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1987/8

**A WORLD**

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A WORLD FOR ALL

UN MUNDO QUE GANAR **КАЗАНИТЬСЯ** **ДУННА**


FOR FAST

# PHILIPPINES REVOLUTION AT A CROSSROADS

—An Open Letter to the CPP

Inside:  
New Document  
of CP of Peru

جهانی برای همه **UN MONDO DA CONQUISTARE**



## Peru



An important new document from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru describes the progress in constructing a new people's regime through the people's war against the reactionary Peruvian state.

## Philippines

An Open Letter from the Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement to the Communist Party of the Philippines expresses deep concern over developments in the line of the CPP and the danger this poses to the revolutionary character of the Party and the people's war it is leading.

## France

In December 1986 a giant student movement erupted in France from "out of nowhere." Claude Duchène analyses three weeks of intense struggle and draws some of the lessons of this movement.

THE PROLETARIAT HAS NOTHING TO LOSE  
BUT THEIR CHAINS, THEY HAVE  
A WORLD TO WIN. . .



PROLETARIANS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

1987/8

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#### **Peru**


Statements of Peruvian Communist Party Central Committee and Committee of the RIM on the heroism of hundreds of revolutionary prisoners massacred by the government. Also analysis of first five years of people's war.

#### **Haiti**

Articles on the crisis in Haiti, the mood of the masses and the tasks of revolutionaries. Includes a joint call by two Haitian Marxist-Leninist groups.

1986/7

#### **Forward Along the Path Charted by Mao Tsetung**



On the 20th anniversary of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and 10 years after the death of Mao and the reactionary coup d'état. This issue consists principally of articles submitted by participating parties and organisations of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, which analyse Mao Tsetung's development of the science of Marxism-Leninism and discuss why and how Mao Tsetung Thought is decisive for advancing the world proletarian revolution.

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TO WIN 獲得的將是整個世界 МИР ВБИГРАТЬ

MONDE A GAGNER जीतने के लिए सारा विश्व है A WORLD

UN MUNDO QUE GANAR KAZANILACAK DÜNYA विश्व विजय

*A World To Win* has been inspired by the formation of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, announced on March 12th, 1984, which has regrouped many Marxist-Leninist parties and organisations from around the world. It is not an official organ of the RIM. Its pages are open to all those on the same side of the barricades in the fight against imperialism and reaction.

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*A World to Win* cannot accomplish its tasks without the active support of its readers. Letters, articles and criticism are needed and welcome. Manuscripts should be typed double spaced. In addition, we need translators, help with distribution (including through commercial channels) to make this magazine available in as many countries as possible, art work (as well as clippings and original photos), and of course financial contributions from those who understand the importance of the continued publication of this magazine. This includes both individual contributions and the efforts of those who undertake the responsibility for raising funds for this magazine. Send pledges and donation cheques made out to "A World to Win."

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جهانی برای فتح UN MONDO DA CONQUISTARE

New PCP Document

# Develop the People's War to Serve the World Revolution



The recent appearance of the pamphlet *Develop the People's War to Serve the World Revolution* is an important event, since it is the most extensive document by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) in several years. It is available in Spanish in several countries and other editions are reportedly in preparation. Major comments on this work and other articles apparently designed to refute it have begun to appear in leading bourgeois publications in many countries, such as *Le Monde* and *The Guardian*. In Peru itself, in addition to circulating as an illegal pamphlet (Ediciones Bandera Roja), some long excerpts have also been reprinted by the legal press in various forms.

Dated "Peru, August 1986," this 110-page work consists of two parts. The first, "Six Years of People's War," is reprinted here in its entirety. The second, entitled "One Year of the APRA Government," analyses the 1985 Peruvian elections, refutes the Garcia government's programme, deeds and projects, exposes the government's murder of the prisoners of war last June 19th, and answers some of the opportunist arguments used by the legal "Left" against the PCP. In the final passages, the PCP Central Committee declares,

"This people's war has served the world proletarian revolution from the very start and will continue to do so; it enjoys the support of the international working class and the world's peoples, of the genuine revolutionaries and communists, and very especially of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement to which the Party belongs..."

The entire second part will be published in the next issue of *A World to Win*. — AWTW

"A revolution must go through a civil war. This is a rule. And to see only the ills of war but not its benefits is a one-sided view. It is of no use to the people's revolution to speak one-sidedly of the destructiveness of war."

"It is good if we are attacked by the enemy, since it proves that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves. It is still better if the enemy attacks us wildly and paints us as utterly black and without a single virtue; it demonstrates that we have not only drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves but achieved a great deal in our work."—Chairman Mao Tsetung

\* \* \*

**CONTEXT OF THE SIXTH YEAR.** The 17th of May marked the sixth anniversary of the beginning of the people's war in Peru. Six years ago the Communist Party took up arms to advance the democratic revolution — to overthrow the exploitation and oppression of imperialism (principally Yankee), bureaucrat capitalism and subsistent semifeudalism — in order to seize state power for the proletariat and the people, within the context of the world revolution and in its service. Since then, under the invincible banners of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Guiding Thought, we have marched along the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside, and waged revolutionary war taking the countryside and city as a single whole with the countryside the principal theatre of armed action and the city complementary but necessary — in short, a people's war, in essence a peasant war led by the Communist Party, whose core is the creation of revolutionary base areas.

These years can be synthesised like this: 1980 was the beginning of the armed struggle, of guerrilla warfare; 1981 and 1982 saw the unfolding of guerrilla struggle and the sprouting of the People's Committees, the new political power of the workers, peasants and petite bourgeoisie, a joint dictatorship based on the worker-peasant alliance led by the proletariat through its Party; 1983 and 1984 were years of struggle centring around restoration and counter-restoration, that is, counter-revolutionary war to smash the new political power and restore the old, and revolutionary war to defend, develop and build the newly arising people's power, a hard

contest waged between the reactionary Armed Forces and the People's Guerrilla Army; from 1985 through today there has been a continuing defense, development and building to preserve the base areas and expand the people's war throughout our mountains from North to South.

Since 1983 the Peruvian revolution has unfolded under the guidance of the great strategic conception, in political terms, of "Winning Base Areas" and in military terms of developing people's war, which means principally guerrilla warfare complemented by guerrilla actions such as sabotage, selective annihilation and propaganda and agitation, so as to carry out the central task of building, preserving and developing base areas and spreading the people's war throughout the mountains, taking into account the variability that the fluidity of guerrilla warfare imposes not just on the new state power but on all forms of revolutionary construction and work. This basic plan of "Winning Bases" forms the context for the present "Plan for the Great Leap," based on the specific political strategy of "two republics, two roads, two poles," that is, the Republic of the old reactionary Peruvian state vs. the New Democratic People's Republic in formation; the old dead-end road of votes which only serves to preserve the old exploiting order vs. the new road of arms which is transforming Peruvian society to serve the people; two poles, one of the big bourgeoisie heading up the dictatorship of the ruling classes in the service of imperialism, bureaucrat capitalism and semifeudalism, the black and odious past which is being destroyed, vs. the proletarian pole, represented by its Communist Party in the leadership of the democratic revolution whose victory will open the way to socialism and through the course of repeated cultural revolutions fused with the great epic of the world revolution someday lead to communism, humanity's sole, necessary and inevitable goal that can never be abandoned. Through the military strategy of generalising people's war, this political strategy has taken

the concrete form of four campaigns, each with its specific content.

ON THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR. Since every war is a struggle between two camps, the development of the people's war inevitably led to the unleashing of counter-revolutionary war. The Peruvian state, the dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie and landlords under the protection of imperialism, principally Yankee imperialism, defended their threatened existence. At first they tried to minimise the problem in order to preserve their phony democratic image and not endanger the influx of capital in the form of loans and investment. They sent in their police forces, which despite their abuses, outrages and crimes suffered humiliating defeat and were forced to withdraw from the countryside in the disputed areas and seek refuge in the provincial or departmental capitals. Thus all the police operations, launched with such loud and confusing propaganda, were soundly defeated and the first People's Committees arose. In the face of the advance of the new state power, the Belaunde government abandoned its reticence to send in the reactionary Armed Forces; the class necessity of the exploiters and oppressors carried the day and the task of restoring public order was handed over to the Armed Forces (the Army, Navy and Air Force), the backbone of the state, supported by the police forces (the Civil Guard, Republican Guard, and Investigative Police). In December 1982 a state of emergency was declared in the region of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac, and it was placed under the Armed Forces' political-military command. This status was later extended to other areas in the departments of Pasco, Huanuco and San Martin; it is still in force essentially despite some variations. Military control reached a new and important phase with the imposition of a state of emergency and curfew in Lima and Callao beginning in February 1986, which subjected the capital of the Republic and its more than six million inhabitants to military rule. As a result of these moves, seven

and a half of Peru's 20 million people are under military authority: a million and a half people live under the absolute and unrestrained political-military authority of the Armed Forces, the new lords over their lives and property, revived feudal tyrants decked out with noose and knife; while six million people in the very capital of this much-touted democracy live without any guarantees or rights, subject to overbearing brutality and disguised murder under a martial law which goes so far as to give itself the right to ban one or another specific artistic performance even in a public gathering previously authorised by the military.

*How have the Armed Forces carried out the counter-revolutionary war?* Basically they have followed the doctrines of their master, Yankee imperialism, with its theories of counter-revolutionary war based on its own experiences, especially in Vietnam, and particular lessons it has drawn from its fight against the armed struggle in Latin America, especially Central America. To this fundamental theoretical basis they have added the "anti-terrorist" experience of Israel and their chums in Argentina, as well as advice from West Germany, Taiwan, Spain, etc. On top of all this they throw in their few months experience in the 1965 anti-guerrilla struggle and the more limited experience of La Convencion. Operations are under the leadership of the Armed Forces Joint Command, acting according to the instructions of the National Defense Council headed by the President of the Republic, whether it be Belaunde or Alan Garcia, who have been directly and undeniably responsible for every measure carried out, as well as for the war's overall political leadership, which means they bear the main responsibility for the conduct of the counter-revolutionary war. In short, they have applied world counter-revolution's well-known strategy against revolutionary struggle, armed subversion and people's war, a strategy which has been defeated many times — smashed and thoroughly and completely beaten by people's war, time and

again demonstrating to the world the superiority of the proletariat's strategy over that of imperialism.

*Masses against masses.* When the Armed Forces came in they had already been studying the revolutionary war for three years as well as advising and planning the police actions, so they had certain advantages from the beginning, and obviously they had more and better human and technical resources than the police. They immediately began to implement their plan of setting masses against masses, following the old imperialist doctrine of using natives to fight natives. First they used pre-trained units made up of handpicked army veterans and peasants linked to local tyrants and livestock rustlers, whom they had employed as agents and infiltrators among the peasants, and hooked up to the refurbished intelligence network they had begun to set up years before in the 1970s. Based on these agents, infiltrators, spies and stool pigeons, aided by the authorities, local tyrants and petty tyrants and their flunkies, they formed vigilante bands under military authority to take part in joint actions with the police and Armed Forces (who themselves often acted disguised as peasants or police), unleashing white terror in the countryside, assassinating Party members, fighters, mass leaders and peasants, carrying out real witchhunts against revolutionaries and the advanced, as well as robbery, rape, torture, looting, arson and slaughter. This is how they carried out the sinister policy of burn all, loot all and kill all. Later, they used the white terror and death threats to subjugate a part of the masses, and in this way masses under direct vigilante coercion and control were forced to aid the counter-revolutionary war. These coerced people from among the masses acted as guards, arrested and murdered guerrillas, carried out razing operations against neighbouring communities or towns and even more distant ones, and took part in search and pursuit operations against the guerrillas. Later these people were regrouped along with people from neighbouring areas into strategic hamlets under direct military rule. There, in

addition to being forbidden to come and go freely, since no-one is allowed to go anywhere alone, even to work, and subject to constant control, they were militarised and organised into "patrols" and "defense committees," forced to take up rudimentary weapons, and, sunk in starvation and poverty, obligated to take part militarily in the white terror and the counter-revolutionary war. In conclusion, while the police forces were also used as cannon fodder by the Armed Forces, as even the soldiers, sailors and aviators have always been, these coerced masses have been the main and real cannon fodder in this sinister plan of pitting masses against masses, of using natives to fight natives; these coerced masses have been and still are used to spearhead all the reactionary attacks and operations or to surround the repressive forces like a human shield. These coerced masses have suffered 2,600 losses (including vigilantes), almost five times more than the number of uniformed soldiers and police killed (without taking into account the hundreds of infiltrators, agents and informers).

