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On
Negotiations and Turning Points
Let
the Lessons of the Past Fire the Way Forward!
By the Committee
of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement - June 1994
The following document
was circulated within the RIM in June 1994 as an important step
in deepening the RIM's understanding of the two- line struggle in
the PCP and on that basis intensifying support for the PCP Central
Committee and the People's War. It was circulated more broadly thereafter,
and now is being made public in AWTW in order to serve the
campaign to Rally to the Defence of Our Red Flag Flying in Peru.-AWTW
Comrades,
Since October of
1993 a very important struggle has been developing in the PCP, principally
focused on the question of peace negotiations but involving fundamental
questions of the revolution, specifically advancing the People's
War in that country in the context of the severe blows the People's
War has received in the last two years, especially the capture of
Chairman Gonzalo in September 1992. This struggle broke out first
when the Fujimori regime attributed a call for "a struggle for peace
accords" to Chairman Gonzalo. From that point onward, the Committee
of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement has attached great
importance to these developments.
Our initial approach
was to launch a necessary investigation and study of the actual
situation in Peru, the positions of Chairman Gonzalo and the Central
Committee of the PCP, and the political thinking of the major figures
in the debate, as well as the historical experience and political
principles involved. At the same time, we warned against jumping
to hasty and ill-founded conclusions before all of the factors were
known. We also stressed that the class enemy, in Peru and internationally,
was trying to sow division, confusion and demoralization, and that
it was all the more important that our Movement solidify its ranks,
confront this new situation in a unified and disciplined way, and
step up its support for the People's War in Peru and to Defend the
Life of Chairman Gonzalo.
In the course of
this process, we have come to better understand the complex factors
and the issues involved. It has become clear that a two-line struggle
has erupted in the ranks of the Communist Party of Peru. A group
of people who historically had played leading roles in the PCP have
been vigorously promoting a line of "peace conversations to reach
a Peace Agreement, whose application brings with it a conclusion
to the war that the country has been going through for thirteen
years" and calling for negotiations with the Fujimori regime (in
order to "arrive at peace negotiations which would bring a conclusion
to the war"). This grouping seems to be concentrated within the
prisons, although it also has at least some support from among PCP
members and supporters outside of prison, both in Peru and abroad.
This grouping claims that the call for negotiations has originated
directly from Chairman Gonzalo and brands those in the PCP opposed
to this line as "ultra-left".
The Central Committee
of the PCP has strongly opposed this line and has condemned the
letters and videos purported to be by Chairman Gonzalo as a "hoax"
perpetuated by the reactionary regime. They have vigorously opposed
the line of seeking a negotiated end to the war as "capitulation"
and instead have called on the Party to continue the People's War
along the plans previously laid down.
The People's War
in Peru and its leadership, the Communist Party of Peru, have been
inextricably linked to the development of RIM. The People's War
has been seen, and correctly so, by the masses as a shining example,
a beacon pointing the way forward for the oppressed the world over
and living proof of the vitality and correctness of our revolutionary
ideology, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. The PCP has not only been leading
forward this great revolutionary war, it has also greatly contributed
to the political and ideological development of our Movement itself,
especially in the recently culminated struggle for the RIM to adopt
and unite around MLM.
What affects the
PCP cannot but greatly affect our Movement and the course of the
world proletarian revolution. The current debate in the PCP is no
mere academic dispute over the advisability of negotiations. It
is a debate touching fundamental questions of the assessment of
the current situation in Peru and internationally, of the capacity
of the Party to maintain and advance the People's War, of the very
process by which revolution will advance through twists and turns
and achieve final victory.
What is the goal
of our investigation, study and struggle? Our main goal must be
to arrive at a firm grasp of the correct line and on that basis
render the greatest possible support to the People's War in Peru
and its vanguard, the Communist Party of Peru. The existence of
our Movement is an extremely positive factor in this process of
two-line struggle. It is a vehicle through which the experience
of the international proletariat can be brought to bear on the questions
at stake in the PCP and through which the Marxist-Leninist-Maoists
of the world can support a correct line.
