

# Korea's Division and Its Truth



# ***Korea's Division and Its Truth***

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## **Preface**

The problem of Korea's reunification has been raised by its territorial split by outside forces.

Koreans are a homogenous nation that has lived on the same territory using one language, creating one history and culture and carrying forward one lineage throughout its 5 000-year history.

Division imposed by the outside forces is a great misfortune and tragedy for the nation.

The tragic consequences of the division of the feelings and harmony of the fellow countrymen and the territory of the country affect every moment and every day of the real life of the Korean nation.

Reunification is the task that brooks no further delay nor slowness and the vital requirement of the Korean nation.

There is no present without past, and no future without present. A good understanding of the past makes it possible to cope properly with the present and map out a bright future. It is all the more so with the problem of Korea's division and reunification that is linked to its territorial integrity and the life and death of the nation.

A correct understanding of the cause of its territorial split through its history will make it possible to put an end to the tragic division as soon as possible and achieve its reunification, a long-cherished desire of the Korean nation.

This book features the beginning of Korea's territorial split, imperialists' competition for the conquest of the country and the subsequent events, and their details and unknown episodes.

The editorial board hopes the book will help readers to have a correct understanding of the moves of the imperialists who had long conducted fierce competition over the land of Korea and the actual facts of its division.

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# **1. Who First Schemed to Divide and Occupy Korea**

## **Competition of World Powers**

Towards the closing days of its rule, the feudal Korea defined “closing the country’s door and defending the national sovereignty” as its diplomatic policy.

As a consequence of the strengthening of the guard and surveillance of its borderlines and strict law-based control of entry to and exit from the country, there was hardly an illegal trespasser. By the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the only visitors to the country included the Chinese and Japanese diplomatic envoys and merchants. Illegal trespassers, if any, were harshly punished: those who revealed domestic circumstances to foreigners were sentenced to thrashing on naked buttocks with sticks made of willow branch, hard labour with deprivation of freedom for a certain period or hanging, according to the severity of the crimes. Those punishments also applied to foreigners regardless of their nationality, reason and the length of stay.

This policy reduced Korea to an “unknown world” isolated from the outside world.

Since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the US and European capitalist powers, with an ambition to invade the East, brought pressure to bear upon Korea, demanding that it open its door.

After finding their way to its seas, they first demanded “opening-up” and “trade” and next permission of survey and investigation of seas nearby and neighboring islands. They went so far as to threaten and pressurize its rulers by accusing them of and blaming them for “some wrongdoings”. Besides they marauded on villages, plundering wealth and killing civilians, and even dug out the tomb of Prince Namyon (father of the then Korea’s real ruler Regent Taewon).

To swallow Korea, rich in underground resources and lying at a strategically important location, the US and European powers waged a cut-throat competition among themselves.

Qing China intervened in Korea’s internal affairs incessantly to put it under its control while Japan, advocating the “theory of conquest of Korea,” invaded Korea whenever opportunities cropped up, saying that conquest of Korea was a matter vital to it. The US situated at the opposite side of the Pacific was craving for it, seeing it as a “dagger” useful for its invasion of Asia and the continent while Czarist Russia, having embarked on the implementation of “southward policy,” was hunting for a chance to invade Korea. Involved in this contest for Korea were also Britain, France and Germany.

Most active in this was Japan, an underdeveloped capitalist country. Following the 1868 Meiji Restoration that had transformed its state system into capitalist one, Japan, shouting “a wealthy country with a powerful army”, enforced a compulsory military service system in the country and boosted the shipbuilding and munitions industries to step up preparations for invasion of Korea. It cooked up the *Unyo* incident in 1875 and, by enforcing the Korean



government to sign the unequal Kanghwado Treaty, won aggressive concessions including the right to open ports, station a consul, enjoy extraterritorial privileges, conduct free trade, survey coastal waters, make its ships in distress call at Korea's ports, and conclude supplementary treaties.

There were some factors that helped Japan, an under-developed capitalist country with relatively weak strength, be the first to realize the "opening-up" and invasion of Korea.

In 1873, the Queen and her ilk, in collaboration with King Kojong, proclaimed governing by the emperor, putting an end to the regency by Prince Taewon.

The ouster of Prince Taewon, who maintained the closed-door policy, made a breakthrough in the country's policy. This provided the Queen, soft and submissive towards Japan, with a golden chance to seize power.

Japan, close to Korea geographically and well informed of its political developments, with the help of its numerous spies in the office set up in Pusan and other places to facilitate commercial activities in Korea by the Japanese, foresaw that the Queen, obsessed with repugnance and vengeance against Prince Taewon, would apparently reject his closed-door policy and take a path to "opening-up". Considering that a proper use of the Queen group's move would allow it to surely break through Korea's closed-door policy, Japan planned to bring Korea's rulers to the dialogue table by threatening them with arms.

Things went as Japan planned. At the talks held on Kanghwa

Island, the feudal Korean government accepted the humiliating treaty Japan had prepared, ending up in concluding the Kanghwado Treaty with Japan.

Its adoption was also a product of the active support from the US which was seeking for an opportunity to invade Korea.

After suffering a defeat in its armed invasion of Korea in 1871, the US changed its strategy into finding its collaborator in an attempt to achieve its goal. It saw Japan, whose political circles were dominated by barbarous samurais, as its reliable partner. For this reason it always rendered positive support and aid to Japan in the latter's invasion of Korea.

When Japan was making preparations for the conclusion of the Kanghwado Treaty, the US minister in Japan encouraged the Japanese foreign minister, saying that sending "impregnable warships" and dealing a "deliberate blow" at Korea could bring it a success. He gave Tailer's book *Brief History of Perry's Expedition to Japan* to Inoue, Japan's deputy envoy to the talks, and urged him to threaten and blackmail Korea as dictated by the book.

As the Kanghwado Treaty opened the door to Korean invasion, the US and European powers, as if they had been waiting for the chance, called for "equal opportunities" and concluded a host of unequal and subordinate "treaties" with Korea by intimidating and coaxing its rulers. They include the Korea-US Treaty adopted in May 1882, Korea-UK Treaty in November 1883, Korea-Germany Treaty in November 1883, Korea-Italy Treaty in June 1884, Korea-Russia Treaty in July 1884 and Korea-France Treaty in June 1886.

With the foreign forces making inroads into Korea and expanding their foothold under these unfair “treaties”, such political factions as pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, pro-American and pro-Russian factions were formed in the ruling circles, which engaged in factional strife for power with the backing of outside forces. When Qing China gained the upper hand in the contest for the control of Korea, the pro-Chinese faction held sway; when Japan prevailed, this time the pro-Japanese faction dominated; and when Czarist Russia got the better of it, the pro-Russian faction seized power.

On this land that had turned into a venue for competition of foreign aggressors, the nation, its owner, could not escape disaster and humiliation.

### **“Sovereign State” Devoid of Sovereignty**

During the foreign aggressive forces’ competition for Korea in the closing years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the confrontation and war between Qing China and Japan was the first and most acute and explosive one. This broke out for exclusive domination of Korea. The biggest obstacle to Japan’s escalating invasion and control of Korea was China’s historical intervention in Korea. Leaving it as it was would make the former’s exclusive domination over Korea unfeasible. To free Korea from the influence of China, Japan stepped up preparations for military clash with China.

Although they had noticed Japan’s moves, Chinese rulers believed that Britain would take their side to deter Japan as it had more concessions in their country than other nations and had great

interest in the Korean issue. However, Britain's response was a far cry from China's expectations.

Expecting no benefit from a possible Sino-Japanese war, Britain proposed a plan of placing Korea under "joint guardianship" (divided control over Korea) by China and Japan. Seeing the proposal to be conducive to camouflaging Japan's preparation for a war against China and whitewash it as "peace-lover", the Japanese minister in Britain Aoki reported this proposal to his government.

Following is an excerpt of the proposal:

"... Britain proposes that four southern provinces (Kangwon, Chungchong, Kyongsang and Jolla) be protected under Japan's exclusive domination over their external affairs while recognizing China's temporary protection of three northern provinces (Hamgyong, Phyongan and Hwanghae) on certain conditions. It also proposes that Kyonggi Province be separated from other provinces and ruled by the Korean King under the protection for which China and Japan will be responsible and that a new force be prevented from making any attempt to request any right to the other regions."

Through this proposal, Britain was trying to participate in the competition for the control over Korea under the camouflage of "peace-maker" and on the other hand to protect its many concessions in China and contain Czarist Russia's southward advance.

Japan conveyed Britain's proposal to China. As a matter of fact, to rule divided Korea did not conform to its immediate interest and was not its ultimate goal either. However, it did so because that was necessary for the time being for its stepping up preparations for war

against China.

Foreign forces being hell-bent on seeking their own interests, confrontation between China and Japan got closer to its extremity, a war.

In 1894 the Kabo Peasant War against feudal oppression and foreign invaders broke out in Korea.

Korean government, panic-stricken by successive victories by the peasant army, requested China to dispatch its army to Korea to help quell the riot.

Meanwhile, Japan landed its troops in Inchon under the plea of “protecting” its residents in Korea. It went on to make an abrupt attack on the Chinese fleet in Asan Bay, igniting the Sino-Japanese War without any declaration, and perpetrated murder, arson and pillage in Korea.

The Japanese troops, numerically superior, speeded up its northward advance and routed China’s Beiyang army around Pyongyang and its navy seized the command of the West Sea of Korea by sinking five major ships of the Beiyang Fleet. By late October they crossed the Amnok River and made inroads into Manchuria, and a unit landed in the Liaodong peninsula, seizing fortresses in Dalian and Lushun. They escalated their invasion into China, occupying Weihaiwei, the naval base of the Beiyang Fleet, threatening Beijing and occupying the Penghu Islands in the south.

In late November the Japanese troops seized Lushun and massacred its citizens, irrespective of age and sex in four days on the preposterous ground that the Japanese residents in the city had been slain by Chinese troops. The citizens who drowned themselves

into the sea off the city to escape the massacre were said to be numberless. Only 36 survived the massacre; their lives were spared by the Japanese troops for the disposal of the corpses of the people slaughtered by them. In a commercial city at the entrance to the Liaodong peninsula, the Japanese troops mobilized two engineer companies and four infantry companies to burn down the city, killing all living things, “even rats” as they said.

The US lavished support and cooperation on Japan to ensure its victory in the Sino-Japanese War. When Japan came up with a peace proposal, the American consulate members in China resorted to intimidation and appeasement to persuade the Chinese rulers into coming to the talks and sometimes hid Japanese spies who would otherwise be caught red-handed while collecting military intelligence. When public denunciation of the Japanese troops’ massacre gathered momentum not only in China but also across the world, the US stood for them, saying that the Japanese army cannot do so as “it is commanded by the best officers in the world.”

When Britain with a lot of concessions in China asked it to jointly propose ceasefire of the war, the US declined it, sticking to “noninterference”. In November 1894, Roosevelt suggested “peace mediation” to the two warring parties. Although he vociferated the “peace in the East” and “honour of the two countries of China and Japan” under the signboard of “peace mediation”, he, in fact, forestalled Britain and Chinese government-friendly European powers to prevent them from intervening in the affairs of Japan.

Despite “making peace” by the US, the Japanese foreign

minister took a hard line, saying, “The war would continue unless the Chinese government asked directly for peace.”

The US immediately joined it and added fuel to Japan’s aggressive manoeuvres, giving encouragements to its war escalation by calling it to “attack Beijing without hesitation and not to withdraw its troops before seeing the realization of peace terms”. At the US instigation, Japan strengthened its military offensive, occupying Dalian and other vast areas of Chinese territory and threatened Beijing. As a consequence, in March 1895 the Chinese government had no alternative but to come to the peace negotiations for ceasefire. At the talks the Japanese side was as elated as a “victor” and put pressure and threat to bear upon the Chinese side in every matter. First, Japan flatly rejected the Chinese side’s proposal to hold the talks in Shanghai, and made Shimonoseki of Japan host the talks. The purpose was to show the world the “spectacular scene” of defeated China coming with a white flag and boost the morale of its people, thereby meeting its brigandish demand to the full. Japan also made a quarrel over the status and authority of the Chinese delegate of the parley and made the Beiyang minister Li Hongjiang come to Japan as the senior delegate.

At the early talks, the Japanese side’s demand met with the opposition of the Chinese side. After the 3<sup>rd</sup> round of talks the Japanese side got some Japanese hooligans to pistol Li Hongjiang on his way to his lodging. Seriously wounded on the face and fallen into a critical state, Li was carried to a hospital and received first aid treatment.

After leaving the hospital, Li infuriated with the Japanese acts,

continued to stand up to the Japanese side in discussions of major agenda items. Then Japanese shot the second “bullet”. Ito Hirobumi called Li’s son, who was accompanying his father to the talks, to his own residence and threatened him, saying that a huge reinforcement of Japanese troops aboard 60–70 vessels could be sent to China and there was hardly a guarantee that Li’s party leaving Japan would enter the gate to Beijing again if the talks got disrupted. Informed of this bombshell declaration, Li reported to his government that Japan was going to attack Beijing by sending a reinforcement of 100 000 troops and no progress in the talks would trigger tension in the situation.

The Chinese authorities gave him instructions that he conclude a peace treaty through a proper compromise between both sides if an agreement was not reached on agenda items. In line with the instructions, the wounded Li went to the talks and signed the Shimonoseki Treaty by “properly negotiating” the draft treaty advanced by Japan.

Thanks to the treaty, Japan won control over Taiwan, Penghu Islands and Liaodong peninsula and squeezed 200 million *yuan* as “damages” and economic privileges in various sectors.

In particular, the treaty’s first article, stipulating that “China confirms that Korea is a completely independent state,” opened a road to the unrivalled Japan’s swallowing up of Korea totally free from China’s political, economic and military forces.

Japan strengthened invasion and domination of Korea, labelling the latter as a “completely independent state” and imposed enslavement and distress on the Korean nation, professing itself to be a



“protector” of an “independent state”. This was the historic tragedy wrought by the Sino-Japanese War.

## **Tragedy Wrought by the Powers’ Contest and “Royal Moving to Russian Legation”**

After the end of the Sino-Japanese War, there emerged a Kim Hong Jip-led cabinet in Korea. Japan appointed 50 Japanese advisers to the government organs for intervention in the internal affairs of Korea. As a result, the Korean government’s policies as a whole turned pro-Japanese.

It strengthened surveillance and control over the royal court to deny it access to foreign diplomats and entrusted the Training Unit, a pro-Japanese armed force, to the guarding of the royal palace to contain pro-Russian-leaning the Queen. Given the situation, the Japanese in Korea became extremely arrogant, and did anything they liked. It is well evidenced by a writing by the then secretary of Japanese legation Haoki Masu, which reads in part:

“There’s no need to mention the arrogance of the Japanese over their victory in the war. Currently even the consuls have become impertinent and arrogant towards the Korean government. Japanese officials are defending these unjust behaviours and inspiring the Japanese to these behaviours. A Japanese drunkard broke into the house of a Korean government minister and committed violence upon him. Another Japanese drunkard bumped into Korean foreign minister Kim Yun Sik on the road. These vile outrages are really

deplorable. It is of no use urging Koreans not to hate the Japanese so long as such doings take place.”

Those accidents aroused strong anti-Japanese sentiments among the feudal rulers, not to mention the people of all walks of life, and inspired them to more vehement anti-Japanese movement.

To take an example, entering the summer of 1895, the pro-Russian faction, with the backing of pro-Russian-leaning the Queen, returned openly to the political arena from its hibernation. They abolished regulations and policies put forward by the pro-Japanese cabinet and were busy widening the road for Russia into Korea. It was a product of the Queen’s policy of “Welcome Russia, Rout Japan”. The situations turned unfavourable for Japan, which had created favourable circumstances for its exclusive domination of Korea after driving the Chinese troops out of it through the Sino-Japanese War. Since then the powers’ competition for Korea was highlighted by the Russo-Japanese rivalry.

As the pro-Russian elements gained upper hand with the backing of the Queen and anti-Japanese sentiment grew among the royal court and bureaucrats, Japan clung to more brigandish means, the measure to remove the Korean forces rejecting the will of Japan.

The first target was the Queen, kingpin of the pro-Russian faction.

To remove her, Choshu warlord Miura, nicknamed “Brusque General”, was appointed as the Japanese minister in Seoul. Miura who went to Korea after fixing even the date for murdering the Queen submitted a written opinion of policies to his government, which reads in part: “Our Korea policy needs gale and lightning; it

needs a measure of giving it no time even to block its ears. ... I am already determined to lay down my life on this land. A makeshift plan doesn't work. Extraordinary decision is needed to remove the cause of trouble”.

In order to hide his vicious plan, he said to the Queen, a fanatic Buddhist believer, that he would like to enjoy the landscape of Korea, that he would not enter the royal palace if she did not want him, and that he was going to personally copy the Buddhist Scripture and present it to her. Upon hearing that the Korean King was going to disband the Training Unit, organized by Japan and run by pro-Japanese elements, he wasted no time to launch the plan to remove the Queen.

At 4 a.m. on October 8, 1895, he drove about 1 600-strong killer group including 60 gangsters and 500 garrison troops to make an abrupt attack on the Kyongbok Palace. The order they were given was to “enter the palace and kill the fox (Queen) as circumstances may determine”. After breaking into the palace, the murderers encircled the Konchong Palace, the residence of the Queen, killing the resisting guards of the palace, and raided on the Konnyong Hall, her sleeping chamber. They slashed the fleeing court maids indiscriminately. They calculated that the dead court ladies would include the Queen. They detected a “maid” in an uncommon attire and at once grasped her hair, throwing her on the ground and slashing her with a sword.

The murderers rolled the still alive and bleeding Queen in a quilt, threw her on the courtyard of the Konnyong Hall and brought

the surviving maids to make them confirm if she was the Queen or not. In order to remove the trace, they put the body of the still breathing Queen on a pile of firewood, poured petroleum and set it on fire; later they threw the few remaining bone scraps into the Kyonghui Pond.

Kikuchi Kenzo, who had been involved in the incident wrote in his diary: “The Queen’s bloody corpse was poured with petroleum and set ablaze. In a moment the tiny corpse was enveloped by flames and reeked of strange smell. Indeed, it deserved God’s weeping.”

This was the Ulmi incident that indicts against the crime of the Japanese imperialists who resorted to every possible means and method to invade Korea. It also left a serious lesson that when a nation fails to defend its sovereign rights, it is subjected to great misfortunes and humiliations.

The root cause of the murder of the Queen was the competition between Czarist Russia and Japan for concessions in Korea.

To look back on the world’s modern history, the Queen was not the only woman who was killed because she was queen.

During the French revolution Queen Mary Antoinette was beheaded by the guillotine, and during the Russian October Revolution the Empress of Nikolai II was shot to death at the foot of Mt. Ural. Their deaths were the outcome of home-grown struggles for the transformation and progress in these countries. By contrast, Queen’s death was a lamentable one caused by the Japanese imperialists who schemed to make a plaything of another nation’s destiny.

After murdering the Queen, the Japanese imperialists urged

Prince Taewon, her political rival, to make an accusation against her and make public the posthumous disowning of her title of queen, making her an “ordinary woman”. They also urged the Kim Hong Jip-led Cabinet to push forward with forcing men to have their hair cropped, an order it had issued to civilize the Korean nation in a Japanese way.

The murder of the Queen and the following developments fanned the anti-Japanese, anti-government volunteers’ struggle across the country.

The world powers bent on competitions for the control of Korea could not remain on-lookers of the Ulmi incident. Their foremost concern was how to curry favour with the Korean King and take the initiative in the country availing themselves of the murder of the “mother of the nation”. Among them, Russia’s move was conspicuous.

The day after the incident Russian minister Veber rushed to the royal palace and met Miura; there he strongly demanded investigation of the incident, saying that this can never be overlooked because it was extremely serious.

Although Miura tried to shirk the responsibility and blame by all means, Veber had already a good knowledge of the truth.

Two days after the incident, Veber presented Kojong with a box made of tin, saying that it contained foods safe to eat. His remark meant to warn him against the poison and toxic foodstuffs that were likely to be available in the royal court. This was a sign of Russia’s attempt to create a favourable condition for its advance to Korea by fawning upon Kojong who spent extremely uneasy days with hatred

towards the Japanese after the Queen's death.

The US did not miss the opportunity offered by the incident. Always around Kojong, American missionary Underwood made sure that Kojong's meals were prepared at his own house, and he and his wife slept in the chamber next to Kojong's, saying that only America's protection would guarantee his "personal safety".

The Japanese did not turn a blind eye to the moves of other forces. They helped the pro-Japanese cabinet, not to mention themselves, further strengthen guard and blockade of the royal palace and tighten the control of foreigners' visit to the palace.

After deploying 100 marines in Seoul under the plea of "protecting its legation" in the wake of the incident, Russia moved 120 more sailors to Seoul from its naval vessel anchored in Inchon when Japan sent its reinforced troops to crack down on the Korean volunteers' struggle.

As a consequence the confrontation between Russia and Japan grew worse.

In consideration of the poor guard of the royal palace and the growing anti-Japanese sentiment of King Kojong after the Queen's death, Veber hatched a plan together with pro-Russian figure Ri Pom Jin to lure the King to the Russian legation.

They egged on the King's favourite concubine Om and a court maid Kim to say to the King, "It would be advisable for him to move to the Russian legation for the time being," adding that the Japanese were scheming to dethrone him.

Consequently on the night of February 11, 1896, King Kojong

and the crown prince hiding in a court maids' carriage broke out of the Kyongbok Palace and moved to the Russian legation in Jongdong. This resulted the Korean political arena to witness the pro-Russian force and its wirepuller Russians, cutting a wide swathe in sharp contrast to the shrinkage of the pro-Japanese force and its mastermind, Japanese, who sustained a telling blow.

### **38<sup>th</sup> Parallel-based Division Discussed behind the Curtain**

In the summer of 1896, the coronation of Emperor Nikolai II was held in Russia.

Japan sought to use the ceremony to improve their awkward situation. A kingfish of Japanese warlords Yamagata Aritomo was dispatched to Moscow in the capacity of the delegate to congratulate the coronation. Japan had no alternative since no contact with Russia which was holding all the cards in the invasion of Korea could cost the fruit it had harvested. However, it found it awful to send a mission to congratulate Russia on its imperial coronation ceremony because of an incident that had happened when Nikolai II was the crown prince.

Five years earlier, in May 1891, Nikolai travelled to the Far East of Russia to take part in the groundbreaking ceremony of Siberian railway project, and availing himself of the opportunity he made a trip to Japan.

A Japanese policeman, who was escorting him, got “infuriated”

with him, complaining that the crown prince was wandering about on the plea of tourism to carry on “acts of espionage”, when it was a “duty” for him to pay a “courtesy call” to the Japanese Emperor, and struck him by the head with his saber. The saber cut off the hat tip, and inflicted about 7 cm wound in the crown prince’s scalp. This caused a “great incident of apologies”, including the Japanese emperor going to Kyoto to ask after the hospitalized crown prince there. The fear of retaliation by Russia, boasting of a ground force, one of the strongest in the world and occupying a great part of the earth, set atremble the whole of Japan.

Thanks to the “magnanimity” of Russia as befitting a “power”, the incident passed without any trouble, though the Japanese samurais still carried the seed of anxiety.

Yamagata was given 6-point “instructions” for compromise and negotiation with Russia by the acting Japanese foreign minister, who also asked him to inquire into the Russian authorities’ opinion on the Korean issue.