**Genocide.** When their policy of masses against masses proved unable to check the people's war, the reactionary Armed Forces resorted to the most evil, perverted and criminal genocide, one of the greatest infamies in the history of the Republic of Peru. The military showed its genocidal tendencies from the beginning, in Huambo, Iquicha, Huaychao, etc. President Belaunde cynically saluted and approved of these incidents as "the Ayacucho peasant's gallant answer to terrorism." It should be made clear that he himself had approved and authorised such actions and not only publicly praised but called for genocide: this is the self-proclaimed democrat, humanist and Christian full of respect for the Constitution and the law, covered forever in the blood of the people which began to flow in torrents. Among the victims were the journalists cynically and cowardly murdered in Uchuraqay.

They began to wipe out the peasants and their communities and



small towns in 1983 in the department of Ayacucho. In June of that year, in Espite, in the province of Cangallo, they used helicopters to machine-gun the masses and throw grenades at villagers trying to flee through the mountains. In July, in the towns of Oqopeja and Uchuraqay, in the province of Huanta, again they used helicopters to machine-gun the masses and wipe them out with grenades. In Paccha, a town in Vinchos, in the province of Huamanga, the majority of the population were murdered and the rest carried away to Lima. In July, the first monstrously tortured bodies began to turn up in the streets of the city of Ayacucho and the surrounding areas; during the two months leading up to the November elections the bodies of more than 800 people were found — people who had been brutally murdered after bestial tortures and their bodies left to rot. In November, in Silvia, in the province of La Mar, in a reprisal for an am-

bush against the Army, they arrested 60 people and indiscriminately killed 20 of them. A month before, in Sillco, in the province of Huanta, they threw grenades and fired directly on the masses for the first time. Culminating this slaughter, on election day, in Socos, in the province of Huamanga, the local police detachment tortured and murdered more than 50 people who had been taking part in a wedding party. Officially, 37 people were reported dead.

Along with all this reactionary white terror, they began to set up concentration camps in the department, massive and evil torture centres, under the control of the Army in the "Los Cabitos" barracks in the city of Ayacucho, in Totos (Cangallo) and Qoisa and Pichari (La Mar), and under the control of the Navy in Huanta. In the Totos camp, as of July 1983 they had secretly buried more than a hundred people; more than 20 of them had their throats cut, prisoners were tortured and buried alive, new prisoners were forced to dig graves over three metres deep and then were shoved in, while others were thrown in with their hands and feet tied. In Totos the torture is especially brutal and sadistic. To terrify the people, they cut off heads and impale them on stakes.

But the genocide was not confined to Ayacucho. In October 1983 it spread to the department of Pasco, the country's mining centre; there, in Chinche, a hamlet of the province of Alcides Carrion, 45 peasants were wiped out. On November 13th, the day of the municipal elections, three helicopters were used to machine-gun the population in Parabama, in Tauacaja province in the department of Huancavelica, killing more than 50 people in retaliation for an ambush guerrillas had carried out against an Army patrol that day.

During 1984 the genocide became macabre, reaching the heights of horror. The Armed Forces, mainly, as well as the police, unleashed their evil, rotten, inflamed, blind and rabid hatred against the people, in their frustrated efforts to stop the revolutionary war by isolating the

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guerrillas from the masses of peasants, particularly the poor peasants. Once again, as is their tradition, the armed reaction fed upon the flesh and blood of the unarmed people. Let's look at some of the "heroism" that serves to prop up their false glory and unfounded pride.

The genocidal slaughters. In the department of Ayacucho at the end of June they killed 150 people in the San Francisco area. July 5th they killed 30 peasants in Chiara; on the 8th, they killed 40 after an operation in Rosario; the 12th, they wiped out 30 people in Pomabamba; on the 15th, in a reprisal for an action at Apacheta they killed 17; the 16th, 25 tortured bodies were found along the highway to Huamanguilla. August 3rd, the tortured bodies of 37 people were found in Puramanta; on the 18th the corpses of 17 tortured children and adolescents were found in Cocahuichun, in Via de los Libertadores, and 8 bodies, 2 of them children, in Leompata; the 27th, 19 people were found murdered in Sarrarumi and 21 in San Francisco. September 1st, 23 peasants were killed in Churrubamba and Misquibamba. The same month, in Paraiso, in Mariscal Caceres province in the department of San Martin, they killed 22 peasants. In the department of Huancavelica, between the 15th and 23rd of October, an Army operation killed 75 peasants in Milpo and 15 in Pillo-Pachamarca. November 19th, once again in Ayacucho, they wiped out 50 peasants in Putis and Chullay; in Lucmahuaiqo, Vilcabamba, in the department of Cuzco, soldiers and vigilantes from Andahuaylas killed 22 peasants on the 23rd and 20 more on the 26th. Once again in Huancavelica, December 6th the police killed 38 peasants in Cuni, near Marcas in the province of Acobamba; the same month 16 bodies were found in Ayahuarcuna, in Ayacucho.

Some actions that took place in June and July in Ayacucho as part of this sinister wave of genocide in 1984 should be specifically mentioned. In Vinchos, they killed 40 commissioners of various people's committees. In Remillapata they



shot a child of nine and another of 11 together with their mother and their father who was the Security Commissioner; in Mayopampa they threw a commissioner into a burning building. These vile murders — so merciless and ferocious that children are shot because they happen to be the children of members of the new political power — are a monstrous expression of the hate and fear with which this new political power fills them. In Balcon 70 Marines came in and murdered 18 peasants, among them six children whose bodies they carried off. A third of the dead were children — this murder of children is a constant policy to terrorise and break the parents, as well as a disgusting and often-used way of punishing revolutionaries especially. Nevertheless the Marines came back again the next day, sarcastically and contemptuously offering people food, trying to buy them off. The people quite justly became enraged and drove them away. After an ambush in Pichari the “glorious” Civil Guard came in and stopped a truck carrying passengers, who were taken off and killed. Local forces of the People’s Guerrilla Army buried these 20 people, but the murder was attributed to the PGA. This is another common trick used by the reactionary forces who often disguise themselves in peasant clothes in order to commit atrocities, looting, rape, arson, razings and the most frightful crimes, especially against children, and then blame the guerrillas so as to turn the masses against them. One example of this is the murder of 50 peasants by the Marines in a place called Azangaro, 20 minutes from Luricocha, during this same period. Another example of their terror tactics took place in San Francisco, when peasants going down to the jungle to harvest were indiscriminately wiped out, without even being asked for their papers. In Huamanguilla they killed nine peasants, burning one of them alive. That is one of their usual ways of terrifying people by showing their mercilessness towards anyone considered a communist or a guerrilla. A similar example happened in Chuschi, January 10th 1983, where

they tied dynamite to a peasant and blew him up while shouting, “This is how terrorists die!” This barbaric policy has been implemented since the beginning of the Armed Forces’ intervention and continues today. In this black wave of death razing became widespread. A small example is the operation in Incaraqay, where after stealing everything they burned down 500 houses. The extermination made whole towns disappear; July 15th, the Armed Forces backed by vigilantes killed the entire population of Quinuas and completely wiped the town off the face of the earth. But even this was not enough for them. The white terror continued fattening on the people’s flesh. August 22nd 1984, in a reprisal for an ambush, a Marine unit in Silvia arrested 50 youth at random and shot them; emulating the German fascists who set Europe aflame during World War II they murdered 10 sons and daughters of the people for every Marine who fell in combat. November 10th Marines aided by the Republican Guard finished off 40 peasants in Quimbiri, after having savagely tortured them in Luisiana — a telling example of their ongoing policy of covering their tracks and hiding their crimes by exterminating the victims.

Discoveries of common graves. Another shocking proof of the genocide perpetrated by the Armed Forces has been the discovery of common graves, a macabre and disgusting sight. The inextinguishable death cries of men, women and children shook the national conscience. The broken lives of the people have fueled history’s enraged clamour for class justice — a justice that only the advancing armed revolution can and will bring about — as well as the constant and unsilenceable exposure of the barbarism with which the Peruvian state defends itself, using its Armed Forces, under the leadership of whatever government happens to be on duty, whether it be the Popular Action party of Belaunde or Alan Garcia’s APRA, because what is at stake is their class dictatorship, their very order of exploitation and oppression. In the department of Ayacucho on August 19th 1984, a grave with 10 bodies was found in

Via de Los Libertadores, and on the 22nd a grave with 30 corpses along the Huanta-Mayo road, 30 kilometres from Huanta. On the 23rd seven common graves with a total of 89 bodies in an advanced state of decomposition were found in Pucayacu, a discovery which profoundly shook public opinion and unleashed the masses’ condemnation and repudiation of the Armed Forces and the Belaunde government then in power. The political-military command of the region was in the hands of General Adrian Huaman and the officer directly responsible for the massacre was Naval Captain Alvaro Artaza. Garcia tried to rename Huaman the chief of Ayacucho, and Barrantes (leader of the “United Left” — *trans.*) used to call him “the peasant general.” The trial of Capitan Alvaro took place within the Navy itself, and the present APRA government gave him a promotion, closed his case and sent him to Spain for his own protection. The same day a common grave with 30 bodies was found in Ayahuaracuna (Macacharca); on the 25th others were found in Quinua and Muyuri; and the 28th a grave with 12 people whose throats had been cut was found in Cocahuischaca, Via de Los Libertadores. In September peasants exposed the existence of common graves in Toldorumi, Zamatapampa and Usutapampa in the province of Victor Fajardo, and in Pichuyrumi and Qarpaqasa in Cangallo. The authorities and the daily newspapers paid little attention to these exposures by the peasants, just as they ignored many others in order to hide the real extent of the genocide. September 13th three new common graves with 50 dead were discovered in Iribamba; on the 14th a grave with five bodies was found in Luricocha and another in Qasa-Orqo with 10 tortured corpses. On the 18th a grave with five bodies in Yanaorqo. October 18th a grave with 25 bodies in Vado Chico (Huanta); on the 20th, one with eight dead in Capitanpampa, another with three in Ayahuaracuna and a third with five corpses in Iribamba; the 25th, four new graves with 41 bodies in Vado Chico; the 28th, a grave with four

dead in Laurente (Huanta). November 13th a grave with 15 bodies in Huamanguilla; the 19th, three graves containing 45 murder victims were found in Las Vegas, at kilometre 25 of the Ayacucho-Huanta road; and the 22nd, three graves with 10 bodies were found in Neque.