Through the course
of study and struggle, our whole Movement can and must come to a
clear and unified understanding of the questions involved and sharpen
our understanding and grasp of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, particularly
the laws of revolutionary warfare and the dynamics of the process
through which the revolution advances amidst twists and turns toward
the seizure of power. Deepening our understanding is not a scholastic
question, it is a pressing task of the class struggle.
The very weight
of the stakes involved in this struggle and the crucial role that
falls upon our Movement requires that we strive to reach a basic
understanding of the lines involved and basic conclusions with resolution,
dispatch and urgency, but not hastily or carelessly. In the case
of the PCP, which has played such a vital role in the development
of our Movement, the need for such an approach is all the more apparent.
But this approach is not a call for a long protracted period of
leisurely debate or indecision. The very fact that this struggle
is taking place under conditions of warfare and that the class enemy
is utilizing this situation to attack the party, the people's armed
forces and the people increases our sense of urgency and determination.
We should step
up our support for the revolutionary communists and the masses of
Peru in their heroic People's War and maintain the Campaign to Defend
the Life of Chairman Gonzalo. We must remain vigilant against efforts
of the class enemy as well as oppose the actions of opportunists
or even misguided friends who are seeking to "fish in troubled waters".
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism
- Our Microscopeand Telescope
As our Chinese
comrades used to say, MLM is our "microscope and telescope" to examine
all problems of society and nature, in both its minute detail and
grand outlines. This is most assuredly our great weapon in understanding
the problem of the two-line struggle in the PCP. The fact that our
Movement has recently taken the great step of uniting around our
higher understanding of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as our ideology
lays a solid basis and high plane from which to confront the serious
test before us.
In examining the
questions concerning the development of the People's War in Peru,
and in particular the struggle over peace accords, it is natural
that comrades take the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theses on war and
peace, and more specifically, Mao's teachings and example on protracted
people's war as a starting point.
Mao was able to
show that in China (and later he came to hold this to be generally
true of the countries oppressed by imperialism), it was possible
and necessary for the proletariat to engage the reactionary classes
in a lengthy war, beginning from a position of weakness and gradually
developing a position of strength. In the document Long Live
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism!, our Movement has united around the
understanding that, in the oppressed countries, armed struggle is
the main form of struggle and the people's army is the main form
of mass organization.
This is based on
an understanding that the objective conditions generally exist for
launching, maintaining and advancing revolutionary warfare step-by-step.
Specifically, it means in these types of countries it is possible
for the proletariat to establish red political power in parts
of the country while still not being in a position to establish
nationwide political power. The existence of people's political
power, which takes different forms but which leads to the creation
of red base areas, is the marrow of the people's war. People's power
is the accomplishment of the war, gives war its revolutionary character
and enables the revolutionary war to rely ever more deeply on the
masses and to advance.
At the same time,
it is clear that any revolutionary war will almost certainly confront
sharp turns and even reversals and setbacks. Protracted people's
war has never been "smooth sailing" or just going gradually from
one victory to another. In fact, the Chinese revolution itself went
through a number of dramatic turning points. Some of these were
the result of erroneous lines in the leadership of the Communist
Party of China (such as when 90% of the communist forces were defeated
before the Long March was undertaken). But objective developments
domestically and internationally can lead to dramatic shifts. A
change in the balance of strength between the people's forces and
the enemy, a shift in the alignment of class forces, or the passage
to a new stage or substage of the revolution are examples of objective
developments which led to changes in strategy and tactics (such
as the need to build a United Front Against Japan following the
Japanese invasion of China).
In other words,
protracted people's war will necessarily be protracted, it
will go through twists and turns, advances and retreats, as it advances
toward its final victory. The process of war and especially key
turning points will necessarily involve shifts in class alliances
and changes in policy by the revolutionary forces. Mao used different
strategy and tactics at key junctures based on his concrete analysis
of concrete conditions and keeping in mind the overall goals of
the revolution. He responded, for example, to the near decimation
of the people's armed forces in the early 1930s by organizing and
leading the Long March1 - a great retreat militarily which succeeded
in preserving the core of the armed forces and the Party which soon
after led the War Against Japan. Just as the Long March was Mao's
answer to one turning point in the Chinese Revolution, so too his
participation in peace negotiations in 1945 with Chiang Kai-shek
was a different tactic to address a different turning point in the
revolution. Historical experience has shown that sharp two-line
struggles in the Party often emerge at precisely such major turning
points.