The “instructions” aimed at preventing Korea from being placed under the exclusive domination of Russia included an item that reads:

“In the event of army dispatch by both Japan and Russia to keep peace and order in Korea, the country (Korea) shall be divided for the troops and there shall be a considerable distance between the two places.”

This evidences that Japan had already prepared a “plan” for the division and military occupation of Korea in collaboration with Russia on the plea of “keeping peace and order” in Korea.

At the first round of behind-the-curtain talks with Russian



foreign minister Romanov, held on May 24, 1896, Yamagata specified the issue. The content reads as follows:

“When there are concerns over the worsening security and order in Korea, governments of the two countries can help Korea by dispatching reinforcements to their troops in the country. In that case, to avoid clashes between the two armies, the two countries shall divide areas for stationing their troops, one party deploying its troops in the southern part of Korea and the other in the northern part. And there shall be a considerable distance between the two armies to prevent clashes.”

The minute of the talks reads that the two men “burst into hearty laughter” while discussing the issue of the demarcation line with forks in their hands to share a fat chunk of Korea.

Later, as regards the demarcation line issue, Romanov wrote in the book, titled *Diplomatic History of the Russian Interest in Manchuria*, that at the talks Yamagata suggested to him that the area south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel would be occupied by Japan and the area north of it by Russia.

This illustrates how tricky and nasty the Japanese imperialists were to eat even half of the Korean land as they knew they were not a match for Russia in terms of strength, and the first criminal in Korea’s division along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel was none other than the Japanese imperialists.

Fathoming Japan’s greed, Romanov declined to say yes or no to the plan while nodding on the view of avoiding clashes.

Then he brought together the opinions of Japan’s “plan” from the

military and other circles. The unanimous opinion was that Japan's "proposal" must be rejected. Especially there was a strong opposition from the military circles, the reason of which was as follows:

"Yielding the southern part of the Korean peninsula to Japan according to the subsequent treaty may lead to Russia's official and permanent abandonment of the area that is most important strategically and in terms of military relationship of naval forces. It is as good as trammeling the freedom of its future actions of its own accord."

True to this opinion, Romanov, at the second round of the behind-the-scene talks held on June 4 the same year, asked Yamagata to remove the words "north and south". Insisting that the issue "would have better remain unsettled", he managed to clear the words, concludingly rejecting Japan's "proposal" to share Korea by dividing it into two along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

Romanov-Yamagata secret talks continued to the fourth round, culminated in the release on June 9, 1896 of a "protocol" composed of 4 open articles and 2 secret ones. One secret article reads that both Russia and Japan shall respectively dispatch reinforcements to Korea if necessary, and, in that event, "each army's deployment areas shall be confirmed to prevent collision". None of the articles included Japan's plot to occupy one half of Korea by dividing it into the north and the south with 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as a demarcation line. It is not accidental that the Russian finance minister described Romanov-Yamagata "protocol" as "extremely successful".

This being the situation, Korean rulers were totally ignorant of the two aggressive forces' plot and bargain over the territory of Korea.

Although his long stay in Russia coincided with the ongoing secret talks in Petersburg between Yamagata and Romanov, a special envoy of Korea Min Yong Hwan was not aware of their bargaining of the issue of his nation's destiny. He was beside himself in the ambience of celebrating the grandiose imperial coronation ceremony, visiting one place after another in the city and adoring the military and educational systems of Russia. Following is a conversation between King Kojong and Min Yong Hwan on October 21, 1896.

“King: Were you on time for the coronation ceremony and how did you get along during the travel?”

Min Yong Hwan: I have had a good journey thanks to Your Majesty's care.

King: What were the general distribution procedures of the military system like?

Min Yong Hwan: The military system is identical to that of Western countries, and the entire nation is so enthusiastic in the military affairs that it has become a power. There are also male and female schools of various kinds that are educating and training talents. Although the Western style of customs different with ours is hard for us to take as it is, the examples they set in administering politics in military affairs and schools worth copying.”

This was what Min Yong Hwan reported to the King after spending months in Russia.

At the time the Russo-Japanese debate over “protection” of Korea was reported in this or that way only in the newspaper *Tongnip*

*Sinmun* (Independence Newspaper-*Tr*), but it failed to lay bare the veiled aggressive nature and danger at all. It spoke highly of Russia's "invitation" of the Korean envoy and described Min Yong Hwan's trip to Russia as "successful". After all the country was on the decline and the destiny of the country and nation was put at stake.

However, the US, Britain, France and Germany, which had already been stretching their tentacles of aggression to Korea, scented the secret of the Russo-Japanese "protocol", and called for "equal opportunity" one after another. Russia's imperial coronation ceremony was also attended by Li Hongjiang from China, who was responsible for the diplomacy of the country. He had been to Japan in the capacity of Chinese delegate to peace talks after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War to sign the humiliating Shimonoseki Treaty. He was 74 years old. Arriving at Petersburg with a wooden coffin in preparation for possible death during his trip, he hunted for a chance to intervene in the Korean issue with the backing of Russia.

## **Until the Rejection of the 39<sup>th</sup> Parallel-based Division Plan**

Historically, Korea and Manchuria had been an important venue for competitions between Russia and Japan. This became a prime motive for the Russo-Japanese War. Russia's vigorous advance towards Far East after the Sino-Japanese War went against the grain with Britain, the US and Japan.

After stripping the Liaodong peninsula through three-party intervention of Japan's occupation after the Sino-Japanese War, Russia occupied it in May 1898, and after cracking down on the Yihetuan riot in Manchuria, did not withdraw its troops and instead kept them stay under the plea of "protecting" the East China Railways.

In April 1903 it sent some of its troops stationed in Manchuria to Korea's northern border area to seize Ryongampho.

The closer Russia's southward advance approached the Pacific, the more Britain sharpened vigilance against it as it had huge interests and concessions in the Far East. Originally, Britain thought that it would be able to use China, when the latter was bluffing once to check Russia's advance to the Far East. However, with China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and the rise of Japan as a power in the Far East, it turned to Japan, hunting for a chance to use it as a breakwater against Russia.

The US, which had been plotting to extend the sphere of its influence to China, including Manchuria, and Korea under the plea of "opening the door" and "equal opportunity", was much perplexed by Russia's rapid advance toward the Far East. For the realization of its ambition, it actively supported Japan politically, economically and militarily and gave it every possible assistance in containing Russia. Under these circumstances, the commonness of mutual interest in taking advantage of one another's strength to attain its goal gave birth to alliance between Britain and Japan on January 30, 1902. The US added fuel to its formation as the alliance was aimed at opposing Russia.

The alliance was a military one which had as its content Japan's approval of Britain's "special interest" in China and Britain's recognition of Japan's political privilege and "special interest" in the commercial and industrial sectors in China and especially in Korea. It also stipulated that, if this interest was threatened by other country's aggressive moves, each would take necessary measures.

With the formation of this alliance, the Far East witnessed an anti-Russian union of Japan, Britain and the US. The relationship of forces that was formed seven years after the Sino-Japanese War gave much encouragement to Japan that was stepping up war preparations against Russia for the conquest of Korea.

In August 1903, Japan, now free from international isolation, advanced a unilateral and high-handed "draft solutions" of the Korean issue to Russia.

Starting with a deceptive stipulation that Japan and Russia "respect the independence and territorial integrity of Korea and China", the "draft solutions" demanded that Russia recognize "Japan's superior interest in Korea", do not interfere with the "extending of railways from Korea to southern Manchuria", and "recognize" the fact that "giving advice and aid to Korea's reform and good governance" belonged to "Japan's exclusive rights". This was more an ultimatum to arbitrarily force its demands rather than a "proposal" to settle the Korean issue.

Russia delayed its reply to Japan's "draft solutions", and advanced its "counter proposal" on October 3. The "counter proposal", too, began with a deceitful stipulation that "Korea's

independence and territorial conservation shall be respected” and its gist was that Russia would give green light to Japan’s political and economic privileges in Korea, whereas Japan should recognize that Manchuria and its laterals were totally outside Japan’s rights, and both states should promise not to put some of Korea’s territory to military usage nor to install any military facilities at its coast for disturbing free sailing and to divide Korean’s territory along the 39<sup>th</sup> Parallel line and make the area north of it a neutral area.

Although the first article of both Japan’s “draft solutions” and Russia’s “counter proposal” stressed “Korea’s independence and territorial integrity”, it was the open revelation of two aggressive forces’ intention not to give up their ambition for the invasion of Korea and their efforts to realize it.

What was new in Russia’s “counter proposal” was to divide Korea’s territory along the 39<sup>th</sup> Parallel and make the area north of it a neutral area. The creation of “neutral area” was aimed at preventing the Japanese forces from entering the area north of the 39<sup>th</sup> Parallel and placing the area under its rule.

Japan could easily realize Russia’s ambition.

Whereas in 1896, Japan’s proposal for dividing Korea along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel had been rejected by Russia which was scheming to swallow up the whole of Korea single-handedly, this time Russia’s proposal was rebuffed by Japan with the same greed.

The Russo-Japanese relations of ceaseless veiled enmity for their strategic interests rapidly developed into a showdown of strength, Russo-Japanese War in 1904.

## **Conspirator’s “International Guarantee”**

Immediately after igniting the Russo-Japanese War, Japan forced its aggressive Korea-Japan Protocol on Korea. Its first article stipulated that “Korea shall have faith in Japan and listen to the latter’s advice in policy reformation”; it reflected Japan’s scheme to put Korea’s internal affairs under its thumb to meet its aggressive demands.

The protocol also demanded that Korea nullify all treaties and agreements concluded with Russia and take back Russia’s concessions in the country.

King Kojong could not but make public “repeal of all treaties concluded with Russia”. Meanwhile within the feudal government there occurred a campaign to eliminate pro-Russian elements from the official posts and political circles and uproot its aftermaths.

On the other, the US gave a series of impetus to Japan for the latter’s triumph in the war while strengthening ties with it.

In late July 1905, US Secretary of State Taft made a trip to Japan under the direct order of President Roosevelt amid hearty welcome of the Japanese ruling circles. On July 29, he held secret talks with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura and concluded the Katsura-Taft Agreement. The agreement in the form of a confidential memorandum read in part:

The Philippines must be ruled by such a powerful “friendly state” like the US and it is intolerable either to allow the Philippines to have a “disorderly” autonomy or to let the Philippines play into the hands of other Europeans.



Promoting mutual understanding among the three nations—Japan, the US and Britain—is the best method and, in fact, one and the only means to keep the overall “peace” in the Far East.

The Korean issue is the direct cause of the Russo-Japanese War and the solution of this issue is implicitly important for Japan. If Korea is left as it is after the war, it will be likely to conclude an agreement with any foreign forces and return to the complicated pre-war state. Japan confirms that a drastic measure should be taken to prevent Korea from returning to the critical state.

The United States recognizes Japan’s suzerainty over Korea. It fully recognizes that this is a logical conclusion of this war and a direct outcome conducive to the everlasting peace in the Far East.

In a nutshell, the “agreement” was a brigandish document, by which Japan recognized the US colonial rule over the Philippines in return for the latter’s positive assistance to the former’s invasion of Korea and giving green light to placing Korea under its guardianship.

Afterwards the US outperformed Japan in reducing Korea to Japan’s “protectorate”.

Entering the latter half of 1905, when the situation at the Russo-Japanese War turned unfavorable for Japan, Roosevelt proposed mediating peace talks between the two warring countries. Consequently the American port city Portsmouth hosted peace talks between the two countries to put an end to the war. The talks were held between Russia and Japan outwardly, but in fact Russia was on one side and Japan and the US on the other.

At the talks the Japanese side advanced 12-point “peace terms”,

which had already been consulted with and agreed by Roosevelt.

The Article 1 reads as follows:

“Russia approves Japan’s superior political, military and economic interests in Korea and commits to refrain from laying obstacles to or intervening in Japan’s taking measures to provide guidance, protection and supervision which are recognized to be necessary for Korea.”

Japan also suggested its sharing of Sakhalin, payment of military indemnity, limiting the Russian naval forces in the Far East as conditions of peace. However, those were unacceptable for Russia, which was not a defeated nation in the war.

When the Korean issue was put on the agenda at the item-on-item deliberation, the Russian side urged the Japanese side to add the sentence “The authority of the Korean royal court is inviolable” in the agreement, saying that otherwise the two countries would likely be accused of causing the ruin of an independent state.

To this, the Japanese delegate replied arrogantly, “if there is a protest from other powers, it is a problem between Japan and them, not one related with Russia.”

As a result, the talks left the statement of the Japanese delegate in the minute book, far from mentioning the issue of Korea’s sovereignty. The Japanese delegate could make such a high-handed and unilateral remark towards the Russian side just because he was backed by the “international guarantee” promised by the US. The US had already recognized Japan’s postwar occupation of Korea by concluding the “Katsura-Taft Agreement” and masterminding the formation of the second Britain-Japan alliance and reached an

agreement beforehand with Germany on this issue.

The original manuscript of the Japanese side's "peace terms" was, as a matter of fact, the brainchild of American adviser Denison to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. As the contents of the treaty were in the interest of Japan and the US, even the officials of the US Department of State later referred to Article I, which stipulates "Japan's taking measures for guidance, protection and supervision which are recognized to be necessary for Korea" instead of "protection" and "annexation", as a phrase whetting appetite and an "excellent sentence" pushing Korea completely into the hands of the Japanese.

Owing to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Russia lost the rights to occupy Korea as well as many concessions including the Liaodong peninsula, southern Manchurian branch line (Changchun-Lushun railways), part of Sakhalin south of 50° North Latitude. This also signified Russia's defeat in the competitions with Japan for Korea. As a result, Japan became the real ruler of Manchuria and Liaodong peninsula and buckled down to put Korea under its exclusive domination and reduce it to its colony.

### **“How Bitter, Compatriots!”**

After Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the powers' competition for concessions in Korea entered a new phase.

Participating in the previous competition had been not only Japan, Qing China, Russia, the US, and Britain but also France and Germany. It had been characterized by cutthroat fights fought

among a host of thieves to seize Korea. It had witnessed the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War and the elimination of two defeated nations, Qing China and Russia. The remaining Britain and the US were not Japan's rivals as both gave active assistance to Japan's invasion of Korea for their strategic purposes. The weak France and Germany paid no special concern for the Korean issue. After the elimination of its dangerous rivals in the competition, Japan schemed to be an exclusive and ultimate dominator of Korea.

On October 27, 1905, immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, a cabinet meeting was held in Japan, where the Decision on Establishment of Korea Protectorate was enacted. This decision premised that "Korea's becoming a protectorate of Japan is inevitable", and fixed the "date" and "draft treaty" for the "establishment of a protectorate".

On November 9, Ito Hirobumi, president of the Japanese Privy Council, turned up in Seoul under the signboard of a "consolatory visit to the Korean Royal Court." Thinking that intimidation and appeasement would be better than an abrupt request for negotiations for concluding the "protection treaty" with Korea, he spent a week, touring Seoul, Inchon and other places, making much ado about "Korea-Japan cooperation" and "friendship".

Ito called on King Kojong and said that cementing the Korea-Japan ties would be a "guarantee" for the security of Korea.

On the other hand, he egged on pro-Japanese traitors to loudly call for the Korea's handover of diplomatic rights to the Japanese "Emperor" endowed with "morality" and "virtue" and submit a

“petition” requesting the Japan’s “guardianship”. However, the problem of existence of a nation and its sovereignty could not be a plaything of such tricks.

Then in mid-November Ito mobilized Japanese troops in Korea to surround the Korean royal palace, creating a charged atmosphere, and entered it to put the issue of conclusion of “protection treaty” on the table. King Kojong denounced the outrageous acts of the Japanese soldiers. To him, Ito asked back if he knew to whom he would thank for Korea’s independence.” He produced the manuscript of the Ulsa Five-Point Treaty and threatened that the King had to be aware that “the manuscript was a final document without an inch of room for revision” and rejecting it would bring a “worse outcome.”

Not content with it, Ito entered the conference hall of Korean government ministers’ council in royal presence and, fingering one minister after another, asked them about yes or no to the “manuscript”, and forcibly stamped the government seal they had stolen on it. Indeed, the fabrication of the Ulsa Five-Point Treaty was a humiliating and heart-breaking tragedy that befell to the Korean nation because of their weak national power and poor military strength.

It was an outcome for Korea, which had been plagued by chronic ignorance and chained to feudalism while the Japanese samurais hurried, gasping, along the road to militarist capitalism after the Meiji Restoration.

Having long advocated the Theory of Conquest of Korea and

bent on invasion of Korea, the Japanese samurais had as of 1905 possessed about 200 000-strong standing army and 12 modern warships more than 6 000 tons each.

By contrast Korea, shackled to feudalism and dependent on meager farming, had been manufacturing farm implements in its embryonic stage of factory production.

The military sector was further outdated.

The strength of the Korean army amounted to about 7 000 at most, including two Seoul-stationed regiments of 5 000 men and 8 provincial battalions of about 2 000 men. Their military hardware included such primitive weapons as bow, spear and sword and some firing weapons like firelocks and a small number of rifles. 200 000 troops vs 7 000 men, warships and guns vs firelocks—this was a comparison in terms of the national strength and military power between the imperialist Japan and feudalist Korea, which had been struggling to defend the country by dint of closed-door policy. The weak country was unable to check the arrogant and impudent move of the Japanese samurais. Righteous Koreans were so indignant at the humiliation by the Japs that some committed suicide and others joined the volunteers army with arms in hand.

A patriotic man Jang Ji Yon wrote a leading article, titled “Wailing All Day after the Nation’s Fall” for a newspaper.

“Oh, how bitter! To be a slave or to be killed, our 20 million people? Can the national spirit, 4 000-years old since the birth of the nation, be perished overnight?

Too sad, too heartrending! Compatriots! Compatriots!”

## **2. 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel Splitting the Territory and Nation**

### **On the Eve of the End of the War in the Pacific**

Entering the year 1945, World War II was nearing its end. In Europe, Italy and Germany were defeated. The result of the Pacific war ignited by Tojo-led Japanese imperialists with faith in the victory of Germany, its ally, in the war against the USSR, was sure to be predictable.

At the outset, Japan started the war by surprising the US major naval base in Hawaii without a declaration of war, the way it usually had done.

Gaining the upper hand temporarily in the Pacific front, the Japanese army occupied many countries in Southeast Asia such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Myanmar in the early days of the war and extended its front to India, New Zealand, and Australia. It was not until after August 1942 that the US and British troops could switch to counterattack from the Solomon Islands and Nanyang Archipelago.

However, they dragged on the war, paying more attention to expanding their dominance over colony than to dealing a telling blow at Japan.

With Japan's defeat looming and with a view to a favourable

position in treating the postwar international affairs, the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, claiming hundreds of thousands of civilians.

However, that could neither stop the aggressive acts of Japan nor bring about a radical turn in the war.

Thanks to the anti-Japanese national liberation struggle staged by the Korean People's Revolutionary Army which had turned out in the final battle to win the country's liberation under the command of General Kim Il Sung, the struggle by the Chinese and other Asian peoples and the anti-Japanese offensives of the Soviet army, the Japanese imperialists began to be routed rapidly.

The main force of the KPRA advanced southward, annihilating the Japanese troops in several directions from Korea's northern border areas, east coast and inland areas.

At the same time, many small units of the KPRA and nationwide resistance organizations conducted political activities and armed struggle in different places of the country, hastening the day of national liberation.

The Soviet army, which was to join the anti-Japanese war as dictated by the Yalta Conference and Potsdam Conference, landed in Chongjin, a northeastern port city of Korea.

Japan, on the verge of total defeat in the Pacific war, advocated the "theory of defending Korea", seeing it as its logistics base, ultimate war base, to prolong their remaining life. It made last desperate efforts with a determination to fight to the last with Korea as its final stronghold.



The start of the advance of the Soviet army annihilating the Japanese Kwantung Army created a favorable environment for the KPRA and the Korean people to achieve national liberation by their own effort.

The KPRA's general offensive and the Korean people's nationwide resistance could result in a short-term successful conclusion of the Soviet army's operations against Japan.

Indeed Korea's liberation was a great fruition which the Korean nation accomplished by its own efforts under the wise leadership of General Kim Il Sung, peerless patriot and iron-willed brilliant commander.

By contrast, the US, fighting with Japanese troops in the Pacific area and pessimistic of the prospect of the war, kept watching the Korean peninsula with concerns over the postwar treatment.

The US 24<sup>th</sup> Corp and 10<sup>th</sup> Marine Corp, deployed in the Pacific area, managed to land on Okinawa in April 1945 at the cost of heavy casualties, but could not advance further in the face of stubborn resistance offered by the Japanese army. Worse still, the dire dearth of strength and naval transport vessels tormented the US rulers. That was why military operations in the Korean peninsula were beyond their thought. It was openly manifested by the US army in the Potsdam Conference held from July 17 to August 2, 1945.

During the conference, Antonov, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet forces, conferred separately with Marshall, chief of the General Staff of the US Army, about the Soviet army's entry into the war against Japan.

Marshall called for immediate entry of the Soviet forces into the anti-Japanese war to destroy the Japanese troops finally and at a go, saying that the US forces that found themselves in Okinawa could not afford landing in Japan proper and the Korean peninsula because of shortage of strength and vessels.

The dialogue between Antonov and Marshall reads in part:

Antonov: Does the US forces have any plan to land in the Korean peninsula?

Marshall: It has not been considered yet. Especially it is impossible in the near future. It is because vessels for offensive are insufficient and there is a danger of attack by the Japanese forces. The control of the Korean peninsula can be ensured by the air force after the seizure of the Kyushu Island, Japan, and rehabilitation of airfields there.

This illustrates that the US dared not think of the annihilation of the Japanese troops in Korea. In response to Marshall's request, Antonov said: "The Soviet forces will enter the war in early August to attack the Japanese Kwantung Army and carry on military operations in the Liaodong and Korean peninsulas."

The prevailing balance of military forces and the developments in the Korean peninsula struck the US authorities with panic, who calculated that the fall of Japan could make it easy for them to be a ruler of colonial Korea.

The US neither found itself on the Korean soil nor could go there while the Korean people were wiping out the Japanese troops in their home country. This situation badly demanded that the US rulers

make an excuse by this means or the other for intervening in the Korean issue and putting their aggressor troops on the Korean soil.

Meanwhile, the Japanese authorities, fearing the blame and punishment for their war crimes in the wake of their defeat in the war, held a Supreme War Council meeting in the presence of the “Emperor” in the imperial bunker in Tokyo for a long time from the evening of August 9 to the early morning the following day.

At the meeting there were serious marathon debates over how to check the revolutionary advance of the Japanese people occasioned by the defeat in the war, how to maintain and preserve the “Imperial” system and the foundation of militarist Japan and how to mitigate the terms of unconditional surrender dictated by the Potsdam Declaration.

The discussions made an in-depth analysis of the content of the secret negotiations with the US side on the conditions for the conclusion of war and concluded that the US was waiting for Japan’s surrender, leaving a loop hole in the implementation of the Potsdam Declaration.

Based on it, the Japanese authorities discussed their surrender as demanded by the Potsdam Declaration with the reservation that “the Emperor must be retained as head of the state”.

They calculated that if they relied on the US-British side, complying with the Potsdam Declaration, before of the Soviet forces’ landing in Japan, they could preserve the existing state system and escape the grave punishment by the Japanese people under the patronage of the US.

In accordance with the decision of meeting, on August 10, the Japanese government asked Switzerland and Sweden, neutral countries, to convey its acceptance of conditional surrender to the Allied side—the US, Britain and China. The USSR was to be informed directly by the Japanese Foreign Minister Togo through its ambassador to Japan Malik.

