Democracy:
More
Than Ever We can and Must Do Better Than That
By Bob Avakian,
Chairman of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Communist
Party, USA
Quotations from the
CRC document are referenced according to the paragraph number
of the document, which is reprinted beginning on page 74. - AWTW
Author's
Note
This critique
of the document "On Proletarian Democracy" was written
in the fall of 1991, as part of a book, Phony Communism Is Dead...Long
Live Real Communism! As final preparations were being made for
the publication of this book, the news was received that, according
to a statement by the Central Reorganisation Committee, Communist
Party of India (Marxist- Leninist), the decision had been made
to "dissolve the all-India structure" of the CRC. As
is also clear from this statement, this decision was taken on
the initiative of K. Venu, the (former) Secretary of the CRC,
who was also the principal author of "On Proletarian Democracy".
This move
to liquidate the CRC organizationally is clearly a further leap,
backwards, and also is an extension of the political and ideological
line that runs through "On Proletarian Democracy". The
attempt at liquidation of the CRC as an all-India organization
and the rationalization given for this underline the importance
of deepening the all-around criticism of the opportunist line
and outlook that has increasingly characterized the leadership
of the CRC, with K. Venu at the head.
In light
of all this, it was decided, in consultation with the Committee
of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, in which the CRC
has been a participating party, to submit this article to A World
To Win, to be published there along with the CRC document, "On
Proletarian Democracy". As stated in this critique, it was
the hope in writing it that it would make a contribution to a
struggle, on the part of comrades inside and outside the CRC,
through which the CRC would reverse its course, repudiate "On
Proletarian Democracy", reclaim the great revolutionary heritage
of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist movement in India, and both reaffirm
and contribute to further developing the revolutionary principles
on which the Communist Party of India (Marxist -Leninist) was
founded. Although the CRC leadership has, unfortunately, taken
the opposite course and taken an even further leap into opportunism,
this has brought forth open struggle from within the ranks of
the CRC.
For many
reasons, not the least of which is the immense importance of the
revolution in India to the world proletarian revolution, it has
been very encouraging to hear that struggle has broken out against
the opportunist line that had brought the CRC to such a crisis.
No doubt the struggle will be complex. This makes even clearer
the decisive importance of carrying out deep-going and all-around
criticism of the revisionist political line that is expressed
in a concentrated way in "On Proletarian Democracy"
and of searching out more fully the links between this line, with
its underlying outlook and methodology, and the other lines put
forward by its authors.
Once again,
it is the hope that this critique of "On Proletarian Democracy"
can make a contribution to that process. And, at the same time,
as also stated at the beginning of this critique, it is aimed
as well at contributing to the process whereby "the RIM overall
will be further strengthened in its resolve to unite on the basis
of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and to firmly uphold the historical
experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat while summing
up deeply the errors of the international communist movement,
as well as its great achievements, and advancing on that basis".
- Bob
Avakian
December 1991
Introduction
This heading
deliberately recalls the title of the book I wrote on the question
of democracy - its social and class content, its historical role
and relation to the proletarian revolution and the goal of communism.
The momentous events in the world in the few short years since
that book was written - in particular the radical changes in the
nature of bourgeois rule in the Soviet Union and what has been
its bloc, along with the events focused in Tiananmen Square in
China - have indeed made what was said in that book, on the possibility
and necessity of doing much better than that, more relevant and
important than ever. They have underscored the significance of
the conclusion that, "Where it is possible to speak of democracy,
of whatever kind, that is a sign that class distinctions and,
in one form or another, social antagonisms - and with them dictatorship
- are still to be found, indeed still characterize society. And
when this is no longer the case, it will no longer be possible,
or necessary, to speak of democracy." (Bob Avakian, Democracy:
Can't We Do Better Than That?, Chicago: Banner Press, 1986, p.
261)
As we
know, these earth-shaking events in countries commonly conceived
of as "communist" have had major repercussions not only
among the masses of people broadly but also among the conscious
revolutionary forces, including within the ranks of those who
have considered themselves revolutionary communists and have based
themselves on the revolutionary line of Mao Tsetung and the whole
history of the international communist movement identified with
Marx, Lenin, and Mao. One of the sharpest examples of this is
a document recently published by the Central Reorganisation Committee,
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (hereafter referred
to as CRC), an organization that has been affiliated with the
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM). This CRC document,
"On Proletarian Democracy", represents a fundamental
repudiation not only of the Declaration of the RIM itself but
of the fundamental principles on which that document is founded
and even more a repudiation of the entire experience of the international
proletariat and the international communist movement in exercising
the dictatorship of the proletariat and carrying out the socialist
transformation of society.1
To be
more precise, this document upholds only the Paris Commune of
1871 as a legitimate exercise of the dictatorship of the proletariat:
it sets the very brief and limited experience of the Commune against
the entire historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat
in socialist society beginning with the October 1917 Soviet Revolution.
2
The following
is the basic argument of this CRC document: Although before the
October Revolution Lenin upheld the Paris Commune as the model
for the dictatorship of the proletariat (as can be seen in The
State and Revolution, written by Lenin only a few months before
the October Revolution), nevertheless, soon after the Bolshevik
revolution seized power, Lenin put into practice a line of imposing
a dictatorship of the communist party in place of the exercise
of political power by the masses of working people themselves.
And, as the saying goes, the rest is history. Stalin carried out
and carried to further extreme this dictatorship of the party
and even Mao and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution did
not break with this political system of party dictatorship. Thus,
this whole historical experience, with its "monopoly of political
power" by the party, must be repudiated and future socialist
revolutions must revert back to a strict application of the Paris
Commune model.
It is
not hard to recognize that the line of this CRC document shares
much in common with long-standing attacks on Leninism and with
present-day assaults on communism in general.
For these
reasons it is necessary to reply, publicly and in clear and forceful
terms, to this document. There is no way to avoid it - this document
constitutes a complete degeneration into rather classical social-democratic
opposition to communism and the proletarian revolution. That may
sound extreme, but it is no more extreme than the open assertion
in this document that the entire experience of the dictatorship
of the proletariat, beginning with the Soviet Union, and the basic
orientation guiding this experience - not only in the Soviet Union
under the leadership of Lenin as well as Stalin but also of China
under the leadership of Mao Tsetung - that all this is fundamentally
flawed and must be rejected and utilized as teaching material
by negative example.
It is
especially painful to see such a development because the CRC had
set itself the task of defending and further developing a very
positive and important revolutionary history - identified with
the most advanced revolutionary experience and leadership within
the international communist movement (from Marx, through Lenin,
to Mao) and also with the whole experience of the armed struggle
of peasant masses led by communist revolutionaries in the late
1960s-early 1970s in India (this was marked by the outbreak of
this struggle in the village of Naxalbari in India's state of
West Bengal in the spring of 1967, which has been known as the
"spring thunder"). This "spring thunder" and
the revolutionary road associated with it was hailed at the time
as a major development by the revolutionary leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party, and it remains true that, whatever mistakes
and shortcomings may have been involved, this was a tremendously
powerful and significant revolutionary development not only in
that part of the world but for the world as a whole.
For these
reasons the approach that must be taken in answering this document
is what Mao described as "cure the sickness to save the patient".
But, as part of this, Mao insisted that sometimes it is necessary
to administer a shock to someone in order to make them realize
the seriousness of the "sickness" and to help them seek
a cure. The CRC document is labeled a "draft": hopefully,
as a result of sharp struggle, on the part of comrades inside
and outside the CRC, against the line contained in this draft,
it will be thoroughly repudiated and the comrades of the CRC will
once again retake the revolutionary road, and the RIM overall
will be further strengthened in its resolve to unite on the basis
of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and to firmly uphold the historical
experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat while summing
up deeply the errors of the international communist movement,
as well as its great achievements, and advancing on that basis.
It is in that spirit, and with that goal in mind, that this critique
of the CRC document is made.
To begin, and to give an overview, the following are some general
conclusions that must be drawn from a critical reading of this
document:
1. There
is a stunning lack of materialism in this document. There is an
absence of understanding of the fundamental contradictions, particularly
in the economic base but also between the economic base and the
superstructure, that mark socialist society as a transition. These
are questions that Mao and his revolutionary headquarters identified
as decisive for the struggle to not only uphold the dictatorship
of the proletariat but to carry forward the revolution under the
dictatorship of the proletariat and combat revisionism and the
rise to power of the bourgeoisie. But, in this CRC document, all
this is rejected as off the mark, or not dealing with the essential
questions!
More specifically,
there is a lack of a sense of the existence of different classes
(as well as advanced, intermediate, and backward) among the broad
category of "the people" in socialist society. Or, more
accurately, there is a refusal to recognize the crucial role of
Marxist class analysis - such analysis is rejected in the name
of opposing "class reductionism"!
Along
with this, there is no serious attention paid - and apparently
no real importance attached - to the very difficult problems that
have confronted the socialist states as a consequence of their
being in a position of being "encircled" by imperialism
- existing in a world still dominated overall by imperialism.
To attempt to discuss the questions of democracy and dictatorship
apart from a serious examination of this problem betrays a lack
of seriousness - and more specifically it betrays the classical
bias and "blindspot" of social-democratic types who,
with a typical bourgeois idealist outlook, purport to treat the
question of democracy in some "pure" and "classless"
way, in abstraction from its actual content and from the actual
historical and social context.
2. The
arguments made in this CRC document on the role of the party -
or, as they would have it, the lack of an institutionalized vanguard
role for the party in socialist society - lead toward a line of
"peaceful transition". The very logic of these arguments
leads toward the conclusion that violent overthrow is itself "coercive"
and "elitist" toward the masses (or at least toward
sections of them who do not take part in this armed struggle)
and is therefore fundamentally wrong.
This document
does not draw this conclusion - in fact it says that the violent
overthrow of bourgeois rule is necessary - but that is only because
this document does not pursue its own logic to its "logical
conclusion". In this sense, this document lags behind those
social-democrats, anarchist-pacifists, et al., who have historically
made such arguments in insisting that waging war, even a revolutionary
war, itself fosters elitism and concentrates power in the hands
of an apparatus - the party, at the core of the revolutionary
armed force - that leads the revolutionary war and already, in
so doing, forms the core of the new regime of power. Quite often
this is linked by such people with a condemnation of Lenin's basic
orientation - particularly as concentrated in What Is To Be Done?
- concerning the role of vanguard leadership in relation to the
masses. It is here, such people often claim, that the origins
of the "dictatorship of the party" lie. The CRC document
picks up this "dictatorship of the party" distortion,
but it does not include the "discovery" of its "origins"
in What Is To Be Done? (here, again, this document is "lagging").
This cry
of "the dictatorship of the party" is inescapably linked
with "they should not have taken to arms" - the refrain
raised by counterrevolutionaries in condemnation of the Paris
Commune as well as the Russian Revolution, as Lenin pointed out,
and the common refrain of such people in opposition to all genuine
revolutions, especially proletarian revolutions. Here it is important
to recognize that all revolutionary armed struggles that have
led to the seizure of power by the proletariat have so far started
- and in the future are likely to start as well - with a minority.
This is true whether these armed struggles have been protracted
people's war in a Third World country or urban insurrection in
an imperialist country. Such armed struggles are begun before
the majority of the people (even in the immediate areas where
the armed struggle is started) have been won to support for them.
And such armed struggles, however much they may fundamentally
rely on the masses, do after all exert an element of coercion,
not only against the enemy but also, in a qualitatively different
but real way, even on the masses affected by them - in a real
sense they force the masses, in particular those not already involved,
to take a stand in relation to them.
This was
certainly the case with the Bolshevik-led October Revolution in
1917. It is quite probably a fact that not even a majority of
the workers in the Soviets, considering the country as whole,
were yet won to the idea of launching the armed insurrection at
that time. Certainly this was true of the peasants throughout
the countryside. And even in the main cities where the armed insurrections
were first carried out (in particular Petrograd and Moscow), the
majority of the non-industrial workers among the people were certainly
not consciously supporting the Bolshevik banner when the Bolsheviks
launched these armed insurrections, yet these non-industrial workers
must be considered among the broad category of "the people".
So, according to the logic of this CRC document, there is nothing
left to conclude but "they should not have taken to arms".
You cannot "logically" argue that the vanguard must
not impose its will on the people when it is in power but it may
do so in coming to power in the first place. The contradictions
involved here can be resolved through the application of materialist
dialectics, but this cannot be done by applying the (bourgeois)
logic that has been adopted in this CRC document.
Of course,
it is true - and a profound truth - that the actions of the Bolsheviks
in launching and leading these armed insurrections were in the
interests of the majority of the masses - not only in some general
and long-term historical sense but in terms of corresponding to
the immediately and urgently felt needs of the masses and to their
"political will". But that is just the point: criteria
like this are precisely what the CRC document is now rejecting
and replacing with the logic and demands of formal (bourgeois)
democracy, that is, the insistence on the forms of democracy without
regard to the social and class content, or the raising of the
form above the content.
3. The
same logic will also lead to the abandonment of the dictatorship
of the proletariat itself as an "undemocratic" system
of government. The dictatorship of the proletariat also involves
an element of coercion, by the state, in relation not only to
antagonistic classes but also to individuals among the (broad
category of) the people. Basic policies - including everything
from differential wage scales to such things as the sending of
millions of educated youth to the countryside to integrate with
the masses of peasants - all such things include an element of
coercion.
Of course,
coercion cannot be relied on in relation to the masses of people
- education and struggle on the basis of a communist ideological
and political line must be relied on - but this cannot eliminate
altogether the element of coercion involved here. This is related
to the underlying existence of inequalities left over from the
old society - such as the differences between the city and the
countryside, between the workers and the peasants, and between
mental and manual labour. Lenin spoke of how the state was still
necessary in socialist society (and he meant even after ownership
of the means of production was completely socialized) because
of the existence of such contradictions. This state is necessary,
he said, in order to ensure that such contradictions were handled
in a way consistent with the advance to communism, but at the
same time the exercise of this state power - the dictatorship
of the proletariat - includes the enforcement of "bourgeois
right" (the expression in law and policy of relations that
contain the elements of inequality left over from the old society).
To drive his point home, in a somewhat provocative way, Lenin
referred to this state as "the bourgeois state, without the
bourgeoisie" (see Lenin, The State and Revolution, Collected
Works [LCW], Moscow: Progress Publishers, vol. 25, p. 476).
The logic
guiding this CRC document cannot provide an answer to the question
posed, according to the same (bourgeois) logic: If socialism is
really in the interests of the majority of the people, if it relies
on the masses of people and corresponds with their interests,
while the interests of only a small minority of exploiters lie
in opposing socialism and restoring capitalism, then why is it
necessary to have a dictatorship at all?
I spoke
to this question at great length in Democracy: Can't We Do Better
Than That? (particularly chapter 7). There I quoted extensively
from Lenin's work "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade
Kautsky", which deals with this question in a very trenchant
way. Lenin speaks to both the internal basis and the international
connections of the bourgeoisie which give it real advantages over
the proletariat which is newly risen to power and does not have
historical experience of exercising power. He shows why, for all
these reasons, the dictatorship of the proletariat will be necessary
for a long period of time.
This same
question was returned to repeatedly by Lenin during the early
years of the Soviet Republic, and his works during that period
give a very rich, if still beginning, analysis of why the dictatorship
of the proletariat will be necessary for an entire period of transition
from capitalism to a higher stage of society. And, as we know,
Mao developed this analysis further and systematized it into the
basic line that socialism constitutes a long historical period
of transition from capitalism to communism, that all throughout
this period there are classes and class struggle, and that it
is necessary to combat capitalist restoration and continue the
revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the
CRC document has lost sight of all this: with its logic, it cannot
give a materialist explanation of why the dictatorship of the
proletariat is absolutely necessary throughout the stage of socialism
and how this dictatorship is not in conflict with but consistent
with the fact that socialism and the advance to communism conform
to the fundamental interests of the proletariat and broad masses
in opposition to a handful of exploiters.
Rather
than continue with the discussion of general conclusions drawn
from this CRC document, it would be better to turn now to an examination
of some of the particular arguments made in this document. This
will help to "flesh out" and to extend and deepen these
basic conclusions.
On Recent
Events in the Former Soviet Bloc and China
From the
very start, the way things are formulated in this document reveals
a tailing after petit-bourgeois democratic illusions - and a bourgeois-democratic
conceptualization in general. In the first sentence, the events
of the last few years "in former socialist countries such
as China, the Soviet Union, and those in East Europe" are
referred to simply as "democratic upsurges". (paragraph
1.1 - see CRC document starting p. 74))
First
of all, these events, including the mass upheavals in such countries,
have involved many different class forces, mobilized around a
number of different programs, but the essential fact is that bourgeois
ideology and politics have been in the lead. To describe these
simply as "democratic upsurges" is to fail to make any
serious class analysis - and to present democracy as it is presented
by the bourgeoisie: as a "universal", "classless"
phenomenon. It is to tail petit-bourgeois spontaneity, and more
to promote, indirectly at least, the bourgeois forces, outlooks
and programs in the lead of these "democratic upsurges".
And this
is true, despite the fact that this document goes on to make general
statements about how "M-L forces have cautioned them [the
people] that bourgeois democracy or an unconcealed capitalism
is not the solution". (par. 1.2) For, once again, to simply
characterize these upsurges as "democratic" is to cover
over their bourgeois-democratic essence: the essence of a thing,
as Mao made clear, is determined by its principal aspect, which
in this case is the domination of bourgeois forces and outlooks
within these "democratic upsurges".
Further,
it is important to take note of what might, at first, seem like
a minor matter of formulation. At the beginning of the second
paragraph we find the characterization of the regimes in "the
former socialist countries" as "social fascist"
(par. 1.2, emphasis added). This is a formulation that was used
by Mao, and has been used by Maoists following him (including
at times our Party, although we have more come to characterize
the form of bourgeois rule in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,
Brezhnev, and the like, as "revisionist democracy").
But the important point is that Maoists have always stressed the
class content - the bourgeois essence - of this revisionist rule.
Both in spontaneous popular consciousness and in the history of
the international communist movement, fascism has tended to be
treated as something virtually "above classes", something
which is "worse" than "normal" bourgeois dictatorship,
something which justifies reducing the terms of struggle to fascism
vs. bourgeois democracy. This is what is suggested in this CRC
document as well: the use of "social fascist" to refer
to revisionist regimes is repeated and consistent throughout this
document, and when to this is contrasted "democratic upsurges"
then there is the clear implication that democracy - what is in
essence bourgeois democracy - is preferable to "social fascism"
and to open dictatorship in general - including, as we shall see,
the dictatorship of the proletariat.
But we
do not have to rely on drawing inferences from seemingly subtle
nuances. Soon enough this document openly repudiates the entire
historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat beginning
with the Soviet Revolution, and in opposition to this comes out
with a call for what is barely disguised bourgeois democracy.
When the document says, from the very first paragraph, that in
response to the "repercussions of these developments"
("the recent wave of democratic upsurges in former socialist
countries") communists "have to grasp the depth of these
problems and find out appropriate answers", it is already
becoming evident that this document regards the basic answers
that have been given by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to be insufficient
or incorrect and that what it intends is a fundamental re-evaluation
- and rejection - of what is soon referred to as "the traditional
Marxist-Leninist interpretation of capitalist restoration in the
former socialist countries". (par. 1.3)
This
is made more explicit and further elabourated before long:
"In
this situation, it is the duty of the genuine communists to look
back and identify the root cause for the problem faced by the
communist movement. Without answering the basic issues raised
in front of us no communist organisation can advance in its own
practice. Such basic questions if left unanswered for long, will
demoralize the cadres and weaken the organisation. Therefore,
the resolution of these problems, or at least attempts at resolution,
must be taken up as an urgent political task. It is in this spirit
that we call upon all genuine communists to re-examine the whole
history of the communist movement and the basic concepts we had
held aloft so far, so as to get a clear picture of the dictatorship
of the proletariat as practised until now". (par. 1.9)
So, let's look at this "re-examination".
First
let's begin with another quote from this document. Referring to
"the traditional Marxist-Leninist interpretation of capitalist
restoration", the document says, "This explanation is
basically correct in relation to the economic aspect of capitalist
restoration. But it is not sufficient to answer the principal
political issue raised by the masses in these countries. Their
major demand is the dismantling of the existing political system
which ensures the monopoly of the communist party." (par.
1.3)
To begin
with, this is a metaphysical separation of politics and economics
- there cannot be an explanation that is correct in regard to
the economic aspect but incorrect, or "insufficient"
in fundamental terms, in regard to the political aspect. Further,
referring, as the CRC document does, to "the masses"
and "their major demand" obscures the fact that this
"dismantling of the existing political system", while
it may have considerable mass support and express considerable
mass sentiment, is above all the demand of certain bourgeois forces,
both in the sense that they are the ones who have been the motive
force in promoting it and, more fundamentally, in the sense that
it corresponds to their particular interests and meets real needs
of theirs in the present situation.
Then the
document goes on: "But so far as the masses of these countries
are concerned, there is no difference between the essential structures
of this social fascist political system and those which existed
earlier when they were socialist." (par. 1.3) And the document
makes clear it agrees with this view: "Even in China, where
the Cultural Revolution gave rise to a new political situation,
the state structure under Deng is not essentially different from
the one which existed previously." (ibid)
What an
astounding statement! No difference?! This amounts to tailing
after the most backward among the masses and after the bourgeoisie,
which has long run this line. This is ridiculous when applied
to the Soviet Union - not only in the early years, in the time
of Lenin's leadership, but even as an assessment of the decades
during which Stalin was the leader of the Soviet Union. Let's
look at a few examples: the waging of the war against counterrevolutionary
forces and imperialist invaders in the first years of the Soviet
Republic; the lively struggles within the party throughout the
'20s (notwithstanding the fact that organized factions were outlawed
in the party); the mobilization of class-conscious contingents
and the mass upheavals that brought into being the collective
farms in the early 1930s; the mobilizations of the masses to carry
out socialist industrialization, despite certain definite erroneous
tendencies involved with this - all this and countless other examples
are clear evidence that there was a radical difference between
the Soviet Union when it was socialist and then when the revisionists
seized power and restored capitalism.
It is
true that, especially after major transformations had been carried
out in the economy of the Soviet Union (by the mid-1930s), there
was a real tendency for the Soviet Party and Stalin as its leader
to rely more on administrative measures, experts, and so on. Criticism
of this can and must be made - and has been made by Maoists -
and an understanding of the basis for these erroneous tendencies
must be deepened. But this can only be done, correctly, on the
basis of MLM principles and not those of bourgeois democracy.
As a guideline in this, not the howls of Trotskyites, Mensheviks,
Kautskyites and bourgeois democrats generally about the horrors
of bureaucracy under Stalin (and Lenin) but the following from
Mao Tsetung sets the correct orientation: "At that time Stalin
had nothing else to rely on except the masses, so he demanded
all-out mobilization of the party and the masses [Mao is referring
to the period of the late 1920s and early '30s]. Afterward, when
they had realized some gains this way, they became less reliant
on the masses." (Mao Tsetung, A Critique of Soviet Economics,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 119) But it must be kept
in mind, as Mao consistently did, that there is a world of difference
between Marxists who err - even seriously err - in the direction
of becoming less reliant on the masses and revisionists whose
rule is based on the exploitation and oppression of the masses.
It is
sheer idealism and metaphysics to argue that this radical difference
was not reflected throughout the institutions of society - in
what actually took place there and on what basis - and in the
relation of the masses to all this and their attitude toward it.
This argument
is shallow formalism. What it amounts to is saying that, because
there was the institutionalized role of the communist party as
the leader of all facets of political and economic life, therefore
it made no essential difference whether this leadership represented
the socialist or the capitalist road. And to justify this argument
in the name of "classless" masses who see "no difference"
between the "essential structures" of socialism and
capitalism is, at best, to tail after those strata and ideas among
the masses that are most in thrall to the outlook of the bourgeoisie.
And this
is all the more patently ridiculous when applied to China. Have
the authors of this CRC document "forgotten" the tremendous
transformations that were carried out on all levels of Chinese
society, first of all with the nationwide seizure of power and
even more so through the Cultural Revolution? Apparently they
have "forgotten" how the revisionists, having seized
power after Mao's death in 1976, set about systematically attacking
and reversing all this, dismantling these "socialist new
things" - things such as the revolutionary committees, from
the basic levels on up, which combined the masses and leaders
in actual forms of government and administration; the various
3-in-1 combinations, combining the masses, cadres and experts,
and so on, on all levels of society; the participation of the
workers in management and of managers as well as leading officials
in productive labour as an official policy; the May 7 cadre schools
where cadres of the party and state went to the countryside and
took part in productive labour as well as study and ideological
and political struggle; "open-door" education and science,
mobilizing and relying on the masses and combining experts with
the masses and practical experience with theoretical study; health
care oriented toward the masses, and in particular toward the
masses in the rural areas, and relying not simply on professional
medical personnel but "barefoot doctors" throughout
the countryside and so on.