On Peace Negotiations
- Some Historical Experience
There is important
historical experience, both positive and negative, concerning the
carrying out of peace negotiations and even the reaching of agreements
between revolutionary communist forces and the forces of a reactionary
regime combating them.
The two most outstanding
examples of when it has been correct for the communists to enter
into peace negotiations with their enemies were the Brest-Litovsk
agreement2 between the newly established Soviet Union and German
imperialism in 1918 and the Chungking negotiations3 between Mao
Tsetung and the reactionary forces led by Chiang Kai-shek following
the defeat of Japan in World War 2. In both cases, there had been
wrong lines from the "left" opposing any kind of compromise and/or
the Right, which advocated giving up the struggle for seizure of
power. These two cases of correctly using negotiations are different
in many respects and must be examined in their historical circumstances.
Nevertheless, certain general principles can be seen from the way
in which Lenin and Mao addressed these situations.
On the other hand,
there have been important cases in the history of the international
communist movement where communist parties have incorrectly sought
to achieve some kind of agreement with the reactionary classes which
objectively compromised the interests of the revolution. This was
the case, for example, in France, Italy and Greece4 in the period
after World War 2 when the Communist parties of those countries
agreed to disarm the armed forces of the proletariat and enter into
reactionary governments.
In more recent
history, there are a great many examples of revisionist and opportunist
forces trafficking in the blood of the people - using their struggle
and sacrifice as a means for the revisionist or opportunist forces
themselves to seek an agreement with the reactionary classes (and
ultimately to try to incorporate themselves into these classes),
while the basic oppression and exploitation of the people remain
unchanged. This was the recent case in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Today it is being replayed in South Africa and Palestine.
The policy of "negotiating
in order to fight" sometimes used by the revolutionary communists,
which may under certain circumstances be part of a strategy for
advancing the armed revolutionary struggle for power, is the opposite
of the revisionist and bourgeois reformist strategy of "fighting
in order to negotiate".
Peaceful forms
can only be preliminary or supplementary to the armed
struggle for political power. Once a war has begun, the laws that
govern it are qualitatively different than those which govern peaceful
struggle. The protracted nature of warfare in the oppressed
countries makes it likely that revolutionary warfare will go through
different stages and twists and turns between its initiation and
the final victory of the people's forces (and negotiations and different
types of agreements may be part of this process). But it is not
possible to stop a revolutionary war and simply return to the situation
that existed prior to the outbreak of the war with hopes of "starting
again". The very dynamic of war, which leads toward the destruction
of one side by the other, will not allow this.
In short, under
certain circumstances negotiations can be carried out and concessions
given, but as Chairman Mao said, "there are limits to such concessions;
the principle is that they must not damage the fundamental interests
of the people" (SW, Vol. IV, p. 49). Although necessary compromises
and adjustments may have to be made at certain stages, the fundamental
gains of the people, such as the essential core of the people's
army and red political power, the base areas,etc., must be preserved.
Mao stressed, "without a people's army the people have nothing."
Furthermore, negotiations
are only one possible approach to a dramatic change in the revolutionary
process. Whether this is correct at a given time can only be assessed
on the basis of the concrete analysis of concrete conditions, including,
for example, whether the people's forces have adequate strength
to successfully use such a tactic, whether other changes in military
and political approach may be more correct for addressing the new
situation, and so forth. As pointed out above, there were important
experiences especially in the long history of protracted people's
war in China led by Mao when the People's War faced severe blows,
even big defeats, and crossed through extreme difficulties, but
the problems of the revolution were resolved through the means of
war, i.e., by creative though painful use of the laws of war instead
of by using the tactics of negotiation. Mao also stressed that "sometimes
not negotiating is fighting tit-for-tat".
The experience
of the international communist movement in the recent decades in
which revolutionary armed struggle has been launched has shown the
great importance of striving to "keep the red flag flying", that
is, maintaining the revolutionary struggle even under difficult
conditions and in the face of setbacks.
The Two-Line
Struggle
The point of reviewing
the history and principles of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is to be armed
to correctly understand and evaluate the debate currently under
way in the Communist Party of Peru. While it is not yet possible
to fully understand all of the factors currently under discussion
in the PCP, it is possible and necessary to use historical
experience and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to critically examine the
arguments and proposals being advanced by the principal exponents
of different lines in this struggle.