The genocide continued in 1985, though not with the same intensity. Right up until Belaunde left office, common graves continued to be discovered in Ayacucho: January 11th a grave was found in Paqueq (Huanta) with four bodies; January 16th four graves were uncovered, one in Huamanguilla with 11 bodies, a second in Qanqana (Huanta) with five, and in the province of Huamanga, a third in Pava with three bodies and a fourth in Pacha with 16. Two graves with 30 bodies were found March 10th near Huanta. The massacres continued in this region, as these statistics show: February 23rd in Canaire


they killed 50 peasants; on June 26 in Miopata-Suco (Huanta) they annihilated 12. July 9th in Manzanayoq (Cangallo) they cut the throats of eight peasants and cut their bodies into pieces, and did the same to another eight in Pacamarca, also in the province of Cangallo. July 12th they killed 12 peasants and sacked and burned homes in Waracayoq; five were killed in Chacari. This genocide also began to spread throughout the department of Huanuco: February 21st a grave with five bodies was found in Alto Pacae; the 22nd they killed 12 peasants in La Soledad; another grave with seven dead was found the 28th in Aucayacu. In March, they killed 30 people in Arancay. On June 27th a grave with 11 bodies was found in Yanajanja (Nuevo Progreso). Thus the AP government which had plunged the country into a bloodbath ended its term in office completely soaked in it, covering ex-president Belaunde with

the indelible shame of genocide, and leaving us a valuable lesson: the more the various governments which by turn head the Peruvian state talk about "democracy," "human rights" and "peace," the more hunger, poverty, repression, terror, murder and even genocide they furiously unleash against the Peruvian people.

How has the counter-revolutionary war gone since Garcia's APRA government took office, especially regarding the questions we have been referring to? In political-military zone number five, whose principal centre of operations is the department of Ayacucho, once again on August 2nd they began an operation that razed villages in Huambalpa, Carhuanca, Pujas, Vilcashuaman, Vischongo and Cangallo; the 10th they razed Huamanmarca and murdered seven peasants. The genocide at Aqomarca August 14th shook all of Peru: in a place called Llocllapampa eight

Poster done by the PCP honouring the heroic resistance of the prisoners massacred by the Garcia regime. The poster is red, except the soldiers, who are black. It reads: "Glory to the fallen heroes, long live Revolution! Finish off the great leap with a seal of gold! Day of Heroism — June 19th, 1986."

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graves were found, containing a total of 69 corpses; in addition two people were murdered in Piteq, one in Yuraqera, one in Mayopampa, two in Ahuaqpampa and three in Queuqata, all savagely killed by the Army, which would surround the village, round up the peasants, separate the men from the women and children, and rape, pillage, shoot, finish them off, then cover some of the bodies with lye, burn the rest and bury the unidentifiable bits and pieces of bodies in pits. In the midst of all the fanfare and demagogic bluster about "revolution," "a national, democratic and people's state," "democracy," "respect for human rights," "not answering barbarism with barbarism," "reconciliation," "fighting while upholding the law" and other cheap phrases thrown to the wind by the APRA government, the exposure of Aqomarca tore apart their lies and revealed their double-dealing, shattered illusions and once again unmasked their opportunism. Then came a great hustle and bustle in parliament, a farce of gestures and so-called presidential measures, while the opposition rent their clothes and made easy deals, and the people repudiated and condemned all this and advanced further towards becoming clear about the highest ruling circles. Almost a year has gone by since then. Commands have been reshuffled; Lieutenants Hurtado, Paz and Rondon have been held responsible; the various commissions have presented their reports, etc., etc. Today Hurtado has been given a promotion and sent abroad for further training, probably in the U.S. or some part of the world under U.S. control; Paz also got a promotion and Rivera will undoubtedly get one in 1987. What happened to the investigation, the indictments the Army was preparing? Buried under silence. The sentence of 10 days hard labour the military investigators proposed for Lieutenant Hurtado — has it been carried out? Just as in the case of Pucayacu, only the triumphant revolution will bring about justice.

But this "fighting while upholding the Constitution and the law" continued. Between August

28th and September 4th 60 peasants were murdered in Huambalpa; in Pucayacu on August 28th a new grave containing seven bodies came to light. The "democratic" application of the principle "fighting while upholding the Constitution and the law" went on. The villages of Aqomarca, Umaru, Incaraqay, Patin, Tankiwa, Cochapata, Mayopampa and Manallasq were razed between the first and the 25th of September. A new genocide took place September 2nd and 3rd: Umaru and Bellavista, 66 dead, 29 murdered in Bellavista the 2nd; and immediately afterwards, on the 3rd, 37 peasants wiped out, among them 11 children under nine years old. September 13th they killed seven eyewitnesses to the Llocapampa massacre, including a child of nine. The 28th four graves were found with over 80 bodies, in Totora, near Sachabamba. In the department of Huanuco, four graves with 14 bodies were found in Huancar (province of Ambo), and in the department of San Martin a grave with the bodies of seven murdered people was uncovered in Situui (province of Mariscal Caceres).

On October 4th Peruvian society was once again shaken by another genocide, this time in the very capital of the Republic, in Lurigancho prison where 30 prisoners of war were murdered and 23 wounded, before the eyes of seven thousand prisoners. Following a pre-established plan meant to break the prisoners of war and deal a blow to the revolution, the Llapan Atic, the Republican Guard's anti-subversive troops, armed to the teeth, were unleashed against the British Pavilion where those convicted of "terrorism" were being held. When instead of surrender they were met with heroic resistance, they used dynamite and explosive charges to open a breach in the walls, then threw dynamite into the cellblock, along with teargas and incendiary bombs. After the assault, they finished off the wounded, burned alive and brutally beat the survivors and finally burned down the cellblock to hide the evidence of their monstrous criminal genocide. But despite their cynical efforts to cover up their



crime and silence all witnesses, the truth got out, further unmasking the APRA government and its undeniable guilt for this new, cold-blooded barbarism.

November 2nd in Uchuyunqa, in the province of La Mar in the department of Ayacucho, they killed 19 peasants; at the end of the year, peasants in San Martin exposed massacres in Aucayacu, Campo Grande, Venenillo, Madre Mia and Palo de Acero. As 1986 began, this situation continued, as the following facts are enough to show: January 21st in Churrupampa, near Huanta, seven bodies were found; in Uchiza, Huanuco department, 30 people were killed in February; and in the department of Pasco, in the hamlets "Ocho de Diciembre" and "Independencia" five peasants were shot dead on their own doorsteps in retaliation for a guerrilla raid. In short, Garcia's APRA government is continuing the same genocide the Belaunde government started.

The missing. The policy of making people "disappear" has been part of this genocide since the Armed Forces came in; it intensified greatly at the beginning of 1984 and has continued through today. Now, especially in the last few months, once again there have been more and more reports of people turning



up “missing.” The “missing” amount to thousands of people but the exposures and protests bounce up against the official silence which denies or ignores the suits brought against it and stonewalls everything. This perverse policy, long practiced by reaction, has become especially intensified lately. Its immediate precedent was the sinister policy of “disappearances” carried out by the 1970s Argentine military government that bathed its people in blood and even more ignominiously made tens of thousands “disappear.” A similar policy is being carried out here, also feeding on the poorest masses, above all peasants, who are not reported missing because of lack of any documentation or because of the restrictions and persecutions their families face, but who undoubtedly make up the bulk of the thousands never found. They lie wrapped in the shadow of as yet undiscovered graves or in clandestine cemeteries in the many concentration camps, together with the remains of other exemplary sons and daughters of the people, of the class and of the revolution. These thousands of “missing” make up yet another historically implacable accusation that will dig the ground out from under the reactionary Armed Forces and, along with the devastating blows of the armed people, bring about their destruction and so prepare the end of the rot-

ten order of the Peruvian state they hold up.

What have been the results of this genocide? The evil and shameful murder of 8700 Peruvians, 8700 sons and daughters of the people, including 4700 murdered from among the masses, the poorest and most exploited, especially from among the peasants as well as from the neighbourhoods and shantytowns of the cities, and 4000 disappeared, of the same classes, flesh of the same flesh. The policy of genocide carried out by the Armed Forces has cost the people, the proletariat, the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie 8700 of its children, who have fallen murdered, and not at all in the way claimed by phony and inconsistent revolutionaries, or those opportunists who pretend to be revolutionaries while preaching the evolution of the existing social order, or those hacks who openly or secretly scribble in defense of the system, or those such as the reaction and its flunkies who claim that the genocide is a result of the people’s war. No! The genocide is clearly and specifically a policy approved and ordered by the government of the Peruvian state, proposed and implemented by the Armed Forces with the help of the police, an evil and barbarous practice begun in 1983, cruelly and bloodily intensified in 1984 and systematically carried out through today, and now being worsened and once again intensified by Garcia and his reactionary APRA government whose responsibility must be resoundingly exposed. But what has been the purpose of this genocide? To contain the people’s war launched in 1980, which by the end of 1982 had begun to establish the new political power in the form of People’s Committees; to smash the guerrilla war, to separate the masses from the revolutionary war, to destroy the new political power and hold back its development, to hold back the development of the people’s war; to achieve the reactionary political objectives of the Armed Forces, the Army, Navy and Air Force, institutions which together and through a division of genocidal labour among them killed 1767 sons and daughters of the people in 1983

and “disappeared” 730 — until that year there were only 14 losses among the masses and no “missing” — a total of 2,497 people from among the masses murdered in 1983. In 1984? The spiraling political genocide against the masses reached 2,522 dead and 2,881 disappeared; a total of 5,403 sons and daughters of the masses murdered, the highest peak of the genocide perpetuated so far by the Armed Forces.

Did they succeed in their objectives of smashing the people’s war, of putting an end to it? No, because the people’s war, corresponding to its class character, has shown its superiority; it has proven itself capable of confronting persistent evil violent offensives and genocide of tremendous proportions, and, more tempered, of continuing to develop and grow. In these hard times of forging and heroism and turbulent trumpets of the new state beginning to be born, pregnant with the future, the masses are showing themselves ready and willing to change our society and they are doing it; the Party, the Communist Party of Peru, leading the people’s war, is fully demonstrating that it is the vanguard of the proletariat and that it adheres strictly to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and its accurate and correct application to the specific concrete conditions of the democratic revolution in Peru, and further, with firmness and resolution the Party is holding the course of the people’s war — a war that is and will continue to be marching unwaveringly towards the foundation of the People’s Republic of Peru, opening the door to socialism and the final goal. The people’s war has not been smashed, stopped or held back; rather, as the regime’s chieftains have been forced to admit even while continually trying to minimise it, and as their fears, frantic manoeuvres and measures especially demonstrate, the people’s war is rising, developing and delivering resounding blows. Thus the genocidal plans and the genocide itself have failed, as their policy of using masses against masses failed and as their whole reactionary strategy is failing. What has come of using masses against

masses, of their genocide, of their reactionary strategy? It has once again covered the Armed Forces of the Peruvian state with the blood of the people, to an extent never before known in the history of the Republic; the genocide they have perpetrated will turn more and more against them and spur on the concentrated class hatred with which their criminal barbarity has filled the masses. Their new heights of infamy have been registered forever in the memories of countless masses who will mete out crushing punishment to those who are politically and militarily responsible, no matter how long it may take. This blood which has been cynically and perversely spilt today has become a thundering and powerful public accusation against the Peruvian state and its Armed Forces and police, its political leaders and chieftains of crimes against humanity, and it will more and more become the unfurled banner at the centre of the revolutionary storm, waving and shining as the victorious people's war carries out the complete and thorough justice denied it today.

What we have seen and experienced in the people's war in Peru has reaffirmed even more deeply for us the ineluctable law established by Chairman Mao Tsetung: "All reactionaries try to eliminate the revolution through mass slaughter, and they think the more people they kill the more it will weaken the revolution. But despite the reaction's subjective wishes, facts show that the more people they kill the stronger the revolution becomes and the closer the reactionaries come to their doom. This is an ineluctable law of history."

**THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR.** The application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions of Peruvian society leads to the conclusion that revolutionary violence or violent revolution, the only way to seize state power and transform the world, must take the form of people's war and more specifically a peasant war led by the Communist Party of Peru as the representative of the proletariat, a war which develops as a single

whole waged principally in the countryside and complementarily in the cities, following the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside whose essence is the establishment of base areas, so that the democratic revolution culminates in the establishment of a People's Republic, a great victory which must be followed by continuing the revolution through socialism and cultural revolutions, under the dictatorship of the proletariat with the firm exercise of its class violence, until achieving, together with all humanity, glorious communism, the realm of true freedom. Posing the question this way, four fundamental questions arise and must be taken into account: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as the ideology of the proletariat; the Party as the leader of the war; people's war in the specific form of a peasant war which follows the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside; and revolutionary base areas or the new state power. Let us judge the sixth year now completed in the light of these relevant points.

*Regarding Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.* We take the stand of the international proletariat, the last class in history, with its own class interests different from and antagonistic to those of other classes, and with an aim that only the proletariat leading the peoples of the world can attain, communism, the only unsurpassable new society, without exploited or exploiters, without oppressed or oppressors, without classes, without a state, without parties, without democracy, without weapons and wars, the society of "great harmony," the radical and definitive new society towards which 15 billion years of matter in motion — that part of eternal matter which we know, has been inevitably and irresistibly heading, but only by propelling the class struggle forward until it reaches the epic heights of people's war, with guns in the hands of the armed class and masses of people, and counter-revolutionary war is destroyed forever, imperialism and reaction are overthrown and swept off the face of the earth, and in the shadow of the guns of invincible people's war upon

which the dictatorship of the proletariat rests, society is transformed in all spheres, destroying and eliminating all class differences and private ownership of the means of production that gives rise to them, ending war forever, and communism shines for all humankind. Since we take the stand of the international proletariat, our starting point is that its ideology today is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, with Maoism principal as its third stage, the highest point the proletariat's ideology has reached in its historical process of development. It is within this context that we take up the position and class interests of the Peruvian proletariat as part of the international working class, since only on the basis of the universal doctrine of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is it possible to stand with the proletariat and fight for its interests, here or anywhere else. There is only one proletarian ideology; it is applicable to the whole world and its development is a single world process. On the other hand, ever since Marx found Marxism and through the advances made by Lenin and Chairman Mao Tsetung, the basic question has always been the application of this science to the conditions of each revolution; consequently the problem is the application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions of the Peruvian revolution, and specifically, the application of the universal law of violence, people's war, to the revolutionary war in this country. From this fusion of Marxism with our concrete reality there arises and develops Guiding Thought, that is, the application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions of the Peruvian revolution. In short, our starting point is the outlook of the international proletariat, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and the Guiding Thought of Chairman Gonzalo. These are the basis of all our political, theoretical and practical action; without this basis it is not possible to serve the class firmly and consistently.

*Regarding the Party.* First let's look at the need for a party; then  
(Continued on page 77)

December '86

# Student Upsurge in Imperialist France

by Claude Duchène\*

December '86 — the abrupt, massive outbreak of French secondary school and university students — has sprung into the air the smug assumptions of the bourgeoisie that the new generation of youth in France since 1968 is silent and bought-off. In addition, it dusted off any notion for revolutionary forces who welcome these sudden upsurges that the inactive, boring and narrow scope of the French political scene is as predictable as its outward appearance has suggested. There was little telling smoke seeping from the volcano.

But erupt it did, quickly and suddenly, with a potent strength that shook this society, throwing the government into a political crisis — including a major retreat from its reactionary offensive — while also richly initiating the newly-awakened youth to political life and at the same time helping to set off tremors in cities in a number of countries, most notably in Spain.

This crisis offered important in-


sights into the process of preparing for revolution in the imperialist countries. Such social eruptions punctuating the normal calm of the overall non-revolutionary period are important testing grounds and a terrain for gaining strength for the proletariat. Not the least of this was, as Lenin observed, that crises reveal the mainsprings of the class struggle that ordinarily remain hidden, including the fundamental weakness of the system, the basic nature of the bourgeois dictatorship, and the role and programme of the various class forces in society.

The student upsurges lasted a short three weeks, and although order was restored the ruling class had many wounds to lick, social bridges to try to repair, and most of all a sinking credibility rating that is cause for celebration and stepped-up revolutionary work.

**“We Don't Want Your University Reforms!”**

What triggered the movement was a reactionary bill to redesign and modernise higher education in France, a set of structural and curriculum changes to better prepare its university-trained elite to meet the

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needs of French imperialism which, from the bourgeoisie's standpoint, were long overdue. For students it was one more obstacle blocking what they see as an already uncertain future. From the beginning it was a contradictory movement that required close analysis by class-conscious revolutionary forces.

On the one hand, the movement openly and forcefully targeted increased "selection," the process of weeding out the "poor" students and promoting the "best" into the hierarchy of society. The bottom line of the protest was opposition to new admission procedures which would allow each university (popularly known as *fac*s) to select its own students according to its own criteria, and which would now issue its own diploma instead of the universally-recognised national diploma independent of what school was attended.

Accustomed to being able to enter any of the 78 *fac*s which make up the French university system and to enroll (in theory at least) in any course of study they wanted — provided they had passed the *baccalauréat* (bac) exam at the end of secondary school — the students rebelled primarily against further screening both upon entering the university and upon moving into the second cycle after two years.

Other measures which angered the students were the planned increase in tuition fees which would further separate the schools into elite *fac*s and second-rate *fac*s and the breaking up of the universities into more defined, specialised departments, along with tailoring the curriculum to suit the needs of outside, private industry which, in turn, would partly subsidize them.

Accompanying this bill, dubbed the Devaquet reform after Alain Devaquet, a junior minister charged with higher education, was a proposal to modify the *lycées* or secondary schools, which youth go to if they have not already been routed to Lycées d'Enseignement Professionnel (LEPS), those technical or other non-academic secondary schools which do not deliver a *bac* and are not on the college-bound track. This initial routing process culminates at about age 14, though



in reality is a feature of the education system since the first day of school. This reform, by Minister of Education René Monory, called for condensing the curriculum of the final lycée years, eliminating classes not absolutely needed to get the bac — such as foreign languages in some courses of study — and cutting back on teachers and special programs. This would amount to further streamlining the broad education students could at least hope to receive at the secondary school level and accelerate selection by reaching downward, reducing opportunities at an earlier point.

On the other hand, this student movement rose to defend their position as an already privileged stratum of society. Although it rejected making education even more elitist, this was from a podium already reserved for society's future elite, those being prepared to take over middle-level administrative and professional posts as well as some upper-level jobs as managers and technicians in the functioning of the imperialist system. Top positions are still generally reserved for the small number of graduates of the *grandes écoles*, highly elite state schools where the really serious preparation for becoming bourgeois rulers and managers takes place and which bac holders must test into.

One weekly magazine cynically tried to distinguish the students of 1986 from those of 1968: "in '68 they cried, '20,000 workers are on their way to help (man the barricades in the Latin Quarter). We have to hold strong until then.' In 1986, they say, 'Fine if the workers join us, just as long as we don't have to become one!'"

And while this was a generation of youth raised often by parents who themselves had exploded in 1968 and by and large not at all favourable to the rightward policy shifts being implemented by government, nonetheless before this movement it was a rather unpoliticised generation, raised in the dulling climate of social democracy. These were youth who opposed what they perceived as the deterioration of equal chances and freedoms, but who did so from a certain "anti-ideological" framework that tend-

ed to block fundamental questioning of the roots of these inequalities and preferred cultural points of reference mildly critical of authority, and who especially rejected falling headlong into a bureaucratic, disciplined, boring existence, topped off by the increasing likelihood of ending up unemployed. The prospects of having few alternatives to choose from figured in heavily given the social fabric of France, where unemployment which is about 11% is largely a youth phenomenon. Many had been active in the struggle against racism; at the same time, when the *Rainbow Warrior* ecology ship was sunk by the government while protesting nuclear testing in the Pacific, they did not stir.

After events had escalated and opinions on everything began to be tested, it was evident that many did want to rectify the injustices of the system, but reasonably and one at a time. It was the system itself, of course, which would open their eyes wider and inevitably put much more into question than reorganisation of the universities.

The overhaul of the university system had to be opposed: the only good thing about it was the sharp reaction it provoked; far preferable to being lost in the bureaucratic shuffle, it introduced many to the practical art of political science.

#### Spreading like Brushfire

Before November, the student youth were unaware that the authorities were about to reshape their futures. Pro-Socialist Party forces active in the national student organisation, the UNEF — ID (*indépendant-démocratique* to distinguish it from the Communist Party-controlled UNEF, both organisations that came out of the 1968 upheavals) began to take out the issue at some facts, most notably Villetaneuse on the north side of Paris, a campus which had been especially influenced by the SOS Racisme movement that has activated some French youth over the past two years. By mid-November the soon to be familiar mass meetings, called "Assemblées générales," voted to go on strike and spread it to the rest of the

French university system. From there a national meeting of student delegates at the Sorbonne voted to carry the strike movement to defeat the Devaquet reform throughout France. On November 23rd a national teachers' demonstration was held by the pro-Socialist FEN (National Federation of Teachers) Union. Monday the 24th, the students sent a fleet of students out to the lycées to explain the stakes of the Devaquet law, especially to the older classes preparing the bac. The initial test of strength for this budding movement was the national demonstration called for November 27th in Paris. Marches formed up from six or eight different directions flooding into the main artery cutting through the Latin Quarter — Boulevard St. Michel — an unending stream of fac and lycée contingents that literally ringed the interior of the city, pushing their way towards the National Assembly building, where the French Parliament meets. At first the infamous riot police, called the CRS, blocked access to this forbidden area, but then were ordered to retreat to their vans. It was too early for the state to reveal its fangs to the inexperienced young demonstrators, many of whom tried individually to convince the CRS guards of the justness of their cause. "Your children are students too!" some cried.

Only a violent confrontation could have contained the swelling wave of students singing, "Devaquet, if you knew where we'd shove your reform. Don't wait ass-angle moment, Devaquet resign!" On one side of the big iron gates was a Council of Ministers watching, waiting and perspiring; on the other, 200,000 youth, the great majority in the streets for the first time in their lives, jubilantly clamoring to be heard.

#### From "Apolitical" to Whose Politics?

The air was electric, politically charged with a sense of awe and expectation at the massive energetic strength they had assembled, without really even knowing it. The freshness and vitality reflected the unmatched initiative of youth,

boldly daring to go out and challenge the status quo and refusing to swallow yet another restriction on their future. Their understanding was, of course, uneven. Some linked this attack with others, chanting "Deport Devaquet not immigrants," but more common that day was the slogan: "Devaquet your paper gets a O." A certain innocence was pervasive — illustrating primarily the newness of political activity to the young predominantly petit-bourgeois students raised in a wealthy imperialist country. But this naiveté was intentionally reinforced from the outset by the student leaders' ambiguous slogan of "We are apolitical."

Their goal was to contain the issue within student bounds — respectably reformist — but the fact that at first the "apolitical" cry was taken up so widely indicated the beginning level of the movement. Partly it was a reaction to the bourgeois press' immediate attempt to portray the movement as already manipulated by left-wing radicals, a false notion stemming from the participation of some in fact very right-wing Trotskyists in the national leadership. Based undoubtedly on a genuine desire to rip off all the labels being pasted on the movement and to reject the claws of institutionalized politics until events changed the terms of the battle the students thought they could retain their unity and independence from vultures of all types if they stayed "apolitical."

The more intermediate and backward students who clung to this safety-zone did so partly to solicit support from and legitimacy in the eyes of bourgeois society, itself quite a political statement. Of course for those who demanded that the movement remain "apolitical" in order to vent against the heritage of May 1968 and the influence of the Maoists and anarchists back then or to proclaim revolutionary alternatives as dead based on looking at the collapse or integration into the system of the entire extra-parliamentary left — this too was highly political.

The question became clearly not how to stay "apolitical," but *whose* politics this movement would em-



brace, and around what political lines it would divide. As it developed its participants' ignorance was rapidly giving way to embryonic political understanding, forcing them to draw some of these lines and defend them.