The Soviet ambassador had already requested an interview with the Japanese foreign minister on August 9 to deliver the Soviet government's declaration of war to the Japanese government.

Unaware of it, Togo met Malik in a secret room of the Diet on the morning of August 10, told him about Japan's acceptance of conditional surrender and asked him to convey it to the US and Britain. Then he handed over to Malik an English copy of the notice of acceptance of Potsdam Declaration identical to those sent to Switzerland and Sweden.

Meanwhile, Malik, on his side, gave to Togo the declaration of war on Japan from the Soviet government. As a result, the interview witnessed a simultaneous exchange of two documents of war declaration and surrender acceptance between the two belligerent sides. It was a bizarre thing unprecedented in history.

The US government received the Japanese government's formal notice that it will surrender with the reservation that the "Emperor" be retained as head of state, respectively through Radio Tokyo on the morning of August 10, 1945, via Moscow on the late evening the same day and through US Legation in Switzerland at 2 a.m. the next day by the Washington time.

This brought about a radical turn in the situation of the Pacific war.

The abrupt release of surrender notice by Japan that had clamoured the defence of Japan proper and long-term war made the US extremely nervous. The US forces were plunged in a quagmire around Okinawa while the Korean People's Revolutionary Army and Soviet forces were storming deep into Korea.

Immediately after the announcement by Radio Tokyo President Truman brought together the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, Secretary of Navy and Admiral at the White House and conferred with them about the measures to cope with the rapidly changing situation in the Far East.

This consultation focused on issues, like how to make the allotment areas for powers to be responsible for the receipt of Japan's surrender and disarmament of Japanese troops benefit the United States, what proposal on the Far East issues at the Allied conference would help the US expand the sphere of its influence, and what to do for the US to lay a foothold in the Korean peninsula and occupy it.

The Secretary of State called for extending the US sphere farther north, insisting on the US receipt of surrender of Japanese troops throughout Korea.

However, as Truman admitted, the opinion was hard to bring into effect in the face of two insurmountable obstacles—long distance and shortage of troops.

The long-drawn meeting produced no proper measure. Then Truman called a meeting of the State, War, Navy Coordination

Committee and ordered to submit within the day (August 10) measures for the conclusion of anti-Japanese operations and receipt of its surrender.

The SWNCC met in the room of the assistant secretary of the Army. The focus of the debate was on how to make the US forces take charge of the disarmament of Japanese troops in Korea. The repeated debate only brought into relief the impossibility for the US forces to put the whole of Korea under its control, given its position at the time.

The SWNCC consigned the task to settle the bottleneck to the Strategy Policy Section, Operations Bureau, Department of the Army and urged it to work out a rational countermeasure until the midnight of August 10. There were only 30 minutes to go until that time.

## **An Overnight Product by Two Colonels**

On August 10, 1945, by the Washington time, the room of the assistant secretary of the Army kept bright until late at night. The room was occupied by Colonel Charles Bonesteel, head of the Strategy Policy Section of Operations Bureau, and Colonel Dean Rusk who were discussing how to implement the order of the assistant secretary.

The assistant secretary had said;

Japan's surrender is likely to be more imminent than it was expected. There's no time to waste. We must add a line for the Allied occupation areas to the general order to be sent to

MacArthur.... Put it as farther north as possible. As you see, the US forces are in Okinawa 600 miles away from the Korean peninsula while the Soviet forces have already entered its northern part.

He was going to determine the zones for the Allied forces to receive unconditional surrender of Japanese troops in the wake of the conclusion of the Pacific war at its free will without prior consultation with other Allied powers.

It was the US design to take the initiative in receiving Japan's unconditional surrender and conduct postwar treatment of the Asia-Pacific problems in accordance with its interest.

The two colonels, arguing pro and con under strong pressure of their superior, used a miniature map of the Far East devoid of provincial boundaries of Korea, and at last fixed the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the "line for dividing the areas for the disarmament of Japanese troops" by the US and the USSR. The fixation of the line that would inflict incredible misfortunes and disaster to a country, a nation, and exert enormous influence on the international community occurred at 2 p.m. on August 11, 1945.

Choosing the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel was ascribable in part to its location at the central part halving the Korean territory and in part to the fact that the southern part, that would be under the US control, included Seoul, the bulwark of fascist rule of the Japanese imperialists. They believed that the seizure of Seoul by the US would create favourable conditions for securing domination over Korea in future.

Their draft plan underwent examination by the strategy and policy group of the Operations Bureau of the US Department of the

Army, a joint policy meeting of the Departments of War and Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and SWNCC at an ultrahigh speed and was ratified by President Truman on August 16.

Truman wrote as follows in his memoirs. An urgent countermeasure was needed as there were concerns that if developments were left to their own course the Red Army might occupy the whole of the Korean peninsula and it was also rude to demand their withdrawal from the occupied land. Defining the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as Korea's demarcation line was initiated by the US.

The US Secretary of State Acheson wrote in his memoirs that the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, convenient administrative boundary, was a brainchild of Colonel Dean Rusk, a young officer employed some time earlier by the Department of the Army after returning from his stint in China.

Dean Rusk himself revealed the truth in *Rusk Memo* he sent to the director of the History Policy Institute under the Department of State on July 12, 1950. It reads;

With the sudden arrival of Japan's surrender the Department of State and the three services had to conduct an urgent examination of the general order for General MacArthur and steps to be taken with the Allied powers.

To this end, the SWNCC held marathon meetings between August 10 and 15. I remember that the August 10 evening meeting was held in the room of the Deputy Secretary in Pentagon and went on almost all night.

There was a recommendation from the Department of State that the US army had better advance as far north as it could to



receive the surrender.

The assistant secretary requested Colonel Bonesteel and me to go to the next room and map out a plan that could harmonize the political hope of advancing farther north for the receipt of Japan's surrender with the limited capability of the US army to make swift entry into Korea.

We proposed the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel despite the knowledge that it was beyond our power because we thought that it was desirable to include the capital in the US forces' responsibility area.

On the day it was ratified by Truman the plan was delivered to MacArthur, who made it public as the General Order No.1.

To summarize the part of the order relevant to the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, it reads in the following vein:

A. ...

B. The high-ranking officers, all ground, naval, air and accessory units of the Japanese army in Manchuria, Korea north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, Sakhalin and Kuril Islands shall surrender to the commander-in-chief of the USSR Far East Army.

C. ...

D. ...

E. The high-ranking officers, all ground, naval, air and accessory units under Japanese imperial government and the Imperial Headquarters in Japan proper, the small islands around it, Korea south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, Ryukyu Islands and the Philippines shall surrender to the commander-in-chief of the US Pacific forces.

Concurrently with the publication of the General Order No.1,

Truman unilaterally announced that MacArthur was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces vested with plenipotentiary power to accept Japan's surrender. This was an arbitrary step disregarding the Allied powers taken by the US imperialists to achieve their dirty interest by taking the initiative in the postwar treatment.

## **Japan's Responsibility for the Division of Korea**

On September 28, 1990, in Pyongyang, the Workers' Party of Korea, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, and Japan Socialist Party published a joint declaration on Korea-Japan relations.

The first article of the 8-point Joint Declaration states that the three parties recognized that Japan must officially apologize and make adequate reparation for the fact that it had inflicted great misfortunes and disasters on the Korean people in the past and for the loss the Korean people had suffered for 45 years after the war.

Kaifu Toshiki, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, in his personal letter to President Kim Il Sung, mentioned the existence of a miserable past of Korea owing to Japan and added; "For such a miserable past ex-Prime Minister Takeshita expressed his feeling of soul-searching and regret in the Diet in March last year, and I, as Prime Minister, share his idea". And he expressed his hope of improving the relationship between the two countries.

Kanemaru Shin, member of the House of Representatives and head of the delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party, also

expressed deep apology for Japan's past colonial rule over the Korean people.

The three parties confirmed that in the event of establishment of diplomatic relations with the DPRK, the Japanese government should make full reparation for the bygone colonial rule and the loss inflicted on the people of the DPRK for the ensuing 45 years.

The joint declaration elucidated that in order to liquidate the disgraceful past and establish diplomatic relations between the DPRK and Japan, Japan must apologize and make reparation for its past crimes against the Korean people, that Korea had been divided into two owing to Japan's criminal acts and the Korean people were suffering from immeasurable difficulties and pains resultant from its long-standing division, and that Japan must be responsible for them. This represents the common will of all the Japanese people who love justice and have reason.

Nevertheless, the current Japanese reactionaries are going to nullify the Joint Declaration of the three parties of the DPRK and Japan, turn a blind eye to the responsibility of the Japanese imperialists for the division of Korea and avoid apology and reparation for it.

However, the historical facts can never tolerate them. To trace back history, Japan hatched a "divide and rule" plan for the conquest of Korea more than 400 years ago. The line dividing Korea suggested by Japan was around the present-day 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. As there were not such geographical conceptions as latitude and longitude at the time, any topographical feature or landmark was

used to mark territory and region.

During the Imjin Patriotic War (1592–1598), hundreds-of-thousands-strong Japanese troops invaded Korea only to be routed from Seoul in April 1593 and pressed to the tight corner of South Kyongsang Province and coastal areas of South Sea of Korea by the fierce anti-aggression struggle of the Korean people. The endangered Japanese forces repeatedly proposed “peace talks” to secure a breathing spell and regroup its forces.

At the talks the Japanese aggressors proposed such shameless and brigandish demands that Korea should have only four northern provinces including Seoul under its jurisdiction, hand over four provinces south of the Han River to Japan and send one of the Korean royal princes and ministers to Japan as hostages. The “peace talks” lasted from August 1593 to December 1596.

With no progress in the talks, Hideyoshi, in July 1596, demanded that the Korean side hand over the three lower provinces (Chungchong, Jolla and Kyongsang) to Japan instead of the initial four provinces.

Having prepared for a new offensive during the period, Hideyoshi divided 140 000-strong troops into 8 detachments and hurled them into Korea.

Their reinvasion was foiled by the heroic struggle of the Korean people and in particular outstanding activities of renowned patriotic General Ri Sun Sin. The aggressor troops suffered heavy casualties and took to flight home.

As seen above the Japanese aggressors had long harboured

ambition to divide and rule Korea.

In addition, but for Japan's occupation of Korea, there would have been no ground for the advance by both Soviet and US forces in Korea under the signboard of "disarmament of Japanese troops."

As its defeat in World War II drew nearer, Japan provided the US with a firsthand excuse for the division of Korea.

In February 1945, when its defeat in the war became a fait accompli, Japan reformed the command system of its army on the occasion of the Yalta Conference that discussed the Soviet army's entry in the war against Japan:

The Korean Army, i.e. the Japanese troops in Korea, was reorganized into the 17<sup>th</sup> Directional Army and the Korean Military District. The 17<sup>th</sup> Directional Army took charge of the defence of Korea as a field army directly under the Imperial Headquarters and the Korean Military District undertook recruitment, education, logistics, and garrison.

The repeal of the USSR-Japan Neutrality Pact in April 1945 and the defeat of fascist Germany in May 1945 increased the possibility of the Soviet Union's entry in the war against Japan.

To cope with it, Japan, on May 30 posted the 17<sup>th</sup> Directional Army to the defence of southern half of Korea against enemy invasion and consigned to the Kwantung Army the task of making preparations for operations against the Soviet Union. Consequently, in June, Japanese troops in the northeastern part of Korea came under the command of Kwantung Army Headquarters. Hence the Japanese troops in the area north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel came under the

command of the Kwantung Army and those in the area south of it were placed under the command of the 17<sup>th</sup> Directional Army.

The 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, that Japan had used just before its defeat to mark the boundary of district of its troops in Korea, now constituted for the US a basis for the division of disarmament zones of Japanese troops.

Concerning this, the US 24<sup>th</sup> Corps Commander Hodges, on entering south Korea in September 1945, said basing on the deployment of Japanese troops at the time of their surrender, the Allied forces ordered via MacArthur that Japanese troops in the area north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel surrender to the Soviet army and those in the area south of it to the US army, respectively.

Originally, Japan made desperate efforts not to lose the colonial domination and rule over Korea to the last moment of its irrevocable defeat in the Pacific war.

On the verge of being kicked out of the vast areas of Asia and the Pacific, Japan made final desperate efforts to prepare for “operations in Japan proper” since early 1945 while attempting to escape punishment by achieving ceasefire through negotiations in its favourable conditions. To this end, it held several rounds of secret negotiations with the US in Bern, Switzerland, and Stockholm, Sweden, in April, May and July 1945.

Typical of them is a government-level meeting on April 1945 between the Japanese counselor in Switzerland and the American intelligence chief Allen Dulles. At the meeting the Japanese counselor proposed as conditions for Japan’s surrender the retention

of “emperor” system and the militarist constitution, international management of Manchuria and continuance of Japan’s rule over Korea and Taiwan.

This could not be acceptable to the US which had long planned colonial domination over Korea. The US side stated that Japan could retain its “emperor” system but must transfer the rule over Korea to it.

During the Korean war in the 1950s, Japan begged several times the US for the permission of its colonial domination over Korea. According to a confidential document of the US army, declassified and opened to the public in 2001, Japan, despite the ban on its military activities as a result of its defeat in World War II, had already in October 1950 dispatched a large number of naval vessels and troops to the Korean war asked by the US army and later sent several batches of young people to the war, submitting to the MacArther Command a petition strongly demanding handover of the Korean peninsula as its colony in return for its assistance.

On the verge of its defeat, Japan played a catalytic role in hastening the occupation of the Korean peninsula by the US aggressive troops. At the midnight of August 9, 1945, when the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army and the Soviet army launched military operations against Japan, the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo held a council in the presence of the “Emperor”, and at 2 a.m., the next day, made a final decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender.

To which country of the Allied forces including the Soviet

Union and the United States would it surrender first?

Judging from the war situation, it was as clear as daylight that it should surrender first to the Soviet army storming irresistibly across the vast areas from the northeastern provinces of China to the Korean peninsula and the Far East. However, the Japanese military authorities tempted the US army's entry into the Korean peninsula by claiming that it should surrender first to the US army even though it was yet to get access to the vicinity of the Korean peninsula.

At 6 a.m. on August 10, 1945, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces in Korea wired an open telegram to the Headquarters in Tokyo promising that his troops would surrender to the US army. The open telegram was instantly intercepted by the US military intelligence agency that had already decoded the wireless cipher text the Japanese army used during the Pacific war and been fully informed of its intentions and movements.

Marshall, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, wasted no time to order the chief of the Operations Bureau of the Department of the Army to take measures to catch the windfall quickly. His order was, in other words, to draw up a plan to halt the "southward advance" of the Soviet army while enabling the American troops that were stuck in Okinawa to make quick entry into the Korean peninsula.

The consequent overnight product was the plan to fix the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the demarcation line for the disarmament of Japanese troops by both the Soviet and the US troops.



## **Occupation of South Korea by the US Forces and Realization of Division**

Although it succeeded in dividing Korea with the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the demarcation under the connivance of its Allies the US could not set foot in south Korea owing to the dearth of strength and transportation means. To settle the challenges, it decided to use Japan that had collaborated with it historically for the invasion of Korea and was now having its troops in the area south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel despite surrender.

On August 20, 1945, MacArthur in Manila sent by radio a special order to Abe, the Japanese governor-general of Korea. It read that he must be “fully responsible for the security” in south Korea until the arrival of US troops there and would be sentenced to a “harsh punishment” if he had failed to do so. This coercive demand was intended to stress that south Korea is not a “vacuum” but would soon be a US army’s occupation area dominated by the US political and military power and to force him not to make any trouble with the realization.

The US scattered over Seoul on August 21 by plane tens of thousands of leaflets of “Proclamation” in the name of John Hodges, commander of the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps, who was in Okinawa with a mission to occupy south Korea.

The “Proclamation” made public the US army’s immediate occupation of south Korea and coerced the south Korean people to

obey the occupation army unconditionally and keep patient towards Japan's rule despite displeasure with it.

Since August 31, 1945, the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps command kept up with the developments in south Korea via radio communication from the command of the Japanese forces in Korea.

On September 2, 1945, MacArthur, after finishing the signing ceremony of surrender document by Japan onboard the US battleship *Missouri* anchored in Yokohama, Tokyo Bay in Japan, declared again by radio that Korea south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel would be occupied by the US army.

The next day, on September 3, Hodges issued a strict order that the command of the Japanese forces in Korea keep "security" in south Korea and preserve all colonial ruling machines as they are until US troops landed there.

The US measures injected the Japanese rulers in Korea, who were too depressed after the defeat, with authority and courage as befitting a tyrant of colonial rule, encouraging them to be further bent on crackdown on and pillage of the south Korean people. It was not until September 8, 1945, several days later, that American troops entered south Korea without a bloodshed. It was a far cry from the image of the Soviet army who advanced into the northern part of Korea, beating the Japanese troops.

At 1 p.m. on September 8, they landed in Inchon and, in the morning the following day, headed for Seoul, with armoured cars in the van. Although they had fought bloody battles with American troops until yesterday, Japanese troops and policemen made no stint

now to shoot and kill people everywhere to cater for the American troops' landing and occupation of south Korea.

Amid such environment, by mid-October, about 70 000 troops, the main force of the 24<sup>th</sup> Corps (Divisions 6, 7 and 10) streamed one unit after another into south Korea and occupied its entire territory.

The first order by Hodges, on entering the land, was a curfew. The order banning traffic from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. the next day lasted for about 36 years and was lifted only in January 1981.

Obsessed with hostility towards the Korean people, the US forces, headquartered in Seoul, deployed two divisions in the border areas along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and one division in the area south of Seoul, respectively, to realize the division of Korea with the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the demarcation.

Moreover, they took a series of steps to turn the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel that had been temporarily designated as a line for disarmament of Japanese troops into a line of politico-military demarcation for the complete division of Korea into two. The hundreds-of-kilometres-long areas along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel became home to 108 US army posts and 132 south Korean police posts, in other words one post for every 1.3 km on average. Besides, the area was posted by the supplementary posts of the reactionary armed groups and terrorist organizations including the Sobuk Youth Corps and Taehan Young Men's Association.

The aggressors and reactionary groups on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel cut off the free traffic and goods trade of people on both sides and resorted to provocation against and instilling hostility towards the north.

Among the 180 latitudinal lines on the globe, the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel has been reduced to a demarcation line severing the Korean territory into two and splitting the Korean nation of one ancestral blood line.

The latitudinal lines covering the surface of the earth run only straight across the lay of and things on the land including mountains, rivers, streams and plains as well as urban and populated areas and industrial establishments. However, the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel has partitioned 8 counties, 122 villages and even a school and the house of a household in Korea into the north and the south, and closed down 514 villages. It also has cut off railways, roads, waterways and power lines and blocked the traffic and goods trade.

The act of the US imperialists who occupied south Korea after creating a demarcation line in an illegal and conspirational method is a crime of brigandish aggression that can be justified by nothing.

It is, above all, a crime encroaching upon the sovereignty of the Korean nation.

Contrary to the requirements of international law calling to respect the sovereignty of a country and nation, they occupied south Korea and split the Korean nation. This is a fundamental infringement upon the independent right of the Korean nation who wanted to live and develop as one nation and a negation of the existence of a nation.

It is also an impudent treachery to the international agreements concerning the Korean issue.

During World War II, the world powers discussed the postwar treatment of the Korean problem several times and adopted

international agreements and declarations for it.

The Cairo Conference in 1943 recognized the enslavement forced on the Korean people by Japan and declared that Korea should become free and independent. Such demand was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration held by the Allies in July 1945 as the last wartime conference focusing on the treatment of postwar problems. None of them referred to a line for division of “operations zones” for the disarmament of Japanese troops by the Soviet and US armies, in other words, the division of Korea. The US, as a party to the international conferences and international agreements, bore a duty and responsibility to ensure their proper implementation. However, beginning from the effectuation of its Korea domination strategy, it took a track of treachery, scrapping the international agreements agreed by itself and ended up with occupying south Korea by fabricating the plan of division along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

## **Outpost for Aggression**

After occupying the southern part of Korea under the plea of disarming Japanese troops, the US concentrated its efforts on turning the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel into an outpost to convert south Korea into its colonial military base and use it as a foothold for the invasion of the whole of Korea and Asia.

In order to block the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel like a border between hostile countries, it deployed two divisions there; one division in the areas west of Ryonchon and the other in the east. In addition the south

Korean police force was deployed there: the counties near the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel had about 300–500 policemen each and the subcounties adjoining the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel had got some 100 each. In particular the subcounties adjacent to the line had one or two supplementary companies of combat police force, the number totaling some 30.

Meanwhile, the US ceaselessly perpetrated armed provocations, clashes and military actions along the line. Between September 1945 and 1946, they conducted 106 rounds of grave provocations and hostile acts in the areas north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel including military reconnaissance, pillage, murder and abduction of civilians and arson in villages. Afterwards the number of provocations and incursions, and the number of invaders and assault targets increased rapidly year on year.

It is not on June 25, 1950, but much earlier that a war started in Korea. Since 1947, the US continued to attack north Korea.

The following list shows the US armed provocations on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

| Year | Number of provocation | Number of incursion | Number of invader |
|------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| 1947 | 454                   | 246                 | 4 477             |
| 1948 | 932                   | 339                 | 6 030             |
| 1949 | 2 617                 | 1 060               | 67 398            |

There were 1 147 rounds of armed provocations during the first six months of 1950 until the outbreak of the Korean war.

The armed provocations and assaults organized and commanded by the US were a local war in view of size, purpose, duration and frequency.

Through the armed clashes and skirmishes, the US sought to disturb the public mindset and sow a seed of distrust and animosity against each other in the north and the south, and furthermore reconnoiter the military strength and deployment of the north, augment the combat capability of its troops and secure offensive positions favourable for starting an all-out war.

The combat action and assaults to occupy a certain district north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel under the jurisdiction of the DPRK by force of arms were a real war in the true sense of word, not simple clashes on the demarcation line.

With regard to the events on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel a foreign publication wrote:

“The area above the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel is literally a front. Ceaseless battles are going on there. This is a real war.”

The US did not conceal the truth that they organized and commanded the armed provocations on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

The US army general Robert, head of the American Military Adviser Group since the early days of the founding of the south Korean puppet army, said at a division commanders’ meeting held in October 1949 at the army headquarters: It’s a truth that the numerous assaults on the north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel have been launched by my decision. ... In future there will be more.

Typical of the local wars on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel is a battle on Mt. Songak on July 25, 1949. The US enlisted 5 700-strong south Korean force, including the 11<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, a battalion of the 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment of the “Metropolitan”

Division, two combat police battalions (about 1 500), hundreds of armed scoundrels of the Sobuk Youth Corps.

Attaching a great significance to the assault on Mt. Songak, Robert personally turned up at the offensive units and issued an order to seize Mt. Songak and advance to Kumchon 17 km deep north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. He also made sure that 4 km-wide front line was covered with gunfire support and the battle was commanded by the US advisers to the south Korean divisions and regiments.

The US offered all necessary combat means including weapons and ammunition to the local wars.

## **An Aggressive War to Dominate the Whole of Korea**

Finally, the US launched an armed invasion against the DPRK and the Korean people.

Dulles who had flown to south Korea in the capacity of a special envoy of President Truman inspected the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel area and gave his final ratification of the operations plan for “northward expedition” in a trench on June 19, 1950. After waging a series of local warfare on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel for the military occupation of the whole of Korea, the US at last mobilized its puppet south Korean army into a surprise, all-out armed attack against the northern half of Korea on June 25, 1950.