Also,
very decisively, the revisionists have made fundamental changes
in the People's Liberation Army, abolishing its character as a
revolutionary army that relies on the conscious dynamic role of
its soldiers and the support of the broad masses. The revisionists
have replaced this with a "professionalized" bourgeois
armed force. It is this "new" PLA that carried out the
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Along with this, the revisionists
have reversed the earlier efforts, under revolutionary leadership,
to build up the militia precisely as an expression of the broad
masses themselves in arms, guided by a proletarian line (even
while it remained the case that the standing army could not be
abolished for some time, for all the reasons that will be discussed
here).3
Do the
authors of this CRC document really expect anyone who is familiar
with all this to believe that this constitutes no real difference
in the essential structures of society or that the masses - particularly
the masses of workers and peasants - are unaware of these differences
or consider them insignificant?! When, in accordance with the
"essential structures" and the prevailing proletarian
ideology in socialist China, the workers on the Shanghai docks
raised the slogan "Be masters of the wharves, not slaves
to tonnage"; when the workers in an enterprise marched into
the management office, demanding of the management personnel,
"Where are your hammers" - where is your participation,
together with the workers, in productive labour? - was that not
a radical difference from the situation in China today, and don't
the masses of workers know the difference? When the people's communes
in the countryside were broken up and rich-peasant farming promoted,
while the policy of giving priority to agriculture in the national
economy was undermined; when "serve the people" was
replaced by "to get rich is glorious" as a guiding principle
- did not all this represent a radical reversal which the masses
of working people could not help but recognize? Once again, when
this CRC document speaks of "the masses", it apparently
has in mind the most backward and above all those among the intellectuals
and other privileged strata who are most influenced by "classical"
bourgeois-democratic ideas and bourgeois ideology in general.
The Paris
Commune in Perspective: The Bolshevik and Chinese Revolutions
as its Continuation and Deepening
Next,
let's turn to the review in this CRC document of what Marx summed
up from the Paris Commune, in his monumental work The Civil War
in France, particularly regarding the abolition of the standing
army and its replacement by the armed people themselves and the
fact that all officials in the Commune were elected and could
be recalled by the votes of the people, through universal suffrage.
These sections of the CRC document also recall how Lenin upheld
these essential lessons in The State and Revolution (and some
other writings in the period just before and for a period after
the October Revolution), but then, even under Lenin, the CRC document
argues, there began a basic departure from this path (see paragraphs
2.1-6.6).
First,
some "historical overview" is required. Here we have
to call attention once more to the fact that in the experience
of the Soviet Union (and of socialism generally so far), it has
not proved possible to fully implement the policies adopted in
the Paris Commune - and, to a large degree, in the very beginning
of the Soviet Republic - policies to which Marx had attached decisive
importance. To focus on a key aspect of this, it has not been
possible to abolish the standing army as an institution and to
replace it with the armed masses themselves. This is largely owing
to what has been spoken to before: the fact that revolutions leading
to socialism have taken place not in industrially developed capitalist
countries where the proletariat is the majority of the population
(or at least is the largest class), as Marx and Engels had foreseen,
but in technologically backward countries with large peasant populations
where the proletariat is a small minority; these revolutions have
occurred not in a number of countries all at once, but more or
less in one country at a time (leaving aside the experience of
the Eastern European countries in the aftermath of World War 2,
where there was some transformation in aspects of social relations
but there was never a real socialist transformation of society);
and socialist states have existed in a world still dominated by
imperialism.
As for
why it has not been possible so far - and is very unlikely to
be possible for some time into the future - for socialist countries
to abolish the standing army and replace it with the armed masses
as a whole, it can be summarized this way: To do this will require
an advancement in the transformation of production relations (and
social relations generally), as well as in the development of
the productive forces, to the point where the masses as a whole,
and not just a small part of them, can be organized and trained
in military affairs on a level that is really sufficient to deal
not only with "domestic" counterrevolutionaries but
beyond that the armed forces of the remaining imperialist powers
and other reactionary states. When that point is reached, there
will in fact no longer be a need for a section of the masses -
a special body of armed people - who specialize in and devote
their main activity to military affairs: the standing army can
then be abolished and replaced with the armed masses. But, again,
no socialist state that has so far existed has achieved or even
come anywhere near that point.
Marx,
in his writings on the Paris Commune (and Lenin when he wrote
The State and Revolution before the October Revolution), did not
have this experience to sum up. To a significant degree, while
the fundamental orientation in these works concerning the dictatorship
of the proletariat must be upheld, many particular aspects of
their analysis reflect an insufficient understanding of the intensity,
complexity, and duration of the struggle to carry out the communist
transformation of society - and the world - after the dictatorship
of the proletariat has been established in one or a number of
countries. After all, the Paris Commune only lasted two months
and only in parts - though very important parts - of France, and
not in the country as a whole.
To highlight, in a somewhat provocative way, the historical limitations
of the Paris Commune, it is useful to repeat what I wrote in Democracy:
Can't We Do Better Than That?:
"In this regard, the following argument by James Miller concerning
Marx's view of the Paris Commune of 1871 is worth citing:
"'the
insurgents of 1871 were remarkably like the Parisian insurgents
of 1792, 1830, and 1848: artisans, journeymen, apprentices, independent
producers, professionals, and only a few labourers in the new
factory industries. Though the Commune of 1871 may be regarded
as the last efflorescence of the French popular culture of politics
Rousseau helped to define three generations before, it is far
more difficult, particularly in the light of modern historiography,
to find in it a harbinger of an international proletarian revolution.'
(Miller, Rousseau, pp. 260-61)
"While
Miller's observations are one-sided and his last sentence in particular
is wrong - it is Miller's bourgeois bias that makes it hard for
him to find in the 1871 Paris Commune 'a harbinger of an international
proletarian revolution' - nevertheless, his comments are not without
any validity. They do reflect the fact that even this Paris Commune
embodied both elements of the old, bourgeois revolution as well
as of the new, proletarian revolution and that it could not, as
such, serve as a fully developed model of a proletarian state
(especially one in the early stages of the international proletarian
revolution and surrounded by powerful bourgeois states)."
(Avakian, Democracy, pp. 38-39, footnote 63)
We cannot
take an idealist and metaphysical approach of insisting that reality
must be bent to conform to what was projected by Marx (and Lenin,
before the October Revolution in particular) on the basis of this
very significant but also very limited experience of the Paris
Commune. If we are going to do that, we might as well insist that
the proletariat leap immediately from capitalism to full-blown
communism and thereby avoid all the contradictions involved in
the socialist transition and the dictatorship of the proletariat!
What we should insist on is evaluating the line and practice guiding
the states where such revolutions have occurred to see whether
in fact they are consistent with the fundamental orientation set
forth by Marx through his summation on the Paris Commune - whether
the lines, policies, institutions, and ideas that have characterized
those societies have overall led in the direction of transforming
society toward the abolition of classes and, with them, the state
(and the party). On the basis of these criteria, we must once
again reaffirm "the traditional Marxist-Leninist[-Maoist]
interpretation" that the Soviet Union under the leadership
of Lenin and Stalin, and China under the leadership of Mao, represented
the continuation of the Paris Commune.
One other
point must be addressed here - another way in which the expectations
of Lenin with regard to the character of the proletarian revolution
have not been fully borne out. In the first year after the October
Revolution, Lenin wrote that:
"The
misfortune of previous revolutions was that the revolutionary
enthusiasm of the people, which sustained them in their state
of tension and gave them the strength to suppress ruthlessly the
elements of disintegration, did not last long. The social, i.e.,
the class, reason for this instability of the revolutionary enthusiasm
of the people was the weakness of the proletariat, which alone
is able (if it is sufficiently numerous, class-conscious and disciplined)
to win over to its side the majority of the working and exploited
people (the majority of the poor, to speak more simply and popularly)
and retain power sufficiently long to suppress completely all
the exploiters as well as all the elements of disintegration.
"It
was this historical experience of all revolutions, it was this
world-historic - economic and political - lesson that Marx summed
up when he gave his short, sharp, concise and expressive formula:
dictatorship of the proletariat." ("The Immediate Tasks
of the Soviet Government", LCW, vol. 27, pp. 264-65, emphasis
in original)
Here Lenin
was contrasting a revolution led by the proletariat with earlier
revolutions in which the proletariat was not able to win leadership
and carry the struggle as far as the overthrow of capitalism.
But, in certain significant aspects, what Lenin says here - concerning
the difficulty of maintaining the revolutionary enthusiasm of
the masses - has also proven to apply to the proletarian revolution
itself.
This is
linked to what has been the actual process of the proletarian
revolution so far in the world (discussed above) and the related
fact that the transition from capitalism to communism has proven
to be a much more long-term, complex, and tortuous process than
had been previously envisioned, not only by Marx and Engels but
also by Lenin himself before the October Revolution and in the
period immediately afterward (it was in the early 1920s, in the
last few years of his life, that Lenin more fully confronted the
fact that the Soviet Revolution would very probably have to "go
it alone" for a period of time).
All this,
in turn, is bound up with the fact that there is a wave-like character
to the class struggle under socialism and in particular a wave-like
character to mass upsurges to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat
and carry the revolution forward under this dictatorship. To return
to Lenin's statement about maintaining the revolutionary energy
and enthusiasm of the masses, the point can be put this way: as
it has turned out, with the socialist transition period and the
dictatorship of the proletariat lasting much longer than expected,
and with the initial socialist revolutions not being closely followed
by other revolutions in more technologically advanced societies;
with the socialist states continuing to exist in a situation of
being encircled by imperialism - with all of these factors that
have been discussed, it is not realistic to expect nor has it
been the case that the masses have been able to maintain a high
pitch and intensity of revolutionary enthusiasm and energy on
a continual basis. In fact, the expectation that they could is
contradicted not only by experience but also by the principles
of dialectics.
It is
because of, and as part of, this contradictory nature of the whole
process of transition from capitalism to communism, worldwide,
that the role of the masses as rulers of society and owners of
the means of production under socialism is real but is not absolute
- it is relative and sharply contradictory - and is both expressed
directly through their own involvement in all spheres of society
and is mediated through a number of instrumentalities, above all
the state and the vanguard party.
Once again,
no formalistic approach - no insistence on formal democracy as
the essence of the matter - can even seriously address, let alone
resolve, this contradiction. And to insist on such an approach
is in fact to act in accordance with the principles of bourgeois
democracy and with the interests of the bourgeoisie in attacking
and undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat precisely
on the basis that, because it does not conform in every important
respect to the principles of formal democracy, it therefore represents
a negation of democracy, even for those in whose name it is exercised.
Let's
turn to more particular points on this.
The document
says: "This overall programme for seizure of power was implemented
by the second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies held on October 25-26, 1917." (par. 5.2)
But, it
is important to note, the Bolsheviks did not wait for this Congress
to seize power - they initiated the armed insurrection before
this Congress. As is recounted in the History of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), this All-Russia Congress
of Soviets opened "when the uprising in Petrograd was already
in the full flush of victory and the power in the capital [Petrograd]
had actually passed into the hands of the Petrograd Soviet".
(HCPSU, Moscow, 1939, Chapter Seven, part 6) Trotsky, among others,
opposed this, standing on the formality that the armed insurrection
should be declared by this All-Russia Congress of Soviets. All
this is linked with the point made earlier (in the summary of
general conclusions) about how the insistence on formal democracy
that marks the CRC document would lead logically to declaring
the Bolshevik-led armed insurrection to be a violation of democracy
and a failure to rely on the masses, through their representative
institutions, to carry out the seizure of power. This is very
much in line with the arguments Trotsky made at the time; and
if such arguments had been listened to, that would very probably
have killed the armed insurrection, and then there never would
have been an October Revolution to argue about.
The CRC
document allows that the Bolshevik decision to withdraw from the
Constituent Assembly "was justifiable in the sense that the
power of the Soviets which had emerged through revolution was
really representing the political will of the vast majority of
the people". And the document seems to say it was justified
for the Constituent Assembly to then be dissolved, through an
act of the Central Committee of the All-Russia Soviet - an act
taken on the initiative of the Bolsheviks (see par. 5.4).
Note well:
"was really representing the political will of the vast majority
of the people". This is correct - and, as stressed before,
this also applied to the carrying out of the armed insurrection,
even though that was not strictly done through the decision of
the All-Russia Congress of Soviets or with the formal approval
of the majority of the masses, through their elected organs. In
fact this criterion - whether or not something conforms to the
basic interests but also to the "political will" of
the masses of people - is the essence of the matter and far more
decisive than questions of formal democracy. But it is precisely
this criterion that this document "forgets" - abandons
and replaces with criteria of formal democracy - in its "re-examination"
of the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat
- no, more, of "the whole history of the communist movement
and the basic concepts we had held aloft so far".
Then the
document says: "But, what was developing...[was that] the
new political system was gradually coming under the control of
the communist party." (par. 5.7) Here is where the argument
about "the dictatorship of the party" begins to become
more full-blown. The document goes on to assert that:
"Lenin
categorically declared the role of the communist party thus: 'After
two and a half years of the Soviet power we came out in the Communist
International and told the world that the dictatorship of the
proletariat would not work except through the Communist Party.'
(p. 199, vol. 32, Collected Works) Now the circle is complete.
The practical programme for establishing the dictatorship of the
proletariat which started with the attractive slogan, 'All power
to the Soviets' ended with the reality that the dictatorship of
the proletariat was exercised through the Communist Party, where
the Soviets became mere cogwheels in the machine. Even though
Kautsky's criticism was coming from the angle of bourgeois parliamentarism,
the fact remains that in the present day world situation, when
a qualitatively new political system as envisaged in a genuine
dictatorship of the proletariat has not emerged as a historical
reality, it is not the class, but its party that actually governs."
(par. 5.8)
Quite
a few assertions, and distortions, are made here, touching on
fundamental questions, so it is necessary to go into them in some
depth. First, we cannot let pass the seemingly innocent clause
"Even though Kautsky's criticism was coming from the angle
of bourgeois parliamentarism". In fact the "even though"
here is just the point - Kautsky's objection to the dictatorship
of the proletariat as practised under the leadership of the Bolsheviks,
from the time of Lenin on, was completely bound up with "bourgeois
parliamentarism" - it was precisely the standpoint of such
"parliamentarism" that caused Kautsky to distort what
this dictatorship of the proletariat was and to oppose it. And
it is fundamentally the same standpoint that informs (or misinforms)
the distortion and repudiation of the whole historical experience
of the dictatorship of the proletariat in this document. In fact,
this document is marked by Kautskyite logic throughout, "even
though" it does not openly, fully, embrace Kautsky.
This is
reflected in the distorted and tortured use of the quotes from
Lenin and Stalin in this section of the CRC document. First, let's
look at this document's treatment of the statements by Lenin on
the essential point that, as Lenin plainly puts it, the dictatorship
of the proletariat will not work without the leading role of the
communist party.
In the
very same work of Lenin's (and on the very same page) from which
the CRC document quotes, Lenin makes clear that this does not
mean that the party exercises dictatorship instead of the proletariat,
or that the party is somehow separated from the proletariat in
the exercise of this dictatorship. He makes clear that it is the
proletariat that exercises dictatorship, but that it cannot do
this without the leadership of the party. Again, on the very page
cited, and throughout this work (Lenin's speeches at the 10th
Party Congress in March 1921), Lenin stresses that it is an anarchist
and syndicalist tendency which cannot see the unity between the
leadership of the party and the exercise of dictatorship by the
masses of proletarians; and that accusations about party dictatorship
are arising in the context of and to a considerable degree because
of the influence of the atmosphere of petit-bourgeois disintegration
that then existed in the Soviet Republic as a result of the long
civil war and the massive dislocations and economic ruin that
resulted from that war and in its wake (the class position and
outlook of many workers was being undermined in these conditions;
masses of peasants were being ruined; and the economic links between
workers and peasants, city and countryside, had not yet been firmly
re-established and recast along new lines). This reply of Lenin
to his critics at that time stands very well as the answer to
the authors of this CRC document, some 70 years later.
As for
the statement that "the Soviets became mere cogwheels in
the machine", apparently the authors of this document think
they have made a profound point by adding the word "mere"
here. But, as Lenin explains it, there is nothing "mere"
about it. He makes clear that while, on the one hand, "the
Party, shall we say, absorbs the vanguard of the proletariat,
and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat",
at the same time, the functions of government "have to be
performed through the medium of special institutions which are
also of a new type, namely, the Soviets". ("The Trade
Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes", LCW,
vol. 32, p. 20) The authors of this document actually quote this
statement from Lenin, but they do not grasp its significance -
apparently they are so put off by the use of the metaphor "cogwheels"
that to them it is of little importance that Lenin says that the
Soviets perform the functions of government and that these Soviets
are "special institutions" and are "of a new type"
(note: they are not the same old institutions of bourgeois society
but represent a radically new form of state power and are performing
the functions of government). How, and with what outlook, is it
possible to miss the historic significance of this?
Yes, Lenin
does frankly discuss the fact that "in all capitalist countries
(and not only over here, in one of the most backward) the proletariat
is still so divided, so degraded, and so corrupted in parts (by
imperialism in some countries) that an organisation taking in
the whole proletariat [here Lenin is referring to the trade unions
in particular] cannot directly exercise proletarian dictatorship.
It can be exercised only by a vanguard that has absorbed the revolutionary
energy of the class." (ibid, p. 21) And then Lenin goes on
to make the infamous statement that, "The whole is like an
arrangement of cogwheels", and, "It cannot work without
a number of 'transmission belts' running from the vanguard to
the mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass
of the working people." (ibid)
One can
only ask here: what is wrong with this? Where, in any of this,
is there the notion that the party exercises the dictatorship
of the proletariat and the functions of government in place of
the masses? The only objection that can be raised - and the one
that is in fact being raised in this CRC document - is that Lenin
insists on the leading role of the party. You may object to that
if you wish - and certainly the bourgeoisie, and various Mensheviks,
social-democrats and so on, from the time of Lenin on down, have
strenuously objected to it - but anyone claiming to be a communist
and to uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat in principle
must show how the masses can in fact exercise the dictatorship
of the proletariat and prevent the restoration of capitalism without
the leading role of the party that is, without the institutionalized
leading role of the party. The one is the same as the other: recognizing
this leading role in words while insisting it not be an institutionalized
leading role amounts in reality to the same thing as negating
this leading role altogether. We shall see how this CRC document
aims to show precisely that the masses would be better off without
the (institutionalized) leading role of the party under socialism,
and how the document fails miserably - as it must - to show this.
To put
this whole question of the role of the Soviets (and other mass
organizations) in relation to the Communist Party in broader,
and more historical, perspective, it is necessary to "demystify"
this whole thing a bit. In the first place, although in a real
and profound sense the Soviets were the creation of the masses,
this was never a question of some "pure" or purely "spontaneous"
creation of the masses. The Soviets were the product of the class
struggle, in which the masses were influenced by a number of different
political forces, including the Bolsheviks and also the Mensheviks
and a number of others. And within the Soviets, from their inception,
there was continual and often fierce struggle between representatives
of different trends, ultimately representing different class interests.
A concentrated
focus of this struggle was the question of what, after all, was
the political role of the Soviets and what process they were to
be part of. To put it simply, the Bolsheviks saw in the Soviets
a means for the masses to be organized for the overthrow of the
old order, the smashing of the old state machinery and the exercise
of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the Mensheviks and others
rejected and resisted this - their view of the Soviets flowed
from their petit-bourgeois outlook - and when and to the degree
that they led or influenced the Soviets, this was in the direction
of turning them into mass organizations oriented toward social-democratic
and/or anarchist programs, in opposition to the seizure and exercise
of state power by the proletariat. Struggle over these fundamental
differences went on within the Soviets before and right up to
the October insurrection; and it went on, in different forms,
after power was seized.
It is
true that, not long after the seizure of power, Lenin recognized
the need for an adjustment in the role of the Soviets and the
relation of the Party to them, which is reflected in the statements
by Lenin that the CRC document cites. But this has to be understood
in the context of the concrete events of the time as well as in
a larger historical perspective. As noted earlier, this was a
situation of desperate civil war and then, even with victory in
that war, of massive disruption, dislocation, and disintegration,
economically and politically. In these circumstances, many of
the most advanced elements within the Soviets had volunteered
to become leaders and commissars of a Red Army that had to be
created, almost literally, overnight and hurled into decisive
battle. Others were mobilized on different but also decisive fronts
of struggle: on trouble-shooting missions where crises of various
kinds had erupted; to help in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries;
to help staff the food administration, factory management, etc.;
and to join and build up the Party.
The fact
is that, by the end of the civil war, tens of thousands of workers,
soldiers, and sailors held responsible administrative positions
(and this policy of absorbing advanced masses into the governing
apparatus would continue with the collectivization and industrialization
drives later, under Stalin's leadership). But it was also a fact
that, as a result of all this, many of the best and most far-sighted
leaders of the proletariat were enlisted not in the Soviets but
in other institutions. And, along with this, there was a shift
in the relative weight of the Soviets, as compared to these other
institutions, including especially the Party, in the actual administration
of society and the overall exercise of the dictatorship of the
proletariat.
This is
what Lenin is speaking to with his much-maligned analogy about
cogwheels, conveyor belts, and so on, and his more general statement
about the leading role of the party in the exercise of the dictatorship
of the proletariat: Lenin is summing up, from the actual experience
of that crucial period, that it is not possible to exercise this
dictatorship simply through the Soviets or without systematic
(institutionalized) party leadership of the Soviets (and other
institutions and mass organizations). But he is not saying that
the Soviets will no longer play a decisive role - he makes clear
that they will continue to be relied on to perform the functions
of government. He is not saying the party can replace the Soviets
(or those other institutions and mass organizations) in the exercise
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He is not saying the leaders,
rather than the masses, are decisive in the exercise of this dictatorship.4
Here it
seems important to speak to another practice of the Paris Commune
that Marx identified as a matter of decisive importance: the "replaceability"
or "revocability" of leaders. Once again the historical
experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat has shown that
it has not been possible to apply this principle in the strict
sense in which Marx spoke of it, drawing from the Paris Commune,
where officials were elected by the masses and subject to recall
by them at any time.
It must
be said straight-up that it does not get to the essence of things
if the masses have the formal right to replace leaders, when the
social conditions (contradictions) are such that some people are
less "replaceable" than others. To give an extreme example,
if the masses in socialist China had had the right to vote Mao
out of office, and if they had exercised that right foolishly
and voted him out, they would have been confronted with the stark
fact that there wouldn't have been another Mao to take his place.
In reality, they would find themselves in a situation where someone
would have to play a role which, from a formal standpoint, would
be the same as that of Mao; that is, someone would have to occupy
leading positions like that, and the division of labour in society
- in particular between mental and manual labour - would mean
that only a small section of people would then be capable of playing
such a role. Voting Mao out of office would only mean that somebody
less qualified - or, even worse, someone representing the bourgeoisie
instead of the proletariat - would be playing that leadership
role. You can't get around this, and adhering to the strictures
of formal democracy would be no help at all.5
This,
of course, does not mean that the division between masses and
leaders should be made into an absolute, rather than being restricted
and finally overcome; nor still less does it mean that the leaders
and not the masses should be seen as the real masters of socialist
society. In revolutionary China great emphasis was given to the
role of the masses in criticizing and in an overall sense supervising
the leaders. And this found expression on a whole new level through
the Cultural Revolution, which, Mao stressed, represented something
radically new - "a form, a method, to arouse the broad masses
to expose our dark aspect openly, in an all-round way and from
below". (Mao, cited in Report to the Ninth National Congress
of the Communist Party of China, Peking: Foreign Languages Press
[FLP], p. 27) Yet, as important and pathbreaking as this was,
the fact remains that throughout the socialist transition there
will not only be the need for leaders - and an objective contradiction
between leaders and led - but there will be the possibility for
this to be transformed into relations of exploitation and oppression.
Given
the contradictions that characterize the transition from capitalism
to communism, worldwide, if the party did not play the leading
role that it has within the proletarian state, that role would
be played by other organized groups - bourgeois cliques - and
soon enough the state would no longer be proletarian, but bourgeois.
It must be said bluntly that, from the point of view of the proletariat,
the problem with the ruling parties in the revisionist countries
is not that they have had a "monopoly" of political
power but that they have exercised that political power to restore
and maintain capitalism. The problem is that they are not revolutionary,
not really communist - and therefore they do not rely on and mobilize
the masses to exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat, and
to continue the revolution under this dictatorship.
As spoken
to above, through the Cultural Revolution in China new means and
methods were developed for attacking the differences and inequalities
left over from the old society - means and methods for restricting
bourgeois right to the greatest degree possible at any given time
in accordance with the material and ideological conditions. Yet
it will remain a fundamental contradiction throughout the socialist
transition period that there are these underlying differences
and inequalities and their expression in bourgeois right, which
constitute the material basis for classes, class struggle and
the danger of capitalist restoration. This is a problem that cannot
even be fundamentally addressed, let alone solved, by a formalistic
approach. It has to be addressed through waging class struggle
under the leadership of revolutionary communists - making this
the key link - and in no other way. And this is exactly how it
was approached under Mao's leadership.
Specifically
with regard to income distribution, through the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution a basic orientation and, flowing from it,
concrete policies were adopted to gradually narrow wage differentials
- in accordance with the development of common affluence and mainly
by raising the bottom levels up. As an important part of this,
there was an orientation of keeping the difference in pay between
government officials and ordinary workers as little as possible
- the fundamental spirit of the Paris Commune on this was proclaimed
and upheld in practice - although such pay differences still existed
and were viewed as something that had to be further reduced. But,
once again, as important as it was to apply such principles, in
correspondence with the actual conditions at any given time, this
could not change the essential fact that, for a long historical
period, there will persist differences and inequalities in socialist
society which contain within them the potential to develop into
class antagonism if a proletarian line is not in command in dealing
with them.
