critical approach to its myths, legends, and traditions by means of 'rational' guesses. For him the stories about Herakles and Kerberos, for instance, represented a reflection of the fact that Herakles killed and delivered to Eurystheus a snake living in the neighbourhood of Tainaron. There, according to legend, was the entrance to Aides (Hades), and the snake had dispatched many people there by its bite, for which reason it was dubbed the watch-dog of hell.⁴⁹ Geryoneus, whose cows Herakles was said to have stolen, was a king living in the region of Ambracia whom Herakles defeated with the aid of Epirian troops,⁵⁰ and so on. Herodotus, the historian of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., can be considered a continuer of the work of Hekateios. When interpreting the myth of Prometheus, Herodotus saw in him a Scythian king whose land suffered from the floods of the river Aëton.

Herakles turned this river into the sea and saved the land of Prometheus from flooding. And because Aëton means 'eagle' in Greek, that is why they began to speak of Herakles' killing of the eagle that was allegedly eating Prometheus' liver.'

The rationalist interpretation of myth was further reflected in Palaephatus' criticism of mythology (fourth century, B.C.), which he consistently tore to pieces in his book *On Incredible Things* (*peri apiston*), and in Euhemerus, who saw in the gods kings who had been deified either when alive or after death.

A scornful attitude toward the allegorical and rationalist interpretations of myths is often met in the literature. S. Y. Lurye, for example, thinks that myths, through this shallow rationalisation

have lost . . . their artistic value while science has gained nothing from it; to bring out the true picture of events it is much better rather to discard a myth than to rationalise it."

(1) The modern analysis of myths, however, is an extremely complicated reduction of their rationalisation to a really scientific character. We therefore cannot help seeing in the early allegorisation and rationalisation, which is itself an important source for modern interpretations, the basis of a scientific critique of mythology. (2) Allegorisation and rationalisation were of great significance because of their breaking down of the unity of the mythological outlook upon the world, which still retained its conservative ideological function. The transmutation of myth as 'word', 'narrative' (and moreover the 'true word', the function it had in Homer) into tradition, legend, and later hearsay, fairytale and fable, did not happen without the involvement of an allegorical and rationalist interpretation of myths. It was not fortuitous that this last meaning of the word 'myth' began to predominate in the fourth century B.C. But the road to another conception of outlook upon the world was inevitably laid thereby.

A qualitatively different road was opened up through the symbolic interpretation of myth. Symbolism is not allegorisation, in which the mythical names and events represent only sensuous forms of reflecting some kind of other, quite real, abstract sense; nor is it rationalisation that sees real historical events or natural phenomena behind the myth. A symbol is a unity of meaning and the sensual image, but a unity in which there is a conventionality reinforced as a rule by a cult (in religion) or a rule (in science), that makes impossible adequacy of the reflected and symbol in the sense of conceptual reflection. A symbol in art and religion (in contrast to science, in which it is converted simply into a sign) generally has a many-sided meaning capable of being converted simply into a polyseme. Symbolism plays an important role during the religious conversion of myths, and their conversion in a cult from the direct, living 'reality' into a symbol of another, otherworld existence.

In Greece the process of symbolic interpretation and cult consolidation of myth took place in Orphism. It is usually treated in the literature as a kind of religious renaissance, but some-

times as a reaction against the rise of philosophy, which threatened to sweep away the whole religious life of the Greeks by 'the wave of naturalism'.⁵³ Orphism resorted widely to symbolism. The Orphics developed the tendency already noted in Hesiod, to interpret divine names etymologically, into a whole system known to us from later memorials. Zeus, for instance, 'from whom all we gods proceed', was called such for the following reason:

In fact, Zeus wanted to generate life (*zōia*) and therefore they call him Zeus (*Zēn*), and also Zeus (*Dia*), because everything proceeds from him (*dia*).⁵⁴

Kronos was correlated with time (*chronos*) and was directly converted into it, so that Kronos-Chronos began to play a significant, and according to some sources paramount, role in the 'Orphic theogony'.⁵⁵ Aphrodite was associated with sea foam (*aphros*), from which she was born (*Aphroditē-aphrogenē*). Pan was the symbol of 'all' (*pan*); Demeter was the 'mother of the earth' (*gē mētēr-Dēmetēr*); Pallas was from *pallein*), because 'Athena, who concealed the heart of Dionysos, is called Pallas from [the word] "shake" (*pallein*) the heart', and so on.⁵⁶

Nestle saw simple allegorisation in these examples.⁵⁷ But Orphism went much further, although there was not only such an element in it, but also a play on words, as in the etymology of Aphrodite. The name of Zeus was not an allegorical designation of life; it was precisely a symbol of the unity of life and its 'beginning', which made it possible to see in Zeus 'the beginning, middle, and end' of everything existing, the unity of the world whole, 'Only one Zeus, one Helios, one Dionysos, one god in all. How is one to name them separately?'⁵⁸ And that means that it is a claim not simply to 'decode' the divine names, and discover their etymology, but also to something more, viz., a profound reconstructing of the mythological heritage that implies belief in another world. Hence, too, the opposing of the believer and the object of belief, still foreign to mythology itself. Orphism existed at the beginning of the religious reworking of myth; for that reason it must be regarded as a movement distinct from philosophy.

The symbolism of the 'Orphic' theology (very differing ideas have come down to us under that name), like the content of the 'Orphic' and other ancient theogonies and cosmogonies that

arose in the seventh to sixth centuries B.C., shows that it was not a philosophical movement, but a religious one. Take the content of the 'Orphic' theogony of Hieronymus and Hellanikos, and the 'Holy Doctrines', which have come down to us in various versions associated with the name of the Alexandrian scholar Apion, cited by Clement of Rome (end of the 1st century. A.D. and early second), the Christian writer Athenagoras (2nd cent. A.D.), Damascius, the Neoplatonist of the sixth century A.D. The winged snake Chronos or Herakles arose from water and slime, with the heads of a lion and a bull, and the divine face between them; with it was united the incorporeal Adrasteia-Ananke (necessity). According to Athenagoras, Chronos generated a huge egg from which Earth (Ge) and Heaven (Uranos) were formed. According to Apion, a spherical body or shell (*sphairioides kytos*) was formed from animated matter in a boundless chasm through the combining of life-creating principles. Like a bubble in boiling water it rose, and from it, as from an egg, was born the god Phanes. According to Damascius Chronos begot Aither (the Sky) and Chaos (the Void), then an egg, from which Phanes was born, alias Metis (Wisdom) and Erikepaïos (Strength).⁵⁹

Then follows an almost identical picture of the birth of the gods: Phanes (Love), who personified the undivided Universe, contained in embryo all separate worlds and gods, all things and creatures. He begot Night as his opposite; from their marriage were born Gaia and Uranos, and from them the Moirai, Kyklopes, Hekatoncheiren, and Titans, then the Olympian gods. Zeus, having swallowed Phanes, and inherited his strength, overthrew Kronos and became the supreme god, 'the beginning, middle, and end' of everything existing. From the marriage of Zeus and his mother, Rhea-Demeter, was born Kore-Persephone, and from his marriage with her, Dionysos. The Titans killed and devoured Dionysos, but Athena saved his heart, and Zeus resurrected him. From the ashes of the Titans blasted by Zeus in which particles of Dionysos devoured by them were preserved, men were created.⁶⁰

We would draw attention to the fact that, being a *theogony*, i.e. 'history' of divine beings, the birth of the gods was an irreversible process. Even the understanding of 'beginning' or 'first principle' (*arche*) as an exclusively natural one of the type of

water and slime, or animated matter (*hylēs empsychoy*) did not imply a returning to it of what had arisen, just as Hesiod's gods did not return to Chaos after they had been overthrown by the next generation. We see a similar picture in the theocosmogony of Pherekydes, which begins with the eternal existence of a 'trinity' of gods—Zas (Zeus), Chthoniê (Gaia, i.e. Earth, after marriage with Zas, who gave her the earth), and Chronos (Time). Chronos produced fire, water, and air from his seed.⁶¹ Later the snake Ophioneus was born and a fight developed between the hosts of Kronos and Ophioneus, like the struggle between the gods and the Titans in Hesiod and that of Horns and Typho (Seth) in Egyptian mythology.⁶² The merging of Chronos and Kronos in the accounts of Diogenes Laertius and Damascius on the one hand and of Origenes on the other is indicative. Allegorisation seemingly had an effect here, rather modernistically expressed by Hermeias, who described Pherekydes' system as follows:

In the beginning were Zeus, Chthoniê, and Kronos: Zeus is ether, Chthoniê earth, Kronos time; ether is the active element, earth the passive, and time the principle of becoming.⁶³

Without going into a further discussion of the various theogonies we can conclude that, although the profound changes produced in the myths by allegorisation, symbolisation, and cosmogonic and theogonic reworking furthered their decomposition, yet philosophy still did not arise as a result. The theocosmogonies, beginning with Hesiod and ending with Pherekydes, did not rise above 'prephilosophy', and contained only rudiments of philosophic thought. Furthermore, their leading orientation on anthropomorphic and sociomorphic genesis, and orientation on interpretation of myth in a spirit of religious symbolism, which was particularly manifest in the Orphics, while they prepared the way for the rise of philosophy, at the same time established an impassable boundary between it and them.

This boundary was breached to some extent by the activity of 'the Seven Wise Men' for whom generalisation of social experience and folk wisdom, and deducting of moral and social precepts from them, acquired very great significance. The folk wisdom fixed and generalised in the work of the 'sages' was the basis for manifold stories, verses, proverbs, and saws. Their state-

ments, inscribed on stones set up along main roads, became part of the people's education, a kind of popular philosophy of the Greeks. Its vitality, logical character, and striving for a rational explanation of phenomena produced an irresistible impression. The fact that this was not divine wisdom, derived from myths or religion, but human wisdom intended for people, was also no less important. There is no doubt that the sayings of the 'sages' reflected a new basis and a new spiritual climate of the rising civilisation that ultimately gave rise also to philosophy. The moral maxims, moral and political prescriptions, and the worldly wisdom were not developed in them, however, in a well-founded system. And only in Thales, who is ascribed, not by accident, both to the 'Seven Wise Men' and to the first philosophers, do we see a vast breadth of thought associated with linking up cosmological questions with morality.

Here are the gnomes of Thales as transmitted by Plutarch.

- (a) 'What is the eldest thing?' 'God,' said Thales, 'for God is something that has no beginning.'
- (b) 'What is the greatest?' 'Space; for while the universe contains within it all else, this contains the universe.'
- (c) 'What is the most beautiful?' 'The Universe; for everything that is ordered as it should be is a part of it.'
- (d) 'What is the wisest?' 'Time; for it has discovered some things already, and shall discover all the rest.'
- (e) 'What is the most common?' 'Hope; for those who have nothing else have that ever with them.'
- (f) 'What is most helpful?' 'Virtue; for it makes everything else helpful by putting it to good use.'
- (g) 'What is most harmful?' 'Vice; for it harms the greatest number of things by its presence.'
- (h) 'What is strongest?' 'Necessity; for that alone is insuperable.'
- (i) 'What is easiest?' 'To follow Nature's course; because people often weary of pleasure.'¹⁴

Before us we have a very ordinary Greek *agon* or contest in solving riddles; it was a common type of Greek folklore that already included quite complicated ideological problems. A transition from 'wisdom' (*sophia*) to philosophy, i.e. to 'love of wisdom', will readily be seen here—both in content and in form, which already includes a rational argument in favour of the stat-

ed answer. The ancients already saw a great difference in that. Diogenes Laertius related an argument said to be that of Pythagoras:

All too quickly the study was called wisdom and its professor a sage, to denote his attainment of mental perfection; while the student who took it up was a philosopher or lover of wisdom."

The distinguishing mark of philosophy was thus a bent for and aspiration to wisdom, to comprehension of the world and of man's place in it. But this attribute was also shared, to some extent, by science.

The problem of the origin of science and its interconnection with philosophy is quite complex. Where cognitive scientific creative effort begins, where science appears as a more or less formed system of knowledge, it is practically impossible to distinguish it from philosophy: the same personages, the same doctrines, in which the elements of scientific knowledge are embedded in an ideological generalisation. It is not surprising that an idea of the concurrence of philosophy and science, of philosophy as an initial undivided science from which the concrete sciences were later differentiated and 'hived off', is so common. There is no little truth in it, yet it is not the whole truth. Even when we take the earliest period, that of the rise of philosophy, we can already speak of a relatively separate existence of philosophic and concrete scientific knowledge. Three considerations allow us to say that. (1) The origin of science and philosophy in Greece had a basis in the form of concrete scientific knowledge borrowed from oriental cultures, above all those of Egypt and Babylonia. (2) Parallel with the establishing of philosophy we see a development of quite separate, independent knowledge, i.e. mathematical, astronomical, medical, anatomical and physiological, geographical, etc. (3) In the first doctrines of philosophy there was sometimes also a quite clear demarcation between specific knowledge and ideological (sometimes bordering on the religious-mythological), i.e. philosophic propositions proper.

When speaking here of concrete scientific knowledge and the elements of such, in brief of science in the historically determined and limited sense in which one can speak of it in relation to antiquity, we mean by it the aggregate of systematic knowledge based on observation and experience that made it possi-

ble to tackle and solve certain standard, practical tasks. That knowledge had already been separated off from myth and magic, though it might outwardly be linked with them. In any case, the absence of such an organic connection made it possible to separate specific scientific propositions from mythological ones, without disturbing the integrity of the one or the other. On the other hand, this knowledge did not rise to the level of ideological generalisations and could be exactly separated from them. It is in that sense that we speak of Near Eastern science—Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics and astronomy, Phoenician geography and navigation, medicine, etc.

The essential difference of Greek science from Near Eastern is usually seen in its striving to give knowledge a logical, conclusive, 'theoretical' character, and to elevate the empirical to the level of theoretical knowledge. Greek science and philosophy are therefore so close together as to be sometimes inseparable. There was, however, another movement, properly scientific, in Greece, that opposed philosophy to some extent. In other words, the link between specifically scientific and philosophic knowledge in Greek thought of the seventh to fourth centuries B.C. was far from as synonymous and unambiguous as it seems to scholars who see in Greek philosophy a 'single, undifferentiated science'.

Take mathematics, for instance. It might be thought, from the evidence of the mathematical studies of Thales and the other Milesians, that there was a certain link between their doctrines and mathematics, but their 'physical' picture of the world had a quite qualitative character, and the link was mainly methodological, consisting in a quest for logically connected rational explanations. Pythagoras? If we take the most optimistic conclusions about the time of the origin of Pythagorean philosophy, the position in regard to it is quite complicated. The ethical, religious part of the Pythagorean doctrines had no link at all with mathematics: the 'sayings of the master', the so-called *Acusmata*, were a collection of magical prescriptions and moral principles based on a mythology of the transmigration of souls. Learning proper, *mathēmata*, is not reducible to mathematics.

If we take it, in accordance with ancient tradition, that the early Pythagoreans recognised that 'all is number', it is obvious that this thesis was not a mathematical, but a philosophical, general ideological one. There is an enormous distance between

the Pythagoreans' mathematical studies, which did not go further in their earliest period than a recording of separate mathematical (numerical) patterns and regularities, and the ideological doctrine of 'number' as the 'principle and element' of the real. One must agree with P. P. Gaidenko when she writes:

Before mathematics developed at a theoretical system, there arose a doctrine of number as a kind of divine principle of the world, and this ... philosophical, theoretical doctrine played the role of mediator between ancient oriental mathematics [which also composed the initial material of Greek mathematics—*Ed.*] as a collection of examples or models for solving separate practical tasks and Greek mathematics as a system of propositions strictly connected with one another by proof.⁸⁸

But if philosophy played the role of 'mediator' here between practical-applied and theoretical knowledge, i.e. between the empirical and the theoretical, it was the 'mediator' on the ideological plane between specific, scientific, empirical, and practically oriented *knowledge* and socially, regulatively oriented myth—or rather, an ideological structure that removed their contradiction.

As an example confirming and explaining this idea we can take the famous 'table of opposites' ascribed by Aristotle to the 'Pythagoreans', i.e. the contemporaries of Alkmaion of Kroton (first half of the sixth century):

Limit	Unlimited
Odd	Even
One	Many
Right	Left
Male	Female
Motionless	Moving
Straight	Crooked
Light	Darkness
Good	Evil
Square	Oblong ⁸⁹

Only three of the ten pairs of opposites (2, 3, and 10) are purely mathematical; all the rest have a 'physical' or 'ethical' sense, the ethical colouring being laid on both the 'physical' and the 'mathematical, and vice versa.⁸⁸ It is typical that even the 'mathematical' opposites do not in the least represent *mathematical* statements; they can be presented, rather, as partial 'pro-

grammes' of mathematical inquiry. Odd and even, for instance, are understood as 'elements' (*stoicheia*) of number; the former is comparable with the unlimited and the latter with the limited, and so on. The Pythagoreans' general statement that 'all is number' can be presented in the same way. Let us just say that this 'scientific programme' of theirs⁶⁹ is no more 'efficient' in mathematics than the similar 'programmes' that 'all is water' or 'all is fire' in antique physics. The reason for 'inefficiency' will readily be seen when we go into the contradiction of the analysis that Aristotle made of the Pythagoreans' thesis, viz., number and principle; the principle (*archē*) of all things and the things themselves; it is the matter and the form of the real; it is their essence and their property; it is the active and passive cause, etc. But one cannot agree with Makovelsky that the cause of these contradictions was that Aristotle took formulas on the one hand relating to different stages of the development of Pythagorism, but on the other hand was unable to express Pythagoras' doctrine in terms of his own philosophy.⁷⁰ The Pythagoreans' 'number' was really *all that* (there was no formal contradiction in it) when viewed as a collection of syncretically merged possibilities of realising the general principle. Only in the course of time, under the criticism in particular of the Eleatics, did Pythagorism develop a new, less ambiguous and more 'efficient' programme, apprehended also by Platonism: 'things are like numbers'.

That such a 'programme' was built up in philosophy cannot convince us of the actual indistinguishableness of philosophy and mathematics, although we, too, have studied the classifying of mathematics among the philosophic disciplines common in antiquity (*philosophiai theōretikai*): the historian of mathematics easily distinguishes Archytas, Eudoxos of Knidos, and Euclid from Zenon of Elea, Demokritos, and Plato; and above all, because the former were engaged in practical mathematics, seeking means of solving mathematical problems, while the latter turned to problems of substantiating science and clarification and development of its basic concepts.

Antique 'physics' had a different relation to philosophy than mathematics. Physics in the modern sense, as the science of the general properties, structures, interactions, and motion of material bodies, properly speaking did not in fact exist outside philo-

sophy, being governed by general considerations of natural philosophy that included, for example, quite speculative, though not alien to observation, descriptions of concrete mechanisms of the mutual conversion of 'elements'. Take Anaximenes' 'condensing' and 'rarifying' of air (correspondingly, cooling and heating).⁷¹ Arguments of an astronomical and meteorological character, are relatively independent of these considerations, e.g. Thales' description of the structure of the universe,⁷² or Anaximander's explanation of thunder and the phenomena accompanying it.⁷³

It is indicative that structural descriptions and causal explanations that assumed direct observation and explanation of the observed by obvious analogies were to some degree independent of the principal orientations on a 'first principle'. In antique 'physics', however, it was the concept-images, verbally expressed general notions, that still played the determinant role and not concepts, while structural-causal analogies gradually gave way to metaphors, especially in the ideological problematic. Metaphor, as a means of artistic (and mythological) thinking, was never unambiguous. As a result antique 'physicists' gave ambiguous explanations that did not agree with one another, being unable to *prove* them, while at the same time not relying on *authority* or mythological tradition.

That is why they were criticised from various standpoints. The mythologist, for example, did not accept the 'physicists', 'who prate about heavenly matters', since they offended the grandeur of divinity by explaining natural phenomena by irrational principles and necessity.⁷⁴ The naturalists condemned their appeals to 'principles', neglecting the concrete facts.

We see this in medicine. The 'Hippocratic Collection', in which the state of the Greeks' medical science of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. was recorded, incidentally reveals both the existence of doctrines that depended essentially on philosophy and teachings consciously opposed to it. In the former we see a deliberate likening of the theoretical procedures of medicine to philosophic ones. Both the first philosophers and the physicians of this trend considered man a microcosm and demanded that he be approached from the standpoint of the relation between things and the elements of the real in general. The idea contained in the treatise *Airs, Waters and Places* that 'the main

element of the organism is air. Sickneses amount to a lack of air' corresponds to the thesis of Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia that each thing, according to its quality, is a certain quantity of air.⁷⁵ In other treatises the approach is different.

The authors of the treatises *On Ancient Medicine*, *The Science of Medicine*, *Epidemics*, and on *The Nature of Man* expressed marked disapproval of abstract theories that scorned specific symptoms and tried to explain diseases and their treatment by references to general 'postulates' or 'elements'.

In all previous attempts to speak or to write about medicine, the authors have introduced certain arbitrary suppositions into their arguments, and have reduced the causes of death and the maladies that affect mankind to a narrow compass. They have supposed that there are but one or two causes; heat or cold, moisture, dryness or anything else they may fancy. From many considerations their mistake is obvious... They are specially to be censured since they are concerned with no bogus science, but one which all employ in a matter of the greatest importance, and one of which the good professors and practitioners are held in high repute."⁷⁶

Futhermore medicine is not simply a craft but is also a science, since it

has for long possessed the qualities necessary to make a science. These are original observations and a known method [archē kai hodos eyrēmenē—*Ed.*] according to which many valuable discoveries have been made over a long period of time. By such a method, too, the rest of the science will be discovered if anyone who is clever enough is versed in the observations of the past and makes these the starting point of his researches."⁷⁷

The opposing of medical practice to abstract theorising, backed up by 'arguments and proofs... all of which mean nothing',⁷⁸ was consolidated by claims to possess 'original observations and a known method' that enabled medicine to develop its researches and practical tenets independently. By refuting natural philosophical assertions

that there is one basic substance which is unique and the basis of everything; but they call it by different names, one insisting that it is air, another that it is fire, another water, another earth,"

the author of the treatise on *The Nature of Man* appealed to substances really visibly discoverable in man, viz., blood, phlegm, and two types of bile (yellow and black). And although his arguments were no less speculative than those of the natural philosopher doctors, he constantly strove to link argument with observation, experience, and the result of medical activity against one disease or another and its symptoms.

Greek historical science had even greater independence in relation to philosophy. We have mentioned its role above in the decomposition of mythology, a rationalist interpretation of which was primarily the affair of historians. The fact that history did not base itself on the authority of religion in this had already been specially stressed in antiquity by Josephus Flavius, for example. That was the strength of Greek historical science. While still far from freed from the influence of mythology and legend, it nevertheless approached a historical event from the standpoint of reason, understood as the human capacity to achieve truth. Furthermore, it not only interpreted myths but also recorded historical facts.

While history (*historia*—inquiry, questioning, information and facts obtained from others, stories of the past) was initially based on mythology, purging it of absurdities and contradictions, and searching for the ‘historical fact’ in a mythical tale, it gradually began to draw on legends, lists of officials in their historical order, and lists of the victors at the Olympic and other Games. As a result it became possible to fix the chronology of events more accurately. The notes and tales of travellers, military campaigners, etc., were drawn upon. Hekateios of Miletos, Charon of Lampsakos, and Hellanikos of Mitylene laid the basis of Greek historical science. Alongside mythography there appeared the historical chronicle (Charon’s *Lampsakian Tablets*, Hellanikos’ *Atthides*, *Victors of the Karneian Games*, and *The Priestesses of Hera at Argos*), and historical ethnographic descriptions (Hellanikos’ *Lesbiaka*, *Argolika*, *Persika*, *Scythica*, etc.).

These works paved the way for the appearance of Herodotus’ *History*. It was not by chance that Herodotus (circa 485-425 B.C.) was already called the ‘father of history’ in antiquity. Having borrowed the main forms and techniques of narration of past events and rationalist interpretation of myths from his pre-

decessors the Ionic logographers, and a keen interest in everything 'human' in history from the Sophists, and also belief in the relativity and equal value of the customs, values, and knowledge of various peoples,⁸⁰ Herodotus combined them with literary techniques characteristic of the literature of the Orient.

Herodotus formulated not unimportant scientific principles in a few methodological remarks dotted here and there in his book. Above all there was a clear aim: the book was written so that time would not efface men's deeds from people's memories, so that the reasons for the war between the Greeks (Hellenes) and the Persians would not be forgotten. He saw the historian's work, furthermore, as an obligation to pass on what had been said, though he was not obliged to believe everything said.⁸¹

Wilhelm Nestle has justly written that

this orientation on substantiating causes and winking out reality from mythical and anecdotal tradition is the characteristic of the scientific spirit and is already enough by itself to prove Herodotus worthy of the honourable title of 'Father of History'.⁸²

We would add, however, that there was still no scientific critique of sources with Herodotus; at best there was an attempt to correlate reports with common sense. In the *History* the historical evidence, accepted without any attempt to correlate it, is often contradictory; there are no precise chronological indications. And even the orientation on disclosing the true causes of historic events suffers from superficiality and naiveté, in particular in the first book of the *History*, in which the causes of the war between the Greeks and the Persians are reduced to mutual hate.

Herodotus was little interested in philosophy. As regards his world outlook he was traditional, recognising gods and their intervention in human affairs, fate, divination, miracles, etc., but that did not prevent him from attesting bribery of the priests of the temple of Delphi, and evaluating the oracle's recommendations critically.

We still find among Greek historians, as among the spokesmen of other fields of knowledge, a preponderance of factological inquiry characteristic of science (even though still only nascent), i.e. observation, recording and critical, rational interpretation of facts, and establishing of causal links between phenomena. The

main feature that distinguished ancient science from philosophy, which was developing parallel with it, and sometimes integrally linked with it, was precisely the *empirical* component of knowledge. Ancient science was characterised by reliance on experience and practice, and a striving to verify visually and sensually the general principles and hypotheses formulated in the course of cognitive activity, and to develop cognition based in its own 'principles and method' without the speculative theorising.

There were naturally still few reliable observations of the processes of nature and society. As the development of scientific knowledge in modern times has indicated, observation as such and contemplative experience were still inadequate. Experiment was still needed, which became the specific difference between the empirical, observational component of ancient science and the science of modern times. But this empirical component itself already formed that component of developing human knowledge as an integral whole in antiquity which pointed ahead and came into sharp contradiction with mythological explanation. There is no doubt, in fact, about the explanatory, aetiological function of mythology, especially late mythology. But it was an *illusory* explanation. The global 'determinism' of mythological thought on the principle of 'all from all' in fact explained nothing, and the relating of the 'explained' event to a divine force responsible for its appearance was in essence a tautology that did not go further than the semantic system of the myth. Scientific explanation, on the contrary, drew on reality itself and on objective factors. Empirical authenticity arose from it, opposed to the 'authenticity' of myth based on custom and tradition. The absence of a priestly caste or estate, and of a unified dogmatics in Greece, moreover, weakened custom and tradition. For the Greek, therefore, even the believer, Tertullian's '*credo quia absurdum*' (I believe it because it is absurd) was in practice inconceivable; even the object of belief must be plausible and believable in contrast to the 'unbelievable' that myth perpetually narrated.

It therefore seems that the 'principle and method' of knowledge recorded in written form in medicine and history had already come into decisive contradiction with mythology in the fifth century. Their characteristic features were requirement of

plausible knowledge, not diverging from living practice, accessible to 'ordinary people', checkable by observation, 'inquiry', and alien to any 'empty hypothesis'; rejection of authority, and reference to the 'divine' nature of the phenomena investigated; a quest for a real, causal explanation. It was this contradiction, which of course arose long before it was put into writing, that was the starting point for the formation of philosophy—a long process that took more than two centuries in Greece, from the end of the seventh to the beginning of the fourth century. Scientific knowledge above all threw doubts on the aetiologic function of myth. But the specific knowledge of the sciences, while giving partial explanations, was unable, because of its fragmentary character, but at the same time its orientation on specific explanations of phenomena, to perform that ideological function which myth had performed before, and still did. At the same time, the initial ordering, formalising, and 'rationalising' of myth in the epic undermined its ideological significance. A kind of 'ideological vacuum' was formed as a result, that called to be filled. And it was filled by the *philosophic* outlook, which put forward a dialectical resolution of this contradiction and a dialectical synthesis of the opposites, viz., a general, ideological orientation, derived essentially from mythology, and a scientific orientation requiring plausible explanation, amenable in principle to observational empirical explication.

That raised the contradictory relation of philosophy to myth, on the one hand, and to specific scientific knowledge, on the other, to the highest degree. The philosopher, inclined on the whole to scientific thought, nevertheless not only did not forget myth but employed it to his own ends, as a source of 'knowledge', material for thorough revision and meditation, and a mode of thought. He not only made use of scientific knowledge, which he sometimes himself added to, but also polemicised against a one-sided, specific-empirical 'multiknowledge'. Hence the two one-sided attitudes to the first philosophers which succeeded one another. One was that the thinkers of Hellas down to Plato were not philosophers but scholars, and Greek philosophy essentially was a single, undifferentiated science. The other was that all Greek philosophy, starting with Thales, was a mystical experience blossoming into a luxuriant myth, and development of an initial symbolic Concept-Myth.

As a matter of fact we are faced with two programmes of inquiry into the forming of philosophy, and the development of the history of philosophy has shown that neither could be pursued without diverging in any marked way from the facts. It is not a matter just of their one-sidedness, but that they are undialectical, reducing philosophy in fact to some of its sources.

The Moulding of Philosophy

The initial contradiction whose resolution started the moulding of philosophy can be expressed another way. Myth 'explains' the world (nature, society, and man) through a transition from an unknown, amenable to explanation, to an even less known divinity or divinities, that are perhaps even unfathomable in principle. It thus imposes a system of social regulations for ordered guidance of appropriate social institutes. With the development of specific scientific knowledge and the practical know-how and skills based on it, more and more significant fragments of this system came to be doubted, and its integrity was more and more disrupted. But the absence of a new, integrated system (or rather the impossibility of one in principle at that time) based on specific scientific knowledge posed the task of developing a system that would give the social individual a general ideological orientation on the one hand, and would be based on certain knowledge rather than myth on the other hand. Since undeveloped, highly fragmentary specific knowledge could not be such a system, the contradiction could only be resolved through the rise of an ideological system that combined a general ideological intention with a rational approach that called for (and in principle achieved) a reliable ('natural') explanation.

Philosophy became this ideological system as a dialectical synthesis that removed the initial contradiction. The latter re-appeared, it is true, but already in another form, in philosophy itself and the struggle of its two opposed trends, materialism and idealism.

We have already mentioned the two attitudes to the first philosophers. One was essentially an absolutising of the scientific character of philosophy. It was created by the positivists of the end of the nineteenth century, and amounted to saying that

before Plato almost all Greek thinkers were not philosophers in the sense one gives the term today, but *physiologists*, as they said, i.e. scientists... The kernel of the ancient *physiologists'* system was never a metaphysical idea but rather a general conception that each of them formed of the world from the aggregate of his own partial knowledge."

In the Foreword to the third edition of his *Early Greek Philosophy* (in 1920) Burnet expressed his view categorically as follows:

My aim has been to show that a new thing came into the world with the early Ionian teachers—the thing we call science—and that they first pointed the way which Europe has followed ever since, so that, as I have said elsewhere, it is an adequate description of science to say that it is 'thinking about the world in the Greek way.' That is why science has never existed except among people who have come under the influence of Greece."

The main feature of science is its empirical, inductive character.

The view of Greek philosophy began to change gradually in the twentieth century, inclining more and more to a stress on its link with and continuity of mythology. F. M. Cornford, for example, held that there was 'nothing but theology' behind the 'dogmatic systems of the first philosophers', while 'science has its principal root in magical art'.⁸⁵ In its rise philosophy fully preserved the model of mythological cosmogony, and the cosmogony of the Milesians, in particular of Anaximander, worked 'on a scheme of cosmogony already provided by Hesiod and other poetical cosmogonies'.⁸⁶ Philosophy only rationalised myth, eliminating the mythical imagery. Losev went even further in his early works, dissolving philosophic thought in fact in mythology.

Thales' thought is not science, religion, or abstract philosophy. It is mystical experience, mildewed with a lush cover of myth... Everything that is said about him applies to all Greek philosophy—irrespective of its naturalism or idealism."

So the idea of the unity and indestructibility of everything, the antithesis of individual things and impersonal elemental forces, the idea of universal animation and universal divinity merged

in 'a doctrine of the identity of God, World, Reason, and Soul as the common, initial, dialectical Concept-Myth'.⁸⁸

All the same it proved impossible to follow that position consistently. In his *Greek Philosophy*, published in 1914, 22 years after his first book, Burnet wrote: 'But, while philosophy is thus intimately bound up with positive science, it is not to be identified with it.'⁸⁹ Why? Because the main problem of philosophy is that of reality, and it cannot be answered without allowing for man's relation to existence, 'which at once takes us beyond pure science'.⁹⁰ The evolution of Losev's views is no less indicative. Although he continues to see a close link between antique philosophy and myth, he represents the former now as a negation of the latter, the transition of the latter to its opposite. 'Instead of gods this new thought now strives to penetrate the laws of material nature and cosmos.'⁹¹ True, he sees a resolution in that of the contradiction of myth and thought, of the mythical, unsullied nature of existence and its understanding, rationality, and objective comprehensibility, in that mythical reality is translated into the language of consciousness, reason, and thought, while the general ideology of the slaveowning formation is treated as

a conscious counterposing of the thinking subject and objective, absolute myth, a consistent construing of the ancient mythology in art, philosophy, and science by the means of subjective consciousness.⁹²

But it is no longer the initial myth by which the man of gentile society lived, but rather its philosophical reconstruction.

We have no space for a detailed polemic here against that view; we shall only say that this undoubted exaggeration of the role of myth and underestimation of the role of specific knowledge in the origin of philosophy are connected with the fact that Losev (in accordance with his field, aesthetics) mainly pays attention to art, in which the thesis of the translation of myth into another language as a means of resolving the contradiction between it and rationality has a much greater grain of truth than in the case of philosophy. It is more important for us that neither the identification of nascent philosophy with science in general nor its rapprochement with mythology became an adequately substantiated orientation.

The qualitative distinction between philosophy and the re-

ligious-mythological outlook on the one hand, and empirical knowledge on the other, is sometimes employed to describe philosophy as a 'No Man's Land, exposed to attack from both sides'.⁹³ That view, formulated in the main by philosophers close to positivism, starts from the assumption that philosophy ('metaphysics') tries, by means of reason, to deal with ideological question of the meaning of the world and life, which is unattainable by exact scientific knowledge. As a result philosophy seems to be the product of two factors: traditional religious and ethical conceptions on the one hand and scientific investigation (in the broad sense) on the other.

Individual philosophers have differed widely in regard to the proportions in which these two factors entered into their systems, but it is the presence of both, in some degree, that characterizes philosophy.⁹⁴

Bertrand Russell thus grasped the interaction of the religious (and mythological) and scientific factors in the forming of philosophy, but he understood it metaphysically. The fact is that these two factors, entering the doctrines of philosophers in different proportions, no longer function in their old role, as religious and scientific conceptions respectively. The synthesis of the general ideological orientation taken from myth by philosophy and the rational, observational orientation of scientific knowledge is not their simple combination but a thought operation from which there arises something new in principle on the one hand, and in which the initial elements themselves are reworked, altered, 'sublated' in a new thought formation on the other, getting a meaning distinct from what they originally and separately had. This something is philosophy.

In the Soviet literature there has been a strengthening of the view that philosophy arose as its intimate unity with specific scientific knowledge. Kessidi, for example, who gives the most circumstantial grounds for this view, writes:

The natural sciences and philosophy were born simultaneously in Greece (at the turn from the seventh century B.C.); from the moment of their birth to roughly the end of the fifth century, they were not differentiated, and constituted the structure of the theoretical knowledge of that time in general, i.e. a single whole that was subsequently

called natural philosophy. What is said about the distinction between the natural philosophic explanation of the world and the religious-mythological one refers primarily to the specific sciences and scientific knowledge."

We have already said above that one can hardly accept the claim that there was no differentiation between philosophy and specific scientific knowledge before the fifth century B.C. It follows, furthermore, from our quotation from Kessidi that the theoretical knowledge of the seventh and sixth centuries was precisely *philosophy* ('natural philosophy', 'physiology'), i.e. what we call the theoretical outlook upon the world, and not some undifferentiated whole. Kessidi's remark that the radical distinction between the religious-mythological explanation of the world refers not to the 'natural philosophic' one as a whole, but primarily to the specific sciences, is evidence, if not of differentiation, then at least of the differentiability of the ideological and specific scientific elements in the 'theoretical knowledge' of the epoch. One must not forget, moreover, that this specific scientific knowledge differed radically from philosophic precepts as well.

The answer to the question of the origin of philosophy calls for consideration of the distinction between the *object* of philosophic inquiry and that of specific scientific investigation. When we consider the doctrines of the first philosophers *en bloc*, of course, as an 'undifferentiated whole', we see in them a combination of the most varied information—from very broad ideological generalisations to very specific descriptions of the simplest phenomena. But the historian of philosophy cannot take a special interest in, say, how Thales understood the causes of the flooding of the Nile or what geometrical discoveries were his. Those matters belong to the history of geography or mathematics, and it is historical chance that Thales concerned himself with them. Thales interests the history of philosophy as one of the first philosophers, who tackled the problem of the nature of what *exists* in his own way. And his specific scientific knowledge and discoveries had a sense of a special kind in it, not in themselves but for their value for substantiating the new, theoretical outlook upon the world, in contrast to both the old religious-mythological one and specific scientific knowl-

edge proper, yet, at the same time, for their role as deductive conclusions from general, ideological propositions and so as 'verification' of the latter.

It thus makes sense to speak of the origin of philosophy in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. only when we consider the doctrines of the first philosophers in their legitimate tendency to elucidate the universal ideological principles or 'beginnings'. But then the question immediately arises of the specific *method* of philosophy meant to promote elucidation of these 'principles'. Here we see a fundamental difference between philosophic method—what has been called dialectics or *theoriā* (we use this latter term together with Losev) from the 'principles and method' of the specific sciences on the one hand and religious-mythological orientations on the other. While the former were orientated on directly observable and tested facts, consciously rejecting 'void hypotheses', and the latter were based on tradition and authority, philosophy laid claim to a special kind of *contemplation* of what is, in its essence, supportable by means of rational thought as 'dialectics', i.e. the art of dispute, and clarification and resolution of the contradictions of thinking about the world. Behind this 'contemplation' often mystified, there lay of course the complex, many-sided activity of human thought, syncretically merging into a kind of intellectual intuition, gradual consciousness of the essence of which has been gradually realised during the whole history of philosophy. But that is a special, very complicated theoretical question that calls for special inquiry.⁹⁶

Let us examine the forming of the subject-matter and method of philosophy during the activity of the so-called Presocratics, turning to the key concepts of antique philosophy, viz., 'nature' and 'existence', 'dialectics' and 'theory' (*theoriā*).

A process of 'sublating' the ideological precepts of myth and the factological maxims of awakening science in the doctrines of the first philosophers is clearly traceable in the development of the antique concept of 'nature' (*physis*), the subject-matter and key concept of nascent philosophy. This word, and the expressions related to it—derived from the verb *phyō*, to bear, grow, etc., and correspondingly to be born, develop, arise—have a dual sense. On the one hand, it is birth, origin, genesis. On the other, it is what is generated in this process, primarily prop-

erties, appearance, 'breed'. In Homer, and Theognis, for instance, and later in Pindar, the word *phya* or *phyē* is often used to mean a noble appearance, carriage or bearing, beauty, attended with a 'noble' origin. At the same time there is one place in Homer (*Odyssey*, X 303), where we meet the word *physis*, meaning rather just 'properties':

He pulled the herb out of the ground and showed me what it was like [*physis*]. The root was black, while the flower was as white as milk; the gods call it Moly, and mortal men cannot uproot it, but the gods can do whatever they like."

Shuisky used 'properties' (Russian *svoistva*); other translators use the word 'nature' (Russian *priroda*), which complicates and confuses the matter. What is meant here is simply the magical properties of the plant that Hermes gave to Odysseus to save him from the enchantress Kirkē.⁹⁸

In mythology the world *physis* acquired a mythical sense only quite later, when it was used for the abstract personification of 'Nature', i.e. the father, mother, and wet-nurse (*tithēnē*, *trophos*) of all things.⁹⁹ But its meaning as 'genesis' had paramount place in mythology. The idea of genesis is a concept of the origin of mythological beings—the gods as both the world and everything that is in it—from a certain 'beginning' or 'principle' (like the Chaos of the ancient Greeks), or from other divine creatures. The myths of the creation of the world by the act or word of a divinity are seemingly later ideas that required a higher level of development, when food-gathering and hunting had been succeeded by production proper, and when man began to *produce* and later to order and command.

'Gentile' ideas of genesis were particularly strengthened in the slaveowning period when the class differentiation of society and singling out of 'noble' clans evoked a need to legitimise their advantages; that was done by claiming their origin from gods or heroes. Certain clans were thus included in the world order and in the hierarchy of the social world as a necessary, recognised link.

The idea of the origin, 'birth and death' of all things thus took first place in philosophy from the very outset, but already not as in myth. While mythology and the theogonic doctrines spoke primarily of the birth of 'immortal' gods, it was a matter

of all things in general in the first philosophic doctrines, and that on a special plane. The oldest witness, Aristotle, wrote:

Most of those who first philosophized regarded the material kinds of principles as the principles of all things; for that of which things consist, and the first from which things come to be and into which they are finally resolved after destruction ... this they say is the element and the principle of things.¹⁰⁰

At least two moments catch our attention in this testimony. (1) The 'element and principle' is converted into a substratum or substance, 'that of which things consist' (or 'that from which all existing things are').¹⁰¹ But could one say that beings generated from Chaos 'consist of chaos'? Of course, not! (2) It is recognition of the reversibility of genesis: 'the element and the principle' (*archē kai stoicheion*) is that 'out of which things come to be and into which they are resolved in the end',¹⁰² having completed their age. But could one say that Gaia, Tartaros, and Eros, and Erebus and Nyx, begotten by Chaos, and their descendants, and the progeny of Gaia and Uranos and the other 'immortals' returned again to Chaos? Naturally not; such a posing of the question within the context of the mythological world outlook was quite inconceivable. Theogenesis was *irreversible*.

But philosophy and its general ideological orientation on deducing the genesis of all existing things from a common, general 'principle' also contradicted the specific scientific notions in which the investigator's interest turned on the particular and not the general. The author of the treatise *The Nature of Man* wrote:

I am not going to assert that man is all air, or fire, or water, or earth, or in fact anything but what manifestly composes his body [our italics—*Ed.*]; let those who like discuss such matters. Nevertheless, when these things are discussed I perceive a certain discrepancy in the analyses for, although the same theory is employed, the conclusions do not agree. They all, theorizing draw the same deduction, asserting that there is one basic substance which is unique and the basis of everything; but they call it by different names, one insisting that it is air, another that it is fire, another water, another earth. Each

adds arguments and proofs to support his contention, all of which mean nothing. Now, whenever people arguing on the same theory do not reach the same conclusion, you may be sure that they do not know what they are talking about.¹³

Why did he deem it unjustified to judge the nature of man from his origin from such an original principle? Precisely because it was not 'what manifestly composes his body'. The doctor, moreover, considered it obvious that

in the first place, generation cannot arise from a single substance. For how could one thing generate another unless it copulated with some other.¹⁴

The manifest existence of an initial element and principle in the human body, and its union, combination, and 'mixing' with other principles, seemed necessary to the doctor for an opinion on the genesis and 'nature' of the human body, on the principles of its health and sickness. In each case, moreover, it was necessary to discover the specific mechanism of their operation, a requirement that did not emerge in clear form with the first philosophers. The author of the Hippocratic treatise *The Nature of Man* counterposed an empirical orientation requiring discovery of 'principles' observable and sensuously and directly existing in the human body to the philosophical approach based on discovery of a single 'principle' or single 'nature' of all human properties and qualities, viz., air, or fire, or water, or earth. It is indicative that he did not even introduce a common term for these observable 'principles', limiting himself to listing them: blood, phlegm, and two kinds of bile. 'The human body contains blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile. These are the things that make up its constitution and cause its pains and health'.¹⁰⁸ Health was a balanced combination of these components of the body; sickness or disease was the result 'of a disturbance of this balance or discharge of one of the components, and correspondingly a wasting of one part of the body and overfilling of another. That allowed the author not only to explain sickness but also to describe the effect of medicines, and the influence on the body of diet, the seasons, climate, physical exercise, work and leisure, etc.

The point is not, of course, that there were no speculative arguments and conjectures in that; an empirical approach could

not yet yield reliable results without an experimental scientific approach, but there was already an exclusive orientation on observation and on what was directly given in experience. As a result, the composition and constitution of the body as the observable result of genesis, was what was meant by 'nature' (*physis*) in those fields of specific scientific knowledge that were independent branches of knowledge, in contrast to 'physics' and were thus models for the physical science of the future.¹⁰⁶ Philosophy had simultaneously in mind both the origin and genesis of existing things and the results of this genesis, sense objects, and their turning back into the single element and principle. But there were also other elements, no less substantial, in it.

Jaeger, when characterising the first Greek philosophers and their understanding of 'nature' wrote:

In the Greek conception of physics two subjects are confused: the inquiry into the origin of the universe (which compels reason to move beyond phenomena observed by the senses), and the comprehension of everything which proceeds from that origin and now exists, by empirical investigation.¹⁰⁷

On the whole he was right; his mistake was simply that these two subjects were not 'confused', but *synthesised* in a single ideological orientation of philosophy. The first philosophers' investigation of 'nature' was primarily, of course, a philosophical one, an investigation of the 'nature of things' that necessitated going beyond the sensually observed to the 'elements and principle' of everything that exists. In the ideological set-up of the times it was an appeal to the divine attributes of the first principle. But investigation of 'nature' also had an empirical aspect, which implied an understanding of the 'divine' qualitatively distinct from myth; the general ideological understanding of 'principle' had to admit in principle of an empirical explication and a rational transition from the general to the particular and single.

As we have already remarked, the nature-*physis* of the first philosophers implied the *process* of birth (*genesis*), and constitution, structure, and *existence* of what existed. It is interesting that there was a splitting of the whole in the literature of

the end of the nineteenth century. Burnet, basing himself on the derivation of *physis* from the Greek root *phy-* (Lat. *fu-*, English *be*), which meant 'to be', saw in the ancient 'nature' something permanent of which the world had been made¹⁰⁸ Several authors (W. A. Heidel, A. O. Lovejoy), when opposing him, linked it with the ideas of 'growth' and 'origin'.¹⁰⁹ The dispute that developed led to the second view being almost universally accepted, but neither Burnet nor his opponents considered this evolution of the term sufficiently, though they recognised that new meanings arose as it developed. Let us consider this evolution as regards philosophy.

The evolution of the term *physis* was summed up by Aristotle, who gave a set of definitions of 'nature' in his *Metaphysics*:

- (1) 'the generation [genesis] of growing objects;
- (2) 'the first constituent from which a growing object grows', and which is retained in the composition of the growing object;
- (3) 'the source, from which motion first begins in each natural thing';
- (4) 'the first constituent (*hylē*), which is in a natural thing or from which a natural thing is generated, and which is without shape or incapable of changing from its own potentiality';
- (5) 'the substance [*ousia*] of natural things—their form or shape;
- (6) 'every substance in general', including the substance of things made artificially."¹¹⁰

Aristotle's own conception of the substance of things was that 'nature spoken of in the primary and main sense is the substance of things which have a principle of motion in themselves *qua* what they are.'¹¹¹ That definition, of course, by no means answers how the first philosophers understood 'nature'. Aristotle's definition was based on a differentiation and opposing of the 'matter' and 'form' (substance) of things, the form possessing self-motion, but the matter not. Nevertheless one cannot reject his definition, since his conception is the legitimate fruit of the evolution of the preceding doctrines. Let us try to disentangle the content of the early Greek philosophies that treated the concept of 'nature' from Aristotle's analysis of it.

(1) It is quite evident that the first Greek philosophers' concept of nature-*physis* included the origin and destruction, life and death of all things, but naturally not of it itself. In fact

we find in Anaximander's doxography¹¹³ the epithets 'deathless' ('immortal') and 'ageless' ('unaging')—*aidion kai agērē*—in reference to the first principle (*apeiron*) however he himself understood it, while in Euripides 'immortal and unaging' appear as direct epithets for 'nature'.¹¹³ (2) It is clear therefore that among the early philosophers the concept 'nature' included recognition of a certain *constancy* lying 'behind' changes and changing things and 'in' the changes. 'Nature' was thus logically not yet a differentiated unity in diversity, stable in changes, being preserved in the changing and the arising. One can say that it was a compound, a synthesis, whose components were closely, indistinguishably fused.

Aristotle tried to give a logically clear picture of how 'nature' should be understood. He thus clarified the nub of the matter to some extent, but at the same time broke down the initial syncretic unity of the intuition of 'nature' characteristic of the first philosophers, and undermined the naive dialectic of the concept. As a result it came about that the singling out in 'nature' of an abstract 'genesis' (1) and later of an equally abstract moment of stability and constancy (2) already led Aristotle himself into contradictions.¹¹⁴ But the fact that he employed the expression 'principle and elements' (*archē kai stoicheion*) to signify the 'beginning' or 'initial principle' of the early philosophers suggests that an understanding of this unity of the dynamic and stability in early Greek 'nature' was no foreign to him. In that conjunction are expressed the temporal moment of the natural process ('from which' it began) and the substantial moment (from what it was formed and composed). We can quite rightly say that the understanding of 'nature' as the self-motion of everything existing came from that (3), i.e. the moment that directed and moved (by 'which' nature was initiated and governed as a process).¹¹⁵ The first philosopher's quite well attested authorship of the term 'embracing' or 'enveloping' (*periechon*)¹¹⁶ suggests the existence here, too, of a spatial aspect ('whence' things originated).