Claiming that they would have breakfast in Haeju, lunch in Pyongyang and supper in Sinuiju, they crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

On June 27 Truman ordered MacArthur to throw the US navy



and air force into the Korean front and used the UN to take a series of aggressive steps. To further escalate the armed invasion against the north, the US saw that the UN Security Council adopted an illegal resolution on organizing the UN Forces by enlisting their satellite countries on July 7, 1950, and appointed MacArthur as the commander-in-chief of the UN Forces the following day.

However, things went in contrary to their original intentions.

In the face of powerful counteroffensives of the Korean People's Army, the aggressors suffered heavy casualties and had to retreat.

Thanks to the general offensive of the Korean People's Army to take Seoul in the morning of June 28, the enemy's defence line began to crumble like a castle in the air, and the flag of the DPRK was hoisted on the puppet Capitol Building. Seoul was completely liberated at 11:30 a.m.

On July 5, encountered with a brave KPA unit in the area north of Osan, the Smith Task Force of the US was annihilated after an hour-long battle. The US 24<sup>th</sup> Division, a much-touted "invincible division", was also sieged and destroyed in mid-July, its commander Dean taken prisoner.

By August the aggressor troops were confined to a narrow area linking Pohang, Taegu and Masan, surrounded by the KPA on three sides. The KPA liberated more than 90% of the whole area of south Korea and more than 92% of its population.

The US troops were to be completely expelled from the south Korean land.

Concerning the fact the US media wrote that the reality

evidenced how the strong US forces were waging a hopeless and fierce war and how the army of north Korea, a smallest country, was destroying US troops and driving them into the waters.

In fact US troops and south Korean troops, extremely terror-stricken and in despair, planned to pull out of the Korean land quickly. On a secret directive given to Jong Il Gwon, chief of the General Staff of the south Korean forces, on September 4, 1950, by Walker, commander of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army, which was placed under siege in a small southern coastal area a south Korean publication wrote:

To my regret, it is likely that the current front can't be maintained any longer. The United States is working out a plan to withdraw the 8<sup>th</sup> Army to Japan in the worst case. This probably requires the shipping of about 100 000 personnel including two or three divisions of the south Korean army to Guam or Hawaii. It is a directive from the MacArthur Command. I want you to select which category of people and which divisions will be shipped in preparation for the event. Keep it a secret. Please do me a favour.

Driven into a tight corner, the US made final desperate efforts in every possible way not to be routed from the Korean land whatever it might cost. It hurled most of its ground, naval and air forces into the Korean front, and even the forces of their 15 satellite countries. In mid-September, the huge forces carried on landing operations in Inchon while resisting at the Raktong Perimeter.

The extreme disparity in strength brought about a rapid change in the front situation, and the KPA had to beat a temporary, strategic retreat. They were followed by US troops who crossed the 38<sup>th</sup>

Parallel, former demarcation line between the north and the south, in the eastern front on October 1, in the central front on October 3 and in the western front on October 7, respectively, and made further inroad into the areas of the northern half of Korea. The invasion into the areas north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel was a clear proof to the falsehood of the US propaganda that so far the hostilities had been their “police actions” to “frustrate the enemy forces” in south Korea.

The US abused the UN once again to justify its combat actions beyond the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

When the UN Forces invaded into the north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, it saw to it that the UN General Assembly at its session held on October 7, 1950, adopted a resolution that Korea must be “unified” under the “leadership of the UN” and approve the occupation of the whole of Korea by the UN Forces. This was tantamount to its “approval” of the US domination over entire Korea as a “rational one”. The UN Korea Unification and Rehabilitation Commission organized by the US was a means with which to implement it.

The US troops paid dearly for their deep intrusion into the northern half of Korea. Within less than half a year after the start of the Korean war, the US army divisions hurled into the front including the 24<sup>th</sup> Division, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and 2<sup>nd</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, and 8<sup>th</sup> divisions crumbled one after another.

An American author of war history wrote about the severity of the US defeat in the following vein:

In October 1950 MacArthur, accompanied by Walker and others, reviewed in a suburb of a city F Company, 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment of

the US 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division that was alleged to have rendered “distinguished military services” in the war. When he urged the company that anyone who had served from the early days of the war was asked to step forward, only 5, three of them wounded, came forward. There had been about 200 of them 96 days earlier when they had first taken part in the Korean war, but the wretched war claimed so many young lives.

A week before he visited the F company, MacArthur vaunted loudly about the conclusion of the war until the Thanksgiving Day (November 23) at the closed-door talks with President Truman on Wake Island. He increased the offensive speed to keep his promise, only to cause such casualties and repeated defeats.

From October 25, 1950, the KPA foiled the enemy’s hysteric offensive through a powerful counterstrike in the area north of the Chongchon River and a stubborn defence on the Hwangcho Pass line.

The US, again loudly advertising the conclusion of the Korean war before Christmas (December 25), launched another new large-scale offensive.

On November 24, 1950, MacArthur turned up at the Korean front and ordered a general offensive, saying that this would “put an end to the Korean war”. And he said to the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Division as follows:

Tell the US soldiers that they can return home when they have reached the Amnok River. ...

I confirm my statement that they will be able to have the Christmas cake in their homes.

In order to support MacArthur's preposterous "war conclusion" plan, Truman published a provocative November 30 statement that A-bomb could be used according to a decision of the general command of the US forces in Korea.

However, neither the new "general offensive" nor the A-bomb blackmail did not help them escape from a crushing defeat.

The KPA units switched to a decisive counterattack, encircling and annihilating the enemy's main force around the Chongchon River and Lake Jangjin areas, and advanced to the south.

Through combined actions with the second front units, they liberated the whole area of the northern half of Korea that had been occupied by the enemy.

Stampeding to the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel line, the US troops and mercenaries attempted to check the advance of the KPA there. However, they suffered tremendous losses on manpower and combat equipment and again had to retreat to the 37<sup>th</sup> Parallel line. In the course of these battles, the US lost most of its operational reserves, not to mention the major front units.

The US army sustained "the greatest defeat of its kind in its history" and the myth of its being the strongest was shattered to smithereens.

An American publication wrote about the defeat in the following vein:

The US and its allies are suffering a big disaster. The huge force of the communist army vanquished the UN Forces, forcing the 140 000-strong American troops to beat a decisive retreat. 140 000 men represent the number of all the elite units the US has. This was the worst of defeats the US has experienced.

### **3. Accursed Military Demarcation Line**

#### **Until the Opening of the Korea Armistice Talks**

By June 1951 the front was by and large fixed on the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel from the estuary of River Rimjin in the west to the north of Rinje County, Kangwon Province.

The Korean People's Army units continued to deal crushing blows through a stubborn positional defence battle at US troops who were trying to take the initiative on the front. US troops could not advance even a step northward from the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. During a year after the outbreak of the war, they sustained an irreparable political and military defeat. According to their watered-down data, the US loss in the Korean war exceeded US\$ 50 billion at the time. The loss of manpower and combat equipment was more than half that it had suffered during World War II. The casualties and POWs numbered 598 000 and weapons and combat equipment captured or destroyed included 146 000 rifles of various kinds, 6 838 guns of different sorts, 9 145 trucks, 1 997 tanks and armoured cars, 1 730 aircraft destroyed or captured, 122 vessels sunk and 120 truckloads of ammunition of all kinds captured.

The much-touted “invincible divisions” and “elite divisions”—24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> Divisions and 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division were almost vanquished and the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Divisions and the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division that had been called the “pride” and “honour” of the US sustained a crushing blow.

The war brought death and indignity to the US generals. The so-called “veteran general” MacArthur was ousted from his post and the 8<sup>th</sup> Army Commander Walker was killed trapped in a mine, and the 24<sup>th</sup> Division Commander Dean was taken prisoner. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Commander Smith was labelled a “grave general” for he had more his soldiers lying dead in the graves than those who survived, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division Commander, who had boasted that “the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division absolutely doesn’t mean the 2<sup>nd</sup> place”, was nicknamed a “son of a bitch” since he alone took to flight leaving a number of his officers and men killed and taken prisoner at the battle around the Chongchon River line.

The myth of the US being the “strongest” was shattered. The American newspaper magnate Hurst wrote in his newspaper *New York Journal and American*: The Korean war is a war we can never win even if we put almost all of our regular army, navy and infantry in it.

In face of strength dearth, the US ruling circles asked its satellite countries to send more troops to the Korean front twice in April and May 1951, but no one complied with it.

On learning the front situation and the stand of the allies, the US general Wedemeyer lamented that at present he couldn’t look forward to the decisive victory of the UN Forces.

In early May of 1951, when US troops in the Korean front had to beat a retreat to the area south of the Pukhan and Soyang rivers, a meeting of the State Security Council was abruptly convened, where a marathon discussion was held about a new Asia strategy and problems arising in the Korean war; on May 6 it came to a

conclusion that they should recognize the defeat of the US forces in the Korean war and hold a truce talks.

The US ruling circles began racking their brains to find a clue about the opening of the talks with the Korean People's Army.

With regard to this, Secretary of State Acheson wrote in a book:

The conclusion drawn by us all was that addressing the matter either by an open method via the UN procedures or by relying on the talkative Indian foreign ministry would all bring a fatal result. Therefore, we began to smell like a pack of hunting dogs.

Among the people who were active in the behind-the-scenes negotiations for detecting the DPRK's stand towards ceasefire were the State Department officials, American diplomats in the UN, the former ambassador to the Soviet Union, etc.

As a result of the brisk movement and begging diplomacy of the US diplomats, the US side suggested ceasefire talks to the KPA side via Ridgway, commander-in-chief of the UN Forces, on June 30, 1951.

Although they proposed the talks, the US pursued its wicked goals.

Its proposition was aimed at attaining through the talks the goals it could not achieve in the war and winning a time needed for preparing for a new offensive. It was also aimed at misleading the world public and disguising its identity as an aggressor by proposing the talks as if it wanted to put an end to the war and loved peace.

The true intention for proposing the talks is clearly noticeable from the "major guidelines" the US government sent to Ridgway with regard to the talks, which stressed in particular that "losing face of the US is intolerable."



The Joint Chiefs of Staff put forward as “minimum conditions” to be realized at the ceasefire talks formation of an armistice committee, its members being “empowered” to have access to all parts of north Korea and application of “one to one principle” to the exchange of POWs.

In contrast to the US intention, the DPRK’s stand towards the talks was that it wanted to end the war and achieve peace through the talks.

The Korean people’s principled and steadfast peaceful stand made it possible to hold the Korean armistice talks despite the US pursuance of mean purposes. The talks were held between the Korean side with the KPA delegate as the senior delegate and the UN Forces side with the US army delegate as the senior delegate.

## **Holding Up the White Flag**

At a cozy hillside at Koryo-dong, Kaesong, there stood a single-storeyed tile-roofed house built during the period of the feudal Korea.

The building called Raebong villa had been owned by Yun Chi Yong, a big landlord and businessman, before the country’s liberation. After liberation Yun Chi Yong went to Seoul, and with the backing of the US, had once been a secretary of Syngman Rhee, and later assumed an important position in the Trade and Industry Ministry of the south Korean “government”.

Into the yard of this house, 20 USA-made jeeps pulled up at 8:20 a.m. in July 8, 1951. They were carrying members of the US side who would attend the bilateral liaison officers meeting, a preliminary meeting for the ceasefire talks. The first six cars were carrying the

UN Forces liaison officer and his suites and the remaining 14 ones the US MPs and journalists from foreign countries.

The chief liaison officer of the UN Forces side was a colonel of the US Air Force. Born into a big capitalist's family, he worked at an important position of the State Department before being suddenly sent here with a shoulder strap of colonel at the recommendation of the State Department "for his outstanding wisdom and eloquence."

He saluted to a lieutenant colonel of the KPA working as a guide and said, "Thanks!" in contrast to the circumstances In the hall he was once taken aback at the closing sound of a window, looking about wondering. He who is guilty of something feels always uneasy and gets restricted in action.

Looking at the cars in rows in the yard of the preliminary talks hall, a south Korean journalist said:

"All cars here are the USA-made cars."

It was true. Not only their cars but also the cars from the DPRK side were all jeeps made in the USA.

This was a revelation for all the foreign journalists from the south as well as other people.

Looking at them, one of the journalists from the DPRK side gave a gentle remark:

"You have found a very wonderful thing. These cars are not ones we have purchased from the United States nor ones we have imported through a third country. They are trophies we have taken from you free of charge. We call them not USA-made cars but simply booties."

Looking at them again, the satisfaction over the "mightiness" of

the great America instantly gave way to the humiliation of the defeated and uncontrollable terror on the faces of members of the US side.

The liaison officers meeting discussed about the venue for armistice talks, lodgings, supply service and other matters and announced the list of the two sides' representatives.

Two days after the meeting, on July 10, 1951, the first meeting of the full-dress Korean armistice talks took place at the Raebong villa at 10 a.m.

For the meeting, several generals including lieutenant general C. Turner Joy, the US Far East Navy Commander, senior delegate of the UN Forces, were chosen.

When leaving Munsan for the Raebong villa, the UN Forces delegation received a good send-off. The UN Forces commander-in-chief Ridgway who was staying in Japan was the first to fly into Munsan stealthily and called them for an "honourable ceasefire", maintaining that "Ours is the strongest army. We must never make a concession." Then he walked side by side with Joy to the helicopter bound for the talks venue to see the delegation off. All of the US service personnel in the Munsan base turned out to see the delegation off shouting at the top of their voices. After seeing the spectacular scene in Munsan, some 150 American journalists were busy vying for the lead to write a column, making a wrong guess that the "honourable ceasefire" pursued by the US was a matter of time and laying a bet of wine among them on the "date of ceasefire that would be fixed in weeks".

The delegates of the UN Forces side who got to the area of the DPRK side (Panmunjom) by helicopter were also offered the USA-made jeeps.

The procession of jeeps with white flags at the bonnet carried the UN Forces delegates through Kaesong to the Raebong villa. It was preceded by three trucks carrying KPA soldiers in new uniforms, who were waving their hands in smile to the local people who were looking at the unusual procession.

The delegates of both sides entering the talk venue presented contrasting looks. The faces of the DPRK delegates were full of triumphant spirit and the feeling of awe-inspiring judge, whereas the faces of the US side delegates, dispirited and looking about wonderingly,

—Anecdote—

### **Underwood III, Alias Won Il Han**

He is the grandson of Horace G. Underwood, an American missionary (priest of the American Presbyterian Church) who had come to Korea in 1885 as a scout for the aggression of Korea. His father, Horace H. Underwood (alias Won Han Gyong) spent his life in Korea, resorting to the US ideological and cultural invasion and espionage acts against Korea before dying in 1951 in Pusan. Born and brought up in Korea, Underwood III, like his grandfather (Won Tu U) and father (Won Han Gyong) got a Korean name, Won Il Han. During the Japanese military occupation of Korea, he lived in Seoul and, after the outbreak of the war in the Pacific, went to the US and served as an officer in the US Navy. After the defeat of Japan, he was discharged and employed by the education department of the US Military Government in south Korea. Like his father, in the US Military Government he helped ensure the colonial rule over south Korea while conducting intelligence activities of infiltrating spies and saboteurs into the areas of the northern half of Korea. When American “bigwigs” made a trip to

assumed the shameful of the defeated and exhibited the wretched and anxious psychology of a criminal in the dock.

The DPRK delegates entered the hall through the northern door to sit on the northern chairs facing south, and the US delegates took their seats on southern chairs facing north. They were followed by 30 staff officers and technical personnel respectively from both sides who occupied their seats appropriate to their positions.

One person of the US side members drew special attention; it was Underwood III, alias Won Il Han, senior interpreter of the

south Korea, he used to act as a “reliable interpreter”.

After the end of the US military rule in south Korea he worked at Yonsei University as a professor and volunteered to join the US army in June 1950 when the US ignited the Korean war. While making a plan for landing in Inchon in September 1950, MacArthur used to receive “advice” from Underwood III who was well informed of the local natural conditions and topography, and used him as his guide.

In the battles fought around Seoul, he guided the US scouts with his deep knowledge of the topography and the Korean language.

During the strategic, temporary retreat of the Korean People’s Army, he found himself in the Hamhung area, bent on manslaughter as an adviser, and fulfilled a “special task” in the POW camp on Koje Island.

He worked as the interpreter of the senior delegate of the UN Forces side to the Korean armistice talks because, as he said, three generations of his family from grandfather had lived in Seoul, Korean was his first language and his birth, love and marriage occurred in Korea. To camouflage his identity, he purchased the genealogy of a Korean, named Won Ju On, in 1985 and professed himself at the age of 68 to be a “descendant of honour” of the family.

senior delegate of the UN Forces side.

After glancing over the arrangement of seats, Joy, the senior delegate of the UN Forces side, frowned. He seemed to be aware of the Oriental custom that the victor occupy the northern seat and the defeated the southern seat in the dialogue hall. However, it was beyond his means because Kaesong talks were between the victor, the enemy force (the Korean People's Army) and the defeated, the US army as he confessed himself.

Standing opposite to each other on the table were the flag of the DPRK and the flag of the UN abused by the US troops. This was a sign that the US that had so far not recognized the existence of the DPRK came to recognize it officially and surrendered to it. It also reflected its diplomatic defeat.

The two sides reached an agreement on and adopted the following agenda items.

a: Passage of agenda items.

b: Confirmation of the Military Demarcation Line and establishment of a demilitarized zone.

c: Practical measures for the realization of truce and cessation of hostilities.

d: Problems concerning the policy of POWs.

e: Overtures to the concerned governments of the two sides.

The agenda items were issues whose settlement was indispensable for putting an end to the hostilities and defending peace in Korea and furthermore realization of the independent reunification of Korea.

## **Stubbornness Resultant from Territorial Ambition**

From July 27, 1951, the Korean Armistice Talks discussed the issue on fixing the Military Demarcation Line and demilitarized zone, the second agenda item.

From the outset the discussion proceeded amid serious confrontation because of the different purposes and stands both sides pursued in the talks.

As the Military Demarcation Line would be a line directly connected to the jurisdiction over the territory, territorial waters and territorial air space, fairness and justness should have to be thoroughly ensured in its fixing.

The DPRK side proposed to fix the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the Military Demarcation Line and that both sides retreat 10 km each from it and the resultant space be fixed as the demilitarized zone.

As the demarcation line of the prewar days was recognized by both sides, this could be the basis of peaceful settlement of the Korean question and was a fair and just proposal in consideration of the prevailing situation on the front at that time.

For this, the then UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie said: “As I already stated in Ottawa, I still support armistice with the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the demarcation line.”

Malik, USSR delegate to the UN, said in his speech at the UN: “The two warring countries should achieve ceasefire with the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the demarcation line.”

However, the US side, pursuing an “honourable armistice”, made desperate efforts to realize at the talks the territorial ambition they failed to achieve on the front.

The US side postponed the armistice talks for nearly four months in an attempt to separate 13 000 square kilometres of territory from the area of the northern half of Korea.

The senior delegate of the US side did not try to listen to the proposal of the DPRK side to the last, but presented a map illustrated with the Military Demarcation Line they put in, saying that in consideration of the military situation in Korea the demilitarized zone should be established somewhere farther north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. The map had the Military Demarcation Line marked in black colour, the southern area of demilitarized zone in blue and the northern area in red. On their map the northern red line was drawn 80 km north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

To see it in detail, the section cut off by this line included not only Kaesong, southern area of Yonbaek and part of Ongjin in the south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel but an area ranging from Songwol-dong of Ongjin to Kosong via Kumchon in the north of the 38th Parallel, totaling an area of 13 000 square kilometres, in other words, a vast area accounting for one-twentieth of the whole territory of Korea.

This meant more than seven times the size of Jeju Island (about 1 840 square kilometres), the largest island in Korea, or about 3 000 square kilometres more than that of Kyonggi Province, the most populous of all the provinces in Korea as of that time.

As the map reflected an unimaginable gangster-like nature and



shamelessness as they were, the senior delegate of the DPRK side only looked down at it silently. After a while, he ridiculed his counterpart, saying that he was surprised to see a strange map on which anyone can draw a demarcation line with red, blue and black pencils as he or she wanted.

To rationalize the fixing of demilitarized zone the US side called for appropriate compensation, clamouring about the supremacy of its naval and air forces.

The assertion of the US side was as follows:

... The UN Forces is taking a complete control of air and waters in the Korean peninsula. So which side benefits from armistice, the UN Forces that can blockade the coast and bomb any desired place in the area up to Amnok River or the north Korean army? That's why the Military Demarcation Line should be established somewhere between the 'air and naval front' with the Amnok River as the demarcation line and the army front in the area of Kaesong, Phyonggang and lower part of the Pukhan River where the troops of both sides are confronting.

The senior delegate of the US side, who explained lengthily the rationality of drawing the Military Demarcation Line at the middle zone of these two fronts, soon vanished through the back door of the conference hall, afraid of the Korean side's reaction.

In the wake of the talks that day, the government-paid media of the US and south Korea conducted a large-scale propaganda campaign about the "US naval and air supremacy.

Among them there was an article, which reads in part:

“We are maintaining the complete control of waters and air. At present the place or spot where the military situation can maintain balance lies in the middle spot between the confrontation line of ground forces of both sides and the line linking the air and land in the northernmost part of Korea. Accordingly, we consider that the Military Demarcation Line both sides can agree upon lies somewhere between the present confrontation line of ground forces and the border in the northernmost part of Korea and, also have the right to choose the spot in fixing the balanced spot.”

From the start the discussion about the Military Demarcation Line took place amid serious confrontation.

The discussion of the second agenda item continued on July 28.

That day the DPRK side verified in a scientific way the irrationality of the US argument about the “naval and air supremacy”, and rejected flatly the enemy’s gangster-like demand, saying, “The ground force plays a decisive role in war and the navy or air force can never win the war single-handed. This is proven by the history of modern warfare. The ground front is maintained and unfolded by a combined power of not only ground troops but also the air and naval forces. In your case, it is true that all the ground, naval and air forces are mobilized, only to barely maintain the present front. You are making desperate efforts to push upward on the ground front even a little, demanding “compensation” for air and naval supremacy. This fact itself reveals that your sophistry is wrong.

It continued; If naval and air supremacy has a great effect on war as you say, why were US troops driven to the Raktong River and why

were they expelled from the Chongchon River and Lake Jangjin? You are bragging about the effectiveness of naval and air forces, but rather they have killed innocent people and savagely destroyed peaceful cities and villages with indiscriminate bombardment and bombing.

According to the data gathered later, the US got 700–1 000 aircraft to make more than two sorties on average a day in the sky over Korea for barbarian bombing. Of them only 15 percent was for covering their ground force, and the other 85 percent for destroying peaceful cities and rural villages and killing civilians. Not a few of the aircraft were directly involved in dropping chemical and germ bombs for mass murder of civilians. As a result, cities and county and sub-county seats of the DPRK were severely destroyed and lots of people lost their lives.

That day the US side found no excuse to his counterpart's reasonable and strong refutation.

A Western author who witnessed the scene wrote as follows:

“Senior delegate Nam Il delivered fervent speeches from the beginning of the meeting of July 28. He said: According to your logic, we may well demand that the Raktong River line be the Military Demarcation Line. To think your absurd insistence, I can't help but doubt why you are here. Is it for peaceful negotiations or for finding an excuse to escalate the war? Your logic may have sense with only a neuropath or an idiot.

“When an interpreter interpreted his words into English, the faces of representatives of UN Forces turned pale and their breathing became rough. Dumb-founded, Joy kept his mouth shut

and only looked at Nam Il's face.