The Exercise
of Power in Socialist Society: Leadership, the Masses and Proletarian
Dictatorship
With this
in mind, let's return to the question of the "dictatorship
of the party". The CRC document goes on to say that, "The
position taken by Lenin in relation to the party and the dictatorship
of the proletariat is not very different from the position Stalin
adopted and implemented." (par. 5.9) This is essentially
true - although this involves sharp contradiction, it is true
in its principal aspect that Stalin upheld and applied Leninist
principle in leading the dictatorship of the proletariat in the
Soviet Union - and this is to the credit of Stalin. But to cast
Stalin, and Lenin, in a bad light and buttress its accusations
against "the dictatorship of the party", the document
says that, "Stalin argued that the dictatorship of the proletariat
is 'in essence' the dictatorship of the party. And in exercising
this dictatorship, the party uses the Soviets as mere transition
belts like the trade unions, Youth league, etc." (par. 5.9)
It is remarkable how the CRC document quotes this one phrase from
Stalin, but it does not quote what he says, at great length, before
and after it. First, here is the immediate context in which Stalin
uses this phrase:
"The
highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here, in
the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
for example, is the fact that not a single important political
or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other
mass organizations without guiding directives from the Party.
In this sense it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat
is, in essence, the 'dictatorship' of its vanguard, the 'dictatorship'
of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat."
(J. V. Stalin, "Concerning Questions of Leninism", part
V, in Problems of Leninism [POL], Peking: FLP, p. 184, emphasis
in original)
Stalin
then goes on to discuss, for literally page, after page, after
page, how this must not be taken to mean that "a sign of
equality can be put between the dictatorship of the proletariat
and the leading role of the Party (the 'dictatorship' of the Party),
that the former can be identified with the latter, that the latter
[the Party] can be substituted for the former [the proletariat]".
(ibid, emphasis in original) He explicitly argues that, "To
say 'in essence' does not mean 'wholly'" (ibid, p. 185),
and he discusses in some detail why this is so. He not only polemicizes
at length against a line of attempting to substitute the Party
for the masses in the exercise of this dictatorship but specifically
says that, "whoever identifies the leading role of the Party
with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes the Party
for the Soviets, i.e., for the state power". (ibid, p. 189,
emphasis added)
Stalin
stresses the importance of applying the mass line. He insists
that the Party must maintain correct "mutual relations"
with the masses, relations of "mutual confidence", and
this means "that the Party must closely heed the voice of
the masses; that it must pay careful attention to the revolutionary
instinct of the masses; that it must study the practice of the
struggle of the masses and on this basis test the correctness
of its own policy; that, consequently, it must not only teach
the masses, but also learn from them". (ibid, pp. 190-91)
He warns against any tendency to turn the leading role of the
party into a dictatorship over the masses and emphatically states:
"Can
the Party's leadership be imposed on the class by force? No, it
cannot. At all events, such a leadership cannot be at all durable.
If the Party wants to remain the party of the proletariat it must
know that it is, primarily and principally, the guide, the leader,
the teacher of the working class.... Can one consider the Party
as the real leader of the class if its policy is wrong, if its
policy comes into collision with the interests of the class? Of
course not. In such cases the Party, if it wants to remain the
leader, must reconsider its policy, must correct its policy, must
acknowledge its mistake and correct it." (ibid, pp. 196-7,
emphasis in original)
And so
on - once again for page, after page, after page, Stalin elaborates
these decisive points in opposition to the notion that the Party
can substitute for the masses in the exercise of the dictatorship
of the proletariat or even exercise dictatorship against the will
and interests of the masses, by imposing its leadership on them
through force.
But none
of this is dealt with in this CRC document, which quotes the "in
essence" phrase, adds a statement about how Stalin said the
Soviets were used by the Party "as mere transmission belts"
and leaves it at that. It is difficult to believe that the authors
of this document did not even bother to read the whole passage
in question - and still more difficult to believe that, if they
did, they willfully chose to ignore all that Stalin goes on to
say about this question. But, once again, these are the typical
methods of those who oppose the historical experience of the dictatorship
of the proletariat from the standpoint of bourgeois democracy
- even of a radical or "socialist" variety - these are
the methods one is forced to adopt once one repudiates "the
basic concepts we had held aloft so far" and succumbs instead
to bourgeois logic.
It could
be argued that, even with everything Stalin says about this question,
along the lines I have cited here, still the formulation that
the dictatorship of the proletariat is "in essence"
the dictatorship of the party is a rather unfortunate one. There
is, I believe, some truth to this: ironically, this formulation
itself can be interpreted as cutting against the very relationship
that Stalin was insisting on - the relationship in which the masses
exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership
of the party. It could be further argued that this formulation
can reflect, or at least encourage, a tendency toward not relying
on the masses, toward a "top-down" orientation. And,
especially in light of experience - positive as well as negative
- since that time, it must be said that there is some truth to
this as well. Such a tendency did become rather pronounced in
Stalin. This, however, was not a straight-line process but one
in which a more correct orientation on Stalin's part was, in certain
significant aspects, turned into its opposite, as Mao pointed
out.
But the
CRC document treats this as if, from the start, Stalin had an
orientation of not relying on the masses; as if, following in
Lenin's footsteps, Stalin was advocating and carrying out a line
of replacing the dictatorship of the masses with the dictatorship
of the party. In fact, this is a line Lenin firmly opposed; it
is a line Stalin rejected - explicitly, emphatically, and with
extensive argumentation - in the very work the CRC document cites.
In that work Stalin, following Lenin, puts forward the correct,
dialectical view of the relation between the party and the masses,
a relation in which the party is the leading force and the masses
are the motive force.
The CRC document takes off from its distorted use of Stalin's
"in essence" statement to draw this conclusion:
"From
this position, the nature and course of development of the bureaucratisation
process and the emergence of new classes can easily be traced.
Under such a political structure, the absence of a conscious policy
to restrict bourgeois right and the increasing reliance on material
incentive for promoting production laid the economic foundation
for bureaucratic capitalism. And when we reach the stage of Mao's
finding that under the dictatorship of the proletariat the bourgeoisie
emerges within the party itself, the picture becomes complete."
(par. 5.9, emphasis added)
This is
opposed to the analysis Lenin made of the basis for "the
emergence of new classes", and in particular the bourgeoisie,
under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin pointed to Soviet
government employees and the strata of intellectual workers in
general, as well as to the persistence of small-scale production,
as main sources of a new bourgeoisie; but his analysis was rooted
in a materialist estimate of the social and class contradictions
remaining in socialist society - it did not look for the source
or origins of the new bourgeoisie in "the bureaucracy"
as such. Lenin was right - on the right track - the CRC document
is completely off.
As noted
earlier, Mao developed Lenin's beginning analysis of this problem
more fully, into a comprehensive line. The CRC document puts forward
an "inversion" of this line - and of reality. It does
not proceed from the underlying contradictions in the economic
base (the remaining differences and inequalities, the persistence
of commodity relations, etc.) - in the context of the international
situation - and then examine the superstructure (in particular
the governing institutions and ideas) in that light, but in fact
proceeds from a distorted analysis of contradictions in the superstructure
and superimposes this on the economic base. It reverses the relation
of politics and economics, the relation between the superstructure
and the economic base. It may seem superficially similar to the
Maoist analysis but is actually the opposite of it: it is idealist
while the Maoist method is materialist. It makes bureaucratic
deviations - some real, many invented in this document - the basis
for, or the essential factor in creating, the "economic foundation"
of "bureaucratic capitalism".
This idealist
viewpoint on the basis for the engendering of the new bourgeoisie
in socialist society and the danger of capitalist restoration
is repeated a number of times in the CRC document, including in
the remarkable assertion that:
"he
[Lenin] comes to the solution of replacing dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie by the dictatorship of the proletariat by simply reversing
the dictatorship of the minority over the majority into a dictatorship
of the majority over the minority. Hence no qualitative break
with the old structure is required. Ultimately, the old structure
which concentrates political power in the hands of the state leadership,
leads to the emergence and strengthening of a new ruling class
from among the working class and the ranks and leadership of its
party itself." (par. 9.2, emphasis added)
Here it
can be seen even more clearly how the CRC document treats the
superstructure - actually a distorted view of the superstructure
in socialist society - as the decisive element in "the emergence
and strengthening of a new ruling class".
Mao rejected
the mechanical materialist "theory of productive forces",
which sees the productive forces and the economic base of society
as determinant in some kind of absolute way - which does not recognize
the dynamic role of the superstructure in reacting back upon the
economic base nor the role of revolution in the superstructure
and the relations of production in unleashing and developing the
productive forces. But Mao opposed this mechanical materialism
with dialectical materialism - not with idealism6 - not with a
line that denies the ultimately decisive role of material reality
and specifically of the economic base in relation to the superstructure
in society. The CRC document, however, under the banner of opposing
"the economic reductionist position" (par. 7.4), misconstrues
Mao's line and in fact denies the decisive role of economics in
relation to politics (and we shall also see later how the CRC
document further repudiates Marxist materialism in the name of
rejecting "class reductionism").
Again,
the Maoist line identifies the essential material basis for capitalist
restoration as residing in the remaining contradictions in the
social relations, above all the production relations, within socialist
society, as well as the international relations. It focuses on
the superstructure fundamentally in relation to these contradictions.
The line of this CRC document makes such contradictions in the
economic base a secondary matter, subordinate to the supposedly
decisive element: the existence of "such a political structure",
i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat which is not based on
formal democracy.
Next let's
turn to the discussion in the CRC document about the struggle
between Trotsky and Stalin and how Trotsky's criticisms failed
to "answer any of the basic questions faced by the dictatorship
of the proletariat" but incidentally - and it is treated
as incidentally - Stalin was right in the "major controversy"
with Trotsky about the possibility of building socialism in one
country. (See par. 5.10)
But how
could Stalin have been correct - how could he have led in the
building of socialism in the Soviet Union - if he was responsible
(more than anyone else) for imposing a dictatorship of the party
over the masses? What kind of socialism can be built under such
a dictatorship? Or perhaps there never was any socialist society
established in the Soviet Union? Or in China either, following
the same logic. Then what was the economic base of these countries?
Capitalist all along? Or something else - in which case you end
up with the same basic analysis of Trotsky after all.
Once again,
this whole line of argument metaphysically treats the relation
of economics and politics, the base and the superstructure, although
there is a certain "consistency" to it: if this line
were applied, it would lead to both the economic base and the
superstructure being dominated by the bourgeoisie. Perhaps ironically,
this line seeks to replace the basic revisionist formula - state
ownership plus the institutionalized leading role of the party
guarantees or equals socialism - with the formula: mass democracy,
on the strict Paris Commune model, plus the "traditional
Marxist-Leninist" approach to socialist economics, is the
basis for preventing capitalist restoration. Neither of these
formulas is "better" than the other - they are both
wrong.
For all
the reasons that have been previously discussed, the abandonment
of the institutionalized leading role of the party will lead to
capitalist restoration just as much as the insistence that this
institutionalized leading role will in and of itself guarantee
against capitalist restoration, regardless of the line of the
party in relation to the actual material contradictions faced
by the dictatorship of the proletariat, both within the particular
country and internationally. Here it is important to recall what
was said earlier: if the party does not play such an institutionalized
leading role, some other force will, in fact bourgeois cliques,
and they will institutionalize the rule of the bourgeoisie. This
is owing to the underlying contradictions of socialist society,
and under these kinds of conditions it is not possible for the
formal structures of the Paris Commune to be implemented in every
detail, and if they are, as Mao said, it will make too much room
for the bourgeoisie, which will come to dominate them and dominate
all of society.
Let's
move on to this document's summation of what it calls Rosa Luxemburg's
"piercing criticism" of the dictatorship of the proletariat
in the Soviet Union (see section 6). According to Luxemburg, the
Bolsheviks were fundamentally wrong, because like Kautsky, they
"'oppose dictatorship to democracy'". And, argues Luxemburg,
the Bolshevik position is "'far removed from a genuine socialist
policy'" - she actually says that the Bolsheviks "'decide
in favour of dictatorship in contradistinction to democracy, and
thereby in favour of dictatorship of a handful of persons, that
is, in favour of dictatorship on the bourgeois model'". (Luxemburg,
as cited in the CRC document, par. 6.1, from Rosa Luxemburg Speaks,
New York, 1970, p. 393, emphasis added) This is yet again the
"classical outlook" of the petit bourgeois who stands
midway between the bourgeois and the proletarian and recognizes
in the dictatorship of both a subordination of petit-bourgeois
interest to the interests of the ruling class, but who does not
readily recognize the fundamental difference between these two
dictatorships.
The
CRC document continues with its presentation of Luxemburg's "piercing
criticism" as follows:
"She
observed that, the model of dictatorship of the proletariat established
under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky [sic], after the October
Revolution, was actually trying to eliminate democracy as such,
in the name of 'the cumbersome nature of democratic electoral
bodies'.... 'To be sure every democratic institution has its limits
and shortcomings, things which it doubtless shares with all other
human institutions. But the remedy which Trotsky and Lenin have
found, the elimination of democracy as such, is worse than the
disease it is supposed to cure: for it stops up the very living
source from which alone can come the correction of all the innate
shortcomings of social institutions. That source is the active,
untrammeled energetic political life of the broadest masses of
the people.'... Opposing Lenin's claim that the Soviet system
of proletarian democracy is a million times better than bourgeois
democracy, she [Luxemburg] evaluated the situation under the dictatorship
of the proletariat practised by Bolsheviks thus: 'In place of
the representative bodies created by general popular elections,
Lenin and Trotsky have laid down the Soviets as the only true
representation of the labouring masses. But with the repression
of political life in the land as a whole, life in the Soviets
must also become more and more crippled. Without general elections,
without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a
free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution,
becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy
remains as the active element. Public life gradually falls asleep,
a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy and boundless
experience direct and rule.'" (par. 6.2, 6.4.; the citation
in the CRC document for the statements by Rosa Luxemburg is: Rosa
Luxemburg Speaks, pp. 387, 391)
This is
a social-democratic line which - despite Luxemburg's attempt to
distinguish her position from bourgeois democracy - perfectly
exposes the fact that such a position conforms to the bourgeois-democratic
outlook. The masses of people in the Soviet Union, at that time
especially - the early years of the Soviet Republic - were certainly
energetically, actively, and consciously involved in political
life, on a broader and deeper scale than anything history had
witnessed up to that time. And Luxemburg's argument is in no way
a refutation of Lenin's assessment that the dictatorship of the
proletariat, as it was practised in the Soviet Republic, was "a
million times more democratic" - for the masses of people
- than any bourgeois-democratic state. To argue otherwise, as
Luxemburg does, and to declare that the Bolsheviks were seeking
to stifle the political activism of the masses and to eliminate
"democracy as such", betrays an outlook that identifies
the political activism of the masses with the strictures of bourgeois-democratic
formalism and identifies "democracy as such" with democracy
as practised according to bourgeois-democratic principles. And
this is precisely what Luxemburg does with her emphasis on "representative
bodies created by general popular elections" - in opposition,
let it be noted, to "the Soviets as the only true representation
of the labouring masses" - and her calls for "unrestricted"
freedom of press and assembly.
The CRC
document even goes so far as to say that, "The basic defect
of the Soviet system" - note well: the "basic defect"
- "is exposed by Rosa in this way: 'Freedom only for the
supporters of the government, only for the members of one party,
however, numerous they may be - is no freedom at all. Freedom
is always and exclusively freedom for one who thinks differently.'"
(par. 6.3., citing Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, pp. 389-90)
First,
it is distortion and slander to say that there was freedom only
for those who supported the government and the Bolsheviks. It
is true - and it is right - that counterrevolutionary forces were
suppressed, particularly when they rose in arms against the Soviet
government. There was, for example, the famous incident of the
Kronstadt rebellion in which, as Lenin frankly acknowledged, there
were masses involved; but, as he put it, before long the intrigues
of the old whiteguard generals (that is, the old generals of the
counterrevolutionary army that had waged the civil war against
the proletarian regime) came out into the open in relation to
the Kronstadt events, as did the imperialist connections of these
whiteguard generals. It became clear that the Kronstadt revolt
represented an attempt to overthrow the proletarian regime and
restore the old order. So, naturally and correctly, people participating
in such reactionary revolts were suppressed. (See "Tenth
Congress of the R.C.P. (B.), March 8-16, 1921", part 2, "Report
on the Political Work of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.),
March 8", LCW, vol. 32, pp. 183-85)
But there
was plenty of criticism raised, and "allowed", of the
government and the Party. This is very clear, among other things,
in reading Lenin's writings and speeches from these years of the
new Soviet Republic. Lenin talks openly about how they are existing
in a petit-bourgeois atmosphere, and that they have to learn how
to find some form of accommodation with the petit-bourgeois strata,
particularly among the peasantry, without compromising away the
basic interests of the proletariat. He discusses the whole problem
in historical terms - how you can expropriate and crush the resistance
of the big bourgeoisie and landlords relatively quickly once you've
seized power, but you have to carry out a policy of long-term
co-existence and struggle with all the small-scale producers and
generally with the petite bourgeoisie - as he puts it, you have
to both live with and transform the petite bourgeoisie, in its
material conditions and in its outlook, as part of advancing toward
the elimination of class distinctions (such a discussion can be
found, for example, in Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder,
which was written in the first few years of the Soviet Republic).
So Lenin's writings and speeches from those years - including,
incidentally, some that are quoted, in a distorted way, in this
CRC document itself - make very clear what Lenin's basic approach
was, and that his was not an orientation that anyone who raised
criticism of the government and the Bolsheviks should be suppressed
and denied political rights.
Instead
of seriously grappling with what Lenin has to say about these
difficult contradictions, the CRC document looks to Rosa Luxemburg's
misguided criticisms for guidance. Much of what is mistaken about
these criticisms, and their underlying orientation, is revealed
in the statement by Luxemburg that freedom is "always and
exclusively freedom for one who thinks differently". This,
of course, is linked to Luxemburg's call for "unrestricted"
freedom of press and assembly, etc. And this is in line with classical
bourgeois democracy, which identifies freedom with the rights
of the minority against "the tyranny of the majority".
For example, this is very similar to the formulations of people
like John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville in their writings
on democracy and on individual liberty. In response to this, the
question must be posed: who is it that, under the dictatorship
of the proletariat, "thinks differently" most of all
- if not the bourgeoisie and counterrevolutionaries? I am not
being facetious: the "logical conclusion of the logic"
of Luxemburg here is that they, above all, should be granted freedom,
full political rights. And then where is the dictatorship of the
proletariat?7
It is
very instructive to contrast Rosa Luxemburg's statements on what
freedom is, "always and exclusively", with the profound
statements of Mao Tsetung on what constitutes the freedom, or
the fundamental rights, of the labouring people in a socialist
society: the right to control society, the right to be masters
of the economy, the right to control and suppress the antagonistic
forces that are trying to restore capitalism, the right to exercise
their rule in all spheres of the superstructure. Everything flows
from this freedom, or these fundamental rights, as discussed by
Mao. This represents something much more profound and correct
than Luxemburg's definition of freedom - in fact it is the opposite
of Luxemburg's democratic formalism - it speaks to the essence
of the matter:
"Who
is in control of the organs [of power] and enterprises bears tremendously
on the issue of guaranteeing the people's rights. If Marxist-Leninists
are in control, the rights of the vast majority will be guaranteed.
If rightists or right opportunists are in control, these organs
and enterprises may change qualitatively, and the people's rights
with respect to them cannot be guaranteed. In sum, the people
must have the right to manage the superstructure." (Mao,
A Critique of Soviet Economics, New York: Monthly Review, 1977,
p. 61, emphasis added)
Here Mao,
like Lenin before him, puts forward the correct, the materialist
and dialectical, view of the relationship between the exercise
by the masses of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership
of their communist vanguard.
Let's
move on to the next point that needs to be addressed in this CRC
document: "But in spite of all these major breakthroughs,
it can be seen now, that the New Democratic Peoples Dictatorship
established immediately after the completion of revolution in
China or the dictatorship of the proletariat which followed, did
not mark any significant advancement from the basic framework
developed by Lenin and Stalin." (par. 7.2)
To this,
considering the spirit and thrust of the CRC document, one can
only respond: "Thank god!" By now it should be clear
that the "significant advancement" the authors of this
document find lacking is in fact the abandonment of the dictatorship
of the proletariat and the adoption in its place of models based
on the "piercing criticism" of people like Luxemburg
and her exposure of the "basic defect of the Soviet system"
in its departure from bourgeois-democratic formalism.
So let's move on to another formulation in this document:
"The
basic problems faced by the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin,
namely, the lack of a political system in which the people can
directly participate and assert their political will, socialisation
of means of production leading to centralisation and the accompanying
bureaucratisation of the whole system, were all manifested in
China also. Hence, the same process of capitalist restoration
which had already reached an advanced stage in the Soviet Union
had started in China also." (par. 7.3)
Class Struggle
Under Socialism and Forms of Mass Rule
Having
already spoken a number of times and from various angles to this
document's fundamentally wrong analysis of the political system
and its relation to the economic system in the Soviet Union (and
socialist society generally), I will only call attention here
to the word "Hence" that begins the last sentence above.
This "Hence" represents the continuation of the idealist
and metaphysical treatment of the relation of economics and politics
that was pointed to earlier, particularly in criticizing the CRC
document's "inverted analysis" of the basis for capitalist
restoration. Once again, this "Hence" is hardly how
Mao identified the basis and process of the engendering of the
bourgeoisie in socialist society and the danger of capitalist
restoration.
Indeed,
another expression of the idealism reflected in the use here of
"Hence" is its implication that capitalist restoration
resulted primarily from the mistaken orientation and policies
of the revolutionaries, in China as well as in the Soviet Union;
whereas, in reality, the danger of capitalist restoration was
rooted in the underlying contradictions marking socialism as a
transition from capitalism to communism, worldwide, and the triumph
of the capitalist-roaders was the outcome of the class struggle,
both within the socialist countries themselves and internationally.
The viewpoint of the CRC document on this decisive question echoes
the loud proclamations these days about the "failure"
of communism, rather than recognizing that what has happened in
the Soviet Union and China represents, in its essence, defeats
inflicted on the international proletariat by the international
bourgeoisie, and that the mistakes of the revolutionaries were
secondary and mainly mistakes in dealing with the very real problems
and dangers caused primarily by imperialism and its still dominant
position in the world.8 Such defeats are, from the standpoint
of historical materialism, not surprising, particularly in the
early stages of the conflict between proletarian revolution and
bourgeois counterrevolution; the point is to learn from all such
defeats - to learn well the real lessons - in order to be able,
time and again, to turn temporary setbacks into new and still
greater breakthroughs, and to advance through the course of the
ongoing historic battle to final victory.
But this cannot be done if the real terms of the struggle are
not understood and an idealist interpretation is imposed on reality,
as the CRC document does in the following:
"Actually
he [Mao] was coming closer to the crux of the problem when he
identified the areas of struggle in the superstructure, and in
the relations of production. Similarly he recognised the fact
that political power was not in the hands of the working class
and other toiling masses of the people. Here he identified the
crux of the matter - how to bring political power into the hands
of the people." (par. 7.4)
Wrong!
Mao recognized and said that important parts of the superstructure
were not in the hands of the masses, and he called on them to
seize back those portions of power that had been usurped by capitalist-roaders.
But he never said that these capitalist-roaders had usurped supreme
power, that political power over society as a whole was not in
the hands of the proletariat. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
was a revolution carried out in a situation where the proletariat
held state power but faced a life-and-death struggle to prevent
the rise to power of revisionism and capitalist restoration -
it was the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship
of the proletariat.
The "16-Point
Decision" issued in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution
as a general guideline for carrying out this revolutionary struggle
makes this very clear. It says the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution "constitutes a new stage in the development of
the socialist revolution in our country"; that, "Although
the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use
the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes
to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage
a come-back" and that the proletariat must meet this challenge
head-on. And what is identified as the objective of this Cultural
Revolution? It is not to deal with a situation where the masses
do not have political power but "to struggle against and
overthrow those persons in power taking the capitalist road, to
criticize and repudiate the bourgeois reactionary academic 'authorities'
and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes
and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts
of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist
economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development
of the socialist system". ("Decision of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution", ["16-Point Decision"],
August 8, 1966, Peking: FLP, point 1, p. 1, emphasis added)
And, in
important discussions with Chang Chun-chiao during the height
of the Cultural Revolution (discussions quoted from in this CRC
document, in fact), Mao himself makes clear that:
"Our
present revolution - the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
- is a revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and
we have launched it ourselves. This is because a portion of the
structure of proletarian dictatorship has been usurped and no
longer belongs to the proletariat, but to the bourgeoisie. Thus,
we had to make revolution." ("Directive on Great Cultural
Revolution in Shanghai", in Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought,
published by Joint Publications Research Service, Arlington, Virginia,
USA, vol. 2, p. 451, emphasis added)
This CRC
document is doing a "two into one" here. It is trying
to combine its wrong-headed line on "the dictatorship of
the party" with Mao's qualitatively different, and correct,
analysis of the bourgeoisie within the party (the capitalist-roaders)
and the need to wage struggle against these capitalist-roaders
and to further revolutionize the party itself as part of the overall
struggle to remain on the socialist road and continue the revolution
under the dictatorship of the proletariat.9
But
this CRC document continues on superimposing its idealist vision
on reality. It makes this assessment of the Cultural Revolution:
"As
Mao himself pointed out it was actually the masses who developed
the new form of struggle, the Cultural Revolution. It was actually
a struggle against the structures of the bureaucratisation existing
under the dictatorship of the proletariat. As it was a spontaneous
outburst of the masses, the anarchic deviations it developed were
quite natural. But what had to be done was to systematise all
these lessons into a new political system and form of struggle
to be practised under the dictatorship of the proletariat. But
unfortunately, we cannot see any such positive development during
Mao's lifetime." (par. 7.5)
Wrong
again - incredibly wrong. To begin with, this is tailist and a
worshipping of spontaneity. Ironically, this is the "flip
side" (or "mirror opposite") of the argument that
is frequently made that all the Cultural Revolution represented
was power struggles among elite cliques with the masses used as
pawns. The Cultural Revolution was not "spontaneous"
- the Cultural Revolution, like all great revolutionary undertakings,
was in a fundamental sense the creation of the masses, but the
masses were given leadership in this by a communist vanguard (recall
how Mao says that "we have launched it ourselves", referring
to the proletarian headquarters in the Communist Party). Without
this leadership there would not have been a Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution - it would have been rather quickly suppressed,
if it got off the ground at all, and certainly it would not have
reached the heights and achieved the great transformations it
did. The Cultural Revolution was the combination of the initiative
of the masses with the leadership of a communist vanguard.