The nature-*physis* of the first philosophers thus appears as a universal intuition of a dynamic, self-moving whole that generates its existing parts (*ta onta*). The recording and bringing to the fore of the substantial aspect (not yet counterposed at all to everything else) led to 'nature' beginning to be understood

primarily as 'element'. The influence of the specific scientific, empirical orientations, which suggested the idea of the leading role of objective, material factors of reality, apparently, made itself felt in this. But the philosopher erected this thought into a specific ideological orientation. Plato reminded us of that when analysing the doctrines of his predecessors.

Does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all things? these he calls nature.¹¹⁷

They were not simply the 'material' from which things were created, but active, creative forces combining all the above-mentioned aspects of nature-*physis*, and at the same time discovered visually and empirically in it. The nature-*physis* of the early Greek philosophers therefore cannot be understood in the sense of the Aristotelian 'material principle' (*hylē*) in sense (4). And Aristotle constantly employed this understanding of his of 'matter' as incapable of self-development for a critique of the naive materialism of antiquity.

As we have seen, the main thing in the concept 'nature' for Aristotle was 'substance'. How did matters stand as regards it among the first philosophers? Theoretical, philosophical comprehension of it was only beginning. Herakleitos, for instance, added yet another aspect to 'nature' besides those already discovered, viz., 'Nature loves to hide herself'.¹¹⁸ That is an unmistakable approach to understanding 'nature' as *substance*, i.e. as the inner content and structure of reality, counterposed in some way to the external, to phenomena, to 'what manifestly composes' it (in the words of the author of the treatise on *The Nature of Man*).¹¹⁹ This content and structure of what exists was treated by Herakleitos as 'hidden harmony' (*harmonīē aphanēs*) in opposition to visible harmony.¹²⁰ The Pythagoreans tried to find the mathematical expression of this harmony, which appeared on the ideological plane as harmony of the limit and unlimited.¹²¹

The next step in the evolution of the concept of nature-*physis* was made by the Eleatics. The single 'nature' of the Milesians and Herakleitos was divided by them into an unchanging eternal 'existence', the 'Way of Truth' and a changeable, inconstant, ephemeral 'Way of Seeming'.¹²² Naturally, *physis*

now characterised only the world of appearance; in the sphere of unaltered existence (being) there was no place for origin, becoming, or genesis.¹²³ Empedokles, under the undoubted influence of the Eleatic school, limited the meaning of nature-*physis* to one only;

This too I'll tell thee:
No nature is there of a mortal thing
Nor any curst fatality of death.
Mixture alone there is and dissolution
Of things commingled, and men call them nature.¹²⁴

The teaching of Demokritos was the end point in this evolution of *physis*. While retaining a meaning, in most cases, that coincided with the natural-science one, above all the medical meaning as the constitution of man, he introduced an understanding of nature as an aggregate of natural (*physika*) bodies, or atoms. Burnet, drawing attention to this, drew a conclusion from it in favour of his own understanding of nature-*physis* as existence, that which exists; counterposing it to 'nature' as genesis, he said: 'to my mind the fact that the Atomists called (the atoms *physis* is conclusive... Atoms do not "grow."¹²⁵ But if that is conclusive, it is only so for understanding the results of the evolution of 'nature' in one of the trends of antique philosophy, viz., within the materialist trend, which was completed in it by rejection of biomorphic, organistic analogies and a transition to 'mechanistic', largely 'technomorphic' explanations.¹²⁶ Instead of 'birth' and 'growth' came a mixing, and a separation of what was mixed, a 'sorting out' or sieving (*diakrisis*) while combining of material particles into ordered bodies as 'in the disposal of pebbles, washed up by waves on the beach', or the sieving of lentils, or grains of wheat or barley.¹²⁷

The concept was developed in another direction within the idealists trend, which was completed by the idealism of Plato and Aristotle. Plato had already accused the old and new 'physiologers' of materialism and atheism through the mouth of the Athenian in the *Laws*.

Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first but last, and that which

is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of God.¹²⁹

They proclaimed that fire or air, water or earth was the prime element.

But if the soul turn out to be the primeval element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature.¹³⁰

Thus, not only Aristotle, but also Plato, put the first philosophers—'physicists'—essentially in the materialist line in philosophy. Analysis of the concept of nature-*physis* has led us, consequently, to the cardinal problem of philosophy, its *basic question*, already quite distinctly posed, as we see, by Plato, but developed one way or another over the whole course of the forming of philosophy; in that connection the shaping of philosophy was correspondingly the forming of the two main trends in it, differentiated by their answer to this cardinal philosophical question. It was completed by the rise of the doctrines associated with the names of Demokritos and Plato. It was not fortuitous that Lenin spoke of 'the lines of Plato and Democritus in philosophy'¹³⁰; materialism and idealism appeared in the history of philosophy for the first time in relatively complete form.

It follows from that, at the same time, that we cannot speak of the existence of two consistent trends 'from the very beginning' of philosophy distinguished by a distinct, unambiguous answer to the basic question. As philosophy arose and took shape there were discovered rather to be two interacting *tendencies* in which materialist or idealist aspects and moments predominated. The point, moreover, is not that there were reminiscences of mythology in the 'materialistic' doctrines of the first philosophers that made them deviate toward idealism, or the existence of a 'physical' orientation in the 'idealistic' ones that related them to teachings that had on the whole a materialist trend. That is well known; suffice it to cite the constant use of the term 'soul' to designate and explain the moving principle of things, or the use of the word and concept 'god' for various purposes, which was undoubtedly taken over from mythology. What is important is something else, namely that these concepts were blended with the philosophical, ideological prob-

lematic, taking it beyond the limits of specific, scientific knowledge into the sphere of ideological speculation about the world.

When Thales said that 'all things are full of gods' or called the soul 'a certain moving element'¹³¹ we see here not a statement of natural science but an ideological proposition, different in principle from such a statement, whose purpose was to express an idea about life, self-movement, and the universal dynamism of nature. At the same time it is already not the 'soul' and 'god' of mythology. Anaximander's 'born gods',¹³² and even more Anaximenes' gods that arose from air,¹³³ speak for themselves. Just as their 'gods' were produced from 'nature', so too the 'theology' of the Milesian philosophers came from their 'physics'. Is it not that duality which is the source of the enigmatic dictum of Herakleitos that 'wisdom is one thing only, willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus'?¹³⁴

On the other hand, among the Pythagoreans, whose 'number', taken as the primary principle, definitely indicated the origin of the idealist trend, we find elements of 'physics' resembling the Milesian or Herakleitean in many ways. Hippasos of Metapontion, an older contemporary of Herakleitos, saw the primary principle (like the latter) in fire.¹³⁵ The '*pneuma*' which, according to Aristotle's 'so-called Pythagoreans', the world drew into itself from the unlimited,¹³⁶ was closely related to 'air' (*pneuma kai aēr*) of Anaximenes. Xenophanes, who can be placed in a certain sense at the source of the Eleatic school, for all his 'pantheism' saw the prime material in earth and water.¹³⁷ Even Parmenides, incidentally, pictured his 'Way of Seeming' after the model of the antique *physika*, producing everything that exists from fire (light) and earth (night or darkness).¹³⁸

In general the first philosophic doctrines, like any nascent phenomenon, contain various, in some way directly opposed possibilities of development. The clearest example of this is the teaching of Xenophanes. This pantheist philosopher was the first to proclaim that 'God is one'.¹³⁹ He was a critic of religion who knew that men created gods in their own image, a profound thinker who understood that

truly the gods have not revealed to mortals all things
from the beginning; but mortals by long seeking
discover what is better,¹⁴⁰

and a hopeless sceptic, who believed that if any man

succeeds to the full in saying what is completely true, he himself is nevertheless unaware of it; and Opinion (*seeming*) is fixed by fate upon all things.¹⁴

One can hardly (all the more so in the absence of any complete text of his works) discover a single logic in this. Rather it is a spectrum of the possible paths of development of thought realised in some way in antique philosophy.

The possibilities that existed in obviously united philosophic conceptions are no less striking. We have already spoken of Anaximenes' distinct materialist tendency. But his teaching about 'enveloping' air,¹⁴² expressed in the words 'As our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air surround the whole universe',¹⁴³ clearly led to the idea that air as the principle of life had a nature related to thought as the leading property of the living. That possibility was partially realised in the doctrine of Diogenes of Apollonia. Having taken Anaximenes' teaching about the primacy of air, he endowed it with rational capacities:

men and the other animals live on air, by breathing, and this is to them both soul and mind... And I hold that that which has intelligence is what men call air. All men are guided by it, and it masters all things. I hold that this same thing is God, and that it reaches everything and disposes all things and is in everything.¹⁴⁴

An opposite view is that of Hippon, who revived the teaching of Thales in the middle of the fifth century B.C. Although Thales' 'water' was permeated by divine forces,¹⁴⁵ Hippon was

a materialist in the strict, literal meaning of the word. He deduced everything from one substance, without resorting to anything else whatever. He recognised water as such as the prime matter, without ascribing spiritual properties to it. Hippon has a special place in history because of his attempt to derive the world from pure matter.¹⁴⁶

All that, of course, is a *modern* appreciation, made from long, instructive experience of inquiry into the history of philosophy. But we can probably state one thing firmly. The basic question of philosophy took shape and was resolved in a complex interaction of mythological and specific, scientific ori-

entations. As Engels remarked, this question 'has, no less than all religion, its roots in the narrow-minded and ignorant notions of savagery',¹⁴⁷ in diverse primitive notions about human consciousness ('soul'), the sense and character of human cognitive activity, and so on. But it could only arise as a *question* or problem when alternative answers were proposed, and associated with primitive notions about nature and man, but *already* having a different, primeval scientific character. Nascent philosophy *could not help posing* this basic ideological problem in the traditional religious, mythological form of a question about the sense and essence of the divine; it *answered* it, *resolved* the problem, by rational means (though far from always scientific ones, it is true).

An ideological factor inseparable from the world outlook and belonging to its essence thus inevitably invaded philosophy. Both the philosophers themselves and the spokesmen of religious ideology very quickly recognised this. We have already cited the testimony of Plato that recognition of the primacy of the material principle led to 'impiety'. But even earlier, during the Peloponnesian War, the religious fanatic Diopeithes introduced a special bill against 'those who do not acknowledge divine things or who give instruction about celestial phenomena'.¹⁴⁸ This *psephism* of Diopeithes' provided the basis for a charge against Anaxagoras; Sokrates was accused of breaking the law and of searching 'into things under the earth and in heaven'.¹⁴⁹

What we have said is evidence that philosophical knowledge, in contrast to that of the specific sciences, went beyond the empirical, furthermore, its road to ideological generalisation itself proved unreducible to empirical consideration. But it also did not boil down to religious 'knowledge' based on myth and tradition. Furthermore, having begun with 'nature', philosophy consistently deepened its inquiries, passing to essence and 'existence' in contrast to 'phenomena' and 'appearance'. This process, moreover, went on within both the materialist and idealist tendencies. But whereas the deepening in the former was mainly through a change in understanding of 'nature' itself, in the latter it was through a counterposing of 'existence' to 'nature'. In the Eleatic school we already see this counterposing of 'psysics', which was the changing and moving 'prin-

ciple and element' to the *logic* of a single, unchanging, unmoving 'One Being'.

It was that which determined the basic idealist tendency of the Eleatic school; only the tendency, since it was the clearest, and later most consistently realised possibility of a complicated, contradictory doctrine. The founder of the Eleatic school, strictly speaking, was Parmenides. His system yields to reconstruction and interpretation with difficulty, but a counterposing and demarcation of an ontological, 'metaphysical' orientation and a 'physical' one are clearly observable in it. We refer to the differentiation of 'being' already mentioned as a Way of Truth and a Way of Seeming. But there was a contradiction, too, in the very analysis of 'being'.

Parmenides tried to make a logical analysis of the concept 'being' as that which existed and could be comprehended by reason; his analysis led to the conclusion that it did not arise and did not suffer death, that it was whole, homogeneous, and unmoving. Consequently it somehow possessed spatial characteristics, i.e. physical ones: it was unmoving, in the sense of spatial movement; it was spherical, i.e. had geometrical shape; it was filled, which meant it had no void, i.e. it had characteristics proper to a material body; their negation was somehow their confirmation. Consequently 'metaphysical' (philosophical) reality was not yet differentiated from 'physical' reality in Parmenides' teaching. His 'being' was not pure idea, but also not an empirical thing, not substance.

Parmenides' one is material-ideal being. It is not surprising therefore that his doctrine of being was the principled premiss both for the materialist doctrine of Demokritos and the idealist theory of Plato.¹⁰⁰

While agreeing with this idea of Kessidi's, we must stress, however, that the path to idealism lay precisely through the 'metaphysical', ontological content of Parmenides' doctrine, i.e. through the most important, essential determinant in it. Because isolating of 'being' from what immediately exists, from the real things of the actual world, is also the path to idealism. Parmenides could still not follow it to the end since the term 'being' or the existence (*to on*) itself did not exist for him, and the corresponding concept was given as 'that which exists' (*to*

eon, *ta eonta*), or simply as the infinitive *einai*.¹⁵¹ The possibilities of hypostatizing this concept ('being' to counter-balance things 'that exist', and the ontological to counter-balance the physical) were consequently still substantially narrowed. Only Plato proved able, in his abstraction of 'that which exists' (*to ontos on*), to develop a system of absolute idealism consistently.

The counterposing of 'that which exists' to the real, 'physical' existence of things of the empirical world influenced Plato's understanding of philosophy in its fundamental distinction from the specific sciences.

There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of them regarding only the transient and **perishing**, and others the permanent and **imperishable and everlasting** and immutable; and when judged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former.¹⁵²

But in that case a physical interpretation of being proved logically impossible: the 'being' of ideas contradicted the 'non-being' of matter, and this 'naught' (*mē on*) could only possess mythological characteristics. At best it was given the mythologised, biomorphic and anthropomorphic characteristics of '*the mother and receptacle*'; this 'is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible and is most incomprehensible'.¹⁵³ Those scientists are right who see the main content of the *Timaeus* in a mythological dialectic of cosmos; it is consequently the only probable, plausible, approximate construction that served as the basis of Pythagorean mathematising.¹⁵⁴

Melissos, on the contrary, gave Parmenides' argumentation a 'physical' sense. The main idea of his philosophising, viz., the unlimited temporal and spatial character of what exists (*to eon*), was probably directly linked with Anaximander's argument about unlimited 'nature'. Melissos believed that at the basis of the four elements there was some general essence, the Boundless (*apeiron*) which 'has no beginning and no end', and which his successors called 'matter', but he could not prove that. He called that essence 'the One' (*hēn kai pan*). But what could Melissos have understood by matter as 'the One'? According to Aristotle, his 'One', or unity 'in relation to matter'

(*kata ten hylēn*), was also eternal, like itself, homogeneous, full, and unmoving, but already unlimited in contrast to the limited 'One' of Parmenides.¹⁵⁵ 'If then [Melissos said] it were to alter by a single hair in ten thousand years, in the fullness of time it would perish entirely.'¹⁵⁶ In that case, however, any other picture, in the nature of Parmenides' 'Way of Seeming' was impossible; it became simply impossible. Any attempt to represent what existed otherwise than by the principles of the Eleatics was fraught with contradiction—in it 'the statements are not consistent with one another'.¹⁵⁷

While Plato was the continuer (and completer) of the idealist tendency in the doctrine of the Eleatics, Demokritos developed the materialist trend. But the development was effected through negation. Karl Popper has aptly depicted Parmenides' system (incidentally, not distinguishing between the ontological and 'physical' in it), in the form of a deductive scheme:

1. Only what is, is.
2. What is not does not exist.
3. Non-being, that is, the void, does not exist.
4. The world is full.
5. The world has no parts; it is *one* huge block (because it is full).
6. Motion is impossible (since there is no empty space into which anything could move).¹⁵⁸

Such is Parmenides' 'Way of Truth', interpreted, however, 'physically'—Parmenides himself would not have interpreted 'non-being' as void. Since conclusions 6 and 5 were obviously contradicted by observable facts, says Popper, Demokritos, when rejecting them, introduced alternative premisses and obtained the following scheme:

6. There is motion (thus motion is possible).
5. The world has parts; it is not one, but many.
4. Thus the world cannot be full.
3. The void (or non-being) exists.¹⁵⁹

Popper completed Demokritos' set of statements with that, but it should be supplemented by the following alternatives to the Parmenidean system:

2. What is not (not-being) exists;
1. What is, exists.

These two points have special significance for us. Existing in precisely that form in the fragments of Demokritos, they are evidence that we do not simply have a physical picture of the world in the philosophy of Atomism, but also an ontological picture of it. According to Plutarch, it was Demokritos who

established that 'the *thing* exists no more than the *nothing*' meaning by the term 'thing' (*den*) body and by the term 'nothing' (*mēden*) void, since the latter has some nature and independent existence.¹⁰⁰

Aristotle wrote even more definitely, though not in the words of Demokritos:

Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that being (*to on*) exists no more than not-being.¹⁰¹

At the same time he gave it a physical interpretation, identifying 'being' with atoms and 'not-being' with void.¹⁰²

There was consequently already a terminological distinction in Demokritos between the ontological consideration of the opposition of being (*den*, the thing; in the fragments it is also *to on*) and not-being (*mēden*, *oyden*, nothing; also found as *to mē on*), and the physical one (of atoms and void). The ontological and the physical, moreover, in contrast to the Platonic treatment of them, which not only greatly complicated passage from the one to the other, but also reduced 'physics' to the level of 'appearance', or *seeming*, were not simply differentiated among the Atomists but also had a close, reciprocal connection. That enabled latter to pass freely from the philosophical level to the specific scientific one, and vice versa. From that arose the distinct opposition of materialism to idealism in the treatment of the main philosophic problems: viz., material, objective being vs the ideal 'existent'; determinism vs teleology; the 'physical' interpretation vs the 'metaphysical', and ultimately the theological-methodological.

Philosophy differs qualitatively from mythology and growing specific scientific knowledge, as well, as regards *method*. We can hardly speak of 'method' in mythology. The fundamental distinction of myth, that 'it is not logical and rational but evocative and emotional',¹⁰³ excluded such a posing of the problem in general, relating myth-making to the realm of the socio-psychological rather than the logical and methodological. That

meant, of course, not that there were no specific patterns or *principles* of myth-making, but that, had they become the object of subjective reflection and later of conscious application, myth would have ceased to be myth, 'divine word', amenable to precise transmission and not created and altered by man's will. Myth was, therefore, in principle beyond method.

On the other hand, specific scientific knowledge was aware of itself from the outset as systematic knowledge, built up according to certain rules. The rudiments of mathematics already presupposed that it was necessary to develop certain rules of calculation that must govern all calculations of a given type, so ensuring a single true result. That requirement was later extrapolated to all knowledge. In that respect the high, even proud evaluation of the 'principles and methods' proper to his science of the author of the treatise *One Ancient Medicine* is not surprising; we have already mentioned it above. And when the author of another Hippocratic treatise, on *The Nature of Man*, spoke of the disputes of people who claimed that man's nature was a kind of unity, he saw the weakness of their arguments precisely in their conclusions' differing from one another, and that, in their disputes,

the same man never wins the argument three times running, it is first one and then the other and sometimes the one who happens to have the glibbest tongue. Yet it would be expected that the man who asserts that he can provide the correct explanation of the subject, if that is, he really knows what he is talking about and demonstrates it correctly, should always win the argument.¹⁶¹

That could be taken as an ordinary sneer at 'philosophers' who do not properly know what they are talking about, if it were not a direct counterposing of the scientific methods of medicine to this 'dialectic'. But it will readily be seen that philosophical reflection on philosophic methods was much later, since awareness of dialectics as this method did not come earlier than with Sokrates and Plato. The following initial meanings of dialectics are, moreover, clearly distinguishable in the various definitions and aspects of antique dialectics that we find in Plato¹⁶²: ability to conduct a talk or dispute; ability to pose and answer questions so as to reach the truth in a clash of con-

tradiçtory ideas. When Aristotle (according to Diogenes Laertius¹⁶⁶) called Zenon of Elea 'the inventor of dialectics', he had in mind, it would seem, Zenon's aphorisms which amounted to negation of an opponent's thesis by bringing out its contradictory character, and consequently to demonstration of the antithesis 'from the contrary'. Distinct approaches to dialectics in that sense were already visible in Parmenides, and perhaps in Xenophanes¹⁶⁷ and had their roots in the old Greek *agon*, the public dispute and contest (in this case mental contest).

But even the movement toward developing the logical theory of dialectics as a method of combining and separating concepts, initiated by Sokrates and Plato, did not lead to dialectics as 'a rigorous science'. All Plato's claims in that respect broke down on the contemplative and speculative character of the initial constructs—the 'ideas' that he advanced as the mental basis, principles, laws, or 'hypostases' of things. The complexity and contradictoriness of dialectics itself, in Plato's understanding of it, and at the same time in the antique conception in general, is displayed in that. Dialectics was at once discursive and emotional, speculative and intuitive, and artistic and graphic (and not just in Plato), which means that it could not be unambiguous in principle, permitting of both a certain indefiniteness of premisses and adequate freedom of ideological conclusions.

When Aristotle interpreted dialectics as a kind of argument based on probable (plausible) premisses, he considered its usefulness for philosophy to be that its

ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise.¹⁶⁸

Doubt (given the backwardness of scientific knowledge) was almost universal, and behind the 'indubitable' premisses there lay either an indefinite intuition, substantiated by analogies, or a myth, substantiated by tradition and custom; either probable, plausible knowledge or faith hallowed by history. The latest scepticism began to examine any knowledge from those standpoints.

One point here, however, is important for us, viz., the contemplative character of ancient philosophy, expressed on the

methodological plane by the concepts 'contemplation' (*theōria*) and 'contemplative life'.

Karl Marx, characterising the old philosophy, wrote:

The chief defect of all previous materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that things [*Gegenstand*], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the *object*, or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity, practice*, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the *active* side, in contradistinction to materialism, was set forth by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such.¹¹

That explains not only the contemplative character of the materialism of the past but also the corresponding weakness of idealism. And it all has its roots in the antique conception of philosophy, and in analysis of the relation of the 'theoretical' and the 'practical' understanding of life. What is philosophy? An active, living ideal aimed at mental and practical assimilation of the world? Or an ideal of 'theoretical life', alien to nature and social life, and oriented on the 'divine'?

The formation of philosophy in Ancient Greece discovered the specific development of the philosopher's life ideal, viz., 'theoretical life', as it was called in general. Just as any knowledge comes from people's business and practical activity, *sophia*, wisdom, and philosophy also originate from it. Bruno Snell, investigating the expressions employed in Preplatonic philosophy for the concept of knowledge, wrote that five grades could be distinguished in the evolution of the concept *sophos*: (1) the artisan or craftsman; (2) the artist; (3) the 'wise man'; (4) the natural philosopher (*physikē theōria*); (5) the metaphysician (whose objects were: divine principles, supercosmic and absolutely immutable).¹⁷⁰ The last two grades—natural philosophy ('physics') and metaphysics—were closely linked with the concepts of 'theory' and 'theoretical life'.

The etymology of the Greek word *theoria* is not wholly clear, and is usually reduced to two moments. Since *theōros*, the initial word of this family, meant a public official who performed commissions of a cult character (e.g. to be present at a religious festival), it was considered as the simultaneous derivative of *theos* (god) and *theō* (to look at, to see, to visit, etc.). But

a number of convincing considerations led Redlow to the conviction that there was another aspect to it. *Theōria* in the sense cited never meant presence at a religious festival in one's own city; it was always associated with a journey to a place of divination, divine worship, religious festival, etc.¹⁷¹ Herodotus' use of this word, in Redlow's view, led to recognition of a close link between *theōria* as contemplation of the world in order to get to know it and journeys that had, moreover, practical aims. According to Herodotus Solon occupied himself with that; Plutarch considered trade to be the direct aim of the journeys to Egypt of the philosopher Thales, the mathematician Hippocrates, and even of Plato.

The social grounds for the transformation of *theōria* from a journey to the venue of panhellenic games into one for business purposes, linked with an active seeing and acquiring of the new and foreign, into knowledge and experience gained from travelling, and into contemplation and seeing of the outside world, were the development of industry and commerce in sixth-century Athens, and the establishment of democracy. That also applies to the Ionic colonies.... Scientific *theōria*, scientific reflection of the external world, arose not from cutting off the world but from greater sensitivity to the world.¹⁷²

Nevertheless *physikē theōria*, the first philosophers' study of nature, signified a certain separation and alienation of 'theory' from immediate practical affairs. It was, of course, not just an ignoring of practical activity, which from commerce to politics, was not foreign to the philosophers, but 'that their ambition is of another sort', as Aristotle said of Thales.¹⁷³ *Theōria* was therefore rather contemplation and speculation as a specific feature of the method of philosophic inquiry.

The science studies of recent decades have shown quite convincingly that science as such cannot be interpreted in a narrow empirical way as an accumulation of knowledge obtained by purely inductive generalisations. Intuition, guesses, and extrapolation constantly operate in the specific sciences, for, (as Engels stressed long ago) *hypothesis* is a form of development of science. In other words it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between philosophical *knowledge* and that of the specific sciences. Nevertheless both the objective content

and social function of philosophical principles, and philosophers' and scientists' subjective comprehension of the relation of the knowledge of the specific sciences and of philosophy suggest the legitimacy of certain typological delimitations.

We spoke above of subject demarcations connected with philosophy's appealing to universal, ideological principles as a counter-weight to the factological in the general trend of a specific science, generalisations of which still had in mind application of the appropriate knowledge to a single object. No matter how mistaken verificationism, say, is as a philosophic concept of science and principle of the demarcation of science and philosophy, specific scientific knowledge cannot exist without concrete, really tangible, obvious, factual confirmation of its propositions and conclusions, or without achieving the real practical results that one expects from it. Philosophy does not directly pursue such aims, and such results are correspondingly not expected of it. Its practical sense is rather development of man's life ideals from general ideological principles, ideals that in turn are not understood as something subject to direct and universal realisation.

The specific of philosophy, consequently, is its appeal to 'man in general', by which, naturally, can only be meant, in any epoch, the 'ideal man' of his time! That orientation began to be obvious, beginning with the Sophists and Sokrates, although it was implicit in philosophy from the outset, arising from the regulative orientation of the mythological outlook, the 'objective morality' of the epoch, and folk wisdom. It is not surprising that *ethics*, which is also understood as the hub of 'practice', was originally at the centre of philosophy's 'practical' aspirations.

In contrast to specific scientific knowledge and the everyday life orientation of ordinary consciousness, philosophy aspired to an ideal of 'contemplation'. Its 'disinterestedness', which had already found expression in its first definitions, was an illusion, of course, but a real illusion, objective appearance, based on its actual social status. The determinant in it was the impossibility of a practical transformation of real social affairs in accordance with the ideal, which dictated a need to judge about the world 'from outside', rising 'above' its immediate living phenomena, partial and private interests, selfishness, and cares.

Freedom consisted precisely in that disinterestedness, and the way to it was understanding, speculation, *theōria*. Such is the import of the testimony of Clement of Alexandria that Anaxagoras of Klazomenai said that the aim of life was speculation and the freedom stemming from it.¹⁷⁴ By speculation, here, was meant investigation of nature, i.e. to contemplate the heavens and the arrangement of all cosmos, for the sake of which it was better to be born than not to be born.¹⁷⁵

The doxography of antique philosophy is full of that kind of statement. Just the same, one can note that the opposing of speculation to practical affairs was rather softened in the materialist tradition; in particular because of the absence among the first philosophers, especially the Ionians, of a hard and fast line between speculation and sensuous knowledge and observation. Recall Herakleitos' statement that 'things that can be seen, heard, learned—these are what I prefer'.¹⁷⁶

Demokritos' understanding of 'theory' is particularly relevant in this connection. He was the real founder of the materialist line in philosophy, and not only differentiated sensuous ('dark') and rational ('light') knowledge, but also found a close connection and mutual dependence between them. And although he sometimes used the word *theōrein* and its derivatives ordinarily in the everyday sense of 'to look at',¹⁷⁷ it is also often met in its philosophical meaning. Eusebius, for instance, described atoms according to Demokritos as comprehensible only by reasoning (*logōi de theōreta*), and Aëtius conveyed the ideas of Demokritos and Epicurus about sensuous qualities in the same way as the result of the effect of particles without quality, 'comprehensible by reason'.¹⁷⁸ The coincidence of the terminology of Eusebius and Aëtius gives us grounds for concluding that the term 'comprehensible by reason' (*to logōi theōreton*) is authentic, which is evidence in turn that there was no understanding here of 'theoretical' knowledge as some sort of speculation leading to results different from those of ordinary means of understanding associated with sensual, visible comprehension and discursive thinking. There can be no question, naturally, of Demokritos' 'practical extension' of the idea of contemplation to ethical reflection or meditation, which would have had, as its result, a specific moral content in the sense of 'contemplative life'; viz., a noble state of the soul (*eythymia*), well-being

(*eyestō*), imperturbability (*athambiē*), which constituted Demokritos' ideal associated with rejecting excessive desires and 'always keeping within one's powers',¹⁷⁹ and not at all with inactivity and contemplation, let alone with an orientation on religious asceticism.

It was the distinct separation of the theoretical and the practical (which still had attendant religious moments) that we saw in the Pythagorean opposing of '*akusm*', or what is heard from the teacher, to knowledge proper. But the most developed opposing of 'theory' to practical activity is seen in Plato. In his system 'theory' has a central place. Losev, deriving the word itself from *thea*, a spectacle, and *horo*, I look or see,¹⁸⁰ sees in Plato's theory 'a mental-sensory understanding' of knowledge.¹⁸¹

All that, of course, can be found in Plato the artist. But as a philosophic phenomenon and method proper, theory is rather the road to emancipation from the body so as to 'pass to the family of the gods'.

Philosophy ... received and gently comforted her [the soul—*Ed.*] and sought to release her, pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses are full of deception, and persuading her to retire from them, and abstain from all but the necessary use of them, and be gathered up and collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself and her own pure apprehension of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation; for such things are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and invisible.¹⁸²

And what is seen in aesthetics as the fullest embodiment of artistic intuition, is turned in philosophy into a religious ideal of 'release' or 'emancipation'.

The Platonic theory proved, in this connection, to be super-rational and supersensible intuition, containing in itself, in 'sublated' form, feeling and reason, art and myth, religion and philosophy. As an aspect of the philosophic method, and its essence, it included thought, above all as contemplation (*thea*) of what exists in itself. The discursive nature proper of thought merged into a single whole in it with that highest sensuality, corporeality, and existence determinacy that characterised the highest, other, 'mental' world to which theory gave access.

A straight path runs through Aristotle's paeans to theory in his early works, written under the influence of Plato,¹⁸³ to the late Hellenistic ideal of the 'contemplative life' (*bios theōretikos*, *vita contemplativa*). In the treatise of Philon of Alexandria *De vita contemplativa* this ideal was already revealed as the ideal of the ascetic religious community of Therapeutae. The aim of the 'contemplative life' was to cure the soul of its sicknesses, passions, and defects and at the same time to serve God in a fitting way; both functions were signified in Greek by the same term *therapeiō*.

The intuitive moment of ancient theory, taken to its extreme in the Platonic conception, was manifested one way or another in the whole methodology of Greek philosophising, comprising its specific difference from concrete scientific thinking, its permeation by discourse distinguished it from the mythological mode of thought (in this case close to the artistic). In Greek theory, therefore, particularly in its highest expression, we have a kind of synthesis of sensual, rational, and evocative, artistic knowledge.

The synthesis was different in the various doctrines, of course. The conception of theory reviewed above was opposed in many ways to its other conception developed by Aristotle, which was much closer in spirit to theory in its modern meaning. In his mature works Aristotle compared theoretical knowledge with the practical and creative. Theoretical knowledge was not only the 'first philosophy' (later called metaphysics and appearing at the same times as theology). It was also 'theoretical' (speculative) physics and mathematics. 'Hence', he wrote,

there should be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and theology. . . So, the theoretical sciences are to be preferred over the other sciences, but theology [the first philosophy—*Ed.*] is to be preferred over the other theoretical sciences.¹⁸⁴

With that posing of the matter, in spite of the absolute priority of the first philosophy, the theories of nature and mathematics were preserved among the theoretical sciences. The link between philosophy and the investigation of nature was consequently not completely broken. Metaphysics, as inquiry into the general foundations of any knowledge and existence, and as study of the highest and universal kind of existence, develop-

ed categories and principles that the separate sciences employed, and substantiated their axioms.

The conception of the 'contemplative life' was correspondingly altered. It was transformed into a life devoted to contemplation of truth, relatively independent of the object of this contemplation, so that its meaning was no longer defined exclusively by the 'divine' but was orientated on the whole diversity of natural, social, and spiritual life (it could not help being understood hierarchically of course). But it was also the path on which specific sciences arose that devoted themselves to the specific and partial rather than the universal. But the deliberately adopted hierarchism in understanding what exists inevitably involved a relative (and in certain conditions absolute) subordination of the separate, partial types of knowledge to the universal.

A system of philosophy that became widespread in Hellenistic times, was built up in philosophy itself via this path of detailed elaboration and isolation of the concrete tasks of science, viz., logic (in the Epicurean canon as the doctrine of the criteria of truth and the good); physics (which was completed among the Stoics by the deification of nature); and ethics. Philosophy finally took shape there as an outlook on the world and life and method and as the subject-matter—in that form—of the antique history of philosophy.

¹ Karl Marx. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp. 206-207.

² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³ Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, (Allen & Unwin, London, 1948), pp. 57, 276.

⁴ See V. G. Burov et al., (Eds.). *Drevnekitaiskaya filosofiya* (Chinese Philosophy), Vol. 1 (Mysl, Moscow, 1972), pp. 16-17.

⁵ Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971) p. 332.

⁶ See Miguel Leon Portilla. *La Filosofia Nahuatl. Estudiada en sus fuentes* (Ediciones especiales del Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, Mexico, 1956).

⁷ Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), p. 46.

⁸ See The General and the Particular in the Historical Development of the Countries of the East. In G. F. Kim et al. (Eds.). *Materialy*

diskussii ob obshchestvennykh formatsiyakh na Vostoke (aziatskii sposob proizvodstva), Nauka, Moscow, 1966: V. N. Nikiforov. *Vostok i vsemirnaya istoriya* (The Orient and World History), 2nd ed. (Nauka, Moscow, 1977). Nikiforov's book is interesting as an attempt at a comprehensive examination of the problem of the basis and superstructure.

⁹ V. I. Lenin. *The State. Collected Works*, Vol. 29 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp. 475, 477.

¹⁰ See A. N. Chanyshev. *Egeiskaya predfilosofiya* (Aegean Prephilosophy), Izd-vo MGU, Moscow, 1970, pp. 19-26.

¹¹ See N. A. Mashkin, D. P. Kallistov. Economic Development of Greece in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries B.C. In V. V. Struve and D. P. Kallistov (Eds.). *Drevnaya Gretsia* (Izd-vo AN SSSR, Moscow, 1956), p. 167.

¹² Walter Rubin. *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* (Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1954), p. 70. See also G. M. Bongard-Levin and G. F. Ilyin. *Drevnaya Indiya* (Ancient India), Nauka, Moscow, 1969, pp. 310 ff.

¹³ V. N. Nikiforov. *Op. cit.*, pp. 224, 228.

¹⁴ *Aristotle on the Athenian Constitution*. G. Bell & Sons, London, 1912, p. 2.

¹⁵ See O. N. Yukina. Attika in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries B.C. In *Drevnaya Gretsia*, pp. 131-135; see also A. I. Dovatur. *Rabstvo v Attike v VI-V vv. do n.e.* (Slavery in Attika in the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C.), Nauka, Leningrad, 1980, p. 9: 'To sum up, we get (1) a gloomy background of the social picture with a general characteristic—enslavement . . . of the poor by the rich; (2) absence of clear answers to the questions naturally asked by the reader, and too facile reports on social relations, but with quite clear pointers in the last stages of the road that brought the freeman to a condition of slavery. Such are the results of his examination of Aristotle's evidence.

¹⁶ G. M. Bongard-Levin and G. F. Ilyin. *Op. cit.* (Chapters XIV-XVI).

¹⁷ V. N. Nikiforov. *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

¹⁸ See A. I. Dovatur. *Op. cit.*, pp. 67-78.

¹⁹ Frederick Engels. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983), p. 173.

²⁰ Theognis, lines 189-192. Cited from George Thomson. *Studies in Ancient Greek Society*, Vol. 2, *The First Philosophers* (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1961, p. 266).

²¹ Stobaeus, III, 1, 172, DK 10, 3. In Hermann Diels. *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (11 edition), edited by W. Kranz (Berlin, 1964), Vol. 1, p. 63. Translated from the Russian version.

²² *The Sermon of the Lord or Bhagavad-Geeta* (from the Mahabharata, Chapter I, Girnara Publications, Bombay, 1962) verses 26-33, 35, 37, 40, 45, pp. 17-20.

²³ Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 523.

²⁴ *The Sermon of the Lord or Bhagavad-Geeta*, Chapter II, verses 31, 33, pp. 26-27.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Chapter VIII, verse 60, p. 156.

¹⁶ The idea of the immortality of the soul and of metempsychosis justifies murder in the following way: 'For every birth must end with dying breath /And new life ever kindled by every death' (27), or 'even without Thee, not one warrior in battle array/Shall escape from death that brooks no delay/ (32), By me and not by thee they are already slain,/ Be thou merely a link, O Arjuna, in Time's fatal chain' (33) *Ibid.*, Ch. XI, pp. 100, 101.

¹⁷ On the caste system reflected in the *Mahabharata*, see G. M. Bongard-Levin and G. F. Ilyin. *Op. cit.*, Chapters 14 and 17.

¹⁸ See Yudhishtira's questions in Ch. 261 of *Mokshadharma*: how can the laws established by the Vedas be eternal when they are different at various periods of time (*yuga*)? And the more since they can be broken? (Translated from Russian.)

¹⁹ F. S. Bykov. *Zarozhdenie politicheskoi i filosofskoi mysli v Kitae* (The Birth of Political and Philosophical Thought in China), Nauka, Moscow, 1966, p. 63. See also V. N. Nikiforov. *Op. cit.*, pp. 215-225.

²⁰ F. S. Bykov. *Op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

²¹ See A. S. Bogomolov. Objectification, Values, and Sociological Knowledge *Sotsiol. issled.*, 1975, 13, 2: 53-61.

²² See Frederick Engels' letter to Conrad Schmidt (27 October 1890) in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Correspondence* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p. 400.

²³ See the entry 'Mifologiya', by A. F. Losev in *Filosofskaya Entsiklopediya*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1964), p. 458.

²⁴ See N. S. Volskaya. The Semiotics of Greek Myths (after Homer and Hesiod). *Voprosy filosofii*, 1972, 4: 115-126. 'The habits and skills' singled out and calculated by Volskaya fall without difficulty into the named groups.

²⁵ Only this merging can explain the lethal, fatal consequences of breaking a taboo. See L. Lévy-Bruhl. *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (Félix Alcan, Paris, 1922), pp. 323, 325-327.

²⁶ See A. F. Losev. *Antichnaya mifologiya v yeyo istoricheskom razvitií* (Antique Mythology in Its Historical Development), Moscow, 1957, pp. 15-16.

²⁷ *The Iliad of Homer and the Odyssey* (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1952), p. 100.

²⁸ Hesiod. *Theogony*, 116. Cited from George Thomson. *Op. cit.*, p. 150. See also Hesiod. *Theogony*, 116-120. Verily first of all did Chaos come into being, and then broad-bosomed Gaia (earth), a firm seat of all things for ever, and misty Tartaros in a recess of broad-wayed earth, and Eros, who is fairest among immortal gods. (G. S. Kirk & J. E. Raven. *The Presocratic Philosophers*, CUP, Cambridge, 1957, p. 24).

²⁹ Hesiod. *The Works and Days* (Univ. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1959), 108-112.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 173-175.

³¹ N. S. Volskaya. *Art. cit.*, p. 125.

³² 'The first difference between magic and science,' wrote Claude Lé-

vi-Strauss, 'is therefore that magic postulates a complete and all-embracing determinism. Science, on the other hand, is based on a distinction between levels: only some of these admit forms of determinism; on others the same forms of determinism are held not to apply.' (*The Savage Mind*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966, p. 11). The geneticism of the developed myth, represented in the epic and in theogonies, substantially restricted this 'determinism', opening the way to future limitation and concretisation of causal connections, i.e. to science.

⁴ A. F. Losev. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁵ I. L. Geiberg. *Estestvoznaniye i matematika v klassicheskoi drevnosti* (Natural Science and Mathematics in Classical Antiquity), Moscow and Leningrad, 1936, pp. 23, 24.

⁶ See A. F. Losev. *Istoriya antichnoi estetiki (rannaya klassika)* (History of Antique Aesthetics—Early Classics), Vysshaya shkola, Moscow, 1963, pp. 183-200.

⁷ Hesiod, *Op. cit.*, 724-725.

⁸ H. Diels. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Weidmann, Dublin/Zurich, 1968), 8 A2. Translated from Russian. Hereafter this work will be referred to by the normal system: the letters DK (Diels-Kranz), a number signifying which thinker is meant, and the characteristic of the source (A—document, B—fragment) and its number.

⁹ Hekateios, frag. 1ab. See: F. Jacoby (Ed.). *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, Vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1923), hereinafter cited by the number of the fragment and the name of the publisher. Citation translated from the Russian rendering.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, frag. 27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, frag. 25, 26.

¹² A. F. Losev. *Problema simvola i realisticheskoye iskusstvo* (The Problem of Symbol and Realist Art), Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1976, p. 238.

¹³ S. Y. Lurye. *Ocherki po istorii antichnoi nauki* (Essays in the History of Antique Science), Izd-vo AN SSSR, Moscow-Leningrad, 1947, p. 60.

¹⁴ Werner Jaeger. *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1947), p. 58. There are indications incidentally of a reverse dependence of the first philosophers on the Orphics. See V. Macchiore. *From Orpheus to Paul. A History of Orphism* (London, 1930).

¹⁵ O. Kern (Ed.). *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1922); hereinafter referred to by the name of the editor and the number of the fragment. Citation translated from the Russian version.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, fr. 37, 54, 56, 57, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, fr. 183, 54, 302, 35.

¹⁸ W. Nestle. *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (Scientia Verlag Aalen, Stuttgart, 1966), p. 63.

¹⁹ Kern, fr. 239b.

²⁰ Kern, fr. 54-58, 60, 64, 65. See also G. S. Kirk & J. E. Raven. *The Presocratic Philosophers* (CUP, Cambridge, 1957), p. 41.

²¹ For a description of the Orphic theogonies see George Thomson.

Op. cit., pp. 149, 237; see also O. Novitsky. *Postepennoe razvitiie drevnikh filosofskikh uchenii v svyazi s razvitiem yazycheskikh verovanii* (The Evolution of Ancient Philosophic Doctrines in Connection with the Evolution of Pagan Beliefs), Part 22, Kiev, 1860; A. H. Chanyshev. *Op. cit.*

¹⁰ DK 7 B 1; A 8; K. Freeman. *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 14.

¹¹ DK 7 B 4. See K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹² Hermeias. See H. Diels. *Doxographi graeci* (Berlin, 1879; Leipzig, 1929), p. 654. Citation translated from the Russian version.

¹³ Plutarch. The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men (*Septem Sapientum Convivium*). *Moralia*, Vol. II. Translated by F. C. Babbitt (Heinemann & Co., the Loeb Classical Library, London, 1928), p. 389.

¹⁴ Diogenes Laertius. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Vol. 1 (Heinemann, London, 1938), pp. 14-15.

¹⁵ P. P. Gaidenko. *Evolutsiya ponyatiya nauka: Stanovleniye i razvitiye pervykh nauchnykh programm* (The Evolution of the Concept of Science: The Establishment and Development of the First Scientific Programmes), Nauka, Moscow, 1980, p. 29.

¹⁶ Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. Cited from George Thomson, *Op. cit.*, p. 261.

¹⁷ See, for example, the analysis of the various meanings of 'limit' and 'unlimited' in W. Heidel's article 'Peras and Apeiron in the Pythagorean Philosophy' in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1901, 14: 384-399.

¹⁸ See P. P. Gaidenko. *Op. cit.*, pp. 10, 39 et. al.

¹⁹ See A. O. Makovelsky. *Dosokratiki* (The Presocratics), Part 3 (Kazan, 1919), pp. XIX-XX.

²⁰ DK 13 A 7, A 8, B 1.

²¹ DK 11 A 10, A 11, A 24.

²² DK 12 A 23, A 24.

²³ See, for example, DK 59 A 18; K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

²⁴ See the detailed comparison of the philosophical and medical theories of this school in Camilla Warnke's chapter 'Die Geburt der wissenschaftlichen Medizin aus der Weltanschauung der Antike', in Günter Kröber (Ed.) *Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung in der Antike. Von den Anfängen bis Aristoteles*. (Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1966), pp. 225-227.

²⁵ *The Medical Works of Hippocrates*. Tradition in Medicine. Translated by John Chadwick and W. N. Mann (Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford, 1950), p. 12. See also George Thomson. *Op. cit.*, pp. 305-306.

²⁶ *The Medical Works of Hippocrates*. Tradition in Medicine, pp. 12-13.

²⁷ *The Medical Works of Hippocrates*. The Nature of Man, p. 202.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ S. Y. Lurye considered, for chronological considerations, that there could be no question of influence of the Sophists known to us on Herodotus, but rather that the Sophists themselves had experienced the

influence of Ionic scientific literature, which Herodotus had been the main transmitter of. See *Op cit.*, p. 112. Wilhelm Nestle held a diametrically opposite view. See W. Nestle. *Op. cit.*, pp. 509-513. One should probably speak of a reciprocal influence here, allowing for the fact that Herodotus was a contemporary of Protagoras of Abdera (circa 481-411 B.C.), while the latter was the compiler of laws for the Panhellenic colony of Thurioi, where the work of Herodotus also appeared.

" Herodotus, I, 1; 1,95.

" W. Nestle. *Op cit.*, p. 504.

" Paul Tannery. *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène. De Thalès à Empédocle*. 2nd edition by A. Diez (Gauthier-Villars et Cie., Paris, 1930), pp. 11-12.

" John Burnet. *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed. (Macmillan, London, 1940), p. V.

" F. M. Cornford. *From Religion to Philosophy. A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation* (CUP, Cambridge, 1912). Cited from the Harper Torchbooks edition, New York, 1957, pp. 138, 139.

" *Idem*. *Principium Sapientiae. The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought* (CUP, Cambridge, 1952). Cited from the Harper Torchbooks edition, New York, 1965, p. 200.

" A. F. Losev. *Ocherki antichnogo simvolizma i mifologii* (Essays in Antique Symbolism and Mythology), Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1930), p. 110.

" *Ibid.*

" John Burnet. *Greek Philosophy. Thales to Plato* (Macmillan, London, 1968), p. 9.

" *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

" A. F. Losev. *Istoriya antichnoi estetiki*, p. 105.

" *Ibid.*, p. 106.

" Bertrand Russell. *History of Western Philosophy*, 2nd edition (Allen & Unwin, London, 1961), p. 13.

" *Ibid.*

" F. Kh. Kessidi. *Ot mifa k logosu* (From Myth to Logos), Mysl, Moscow, 1972, p. 106.

" See V. F. Asmus. *Problema intuitsii v filosofii i matematike* (The Problem of Intuition in Philosophy and Mathematics), Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1963.

" *The Iliad of Homer and the Odyssey* (The *Odyssey*, Book X, 303), p. 239. Translator's note: the author's point (this chapter was written by the late A. S. Bogomolov) is clearer from P. A. Shuisky's Russian translation of the *Odyssey* in which the passage in the English translation we have cited 'showed me what it is like' is rendered 'explained its properties to me'. W. K. C. Guthrie renders *physis* in that passage of the *Odyssey* as the 'bodily form' of a plant (*History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. 1, CUP, Cambridge, 1962, p. 82).

" For further details see I. D. Rozhansky. *Razvitiye estestvoznaniya v epokhu antichnosti* (The Evolution of Natural Science in Antiquity), Nauka, Moscow, 1979, pp. 66-71.

" See O. Kern. *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1922), fr. 10, 18.

¹⁰⁰ Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, 1A, 3, 983b. Cited from *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Indiana U.P., Bloomington, Ind., 1966), pp. 16-17.

¹⁰¹ W. K. C. Guthrie. *History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (CUP, Cambridge, 1965), p. 119.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *The Medical Works of Hippocrates*. The Nature of Man, p. 202. See also the analysis of the polemic against the philosophers in the treatise on *The Nature of Man* in Hippocrates. *La nature de l'homme* edited and translated, and commented on by Jacques Jouanna (Brussels, 1975), pp. 39-43.

¹⁰⁴ *The Medical Works of Hippocrates*. The Nature of Man, p. 203.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

¹⁰⁶ As Rozhansky has noted, the initial meaning of *physis* for antique medicine was 'man's internal constitution reflected in his external look' (*Op. cit.*, p. 73), from which its other meanings stemmed.

¹⁰⁷ Werner Jaeger. *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture*, Vol. 1 (OUP, New York, 1945), p. 155.

¹⁰⁸ John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 363, Cf p. 10.

¹⁰⁹ See W. A. Heidel. *Peri physeos: a Study of the Conception of Nature among the Pre-Socratics*. *Proceedings of the American Academy*, 1910: 77-133; A. O. Lovejoy. The Meaning of *physis* in the Greek Physiologists. *Philosophical Review*, 1909: 369-383. See also W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 140, n 1.

¹¹⁰ *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, pp. 77-78 (Book D, 4. 1014b-1015a).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78 (Book D, 4, 1015a).

¹¹² DK 12 A 11.

¹¹³ John Burnet. *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 10.