The senior delegate of the UN Forces who came narrowly to himself after a while said that they would occupy the area, which they had claimed, by intensifying military offensive through operations of the naval and air forces.

It was a blackmail that they would achieve their unjust demand by dint of strength.

Staring at his counterpart with scornful eyes, the senior delegate of the DPRK side retorted, saying, "Do as you like. We are afraid of nothing."

As they could not realize their demand at the negotiations, the US resorted to military pressure. As if it was demonstrating the "effectiveness of air control" and "might of air supremacy", it perpetrated large-scale bombing on Pyongyang from July 23 to 27, 1951, by mobilizing hundreds of aircraft. Meanwhile, they hurled huge armed forces into the area northeast of Yanggu and the area around the Pukhan River to make an offensive against positions of the KPA.

There were waged fierce battles to destroy their supremacy of naval and air forces and foil their desperate offensive.

The artillerymen of the KPA sank numerous enemy vessels, and the A.A. artillerymen shot down many enemy planes.

The movement of aircraft-hunting group originally initiated by Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung, ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander, was conducted briskly.

In less than a month from the start of armistice talks hundreds of planes were shot down and scores of warships, large and small, were sunk into the sea.

But the US continued to use tricks to realize at any cost its territorial ambition through the armistice talks.

This happened during the talks held on July 29. The US senior delegate advanced the so-called three principles, urging to discuss the issue of establishing a demilitarized zone first, putting aside the issue of fixing the Military Demarcation Line for later discussion since the issue was hard to reach agreement.

Their proposal was wrong in its raising.

A military demarcation line is a line for separating the warring armies of both sides and halting hostilities between both sides. A demilitarized zone is a buffer zone for preventing conflict by isolating armies of the two belligerents from each other after the truce. Accordingly, there can be neither ceasefire nor demilitarized zone without a military demarcation line. Therefore, proposing to establish a demilitarized zone prior to the fixing of a military demarcation line was in fact an absurd logic which made it impossible to realize anything as it reversed the order of solving problems.

The three “principles” for the establishment of a demilitarized zone, too, were pursuing impure purposes.

They maintained that the establishment of a demilitarized zone needs to “reflect an overall military situation” and there should be conspicuous topographical features and suitable defence positions. Under the pretext of reflecting the overall military situation the US sought compensation for the “supremacy of naval and air forces”, and under the pretext of establishing a demilitarized zone in the places with topographical features easy to see and suitable defence

positions it sought to seize major strategic and tactical zones its forces had failed to take in battles. The theory of first fixing a demilitarized zone was literally nothing more than a duplicity of the US to hide its defeat on the front and realize territorial ambition.

At the armistice talks held on July 30 the DPRK side stigmatized the US theory as a gross violation of the second agenda item which required to fix a military demarcation line before setting a demilitarized zone and a product of its hidden ambition for territory, and sternly denounced it as an intentional provocation to wreck the armistice talks.

Meanwhile, the DPRK side conducted a dynamic information campaign to expose to the world the details of debates over the setting of a military demarcation line and the manoeuvres of the US to take an area of 13 000 square kilometres. The shameless identity of the US came to be known worldwide, and the voice of denouncing it raised across the world.

Even the Western and government-patronized media insisted that the request for compensation on land for the supremacy of naval and air forces was an unprecedented thing.

That the supremacy of naval and air forces cannot be a decisive factor of victory in war was admitted by Mark Clark who was appointed as a commander-in-chief of the UN Forces in 1952 and commanded the forces in the Korean war before signing the armistice agreement. He said; Maybe the flying corps, navy and aircraft carriers have saved us from defeat, but they did not give us any chance to bring about the battle results in our favour. Our air force failed to prevent the sustained flow of enemy supplies and

reinforcements from arriving at the battle lines. In other words, the air force could never isolate the front.

The US that had failed to achieve its territorial ambition at the talks went over to a new large-scale offensive, resorting to the military strength again.

## **Consistent Stand of the DPRK**

As it could not realize its territorial ambition through the armistice talks the US unilaterally scuttled the talks and went over to the launch of the Summer Offensive it had prepared behind the scenes of the talks, saying, “Only war is the wayout of truce talks that is at a standstill.”

By the end of July 1951 Van Fleet, commander of the US 8<sup>th</sup> Army, had about 300 000 troops (7 US divisions, 10 south Korean divisions and 4 brigades from satellite countries) under his control.

The military purpose of the Summer Offensive was to push the front to the Kaesong-Kumchon-Ichon-Wonsan line by staging a landing in the area of Wonsan or Thongchon on the east coast in combination with the attack on the ground front to occupy the strategically important mountainous areas in the eastern and central parts of the front and further, occupy the whole area of the northern half of Korea. In other words, the US aimed at putting military pressure to bear upon the DPRK side by taking initiative at the armistice talks to achieve an “honourable truce”.

For such military, political and diplomatic purposes, the US

chose the area of Height 1211 and Malhwi-ri area in the eastern sector of the front as the direction of its main attack on the ground and manoeuvred to annihilate the KPA units in the line of Ipho-ri after breaking through the KPA defence line in two areas—Pia-ri and Kajon-ri—and expand the battle successes.

For the operations on the ground front it hurled huge troops 130 000 strong, 1 000-odd aircraft and lots of guns and tanks into the eastern sector of the front.

On the early morning of August 18, the US troops poured myriads of shells and bombs before making intensive attacks on the major heights occupied by the KPA, including Height 1211 and Height 983.1.

Through an active positional warfare, the KPA units offered stubborn resistance, totally crushing the enemy's attack in the defence line and on the sea.

Under the direct command of Van Fleet they turned the heights into a sea of flames with the largest-scale bombardment and largest-scale bombing, and made continuous wave-like attacks, despite many casualties and losses, but they could not break through the solid defence positions of the KPA soldiers who were fighting by relying on pit position.

Height 1211 and its adjoining peaks became a “heartbreak ridge” and its valleys a “punch bowl” for the enemy.

The Summer Offensive that went on from August 18 to September 22 ended in an ignominious defeat of US troops. During this period the US left a manpower of 78 000 killed or taken prisoner and lost numerous arms and combat equipment. The defeat



in the Summer Offensive was so crushing that Bradley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who incited Van Fleet to the Summer Offensive, lamented that the Summer Offensive of Van Fleet was a wrong war waged at the wrong time and in the wrong place.

Albeit the defeat in the Summer Offensive, the US rulers saw that the UN Forces side stuck to the original proposal, saying that they had no reason to change their basic line of negotiations (armistice talks) as the KPA had not been pushed back militarily.

Now that Van Fleet's Summer Offensive had failed, Ridgway took the turn. When he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the UN Forces, Ridgway had appeared in Tokyo wearing a combat uniform with grenades hung on both sides of his chest. He asserted that he would inflict pressure on the other party of talks with the Autumn Offensive.

The Autumn Offensive, continuation of the Summer Offensive, pursued the same purposes.

For the realization of the purposes of the Autumn Offensive Ridgway planned to hurl the US 10<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Corps and the reserves of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps of the south Korean puppet army in the areas of Height 1211 and Malhwi-ri that bore the brunt of their attack, and the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the British army, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division and 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division of the US army and 9<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division of the south Korean puppet army in the Sangnyong-ri and Sibyon-ri area.

The Autumn Offensive started on September 29. In order to hide the direction of main attack and ensure unexpectedness in the attack on Height 1211, Ridgway launched an attack on the eastern and western sectors of the front nearly at the same time.

The fiercest battle was fought in the area of Height 1211. The US concentrated troops into this area because the capture of the height would allow them to take heights adjacent to it and advance dozens of kilometres to the north. To capture the height and its series the enemy poured more than 30 000–40 000 shells and bombs on average a day. Rocks were reduced to ashes, hundreds-of-years-old trees uprooted and burnt, and even squirrels, finding no place to hide, ran into the bosoms of the KPA soldiers. The elevation of the height shrunk by one metre on average.

The enemy made a “wave-like attack”, driving forth companies, battalions, regiments and even divisions.

However, the combatants of the KPA by relying on pits and trenches gave wholesale deaths to the pouncing enemy.

The Autumn Offensive, too, ended in an ignominious defeat of the US forces.

In this period the US left 147 000 troops killed, wounded or captured, 279 tanks and armoured cars, 113 guns of various types and 141 trucks destroyed or captured, 961 aircraft and 60-odd ships, shot down, sunk, damaged or captured, and 44 000 small arms captured. Despite such a great loss US troops failed to advance to the aimed line at any place and occupy even a single height.

Reviewing the Autumn Offensive, Bradley lamented that if operations were staged in that way, it would take at least 20 years for Ridgway to reach the Amnok River.

The US that had claimed that technical supremacy decides the destiny of war, boasting of its “air and naval supremacy”, suffered

one bitter defeat after another, rather than realizing its territorial ambition through the offensives.

Having realized that there was no chance of victory in the showdown of strength with the DPRK, Ridgway could not but propose to the DPRK side to resume the armistice talks.

## **Military and Diplomatic Warfare Targeted at Kaesong**

Ridgway on October 4, 1951, sent a letter to the DPRK side. The letter in relation to the venue for the armistice talks read as follows:

I propose that our delegations hold talks at a place in the middle part between our two fronts which your side chooses and I can accept as a place where the armistice talks can resume quickly.

It was only two months previously that the US side declared that it would not come out to the talks again unless the hall of armistice talks (Raebong villa) that had been in the DPRK-controlled area by that time was moved to the area under their military control, withdrawing unilaterally from the meeting hall with the Summer Offensive near at hand. But Ridgway shamefully requested to hold the talks again, announcing the nullification of their “declaration” in the letter dated October 4. Considering that the US side changed its previous stand and the armistice talks were between the two warring parties, the DPRK side agreed to move the venue of the talks to Panmunjom from Kaesong (Raebong villa) and expanded the neutral zone by adding the area from Kaesong to Munsan to it.

Thanks to the bold measures taken by the DPRK side, the armistice talks resumed in Panmunjom on October 25, 1951, 63 days after recess.

The talks discussed again the second agenda item—fixing the Military Demarcation Line and demilitarized zone.

For the establishment of military demarcation line, the DPRK side proposed that the line where both sides confronted each other should be a military demarcation line. It was a consistent stand of the DPRK side.

At that time the contact line of the two armies ran in the south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel in the west and its north in the east with the Rimjin River as a boundary. Since the extent of areas occupied by both sides in the south and north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel was similar, it made little difference to the DPRK side's original insistence on fixing the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line.

The US side, too, put forward a proposal, the so-called “final proposal”. Its main content was to turn the vast area of 1 000 square kilometres including Kaesong into a demilitarized zone. Though it retreated far as compared with its initial ambition for taking a vast area of 13 000 square kilometres from the north's territory, its gangster-like nature did not change at all. In particular, the US side schemed to rationalize its demand to take the Kaesong area at any cost, persisting that “Kaesong is a must for the defence of Seoul” and “Kaesong is very important militarily as it is only 40 kilometres away from Seoul.”

About this a Western journalist wrote as follows:

“The UN Forces side wanted to take Kaesong in its hand. Kaesong is an old city and locates in the south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. It belonged to south Korea before the Korean war. It is widely known as a home of *insam* and also played an important role as an outer fort for the defence of the capital city, Seoul. In other words, Kaesong is a most important stronghold for south Korea not only in the military aspect but also in the political, economic and psychological aspects. The UN Forces wanted it more than the mountainous areas in the eastern and middle parts.”

The schemes of the US to take the vast area and Kaesong in the name of a “demilitarized zone” could not work.

At the meeting the following day the DPRK side confuted the US proposal taking detailed facts that the military demarcation line proposed by the US side ran deeper into the area of the DPRK side than the front where the battles were substantially being fought between the two sides. It went on to say that it could “adjust” rationally some regions in favour of both sides, strongly insisting that the military demarcation line should be established on the basis of the existing military contact line of both sides.

The senior delegate of the US side, who calculated that he could obtain something from the “adjustment” hinted by the DPRK side, proposed with some expectation to exchange the narrow area around Kosong and Kumgang unfavourable for their defence with Kaesong under the control of the DPRK side.

It was rejected on the spot, but the enemy did not intend to retreat from the bargain.

The Americans who could neither occupy Kaesong by dint of military strength nor abandon it resorted to a preposterous sophism.

The senior delegate of the US side said that Kaesong was occupied by the DPRK side without battle on the eve of the armistice talks and that but for the armistice talks in Kaesong, the US army would have already occupied it.

Kaesong and its surrounding areas had already been occupied by the DPRK side in June before the start of the armistice talks. At that time the US army had deployed a small scouting detachment in the area west of the Rimjin River and been denied access to Kaesong and its suburbs.

Later they launched several offensives to take Kaesong, but each time in vain in face of the powerful counterattack of the KPA.

Such facts allowed the senior delegate of the DPRK side to slap down the US side. He said to his counterpart jeeringly, “You say that you need Kaesong for the defence of Seoul. If we demand some area of south Korea for the defence of Pyongyang, what will you do?”

His rebuke left the senior delegate of the US side tongue-tied.

As its sophistry and trick did not work at the talks, the US foolishly schemed to realize its territorial ambition for Kaesong with “strength” again. It launched another round of military offensive to seize the Kaesong area, but it ended in ignominious defeat by a powerful counterblow of the KPA.

Finding themselves in a dilemma, the US side came out to the talks table again for the discussion of proposal raised by the DPRK side, i.e. “Some area can be rationally adjusted in favour of both sides.”

At the talk held on November 1 the senior delegate of the US

side assumed a low posture to bring their “barter” to success, saying that he would add several islands to Kosong and its southern area they already proposed in exchange for Kaesong. As for the aforesaid islands, they were of little significance. At that time the US side had a few islands in the north of military contact line. As small islands, they could never be compared with Kaesong and its surrounding area in the military and economic point of view.

The senior delegate of the DPRK side flatly rejected the bargain proposed by the US side, explaining such reasons. He refuted to the face of his counterpart, saying that if they were so eager to take Kaesong, why had they not accepted the DPRK side’s original proposal to fix the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel as a military demarcation line and why were they persisting in doing it now.

However, the senior delegate of the US side desperately buckled down without caring a hang about face and shame.

Later as the talk for the discussion of the second agenda item commenced on November 3, the US side put out a map which included Kaesong and Mt. Songak in the demilitarized zone, insisting that the line passing the Nam Gate in Kaesong be defined as the Military Demarcation Line in the Kaesong area. This was an order from Ridgway to Joy, senior delegate of US side, to “include Kaesong in the demilitarized zone in case of failure to fix the Military Demarcation Line retaining Kaesong.”

It was indeed a shameful behaviour. As part of the Chonma and Suryong Mountains featuring mountains of less than 500 –700 metres in height connected to the Ahobiryong Mountains, the area

of Mt. Songak in Kaesong the US side proposed to turn into a demilitarized zone was the highest place in the Kaesong area. In particular, it was an area of military and strategic importance.

If it took Mt. Songak which provides control of Kaesong south of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel and the Kumchon area north of it, the US could secure a forward base favourable for invading the north, control the railways and road between Kaesong and Kumchon and the road between Kaesong and Jangphung and easily invade up to the Ryesong River north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

As it fixed the demilitarized zone and drew its boundary according to its aggressive schemes, the map presented by the US side showed the area of Kaesong and Mt. Songak in the shape of a gourd. As it

—Anecdote—

### **Two Hours-and-Eleven-Minutes-Long Staring War**

At the 20<sup>th</sup> session of the armistice talks the US side cut a rare ridiculous figure to frustrate the talk in order to inflict pressure to bear upon the DPRK side.

Joy shut his mouth tight after saying that he would not consider the DPRK side's insistence on the fixing of the military demarcation line and that he had no more to say. As he was driven to a tight corner, unable to find any word to confute the correct proposal of the DPRK side, he behaved in such a queer manner.

His childish act prompted the DPRK side to counter the mute offensive of the US side with silence, full of self-confidence.

A Western journalist who witnessed this confrontation on the spot



was so slushy and funny as a child's sketch that even the journalists of the UN Forces side blushed, whispering among themselves.

Having suffered repeated defeat in the military and diplomatic warfare targeted at Kaesong, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Ridgway and Joy to save the face of the US at any cost, blaming them as "incompetent beings". Unable to endure his superior's pressing demand, Ridgway and Joy racked their brains and thought out a "good idea".

Joy who came to the talks proposed to go over to the discussion of another agenda item postponing the agreement of the former item now that the military contact line of both sides could move later, saying that he "accepted" the proposal of the DPRK side to fix the military contact line of both sides as a military demarcation line.

wrote as follows:

"The representatives of the north Korean side including Nam Il sat up straight with their mouths locked. It was a posture implying that they, too, would refuse to say if Joy boycotts discussion. The silence between both sides reigned for 2 hours and 11 minutes. The representatives of the north Korean side literally conducted a fight of glare, staring at their counterparts of the UN Forces in front of themselves each.

Joy was a loser in this fight. Taking a deep breath, he opened his mouth rubbing his eyes with one hand, "Their attitude was unexpected. Staring at the same object for a long time was boring. Surviving such a long stare seemed a great thing to me."

Joy, who lost the war of staring more than two hours, soon fled after humbly raising to the Korean side a question: "What about discussing the third agenda item now that the second one is probably in slow progress."

The US had a purpose in proposing this. If the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone were fixed in the situation of that time, it could not occupy the Kaesong area and its ambition for taking more land would not be realized.

Aware of its sinister design, the DPRK side at the November 7 talks advanced a written document of its final stand on fixing the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone.

It was as follows: The present military contact line of both sides should be the military demarcation line and both sides should retreat two kilometres from it each to create a demilitarized zone; as the military contact line of both sides will change in the future during the ongoing war some amendment can be given to it according to the changes just before signing the armistice agreement.

The US side could not but accept this fair and realistic final proposal. But in order to realize its territorial ambition at any cost it attached conditions, stressing the need to reaffirm that the hostilities would go on until the armistice agreement would be signed, though an agreement on the main principle on fixing the military demarcation line was reached. It was a ludicrous attempt to make up for its defeat at the talks with “strength” later.

To this, the senior delegate of the DPRK side said in a dignified and dynamic tone, “Our proposal includes no article restricting your military actions in the period of talks from the date of fixing a military demarcation line to the date of concluding armistice agreement. Do as you like. But if you try to change the already-confirmed military demarcation line by means of any ‘military pressure’ with

overconfidence in your strength, the outcome will not be what you desired. Therefore, we don't try to restrict your military actions hereafter, but only emphasize once again our assertion that the military contact line of both sides can be amended in accordance with the changes at the time of signing the armistice agreement."

The draft agreement presented by the DPRK side was adopted without amendment at the subcommittee meeting and formally ratified at the 27<sup>th</sup> full-dress session of the armistice talks held several days later.

The following is its main content:

1) Both sides agree on defining the real contact line of both sides as a military demarcation line and establishing a demilitarized zone by retreating two kilometres each from this line.

2) If the armistice agreement is signed within 30 days after the ratification of this agreement by this meeting, the Military Demarcation Line and demilitarized zone confirmed now shall never be changed again whatever the changes in the military contact line of both sides.

3) Considering that hostile acts would continue until the armistice agreement is signed, if the armistice agreement is not signed within 30 days after the ratification of this agreement by this meeting, both sides shall amend the Military Demarcation Line and demilitarized zone according to the changes in the military contact line of both sides just before the signing of the armistice agreement.

The ratification of this agreement put an end to the discussion of the "question on establishing a military demarcation line and demilitarized zone", the second agenda item of the Korean armistice talks, through twists and turns of four full months. The whole process

of this military and diplomatic warfare was characterized by the DPRK side's principled stand, high-handedness and right assertions and the US side's consistent irrational insistence, craftiness and defeat.

Despite the adoption of the agreement, the then military contact line of both sides failed to become a practical military demarcation line. It was because the war continued owing to the US imperialists' cunning and treacherous acts to realize their aggressive goals by winning an "honourable ceasefire" in the Korean war.

Thus, there occurred changes in the military contact line of both sides.

Later revisions were made to the military demarcation line in accordance with the agreement which required to revise the Military Demarcation Line and demilitarized zone in accordance with changes in the military contact line of both sides, if the armistice agreement was not concluded within 30 days after the adoption of the agreement.

Through the revised Military Demarcation Line history proved that the DPRK side's assertion was just and correct whereas the US bigotry was unjust.

## **Talks Replaced by Bullets and Shells**

The Korean armistice talks finished discussion on the second agenda item in November 1951 and then progressed step by step despite vicissitudes. Thanks to the sincere efforts of the DPRK side, the discussion on the third agenda item (concrete arrangements for ceasefire and armistice) was completed on April 27, 1952. and the discussion on the fourth agenda item (arrangements relating to

POWs) was agreed upon and codified after hot debates.

Its content is as follows:

“Both sides shall immediately release and repatriate all the prisoners of war held in their custody at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective.” And “Each side ensures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming effective of this armistice agreement.”

By May 1952 the draft of the Korean armistice agreement got agreement on every agenda item, and signing of this draft could bring truce.

But the US that did not want peace in Korea, picking a quarrel with the issue of repatriation of POWs, unilaterally overturned the already-agreed principle of repatriation of POWs and came out with “voluntary repatriation”.

President Truman, in his “special statement” on May 7, said that the repatriation of all POWs was a “permanent shame on the US and UN”.

The senior delegate of the US side insisted that the principle of “voluntary repatriation” was “decisive, final and unchangeable” and unilaterally declared an indefinite recession before leaving the hall. Owing to the treacherous acts of the US the armistice talks came to an indefinite stalemate again and the war continued.

In the light of the August 12, 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs, this was a gross violation.

Article 118 of the convention stipulates that just after the stop of hostilities the POWs should be released and repatriated without

delay, and Article 7 notes that POWs cannot give up some or whole of the rights provided by this convention in any circumstance.

The US had an intention to unilaterally detain by force in south Korea the prisoners of war of the DPRK side after the truce through “voluntary repatriation” and then use them for criminal purposes.

On May 7, 1952, Mark Clark, director of training bureau of the US army, replaced Ridgway as the commander-in-chief of the US

—Anecdote—

### **US Brigadier General Who Became a “Captive” of Captives**

On May 7, 1952, when Clark came to Tokyo as a new commander-in-chief of the UN Forces, Ridgway, his predecessor, informed him that the red POWs in south Korea were holding hostage the head of a POW camp.

Ridgway’s words instantly spoiled the mood of Clark.

It was a grave incident that a brigadier general of the US army, who was head of a POW camp, fell captive to the empty-handed POWs of the KPA. Moreover, it was the incident related to the US policy on POWs.

At that time US troops were brutally torturing and massacring the POWs of the DPRK side in gross violation of the international convention on the treatment of POWs.

The number of DPRK POWs killed by the US was countless—some had become guinea pigs for the study of germ warfare and “war medicine” and some others targets of weapons efficiency test and live shell firing practice. The atrocities became more heinous with the start of discussing of the POW repatriation problem at the armistice talks. It was aimed at keeping in custody more POWs of the DPRK side by satisfying its demand of “voluntary repatriation” and “one to one exchange”.

Far East Army and of the UN Forces.

After all the US had replaced the commander-in-chief of the UN Forces three times in less than two years after the outbreak of the Korean war.

The US believed that Clark, “veteran of hard fighting”, would open a breakthrough for “victory” on the Korean front and take initiative in the armistice talks, thus winning an “honourable truce”.

But such schemes of the US side were met with a resolute opposition from the POWs of the DPRK side. As a reflection of this situation, the head of the POW Camp on Koje Island was changed eight times in the period from January to early September 1951.