The bourgeoisie itself tried to polarise the movement politically early on. The students grew furious at the patronising descriptions of the movement as "carefree, uninformed, and glad to get out of



class." Not surprisingly the press paid a lot of attention to shaping the politicisation of the movement, sticking their mikes under the noses of those students who *were* mainly worried about their own narrow interests of getting ahead and finding a comfortable job. They launched a continuous political and ideological barrage against May '68, constantly drawing parallels and dissimilarities to promote the slogan already circulating among students that "'68 is old, '86 is better" on their own terms with such litanies as "look at *our* youth, tasting the sweet democratic right to express themselves freely through festive, well-behaved marches." "In '68 they wanted to reject the system; in '86 all they want is a secure place in it."

The climate of late November was highly charged and pushing to go higher. Through this first day of

protest the youth became conscious of themselves as a powerful social force, noisily obliging the rest of society to sit up and take notice. The lycéens had leapt into the fray, outstripping the university crowd in energy, creativity and numbers. This movement had taken over the streets in cities from Lille to Montpellier, provoking debate on street-corners and in cafés everywhere. Riveted to the sides of the march routes were also thousands of on-lookers, many active just a decade ago, who alternately smiled, cheered and scratched their heads, wondering where the hell this giant wave of "non-violent" youth shouting their lungs out had appeared from.

#### **The Political Landscape in France from '68 to '86**

These were youth who had neither lived through the deep political experience of 1968 and the revolutionary aspirations it had given expression to, nor had they crashed, either demobilised or coopted, into the stony social-democratic embrace of the bourgeoisie some had wanted to hang from the Sorbonne's pillars a little more than a decade before.

The single most influential event

that has shaped the French political landscape in the 1980s was the election of François Mitterrand as President in 1981. The victory of social democracy was the end of a long downhill slide from the mass revolutionary movement launched in 1968; those who had not already been swept into its wake were confused and disarmed to counter its pink, but thoroughly imperialist platform. The brief euphoria of popular triumph against the Right was but a prelude to a long sleep of political inertia and inactivity, the deadening of a generation awakened and initiated in the fury of class struggle of 1968 and a world in turmoil.

May 1968. Two months of deep social and political crisis, the youth at the fore challenging the bourgeois order itself, stung the ruling classes of the stable post-war world, coinciding with the revolutionary struggle of the Vietnamese people and widespread anti-imperialist movements against U.S. imperialism, the high tide of revolutionary struggle throughout the world, and especially the renewed revolutionary mass upheaval in China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Although it was launched first by student demands to expand university facilities, the movement developed swiftly into open confrontation with the state, putting into question the very nature of capitalist society itself. Days of pitched fighting in the Latin Quarter followed with battalions of high school youth building and manning barricades and drew in large numbers of workers and working-class youth. One popular slogan "Let's be reasonable, demand the impossible" well illustrated the refusal of the movement to settle for what was acceptable and achievable under the bourgeois system.

Hundreds of thousands of workers were spurred into conscious participation in the class struggle, including opposing the stranglehold of revisionism. Rolling right over the pleas for calm and order of the revisionist French Communist Party (PCF)-controlled trade union, the CGT, they occupied factories, mines, shipyards and government offices, immobilising France in

repeated strike waves and reaching into every cranny of society, debating reform versus revolution.

The revolt was widespread and deep and although this was on a free-spirited basis that ranged from spontaneous rebellion infused with anarchist "down with authority" sentiments, contending with the clamp of revisionist conservatism and Trotskyist reformism, it is also true that Marxist-Leninist influence surged forward, as Red Books and other Marxist-Leninist literature were widely studied. Mao and his revolutionary vision were already a current in the rebellion. Within a week, the revolutionary masses in China, too, were organising large demonstrations and meetings upholding the struggle in France, emphasising the importance of the students' action in propelling the proletariat onto the political stage.

The French bourgeoisie was able to put an end to the May '68 crisis through a combination of repression, mobilisation of a solid base of frightened respectable citizens, and, especially, dramatic economic concessions to the workers. Nevertheless, May '68 was a giant impulsion to the growth of the Marxist-Leninist movement in the country. Mao Tsetung had a big impact not only in the revolutionary movement directly, but far more broadly among intellectuals and others. The spectre of another '68 haunted the bourgeoisie throughout the battles of December '86 and the more they spoke of the "dissimilarities" the more worried they had become.

It took the French bourgeoisie a decade to repair the damage 1968 had done. Ideologically, they launched an assault against Marxism, and particularly against Mao Tsetung Thought. The continued reserves of French imperialism enabled them to carry out a relatively vigorous expansion and continual rise in living standards through most of the 1970s.

The principal vehicle for "recuperating" the May '68 generation back into the folds of the imperialist system was the Socialist Party led by François Mitterrand, under the Presidencies of Georges Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing respectively.



*Advertising in background: Here, the State is investing in your future.*

This process was conditioned by the developments in the world as a whole, specifically the coup d'état in China and the crisis in the international communist movement, which in France led to the almost total collapse of the Maoist movement.

This was the background for François Mitterrand's election as President in 1981. The results of the coming to power of the Left (originally the French CP had shared in the government) was the complete demobilisation of any (left) opposition to the government. At first, the Mitterrand government of Pierre Mauroy gave out some small concessions (one extra week of paid vacation, for example). But bit by bit the government adopted one openly reactionary policy after another (extradition of Basque refugees to the arms of their Spanish torturers, military expeditions to Chad and Lebanon) with little opposition.

Nevertheless, beneath the surface, sentiment was growing among a new generation that had grown up under the Mitterrand years. In particular, important ferment began to develop among France's "second generation" immigrants — that is, the children of North African workers and others — brought to France to work during the 1960s especially. These "Beurs" (slang for Arab) are the constant target of police repression and face a par-

ticularly bleak future in imperialist France. But, unlike their parents, they are very tightly integrated into the overall social and cultural life of the country and represent a key force among the youth as a whole. The movement called SOS Racisme touched a vibrant chord among French and Beur youth with their anti-police slogan, "Hands off my buddy!" Although SOS Racisme is now led by diehard opportunists linked to the Socialist Party, several activities have also drawn out large numbers of the youth.

It is the stirring of these Beurs that represented the most direct and immediate forerunner of the student movement and has also been a constant nightmare for the bourgeoisie.

### **Capitalism and Education, or Why Reform French Universities**

Selection in education touches a major nerve of bourgeois society: it reinforces class divisions by sharpening up who will have access to upward mobility in the capitalist hierarchy and who will be permanently excluded. For the bourgeoisie it concentrates a lifelong process of culling through and shaping the generation that will be given significant responsibility within its governing structures and its production, academic and scientific domains, which all serve to preserve and enhance both the stability of the nation and vigour of its empire. Education is of course

only one mechanism through which the imperialists guarantee their successors, but more broadly in society it also plays an instrumental role in reproducing both the dominant property relations and the bourgeois superstructure on which they must rely so heavily.

In France the education system has for some time been considered inefficient and unwieldy. Only two-thirds of those students who go to lycées actually obtain the bac. Only 40% continue in the university after the first two years, when the DEUG diploma is delivered.

There has been a corresponding attempt to bring educational policy into line with the overall necessities to rationalise posed by the imperialists' economic crisis. On the one hand they are tightening up the way resources are allocated and adopting an orientation which seeks to minimise free (or low cost) general education at the university level that doesn't directly contribute to the modernisation being carried out in many spheres, an aspect of which is shifting away from heavy subsidisation of the public sector.

On the other hand, the educational reforms were designed for the "better" training of personnel and a new crop of technocrats as part of rationalising industries that France hasn't been as competitive in.

The reforms are also "in sync" with the times. Fundamentally the French bourgeoisie is embroiled along with its Western imperialist partners in an international crisis and is actively taking part in preparations for the world war which that crisis is heading towards. For some time the bourgeoisie has been aware of the need to make structural changes in the French economy, and much of the current overhaul was already begun by the Socialist government including the educational reforms themselves, originally drafted by former Socialist Minister of Education Jean-Pierre Chevènement. The fact that the current right-wing government, headed by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in "cohabitation" with Socialist President Mitterrand, is under attack for implementing the changes, in no way alters the truth that the ruling class is fundamental-

ly united about what direction to take France.

### An Overall Offensive

Thus consciously and deliberately accompanying these measures is a blatant political and ideological offensive that is enhanced by the neo-Gaullist reactionary rhetoric of the Right's lawmakers, openly designed to whip up French chauvinism and demand that the masses make sacrifices and get into line.

The shift in national politics that escalated with Chirac's taking the helm and translated into an all-around reactionary offensive was apparently silently taking its toll, and the explosion against the university reform was, at least in part, a reaction to this whole campaign. After extraditing more Basques, and expelling Italian, Irish, and other political refugees living in France, the Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua — who himself has come to personify reaction in the government — chartered a plane in October to deport *en masse* 101 Malian immigrant workers whose papers were supposedly not in order.

The open arrogance of the Right was also strengthened during the reactionary series of terrorist bombings against the population in Paris in early fall 1986. This accelerated the process begun last spring when the Right assumed power of giving the police and repressive apparatus in general a highly visible and viciously active profile. While searching people and their belongings in every imaginable circumstance "for bombs" during the anti-terrorist hysteria, the police used the climate to administer the new government clampdown on immigrants which aimed to spread terror among the masses of immigrants and finger some brown-skinned "social parasites" who should "go home" to Africa or Asia or elsewhere and take their "sprawling" non-French speaking families with them.

As part of its ideological offensive — which in the domain of education has meant editorials glorifying the principles of family, hard work and the fatherland for "our youth" — there has also been

lots of television time and indirect (through "critical" interviews, etc.) promotion of the neo-Nazi National Front organisation and its leading rabid spokesman, Jean-Marie Le Pen. This racist defender of "France for the French" incontestably helped to lay the ground in the public opinion mills for the reactionary wave in general and in particular for the government's proposed new nationality code, an open call to put into law greater terror and repression against foreigners on the basis of national chauvinist reaction. This is "selection" in the field of French citizenship, forcing youth born in France of immigrant parents (some of whom at present automatically receive French nationality at the age of 18) to prove they are properly *French* enough to be relied upon for the national unity the bourgeoisie must build and consolidate. It also serves to impose self-control on an explosive section of the population — second generation foreign youth — while terrorising those who might not make the mark by threatening expulsions, which have already begun in earnest.

Then came legislation for building private prisons and imprisoning drug offenders, and the streamlining of access to and content of education. . . all measures that generally targeted youth. But the bourgeoisie must pay a social and political price to implement these offensives. There was certainly ample cause for a major explosion — the student rebellion didn't come from nowhere, even if political awareness seemed low and outrageous actions by the ruling class were not getting the counter-attack they deserved and nobody had even heard of Alain Devaquet before mid-November.

And what a fresh tempest, a fine example of the political situation changing very quickly — and radically — without apparent warning.

### Staring Down the Barrel of a Grenade Launcher

The government promised to restudy the proposed Devaquet bill after the gigantic turnout at the November 27th demonstration

which rippled through cities all over France. 20,000 in Rennes (in Brittany); 20,000 in Lille in the industrial North; 15,000 in Toulouse in the South; 30,000 in Lyon plus thousands of lycéens rarely seen in the streets in dozens of smaller cities and towns as well, had stepped out to confront the government's plans. Some of the most objectionable parts of the bill might be rewritten, the Education Ministry said, but withdrawing the reform was not on the agenda.

Another major national mobilisation was called for the following week. In the daily assemblies, most universities voted to strike starting December 1st and to stay out until the whole bill was dumped. Many lycées followed suit. Some facs were occupied, though rather than becoming a major aspect of the movement this mainly facilitated nighttime preparations for the next day's activities in key centres and at times served to receive out-of-town demonstrators who would repeatedly flock to Paris. The students organised themselves into a thousand committees — to handle press and information, fund-raising, transportation and coordination with other schools. If there were facs in town, active lycéens used them as staging areas to build for December 4th.