¹¹⁴ See for example the contradictions in Aristotle's analysis of the term *physis* in Empedokles (I. D. Rozhansky. *Op. cit.*, p. 84).

¹¹⁵ Compare Anaximander's expression 'and governs everything' (DK 12 A 15).

¹¹⁶ See A. V. Lebedev. *Archē i to perischon* in the Presocratics. In *Antichnaya balkanistika*, No. 3 (Moscow, 1978), p. 35.

¹¹⁷ Plato. *Laws* X, 891. *The Dialogues of Plato* (in two volumes), Vol. II (Random House, New York, 1937), p. 633. In the tenth book of the *Laws* Plato summed up the doctrines of the various schools of ancient philosophy from the Milesians to Demokritos and the Sophists. Identification of the doctrines that are spoken about calls for special work in each case.

¹¹⁸ DK 22 B 123. Cited from George Thomson. *Op. cit.*, p. 277. Kathleen Freeman gives 'Nature likes to hide' (*Op. cit.*, p. 33).

¹¹⁹ *The Medical Works of Hippocrates*. The Nature of Man, p. 202.

¹²⁰ DK 22 B 54. Cited from K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

¹²¹ Philolaos, for instance, stated that 'nature in the universe was fitted together from the Non-Limited and the Limiting' (DK 44 B 1). Cited from K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹²² See George Thomson, *Op. cit.*, p. 290.

¹²³ See I. D. Rozhansky. *Op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

¹²⁴ DK 33 B 8. Cited from Karl Marx's notebooks on Epicurean philosophy (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 459). The verse translation is from the Loeb Classical Library edition of Plutarch's *Colotes* (p. XXXIV). For other versions see K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 52, and W. K. C. Guthrie, *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 271.

¹²⁵ John Burnet. *Greek Philosophy. From Thales to Plato*, p. 21.

¹²⁶ A. V. Lebedev is right in claiming that the technomorphic 'metaphorical code' employed in Presocratic text 'has seemed of least importance only because it has not been sufficiently studied' (*Vestnik drevnei istorii*, 1979, 2:6).

¹²⁷ DK 68 B 164. See W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 409; K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

¹²⁸ Plato. *Laws*, X, 891. *The Dialogues of Plato*. Vol. II, p. 633.

¹²⁹ Plato. *Laws*, X, 892. *Op. cit.*, p. 634.

¹³⁰ V. I. Lenin. *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 117.

¹³¹ DK 11 A 22 (Aëtius 1,7,11). See G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, pp. 95-96; W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 65.

¹³² DK 12 A 17, after Cicero. See G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹³³ See DK 13 A 10, after St. Augustine (C.D. VIII, 2). See G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

¹³⁴ DK 22 B 32. Cited from George Thomson. *Op. cit.*, p. 277. See also K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹³⁵ D. L. VIII, 84; DK 18, 1. See W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 321.

¹³⁶ DK 58 B 30. See W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 133.

¹³⁷ DK 21 A 29, B 33. See K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, pp. 23, 24.

¹³⁸ See K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, p. 149.

¹³⁹ DK 21 A 23. See K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 23; W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 374; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, p. 169.

¹⁴⁰ DK 21 B 18. See K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 22; W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 376.

¹⁴¹ DK 21 B 34. See K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 24; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, p. 179; W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 376, 391.

¹⁴² See W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 225.

¹⁴³ DK 13 B 2. See K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 19; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, p. 158; W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 131.

¹⁴⁴ DK 64 B 4, B 5. Cited from W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 365. See also K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 88. A comparison with the line of thought in the *Upanishads* suggests itself here. Recall the famous story of the 'pran' (Breath) dispute (*Chāndogya Upanishad*, V, 1), which ended with recognition of the breath-soul as the supreme principle. Development of that thought led to identification of breath-air and the spiritual principle *Atman*.

¹⁴⁶ DK 11 A 23 (Aetius 1,7,11). See G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, p. 89 (for DK 11 A 13), and p. 90 (Aristotle's reference to Hippon; Herakleitos' reference to Thales).

¹⁴⁷ A. O. Makovelsky. *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹⁴⁸ Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. *Op. cit.*, p. 346.

¹⁴⁹ Plutarch. *V. Pericles*, 32; Diodorus, 12, 39 (DK 59 A 17). Cited from W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 268.

¹⁵⁰ Plato. *Apology*, 19. *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 1, p. 402.

¹⁵¹ F. Kh. Kessidi. *Op. cit.*, p. 248.

¹⁵² See John Burnet. *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 1278.

¹⁵³ Plato. *Philebus*, 61. *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. II, p. 397.

¹⁵⁴ Plato. *Timaeus*, 51, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. II, p. 31.

¹⁵⁵ As Rozhansky has shown, the fundamental tenets of Plato's physics 'are precisely those propositions in relation to which the physics of Plato's microworld [we leave this modernised expression to the author's conscience—Ed] is sharply counterposed to his cosmology' (I. D. Rozhansky. *Op. cit.*, p. 373).

¹⁵⁶ Werner Jaeger. *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1947), p. 53, see also A. N. Chanyshev. *Italiiskaya filosofiya* (Italic Philosophy), Izd-vo MGU, Moscow, 1975, p. 204.

¹⁵⁷ DK 30 B 7. Cited from W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 103.

¹⁵⁸ DK 30 B 8. Cited from K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹⁵⁹ Karl R. Popper. *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (Harper & Row, New York, 1968), p. 80.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁶¹ See W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 392, for the English rendering of DK 68 156 (from Plutarch. *Adv. Col.* 1108f) by J. E. Raven. See also K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 106 ('Naught exists just as much as Aught').

¹⁶² Aristotle. *Metaphysics* (985 b 4). Cited from W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 392. See also G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, pp. 406-407, where the rendering is 'that not-being exists no less than being'.

¹⁶³ See also W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 393.

¹⁶⁴ V. A. Yakobson (Ed.). *Mifologii drevnego mira* (Mythologies of the Ancient World), Nauka, Moscow, 1977), p. 21.

¹⁶⁵ *The Medical Works of Hippocrates. The Nature of Man*, p. 202.

¹⁶⁶ See A. F. Losev. *Istoriya antichnoi estetiki: Sofisty, Sokrat, Platon* (The History of Antique Aesthetics: the Sophists, Sokrates, Plato), Iskustvo, Moscow, 1969, pp. 234-236.

¹⁶⁷ Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 57.

¹⁶⁸ This is suggested, in particular, by the content of the anonymous treatise *On Melissos, Xenophanes, and Georgias*. See the analysis of the 'antinomies' in M. I. Mandra. *Eleaty: Filologicheskiye razyskaniya v oblasti istorii grecheskoi filosofii* (The Eleatics: Philological Studies in the History of Greek Philosophy), Odessa, 1911. pp. 80ff.

¹⁶⁰ Aristotle. *Topics*, 101a, 34. *The Works of Aristotle*, Vol. 1 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1952), p. 144.

¹⁶¹ Karl Marx. Theses on Feuerbach. In Marx, Engels. *The German Ideology* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p. 618.

¹⁷⁰ Bruno Snell. *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der Vorplatonischen Philosophie* (Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin, 1924), p. 17.

¹⁷¹ Götz Redlow. *Theoria: theoretische und praktische Lebensauffassung im philosophischen Denken der Antike* (Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1966), pp. 18-21.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁷³ Aristotle. *Politics*, Book I (P. F. Collier & Sons, New York, 1900), p. 17.

¹⁷⁴ See DK 59 A 29.

¹⁷⁵ See DK 59 A 30.

¹⁷⁶ DK 22 B 55. Cited from W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 429; See also K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 28; G. S. Kirk & J. E. Raven. *Op. cit.*, p. 189.

¹⁷⁷ See, for example, DK 68 B 191 (or S. Y. Lurye. *Op. cit.*, fr. 657); 'Rather you must consider the lives of those in distress, reflecting on their intense sufferings, in order that your own possessions and condition may seem great and enviable' (K. Freeman. *Op. cit.*, p. 109).

¹⁷⁸ See S. Y. Lurye. *Op. cit.*, fr. 209; DK 68 A 124, Lurye, fr. 486. For some incomprehensible reason Lurye translated one and the same Greek phrase into Russian as 'perceptible through thought' (fr. 209) and 'perceptible through reason' (fr. 486).

¹⁷⁹ See W. K. C. Guthrie. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 493; DK 68 B 3; Lurye, fr. 737.

¹⁸⁰ It would seem that this is a later etymology than that adduced above. The religious feast or festivity (e.g. *hē toy Dionisiou theōria* of Dionysus) was least of all a spectacle that later became a theatrical performance, which also bore the name *theōria*.

¹⁸¹ See A. F. Losev. *Op. cit.*, p. 464.

¹⁸² Plato. *Phaedo*, 82, 83. *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I, p. 468.

¹⁸³ In, for example, the *Protrepticus*. See *Aristotelis opera*. (Berlin, 1870). Vol V. *Aristotelis quae forebantur librorum fragmenta*/Coll. V. Rose, fr. 58.

¹⁸⁴ Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, VI, E, 1, 1026a, 19-24. *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 103.

4

From Aristotle to Hegel

The history of philosophy took shape as a discipline over the whole course of the evolution of philosophic thought. As the process and result of the self-reflection of philosophy, it has a dual aspect: (1) as a historical science that brings out and critically investigates the facts of the development of philosophic thought in the regular succession of doctrines determined as to their content by the objective, historical development of society, the progress of scientific knowledge, and the immanent development of that content by virtue of its relative independence; and (2) as a discipline. As the latter the history of philosophy has to bring the achievements of past thought into the context of today's philosophical problems, and into systematic connection with the philosophic knowledge of the epoch. The task and ideal of the history of philosophy as a discipline are a combination of these two functions.

These functions are often divided in the real historical process (to trace which briefly is the purpose of this chapter), and we are faced with very different forms of interaction between philosophy and the history of philosophy, and consequently also with different types of understanding of the latter as a discipline. The logical differentiation of these functions yields a series in which the empirical amassing of facts is replaced by their critical examination, and that by a synthesis of preceding philosophic knowledge into a system that is the supreme ideological generalisation of all existing knowledge and social practice for its epoch.

Basing ourselves on that we can distinguish the following types of construct in the history of philosophy: (1) the empirical; (2) critical, divided in turn into (2a) the eclectic, associated with the inclusion in the resultant system of selected

(*eklego*—Gr. to choose from, select) 'best' solutions of the past; (2b) sceptical, based on denial of the positive value of these solutions; (2c) the critical proper, evaluating the results of philosophic inquiry from the author's own standpoint; and (3) the synthetic, or scientific proper.

As with any classification we are dealing here, of course, with a scheme that simplifies the real historical forms of the conceptions to some extent; nevertheless it enables us to orientate ourselves in the process of the shaping of the history of philosophy as a discipline. Even though the empirical mode of exposition of the history of philosophy inevitably posits the position of the philosopher who is selecting and interpreting the facts, it brings 'his majesty fact', all the same, to the forefront. This empirical method is quite broadly represented in the history of our discipline, and most distinctly in the works of the Greek doxographers who set themselves the four-square task of describing the 'ideas' of philosophers of the past. But we also see it in Friedrich Ueberweg's famous *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, repeatedly republished after his death.¹ This work, which enjoyed great popularity, became so like a reference book with time that it practically ceased to be a work on the history of philosophy.² Indeed, that is the logical result of the purely empirical approach, with all the reservations connected with it including the need to express the 'views' of philosophers of the past in the language of present-day philosophy: 'The history of philosophy is history, not philosophy.'³

In other words, the empirical approach, which converts the history of philosophy into observations and memorials rather than an affair of the mind (indifferently the 'observations' and 'memorials' of a witness or archives) eliminates it as a philosophical discipline. And that is all the more harmful since fact in the history of philosophy is not only 'what was' but also what was the reflection of social and natural existence; 'Is it the earnest struggle of the inquiring mind with its object—the world, life, or humankind proper?'⁴

The history of philosophy is always the history of philosophic problems and their solution by thinkers in concrete conditions of place and time. It must therefore also be critical history, which implies (1) criticism of sources, and establishment of their actual meaning, and (2) criticism of the solutions. In

other words criticism is primarily an analytic activity aimed at interpreting a doctrine and bringing out what problem the author tackled and decided and what consequences his solution entailed.

In the history of philosophical historiography the principle of a critical approach to preceding philosophy was formulated by Plato, who stressed the need for thorough analysis of the conception advanced, in order to clarify whether the thought produced a phantom or a ripe fruit. The later doxography presented by Christian authors made the relation between the investigated doctrine and religious dogmas the criterion of critical analysis. The classical example of that was the *Refutation of All Heresies* of Hippolytos (third century A.D.), who put the history of philosophy at the service of religion, seeking by its means to refute heretical doctrines by demonstrating that their precepts were taken from doctrines of antiquity (philosophy, the mysteries, and astrology) rather than from the Holy Scriptures.⁵

The effect of that 'naive' criticism was that the author of the first modern history of philosophy, Thomas Stanley, even limited it to antiquity, on the grounds that the truth philosophy aspired to was included in the Christian religion, and that philosophy was therefore of no use after the rise of Christianity. At the same time there was no point in tracing the history of philosophy.⁶

One of the first conclusions of philosophic criticism, applied to the history of doctrines, was scepticism. It will readily be seen that its basis was the fact of systematic divergences between philosophers in tackling the central problems of knowledge. The contradictions and disagreements among philosophical schools was a symptom of the impossibility both of knowledge and of instruction. Because

in every instance, then of learning there ought to be agreement regarding the subject taught and the teacher and the learner and the mode of learning; but, as we shall show, none of these things is agreed, therefore no learning exists.⁷

The long tradition of scepticism in the history of philosophy was completed by the line of positivism in the nineteenth century, which saw 'positive philosophy', the only one worthy

of being called philosophy, as a simple generalisation of scientific knowledge. From that angle the philosophy of the past was 'metaphysics,' devoted in vain quests for 'transcendent' knowledge and therefore fruitless. The history of that philosophy was no more than a history of human errors and delusions. Theoretically, as positivists believed, the history of philosophy had to do with the impossibility, rather than the difficulty: its problems were inaccessible to positive knowledge and hence there could be no progress of it.

Things were presented differently by supporters of the eclectic trend, for whom the aim of the selection of material on the history of philosophy was to build a system 'of their own' in which theses of various schools that admitted of mutual agreement could be combined, suitably treated. From the standpoint of Cicero, for example, a philosopher either looked on existing doctrines with suspicion and hostility, censuring them, or ventured to follow them, in which case he could accomplish much with the legacy of the philosophers' doctrines.⁸ Another representative of eclecticism, but of modern times, the French philosopher Victor Cousin, saw in it an important means of developing philosophy. Since it 'judges all the schools fairly and even with goodwill, borrows what is true from them, and neglects what is false' it is permeated with a 'spirit of conciliation'.⁹

But that did not mean indifference to choice of the 'true'; some preferred system of views always remained the criterion. For Cicero it was Stoicism, flavoured with academic Scepticism. Cousin's 'intelligent eclecticism',¹⁰ on his own admission, was

one of the most important and useful applications of the philosophy we profess, but it is not the principle of it. Our true doctrine and true banner is spiritualism.¹¹

The most fruitful approach within the 'critical' conception has been the Kantian. One of its first representatives, Karl H. Heydenreich, considered the following to be the basic principles of 'critical' history of philosophy:

(1) to aim to develop genetically, in relation to every opinion and system, their origin and moulding according to all the reasons and relations that might

influence them; (2) to substantiate both the whole and the parts of each one according to principles.¹²

While the first point was only properly developed within Hegelian notions of the history of philosophy, the second acquired an *a priori* character: the historical process of philosophy had to be substantiated 'according to principles', i.e. *a priori*, answer the question '*Quid juris?*' (as in all other cases), how was a history of philosophy possible? Kant distinguished the history of philosophy from history in general as an empirical science on the grounds that it was impossible to narrate in it about what had happened without first knowing what had to happen and what could happen.¹³

That idea contained, in embryo, a true notion of the pattern of development of the history of philosophy and of the need to bring it out; furthermore, it contained a scheme for tackling one of its most important problems, viz., the relation of chance and necessity in the course of philosophical development. But the traditional Kantian conception of necessity as an *a priori* characteristic led to the criterion of choice of the 'necessary' becoming the author's own system (or the one he was associated with); presented *a priori*, this criterion became an instrument of forcible 'transformation' of the historical facts to suit the system.

A truly scientific solution of the problem of the pattern of the history of philosophy is associated in the history of philosophic historiography with a synthetic or, rather, theoretical conception of this discipline. Its founder must be taken as Aristotle, who saw in analysis of the history of philosophy a means for bringing out (1) the logic of the shaping of philosophic theory proper, and (2) the pattern of the history of philosophy that inspired thinkers to devise ever newer, fuller, and more complete systems. But the decisive step to creating a scientific history of philosophy was taken by Hegel. Having explicitly represented, and thoroughly substantiated, the principles put forward by Aristotle, he supplemented them by stating the necessary connection of philosophy with its time, with 'the spirit or the principle of the times',¹⁴ and the idea of progress in philosophic understanding.

It is thus [he wrote] that the self-developing reason in the history of Philosophy makes of itself an

end, and this end is not foreign or imported, but is the matter itself, which lies at the basis as universal, and with which the individual forms of themselves correspond."

Hegel formulated these principles idealistically, however. It only proved possible to develop a real comprehension and all-round application of them to analyse the process of dialectical history of philosophy from the standpoint of dialectical materialism and its inherent materialist conception of history. It is Marxist-Leninist historicism that makes a scientific picture of the process possible.

The History of Philosophy in Antiquity and the Middle Ages

The beginning of knowledge of the history of philosophy is often associated with Plato. And in fact the dialogue form of his works was well adapted to critical analysis of the views of his predecessors, while Sokrates' 'demon', which inspired him to ask questions, and led to discovery of the inner contradictions of the doctrine discussed, was an exemplary 'critic'. The subject of the discussion was, as a rule, the separate doctrines of philosophers of the past. They were discussed in a lively, thorough manner, that did not lack erudition, irony, logic and joking, derision, even jeering. But the question of adequacy immediately arose; how to differentiate between the position of the thinker of the past, the conclusions drawn by Plato (about which the thinker himself had most likely not thought), the objective content of that position, and the standpoint of Plato himself? Can, for example, the expounded doctrine of the mobility (fluidity) of everything that exists be identified with the genuine teaching of Herakleitos, and the views of his followers, the 'eternal flux' (*aei rheontes*), in Plato's ironic definition, or was it Plato's own construct, invented as a target for his refutations? Even when Plato spoke of doctrines congenial to him, and could be expected to hand them on objectively (as in the case, for example, of Pythagorism), he did not cite the authors, books, or teachings themselves, so that it is almost impossible to relate them with the facts of history.

All that makes Plato a 'witness' (in the apt phrase of A. N. Gi-

lyarov¹⁶ rather than a historian of philosophy. His evidence, the oldest that has come down to us about the first philosophers of Greece, is of immense importance, of course, but it calls for historical treatment.

We find a fundamentally different situation in the works of Aristotle. He went into the history of philosophy in order to confirm the initial principles of his doctrine. The 'summative' approach he employed called precisely for objective exposition of the doctrines of the past, which figured in this connection as of limited, partial value, requiring supplementing, rather than as mistaken. In the first book of his *Metaphysics*, devoted in the main to historical analysis of the teachings of his predecessors, he put the question as follows:

Let us examine the contributions of others before us, who attempted the investigation of being and philosophized about truth. For clearly they, too, speak of certain principles and causes, and so there will be some profit in our present inquiry if we go over what they say; for either we shall discover some other genus of cause, or we shall be more convinced of those we just stated.¹⁷

The task of historical inquiry in philosophy is thus to pass on the views of previous philosophers so as to incorporate them in the system of knowledge (in this case of 'principles and causes'), discover something new, not noted in systematic investigation, or confirm a discovery. Aristotle's distinguishing feature as a historian of philosophy, moreover, was his aspiration to determine clearly whom a doctrine belonged to. The exception was the 'so-called Pythagoreans', a collective term most likely employed because of the esoteric character of their teachings, and consequently of their anonymity. Aristotle developed and employed a whole number of principles and techniques of research that helped guarantee objectivity of exposition. Let us note the following.

1. Strict definition of the aim of the inquiry making it possible to distinguish the starting point (in this case the view of the thinker of the past) from the result, i.e. from Aristotle's own doctrine. That enabled him to give a general estimate of the first philosophers in respect of his own theory:

It is clear, then, also from what has been said before, that all thinkers seemed to seek the causes nam-

ed in *Physics*, and that besides these we have no other that might be named. But they talked about these vaguely; and in one sense they stated them all, but in another they did not state them at all. For philosophy about all things at the start seems to falter, inasmuch as it is at first both new and just beginning.¹⁸

2. As objective an attitude to predecessors as possible, it being

just to be grateful not only to those with whose opinions we might agree, but also to those who have expressed rather superficial opinions; for the latter, too, have contributed something, namely, they have handed down for us the habit of thinking... The same may be said of those who spoke about the truth; for some of them handed down to us certain doctrines, but there were others before who caused them to be what they were.¹⁹

3. A clear distinguishing of what a philosopher really said from what the investigator deduced from it as a logical consequence. His remarks about Anaxagoras, for instance, were highly expressive:

If we were to believe that Anaxagoras spoke of two elements, we would most certainly do so from his statements, which he himself did not articulate, but which he would have accepted of necessity as indicating two elements if one were to induce him to see this.²⁰

4. Finally, a description of the source of communicated information, with a clear differentiation of exact knowledge and legend and tradition. Thus, when speaking of Thales, Aristotle constantly stressed only the probability of his own knowledge of him: 'perhaps coming to this belief by observing that...' ²¹; 'Thales is said to have spoken out in this manner...' ²². Here is another example: 'We know that Anaxagoras openly made these statements, but Hermotimus of Klazonenai is credited with having made them earlier.'²³

We can thus say that Aristotle had a quite attentive attitude to the doctrines investigated, trying (at least in the first book of the *Metaphysics*) to hand on the content of the teachings of the past exactly and adequately; he saw the possibility of distortions and strove to secure himself against them. It is therefore impossible to accept, without reservations, the hyper-

critical view of Aristotle expressed by Cherniss in his book on Aristotle's criticism of the Presocratic philosophers.²⁴ Cherniss' pupil McDiarmaid expressed this view as follows:

Aristotle is not interested in historical facts as such at all. He is constructing his own system of philosophy, and his predecessors are of interest to him only in so far as they furnish material to this end... Holding this belief, he does not hesitate to modify or distort not only the detailed views but also the fundamental attitudes of his predecessors or to make articulate the implications that doctrines may have for him but could not have for their authors.²⁵

As we have seen, matters were not so in the first book of *Metaphysics*. It is difficult, of course, to expect that Aristotle succeeded everywhere in following his quite cautious orientation of a historian. The many statements about philosophers of the past scattered throughout his works therefore need to be carefully checked. But one must also not forget that it was Aristotle who first formulated and applied the principles of objective inquiry, and that he developed no few methods in his practice that to some extent guarded against errors.

At the same time Aristotle demonstrated that the doctrines of the past became the source of new knowledge, the basis for significant conclusions. We have already said that his position was that examination of the views of his predecessors could suggest propositions not yet noticed, or confirm conclusions drawn. Furthermore, their examination could help bring out the logical pattern of the development of predecessors' thought, the logic that had already led them to the important conclusions drawn, and could lead to new, richer, more developed conceptions. When closely tracing development of the doctrine of principles and causes in the Presocratics, for instance, Aristotle noted that each of the views expressed by his predecessors provided scope for development. Having adopted the material principle, he considered, one must then think about what put matter into motion ('the source which begins motion'²⁶), why changes took place in the 'essence of existence' and what caused changes, movements, and actions.²⁷ At first glance he brought the thinkers of the past as far here as his own conclusions, to what he needed, viz., to formal, active purposive causality. But that is not quite so.

Aristotle criticised the 'physicists' for having not accepted other principles than the material ones. From his standpoint, based on recognition of matter as passive and requiring to be activated from outside in order to realise motion and form, the first philosophers illegitimately left the question of the cause of motion out of consideration. But he correctly reflected their view: they had no need of this actuating cause since they treated nature as the sole, self-moving element. They therefore 'were not dissatisfied with themselves'²⁸. Aristotle quite logically linked the rise of this need for a deepening of inquiry into the 'underlying subject' and a transition from one sole 'material' cause to the motive one with the process of the differentiation of single nature (*physis*), as the basis and independent cause of the birth of everything that exists, into component elements. The aggregate of 'elements' obtained, which form things through combination and separation, first presented by Empedokles, already logically required a 'motive cause'—Love and Strife for Empedokles, or 'Mind' for Anaxagoras.

In that example we already see that Aristotle is a quite reliable source of information about the preceding philosophy and at the same time the first of the representatives of that trend in the history of philosophy which we put in the synthetic or scientific line. As for the criticism of him as a historian of Presocratic thought, its sound point is that his exposition—like that of any other historian, incidentally—cannot be taken on trust, but must be verified from all available sources, including analysis of the contexts in which he himself employed preceding doctrines and the conclusions of his own that he drew from them.²⁹ But that is a commonplace and generally accepted position.

Matters are much more complicated with the other major historian of philosophy of antiquity, Aristotle's pupil Theophrastos who can be called the first historian of philosophy *par excellence*. After the appearance of Hermann Diels' capital work *Doxographi graeci* in 1879 there remained no doubt that the work of Theophrastos *Epitome of Physical Opinions* (or *Opinions of the Physicists*), reconstructed by him from later doxographies (Simplicius, Diogenes Laertius, Galen, Hippolytus, and others) and the fragment *De Sensu* (*On Sensation*), preserved in a fourteenth century manuscript, was the basis of all

subsequent descriptions of the philosophical doctrines of antiquity. The sixteen books of the *Physical Opinions*, especially meant as a work on the history of philosophy, was long taken—in contrast to Aristotle—as the most reliable source, unaffected, or almost so, by Peripatetic ideas. This point was confirmed by Theophrastos' seeming to have had access to the books of his predecessors, preserved in the library of Plato's Academy.

Although it could not escape scholars that Theophrastos relied as well on the survey of the opinions of the first philosophers in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, the similarity between the two works was treated rather as external confirmation of Aristotle's conclusions by the independent judgments of Theophrastos. Only in the 1950s did McDiarmid, following Cherniss, throw doubts on Theophrastos' exposition of the doctrines of the Presocratics. His conclusion about the fragments from the *Physical Opinions* was extremely negative.

In sum, the fragments considered disclose no evidence that Theophrastus employed his knowledge of the Presocratics in such a way as to exercise independent judgement about them. Despite his apparent investigation of the original texts, his accounts are in all essentials simply repetitions of some of the interpretations that he found in Aristotle and have, therefore, the same deficiencies. Further, by his method of selection and adaptation he has frequently misrepresented his source and has exaggerated the faults present in it. It must be concluded that, with regard to the Presocratic causes at least, he is a thoroughly biased witness and is even less trustworthy than Aristotle."

But let us see what can be said 'in justification' of Theophrastos. Of course, he depended on Aristotle, but compared with the latter he introduced a very important technique of inquiry without which scientific reliability of analysis is hardly possible; relying on the sources available to him, he introduced genuine extracts from the works of philosophers of the past. That is his inestimable contribution not only to research proper, but also to the methodology of inquiry in the history of philosophy. It is in this that he appears as an original scholar who took Aristotle's precepts further; extracts from the works of the authors studied better guaranteed the adequacy of the content of the

doctrines transmitted than the most exact paraphrase, not to mention that it would have been practically impossible in general, without them, to judge the first period of Greek philosophy, from Thales to Demokritos inclusive.

Let us note that Theophrastos did not depend so much on Aristotle in his philosophy as his critics assume. He often polemised against his teacher on cardinal questions of philosophy, detecting difficulties that faced the Stagirite.³¹ And it can hardly have been one of the initial tasks of Theophrastos' inquiry in the history of philosophy to justify Aristotle's doctrine.

Properly speaking, the difficulty here is something else. *Physical Opinions* has come down to us only in fragments preserved in various later sources, and only the fragment *De sensu* is represented by a sufficiently broad, connected text. Therefore we do not know his posing either of the question of the aims and tasks of inquiry, or of the methodological and methodic indications and reservations that we find in Aristotle. Does that mean that there were none? Can one believe that Aristotle's scientific conscientiousness was lost so soon by his pupils? In any case *Physical Opinions* deserves no less respect and confidence than other historical works of the early Peripatetics on the history of science, for example the works of Eudemos of Rhodes on the history of mathematics.³² Speaking abstractly, we may doubt the 'theory of one source' (*Einquellentheorie*) so fashionable in the nineteenth century, on which Diels' belief about Theophrastos as the sole starting point of all doxography was based. But there are still not adequate grounds for not tracing the doxographies of later times, both the biographies and the 'successions' of the philosophers, to the work of Theophrastos. In any case it was first description of the 'opinions' of the Greek philosophers.

According to the information that has come down to us, *Physical Opinions* existed in two versions: 16 *Books of Physical Opinions* and 18 books *On Physics*. It is possible that they were one and the same work, but that the second included also an *Epitome*. Diogenes Laertius also named several works of Theophrastos about individual philosophers: Anaxagoras (*A Reply to Anaxagoras* and *On the Writings of Anaxagoras*), Anaximenes, Archelaos, Demokritos (*On Demokritos* and *On the Astronomy of Demokritos*), and Empedokles. Diogenes Laertius

seemingly knew these works only from some catalogues; we have no further information about them.

Judging from Diels' reconstruction, Theophrastos' work was built up in two ways. On the one hand it set out the doctrine of the 'physicists' about 'elements' (*archai*) in chronological order, accompanying the exposition with notes on each of the philosophers and on their relations with one another. Theophrastos laid the foundations for grouping the philosophers by 'schools', systematised correspondingly by the relation teacher-pupil. Anaximander, for instance, was the pupil and successor of Thales, Anaximenes of Anaximander (fr. 2.); Xenophanes was the teacher of Parmenides (fr. 5), and so on. On the other hand, the further exposition was made by comparing the opinions of the old philosophers in the context of opposing solutions of the problems studied. In the fragment *De Sensu*, for instance, we read:

The majority of beliefs about sensation, and the most widely held, fall into two classes. Some effect it by similarity, others by the contrary, by similarity Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato, by the contrary Anaxagoras and Heraclitus."

The presentation of the history of doctrines on sensation enabled Theophrastos to reconstruct a lively picture of the struggle of opposed opinions, but at the same time to suggest sceptical conclusions in regard to them, which prompted return to the 'true' doctrine, i.e. Aristotelianism.

The sense of this comparing was to overcome 'extremes' and deduce the truth from opposing statements and to resolve the contradictions brought out by the comparison. This method of *aporia* used by Aristotle and Theophrastos influenced their works on the history of philosophy in two ways. While contributing, on the one hand, to bringing out the content of the old doctrines in 'pure' form, i.e. in the most abstract propositions typical of them, it forced the ancients, on the other hand, to 'answer' new questions and deal with problems that they had possibly not dreamed of. It is necessary to take that aspect of the matter carefully into consideration when analysing the 'aporetic' parts of Theophrastos' work.

Theophrastos had already established the order of the problems in which the 'opinions' that had correspondingly become

the main problems of philosophy were compared: viz., about elements, the world, celestial phenomena, terrestrial phenomena, the soul, and the body. These units were divided in turn into smaller ones. The first group, for instance, included elements (*peri archōn*), god, geniuses and heroes, matter, ideas, etc.; the second the world (*peri kosmoy*), heaven, stars, the sun, the moon; the third the Milky Way, comets, thunder, clouds, the rainbow, etc., the fourth land, the sea, the floods of the Nile; the fifth the soul, sensation and the sensible, vision, etc.; the sixth seed, conception, etc.³⁴

Properly speaking that is the structure of the *Opinions* compiled in Theophrastos' way in the first century B.C. and supplemented by the 'opinions' of later philosophers down to Poseidonios and Asklepiades. In revising Theophrastos the Stoic author omitted his polemic against the ancients, and while preserving the order of the problems, expounded the 'opinions' quite uncritically. It is with that collection, seemingly, which replaced Theophrastos' works, that the long history of doxographic literature begins. Below we shall trace its 'genealogical tree' compiled by Capelle from the work of Diels.³⁵

As Makovelsky wrote,

the *Vetusta Placita* superseded the work of Theophrastos, which was almost completely forgotten, but it itself soon gave way to the fuller collection compiled by Aëtius. The same fate overtook the work of Aëtius, too, in time. But the Pseudo-Plutarchian *Placita* that replaced it long remained popular and enjoyed the fame of a classic work. In fact it was a sorry compilation that was simply an abridgement of Aëtius collection, made quite carelessly and without knowledge of the matter.³⁶

Another important source relying on the *Opinions* is the *Physical Extracts* (*physikai eklogai*) of John of Stobi (Stobaeus), which originally constituted a single whole with his *Anthology*. The *Eclogues* contained material relating predominantly to 'physical' problems (divinity, elements, the world, etc.),³⁷ 'dialectics', rhetoric, and grammar, while the *Anthology* embraced ethics, politics, and economics.³⁸ Both these sources, the Pseudo-Plutarchian *Placita* and the Stobean *Eclogues* have been preserved in full and were used by Diels to restore the work of Aëtius, including information coming from Theophrastos via

the *Opinions* and the arguments proper of Aëtius in the 'Introduction' and in the introductions to the separate chapters. Aëtius, for example, defined 'nature' as the 'element of motion and immobility', required (with Plato and Aristotle) a distinguishing between 'principle' (*archē*) and 'element' (*stoicheia*) which had not been drawn by some of the thinkers of the past, and so on.

We shall touch only on two major historians of philosophy who played, as far as we know, a paramount role in the development of this discipline, namely Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius. Though probably almost contemporaries (second half of the second century and beginning of the third), they represent two approaches to the history of philosophy, the sceptic and the factological. Sextus Empiricus' analyses are embedded in the system of his sceptic argumentation, while not losing their independent value as an exposition of the continuity of ideas. The work of Diogenes Laertius is precisely a history of philosophy as it was conceived at that time.

The historical part of Sextus Empiricus' work *Against the Mathematicians* (in 11 books) consists of the greater part of Book 1 of *Against the Logicians* (7th book), and forms a kind of historical introduction to the Sceptic theory of knowledge. The central problem, around which the exposition is built, is truth and its criterion. The basis for distinguishing it is the idea

that if truth is to be sought in every division of Philosophy, we must before all else, possess trustworthy principles and methods for the discernment of truth."

On the other hand investigation of the truth and its criterion were necessary because

the problem of this Criterion is everywhere a subject of controversy ... also because the most extensive systems of Philosophy pronounce judgement on the weightiest matters."

This division of the studied material enabled Sextus to analyse the history of the relations of the philosophic schools and at the same time to make an objective survey of all the currents that interested him. The interest associated with the system of Sceptical argument forced him to systematise the subjects of his

analysis and to describe their different aspects relatively exhaustively, going into details.

Sextus, for instance, described in detail in what senses one could speak about the truth, and in what senses it had been spoken about,⁴¹ and about its criterion.⁴² Correspondingly, within the context of the general division of philosophical schools into the dogmatic and the sceptic, i.e. those that recognised a criterion of truth and those that rejected one, he divided the former into those who applied the criterion in the sphere of reason or the realm of irrational acts, or in both.⁴³ Examination of all these positions led both to elucidation of theoretical, cognitive aporias and to the task of inquiring into them, but already in a generalised way so 'that we may not be compelled to repeat ourselves by assailing one by one all the philosophers enumerated'⁴⁴. In that way he passed from a historical examination to a systematic one.

The other principle of the classification of doctrines was to divide them according to their structure; taking only physics, ethics, or logic; or taking two parts, i.e. physics and logic, physics and ethics, or logic and ethics, or, finally, taking all three parts.⁴⁵

Sextus' application of these classifications to the history of philosophy obviously schematised it, but his generally recognised objectivity enabled him to make the necessary corrections without special difficulty, and he is considered (not by chance) one of the most reliable witnesses. To his systematic exposition he added many cross-references to other sections of the book, and to his other work *Pyrrhonic Sketches*.

When citing or criticising the dogmatists that the Sceptics criticised, Sextus Empiricus ... is one of the main sources for the history of all Greek philosophy in general. Only Diogenes Laertius, perhaps, can rival him for the amount of information he communicated about the former philosophy... Sextus Empiricus ... was absolutely systematic and felt a direct aversion for fiction of any kind. He was a quite abstract thinker who was interested only in the logical consistency of the theories he criticised; but all the other aspects of those theories, and even more the personal peculiarities of their authors, did not interest him at all.⁴⁶

A source of the information reproduced by Sextus was apparently Klitomachos. Diels also noted a direct affinity with Theophrastos. Things are more complicated as regards the origin of Diogenes Laertius' book *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. The studies of Bahnsch, Nietzsche, Maass, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Diels, Usener, and others, published in the last third of the nineteenth century, agreed in recognising its compilative character; the critics were not ashamed, moreover, of extremely unflattering evaluations of Diogenes as 'wretched compiler' and 'a regular ass'; Nietzsche, for example, described his method as copying credulous to the point of stupidity. Twentieth-century philosophers' estimate of Diogenes does not differ much. Losev, summing them up in his foreword to Gasparov's Russian translation is quite unconsoling:

The value of Diogenes Laertius' treatise is not, in general, its historical analysis at all. It is a very curious and interesting antique mixture of the altogether important and the altogether unimportant, the first-rate and the second-rate, the quite serious and the amusing.⁴⁷

And even the reservation that it would be 'both unscientific and unhistorical' to demand anything more of a classical treatise does not help.⁴⁸

Yet the fact that it is his work—the oldest treatise of its kind—that has come down to us can hardly be counted an accident. While unable to compare it with contemporaneous and preceding works—they simply have not come down to us in any sort of full form—we must mention a number of merits of Diogenes' study. First of all there is his aspiration to base himself on reliable facts and on opinions that seemed to him authoritative. On a whole series of questions we find references to sources. That, of course, often led to the survey of sources unaccompanied with his own analysis resulting in contradictions and absurdities. But when we appreciate Diogenes for what he did rather than for what he did not do (and could not do for historically quite clear reasons), our estimate will not be so low. It is not fortuitous that Losev noted—without, however, attaching sufficient importance to it—that Diogenes

understood much, formulated much correctly, and that many of his historical observations are undoubt-

edly instructive. Many of the old Greek texts cited by him are now included in modern collections and have an honourable place in them."

Suffice it to point out that in Diels' collection Diogenes Laertius has a prominent place, yielding little to Plutarch, Stobaeus, and Simplicius.

Certain classifications of doctrines are known to us from paraphrases and extracts. The most common one, coming down from Sotion Peripatetic (second century B.C.), distinguishes two trends: (a) the Ionic (Thales—Anaximander—Anaximenes—Archelaos—Sokrates—the Socratics—Plato—Aristotle—the Peripatetics—the Cynics—the Stoics) and (b) the Italian (Pythagoras—Ameinias—Parmenides—Zenon—Leukippos—Demokritos—Pyrrhon—Epicurus). Diogenes Laertius, when recalling this system in his introduction, introduced certain amendments, and then considered other classifications.

Philosophers were divided into dogmatists and sceptics. They could be divided, too, according to what they concerned themselves with, and the structure of their philosophy, into physicists, logicians, and ethicists. According to Diogenes, a 'physical' approach predominated down to Archelaos; ethics began with Sokrates, and dialectics, i.e. logic, with Zenon of Elea. Subsequently ten schools were distinguished ('sects'—*hairesis*); the Academic, Kyrenaic, Elean, Megarian, Cynic, Eretrian, Dialectic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean⁵⁰ He mentioned a version of Hippobotos who had listed nine schools in his work *On Philosophical Sects*,⁵¹ pointing out the difficulty of defining Scepticism as a school. Where the Sceptics 'in their attitude to appearance follow or seem to follow some principle', they formed a school; but when by school was meant the adherents of some dogma, then they did not form one.⁵² Finally, he noted the existence of an eclectic school associated with the name of Potamo of Alexandria.⁵³

The structure of Diogenes' book is as follows. He divided the Ionic series after Sokrates into three trends: the Academics (from Plato to Klitomachos), the Cynics and Stoics, and the Peripatetics. Within the Italian series the Eleatics and the Atomists were separated from the Pythagoreans. He included Empedokles with the latter, remarking, however, that not everyone agreed on that. We thus get three series: Ionic philosophy, Pyth-

agorism, and Eleatic-Atomist philosophy. Diogenes considered Herakleitos an independent thinker⁵⁴ under whose influence there was a sect 'called the Heracliteans.'⁵⁵ Diogenes of Apollonia, was treated similarly, though very little was said, incidentally, about him.

Diogenes Laertius thus undoubtedly tried to create an original system of classifying the historical material, allowing for the merits and deficiencies of preceding systems. He raised the question of the beginnings of philosophy, answering it in general in favour of its Greek original source. While associating the rudiments of philosophy with the names of Musaeos, Linos, and the 'Seven Wise Men', he began it all the same with Anaximander and Pythagoras.⁵⁶ The dual system he employed was original, viz., his short (*kephalaiōdōs*) and detailed (*kata meros*) expositions of 'opinions'. When Diels was compiling them, he came to the quite probable conclusion that, while the short exposition came from some biographical source, sharing all its weaknesses, the detailed exposition was oriented on a doxographic source coming down from Theophrastos, and consequently much more valuable.⁵⁷

Diogenes' use of the 'successions of philosophers' (primarily, it would seem those of Sotion, Herakleitos of Lembos, Hippobotos, Demetrios of Magnesia, Alexander Polyhistor, Diokles, and Favorinus,⁵⁸) led to a superfluity of 'fictional' digressions in his work—anecdotes, legends, imaginary details of the lives of philosophers, faked letters. He also inserted his own epigrams into the exposition. His work was possibly not completed, so that there is much repetition in it, inaccuracies, attributions to one philosopher of what undoubtedly belonged to another, and so on. Some of the mistakes evidently arose from spoiling of the text during copying, including writing into it of extracts from other doxographies, for example, that of Pseudo-Plutarch.

Diogenes Laertius, however, deserves credit for a very great service. His tenth book, devoted to Epicurus, contains the only biography of the great Atomist to come down to us, three letters of his on all the main issues of his philosophy, and the *Principal Doctrines* (of 40 aphorisms). Diogenes passionately defended Epicurus against opponents' calumniating accusations, drawing an attractive, perhaps even embellished picture of him.⁵⁹ The *Principal Doctrines* are undoubtedly genuine, and

the letters, although their authenticity is not guaranteed, reflect Epicurus' main ideas. Without Diogenes' work we would know extremely little about Epicurus.

What we have said allows us to make a general evaluation of the work of Diogenes; for all its shortcomings, it is—with a critical approach—one of the most important sources of information on Greek philosophy. Yet we must add that it is difficult to speak of it as a strictly scientific work. There is too much of books for piquant reading in it; while it retains a historical, cultural value, that circumstance substantially reduces its significance as a history of philosophy.

There is another problem in connection with Diogenes Laertius, viz., the periodisation and chronology of Greek philosophy. It is of cardinal importance to establish the dates of the lives and activity of the thinkers, not only so as to establish their succession but also so as to analyse the reciprocal influences, contradictions, and disputes of the schools, and so on. Without that it is impossible to examine the course of the history of philosophy scientifically. It is not surprising that the chronography of philosophical thought, and of history in general, was born in the school of Aristotle. Demetrios of Phaleron, who settled in Alexandria in the third century B.C., compiled a 'List of Archons' that makes it possible to fix the time when the separate philosophers who were their contemporaries lived. Kalimachos (third century B.C.) compiled a table of writers in which there is a list of their main works with biographical and chronological notes. Eratosthenes of Kyrene (circa 275-194 B.C.) compiled a work known as the *Chronography*. Finally (in 144 B.C.), there appeared the *Chronika* of Apollodoros of Athens, in four books, in which the time of the activity of certain historical persons, including philosophers, is determined in relation to some significant event in their lives, taken as their 'acme'—the age of their flourishing and maturity (age 40). That system of defining the time when historical persons lived became classical, and was employed broadly by Diogenes Laertius.

Although Apollodoros' *Chronika* was lost, Diogenes Laertius drew the great part of his chronological information from it. Apollodoros is our main source, through Diogenes, of dates relating to the early history of philosophy.*

The second and third centuries A.D. gave a new trend to the history of philosophy. Through the methods of interpreting classical texts (especially of Homer and Hesiod), developed by Alexandrian philologists, the technique of philosophical exegesis was more and more broadly employed. Typically exegesis served as a pretext for developing and justifying a certain doctrine, most often a private conception developed by the author of the commentary. Examples are Plutarch of Chaeronea's commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, Apuleius' *Theology of Plato*, Proklos' commentaries on Plato's dialogues (*Alcibiades*, *Cratylus*, *Parmenides*, *Timaeus*, the *Republic*), Simplicius' commentaries on works of Aristotle (*De anima*, *De caelo*, *Categories*, *Physics*).

There was a radical turn in the means of philosophic inquiry, and thereby, also, in the direction of activity on the history of philosophy, during the transition from antiquity to the Middle Ages. The text of the Scriptures (understood as divinely revealed absolute truth) now became the subject of theological and philosophical exegesis, while exegesis itself became a means of explaining and consolidating the authority of the Scriptures and of the dogma sanctioned by the Church. Views on philosophy also altered; it was subordinated to religion to the point of being dissolved in it. Philosophy, St. Augustine, for example, argued, was love of wisdom.

Now if God be wisdom, as truth and scripture testify, then a true philosopher is a lover of God ... creator not only of this visible world ... but of every living soul also."

Correspondingly, philosophy was love of god, and the history of philosophy acquired the function of an apology for the Christian religion.

The primary problem and task of all early Christianity was defence of Church ideology against 'pagan' philosophy and 'heresy', or the 'pseudonymous knowledge' (*pseudōnymos gnosis*) that functioned as the ideological basis of heresy. In accordance with these apologetic precepts, the structure of the historical excursuses that often appeared as a component of apologetic works had the aim of demonstrating the superiority of Christianity over 'paganism'. Thus, in the *Apologies* and *Dialogue with Trypho*, *Hortatory Address to the Greeks* of St. Justin Martyr,

the Philosopher (middle of the second century A.D.) philosophy was highly valued as

the greatest possession, and most honourable before God, to whom it leads us and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy.⁶³

But Hellenistic philosophy knew only separate, partial truths;

And that you may learn that it was from our teachers . . . that Plato borrowed his statement that God, having altered matter which was shapeless, made the world, hear the very words spoken through Moses⁶⁴

and cited the appropriate passages from the Bible. Or—the Herakleian-Stoic *ekpyrōsis* (conflagration) had been proclaimed in *Deuteronomy*: 'Everlasting fire shall descend, and shall devour to the pit beneath.'⁶⁴

All these partial truths were accessible to philosophers, Justin considered, because 'He is the Word of whom every race of men were partakers.'⁶⁵ But the founders of philosophical schools, who became famous through advancing certain ideas, had disciples

and each thought that to be true which he learned from his teacher: then, moreover, those latter persons handed down to *their* successors such things, and other similar to them; and this system was called by the name of him who was styled the father of the doctrine.⁶⁶

In his essay on the history of Greek philosophy, *Hortatory Address to the Greeks*, Justin passed to an analysis of the philosophers' disagreements and—in order to eliminate them—considered it reasonable

to recur to our progenitors, who in point of time have by a great way the precedence of your teachers, and who have taught us nothing from their own private fancy, nor differed with one another, nor attempted to overturn one another's positions, but without wrangling and contention received from God the knowledge which also they taught to us.⁶⁷

The orientation on the Scriptures thus proved decisive. But there were also disagreements on their interpretation, which the

apologists attributed to the influence of the discordant philosophical schools. Study of the latter therefore presented considerable interest for the Christian apologists and later for the Church fathers. The objective fact of the interaction within Christianity of Judaism and vulgarised elements of Hellenic philosophy, especially Platonism and Stoicism, called for careful study and criticism of Greek philosophy. The Christian authors followed the beaten path in that, borrowing the interpretation of the views of philosophers from certain doxographic sources. The validity of their historical excursions, therefore, largely depended on the value of the sources.

Hippolytos' *Refutation of all Heresies* probably attracted most attention (third century), but in it we find an extremely contradictory situation. He inserted the task of a critique of 'heretical' doctrines into the context of an analysis of Greek philosophy on the grounds that it was from it that the 'heresiarchs' had taken their doctrines. Hippolytos expounded the views of the 'physicists' (Thales, Pythagoras, Empedokles, Herakleitos, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaos, Parmenides, Leukippos, Demokritos, Xenophanes, Ekphantos, and Hippo-pon), the 'ethicists' (Sokrates, the 'pupil of Archelaos', and Plato, who 'combined the three philosophies', i.e. was equally concerned with physics, ethics, and dialectics), and the 'dialecticians' (Aristotle and the Stoics Chrysippus and Zenon). The exposition was completed by an analysis of the views of Epicurus (which were opposed to almost everything), and of the Academic Pyrrhon, the Indian Brahmins, Celtic Druids, and—Hesiod.⁶⁹

What we have said shows how the true and false were combined in the work of Hippolytos. The common view is that the reason was a combining of two sources: the well abridged Theophrastos (seeming the same as was used by Pseudo-Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius), and some biographical work, abounding in unreliable information and simply anecdotes.⁶⁹ We must add, however, that the use of fragments and expositions of the doctrines of the ancients in a polemic against 'heretics' in itself put its stamp on the material employed. Thus Hippolytos used fragments of Herakleitos in a polemic against Noet, and of Empedokles against Markion, trying to demonstrate that these 'heresiarchs' in fact preached the teaching of Hera-

kleitos or Empedokles, rather than of Christ. Therefore, as with the 'coordinating' of the doctrines of Greek philosophers and the Bible, there was a manipulation of the philosophers' texts, which were tailored in such a way that they could be made to fit the statements of the 'heretics'. While criticising the anti-trinitarian Noet, Hippolytos identified his doctrine on the unity of the first two persons of the Trinity with the Herakleitean doctrine of the identity of opposites.⁷⁰ The dualism of Markion, who recognised the existence of two gods (an evil, cruel demiurge-creator and a good saviour), Hippolytos likened to Empedokles' doctrine of Strife and Love. With such an identification, both aspects were naturally distorted.