In March 1952, the ninth head of camp recognized as a “competent POW expert” was appointed. In order to implement the “voluntary repatriation” proposed at the armistice talks, the brigadier general would often persuade POWs into making turnaround. One day infuriated with his false propaganda, POWs caught and dragged him into a building through wire entanglement inside the camp. So in less than two months since his appointment the “competent POW expert” was taken a “captive” of captives. At one rainy night he was tried by a “people’s tribunal” organized by the POWs.

The incident that had happened in a POW Camp guarded by 10 000-strong US troops gave a great shock to the US authorities.

Truman ordered Clark, now in Tokyo after being appointed as the commander-in-chief of the UN Forces, to settle this incident prior to other affairs.

Clark met Ridgway and Van Fleet in Pusan on May 9 and flew with them to Koje Island by stealth using the nap time of pressmen. They feared that if the news of four-star generals’ trip to Koje Island for a US general who was held a “captive” of captives was spread, it might bring

Elated Clark met the UN Secretary General and shot the breeze just before leaving the US.

Under the command of Clark were the ground forces about 550 000 strong of the US, south Korea and satellite states that were hurled into the front, the US troops 60 000-odd strong on standby in Japan as a strategic reserve and numerous combat equipment.

Though he occupied the position of the commander-in-chief of

them a big shame.

Arriving at the island, Clark ordered Van Fleet to quickly rescue the brigadier general by every possible means and method. Van Fleet appointed another brigadier general as head of the camp and saw that he rescued his predecessor by mobilizing tanks, machine guns and even chemical weapons.

But having failed to bring by means of physical strength the POWs to their knees who opposed “voluntary repatriation”, he chose the way of writing a letter of apology as demanded by POWs to save him.

His letter of apology read as follows:

“I admit that there happened bloody incidents where numerous prisoners of war have been killed by the UN Forces. I promise to treat POWs in a humanitarian way in future in accordance with the principles of international law. I’ll do my best to keep violence and incidents of bloodshed from recurring in future.”

The written apology angered the US authorities to the extreme. Nothing would be more disgraceful to the US than the fact that the newly appointed head of camp wrote letter of apology to POWs, not to mention the fact that brigadier general of the US army, who was head of a POW camp, became a “captive” of captives. The apology writer was immediately dismissed from his post and the “captive” released five days later faced the same fate.



the UN Forces bragging much, he failed to achieve any remarkable “success” not only on the front but also in the armistice talks. Embarrassed, he made a general mobilization of aggressive armed forces to perpetrate a “strangulation operation”, saying that he would “wipe out of the map” 78 cities of the northern half of Korea.

Such military operations and escalation of war by the US aroused a greater indignation of the soldiers and people of the DPRK, thus bringing about a thousand-fold death to themselves.

The US, scheming to recover the military and political defeat through a long-term warfare, prepared large-scale military offensives with much efforts and carried them into effect, blocking the advance of the armistice talks on purpose.

Typical of them were the Kimhwa Offensive, “model battle” on T-shaped Height and the New Offensive upon which they hinged the fate of war. Nevertheless all the military operations could not help them realize their goals.

## **Kimhwa Offensive Ends in Defeat**

The aim of the Kimhwa Offensive was to break through a delta connecting Kimhwa, Phyonggang and Cholwon in the central front and, after reinforcing the units with the units landing in Thongchon on the east coast to “annihilate” the KPA units and push north. The main purpose the US pursued in this offensive was to realize their territorial ambition by pushing the military contact line of both sides upward to the north and set a military demarcation line there. At the

same time Clark tried to inject a fresh breath to the troops of the vassal states that were extremely depressed owing to the repeated defeat by showing them a new “road to victory”.

For the reason, the US concentrated its forces on Clark’s Kimhwa Offensive.

First of all, it made the so-called master hands in operations such as the commander of the US Pacific Fleet and the general commander of the ground force on the mainland map out the operational plan and its details through discussion and examination with field commanders on the front, frequenting south Korea and Japan. And they made preparations for landing in Thongchon on the east coast by a large US mobile unit—roughly the size of the unit that participated in the operations for landing in Inchon—and concentrated on the central front the US 7<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> divisions, the 9<sup>th</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> divisions of south Korea and thousands of pieces of guns. On Clark’s order, the units deployed on the central front received a special night and squad training again.

The Kimhwa Offensive commenced on October 14, 1952, with the 20-km-long front north of Kimhwa as the major thrust area.

Clark lavished the supply of military materials. 70-odd aircraft made sorties every day to “scorch” the area in the direction of attack, and the positions of the KPA were poured with about 24 000 shells every day. Though they made a “wave-like attack” about 10 times a day, they could not help but retreat leaving numerous corpses.

With regard to the defeat in the Kimhwa Offensive, the US imperialists screamed:

“This combat (Kimhwa Offensive) was the second deadliest battle for elite units in the 28-month-long Korean war. It has been surpassed only by the crushing defeat of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army in north Korea in 1950”.

The failure of the Kimhwa Offensive once again awakened the US authorities to the fact that they “can never occupy even a height as small as a fist even at the cost of horrible loss” on the Korean front.

## **Bankruptcy of the New Offensive**

In November 1952, when the armistice talks were at a stalemate, the US held a presidential election, in which the Democrats lost and Eisenhower, notorious warlord of the Republican Party won.

Before the election Eisenhower made a commitment that if he became president he would go to Korea to find a solution to “putting an end to the war”, but he chose the other road.

In December 1952, Eisenhower, who flew into south Korea together with the war henchmen such as the defence secretary, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commander of the Pacific Fleet, discussed with Clark and Van Fleet in Seoul a further expansion of aggressive war, not ceasefire. They hatched the New Offensive featuring formation of a second front in the area linking Wonsan and Pyongyang and an all-round offensive in combination with it, the use of atomic weapons and a large-scale bombing of Northeast China. For the New Offensive they planned to conduct landing operations both on the east and west coasts for the isolation of the front from rear of the DPRK, “encircle and annihilate” the

KPA units on the front and expand the flames of war to the Asian continent after occupying the whole of Korea.

For the preparations of the New Offensive, the US newly hurled into the Korean front numerous vessels and aircraft, combat technical equipment and huge troops and waged exercises for landing operations.

In the meantime it took into account use of the spy clique led by Pak Hon Yong and Ri Sung Yop lurking within the DPRK.

Pak Hon Yong who had already turned a spy of the US in 1939, and his stooges occupied important posts in the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the DPRK after liberation (August 15, 1945), and carried out secretly orders of their master to "rally forces to overthrow the government of the Republic". As the war dragged on, they attempted to topple the government through an "armed revolt" in concurrence with the New Offensive of Eisenhower on a new order of their master.

Thus, Korea's military and political situation entered a new phase between the end of 1952 and early 1953, and the armistice talks were on the brink of total bankruptcy. The problems already agreed upon at the armistice talks and, in particular, the agreement on the establishment of the Military Demarcation Line, too, were likely to be nullified.

As direct preparations for the New Offensive US troops made a surprise attacks scores of times in the isolated areas of the front and increased intensive bombing to cut off the front from the rear from early January 1953.

However, the KPA units frustrated the enemy's 48 rounds of

partial attacks and 143 rounds of raids in the period between January and March 1953 through positive combat activities, firmly taking initiative on all the fronts. Among them was the battle on T-shaped Height waged under the direct command of Van Fleet, commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army.

### **End of a “Model Battle”**

As a prelude to the New Offensive Van Fleet organized a battle to capture T-shaped Height, a “decisive operation” to overcome the phase on the front. T-shaped Height northwest of Cholwon in the central section of the front is 200–300m high, and was defended by a KPA unit.

Van Fleet hurled large forces and combat equipment into the battle for the largest offensive since the Kimhwa Offensive.

From some days before the commencement of full-scale attack of troops of three divisions supported by the latest-style tanks, large-calibre guns and mortars, the US forces perpetrated a large-scale bombardment and bombing on the height. On the day just before the attack they poured almost 6 000 tons of shells and bombs on the height.

Prior to an all-round attack on the height, Van Fleet said to the high-ranking officers of three services, such as the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Army and commander of the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Force, officials, “invited” war correspondents of the UN Forces and consuls and counselors of different countries on the spot that they would see how he would be annihilating the communist army by organizing

and commanding a “model battle”.

Informed of the US attempt, Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung ordered the artillery unit on the Yangdok line to advance by 4:00 a.m. of January 25 to the line where it could smash the enemy pouncing upon T-shaped Height, and sat up the whole night to command their manoeuvring.

The artillery unit arrived at the designated line and made full preparations for firing.

At 5:00 a.m. of January 25, 1953, US troops launched attacks under the cover of hundreds of planes and guns and 40 tanks under the command of Van Fleet. The KPA artillery unit, upon the order of general offensive of Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung, showered fire on the enemy’s latest combat equipment. As the enemy climbed up the height in groups believing in their numerical supremacy, the KPA combatants administered them merciless blows by relying on the durable pit positions. Finally, the “model battle” became a battle which showed a “model” of how aggressors were killed.

The US calculated that this battle would end in the “loss of about 200 lives”, but they failed to seize the height even at the cost of about 6 000 lives.

The crushing defeat of US troops on T-shaped Height gave rise to the voices of worry over the prospect and destiny of the New Offensive among the US political and military circles.

Why did the battle waged by hurling different services and arms and even latest weapons in order to capture an unknown small height end in failure? Why did the battle fail in spite of applying the demands of modern military science in a “model” manner? The

result of the battle foretells what the result of large-scale offensive to be waged on all fronts will be ....

Bradley said that it was difficult for the US to win a military victory in the Korean war despite great losses of effectives.

The commander of the British troops in the Korean war said that it was impossible for the UN Forces to win victory in the Korean war, and that there is no way of warranting their assured victory.

Driven to a last ditch, the US authorities saw that Clark sent to the DPRK side a message on February 22, 1953 proposing an exchange of wounded prisoners of war of both sides.

Thus, a full-dress meeting of armistice talks that was suspended for more than six months resumed on April 26, 1953.

## **Stick Is the Best Choice for a Mad Dog**

At the armistice talks the US side continued to resort to a sinister plot to delay armistice, dreaming an “honourable armistice”.

Since the principle of POW repatriation was agreed upon at the talks, there was no room for the US side to find any pretext to hinder the realization of ceasefire. It tried to win time, finding fault with trifling questions, out of the desire to achieve an “honourable armistice” and territorial ambition at any cost.

Now that both sides had already agreed that the Military Demarcation Line may be fixed again according to the changes of contact line of both sides, the US side schemed foolishly with the hope on that article.

The US jingoists urged Eisenhower to launch the New Offensive, which had been prepared but never realized.

The US aircraft bombed dams of reservoirs such as the Kusong Reservoir, not related with battles, intensifying barbarous bombing on cities and rural communities in the northern half of Korea.

The bombing, unprecedented in war history, was aimed at drowning tens of thousands of Koreans in water and starving them to death by destroying irrigation facilities necessary for grain production.

Meanwhile, the US helped Syngman Rhee to clamour about “resolute opposition of armistice” and “independent march north”.

And it instigated the Syngman Rhee clique on June 18, 1953 to oust 27 000 POWs of the DPRK side from the camps to detain them in south Korea. This was a wanton violation of agreement with the DPRK.

Its allies and satellite countries as well as peace-loving peoples of the world denounced it for the vicious act.

The US excused themselves, saying that the release of POWs was an “independent action” of the Syngman Rhee clique and “measure taken by themselves” without informing it of the measure. Embarrassed at the worldwide denouncement and powerful military punishment by the DPRK side, the US promised to gather in the “released” POWs again and intensify control over the Syngman Rhee clique.

A hot lesson had to be given to those who were doing crazy acts beyond their reason.

Accordingly, three rounds of powerful strike by the DPRK took place from May 13 to July 27, 1953, the last period of the Korean war. The purpose of this strike was to force the enemy to accept the



DPRK side's fair proposal at the armistice talks, remove the enemy's salience formed on the front and hasten the final victory of the war.

There was the first round of strike between May 13 to May 26, 1953. The KPA units administered nearly 30 rounds of powerful strike to 21 objects in the foremost defence area of the enemy, thereby annihilating numerous manpower and capturing some heights.

The second round of strike between May 27 to June 15 dealt 70 rounds of assaults at 56 objects. The enemy were ousted from a 55 square-kilometre-wide area including 33 key heights, as well as from the salience in the left side of the Pukhan River. The strike included the noted battle on Height 351.

As a projecting height situated 5 km south of Kosong, Kangwon Province, and 3 km west of the east coast, Height 351 was very important militarily and strategically. Hence, the enemy built a strong defence position on the height for more than two years, bragging that this height was an "impregnable fortress", a "line of no retreat" and that "even if we surrender Seoul we can never surrender Height 351".

At 0:50 hours on June 2, supported by 130 pieces of artillery, the KPA soldiers launched an attack, and captured it within 15 minutes.

As the day broke the enemy hurled enormous troops into the height and a nameless height beside it, mobilizing vessels, artillery and aircraft to recapture the lost height.

The KPA soldiers displayed an unmatched heroism to frustrate the enemy's repeated counterattacks. The local people in the Kosong area, including the Namgang village, supported them.

They repulsed the enemy's 50-day-long obstinate counterattack,

killing and wounding 8 500 enemy soldiers.

After the second round of strike by the KPA, Van Fleet, on his tour of the front, dismissed the chief of staff of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps and commanders of the 5<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry divisions of the south Korean army, blaming them for the heavy losses.

The third round of strike by the KPA was conducted from July 13 to 27, the last day of the war. In this period the enemy left 78 000 manpower killed, wounded or captured and retreated 160 square kilometres south from the front.

During the three rounds of strike the KPA combined units waged 1 800 rounds of combat action, annihilating numerous enemy troops, foiled the US schemes to move the Military Demarcation Line towards the north and advanced south, thereby seizing an area of about 300 square kilometres in the south.

The strike showed that the strong was not the US but the DPRK and that if the former persisted in war it would only bring death to them.

The US authorities who were desperate to escalate the war could not but see this stark reality.

They kneeled down before the KPA and the heroic people of the DPRK and signed the Korean Armistice Agreement.

The disgrace, not “honour”, to sign the armistice agreement was given to Clark.

Clark, who had enjoyed the honour of accepting surrender of the fascist German forces in Italy and Mussolini’s army during World War II, came to be recorded in history as the “first US commander who signed an armistice agreement without victory”.

The armistice talks took two years and 17 days until the signing of the armistice agreement, but its signing ceremony took only 16 minutes.

At 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed and after 12 hours since then all military actions stopped in the whole of front and thus the Korean war unleashed by the US ended after three years, one month and two days.

After signing the Korean Armistice Agreement Clark confessed that he came to wear a worn-out felt hat in his last years because he did as instructed by his government. Wondering whether he would go angling back at home, he added that only MacArthur, Van Fleet and Ridgway would understand him at the moment.

Some days later Clark was stripped of all his official posts and found himself idle in Tokyo before leaving for the US. His mother who greeted him at the airport said: “There was no sign of stamina, dignity and prestige, and only two streams of tears were rolling down on his face.”

This was not the looks of Clark only.

It was the looks of the US that had ignited a war, boasting of being the “strongest” in the world, but suffered an ignominious defeat in Korea, a small country, and making a downhill march.

## **The Greatest and Worst Defeat**

As a result of the realization of armistice in Korea, military actions were stopped and the Military Demarcation Line was established according to the agreement on making the military contact line of both sides a military demarcation line.

The line linked the estuary of the Han River, Phanmun, Ryonchon, Cholwon, southern ridge of Mt. Osong, northern ridge of Mt. Paegam, southern ridge of Mt. Oun, Mundung-ri, Wondae, Toksan-ri and Phooejin-ri south of Height 351.

Among islands lying to the north and southwest of the provincial boundary line between the then Hwanghae Province and Kyonggi Province, Paengnyong, Taechong, Sochong, Yonphyong and U islands belonged to the south of Military Demarcation Line and the rest to its north.

The 240-km-long Military Demarcation Line from the Rimjin River estuary to Phooejin-ri south of Height 351 was a boundary line fixed according to an agreement by the belligerent parties upon stopping hostile military actions; it was not a line dividing a territory on which a homogeneous nation were living, much less a border line established between nations.

In fact the Military Demarcation Line had changed several times in accordance with the change of areas occupied by both sides.

It was on November 23, 1951 that the US, which had attempted at the armistice talks to take off 13 000 square kilometres of an area occupied by the DPRK, could not but accept the proposal of the DPRK side to make the military contact line of both sides a Military Demarcation Line.

At that time the US had threatened that it would push the front upward and draw the Military Demarcation Line there by inflicting a “merciless military pressure” on the DPRK, saying that if the line was fixed an “actual armistice” would be realized. To this, the DPRK side warned, “The front may move to the south”. The reality

showed that it was not an empty talk. The Military Demarcation Line fixed on July 17, 1953, on the eve of armistice, moved 192.9 square kilometres to the south as compared with that on June 18, 1953, when the Syngman Rhee clique “released” the POWs of the DPRK side for their forced detainment, clamouring for “independent push north”. Nobody could know where the KPA’s southward advance would reach if the time dragged on. Having keenly felt that only armistice they were delaying could save them from ruin, the US complied with the terms of the armistice agreement.

The defeat in the Korean war brought about a cataclysmic change in the US jingoists, its military authorities.

Armed forces are one of the most important factors decisive of victory in a war and its direct undertaker.

When the US started the Korean war, it was less than five years after the end of World War II, and it had millions of troops with rich battle experience.

They were highly elated for the joy of victory in the war, and their spirit was soaring.

The US entrusted the generals, who had displayed their “skills” in World War II and been recognized as the “most wonderful commanding officers” in the United States, to command these soldiers.

During World War II the United States had produced five five-star generals corresponding to marshals of other countries; they were Marshall, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff equivalent to the chief of the General Staff, MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Front, Eisenhower, commander-in-chief of the Allied

forces in Europe, Bradley, commander-in-chief of the US group army in Europe and Nimitz, admiral of the Pacific Fleet.

Among the five five-star generals all, except the retired Nimitz, joined the Korean war—Bradley as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur as commander-in-chief of the US Far East Forces, Eisenhower as President, and Marshall as the defence secretary. This was a noteworthy event in the US history.

In the Korean war such field commanding officers as Walker, Ridgway, Van Fleet, Clark and Taylor, most outstanding figures among the US prides, elaborated operations plans and commanded them on the spot. To look back upon the US history stained with aggression and war, there had been a number of occasions when one or two generals of this type were dispatched to an on-going front to easily win “victory” or satisfy its brigandish demand. But the Korean war brought disgrace and death to the US generals.

In the Korean war which produced “tombs of the most excellent commanding officers” the US lost 405 000 officers and men. The number, when added with that of the casualties of the south Korean puppet army and the satellite states, amounted to 1 567 000.

In the Korean war the US left an unprecedented record in losing the latest combat equipment they boasted of being the top class in the world.

- Troops killed, wounded and captured 1 567 128
  - Of them US soldiers 405 498
  - South Korean puppet troops 113 965
  - Troops of satellite states 30 665

- Combat equipment captured, downed, sunken and destroyed
  - Aircraft captured 11, downed 5 729, damaged 6 484
  - Tank captured 374, destroyed 2 690
  - Armoured car captured 146, destroyed 45
  - Truck captured 9 239, destroyed 4 111
  - Naval vessel sunken 164, destroyed 93
  - Vessel captured 12, sunken 163, destroyed 132
  - Various kinds of gun captured 6 321, destroyed 1 374
  - Various kinds of small arms captured 925 152
  - Flame projector captured 117
  - Various kinds of communications equipment captured 5 788
  - Various kinds of shell captured 489 260
  - Various kinds of ammunition captured 21 245 071
  - Various kinds of grenade captured 224 123
  - Various kinds of mine captured 14 449
  - Various kinds of crane destroyed 5

The American magazine *US News and World Report* wrote about the losses suffered by the US in the Korean war as follows:

“The losses of the US forces are more than two times that it suffered in the five major great wars—Independence War, 1812 War, Mexican War, US-Spain War and Philippine War.”

## **National Division**

### **Created by the Military Demarcation Line**

Armistice in Korea means ceasefire between the DPRK and the US.

The Military Demarcation Line caused by the war bisected into the north and the south the territory of Korea connected by one mountain range and the fellow countrymen with the same blood.

Along the line of division stretching 240-km from east to west across the central part of Korea there stand square stakes 1.5 metres high with yellow board one metre in width and 0.5 metre in length on which the words “Military Demarcation Line” are written.

The line signifies that “A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces,” (Paragraph 1, Article 1, “Korean Armistice Agreement”) and “No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line....” (Paragraph 7, Article 1, “Korean Armistice Agreement”)

The stakes splitted into the north and the south 122 villages including Panmunjom, 27 sub-counties including Kimhwa sub-county of Kimhwa County, and 8 counties including Kosong and Jangdan counties. The demilitarized zone cleared away 514 villages within the area.

The stakes also blocked the three A-class roads, 24 B-class roads and 197 cart-roads and four railways linking the north and the south.

The power line stretching from the north to the south is cut here and the irrigation canals supplying water to the south were blocked here, too.

The mountain range linking the north and the south is cut and rivers and streams, large and small, including the Rimjin and



Pukhan rivers are cut on 116 spots by these stakes.

The stakes became cursed marks dividing the territory and blood ties between the north and south of Korea, which must not be cut off.

The Military Demarcation Line with 1 292 stakes and the 970 km<sup>2</sup>-wide demilitarized zone in the shape of a 4 km-wide belt became symbols of territorial and national division.

During the long years of national division the stakes have grown dark weathered by snow, rain and sunlight.

The roads, once busy with travel, exchange of letters and trade, are covered with weeds, armful-thick trees are growing on the railways, and the railway bridges and power lines have got rusty.

The Demilitarized Zone is overgrown with vegetation and various kinds of animals inhabit there.

The size of trees, thickness of rust and thick woods show the protractedness of national division and the extent and diversity of miseries and sufferings the Korean nation is experiencing.

Cholwon County, Kangwon Province, is a detailed example of the national division created by the Military Demarcation Line.

A vast stretch of open area in the demilitarized zone south of the Military Demarcation Line was the seat of Cholwon County before the Korean war.

Cholwon was the capital of the state of Thaebong. (Thaebong was a kingdom founded by Kungye in 901 after occupying the northwestern area of Later Silla and the northern part of the present North Chungchong Province. It moved its capital from Songak to Cholwon in 905) Cholwon with fertile land and proper climate was

a trading centre of agricultural produce in Kangwon Province and famous for its stock-breeding and sericulture. The Cholwon ox and Cholwon silk were known to the whole country.

This county was bisected into the north and the south by the Military Demarcation Line. After the ceasefire the DPRK moved the seat of county belonging to the demilitarized zone to the north of the Military Demarcation Line.

South Korea moved the county seat to the vicinity of Hwaji-ri and instituted Sincholwon (New Cholwon) County. Quite tragic is that two Cholwon counties exist in the north and the south each with the Military Demarcation Line between them.

Though there are the Seoul-Wonsan railways in the Cholwon Plain, the train that left Pyongyang returns back at the Phyonggang station and the train that left Seoul is unable to run further at Sinthan-ri.

Owing to the accursed Military Demarcation Line, even the inhabitants of the county who had evacuated to the north or the south, escaping the disturbance of war, cannot return home.

They had gone, leaving behind wardrobes, sewing-machines, rice-pots and soy-jar as they were, considering to return home but failed to return for ever.