Afternoon marches formed up almost daily that week at the Sorbonne and usually wound up near the off-limits National Assembly building in Paris. Some students blocked the toll booths on national highways, offering free passage in exchange for a contribution to the national demonstration. Leafleters spread out calling on the population to support the youth. Daily news updates were written into the home telephone computer system. In Grenoble students raised money outside factory gates. In Strasbourg, they crossed into W. Germany and collected funds there. Everywhere they sold phony shares of their facs, symbolising the privatisation aspect of the bill. Inside the facs they organised concerts, film showings and discussions. They called up the national railroad and ordered 21 extra trains coming into Paris. . . all

eyes were set on the 4th.

December 4th. A massive demonstration it was, probably twice as large as the first one a week before, approaching half a million in Paris, though once it got that big, it didn't really matter whose estimate was closest and by how many hundreds of thousands the police figures lied. In the provinces a total of 300,000 took to the streets. It was a festive outpouring of strength — not particularly militant, certainly neither "apolitical" nor politically unified — full of derision of government ministers and privatised (dubbed "coca cola") American-style education, lively cartoons and banners and singing, and marked by confidence that the numbers themselves would back the government down. The lycéens, although ranked after the university contingents, took the day, overwhelming and greatly outnumbering the others. Confident they would win, the idea was common currency that the "CRS will never attack us. . . we're not even 18 yet!" This and many other illusions were about to be shattered.

A rock concert had been planned as a victory celebration in the wide grassy esplanade by the Invalides, in front of Napoleon's Tomb, to follow the return of a student delegation from a meeting with the ministers next door in the National Assembly. The CRS closed off all avenues leading toward the government buildings and the crowd pushed up against their lines, growing angrier and taunting them. As it grew dark, rocks began to fly and a few arrests were made. The CRS first fired powerful water canons into the section of demonstrators directly confronting them. With the idea that riot police were reserved for Latin American dictatorships the students chanted, "We're not in Chile."

Night fell and the uneasiness of the crowd was reflected in chants that tried to meet the heightening tension, but fell short as people wondered what was going on, the wind grabbed at their necks and march marshals began to bark at people to move away from the streets onto the grassy areas. Those not over at the front lines by the helmeted riot police stood huddled

near the sausage vendors' fires talking in small groups. A tear gas canister or two was lobbed from the CRS lines — the first in 10 days of protests during which the students had been allowed a virtually free rein.

Demonstrators first pulled back and then joined hands to advance toward the cops, shouting, "Pascqua, you bastard, the people will have your hide." The CRS became "SS." Although many fearing a turn for the worse had already left, by 21.00 when the CRS launched its full charge to clear out the demonstration, 50,000 youth still milled around, mad and refusing to leave without some response. This came just as the student delegation — screaming for calm as the tear gas choked the stage set up for the victory rock concert — was preparing to report the government's refusal to scrap the Devaquet law.

There was pitched fighting, red fires lighting up the streets as youth hastily constructed barricades and burned whatever they could get their hands on. The CRS fired concussion grenades directly into the ranks of the demonstrators, blasting one student's eye out and fracturing his skull, and seriously injuring another student in the head, while severing the hand of a third.

Anger flared as high as the smoky clouds of chemical, the rude shock of realisation hit many quickly — behind the government's condescending democratic tolerance of their powerful mobilisation had been a planned attack to clear out and "finish" the student movement, just after the evening news. As this dawned on the tens of thousands who had been swept from the Invalides by squads of CRS, many of them quickly regrouped in the Latin Quarter where sporadic street fighting continued. While the bourgeoisie had hoped by letting its fangs out for all to see that they would polarise this movement and isolate any who dared counter its prevailing "well-behaved" character to take things further, in fact they only accelerated the molding of an advanced section of the movement, while at the same time outraging the student movement and public opinion in society

as a whole.

Not only was the government's gamble not a sound one, it backfired dangerously. Many students began to see how they had been manipulated — not by "outside agitators," but by the government itself, who while toying with the idea of reworking or modifying their bill, basically had decided that no, they were going to put it into law, punctuated with the crash of clubs and grenades that underscores their power.

### "Turn Off the TV and Open Your Eyes!"

The press began to initiate the fast-awakening youth to the wonders of bourgeois propaganda mills during a social crisis. One editorial writer for the right-wing *Figaro* daily stated that the French youth had been struck with "Mental AIDS," and a number of progressive artists were accused of being "carriers" of this dreaded disease. The response of the youth was to wear patches and stickers, saying "I have Mental AIDS." The media also churned out stories which used the possibility some provocateurs had been present to muddy the obvious charge by the police and to obscure the fact that thousands of students had taken a more advanced position against the enemy. While the government quibbled about how to present its "reexamination" of the bill, the students showed up at the Sorbonne. Hot debate flew as illusions and disappointments that "this thing is going to fail" and "why does mass protest always turn violent" gave way to the much more pressing and compelling truth that the government's attack and refusal to budge required them to up the ante.

Some twenty thousand students and youth marched defiantly back to Invalides, first winding around Paris to tell people what had happened the night before. Police vans rushed around to prevent them from taking this or that bridge or grand boulevard. "Our friends' blood is on your hands!" the students chanted as they passed through some of the most chic business districts, snarling traffic, but not sure where more allies were

to be found.

They vowed to not give in to the government's pressure, to harden the movement and persist until the law was withdrawn. Many felt they had now invested a lot, including the well-being of two fellow students. And a new slogan had emerged: "Turn off the TV and open your eyes!" Some youth were seeking deeper and more radical explanations for the developments that belied the average level of understanding and "apolitical" coda.

Although thousands had already been handed out, on Friday students grabbed the "It's Right to Rebel!" leaflet out of RIM sympathisers' hands to help distribute them. "Have you read it?" "Yeah I got it yesterday, It's right. . . ." And others said, "No, I want the other one — the one with Mao on it" (referring to a short pamphlet on the Cultural Revolution). People alternately cheered and booed as they filed past the big red banner also inscribed with Mao's words "It's Right to Rebel!", flying from the statue of Danton at Odéon.

"What does Mao have to do with our movement here?" That question was in part answered by the mutual repulsion and attraction towards the stand and programme of the proletariat connecting Mao's revolutionary vision to the protest shaking French society. At the corner of St. Germain and St. Michel a *Dazibao*-style big-character poster was put up by some students . . . a wall of raging debate on where to take the movement, who to ally with, the violence.

The next three days the bourgeoisie got little sleep. Friday night December 5th, youth and students from the Paris area joined those from the march who had broken into and taken over the Sorbonne courtyard. Animated discussion in the blocked-off streets of the Latin Quarter, by the light and warmth of burning piles of debris . . . but little direction emerged. One megaphone called on taking the movement out more broadly to the rest of society, another countered that this had to remain a student movement or it would lose its purpose. When the CRS came to clear

out the Sorbonne courtyard things blew up. Cars were overturned and torched, there were running pitched battles with the police. Finally, the "acrobats" — squads of 2-man police teams on motorcycles, one drives, while the other wields a 4-foot club. Instituted in France after May '68, they now swept through to retake St. Michel in the middle of the night. A 22-year-old Beur student named Malik Oussekiné was chased into a doorway and clubbed to death.

### A New Leap

The march of mourning the next afternoon needed no publicity. News of the murder of Malik had spread all over, pulling out young and old, people of all social classes and a significant number of immigrant and Beur youth. As the ranks of marchers filed past the hospital where he was pronounced dead, some sections remained silent, others broke into chants. Some of the chants began to touch on various social questions, although the fact that it was a Saturday and had brought out many working people of diverse strata also meant the politics at times got formulated by the revisionist CGT and the Socialist Party-led CFDT trade unions, who had their own political designs on the movement and sought to take advantage of Chirac's crisis to dream of the 1988 presidential elections. Commonly heard: "Chirac, resign, Pasqua resign, the people will have your hide!" "Down with the government that kills students and expels immigrants." With the eyes of thousands on her, a woman spray-painted on the wall of the Army veterans centre right under the nose of its guards: "Pasqua Assassin!" Devaquet was already a dead letter. He had resigned that morning. But the march was no longer about university reform anyway.

As dusk fell, the CRS moved in, splitting the march into several parts with tear gas. The student march marshals formed chains to discourage the timid from continuing the battle. On the sidewalks, it seemed like all of society was debating the future of France and what they should do, how things could be

changed, what's wrong with the government, is there a whole system behind it. Some middle-aged people talked about '68 and about what their children would get if they didn't fight now. Some youth said "Dump the Right, we've got to bring the Socialists back," or "I wish we could change the whole system, but you can't; you can only fight injustices one at a time." The more controversial, the bigger the circle. A well-dressed, perfectly coiffed woman (no stranger in this affluent neighborhood suddenly beset upon by the march and the CRS assault) piped in nervously, "What about poor Malik — what about *his* future?" The CRS and reactionary tenor of the current state had few defenders that day.


Another major leap in the spiraling of events had occurred and the situation was not favourable for the government to muscle things back under control. A good bulk of the march had already regrouped and was marching to Chirac's Hotel de Ville (City Hall) headquarters. Lines of police vans camped out front, and nervous rows of helmets and visors shone through the night-lit fountains surrounding this seat of power. The crowd surged forward throwing rocks and chanting: "Pasqua, Chirac, resign!" "Pasqua terrorist!" and less often, "terrorist state," turning the anti-terrorist climate of early fall back towards those really responsible. A plumber from the proletarian suburbs, who was active in '68 and never renounced it, said, "This is nothing. Wait and see what happens if we workers come out in the streets again. . . This government is rotten."


All around the air was charged. The CRS positioned itself to clear the downtown area. RIM sympathisers, followed by some anarchists who liked their chant "Imperialist state, terrorist state," called on people to march to the Sorbonne. Several hundred took off across the Seine river passing first through the Latin Quarter and then on to a nearby fac. A student marshal inside the gates with a megaphone refused to let people in to attend the mass meeting going on. "You aren't all students, there

are trashers among you. Where are your cards?" "We're all trashers," people screamed back, "Delegates, resign!" An impromptu speak-out among students and others was set up, as people jumped up on cars to address the crowd, including a number of furious young women.

Then new fighting, fiercer than the two previous nights, took over the Latin Quarter. Cars and tempers burned. More debate about who should be in the streets — were these "non-students" all just a bunch of "riff-raff trashers" from the working class; *whose* future was at stake; why is it always immigrant youth who are blown away by the police first, next they want to pass a nationality code . . . is revolution possible?

Of course by then the thousands active in the streets at night in skirmishes with the police had been reduced in the bourgeois press to "hundreds" provoked by a handful of "unwashed outside agitators" — unemployed youth and revolutionary elements, the Right said, police provocateurs, said the Left. Both "sides" of the bourgeois press agreed that this rioting and uncharacteristic hostility towards authority had nothing in common with the students' virtuous protest.





highly integrated, the ripples throughout society tend to be immediate and their effect extremely concentrated — both extensively (on a national scale) and horizontally (throughout society). This fact, a feature of imperialist society generally, is even more exaggerated in extremely centralised France.

In France, the university system, for example, is organised around a central nationalised structure, with one-third of its branches in the Paris area; this, and the fact that Paris is the centre of every essential aspect of government and ruling class decision, in addition, of course to the students' quite conscious call for national demonstrations and the broadest mobilisation of public opinion in general had all contributed objectively to the rapid spiraling of events way beyond the bourgeoisie's immediate expectations and political preparedness to handle them.


#### **From Student Protest to Major Political Crisis**

What had begun as a seemingly harmless student protest to block reforms of the education system had blown up into a serious political crisis, jolting all of society and posing much bigger questions. The particularities of imperialist France, especially its highly centralised state, had further accelerated this process.