Thus, for all that late antiquity abounded in works that can, without stretching the point, be classed as history of philosophy, its theoretical and methodological problems were not specially developed in them. Confirmation and description of some of the techniques that would have ensured objectivity of the examination and rough principles of the classification of trends and the rudiments of chronologies—was all, perhaps, that the history of philosophy could boast of in antiquity. Its value for us is primarily the value of the sources of information about the oldest philosophies and the cultural situation in which philosophy developed historically.

The general decline of scientific thinking in the Middle Ages, caused by the dominant influence of the religious outlook and the conversion of philosophy into the handmaiden of theology, also affected the history of philosophy. In spite of the fact that Greek philosophy had become a source of problems and solutions for mediaeval philosophy (especially after the thirteenth century) that might have necessitated development of historical inquiries, that did not happen. The genre that proved closest to the history of philosophy was the commentaries on the works of philosophers of the past, especially of Aristotle, and of the 'Church Fathers'. But the aim in that, too, was primarily to substantiate religious dogmas. As mediaeval philosophy developed, it is true, commentaries more and more acquired the look of free variations on a theme set and determined in its general outlines by an authoritative text.⁷¹

In Arabian philosophy, moreover, which was theologically oriented on the Koran, in which purely philosophical problems

were much less distinctly posed than in the Bible, there was a direct necessity to return to commenting on the Greek thinkers. Alkindi (Alkendi) (c. A.D. 800-879) had already written his treatise on a number of books of Aristotle and what was needed in order to master philosophy; Al-Farabi (A.D. 870-950) wrote commentaries on all the works of Aristotle known to him, and on Porphyry's *Isogoge*. Ibn-Ruṣd (Averroes) (1126-1198) wrote commentaries on all the main works of Aristotle (except the *Politics*), and also on Plato's *Republic*. This was not, naturally, a simple commentary; in the new conditions of social life the ideas of the philosophers of the past were primarily perceived by a switching of ideas expressed by predecessors to the solution of new tasks that had been unknown to them.⁷²

The mediaeval commentaries are therefore not works on the history of philosophy as such. Thomas Aquinas' commentaries on the works of Aristotle, for instance, are essentially their re-working in the spirit of Catholicism. As the Jesuit Frederick Copleston has correctly written:

Though St. Thomas did not hesitate to adopt an Aristotelian position even when this led him into conflict with traditional theories, he did so only when he considered that the Aristotelian positions were true in themselves and were thus compatible with Christian revelation.⁷³

When there was a divergence Aquinas rejected Aristotle's statements or ascribed the blame for them to Averroes' interpretations that did not correspond to his own views. In a commentary on the twelfth book of *Metaphysics*, for instance, St. Thomas ascribed the idea of divine omniscience to Aristotle, though the latter spoke only of god as self-thinking reason.⁷⁴ The ideas of the past, we would add, were presented to the mediaeval thinker's mind in general, synthesised form, in the works of Aristotle, who overshadowed all philosophy that preceded him or came after him.

As for literature on the history of philosophy proper, it is represented by two memorials. In Arabic there is Shahrastani's *Religious Sects and Philosophical Schools* (c. 1100).⁷⁵ In Latin there was the work of Walter Burleigh, pupil of Duns Scotus, *Book of the Life and Morals of the Ancient Philosophers and Poets* (c. 1330).⁷⁶ Shahrastani was the first to try and

trace the development of philosophic thought not only in antiquity but also among Arab thinkers, and included in his exposition both the religious-philosophical teachings of the various sects of Islam (Ismailites, Mutazilites), and the doctrines of philosophers, including Abu Ali ibn Sina (Avicenna) who flourished at the beginning of the eleventh century. As for Burleigh's book, it was a quite uncritical compilation, whose 132 chapters treated of philosophers, mythologists, poets, writers, dramatists, historians of antiquity, disposed without any rhyme or reason.

Suffice it to say that after the famous Seven Sages came Zoroaster, Anaximander, Anacharsos, Mysosternon (Myson), Epimenides, Pherecydes, and Homer and Lykurgos (Chapters 1-15); then Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Krates, Stilpon, Archilochos, Simonides, Archytas, and Aesop (Ch. 16-28). Chryssippus (Ch. 29) preceded Sokrates (Ch. 30), Karneades Plato, and so on. One can hardly, of course, rate it as a reliable source.

The Renaissance and Modern Times. From 'Scholasticism' to Science

The situation as regards the history of philosophy altered substantially during the Renaissance. While the Middle Ages could be characterised as the 'Dark Ages' of the discipline, new light began to dawn. As the French historian, Lucien Braun, has justly pointed out:

The Renaissance was defined through new requirements. It brought a consciousness of the past, advanced philological exactness, led to an exhaustive stocktaking. Another way of doing things became possible on the background of these elements, viz., scholarly history."

In other words, critical analysis of 'authoritative' sources took the place of following them, and at the same time a striving to extend their range as far as possible and to establish and take into consideration everything preserved from the past, which all called for development of a linguistic critique of the manuscript tradition. But the main thing was to understand them as testimony of the past, and to evaluate them as part of the

cultural heritage rather than as authorities. Printing gave a powerful stimulus to the rebirth and assimilation of the heritage of antiquity, enabling texts checked by connoisseurs to be reproduced quickly and reliably, independent of the literacy and attentiveness of the copyist.

The Renaissance gave us the first scholarly editions of Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Lucretius, Plotinus, Proklos, the Church Fathers, and the most important mediaeval authors.⁷⁸ A Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius appeared in Venice in 1475, in Nuremberg in 1476 and 1479, and the full Greek text (it had been printed in part earlier as an appendix to editions of Aristotle and Theophrastos) in 1533 in Basle. But the scholarly outlook of the Renaissance was limited. 'Scholarly' history of philosophy meant not so much investigation of preserved memorials as reproduction of them. Even in Montaigne's *Essays* we find it said that the most important thing for the historian of philosophy was

to collect into one volume or register, as much as by us might be seen, the opinions of ancient Philosophy concerning the subject of our being and customs, their controversies, the credit, and patching of factions and sides, the application of the Authors and Spectators lives, to their precepts, in memorable and exemplarie accidents. O what a worthy and profitable labor would it be!⁷⁹

Thus it was a 'worthy and profitable labor' that demonstrated the opinions of the ancients on the good in examples. Montaigne therefore dreamed of 'a dozen of Laerti' expounding these views and examples.⁸⁰ It is not surprising that works on the history of philosophy from the fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries went no further than Diogenes Laertius; at best his book was enriched by information from other sources that had become accessible as new manuscripts appeared from the East or from monastery repositories. Take, for example, Buonosegnius' *Letters on the Greatest Sects of Philosophers and the Differences between Them* (1458),⁸¹ a work that did not go beyond the limits of the knowledge available in the Middle Ages. Around a score of compendia on the history of philosophy appeared in the next hundred years, but they only added to source. J.J. Fries' *Chronological Library of Classical Philoso-*

phers broadened the chronological bounds of the history of philosophy up to the year 1100.⁸² Heurnius brought in the philosophy of the Chaldaeans and Hindus, and in his edition of 1619 that of the Babylonians and Egyptians.⁸³

At the beginning of the seventeenth century there was a turn in the treatment of the history of philosophy as a discipline, which is associated with the name of Francis Bacon, who treated historiographic problems in his books *De Sapientia Veterum* and *The Advancement of Learning*. The first was concerned with the interpretation of ancient myths in the spirit of the Renaissance: 'beneath no small number of the fables of the ancient poets there lay from the very beginning a mystery and an allegory'.⁸⁴ In the latter, however, Bacon posed real problems of the methodology of the history of philosophy, proceeding from his own empiricism. He associated history in general with memory, writing: 'the custody of retaining of knowledge is either in writing or memory'.⁸⁵ While ascribing no little importance to the history of learning, he also said much about the history of philosophy.

'A complete and universal History of Learning is yet wanting,' he said.⁸⁶ It had yet to be compiled, and he advised that

the matter and provision of it be not drawn from histories and commentaries alone; but that the principal books written in each century, or perhaps in shorter periods, proceeding in regular order from the earliest ages, be themselves taken into consultation; that so ... by testing them here and there, and observing their argument, style, and method, the Literary Spirit of each age may be charmed as it were from the dead.⁸⁷

Such a study, he said, 'would very greatly assist the wisdom and skill of learned men in the use and administration of learning'.⁸⁸ As in everything else, knowledge in the history of learning was not an end in itself, but a source of strength.

Bacon drew important historical conclusions when employing his method in relation to the history of philosophy. The 'dogmas of ancient philosophers' were primarily a posing of problems. While the history of science, moreover, gave us problems of nature 'manifold or scattered', the history of philosophy was 'an appendix... to nature united or summary'.⁸⁹ In spite

of the common notion of his scorn of Aristotle, Bacon actually valued the latter highly as a man who brilliantly stated problems. His criticism was levelled at Aristotle's solutions and answers. He also had a high regard for the work of philosophers of the Preplatonic period, especially the Atomists.

But the main thing for which Bacon valued the history of philosophy was that, by inspiring reasonable doubt, it saved philosophy from errors and fallacies, while at the same time helping to get at the truth. All that was fraught with a danger of scepticism, of course, but there was a means against it.

I wish a work to be compiled with diligence and judgement out of the lives of the ancient philosophers, the collection of placita made by Plutarch, the citations of Plato, the confutations of Aristotle, and the scattered notices which we have in other books, both ecclesiastical and heathen ... concerning the ancient philosophies. For I do not find any such work extant.⁸¹

Bacon, however, demanded serious rethinking of the historiographic methods of the ancients. It was not right to list separate ideas, books, and doctrines.

But here I must give warning that it be done distinctly, so that the several philosophies may be set forth each throughout by itself... For when a philosophy is entire, it supports itself, and its doctrines give light and strength the one to the other; whereas if it be broken, it will 'seem more strange and dissonant'.⁸²

The same went, of course, for the systems of recent times, among which Bacon mentioned those of Paracelsus, Telesius of Consentium (Bernardino Telesio), and Patricius the Venetian.

Thomas Stanley, the author of *The History of Philosophy* that appeared in 1655, also refers to the same place in Bacon taking him as sufficient authority.⁸² His book was limited, it is true to ancient philosophy, including a quite fantastic exposition of oriental philosophy. But he aspired to an integrated reproduction of the doctrines studied. His range of sources was unusually broad. While relying in the main on Diogenes Laertius and Eunapius, he also quoted from Aëtius, Anaximenes, Antigonos, Antisthenes, Aristokles, Aristoxenos, Kallimachos, Kleitomachos, Diokles, Herakleites, Hermippos, Hesychios,

Hippobotos, Jason of Pherai, Idomeneus, Nikandros, Níkias, Panaetius, Phantias, Plutarch, Sotion, Theodoros.⁹³ There were also frequent references to Cicero, Clement of Alexandria, Suidas, and Proklos.

The structure of Stanley's book was relatively traditional; the first part dealt with the 'sages', the second with the Ionians (Anaximander, Anaximenes, Archelaos), the third with Sokrates and the Socratics, the fourth with Plato and the Academics, the fifth with Aristotle and the Peripatetics, the sixth with the Cynics, the seventh with the Stoics, the ninth with Herakleitos, the tenth with the Eleatics, the Atomists (Leukippos, Demokritos, and Anaxarchos) and Protagoras, the eleventh with the Sceptics Pyrrhon and Timon, the twelfth with Epicurus. The thirteenth part contained an exposition of the philosophy of the Chaldaeans, the fourteenth of the Persians, and the fifteenth of Arabian philosophy.

Stanley's book was a sort of pinnacle of the 'erudite' history of philosophy. While pointing out, in his preface, the need to present the views of the ancients exactly, allowing for the fact that the information that had come down to us was frequently distorted or torn out of context and therefore did not enable him to perform the task indicated by Bacon, he nevertheless refrained from serious criticism. It is not fortuitous that one of the founders of the 'critical' history of philosophy, Christoph Heumann, likened Stanley to a man who, before he built his house, got together all he could find, but left it to the builder to decide what to use.⁹⁴ In fact, along with the materials drawn from the authors listed above and independent analyses of works that had come down to his time, he included Herakleitos' 'Epistles' to Hermodoros (of a clearly pseudo-epigraphic character), a paraphrase of Plutarch's 'The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men', the seven 'Epistles' of Sokrates, and so on. The book also included English translations of several works by contemporaneous authors. The chapter on Pythagorism included an extract from Reuchlin's *On the Cabalistic Art*. Olearius, who translated Stanley's book into Latin, deleted it, but in turn included his own treatise *On the Genius of Sokrates*⁹⁵; and supplemented the exposition of Herakleitos by his own dissertations on the beginning of natural things according to the teaching of Herakleitos, and on the origin of things according to the doct-

rine of Herakleitos.⁹⁶ In the section on Epicurus extracts from Gassendi's *Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma*⁹⁷ were included, and in the chapter on Plato Hieronymus Bienvieni's Platonic dissertation which explained the *Hymn of Love*, translated into Latin from the Italian by Count Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and the hymn itself with a commentary.⁹⁸

Both the English text, and the Latin translation, which made Stanley's books accessible to scholars on the Continent, included topical, generally meaningful, and interesting (from the standpoint of the author and translator) studies in the history of philosophy, and even simply philosophical ones. A book on the history of philosophy was converted into a work on a broader, philosophical plane.

George Horn's work *Seven Books on the History of Philosophy*, which appeared almost simultaneously with Stanley's, had a much broader chronological range. Horn, claiming to present a history of philosophy from 'the Creation', wrote about the 'philosophy of the Bible', including the 'teaching' of Adam, Abel, the 'heresy' of Cain, and the views of Noah; he wrote about Janus and Prometheus, of Punic, Scythian, and even hyperborean philosophy. Greek philosophy he divided into three periods: the heroic, the theological or mythical, and the philosophic. The first designated the beginning, the second the continuation, and the third the completion. The first was the most powerful, the second the most attractive, and the third the most refined.⁹⁹ In the fifth book he surveyed both Christian philosophy, beginning with Christ as 'the fount of true wisdom', and its struggle against pagan philosophy and heresies, and Arab philosophy, including Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. Mediaeval philosophy, the Renaissance, and the Reformation were considered in the sixth book. The essay in the history of philosophy was completed with a description of attempts to reconcile various schools. Problems of the history of philosophy were treated in the seventh book on the systematic plane (i.e. names of schools, organisations, learned titles and degrees, survey of literature, and so on).

While really broadening the horizon of historical inquiry in philosophy (not always, it is true, to its good), Horn described the philosophies treated extremely briefly, sometimes using an anecdote from the life of a philosopher,¹⁰⁰ which was a quite

typical method of seventeenth-century historians of philosophy.

The history of seventeenth-century literature on the history of philosophy was completed by Pierre Bayle. Unlike Bacon he did not theorise much about the history of philosophy, but tried to pursue a critical line in all his works that had anything to do with it. His famous *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1697; Second edition—1702) contained a whole number of entries characterised by a dual line of criticism. On the one hand there was a striving to correct the errors that abounded in seventeenth-century editions, to check and bring together all the available data, so recreating a reliable picture of the phenomena or personalities studied. On the other hand there was a critique of the doctrines studied and their sources. To the raptures about antiquity characteristic of the Renaissance, Bayle counterposed the following:

All the sects of ancient philosophy are guilty of having argued inconsistently. . . Was it from bad faith or from ignorance that they contradicted themselves in that way? I know absolutely nothing about it.¹⁴¹

But in any case it was a fact; and for Bayle it was not the genuineness or not, or the authenticity of the text of a document as such that was significant—the scholars of the Renaissance had been satisfied with that—but rather the ideas expressed in it.

Furthermore, problems of the history of philosophy were topics of the day for him, full of problems of the ideological struggle of his time. He worked an analysis of the teachings of St. Augustine, for instance, into a polemic on freedom of conscience and the right of authorities to bring pressure to bear on 'idolators' and 'heretics', so vital for France of the seventeenth century, the time of the Huguenot wars and persecution of Protestants, who were responsible, incidentally, for the same persecution of people of a different trend of belief. When analysing Aristotle's views Bayle criticised not only the views themselves (employing the arguments of Gassendi), but also their Scholastic interpretation, and also the Scholastics' striving to impose them. For was it not absurd that

when they cited a passage from this philosopher, they did not dare say, *transeat*: it was necessary either to refute it or to explain it in their own way.¹⁴²

In other words, problems of the history of philosophy were converted into problems of modern times; that was the basis of Bayle's influence on the science, ideology, and culture of the eighteenth century. Lucien Braun, who has specially investigated the references to Bayle in the literature on the history of philosophy, writes:

Bayle represented, at the end of the seventeenth century, the populariser of ideas in which the new historical demands were being expressed. His *Dictionnaire* was read with avidity by educated Europe. And from the beginning of the eighteenth century he was cited in all the histories of philosophy appearing in Germany (Bayle was the author most quoted in the F. Budde's *Compendium* (1712): 54 times against 16 for Aristotle). His influence was considerable; Heumann and Brucker were soaked in it, and he continued to be read after them.¹⁰³

The men named, C. A. Heumann and J. J. Brucker, were initiators of the 'critical history of philosophy' of the eighteenth century, that creation of the Age of Reason. In 1715 Heumann published the first issue of the first journal on the history of philosophy, viz., *Acta philosophorum* (i.e. the principal news of the history of philosophy). Up to 1726, when it ceased publication, 18 numbers had appeared.¹⁰⁴ In 1737 Deslandes' three volume *Critical History* appeared, which 'dealt with its origin, advances, and the various revolutions it has undergone up to our day'.¹⁰⁵ The three volumes of the 1737 edition came down to the Renaissance, finishing with Book IX though the table of contents listed a Book X (from the Renaissance to Descartes). The second edition, in 1756, comprised four volumes.

Deslandes' book was the first of a number of 'critical histories of philosophy' that appeared under that title in the eighteenth century. Its claim to criticalness was associated with examination of the works of the 'erudite' trend, in which available materials were copied without analysis or the author employed his own inventiveness in order to reconcile old and contemporary views. But Deslandes did not approve of extremes in criticism:

The Panegyrists and the Critics [he wrote] have equally exaggerated and, caring little to accommodate

themselves to the Public's true interests, they have often followed only their taste and their prejudices.¹⁰⁸

What everyone expected from philosophy, however, was

good sense, humanity, civility of manners, love of society. This true Philosophy, noble and purged, allures us and at the same time exhorts us to live according to Nature.¹⁰⁹

This moderate, enlightened understanding of the matter lent Deslandes' orientation a touch of moralising and his 'criticism', limited by recognition of the indisputability of divine revelation, left room at the same time for understanding the history of philosophy as the progressive movement of thought, whose criterion was the common sense of the historian.

Criticism of a different kind was typical of Jacob Brucker (1696-1770). His principal work, a five-volume critical history of philosophy from the Creation down to his time, originally written in Latin, was composed in a spirit that had already become traditional for German erudition and solidity.¹⁰⁸ Brucker interests us primarily for his method. He had his predecessors. Heumann, for example, had made a detailed analysis of the techniques and methods of the history of philosophy in his 'Introduction to the History of Philosophy'.¹⁰⁹ Brucker cited it as an authority. In his extensive 'Preliminary Dissertation on the Nature, Structure, Titles, and Means of the History of Philosophy', Brucker distinguished various means of historical inquiry: history of the separate philosophical disciplines; history of the lives and acts of philosophers, and so on.¹¹⁰ He himself had in mind the writing of a universal history of philosophy that would include the lives of philosophers, their deeds (*res gestae*), fates, a description of their pupils and opponents, the origin of schools (sects), the successions of philosophers, the rise and decline of doctrines, and so on. But his work was mainly devoted to doctrines.

Brucker formulated 15 principles of scholarly inquiry in his 'Preliminary Dissertation', beginning with a requirement to investigate all primary sources, which alone could be used; indirect sources should be traced to originals. The final, fifteenth point required rejection of modernisation, prescribing that the

ideas of philosophers of the past should not be adapted to those that we ourselves held. This was a real code of historical inquiry into philosophic schools and doctrines, a code that related, however in the main, to methods of collecting and treating facts, but not a theoretical, methodological orientation. The latter, not clearly expressed, determined Brucker's place in the right wing of the German Enlightenment. Its main demand was a combining of tradition and critically established facts with sound sense.

We would stress 'tradition', since Holy Writ remained an absolute authority for Brucker. He only required that it not be interpreted in *extenso*, and that nothing should be ascribed to its characters that could not be exactly gleaned from the Scriptures themselves.

Let us cite the introductory remarks in Jean-Henri-Samuel Formey's *Histoire abrégée de la philosophie*, which has been called 'a French extract of Brucker'¹¹¹:

This History comprises the life and doctrine of the Philosophers who had any reputation whatever in the World. Although the historical facts concerning the Philosophers do not even belong to Philosophy, it is however customary and even reasonable to give an idea of them. It is just as interesting, if nothing more, to know when such and such a Philosopher lived, and how he lived, than to peruse the sterile annals that note the years and length of the reign of such and such a Prince whose name should and ought to have been buried in oblivion. The doctrines even of the Philosophers often largely depend, besides, on the times, places, and circumstances in which they lived. The Historian of Philosophy must therefore display a spirit of discrimination here in order to choose really interesting facts.¹¹²

Brucker divided the whole history of philosophy into three periods: from the Creation to the founding of Rome; from the founding of Rome to the Renaissance; and from the Renaissance to his own day. He was particularly critical in his analysis of the theme of the 'philosophy of the patriarchs' fashionable in his time. While mentioning Heurnius, Horn, and Budde directly, he denied the very possibility of judging them, pointing out the absurdities stemming from such attempts.¹¹³

While understanding the history of philosophy as a scholarly discipline and counterposing it to revelation, Brucker declined to include what related to revelation and religion as such in it, untouched by rational analysis. For him, therefore, the religious man, and even the pastor (he was such in Augsburg from 1744 to his death), brought forward matters of knowledge, and not of faith, and of the quest for truth in the spirit of the Renaissance. But the methodic requirements of reason, he thought, did not lead away from faith but, on the contrary, to agreement with it. He was therefore immune to the pious awe usually experienced by religious writers in regard to materialist and atheistic systems, and at least expounded them objectively.

Brucker's chief methodic technique was to reduce an investigated system to some, sometimes quite a few principles. Aristotle's system, for example, was expressed through 210 principles: 53 theses relating to his logic, 57 to physics, 32 to metaphysics, and so on.¹¹⁴ Two of the requirements of his method were thus satisfied: (1) accuracy as regards the textual reproduction of the most important principles, and (2) the exhaustive character of the exposition. The systems principle was realised by establishing the philosopher's central idea on which the system could be reconstructed. According to him, the structure of Aristotle's system, for example, was determined by Aristotle's main intention being to found a new physical school on the remnants of all the rest and to treat of the elemental things.

Since the history of philosophy presented itself to Brucker as realisation of the laws of 'natural reason', the actual task of the history of philosophy was solved by discovering how 'natural philosophy' was manifested in the various doctrines of the past.¹¹⁵ But what was this 'natural philosophy'? Brucker saw it in the ideals of the Enlightenment.

This feature of Brucker's approach to the history of philosophy was the basis for Hegel's severe opinion:

Brucker's manner of procedure is entirely unhistoric, and yet nowhere ought we to proceed in a more historic manner than in the history of Philosophy.¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, if we start from what Brucker (and the 'critical' history of philosophy in general of his day) did, and not fixate

on what he did not do, one can hardly share Hegel's view of Brucker's work as 'so much useless ballast'.¹¹⁷ Above all it was an undoubted service of Brucker's that he developed the methodic aspect of inquiry in the history of philosophy, by which he summed up a whole epoch of gathering and working over historical material. Without that work, in which Brucker was not alone, it would have been impossible to pass to the next stage, that of methodological, theoretical work proper on the history of philosophy.

In the second half of the eighteenth century the central theoretical problem of history in general, and of the history of philosophy in particular, was that of progress. Introduced into the philosophy of history in the works of Turgot, Condorcet, and Herder, it rapidly penetrated the history of philosophy. With his idea of a 'natural system' of philosophy, Brucker had already seen the idea of historical philosophical progress in the achieving of this system. The idea of progress in the history of philosophy was developed by Deslandes. In the context of the German Enlightenment of the second half of the eighteenth century progress (*Fortschritt*) appeared as the realisation of a certain aim facing human reason, i.e. the creation of a finished system of generalised knowledge that coincided with absolute truth. Its formation cannot be understood as something chance.

So the notion of a single, natural, purposive process of philosophical development, had been formed, and its theoretical comprehension now presumed the elucidation of a substratum or subject and the laws and results of the historical philosophical process, i.e. of a system of 'completed' philosophy, i.e. absolute truth. All these matters were dealt with differently, of course, but it was obvious that they had to be tackled by the history of philosophy.

There was a tempestuous development of inquiry into the history of philosophy in the latter half of the eighteenth century, above all in Germany, where the work of a host of representatives of 'popular' philosophy was, if not fruitful, at least prolific. Inquiry into the history of separate problems was usually combined with the general history of philosophy. Thus Christoph Meiners, for example, published a *Historia doctrinae de vero deo* (1780) and *Grundriss der Geschichte der Weltweisheit* (1786), and Johann Feder a *Grundriss der philosophischen Wis-*

senschaften (1767). Several works on the history of separate problems and sciences were published in France, Italy, and Holland. We would mention the following: Basilio Terzi's *Storia critica delle opinioni all'anima* (1776), which was followed by volumes on cosmology, theology, and natural law (to 1788); Charles Batteux's *Histoire des causes premières, exposé sommaire des pensées des philosophes sur le principe des êtres* (1769), Louis Dutens' *Recherches sur l'origine des découvertes attribuées aux modernes* (1766) in which he demonstrated the antique origin of several contemporary ideas in philosophy and science.

No less important was the educational activity of spokesmen of the 'popular philosophy', viz., the publication of works of philosophers of the past, of various periodicals, 'philosophical libraries', etc. Seventeen philosophical journals appeared in Germany in the second half of the eighteenth century, in which much material on the history of philosophy was published. We would specially mention the *Magazin für die Philosophie* which published material for the most part from the yearbooks of the Berlin Academy of Science and Literature.¹¹⁸ The 'Philosophical Library' published by Feder and Meiners was distinguished by an anti-Kantian trend.¹¹⁹ We would also mention here N. I. Novikov's journal *Utrennii svet* (Morning Light) published in Moscow from 1777 to 1800, the first philosophical journal in Russia.

Among the problems broadly discussed in the 'popular philosophy' was that of the attitude to progress recapitulated in great scientific and philosophical discoveries. While the works of Dutens and Batteux stressed the antique sources (in essence) of a number of discoveries, the German Enlighteners claimed that it was much more important who put discoveries into broad circulation and how, than who first formulated some thesis. Hissmann, for example, described the principles that guided Dietrich Tiedemann in his *Spirit of Speculative Philosophy* as follows:

Those who closely examine the systems and opinions of philosophers (*Weltweisen*) should, apart from a critical verification of the sources, be particularly concerned about two things: to note the inventions of each great man (...), then to describe

the way philosophical geniuses have treated the truths discovered.¹¹⁹

Tiedemann (1748-1803), was undoubtedly one of the greatest historians of philosophy in the 'popular' camp. He achieved fame after publication of his *Greece's First Philosophers or the Lives and Systems of Orpheus, Pherekydes, Thales, and Pythagoras* in 1780; in 1791-1797 he published his *Spirit of Speculative Philosophy*¹²¹ in six volumes, undoubtedly the greatest event since Brucker. Furthermore, Tiedemann formulated a number of important methodological principles that found their way into the arsenal of the discipline.

Tiedemann assumed that

since we do not have a philosophical system universally accepted as true, it is therefore not proper, in an appreciation of doctrines and systems, to raise the question of their degree of truth. The merits of philosophers cannot be appreciated by such a criterion.¹²²

The tenet was also extended to revelation and any transcendental understanding of philosophic truth, which meant that, in order to avoid relativism, one had to pose the very task of the history of philosophy in a new way. The criterion of a philosophy was its 'relative perfection', i.e. the fullness and coherence of the experience fixed in its system. Once reason was awakened, Tiedemann argued, it never disappeared or remained entirely inactive. On the contrary it continued to grow over the centuries.

One sought in vain in the entire course of this history for a century without a famous philosopher, or in which the domain of human reason was not broadened. Reason advanced at a firm, irresistible pace; that was a manifest fact. It progressed continuously in the sense of becoming refined and extended wider and wider.¹²³

In that case, however, 'relative perfection' came out exclusively as an inner criterion, since the external relations of a system with its epoch and object were reduced to its 'success'. It was this 'success' that was essential for evaluating a philosophy; it was it that determined who introduced anything new and essential into the history of philosophy and the development of philosophical science.

The formalism of that is obvious. It completely removed the problem of truth relative to the successive systems and doctrines. 'Success' ('Progress') was by no means an objective criterion of the significance of a doctrine; the history of thought showed that he who enjoyed success in his day was far from always right—it was clearer from the height of the next epoch who actually discovered and developed a trend that moved ahead. But Tiedemann did not stop at 'success', deducing from it a concept of 'spirit of the times' (*Zeitgeist*).

He was not the first to formulate it, incidentally. Meiners had already used it to characterise the relation that existed between the thought (*Denkart*) of an epoch and the general state of its culture.¹²⁴ Tiedemann treated the concept more concretely, having in mind the impossibility, when analysing a doctrine, of fully abstracting such factors as manners and customs, political system and regime, legislation, standard of education, etc., in which it arose, by which it was determined, and which, in turn, were influenced by the philosophy of the epoch. He wrote that one should judge the mentality and spirit of the thought of the times by relating them to the constitution and government of the state. It was therefore appropriate to mention political history as far as was necessary in order to understand the transformations in general principles, dominant passions, and conditions favourable and unfavourable to intellectual life.¹²⁵ In short, he was the first to formulate clearly, by means of his concept of 'the spirit of the times', the idea of a link between philosophy and politics, law, and morals, and the life of society in its various manifestations.

Tiedemann also tried to carry out the idea contained in this programme. He did not, it is true, do it adequately—possibly he lacked the talent as a writer, and erudition as a historian and philosopher.

Hegel, we must note, did not even credit Tiedemann with the important idea of contradiction as an essential factor in the progress of philosophy. But Tiedemann said that the contradiction between philosophy and theology had no less influence on their development during their interaction and struggle in history, than did the social conditions of thought.¹²⁶ True, he did not come to the conclusion that the

social conditions themselves affected the development of philosophy precisely through their contradictions and antagonisms, the idea that was so significant for Hegel, and in particular for Marxism. But more about that below.

The difficulties of scholars adhering to the 'popular philosophy' in adequately realising their interesting intentions as regards the history of philosophy were due to the low standard of that philosophy itself. Being a kind of degenerate form of the German Enlightenment, the 'popular philosophy' was extremely unhistoric, so that even its major figure, Moses Mendelssohn, was justifiably reproached by Kuno Fischer, recalling his *Phaëdon*, as follows:

This Sokrates of Mendelssohn's is an eloquent Wolfian, who learned his most reliable arguments for the immortality of the soul from Wolf, Reimarus, and Baumgarten. Under the names of Greek philosophers we hear an eighteenth-century German academic philosopher giving a lecture on immortality in the Athens prison, with all the metaphysical and teleological evidence of the philosophy of his day... So little, or rather so empty, was the understanding of and feeling for *historical* truth in the Age of Enlightenment.¹²⁷

Nevertheless, without the immense work done in the eighteenth century, which produced a whole series of voluminous histories of philosophy, separate courses, and monographs,¹²⁸ it would hardly have been possible to pass to the next stage, which was marked by a transition from methodic reflection to methodological, theoretical substantiation proper of the history of philosophy.

The nineteenth century began with a profound reflection in the field of philosophic historiography that the eighteenth century with its vast experience had not known.¹²⁹

This remark of Lutz Geldsetzer, a West German specialist in the history of philosophy, clearly records the rise in the nineteenth century precisely of the theory and methodology of the history of philosophy. The first impressive result of this reflection was Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy.

The origin of Hegel's conception, however, was preceded by

the fierce polemic around problems of the history of philosophy that developed in the 1790s in connection with the rise of Kant's 'critical philosophy' and its spread to this field. There was nothing surprising in that: the quantitative rapidity of the development of the history of philosophy really called for theoretical, methodological thinking about it. The discussion was begun by the Kantians, in Heydenreich's paper 'Some Ideas on the Revolution in Philosophy made by Kant and especially on Its Influence on the Treatment of the History of Philosophy', published in 1791 as a supplement to the translation of Agatopisto Cromaziano's critical history of the revolution in philosophy over the past 300 years.¹³⁰ The basic idea of the article was that the revolution in philosophy made by Kant required human knowledge to be correlated with the capacities of the subject—with pure and practical reason and a capacity for judgment—rather than with the object. They were an inner set of tools of knowledge and therefore its 'life' itself and activity. Heydenreich likened Kant's critique 'to a map on which not only roads and halts were marked but also spots where travellers regularly lost their way'. 'He who knows the system,' he said, 'is the more convinced that he is studying the systems of philosophy in a most exhaustive way and fathoming its spirit better.'¹³¹

To bring out the sense of the historical process of philosophy from a Kantian standpoint, therefore, meant above all to reveal the mistakes and errors made by the philosophy of the past in trying to go beyond experience. But inquiries made along these lines were always open to the danger that Hegel noted when speaking of the Kantian Tennemann:

He praises philosophers, their work and their genius, and yet the end of the lay is that all of them will be pronounced to be wanting in that they have one defect, which is not to be Kantian philosophers.¹³²

It was that approach which Reinhold justified, in essence, in his lecture on the concept of the history of philosophy, in which he defined philosophy as the 'science of determining the independent relations of things from experience',¹³³ i.e. their *a priori* and therefore necessary connections. Reinhold defined the history of philosophy correspondingly:

My idea of the history of philosophy can be expressed as follows: it is the represented essence of the changes that the science of the necessary relations of things has experienced from its beginning to our day.¹³⁴

It was consequently distinguished from the history of the human spirit as a whole, from the history of science in general, and from the history of the lives and ideas of philosophers (which could only be regarded as material for the history of philosophy).

The main point in Reinhold's conception was the criteria appertaining to the history of philosophy.

My criterion is the philosophical sense (*der philosophische Sinn*) of a manner of presentation. Let some one thesis that has been written by some illustrious philosopher or another lack such sense, it will not belong to what I hold to be the history of philosophy.¹³⁵

Since Reinhold, who was then an orthodox Kantian, saw 'the sense of philosophy in general' precisely in Kant's philosophy, he also discovered the criteria there for deciding what had 'philosophical sense'. He was followed by the editor of the *Beyträge*, Fülleborn, who substituted 'spirit' (*Geist*), treated in Kantian style, for his 'philosophical sense' (*philosophische Sinn*). There were dogmatic, sceptical, or critical types of philosophising, each of which rested on elements of the thinker's anthropological constitution.

To set out the spirit of a philosophy [he wrote] was to show how far a philosopher's statements were based on the very nature of the human spirit, conformed to its laws, and went beyond or respected the limits of our power to understand.¹³⁶

And because that nature boiled down to the capacities for judgment, doubt, and inquiry predominant in a philosopher's activity and frame of mind, the history of philosophy was given a transcendental, psychological explanation rooted in a similar interpretation of Kant's philosophy.¹³⁷

Kant himself, however, by no means reduced matters to a transcendental, psychological explanation of the principal concepts of his philosophy; the substantiation of scientific

knowledge, he considered, presupposed its logical foundations in general and its 'objective' structure (in his sense, i.e. its universal, necessary structure, which did not depend on the individual subject). When this dual orientation of Kant's was applied to the history of philosophy it acquired a specific form.

Relative to history as such, Kant considered that, since historical science belonged to the sphere of practical reason, i.e. the due but not essential reason, the *a priori* basis of history must be the idea of *Homo Noumenon*, man as a thing in himself. As regards the history of philosophy, Kant believed that the history of philosophy was neither historical, or empirical, but rational, i.e. *a priori*. For though it established facts of reason, it looked for them in the nature of human reason, rather than in the historical narrative. At the same time Kant saw in the succession of trends in the history of philosophy something akin to a mathematical regularity and logical pattern of concepts. He thus paved the way for the Hegelian understanding of the history of philosophy as the necessary development of the spirit (*Mind*).¹³⁸

The theoretical considerations of Kant and the Kantians thus linked up; a regularly developing transcendental Ego operated in the history of philosophy, and it was the business of the historian of philosophy to trace and correspondingly evaluate its regular striving and own self-development; the *a priori* pattern was then opposed to the empirically discovered errors of finite individuals.

At the same time one can say that the ideas of Kant's paramount importance for the history of philosophy expressed in a number of Western works on the history of philosophy are quite exaggerated. Furthermore Kant's overall evaluation of the 'history of pure reason', i.e. of the preceding philosophical process, was very pessimistic; it was an edifice, to be sure, but it appeared to his eye 'to be in a very ruinous condition'.¹³⁹ The reason for that was his exclusive orientation on his own system. The position was made worse by the fact that his system was inconsistent and contradictory, and permeated with agnosticism.

The Kantian history of philosophy developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and was mainly guided by psychologism. Göss, almost repeating the definition of the history of philosophy given by Reinhold, said in his work on

the concept of the history of philosophy that from his standpoint it was

a general exposition of the changes that have taken place in the science of the necessary and universally valid forms, rules, and principles of the original power of the human spirit.¹⁴¹

stressing the psychological aspect. That told in particular on the belief in the importance of hermeneutics, and its canons and rules, for the history of philosophy, which helped clarify the adequate sense of studied texts. The psychological orientation reached its peak in the systematics of philosophies developed by Carus. Seeing in a philosophy a system generated by its author's subjective aptitudes, and at the same time embodying the 'eternal uneasiness' of the human spirit, engaged in quests for the truth, he understood the history of philosophy as the 'systematic genesis' of doctrines embodying these aptitudes. This subjective process could only be treated scientifically, however, when it was correlated with 'certain immutable normative ideas' (*Normalidee*), i.e. analogues of the Kantian regulative idea of reason. From that angle Carus singled out the following types of element in philosophy: (1) dogmatic (empiricism, rationalism, eclecticism); (2) systems of being (realism, idealism, synthetism); (3) mode of existence (pluralism, monism); (4) systems of causality (determinism, indeterminism); (5) systems of destiny (fatalism, blind necessity, finalism); (6) theological systems (supranaturalism, theism, atheism, deism); (7) ethical systems (material and formal ethics).¹⁴¹

This structure became the basis, in one variant or another, of a more detailed classification of doctrines treated in their historical development, and at the same time a criterion for the selection of materials relating properly to philosophy. But the psychological orientation, revised by transcendentalism and normativism, came into conflict with the Kantian idea of the necessity of an *a priori* of philosophy. In the middle of the 1790s the latter received anonymous expression in a paper published in Niethammer's *Philosophisches Journal*, entitled 'A Survey of the Best That Has Been Done in the History of Philosophy since 1780'.¹⁴² The author may have been Fichte. The moments of historicism and even dialectics that were present in the posing of the question then become comprehensible. And

because it is the history of philosophy that surveys what happens in time, it should make this survey in connection with the idea of philosophy as a science. That meant, however, that the history of philosophy itself should be something integral; it was only an ideal, true, that had still not been realised and possibly would never be realised. Consequently, one could only speak of the history of philosophy as an *a priori* science as an ideal, possibly even unattainable.

That idea was taken up by the Kantian Johann Christian Grohmann in an article 'What Does It Mean: History of Philosophy?', published in 1798.¹⁴³ An *a priori* history of philosophy could only be 'a representation of *possible* systems insofar as they could be deduced according to laws and conclusions determined *a priori*, without reference to reality'.¹⁴⁴ But that was already not history, but the final consummation of philosophy.

It will be clear from this that the historians of philosophy from the Kantian camp only approached the contradiction of the history of philosophy as a science, which became determinant for Hegel, as a contradiction between the systematic character of philosophy and the historical character of its realisation. Hegel expressed it as follows:

Philosophy aims at understanding what is unchangeable, eternal, in and for itself; its end is Truth. But history tells us of that which has at one time existed, at another time has vanished, having been expelled by something else. Truth is eternal; it does not fall within the sphere of the transient, and has no history. But if it has a history, and as this history is only the representation of a succession of past forms of knowledge, the truth is not to be found in it, for the truth cannot be what has passed away.¹⁴⁵

The task posed by Hegel was to resolve this contradiction.

Hegel's History of Philosophy and Marxism

Hegel 'was the first to comprehend the whole history of philosophy', Karl Marx wrote in a letter to Lassalle.¹⁴⁶ And it was not just that he expounded or illuminated the preceding history of philosophy in his lectures; after all, Brucker, and Buhle, and

Tennemann had brought the history of philosophy up to their own day. The idea of Marx's remark is that Hegel embraced the history of philosophy in a single theoretical formula: viz., the development of philosophy presents itself to us as a unity of the logical and the historical, and at the same time as an ascent from the abstract to the concrete. In other words, here, as in the whole of his philosophy, Hegel started from the concept of development, of dialectics.

Dialectics, 'the teaching which shows how *Opposites* can be, and how they happen to be (how they become) *identical*',¹⁴⁷ is the principal, rational content of the Hegelian philosophy. And when Hegel began his analysis of the theoretical content of the process of the history of philosophy precisely with the contradiction between the single, universal, eternal truth and the manifold unique, fluctuating, and transient images of it that have succeeded one another, we rightly expect a resolution of that contradiction from him. And he gave it, by introducing the concept of development and concreteness. Since it was a matter of one truth, he said, the starting point of philosophy, and its end, were

to know this one Truth as the immediate source from which all else proceeds, both all the laws of nature and all the manifestations of life and consciousness of which they are mere reflections, or to lead these laws and manifestations... back to that single source, and from that source to comprehend them, which is to understand their derivation.¹⁴⁸

This 'derivation' itself is summarised in the concept of development, in which lies the key to understanding all the strong and weak aspects of Hegel's conception.

This conception can be briefly described as follows. The facts that philosophy deals with are ideas. But they are not the ideas of an individual person, although they would not exist so without him. They are abstract, one-sided, limited manifestations of thought in general, of eternal Truth, and of the Absolute Idea. And as such they are the original and initial phenomenon of Philosophy as such. The highest form of philosophy in general was Hegel's own philosophy, the fact that it was the philosophy of Hegel, incidentally, was quite by chance and had no fundamental significance. What was important was that

Mind or Spirit achieved Truth in it. But it followed that the history of philosophy could not be a subjective critique of subjective thought forms, i.e. of 'opinions'. The critique should consist in explanation of the limited character of each partial expression of the truth, and of the universal, necessary connection in which these partial expressions, i.e. the philosophical systems of the past, were found.

The one-sided, abstract images of the Truth were, themselves, consequently, expressions of a self-criticism proper, during which the immanent movement of knowledge, its 'development' (*Entwicklung*) took place. The philosopher does not simply formulate certain ideas about the world as a philosophising individual; Truth realises itself in his consciousness, but only as 'the spirit of the people' or 'the spirit of the time'. Only at a certain level of development—for Hegel that of the latest German philosophy—did a concrete image of Spirit arise, and the task of 'taking as its object the unity of thought and Being, which is the fundamental idea of philosophy generally',¹⁴⁰ rose to its full height before philosophy.

From that followed the view that philosophy acquired reality solely in its own history on the one hand, and on the other that, in dealing with the history of philosophy, we are thus dealing with philosophy itself.

Having developed this conception, and realised it in his exposition of the history of philosophy, Hegel did something of the greatest theoretical significance, which had enormous influence on philosophical historiography. It was a component of the whole effect that Hegel had on historiography in general. But we must not, at the same time, forget that there was a profound inner contradiction between the method and system inherent in the whole Hegelian theory. As Engels commented:

A system of natural and historical knowledge, embracing everything, and final for all time, is a contradiction to the fundamental law of dialectic reasoning. This law, indeed, by no means excludes, but, on the contrary, includes the idea that the systematic knowledge of the external universe can make giant strides from age to age.¹⁴¹

As regards the history of philosophy, this meant that the Hegelian system itself, considered as the result of the historical

progress of philosophy, was no more than a historically limited synthesis of the known existence of his epoch. Being a nodal point in historical process of philosophical development, like any other doctrine of equal standing, it had to discover new paths for philosophy rather than complete the process.

Hegel, and his right-Hegelian successors in particular, noted the 'finality' of the system; in the words of Rosenkranz, 'the only progress still left is scientific understanding of this standpoint'.¹⁵¹ This 'finality', however, was a reflection of the fact that the Hegelian system summed up progressive development of all antagonistic social formations (their economies, politics, law, art, science and religion). And even more so their philosophy. But that had been done in an illusory form that reflected this development as the development of the 'Notion', which allegedly unfolded the implicit content of the Idea. The path followed by humanity was realised and summed up and the different forms of mankind's activity represented 'as stages of a road which has been worked over and levelled out',¹⁵² and thus, as a matter of fact, justified.¹⁵³

A concept of development thus underlay the Hegelian conception but it cannot be identified with the modern one; for Hegel development proper (*Entwicklung*) was the unfolding of the Notion-determinations inherent in the Idea. The Notion, in its development, 'keeps to itself and only gives rise to alteration of form, without making any addition in point of content'.¹⁵⁴

The principal fault of all idealism is clearly expressed in that, namely that if 'spirit' is taken as the initial, starting point, it is *a priori* the highest in relation to everything derived from it and that it is already impossible to see the process of the origin of the truly new in earthly, real development; it was already preordained *a priori* in the initial spiritual being, and ultimately in the divine. Hegel's profound dialectical flair enabled him to tone this absurdity of idealism down only by a doctrine of development as the ascent from the abstract of the concrete.

In the introduction to his lectures on the history of philosophy he explained the problem through the concepts 'in itself' and 'for itself':

The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (*potentia, dynamis*); the second

principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (*actus, energeia*).¹⁵⁵

In historically developing human thought, that which was 'in itself', i.e. reason, becomes 'being-for-itself', i.e. conscious of itself. Hegel specially stressed two aspects of development; on the one hand 'no new content has been produced' in it; on the other hand 'this form of being for self makes all the difference'.¹⁵⁶

All knowledge, and learning, science, and even commerce have no other object than to draw out what is inward or implicit and thus to become objective.¹⁵⁷

As a result a very contradictory picture was built up.

Taken in its distinct, preformist content, Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy was particularly formal. The changes taking place during the development of philosophy, according to him, were not a trying to understand real being, independent of the knowing mind, but a 'drawing out from itself' of the implicit content of the Idea and its 'becoming objective'. From that point of view the history of philosophy could only be the history of logical development ('filiation') of ideas, but not a real process reflected by philosophical historiography. And the primacy of the Idea, which developed its *a priori* implicit content in history, converted the historical process into development of the system now existing, i.e. into a teleological process of consistent elucidation of this system. From that standpoint historical development was completely subordinated to the logical, and the factual development to the structure of the system.

But that was a conception. Hegel, of course, considered that the 'eternal essence' of God 'before the creation of Nature and of a Finite Spirit' was known to him; and he thought he had depicted it in his logic.¹⁵⁸ But the real source of these notions about the movement of concepts in logic that allegedly reflected the essence of God was actual reality.

In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of *all* notions, in the *identity of their opposites*, in the *transitions* of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly, *divined PRECISELY THIS RELATION OF THINGS, OF NATURE*.¹⁵⁹

And when we allow for the fact that he took 'his self-develop-

ment of concepts, of categories, in connection with the entire history of philosophy',¹⁶⁰ it is natural that the construction of the logic required study of immense factual material first of all, and that of the history of philosophy.

We must therefore note that while logic prevailed *de jure* in Hegel, it was subordinated *de facto* to the actual structure of the historical process of philosophy. That was all the more so because, for him, the logical did not contradict the historical, but coincided with it by virtue of the coincidence of being and thought. Hegel simply stood their actual relation 'on its head' in making the logical precede the real, which meant that his conception of the history of philosophy had this sense, that the logical and historical coincided to the extent that the reflection coincided with the reflected, i.e. with the actual process realised by philosophy in its history. To the extent that there was such a coincidence, Hegel was right. But in realising the Kantian idea of the *a priori* history of philosophy in this (the only possible) way, Hegel at the same time made the mistake in understanding any historical science, and the history of philosophy in particular.

Historical inquiry necessarily implies two processes not reducible to one another, viz., tracing of the real history and discovery of the theoretical meaning of the historical process, i.e. discovery of its general pattern. The fact that this pattern is not only not embodied in all the facts, and in each of them, as shallow empiricism suggests, but may even contradict them,¹⁶¹ creates the illusion that some ideal principle lies behind the real facts of history. Spirit and Idea are not only not reducible to facts but also determine them. And the non-coincidence of the Idea and facts is a consequence of the 'impotence of life' incapable of embodying the Idea adequately or the result of the 'inorganic existence' of Spirit in history. Hegel was also in the grip of that illusion. In following that path he came to a conclusion of great theoretical importance, viz., that the development of philosophical thought was law-governed. But he missed another point, namely that this regularity was not outside the facts and that the facts of the history of philosophy themselves were a reflection of objective natural and social reality. The consequences stemming from that proved destructive for his theoretical conception.