The authors
of the CRC document don't want to recognize this because it doesn't
fit in with their line of pitting the masses against the party
- their line of declaring the party's leadership in the dictatorship
of the proletariat to be nothing but "the dictatorship of
the party" over the masses. Hence their statement that the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was "actually a struggle
against the structures of the bureaucratisation existing under
the dictatorship of the proletariat". No, it was not "actually"
that. It was actually what Mao said it was - a revolutionary struggle
whose target was the Party persons in authority taking the capitalist
road.
Let's
move on to how this CRC document characterizes Mao's discussions
with Chang Chun-chiao regarding the Shanghai Commune. The document
says that, "As can be seen in Mao's discussions with Chang
Chun-chiao with regard to the Shanghai Commune, he had no new
answer to the basic question which confronted them during the
Cultural Revolution. Instead he went back to the theme of the
party's ultimate authority to safeguard the dictatorship of the
proletariat." (par. 7.5)
Here the
CRC document misses the whole point. The problem is not that Mao
"had no new answer" - the problem is that the authors
of this document don't "get" Mao's answer. Mao's essential
point was that under the conditions then prevailing in China,
and with the international context in mind, the commune form that
had been developed during the upsurge of the Cultural Revolution
in Shanghai was not an appropriate form for the dictatorship of
the proletariat at that point - it did not conform to the material
conditions and in particular the relative strength of the opposing
classes under the existing conditions. In other words, if they
attempted to maintain the Shanghai Commune (and implement it throughout
China), including a rather strict adherence to the model of the
Paris Commune of 1871, then the counterrevolutionaries would be
able either to outright overthrow proletarian rule or else make
use of the commune form and turn it into its opposite, using it
to actually usurp power from the masses and then suppress them.
Again, this is because of the underlying contradictions in socialist
society and because of the international situation.
This is
the point of Mao's analogy to the Paris Commune itself. He said
that if the Paris Commune had not been crushed, it would have
become a bourgeois commune. In other words, given the actual situation
at that time, if the Paris Commune had lasted and the attempt
had been made to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat
in that form, it would have been taken over from within by bourgeois
forces.
Mao
emphasizes, tellingly, that the essence of the matter lies not
with the form but with the content. And he applies this to the
experience of the Soviet Union:
"In
regard to the form of soviet political power, as soon as it materialized,
Lenin was elated, deeming it a remarkable creation by workers,
peasants, and soldiers, as well as a new form of proletarian dictatorship.
Nonetheless, Lenin had not anticipated then that although the
workers, peasants and soldiers could use this form of political
power, it could also be used by the bourgeoisie, and by Khrushchev.
Thus, the present soviet has been transformed from Lenin's soviet
to Khrushchev's soviet." (Mao Miscellany, vol. 2, p. 452)
Here again,
the authors of this CRC document actually quote this but they
miss the whole point - they dismiss Mao's profound historical
observations as "Mao's confusion"! (par. 7.5) It is
not Mao but the authors of this CRC document who are, profoundly,
confused. It seems they have become so blinded with bourgeois-democratic
formalism, and bourgeois-democratic prejudice and illusions in
general, that they really don't understand that Mao is summing
up the overall lesson that, so long as classes, and in particular
the bourgeoisie, are around, then there is no form that, in itself,
can constitute an impenetrable barrier against capitalist restoration.
That the bourgeoisie can take over, and use for its own purposes,
forms developed in the exercise of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
This is
why the essence (the principal aspect) of the matter is the content,
not the form. This understanding of Mao's is also reflected in
his, unfortunately, prophetic observation: "If we should
be overthrown and the bourgeoisie came to power, they would have
no need to change the name, but would still call it the People's
Republic of China. The main thing is which class seizes political
power. That is the fundamental question, not what its name is."
(Mao Miscellany, vol.2, p. 453)
These
were the key points Mao was making in his discussions with Chang
Chun-chiao: he was calling attention to the fact that both the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat can make use of the formal structures
created under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that attention
must be focused on the content - the class content - not the form;
and, more specifically, he was saying that, under the conditions
of that time, the adoption of the commune form would actually
be more favourable for the bourgeoisie than the proletariat -
it would weaken the proletariat in exercising its dictatorship
and strengthen the hand of the bourgeoisie in overthrowing that
dictatorship, or subverting it from within and turning it into
its opposite. As a key part of this analysis, Mao particularly
stressed that there has to be a vanguard leadership. He says,
I don't care if you call it a communist party, or by some other
name, you're still going to have a core of leadership.
This is
not because Mao was determined to impose "the dictatorship
of the party", but fundamentally because of all the things
that have been said here about the underlying contradictions involved
in the transition from capitalism to communism worldwide and how
the revolutionary energy and enthusiasm of the masses and the
class struggle overall proceeds in waves, or through spirals,
and not in a straight line. To reiterate this crucial point: these
underlying contradictions in socialist society - particularly
between mental and manual labour, but also between the city and
countryside, and workers and peasants, and other such major social
contradictions - will express themselves in the fact that there
will be an objective difference between the advanced section of
the class and the class as a whole. This, in turn, will express
itself in the fact that there will be some kind or other of leading
core - and if it is not a proletarian leading core, it will be
a bourgeois one, whether openly or in "socialist" guise.
This is related to the basic point that if a correct line is not
in command, an incorrect line will be. And a correct line has
to be consciously struggled for and applied. If you try to go
about spontaneously exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat,
you will hand things over to the bourgeoisie.
All this
is why, as Mao says, there has to be a party as the leading core.
And this is one of the essential reasons why, under the conditions
of the time, the commune form would not work - would weaken the
proletarian dictatorship and aid the bourgeoisie in outright overthrowing
this dictatorship or taking it over from within.
To all
this must be added the whole international situation: what institutions
and measures are necessary to deal with the threat of imperialist
attack, and how that interrelates with the existence of classes
and class struggle within the socialist society and all the contradictions
that have been talked about in this connection. Mao's discussion
of this question is based on a profound grasp of, and represents
a profound grappling with, these questions. But the CRC document
has "missed" all this and instead applies a shallow
formalistic approach.
So, it
is simplistic and misses the essence of the matter to say that
Mao "went back to the theme of the Party's ultimate authority
to safeguard the dictatorship of the proletariat". Mao definitely
did continue to uphold the overall leading role of the Party,
but at the same time he insisted that the Party itself had to
be revolutionized as part of revolutionizing society as a whole.
Even the way in which the Communist Party was reconstituted as
a result of the upsurge of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
shows that Mao was striving to apply as far as possible the basic
principles and spirit of the Paris Commune while recognizing that
it was not possible to strictly apply many of the specific forms
and policies of the Commune. The Party was reconstituted, from
the basic levels on up, in an open-door way, through open mass
meetings where people in the Party units to be reconstituted were
subjected to the criticism and overall supervision of the masses.
Once again, this was an application of the basic principles and
spirit of the Paris Commune; it was an expression of the fact
that the dictatorship of the proletariat was being exercised by
the masses with the leadership of the party.
As for
mass forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao supported
and popularized the revolutionary committee as the form most appropriate
for leadership under the conditions of the time - and the revolutionary
committees too, it should be pointed out, were fundamentally the
creation of the masses, with the leadership of the proletarian
headquarters in the Party. This form first arose out of the mass
upsurge in the Northeast of China, particularly in Heilungkiang
(Heilong Jiang) Province, and then this was summed up and popularized
- and, yes, institutionalized - throughout society, on all levels.
This was a "new thing" of great significance created
through the Cultural Revolution: a way, as mentioned earlier,
of combining the masses with leading cadres of the Party and state
in actual forms of government and administration on all levels
of Chinese society.
The conclusion the CRC document draws on this point reflects no
understanding of all this. The document simply says:
"Mao's
main point is that what matters is not the form of the state structure
but which class seizes power. This shows that Marx's emphasis
on the new form of state under the dictatorship of the proletariat
was almost forgotten." (par. 7.5, emphasis in original)
Shows
this to whom?! It does not show this at all. Yet one more time,
the authors of this CRC document have read (and even quoted) but
not understood. On the contrary, what this experience really shows
is that Mao in particular paid great attention to this question.
While stressing that form in itself is not the essence of the
matter, Mao at the same time paid great attention to the unity
of the form and content of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
especially to the development of new forms which increasingly
enabled the masses to strengthen their rule in society - to exercise
all-around dictatorship over the bourgeoisie and be the masters
of the socialist economy.
It was
Mao who earlier had led and supported the masses in the creation
of the rural people's communes, in the face of bitter opposition
from the revisionists in Party leadership. The people's communes,
while not strictly following the Paris Commune model in every
respect, applied basic principles of the Paris Commune. They were
new forms of socialist production and social relations, and new
transformations in the superstructure, which combined a further
advance in public ownership in the economy with more advanced
forms of administration involving the broad masses. More generally,
Mao also summed up and popularized advanced experience in establishing,
in both industry and agriculture, new forms of more advanced socialist
production relations, new means of breaking down the old division
of labour and involving the masses in management and administration
while involving managers, administrators, and intellectual workers
generally in productive labour together with the masses of working
people. And, of course, all this took a still greater leap forward
through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Ignoring
this rich historical experience, the CRC document persists with
its idealist formalism. A few pages later, it returns to and extends
its misunderstanding, or misrepresentation, of the profound point
Mao is actually making - the real lesson he is drawing - concerning
the historical fact that Lenin's Soviets were transformed into
Khrushchev's Soviets. The document actually argues that, "Mao
had also not grasped the importance of a new political organisational
structure" and that, in Mao's view, "the discovery of
Soviets was of no significance". (par. 8.11)
This is
unbelievable! As we have seen, this is not Mao's point at all.
And it is an irony worth noting that earlier the CRC document
argued that the Soviets, once they came under institutionalized
Party leadership, represented nothing qualitatively new, even
though Lenin stressed that it was the Soviets, not the Party itself,
that performed the functions of government and that the Soviets
were "special institutions" of a "new type"
(see CRC document, pars. 5.7-5.8). Now this CRC document attributes
to Mao the argument that the Soviets represented nothing qualitatively
new, when Mao is not saying anything of the kind and is making
a completely different point.
Let's
look at the CRC document's further evaluation of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution:
"The
Cultural Revolution was possible only because of the leadership
of Mao and it developed outside the existing political structure.
Even though Mao had pointed out that many more Cultural Revolutions
will be required during the whole period of socialism, it is quite
clear that they are not going to continue in the absence of a
system where such Cultural Revolutions are ensured. Mao and other
socialist leaders in China could not develop or envisage such
a system. What they tried was to establish an all-round dictatorship
over the bourgeoisie, using the same old framework of the dictatorship
of the proletariat. Such an approach appeared to be only more
authoritarian, and even the anti-bureaucratic content of the Cultural
Revolution was misrepresented in this context." (par. 7.6)
This is
yet more idealism and metaphysics. Given all that has been said
here about the contradictory character of socialist society, how
could there be such a "guarantee" - what formal institutions
or procedures could "ensure" Cultural Revolutions, let
alone their success? And we must ask: appeared "only more
authoritarian" to whom - to which class? Here once again
this document reveals its consistent tendency to tail after the
most backward and particularly to pander to bourgeois-democratic
prejudices and the bourgeois outlook generally - including, frankly,
crude anti-communism. In fact, here this document more or less
openly takes up the standpoint of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois
intellectuals whom this authority was directed against and who
chafed under this authority. In this context it is worth repeating
Engels's comments ridiculing the anarchists - comments that, interestingly,
use the experience of the Paris Commune as a frame of reference
and sum up the following lesson from that experience:
"Have
these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly
the most authoritarian thing there is; it is an act whereby one
part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by
means of rifles, bayonets and cannon, all of which are highly
authoritarian means. And the victorious party must maintain its
rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries.
Would the Paris Commune have lasted more than a day if it had
not used the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie?
Cannot we, on the contrary, blame it for having made too little
use of that authority?" (cited in Lenin, The State and Revolution,
LCW, vol. 25, pp. 442-43)
Of course,
Engels had clearly in mind the class content of the dictatorship
of the proletariat - he was not upholding authority in general
or in the abstract but precisely the revolutionary authority of
the proletariat - and the same applies to Mao and the other "socialist
roaders" in China. They upheld and led in giving life and
form to the exercise by the masses of the dictatorship of the
proletariat over the bourgeoisie and those seeking the restoration
of capitalism.10
The Problem
of Bureaucracy, The Role of the Party and State Structures Under
Socialism
Next,
under the heading "Basic Error", this document sets
out "to find out where and how Lenin went wrong". But
this whole "discovery" only deepens the "basic
error" that runs through this whole document. Not only do
previous arguments in this document go from bad to worse, but
new ones are introduced that represent an even more obvious departure
- retreat - from Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. The remainder of this
critique of the CRC document will focus primarily on these "new"
arguments - which, as we shall see, are not really new at all.
The CRC
document says: "In the political structure of the Paris Commune,
the Communist Party was not having any direct role." (par.
8.4)
To this,
once again, with historical perspective, we can only say "Thank
god!" By this I mean that, if any of the most influential
forces within the Commune had played such a "direct"
leadership role, this would have been leadership by a party that
did not truly represent the proletariat. This is because the leading
forces in the Commune were not really communists: they were socialists,
but not scientific socialists. They were political opponents of
Marx, and if the Commune had lasted longer and their leadership
in it had been consolidated, this would have led to the restoration
of capitalism anyway. Once again, the lack of a real, communist
vanguard party was a fatal weakness of the Commune. This relates
to the fundamental point about the limitation of the experience
of the Paris Commune and how it is wrong to raise this very limited
experience against the much greater experience of the dictatorship
of the proletariat since - although in fact the Russian revolution
and the Chinese revolution upheld and applied the basic spirit
and orientation that Marx identified in the Paris Commune.
Let's
move on to another statement in the CRC document:
"The
absence of any mention of the role of the party in the whole scheme
of the dictatorship of the proletariat as explained in The State
and Revolution by Lenin is very conspicuous. It may be due to
this influence of the political structure of the Paris Commune.
But here, unlike in the Paris Commune, the Party was going to
play the crucial role because by the time of the October Revolution,
a party had already been developed as the vanguard representing
the class interests of the proletariat. So this was the crucial
theoretical question to be resolved during that period. Lenin's
total neglect of this question was a serious lapse leading to
the basic error in developing the understanding of the dictatorship
of the proletariat." (par. 8.5)
It is
true that, in The State and Revolution, Lenin was not addressing
the question of the party's role in the dictatorship of the proletariat.
His object in writing The State and Revolution, in the period
between the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution and
the October 1917 proletarian revolution, was to demonstrate the
need for the violent overthrow of the bourgeois state, the smashing
of the old state machine and the creation of a new kind of state
- the dictatorship of the proletariat. This, and not the role
of the party in the dictatorship of the proletariat, was the crucial
theoretical question that had to be taken up right at that decisive
moment.
The State
and Revolution was a polemic against the opportunist "socialists"
of the time (Kautsky being the most "prestigious" and
influential) who were denying the need for violent revolution
and proletarian dictatorship and were distorting the basic Marxist
teaching on the state - that it is an instrument of class suppression,
which arose with the development of class antagonisms and will
itself be eliminated with the elimination of these antagonisms
and of class distinctions generally through the revolution of
the proletariat and its radical transformation of society and
the state. In writing this polemic, Lenin was basing himself on
what Marx and Engels had summed up from the only historical experience
of the dictatorship of the proletariat so far, the Paris Commune.
The question of the role of the vanguard communist party in the
exercise of the dictatorship of the proletariat had not yet come
sharply into focus.
It is
not inconceivable that on the basis of extrapolating from the
experience of the Paris Commune - and specifically the fact that
there was no real communist vanguard in the Commune - Lenin might
have reached some conclusions about the need for the party to
play a vanguard role not only in overthrowing the old state power
but in creating and exercising the new. But to suggest that, because
he did not do so in The State and Revolution, this represents
some kind of "serious lapse" that led to a "basic
error" is yet another example of idealist and metaphysical
thinking.
It was
precisely through the experience of the October Revolution and
then the exercise of power by the proletariat that this question
of the party's leading role was brought to the fore. At that point,
Lenin certainly did take up this question, in the realm of theory
as well as practice, continuously over the next several years.
His writings and speeches in this period (the first few years
of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Republic
and the last few years of Lenin's life) are full of discussion
of this question and a wrangling over the contradictions involved
with this - in fact, earlier this CRC document cited some of these
writings and speeches (of course in a distorted way in order to
accuse Lenin of advocating the "dictatorship of the party"
over the masses).11
The way
this question actually arose illustrates the real relationship
between practice and theory, and the fact that, as Lenin said,
the most important function of theory is to address the pressing
problems of the day, the actual theoretical problems thrown up
by practice.
So let's go on to another statement in the CRC document:
"After
the seizure of power in October, the Congress of the Soviets became
the formal authority of the new political power. But actually,
the party was playing the crucial role in evolving all important
policies and tactics behind the scene. In effect the party was
controlling the Soviets, though its specific role in the new state
structure was not defined." (par. 8.6)
Here,
disturbingly, we see the CRC document raising the spectre commonly
raised by the bourgeoisie - the spectre of those sneaky communists
with their hidden agendas! We also see this document once again
putting forward its familiar bourgeois formalism (complaining
that the formal structures of democracy were not really being
adhered to), but now this is done in the name of opposing formalism
(the Soviets were only the formal authority but the communists
were actually controlling things behind the scene). In fact, this
was not at all "behind the scene". Earlier, this CRC
document quoted Lenin saying that the Bolsheviks had "told
the world" of the indispensable leading role of the party.
The fact is that the Party's role was being more and more clearly
defined as the overall leading force in the dictatorship of the
proletariat, in dialectical relation with the masses, who were
mobilized to exercise this dictatorship. This is precisely how
Lenin dealt with it in theory and in practice, and so too did
Stalin, in the main, especially early on (recall Mao's comment
about how at first under Stalin's leadership they had nothing
to rely on but the masses and so Stalin demanded all-out mobilization
of the party and the masses, although later, after they had made
some gains this way, they became less reliant on the masses).
The
CRC document goes on to say:
"So,
under the pressure of the circumstances, in the face of both external
and internal threats, the party was forced to play the central
role, relegating the Soviets to the background." (par. 8.7)
Once again,
it is a vulgarization and fundamentally wrong to say that the
Soviets were "relegated to the background". Even "under
the pressure of the circumstances", and with a necessary
shift in the relative weight of the Soviets, in relation to other
institutions - including especially the Party - in the administration
of society and the overall exercise of the dictatorship of the
proletariat (as discussed earlier), the Soviets were still relied
on to perform the functions of government, under the leadership
of the Party, as Lenin said. But here it is necessary to return
to the larger historical question concerning the role of soviets
(and similar institutions and mass organizations) in the process
of socialist revolution and the advance to communism.
Stalin,
in a talk on the Chinese revolution, and specifically in answering
a question about the formation and role of soviets in that revolution
(this was in 1927, in the early stages of the Chinese revolution),
discussed how soviets are "organs of an uprising against
the existing power, organs of struggle for a new revolutionary
power, organs of the new revolutionary power". (Stalin, "Talk
with Students of the Sun Yat-Sen University", May 13, 1927,
Eighth Question, in On the Opposition, Peking: FLP, p. 689) Without
getting into the specific, and rather complicated, tactical questions
that Stalin was speaking to, relating to the Chinese revolution
in that period, there is an important, more universal question
that Stalin is touching on. In the experience of the Bolshevik
revolution (and this was also true of the Chinese revolution in
those situations where soviets were set up), the soviets were
brought into being in the course of mass upsurge, and for a period
after the seizure of power12 they retained the same dynamism that
had characterized them in this upsurge. But it was bound to be
the case that this could not be sustained on the same level, in
a sort of "linear" way for a protracted period of time.
This,
too, is related to the points made earlier about the problem of
maintaining the revolutionary energy and enthusiasm of the masses
and how the class struggle and the revolutionary upsurges of the
masses are bound to develop in wave-like or spiral manner in socialist
society (as well as in capitalist society). This is bound to be
reflected also in the degree of dynamism - or, at times, the relative
lack of dynamism - of organs like the soviets under the dictatorship
of the proletariat. The fact that, in the Soviet Union, the Soviets
at any given time may not have had the same dynamism that they
had during the period when the masses were rising up to seize
power and then in the first years when they were beginning to
exercise power - this is an expression of this objective wave-like
development and not of sneaky and sinister attempts of the Bolsheviks
to replace the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship
of the party, as the CRC document alleges.
And, contrary
to what this document says, Lenin did not make it a principle
that "only the party", and not the masses, "can
exercise the dictatorship". (par. 8.7) He grappled seriously
with the problem of how to involve the masses in the administration
of the state and how to combat bureaucratic tendencies that interfered
with this. Again, his writings in the last few years of his life
are full of grappling with this question, while at the same time
he was forced to recognize that a bureaucracy of some kind or
another could not be eliminated for a long time to come.
One of
the most important ways in which Lenin led struggle against bureaucratization
and the tendency for the Communist Party, as a party in power,
to become corrupted was the campaign conducted to purge the Party
of careerists - particularly of people who joined the Party when
power had been consolidated and the Party was playing a leading
role in the institutions of society, in the economic and political
life of the country. Lenin insisted that the Party, especially
now that it was the leading force of a proletariat in power, must
continue to be made up of those who join it expecting and prepared
for self-sacrifice in the interests of the proletariat. In 1921,
in the period after the victorious civil war against home-grown
reactionaries linked with a number of imperialist powers, Lenin
said this about the purging of the Party:
"The
purging of the Party has obviously developed into a serious and
vastly important affair.
"In
some places the Party is being purged mainly with the aid of the
experience and suggestions of non-Party workers; these suggestions
and the representatives of the non-Party proletarian masses are
being heeded with due consideration. That is the most valuable
and most important thing. If we really succeed in purging our
Party from top to bottom in this way, without exceptions, it will
indeed be an enormous achievement for the revolution.
"...the
Party must be purged of those who have lost touch with the masses
(let alone, of course, those who discredit the Party in the eyes
of the masses). Naturally, we shall not submit to everything the
masses say, because the masses, too, sometimes - particularly
in time of exceptional weariness and exhaustion resulting from
excessive hardship and suffering - yield to sentiments that are
in no way advanced. But in appraising persons, in the negative
attitude to those who have 'attached' themselves to us for selfish
motives, to those who have become 'puffed-up commissars' and 'bureaucrats',
the suggestions of the non-Party proletarian masses and, in many
cases, of the non-Party peasant masses, are extremely valuable.
The working masses have a fine intuition, which enables them to
distinguish honest and devoted Communists from those who arouse
the disgust of people earning their bread by the sweat of their
brow, enjoying no privileges and having no 'pull'.
"To
purge the Party it is very important to take the suggestions of
the non-Party working people into consideration. It will produce
big results. It will make the Party a much stronger vanguard of
the class than it was before; it will make it a vanguard that
is more strongly bound up with the class, more capable of leading
it to victory amidst a mass of difficulties and dangers."
(Lenin, "Purging the Party", LCW, vol. 33, pp. 39-40,
emphasis in original)
Such Party
purges and other measures against bureaucratization adopted under
Lenin's leadership could not and did not, by themselves, solve
the problem - they did not and could not resolve the underlying
contradictions that gave rise to bureaucratization, to careerism
among party and state officials, and so on. But these policies
unmistakably show the determination of Lenin to combat such careerism
and bureaucratization and any tendency to turn the party and state
into their opposite - into instruments of dictatorship over the
masses.
This problem
required new innovations, new means and methods of struggle -
and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China was such
a new innovation, such new means and methods of revolutionary
struggle, under the dictatorship of the proletariat. But, as Mao
said, one Cultural Revolution could not solve all the problems.
Nor could it eliminate the objective wave-like character of the
class struggle and mass upsurges. As Mao said, there will have
to be many Cultural Revolutions along the road to the final achievement
of communism, yet there cannot be Cultural Revolutions all the
time. During those times when a Cultural Revolution is not possible,
bureaucratic tendencies must be combated and, more fundamentally,
the means must be found for mobilizing the conscious activism
of the masses to the maximum degree possible. But none of this
can provide an iron-clad guarantee against capitalist restoration
or change the fact that there will be periods in which the revolutionary
"tenseness" and initiative of the masses is not at a
high peak, even in socialist society.
Related
to this is the approach of the party, as the leading force in
the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the question of dissent
and the clash of opinions, both within its own ranks and generally
in society. In "End/ Beginning" and in a number of other
works, following Mao I have stressed the importance of allowing,
even encouraging, these things under the dictatorship of the proletariat
as a general principle. But, at the same time, it must be recognized
that this question, too, cannot be dealt with in the abstract,
formalistically, according to some notion of "pure"
or "classless" democracy - it, too, will be decisively
influenced by the actual conditions and in particular the class
relations and class struggle, both within the socialist society
and internationally.