Marxist-Leninist-Maoists
do not rule out a priori the possible need for a dramatic
and sudden change in the policies of the revolutionary forces. Such
changes can sometimes be required by the change in the relation
of class forces domestically and on a world scale, and history has
shown that such changes often lead to a certain confusion in the
revolutionary ranks.
But the fact that
negotiations are permissible as a tactic or that a dramatic change
in strategy and tactics may at times be required does not in any
way prove that the particular negotiations which are proposed in
Peru and the proposed policy of "fighting for a peace accord" are
correct. In order to examine this, the guiding principles involved
are:
Do the proposed
negotiations serve the task of seizing political power through revolutionary
warfare, regardless of what stages or turns this warfare may go
through, or are they aimed at returning to the pre-war situation
of 1980 - a protracted period in which no revolutionary armed struggle
existed?
While certain
compromises may prove to be necessary, do the proposed negotiations
safeguard the "fundamental interests of the people" referred to
by Mao, that is, the essential core of people's power and the revolutionary
armed forces?
Under the circumstances
where most of the information concerning the "negotiation/peace"
policy is coming from the class enemy, it is necessary to be doubly
prudent. But it is possible and necessary to use the above criteria
as a standard against which to judge any call for an agreement or
any agreement itself.
In earlier stages
of this struggle, little was known of the actual content of the
proposal for a peace accord or the political arguments of those
proposing this strategy. However, the publication of the article
"Take Up and Fight for the New Definition and the New Decision"
(called in Spanish Asumir) in the reactionary Lima newspaper,
La Republica, and its endorsement by the main exponents of
the negotiations line abroad helps bring the questions involved
in this struggle into sharper focus. We would again encourage comrades
to carefully study this article along with some other articles arguing
the same positions which have been recently obtained and to apply
the standards and criteria which we have indicated here to understand
and evaluate the line proposed by the Asumir article. The
Committee has serious concerns that the arguments made in Asumir
and other documents do not meet the above criteria. Specifically,
does the line of Asumir safeguard the fundamental interests
of the people? Does it enable the forces of the proletariat, through
whatever twists and turns, to advance their struggle for nationwide
power? A criticism is being prepared by one of the participants
of the Movement of the main aspects of Asumir.
One of the important,
if secondary, elements in the two-line struggle in the Communist
Party of Peru involves the evaluation of the international situation.
This is particularly the case with the Asumir article, which
relies heavily on its analysis of an allegedly unfavourable international
situation to justify reaching a peace accord.
As pointed out
previously, this analysis runs contrary to the understanding achieved
by our Movement and reflected in the Resolution adopted by RIM,
"On the World Situation". While the questions concerning peace negotiations
in Peru must be decided primarily in the context of the development
of the war and the struggle for power, questions concerning the
international situation inevitably affect the assessment of the
revolutionary possibilities in Peru and elsewhere in today's world.
Specifically, is the international situation, with the collapse
of the social-imperialist USSR and its bloc, now such that conditions
in the oppressed countries are basically unfavourable for launching,
maintaining and advancing the revolutionary warfare of the masses?
What are the
Views of Chairman Gonzalo?
From the beginning,
one question has been if or to what extent the call for a peace
accord reflects the position of Chairman Gonzalo. While the Fujimori
regime and supporters of the negotiations have insisted that Chairman
Gonzalo is the author of the call for the peace accords, opponents
of this line - specifically the CC of the PCP - have strenuously
argued that the letters and videos purporting to be from Chairman
Gonzalo have been fabricated by the enemy.
Chairman Gonzalo
is still denied access to the outside world and there is no basis
to know with certainty what his views are or what information he
has access to. Also, conditions of his treatment by the reactionary
regime are extreme. We must continue to fight to end the conditions
of isolation of Chairman Gonzalo. As long as his isolation continues,
we must consider all alleged communications from him with the utmost
prudence. Whatever Chairman Gonzalo may or may not be saying, what
is certain is that the reactionary regime is utilizing his isolation
to spread speculation and demoralization, and these efforts should
be vigourously combatted.