The first of these consequences was that the process of philosophical development in its historical specific nature proved accidental and essentially did not merit attention. For the necessity, forcing its way through these coincidences, was already known; it was rooted in the system. Why, then, a history of philosophy? For was not logic alone sufficient? At best history remained an illustration of the logic of the philosophical system, and all the more so because the whole content of the historical process—not its form—was already given in advance. The Marxist history of philosophy, while relying on Hegel's dialectic, freed of its mystic form, cannot help adopting the idea of the regular development of philosophy. But it evaluates another aspect as well, in principle, viz., that the truly new and still unprecedented appears in historical development, and not, moreover, in form alone, but also in content. Marx's historicism is thus not only based on recognition of historical regularity and requires it to be brought out, but sees (1) the non-coincidence of this pattern with the actual empirically given course of the process, and (2) the substantial originality, independence, uniqueness, and novelty of the links united by this regularity.

The dialectical materialist approach to the historical process in general, and to the history of philosophy in particular, is thus opposed both to 'existential' historicism, which sees in historicity mainly the uniqueness of an event, and to Hegelian 'logicism', which saw in the independent systems succeeding one another in history only stages in the development of a single, final system of philosophy.

In short Hegel could easily 'write in' any facts of past development into his history of philosophy when he had shown that phenomena that 'did not fit in' were side effects and chance formations that did not make the philosophical 'weather': the objective logic of the process sifted them out, so to say. But there could also be facts among them that pointed ahead, to the future, that had still not happened, to the really new. To miss them as 'secondary' and 'chance' would have meant to lose the most important thing, the prospect of development. That was what, in essence, happened with the whole line of materialism ignored by Hegel. And the source of that weakness was his idealist rationalism, realised in his idealist historicism.

There was another side to his historicism, however. Hegel formulated the idea that philosophy was the thought of its epoch, 'entirely identical with its time'.¹⁶²

The particular form of a Philosophy is thus contemporaneous with a particular constitution of the people amongst whom it makes its appearance, with their institutions and forms of government, their morality, their social life and the capabilities, customs and enjoyments of the same; it is so with their attempts and achievements in art and science, with their religions, warfares and external relationships, likewise with the decadence of the States in which this particular principle and form has maintained its supremacy, and with the origination and progress of new States in which a higher principle finds its manifestation and development. Mind in each case has elaborated and expanded in the whole domain of its manifold nature the principle of the particular stage of self-consciousness to which it had attained... Philosophy is one form of these many aspects... It is the fullest blossom, the Notion of Mind in its entire form, the consciousness and spiritual essence of all things, the spirit of the time as spirit present in itself. The multifarious whole is reflected in it as in the single focus, in the Notion which knows itself.¹⁶³

In putting forward that tenet Hegel well knew that the manifold of social life, which also included philosophy, was not a simple set of various definitions, whether or not included in this citation. Philosophy was also not the cause of these factors, just as none of them was the cause of philosophy. 'One and all have the same common root, the spirit of the time.'¹⁶⁴ That notion, taken from the Kantians, acquired a rather different sense with Hegel, however; it expressed a general law or principle, to which the multifarious definitions of the epoch were subordinated. Hegel's philosophy of history had an analogue of 'the spirit of the time' in the concept of 'the spirit of the people',¹⁶⁵ which 'erects itself into an objective world'.¹⁶⁶

These concepts are of paramount importance for understanding the whole system of the Hegelian philosophy of history and history of philosophy. Here, as elsewhere in Hegelian idealism, we find a duality and inconsistency, a contradiction between declared principles and their real application. In the philosophy

of history it is not difficult to interpret 'the spirit of the people' profoundly in its material (i.e. economic, political, etc.,) manifestations. As for the history of philosophy, 'the spirit of the time' leads to a magnificent tautology: philosophy, fixing the 'image of the spirit' is itself determined through that 'spirit'.

The point is that a meaningful understanding of philosophy in its relation to the epoch is only possible when it is treated precisely as an expression and reflection of the objective content of the epoch—'the spirit of the time' is its objective sense, the sense of its being. To proclaim that being 'spirit' would mean to identify the epoch with its philosophy. But a philosophy cannot be identical with its time, just as a reflection cannot be identical with the original. The identification of philosophy and its time was the consequence of Hegel's idealism, which had to take 'as its object the unity of thought and Being, which is the fundamental idea of philosophy generally'.¹⁸⁷ That principle held both for philosophy and for its history. But (1) the historian of philosophy, and even Hegel himself, was not directly given 'the spirit of the time' from which the philosophy could be deduced, and that meant that he was forced willy-nilly to turn to the epoch itself in order to elucidate its 'spirit'. In following that road Hegel made real discoveries both in the sphere of the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy.

(2) Hegel was always a dialectician. He saw that the time and its philosophy were identical only in content, being different in principle and qualitatively in form. That was not unimportant because of the unity of form and content, which he never forgot. Because

if Philosophy does not stand above its time in content, it does so in form, because, as the thought and knowledge of that which is the substantial spirit of its time, it makes that spirit its object.... This knowledge itself undoubtedly is the actuality of Mind, the self-knowledge of Mind which previously was not present: thus the formal difference is also a real and actual difference. Through knowledge, Mind makes manifest a distinction between knowledge and that which is; this knowledge is thus what produces a new form of development.¹⁸⁸

In other words, the identity of the time and its philosophy also presupposed a difference between them; philosophy was

comprehension of the time in thought and consequently knowledge of it, while the epoch (or rather its 'spirit', 'the spirit of the time') formed the object of that knowledge. Hegel thus 'saved' the time from dissolution in philosophy, once more exhibiting the greatest realist flair, which the founders of Marxism-Leninism more than once remarked upon. But idealism immediately triumphed here, for the 'new form' was engendered precisely by knowledge:

The new forms at first are only special modes of knowledge, and it is thus that a new Philosophy is produced: yet since it already is a wide kind of spirit, it is the inward birth-place of the spirit which will later arrive at actual form.¹⁶⁶

Hegel got the chance to recognise and describe the substantial, and not simply formal, character of the development of philosophy (in spite of the logic of his idealism) through treating development as an ascent from the abstract to the concrete. In his idealist view that meant that the content implicitly, ideally given in the initial abstract 'pure being' of the spirit had still to be really developed in the actuality of different aspects of social affairs and in the 'spiritual element', philosophy. The first aspect was the subject-matter of the 'philosophy of world history', while the second was the subject-matter of the history of philosophy. Since the initial moment was 'pure being', i.e. the ideal 'programme' of all further development, Hegel could only understand the historical process as the 'other' of this ideal existence (being), a manifestation of the spirit of that time. The spirit could not be realised directly either in nature or in history (as it is realised in logic). It was 'a severe, a mighty conflict with itself'.¹⁷⁰ And the spirit was not fully realised, because of the 'impotence of nature' and 'impotence of life'. How then to discover the 'spirit' itself, 'mind', by this 'work'?

Here we come up against one of the weakest sides of Hegel's conception, viz., the real in the development of the spirit proved to be only that which corresponded to the initial plan, which had a divine nature.

This plan [he wrote] philosophy strives to comprehend; for only that which has been developed as a result of it, possesses *bona fide* reality. That which does not accord with it, is negative, worthless existence.¹⁷¹

Those sentences are from *The Philosophy of History*, but are fully applicable to the history of philosophy. But where, then, were the criteria of the difference between the 'real' and the 'simply existent'? Yet all the same it was the 'spirit' or 'mind', i.e. the historically limited 'spirit of the time', Hegel's time, which had to perform the role of supreme judge. For if the real or actual really was, only two variants were possible, since it corresponded to the 'divine idea': the content of this idea was given either by supernatural revelation or in philosophy (Hegel's philosophy, naturally). Hegel essentially rejected the first as a reference point for historical inquiry in philosophy, for 'there is not in the latter as there is in Religion a fixed and fundamental truth which, as unchangeable, is apart from history'.¹⁷² Which meant that there remained Hegel's own system. And if the empirical content of the process was 'real' only insofar as it corresponded to his own system, then everything must be banished from the history of philosophy, or ignored, that did not satisfy that criterion. And we came once more, but from the other side, the side of the Hegelian understanding of the relation of philosophy and its time, to the same conclusion about the fatal limitation of the thinker's theoretical apparatus.

Here, of course, the theoretical orientation clashed with the real process and did not always come out on top. Thus, from Hegel's standpoint,

the sequence in the systems of Philosophy in History is similar to the sequence in the logical deduction of the Notion-determinations in the Idea.¹⁷³

Each of the systems succeeding one another, he considered, embodied in itself 'a particular definition of the Absolute' and 'every system represents one particular factor or particular stage in the evolution of the Idea'.¹⁷⁴ The stage of 'being' was depicted in the philosophy of the Eleatics, mainly in Parmenides. That is why 'philosophy began in the Eleatic school, especially with Parmenides'.¹⁷⁵ Correspondingly, 'Nothing' was the principle of Buddhism,¹⁷⁶ 'Becoming' of Herakleitos,¹⁷⁷ and so on. But how was it in history?

When we turn to Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy we immediately see that he did not follow that scheme at all, beginning his presentation of the history of philosophy 'prop-

erly speaking' with Thales.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, he gave the following scheme of Greek thought there: (1) thought in the abstract, i.e. natural or sensuous form—from Thales to Anaxagoras, who achieved the highest determinateness then possible, i.e. Mind as 'self-determining Thought'; (2) 'the principle of subjectivity', i.e. thought 'as present and concrete in me'—the Sophists, Sokrates, and the Socratics; (3) 'where objective thought, the Idea, forms itself into a whole', i.e. the abstract idea in 'the form of universality' in Plato, the idea 'in the determination of its efficacy or activity' in Aristotle.¹⁷⁹ With that the first period of Greek philosophy was completed.

The movement of philosophic thought within the first period developed in turn as follows: the Ionians 'grasped the universal in the form of a natural determination' of a material principle, 'as water and air'. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans saw 'number' as 'the substance or the essence of things' as 'a non-sensuous object of sense'. The Eleatics regarded 'pure thought' in 'liberation from the sensuous form and the form of number'. Then came Herakleitos, who understood the absolute as a process, as 'that which moves or changes'. Empedokles and the Atomists returned to the 'stationary... substratum which underlies the process', while Anaxagoras defined essence (substance) as 'the moving, self-determining thought itself'.¹⁸⁰

As we see, this sequence was very different from the scheme given in the 'Lesser Logic'. Only the general scheme of the passage from the abstract to the concrete was preserved. And that indicated that Hegel's starting point (the priority of the logical in the system 'logical-historical') could not be employed as a direct methodological principle of historical inquiry. The divergence of the logical proper from Hegel's historical exposition (in the 'Lesser Logic' and the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* respectively) is evidence both of his immense historical flair and of his abstract, distorted understanding of the link between logical development and history.

The materialist understanding of the matter is that the logical method 'is indeed nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and diverting chance occurrences'.¹⁸¹ With that posing of the matter it becomes clear why Hegel deviated from logic in favour of history. It was, he guessed, because it was simply impossible to abstract historical form,

and even 'diverting chance occurrences', and the 'simple existence' of historical objects, in application to historical sciences. The logical was necessity, which cut its way through the historical facts and 'chance occurrences'. And if we were obliged, when developing a system of philosophy, to present it as a necessary consequence of the historical process, as an expression (in Hegel's words) 'of a road which has been worked over and levelled out',¹⁸² this necessity was not formulated *a priori* but was elucidated by historical inquiry itself.

Hegel himself drew attention to that aspect of the matter, stressing that

though the development of Philosophy in history must correspond to the development of logical philosophy, there will still be passages in it which are absent in historical development.¹⁸³

and vice versa. In the *Philosophy of Right* he even stressed that

the elements, which result in a further definite form, although preceding this result as phases of the conception, do not in the temporal development go before it as concrete realisations.¹⁸⁴

But for Hegel this lack of coincidence—'chance' and 'appearance'—was something belonging to the 'sphere of finality and hence cannot be the principle of Philosophy'.¹⁸⁵ Marx considered in principle that the order of the categories reflecting the structure of a historically determined formation on the theoretical plane was specific for each qualitatively determined structure. And the sequence of the categories as a logical sequence was not automatically determined by their historical sequence or vice versa. As regards economic categories, one could say, as Marx pointed out, that 'their order of succession is determined by their mutual relation in modern bourgeois society'.¹⁸⁶

Exactly the same in the history of philosophy, the historical order of development of categories embodying the succession of doctrines, should not necessarily correspond to the logical order of some historically formed system of categories (the Hegelian included). In contrast to the categorial structure of the economic phenomena studied by political economy, in the history of philosophy it is a matter of mental reflection not only of the object but also of the subjective conditions and orientations

arising from objective circumstances but leading to substantial aberrations, distortions and illusions. These are the factors that Lenin described as the epistemological and the class roots of a philosophical doctrine.

In other words the coincidence of historical development and logical structure is more thoroughly traceable within socio-economic formations and the philosophical formations corresponding to them. The coincidence of the historical development of antique philosophy, for instance, and the logic of the final philosophical system can be traced quite convincingly from the example of Aristotle, who himself consciously employed the material of preceding philosophy for his constructs. The general logic of the Hegelian system is clearly traceable in the historical forming of modern philosophy, and so on.

What has been said means that the materialist principle of the priority of the historical over the logical makes a more flexible approach possible to the historical process itself, and helps avoid rigid schematicism. Materialism starts here from the point that philosophy is the expression, reflection, and synthesis of the being and understanding of an epoch—of a new epoch that is not reducible to the previously existing, which is giving birth to more and more new productive forces, social relations, socio-economic structures, ideas, and scientific theories, that did not previously exist. The fact that philosophy does not beget an epoch, but the epoch philosophy means above all the existence in philosophy of progress not only in form but also in content.

Hegel came to the idea of progress in philosophy on the basis that every philosophical system comprises a moment, stage, or degree in the general development of philosophy. The principle worked out and developed by it is not wiped out but enters the succeeding philosophy in sublated form. In *The Science of Logic* this is expressed as follows:

[For] the result contains its own beginning, and the development of the beginning has made it the richer by a new determinateness. The universal... raises to each next stage of determination the whole mass of its antecedent content, and by its dialectical progress not only loses nothing and leaves nothing behind, but carries with it all that it has acquired, enriching and concentrating itself upon itself.¹⁷

But we have already seen that all this is progress only as to form; it is a transformation in the form of knowledge of what already exists 'in itself' in the starting point, in the 'all-embracing and immutable Idea'. It is not surprising that, having briefly repeated this passage in §32 of the *Philosophy of Right* he summed it up as follows: '... it cannot be said that the conception ever comes to something new.'¹⁸⁸ This is consequently pseudo-progress, representing a historical repetition, completed in time, of states, of Ideas preformed and already passed in the sphere of the logical. The real progress of philosophy can only be discovered when philosophy is regarded as the expression of aggregate social progress, the progressive development of socio-economic formations.

Dialectical materialism therefore has another approach to the interaction of the different elements of a social formation that are involved in the moulding of philosophy. Hegel understood this interaction as a manifestation of the activity of the 'spirit' summed up in 'the spirit of the time', which found expression, in turn, in 'the spirit of the people'. As regards social consciousness it was essentially tautological: the spirit was explained, through the spirit. By disclosing the objective material foundation of philosophy in its historical development, the historian of philosophy reduces a philosophy on the one hand to its objective foundation, and on the other deduces it from the real contradictions of this objective foundation, contradictions that induce a comprehending of the world, giving birth to the very need for philosophy.

Properly speaking, we have here the materialist interpreting of an important idea of Hegel's, who considered that

in order for philosophy to be manifested in a people, there must be a break (*Bruch*) in the real world. Philosophy is then the reconciliation of the corruption that the thought (idea) had begun; this reconciliation takes place in the ideal world, in the world of the spirit, to which man escapes when the earthly, mortal world no longer satisfies him. Philosophy begins with the end of a real world.¹⁸⁹

As Wolfgang Heise had justly remarked, 'those sentences amalgamate Hegel's profundity and his "false positivism"'.¹⁹⁰ The profundity consisted in the fact that Hegel discovered a historical break at the beginning of philosophy, i.e. a social revolution,

while the decline of the old world laid the basis for a new philosophical position. Only Marx achieved a real synthesis here, meant to complete reduction of the ideal formation to its secular basis by discovering the latter's 'inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness'—the Hegelian 'break' in its real social essence—and to do so on the basis of a practical, revolutionary transformation of the reality that gives birth to alienated ideological forms.¹⁹¹

The false positivism of the Hegelian history of philosophy comes out here in the form of an affirmation of the reconciliatory function of philosophy. 'Minerva's owl flies only in the dusk' is an extremely pessimistic phrase requiring closing of the eyes to the fact that the 'break' recorded as the impulse of the rise of philosophy was an impulse not only, and not so much to a summing up as to the birth of a new society and a new philosophy that were not satisfied with a summing-up but which pictured the prospects. The 'philosophy of summing-up' had, as its inner essence, a very profound contradiction reflecting the contradiction of its earthly, secular basis.

In Hegel's philosophy that was a contradiction between the dialectical method and the idealist system, which was expressed on several planes in his conception of the history of philosophy; the following are the main ones. (1) The notion of the wholeness of the process of the history of philosophy, which allegedly found completion in his system. This was an unresolved antinomy of historicity and the ideal. Hegel had no need of the ideal system that on the whole would have lain outside historical reality; on the contrary, he strove to discover how the system found reflection in the whole aggregate of real processes. But these processes (including that of the history of philosophy) were understood precisely as an expression of the ideal system and were therefore only an appearance of reality. The infinite development of philosophy (in any case within the limits of the existence of the human race) then came into clear contradiction with the 'complete' character of the Hegelian system. (2) It therefore came about that philosophy developed only in the past, while its present state was withdrawn from the universal link of development.

Hegel's understanding of the historical role of philosophy was no less contradictory. As Marx wrote:

Already in *Hegel* the *Absolute Spirit* of history has its material in the *Mass* and finds its appropriate expression only in *philosophy*. The philosopher, however, is only the organ through which the maker of history, the *Absolute Spirit*, arrives at self-consciousness *retrospectively* after the movement has ended. The participation of the philosopher in history is reduced to this retrospective consciousness, for the real movement is accomplished by the *Absolute Spirit* *unconsciously*.¹⁸³

But that signified the half-hearted character of Hegel's solution; having declared philosophy the mode of existence of the *Absolute Spirit*, he declined to declare philosophy the driving force of history or the philosopher the *Absolute Spirit*, i.e. in the final analysis himself.¹⁸³ On the other hand, the *Absolute Spirit* itself became the creator of history only in appearance.

For since the *Absolute Spirit* becomes *conscious* of itself as the creative World Spirit only *post festum* in the philosopher, its making of history exists only in the consciousness, in the opinion and conception of the philosopher, i.e. only in the speculative imagination.¹⁸⁴

Those words comprehensively expressed the speculative and mystical in the Hegelian conception of philosophy, viz., that which extremely enhances its claims but at the same time deprives it of real historical significance.

The vast picture of the development of philosophic thought painted by Hegel is, nevertheless, striking in its wealth and range, and at the same time in the unity of the dialectical process traceable in its diversity. Several partial problems remain.

Hegel's periodisation of the history of philosophy is of interest. He made claim to a scientific, i.e. necessary, division of it into periods, and linked the latter with the development of society in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modern times, and expressively described the qualitative differences arising in the course of philosophy's development from antiquity through the Middle Ages to modern times.

The Greek world developed thought as far as the Idea; the Christian Teutonic world, on the contrary, has comprehended Thought as Spirit. Idea and Spirit are thus the distinguishing features.¹⁸⁵

The Idea as the world of ideas existing in itself, this result of Graeco-Roman philosophy, had to be replaced by the Spirit, by the identity of the particular (individual) and the universal, being and thought, finite and absolute consciousness. 'This then,' Hegel wrote, 'is the standpoint of the present day, and the series of spiritual forms is with it for the present concluded.'¹⁹⁶

But this discrimination was built up in the course of development—from 'the idea in general' in Graeco-Roman philosophy to the counterposing of substance and reflection in mediaeval, and to the concept in modern. Behind that ideal movement, reflecting the structure of Hegelian logic, lay the process of the movement of world history as progress in the concept of freedom.

That reasoning led right up to a concrete evaluation of Oriental philosophy. Hegel deliberately excluded its history from his course, but devoted 20 pages to it in his introduction. Because consciousness of freedom was underdeveloped, the subject did not exist in the Orient as an individual or personality, Hegel considered. And since the individual and his consciousness had 'no significance, and as being what is accidental and without rights, is finite only',¹⁹⁷ 'no philosophic knowledge can be found there'.¹⁹⁸ He put forward there, in idealistic form, the reasonable statement that philosophy presumed a certain level of the subject's social development in order to appear. He rightly refused to include mythological and prephilosophic forms in the history of philosophy as philosophy. But he lacked historicism in his approach to the problem, painting the whole Orient in one colour, without noting that society had also developed in the East, and that philosophy, too, had developed, providing splendid examples of philosophic thought proper. It was this limitation of his historicism that led him to a Eurocentric position in the history of philosophy.

When Hegel spoke of the origin of philosophy he stressed, not by chance, the importance for it of the existence of actual political freedom,¹⁹⁹ of a flowering of individuality, which grasped 'its Being as universal' precisely in Ancient Greece.²⁰⁰ We spoke above of a social 'break' as a condition of the rise of philosophy. Hegel posed the further question of the sources of philosophic thought, in which he included mythology (for

him, incidentally, indistinguishable from religion) and 'worldly wisdom'.²⁰¹ Given the inadequacy of that notion, which did not take the development of special knowledge, and of the principles of the science of the time, into account, Hegel formulated an important idea about the inner contradiction of mythology, that between sensuous form of representation and universal, conceptual content, resolution of which, leading to correspondence of form and content, gave rise to philosophy.²⁰²

The dialectical conception of the origin of philosophy was only one of Hegel's important, valuable analyses of the facts and processes of the history of philosophy. Lenin considered one of his extraordinary merits to be his 'tracing predominantly the *dialectical* in the history of philosophy'.²⁰³ Being a profound dialectician, Hegel specially drew attention to the problem of the objective contradiction, the rise of the new in the course of development, self-movement, etc. In spite of the fact that idealism had its effect here, too, the results of his analysis of the history of dialectics are still instructive.²⁰⁴

For all the greatness of his history of philosophy, of course, Hegel could not avoid a whole number of errors. Hegel's history of philosophy suffered from the same fundamental fault as his system as a whole; the substantial premiss that the history of human thought could not find final completion in discovery of 'Absolute Truth' at bottom contradicted the idea of the completion of that development in some kind of universal system.

Consciousness of that contradiction was not slow to develop. Reproaches against Hegel had already become commonplace in the 1830s, for his absolutising of his own philosophy—and correspondingly for 'completing' the development of philosophy in general by it. Take, for instance, Chalybäus' book *The Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy from Kant to Hegel* (1837):

Had Hegel taken his system for the final and highest stage, for the completion of his [speculative—*Ed.*] consciousness on which there could not essentially be further progress beyond it, it would have happened to him, as happened with most of the great philosophers, who, each in turn, believed he had brought the stone of Sisyphos to a halt, he would have been mistaken.²⁰⁵

The materialist critique of Hegel's history of philosophy was much more fruitful. In his article on the Hegelian history of philosophy, written in 1840 but first published only in 1874, Feuerbach reproached Hegel for having treated history as a stream, but one without a bottom. It was consequently not even that Hegel had stopped this stream, he had not plumbed its depth, i.e. the objective basis of the flow, viz., the real life that determined the tasks and solutions of philosophy. Hegel, he wrote, for instance, treated the sense of Neoplatonism in such a way that the Absolute Idea was discovered in it as excitement or ecstasy. But in fact

the age of the Neoplatonists was a time of misfortunes, of discontent with the world, of illness. Philosophy had the significance of medicine in such times. . . It had to meet the needs of the sick heart, heal wounds, put reality in place of loss of the world. That was only possible through images that bewitched the mind, only through fantasy, and not through reason.¹⁰⁰

And in that Feuerbach was right.

Feuerbach proclaimed the possibility and necessity of treating the philosophy of an epoch as a reflection precisely of its needs, passions, and hopes. But he understood them in general in the spirit of psychologism, i.e. as investigation of the psychological grounds of a philosophy. Herzen went much further in his famous *Letters on the Study of Nature* (1844-5), in which an orientation on science and, moreover, the science of thinking triumphed. Philosophy was not a thought about the Idea but thought about nature.

The office of science[he wrote] is to raise everything that exists into thought. . . To understand an object means to discover the necessity of its content, to justify its existence, its development. What has been recognized by us as necessary and reasonable is no longer alien to us; it has already become a clear idea of the object.¹⁰¹

The same idea was applicable to the history of philosophy—'the history of thought is the continuation of the history of nature'.²⁰⁸

While following Feuerbach, but by no means rejecting the

Hegelian dialectic, as Feuerbach did, Herzen turned the relation of the historical and logical 'right side up':

Logical development goes through the same stages, as nature and history. Like the aberration of the stars in the firmament, they repeat the movement of the earth.⁴⁰⁹

For the development of human thought was not realised in accordance with the 'Idea'; in it 'there was much latitude for the free play of the spirit, even for freedom of individuals swept away by passions'²¹⁰ So it would be vain to seek in history that order which 'pure thought' developed for itself.

Hence also the idea of the infinity of nature and history. Where as Hegel saw in the new philosophy, beginning with Descartes, the 'land' to which his philosophical ship was putting in to, the shore that thought finally achieved, for Herzen it was only a halt, a stopping place.

We ... see the new philosophy as the shore on which we stand, ready to take off with the first favourable wind, ready to express our thanks for the hospitality received and having pushed off, to make for other shores.⁴¹¹

The great turning point in human thought made by the philosophy of modern times opened up a new perspective, viz., the transition of thought to deeds, of philosophy to revolution.

* * *

Our survey of conceptions of the history of philosophy has already indicated that they have a long and interesting history that could make the subject-matter of an independent inquiry. While philosophical historiography proceeds essentially from an understanding of the relation between philosophy and its history, and of the philosophical and methodological position of the historian of philosophy himself, it is just as partisan as philosophy as a whole. Hegel stressed that 'one must also be partisan in the history of philosophy, to take something for granted, to have a purpose'.²¹² The goal, it is true, is not 'pure, free thought', as Hegel considered. Partisanship in the history of philosophy means to take the social tendency of the investigated doctrine fully into account and to put it into the context of the progressive development of society, into a situation of so-

cial, class struggle, of the struggle of parties in philosophy, which ultimately reflects the tendencies and ideology of hostile classes.

The history of the conceptions of history of philosophy themselves brings out their progress—ever more developed, concrete scientific presentation and comprehension of the subject-matter, method, and tasks of philosophical historiography, presented in the successive stages of its development and necessarily leads to historical materialism as the methodological basis of a modern scientific history of philosophy.

¹ Edited by K. Praechter (the 'Ueberweg-Prächter'), 13th edition, Basle, 1953.

² Lenin's estimate of this book was 'Something *unleserliches!* [unreadable!—Ed.]. A history of names and books!' (V. I. Lenin. *Philosophical Notebooks. Collected Works*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 52).

³ The words of Alexius von Meinong, an eminent Austrian philosopher. Cited from Robert Reininger. *Geschichte der Philosophie als philosophische Wissenschaft* (Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1928), p. 1.

⁴ Nicolai Hartmann. *Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte* (Philipp Reclam Jun., Stuttgart, s. d.), p. 16.

⁵ Hippolytos. *Refutation of All Heresies*. Hippoliti philosophumenon prooemium. In H. Diels. *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879), p. 544.44. See also W. K. C. Guthrie. *History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. 1 (CUP, Cambridge, 1962), p. 405; G. S. Kirk & J. E. Raven. *The Presocratic Philosophers* (CUP, Cambridge, 1957), p. 2.

⁶ Thomas Stanley. *The History of Philosophy* (London, 1655). See, for example, *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simon), Vol. 1 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968), pp. 111-112.

⁷ Sextus Empiricus. Vol. III. *Against the Ethicists* (Book XI, Chapter VII, 218). Translated by R. G. Bury (Heinemann, London, 1936), p. 490.

⁸ See Cicero. *Tusculanae quaestiones*. II, 1, 4.

⁹ Victor Cousin. *Du vrai du beau et du bien*. (Didier & Cie., Paris, 1879), p. 11.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. III.

¹² Cited from Lutz Geldsetzer. *Die Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert* (Verlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan, 1968), p. 20.

¹³ See Immanuel Kant. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Vol. 20 (Berlin, 1942), p. 373.

- ¹⁴ Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 114.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 115.
- ¹⁶ See A. N. Gilyarov. *Istochniki o sofistakh: Platon kak istoricheskii svidetel'* (Sources on the Sophists: Plato as a Historical Witness), Kiev, 1891.
- ¹⁷ Aristotle. *Metaphysics* (Book 1A, 3, 983b). (Indiana U.P., Bloomington, 1966), p. 16.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Book 1A, 10, 993a. *Op. cit.*, p. 34.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Book 2a, 993b, 13-18. *Op. cit.*, p. 35.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, Book 1A, 8, 989a, 32-36. *Op. cit.*, p. 27.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, Book 1A, 3, 983b. *Op. cit.*, p. 17.
- ²² *Ibid.*, Book 1A, 3, 984a. *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, Book 1A, 984b, 19-23. *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
- ²⁴ H. Cherniss. *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore, 1935).
- ²⁵ J. B. McDiarmid. Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes. In *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*, Vol. 1 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1970), p. 180.
- ²⁶ Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, Book 1A, 7, 988a, 33. *Op. cit.*, p. 25.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, Book 1A, 7, 988b, 30-31. *Op. cit.*, p. 25.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, Book 1A, 3, 984a, 28-30. *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
- ²⁹ W. K. C. Guthrie gave a critical analysis of Cherniss' arguments in his paper 'Aristotle as Historian' in *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*. Vol. 1. (See also W. K. C. Guthrie. Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy. *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1957, 1:35-41.)
- ³⁰ J. B. McDiarmid. *Art. cit.*, pp. 237-238.
- ³¹ See R. K. Lukanin. Theophrastus and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. *Vestnik MGU*, 1978, Series 7, 1. pp. 64-74.
- ³² According to E. Zeller the writings of Eudemos were 'the principal and almost the sole source of all later information about the mathematicians and astronomers of antiquity' (E. Zeller. *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Part 2, 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1879), pp. 869-870.
- ³³ Theophrastus. *De Sensu*, 1 (H. Diels. *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 499). Cited from W. K. C. Guthrie. *History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 67.
- ³⁴ See the table of contents of the collection called 'Vetusta Placita' by Diels in his *Doxographi Graeci*, pp. 181-183.
- ³⁵ W. Capelle. *Die Vorsokratiker* (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1958). ('Genealogical Tree of the "Sources" on the History of Presocratic Philosophy').
- ³⁶ A. O. Makovelsky. *Dosokratovskaya filosofiya* (Presocratic Philosophy), Part 1, Kazan, 1914-1915, p. 77.
- ³⁷ See the table of contents of Book 1 of the *Eclogues* in Diels. *Doxographi Graeci*, pp. 270-272.
- ³⁸ See the table of contents in *Ioannis Stobaei Florilegium*, Vol. 1, edited by A. Meineke (Leipzig, 1855), pp. XXXI-XXXVI.
- ³⁹ Sextus Empiricus. Vol II. *Against the Logicians*, 1, 24. Translated by R. G. Bury. (London, 1933), p. 13.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 1, 27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1, 38-45.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1, 29-37.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1, 47.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, 262.

¹⁵ See *Ibid.*, 2-4.

¹⁶ A. F. Losev. The Cultural and Historical Significance of the Scepticism of Antiquity and the Activity of Sextus Empiricus. In *Sekst Empirik. Sochineniya*, Vol. 1 (Nauka, Moscow, 1975), p. 40.

¹⁷ In Diogen Laertsky. *O zhizni, ucheniyakh i izrecheniyakh znamenitnykh filosofov* (Mysl, Moscow, 1979), p. 59.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ See the substantiation of this view in the article by A. S. Bogomolov and G. V. Khlebnikov 'Diogenes Laertius as a Historian of Philosophy'. *Filosofskie nauki*, 1982, 3: 80-89.

²⁰ See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (1, 18-19), Vol. 1 (W. Heinemann, London, 1938), p. 18-19.

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 19.

²² *Ibid.*, I, 20.

²³ *Ibid.*, I, 21.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, IX, 5-17. *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 415.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, IX, 6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 13. *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1. p. 15.

²⁷ See Hermann Diels. *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 168.

²⁸ See Nietzsche's scheme (cited by Makovelsky, *Op. cit.*, p. 127). While Nietzsche gave priority to Diokles, Favorinus, and an 'unknown Sceptic', Maass gave preference to Favorinus, Wilamowitz-Moellendorf to Diokles, Usener to Nikaion of Nikaia, A. Gerke to an unknown Platonist of the first half of the second century A. D., and so on. See A. O. Makovelsky. *Op. cit.*, pp. 126-131.

²⁹ Diogenes Laertius, X, 3-11.

³⁰ A. O. Makovelsky. *Op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.

³¹ St. Augustine of Hippo. *The City of God (De civitate dei)*. Translated by John Healey. Vol. 1 (Book viii, ch. 1) (J. M. Dent & Sons [Everyman's Library], London, 1945), p. 225. Augustine had in mind the passage from *The Wisdom of Solomon* (7, 25-26): 'For she [wisdom] is the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty... the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness' (*Ibid.*, p. 898).

³² Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson (Eds.). *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, Vol. 2, Justin Martyr and Athenogoras. Translated by Marcus Dods, George Reith, and B. P. Pratten (T & T Bell, Edinburgh, 1867). Dialogue with Trypho, ch. 2, p. 87.

³³ A. Roberts, J. Donaldson (Eds.). *Op. cit.* The First Apology of Justin, p. 57.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

'For a fire is kindled in mine anger,
'And shall burn unto the lowest hell,
'And shall consume the earth with her increase,

'And set on fire the foundations of the mountains,
(E. S. Bates [Ed.]. *The Bible Designed to Be Read as Literature* [Heinemann, London, n. d], 2nd ed., p. 151.)

As we see, that is not so very close to the idea of 'conflagration'.

⁶⁶ A. Roberts, J. Donaldson (Eds.). *Op. cit.* The First Apology of Justin, p. 46.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Dialogue with Trypho. Ch. 2, p. 87.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Justin's Hortatory Address to the Greeks, Ch. 8, p. 294.

⁶⁹ See Hermann Diels. *Op. cit.*, p. 553.

⁷⁰ See A. O. Makovelsky. *Op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.

⁷¹ *Hippoliti refutatio omnium haeresium*, IX, 7-10. See the analysis of this point in S. N. Muravyov's article 'Hippolytos Cites Herakleitos' in V. V. Sokolov et al. (Ed.). *Iz istorii antichnoi kul'tury* (Izd-vo MGU, Moscow, 1976), pp. 120-140.

⁷² See G. G. Mayorov. *Formirovanie srednevekovoi filosofii: Latinskaya patristika* (The Moulding of Mediaeval Philosophy: Latin Patristics), Mysl, Moscow, 1979, pp. 14-15.

⁷³ See V. F. Asmus. *Dialectics and Philosophy. Izbrannye filosofskie trudy*, Vol. 2 (Izd-vo MGU, Moscow, 1972), pp. 285-287.

⁷⁴ Frederick Copleston. *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. II (Burns Oates & Washbourne, London, 1950), p. 426.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 424, 426.

⁷⁶ Asch-Schahrastrani. Abu'l-Fath'Muhammad. *Religionsparteien und Philosophenschulen*. Vol. 1. Translated by Harbrücker (Halle, 1850), Vol. 2 (1851).

⁷⁷ *Gualteri Burlaei liber de vita et moribus philosophorum*. Edited by H. Kunst (Tübingen, 1886). The historical significance of this book is the fact that it was the first printed history of philosophy. It was first printed in Cologne in 1472, republished in Nuremberg in 1477, and published in a German translation in Augsburg in 1519. See also Lucien Braun. *Histoire de l'histoire de la philosophie* (Ophrys, Paris, 1973), p. 54.

⁷⁸ Lucien Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁷⁹ See the description of a philosopher's 'ideal library' in A. Kh. Gorfunkel. *Gumanizm i naturfilosofiya ital'yanskogo Vozrozhdeniya* (The Humanism and Natural Philosophy of the Italian Renaissance), Mysl, Moscow, 1977, pp. 24-25.

⁸⁰ *Montaigne's Essays*, Vol. 2 (Book 2, Ch. 10 11). Translated by John Florio (J. M. Deute & Sons, Everyman's Library, London, 1965), p. 296.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁸² J. B. Buonosegnus. *Epistola de nobilioribus philosophorum sectis et de eorum inter se differentia*. Published by L. Stein in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 1 (1888).

⁸³ J. J. Frisius. *Bibliotheca philosophorum classicorum authorum chronologica* (Tiguri, 1592).

⁸⁴ O. Heurnius. *Philosophiae barbaricae antiquitatum libri duo* (Lugduni Batavorum, 1600); *idem.*, *Primordia babilonicae, indicae, aegypticae philosophiae* (1619).

⁸⁴ Francis Bacon. *Of the Wisdom of the Ancients. The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon* (Routledge & Co., London, 1905), p. 822.

⁸⁵ *Idem. The Advancement of Learning. Book 2* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1891), p. 164.

⁸⁶ *Idem.*, *Novum Organum*, Book 2. *The Philosophical Works*, p. 431.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 468.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² See Thomas Stanley. *Historiae philosophiae*. Translated into Latin by Olearius. (Leipzig, 1711), p. 656.

⁹³ See *ibid.*, pp. a3-a4.

⁹⁴ There was a review of Stanley's book in the first issue of *Acta philosophorum*, *das ist gründliche Nachrichten aus der Historia philosophica*, (p. 539), published in Halle in 1715.

⁹⁵ Thomas Stanley. *Op. cit.*, pp. 130-160.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 839-872.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 950-1109.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 557-580.

⁹⁹ See Georgii Hornii *historiae philosophiae libri septem Quibus de origine, successionem, sectis et vita philosophorum ab orbo conditio ad nostram aetatem agitur* (Lugduni Batavorum, 1655), p. 149.

¹⁰⁰ For example, he said of John Patrick Eriugena that around A. D. 880 there flourished in Britannia the celebrated John Patrick Eriugena (an Irishman, since the local inhabitants still call Ireland Erin), a man highly erudite in oriental languages, philosophy, and theology, who first taught (*the bona artes*) at Oxford, in the college founded by Alfred the Great. Eriugena's pupils, Horn wrote, stabbed him with styles (*graphiis conforderunt*) when he scolded them at mass. (See *Op. cit.*, pp. 296-297).

¹⁰¹ Pierre Bayle. *Continuation des pensées diverses, écrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne à l'occasion de la Comète qui parut au mois Decembre 1680*, Vol. 2 (Reinier Leers, Rotterdam, 1705), pp. 500-501.

¹⁰² Pierre Bayle. *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, Vol. 2 (Descer, Paris, 1820), p. 365.

¹⁰³ Lucien Braun. *Op. cit.*, pp. 105-106, 106a.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103n.

¹⁰⁵ A. F. Boirot Deslandes. *Histoire critique de la philosophie où l'on traite de son origine, de ses progrès, et des diverses révolutions qui lui sont arrivées jusqu'à notre temps* (François Changuion, Amsterdam, 1737).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. XXIII.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. XIII.

¹⁰⁸ Jacobi Bruckeri *historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabilis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta*. 1742-1744. 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1767.

¹⁰⁹ See C. A. Heumann. *Einleitung zur Historia philosophica. Acta philosophorum*, 1715, Nos 1-4.

¹¹⁰ *Dissertatio preliminaris de natura, constructione, usu mediisque*

historiae philosophiae. In J. J. Brucker, *Op. cit.*, 2nd edition, Vol. 1, pp. 10-11, 13-19.

¹¹¹ See F. A. Carus. *Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Nachgelassene Werke*, Vol. 4 (Leipzig, 809), p. 74.

¹¹² J. H. S. Formey. *Histoire abrégée de la philosophie* (Schneider, Amsterdam, 1760), p. 27. English translations: London, 1766; Glasgow, 1767. The introduction contains Formey's own views on the essence of philosophy (in a Wolfian spirit).

¹¹³ J. S. Brucker. *Kurze Fragen aus der philosophischen Historie von Anfang der Welt bis auf der Geburt Christi* (Ulm, 1737). See also the exposition of the 'philosophy of the patriarchs' in *Io. Francisci Buddei compendium historiae philosophiae*, Ch. 2 (Halle, 1731).

¹¹⁴ See L. Braun. *Op. cit.* p. 125.

¹¹⁵ Lucien Braun is right when he finds an analogy here to the philosophical approach common at the time, which saw in the development of languages the result of their progressing deviation from a single original one. See L. Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

¹¹⁶ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1. Translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1892); cited from the Humanities Press (New York) edition of 1974, p. 112.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Magazin für die Philosophie und ihre Geschichte* aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademien angelegt, 1778-1883, Vol. 6.

¹¹⁹ *Philosophische Bibliothek*, edited by Feder and Meiners, 1788-1791.

¹²⁰ Michael Hissmann. Bemerkungen über einige Regeln für den Geschichtsschreiber philosophischer Systeme. In *Deutscher Merkur* 1777, 10: 24. Cited from Lucien Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 178n. Translated from French.

¹²¹ Dietrich Tiedemann. *Griechenlands erste Philosophen oder Leben und System des Orpheus, Pherekides, Thales und Pythagoras* (Leipzig, 1780); *idem. Geist der spekulativen Philosophie* in six volumes (Marburg, 1791-1797). See also Lucien Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 186, where the relevant passage is cited. Translated from French.

¹²² See Dietrich Tiedemann. *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*, Vol. 3, p. VI.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 646; L. Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 188. Translated from French.

¹²⁴ See C. Meiners. *Beytrag zur Geschichte der Denkart der ersten Jahrhunderte nach Christi Geburt* (Weidmanns Erben and Reich, Leipzig, 1782).

¹²⁵ See D. Tiedemann. *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. XIV and L. Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 191n.

¹²⁶ D. Tiedemann. *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 623; L. Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹²⁷ Kuno Fischer. *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, Vol. 3. Edited by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Karl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, Heidelberg, 1902), p. 653.

¹²⁸ The chronological index for the eighteenth century compiled by Lucien Braun (*op. cit.*, pp. 367-385) contains more than 100 titles, in-

cluding multivolume and periodical publications. See also F. A. Carus. *Op. cit.*, pp. 59-90.

¹²⁹ Lutz Geldsetzer. *Die Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert* (Verlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan, 1868), p. 19.

¹³⁰ Karl H. Heydenreich. 'Einige Ideen über die Revolution der Philosophie, bewirkt durch Immanuel Kant, und besonders über den Einfluss derselben auf die Behandlung der Geschichte der Philosophie'. In Agatopisto Cromaziano. *Kritische Geschichte der Revolution der Philosophie in dem letzten drei Jahrhunderten* (Leipzig, 1791), Vol. 2. pp. 213-232.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 227 and 215. Cited from Lucien Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 208. Translated from French.

¹³² *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 113-114.

¹³³ K. L. Reinhold. Über den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie. Eine akademische Vorlesung. In G. G. Fülleborn (Ed.). *Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*. No. 1 (Jena, 1791), p. 13.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 31.

¹³⁶ Georg Gustav Fülleborn. *Was heisst den Geist einer Philosophie darstellen?* (Halle, 1789), p. 200; cited from L. Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 231. Translated from French.

¹³⁷ See K. S. Bakradze. *Izbr, filos. tr.* (Selected Philosophical Works), Tbilisi. 1973, Vol. 3, pp. 153-154.

¹³⁸ Immanuel Kant. *Werke*, Vol. 20 (Berlin, 1942), p. 341.

¹³⁹ Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 481.

¹⁴⁰ G. F. D. Göss. *Über den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Erlangen, 1794), p. 26. Cited from L. Braun. *Op. cit.*, pp. 227-228. Translated from French.

¹⁴¹ See F. A. Carus. *Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 4, pp. 127-131. See also L. Braun. *Op. cit.*, p. 228.

¹⁴² *Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft, deutscher Gelehrter*, 1795, 2, 4: 331.

¹⁴³ J. C. A. Grohmann. Was heisst: Geschichte der Philosophie? in Lutz Geldsetzer. *Op. cit.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28

¹⁴⁵ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Vol. 1, pp. 7-8.

¹⁴⁶ Karl Marx to Ferdinand Lassalle, 22 February 1858. Marx/ Engels, *Werke*, Vol 29 (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1967), p. 549.

¹⁴⁷ See Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, in Philosophical Notebooks (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38), p. 109.

¹⁴⁸ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 19-20. See also G. W. F. Hegel. *Vorlesung über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 1. Edited by Gerd Irritz; text edited by Karin Gurst (Reclam Verlag, Leipzig, 1971), pp. 108-109. G. W. F. Hegel. *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Edited by Johannes Hoffmeister (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1966), p. 29. The latter differs textually and structurally from the former. The English citation follows the text of the *Lectures*.

¹⁴⁹ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 3, p. 409.

¹⁵⁰ Frederick Engels. *Anti-Dühring*, p. 33.

¹⁵¹ Karl Rosenkranz. *Erläuterungen zu Hegel's Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Verlag von L. Heilmann, Berlin, 1870), p. 143.

¹⁵² G. W. F. Hegel. *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Translated by J. B. Baillie (Harper & Row, New York, 1967), p. 89.

¹⁵³ It is therefore impossible to limit oneself to a definition of Hegel's philosophy as a philosophy of capitalist society only—a view that now prevails. In the same way as all preceding stages in the development of thought were 'sublated' in Hegelian logic, so the principles of all preceding social forms were 'sublated' in his philosophy as a whole. It is still an unfulfilled task of Hegelian studies to bring that out.

¹⁵⁴ *Hegel's Logic*. Translated by William Wallace. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982), p. 224.

¹⁵⁵ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 20.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁵⁸ G. W. F. Hegel. *Science of Logic*, p. 61.

¹⁵⁹ See Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. *Op. cit.*, pp. 196-197.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹⁶¹ See E. V. Ilyenkov. *Dialectics of the Abstract and Concrete in Marx's 'Capital'* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982), pp. 223-237; *idem*. *Dialectical Logic* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), pp. 344-369.

¹⁶² *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 54.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ G. W. F. Hegel. *The Philosophy of History*. Translated by J. Sibree (Dover Publications, New York, 1956), p. 74.

¹⁶⁷ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 3, p. 409.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 54-55.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁷⁰ G. W. F. Hegel. *The Philosophy of History*, p. 55.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁷² *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 9.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁷⁴ *Hegel's Logic*, pp. 125, 126.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁷⁸ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 170.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

¹⁸¹ Karl Marx. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 225.

¹⁸² G. W. F. Hegel. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 89.

¹⁸³ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 302.

¹⁸⁴ G. W. F. Hegel. *Philosophy of Right*. Translated by S. W. Dyde (Bell & Sons, London, 1896), p. 37.

- ¹⁴⁵ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 302.
- ¹⁴⁶ Karl Marx. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, p. 213.
- ¹⁴⁷ *Hegel's Science of Logic*, Vol. II. Translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (Allen & Unwin Ltd., London), pp. 482-483.
- ¹⁴⁸ G. W. F. Hegel. *Philosophy of Right*, p. 38.
- ¹⁴⁹ G. W. F. Hegel. *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1966), p. 151.
- ¹⁵⁰ Wolfgang Heise. *Aufbruch in die Illusion* (Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1964), p. 27.
- ¹⁵¹ See Marx's Theses on Feuerbach. In Marx, Engels. *The German Ideology*, (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), pp. 618-620.
- ¹⁵² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The Holy Family* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), pp. 85-86.
- ¹⁵³ Others did that for Hegel, mainly his critics in the past century. Janet and Séailles, for instance said: 'God—is Hegel'. Paul Janet, Gabriel Séailles. *Histoire de la philosophie. Les problèmes et les écoles* (Delagrave, Paris, 1877), p. 877. M. Rubinstein said: 'Hegel wanted to be the Absolute Spirit' (*Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii*, 1905, 80: 759).
- ¹⁵⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The Holy Family*. *Op. cit.*, p. 86.
- ¹⁵⁵ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 101.
- ¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 552.
- ¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 98.
- ¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- ¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 99.
- ¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- ¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 81-89. See also A. N. Chanyshv. Hegel on the Origin of Philosophy. *Vestnik MGU*, 1970, Ser. 7. Philosophy, 1: 25-34.
- ¹⁶³ See Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* in his Philosophical Notebooks (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38), p. 247.
- ¹⁶⁴ See A. S. Bogomolov. V. I. Lenin and the Problem of Objective Dialectics in the History of Philosophy. *Vestnik MGU*, 1970, Ser. 7. Philosophy, 2: 46-52.
- ¹⁶⁵ Heinrich M. Chalybäus. *Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel*, 3rd edition (Dresden, 1843), p. 8.
- ¹⁶⁶ Ludwig Feuerbach. *Zur Hegelschen Geschichte der Philosophie*. In Karl Grün. *Ludwig Feuerbach in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass*, Vol. 1 (Wintersche Verlagbuchhandlung, Leipzig, 1874), pp. 395, 396.
- ¹⁶⁷ Alexander Herzen. Letters on the Study of Nature. Letter Two. Science and Nature—the Phenomenology of Thought. *Selected Philosophical Works* (FLPH, Moscow, 1956), p. 130.
- ¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135.
- ¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.
- ¹⁷¹ *Idem*. Letter Six. Descartes and Bacon. *Op. cit.*, p. 250.
- ¹⁷² G. W. F. Hegel. *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*, p. 135.

5

Basic Features of the Process of the History of Philosophy

The Evolution of Philosophy as a Philosophic Problem

Dialectical materialism is the most general theory of development. The Marxian understanding of the process of the history of philosophy as a specific form of development, investigation of which presupposes the working out of a corresponding (special) theory of development, is determined by that.

The universality of development inevitably complicates its definition. Far from all the processes taking place in the world are directly processes of development. But development has an all-embracing character. Consequently it includes phenomena which, though necessary moments of it, still do not, in themselves, form this process. Movement (motion) is not development, but the latter (it goes without saying) is impossible without it. The same applies to change, both quantitative and qualitative, as is indicated by transitions from one aggregate state to another or by chemical transformations.