This was certainly not a revolutionary crisis, neither was it a repeat, which it couldn't be, of 1968, though it helped to reveal in a miniature way many of the features that will appear in such a crisis. It also illustrated clearly why when things snap in this type of country, where the economy, transport, communications and the forms of government control are

Though they knew it was not a May 1968, and reassured themselves so daily on the news, they had a December 1986 in a world where the stakes have been considerably raised and they did not know what January would bring. (And it proved a worthwhile question, since a wave of strikes in the national electricity industry and railroad system brought new turmoil immediately after the student movement subsided.)

By Monday, December 8th, its national seat of power had become so hot that the bourgeoisie couldn't sit down: one junior government



*Barricades at the height of the confrontation, with the French flag in the centre as part of the fuel.*

minister had already left, the decision to go ahead with the bill and back it up with force had only escalated the struggle, the franc was tumbling on the international markets, and the Chirac political stable was under attack to be firm from European leaders. Chirac's pleas, "Let's discuss it, we live in a democracy," themselves became a lesson, since his democratic forces of order had spoken more truthfully! Pasqua got on TV and said his police had done just what they were told. Forced to talk compromise and cool public opinion down, Chirac also had to defend this most normal aspect of capitalist rule — its dictatorship by military force — while the slogan in the streets becoming more popular by the hour demanded his resignation and had turned his Interior Minister's name into a synonym for assassination and terrorism!

All weekend, the contending forces within the "cohabitation" government fought over how to defuse the crisis. Chirac even called in the head of the Socialist Party-led trade union for unprecedented consultation on Sunday. The dilemma of the government was real, as the movement threatened to spin wildly out of control. Yet to withdraw the Devaquet law would

also be a giant admission of weakness in the face of the masses.

#### **The Bourgeoisie's Retreat**

Mitterrand, mysteriously quiet, even absent from the turn of events flew home from a London summit meeting to piously denounce the excessive violence on both sides. On Monday the bourgeoisie retreated. Chirac announced that the Devaquet bill would be withdrawn, and the Monory reforms postponed. For the ruling class overall, partisan politics had to be put aside, for their principal concern at this point was whether they were going to regain control of the students at all, and whether this movement would spark further upsurges among the youth more broadly, particularly young immigrant and French proletarians. Clearly such a development bore even greater dangers of engaging the proletariat as a whole into political life, bursting beyond the revisionist and reformist manacles which has held them largely in check and which would polarise the middle classes far more than they were at present.

Undoubtedly mocking PCF leader Maurice Thorez' famous comment, "You have to know when to stop a strike," RPR Secretary Jacques Toubon reasoned on the

news, "You have to know how to stop a movement." But, in conceding defeat, they had paid a heavy price.

Rejection of the Socialists' rhetoric, their sudden and conspicuously noisy applause and encouragement to the student movement — which in non-government circles naturally grew more militant as the crisis surrounding Chirac grew more embarrassing — had already become a dividing line in the movement. While it was a matter of record that key elements of the Devaquet law had originally been proposed by the Socialists themselves and the law sailed through parliamentary procedures with hardly a ripple of opposition from Mitterrand or the minority Socialists, the political implications of this remained obscured to many in the face of the easier solution of "uniting against the Right" and its openly reactionary programme.

As usual, the Socialists won the hypocrisy award of the bourgeoisie hands down. All the while deploring the violence — on both sides, of course — and echoing the student leaders and backward students, spokesmen such as Socialist Party Secretary Lionel Jospin were openly campaigning for 1988 already, suggesting the elections be moved

up given the demonstrated incompetence of the Chirac government etc., and firmly planting the notion that the next phase of the student movement should be voter registration drives!

This left Mitterrand a slightly freer hand to enter the crisis arena at the last moment as "supreme arbiter." Based on the interests of the cohesiveness of bourgeois rule, he both defended the police and called for national unity *against violence*, and for a return to peaceful order. In a typical spectacle of the doubletalk he has become famous for, he declared: "We cannot permit a struggle against one another, nor a struggle of the French against the state. The students are right: Never again. . . I support them."

#### "Never Again"

Although some of the most advanced wanted to apply this slogan to banish Mitterrand himself, who in a final sickening wave of his national healing wand visited Malik's bereaved family and sent an assistant to see the wounded CRS in the hospital, unfortunately he suffered only minor political damage in the eyes of the broad masses of students. The "cohabitation" proved to be an ideal shield allowing Mitterrand to remain "above" the dirty work of the government.

The national student coordination called for a final demonstration for December 10th — a "bitter victory" march symbolising the retreat which had been forced at a high price. Its theme was "never again the repression, death and wounded when youth are peacefully demonstrating for their future." But it was an ironic theme indeed, for the lurid workings of the imperialist forces of order were already responsible for the death of another young Beur. The murder of 19-year old Abdel Benyahia by a drunk off-duty cop in a northern Paris suburb, the same Friday night that Malik was killed, was covered up by police all weekend because of the country's volatile political mood. Monday, when reports leaked out, some students went to join the proletarian Beur youth who marched with Abdel's family and friends Monday and Tuesday. More immigrant

youth began to come down to the Latin Quarter to check out the student movement.

On Wednesday December 10th hundreds of thousands marched throughout France with gigantic flower wreaths from many lycées and portraits of Malik. In Paris a somber sense of mourning contended with an angry edge against police repression and the demand for Pasqua and Chirac to resign. The effort to impose silence didn't last long as contingents screamed out, "Pasqua, the law is made in the street, not by you!" Many students wore targets while others lay down in the streets and bucket-toting friends swashed painted silhouettes around them.

At Nation plaza, where the march was supposed to end, student leaders called for dispersion. A counter chant rose from those who wanted to go further: "No to dispersion. . . Yes to Pasqua's resignation." At one point, in the face of the prevailing effort by student (and trade union) marshals to make peace and to extinguish the struggle and the whole movement along with it, some Beur youth electrified the crowd by unfolding a giant banner of Abdel, a defiant symbol that police murder is still standard fare and that justice was by no means delivered. The portrait of Abdel was symbolic of the need and possibility for the movement to go over to take up the fight of the immigrant youth, the refusal to remain simply a student movement and a refusal to see the movement officially declared over.

Scuffles broke out as a section of youth followed the "Dispersion is treason" chant to form up and continue the march. Marshals and PCF goon squads physically tried to block them and the confrontation grew fierce. Finally as many as a thousand people took off hoisting available banners, including one RIM sympathisers had brought which read, "Honor Malik — carry on the struggle!" and singing a wide variety of chants as they swung towards Bastille and their target, the Hotel de Ville, some resurrecting the '68 chant, "Revolution, the only solution!" or "Chirac, guess who's coming to dinner!" while others

focused on Pasqua. When the CRS sealed the route to City Hall, the march fought its way through to the Latin Quarter.

#### The Participation of "Deselected" Youth

The student movement of December '86 had the virtue of blasting a wide hole in the social peace of France. The bourgeoisie, caught by surprise and forced to back down, came under serious ridicule and attack by those supposed to be competing to become its most willing disciples. More alarming still — and in large part the reason compelling the bourgeoisie to make important concessions to stop the movement — was the appearance of new elements of the youth. Potentially explosive sections of proletarians and especially immigrants who had not previously emerged as a political force in the early stages of the movement began to step forward as the focus of the movement more and more targeted the state, particularly its repressive apparatus.

The lycéens' participation tended to act as a catalyst more broadly and deeply in society, posing the question of who would be deselected earlier, not just from education, but from the middle and upper strata of society. And this whole rejection of a sinking quality of life and a future armed with an "unemployment diploma" was a lever for some of the "deselected" themselves to join the student movement, particularly the LEP technical school students who weren't in any case destined for a regular bac.

"We're not any dumber than you and we're not going to work in a factory!", a leaflet put out by some of these students from an electronics school warned the university students. It went on to challenge the students to fight against more than just the Devaquet law: "As the future managers of society over us, the ones who are supposed to produce for it, if you want to be loyal government apprentices. . . and become teachers, social servants, journalists, personnel directors so that tomorrow you can teach us, serve us, inspect us and inform us, lead and survey us, then get lost! But if you want, to begin with, to

attack the school system which excludes us, degrades us and fight against social segregation and poverty, then we're with you!"

This was a point of view some students welcomed as it helped sharpen up the real links between selection and capitalism . . . between ruling and being ruled over. The presence of sections of proletarian and immigrant youth of Arab, Antilles and Black African origin had its own impact.

This was a student generation heavily influenced by the "mood" among the youth of opposing police repression and racist attacks generally and they at least wanted to increase equality rather than watch it be eroded. At the same time the petit bourgeois character of the students caused them to hesitate over the possibilities and necessities of linking up with the proletarian and immigrant youth. To some, social change was only a function of how powerful they, the petite bourgeoisie, could be as a social group exerting pressure on the government against various injustices. Up to a certain point (especially if other youth didn't violate the "respectability" line too much) they welcomed the plurality of forces involved.

Other students, however, encouraged and sought out the participation of more proletarian youth in their movement exactly because it tightened the vital link to the broader class contradictions and divisions in society, because it deepened the movement by reaching towards the real dispossessed and victims of inequality. Some students sense, if not always consciously, that this is the force behind any major social change, certainly any revolutionary challenge of the current order that manufactures these injustices.

Furthermore, those who had made a lot of sacrifices to push this movement forward knew that the students by themselves were not likely to take things much further. One third-year accounting student who was going to be kicked out of the program and lose everything he'd worked for because he'd been active in the strike said, "I learned more being in the streets and it was



20, rue Monsieur le Prince, site of the murder of Malik, became a shrine for weeks. Hundreds placed wreaths or wrote denunciations of the state on walls there.

definitely worth it but are *they* (other students returning to class) going to continue to fight?"

#### Favourable Political Terrain

In France today there is no revolutionary party of the proletariat, no Marxist-Leninist vanguard. Moments of crisis and upsurge can serve to train and prepare the awakening masses and strengthen the revolutionary forces as well. The *Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement* points out that "the Marxist-Leninist party must be built in close relationship with carrying out revolutionary work among the masses, implementing a revolutionary mass line, and, in particular, addressing and resolving the pressing political questions which must be resolved in order for the revolutionary movement to advance." To remain aloof or turn aside from such mass upsurges would mean that the communist party never will be built.

Joining in these movements, striving to lead them forward and spreading the outlook and influence of the proletariat to the highest degree possible even with small forces is imperative, or it will be impossible to rally revolutionary elements and raise the political and organisational level which can lay the basis for a party.

In this context, there were

numerous "rightist" pitfalls to avoid, such as tailing the spontaneous movements and concentrating only on building them while losing sight of the final goal of revolution. Yet it was equally important for the proletarian revolutionary forces not to underestimate the actual role that the students were playing in stirring up society overall and even more, in propelling the more "dispossessed" into motion and opening up a field for them to act.

Although the class composition of the student movement was petit bourgeois — not the social base of the revolutionary vanguard — it was necessary to cast off reluctance to take positions on the different ideas and slogans put out by the students and not to restrict the activity of the Marxist-Leninists to simply general revolutionary propaganda.

Correctly assessing the student movement required digging deeply into its various aspects and making an analysis of the underlying contradictions which gave rise to the wave of protest. It meant delving in and closely following each development, evaluating the political understanding and questions of the youth involved along with the political tendencies shaping the direction of the movement, in order to develop a revolutionary line to be

able to help polarise the movement on a correct basis, and rally the advanced forces, and also carry out revolutionary work *outside* of the movement, among other strata as well. It was possible to conduct revolutionary activity and agitation that reveals more plainly the partially hidden class nature and interests of various paths and slogans, and links the new-born awareness of some aspects of the system to a broader, more complete picture of the nightmare that is imperialism.