Before the war there was an experimental plot of the then Wonsan University of Agriculture in an area by the Nam River, where the university's research group and students pumped up the water of the river there, developed a new high-yield rice breed while cultivating various kinds of vegetables, apple, persimmon and pear. But the area is now covered with weeds and shrubs.

Along the Nam River, there is a place which was the seat of Sudong Sub-county, Kosong County. Discovered there were an oil tank and a safe, and brass vessels, rice boxes and sewing-machine frames in the sites of houses. Probably their previous owners would not have returned to their dear homes.

The villages and homes through which the Military Demarcation Line runs carry a lot of sad stories about the persons who were forcibly separated.

A girl named Yu Nan Yong, who had been bereft of her parents in her early days, married a boy in the north of the Rimjin River and lived in a town south of the river. She gave birth to a son in 1951 and paid a visit to her husband's home. Her family-in-law welcomed her and took warm care of her, as she bore a boy who would carry their lineage. In the meantime, the front which had pushed up and down was fixed with the Rimjin River as a boundary line. US troops stationed south of the river destroyed the ferry. The woman eagerly waited for the opening of the way to the town on the opposite side of the river where her husband was waiting for her, but contrary to her expectation, the cursed Military Demarcation Line came into being and blocked the way ahead.

Many, many years passed; the baby grew into an adult and her hair got grey.

Whenever grandsons were born, she shed the tears of both joy and pain.

Here is another story.

One day in early winter of 1950, a young woman carrying a baby

on her back was seeing off her husband at the Kugang ferry on the Rimjin River. The husband who had been staying in his wife's home was leaving for Seoul to deal with household goods as a war broke out. The woman said in an anxious voice, "My dear, finish your work as quickly as possible and return."

"Don't worry. Take care of the baby. I'll return soon after finishing the things," said her husband.

His son who was two years old at that time graduated from a university of agriculture and became an engineer and a father, but he could not see his father's face.

The partition of the Korean nation by the Military Demarcation Line has brought heartrending pain to every family and every person of Korea and arousing a burning indignation at the US imperialists among them.

## **Product of "Panmunjom Incident"**

After the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the US and its lackeys committed ceaseless military provocations to unleash a new war in violation of the armistice agreement.

They fired at the north 20 minutes after the armistice agreement came into effect, and then made one armed incursion after another, infiltrating armed personnel, aircraft and vessels into the demilitarized zone and territorial air space and waters of the DPRK side.

In 1957 the US moved the UN Command from Japan to south Korea and shipped into south Korea latest combat equipment and

even atomic and guided weapons. And it staged large-scale war games and military drills in succession.

Provocative acts were conducted even in the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom under the jurisdiction of the Military Armistice Commission.

The Joint Security Area of Panmunjom stipulated by the Korean Armistice Agreement is a circular area 800 metres in diameter on the Military Demarcation Line, the contact line of both sides. Here are seven small buildings, including the meeting hall of the Military Armistice Commission. Among them four have been built by the DPRK side and three by the UN Forces side.

In the centre of the meeting hall of the Military Armistice Commission there is a table and a microphone line passes through the middle of it. This line is on the Military Demarcation Line. The security personnel of both sides were performing guard duty in the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom mixed with one another, and correspondents and visitors were also not restrained in the freedom of action.

US troops, who had been indulging in military provocations and outrages in violation of the rules of conduct and order of use in the Joint Security Area, committed provocation again on August 18, 1976.

At around 10:45 a.m. 14 US soldiers tried to cut with axes an aspen tree in the Joint Security Area which could not be handled unilaterally without an agreement of both sides. Their reason was that the tree hindered their guard duty. As for the tree, it had been planted and tendered by the service personnel of the DPRK side for more than 20 years. In this period both sides had stood on guard face to face, but the tree had not been a bother to their duty.

As the security personnel of the DPRK side blocked them, saying that the tree cannot be cut unilaterally without a prior agreement because it had been under their care, the US soldiers were at a loss what to do watching the movements of the personnel of the DPRK side and the US officers.

At this moment an American MP snatched an ax from his colleague and hurled it at the security personnel of the DPRK side. Blood streamed from the face of one of them. The US MP committed such an outrage counting on the numerical supremacy that his fellows were 14 as compared with four security personnel of the DPRK side.

The security personnel were forced to take self-defence measures. They put up a stubborn resistance, hurling back the US MP's ax.

Then the US side mobilized about 30 GIs it had put on standby beforehand.

The four security personnel of the DPRK side fought a heroic fight against the attack and group beating by 40-odd US personnel. As a result of the scuffle, two American officers were killed and many were wounded on both sides. This is the truth of the "Panmunjom incident".

As was exposed to the full later, the "Panmunjom incident" was a criminal incident the US fabricated in a planned way to unleash a new war in Korea.

As soon as the incident happened, the US kicked up a racket, distorting the facts as if the DPRK side provoked first with an ax. But they could not hide the stark truth that the ax in question was made in Australia and widely used as a labour tool in the US army units.

Also revealed was the fact that at the moment when the incident was happening the senior MP officer, the duty officer of the US army and a captain of the south Korean puppet army made scrupulous preparations of photographing and photographed the whole process of the incident on Height No. 3 which commands a bird's-eye view of the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom.

Notwithstanding this, the US authorities, including President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, egged the south Korean and Japanese authorities on to propaganda campaign to sling mud at the DPRK.

From the night of August 18 to the dawn of 19, the US authorities called a meeting of the National Security Council and a meeting of the top-level security group attended by the secretaries of the State and Defence departments, discussing about military actions and “retaliatory measures”. At the meetings they saw to it that the aspen tree in the Joint Security Area was cut at any cost and aircraft carrier *Midway* carrying 75 planes rushed to the sea around Korea under the escort of four frigates in order to support the operations with “strength”. Keeping pace with this, the US forces stationed in south Korea and the south Korean forces, given “emergency readiness order”, entered readiness for action, fully equipped.

Many aircraft including up-to-date fighter-bombers flew into south Korea from the US proper and Okinawa, and the US air force stationed in Japan, too, was astir.

From the evening of August 19 the US Seventh Fleet entered an “alert readiness” and aircraft carriers *Ranger* and *Midway* entered the Korea's territorial waters at the dawn of 21.

On the same day the US hurled its troops ready for action into the Joint Security Area and launched a tree-cutting operation. While the 300 US soldiers cut the tree, 26 helicopters and three B-52 strategic bombers and F-4 Phantom aircraft threatened the north, hovering over the scene.

Hundreds of armed personnel were deployed in the combat position about 400 metres away from the scene to cover the “operation”.

All the facts showed that the US GIs’ attempt to cut the aspen tree in the Joint Security Area was not accidental, but a planned and provocative incident to find an excuse for igniting a war.

Coping with the prevailing situation President Kim Il Sung issued an order on August 19 that all the KPA units and the whole members of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and Young Red Guards should be put on full combat readiness.

Meanwhile, at the meetings of the Military Armistice Commission and its chief secretaries the DPRK side advanced a proposal to prevent possible provocations by US imperialists—to separate the military personnel of both sides in the Joint Security Area with the Military Demarcation Line in between and ensure that both sides perform guard duty in their respective areas only.

Though reluctant, the US side could not but accept it, for there was no room to retort the fair and reasonable proposal.

Thus the district of the meeting hall in the Joint Security Area was divided by cement pavement 50 cm wide and 5 cm high, and the other districts by a partition line of cement pillars 10 cm long and wide and 1 m high standing at intervals of 10 m. Accordingly



the personnel of both sides came to perform guard duty in their respective district only.

This was the first change happened in the partitioning of the Joint Security Area and activity of duty guards according to the agreement of both sides since the fixing of the Military Demarcation Line.

The “Panmunjom incident” showed to the world the will of the KPA to prevent war and safeguard peace and its invincible might and that the US imperialist is a war maniac and peace disturber.

### **“Northern Limit Line”— Ignition Point of a New War**

The Korean Armistice Agreement has fixed the Military Demarcation Line and demilitarized zone on the ground and the military boundary line on the East Sea of Korea. But a boundary line has not been defined on the West Sea of Korea.

At the armistice talks, the DPRK side, in connection with fixing a sea boundary line on the West Sea of Korea, advanced a fair proposal of drawing the line with the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae and Kyonggi provinces as a standard. But this proposal was denied by the US side. A south Korean newspaper wrote: “If it agrees with this, the UN Forces side has to leave the five islands under its jurisdiction in the territorial waters under the control of the north side according to Paragraph 2, Article 13 of the Armistice Agreement, and so it declined this proposal.”

Paragraph 2, Article 13 of the Armistice Agreement stipulates

that among “the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae and Kyonggi provinces, the five islands, the island groups of Paengnyong, Taechong, Sochong, Yonphyong and U shall remain under the military control of the UN Forces side, but all the other islands and territorial waters shall be under the military control of the KPA side.

For this reason, after the conclusion of Armistice Agreement the vessels of the US forces use international waters on the West Sea whenever going in and out of those five islands within the territorial waters of the north side.

The sea boundary line could not be fixed on the West Sea also because it was difficult to draw a boundary line on the sea between the coastal area of the north side and the five islands occupied by the US forces.

After the ceasefire, the Syngman Rhee puppet clique made desperate attempts for military provocation on the West Sea with no boundary line to break the armistice agreement, clamouring about “independent push north”.

These gave a new anxiety to the US side that had been retreating south losing areas of military importance by the powerful strike of the KPA in the last period of war and narrowly escaped from the predicament thanks to the armistice.

The US had to lay restraint on the Syngman Rhee clique running amuck recklessly.

Meanwhile, the West Sea without a boundary line allowed impoverished fishermen of south Korea to enter the territorial waters of the north, abundant in fish, to catch fish or to go over

there. This, too, was intolerable for the US.

After much thought, the US fixed unilaterally the “northern limit line” on the West Sea without any discussion or agreement with the DPRK. This line was also called the “Clark line” named after Clark, commander-in-chief of the UN Forces.

As its makers said, the “northern limit line” was a “final line to intercept defectors to the north” and a “limit line to prohibit crossing the line”, and its aim was to keep the south Korean naval and fishing vessels from entering the territorial waters of the north.

As the US forces laid down the “northern limit line” in their “internal operations rules” like this, they “informed only the navy of it, not the north side”, a south Korean newspaper reported.

Just herein lies the reason why the US neither opened to the public the existence of the “northern limit line” for a long period nor crabbbed with the north under the pretext of it.

With regard to this, Ri Mun Hang, who was a special advisor to the senior delegate of the UN Forces Command side to the Military Armistice Commission and later a lecturer at the Diplomacy Institute of the US State Department, opened to the public the following fact:

“Though the UN Forces Command dealt with many maritime violation incidents at the full-dress meetings, from the first one held on July 28, 1953 to the last held on February 13, 1991, 459<sup>th</sup> meeting and meetings of chief secretaries held at Panmunjom and through direct telephone messages and letters during scores of years, it never mentioned about the encroachment on ‘northern limit line’ or the violation of ‘northern limit line’. There had been no

record of the ‘northern limit line’ in all documents of the Military Armistice Commission. It was not until I had visited the US navy command stationed in south Korea and looked into its record that I knew that the ‘northern limit line’ was the navy’s operation control line and also a limit line to control not only our naval vessels but also fishing vessels.”

A south Korean publication recognized the fact as it was, saying, “The ‘northern limit line’ is an emergency boundary line Clark, the then commander-in-chief of the UN Forces, fixed unilaterally without consultation with the north just after the armistice in 1953.”

As to the question whether the “northern limit line” is lawful or unlawful, there were arguments among important US political figures and academic circle.

In 1975 Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, said in a diplomatic message that the “northern limit line” had been fixed unilaterally and not been accepted by the north, and that the unilateral fixing of a boundary line on the open sea was a sure violation of international law.

In December 1973 aware of consequences that may be caused by the “northern limit line”, Habib, the then US ambassador to south Korea, said in a telegram sent to his government that if an incident happened in the waters under dispute, many countries would consider south Korea wrong.

After investigating a confidential document worked out in January 1974 by the Central Information Agency of the United States, So Jae Jong, a US university professor, wrote about the

“northern limit line” in an on-line newspaper on March 30, 2011. He wrote that the secret document clarified that the “northern limit line” had been fixed to prevent the south Korean naval and fishing vessels from sailing to the north without a special permission, that at that time the CIA had already warned that it could be a seed of dispute because it was the water area surely presumed to be territorial waters of the north, and that today, far from the original purpose, the line had become a seed of fire bringing about the ravages of war because of the clamour about “prompt strike”. He continued that in 2010 a US aircraft carrier entered the waters around the “northern limit line” under the pretext of the sinking of a naval vessel, thus bringing about the crisis of a new world war.

It is the principle to fix a maritime boundary line between sovereign states or between regions with neighbouring water area on the basis of full discussion and agreement of both sides on the principle of equality and impartiality. It is more critical in view of the fact that the Korean peninsula is an area in the state of armistice, not in the state of durable peace and that the DPRK and the US are belligerent parties.

If the US had to fix a boundary line on the West Sea of Korea, it should have reached an agreement with the DPRK through face-to-face discussion.

But the US drew at random a boundary line in the territorial waters of the DPRK without prior agreement or notice and dubbed it the “northern limit line”. Such a line cannot be accepted by the other side and it itself becomes a factor of conflict and recurrence of war.

Today when scores of years have elapsed since then, the south Korean authorities have changed the “northern limit line” into a sea boundary line, and are kicking up anti-DPRK rackets, clamouring about the latter’s “invasion” or “provocation”.

As the “northern limit line” was fixed illegally, its danger is increasing today and south Koreans concerned admit this fact.

The south Korean bellicose elements tried to use the first naval skirmish on the West Sea as a fuse for unleashing an all-out war in the Korean peninsula, but failed; they ignited the second skirmish in 2002 to throw a wet blanket over the unprecedentedly mounting atmosphere of national reconciliation and unity, but failed again. They called the defence minister to the National Assembly to make him answer for the failure. They showered questions on him: Why did the military failed to punish the north crossing the “northern limit line” by revoking the Armistice Agreement.

The minister, who had been well aware of the details of the “northern limit line”, said, “as the ‘northern limit line’ had been fixed by our side for the protection of fishing vessels, crossing of it by the north side is not violation of the Armistice Agreement”. As some persons protested, he shouted back, “‘The northern limit line’ drawn on the sea is different from the Military Demarcation Line on the ground which is stipulated by the Armistice Agreement.”

On the same day despite oppression by the authorities, the south Korean mass media made special mention of the fact that the side crossing “northern limit line” was not violating the armistice agreement, but the side asserting that the “northern limit line” was

legitimate was violating the agreement.

In 2002 a man who once served as an expert officer in the south Korean puppet army said: “The ‘northern limit line’ was unilaterally fixed in 1953 by Clark, commander-in-chief of the UN Forces. It is not an agreed provision.”

The “northern limit line” is an unlawful, ghost line that runs counter to the recognized international law.

A UN convention on the coast defines the territorial waters to be 12n-miles, and so does the south Korean law on territorial waters. In view of these convention and law, the “northern limit line” is deep into the territorial waters of the DPRK. Now that the respect of the territorial waters of 12n-miles is the most important provision of the international convention on the coast, the violation of international law by the US and south Korean authorities can never be rationalized by anything. This was why even the US once distributed to the attendants of a UN maritime law conference held in its country a Korean map on which the “supposed boundary line” between the north and the south on the West Sea of Korea farther in the south than the “northern limit line” on the principle of equivalent distance stipulated by international law on the seas and oceans.

Moreover, international law demands that in the case of defining the water area of an island in the territorial waters of the other side in the special state of armistice as in the Korean peninsula, it should be agreed on the basis of an already concluded agreement. The unilateral drawing of the “northern limit line” in the Korean territorial waters by the US side without any prior discussion with

the north side ignoring the Armistice Agreement is a provocation against the DPRK.

As the US and south Korean authorities had persisted in the groundless “northern limit line”, the north side announced the fixing of “sea demarcation line on the West Sea” through a special report of the General Staff of the KPA in 1999.

As a fair and square self-defence measure to safeguard the country’s dignity and sovereignty, it enjoyed active support and approval at home and abroad.

Nevertheless, the south Korean authorities are persisting as ever in the absurd assertion that the “northern limit line” is the north-south boundary line on the West Sea maintained during the past 50-odd years under someone’s tolerance and its southern water area is a water area they have controlled “traditionally”. In order to attach propriety to this assertion and win “support” of the world public opinion, they are making desperate efforts, resorting to all fabrication, plot and distortion.

But it cannot work in the bright world.

The unjustness and absurdity of the so-called “ground” and fact, “precedence” and “standard” and “propriety” the south Korean puppets advance to prove the existence of the “northern limit line” were revealed to the full.

This being the situation, the south Korean authorities have brought forward the so-called “law of coagulation” and “law of statute of limitations” that are not used even in the West, attempting to make them a legal ground for the maintenance of the “northern limit line”.



The “law of coagulation” is a law that if acquisition of authority is recognized by combined factors of agreement with the relevant side, its permission and tolerance, it becomes reality.

The “law of statute of limitations” is a law that in case the other side does not protest violations of international law on the sovereignty of its territorial waters and territory but tolerates it for a long time, it is recognized of itself. Attached to it is a condition that peace should be maintained without being protested.

It was an obstinacy contrary to reason.

The DPRK has so far stigmatized the “northern limit line” as an unlawful brigandish line and denied its existence itself.

The naval skirmish in June 1999 on the West Sea of Korea, and subsequent skirmishes and bloody battles show that not peace but super-tension is prevailing there.

Since the time when the US and south Korea began to stage war games targeted at invading the whole of Korea in the areas north of Seoul and in the sea boundary area that includes the five islands on the West Sea, the “northern limit line” has turned into a time-bomb for a second Korean war. The south Korean warmongers concentrate aggressive armed forces on this area under the pretext of “defence” and instigate their naval and fishing vessels to intrude illegally into the territorial waters of the DPRK. This shows that they have selected this area as the ignition point of a new war.

Egged on by the US, the south Korean authorities fabricated in March 2010 a mega-incident of sinking their patrol ship *Cheonan* in the water area not far from Yonphyong Island and resorted to frantic

anti-DPRK racket and war manoeuvrings.

But the true nature of the incident was soon revealed, and they not only lost their face at home but were exposed to international denunciation and ridicule.

Instead of drawing a lesson, they fired at random shells at the DPRK's water area from Yonphyong Island while waging the Hoguk war exercise on the West Sea of Korea.

As to the fact that this provocative act had been prearranged in detail for invading the DPRK, the then defence minister of south Korea said at a military meeting: "A plan has already been worked out to strike the north's launching bases and mobilize combat capabilities of the entire army if a local warfare breaks out around the five islands on the West Sea."

Yonphyong Island, a small island with an area of 6.8 square kilometres and 18 kilometres in circumference, became the centre of provocation because this island is a fortified, key point of military importance the south Korean puppets have built up with much efforts for a long period. As the island is situated deep in the territorial waters of the DPRK from the sea demarcation line, if a live shell is fired in any direction here, it is sure to drop inside the territorial waters of the DPRK. Therefore, the KPA administered a due counterstrike, a merciless punishment against the enemy's provocative act.

Today, too, the US and south Korean authorities are trying to use this island and its surrounding area as an ignition point of a new war in Korea, and this arouses a surging indignation among the service personnel and people of the DPRK.

## **4. Concrete Wall—Symbol of the Schemes for Eternal Division**

### **Bright Light of Reunification**

Entering the 1970s the general situation changed in favour of the Korean nation who had made strenuous efforts for the independent, peaceful reunification of their country. Seeing through it President Kim Il Sung delivered a speech, titled, *The Revolutionary Peoples of Asia Will Win in Their Common Struggle against US Imperialism* on August 6, Juche 60 (1971).

In this historic speech he made clear again the 8-point proposal for the independent peaceful reunification of the country which he had already advanced in April that year.

He said that apart from the question as to whether or not the south Korean authorities would accept the proposal, if they truly wanted reunification, they should not be afraid of contacts and negotiations between the north and the south and indicated practical ways to contacts and dialogue between the two sides.

The proposal aroused whole-hearted support and sympathy among the south Korean people of all walks of life.

In south Korea where a mere mention of peaceful reunification, let alone contact, talk, correspondence, and giving and taking of things between the north and the south, had harshly been suppressed

as a crime an atmosphere for peaceful reunification rose high.

Driven into a corner, the south Korean side had to come out to the venue of north-south Red Cross talks less than a week after the announcement of the August 6 speech.

Thanks to the sincere efforts and active measure of the north side, unofficial contacts between the north-south liaison representatives were held on the sidelines of the Red Cross talks and in early May 1972 a south Korean representative came to Pyongyang unofficially. At the interview with President Kim Il Sung he pledged that he would never become a stooge of the US or Japan.

President Kim Il Sung discussed with him the question of national reunification and clarified the three principles both sides should abide by in the common cause of reunification.

The main features of the three principles are: First, national reunification should be achieved independently without reliance on outside forces and free from their interference, second, it should be achieved by peaceful means without resorting to arms against the other side and third, great national unity should be promoted by transcending the differences in ideas, ideals and systems.

The three principles—*independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity*—were the most patriotic and national programme of reunification in that they fully accorded with the specific character of Korea's question that belongs to the right to national self-determination, properly reflected the demand and interests of all the Korean people who do not want to fight a bloody fight against their fellow countrymen, and made the common interests of the nation

the first consideration, transcending differences in ideas, ideals and systems. They made clear the prerequisites for reunification and were acceptable to all because of their applicability and fairness.

The south Korean representative gave assurance, “The south side will make efforts with the three principles of national reunification advanced by Marshal Kim Il Sung as the basis of reunification.”

Following the Pyongyang high-level talks, the second round of high-level talks was held in Seoul late in May 1972. At the talks the north side reaffirmed the agreed three principles, and proposed to make them common programme in settling the reunification problem, organize a North-South Coordinating Commission and make public the agreed points in the form of a joint statement. The north side made sincere efforts to this end.

The ruler of south Korea met the Seoul-visiting high-level delegation of the north side at Chongwadae (presidential building—*Tr.*) and expressed his opinion on the three principles of national reunification, saying: “I fully support the three principles and am of the opinion that difficult problems facing the relations between the south and the north should be solved on the basis of these principles.”

As a result, the North-South Joint Statement clarifying the three principles was made public on July 4, 1972.

The July 4 Joint Statement solemnly declared before the entire nation that the north and the south reached a complete consensus of opinion on the seven points for promoting the reunification cause and that both sides would sincerely implement all the agreed items.

The joint statement provided the Korean people with one and the

only correct guidelines for solving the reunification question, a patriotic banner encouraging them to great national unity, and a beacon that sheds light on the road of reunification.

The Korean nation, with a guarantee for solving the reunification problem by themselves in conformity with their will and interests, took the vigorous first step toward reunification.

The holding of north-south high-level talks in Pyongyang and Seoul, where the coming and going of people had been prohibited for nearly 30 years, and the publication of a joint statement meant that a breakthrough had been made in the barrier of division and that the movement for peaceful reunification had entered a new historic era.

The publication of the North-South Joint Statement dealt a

—Anecdote—

### **“You Are Right.”**

On May 3, 1972, President Kim Il Sung met the representative from south Korea who came to Pyongyang to attend the North-South High-level Political Talks.

Kim Il Sung said:

“I’m glad to meet you today. I am highly delighted and also deeply moved that we, fellow countrymen, have met after a long separation because of the division of the nation.”

The south Korean representative bowed courteously to the President and expressed his thanks to him, adding it was a great honour for him to visit Pyongyang this time.