Irreversibility, which is usually characterised as an attributive determinacy of any development, is inherent in all non-mechanical processes, including those that are not processes of development. Development, nevertheless, is mainly, as a rule, an irreversible process.

Development is thus a unity of manifold processes that form its necessary moments and various determinacies in interaction with one another, i.e. movement, change, transformation, emergence, maturing, passing away, formation of new forms and structures, transformation of content, realisation of trends engendered by preceding states, forming of new systems, etc. Development is an integrative process, a unity of manifold processes.

The principal forms of the universality of processes of development are brought out by the laws of dialectics. Development is a unity, mutual transformation, struggle of opposites, transi-

tion of quantitative changes into qualitative, negation, and negation of the negation. Development is both continuous and discrete. Evolutionary changes and revolutionary transformations constitute necessary forms of it, but they may also be two aspects of one and the same process of development.

The same must be said of progress and its opposite, regress. They are two types of development. In some conditions they are mutually exclusive, in others, on the contrary, they are mutually determined processes. It is, of course, particularly important to establish which form, type, or tendency of development is dominant, fundamental, determinant.

As a universal process development is thus a *unity* of qualitatively different processes, of their interaction, mutual transformation, and aggregate result. It is the manifold of processes constituting development that gives it its universal character. The universality of development consequently does not consist in its taking place *immediately* everywhere; the qualitatively different processes forming development take place everywhere. In other words its universality must be understood dialectically. It presumes a unity of opposites: motion and rest; change and maintenance of a certain state; transformation and equilibrium. Development is a unity of the absolute and the relative, the general and the particular, the transient and the non-transient, identity and difference.

Only a dialectical understanding of the universality of development, and of its contradictoriness, i.e. its inner, inherent relations of mutually exclusive but reciprocally conditioned opposites, makes it possible to differentiate the evolution of nature, evolution of society, and development of knowledge as special forms of a universal, absolute process. The specific patterns of the development of society differ from those of evolving nature. The development of knowledge is governed both by the patterns of social development and the special patterns of this specific process.

Philosophy is a specific form of knowledge (as has been said in detail in Chapter 2). Investigation of the features of its development is a principal task of the theory of the historical process of philosophy. From that it is clear that not only is a general conception of development inadequate for understanding the development of philosophic knowledge, but so too is the special

concept of the development of knowledge. One must not make an absolute of this development, as is usually done by modern Western philosophers and historians of philosophy, but it would be no less serious an error to ignore this difference.

The working out of a theory of the historical process of philosophy is thus not reducible to application of a general concept of development (or of a concept of its specific forms) to the development of philosophy. The job is to bring out the patterns specifically characterising philosophical development, starting from the general theory of development, i.e. from the principles of materialist dialectics.

The history of philosophy as a special field of inquiry arose back in antiquity. But the idea of the *development of philosophy* was first expressed only at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Hegel, who (as Marx said) was 'the first to comprehend the entire history of philosophy'.¹ Engels, having in mind Hegel's doctrine of the development of philosophic knowledge, appreciated his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* as 'one of the most brilliant works'.²

Hegel opposed the belief, predominant before him (and once more revived by present-day Western philosophers) that the history of philosophy was a string of doctrines replacing one another, a motley kaleidoscope of errors, and a disordered manifold of various views on every kind of matter. This conviction undoubtedly stemmed from a general metaphysical interpretation of human history, but it recorded, at the same time, in a hypertrophied way, certain real features of the process of the history of philosophy that we shall touch on below. Hegel criticised this belief and the views of the history and perspectives of philosophy based on it, as remaining at the level of appearance (seeming) and not penetrating to the essence of his historical process. Those views presumed an essential identity between philosophic doctrines, as if there were no substantial differences between them, the identity being inseparable from the differences immanent in the doctrines. The existence of differences presumed the existence of identity. And contradictions between systems existed only insofar as a unity of opposites existed in philosophy. The idea of a contradictory, developing unity of the historical process of philosophy was a principle of Hegel's dialectical idealism. 'Thus we see,' he wrote, 'that Philosophy is

system in development; the history of Philosophy is the same.³

The dialectical conception of the development of philosophy, idealistically interpreted by Hegel, distorted and mystified development in general and philosophical development in particular. The idealist, Engels pointed out, was dealing 'with thoughts as with independent entities, developing independently and subject only to their own laws'.⁴ The Hegelian panlogism, in contrast to other idealist doctrines, erected this principle into an absolute, reducing all forms of development to a logical process, and interpreting the logical as the substantial. From that standpoint development was inherent only in the concept, which was distinguished by authentic self-expression and self-comprehension of the 'Absolute Idea'. Religion, art, and philosophy were forms of existence of the 'Absolute Spirit', or of absolute knowledge (which was treated as understanding of the absolute). Philosophy, which was allotted the highest place in this hierarchy of absolute knowledge, was thus characterised as the final self-realisation of the substance-subject, i.e. was idealised. From that angle, philosophical development was the self-development of philosophy. At first philosophy comprehended the spiritual, i.e. its own content, as substance. But comprehension of the free spirituality, self-causality, and self-activity of substance meant knowledge (cognition) of the subject as the real essence of all that exists. Further knowledge of the subject, and logical development of the determinations inherent in it that are forms of universality, is complete comprehension of the absolute essence of all that exists, comprehension of the unity of substance and subject. Such, according to Hegel, were the three historical epochs of the self-development of philosophy and likewise the main epochs of world history. Human history was thus converted into the history of philosophy.

Hegel, it is true, affirmed that every doctrine was a self-consciousness of a certain epoch, so sharing its historical limitations. 'It is likewise as stupid to believe that any philosophy can go beyond its actual, present world as that an individual can skip his time.'⁵ From that angle, as he pointed out elsewhere, every philosophy 'can find satisfaction for the interests belonging to its own particular time.'⁶ But he reduced historical epochs to logical self-determinations of the Absolute Spirit. Philosophy was therefore not generated or determined by its contemporaneous

epoch, but rather was 'entirely identical with its time',⁷ i.e. constituted its essence. It was not historically determined social being that determined philosophic consciousness but, on the contrary, philosophy that ultimately proved the determined historical development of the substantial power of absolute self-consciousness.

Hegel also recognised that the development of science, in particular of the natural science of modern times, constituted the necessary level of progress in philosophy achieved in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. 'Without the working out of the empirical sciences of their own account, Philosophy could not have reached further than with the ancients'.⁸ But that thesis, whose significance can hardly be exaggerated, was clearly not built up into a system of absolute idealism according to which philosophy itself determined its own development and, furthermore, the development of all non-philosophic knowledge and, in a certain sense, of the whole of mankind in general. This profound, highly fruitful idea therefore did not become the principle of inquiry with Hegel in the history of philosophy. It simply remained a guess, an unrealised idea. But the development of philosophy is not just dependent on the development of non-philosophic knowledge. As Engels stressed, 'it is the political, legal and moral reflexes which exert the greatest direct influence on philosophy'.⁹

The idealist conception of the essence of philosophy inevitably involved an ignoring of the factual features of the historical process of philosophy. Its ideality, Hegel claimed, constituted the truth of the finite. Real materialist being was only external, the alienated existence of the spiritual, of the substantial. A doctrine that recognised material substance was therefore incompatible with philosophy. 'This ideality of the finite', he declared, 'is the principal tenet of philosophy, and every genuine, true philosophy is therefore *idealism*'.¹⁰ But that clearly contradicted the facts. In order to justify his obviously false thesis, Hegel interpreted certain materialist doctrines (Ionic natural philosophy, Spinoza's metaphysics, etc.) as in essence idealist; he also treated most materialist theories as a manifestation of non-philosophic, everyday consciousness.¹¹

The Hegelian theory of the historical process of philosophy thus excluded the struggle of materialism and idealism, in spite of the fact that his *history* of philosophy was a continuous strug-

gle against materialism. But he treated the history of philosophy, moreover, mainly as the development of idealism. The struggle of ideas that he traced was characterised in the main as differences within the idealist trend, differences that presumed a unity of initial tenets. There were undoubtedly disagreements among like-thinking idealists, but even more there was a community of initial positions. Reduction of the history of philosophy predominantly to a history of idealism helped Hegel to 'rectify' the historical process of philosophy to some extent, and even in part to unify it, in spite of constant stressing of the existence of differences among idealists. The process ultimately acquired a single-track character. The constant confrontation of doctrines, currents, and trends that essentially characterised the development of philosophy (whose contradictions often got a 'scandalous' character), was glossed over and underrated, sometimes even being reduced to the level of appearance.

However different the philosophic systems may be, they are not as different as white and sweet, green and rough; for they agree in the fact that they are philosophica.¹²

The statement of a generic unity of all philosophical doctrines, however, was a standpoint of abstract identity by which philosophy was philosophy, just as A is A. But Hegel, as we know, rejected abstract identity as one-sided, and so an untrue determination. The proposition—philosophy is philosophy—had to be counterbalanced by a concrete determination—*different* philosophies exist. There is philosophy and philosophy, but it did not follow from that, as Hegel said, that 'Philosophy in its ultimate essence is one and the same'¹³ A dialectical understanding of essence presupposed recognition of its change, as well.

Hegel's single-track interpretation of the historical process of philosophy was not the consequence of an exaggeration or overestimation of its unity (discovery of which was his outstanding contribution). The point was that he did not understand this unity dialectically enough, which in turn conditioned the ontological premisses of his doctrine of the history of philosophy, according to which all doctrines 'were of necessity one Philosophy in its development, the revelation of God, as he knows himself to be. Where several philosophies appear at the same time, they are different sides which make up one totality forming their

basis; and on account of their one-sidedness we see the refutation of the one by the other.¹⁴

Thus, since philosophies were treated as various sides and categorial determinations of absolute self-consciousness, the contradictions between them were pushed into the background, and the main thing in that case was their unity in the Absolute Spirit. Hegelian panlogism ultimately led, as the foundation of the theory of the historical process of philosophy, to exclusion of the struggle of opposites from its development. The contradiction was removed by a unity and identity in which difference was preserved solely as a subordinate moment. As Marx wrote:

Hegel's chief error is to conceive the *contradiction of appearances as unity in essence, in the idea*, while in fact it has something more profound for its essence, namely, an *essential contradiction*.¹⁵

That understanding of the relation between unity and contradiction, identity and difference helped Hegel eliminate materialism from the history of philosophy and relegate it to the periphery of the historical process of philosophy. By rejecting a metaphysical, absolute counterposing of philosophies to one another, a counterposing to which scepticism had given a negative character, he fell into the opposite error, of *reconciling* opposing doctrines as different determinations of an absolute whole. It was impossible, however, to reconcile materialism and idealism. Even the contradictions between the different idealistic doctrines were often of fundamental significance, as a comparison of seventeenth century rationalist idealism with philosophic irrationalism, for example, indicates. Hegel's striving to substantiate unity of the historical process of philosophy proved to be a glossing-over of its real contradictions at every stage, as is obvious, for instance, from his comparison of Aristotle and Plato.¹⁶ The dialectic of the historical process of philosophy was clearly simplified; in the last analysis this extremely complicated process was deprived of its inherent dissonances, drama, and tensions, and subordinated to a teleological scheme that foreshadowed the end point of the development of philosophy.

When Marx was criticising Hegel's philosophy of law, he pointed out that in Hegel

the *sharply-marked character of actual opposites*, their development into *extremes*, which is nothing else but

their self-cognition and also their eagerness to bring the fight to a decision, is thought of as something possibly to be prevented or something harmful.¹⁷

Application of that criticism to Hegel's interpretation of the historical process of philosophy also does not need, it seems to us, to be substantiated.

The most varied philosophies, even those incompatible with one another (and such exist even within idealism), were thus characterised as different sides of a single, absolute knowledge. Philosophers' errors consisted mainly in their universalising and substantialising of the aspect of the absolute they comprehended. To remove that one-sided interpretation of the absolute was to bring out the immutable, eternal truth of the principle of each philosophy, since it was now already taken as a limited, subordinate system that synthesised all the principles in a single hierarchic whole. In relation to the doctrines thus purged of one-sidedness Hegel declared:

Every philosophy has been and still is necessary; thus none have passed away, but all are affirmatively contained as elements in a whole.¹⁸

Hegel actually claimed to sublate all previous philosophic systems by his doctrine, i.e. both denied and preserved them in his encyclopaedic system. He saw the possibility and objective necessity of such a final synthesis of all foregoing philosophies in the Absolute Spirit's self-cognition being unable to remain uncompleted or inadequate to its divine essence. A 'final philosophy' was consequently necessary and such, in his opinion, was the system he had created, which included (in sublated form, it goes without saying) 'all the separate, particular principles'.¹⁹

The idea of the 'final philosophy' (which is absurd in our day) corresponded in general to the dominant ideas of Hegel's time about the development of scientific knowledge, as well as of philosophy. Irving Langmuir, an eminent modern chemist, has remarked that even at the end of the nineteenth century scientists did not in the least doubt that

the most important of (the) laws of physics and chemistry had already been discovered and that the work that remained to do was largely a matter of filling in the details and applying these great principles for practical purposes.²⁰

The Young Hegelians, and later Feuerbach, it is true, categorically opposed Hegel's conception of a 'final philosophy', but these left followers of his considered the 'philosophy of self-cognition', created by themselves to be also the final philosophy. Feuerbach was of a similar opinion about his own anthropological philosophy.

The idea of a 'final philosophy' was quite unsound as a negation of the necessity for further development of philosophy (a negation motivated by the conviction that philosophy had now attained truth and put an end to errors. Truth, if it were not just a simple statement of fact, was a process (as Hegel said many times), and that applied to any true knowledge, scientific, philosophic, economic, etc. As for errors, they were not things that could be put an end to forever. The inevitability of errors stems from the contradictory process of knowledge, in spite of the fact that any error can be overcome. By presuming the final completion of philosophical development, Hegel thereby betrayed his own dialectical method.

The concept of the 'final philosophy' nevertheless had a profound meaning (which, however, remained unknown to Hegel). It meant, in fact, objectively, the end of philosophy in the old sense of the term.

At any rate (Engels wrote) with Hegel philosophy comes to an end: on the one hand, because in his system he summed up its whole development in the most splendid fashion; and on the other hand, because, even though unconsciously, he showed us the way out of the labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world.¹¹

Hegel thus announced and demonstrated by his own doctrine, the necessity of passing from a pluralism of philosophic systems to a scientific philosophy that, however, not only completed the development that had gone before but at the same time began a new epoch in philosophy. In becoming a science (*science sui generis*), philosophy develops like all the other sciences, which are characterised by a relative unity of content, and researchers' agreement on a considerable part of its elements (which of course does not exclude disagreements, polemics on many other matters, a struggle of opinions, confrontations of mutually exclusive conceptions, etc.). That is why its development, which has become

a scientific outlook on the world, does not signify a transition to other philosophies. It is organic development on its own theoretical basis, development that presumes an enrichment of the existing content by new propositions, negation of tenets that have proved incorrect, deficient, or one-sided, and their replacement by more correct ones more deeply reflecting the reality that was previously comprehended abstractly and inadequately.

Hegel's undoubted merit was his *theoretical* overcoming of the pluralism of philosophies, i.e. his substantiation of the profound dialectical idea that philosophical theories were a necessary link in a single contradictory process of the gradual, stage-by-stage development of knowledge, in spite of their continuous confrontation of one another, mutual negation, and incompatibility. He convincingly refuted the sceptical interpretation of the historical process of philosophy, according to which philosophy never attained true conclusions because philosophers did not agree with one another on anything. Truths, however, were not truths just because they did not raise objections. Hegel explained philosophers' disagreements with one another, and the negation that characterised relations between philosophic systems, in a dialectical way. The objective content of doctrines differed essentially from their subjective form of expression. There was often a relation of succession, therefore, even where it was subjected to a very categorical negation. For continuity or succession did not exclude either disagreements in convictions or negations (which, however, also had to be understood dialectically). The opposition between truth and error was not absolute, i.e. truth was far from such in all its conceivable content, and error (insofar as it was not a simple breach of the rules of thought) was based on facts, though they were not correctly recorded and interpreted.

The development of knowledge, and of philosophic knowledge in particular, which is characterised by each object of inquiry being considered as a whole, and not in its separate aspects, varieties, and relations, is far from a straight, ascending process. It is by no means a direct transition from ignorance to knowledge, from error to truth, from limited truth to absolute truth. The Hegelian conception of the spiral-like progressive development of philosophical knowledge included negation and removal of negation, the revival of preceding knowledge in a trans-

formed form, which was not, however, a movement backward, since it presumed its reinterpretation, explanation, and inclusion in a new system.²²

Hegelian idealism also left its pernicious stamp here on the whole conception of the development of philosophical knowledge. Historical continuity was absolutised, and depicted as a sequence of ideas that initially existed in the Absolute Idea. This mystification of the logical connection and historical sequence of philosophies, and their relation to each other within the context of the progressive development of philosophical knowledge, led to particularly incorrect theoretical conclusions.

The final philosophy in time (Hegel affirmed) is the result of all foregoing philosophies and must therefore contain the principles of them all; it is therefore, if only it is a philosophic teaching, the most developed, richest, and concrete.²³

It goes without saying that he refuted that simplified, essentially undialectical view in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. He did not, of course, consider mediaeval philosophy as having absorbed the achievements of antiquity and so rising above it. When characterising the philosophy of modern times, he did not consider Berkeley and Hume representatives of a higher level of development than Descartes, Leibniz, or Spinoza. Berkeleyanism, he said, was 'the crudest form' of idealism (i.e. of philosophy in general (from Hegel's standpoint), since it did 'not proceed further than to say: All objects are our conceptions'.²⁴ There was thus an undoubted contradiction between his theory of the historical process of philosophy and his concrete study of its development. The contradiction did not, of course, exclude a unity between them.

The speculative-idealist conception of continuity entailed a teleological understanding of progress in philosophy, for development (according to Hegel) was the unfolding and realisation of what had initially existed. The beginning had also to be understood, he suggested, as the result. He therefore interpreted every achievement of philosophy as a turning back on itself of the initial concept, enriched by a new content. It is therefore not surprising that he ascribed an anticipation of the fundamentals of his philosophy to the first Greek philosophers; they had proceeded 'from the unconscious presupposition that Thought is

also Being'.²⁵ He thus often converted the dialectical conception of the development of philosophical knowledge into its opposite.

In order to bring out, and positively evaluate and develop Hegel's brilliant ideas of the progressive development of philosophy, it was necessary first to create historical materialism, from the standpoint of which philosophy is comprehended as social consciousness in which the whole manifold of social life and its determinant basis (the development of social production) is comprehended. Is it surprising that all post-Hegelian middle-class conceptions of the historical process of philosophy (today's included) are characterised by an incomprehension of his legacy in the history of philosophy or, moreover, by militant denial of it?

Wilhelm Dilthey (mentioned above), who considered himself Hegel's continuer in several respects, in fact counterposed the idea of an *anarchy of philosophic systems* to the Hegelian doctrine of a regular progressive development of philosophy. The Hegelian tenet of an essential identity of each philosophy with a historically definite time has been interpreted in a relativist, pluralist spirit: the various attitudes to the world that compose the content of philosophies corresponding to different epochs. Dilthey even affirmed, moreover, that historically different doctrines, however they differed from one another, strove to comprehend one and the same thing that *existed* in the stream of historical, changes, viz., the riddle of being, the meaning of human life. But each philosophy rejected all the other answers to these questions by virtue of its inherent epochal determinacy. The unity of all the philosophies that had 'one and the same world, reality, before them, which appeared in consciousness',²⁶ did not in the least do away with the anarchy of systems, but was actually, rather, its main source.

One of Dilthey's supporters, F. Kroener, said, substantiating this thesis:

The true *scandal of philosophy* is only and exclusively in the anarchy of philosophic systems in that the multiplicity of philosophic views and their fierce struggle against each other are the two sides of one whole.²⁷

But the explanation of the multiplicity of philosophic doctrines by their struggle against each other, like explanation of the

struggle between them by the existence of a host of doctrines, did not in the least, according to him, explain the essence of the process of the history of philosophy.

The necessary pluralism of philosophic systems (writes Kroener) (stems) from the essence of any possible system.²⁸

This pluralism is explained, consequently, by an essential, permanent specific characteristic of philosophy. It is only possible to rise above this anarchy by creating a metaphilosophy, or 'systematology' that would explain the situation inevitable in philosophy. 'Systematology', while coming forward as a philosophy of philosophy, left everything as it was and, by rejecting the possibility of a scientific, philosophical outlook, limited its task to comprehension of the inevitability of an anarchy of systems and its illusory overcoming in 'systematological' consciousness.

The West German philosopher of an irrationalist trend, Hermann Schmitz, calls the pluralism of philosophies an authentic expression of the boundless wealth of mankind's intellectual memory. This notion of a universal human intellectual memory is mystified in the spirit of the Platonic myth of knowledge as recollection or memory; the human spirit, confined in the dungeon of the body, turns mentally to the transcendental world of ideas, in which it existed until its fall, i.e. until its earthly existence. And since different minds are involved with the world of Truth, Good, and Beauty to different degrees, the absolute is unequally stamped on their memory. Hence, too, the multitude of memories of the transcendental, contradicting one another, a multitude which is ineradicable because of the this-worldliness (here and now) of human existence, its fatal alienation from real being. According to that the task of the historian of philosophy consists in 'discovering in the *plurality of systems* an inevitable destiny of philosophical consciousness that rises to methodical rationality',²⁹ i.e. in trying to comprehend, link together, and unite in a single whole the isolated fragments of recollections of the transcendental distorted by the sense perception of this world. The existence of all philosophical systems is therefore equally justified, since they are recollections of the transcendental. There is not, and cannot be, any criterion for evaluation of the cognitive value of philosophies, since the truth a philosophy tries to comprehend, or rather to 'remember', is not of this world. The

sole demand that a philosophy cannot help following boils down to recognition of the necessity of rational recollections of the other world. If this imperative of 'rationality' is accepted, any philosophical construct is as justified as scientific understanding of reality. Schmitz asks:

Does this insight into the inevitable plurality of system force the resigned conclusion that philosophical systems have no obligatory cognitive value and no claim to supra-individual value or currency, but are some private conceptual figments that only interest the author and those who happen to be like-minded with him?²³

It is not hard to guess the answer to that clearly simply formulated question:

No. A system formed by serious philosophical memory cannot help being animated by the same sensible striving for knowledge as any scientific inquiry.²⁴

The unsoundness of that conclusion is obvious even though a philosophy that is absolutely opposed to scientific inquiry and its real, this-world, and object field, naturally cannot be scientific.

The pluralist interpretation of the history of philosophy means, in the final analysis, a denial of the development of philosophical knowledge. From that standpoint there are only philosophical masterpieces, and each of them is something absolutely final and completed, ruling out further work, presupposing a critical review of its content, and its evaluation in the light of previously unknown factors, and regularities. The sole thing that links philosophers to any extent is that they all exist in a world of philosophers. The philosopher, says Edmund Husserl, is primarily

motivated through his philosophical, operative environment of philosophers and their thoughts down to the most-remote past. This milieu, which reaches back to the original foundation of philosophy and philosophical traducement is his living present. In this context he has his fellow-workers, his partners; he discusses with Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Kant, and others.²⁵

The basis of this statement of Husserl's boils down to a claim that each philosophy determines its content itself, starting from

the point that all other philosophies that existed in the past constitute 'philosophic contemporaneity'. In other words, all philosophers that the creator of a system knows are his contemporaries. Philosophical contemporaneity, he claims, 'is the quintessence of philosophic coexistence, the whole history of philosophy' for the philosopher.⁸² The doctrines of the most diverse historical epochs are consequently called coexisting ones, *since* they are considered from the standpoint of a subsequent epoch. That is the sole limitation admitted by Husserl, since Kant could not, of course, have been in Descartes' intellectual field of view, while Descartes had already existed for Kant and moreover as a contemporary of Kant (such is Husserl's basic belief).

The idea of the 'contemporaneity' of all philosophies that are part of the heritage of the philosophy of each historical epoch is nothing else than a wiping out of the historical differences between these doctrines, and consideration of the differences between them as unimportant accretions of a transient epoch. According to Neothomism, for instance, Thomas Aquinas is our contemporary, and everything that put a stamp of historical limitedness on all his teaching related only to the freedom of exposition, and not to the content. To justify that thesis, without which it is impossible to believe in the present-day and fundamental importance of Thomism, let alone its recognition as an 'eternal philosophy', Neothomism has worked out its own conception of the subject-matter of philosophy.

According to it philosophy is occupied with inquiring into basic everyday experience, unaltered in all historical epochs, and identical for all nations, accumulated independently of cognitive efforts, i.e. simply the consequence of the fact that each person is born, grows up, and acts in an environment, experiences thirst and hunger, joy and sorrow, has intercourse with other people, strives for something, gets ill, and finally dies. Everything that the history of mankind introduces into this 'primordial' and allegedly extra-historical everyday experience is treated as attendant, changing its main content, diverting philosophy from its general path indicated by the essential immutability of human nature and the substantial immutability of existence (being). Special scientific experience (whose significance for understanding phenomena Neothomism does not in the least dispute) is therefore considered to be non-existent in principle for philo-

sophy since it cannot add anything to the basic core of everyday experience. And philosophy, insofar as it quits the realm of everyday experience (an adequate expression of which is sound human common sense), and tries to find its basis in special scientific experience, is doomed to fatal errors. Thomas Aquinas, his today's followers say, naturally could not know the discoveries of the science of modern times, but that did not prevent him from developing a system of philosophic truths with which (sic!) the conclusions of modern natural sciences agree. Even the scientific errors of the 'angelic doctor' did not interfere, from that angle, with his philosophic insights, since an adequate interpretation of everyday experience and comprehension of its profound content, which enabled all the ontological determinations of what exists to be comprehended, served as their basis.

It can be shown that the Neothomist conception of the subject-matter of philosophy (and correspondingly the conception of the historical process of philosophy) is not worth attention because it is so obsolete, but this unmistakably archaic conception is shared in essence by many other philosophers who are far from being Neothomists. Husserl, according to whom the basis of philosophising should be a transcendental reductivism, i.e. exclusion of the external world and empirical notions associated with it, and all scientific knowledge, from philosophic vision, preaches in essence an idea very close to Neothomism, of a return to the primordial, pre-experimental, extra-historical, 'pure' human Ego, in whose depths he sought to reveal the fundamental phenomena of true, ideal being. Existentialism organically linked with Husserl's phenomenology, counterposes 'pure' human existence to people's concrete, definite, empirical being, defending the same idea of the immutable human self. Is it surprising that, from the standpoint of Karl Jaspers, philosophy has always been existential, there being no question of any progress within the context of existential philosophising? The only thing there is, is the appearance of new philosophical individualities that are in principle not comparable with one another from the standpoint of the development of knowledge, since philosophy is not knowledge but a special kind of faith.

According to Heidegger the history of philosophy is an inevitably descending process, i.e. movement from the higher to the lower. Its highest level was ancient Greek philosophy. Sub-

sequent doctrines, beginning with Socrates, were at best only more or less distinguished milestones on the paths of this universal historical regression.³³

Thus, whereas in the distant past, even before the appearance of Hegelian philosophy, it had been usual to say that there was a *history* of philosophy, but no *development* in philosophy, a belief prevails in present-day Western philosophy that philosophy, strictly speaking, has neither development nor history, since all philosophers of the past were contemporaries of the philosophers of each succeeding epoch. F. Alquié, for example, said categorically, in a discussion organised by the French Philosophical Society on the theme 'Where Is Philosophy Going in History?', that 'the word history and the word philosophy are absolutely antithetical. I think that there is no history of philosophy, but that there is a philosophy'.³⁴ This point of view, we would note, did not essentially meet any objections.

When one ponders over this persistent, clearly conceptual counterposing of philosophy and history, the only possible explanation of it (considering the facts mentioned above) is that today's Western philosophy is battling against recognition of the development of philosophy. If philosophy were developing, certain trends of development would have to be recognised as characteristic of an epoch; and a valuable posing of the problems, true ideas and views philosophies contain would have to be singled out, by comparative evaluation of the doctrines, at the same time criticising everything false, obsolete and reactionary in them. That kind of analysis presumes the necessity of tracing progress in the development of philosophical knowledge and a summing up of the real gains of philosophy, and a corresponding negative evaluation of those doctrines that deny its achievements, justifying that position by subjectivist arguments of various kinds. In short, a positive evaluation of the history of philosophy, the basis for which was already laid by Hegel, ultimately leads, as history shows, to the scientific, philosophical world outlook of Marxism. That is why many Western philosophers today also claim that there is no past in the history of philosophy that is not real and no doctrines, theories, conceptions, ideas, that are transcended by subsequent development, and no *knowledge*, since there is no general agreement on that point, and of course, for the same reason, no *true* theses.

From that angle there are simply *various* philosophies, and the concepts of truth and error, knowledge and ignorance are inapplicable for their evaluation. 'The history of philosophy', William James said, 'is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments.'³⁵ Today's Western philosophy has not advanced beyond that statement of the beginning of this century. At the same time one can say that they draw all the nihilist conclusions that stem from it. Take for example the sweeping conclusions of Harold McCarthy, an American philosopher of positivist views, who suggests that, 'although no philosophical interpretation is subject to conclusive empirical verification, all philosophical interpretations that assert anything comprehensible at all (or even quite comprehensible) are equally possible'.³⁶ One can only agree with that statement if it is taken out of context of the conception of the history of philosophy it expresses, since it asserts, by the very fact of its existence, that the most obscure statements are undoubtedly possible in philosophy. But it is not a matter, of course, of the obscure statements that Descartes already ridiculed, but of the real history, and actual development and results and achievements of philosophical knowledge.

Present-day Western philosophers (and historians of philosophy) deny the possibility (and necessity) of *theoretical* generalisation of the history of philosophy, whose principles were laid by Hegel. They therefore refuse to draw a line between the true and false, progressive and reactionary, living and dead, transient and non-transient in the history of philosophy. Typical in that sense is the statement of the Dutch philosopher Van Dooren,

The first question to be comprehended is the question whether it is possible to speak of dead philosophy or of living philosophy. Is it not true that to live is something quite different than to philosophise and that it is not possible to use the categories of life to describe philosophy? We might as well speak of a yellow or a square philosophy."³⁷

So, we see, recognition or denial of the development of philosophy is a fundamental ideological question. It is not so much a question of the past of philosophy as of its present and future. Those who deny its development, deny the possibility of the

existence of a scientific, philosophical world outlook and, moreover, deny that it has been realised by Marxism. They regard the whole history of philosophy, and primarily the history of materialism, and the history of dialectics (whose centuries-long development created the premisses of dialectical and historical materialism), from a standpoint of denying Marxism. The bitterness with which supporters of a subjective, pluralist interpretation of philosophy attack Hegel's teaching on the history of philosophy becomes understandable in that connection.

From the angle of the idealist 'philosophy of the history of philosophy', so very influential in France, Italy, West Germany, and certain other countries, Hegelian *historicism* depreciates great philosophies since they are associated with certain social epochs and so lack an inherent supra-historical sense and significance. According to Martial Gueroult, the leader of this movement, philosophy as a logical unity of thought 'does not begin in time. As soon as it appears, it is manifested as intemporal by nature. So all philosophy is the eternal Idea and one understands it as invulnerable to history.'³⁸

Hegel tried to explain the existence of a plurality of contradictory philosophies and to investigate ways of overcoming the situation that opposed philosophy to scientific investigation, i.e. prevented the conversion of philosophy into a real science. Ferdinand Brunner, a follower of Gueroult, interprets this historically progressive attempt as a 'despotic solution of the problem of the plurality of philosophies',³⁹ destruction of the autonomy of philosophy, and in the end a particular incomprehension of the nature of philosophic systems. Each system is an intellectual monument not subject to the influence of time. And Brunner, equating philosophic systems with works of art, whose value he sees in their negating unaesthetic reality, creating an ideal world that transcends it, proclaims:

Each philosophy establishes the real accordingly and appears as a Platonic Idea which is not the copy of reality but its principle of organisation.⁴⁰

He regards the Hegelian history of philosophy from these subjectivist positions as a discrediting of the real history of philosophy, which is allegedly incompatible with progress since there is nothing truer or higher in it, just as there is nothing less

true or lower. According to Brunner the job of the history of philosophy is to refute the 'fiction of progress' and so transcend all philosophies, without giving preference to any one of them, and to reject the slightest assumption of the superiority of one philosophy over another. 'The history of philosophy' (having in mind the philosophic discipline), he writes, 'raises philosophy to the Ideas that constitute the intelligible world, the only real world'.⁴¹

There is no need to go into a more detailed review of this idealist theory, which is presented as the last word in the history of philosophy. Such conceptions of this history are evidence that it is extremely difficult to assimilate the real achievements of dialectical materialism (and probably even impossible) within the context of present-day bourgeois Western consciousness. Lenin pointed out that dialectical idealism was closer to Marxian philosophy than all preceding materialist philosophy. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that today's opponents of dialectical materialism are irreconcilably hostile to dialectical idealism as well. Much modern Western philosophy slams the door on its historically progressive past, since its legitimate heir is dialectical materialism.

The Differentiation, Divergence, and Polarisation of Philosophies

To understand and explain the structure of the development of philosophy means above all to clarify the relations between the various philosophies that sometimes existed simultaneously and sometimes succeeded one another. In the course of the subsequent history of philosophy their number, and the diversity of conceptions and approaches, not only did not diminish but, on the contrary, increased. All that, of course, makes it difficult to understand the history of philosophy as a process of development, since recognition of the ever-growing multitude of doctrines in itself is incompatible with development (in any case directly), which presupposes a certain unity, commensurability, and interaction of the elements comprising them. The question arises whether an indefinite number of doctrines can be divided into relatively simple components, and elementary links and dependencies brought out at first, and later more complicated ones,

whether the relations between doctrines can be examined by drawing a line between appearance and essence, objective content and subjective form of expression, contradictions, and the unity and struggle of opposites. The Hegelian doctrine of the existence of identity in differences and differences in identity, and the doctrine he developed of the contradictory unity of phenomenon and essence, can undoubtedly assist to a scientific understanding of the diversity of philosophies in their unity realised in historical development. It is not, of course, a direct unity; and it does not become such through development. But it can seemingly be represented by analogy with Darwin's doctrine of the unity of the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms, in spite of all the differences, contrasts, and contradictions dividing them.

The idea of a transformation of species had been expressed many times before Darwin. But it was he who raised the question of the origin of species, i.e. of the minimum typological differences between living creatures. Whereas his forerunners had been interested in how differences between such remotely related species as elephants and tortoises had arisen, Darwin studied the differences between the horse and the ass, between the violet and the pansy. He consequently attributed key importance to the difference within identity, whereas such differences had been uninteresting and inessential to his predecessors. The outstanding methodological significance of this approach was indubitable from the standpoint of materialist dialectics. It is also not difficult to demonstrate its application to study of the history of philosophy.

While Thales considered water the primary material, and Anaximenes air, Heracleitos supposed that only fire could be such. Divergences of that kind, which presupposed an essential conceptual identity (in this case recognition of a single primary element, and an essentially materialist conception of it, the idea of the material unity of the world, and a universal transformation of phenomena), can be characterised as a *differentiation* of philosophies. It is a disagreement among the like-minded, yet an *essential* disagreement, since there is a critique and negation in it of the primary element adopted by another philosopher, and through that a deepening and development of the concept of primary element itself. That is particularly obvious when we

go into the doctrines of Anaximander and Herakleitos. The former, seemingly on principle, rejected the assumption that some *certain* substance, clearly differing from all other sense-perceived things, could be their primary source or origin. Hence the hypothesis of the existence of a primordial, indefinite, primary element which still did not include the qualitative differences existing in sense-perceptible reality. Herakleitos who, unlike Anaximander, insisted on the existence of a definite primary element, chose as such the material process that most convincingly brought out the annihilation of definite things, and the transition to 'not being'. We thus see that the differentiation of doctrines was characterised by an essential objective content, i.e. expressed not simply the philosopher's subjective claims to his special view, but the *development* of a definite conception, the advancing of various aspects to the foreground, and self-criticism within a given school. This differentiation, consequently, represented the forming of more substantial differences, in particular when it was extended to interpretation of the initial thesis of a philosophy.

The French materialists of the eighteenth century represented a single current, a union of like-minded persons, within which however, there was an essential (and fruitful) differentiation of views. Marx pointed out two qualitatively different trends in their inquiries: the Cartesian and the sensualist, continuing the doctrine of Locke. La Mettrie's famous dictum that man was a machine, in spite of its historically progressive significance, was unacceptable in essence to Helvetius and Diderot. Helvetius brought to the fore the sensory experience of the human individual, his awareness of his interest (to some extent the concept of interest went beyond the limits of the mechanistic outlook), the significance of education, and so on.⁴² Diderot openly opposed La Mettrie, substantiating the thesis that man is not a machine. He, however, compared the human organism with a musical instrument whose keys were 'struck' by the things affecting a person. That was another version of the mechanistic interpretation of man, in which his sensory nature, and the conditioning of sense perceptions by the external world, on the one hand, and the inner workings of the human 'instrument', on the other, were primarily stressed.

The fact that Diderot and Helvetius disputed one of La Mettrie's underlying systems did not rule out substantial disagree-

ments between them as well. Diderot criticised Helvetius, who suggested that theoretical conclusions depended on the acuteness of sense perceptions and the wealth of sense data. While sharing the basic tenets of sensualist epistemology, Diderot opposed its simplified interpretation, stressing the relative independence of thought (reason) from sense perceptions. These disagreements within materialist sensualism undoubtedly helped overcome the one-sided opposing of empiricism to rationalism, and anticipated a dialectical understanding of the unity of the sensory and the rational.

There is no need here to survey the differentiation of doctrines in more detail, since it is quite obvious from what has already been said that these 'intraspecific', and in part even 'interspecific', divergences represent the development of views common to various philosophers. But the results of this development, i.e. the undoubted deepening, enriching, and concretising of one conception or another, did not become *generally acceptable* (as usually happens in science), i.e. the divergences were retained even when they had already lost their *raison d'être*, largely due to the fact that legitimate expressions, justified changes of conception, and reconsideration of certain views were substantiated (in accordance with the nature of philosophical knowledge) by quite general considerations, assumptions, and suppositions that could not be confirmed experimentally, in practice, by quantitative measurements, etc. All of which, however, does not alter the fact that the differentiation of philosophic views represented an investigatory quest during which related points of view were compared, divergences brought out and substantiated, and the posing of the problem itself given a new content.

It will readily be noted that the differentiation of philosophies, conceptions, and separate theses included a possibility of fundamental divergences, i.e. a tendency to theoretical development of ideas in various directions, including mutually exclusive ones. This process can be called *divergence*, during which differences within an original community of views become preponderant, determinant philosophical characteristics. Descartes' doctrine was the direct theoretical source, as we know, of three quite different trends. The materialist Le Roy discarded the Cartesian metaphysics and the dualist conception of man associated with it. The occasionalists Malebranche and Geulincx, on the

contrary, developed and deepened the idealist aspect of Descartes' system. Spinoza's pantheistic materialism represented an attempt at a monistic development of both his metaphysics and physics.

Divergence, consequently, differs qualitatively from differentiation, and to a lesser extent presupposes negation of one of the principles of a preceding doctrine, and transition to a new principle. But that is still not negation of all the fundamental propositions, so that the opposition in principle still has a one-sided character. It is essentially a matter of the development of one aspect of the negated principle. Since Descartes' system combined a mainly materialist conception of nature with recognition as well of an idealist interpretation of metaphysical reality, divergence was a bringing out of the main contradiction of the system, a counterposing of the opposites included in it, admission of their content and significance not dependent on each other, and correspondingly theoretical development of the essentially different aspects of the Cartesian system.

The divergence of philosophies is a diverse process whose forms are far from exhausted by various types of ideological *inheritance*. It is not only the relation of doctrines to preceding theories but is also an interaction of ones developing in parallels, and *relatively* independent of one another, sometimes taking shape in one and the same historical conditions, but variously expressing the common striving of the epoch. Such, in particular, was the relation between rationalism and empiricism, which were opposing systems of views that were, however, only partially mutually exclusive. In other respects they were supported, on the contrary, by common ideas, and supplemented each other, as a result of which divergence did not exclude convergence. Not only the rationalists of the seventeenth century understood reason as the supreme instance of cognitive activity, but so did the contemporaneous empiricists.

Some writers speak of rationalism in this connection in the broad sense of the term. The cult of reason was in fact a common ideological paradigm of the time of the early bourgeois revolutions. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that philosophical empiricism categorically rejected the cult of *pure reason*, the theory of innate ideas, *a priorism*, identification of the physical and logical foundations, metaphysical reality, in any case as the

object of inquiry, and recognition of objective forms of universality.

On the other hand, rationalism recognised the paramount importance of sense experience, observation, and experiment for understanding *natural* phenomena. Admission of a possibility of supra-experimental knowledge was linked by rationalists not only with admission of a supranatural being but also with recognition of universal patterns and analysis of the specific features of mathematical knowledge.

The dispute between rationalism and empiricism was a kind of collision in relation to which one must recognise that both sides were right in some things and wrong in others. Furthermore, even the errors of both parties were fraught with certain truths.

The theoretical roots of this divergence are obvious. The sciences of modern times exist, on the one hand, as mathematical sciences, and, on the other, as empirical science. Although empirical observations and mathematical inquiry were successfully combined in astronomy, the relation between mathematics, mechanics and experimental study of nature is characterised in the main by an opposition of research techniques and epistemological premises not explicitly stated. That opposition is not, however, a hostile confrontation; it is rather linked with the existence of qualitatively different subject-matters of scientific inquiry. The outstanding achievements of mathematics and celestial mechanics, moreover, represent the ideal of exact knowledge to empiricist natural scientists.

The divergence that characterises the opposition of rationalism and empiricism, however, also has ideological roots. Seventeenth-century rationalism was clearly not free of teleological intentions and implications. Both Descartes' attempt to perfect the ontological argument of Anselm of Canterbury and Leibniz's occasionalism and theodicy essentially characterised that trend, in spite of its obvious hostility to feudal ideology. The last point, which characterised rationalism as a historically progressive bourgeois ideology, found expression in the divergence that took place within rationalism itself. While the occasionalists reinforced the teleological tendency of Cartesianism, dissolving nature in living being. Spinoza elected a quite opposite path. His formula 'god or nature', in spite of all its reservations and theological twists, was undoubtedly a formula of atheism and a materialist panthe-

ism directly upheld by his critical analysis of theology and religion. That divergence within rationalism (and at the same time within the seventeenth-century systems of metaphysics) included a tendency toward a clear polarisation of directions.

We must emphasise that theological intentions and implications are inherent in the philosophy of empiricism, too, and not just in rationalist philosophy. They are also to be found in the science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in spite of the fact that, despite a mediaeval (theological) outlook, it substantiated explanation of natural phenomena by natural causes. The point, consequently, lay not so much in the specific features of rationalism, and even more of empiricism, as in the general ideological atmosphere of the epoch of the early bourgeois revolution, which (in any case up to the end of the seventeenth century) took the form of religious movements (the Reformation, religious wars, etc.).

The divergence taking place within one trend or another was, as a rule, a philosophic process in which a new set of problems arose, the historical posing of questions was enriched, and new answers were found and substantiated. The theory of innate ideas, as originally formulated by Descartes, functioned as a reception of Platonic conceptions and clear homage to the theological idea of certain concepts and notions to which fundamental importance was attached. With Descartes however, it was not reduced to these negative moments; it was a matter of theoretical principles that could not be reduced to inductive generalisations. The concept of *a priori* knowledge was historically linked with the theory of innate ideas, at the same time, however, it fixed essential features of mathematical knowledge and of the logical process in general, albeit inadequately. While the notion of *a priori* knowledge was more and more associated in seventeenth-century rationalist doctrines with attempts to justify theological concepts theoretically, the concept of *a priori* knowledge proclaimed and substantiated by Kant was a negation in principle of the theoretical surmountability of the limits of possible experience.

Kant criticised the *a priorism* of the seventeenth century precisely for its theological intentions and implications. While revising the concept of the *a priori*, he explained that it was essentially a matter of theoretical judgments possessing apodictic univer-

sality. By that posing of the problem its real content, which was directly related to mathematics and theoretical natural science, was explicated. Kant, of course, denied the possibility of a *priori* knowledge independent of sense contemplation, i.e. characterised the *a priori* not as the content of knowledge (which had an empirical origin) but as its form. The subjectivist interpretation of universality and necessity (the negative aspect of Kant's understanding of the *a priori*) could not overshadow the rationalist content of his critique of preceding *a priorism*. His posing of the problem of synthetic *a priori* judgments, i.e. the problem of a scientific, theoretical synthesis, was essentially a substantiation of the possibility and necessity of a transition from empirical investigation of nature to theoretical science.

The divergence of philosophic views was thus by no means a haphazard process in which any thesis was refuted by an antithesis, which was in turn negated. That was only the semblance of the historical process of philosophy; it existed, of course, expressing, albeit inadequately, the real characteristics of the development of philosophy. The semblance rested on negation, but a negation that preserved the objective content it brought out. Such an analysis, viz., dialectical, of the processes of divergence disclosed the development of the concepts, problems, and categories of philosophy. As for the fact (essential for the history of philosophy) that those involved in the dispute belonged to opposing trends, and as a rule never reached agreement, it characterised the subjective aspect of the dispute, on the one hand, while indicating, on the other, that the truths established in philosophy were subject to further development, which also occurred through continuing discussion.

The *polarisation of philosophy* (i.e. formation of fundamentally incompatible philosophies) was a necessary result of the historically progressing divergence of doctrines. It was consequently not a partial negation (presuming partial agreement), but a negation of the whole system of principles and conclusions that followed from it. A tendency to polarisation was already obvious in the process of divergence; it comes out, in particular, when the opposition of rationalism and empiricism is considered. Analysis of the opposition of rationalism and irrationalism helps clarify its further deepening, but rationalist idealism often includes irrational assumptions. Some irrationalist doctrines also contain-

ed elements of rationalism. In other words, rationalist idealism and idealism of an irrationalist hue had certain features in common because of their idealist answer to the basic philosophical question. It was still not a *radical polarisation*, however; only the latter represented a final delimitation in principle and confrontation all along the main lines. Such is the opposition between materialism and idealism, the main philosophical trends.

The struggle of materialism and idealism is the principal form of philosophic development, since the manifold differences are dialectically sublated by this active antithesis (i.e. are mastered, thoroughly revised, and critically assimilated), and a general alternative—materialism or idealism?—thereby developed and substantiated. The philosopher who has not come to the recognition of this alternative, or who ignores it (as often happens in present-day Western philosophy), interprets the pluralism of philosophies (i.e. the external semblance and one-sided expression of the essence of philosophy) as its universal and richest expression, content-wise. Such a philosopher is an eclectic, incapable of comprehending the fundamental significance of the theoretical sequence, which is specially essential and important precisely in philosophy. He remains an idealist, as a rule, but an idealist of a kind who is not aware of (or even denies) the real essence of his doctrine. Lenin spoke of brilliantly consistent idealists who proved capable, because of this radical feature of their doctrines, of outstanding discoveries. That pointing out of the significance of philosophic consistency is of inestimable methodological value. It stresses the need (subjective as well as objective) for an alternative choice between materialism and idealism.

The indefinite multiplicity of philosophies, which confuses the unsophisticated philosophic consciousness, is reduced by historical development itself to a radical opposition of the main philosophic trends. The problem of choice, which would be essentially unresolved or even deprived of sense if it were a matter of choice of one doctrine among the infinite multiplicity of others, therefore also receives a rational solution. There is no blind-alley situation in which choice of one doctrine would mean contempt for the content and achievements of other theories. Their content and achievements are summed up in the history both of materialism and idealism. The point, consequently, concerns the choice between a materialist or an idealist sum-

ming-up of the development, problems and achievements of philosophy.

Materialism and idealism are often depicted in the Western literature as trends existing alongside others, no less significant, perhaps even more significant ones.

It follows that there are no main trends in philosophy at all; the existence of such is usually doubted or in general denied. It is therefore not enough to limit ourselves to proclaiming the Marxian thesis of a radical polarisation of philosophy. It is necessary to trace this process and demonstrate its all-embracing character, and its organic link with all the other processes that characterise the development of philosophic knowledge. It is specially important, moreover, to show that the radical oppositions of materialism and idealism take shape within doctrines, tendencies, and trends whose content previously did not predetermine their materialist or, on the contrary, idealist character. There is not the slightest doubt that doctrines of that kind exist. They are often counterposed by present-day Western philosophers to the dialectical materialist conception of the history of philosophy. Reference is made, for example, to philosophical anthropology, claiming that it has overcome the 'one-sidedness' both of materialism and idealism. Neopositivism has tried to prove that the logical empiricism it substantiates lies outside the traditional, allegedly outmoded, obsolete opposing of materialism and idealism. But serious analysis of these doctrines, and others, indicates that there is a radical polarisation, even when the latest spokesmen of idealism usually deny it. The philosophical anthropology developed by Feuerbach was an anthropological materialism. As for the anthropological philosophy of Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen, and their successors, it is an idealist doctrine in spite of all its difference from classical idealism (which is distinguished by clarity, definiteness, and consistency in answering the main philosophic question). Thus there are both a materialist philosophical anthropology and an idealist anthropologism. A struggle has developed between materialism and idealism in this 'special' field of philosophic inquiry as well.

In pointing out the predilection of one thinker or another for philosophic empiricism, we still do not thereby define his adherence to the materialist or the idealist trend, but that does not mean that empiricism is a philosophically neutral trend. Its his-

tory shows that a radical opposition of materialism and idealism had already taken shape within it in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While Francis Bacon was a classical representative of materialist empiricism, George Berkeley was the classical spokesman of idealist empiricism, whose continuers were the positivists and neopositivists from Comte to Mach, and the neopositivists of the twentieth century. The same radical polarisation characterises the history of rationalism (about which we have said enough above). Spinoza had already, in the seventeenth century, counterposed a rationalist materialism to rationalist idealism. A radical polarisation thus also embraced the metaphysical systems that developed as a rule in the bed of the idealist trend. Spinozism was a materialist system of metaphysics. So, too, were the systems of Robinet and Deschamps, which differed precisely as metaphysical systems from the doctrines of the eighteenth-century spokesmen of French materialism.