Sometimes
it will be possible - it will conform to the interests of the
proletariat - to "open wide" in terms of such debate,
dissent, etc., and the party must not hesitate to seize on such
opportunities to "open wide"; at other times, it will
be necessary to "close ranks" more and carry out ideological
struggle, debate and so on in a more restricted way, and the party
must also not hesitate to adopt this approach when it is required
by the conditions at hand. Yet, through all this, the guiding
principle must be that the forms must be found, both within the
party and among the broad masses, for debate, dissent, ideological
struggle and so on - forms appropriate to the conditions and corresponding
to the interests of the proletariat in the given situation; and
every opportunity should be seized to "open wide" to
the greatest degree possible consistent with the interests of
the proletariat - with the exercise of the dictatorship of the
proletariat by the masses and the continuation of the revolution
under the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the leadership
of the vanguard communist party.
This must
be done even though it is bound to involve risking a lot and repeatedly
upsetting the established order under socialism - it must be done
in a way that does not strengthen but undermines the basis for
the old, capitalist order to be restored. This relates back to
"the positive side of unresolved contradictions under socialism"
and to the related principle that:
"The
party in socialist society must act as the vanguard not only in
terms of being a party in power but also in terms of actively
involving itself in and leading - actually unleashing and winning
leadership of - mass struggle in opposition to those aspects of
the status quo which at any given time have become obstacles to
the further revolutionization of society, which stand in opposition
to the new revolutionary forces being brought forward. In short,
be a party in power and a vanguard of revolutionary struggle against
any parts of power that are blocking the road to complete liberation."
(Avakian, "A Final Note", Revolution, Fall 1990, p.
46, emphasis in original)
All this
involves profound questions that must be grappled with - but,
again, they must be seriously grappled with from the standpoint
of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and its summation of the historical
experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat, not on the
basis of repudiating this and looking for "simple answers"
that pit the party against the masses in what is, frankly, a classical
anti-communist manner. What the Declaration of the Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement emphasizes is all the more important
in light of recent world events:
"The
summation of historical experience has, itself, always been a
sharp arena of class struggle. Ever since the defeat of the Paris
Commune, opportunists and revisionists have seized upon the defeats
and shortcomings of the proletariat to reverse right and wrong,
confound the secondary with the principal, and thus conclude that
the proletariat 'should not have taken to arms'. The emergence
of new conditions has often been used as an excuse to negate fundamental
principles of Marxism under the signboard of its 'creative development'.
At the same time, it is incorrect and just as damaging to abandon
the Marxist critical spirit, to fail to sum up the shortcomings
as well as the successes of the proletariat, and to rest content
with upholding or reclaiming positions considered correct in the
past. Such an approach would make Marxism-Leninism brittle and
unable to withstand the attacks of the enemy and incapable of
leading new advances in the class struggle - and suffocate its
revolutionary essence.
"In
fact, history has shown that real creative developments of Marxism
(and not phoney revisionist distortions) have always been inseparably
linked with a fierce struggle to defend and uphold basic principles
of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin's two-fold struggle against the open
revisionists and against those, like Kautsky, who opposed revolution
under the guise of 'Marxist orthodoxy' and Mao Tsetung's great
battle to oppose the modern revisionists and their negation of
the experience of building socialism in the USSR under Lenin and
Stalin while carrying out a thorough and scientific criticism
of the roots of revisionism are evidence of this.
"Today
a similar approach is necessary to the thorny questions and problems
of the history of the international communist movement."
(RIM Declaration, p. 13)
Unfortunately,
the CRC document departs from and goes in opposition to this correct
approach. And, in insisting on "Two practical steps taken
by the Paris Commune...a political system run through revocable
agents of power and the replacement of the standing army by the
armed people"; in claiming to dig deeper from this perspective
into the "dynamics" of political power (pars. 8.9-8.10),
this document descends more fully into a bourgeois standpoint.
It begins with this characterization of the nature of the state:
"In
a class society, the dominant class wields political power claiming
to represent the whole society. This reflects a contradiction
between the political will of the ruling class and that of the
society as a whole. It is to resolve this contradiction that power
is concentrated in the state structure and wielded by the ruling
class as its executive power. So this concentration of the political
will of the ruling class in the name of the political will of
the whole society, in the concrete form of the state, especially
in its armed might, is characteristic of the political power so
far existing in class society." (par. 8.10., emphasis added)
This is
an incorrect characterization of the contradictions involved and
the essence of the matter. The wielding of political power by
the dominant class is not fundamentally or essentially aimed at
resolving the "contradiction between the political will of
the ruling class and that of the society as a whole". Fundamentally
and in essence, it is aimed at dealing with the contradiction
- the antagonism - between that dominant class and the class (or
classes) over which it must exercise dictatorship in order to
maintain its dominant position in society. And this is rooted,
not in an abstract conflict of "political wills", but
in underlying material conditions - the conflict of class interests
corresponding to certain definite material relations of production.
As Raymond Lotta has incisively summarized it:
"The
state is an objective structure of society whose character is
determined not by the class origins of its leading personnel but
by the specific social division of labour of which it is an extension
and the production relations which it must ultimately serve and
reproduce." (Lotta, "Realities of Social-Imperialism
Versus Dogmas of Cynical Realism: The Dynamics of the Soviet Capital
Formation", in The Soviet Union: Socialist or Social Imperialist?
Part 2: The Question Is Joined, Chicago: RCP Publications, 1983,
p. 41, emphasis added)
As opposed
to this, the CRC document's presentation of this question - focusing
on the "contradiction between the political will of the ruling
class and that of the society as a whole" - is an idealist
one that leads in the direction of covering over the class nature
of the state (and, as we shall see, this is exactly the direction
in which this document is heading). The document continues this
presentation as follows:
"The
proletariat is aiming at qualitatively breaking with this structure.
It must initiate a process which makes the society as a whole
capable of reabsorbing this concentrated power. And the replacement
of the standing army by the armed people is a concrete initial
step in this direction. But in the absence of a complete economic,
political, social system which guarantees this reabsorption, this
alone will not serve the purpose. In the whole process, conditions
and structures should be created so that the (political) will
of the whole society can get expressed and realised directly without
the mediation of a state. It is only then that the proletariat
can achieve its goal of a society where the state withers away.
If the proletariat cannot put forward such an alternative political
system, it cannot make any qualitative break with the existing
bourgeois system." (par. 8.10)
To begin
with the last part here, this is a continuation of an idealist
and metaphysical "inversion" on the relation of economics
and politics as well as an application of metaphysics and idealism
with regard to politics itself - in particular the state. All
this leaves out the decisive question of the transformation of
the economic base in terms of making a "qualitative break
with the existing bourgeois system" - it separates the question
of "bringing forward an alternative political system"
from the economic base, or at the very least takes no account
of the question of transforming the economic base and how this
interacts with the creation of a new kind of state, which in turn
will lead to the withering away of the state. In passing, it refers
to "a complete economic, political, social system which guarantees
this reabsorption", but then it focuses primary and overwhelming
attention on the question of the political system, rather than
focusing on the underlying material conditions and discussing
the political system in this context - in dialectical relation
with the underlying and ultimately decisive economic conditions.
As for
its formulation that, "In the whole process, conditions and
structures should be created so that the (political) will of the
whole society can get expressed and realised directly without
the mediation of a state": this leaves out of the picture
something very decisive that will characterize this "whole
process" - namely the existence of classes and class struggle,
above all the antagonistic contradiction and struggle between
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but also the contradiction
and struggle between the workers and peasants, between the working
people and intellectuals, and other social contradictions which
reflect class contradiction or contain the seeds of class contradiction
and even class antagonism.
It is
true that, with the achievement of communism, involving revolutionary
transformation of both the economic base and the superstructure,
the political and administrative system that will then exist will
in fact express the will of society as a whole - although not
without contradictions. However, the process of achieving communism
cannot be conceived of as though it occurs, not through revolution
under the dictatorship of the proletariat to resolve profound
social contradictions and class conflicts, but through the more
or less linear and evolutionary development of structures that
express "the political will of the whole society" and
"the reabsorption of state power by the whole society".
(par. 10.3)
Next we
are told that "the whole system of the dictatorship of the
proletariat so far practised, starting from Lenin and up to Mao,
failed" (par. 8.11), because it did not put forward the CRC
document's version of an "alternative political system"
and did not conform to this document's vision of how to bring
about the withering away of the state (or "the reabsorption
of state power by the whole society"). To this, once again,
we can say "thank god!" If, in reality, this "whole
system of the dictatorship of the proletariat so far practised"
had attempted to carry out the line of this CRC document, this
proletarian dictatorship would have been undermined and overthrown
far more rapidly than it was, and the international proletariat
would have been robbed of a whole historical experience rich in
real lessons. And we can add that we wish this proletarian dictatorship
had "failed" the CRC document's test even more thoroughly
- or, to put it positively, that it had succeeded not only as
far as it did in preventing the rise to power of the bourgeoisie
but beyond that and down to the present time.
To restate
and re-emphasize the crucial point and the crucial difference
between Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the social-democratic line
of this CRC document on the question of the state and the dictatorship
of the proletariat in particular: This document acts as if, once
you have the dictatorship of the proletariat, the essential thing
in the advance to communism is the extension of democracy - formal
democracy. In reality, the essential thing is the class struggle
- this is the key link, as Mao made clear.
Formulations
which are in some ways similar, on the surface, to some of what
is said in this CRC document on "the reabsorption of state
power by the whole society" can be found in Marx and Engels
(and Lenin), but this document misses (or dismisses) the essence:
the state arises on the basis of the split-up of society into
antagonistic classes and it exists as the organ of one class -
the economically dominant class - in suppressing others: it is
an instrument of class dictatorship. This is spelled out very
clearly and fully by Engels in "The Origin of the Family,
Private Property, and the State": "The state, then,
has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that
did without it, that had no idea of the state and state power.
At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily
bound up with the split of society into classes, the state became
a necessity owing to this split." (Engels, "Origin",
in Marx and Engels, Selected Works [MESW], Moscow: Progress Publishers,
vol. 3., p. 330) And, the state, wherever it exists and whatever
the form of government, is "essentially a machine for keeping
down the oppressed, exploited class". (ibid., p. 332)
"Society
as a whole" has no "political will" - certainly
not in class society. Classes can be said to have "political
will"; and, once again, state power (dictatorship) is exercised
by the dominant class in order to deal with the contradiction
between the "political will" - or, more fundamentally,
the objective class interest - of the dominant class and that
of the classes it exploits and oppresses.
Here an
essential point to focus on is the fact that the most concentrated
expression of state power is the armed force of the state and
the fact that, so long as there is a state - so long, in other
words, as society is divided into classes - the armed forces will
represent one class or another. Such armed forces cannot represent
"the whole people" or "the society as a whole"
without class distinction. Under the conditions of socialism -
which is not only a class society but a society marked by antagonistic
class divisions - calls for abolishing the standing (full-time,
professional) army and replacing it by the arming of "the
whole people" amount to calling for the abolition of the
proletariat's monopoly of armed force, which in turn amounts to
calling for the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Once more,
this is because the fundamental contradictions marking socialist
society as a transition from capitalism to communism constitute
a material basis for the continuing existence of classes and specifically
the continual regeneration of the bourgeoisie, the continual engendering
of the new bourgeoisie, both from among the functionaries of the
party and state apparatus and from among the ranks of the people
generally. In this situation, the abolition of a standing army
under the leadership of the party of the proletariat (its single
communist vanguard party)13 and its replacement by the arming
of "the whole people" would result, in reality, in the
development of different armed forces representing different classes,
including the bourgeoisie. And this would be the case even if
the overthrown ruling classes and their (open) supporters were
excluded from the category of "the whole people" that
is to be armed in place of the standing army of the proletarian
state. The armed forces of the proletariat would be undermined
and weakened; and the strength, including the armed strength,
of other class forces, including bourgeois forces aiming at capitalist
restoration, would be built up. In fact, in such a situation it
would be impossible for the proletariat to retain state power
and continue the advance toward communism. And this can be seen
to be all the more the case when it is kept in mind that "domestic"
counterrevolutionaries would invariably seek out alliances with
foreign imperialist powers and other reactionary states. Thus,
the abolition of a full-time, highly trained armed force of the
proletarian state would fatally cripple it in the battle against
imperialist aggression and against the forces of capitalist restoration
within the socialist country itself.
This,
of course, does not mean that it is unimportant to arm the broad
masses under socialism and that the standing army can be relied
on by itself to safeguard the rule of the proletariat. In fact,
both from the point of view of combating armed counterrevolutionary
attacks (and imperialist aggression) and from the point of view
of carrying out the revolutionary transformation of society toward
the abolition of class divisions (and, with them, the state),
it is necessary and vital to have a situation in which the broad
masses are "in arms" and, more than that, are organized
and trained, in a vast people's militia, alongside the standing
army of the proletarian state (until such time as the standing
army can be abolished).
But the
decisive question, both with regard to the standing army and with
regard to the people's militia, is whether the guns are in the
hands of the masses in actual fact and not just formally. This
question hinges on the nature of leadership that is exercized
in the standing army and the militia. And, in turn, the nature
of this leadership finds concentrated expression in line - both
ideological and political line in its general expression and also
its expression in concrete policies. This involves the internal
relations within the armed forces (including the militia) and
the relations between these armed forces and the masses of people;
it also involves the formulation of the fundamental purpose and
aim of these armed forces and the principles of fighting, doctrine,
and so on that flow from this.
In all
this, the recognition of class differences among the people and
the insistence on the leading role of the proletariat and its
vanguard party, as concentrated in its line and policies, is decisive.
It is this - it is the consistent application of this approach
and the continual struggle focusing on line - which is decisive
in determining whether or not the armed forces of the proletarian
state represent the armed power of the masses acting in accordance
with the revolutionary interests of the proletariat.
Liquidating
Class Analysis in the Name of Opposing "Class Reductionism"
This is
clearly not the standpoint of the CRC document. This document
obscures the class nature of the state. In fact, its analysis
of the state and the process of the withering away of the state
("the reabsorption of state power by the whole society")
involves a fundamental distortion concerning not only the proletarian
state but the bourgeois state as well. Under the heading "Bourgeois
Dictatorship and Proletarian Democracy", we are offered this
(re)evaluation:
"It
was absolutely correct on the part of Lenin to evaluate that all
different forms of bourgeois states are inevitably the dictatorship
of the bourgeoisie and that all the different possible forms of
transitional proletarian state are essentially the dictatorship
of the proletariat. But this aspect of dictatorship is only the
essential part, not the whole of it. A bourgeois democratic state
deals with an important question of human society, the contradiction
between individual and society. But a bourgeois fascist state
does not give room for dealing with that contradiction at the
same level, even though both are essentially dictatorships of
the bourgeoisie. For the first time in the history of the human
society bourgeois democracy recognises the individual as a political
entity and gives him/her a role in the political system, though
formally. The weakness of this bourgeois democracy is that it
is based on the rule of private property whereby it ensures the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Thus the equality professed by
it becomes not only formal, but also bogus."14 (par. 9.1)
First
of all, to critique bourgeois democracy in terms of its "weakness",
in the way this CRC document does, is itself quite revealing!
But beyond that, it is imprecise and incorrect to simply say that
bourgeois democracy is "based on the rule of private property".
It is based on the rule of bourgeois property. This might seem
like a minor, even insignificant, point - and in other contexts
it might be - but in the context of the CRC document's attempt
to obscure the class basis and nature of bourgeois democracy,
it is necessary to insist on this point and to explore its further
implications. Bourgeois property involves, in its essence, the
exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie. Marx and Engels
emphasized exactly this point in the Communist Manifesto. They
showed how "modern bourgeois private property...is based
on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few";
and they stressed that, for the communists, abolition of private
property means abolition of these relations and conditions - it
must be understood "In this sense". (Manifesto of the
Communist Party, Peking: FLP, pp. 50, 51)
Private
property in general does not necessarily involve this class antagonism.
As a general category, private property includes articles of personal
consumption and not just private ownership of the means of production.
The former (personal consumption articles) do not in themselves
involve relations of exploitation; and, for that matter, individual
(private) ownership of the means of production does not necessarily
involve such relations either (for example, farmland owned and
worked by an individual farmer). As Marx and Engels make clear,
it is bourgeois private property (along with other antagonistic
property relations, such as feudalism and slavery) that involve
these relations of exploitation and class antagonism; and while
communism aims to abolish all private ownership of the means of
production, and in fact all commodity production, it draws a clear
distinction between various kinds of private property.15 To simply
use the general characterization "private property"
here - to simply say that bourgeois democracy is "based on
the rule of private property" - is to help conceal the fundamental
class antagonism of capitalist society - an antagonism which,
as we know, is also covered over by the formal aspect of the relation
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in capitalist production
(it appears to be a relation based on the equal exchange of wages
for labour-power, while in fact it is a relation of exploitation).
The open
hosannas to bourgeois democracy in this passage in the CRC document
are rather remarkable ("For the first time in the history
of the human society bourgeois democracy recognises the individual
as a political entity and gives him/her a role in the political
system, though formally"); and it is important to note how
bourgeois fascism is contrasted here with bourgeois democracy
to make the latter seem even more attractive. Once again, what
we have is a distortion that covers over or seeks to mitigate
the class antagonism involved in bourgeois democracy.
This whole
thing is marked by familiar revisionist eclectics - on the one
hand bourgeois-democratic states "are inevitably the dictatorship
of the bourgeoisie" but on the other hand they recognize
the individual as a "political entity" and give him/her
"a role in the political system, though formally". The
CRC document does acknowledge ("though formally") that
this character of all bourgeois states as dictatorships is the
essence of the matter, but then, applying its eclectic method,
it makes this essence non-essential. It focuses on "the contradiction
between individual and society" and in fact places this on
an equal level with - or, really, above - the essential fact that
all forms of bourgeois states are dictatorships. Let's look at
this more closely.
As a matter
of fact, all states, and not just the bourgeois-democratic state,
deal in one way or another not only with classes but with individuals.
In this connection it is important to recall the earlier point
about how the dictatorship of the proletariat itself involves
an aspect of coercion even toward individuals among the masses
who, collectively, are exercising that dictatorship. All states
- all dictatorships - uphold the general interests of the ruling
class, first of all and essentially against the classes antagonistically
opposed to the ruling class, but also against particular interests
of members of the ruling class where and insofar as these come
into conflict with the general ruling class interests.
It is
true that bourgeois democracy does proclaim the rights of individuals
in new and different ways from previous forms of the state, but
once again it must be stressed that Engels's analysis that the
state arises with the emergence of class antagonisms and that
in essence all states are an instrument of class suppression certainly
applies as much to the bourgeois-democratic state as to any other
state. However, the CRC document explicitly attempts to divorce
the relation of the individual to the state in bourgeois-democratic
society from class relations and class dictatorship. Thus, we
are told that "by equating bourgeois democracy to bourgeois
state", Lenin has "neglected the non-class aspect of
democracy reflected in the bourgeois democracy. The recognition
of the individual's political role in the political system of
a society is actually a historical advance in dealing with the
non-class contradiction of individual/ society." (par. 9.2)
In exposing
"how Kautsky turned Marx into a common liberal" - how
Kautsky tried to make it seem that Marx did not really mean it
when he spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for that
would be a violation of democracy! - Lenin made this important
observation: "As far as the philosophical roots of this phenomenon
are concerned, it amounts to the substitution of eclecticism and
sophistry for dialectics." ("The Proletarian Revolution
and the Renegade Kautsky", LCW, vol. 28, pp. 233-34) The
familiar substitution of eclectics and sophistry for materialist
dialectics is found in the CRC document's attempt to separate
individuals from the social classes they are part of in class
society; to attribute a "dualistic" character to the
bourgeois state and the contradictions it deals with; to insist
on the "non-class aspect" of the bourgeois-democratic
state.
In their
last great battle against Deng Xiaoping and the other capitalist-roaders
in China, Mao and his comrades brought out how Deng & Co.
argued that it was necessary to pay attention not only to revolution
but also to production; that rules and regulations in enterprises
dealt not only with the relations between people in production
(class relations) but also with the relations between people and
nature in the process of production (a "non-class contradiction").
The revolutionaries in China pointed out that the relation (or
contradiction) between people and nature in production cannot
be separated in this way from the relations of people to each
other in the process of production (production relations - in
class society, class relations). They exposed the revisionists'
eclectics as an attempt to impose rules and regulations with a
bourgeois class content under the cover of "non-class contradiction"
and to oppose Mao's line of "grasp revolution/promote production"
with a line of suffocating revolution under the banner of boosting
production.
The CRC
document applies the same kind of eclectics with its argument
that the bourgeois-democratic state is not only a means of class
suppression but also has a "non-class aspect". The substance
and effect of this argument amounts to denying or adulterating
the quintessential fact that the bourgeois-democratic state means
democracy only for the bourgeoisie, that it means dictatorship
over the proletariat and masses of people. To "forget"
this - and to talk about the "historical advance" of
bourgeois democracy "in dealing with the non-class contradiction
of individual/ society" - is to forget a fundamental teaching
of Marxism: in class society, individuals are, most fundamentally
and decisively, members of classes, and even their individual
"wills" are a product of their social conditions and
class position and not some individual essence independent of
social relations.16
In order
to make even clearer the essence of the question here and to reveal
more fully the class basis of - the class outlook and interests
represented by - the CRC document's treatment of the bourgeois-democratic
state and its relation to individuals as well as classes, it is
worthwhile reviewing some important passages from major Marxist
works which shed light on this. First, the following from Engels,
in which he lays bare the class content of the self-proclaimed
"universal principles" of the bourgeois revolution:
"The
great men, who in France prepared men's minds for the coming [bourgeois]
revolution, were themselves extreme revolutionists. They recognised
no external authority of any kind whatever. Religion, natural
science, society, political institutions - everything was subjected
to the most unsparing criticism: everything must justify its existence
before the judgment-seat of reason or give up existence....
"Now,
for the first time, appeared the light of day, the kingdom of
reason; henceforth superstition, injustice, privilege, oppression,
were to be superseded by eternal truth, eternal Right, equality
based on Nature and the inalienable rights of man.
"We
know today that this kingdom of reason was nothing more than the
idealised kingdom of the bourgeoisie; that this eternal Right
found its realisation in bourgeois justice; that this equality
reduced itself to bourgeois equality before the law; that bourgeois
property was proclaimed as one of the essential rights of man;
and that the government of reason, the Contrat Social of Rousseau,
came into being, and only could come into being, as a democratic
bourgeois republic. The great thinkers of the eighteenth century
could, no more than their predecessors, go beyond the limits imposed
upon them by their epoch." (Engels, "Socialism: Utopian
and Scientific", MESW, vol. 3, pp. 115-16)
Next,
the following, which Marx described as "the guiding principle
of my studies":
"In
the social production of their existence, men enter into definite,
necessary relations, which are independent of their will, namely,
relations of production corresponding to a determinate stage of
development of their material forces of production. The totality
of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure
of society, the real foundation on which there arises a legal
and political superstructure and to which there correspond definite
forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material
life conditions the social, political and intellectual life-process
in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines
their being, but on the contrary it is their social being that
determines their consciousness." (Marx, Preface and Introduction
to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Peking:
FLP, p. 3)
Finally, the following from Lenin:
"Everyone
knows that the masses are divided into classes;... that usually...classes
are led by political parties; that political parties, as a general
rule, are directed by more or less stable groups composed of the
most authoritative, influential and experienced members, who are
elected to the most responsible positions and are called leaders.
All this is elementary." (Lenin, Left-Wing Communism, An
Infantile Disorder, Peking: FLP, Chapter V, pp. 28-29)
The underlying
and unifying point here is that those whose outlook corresponds
to and is conditioned by the bourgeois world and worldview - and
this applies to the petit-bourgeois democrats as well - are incapable
of grasping the fundamental material reality that determines the
content of a given society and its institutions and ideas. They
cannot correctly comprehend the underlying basis and the actual
class nature of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois-democratic notions
of freedom, individuality, and so on, any more than they can correctly
understand the actual content of proletarian democracy and proletarian
dictatorship. They cannot get right the relations between different
classes, between individuals and classes, and between classes
as such and their ideological and political leadership (parties).
The CRC
document, in its attempt to rationalize its "non-class"
analysis (or analysis of "non-class aspects"), cites
a passage - or, more accurately, part of a passage - from Chapter
I of The German Ideology by Marx and Engels:
"....in
the course of historical evolution......there appears a division
within the life of each individual in so far as it is personal
and in so far as it is determined by some branch of labour and
the conditions pertaining to it.' (German Ideology, p. 66 vol
1, Selected Works, Moscow)".
This is
as cited in the CRC document (par. 13.4) - and this is all they
cite - there is quite a bit left out. If we look at the whole
passage in question, we see that what is left out makes clear
that Marx's and Engels's meaning is the opposite of what the CRC
document implies. Marx and Engels explicitly make the point that
individuality in class society takes shape within and is conditioned
by the class relations. For example, in the very next sentence
after the one cited in this CRC document, Marx and Engels say
this: "We do not mean it to be understood from this that,
for example, the rentier, the capitalist, etc., cease to be persons;
but their personality is conditioned and determined by quite definite
class relationships and the division appears only in their opposition
to another class and, for themselves, only when they go bankrupt."