In any event, the
central question of debate is not over the authenticity of the alleged
communications. While comrades in Peru and elsewhere naturally attach
great importance to the position of Chairman Gonzalo, the debate
must focus on the policy itself, not the identity of its author,
because in any case line is decisive. This is all the more true
in the concrete situation of today when it is impossible to know
with certainty the views of Chairman Gonzalo.
Forward to
a United, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Position!
It is imperative
that the Committee and the parties and organizations of our Movement
devote the necessary attention to understanding and acting upon
the two-line struggle in Peru. As stated earlier, we consider the
question to be the most important question facing our Movement,
one which demands to be treated urgently but methodically.
As we stressed
previously, it is necessary to carry out this very important two-line
struggle in order to solidify our support to the People's War, which
is our only proud red flag flying in the world at present, to defend
it from attacks of any kind of harmful line, and at the same time
through this two-line struggle to develop and deepen our collective
understanding and consciousness on the lines involved and to strengthen
our grasp of the correct Marxist-Leninist-Maoist line. And we have
to carry this out in such a way as to safeguard the unity and integrity
of our Movement. This is particularly difficult to do under the
current circumstances in which the line struggle in the PCP is public
knowledge, but it is all the more imperative and urgent.
It is understandable
that comrades and friends outside of our Movement are also deeply
concerned by the questions under debate and are anxious to hear
the opinions of our Movement as well as to contribute their own
thinking. We must try to organize the participation of others in
this discussion in such a way that they contribute to the process
of our Movement reaching a correct conclusion and not in such a
way that the central role of the Movement and its embryonic democratic
centralism are denigrated and weakened.
It is also imperative
that the current discussion not undermine the important ongoing
task to Defend the Life of Chairman Gonzalo! and Support the People's
War in Peru! We should continue to support and assist the International
Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Abimael Guzman and especially
its efforts to win the battle to win access to Chairman Gonzalo.
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism,
our all-powerful ideology, will enable our Movement to rise to the
challenges before us, and render even greater support to the comrades
of the Communist Party of Peru and the historic struggle they are
waging.
[Notes:]
1 In October 1934,
the main forces of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army started
a major strategic movement from their bases in southern China. In
the course of the Long March, the people's army traversed eleven
provinces of China, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and
trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating
the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions.
The Red Army covered 25,000 li (12,500 kilometers) and finally
arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern
Shensi in October 1935. Mao wrote, "in one respect the Red Army
failed (i.e. failed to maintain its original positions), but in
another respect he [Chiang Kai-shek] has failed (i.e., failed to
execute his plan of "encirclement and suppression" and of "pursuit
and suppression").... The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed
to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists
and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent.
It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct
and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It
has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that
the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without
the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly
about the existence of the great truth which the Red Army embodies?
The Long March is also a seeding-machine. In the eleven provinces
it has sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear
fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future. In a word, the Long
March ended in victory for us and defeat for the enemy." ("On Tactics
Against Japanese Imperialism", Selected Works, Vol. I, p.
161)
2 Brest-Litovsk:
After seizing
power in the insurrection of October 1917, the Bolsheviks were confronted
with the fact that the imperialist German Army was threatening to
conquer Petrograd, the centre of Soviet power, and was inflicting
big defeats daily on the old Russian army. Under these circumstances,
Lenin felt strongly that the Bolsheviks had no alternative to accepting
what he called a "humiliating peace" with Germany in which large
sections of territory were ceded. As he put it, he was trying to
"trade space for time" -- time to consolidate the new Soviet republic
and prepare for other inevitable military conflicts with the imperialist
powers.
Lenin based his
arguments in favour of the Brest-Litovsk agreement on a number of
factors including: that the people of Russia, especially the peasantry,
were extremely war weary ("choked in blood") and demanded peace;
that the old Russian army made up of unwilling soldiers conscripted
by the Tsarist regime was in a state of complete collapse and incapable
of putting up a fight while the new Red Army based on volunteers
from the proletariat and the peasantry was only in its most initial
stages of formation; and that there was no guarantee that the revolution
in Germany would quickly come to their rescue (in weeks or even
days) by overthrowing the reactionary government there.