Engels made the point, at first glance paradoxical, that certain mediaeval mystic doctrines came close, in essence, to materialism.⁴³ That applied not only to Thomas Muntzer, but also to some extent to Siger von Brabant, Meister Eckhart, and Jakob Böhme, as has been shown by the work in particular of B. E. Bykhovsky and Hermann Ley.⁴⁴ It would be wrong, of course, to speak of a mystic materialism counterposed to mystic idealism. Mysticism and idealism are genetically linked. Nevertheless mediaeval mysticism often changed its content essentially, to the extent that it became an antifeudal doctrine, and opponent of religious, theological dogmatism, so that the mystic interpretation of nature, freed of theological precepts, anticipated the materialist understanding of the external world that took shape in modern times. It would be impossible, without allowing for that tendency, to understand the link between the materialist doctrines of the time of the Renaissance and Neoplatonism and the origin of Giordano Bruno's materialist pantheism. A splitting of pantheism into an opposition of materialism and idealism characterised early bourgeois philosophy in a specific way; like all bourgeois ideology it developed at first within a context of religious consciousness, which was gradually transformed and partly overcome by philosophic inquiry.

The opposition between materialism and idealism thus embraced all philosophical tendencies, indirectly if not directly. We

should not, of course, understand by this that each doctrine existed in two mutually exclusive forms—materialist and idealist. Idealism, whatever its concrete, special form, naturally did not break down into an opposition of materialism and idealism, precisely because it itself was the result of a radical polarisation. The attempts of today's Western philosophers and historians of philosophy to pass off existentialism, neopositivism, and even Neothomism as non-idealistic doctrines (but, of course, also non-materialist) are therefore quite unsound. The description of materialism and idealism as the main, all-embracing trends means only that the whole manifold of the problems of philosophy finds expression and development in the great confrontation of these systems summed up by the historical process of philosophy (and of knowledge in general). Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy demonstrates that it is the materialist, or rather the dialectical materialist, summing-up of the history of philosophy that is its adequate, scientific interpretation, capable of really expressing all its inherent wealth of ideas, variety of forms and content, and ideological, theoretical unity.

Our survey of the differentiation, divergence, polarisation, and radical polarisation of philosophies has far from exhausted the characteristics of the development of philosophy. We have dwelt on these features of the historical process primarily because Marxian research workers have not yet paid sufficient attention to them, and have sometimes simply ignored them. The existing features of the historical process also include other characteristics, like historical continuity or succession, progress, change of the subject-matter of philosophy, the counterposing of philosophical inquiry and practical activity, and, likewise, tendencies to overcome this contradiction.

We must stress that the forms of philosophic development that we have considered are precisely those that have to be distinguished from the content substantially associated with them, yet differing from them. These forms, of course, characterise the development of philosophy precisely in a specific way and so distinguish it from development in other fields of knowledge, in particular the science of nature. But the difference must not be exaggerated, as adherents of an idealist (in particular, pluralist) interpretation of the history of philosophy do. There is also a divergence of views, and even polarisation of theories, in natu-

ral science, but in it the divergence is overcome through the development of new theories that allow for the facts that the opposing conceptions interpret in a one-sided way, and reduce them to a single system. As Engels pointed out: 'All human knowledge develops in a much twisted curve.'⁴⁵ That description of the history of knowledge applies to philosophy as well as to science.

The forms of development of philosophy are not, of course, its motive forces. To represent the development of philosophy as if the transition to new theses were made as a consequence of a divergence immanent in philosophical thought would be to go back to Hegel's point of view that it is an autonomous process, the self-development of reason. But knowledge is by no means an autonomous process, especially in philosophy, which derives its content from everyday and historical experience, the natural and social sciences, and other forms of social consciousness (for example, from religion, as is typical of idealism). In the final analysis, the driving forces of philosophic knowledge are the same forces, conditions, and requirements that determine the development of knowledge in general. When Engels characterised the development of philosophy in modern times he remarked that 'during this long period from Descartes to Hegel and from Hobbes to Feuerbach, the philosophers were by no means impelled, as they thought they were, solely by the force of pure reason. On the contrary, what really pushed them forward most was the powerful and ever more rapidly onrushing progress of natural science and industry.'⁴⁶ At the same time, we must not, when stressing this direct conclusion from the materialist conception of history, underestimate the reverse influence of knowledge on social being—an influence that gives its development a relatively independent character. The need for knowledge, not only the individual's but also society's, develops historically. The progressing division of labour gives relative independence to the specialised forms of knowledge and likewise to the impelling ideal motives that characterise them. From that standpoint divergence, in particular radical polarisation, i.e. the struggle between materialism and idealism, are not passive forms, but active, vigorously stimulating ones, the impelling motives of philosophic development.

The opposition between form and content is relative; they

pass into one another, but in so doing content retains its primacy. The same must be said about the relation between social consciousness and social being; their absolute opposition is necessary and justified only within the context of the basic philosophic question, i.e. insofar as it is a matter of the primary and secondary, derivative, and relative. One must not, however, forget the specific character of social relations, which are subject-object ones, i.e. presume a unity and interconversion of the subjective and the objective, in contrast to natural processes. 'There is a difference between the subjective and the objective,' Lenin stressed, '*BUT IT, TOO, HAS ITS LIMITS.*'⁴⁷ Social consciousness does not exist outside social being; the latter is not an unconscious process lacking consciousness. The conditioning of social consciousness by social being is consequently a relation or process characterising the content of social being that takes place within it. Marx and Engels characterised social consciousness as 'conscious being [*das bewusste Sein*] ...the being of men in their actual life-process'.⁴⁸

Underestimation of the subjective factor in the development of knowledge (for example, the role of an outstanding individual) is particularly harmful, since it is a matter of the knowing subject's activity, in which consciousness of the external world and self-knowledge are two aspects of a single contradictory process. The materialist conception of history in no way belittles the active side, the subjective activity of knowledge, and its ideological, impelling motives; it avoids their idealist interpretation and mystification, which ultimately reduce and belittle the immense significance of men's cognitive activity.

Marx called science the intellectual potential of material production, a direct productive force, pointing out, thereby, the unity of the spiritual and the material in the very basis of social affairs. Lenin considered knowledge conversion of 'thing-in-itself' into the 'thing-for-us', also characterising that process as the transformation of necessity 'in itself' into necessity 'for us', i.e. the conversion of necessity into freedom. That presupposed a unity of knowledge and practice, which should be understood as well in the sense that knowledge includes practice and practice knowledge. In contrast to the material processes taking place in nature, practice is conscious, purposive activity, i.e. a unity of the spiritual and material, subjective and objective. The determi-

nant role of the objective in social affairs consists (as Marx pointed out) in its being the materialised, objectivised result of the activity of generations of people, which thereby determines the activity of each new generation. But that, of course, is not absolute, fatalist determination, recognition of which has nothing in common with the materialist conception of history. Marx's analysis of the changing relationship between living and embodied labour, between knowledge and its materialisation in production convincingly refuted the simplified notion of the materialist conception of history that emasculated its principal content.

Engels pointed out that

the materialist method turns into its opposite if it is not taken as one's guiding principle in historical investigation but as a ready-made pattern according to which one shapes the facts of history to suit oneself."

The significance of that methodological pointer can hardly be exaggerated.

Such are some of the general considerations that concern the materialist conception of history, considerations that are very necessary to us in order to avoid a simplified understanding of the development of knowledge in general, and of philosophic knowledge in particular.

Continuity and Progress in the Development of Philosophies

Human history differs qualitatively from the history of the animal kingdom in the existence of a specific, cultural succession or continuity. Each human generation inherits the acquisitions and achievements of preceding generations, which becomes possible through various forms of their objectification. The animal kingdom knows only genetic inheritance; what individual animals acquire in their struggle for existence is lost as a rule for following generations. Each generation begins anew and learns anew the habits and abilities inherent in its species. Birds build their nests today in the same way as they did thousands of years ago.

The inheritance of acquired productive forces and achieve-

ments of knowledge constitutes the basis of progress in both material and spiritual production. The history of science is quite inconceivable without this handing on of the torch of knowledge from one generation to another. Development and, even more, progress in the realm of philosophy are only possible since there is also historical inheritance in it. That truth is not, however, by any means generally accepted, just as the idea of development (and even more of progress) in philosophy also does not enjoy general recognition. (1) There are no theses in philosophy that would be accepted by the majority of philosophers as true. (2) The confrontation of a multitude of philosophies deprives the concept of succession of its generally accepted sense, namely that continuity presupposes the existence of agreement on a number of essential points. (3) Philosophers, especially the most eminent of them (they who personify the principal content of philosophy), do not as a rule attach essential significance to the doctrines of their predecessors, and usually appreciate them as sheer fallacies, emancipation from which is the *conditio sine qua non* of a new, really true philosophy. Bacon characterised previous doctrines as a special kind of spectre, *idola theatri*, subject to eradication. Descartes suggested that he had succeeded in finding the true principle of philosophy only because he had dared to reject everything that previous philosophers had taught. From the standpoint of Kant, all preceding philosophy consisted in two, equally unsound, and in principle incompatible, doctrines, viz., metaphysics on the one hand and scepticism on the other. His own doctrine he considered to be equally foreign to both. He made reservations, it is true: the sceptic Hume roused him from dogmatic, metaphysical somnolence. Nevertheless the 'critical philosophy' Kant created seemed to him to be not only a refutation of the traditional doctrines of metaphysics and scepticism but also the complete opposite of Humism. These examples suggest the posing of theoretical, methodological questions. Is the negation of the doctrines of predecessors evidence of an actual absence of continuity? In other words, does a philosopher's subjective position express his actual, objectively existing relation to preceding doctrines? What does the rejection of preceding doctrines represent? A nihilistic rejection means an incapacity to perceive the valuable elements in the philosophic heritage. The concrete, positive rejection that dialectics charac-

terises as *sublation* is another matter. It is also clear that philosophies of the past were essentially different and that the attitude of succeeding ones of them cannot in principle be synonymous, even when it is expressed by a concept of negation.

Lenin, citing Hegel (who affirmed that 'the negative is to an equal extent positive') stressed that

negation is something definite, has a definite content, the inner contradictions lead to the replacement of the old content by a new, higher one.¹³

In another place, he evaluated negation as the principal element of dialectics (i.e. development), having in mind positive negation, negation of the negation, which presumes critical assimilation of what was negated. Such is dialectical negation.

Not empty negation, not futile negation, *not sceptical* negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics,—which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element—no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.¹⁴

From that standpoint the negation that essentially characterised the attitude of Bacon, Descartes, Kant, and other great philosophers to their predecessors was a dialectical process in its basic, objective content, although subjectively it appeared as an abstract, anti-dialectical negation of the philosophic heritage.

It can readily be shown, for example, that Kant's philosophy, in spite of its rejection of traditional metaphysics and scepticism, was a continuation of them and an attempt to synthesise their opposition. In calling metaphysical reality in question, affirming that the noumena were no more than *a priori* ideas of pure reason, and proclaiming 'things-in-themselves' to be unknowable, Kant continued the line of philosophical scepticism. But, while insisting on limitless knowability of the world of phenomena and of subjectively interpreted nature, and developing ontology as an analytic of *a priori* categories by which sense-perceived reality was allegedly constructed and cognised, Kant developed philosophy in a channel of metaphysics transformed by him. His 'critical philosophy' was a synthesis of scepticism and metaphysics, just as it was also an attempt to unite rationalism

and empiricism critically, particularly an attempt to reconcile materialism and idealism. Its all-round link with, and undoubted dependence on, the philosophic heritage are a fact that has been fully established by historical inquiry.

Hegel was the only great philosopher of the pre-Marxian epoch who made a due appreciation (and perhaps even overevaluation) of the phenomenon of succession in the history of philosophy. He wrote, for example:

since Philosophy in its ultimate essence is one and the same, every succeeding philosopher will and must take up into his own all philosophies that went before, and what falls specially to him in their further development."

Recognition of succession as a pattern of the historical process of philosophy is an undoubted merit of Hegel's. But his one-sided understanding of this process, and underevaluation of lack of continuity being no less essential than continuity, indicate that dialectical idealism was inconsistently dialectical, i.e. distorted the actual dialectic of continuity by glossing over the struggle of opposites. That does not, however, imply that Hegel reduced succession to the simple accumulation of knowledge. He distinguished the historical process of philosophy from the history of science and mathematics, in which

a great, perhaps the greater, part of the history relates to what has proved permanent, so that what was new was not an alteration of earlier acquisitions, but an addition to them. These sciences progress through a process of juxtaposition."

The picture in the history of philosophy is quite different.

The history of Philosophy, on the other hand, shows neither the motionless of a complete, single content, nor altogether the onward movement of a peaceful addition of new treasures to those already acquired."

Even tradition in the history of philosophy meant negation and change as well as preservation.

Tradition is not only a stewardess who simply guards faithfully what she has received, and thus delivers it unchanged to posterity... Such tradition is not motionless statue, but is alive, and swells like a mighty river, which increases in size the further it advances from its source."

There are traditions and traditions, of course. A truly dialectical attitude to traditions presupposes understanding, as well, of the essential circumstance pointed out by Marx that the traditions of the dead oppress the living like a nightmare. Hegel, in spite of his own understanding of the relation between tradition and negation, made an absolute of the process of succession, since all philosophic systems were, according to his doctrine, logical stages in a hierarchical whole, i.e. the Absolute Idea depicted in the *Science of Logic*. With that ontological interpretation of philosophic doctrines the job of the history of philosophy was reduced to finding out to what extent the development of the content of philosophy which occurs during the course of its history, conforms to the dialectical development of the pure logical idea, on the one hand, and departs from it, on the other.⁶⁸ Hegel, it will readily be understood, was mainly interested in making philosophies 'conform' to the speculative scheme of the history of philosophy that expressed the logical structure of his own philosophy. As for the 'rest', which were primarily materialist doctrines, he attached no essential importance, although he constantly opposed them.

The dialectical-materialist conception of succession, while critically accepting all that is valuable in the Hegelian description of the process, goes incomparably further, disclosing its tense dialectic, the interpenetration of opposites and struggle between them, the transition from an evolutionary process to a revolutionary change, the qualitatively different types of negation, etc. One of the premises of the dialectical materialist conception of succession is the delimitation of qualitatively different types of this historical relation. Its comparatively different form is succession within one and the same philosophy or current, such as, for instance, the history of Platonism, Aristotelism, Humism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, etc. But one must not overrate the common element that characterises the various spokesmen of one and the same doctrine that has remained unaltered over centuries. Even within the framework of mediaeval Aristotelism, the differences between the Arabian philosophers (Averröes and Avicenna) and followers of Aristotle like Thomas Aquinas were very substantial. We have already mentioned that mediaeval, scholastic Aristotelism differed essentially from Aristotle's real doctrine. Its revival in modern and recent times also embraces

qualitative differences that are often essentially incompatible with one another. In that sense the history of Aristotelism, like the history of any other outstanding doctrine, constantly goes beyond the limits of its original content, which is interwoven with other doctrines, is transformed and often comes into conflict with the doctrine that served as its theoretical source.

The same has to be said about succession in the history of *currents* (e.g. scepticism). Modern scepticism gladly repeats the ideas of its predecessors in antiquity, but differs essentially in its historically progressive orientation against scholastics, theological dogmatism, and speculative metaphysics. The new ideological orientation also determined its attitude to scientific knowledge. With Hume, however, scepticism, in spite of its critical attitude toward religion, had already acquired clearly expressed conservative features, and a theoretical content associated with them, which particularly affected his censuring of the pretensions of reason.

One must also demarcate succession within *trends*, especially within the main ones. Lenin compared Hegel's dialectical idealism with Plato's philosophy:

Primitive idealism: the universal (concept, idea) is a *particular being*. This appears wild, monstrously (more accurately, *childishly*) stupid. But is not modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the idea of God, of the same nature (*absolutely* of the same nature)? Tables, chairs and the *ideas* of table and chair; the world and the idea of the world (God); thing and 'noumen', the unknowable 'Thing-in-itself'; the connection of the earth and the sun, nature in general—and law, λόγος, God."

He was very far, of course, from underestimating the essential difference between Hegel's doctrine and Plato's; he constantly stressed it, characterising dialectical idealism as one of the sources of Marxism, as materialism standing on its head. But even the fact that he attached special historical importance to Hegel's philosophy, did not in the least diminish the *essence* of the relation of continuity between Hegel and Plato, and between all idealist doctrines in general, which meant that idealism, even in the most developed forms created by its most brilliant exponents, was incapable of surmounting the 'naivete' of its prototype. That

is the inner weakness, the immanent insolvency of idealist philosophising. The relation between the materialist doctrines of various historical epochs differs essentially from the idealist line of continuity primarily because materialism is organically linked with the development of science and philosophically interprets and comprehends its outstanding achievements. The materialism of modern times, and even dialectical materialism, is a continuation of the 'line of Demokritos', but there is not a single concrete thesis specially characterising Demokritean materialism that has not been dialectically negated during the subsequent development of materialist philosophy. What is common in modern, dialectical materialism and Demokritos's doctrine is their recognition of the eternity, uncreated character, and indestructibility of nature and matter, recognition of the regularity of their processes and of their knowability. But these theses, which were deductions from everyday experience in Demokritos's time (which strictly speaking cannot serve as proof of them), have become scientific, philosophical principles in our day that are fully shared by the natural sciences. The materialist conception of matter, motion, and knowledge have altered radically. The faculty of inheritance and of the realisation of succession, the scope and multifaceted character of this capacity are undoubtedly a basic indicator of the validity of a philosophy, and the existence of a profound objective content and of true ideas in it. We do not have epigonistic succession in mind here, however, and the repetition of what has been experienced and traversed, but a creative process, a reworking and transformation. The relation of continuity between opposing doctrines, and in the first place between materialism and idealism, also needs to be considered from that angle.

Some materialists, like some idealists, often say that materialism and idealism are absolute opposites that have nothing in common, and cannot have. From the standpoint of certain idealists materialism is not philosophy at all, since philosophy (for them) is essentially an idealist doctrine. The simplicist materialist view treats idealism as essentially a religious, not a philosophic, doctrine. Yet both materialism and idealism are *philosophies*, and that indicates what is common to them, in spite of their mutually exclusive relation to one another.

The relation of continuity between the main philosophies by

no means consists, of course, in materialists' assimilating idealist theses and idealists' materialist ones. It does not exclude the partisan character of philosophy (as in all other cases) but, on the contrary, presupposes it. It is the partisan character of philosophy that makes a fruitful relation of succession possible between mutually hostile doctrines.

The great historical service of materialism was discovery and substantiation of the principle of determinism. Demokritos, who is justly considered the outstanding materialist of antiquity and the actual founder of materialism as a *system*, said that discovery of some hitherto unknown cause of phenomena was dearer to him than the throne of the Persian emperor. Over nearly two millennia idealism has opposed indeterminism to determinism, linking it with divine will, or teleology, or a subjectivist theory of knowledge. But the science of modern times took its stand resolutely on determinism, considering it an indispensable condition of the natural explanation of natural phenomena. Idealism was ultimately forced to face up to the conception of natural causality (materialist in its origin). Idealists, or at least the progressive spokesmen of that trend (and subsequently not just they) became determinists, but the idealist interpretation of this universal link between phenomena in fact reduced its epistemological and the specific scientific meaning of this principle to nought. For Kant causality was an *a priori* immutable categorial form of the connection of sense perceptions. According to Hegel necessity in the final analysis presumed freedom, because freedom (in contrast to necessity) was substantial, and formed the essence of the spiritual. Idealism, in fact, tries to reconcile determinism with indeterminism. The idealist assimilation of determinism can be characterised as a negative form of succession, since it is not aimed at development and solution of the problem.

We have shown that materialism (and science) 'forced' the supporters of idealism to pass to a position of determinism. We must stress that materialists by no means ignore idealist theses that contain a rational core, which applies above all to dialectical materialism, but also to some extent to its precursors. As we know Feuerbach did not manage to master the Hegelian dialectics; he identified it with idealism, and saw in it a method unacceptable to a materialist. Nevertheless Hegel's influence is felt in Feuerbach's anthropological critique of religion; Hegel

treated religious consciousness as an inadequate subjective expression of an objective, absolute content (because of its sensual, anthropological character). Even Feuerbach's critique of Hegelian idealism is evidence that he perceived certain profound ideas of Hegel's (though inadequately). In criticising absolute idealism as abstract speculation, he spoke of negation as an inalienable element of development, considering 'preservation in the form of negation' possible.⁵⁸

In contrast to Feuerbach, who was only able to see separate brilliant insights of dialectical idealism, Marx and Engels created a materialist dialectics radically opposed to the Hegelian, and at the same time fully assimilated its rational core. We thus see a relation of succession between materialism and idealism, realised through consistent demystification of the rational content developed within idealism. Metaphysical materialism proved incapable of separating out the real content in the teleological constructs of idealism. Only dialectical materialism, by rejecting teleology, pointed out the relations purposiveness, actually existing in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, a fact that metaphysical materialists denied, since it did not fit into their system of views.

The dialectical materialist conception of objective purposiveness is integrally associated with the philosophical contemplation of science, above all of Darwinism. That allows us to stress yet another essential feature of continuity in philosophic development, namely the attitude of philosophy to non-philosophic inquiries. The Hegelian conception of historical succession in philosophy confined philosophy to its own element. Its incurable ailment was the basic idea of the *self-development* of philosophy, which meant recognition of the rise of philosophies solely from preceding ones. But there is hardly a more important source of new philosophic ideas than discoveries in the natural and social sciences, and likewise in social practice and social development, which philosophy reflects as a form of social consciousness, and which it investigates as a specific form of knowledge. Here it proves that dialectical materialism, in contrast to other philosophies, is a system that theoretically ensures all-round, comprehensive, fruitful, and at the same time consistently critical inheritance.

The theoretical preconditions of the philosophy of Marxism

were not only the preceding philosophies (both materialist and idealist), but also the great discoveries of science of the epoch of its rise, the brilliant insights of utopian, critical socialism, the achievements of bourgeois classical political economy and historiography. It would have been impossible for Marxian historicism to take shape without the socialist critique of the capitalist system and bourgeois political economy (which interpreted capitalism as an absolute mode of production). But it is particularly obvious that the creation of historical materialism also became possible through philosophic comprehension of the labour theory of value created by the classical bourgeois political economists. They were limited, it is true, by an economic understanding of labour as activity that satisfied a need for things. To that limited bourgeois view Marx and Engels opposed a philosophical and sociological doctrine of the decisive role of labour (production) in anthropogenesis and in the universal history of mankind in general.

Critical, philosophical mastery of the achievements of philosophic and scientific inquiries presupposes a *social position* that makes it possible. This position is that of *proletarian partisanship*, which must be understood not just as practical orientation arising irrespective of theory, but as the result of the formation of the philosophy of Marxism, i.e. of its founders' investigative activity. Initially Marx and Engels were revolutionary democrats, i.e. stood for defence of all the oppressed and exploited, without singling out the proletariat. Only subsequent inquiries, comprehension of the history of the bourgeois revolutions and the historical experience of the working-class movement helped them pass to new positions (not only theoretical but practical, political ones also). One cannot, consequently, limit himself to saying that Marx and Engels created dialectical materialism because they adopted a stand of proletarian partisanship. There were already proletarian revolutionaries when Marxism arose, but they had not created a scientific socialist ideology. Marx and Engels took a stand of proletarian partisanship not only as a result of their practical political activity in defence of the oppressed and exploited, but in particular because they had discovered, through their theoretical inquiries, the historic socialist mission of the working class.

Historical continuity in philosophic development is thus not

only a theoretical process limited by the bounds of philosophy, as Hegel suggested, but is the interaction of theory and practice, comprehension of social being, the interaction and mutual enrichment of philosophical and non-philosophical inquiries. Logical, theoretical continuity is only one aspect and moment of the historical, social process of succession.

The specific nature of ideological continuity differs qualitatively from historical succession in other spheres of social affairs. People are not free in the choice of their productive forces, Marx said. The productive forces that each generation disposes of are the inherited result of the preceding development of social production. They are only developed further on that, already given, basis. The development of society's spiritual life is also objectively conditioned; social consciousness reflects social being. But the relation of succession without doubt presupposes *historical choice*.

Undetermined choice is, of course, impossible; but it by no means follows that choice is only semblance. When Hegel constructed his system, he gave a new meaning precisely to Spinoza's doctrine of substance and to Fichte's theory of the absolute subject, creating on that theoretical foundation an integral conception of the substance-subject, developing substance, and this represented not only a philosophically substantiated choice, but also a socio-economically substantiated one. What does the specific nature of choice consist of? Why is it necessary to distinguish it from other objectively conditioned processes? In answering that we must again stress that the philosophical legacy is a manifold of ideas, theories, and doctrines. Hegel was mistaken, of course, when he suggested that continuity was a relation between doctrines directly succeeding one another in time. The panlogistic conception of succession as logical determination made continuity an absolute, thereby excluding historical choice (and the historical responsibility of the thinker associated with it), and likewise the element of subjectivity necessary and inevitable in any socio-historical development. Where there is choice there is also refusal. An eminent philosopher often appeals, over the heads of his immediate precursors, to ideas of the remote past that have been repeatedly declared obsolete, out-of-date, transcended, and refuted. The origin of dialectics in the philosophy of modern times, and in particular the rise of

dialectical idealism, owing to concrete historical conditions, was a fruitful appeal to the past, a progressive, historical choice, and rejection of the prevailing metaphysical mode of thought.

Far from all the progressive philosophers of modern times, of course, revived and developed a dialectical mode of thought. Metaphysics had its justification in that epoch; certain investigations, especially empirical ones, were necessary. In the ideological sphere the metaphysical conception of opposites justified the absolute opposition of the new to the old, so characteristic of some progressive bourgeois theorists. The progressive socio-economic and ideological position of any one thinker did not in itself predetermine his choice between dialectics and metaphysics. The choice was largely determined by his orientation on certain ideological traditions and the character and content of philosophical inquiry.

Underestimation of historical choice, and even more its negation, made a correct understanding of the essence of mankind's intellectual development impossible in principle. We can explain this by an example from the history of Marxism. When Marx and Engels began creating their doctrine the Hegelian school had already suffered a split. Its orthodox representatives mainly supported Hegel's system, underestimating, disparaging, and sometimes even ignoring his method, to which the Left Hegelians, on the contrary, attached paramount importance. But a demarcation was also taking place among the latter, some orienting themselves mainly on Hegel's doctrine of substance and objective process, and others taking his doctrine of absolute self-consciousness, and the subjective aspect of the historical process, as their starting point. Feuerbach, who was initially a Young Hegelian, rejected this alternative, and by interpreting substance as nature, and self-consciousness as the real, sensual man, arrived at anthropological materialism. Marx and Engels went even further, criticising contemplative anthropological materialism, and the metaphysical interpretation of nature in general, and of human nature in particular. Summing up the history of materialism, they reworked the Hegelian dialectics in a materialist way, and dialectically reworked preceding materialism. The revolution in philosophy made by Marxism is a very great historical choice, converting necessity into freedom and creative negation, which

realises the whole progressive potential latent in the preceding development of ideas.

The dialectics of historical succession, and in particular in those of its forms that are realised by the development of philosophy, thus has nothing in common with the simplified formula according to which the past determines the present, and the present the future. Karl Popper, who is deeply hostile to the dialectical conception of the historical process, ascribes such a schematisation of social development to Marxism. If such a simplified notion of the relation of the present to the past, and of the future to the present, were adopted, it would be quite incomprehensible how countries that were backward in the past could not only overtake but surpass more developed ones. That happens in philosophy, as we know, as well as in economic and political development. Eighteenth-century France, for instance, owed the flourishing of its materialist philosophy not so much to *its own* historical past (philosophical included) as to the English materialism of the seventeenth century and the other achievements of England, more advanced at that time, on which the French Enlightenment was based. The past is involved in the shaping of the present, of course, but the latter is created by figures of the historical period who are by no means related to the historical past of their country in the same way. In this past, there is that which is perceived as underlying further development; there are also elements in it, of course, that it is necessary to overcome.

The simplified conception of succession, according to which a past state determines the present, is theoretically based on the metaphysical interpretation of determinism that prevailed in science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The materialist conception of history finished with that Laplacian determinism long before it was overcome in natural science.

The past is not in the grip of a given generation, of course; each generation, accepting or rejecting certain elements of the past, exercises historical choice as far as it can. The past can therefore only *partly* determine the present, because people are the product of circumstances only to the extent that the circumstances are created by people themselves. That implies, of course, not only the generations that no longer exist. The dominance of the past over the present is not a universal law but a special

historical situation that is not by any means predetermined or conditioned by the past as such. *Creativity* is the decisive factor in realising historical continuity, and that applies just as much to philosophy as to art.

The link between a succeeding stage of development of knowledge and the preceding one may be more or less direct in science and mathematics, even simple, at least where a discovery becomes possible only because of a preceding one. In philosophy such a 'forced' relation is simply impossible as a rule, because of the specific character of this form of theoretical knowledge and the corresponding specific character of philosophic development.

Engels pointed out that 'the manifold forms of Greek philosophy contain in embryo, in the nascent state, almost all the later modes of outlook on the world'.⁵⁹ It is difficult to name any philosophical problem that has no relation, albeit remote, to problems raised more than two thousand years ago. Such a state of affairs can exist in the natural sciences only by way of exception. The development of natural science is characterised by the discovery of new, previously unknown objects, passage from one sphere of research to another, a constant broadening of the sphere of investigative quest, replacement of old, already solved problems by new ones amenable to resolution, the creation of new material means of knowledge thanks to which the existence of unknown phenomena is brought out, and so on. In natural science, therefore, there are final solutions, and quite exhausted problems that have been finished with once and for all, although it also happens that the resolved problems again become tasks requiring solution because of new scientific data. But what in fact is the exception in science often proves the rule in philosophy. The latter's development, therefore, in particular the rise of new problems, is at the same time continuation of the investigation of matters that were noticed, and even quite definitely formulated, back in antiquity.

Some philosophers, when stating the roots of modern philosophic problems in mankind's remote past, interpret the history of philosophy as a cycle without perspective, an eternal coming back in circles. They thereby ignore the obvious fact that problems noted or even definitely posed in the remote past, are raised in a new way, discussed, and solved in succeeding epochs, be-

cause it is impossible, strictly speaking, to say that they are the same problems. There is a *development of problems* posed in the past here, and because of that a posing of new problems not known in the past. No matter how essential it was that the most important philosophic problems arose already in the first epoch of the development of philosophy, it cannot be grounds in any way for reducing subsequent problems to preceding ones, let alone the original ones. Succession is a regular, natural process, but it should not be made an absolute.

Certain philosophers on the contrary consider this unity of basic philosophic problems that arose back in antiquity not so much as a fact as an appearance of fact. As is to be expected, the phenomenon of succession in the history of philosophy is thereby clearly underestimated, and considered a secondary phenomenon characterising not the original systems but only the relations built up within a school between its founder and his disciples. From that angle all original systems are a negation of continuity. And if we find, when comparing the great philosophers, that they had something in common, that is to be explained not as succession but simply as a meeting of minds, when a philosopher of a later time discovers a fact of congeniality quite unexpectedly for himself.

It will readily be understood that these two opposing conceptions of succession are equally one-sided and therefore unsatisfactory. In the first case the historical process is interpreted in a spirit of the purest continuity, in the second discontinuity, relative independence, the moment of uniqueness, and the subjectivity of the philosopher are made absolutes. Historical succession is a unity of discontinuity and continuity, of reiteration and uniqueness. It must consequently be understood as a creative process that is characterised by a contradictory unity of the continuous and the discontinuous. The dialectics of succession also consists in its bearing its negation within itself, but of course a concrete negation, i.e. a special form of the connection of degrees of development. All that applies in particular to philosophical development, in which knowledge and creativity are inseparably linked.

Historical succession is an indispensable, but at the same time insufficient condition for progressive development. For it also exists where development occurs as regress. It is therefore

understandable why the ideologists of reactionary classes sometimes even absolutise succession, truckling to the past and condemning any break with it and any revolutionary negation of a reactionary *status quo*. Marx back in 1842 exposed the reactionary romantic 'historical school of law', which justified feudal order, citing thousand-year-old tradition, a mode of life built up in time immemorial, and old customs whose origin was lost in the murk of history. Marxism counterposes a progressive, revolutionary conception of succession to the conservative, reactionary interpretation of it. That is why an essential element of the Marxian conception of succession as a *progressive* process is recognition of the legitimacy (in certain conditions, of course, whose necessity must be recognised and proved in practice) of a *break* with social forms that are historically outlived.

The Communist revolution (Marx and Engels wrote) is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas."

The progressive development of knowledge, in contrast to the development of antagonistic social relations and the ideological forms corresponding to them, is characterised by a specific link of discontinuity and continuity, since the revolutionary negation of the reactionary past is not a rejection of preceding productive forces and achievements of knowledge. Lenin characterised the *progressive* development of knowledge as a transition from ignorance to knowledge, from some knowledge to other deeper knowledge, as the movement of knowledge from phenomenon to essence, from essence, so to say, of the first order to essence of the second and third order, and so on. Knowledge ascends from the concrete reflected in sense perceptions of the external world to the abstract, i.e. to concepts and categories that single out separate aspects, relations, and elements of reality, thus promoting its more definite, deeper reflection. But knowledge of concrete reality and its essential connections and relations is only achieved through a synthesis of abstractions, which represents the concrete as a theoretically cognisable unity of various aspects of the reality studied. While the ascent from the concrete to the abstract is a dismemberment of the whole under study into its component parts, aspects, relations, and

separate processes, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete is a theoretical reconstruction of the studied whole. But 'we can never know the concrete completely. The *infinite* sum of general conceptions, laws, etc. gives the *concrete* in its completeness'.⁶¹ All these characteristics of progressively developing knowledge (characteristics that by no means exhaust the diversity of the process), undoubtedly apply to philosophy. The problem, however, consists in singling out the specific features of progress in philosophy that correspond to the qualitative difference between it and other forms of cognitive activity.

We said above that the truths discovered by any one philosophic system are constantly being disputed by others. It is the absence of generally accepted truths that casts doubt on whether the concept of progress is applicable in this field of knowledge. What some philosophers consider an outstanding achievement and gain of philosophical reason, others on the contrary regard as its defeat. Manifold doctrines, moreover, constantly exist, and the confrontation between them makes it impossible to recognise a single criterion of progress even by those philosophers who believe that philosophic knowledge develops progressively, i.e. achieves an ever fuller, more profound and correct understanding during its development of what the object of its inquiries is. And when we allow for the fact that even the concept of social progress is usually characterised by present-day bourgeois philosophers and sociologists as ambivalent and unverified, the difficulties that the historiography of philosophy comes up against when formulating the concept of progress and applying it in its own inquiries become all the more indubitable.

In the West German philosophical dictionary edited by Diemer and Frenzel it is said that

in philosophy ... there is no progress as it exists within the individual sciences, in which the old is outrun and overcome; there is only an advance (*Fortschreiten*) to new questions and new views, clarification of which, however, is only possible in the repetition of the past; philosophy is therefore always actual, and a philosophical work can therefore be always alive and kicking.⁶²

That is a typical point of view of modern bourgeois philosophy,

carefully and correctly formulated but at the same time quite unambiguous.

The American philosopher Gerber tried, in his article 'Is There Progress in Philosophy?', to clarify the very posing of the question semantically. A positive answer could mean (1) that there were cases when philosophical theses became truer, more fuller of content, more significant and substantiated, and (2) that the totality of philosophical theses, as the subject-matter of conviction, became truer and better substantiated than had been the case in preceding periods.⁶³ The first alternative, which relates to individual statements, is evaluated as quite possible; as for the second, which refers to some one doctrine or other, it is improbable. It is impossible, Gerber suggested, to answer the following type of question: is there a road from rationalism to empiricism, from logical positivism to linguistic analysis of progress that approximates to the truth? In the final analysis he inclined to the view of Sellars, that each time when there is a struggle of philosophic systems, it ends not in victory or defeat, but simply in a change in the situation or scene that makes it possible to formulate the questions more correctly, to give clearer answers to some of them, while at the same time eliminating certain others.

The arguments of bourgeois philosophers about progress in philosophy (irrespective of whether they recognise such or deny it wholly or in part) suffer from the very essential fault that they ignore the fact of philosophy's partisanship, i.e. claim to answer the question posed from an above-party, in fact non-existent, philosophical position. But a proper posing of this matter should have a consciously partisan, consistently partisan character. Dialectical materialism considers the development of materialist and dialectical views the most important indicators of progress in philosophy. The Marxian philosopher evaluates idealist doctrines from that angle, refuting their fundamental tenets and at the same time bringing out, demystifying, and materialistically interpreting the rational ideas contained in each significant idealist philosophy. The philosophy of Marxism, by counterposing materialism to idealism, and dialectics to metaphysics, approaches evaluation of doctrines hostile to it *historically*, fully allowing for their place in the development of knowledge, and in the ideological struggle in definite histori-

cal conditions. From the specific, historical standpoint it becomes understandable that the transition from the naive dialectics of antiquity to the metaphysical mode of thought that played a leading role in the development of empirical natural science in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries was undoubtedly philosophical progress. Analysis of the specific historical conditions of the development of philosophy in modern times helps unravel the fact, enigmatic at first glance, that dialectics as a system, as dialectical logic, was developed within the context of idealist philosophy. Modern idealist philosophers interpret that as evidence of an indissoluble link between dialectics and idealism and, furthermore, as proof of the impossibility of materialist dialectics, in spite of the latter's actual existence. They do not, moreover, concern themselves with the fact that dialectical idealism mystified and distorted the method it developed, which naturally threw doubt on the fruitfulness of *idealist* dialectics (which not only naturalists but also historians, economists, jurists, etc. have rejected). But close study of this circumstance, and likewise of the conditions of the rise of the theory of dialectics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, shows that neither the development of science then, nor socio-economic reality had given grounds for a rational, scientific development of the dialectical method. When that real basis of scientific dialectics took shape, the idealists of the mid-nineteenth century rejected the dialectical tradition, and counterposed a new version of the metaphysical conception of development to it.

The considerations set out above do not in the least, of course, disparage the historical merits of the idealists who systematically developed the theory of dialectics. On the contrary, they convincingly show that the transition from the metaphysical materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to dialectical idealism, whose great exponent was Hegel, was undoubted progress in the development of philosophy.

Marx and Engels evaluated *vulgar* materialism as a reactionary phenomenon in the philosophy of the mid-nineteenth century. In that, however, they had in mind the most socio-economically and culturally developed countries of Western Europe. In certain other countries, where feudal or semi-feudal relations still prevailed, with the religious ideology corresponding to them, vulgar materialism played a certain progressive role, as

the historical facts witness. The same must be said of the positivism of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer and their direct followers. This idealist-agnostic doctrine, whose reactionary role in France, Great Britain, and Germany in the middle and late nineteenth century is quite obvious, was counterposed by progressive thinkers in certain comparatively backward countries to the predominant religious, idealist philosophy, whose defeat it promoted there.

Progress, whatever its forms, is a profoundly contradictory process. But antagonistic social relations give forward development disruptive, anti-human, alienated and often even tragic forms. The primary accumulation of capital, brilliantly reproduced and explained by Marx, is striking, but by no means exceptional example of antagonistic progress. The historical experience of today is no less indicative, as is witnessed by scientific and technical progress under state monopoly capitalism.

It would be naive to think that the antagonistic contradictions of social progress are reflected only in philosophy, i.e. are not contradictions of its own development. Marx and Engels characterised preceding philosophy as an alienated form of social consciousness. And it was precisely as alienated consciousness that philosophy performs its ideological function in antagonistic class society. In that quality it enters into complex, antagonistic relations with social practice on the one hand, and with other forms of social consciousness and non-philosophic inquiry on the other. Allowing for that real historical context we must regard the development of philosophic knowledge from the sociological angle as well as the epistemological. The dialectics of truth and error, for instance, which is traceable in the development of each special science, takes on special, usually even paradoxical forms in the history of philosophy; a considerable part of the great discoveries in it were made in an inadequate way, i.e. in the form of errors and fallacies liable to refutation. The famous aporias of Zenon of Elea are a remarkable example of profoundly dialectical truths expressed in an obviously false way. It is important to understand that this fact, which might well be called the 'Zenon phenomenon', was not a chance phenomenon, but an inevitable one in the history of philosophy (especially pre-Marxian philosophy) and that we have here not an exception, but the rule, the pattern of the establishing of truth, which clari-

fies its own content and acquires an adequate mode of expression only through protracted historical development. Fallacies (of course not every error) appear at every stage in the development of philosophy as possible, intentional truths, riddles, and insights.

Only a dialectical or rather dialectical-materialist examination of separate philosophical theses and systems of philosophy enables us to bring out the truth contained in them and to appreciate their real social (progressive or reactionary) content and significance. And that appreciation requires demarcating and concretisation, as a rule, because one and the same philosophy frequently contains both progressive and reactionary views, by virtue of qualitatively different historical circumstances that are interwoven with one another at every stage. That applies not just to eclectic views or to philosophical theories that reflect class compromises. Jean Jacques Rousseau was a most revolutionary spokesman of the French bourgeois Enlightenment, but he saw his ideal in the past, condemned civilisation, the development of culture, and progress. But this critique of civilisation, culture, and progress had an essentially revolutionary character because its emotional quality expressed the necessity of a revolutionary annihilation of 'unnatural' feudal relations in a very categorical way.⁶⁴

It is thus necessary to approach not only the opposition of truth and error dialectically, but also appreciation of the opposition between progressive and reactionary doctrines (whether of philosophies that are opposed to each other or of contradictory tendencies within one and the same philosophy). Marxism does not limit itself just to demarcation of the progressive and the reactionary; it regards them in development in their concrete, historical relations with each other, separating appearance from essence, the subjective from the objective, and so on.

Several bourgeois philosophers, for example, the Neokantian Leonard Nelson, in fact draw a line between progressive and reactionary philosophies but Nelson does not, however, link the progressive and the reactionary with the fundamental antithesis of materialism and idealism, or the struggle between these main trends. Demarcation of the progressive and reactionary *social* content of philosophies is even more foreign to him. His main indicators of progress in philosophy are ideas that antici-

pate the theses of Kant's philosophy, that come close to the Kantian posing of philosophic problems to one degree or other. Everything foreign, opposed, and hostile to Kantianism is correspondingly appraised by the Neokantian standard elected by Nelson as movement backward, regress.⁶⁵

The Marxian conception of the relation of the progressive and reactionary is incompatible in principle with the one-sided, one-dimensional characterisation of the historical process (including that of the history of philosophy). Marx and Engels considered a simple description of preceding socialism to be unsound in principle. In the *Communist Manifesto* they singled out the critical, utopian socialism of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen, which they contrasted to feudal socialism, bourgeois socialism, and petty-bourgeois socialism, characterising all these as reactionary. It was not utopian socialism in general that formed one of the theoretical sources of Marxism, but only its historically determined form. As Marx and Engels pointed out, the social role of critical utopian socialism did not remain unchanged; its progressive character was in inverse proportion to socio-historical development.

Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original view of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat.⁶⁶

These arguments are of immense methodological significance for the theory of the historical process of philosophy as a whole, and for understanding progress in philosophy in particular, since the opposition of progress and reaction in this field does not usually get direct socio-political expression. It would be a mistake, for example, to suppose that idealism by its nature is the ideology of conservative or reactionary classes. At every stage there is an opposition of materialism and idealism within one and the same ideology, e.g. bourgeois. To suppose that the opposition of the progressive and reactionary in philosophy coincides directly with the antithesis of materialism and idealism, of dialectics and metaphysics, would be an overt simplification of the tasks of historical inquiry in philosophy. Metaphysical materialism, which played an outstanding progressive role in the period

of mechanistic science, frequently proves to be a conservative doctrine in our day incapable in the least of recognising new laws, patterns, and regularities. Metaphysically thinking materialists come into conflict with the modern essentially dialectical discoveries of science. And some of them wage a struggle against dialectics.

Specific historical analysis indicates that idealism played a leading role in the development of philosophical knowledge when it functioned as the ideology of progressive classes. The idealist Rousseau was undoubtedly a more revolutionary thinker than the materialists La Mettrie, Holbach, and Helvetius. Aristotle was an idealist but his critique of the ideas of Plato was a critique of idealism in general, as Lenin remarked. The point, of course, concerns the objective content and meaning of his critique of idealism, since Aristotle was subjectively trying to counterpose his own idealism to Platonism. But that circumstance not only does not disparage the historical significance of this fact, but on the contrary heightens it.

Dialectical idealism, Lenin pointed out, was closer to Marxian philosophy than metaphysical materialism. That conclusion, however, does not in the least belittle the irreconcilable opposition of materialism to idealism, since what brings dialectical idealism close to the scientific, philosophical outlook of Marxism, is dialectics, materialistically reworked in the philosophy of Marxism. Lenin's thesis indicates (1) that the metaphysical mode of thought (including that on a materialist basis) has historically outlived itself, and is incompatible with a modern outlook upon the world. (2) It says that outstanding progress of philosophical knowledge was made within the context of certain idealist systems.

Lenin systematically developed the principle of the partisanship of philosophy, the principle of an irreconcilable materialist struggle against idealism and any concession to idealist philosophising. But he never regarded idealism as a historical accident, misunderstanding, or subjective orientation of individual philosophising subjects. (1) From his point of view idealism was an ideological phenomenon that had the same deep social roots as religion (which was the original source of idealist philosophy both historically and logically). (2) Idealism was a historically inevitable form of the development of knowledge (in the condi-

tions of antagonistic class society), that existed not only in philosophy (in which it formed a main trend) but to some extent also in other realms of investigative activity. Lenin developed the doctrine of the epistemological roots of idealism, which is one of the principles of the Marxian theory of the historical process of philosophy. This doctrine helps single out and demystify the valuable ideas expressed, and sometimes systematically developed by outstanding idealist philosophers. The job of reworking Hegel's idealist dialectics in a materialist way, to which Lenin attached paramount importance, can only be correctly understood as a task of irreconcilable struggle against idealism, which is crowned with success precisely because dialectics has become a scientific, philosophical theory of development, thanks to materialism, a theory applicable in all fields of inquiry.

Thanks to the dialectical materialist conception of the specific nature of philosophical progress (which often acquires paradoxical forms), the difficulties that metaphysically thinking investigators of the historical process of philosophy inevitably come up against disappear. The American philosopher Gerber, mentioned above, claims that it is impossible to decide definitely whether the path from Kant to Fichte was actual progress in philosophy. If we abstract this essential stage of philosophical development from real dialectics, of course, it is impossible to answer his question. But if we make the contradictions of that process the object of inquiry, then the answer to this task of the history of philosophy proves to be a conclusion of such an inquiry.

Fichte was a direct continuer of Kant's philosophy. That, however, does not imply that Fichteanism was the sole possible mode of continuing and developing the 'critical philosophy'. Reinhold, too, was a direct continuer of it, not to mention the orthodox Kantians. Some of Kant's continuers subjected the materialist tendency of his doctrine to criticism; others, on the contrary, defended and substantiated that trend. Fichte criticised Kant from the right, from the standpoint of a more consistent idealism, which rejected any materialist assumptions and put a speculative abstraction, the *not-Ego*, in the place of things that cause our sensations, which depended upon, was engendered and determined by the *Ego*, the absolute subject. What made Fichte Kant's most eminent continuer? The fact that he

attached a positive content to Kant's transcendental dialectic and thereby became the founder of dialectical idealism, the thinker who first created the theory of dialectics and developed a system of dialectical views and a dialectical logic.

By his doctrine of transcendental logic, which investigated cognitive forms of thought, Kant raised the question of the need to create a new logic different from the traditional formal one. But his conception of 'transcendental logic' had a negative character. He interpreted dialectics as a logic of errors that were characterised as quite inevitable by virtue of the very nature of knowledge, to which only phenomena, but not 'things-in-themselves' were accessible. He thus made agnosticism the basis of his negative dialectics. Fichte rejected Kant's agnosticism, but along with it the assumption of 'things-in-themselves' existing irrespective of knowledge. He consequently shared the Kantian illusion that the object of knowledge was created by the knowing subject, humanity. Unlike Kant, however, Fichte brought practical activity to the fore, considering it the determinant basis of knowledge. Idealism, of course, as Marx pointed out, 'does not know real, sensuous activity as such'.⁸⁷ Yet Fichte's subjective idealism, since it inquired into the real content of practical activity, led to the discovery of several philosophic truths whose value can hardly be exaggerated.

According to Fichte's doctrine, mankind itself creates the conditions that determine its development. The path that led him to this anticipation of the initial thesis of historical materialism, brilliant in spite of its speculative abstraction, was highly contradictory. According to his initial basic principle the absolute *Ego* (largely coinciding with the concept of humanity in the full volume of its possible, i.e. still unachieved, development) posited itself. But the self-assumption presumed conditions different from its own existence, counterposed to it, and having to be surmounted. There was consequently a *not-Ego*. The second basic principle of Fichte's system was: *Ego* posits *not-Ego*. But for that to be possible, the *not-Ego* must already exist; its assumption cannot be its origin. In short, not only did the self-determination of the subject presuppose the existence of an object, but reality also, by assuming the object, had some object as its precondition. Fichte's third principle, which was a synthesis of thesis and antithesis, a negation of the

negation, therefore stated that the *Ego* only partially presumed the *not-Ego*, since the *not-Ego* partially posited the *Ego*. In the sphere of social relations the subjective and objective are actually inseparable from one another, i.e. men are determined by circumstances, since they create them. Such are the productive forces, created by generations following one another in succession and, therefore, naturally independent of the generation that received them as its heritage.