(MESW, vol. 1, p. 66, emphasis added)
What,
in fact, Marx and Engels are getting at here is not that there
is a "non-class aspect" to the "life of individuals"
in class society, and to their labour in particular, but that
there is a contradiction in the fact that they exist and carry
out their labour as separate individuals yet their role in production
and their role in society overall is conditioned and determined
by the overall social production process with its division of
labour. In capitalist society, their labour (and their overall
existence) is bound together by commodity production and exchange
and most essentially by the process of capitalist accumulation.
Marx and Engels go on to elaborate on this, speaking specifically
to the question of individual freedom and how, especially under
capitalism and above all for the proletariat, the appearance (individual
freedom) is in conflict with the essence (class oppression and
exploitation). Here, in this longer passage from the work in question,
is how they develop this point:
"In
the estate (and even more in the tribe) this is as yet concealed:
for instance, a nobleman always remains a nobleman, a commoner
always a commoner, apart from his other relationships, a quality
inseparable from his individuality. The division between the personal
and the class individual, the accidental nature of the conditions
of life for the individual, appears only with the emergence of
the class, which is itself a product of the bourgeoisie. This
accidental character is only engendered and developed by competition
and the struggle of individuals among themselves. Thus, in imagination,
individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie
than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental;
in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are more
subjected to the violence of things. The difference from the estate
comes out particularly in the antagonism between the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat." (ibid, emphasis added)
In the
Grundrisse, Marx further elaborates on this, making an observation
that is very relevant as an exposure of the position and outlook
set forth in this CRC document:
"In
the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this
semblance seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence,
of distinctions of blood, education, etc. are in fact exploded,
ripped up (at least, personal ties all appear as personal relations);
and individuals seem independent (this is an independence which
is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly called
indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage
in exchange within this freedom; but they appear thus only for
someone who abstracts from the conditions, the conditions of existence
within which these individuals enter into contact (and these conditions,
in turn, are independent of the individuals and, although created
by society, appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable
by individuals).... A closer examination of these external relations,
these conditions, shows, however, that it is impossible for the
individuals of a class etc. to overcome them en masse without
destroying them." (Marx, Grundrisse, translated with a foreword
by Martin Nicolaus, Penguin Books/New Left Review, "The Chapter
on Money", pp. 163-64, emphasis in original)
Let's
see where the authors of this CRC document are heading with their
distortion of the Marxist position on the relation of individuals
and classes, with their insistence on "the non-class aspect"
of the bourgeois-democratic state and the "non-class contradiction
of individual/society". Before long, this is developed into
a whole criticism of what is identified as "one dominant
tendency" in "the line followed by communists from Lenin
onwards", namely:
"...a
class-reductionist tendency. That is, analysing society only in
terms of class and class struggle thereby neglecting the non-class
aspects in the complex phenomenon of society. Lenin's one sidedness
in understanding the complexities of the dictatorship of the proletariat
and his total neglect of the need to develop a political system
will have to be attributed to this class-reductionist approach,
which is still very dominant in the whole communist movement."
(par. 9.6)
This is
a remarkable assertion! Besides everything that has been said,
in refutation of this document, about Lenin's actual theory and
practice in leading the dictatorship of the proletariat, have
the authors of this document forgotten that it was Lenin who wrote
literally volumes on the right of nations to self-determination,
taking to task people like Rosa Luxemburg, among others, who tended
to liquidate the national question, to reduce the oppression of
the masses in the dominated nations to simply a matter of class
exploitation, in the most narrow sense? If the concept of "class
reductionism" has any legitimate meaning, it would refer
to this kind of vulgar economist tendency - the tendency to reduce
every contradiction to the most narrow expression of the relations
between the workers and the capitalists. And no one was a more
consistent and determined fighter against precisely this kind
of tendency than Lenin. But, in waging the struggle against economist
tendencies of all kinds, Lenin did so from the point of view of
a definite class - the proletariat. And that is just the point.
What the authors of the CRC document are actually referring to,
when they invoke the spectre of "class reductionism",
is nothing other than Marxist class analysis. They are expressing
their fundamental disagreement with the statement by Mao that,
"In class society everyone lives as a member of a particular
class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped
with the brand of a class."17 (Mao, "On Practice",
Selected Works, Peking: FLP, vol. 1, p. 296)
As an
illustration of this, we can cite the example that Mao himself
uses in his "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art",
where he speaks to the concept that some artists were raising
- the theme of "love of humanity". He says that, in
actual fact, in a society divided into classes, although people
may talk about love of humanity, it is not possible for anyone
to actually carry out this orientation in practice, since society
is divided into classes and it is not possible to love both the
oppressors and the oppressed. Whether you want to or not, you
have to choose which side you're going to be on. Again, all this
will be fundamentally conditioned by the class relations in any
class society. "Love of humanity" may seem, especially
from a petit-bourgeois standpoint, to have no class character
- or to transcend class relations and deal with a "non-class
contradiction" - but in fact it will always find expression
ultimately in class terms (so long as society is divided into
classes). To insist on this understanding is not "class reductionism"
- it is Marxist materialism.
But, taking
up the CRC document's own concept ("class reductionism"),
it must be said that, while all things in society do not necessarily
express themselves immediately and directly in class terms, they
are all "reducible" to class terms in the final analysis.
For example, when Mao said in his 1968 statement in support of
the Afro-American people's struggle that the contradiction between
the masses of Black people and the ruling class in the U.S. is
in the final analysis a class contradiction, he didn't mean that
there is no national question involved; he meant that this contradiction
would finally be resolved through the proletarian revolution.
To say, more generally, that the national struggle is in the final
analysis a matter of class struggle does not mean that the national
question has no dynamic of its own; but it does mean that in essence
and at bottom it is conditioned by the fundamental class relations
and will find its ultimate resolution through the resolution of
the class struggle with the final victory of the proletariat over
the bourgeoisie and achievement of communism, worldwide; and it
means that different classes, both within the oppressor nations
and within the oppressed nations, will have different outlooks
on the national question, as on everything else.
At this
point it should be clear how the CRC document's opposition to
"class reductionism" is in actuality a petit-bourgeois
demand for "freedom" from the Marxist method of class
analysis and the whole proletarian world outlook and methodology
- a demand which parallels the desire to be "free" of
the proletariat and its dictatorship in the real world, to repudiate
the entire historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat
("from Lenin onwards"). Here the following insights
of Marx are very relevant. Commenting, significantly, on a variant
of petit-bourgeois social-democracy that, in a different context
and somewhat different form, also advocated "the transformation
of society in a democratic way, but a transformation within the
bounds of the petite bourgeoisie", Marx goes on to say that:
"...one
must not form the narrow-minded notion that the petite bourgeoisie,
on principle, wishes to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather,
it believes that the special conditions of its emancipation are
the general conditions within the frame of which alone modern
society can be saved and the class struggle avoided. Just as little
must one imagine that the democratic representatives are indeed
all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According
to their education and their individual position they may be as
far apart as heaven from earth. What makes them representatives
of the petite bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they
do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond
in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to
the same problems and solutions to which material interest and
social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general,
the relationship between the political and literary representatives
of a class and the class they represent....
"But
the democrat, because he represents the petite bourgeoisie, that
is, a transition class, in which the interests of two classes
are simultaneously mutually blunted, imagines himself elevated
above class antagonism generally. The democrats concede that a
privileged class confronts them, but they, along with all the
rest of the nation, form the people. What they represent is the
people's rights; what interests them is the people's interests.
Accordingly, when a struggle is impending, they do not need to
examine the interests and positions of the different classes."
(Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Moscow: Progress
Publishers, pp. 40-41, 43-44, emphasis in original)
Assessing
Historical Experience
Viewing,
from its standpoint, the whole history of socialism so far, the
CRC document draws this conclusion:
"While
upholding the heroic effort to create a new society and the new
things which emerged through socialism (things which have played
a positive role in shaping history) as communists our task is
to focus on our mistakes and correct them; not justify them in
the name of historical limitations." (par. 9.6)
In response to this, three points:
1. In
fact, as communists our main task in this regard, especially in
today's concrete circumstances, is to uphold and defend not merely
"the heroic effort to create a new society" but the
great historical achievements of the dictatorship of the proletariat
in actually bringing into being a radically new society, for the
first time in the Soviet Union, and then carrying this to even
greater heights through the Chinese revolution and the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution. At the same time, and on this basis, we must
also ruthlessly and penetratingly criticize our actual mistakes
and seek the means of avoiding those mistakes in the future and
minimizing mistakes in general to the greatest degree possible.
In this
regard, it must be frankly said that it is inconsistent, not to
say hypocritical, for the CRC document to speak of upholding "the
new things which emerged through socialism (things which have
played a positive role in shaping history)" while at the
same time insisting that "from Lenin onwards" the basic
line and practice of the international communist movement regarding
the most decisive question of proletarian state power was fundamentally
flawed, that within a few years after the October Revolution the
"dictatorship of the party" was instituted in place
of the dictatorship of the masses, and that even the Cultural
Revolution did not break out of this framework of "dictatorship
of the party". To be consistent - that is, consistently Marxist
- the necessary conclusion that would have to be drawn from such
an analysis is that there never was any socialist transformation
in those societies: for how could a Marxist think that such a
world-historical transformation - and socialism, though it is
not yet classless society, nevertheless represents a world-historical
transformation - could be achieved not by the party leading and
relying on the masses but by imposing the dictatorship of the
party over them?! Viewed from this perspective, there would be
very few, if any, "new things" - in particular, socialist
new things - to uphold.
2. With
regard to our mistakes, the first thing is to make a correct appraisal
of what they were - and were not - and on that basis dig into
the roots of them - the objective and subjective roots, those
which did result from historical limitation and from an unfavourable
balance of class forces and those which resulted from errors in
outlook and methodology and in political strategy and policy.
3. This
CRC document has failed to correctly appreciate and sum up the
lessons from either the great advances or the actual mistakes
involved in this historical experience. And this is not accidental:
it is not possible to correctly analyze the mistakes without correctly
evaluating the achievements and vice versa (this is related to
the basic point of orientation stressed in the section of the
RIM Declaration cited earlier - pointing out how the summation
of historical experience is itself an arena of acute class struggle
and that criticism of this experience and genuine creative development
of Marxism is inseparably linked with a fierce struggle to uphold
the basic principles of Marxism). Unfortunately, however, the
CRC document abandons basic principles of Marxism.
Centralization,
Decentralization and the Withering Away of the State
As we
have seen, an incorrect position on the role of the party, particularly
under the dictatorship of the proletariat, is pivotal in the CRC
document's abandonment of these principles. And the document actually
goes so far as to assert that:
"another
tendency encouraged by Lenin's stand on the Party's central role
in the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dominant thinking
in the communist movement which considers that the party determines
everything in relation to social revolution". (par. 9.7)
To attribute
such a position to Lenin clearly flies in the face of reality
- including Lenin's practice as a leader of the October Revolution
and the international communist movement and his contributions
to Marxist theory. But to attribute this to Mao is especially
outrageous. It was Mao who crystallized the understanding that
the masses are the makers of history, that the people and the
people alone are the motive force in the making of world history
- Mao gave this concentrated theoretical expression and he consistently
applied it in practice, in the struggle to seize power, to exercise
the dictatorship of the proletariat and to carry forward the revolutionary
struggle toward communism. And it is not surprising that, with
such a distorted outlook on what has been the actual "dominant
thinking" and practice in the international communist movement,
this CRC document, while "on the one hand" upholding
a leading role for the communist vanguard, soon proceeds to deny
that leading role "on the other hand" and in essence.
This becomes
even clearer as the document gets into what it calls a "new
orientation". Not surprisingly, however, this "new"
orientation is far from new: it is a rather well-known conception
common to a variety of petit-bourgeois and bourgeois "socialists".
And, as is common to such conceptions, this "new orientation"
is grounded firmly in idealism. Continuing to discount or dismiss
the very real contradictions, within socialist society and internationally,
that have been the essential basis for why, in certain significant
respects, the actual historical experience of the dictatorship
of the proletariat has differed from what Marx projected from
the short-lived and very limited experience of the Paris Commune,
this document insists that:
"A
qualitatively new understanding of proletarian political power
must be the starting point. It must reflect Marx's concept of
the Paris Commune - as the reabsorption of state power by the
whole society. So the proletarian state should not be a state
like the bourgeois state or the state under socialism so far practised
by the communists which concentrated the whole power in the centralised
state structure. It will have to be a new political system in
which the state ceases to be a state by starting the process of
reabsorption of state power by society, through a process of decentralising
political power, aimed at reaching a stage when the (political)
will of the whole society can get expressed and realised directly
without the mediation of the state. Such a system can be developed
only by achieving the genuine socialisation of the means of production,
which can again be assured through a political system which ensures
proletarian democracy. This socialist system, in which the socialised
economic base and the proletarian democratic political system
are complementary aspects, must survive on its own becoming a
social system acceptable to and practised by the whole people,
under the leadership of the proletariat." (par. 10.3)
Note the
equation: centralization - bad; decentralization - good. Again,
this reflects the classical petit-bourgeois aversion to the rule
of the proletariat through its powerful centralized state and
its centralized control over the economy. This document is, in
effect, calling for the abolition of the proletarian state - as
soon as the proletariat has consolidated its rule and socialized
ownership - and the replacement of this state by a non-state democratic
political system.
In actual
fact, the withering away of the state is not equivalent to the
abolition of a centralized administrative structure - such a structure
will still be necessary in communist society, although there,
even as compared with socialist society, it will be a structure
of a radically new type. Nor does the process of the withering
away of the state - the process of "the reabsorption of state
power by the whole society" - find its most essential expression
in the weakening of the central state apparatus and its replacement
by decentralized political institutions. In essence, this process
involves the drawing of the broad masses (and ultimately the people
as a whole) into the administration of society - on both the central
and local levels - as part of the whole struggle to overcome the
division between mental and manual labour and all oppressive divisions
of labour and related inequalities in society overall.
But let's
look further at the question of centralization-decentralization
and the CRC document's distorted view of this. In fact, what is
being proposed with the CRC document's "new orientation"
is the same old anarchist-syndicalist line that Lenin criticized:
a line that sets decentralization against the centralized state
power and economic control of the proletarian state - that treats
these as essentially antagonistic, rather than grasping the non-antagonistic
dialectical relation between them. Under the dictatorship of the
proletariat, without a powerful central state apparatus and its
centralized control of the economy, decentralization will only
lead to a situation of conflicting local and particular interests,
will foster capitalist competition and contribute to the restoration
of the capitalist system. In the real world it is impossible for
the proletariat to exercise dictatorship over the enemy, or to
practice democracy among the people, just as it is impossible
for it to be the master of the economy, without such powerful
centralization: without such centralization there is no way to
maintain a unified and integrated socialist economy, relying on
planned and proportional development serving the revolutionary
interests of the proletariat, and no way for the larger interests
of the proletariat as a class to be translated into lines and
policies guiding the entire society.
On the
other hand, centralization without relying on the masses and giving
wide scope to initiative on the local and basic levels will also
lead to the restoration of capitalism, in the form (initially
at least) of state capitalism. This is why Mao stressed that,
in formulating plans for the socialist economy as well as in carrying
out these plans, as with everything else, the mass line must be
practised and fundamental reliance must be placed on the conscious
activism of the masses. Summing up the pathbreaking experience
in carrying out the line of "grasp revolution/promote production"
in socialist China, Raymond Lotta points out that:
"The
Chinese planning system delegated decision-making to local political
authority, which, in conjunction with unified political direction
and new forms of socialist management, increased the exercise
of collective control by the proletariat. The Chinese revolutionaries
demonstrated the possibility of combining regulation with creative
experimentation, centralized control with local initiative, balance
with breakthrough, and economic coordination with mass political
campaigns; they put revolutionary politics in command of economic
development. This model represents a qualitative leap in the theory
and practice of socialist planning...".
"Mao
summed up that too much top-down (vertical) control over the economy
stifled popular initiative. Such a system of planning could not
give full play to local capabilities and allow for creative utilization
of local resources. It also undermined unified leadership over
the economy as a whole, since there was no way that a complex
and diverse economy could be managed on the basis of detailed
commands from the top, no matter how thorough the statistical
information and price calculations may be...."
"Thus
the policy of giving greater scope to local authority was carried
out in dialectical unity with unified central leadership and unified
planning. Local initiative would have the effect of strengthening,
not weakening, centralized leadership and unified planning. But
the real glue of this system ensuring that the interests of the
whole and the overall needs of the revolution were being met was
political and ideological. And decisive to this was the practice
of the 'mass line' to ensure that planning was carried out in
accordance with the interests of the masses and on the basis of
mobilizing the masses." (Lotta, "The Theory and Practice
of Maoist Planning: In Defense of a Viable and Visionary Socialism",
a paper to be published in forthcoming issue No. 62 of Revolution,
emphasis in original)
If the Vanguard
Doesn't Lead, Who Will?
With this
in mind, let's return to the formulation in the CRC document's
"new orientation": "This socialist system, in which
the socialised economic base and the proletarian democratic political
system are complementary aspects, must survive on its own becoming
a social system acceptable to and practised by the whole people,
under the leadership of the proletariat". Here it must be
asked: what is meant by this "whole people"? Does it
include or exclude the overthrown exploiters? And what about newborn
exploiters, arising from within socialist society itself? And
what about degenerated elements from among the working people
themselves, since no reasonable person can deny that in socialist
society there will be such? Once it is allowed that dictatorship
must be exercised over these groups, then we are back to the fact
that "a social system acceptable to and practised by the
whole people" cannot come about right away or in a short
time - without protracted and at times very acute class struggle
and in fact the thorough transformation of the economic base and
the superstructure of society and moreover the whole world.
What,
in this context, can "survive on its own" mean? Does
it mean that if the "whole people" decide they do not
want this system, it must be abandoned until a time in the future
when, perhaps, this "whole people" will decide that
after all they do want this system again - at least for a while.
The absurdity of such a concept - which is related to the absurdity
of this Khrushchev-like notion of a classless "whole people"
- should be readily apparent.
Oh, but
it is said that this "whole people" must practise this
"socialist" system "under the leadership of the
proletariat". But here this CRC document runs into a logical
contradiction of its own making. According to its own logic, it
can legitimately be asked: who gave the proletariat "the
right" to assert its leadership? From the point of view of
this "whole people", why is that not just as bad as
the dreaded "dictatorship of the party"? But, even if
this proletarian leadership were to be accepted, how would this
leadership be actually exercised - institutionally or "extra-institutionally"
- what would be the means and mechanisms for this that would not
actually land you back in the same old situation where the vanguard
of the proletariat plays the leading role?
In fact,
once again the very logic of this document will lead to the conclusion
that there should not be any vanguard, at least not a proletarian
vanguard. And, further, it will also lead to the conclusion that
no one, no social classes or forces, should be excluded from "the
whole people"; for who gave any one group "the right"
to set itself up as the judge of who can be included among "the
whole people". There is, of course, an answer to this, but
it cannot be provided with the bourgeois-democratic outlook that
runs through this CRC document.
At this
point the CRC document seems to allow that the leadership of a
vanguard party will be necessary to carry out the overthrow of
the old state power, the smashing of the old state machinery and
then "the establishment of the new political system".
(par. 10.4) And further, "The vanguard party of the proletariat
will have to play the leading role until the new political system
starts functioning effectively, by completing the process of the
socialisation of the means of production and then consolidating
the power in the hands of the new ruling classes under the leadership
of the proletariat. Once this is achieved the communist party
must give up its monopoly control of the revolutionary transformation
and allow the system to function on its own. Under the proletarian
democratic system, the effectiveness of the new system will be
accepted or rejected by the people through an open democratic
process in which the whole people will be freely involved through
their own political organisations or otherwise." (ibid)
Once again, the document is embroiled in all kinds of logical
contradictions of its own making.
First,
on the question of violently overthrowing the old system and the
role of the vanguard party in this, as was pointed out in the
beginning of this critique, in drawing some general conclusions
concerning the CRC document: this document's position on the so-called
dictatorship of the party is inescapably linked to a position
that a violent overthrow, especially one led by a vanguard party,
is also wrong - elitist and coercive not only against the bourgeoisie
but also against masses of people who may not, at the start at
least, agree with the vanguard party about the need to carry out
this violent overthrow. Shouldn't this question (of whether or
not to overthrow the old system) be put to a vote of the "whole
people"? Or perhaps it should be put to a vote of the "whole
people" minus the old ruling class and those (openly) siding
with it? - but then, again, you would run into the vexing problem
of who would decide, who would have "the right" to decide,
who exactly should be included and excluded from the ranks of
the "whole people". Before long, this kind of formal
democratic preoccupation would overwhelm any orientation toward
overthrowing the system!
This might
seem like a caricature of the CRC document's position, but it
is not. It is not accidental that Khrushchev's line on "the
state of the whole people" was part of a package that also
included "the peaceful transition to socialism". And
the parallel also exists with regard to the line and logic put
forward in this CRC document. If this line and logic is persisted
in, it won't be long before some version of "peaceful transition"
is also more or less openly adopted.
Returning
to the question of when and according to what criteria it should
be determined that the party should no longer play an institutionalized
leading role in the new society, we run into another of the by-now-familiar
logical contradictions in the CRC document. Who is to determine
when "the new political system starts functioning effectively"
and specifically when the consolidation of "power in the
hands of the new ruling classes under the leadership of the proletariat"
has been sufficiently achieved that the party must give up this
role? Is it the party that decides this? But that is a contradiction
in itself - how can the party decide for the masses that they
no longer need the party's institutionalized leading role? Or,
if this is not decided by the party, then by whom and by what
means is this decided - do the people vote on it? But then who
decides when it is time to have such a vote, who organizes such
a vote, sets the rules for it, etc., etc.? The silliness of these
questions is a reflection of the underlying idealism of the whole
line set forth in this CRC document.
Turning
to the economic aspect, in no socialist country to date has there
existed anything close to complete socialization of ownership,
certainly not in the sense spoken of by Marx in The Critique of
the Gotha Programme (where he conceived of all ownership being
ownership by society as a whole). And experience suggests that
it is likely to involve a long period before such complete socialization
can be achieved. In both the Soviet Union and in China when they
were socialist, the fact that things had not yet advanced to the
stage where all means of production were owned by the whole people
was identified as a major reason why commodities and with them
the law of value continued to play a significant, if not overall
regulating, role in the economy. In China, collective ownership
by groups of peasants was still the most widespread form of ownership,
with the relatively small production teams still the main economic
accounting unit. Mao, and Chang Chun-chiao following him, identified
this as a significant and long-term contradiction, very much bound
up with the existence of classes and class struggle and the continual
engendering of the bourgeoisie under socialism. So, to say that
the party should step down from its institutionalized vanguard
role when the process of socialization is completed, without addressing
crucial questions like this, is another, more serious, reflection
of the idealism of this CRC document.
The fact
is that, exactly because of profound contradictions such as this
and their reflection in the superstructure, the party will have
to continue to play the leading role for a long period - in fact
throughout the entire historical period of socialist transition,
which is marked by such contradictions. And to actually play this
role in the correct way - in the correct relationship to the masses
- this leading role must be institutionalized. As pointed out
before, if this is not the case, then, owing to the actual contradictions
still in force, some other group must and will dominate decision-making,
but it will be bourgeois cliques of one kind or another.
What Kind
of Party, What Kind of Revolution?
In opposition
to this understanding, the "new orientation" envisioned
in this CRC document holds that, from the time of the seizure
of power, even when it must still play the vanguard role, the
party "must assert its authority only politically through
the bodies elected by the people", and moreover the party
must function as an "open party" and be "very democratic
even allowing factions etc. as a matter of principle". (par.
10.5) And then, once the functioning of the new political and
economic system has been developed according to the principles
set forth in this document, the party "should formally relinquish
its monopoly of power", and, "Its right to govern should
be strictly based on the electoral support gained by its platform
just like any other platform." (par. 10.9)
This is
yet more idealism. It is mere playing at socialist revolution,
if it is even that. This may be an appropriate party for a socialist
society existing in some idyllic imaginary world where there is
no imperialist encirclement, no soil constantly giving rise to
the bourgeoisie within the socialist society itself, no significant
social distinctions and class contradictions among the people
themselves, no ideological influence of the exploiting classes,
and so on. But it is clear that this has nothing to do with a
revolutionary party that must act as the vanguard of a determined
class struggle, both within the country and internationally, against
a class enemy that still has a powerful base internationally and
even within the socialist society itself has some powerful material
conditions operating in its favour.18
It may
sound "very democratic" to talk about an "open
party" that allows factions within it "as a matter of
principle", and so on. But in reality this is just a recipe
for a party with many different "centres", none of which
will be capable of representing the revolutionary interests of
the proletariat, especially in periods of acute class struggle
- a party that will degenerate into bourgeois factionalism. All
this is indeed "very democratic" - it is very bourgeois-democratic
- the "principle" involved in this is bourgeois principle.19
It should
be recalled how the experience of the Bolshevik Party, in leading
the October Revolution and the Soviet state it gave birth to,
involved, as a significant aspect, breaking with the influence
of social-democracy, represented most prominently by the German
Social-Democratic Party of Kautsky. This was a process which culminated
in a complete rupture, focused around World War 1 - a sharp turn
in which the majority of the parties in the Second International
went from quantity to quality in degenerating into opportunism,
while on the other hand the Bolsheviks also went from quantity
to quality in breaking with erroneous tendencies that had long
held considerable sway in the international socialist movement.
One of the sharpest focuses of this was precisely the question
of the party.