Lenin encountered
very sharp opposition from some other leaders of the Bolshevik Party,
especially Trotsky. The opposition argued that Lenin was "betraying"
the interests of the international revolution by reaching a peace
accord with German imperialism and appealed to what Lenin called
"revolutionary phrase-making".
Lenin stressed
that the situation had to be examined concretely, on the basis of
the actual class relations (their strengths and weaknesses) and
from the perspective of advancing the revolutionary goal.
Even while Lenin was actively pursuing a peace agreement with Germany,
he was appealing to the resistance of the Russian people, especially
the advanced workers who formed the first units of the Red Army
and rushed into the breach where the old Tsarist forces were collapsing.
And he saw the prospect of a peace accord in the framework of preserving
their existing strength, building up an army and preparing for the
military tests of strength he saw looming.
Lenin fought
particularly hard against those within the Bolsheviks who negated
the tremendous accomplishment of the October Revolution. These "lefts"
held that "Soviet power is becoming purely formal" and thus felt
that little would be lost if the German army crushed the new Soviet
republic. Lenin answered them as follows: "And, therefore, more
humiliating than any harsh or even extremely harsh peace, rendered
imperative owing to the lack of an army -- more humiliating than
any humiliating peace is humiliating despair. We shall not perish
even from a dozen obnoxious peace treaties if we take revolt and
war seriously." In other words, Lenin's approach to the humiliating
but necessary compromise of Brest-Litovsk was based on the need
to preserve and strengthen Soviet political power and its ability
to wage war. It was the opposition, and not Lenin, who was prepared
to abandon political power, had given up any serious perspective
of waging war and had fallen into despair. Secondary concessions
were made in order to preserve the fundamental gain of the proletarian
revolution which was the red power. And the Bolsheviks had the strength
to make the enemy observe it.
3 The other great example
of correct use of negotiations was Mao's decision to engage in discussions
with Chiang Kai-shek in the months following the surrender of Japan
in August 1945 (the Chungking negotiations).
At that time,
the Chinese revolution had reached a great turning point with the
victory of the war against Japan. Great victories had been won by
the forces led by the Communist Party of China, including building
a strong party of over one million members, a powerful army, and
liberated areas with a population of 100 million people.
At the same time,
sections of the masses were hoping for peace, and the alliance on
an international scale between the Soviet Union, Britain and the
United States exerted influence on public opinion. Mao's writings
clearly indicate that he had little if any hope of reaching a lasting
agreement with the reactionary Kuomintang government ("The Kuomintang
and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations,
sure to start fighting and sure to break with each other, but that
is only one aspect of the matter." SW, Vol IV, p. 54) But
he clearly wanted to place the burden for the civil war that was
looming on the horizon on Chiang Kai-shek, and thereby further isolate
him. It was important that the masses, and especially some of the
middle strata, realize that Mao had gone to great efforts to reach
a reasonable accord with Chiang. As Mao put it, sometimes going
to negotiations is fighting tit for tat, sometimes refusing to negotiate
is fighting tit for tat.
In order to accomplish
these goals, Mao was willing to make concessions, for example, even
offering to reduce the size of the people's armed forces, withdraw
from some territory, etc. "But there are limits to such concessions;
the principle is that they must not damage the fundamental interests
of the people." (SW, Vol IV, p. 49).
While Mao's participation
in the Chungking negotiations was based on a perspective of preparing
the people's forces for renewed fighting with Chiang Kai-shek, there
were others in the Communist Party of China such as Liu Shao-chi
who argued that, "China had entered a new stage of peace and democracy"
and these forces were willing to abort the further development of
the revolution in return for a definitive agreement with the Kuomintang.
4 During World War
2, the Communist Parties led significant armed forces, partisan
units, in a number of the European countries occupied by Nazi Germany
and in Italy. As the war drew to a close, the question of the future
state in those countries came into sharp relief. The bourgeoisie
in these countries, aided by U.S. and British imperialism and their
armed forces, were determined that the end of Nazi occupation would
mark the return of their own reactionary dictatorship, and they
made the disarming of the workers and popular masses a top priority.
Unfortunately, the main line of the Communist Parties was to liquidate
the people's armed forces in return for a legal role in the post-war
regime, including in some cases, such as France, joining in reactionary
bourgeois-led governments.
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