Metaphysical materialists who proclaimed that men themselves made their history, as a counterweight to the theological outlook could not prove this proposition, since they assumed that external nature, just like the nature of men themselves, determined their way of life and so the perennial fate of mankind. Fichte himself, who made the dialectics of the subjective and objective, and practice as a process of the exteriorisation of the subjective and interiorisation of the objective, the subject of his inquiries, came close to an understanding of the specific objectivity of the social, but as a subjective idealist he extended the specific characteristic of the social to everything that existed in general. The result of his extrapolation of the social to the natural was an idealist distortion of both the former and the latter, negation of the independence of objective reality from the absolute *Ego*, i.e. an obvious blind alley.

We shall not examine the other features of Fichte's doctrine that distinguish it from Kant's philosophy, since what we have said above is quite adequate to show unambiguously that the transition from Kant to Fichte was undoubted progress in the development of philosophic knowledge. But that only comes out with a *definite approach* to the process of philosophic history, i.e. given its dialectical-materialist interpretation. It is also clear that since progress took place within the context of an idealist philosophy, whose premisses were obviously false, it did not exclude regression, movement backward, and negative moments and consequences. Fichte's rejection of 'things-in-themselves' (which he mistakenly identified with agnosticism) became the source of manifold harmful errors and completely artificial constructs in his own system of philosophy. On the one hand, he recognised that self-assuming activity of the subject was impossible without an external reality existing irrespective of the subject. On the other hand, he demonstrated that the self-positing

subject was only possible because the *Ego* posited a *not-Ego*. Fichte was conscious that the object of knowledge was not reducible to knowledge that corresponded to the object, and was only, therefore, knowledge. But by denying objective reality he was forced to construe the object of knowledge, and even more to deduce sensations as the primary material of knowledge.

The Fichtean absolute subject, Marx and Engels pointed out, was a metaphysically, idealistically developed subject in its isolation from nature. Hegel tried to overcome this defect of Fichte's doctrine, and to synthesise the absolute subject with an idealist interpretation of the Spinozean concept of substance. The unity of the two, according to him, formed the developing substance, the substance-subject, the Absolute Spirit. His dialectical idealism was undoubted progress compared with the doctrine of Fichte and other precursors of absolute idealism. At the same time, as Lenin remarked, Hegel's system had taken in all the contradictions of the idealist doctrine immediately preceding it (and left them in essence unresolved).

Our conception of the progressive development of philosophy would be very one-sided if we did now allow for the fact that progress in this field of development is not continuous. In it, to a greater extent than in any other realm of man's spiritual affairs there is unevenness. Hegel made a mystery of the fact that various lands and nations had been involved in this process to varying degrees over the two thousand years of the history of philosophy. While rejecting his errors and the reactionary conclusions associated with them, we are, at the same time, far from underrating the outstanding role of separate nations in the development of philosophy in certain historical periods. Engels noted that the crisis in the metaphysical mode of thought was one of the reasons

why we are compelled in philosophy as in so many other spheres to return again and again to the achievements of that small people whose universal talents and activity assured it a place in the history of human development that no other people can ever claim."

In the history of the sciences, especially of natural science, there are qualitatively different historical periods: epochs of accelerated development and revolutionary changes, and on the other

hand, periods of slowing down, even of decline. That variety of states is even more typical of philosophy, since inquiry is more or less directly combined in it with performance of an ideological function.

The conditions of philosophical development in an antagonistic class society inevitably give rise to crises, regression, and a descending line of development. Lenin wrote that it was unscientific and undialectic to present world history without significant, sometimes immense leaps backward. That also applies to the history of philosophy, perhaps even more than to other aspects of social development.

One of the tasks of historical inquiry in philosophy is to bring out and scientifically explain the principal epochs of development of philosophic knowledge, when philosophy has been enriched over comparatively short periods by outstanding achievements. Engels in particular singled out epochs of the ideological preparation of social revolutions as the most fruitful periods of philosophic development. Such, for example, was the philosophy of the early bourgeois revolutions, i.e. mainly the philosophy of the seventeenth century, whose great representatives (Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hobbes, and Locke) brought about a revival, renewal, and reconstruction of philosophy corresponding to the radical socio-economic shifts that were taking place at that time, the formation of a new mode of production, and the rise and development of the science of modern times.

Engels remarked, further, that the bourgeois revolution in France in the eighteenth century was preceded by a *philosophical revolution*, the French Enlightenment, whose liberating influence was enormous.

The great men, who in France prepared men's minds for the coming revolution, were themselves extreme revolutionaries. They recognised no external authority of any kind whatever. Religion, a natural science, society, political institutions—everything was subjected to the most unsparing criticism; everything must justify its existence before the judgment-seat of reason or give up existence."

Scientific socialism as a theory, whose necessary premiss is the accumulation, of previous ideas, is (Engels said) 'a more logical extension of the principles laid down by the great French philosophers of the eighteenth century'.¹⁰

German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and Feuerbach was also a philosophical revolution, whose principal achievement was the systematic development of dialectics (true, on a false, idealist basis). The significance of that revolution in the historical preparation of Marxism is well known.

It is very indicative, from the standpoint of the sociological description of progress in philosophy, that bourgeois philosophy in the period that followed consolidation of the capitalist mode of production, became ideologically conservative and more and more limited in its theoretical content. In French philosophy of the nineteenth century we do not find any significant continuers of the great ideas of the bourgeois Enlightenment. German bourgeois philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century does not compare in any way, of course, with its predecessors. The real continuer of the great ideas of classical bourgeois philosophy is Marxism. As for the bourgeois philosophy of our century, it is a renunciation of the progressive ideas of its historical past.

The decline of bourgeois philosophy began in the middle of the nineteenth century. The philosophers who most clearly expressed this historical process were Schopenhauer, Comte, and Kierkegaard. Modern bourgeois philosophers (neopositivists, existentialists, and irrationalists in general) are more or less direct continuers of these thinkers. The fact that they continue to have a considerable influence on present-day bourgeois philosophy helps us correctly understand the significance of their doctrines. It would be a simplification, both theoretical and ideological, to treat them as *insignificant* spokesmen of philosophy. It would be more correct to define them as outstanding spokesmen of bourgeois philosophy in the epoch of its crisis, since they most adequately expressed the bourgeoisie's disavowal and renunciation of the progressive ideals of their historical youth. The same should be said of the principal philosophers of present-day capitalist society.

The descending line of development of capitalism is a very complicated, heterogeneous, contradictory process. Lenin described imperialism as the highest stage of capitalist development, for which an unequally higher level of development of the productive forces compared with the preceding epoch was typical, and also an acceleration of scientific and technical progress in

certain spheres of production (especially in war industry), and at the same time an intensification of the retarding role of capitalist relations of production, as a whole, a decay of bourgeois ideology, a sharpening of the antagonisms inherent in the capitalist system, and so on. His evaluation of the imperialist stage thus allowed for the qualitatively different trends of development of capitalism, including its mutually exclusive ones. His definition of imperialism is a synthesis of various determinations. Evaluation of the descending line of development of bourgeois philosophy must be the same.

We must note, when characterising modern positivism, for example, that it discusses inherent epistemological problems organically associated with twentieth-century advances in science. The posing of these problems, the analysis of their content, and the concrete investigations of the structure of scientific theories all have to be considered positive moments of philosophic development, in spite of the unsoundness of its subjective, agnostic premisses. But the neopositivist 'philosophy of science' not only has not answered the problems it raised, but has driven the theory of knowledge up a blind alley (which the most eminent spokesmen of this tendency have been compelled in the end to admit). The whole history of neopositivist philosophising has convincingly brought out contradictions splitting it from top to bottom, the failure of all attempts to resolve these contradictions, correct the errors disclosed and substitute theses that have shown themselves to be unsound by new, more acceptable ones. We can say without exaggeration that the history of neopositivism is its continuous refutation, the discrediting of all attempts to create a scientific epistemology starting from essentially Humean subjective-agnostic premisses. That fact represents a certain positive result in the historical process of rooting out philosophic errors, fallacies, and prejudices.

Everything we have said about neopositivism is applicable *mutatis mutandis* to other currents in present-day bourgeois philosophy. Existentialism, for instance, has dramatically reflected the critical situation being experienced by modern capitalist society. Existentialist philosophising reproduces the sick bourgeois consciousness that has lost its ideals, rational orientation, and belief that human affairs have by no means lost their sense. It would be a serious error to underestimate the significance of

existentialism as an ideological phenomenon really characterising the putrefaction of the capitalist system. This 'philosophy of crisis' is a necessary expression of the spiritual crisis of capitalist society and, moreover, its clearest, most convincing expression compared with other philosophic (and non-philosophic) manifestations of the contemporary bourgeois social consciousness. In that sense existentialism has interpreted traditional philosophic problems in a new way (for example the problem of life and death, freedom, the individual and society, the meaning of life), has radicalised the posing of separate problems that occupied a comparatively small place in classical capitalist philosophy (alienation, the subjectivity of emotionalism), describes the contradictions of the individual consciousness in the conditions of a society in which the alienated products of human activity have become the supreme, universal values. All those circumstances, taken unrelated to how existentialists answer the questions they raise, should perhaps be evaluated as a positive moment in the development of modern bourgeois philosophy. One must not forget, of course, that existentialism criticises bourgeois society from the right, that it recognises the crisis of a historically definite, viz. capitalist system and depicts it as a crisis of human existence in general. That is why existentialist philosophy, in spite of its inherent, romantic anti-capitalism, proves ultimately to be a refined, indirect apology of capitalism.

The forms of the progressive development of philosophy are manifold. It is by no means the aim of this chapter to sum up the results of inquiry into this whole variety (research that still remains one of the unresolved tasks of philosophical historiography). Our aim here is simply to clarify the many-faceted richness of content of the concept of progress in relation to the development of philosophy, and to bring out its most typical features.

The fact that neopositivism, existentialism, and other idealist doctrines of the twentieth century have failed when tackling the questions they raised, and that those doctrines are rejected by many bourgeois philosophers who, however, are unable to counterpose ones of richer content to them, is both an expression of the crisis of idealism and a moment of progressive development in the philosophy of today. The decline of idealist philosophy, an impressive expression of which is modern idealists' open denial of idealist philosophising (in fact they only reject preceding ide-

alist doctrines, including historically justified progressive ones), represents certain progress, although expressed in the form of an illusory negation that is not in fact a real one. The discrediting of idealism is, however, evident, in spite of the rise of more refined forms of idealist philosophising. Suffice it to say that even Neothomists—philosophers of a religious trend—declare themselves to be opponents of idealism. Claude Tresmontant, for instance, asserts that

Christian thought is not an idealism. But, according to the Christian philosophy, matter, which exists, is not the sole thing that exists, and is not uncreated, and is not ontologically sufficient.⁷¹

In the struggle between materialism and idealism this illusory idealist disavowal of idealism is evidence, indirect if not direct, of the growing superiority of materialist philosophy, and of its inevitable and final victory.

The attempts, typical of bourgeois philosophy in the epoch of imperialism, to eliminate the basic philosophic question must also be considered from that angle, attempts aimed at repudiating the alternative it formulates, at a direct opposing of the main philosophic trends, and so to avoid recognising that the sole exhaustive alternative to idealism can only be materialism.⁷² Lenin exposed the reactionary character of these attempts back at the beginning of the century. One cannot help seeing, however, that these reactionary hankerings were caused by real progress, and development of a materialist, primarily dialectical-materialist world outlook.

The diversity of the progressive development of philosophy thus finds its necessary expression in the *general*, but at the same time historically conditioned forms of its existence. It would be an oversimplification to suppose that progress is simply passage from the less perfected, less true to the more perfected, more true. Even the passage from ignorance to knowledge, from one knowledge to another, deeper one, does not adequately characterise the specific nature and diversity of progress in philosophy. The basic thing in the features of the historical process in philosophy is above all the transition from one system of views to another, corresponding to the altered historical conditions and new epoch in mankind's history. Bourgeois philosophy took the place of feudal not just because it was better or gave more correct an-

swers to the questions posed by its predecessors. It largely rejected those question, or in any case, essentially transformed them, and put forward new ones, whose posing, and the answers to which, reflected the social needs of the new epoch, the advances of science, and the secularisation of society's affairs. That, too, was undoubted progress, in spite of all the fallacies and class limitations of bourgeois philosophers. Since philosophy is the self-consciousness of a historically determined epoch (at any stage of its development), its progressive development finds natural expression in a theoretical content that more or less adequately reflects the transition to the new epoch, its inherent social needs, driving forces, and perspectives for social progress.

One of the principal general forms of progress in philosophy is the historically induced change in its subject-matter, range of basic questions. Since we have already spoken of that to some extent in earlier chapters, we shall limit ourselves here simply to some remarks of a principled character. The line between philosophies and the specific, fundamental sciences and the isolating of the latter, are a highly progressive process through which special scientific methods of research are developed more and more successfully, on the one hand, and the premisses and preconditions are built up, on the other, for converting philosophy into a scientific world outlook whose significance for the special sciences (in particular the fundamental ones) cannot be exaggerated.

The contradictions of antagonistic class society, which get their ideological reflection in the antithesis of science and religion, and likewise the specific contradictions that characterise the qualitatively different fields (and forms) of knowledge, result in that the line between philosophy and the special sciences is being drawn by development of the opposition between philosophy and non-philosophic investigative activity. That opposition characterises the attitude of idealism, in particular, to the natural sciences. Idealism inevitably comes into conflict with natural science, whose premisses and conclusions have a materialist (though not always consciously materialist) character. Materialist philosophy (*metaphysical* materialism), incidentally, is also in fact opposed to non-philosophic inquiry (whose achievements by their nature cannot be final, excluding further investigation

of the results of knowledge), since it develops as the 'science of science', i.e. a system of supreme absolute truths allegedly independent of the following development of knowledge.

Detailed, thorough analysis of the opposition of philosophy to non-philosophic activity (both theoretical and practical) allows us to conclude that it was not a subjective orientation of philosophers. It had its historical justification, as is obvious in particular from the example of German classical idealism, whose most important achievement was the development of dialectics. Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were very far from underestimating science when they counterposed philosophy to non-philosophic inquiries, and from counterposing a 'suprascientific' summing-up of reality to the sciences. They counterposed philosophy predominantly to empirical natural science, justifying (true in a false idealist form) the need for theoretical scientific knowledge and a *scientific* philosophy (philosophic *science*) corresponding to it, which they strove to create. Idealism made it impossible to cope with that, but the development of dialectics was one of the most important steps in the historical preparation of its solution. When historically evaluating the opposition of philosophy to non-philosophic activity in the form in which it existed in the pre-Marxian epoch, we cannot help concluding that it played a certain progressive role. In doing so we must, of course, remember the limited character, duality, and one-sidedness of progress in antagonistic class society. But this opposition has lost its historical justification since the advent of Marxism, because the latter has created a scientific, philosophic outlook upon the world, a principle of which is the unity of philosophic and non-philosophic theoretical inquiries, and likewise a unity of philosophy and advanced social practice.

In our day the counterposing of philosophy to non-philosophic theory and practice is an anachronism, like the counterposing of scientific research to philosophy (not to idealist philosophising, but to any philosophy in general), so characteristic of every kind of neopositivism. The powerful integrative processes taking place in modern science are evidence that the change in the subject-matter of philosophy (and so the change in its place in the system of scientific knowledge) is of immense progressive significance precisely because of the creation and development of the Marxian scientific-philosophic world outlook.

The history of philosophy knows many revolutionary upheavals whose outstanding significance was repeatedly stressed by the founders of Marxism. They pointed out, in particular, that the socio-political revolutions in France in the eighteenth century had been preceded by a philosophical revolution, the French Enlightenment, which was the ideological preparation for a revolutionary bourgeois transformation. The bourgeois revolution in Germany was also preceded by a philosophical revolution, German classical philosophy, which became one of the theoretical sources of Marxism.

The revolutionary upheaval made in philosophy by Marxism differs in principle from all the preceding philosophical revolutions, which, because of their class limitations could not put an end to either the idealist interpretation of the world or the metaphysical mode of thought. Those revolutions also could not surmount the historically established opposition of philosophic inquiry and non-philosophic activity (both theoretical and practical). Philosophy only assimilated, comprehended, and theoretically generalised the achievements of the natural and social sciences to a very limited extent. And it was even less able to substantiate social practice theoretically, in particular revolutionary, practical activity. Its interaction with the special sciences was confined to a narrow range of problems; their joint work on general problems as a rule had an episodic character. The outstanding achievements of natural science, of whose ideological significance there is no doubt, were far from always perceived and assimilated by philosophic thought. Philosophy's many outstanding achievements went essentially unnoticed in the sciences of nature and society. In that connection the following remark of Engels' is pertinent:

Propositions which were advanced in philosophy centuries ago, which often enough have long been disposed of philosophically, are frequently put forward by theorising natural scientists as brand-new wisdom and even become fashionable for a while."

The great philosophical revolution that resulted from the rise of dialectical and historical materialism, by putting an end to the opposing of philosophy to non-philosophic activity, signified the creation of a world outlook of a new type, a philosophical, and

at the same time scientific outlook upon the world. The opposing of philosophy to scientific inquiry to which idealism attached paramount importance even when it proclaimed it to be its task to create a philosophical science (Science with a capital, the sole and absolute science), was completely overcome. In place of it was put a conscious unity of philosophy and the special sciences, and their creative collaboration, the need for which is especially obvious in our day when interdisciplinary, complex research has acquired paramount importance.

The scientific, philosophical world outlook created by Marxism is a most general theory that is very closely connected with social practice, the link having, moreover, a conscious, creatively comprehended, investigative, concrete character. In that sense the philosophy of Marxism, as we have already said above, is a negation of philosophy in the old sense of the word. We must stress, moreover, that the Marxian negation of traditional philosophy is a *negation of the negation*, i.e. the creation of a philosophy of a fundamentally new type. Traditional philosophy opposed itself to non-philosophic theory and practice. But it was linked, of course, with the development of the natural and social sciences, although the link did not have a systematic, consistent character, was not joint investigative activity. Traditional philosophy, it goes without saying, was also linked with social practice, but it lacked consciousness of the fact, and likewise understanding of the role of practice in man's spiritual, especially philosophic development. It is also clear that this philosophy performed a certain ideological function, but there was no conscious development of its ideological content. All these defects of pre-Marxian philosophy were overcome by dialectical and historical materialism.

The essence of the *dialectical* negation of philosophy in the old sense of the word thus consisted in negation of a form of philosophy (plus the illusions, traditions, and fallacies associated with it) that had outlived itself, which, however, presupposed the preservation, reworking, and development of everything valuable, full of content, and true in mankind's philosophical development. It would therefore be a very gross error to counterpose the Marxian negation of philosophy in the old sense of the word and critical, scientifically substantiated assimilation of the philosophic heritage to one another. No philosophy of the past was distinguish-

ed by a capacity to master the achievements of preceding development to the extent, that Marxism can. Hegel, who considered his system the sum total of all mankind's preceding intellectual development, in fact was not able to resolve the imposing tasks he set himself, because he excluded all materialism from the history of philosophy and could not tie up the development of philosophical knowledge organically with scientific and socio-economic development. The real sum total of mankind's intellectual development, and the all-round critical generalisation of man's achievements both in the realm of philosophy and in other spheres of scientific and practical activity, is Marxism as a whole, and dialectical and historical materialism in particular.

The outstanding achievements of pre-Marxian philosophy were, on the one hand, the materialist conception of nature, and on the other, dialectics as a theory of development, epistemology, and logic. But the materialist conception of nature developed by the materialists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a basically metaphysical character. In addition it limited the competence of materialism to the study of nature, i.e. did not extend it to the sphere of social phenomena. As for dialectics, it was an idealist method, at least in its developed, systematic form, i.e. was incompatible in principle with the materialist conception of nature.

Marx and Engels reinterpreted idealist dialectics *materialistically*, and converted it into a scientific, philosophic method needed by any theoretical inquiry, and not just by philosophy. They reworked preceding materialist philosophy *dialectically*, freeing it of its limited metaphysical character, and putting an end to the ambivalence of the old materialist outlook, by creating a *materialist conception* of history, historical materialism.

The revolution in philosophy effected by Marxism is the fullest and most adequate expression of development. The philosophy of Marxism is not simply a critical summing up of all mankind's preceding philosophic development (and not only philosophic). It is the developing result, i.e. a developing philosophic system that changes its form and enriches its content in the course of society's development, on the basis of new historical experience and the achievements of the natural and social sciences. This difference in principle of Marxian philosophy from all preceding (and now existing) philosophic systems points to a

completely new type of progressive development alien to non-Marxian philosophy.

Leninism is the contemporary, highest level in the development of Marxism as a whole and of Marxian philosophy in particular. By studying the paths and means by which Lenin generalised historical experience and the achievements of natural science, we get a graphic picture of the organic development of the scientific philosophic outlook upon the world on its own theoretical basis.

Marxist-Leninist philosophy thus, by the very fact of its existence and development, marks the beginning of a new era in mankind's philosophic development. Such are the principal features of the historical process of philosophy.

¹ Karl Marx. Letter to Ferdinand Lassalle of 22 February 1858. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 40 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983), p. 269.

² Frederick Engels. Letter to Conrad Schmidt of 1 November 1891. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Correspondence* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p. 415.

³ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1892); cited from the Humanities Press (New York) re-issue of 1974, p. 29.

⁴ Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Works*, Vol. 3 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970), p. 372.

⁵ G. W. F. Hegel. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Sämtliche Werke* [in 20 Bänden]. Jubiläumsausgabe, Vol. 6 (Frommanns Verlag, Stuttgart), p. 15.

⁶ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 45.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁸ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 3, p. 176.

⁹ Frederick Engels. Letter to Conrad Schmidt of 27 October 1890. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Correspondence*, p. 401.

¹⁰ G. W. F. Hegel. *System der Philosophie. Part I. Die Logik. Sämtliche Werke* [in 20 Bänden], Jubiläumsausgabe, Vol. 8 (Frommanns Verlag, Stuttgart, 1929), p. 227.

¹¹ One must stress, incidentally, that in spite of this basic orientation of Hegel's, he expressed (in passing, as it were) a position of fundamental opposition of materialism and idealism, anticipating to some extent Engels' discovery of the basic question of philosophy. In proclaiming that 'Spirit and nature, thought and Being, are the two infinite sides of the Idea', Hegel arrived at the conclusion that 'philosophy hence falls into two main forms in which the opposition is resolved, into a realistic

and an idealistic system of philosophy, i.e. into one which makes objectivity and the content of thought to arise from the perceptions, and one which proceeds to truth from the independence of thought' (*Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 3, pp. 161, 162).

¹³ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 351.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 547-548.

¹⁵ Karl Marx. Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 91.

¹⁶ Lenin remarked that Hegel glossed over the materialist features of the Aristotelian critique of Plato's theory of ideas, and ignored the real significance of that critique, which undermined the foundations of idealism. 'Aristotle's criticism of Plato's "ideas" is a criticism of idealism as idealism in general' (see Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. In Philosophical Notebooks. *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 281).

¹⁷ Karl Marx. *Art. cit.*, p. 89.

¹⁸ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 37.

¹⁹ G. W. F. Hegel. *System der Philosophie. I Teil. Die Logik. Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe*, Vol. 8, pp. 59, 61.

²⁰ Irving Langmuir. *The Man and the Scientist. Modern Concepts in Physics and their Relation to Chemistry* (Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1962), p. 268.

²¹ Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach. *Op. cit.*, p. 342. In his rough draft of the introduction to *Anti-Dühring* Engels disclosed the true, objective sense of Hegel's final philosophy as follows: 'The Hegelian system was the last and most consummate form of philosophy, in so far as the latter is represented as a special science superior to every other. All philosophy collapsed with this system. But there has remained the dialectic method of thinking and the conception that the natural, historical and intellectual world moves and transforms itself endlessly in a constant process of becoming and passing away. Not only philosophy but all sciences were now required to discover the laws of motion of this constant process of transformation, each in its particular domain. And this was the legacy which Hegelian philosophy bequeathed to its successors' (*Anti-Dühring*, FLPH, Moscow, 1959, p. 37). The negation of philosophy in the old sense, paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, was thus already implicitly contained in its most developed, encyclopaedic form.

²² What Hegel considered a specific characteristic of philosophical development also characterised the development of science in the view of Louis de Broglie: 'The progress of Science is not comparable to a circular movement that brings us always back to the same point; it is rather comparable to a movement in a spiral that periodically brings us back to certain old stages but where the spirals are constantly getting bigger and rising' (*Sur les Sentiers de la Science*, Editions Albin Michel, Paris, 1960, p. 372).

²³ G. W. F. Hegel. *Die Logik. Op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁴ *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 3, p. 270.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 107.

¹² Wilhelm Dilthey. *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 8 (Teubner, Stuttgart, 1960), p. 207.

¹³ F. Kroener. *Die Anarchie der philosophischen Systeme* (Leipzig, 1929), p. 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁵ Hermann Schmitz. *System der Philosophie*, Vol. 1, *Die Gegenwart* (Bouvier & Co., Bonn, 1964), p. 66.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁷ Edmund Husserl. The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology. In *Husserliana. Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 6 (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1954), p. 489.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 489.

¹⁹ Philosophy, according to Heidegger, is a dying, disappearing consciousness in our day since it 'is, in its essence, Greek' (M. Heidegger. *Was ist das—die Philosophie?* (Verlag Gunther Neske Pfullingen, Tübingen, 1965, p. 13). From that point of view philosophy is rooted in the language of the ancient Greeks, whose essence they comprehended as *logos*. By reflecting on Greek we come close to an authentic understanding of philosophy and its real subject-matter. 'Nevertheless we can never go back to that way of speaking nor can we simply comprehend it' (*Ibid.*, p. 44). We must consequently reconcile ourselves to the inevitable ousting of philosophy by philosophical thinking, which is continuously becoming more remote from the existence of what is. Such, too, is the fatal destiny of the civilisation of modern times, which is being inevitably drawn to total catastrophe.

²⁰ See *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, 1973, 1: 24.

²¹ William James. *Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1928), p. 6.

²² Harold E. McCarthy. The Problem of Philosophical Diversity. In *Philosophy East and West*, 1960, 9, 3/4: 126.

²³ W. van Dooren. Philosophie et vie. In: *Hegel. L'Esprit objectif. L'unité de l'histoire* (Actes de III^{ème} Congrès international de l'Association Internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie de Hegel, Lille, 1970), p. 329.

²⁴ F. Brunner. Histoire de la philosophie et philosophie. In *Études sur l'histoire de la philosophie en hommage à Martial Gueroult* (Librairie Fischbacher, Paris, 1964), p. 200.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ 'The natural equality of human intelligences, the unity of progress of reason and progress of industry, the natural goodness of man, and the omnipotence of education, are the main features in his system.' (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The Holy Family*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 153). That view of Helvetius's differed essentially from La Mettrie's doctrine, in spite of the commonness of their premisses.

²⁹ See Frederick Engels. The Peasant War in Germany. In *Karl Marx*,

Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 422.

" See B. E. Bykhovskiy. *Siger Brabantkii* (Siger von Brabant), Moscow, 1977; Hermann Ley. *Studie zur Geschichte des Materialismus im Mittelalter* (Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1957).

" Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p. 241.

" Frederick Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach. *Op. cit.*, pp. 347-348.

" See Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. In Philosophical Notebooks, *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

" Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The German Ideology. In Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 36.

" See Engels' letter to Paul Ernst of June 5, 1890. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 390-391.

" See Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*. *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

" *Ibid.*, p. 225

" *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 13.

" *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 10.

" *Ibid.*

" *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

" G. W. F. Hegel. Die Logik, *Op. cit.*, p. 206.

" See Lenin's conspectus of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in his Philosophical Notebooks, *Op. cit.*, p. 370.

" See Ludwig Feuerbach in *Briefwechsel und Nachlass...*, Bb. I, S. 407. Elsewhere Feuerbach came close to an understanding of the dialectical interconnection of natural phenomena: 'Nature has no beginning and no end. Everything in it is in interaction: everything is relative, everything is at once effect and cause; everything in it is universal and reciprocal' (Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion. *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 6, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1967, p. 115). But that substantially dialectical statement did not get further development in the system of contemplative, anthropological materialism.

" Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 46.

" Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 504.

" See Lenin's conspectus of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. In Philosophical Notebooks, *Op. cit.*, p. 277.

" Alwin Diemer and Ivo Frenzel (Eds.) *Philosophie. Das Fischer Lexikon* (Fischer Bucherei, Frankfurt-on-Main, 1963), p. 107.

" W. Gerber. Is There Progress in Philosophy? *J. History Ideas*, 1973, 34, 4: 669.

" Marx and Engels, while bringing out the reactionary character of petty-bourgeois socialism in the *Communist Manifesto*, at the same time noted its real contribution to the historical development of the critique of capitalist society. 'This school of Socialism dissected with great acuteness the contradictions in the conditions of modern production. It laid bare the hypocritical apologies of economists. It proved, incontrovertibly, the disastrous effects of machinery and division of labour; the con-

centration of capital and land in a few hands; overproduction and crises; it pointed out the inevitable ruin of the petty bourgeois and peasant, the misery of the proletariat, the anarchy of production, the crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the industrial war of extermination between nations, the dissolution of old moral bonds, of the old family relations, of the old nationalities' (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 509). It will readily be understood that this thesis, full of profound methodological sense, relates not only to the history of socialist doctrines but also to the history of philosophy. The appreciation of the first ideological manifestations of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat during the early bourgeois revolutions, given by Marx and Engels, has the same fundamental methodological importance, in our view. "The revolutionary literature that accompanied these first movements of the proletariat had necessarily a reactionary character' (*Ibid.*, p. 514). That combination of the revolutionary and the reactionary was fully explained by the historical circumstances that determined the historical necessity of bourgeois revolutionary transformations.

" Leonard Nelson. Fortschritte und Rückschritte der Philosophie. In *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 7 (Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1970).

" Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 516.

" Karl Marx. Theses on Feuerbach. In Karl Marx, Frederick Engels. *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 3.

" Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 46.

" Frederick Engels. *Anti-Dühring*, p. 25.

" *Ibid.*

" Claude Tresmontant. *Les idées maîtresses de la métaphysique chrétienne* (Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1962), p. 29.

" Nicolai Hartmann, justifying his rejection of a direct counterposing of the main philosophic trends, claimed that both materialism and idealism were historically limited doctrines, while the task of philosophy was, above all, to rise to the suprahistorical and the supratemporal. 'What is suprahistorical in philosophy,' he wrote, 'must necessarily be above a point of view; it must therefore also stand on this side of idealism and realism (N. Hartmann. *Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus. Kant-Studien*, 1924, 29, 1/2:162). The 'new ontology' developed by him was, however, a variety of objective idealist philosophy whose differences from preceding idealist doctrines were not ones of principle.

Gilbert Ryle, one of the leaders of analytic philosophy, i.e. one of the latest versions of neopositivism, wrote that 'both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper question' (Gilbert Ryle. *The Concept of Mind*. Hutchinson, London, 1949, p. 22). The posing of the proper question, according to him, was to reject the terms 'matter', 'consciousness', 'spiritual' as lacking real content. While not limiting himself to an idealist interpretation of them, Ryle interpreted the whole content of knowledge and of everything that exists in a subjective, agnostic spirit.

" Frederick Engels. *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 43.

Conclusion

The starting point for theoretical inquiry into the historical process of philosophy is analysis of the concept of world outlook as a phenomenon of the spiritual life of society varied in both its forms and its content. Philosophy is by no means the first world outlook historically; on the contrary, it arose and developed as one distinct from the original, spontaneously formed religious outlook, as theoretical comprehension of the reality of which religion is the reflection in fantasy. Religious consciousness is conditioned by historically determined social being; it exists irrespective of men's conscious, in particular cognitive, activity. As for theoretical knowledge, it represents (for all its dependence on social conditions) an aggregate of conscious purposive actions that overcome the limited nature of everyday experience formed without cognitive efforts of any kind in the course of daily life. The results of theoretical knowledge, in contrast to the spontaneously occurring reflection of social being, are consequently the fruits of investigative quests whose success depends on subjective activity, the level of knowledge already attained, the direction and methods of inquiry, and so on.

The difference between philosophy and the religious outlook, which continues to exist alongside it, or opposed to it, as mass consciousness, is a historically developing one whose character is conditioned to a considerable extent by the appearance of mutually exclusive opposites within philosophy itself. Materialism and idealism, the principal philosophic trends, are opposed attitudes to religion within the context of the non-religious, philosophic outlook upon the world. Drawing a line between philosophy and religion is therefore a profoundly contradictory process, because idealism theoretically supports, justifies, and sub-

stantiates religious consciousness, even though irrespective of the latter's institutionalised forms and dogmas, substantiation of which is the job of theologians.

Philosophy, whatever its content, trends, and level of development, is a general theoretical outlook, based on some answer or other (materialist, idealist, dualist) to the basic philosophic question, with which its whole historically formed and altering problematic is linked one way or another. In characterising philosophy as a general outlook, we have in mind its difference from a world outlook that comprehends theoretically natural, or even, on the contrary, social reality. It is as a *general* outlook that philosophy integrates theoretically the manifold of knowledge and historical experience in historically determined social conditions, in the interest of certain social classes. The philosophic outlook, consequently, as a general theoretical ideological inquiry, is at the same time social consciousness conditioned by historically determined social being. That, too, determines its ideological function, the highest expression of which is the specific partisanship of philosophic consciousness.

Analysis of the historical genesis of philosophy fully confirms the Marxist conception of the specific nature of philosophy as an outlook upon the world with a general theoretical character, a unity of purposive investigative quests and an objectively conditioned realisation of historically determined social being. A survey of the development of the history of philosophy as a special inquiry aimed at grasping the historical process of philosophy, but at the same time conditioned both by the researcher's orientation and by the social conditions existing independently of him and irrespective of philosophy, also confirms this *differentia specifica* of philosophy, and at the same time indicates that its historical process is a necessary mode of existence of philosophy by which its past is included in its subsequent development.

The subject-matter of the history of philosophy as a discipline is the philosophic heritage. And while the real historical process is nothing other than the form of development of philosophic knowledge, historical inquiry in philosophy is its reproduction in ideas, comprehension, and summing up. This inquiry, of course, presumes a certain conception of philosophy, in other words a definite philosophy as its theoretical basis. Since only a mate-

rialist conception of history can be an adequate, scientific basis for investigating the historical process, the creation of a philosophic historiography in the precise sense of the term only became possible through Marxism. That does not imply, of course, that pre-Marxist, non-Marxist historical inquiries in philosophy can be simply rejected out of hand. A line must be drawn in them, as in historiography in general, between the 'empirical' content of research, the reliability of the actual facts, and the grounding of the description and sources, on the one hand, and the conception, evaluation, and interpretation of all this material, on the other. The fathers of Marxism appreciated the Hegelian history of philosophy as a great achievement of mankind's philosophic development. Lenin, when studying Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, not only deepened and concretised that appreciation but also enriched dialectical materialism with new theses.

The historical process, Engels stressed, can be the subject both of historical inquiry proper, i.e. analytical, descriptive inquiry, and theoretical investigation. Both are equally necessary, although their functions are quite different. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the value of analytical, descriptive investigation of the historical process, which does not, of course, lack theoretical, methodological premisses. Its significance, however, consists in its establishing the facts, making a comparative evaluation of them, and bringing out their reciprocal relations. And that forms the basis (it goes without saying) of the theoretical investigation of the process. The task of this latter inquiry is discovery of the forms of universality inherent in the historical process, the necessary connections of its structural elements and stages of development, in short, of its patterns. Marx's *Capital* is grand evidence of the immense scientific value of theoretical inquiry into the historical (in this case, economic) process. It was thanks to this kind of theoretical inquiry, summing up the history of capitalism, that the laws of the latter's origin, development, and death were discovered.

Theoretical study of the historical process in philosophy is necessary above all because it is a matter of the development of the theory. It is theories (philosophical ones, of course) that are the main facts with which research in the history of philosophy is concerned. The need for theoretical inquiry into the

development of philosophy is due, furthermore, to the very nature of philosophic knowledge, a graphic expression of which is the permanent philosophic dispute. Philosophy does not exist as a unity as regards subject-matter and content or as a whole (albeit in form) whose components depend on each other, agree with one another in the main, and therefore form only various levels and fields of investigation. The philosopher's 'universe' consists of a multitude of very different, opposing doctrines. Their relative independence, coexistence, and struggle, negation, and rejection of one system by another, are the kind of facts awareness of which has constantly led to sceptical denial of the development of philosophy and the possibility of true philosophic statements in general. Hegel, who, unlike the sceptics, created a positive theory of the historical process of philosophy, demonstrated that it not only varied in historical time, but also in fact developed, and substantiated the existence of a contradictory unity of philosophic knowledge. He inquired into the relation of succession between different doctrines (including those opposed in principle), disclosed the dialectical nature of negation, refutation, and the struggle of opposites. But the idealist conception of philosophy inseparable from his whole system made it impossible for him to investigate the real place of this specific form of knowledge in the system of social relations.

Dialectical materialism, in contrast to Hegelian panlogism, brings out the diversity of the relations of philosophic and non-philosophic forms of inquiry on the one hand, and social practice and historical experience on the other. Hegel's dialectical flair betrayed him when he considered the opposition of philosophic and non-philosophic knowledge, and even more the opposition of philosophic theory and non-philosophic (and, of course, non-theoretical) practice. Dialectical idealism was unable to comprehend the relativity of these opposites.

Hegel's genius consisted, among other things, in his discovery of the pattern of the contradictory unity of philosophies in contrast to the sceptics, who ruled out the possibility of a content-wise unity of philosophic knowledge. But Hegel, as if intimidated by the discovery he had made, strove in every way to mitigate the contradictions between really different philosophies, and to reduce them to the level of appearance. The struggle of opposites,

which in his system is not so much a struggle as a unity of opposite definitions of knowledge, is interpreted materialistically by Marxism as a *real* struggle, theoretically expressing not only the contradictions of developing knowledge but also socio-economic and political collisions independent of philosophic consciousness. The genius of the fathers of Marxism is clearly manifested, in particular, in contrast to Hegel, in their consistently disclosing the fullness and tension of contradictions, and likewise the essence and reality of the unity of opposites, which not only exclude one another but presuppose one another. The struggle of opposites in philosophy, therefore, a struggle whose main expression is the antithesis of materialism and idealism, mostly constitutes the essential content of its development. The main historical forms of both materialism and idealism must be considered from that angle. Both sides suffered defeats and gained victories in this struggle. While the materialist critique of idealism exposed its theological intention, subjective blindness, and scorn of facts, the idealist critique of materialism brought out its epistemological contemplativeness, mechanistic limitedness, and so on. The origin of a scientific, philosophic outlook, made possible only by Marxism, can only be understood as the result of centuries of struggle between materialism and idealism. The great ideological value of this struggle, which was obviously not understood by Hegel, therefore only becomes comprehensible from the standpoint of Marxist philosophy.

A scientific theory of the historical process in philosophy, reflecting the real path of historical development, thus of necessity leads to the concept of a scientific, philosophic outlook upon the world that puts an end to the historically outlived opposition of philosophy to non-philosophy, i.e. to non-philosophic theory and social practice. The difference between the two, which undoubtedly is essential, takes place solely within the real unity of social affairs that unites them. The unity of scientific knowledge, despite the qualitative differences between the sciences, and the unity of science and social practice (undoubtedly a dialectical unity, presupposing contradictions and likewise their overcoming), such is the fundamental standpoint of Marxism substantiated by its philosophy. The scientific theory of the historical process in philosophy therefore discloses the *progressive* development of philosophy both in perspective and retrospectively.

The idea of science arose, strictly speaking, together with philosophy, which means that science as theoretical inquiry arose, properly speaking, precisely as philosophy. Philosophy, the first form of theoretical inquiry historically, was a synonym of science not only in antiquity but right down to modern times. The concept of science formed already by antique philosophy as a counter to mythology, on the one hand, and everyday consciousness on the other, is one of the principal philosophic concepts. But the splitting of philosophy into the mutually exclusive opposites of materialism and idealism theoretically predetermined philosophic consciousness' ambivalent attitude to the religious outlook. Social progress, which caused a progressive differentiation in the sphere of science, and the formation of separate sciences, independent of philosophy, intensified this ambivalence. Because of the line drawn between philosophy and the natural and social sciences, the subject-matter of philosophic inquiry underwent a change. Its place, too, in the system of aggregate knowledge was thereby also altered. That historically progressive process reflected not only progressive development of the productive forces, but also the antagonist character of the relations of production. On that basis, which conditioned man's progressive emancipation from dominance by the elemental forces of nature, and at the same time people's enslavement by the spontaneous forces of social development, a counterposing of philosophy to the specific sciences took shape and was consolidated. To avoid oversimplification, this opposition needs to be considered not so much as philosophers' subjective orientation (although, of course there usually is such), as an objective historical dependence whose basis is formed by antagonistic forms of the social division of labour, the dominant position of religion, and the idealist nature of the exploiting classes' ideology.

The contradictory character of the counterposing of philosophy to the sciences comes out particularly graphically in the fact that progressive modern philosophers have been unanimous in their striving to create and substantiate a scientific philosophy. That has not just been a predilection for a tradition born in antiquity. It has, on the contrary, been consciousness of a necessity dictated by the new historical epoch from whose standpoint the ancients' wisdom is not science at all. The founders of bour-

geois philosophy saw in science a new phenomenon, unknown in the past, the highest form of any possible knowledge. Science, according to their view, included philosophy as its ideological and methodological basis. They did not, moreover, impose some special philosophic method onto the sciences; rather, they learned, on the contrary, from science. For them the methodological standard was above all mathematics, and they thought of the scientific philosophy that they strove to create as *mathesis universalis*. That was typical, of course, of the rationalists of the seventeenth century, but not just of them.

The father of German classical philosophy, Immanuel Kant, who proclaimed the task of converting philosophy into a real science, defined the latter as a system of knowledge systematised in accordance with principles. And until philosophy was converted into science it was only argufying.

Until that time [Kant wrote] we cannot learn philosophy—it does not exist; if it does, where is it, who possesses it, and how shall we know it? We can only learn to philosophize, in other words, we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with general principles.¹

Idealism, however, inevitably distorted the rational meaning of the task posed by Kant. For philosophy, according to him, only became a science insofar as it was converted into a system of *a priori* substantiation of science and morality. The task of theoretical comprehension of the foundations of scientific knowledge and human behaviour was formulated as the need to create a transcendental metaphysics. The counterposing of philosophy to non-philosophic inquiry and practical activity was not only not eliminated but on the contrary deepened.

Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel developed Kant's idea of a scientific philosophy as a system of *a priori* principles. Hegel defined science as absolute knowledge, truth, which got the real element of its existence, and the apodictic verity that religion could not give it, through a concept and in the form of a concept. Only science, according to him, was the true knowledge of the Absolute Spirit about itself.

Seeing, then, that Spirit has attained the notion, it unfolds its existence and develops its processes in this ether of its life and is [Philosophical] Science [i.e. Absolute or completely coherent Knowledge].¹

And this science (philosophy, of course) was idealist philosophy. Everything that was true in the other sciences was drawn—from philosophy, since only it was the science that must form the centre of all spiritual culture and all science and truth.³ Such is the final conclusion of dialectical idealism, which proved unable to overcome the main defect of other idealist doctrines, for all its superiority over them.

The genius of Marx, Lenin said, was that he answered all the questions posed by his great predecessors. The creation of a scientific philosophy was also the solution of the problem generated by mankind's centuries-long philosophic development, which gave it a manifold content that was not just specifically philosophic but also scientific, not just theoretical but also practical. Marxism showed the way out of the labyrinth of philosophic systems. The Marxist, positive negation of philosophy in the old sense of the word meant the creation of a philosophy of a new type, a scientific, philosophical outlook upon the world. And that was possible in particular, because the fathers of Marxism reworked idealist dialectics materialistically, and metaphysical materialism dialectically, these principal achievements of preceding philosophic development.

The superiority of dialectical materialism over all philosophic systems existing in the past (and now) lies in its inherent unity, and the interpenetration of materialism and dialectics. One can hardly exaggerate the significance of that essential characteristic of it for philosophic historiography. A scientific understanding of the contradictions of the historical process in philosophy, consistent adherence to the principle of historicism, which makes it possible to evaluate any philosophy objectively, irrespective of how it is related to either materialism or dialectics, investigation of the history of philosophy as the development of philosophy, realised through a struggle of opposites, demarcation of the objective content of philosophies from the subjective form of their construction and exposition, clarification of the real place of philosophy in the system of natural and social sciences, analysis of the social sense and trend of doctrines in the real context of society's development—all that only became possible from the standpoint of dialectical materialism.

Dialectical materialism is not only based historically upon mankind's preceding philosophic development (which it sums

up critically), but it also logically presumes a science of the history of philosophy, which formulates its fundamental concepts through the Marxist analysis of the development of philosophies. But a scientific history of philosophy (scientific in its theoretical content as well as in its form) is based on dialectical materialism, which organically combines scientism and partisanship, the categorical imperatives of philosophic historical research. Marxism, Lenin wrote,

combines the quality of being strictly and supremely scientific (being the last word in social science) with that of being revolutionary, it does not combine them accidentally and not only because the founder of the doctrine combined in his own person the qualities of a scientist and a revolutionary, but does so intrinsically and inseparably.¹

The conversion of philosophy into a science is thus the chief result of its historical process. Its development as a scientific, philosophic outlook upon the world is its main historical perspective. Dialectical materialism is the sole possible basis of a scientific theory of the philosophic historical process.

¹ Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn (J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1934), p. 474.

² G. W. F. Hegel. *The Phenomenology of Mind*. Translated by J. B. Baillie (Macmillan, London, 1931). Cited from the Harper Torchbook edition (New York, 1967), p. 805.

³ G. W. F. Hegel. *System der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Die Logik* (Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Vol. 8; Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart, 1929), p. 32.

⁴ V. I. Lenin. What the Friends of the People Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats. *Collected Works*, Vol. 1. (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p. 327.

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 کان وڌ ڪتاب خريد ڪري ڪتابن جي ليگڱن، ڇپائيندڙن ۽
 ڇاپيندڙن کي همٿائن. پر ساڳئي وقت علم حاصل ڪرڻ ۽ ڄاڻ
 کي ڦهلائڻ جي ڪوشش دوران ڪنهن به رُڪاوٽ کي نه مڃن.
 شيخ اياز علم، ڄاڻ، سمجھ ۽ ڏاهپ کي گيت، بيت، سٽ،
 پُڪارَ سان تشبيهه ڏيندي انهن سڀني کي بمن، گولين ۽ بارودَ
 جي مدِ مقابل بيهاريو آهي. اياز چوي ٿو ته:
 گيت به ڄڻ گوريلا آهن، جي ويريءَ تي وار ڪرن ٿا.

....

جنن جنن جاڙ وڌي ٿي جڳ ۾، هو ٻوليءَ جي آڙ چُپن ٿا؛
 ريتيءَ تي راتاها ڪن ٿا، موتي منجهه پهڙا چُپن ٿا؛

....

ڪالهه هُيا جي سُرخ گُلن جيئن، اڄڪلهه نيلا پيلا آهن؛
 گيت به ڄڻ گوريلا آهن.....

.....

هي بيت اُٿي، هي بم- گولو،

جيڪي به ڪٽين، جيڪي به ڪٽين!

مون لاءِ ٻنهي ۾ فرقُ نه آ، هي بيت به بمَ جو ساٿي آ،

جنهن رڻ ۾ رات گيا راڙا، تنهن هڏ ۽ چمَ جو ساٿي آ -

ان حساب سان اڻڄاڻائي کي پاڻ تي اهو سوچي مڙهڻ ته

”هاڻي ويڙهه ۽ عمل جو دور آهي، اُن ڪري پڙهڻ تي وقت نه

وڃايو“ نادانيءَ جي نشاني آهي.

پَنَ جو پڙهڻ عام ڪتابي ڪيڙن وانگر رڳو نصابي ڪتابن تائين محدود نه هوندو. رڳو نصابي ڪتابن ۾ پاڻ کي قيد ڪري ڇڏڻ سان سماج ۽ سماجي حالتن تان نظر ڪڍي ويندي ۽ نتيجي طور سماجي ۽ حڪومتي پاليسيون policies اڻڄاڻن ۽ نادانن جي هٿن ۾ رهنديون. پَنَ نصابي ڪتابن سان گڏوگڏ ادبي، تاريخي، سياسي، سماجي، اقتصادي، سائنسي ۽ ٻين ڪتابن کي پڙهي سماجي حالتن کي بهتر بنائڻ جي ڪوشش ڪندا.

پڙهندڙ نسل جا پَنَ سڀني کي چو، چالا ۽ ڪينئن جهڙن سوالن کي هر بيان تي لاڳو ڪرڻ جي ڪوٺ ڏين ٿا ۽ انهن تي ويچار ڪرڻ سان گڏ جواب ڳولڻ کي نه رڳو پنهنجو حق، پر فرض ۽ اڻٽر گهرج unavoidable necessity سمجهندي ڪتابن کي پاڻ پڙهڻ ۽ وڌ کان وڌ ماڻهن تائين پهچائڻ جي ڪوشش جديد ترين طريقن وسيلي ڪرڻ جو ويچار رکن ٿا.

توهان به پڙهڻ، پڙهائڻ ۽ ڦهلائڻ جي ان سهڪاري تحريڪ ۾ شامل ٿي سگهو ٿا، بس پنهنجي اوسي پاسي ۾ ڏسو، هر قسم جا ڳاڙها توڙي نيرا، ساوا توڙي پيلا پن ضرور نظر اچي ويندا.

وڻ وڻ کي مون پاڪي پائي چيو ته ”منهنجا پاءُ
پهتو منهنجي من ۾ تنهنجي پَنَ جو پڙلاءُ.“
- اياز (ڪلهي پاتم ڪينرو)

پڙهندڙ نسل - پَنَ The Reading Generation