Saying he was sorry to have had him wake to meet him, the President

heavy blow to the separatists within and without who tried to perpetuate national division running against the Korean people's aspiration and the trend of the times.

The joint statement removed excuses for the outside forces to interfere in the internal affairs of the Korean nation. The outside forces, who had been engrossed in domination and subjugation of south Korea under the pretext of "protection" and "southward aggression from the north", were no longer in position to stay in south Korea.

The entire Korean people at home and abroad raised enthusiastic cheers with the announcement of the joint statement. The whole land of Korea seethed with joy, excitement and fresh enthusiasm for reunification.

That day it was raining in Seoul.

invited him politely to be seated and smoke. After a while he mentioned the urgency of national reunification and the necessity of fundamental principles which could provide the basis for solving the reunification question, stressing that only when there were fundamental principles agreed by the two sides, can they make joint efforts for reunification and successfully solve all problems concerning it. He then put forward the three principles of national reunification—independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity—that should be abided by in solving the reunification question of Korea, and gave a detailed explanation of the contents of principle.

Each time the south Korean representative said, "You are right," "Quite right," and "I fully agree with you."

After reminding him of the three principles, President Kim Il Sung said: "Through the recent talks we have found important common grounds and reached an agreement on the most principled problems. The three

On hearing there would be an important news at 10 a.m. people gathered before radios and TV sets. They were dubious of their ears and eyes at the unexpected news that high-level delegations of the north and the south visited Pyongyang and Seoul alternatively and that the North-South Joint Statement was adopted.

Next moment on the TV screen was displayed the image of President Kim Il Sung they had deeply respected and wanted to see all the time. There arose stormy cheers and shout of hurrah. They embraced one another, laughed and sobbed, cooling their burning hearts with rain.

South Korean newspaper *Dong-A Ilbo* (extra edition of July 20, 1972) reported the scene of that day as follows: “Employees, on the way to the office in the morning, got together before the image of

principles of realizing independent reunification without outside interference, achieving great national unity by transcending differences in ideas, ideals and systems, and reunifying the divided land by peaceful means without recourse to armed force are the starting point of and the basis for the solution of our reunification question.”

The representative from south Korea rose from his seat and said to him, “I pledge assuredly to regard the three principles as the biggest pillar for reunification.”

President Kim Il Sung advanced the idea of forming a reunification organization like a north-south coordinating commission as a joint organization of the nation to realize the three principles. The south Korean delegate agreed with it in principle.

This was how the basis of the North-South Joint Statement, the common programme of the nation, was laid.



broadly-smiling Premier Kim Il Sung, his hand on the shoulder of director Ri, on the billboard of the 'D' Daily. Isn't this a dream? They rubbed their eyes to confirm if this was real. The sound of the wheel of history of relieving closed hearts and venting a clotted grudge roared. Thunder-like joy as if the peaks of Mt Paektu call each other waving hands, begins to run along the blood vessels of 30 million people. ...

Another newspaper *Kyonghyang Sinmun* dated July 20, 1972, wrote:

“Reunification; is the reunification of the north and the south coming? The nation is full of emotion. Expectation, admiration, emotion, cheers—the hearts are rushing again towards the expectation for the reunification day to come. All the rivers and mountains were in deep emotion. TV viewers were startled at the journeys of the representatives of the south and the north. They felt a lump in their throats at the agreement on independent and peaceful reunification.”

The overall south Korean society, including the press, academic and religious circles as well as the oppressed and exploited actively supported the North-South Joint Statement, calling it a “common programme of the nation for reunification” and the “origin of a new history”. With the publication of the North-South Joint Statement, the daily-rising reunification enthusiasm of south Koreans rose like an erupted volcano.

President Kim Il Sung's historic August 6 speech brought about talks between the Red Cross organizations of the north and the south, the north-south dialogues and the North-South Joint Statement to solve the internal problem of the nation by itself; and it led to the formation of the North-South Coordinating Commission.

The north side was always true to the three principles of national

reunification and made sincere efforts to improve the north-south relations through dialogue and expedite reunification.

## **Treacherous Acts of Traitors**

The representatives of the north and the south signed the North-South Joint Statement in a meaningful expression of “True to the intention of the superiors”. This means that the top authorities of the north and the south, instead of individual persons, are responsible for its implementation. However, the “President” Park Chung Hee, prime minister Kim Jong Phil and director of the Central Intelligence Agency Ri Hu Rak, who had the direct obligation to carry it out in south Korea, betrayed it one after another as soon as it was issued.

In an interview Ri Hu Rak, inveterate in treachery and betrayal, explained the “background of the joint statement” and continued, “From today we are going over to an era of south-north confrontation with dialogue from that of south-north confrontation without dialogue,” adding they would invariably take the road of confrontation, instead of reconciliation and cooperation with the north even after the publication of the joint statement.

Kim Jong Phil was proactive in slandering the joint statement. At a session of the National Assembly held two days after the publication of the joint statement, he said, “The joint statement is not a treaty and does not assume the character of treaty. We can neither tell our fortune by the few sheets of the statement nor believe it. People should not be hopeful of the South-North Joint

Statement.” He even said lobbying against the joint statement would not be banned, instigating anti-reunification elements to rash acts against the joint statement.

The south Korean authorities revealed their betrayal in other countries.

Immediately after Park Chung Hee had established the “Yushin” fascist dictatorship system under the pretext of “unification”, Kim Jong Phil went to the US. When the American-Korean journalists asked him the true intention of the “Yushin reform”, he replied, “The debating of unification is only a signboard and cultivating strength is essential. I frankly said about our intention, believing in you, and hope you would cooperate us.”

On his way back home, he dropped in Japan and said to the ragtag of the Association of South Koreans in Japan, “Don’t even dream about unification,” again saying about “cultivation of strength”.

The south Korean authorities now took the road of infringing upon the three principles of national reunification.

Far from the firm pledge they made on the visit to the north that they would never become a stooge of the US or Japan, they depended on outside forces more and more submissively.

At a meeting of the National Assembly held on July 6, 1972, Kim Jong Phil said that the UN Forces stationed in south Korea were not outside forces. Some days later Park Chung Hee said, “I’ll make efforts for the continuous stationing of the US forces through negotiations with America.”

To say that the US forces who are in south Korea wearing the cap of the UN Forces are not outside forces was tantamount to

saying that south Korea may well be considered the 51<sup>st</sup> state of the US after Hawaii.

During his visit to the north Ri Hu Rak had said, “Blood is thicker than water,” but in Japan he said, “We only believe in Japan, so let’s unite together.”

Kim Jong Phil on a visit to Japan in June 1973 said, “Both countries are destined to unite each other”, repeating the “theory on the community destiny” between Japan and south Korea, which Japan had advanced to rationalize its re-invasion of south Korea.

The south Korean authorities also turned away from the principle of peaceful reunification.

On October 1, 1972, Park Chung Hee incited confrontation and war with the north, saying “Now is the season of gathering the strength of an all-out national security and the period of organizing all-people strength, when all should fight with rifle in hand.” In line with it, in south Korea a campaign for “cultivating strength” to hold “supremacy of strength” in the showdown with the north was held, and war preparations for *blitzkrieg* and “modernization” of the army were stepped up. On the occasion of publishing the joint statement, military exercises were held around the Military Demarcation Line, whose culmination was a river-crossing operation exercise of the largest scale after the armistice.

The south Korean authorities even infringed upon the principle of great national unity stated in the Joint Statement.

With the publication of the joint statement, social concern in south Korea focussed on the matter of abolition of the laws related

to “anti-communism”, and Park Chung Hee called the minister of justice to Chongwadae and gave him an instruction that the National Security Law and Anti-Communist Law must not be relaxed but be tightened further in this situation. Some days later he let Kim Jong Phil say that their anti-communist stand could not be changed and “the passive anti-communism we have maintained so far will be changed into active anti-communism.”

In line with this, a sweeping roundup was caused in south Korea, not a great national unity based on surpassing differences in ideas, ideals and systems. A young man in Seoul was indicted by the Anti-Communist Law, because on the day of publication of the North-South Joint Statement he had said, very excited, that he wished the country may be reunified as quickly as possible and free travel between the north and the south be realized. A man of 70 years old was arrested for he had sent a letter to his son in the north through Japan. More than 160 fishermen, who nearly lost their lives by sea storm but survived with the help of the north, were punished by the National Security Law, Anti-Communist Law and Law on Fishing Industry.

Not only these. On the 7<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> of July, 1972, right after publication of the joint statement, 29 persons, who had fought for the peaceful reunification of the country, were tried, 3 of them being sentenced to death and 26 imprisoned for life. During the period between July 13 and 27, Kim Kyu Nam, Kim Jil Rak and Jong Thae Muk, who strived for democratization of society and the national reunification, were executed.

In the meantime, the traitors viciously slandered the north, claiming that they would blow the “wind of liberalization” into the north.

In October 1972, Park Chung Hee established the “Yushin system”, a fascist system aimed at the country’s division and war, in the atmosphere created by the Emergency Martial Law imposed upon the “state of emergency”..

Thus, he became an “absolute monarch” reigning over the “three divisions” (the legislature, executive and judicature), which are the signboard of “democracy”. The “absolute monarch” wielded dictatorial power, barring the implementation of the North-South Joint Statement and dashing people’s aspiration after reunification.

The crime of Park’s clique going against the improvement of the north-south relations was revealed in the attitude the south side took at the north-south dialogue. From the beginning of the dialogue they clung to double-dealing and delaying tactics, checking its progress. They did not put forward any positive proposal helpful to the improvement of relations between the north and the south and the solving of reunification problem; when the north side advanced proposals for collaboration and exchange in the political, economic, diplomatic, military, cultural and other sectors, they said yes, but when the former proposed putting them into practice, they would reply, “Now is not a stage to discuss them.” As a consequence, the talks made no progress for over one year since the publication of the North-South Joint Statement.

The world public opinion branded the south Korean authorities as a “group narrow-minded and shameful in face of the historic task of reunification, denouncing, “They have not given up their conservative and reactionary policies, but are resorting to them more tenaciously than ever before.”

## Creation of “Two Koreas”—A “Policy”

The anti-national criminal acts of Park Chung Hee went so far as to make the eternal division of the nation a “policy”.

On June 23, 1973, he issued a Special Statement whose gist was the simultaneous entry of “two Koreas” into the UN. As an open declaration of the sinister scheme to make the country’s division perpetual, the Special Statement was a product and continuation of the anti-unification, aggressive policy the US imperialists have pursued constantly in south Korea.

In connection with this, Japanese magazine *Gendainome* (October issue of 1973) wrote, “The ‘two Koreas’ policy is a play the Park Chung Hee regime is performing, written and supervised by the US and directed by Japan.”

The US manipulated and instigated Park Chung Hee behind the scenes to declare the plot of creating “two Koreas” as a “policy”. It inspired the south Korean authorities to hold up the “theory of balance of strength”, whose point was that the north and the south should maintain a “balance of strength” in order to “ensure peace” in Korea and “make progress toward unification”, and to this end it was necessary for the US forces to continuously stay in south Korea. This meant that the US that had occupied south Korea with military force would fix Korea’s division permanent with “strength”. And in order to perpetuate Korea’s division by making “two Koreas” as a fait accompli with a “guarantee” of the countries concerned and legalizing

it, it encouraged Park Chung Hee to cling to the scheme for “simultaneous entry into the UN” and “perpetuation of division”. This meant it was attempting to turn Korea’s reunification issue, internal problem of the Korean nation, into an international one, i.e. “simultaneous entry into the UN” so as to deprive the nation of their right to self-determination and illegalize the efforts of the nation for their reunification.

The scheme for “perpetuation of division” was also no more than a sophistry aiming at dividing the Korean nation into two by creating “two Koreas”.

The Japanese reactionaries were a partner with the south Korean authorities in carrying out the US policy of creating “two Koreas”.

Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, dated June 23, 1973, wrote that south Korean prime minister Kim Jong Phil, who dropped in Japan on his way to America, received a hint about a “change of direction” from the Japanese prime minister and foreign minister and, on his way back home, was given specific instructions on the “change of direction”. On the basis of this, Park Chung Hee conceived the “two Koreas” policy. Immediately after Park Chung Hee announced the Special Statement, the Japanese foreign minister said, “Japan which has exchanged frank views with the south Korean side, expressed its respect for and at the same time wholehearted welcome at the courageous decision made by the CEO of the south Korean government.”

The US admitted that the new policy put forward in the Special Statement was a “fruit of long-drawn-out talks between south Korea, Japan and the US”.



As Park Chung Hee published the Special Statement, the US Secretary of State expressed “full agreement” and “full support” to it by the US, saying that it was the most constructive over the past 25 years. On a visit to south Korea he said that the US fully supported simultaneous entry by the south and the north of Korea into the UN and that it would do its best to realize it.

Japan, too, said it would issue its own special statement that “simultaneous entry of ‘two Koreas’ into the UN” was a “realistic and constructive policy” and that it would offer a “fresh aid” to south Korea.

After declaring it as a policy to create “two Koreas” through the June 23 Special Statement, Park Chung Hee said that division was better than unification and that the three principles were the very “principles of coexistence between the south and the north”, trying to use dialogue between the two side for criminal purposes.

The south Korean authorities raised the anti-communist clamour, their universal remedy, more loudly. They organized “anti-communist” events one after another, saying that anti-communism should be made part of daily life and that “mental anti-communism” should be changed into “realistic communism”. The whole land of south Korea was astir with “anti-communist rally”, “anti-communist lecture”, “anti-communist show” and the like. The Ordinance for the Implementation of the Anti-Communist Law was changed for the worse, and anti-communist writings in the animal blood or in dye were put up in streets. It was announced that those who disembowel themselves for anti-communism would be given 300 000 *won*, those who cut one of their fingers 150 000 *won*, those

who write their pledge in blood 30 000 *won*, each in cash, and those who report others' anti-“governmental” speech and act to the government 3 000–5 000 *won* for a meal.

Park Chung Hee put the south Korean society onto a military fascist footing and regarded all that were against the Yushin dictatorship and national division as objects of repression and purge.

Kim Dae Jung, who was a prominent opposition leader and later became president of south Korea, was kidnapped in Tokyo in the daylight and dragged to south Korea and a university professor and a girl student were murdered in torture chamber at the Central Intelligence Agency; even priests and clergymen were jailed when they had offended them.

The foreign minister of south Korea, who went to New York with the proposal for “simultaneous entry of two Koreans into the UN”, said to the representatives of UN member states that the major concern of south Korea was not unification but “to establish diplomatic relations with north Korea”.

As the scheme for the “simultaneous entry into the UN” failed, the south Korean authorities attempted separate entry of south Korea into the UN for the purpose of creating “two Koreas” through the UN.

All facts show that the North-South Joint Statement was out of the thought of the south Korean authorities and the words “peaceful unification” were no more than a veil to cover their “two Koreas” plot and “unification by prevailing over communism”.

In the end of the 1970s they started to build a concrete wall on the Military Demarcation Line in hot pursuit of the perpetual split of the nation.

## **Symbol of National Split and Confrontation**

A product of plot for the perpetual split of the nation by the US and south Korean authorities is the concrete wall bisecting the Korean peninsula. The concrete wall is a symbol of national division and confrontation between the north and the south, and the existence of this kind of wall is a shame of the Korean nation. The concrete wall is the intensive representation of the criminal moves the splittists at home and abroad had committed in all the political, economic, military, social and cultural sectors and shows them visually.

In Korea there are many walls the ancestors of the Korean nation have built to prevent foreign aggression and defend the country's territory and national security.

Among the walls built in the different periods of Tangun's Joseon, Koguryo, Koryo and feudal Korea, many still stand solemnly, boasting of the patriotic faithfulness and resourcefulness of the Korean nation and displaying their impregnableness and grandeur. Even today, these walls remain as the precious assets and prides of the Korean nation, telling the military exploits performed in repelling foreign invaders.

However, in the 70s of the 20th century called a civilized era, a concrete wall, different from the walls associated with patriotic faithfulness, was built in Korea, cutting the blood line of the compatriots of the north and the south.

The concrete wall is 10–19 metres thick at the base, 3–7 metres

wide at the top and 5–8 metres tall.

Tremendous amount of materials were consumed here—800 000 tons of cement, 200 000 tons of structural steel and 3 500 000 cubic metres of mixture. The amount of cement is more than enough to build an expressway between Sinuiju and Pusan.

According to those who visited the wall, the southern side of the wall is gently-sloping, its upper flat part is so wide that 2–3 trucks can pass by and the northern cliffy side is as high as 3–4-storeyed apartment house. The barrier has many pillboxes, structures for installing heavy weapons and lookouts, and in front of the northern side of the wall anti-tank and anti-personnel mines have been buried, and wire entanglement and other various obstacles installed. High-voltage electricity runs in the middle of the 4-5m-high wire entanglements, dividing the territory once more.

The visitors touring this area are astonished to see this barrier and wire entanglements stretching out endlessly from east to west. In particular, in the rivers and streams underwater obstacles (concrete poles) called “teeth of dragon” stand close to one another.

Noteworthy in the concrete wall is the iron gates. South Korean newspaper *Dong-A Ilbo* dated December 30, 1979, wrote: “Heavy equipment have been installed at important places of the wall. There are even iron gates with automatic switch for tanks or armoured vehicles to go in and out.”

They are automatic gates designed for the groups of tanks and armoured vehicles deployed near the area south of the wall to attack the north any moment. Therefore, the wall not only aims at bisecting the Korean territory

but also can serve as a starting position for northward attack.

A journalist, who saw a section of the concrete wall in the Cholwon area, said he was greatly impressed to “see an alien scene”. At the top of the concrete wall there were a pillbox aimed at the north and on its sides an antenna and other communications equipment, under which a cross set up on the wall of a church met his eye conspicuously. He thought the pillbox was to shower bullets at the north, the antenna and other communications equipment to wiretap the phones and catch electric waves from the north, and the cross to cover the scheme for perpetual split by the south Korean authorities with the veil of “God”.

Not only Park Chung Hee but his successors, Roh Tae Woo and Chun Doo Hwan, engaged in the construction of the concrete wall, organizing and commanding the project.

Breaking the ground for the project, Park Chung Hee rationalized it, saying that it was a “defensive measure” against the “southward invasion” from the north, and instructed that it should be built to be an “everlasting fortress”, an “eternal bulwark”. A huge sum of national funds and even the money earned from “labour export” and “prostitution tourism” were put into the project. The south Korean authorities mobilized the people of neighboring villages and soldiers of the south Korean puppet army, saying that it was an expression of “intense patriotism to volunteer to build the wall”.

Park Chung Hee said at the construction site, “We can never live with the communists of the north. It is no matter with us whether the nation is divided into two or three. The security of ‘Yushin’ is the

first and foremost thing. Concentrate all your energies on the building of the concrete wall.”

The toilsome project, forced day and night, produced numerous deaths and injured persons. According to the official data carried by south Korean newspapers in 1979 alone when the project was in height hundreds of people were killed and disabled. This was because the labour was backbreaking, and the construction was under way in the Military Demarcation Line area with mines, blind shells and other various explosives. Accidents were unavoidable as people were forced to work in this area with explosives not removed completely. According to a report of a south Korean newspaper, when the concrete wall was being built on Cholwon Plain south of the Military Demarcation Line, four soldiers carrying a thing on poles were killed by mines. Two civilians treaded on mines while wandering about to find stones to put under the wheel of a truck bogged in mud, and lost their legs.

It was so pitiable that even a newspaper under the government payroll wrote, “The concrete wall is a cursed barrier fraught with the danger of eternal split and people’s blood.”

Chun Doo Hwan, who became president after the death of Park Chung Hee participated in the construction of the concrete wall from its beginning. When he was serving on the front line as commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the south Korean army, he was awarded a decoration to be the first to build the section in the area under his control. When asked, on receiving the decoration, why the concrete wall was being built he answered, “They say it is to prevent southward invasion from the north, but it is nothing but camouflage tactics. It is

in fact to deal a blow to those who cry for reunification and to ensure internal security by building the eternal barrier as soon as possible.”

Roh Tae Woo, successor to Chun Doo Hwan, too, accomplished “special exploits” in building the concrete wall. When he was the assistant operations director of the Presidential Guards Office in 1978, he was in charge of the whole of construction of the concrete wall, and since 1979, when he was promoted to the commander of the 9<sup>th</sup> Division, he mobilized the officers and men of his division in building the concrete wall ranging from the estuary of the Rimjin River to the upper reaches of the Munsang River in Kyonggi Province.

All these facts show that Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, who perpetrated all sorts of crimes against the nation and fellow countrymen in pursuit of their desire for power and indolence, were vicious anti-reunification confrontationists who brought shame to the nation.

Not only the Korean people but the progressive people of the world denounce the concrete wall, and demand that it be pulled down.

The Chairman of the Sri Lanka Committee Supporting Korea’s Reunification said, “To have divided a nation with a single language and custom into two is a serious insult to mankind. We scathingly denounce the concrete wall, which hampers the cause of Korea’s reunification and national unity, as an infringement on the human rights in this civilized world.”

Perplexed at the fierce denouncement and strong demand for dismantling the concrete wall raised in all parts of the world, Roh Tae Woo said, “There is not such a thing” and “I don’t know its existence”.

And once he said, “The concrete wall is an antitank barrier”.

However, the 240 km-long wall, not a needle fallen in a forest, cannot be covered with anything.

A man of elementary military knowledge knows that a tank or an armoured vehicle can never pass a 2 or 3 metre-high vertical barrier.

The US and south Korean authorities had already installed scores of folds of antitank barriers on the roads leading to the depth of south Korea. Generally, it is difficult for a tank or an armoured vehicle to pass a slope of over 30 degrees. But the concrete wall has been built even in districts not passable for tanks and armoured vehicles in view of their topography. It is written in the educational programme of the military academies of south Korea that antitank barriers should be built in open areas or roads and 3 to 4 metres in height is enough. Roh Tae Woo, who had graduated from a military academy and had a military career of scores of years, must be aware of it. Therefore, his assertion that the concrete wall is an antitank barrier proves the fact that it is a barrier of national division.

The concrete wall crossing the waist of the Korean peninsula is a barrier aimed at creating “two Koreas” by severing the bloodline and territory of the Korean nation and checking their reunification. To dismantle the concrete wall or not boils down to the question of whether one desires peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula or seeks its division and confrontation.

The concrete wall should be dismantled without delay in order to put an end to the history of outdated confrontation and open a new era of peace and reunification of Korea.



## Conclusion

Land constitutes the most fundamental and basic condition for the existence of a nation. They exist and develop united organically with land as a base. A nation without their land or living on a divided territory cannot maintain their national identity and grow heterogeneous suffering a great deal of damage, and in the long run ruin.

The US which has occupied south Korea and divided Korea for over 60 years still schemes to unleash a war against the north going against the aspiration and demand of the Korean nation for peace and reunification, and the pro-US, anti-reunification forces in south Korea implore the US for its eternal occupation of south Korea, seeking their personal comfort and desire for power, and prolong the national division.

The geopolitical position of the DPRK is the same as ever, but the weak country of yesterday which was trodden underfoot as a theatre where big powers fought to expand the sphere of their influence, has now been turned into a dignified politico-military power and its people are demonstrating their dignity as an independent people whom no one dares to provoke.

Under the leadership of their supreme leader Kim Jong Un, under the unfurled banner of By Our Nation Itself and in the principle of national independence, the Korean people will achieve national unity, frustrate the manoeuvres of the anti-reunification force with concerted efforts and accomplish the cause of national reunification without fail.

## **Korea's Division and Its Truth**

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