As we
know, in order to prepare for and then lead the October Revolution,
the Bolsheviks, under Lenin's leadership, had to fight a fierce
battle to establish and maintain the kind of vanguard party necessary
for the tasks of proletarian revolution. And, in the aftermath
of the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks again had to make another,
further leap in conceptualizing and realizing a vanguard party
that could lead the continuing struggle. One significant expression
of this was the outlawing of factions within the Party. It is
true that, while this may have been initially seen as a temporary
measure to deal with an acutely difficult situation in the wake
of the civil war, it was then given more general and long-term
application. And this was correct.
Genuine
communist parties, real vanguards of the proletarian revolution,
need the contention of opposing views and a vigorous ideological
struggle within their own ranks, but they also need this to be
done through the unified organizational structure of the party
and not through the formation of organized factions, each with
a different platform, set of leaders, and so on. Serious breaches
of discipline and factional activity within the Bolsheviks almost
killed the October insurrection (Kamenev and Zinoviev, who disagreed
with the insurrection, or at least with the timing of the insurrection,
publicly revealed the plans for the insurrection, with nearly
fatal consequences); and, had factions not been outlawed when
they were (1921), they would have killed the new Soviet Republic
and obviously prevented the building of socialism under the dictatorship
of the proletariat.20
With the
line that is put forward in this CRC document on the nature and
role of the party under socialism, how will the proletariat be
able to exercise its leadership - in fact its all-around dictatorship
- in the superstructure, including such crucial spheres as culture?
What kind of culture, representing which class, will dominate
the stage in this kind of setup? It is worth recalling that, in
discussing the reasons why the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
was absolutely necessary and most timely, Mao pointed to the fact
that, even after power had been seized and up until the time of
the Cultural Revolution, culture and education had overall remained
under the domination of the bourgeoisie (of the revisionists in
particular). It required a monumental struggle to seize control
of these crucial spheres from the revisionists and to embark on
the radical transformation of them. It would be extremely idealist
to think that a proletarian line will dominate in the sphere of
culture - or the superstructure generally - on the basis of spontaneity
and without the systematic, all-around leading role of the party
- a single party unified on the basis of a single line, not one
divided into factions and riddled with factionalism. In the absence
of such leadership, the superstructure will in reality be dominated
by the bourgeoisie, and this, in turn, will mean that capitalist
relations will become dominant in the economic base - that capitalism
will be restored in society as a whole.21
The Bourgeois
Electoral Model vs. Leading the Masses to Remake the World
Yes, it
is true, the party must not rely on its position of authority,
it must rely on the masses; but that does not mean it should degenerate
into acting like any old social-democratic party, tailing the
masses and reducing its role to the framework and confines of
bourgeois-democratic politicking for votes, abdicating its responsibility
to act as a vanguard and actually lead the masses in revolution.
That the
CRC document's vision of the functioning of the "proletarian
democratic system" is in reality not qualitatively different
from a classical bourgeois-democratic system should be clear by
now. Its "model", where the communist party's "right
to govern" is "strictly based on the electoral support
gained by its platform just like any other platform", would,
at best, translate into a situation where rival power centres,
coalesced around different platforms, would compete for the votes
of the masses. The result of this (again, at best) would be some
sort of "coalition" government, in which "socialists"
and "communists" of various kinds would be involved
together with representatives of various other, more openly bourgeois
and petit-bourgeois, "democratic" trends, and in which
the fundamental interests of the masses would be "compromised
away" and no radical transformation of society would be carried
out (and any attempt at this would be quickly and ruthlessly suppressed
by this "coalition" government). Hasn't there been enough
- indeed far too much! - experience, all over the world, to graphically
illustrate this?22
The notion
that somehow this kind of electoral process will result in the
expression of the "political will" of the masses can
only elicit a cynical snort of laughter from anyone who is at
all familiar with this kind of electoral process and who is not
suffering from "political amnesia"; it is a notion that
could be believed only by people who take bourgeois democracy
more seriously than the bourgeoisie itself does - who have not
learned, or have "unlearned", that such democracy, with
its electoral process, is an instrument that serves the exercise
of dictatorship by the bourgeoisie over the masses. This does
not mean that there is no legitimate role for elections in socialist
society, but such a role must be based on the recognition that
the formal process of elections cannot represent the highest or
most essential expression of the "political will" of
the masses; that elections can only be a subordinate part of the
overall process through which that "political will"
is expressed; that elections, like everything else in class society,
will be conditioned and shaped by the fundamental class relations;
and that in socialist society elections must reflect and serve
the exercise of political power by the proletariat, with the leading
role of its party.
In contrast
to this, the following characterization of the role of elections
in bourgeois society applies as well to the (bourgeois) democratic
electoral process the CRC document envisions for its version of
"socialist" society and its "proletarian democratic
system":
"This
very electoral process itself tends to cover over the basic class
relations - and class antagonisms - in society, and serves to
give formal, institutionalized expression to the political participation
of atomized individuals in the perpetuation of the status quo.
This process not only reduces people to isolated individuals but
at the same time reduces them to a passive position politically
and defines the essence of politics as such atomized passivity
- as each person, individually, in isolation from everyone else,
giving his/her approval to this or that option, all of which options
have been formulated and presented by an active power standing
above these atomized masses of 'citizens'." (Avakian, Democracy,
p. 70, emphasis in original)
Throughout
the CRC document we find many references to the "political
will" of the people or of the proletariat. But nowhere in
this document is there the understanding - in fact this understanding
has been repudiated - that there is no way of realizing, and more
than that no way of even determining, the "political will"
of the proletariat and the masses except through the leading role
of the party - through its practice of the mass line and its application
of a communist ideological and political line overall.
In fact,
as we have seen, the CRC document consistently poses the vanguard
role of the party against the conscious activism of the masses.
This is unmistakably clear in its claim that, once the standing
army has been abolished and replaced by the arming of the whole
people, and once the party and its "vanguard role" have
been reduced to a matter of the party competing for electoral
votes on the basis of its platform ("just like any other
platform"), then "unlike in the hitherto practised forms
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the new political structure,
the people wielding the real power in their own hands, also with
the arms in their hands, will be playing a very active role in
the whole political life of the society, thereby being the best
guarantee against restoration and also ensuring the best conditions
for seizing back power if restoration takes place". (par.
10.9, emphasis added)
This is
a most amazing statement! How, for example, could people familiar
with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution argue that the
masses in China were not "playing a very active role in the
whole political life of the society" - both in general and
specifically in combating revisionism and capitalism restoration?
If we contrast the Cultural Revolution with the recent (bourgeois)
"democratic upsurges" in China, we can say, without
the slightest hesitation, that the conscious activism, the class-conscious
revolutionary initiative, of the masses of Chinese people was
expressed "a million times more" in the Cultural Revolution.
And this has everything to do with the fact that in the Cultural
Revolution the masses had the leadership of a communist vanguard,
while the recent struggle has not had that leadership.23 In this
recent struggle there were positive factors and progressive, even
revolutionary, forces taking part - there were open expressions
of respect for Mao and support for Mao's line, there were contrasts
explicitly drawn between Mao and his revolutionary followers on
the one hand and the corrupt revisionist rulers of today on the
other hand. But, with all that, in an overall sense, the forces
and lines that occupied the leading position within the mass upsurge
represented the interests of the bourgeoisie.
Here it
is worth repeating the following on the role of the Leninist party
and its relation to the masses, which applies after the seizure
of power and throughout the socialist transition period as much
as it does to the struggle for the seizure of power:
"Lenin
forged and applied these principles by leaping beyond what had
previously been worked out by Marx or Engels and further by rupturing
with conventional wisdom and practice in the Marxist movement,
but he did so from the foundation of basic Marxist principle,
by adhering to its basic methodology and entirely consistent with
its revolutionary, critical spirit. To raise in opposition to
these principles the experience of the Paris Commune, which was
defeated - in part, if only secondarily, because of the lack of
a Leninist-type party - or the Second International, which degenerated
into an outright instrument of imperialism, is thinking turned
inside-out and facing backwards, to put it mildly. To argue that
the degeneration of the Russian Revolution can be traced to the
very nature and role of the Leninist party itself is first of
all contrary to the facts and an evasion of the fundamental problems
besides. Lenin's argument in What Is To Be Done? - that the more
highly organized and centralized the party was, the more it was
a real vanguard organization of revolutionaries, the greater would
be the role and initiative of the masses in revolutionary struggle
- was powerfully demonstrated in the Russian Revolution itself
and has been in all proletarian revolutions. Nowhere has such
a revolution been made without such a party and nowhere has the
lack of such a party contributed to unleashing the initiative
of masses of the oppressed in conscious revolutionary struggle.
And,...to argue that a vanguard, Leninist party may degenerate,
may turn into an oppressive apparatus over the masses, and therefore
it is better not to have such a party, only amounts to arguing
that there should be no revolution in the first place; this will
not eliminate the contradictions that make such a party necessary,
the material and ideological conditions that must be transformed,
with the leadership of such a party, in order to abolish class
distinctions and therewith, finally, the need for a vanguard party."
(Avakian, For a Harvest of Dragons, Chicago: RCP Publications,
1983, p. 84, emphasis in original)
Democratic
Centralism, Two-Line Struggle and Keeping the Vanguard on the
Revolutionary Road
The CRC
document proceeds with its discussion of the party, taking up
"the principle of democratic centralism, evolved and implemented
by Lenin" as the organizational principle for communist parties.
(see par. 11.2) The CRC document upholds democratic centralism,
in theory, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, proceeds to
argue that its implementation in practice eventually was turned
into an orientation of overemphasizing centralism, virtually to
the exclusion of democracy (this was the case, according to the
document, especially after factions were outlawed in the Bolshevik
Party and then this was made into a principle that has been generally
adhered to by communist parties). Not only was this given theoretical
expression in the "the whole concept of the monolithic communist
Party, propounded by Stalin and solidified during the whole Comintern
period and afterwards" ( par. 11.4); but even "Mao's
attempts to develop the two-line struggle within the party"
as a "step to re-establish the style of functioning of democratic
centralism practised by Lenin, in a more systematic manner"
did not really bring any fundamental improvement, because Mao
would not break with the orientation set, first, with the outlawing
of factions and then with the whole experience of Stalin's leadership
in the Soviet Union and the Comintern. Thus, "in effect the
two-line struggle etc. were only some minor steps at rectification
within the overall framework established earlier". (see
par. 11.5) In opposition to this, the CRC document argues, what
is needed is, "A thorough re-examination of the concept and
role of the communist party in the historical process of building
socialism and communism." (par. 11.7)
We have
seen to a considerable extent already what this CRC document's
basic notion is of the concept and role of the communist party,
but it is worth examining how, under the title "Demystification
of the Communist Party", the document lays out a relativist
and pragmatic line on this question. This begins with the statement
that, "The Communist Party's role of being the vanguard of
the proletariat is to be tested and proved in the course of the
historical process" and that only when a communist party
"realizes that it is always subject to the test of historical
reality, can it come down to the complexities of reality. Then
only can it realize that no authority has been bestowed upon it
either by the working class and the people or by history."
(par. 12.1) The document then goes on to discuss "the qualitative
distinction between the party leading a revolution to seize power
and the party with monopoly in power": in the former case
"the party is compelled by the very context to be self-critical
and continuously correct and develop its line and practice in
order to mobilise the masses for revolution"; while "in
the second case, the pressure of circumstances operate in the
opposite direction". (par. 12.1)
The CRC
document has touched on some real and profound questions here,
and it might seem to be handling them in a correct, dialectical
way. But, unfortunately, once again this is not the case. First
of all, it must be pointed out that, while a party that is not
in power does face the necessity to be self-critical and to apply
the mass line and thereby constantly develop its line and its
ability "to mobilise the masses for revolution", this
will exert itself as a compulsion on the party only so long as
it remains a revolutionary party, only so long as it maintains
an orientation of leading the masses to overthrow the old order
and carry forward the revolutionary struggle toward the goal of
communism. In other words, at any point, the party, rather than
engaging in self-criticism and critically summing up and developing
its line and practice in a more revolutionary direction, can do
just the opposite - it can abandon the revolutionary road and
thereby eliminate the need to be self-critical and to continually
correct and develop its line and practice in order to mobilize
the masses for revolution.
This is
hardly a frivolous or minor point. The CRC document has overlooked
here the very real and powerful pulls that are exerted on parties
faced with the task of leading the struggle for the overthrow
of the old order - pulls to give up on that struggle and to degenerate
into revisionist, reformist parties. Historical experience indicates
that resisting these pulls and remaining on the revolutionary
road is extremely difficult and requires arduous struggle.
On the
other hand, for parties in power, while it is true that there
is a real pull in the direction the CRC document indicates - in
the direction of not systematically applying the mass line and
critically summing up their line and practice - it is not the
case that such parties are almost bound to degenerate once they
come to power (and especially if they have a "monopoly in
power", as the CRC documents puts it). In the one case, as
in the other, what the CRC document leaves out of the equation
- or, at a minimum, fails to focus on as decisive - is precisely
the ideological struggle within the party over the cardinal questions
of line, including most fundamentally the question of what is
the final goal for which the party is aiming - and indeed which
must define its very purposes as a party - and how do the more
immediate objectives and policies of the party link up with and
serve that final goal?
It is
hardly coincidental that the CRC document downgrades the importance
of two-line struggle within the party, declaring Mao's major contribution
on this to be a limited and flawed contribution. In fact, in insisting
on the decisive importance of the struggle within the party between
the two lines of Marxism and revisionism - and the two roads of
socialism and capitalism - Mao indicated a key means for combating
the tendency of the party - in particular a party in power - to
degenerate into a revisionist party. And an important part of
the basis on which Mao made this contribution was precisely his
criticism of the undialectical notion of a "monolithic party"
(see, for example, Mao's comment that, "To talk all the time
about monolithic unity, and not to talk about struggle, is not
Marxist-Leninist" - in Mao's "Talks at Chengtu",
Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters: 1956-71, edited by
Stuart Schram, London: Penguin Books, p. 107).
Mao recognized
that, objectively, there would be different tendencies within
the party - reflecting different forces, ultimately different
class interests - within society as a whole, and that the unity
of the party could only be relative and not absolute, would not
be static but dynamic, developing through a process of unity-struggle-unity.
But what is essential to grasp - and what shows the essential
difference between Mao's line and that of the CRC document - is
that Mao did not pose the necessity for struggle within the party
against the need for the party to be firmly united around one
line and on that basis play the - institutionalized - leading
role in socialist society, until the achievement of communism.24
Mao did
not approach the question of struggle within the party from the
standpoint of bourgeois factionalism or petit-bourgeois anarchism.
Mao recognized that, in a society marked by class contradiction
and class struggle, organized factions within the party would
inevitably mean bourgeois factionalism. Such factions would disrupt
not only the unity of action of the party but also its unity of
will; they would not only undermine the party's ability to lead
the masses but also - and what is basic in being able to lead
them - to learn from them. Factions disrupt not only the chain
of command of the party; they also, and even more fundamentally,
disrupt its chain of knowledge - the flow of ideas from the masses,
through the basic levels of the party, to the party leadership.
In short, they disrupt the ability of the party to play its role
as the vanguard of the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle,
before and after the seizure of power.
All this
is why Mao, while emphasizing the need for and decisive importance
of two-line struggle within the party, also insisted on the three
principles: practise Marxism, not revisionism; unite, don't split;
be open and aboveboard, don't intrigue and conspire. And this
is why Mao insisted that, while the Communist Party itself must
be continually revolutionized, at the same time the Party must
exercise leadership in everything.
Mao's
line is aimed at keeping the party on the revolutionary road and
strengthening its role as the revolutionary vanguard. In opposition
to this, the CRC document's line would reduce the party to a reformist
party, a party mired in relativism, tailing the masses and tailoring
its line to adapt principle to immediate circumstances. This is
revealed in the CRC document's statement that, "The proletarian
class interest itself, under a given condition, is very much relative,
changing according to the changing reality, though the ultimate
interest of the working class, of building communism remains as
a long term goal." (par. 12.1) This is fundamentally wrong:
the proletarian class interest does not change in the way the
CRC document argues; particular tactics, or even strategies, particular
policies, even programs, may change in this way, but the class
interest of the proletariat does not.
The difference
here might seem merely semantic - since the CRC document does
say that "communism remains as a long term goal" - but
in separating this long-term goal from the "proletarian class
interest itself, under a given condition" and declaring the
latter to be "very much relative", the CRC document
opens the door to allowing that anything - any particular policy,
etc. - can be in the interests of the proletariat, so long as
it is accompanied by some general statement about the final aim
of communism. The CRC document's formulation on class interest
is a "two-into-one" formulation: it eclectically combines
the class interest of the proletariat with particular policies,
etc., at any given time. The correct, dialectical understanding
is that the class interest of the proletariat does not change,
but at any given time it can be expressed in specific policies,
etc., which can and do change.
The point,
once again, is that, in any given situation and at all times,
everything - all policies, programs, strategies, tactics - must
proceed with the final aim of communism as the guiding principle
and must serve - not only in word but in deed - as a part of the
bridge leading from the present to the communist future. There
is a fundamental identity between the interests of the proletariat
at any given point and its overall interests in achieving communism,
and this identity must be reflected in the unity between the policies
of the party at any given time and the basic line of carrying
forward the revolutionary struggle to achieve communism. It is
this unity the CRC document would break with its eclectics, its
relativism and pragmatism.
Given
its overall viewpoint, it is not surprising that the CRC document
does not see the need for a communist party whose principles of
organization are consistent with and are an expression of the
revolutionary aims and ideology of the proletariat and which enable
the party to play its vanguard role throughout the long and unprecedented
struggle against a powerful and desperate class enemy - an enemy
whose desperation and determination to defeat the proletarian
revolution become all the greater when it has been overthrown
and can recognize the threat of its historical extinction. The
party envisioned in the CRC document is not so much "demystified"
as it is "de-revolutionized". And this is consistent
with the non-revolutionary, social-democratic notion of "socialism
and communism" that, unfortunately, characterizes this CRC
document from beginning to end.
Conclusion:
Rising to the Challenge or Repudiating Revolution
At this
point, the main theses and arguments of this CRC document have
been dealt with, and the question that once again poses itself
is: where will this line lead those who persist in following it?
By the end of this CRC document, where it broaches "Some
Further Questions", the larger implications of its line and
methodology are becoming evident. In particular there is an orientation
of applying the whole notion of combating "class reductionism"
and focusing on the "non-class aspects" of a whole number
of significant social questions. Thus it is clear that a retreat
from the basic principles and methods of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism
is underway all along the line.
And this
retreat is expressed not only in important political positions
but also in terms of major questions of ideological line. Near
the end of the CRC document, in the course of a discussion on
the proper attitude toward the mistakes as well as the contributions
of leaders of the international proletariat, we find the following
statement: "Even during the rich experiences of Chinese revolution
only Mao's contributions were counted for the enrichment of Marxism."
(par. 12.2)
In response
to this, it must be emphasized that it is not a question of Mao
as an individual, or of his authority as a leader in some abstract
- or formal - sense; and it is not that Mao never made mistakes
or that his mistakes should not be summed up. The point is that
Mao's ideological and political line represents a scientific concentration
of rich experience, both in China and internationally - it represents
the application of communist theory to this experience and the
development of communist ideology to a new stage. Not to grasp
this - or, more to the point, to retreat from a recognition of
this - in the name of not one-sidedly focusing on the contributions
of leading authorities, is once more eclectics. In opposition
to materialist dialectics, it is idealism and metaphysics which
breaks the link between practice and theory as a concentration
of practice. It is relativist, and opens the flood-gates to the
general relativist argument that one idea is as good as another.
This is another significant expression of the overall petit-bourgeois
outlook that has been adopted in this CRC document.
What has
happened here is something very similar to what Lenin describes
in "The Collapse of the Second International": a major
turn in world events has led to disorientation and near-panic,
to the scrambling to discard principles which suddenly seem to
be a burden rather than a boon in carrying out an orientation
of bowing to the spontaneity of the masses and in particular bowing
to petit-bourgeois prejudices and democratic illusions, trailing
in the wake of the bourgeoisie. Before, "the man in the street"
could perhaps be persuaded, particularly about the Soviet Union:
"but that is not real communism". Now that same "man
in the street" looks at statues of Lenin coming down in the
Soviet Union and is reinforced in the "spontaneous"
(bourgeois-propagated) view that "communism was never any
good, even in the land of the first communist revolution".
This kind
of tailing after backward forces and sentiments is strongly exhibited
again at the end of the CRC document. In the concluding paragraph
we are told:
"When
the people of the former socialist countries put the communist
strategy of monopoly power for the party during the whole transitional
phase of socialism on the dock of history, communists cannot remain
satisfied with the consolation that this is the result of backward
thinking among the people. On the contrary, these experiences
again and again indicate the Marxist teaching that the people
alone are the creators of history." (par. 14.2)
First
of all, it is a grand(iose) exaggeration to say that "the
people" in these countries have put the principle of the
institutionalized leading role of the Communist Party "on
the dock of history". With regard to China, for example -
and this is hardly an insignificant example - it is far from the
case that the masses uniformly hold the position that the CRC
document ascribes to them: it is clear that there are many who
have a very real sense of the qualitative difference between the
Communist Party of Mao and the corrupted "Communist Party"
under Deng and who have a deep respect for the former and nothing
but contempt for the latter - and this is especially so if we
are talking about the masses of workers and peasants.
As for
the Soviet Union, while there are a number of people (older workers
in particular) who have a general sense that there are significant
differences between the country under Stalin's leadership and
the situation since (and who strongly prefer the former to the
latter, for a number of reasons), it is safe to say that in the
Soviet Union (and in other "former socialist countries"
that have been part of the Soviet bloc) very few people have ever
even heard a systematic presentation of the Maoist analysis of
the process of capitalist restoration and of the nature of the
ruling classes in the revisionist countries and of the conflicts
among various factions within those ruling classes. It is precisely
this scientific analysis that is required, but rather than make
a materialist analysis of what has gone on in these countries
- including a class analysis of the various forces and lines involved
- the CRC document makes a philosophical principle out of worshipping
the confusion and backwardness of sections of the people in relation
to events there: "these experiences again and again indicate
the Marxist teaching that the people alone are the creators of
history".
This is
the same thing as if, at the outbreak of World War 1, when a wave
of national chauvinism swept through Russia, Lenin had heralded
the chauvinist sentiments and demonstrations of masses of Russian
people as a living testament to "the Marxist teaching that
the people alone are the creators of history"! In fact, the
logic of the CRC document here amounts to saying that whatever
the masses - and in particular the intermediate or even backward
masses, those most strongly influenced by the outlook and propaganda
of the bourgeoisie - think at any given time is an expression
of the real and highest interests of the masses. This is closely
akin to the revisionist formula Lenin strongly criticized: what
is desirable is whatever is possible, and what is possible is
whatever is happening at the given time. This is not an orientation
toward or a method for leading the masses to break with the shackles
- including very importantly the mental shackles - of the old
order and to create a new world through revolutionary struggle.
It is a recipe for miserably tailing the masses and leading them
around in a circle, following their own back-sides, without ever
breaking free of those shackles.
Real and
profound questions have been given concentrated expression in
relation to the recent events in the (former) revisionist countries.
The answer lies in going deeper, making even firmer one's grounding
in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and on that basis fearlessly, and
with a ruthlessly scientific approach, examining the historical
experience of the international communist movement. But, once
again, in this CRC document we see a different response - outright
repudiation of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, of "basic concepts
we had held aloft so far".
It is
important to recall here something else Lenin describes in "The
Collapse of the Second International": how such a leap into
opportunism does not come "out of nowhere" but is the
explosion of certain erroneous tendencies that had been developing
over a longer period (Lenin uses the analogy of a boil that finally
bursts). To take one important aspect of this, the line that runs
through the CRC document is related to the tailing after nationalism
that has for some time characterized the CRC's line, in particular
its expression in the notion of "an ensemble of new-democratic
revolutions", carried out separately by each nation within
(what is now) India - that this represents the road and the content
of the new-democratic revolution in India.25
The authors
of this CRC document say that the CRC, in formulating its line
on the national question, "faced this problem" of "class
reductionism", yet, "Even though we resolved the problem
of counterposing the class struggle with national struggle, we
had not yet grasped the non-class aspects of the national question
because of our own class-reductionist approach." (par 13.2)
But now they "realise the gravity of the setback suffered
by the communist movement due to the lack of a correct dialectical
understanding between class and non-class aspects involved in
developing a political and economic system during the transitional
phase of socialism"; and thus they see the need for a more
concerted struggle against "the concrete manifestations of
this class-reductionist approach" (ibid), in order to be
in a position to more systematically apply their newfound outlook
and methodology to the national question and a number of other
important questions.
In other
words, there are connections between the erroneous positions of
the CRC on a number of questions. There are, no doubt, a number
of important elements involved in the CRC's motion backwards,
and analyzing all the roots and development of this is beyond
the scope of this paper. But clearly in the process of adopting
an erroneous position on the relation between the national question
and the overall new-democratic revolution in India - as well as
on other key questions - the CRC began to move away from the class
standpoint of the proletariat and to take up the class standpoint
of the petite bourgeoisie, including in tailing various nationalist
forces among the oppressed nations in India. This petit-bourgeois
standpoint, with its tendency to resist any strong centralized
ruling force - regardless of whether that force represents the
proletariat or reactionary classes - contributed, in turn, to
the repudiation of "the traditional Marxist-Leninist interpretation"
of the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat
("from Lenin onwards"), with its necessarily strong
central state apparatus and institutionalized leading role of
the vanguard communist party. And, in turn, this leap to repudiate
the principles of MLM on such a decisive question is bound to
lead - and is already leading - to the application of an erroneous
outlook and method and the adoption of erroneous positions on
a whole number of important questions.
The authors
of the CRC document are themselves actually drawing the connection
between their erroneous political positions. They themselves are
revealing a decisive point of outlook and methodology that links
these erroneous positions: the abandoning of the class standpoint
of the proletariat and of Marxist class analysis - indeed Marxist
materialism in general - in the name of opposing "class reductionism".
With this
document, "On Proletarian Democracy", its authors have
retreated into the position that in fact it is not possible or
desirable to cross the narrow horizon of bourgeois right - even
of formal, bourgeois, democracy. Their answer to the question
- can't we do better than that? - is No. Despite any declarations,
or intentions, on their part about upholding the final goal of
communism, they have retreated to the "classical theme"
of not only the undisguised bourgeoisie but bourgeois socialists
singing the same old tired song - they have joined the chorus
of those who proclaim, ever more loudly these days, that we cannot
and must not move beyond the stage in human history where society
remains divided into classes and is marked by social antagonisms.
Whether
they intend it or not, their position would condemn the masses
to a situation where they could not rise up and overthrow the
old order, could not exercise dictatorship over the exploiting
classes and could not carry forward the revolution under this
dictatorship toward the final goal of communism. It would leave
the masses under the domination of an economic system of capitalist
exploitation and a corresponding bourgeois political system where,
as Marx put it, they have the opportunity to choose, every so
many years, which set of exploiters will rule over and oppress
them. That is the logic of repudiating the historical experience
of the dictatorship of the proletariat in socialist society and
the actual lessons communists must draw from it, and replacing
this with demands for an illusory democracy that is impossible
and undesirable under the conditions of socialism, and is unnecessary
- and in a profound sense impossible as well - with the achievement
of communist society, worldwide.
It is
not my intent or purpose here to attempt to examine all the links
between the complete full-blown opportunist line represented by
this CRC document on the dictatorship of the proletariat and other
erroneous tendencies that have characterized the CRC. My focus
has been on exposing this full-blown opportunist line itself,
which represents a concentration of an incorrect outlook, method,
and political line. As expressed in the beginning of this critique
of the CRC document, it is my hope that this critique will contribute
to the comrades of the CRC themselves undertaking a thorough criticism
and repudiation of this document, and in the process re-examining
other positions taken by the CRC to see where and in what ways
these positions have shared at least aspects of this incorrect
outlook, method, and political line.
FOOTNOTES
1. This CRC document
was actually published in December 1990, before the coup/countercoup
events in the Soviet Union in the summer of 1991, which gave rise
to the even further abandonment of any pretence of "communism"
by those in power there as well as instances of mass demonstrations
of an openly anti-communist character. Since,
as we shall see,
this document itself abandons the whole legacy of the proletarian
revolution and the building of socialism, from the 1917 October
Soviet Revolution up through the Chinese Revolution and the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution; and since it is clear that the
events of the past few years in the Soviet Union and China, even
before this coup/countercoup episode and its aftermath, were the
immediate prod that provoked this radical retreat on the part
of those responsible for this CRC document; it is, unfortunately,
reasonable to assume that these most recent events will serve
to further rationalize this retreat in the minds of those who
continue to accept its assumptions.
2. Throughout this
critique of the CRC document, where I speak of how it repudiates
"the entire historical experience of the dictatorship of
the proletariat", I am referring specifically to the experience
beginning with the October 1917 Soviet Revolution. While the CRC
document claims to recognize certain achievements of this historical
experience, it is clear in examining this document that - even
on its own terms and without considering the logical implications
of its position - it regards this entire experience as fundamentally
flawed and insists that a whole different orientation should be
adopted. And it should also be said that, in pitting the limited
experience of the Paris Commune against the experience of the
dictatorship of the proletariat since then, rather than recognizing
and emphasizing the essential unity between them, this CRC document
in reality rejects the fundamental spirit and lessons of the Paris
Commune itself.
3. It is not the case
that militias have been altogether eliminated under revisionist
rule; rather, they too have been transformed into a part of the
bourgeois apparatus of repression, an adjunct to the regular,
standing army serving the rule of the revisionists over the masses.
4. The role of the
Soviets, and revolutionary institutions and mass organizations
more generally, in relation to the larger, more long-term process
of socialist transformation of society is a very important and
complex question. It is a question I will return to later, in
answering further arguments in the CRC document about how the
Soviets were "relegated to the background".
5. As a matter of
fact, the members of the Chinese Communist Party, numbering in
the millions and millions and including a very large percentage
of workers and peasants, did have this formal right to vote Mao
out of office. To be precise, they had the right to elect delegates
to a Party Congress and these delegates, who elected the Party
Central Committee, had the formal right to refuse to elect Mao
to that Central Committee. That they did not do this and why they
did not do this is a further illustration, from a number of angles,
of the basic point here: not form but social (class) content,
rooted in underlying material contradictions, is the essence of
the matter.
6. In fact, the "theory
of productive forces" (and mechanical materialism generally)
is ultimately idealist itself. It metaphysically separates matter
from consciousness. It does not grasp the way in which (as Mao
put it) matter can be transformed into consciousness and consciousness
into matter. Thus, it does not correctly grasp the material foundation
of all ideas, nor does it grasp how ideas can be transformed into
a tremendous material force.
7. It is important
to note the attitude of Lenin toward Luxemburg, with whom he had
many serious disagreements over a number of years, both before
and after the October Revolution. While making many sharp criticisms
of Luxemburg's positions and methodology, Lenin struggled with
her as a comrade within the revolutionary camp. This CRC document
itself states that Luxemburg was in prison when she made some
of her criticisms of the new Soviet government, and that, "after
coming out of prison and getting direct information about the
situation in Russia she withdrew some of the criticisms, and kept
silent on some others. She realised the difficulty in allowing
unlimited freedom to the enemies." (par. 6.6) But, unfortunately,
the CRC document still insists on upholding Luxemburg's criticisms,
specifically on the question of democracy under the dictatorship
of the proletariat, and makes them an integral part of its overall
attack on the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union
(and in China as well).
8. For a further discussion
of this important point, see Avakian, "The End of a Stage
- The Beginning of a New Stage", Revolution, No. 60, Fall
1990, Chicago: RCP Publications, "The defeat in China - the
international dimension", pp. 9-11.
9. In fact, the line
of of the CRC document here is basically in unity with the "left"
opportunist line that was put forward during the Cultural Revolution
- the line which declared that the entire leadership of the Communist
Party and the state (with the exception of Mao and a few others)
was revisionist, and therefore it was necessary to "suspect
all", even to "overthrow all". This was a line
that, had it established itself in command of the Cultural Revolution,
would have sabotaged it and strengthened the hand of the real
revisionists, headed by Liu Shao-chi [Liu Shaoqi] and Deng Xiaoping;
and in fact the revisionist headquarters led by them promoted
or in any case made use of this "left" line in an attempt
to derail the Cultural Revolution.
10. Here it seems
necessary to repeat once more the fact that Engels (along with
Marx) did not foresee the actual course that the proletarian revolution
would take and the actual situation that would be faced by the
proletarian dictatorships that have so far existed. Related to
this, they did not foresee the length and complexity of the process
of transition between capitalism and communism.
This bears on the statement by Engels (quoted earlier in the CRC
document)
that the lack of
sufficiently strong centralization and authority was fatal to
the Paris Commune and that, on the other hand, "'Once you
have won you can do with this authority what you like.'"
(Engels, cited in CRC document, par. 3.5, "'Letter to Carlo
Terraghi,' on the Paris Commune", emphasis added in the CRC
document) The crucial point is that arriving at a situation where
"you have won" - where the victory of the proletariat
has been secured so firmly and irrevocably that the need for a
powerful centralization and authority no longer exists ("can
be done with as you like") - can only be the outcome of a
protracted class struggle, both within socialist society and internationally,
all during which this centralized power and authority must be
firmly upheld and exercised...by relying on the masses, with the
leadership of the communist vanguard. It is precisely this centralization
and authority that the CRC document is repudiating.
11. It could be argued
that the very fact that (even in his writings that were only published
after his death) Lenin did not address this question in any systematic
way until after the October Revolution is a blow against the accusation
that Lenin had intended all along to institute a "dictatorship
of the party" and moreover that there is a thread running
from What Is To Be Done? to this "dictatorship of the party"
(an argument commonly made by social-democrats and such types).
12. In the Chinese
revolution this refers to the seizure of power in parts of the
country well before the nationwide seizure of power.
13. It might be raised:
why could not the standing army, led by the party, be replaced
by the organization of the broad masses in militias, also under
party leadership? The reasons why it has not been possible so
far in socialist society to simply have such militias in place
of (instead of alongside of) the standing army - and some general
assessment of the conditions necessary for such a step - have
been discussed earlier. But it should be noted that the point
I have emphasized here - the leading role of the party over the
armed forces (standing army and militia) - is precisely what the
CRC document must object to. For what is more indicative of a
"dictatorship of the party" than the fact that it exercises
leadership over the armed forces? Such leadership must mean, according
to the CRC document's logic, that the party has a monopoly on
armed force, which is the concentrated expression of political
power. Obviously, this viewpoint contrasts sharply with what is
said here, in this critique of the CRC document, on the role of
leadership in the armed forces and how this relates to the fundamental
question of whether the armed forces (standing army and militia)
really represent the armed power of the masses upholding the revolutionary
interests of the proletariat.
14. It is necessary
to comment on this formulation "not only formal but also
bogus". "Bogus" and "formal" cannot be
so separated here. Since "the equality professed" by
bourgeois democracy is and can only be formal, it cannot avoid
also having an aspect of being "bogus". But on the other
hand it is not entirely "bogus" - it does contain an
aspect of real equality. The essential point - the profound point
that Marxism emphasizes - is that all equality, even that existing
under the dictatorship of the proletariat, is at the same time
inequality. Further, equality, like democracy, reflects a situation
where class contradictions still exist; and in fact, equality,
with its aspect of inequality, contains the seed of class division
even while, in its formal aspect, it appears to admit of no class
distinction.
15. This critique
of the CRC document was written as part of a book, "Phony
Communism Is Dead...Long Live Real Communism!" Here it is
worth repeating a footnote which appears in a different section
of this book:
While,
as emphasized here, the aim of the communist revolution is to
eliminate all property relations in which people are exploited
by other people, and not "to deprive people of their own
property", as Brzezinski puts it, on the other hand it is
the case that in the transition to communism - and more fully
in communist society itself - many things which in present-day
society are owned and disposed of individually (or within the
confines of the present nuclear family) will, to varying degrees,
become socialized and will be consumed in a socialized context.
One example: meals (their preparation as well as their consumption),
which today are the province of separate individuals or families
- and are a burden particularly on the women of these families.
And more generally, with the elimination of commodity production
and exchange, things which in present society must first be purchased
as commodities in order to be consumed (including not only food
but other basic necessities as well as other articles of personal
consumption) will be available to people directly, without the
mediation of money (or other commodity equivalents), according
to people's needs. In that context - in the absence of commodities
and money - although there will remain personal possessions
of various kinds (in particular items of personal consumption),
these will never be more than personal possessions: they will
not be a potential source of privately accumulated wealth that
can be turned into capital, into a basis for exploiting others.
16. It is perhaps
necessary to point out that Engels "went overboard"
on the question of individual wills in his 1890 letter to Bloch
(see Marx and Engels, Selected Letters, Peking: FLP, pp. 75-78),
in which his purpose was to "counterbalance" the overwhelming
emphasis he and Marx had been obliged to put on the role of underlying
material (productive) forces in determining human social development.
In this letter, Engels ended up describing the conflicts in society
as a clash of innumerable individual wills which are ultimately
determined by the underlying material forces. This was a description
which tended to leave out, or "put to the side", the
fundamental fact that individuals and "individual wills"
are shaped by the social position of individuals - and in class
society this means above all their class position. But this particular
tendency in this particular letter does not change the fact that
Engels, and Marxism in general, recognizes the decisive role of
classes and class struggle (since the time classes first emerged),
which is clear in the Communist Manifesto and innumerable other
Marxist works.
17. By this it should
not be understood that there is a direct one-to-one relation in
all cases between the class position of any particular person
and his/her way of thinking. For one thing, there is the fact
that, as Marx and Engels pointed out, the ruling ideas in society
are the ideas of the ruling class, and these ideas are bound to
exert a considerable influence on the thinking of even the members
of the oppressed classes. Further, it is a basic principle of
Marxist, dialectical materialism that ideas, having arisen on
the basis of material reality, in turn exert a great influence
on material reality, and that, in this way, ideas, particularly
correct ideas, have considerable power to influence people broadly
in society (this explains, for example, why some people, particularly
intellectuals, from among the bourgeoisie or petite bourgeoisie
take up the outlook of the proletariat and join its revolutionary
struggle). But, with all this, it remains true that, speaking
of masses of people, there is in the final analysis a general
correspondence between their class position and their outlook.
And more generally, it remains a profound truth that, as Mao put
it, "in class society everyone lives as a member of a particular
class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped
with the brand of a class".
18. The CRC document
doesn't entirely forget to mention class struggle here. It says
that the system of proletarian democracy it is advocating "will
have to evolve further" ("Since socialism itself is
a period of revolutionary transformation") and that, "The
question of such changes in the political-social-economic structures
will itself be a matter of class struggle." (ibid) But this
vague notion of "class struggle" is part of the CRC
document's idealized vision of "socialist society",
in which the material basis for the existence, and strength, of
the bourgeoisie is not taken seriously into account - is not even
correctly comprehended. This "class struggle" could
only be as imaginary as the "socialism" this document
dreams up. It has nothing to do with the real, and decisive, class
struggle that must be waged as the key link throughout the socialist
transition. It doesn't help to talk about "class struggle"
and "a period of revolutionary transformation" in a
context where the nature of this "period of revolutionary
transformation" is distorted and the basis and centrality
of class contradiction and class struggle throughout this period
is misapprehended and misrepresented.
19. One of the main
expressions of bourgeois principle involved here is treating ideas,
including the lines and "platforms" of political parties,
as commodities that have to find their value in the "market
place of ideas" (and the petite bourgeoisie is particularly
susceptible to the illusion that in the operation of the "free
market" equality will actually prevail). There is a basic
failure to recognize that the essence of the capitalist market
in particular is class domination and exploitation.
20. While it may be
the case that the counterrevolutionary treachery of Kamenev and
Zinoviev in this politically (and literally) life-and-death situation
did not result from their involvement in an organized faction
- and, in any case, this could not have been prevented simply
by the organizational measure of outlawing factions - still their
actions were of a clearly factional character: acting according
to their own line and discipline in opposition to that of the
party. And, as a matter of fact, the more full-blown and ongoing
existence of factions will even more fundamentally undermine the
unity of will and action of the party and make it incapable of
playing a vanguard role, of leading the masses in revolutionary
struggle, first to carry out the seizure of power and establish
their own proletarian dictatorship and then to carry forward the
revolution under this dictatorship.
In order
to examine this question more fully, it is worth reviewing the
specific circumstances that led to the outlawing of factions in
the Bolshevik Party in 1921. The Bolsheviks confronted the challenge
of rehabilitating a war-ravaged economy that now faced breakdown,
of re-establishing links with key sectors of the population (particularly
in the countryside), and of strengthening its organization in
a milieu of social dislocation, political disaffection (including
within the urban working class) and wavering among middle strata.
The civil war had been won, yet the fate of the revolution still
hung in the balance. New tasks had to be faced, major policy adjustments
were called for (the New Economic Policy was the systematic expression
of that necessity), and new skills, especially in managing the
economy, had to be developed. Meeting the challenges of the new
situation required a united and resolute party, yet the party
itself was, and could not but be, affected by the strife and upheaval
of the preceding civil war period. Sharp two-line struggle raged
over the road forward. That was inevitable. But the successful
prosecution of that struggle was complicated by the growing problem
of factionalism.
Various
opposition groupings were organizing around separate platforms,
forcing the agenda of party discussion around secondary questions,
and putting adherence to their own platforms above party discipline.
Lenin was concerned about the real danger of a split in the party
at this crucial time; and he was concerned that the necessary
liberalization in economic matters not fan bourgeois-democratic
tendencies in the party. It was also the case that, where and
when they were in a position to do so, factional elements sought
to implement their own programs (for example, followers of Trotsky
tried to carry out their program of militarizing the trade unions,
a disastrous policy that would feed demoralization within the
trade unions and distrust towards the party within society as
a whole, exactly at a time when the need to restore popular confidence
in the revolution was at a premium). The influx of many young
and inexperienced members into the party, alongside many unreconstructed
ex-Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc., created fertile
ground for factional organizing within the party.
Left unchecked,
factionalism would make it more difficult to arrive at and carry
out party decisions, would undermine party unity and give greater
scope for incorrect policies to take hold; in short, it would
weaken the foundations of proletarian rule. Further, precisely
because the Bolsheviks were now a party in power, factionalism
took on a new and threatening dimension. The internal and external
enemies of the revolution could, as they did, speculate on and
take advantage of factional intrigue and work through groupings
close to power in order to further their aims, while the proliferation
of groups organized around their own platforms gave the enemies
within the revolution greater room to manoeuvre and organize.
While
the particular circumstances that led to the outlawing of factions
in the Bolshevik Party in 1921 were ones
of acute crisis for
the new proletarian state and its leading party; and while the
(Footnote continued on next page)
(Footnote continued
from previous page)
existence of factions
within a party in power provides a particularly strong basis for
counterrevolutionary forces, inside and outside the socialist
country, to weaken and even to overthrow the socialist state or
to subvert it from within and turn it into its opposite; there
are more general principles involved. The history of the Bolshevik
Party illustrates that, even before the seizure of power, the
Bolsheviks already needed to rupture more fully with the organizational
line that predominated among the socialist parties of the Second
International, a line which allowed factions, etc., within the
party. This was a line which flowed from the increasingly reformist
outlook and program of the majority (and the most influential)
of these parties - a line which was not oriented toward leading
the masses to overthrow and smash the existing bourgeois state
apparatus and establish a new, proletarian state. The outlawing
of factions in the Bolshevik Party in 1921 - and, beyond that,
the establishment of this as a basic organizational principle
of communist parties - represented the bringing of organizational
practice and principle more fully into line with the objective
needs of the proletarian revolutionary struggle, both before and
after the seizure of power.
This question
of factions within the party will be returned to later, in discussing
the concluding sections of the CRC document.
21. In the pamphlet
Three Major Struggles on China's Philosophical Front it is noted
that Mao warned "that if we do not build a socialist economy,
our proletarian dictatorship will become a bourgeois dictatorship,
a reactionary, fascist dictatorship". (Three Major Struggles,
Peking: FLP, 1973, p. 19) And, as the other side of this, if the
proletariat does not in fact exercise all-around dictatorship
over the bourgeoisie in the superstructure, including the spheres
of ideology and culture, it will not be possible to build a socialist
economy and remain on the socialist road. The line of this CRC
document is an echo of - or actually the "reverse side"
of - the line of Liu Shao-chi and his philosophical followers
who, after the seizure of nationwide political power in China,
advocated a long period in which the economy would be of a "synthesized"
capitalist-socialist character and the superstructure would serve
both the socialist and the capitalist sector and "also serve
the bourgeoisie". (ibid p. 16) The CRC document's line arrives
at the same place "from the other side": it would undermine
the exercise of all-around dictatorship by the proletariat in
the superstructure and create a situation where, in theory, different
class forces would be "sharing power" in the superstructure;
in reality, of course, this "synthesized" superstructure
would mean that the bourgeoisie "synthesized" - "ate
up" - the proletariat and seized control of the superstructure
as a whole and transformed society in its image - back to capitalism.
22. Among the debacles
suffered by socialist and communist parties that have fallen into
bourgeois parliamentarism and/or focused their efforts on involvement
in governments of "coalition" with various bourgeois
forces, perhaps the most dramatic and tragic is the experience
of the Indonesian Communist Party in the mid-1960s. This involved
the massacre of hundreds of thousands of communists (and other
Indonesian people), the decimation of a powerful communist party,
at the hands of the reactionaries. Leading up to this, the Indonesian
Party had increasingly made the focus of its work parliamentary
and other forms of legal struggle; it had increasingly relied
on its parliamentary successes and its positions in a coalition
government (headed by the bourgeois nationalist Sukarno); and
it was consequently unprepared for the counterrevolutionary coup
d'etat carried out by the Indonesian military (led by Suharto)
with not only the backing and back-stage direction but also the
active participation of the U.S. CIA. (see "Historical Document:
Self-Criticism by the Indonesian Communist Party, 1966",
in Revolution, No. 55, Winter/Spring 1987)
Although
the Sukarno government did not, of course, represent the dictatorship
of the proletariat, still there is an analogy between the situation
of the Indonesian Communist Party in that "nationalist"
government and the position that a communist party would be in
if it tried to implement the line advocated by the CRC document
on how a party should operate under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
As noted, such a party would in effect find itself in a "coalition"
government in which the party would not be able to exercise sole
leadership - in fact, it would not really be able to exercise
leadership at all. The party, and the revolutionary masses generally,
would be extremely vulnerable to a reactionary coup d'etat (and
massacres that would accompany it). Here, once more, it is crucial
to recognize that, even leaving out the overthrown ruling class,
the "whole people", under the conditions of socialist
society, means many different classes - including newborn bourgeois
forces - and "the arming of the whole people" would
in reality mean the development of many different armed camps
among the people, including armed forces effectively under the
command of bourgeois counterrevolutionary leadership.
23. Further, it should
be noted that the great unleashing of the masses in the GPCR was
possible, too, because it took place under the dictatorship of
the proletariat, while the 1989 events were suppressed by a bourgeois
state, a bourgeois dictatorship.
24. In a talk, "On
Democratic Centralism", in 1962, Mao says that "secret
factions" must be prohibited, but, "We are not afraid
of open opposition groups, we are only afraid of secret opposition
groups." (Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p. 183) In reading the
whole passage in which these statements appear and taking the
whole spirit of Mao's remarks, it seems clear that he is stressing
a certain basic orientation of welcoming ideological struggle,
if it is conducted in an open and aboveboard way; and when he
talks about not fearing opposition groups that are not secret,
he means something different from organized factions, with their
own internal unity and discipline, operating within the Communist
Party in opposition to the line and discipline of the Party. Rather,
it seems he is talking about groups of people who will coalesce,
less formally, to put forward a position on particular questions.
Mao stresses that, "All leading members within the Party
must promote democracy and let people speak out". (ibid)
At the same time, he stresses that this must be on the basis that
Party members "observe Party discipline, the minority must
obey the majority, and the whole Party should obey the Centre".
(ibid) In other words, discipline must be observed and unity must
be preserved - the discipline and unity of the Party, not of factions
- this is what people must uphold, even when they may be dissenting
from the prevailing Party line or a particular Party policy. Thus,
Mao says: "as long as they do not break discipline, as long
as they are not carrying on any secret factional activities, we
should always allow them to speak and even if they should say
the wrong things we should not punish them. If people say the
wrong things they can be criticized, but we should use reason
to convince them.7"(ibid)
All this
is related to another crucial principle that Mao emphasizes: "Very
often the ideas of the minority will prove to be correct. History
abounds with such instances. In the beginning truth is not in
the hands of the majority of people, but in the hands of a minority."
(ibid) But, again, the grasping of the truth and winning people
to the truth will not be served - it will be undermined - by the
existence of factions within the Party. And for this reason, the
practice of the Chinese Communist Party, under Mao's leadership,
was to strive for a situation in which there was lively, vigorous
debate and ideological struggle throughout the Party (and in society
generally) but not to allow organized factions within the Party
(at least not in any full-blown, institutionalized and "permanent"
way).
The basic
fact is that organized factions will lead to factionalism - they
will lead to a situation where those adhering to these factions
put the line and "unity" of their faction above those
of the party. In certain exceptional cases, when the leadership
of the party has been captured by opportunist elements who impose
a counterrevolutionary line but it is not correct to simply and
immediately abandon the party to such leadership and attempt to
form a new party, it may then be necessary to organize a revolutionary
faction in order to carry out the fight to defeat the opportunist
line and leadership and re-establish the party on a revolutionary
basis. But after a certain period of time, this struggle must
be resolved one way or the other - either in the triumph of the
revolutionary line and the re-establishment of the party on a
revolutionary basis or in the complete triumph of the opportunist
leadership and line - and in the latter case it is then necessary
to break with such a party and to build a new party on the basis
of revolutionary principles, of an MLM line, ideologically, politically,
and organizationally.
25. While the national
question in India is complex and requires careful study, it can
be said that the CRC's line departs from the basic Leninist understanding
of the national question in the imperialist epoch as part of the
world proletarian revolution, and the Leninist orientation of
upholding the right of self-determination for oppressed nations
but at the same time - particularly with regard to nations within
a single state - striving to carry out a unified revolutionary
struggle and to establish a single, unified revolutionary state
over the largest possible territory on the basis of equality among
nations (including, once again, the right of self-determination).
The CRC line goes beyond upholding the right of self-determination
in such circumstances and actually promotes separation, even to
the point of insisting on separate revolutionary movements, separate
new-democratic revolutions, for each of the oppressed nations.
If such a line were actually put into practice, the result would
be that the proletariat in the Indian state - which can and must
be united, through the vanguard role of a single multi-national
party, to play the leading role in one overall new-democratic
revolution - would instead be split along national lines and
in fact would be subordinated to non-proletarian class forces
and programs within each separate nation. Here we see once more
an illustration of the fact that the position of the CRC abandons
the stand - the outlook and interests - of the proletariat and
takes up a petit-bourgeois stand, in this case tailing bourgeois
(and other exploiting class) forces among these oppressed nations
within the Indian state.