Organisationally speaking, this means being *ready* to shift into high gear: to constantly sum-up the accelerating movement might require, for instance, putting out leaflets every 24 hours, and taking similar measures to ensure the physical presence of the revolutionary line in a myriad of forms and in the key arenas.

This proved to be a complicated process, for events moved quickly and required constant reevaluation and analysis — corresponding in fact to the way that the students themselves were rapidly learning, making new judgments, discarding their summations of twenty-four hours before and then eagerly scouting out and comparing different viewpoints.

### Contending as a Political Current

In these circumstances revolutionary agitation was important, even indispensable as a part of developing a revolutionary *current* among the students and proletarian youth. On the one hand the objective situation in France, in which the Maoist forces are still weak and the overall subjective mood of the students was not very favourable to Marxism-Leninism (in contrast, for example, to the situation that prevailed in 1968) meant that leading, or establishing hegemony in the movement was highly unlikely. On the other hand, the political terrain of December '86 proved fertile enough to allow important headway towards creating such a revolutionary current inside and outside the existing student movement.

It was necessary to give expression to the most revolutionary sentiments of the advanced by using the science of Marxism-Leninism-Mao

Tsetung Thought to synthesise these sentiments and, on that basis, develop the programme and slogans to advance the movement in a more revolutionary direction.

This was not simply a tactical question of seizing on key moments when the marches were splitting into sections of people who wanted to go further, as opposed to those looking for the closest *métro* station in order to disperse as their leaders told them to. It also meant developing the line, policy and slogans which would attract and draw forward forcefully and practically a social base for going further, that is, for more thoroughly opposing the system (and the students do not represent such a force even if they will repeatedly spur and pull other more decisive forces into struggle).

In particular it was possible to give encouragement and revolutionary direction to the embryonic fusion already taking place right within the ebbing phase of the "student" movement between on the one hand those students protesting the government's interference in their futures and the murder of their comrades, on the other hand the proletarian youth (and notably the Beur component) appearing on the scene out of the hatred such events provoke *daily* in the lives of the oppressed. To them police repression was not a first experience! They were linking up with this sea of rebellion against the outrages of the bourgeois state because it typifies their experience and because the movement gave them an opening to step forward.

One of the RIM sympathisers' leaflets, entitled "What next?" pointed to the need for a revolutionary movement among the youth overall. "This movement which started off fighting selection in education should welcome with open arms those who have already been cast aside and tracked out of the lycées and universities." Building such a revolutionary youth movement in France could in fact serve to mobilise the advanced among the youth to play their role and to push the overall events in a direction that activates the more key strata of the youth against the numerous attacks coming down to-

day. . . from nationality codes to expulsions, to police repression and murder, to even more ultimately decisive questions such as the invasion of Chad and heightening preparations for world war. . . and the not-too-distant calls for youth to step forward as imperialist cannon-fodder. For isn't all this, even more than stiffer admission criteria to succeed in society and greater restrictions on any individual's control over their future, fundamentally what is really up the road for the masses of people as a whole, including the masses of students? In this light, the same leaflet stressed, opposing all the injustices and outrages of this system is necessary, but there is in fact a *whole* unjust *system* of capitalist exploitation, to be attacked and done away with.

The goal of pushing the movement, or at least a section of it, onto a higher political plane must be carried out in view of preparation for revolution. This is always true for genuine communists, but there exists a particularity of these sudden upsurges which actually heightens the possibilities of making more rapid, qualitative gains, provided that preparation is seen from the Leninist starting point of what these minor crises represent and seeks to enhance and take advantage of the openings as a sort of dress rehearsal for the future, when heavier shocks to the system can give rise to actual opportunities to seize power. Without such an approach, it is difficult to avoid the pitfall of treating the movement as something unto itself.

### Swimming Upstream and Exposing Dinosaurs

Doing communist work required exposing from many different angles the other political currents within the movement, particularly social democracy, and to a lesser extent, revisionism, both of which made gains in the face of the Right's rawly-exposed posture.

The militant rhetoric of the Socialists was deceptive to some; their programme corresponded to the easier, non-confrontational route the students wanted to travel at first. There was an infatuation with democracy in the general as-

semblies, for example, as though it was the nub of how things would develop. The students voted on absolutely everything, including whether to vote and just exactly what the limits of the student leaders' responsibilities were, and how long they would stay "in power." Programmatically the Socialists and Trotskyists not only tailed this but used it as a tactic to denounce "trashers" in the Latin Quarter saying this violence didn't represent "students" as democratically constituted and who voted all their own decisions.

In this and other ways, the Trotskyists carried out plenty of self-exposure through the most right-leaning reformism from their position of relative strength in the national student coordination. The PCF, who focused on nominal tuition hikes and tailed the sacrosanct "autonomy" of the student movement, proved themselves nearly irrelevant, although they have stepped up their youth work in earnest since the movement has subsided.

Taking out a genuinely communist line into this movement inevitably did provoke not just the demoralised and backward, but also those consciously or otherwise affected by the bourgeoisie's efforts to erase the legacy of Marxism-Leninism. More than once the Maoists were called "dinosaurs" here in the land of the dead Marxists, where a major ideological current (including many former pro-Maoist intellectuals) has proclaimed Marxism as *dépassé*. There were ripe opportunities for exposing how it is actually social democracy that is *dépassé*, and it is the system of imperialism which has nothing new to offer the masses except further "deselection," further misery and oppression, and war, and whose state dictatorship will not hesitate to murder rebels and potentially volatile elements.

There were times when the same qualities of youth — freshness, boldness and fewer encumbrances with revisionist and totally wrong summations of the revolutionary path — also seemed shockingly naive and "apolitical." Their rejection of "politics" as they knew it

for cultural or other points of reference revealed that a sense of class contradictions was missing. What has been referred to repeatedly as "anti-ideological" prejudices in the press itself divided into two: the more the bourgeoisie insisted on this, the less true it became in a sense, since part of what the youth wanted to escape from was the bourgeoisie's summations too. The "anti-" wasn't in fact very deep, and as the movement escalated, the youth were not much in the mood to go along with everything which had shaped their prejudices before. A minority emerged who actively sought out a broader view of things, breaking out of the confines of a "student" perspective, even at times seeking revolutionary views.

All this proved to be much more favourable ground than it initially "felt" like, and made it all the more

necessary to show the freshness and the utility of Marxist analysis which has not been seen much in this country for a long time. This helps enable new forces to grab onto and take up this science for themselves, in turn using it to forge a more advanced section that can better lead future outbreaks as the system lurches into deeper crisis.

December '86 happened to coincide with the international campaign called by the RIM — "Forward along the Road Charted by Mao Tsetung" — and this also created favourable conditions for carrying out revolutionary work in the student movement. Not the least of these links was the incendiary and rebellious role of youth in pulling the workers and peasants into the tumultuous struggle of the Cultural Revolution. But more fundamental was the fact that this



Photo of a Paris wall, from an article in *Libération*. Their headline and caption reads: *The great helmsman has returned. New Parisian supporters have found inspiration from Turkey, Lebanon and the Shining Path [Sendero Luminoso — CP of Peru — AWTW] The wall painting reads: Forward Along the Path Charted by Mao Tsetung.*

movement needed to be challenged by Mao's revolutionary vision of classless society, so radically different from and opposed to the revisionism and social democracy prevailing in France and thus inevitably shrouding this fresh political outburst of the youth.

Despite the bourgeoisie's constant incantation that 1968 was over and their repeated crowings that they have successfully buried Mao along with Marxism a good decade ago, Mao Tsetung was apparently still a live and fearsome spectre to some, for he was a frequent reference point in the battle of public opinion over how to sum up the current upsurge and especially in contrasting 1986 with the "violence-prone" revolutionary dreamers of 1968. *Libération* (the bourgeois pro-Mitterrand daily edited by a former pseudo-Maoist turned hard-core apologist for French imperialism) felt compelled to attack the mysterious stencil artists who still try to invoke the path of Mao and have been seen opposing expulsions of immigrants back to Mali or supporting other extreme causes like the People's War in Peru. Repeated experience itself showed that a lot of the less severely brainwashed were quite interested in this "dangerous character" and why his line has a lot to do with whether there will ever be revolution in France, or anywhere, for that matter.

#### Linking up with Labour Aristocrats or Sparking Off the Proletariat

A wrong conception of the relationship between students and workers — and class relationships more generally — was shown by the approach of the student leaders towards the final march, December 10, when at least 25,000 union members brought up the rear. Workers were being confounded with the trade unions and the approval of the trade unions was considered key to broadening the movement. This was also promoted by the Trotskyists with their very non-revolutionary conception of a "general strike." In fact, this idea was *not* aimed at spreading the spirit of rebellion to new sections of society but rather at *stifling* the

students and appealing for the trade union bureaucracy to lend its "respectability" to the cause of the students.

It is worth noting that this call to spread the movement to the "working class" (sic) was made by many of the same forces who most vociferously *opposed* the participation of the "riff-raff" and "unemployed trashers" from the working class youth in demonstrations and streetfighting.

The actual relationship between sections of the workers and the student upsurge was revealed more accurately in the way events themselves developed. Wildcat strikes in the national railroad system, the Paris public transportation system, and the gas and electricity industry broke out in mid-December — clearly a spillover from the student eruption. As opposed to the "strikes" which occur every year for a day or a few hours during wage disputes and routinely are nothing more than a negotiating tactic between the labour aristocracy in the form of powerful unions and the government, suddenly angry masses of workers were heard from.

A militant rank and file, relatively independent of the trade union bureaucracy, thrust itself forward and tenaciously fought for its demands (primarily better working conditions), held daily mass meetings like the students and threw the government back into a crisis of sorts while semi-paralysing transportation and normal production in some areas for another three weeks.

For a number of reasons, including the stranglehold of the unions, the government was able to diffuse and smash the strike movement but their alarm at this turn of events, the seemingly contagious disease of protest, was manifest.

#### The Uneasy Social Truce

Although the Chirac government has called a temporary halt to its reactionary legislation and (for now) has shelved the new nationality code, the French imperialists must and will proceed with their political and economic offensive, though now on a different political footing than just a few months ago.

A fierce public opinion battle has been underway since December over how to sum up the student movement and its effects.

Despite Chirac's adjournment of further inflammatory reforms while he tries to "cool out" and recuperate the youth, they and many others in society too no longer look at things as passively and narrowly as before. The broad and active participation of young women in the movement provoked commentary on all sides and this is highly favourable for future developments. The fact that these youth forced the bourgeoisie to back down in a way that ridiculed and exposed aspects of the system will be hard to reverse. And indeed European ruling class figures are bitterly reproaching the French government for this ("We held firm over the Pershings. . .") The campuses are quite alive with political activity around a number of different issues such as South Africa. Chirac's name is scrawled all over the walls in a rhyme with "club." His Interior Minister Pasqua is widely considered a liar and a murderer. In Lille, these "politically unsophisticated" youth chanted "Pasqua, we'll make you pay for the blood you have spilt" only two weeks after they had wanted to reason with the CRS.

The growing number of "Mental AIDS" victims have awakened to some ugly and brutal features of an antiquated system, and have tasted class struggle against the enemy; they are not likely to be put back to bed so easily. But a crucial question hangs at the centre of whether future sudden upheavals and moments of crisis will just give another jolt, however profound, to this imperialist bastion, or will the emergence of an organised revolutionary proletarian vanguard and the development of a revolutionary movement promote a qualitatively different outcome? One of the bourgeois daily *Le Monde's* more hackneyed interviews summed up the present-day sociological trend as "revolt without revolutionaries" — the prospects of this are as unlikely as France falling back asleep. □

# Open Communist Party

## From the Committee of the

The following Open Letter was forwarded to *A World to Win* by the Information Bureau of the RIM. It is published in full; the subheads have been added by AWTW.

To the Central Committee  
Communist Party of the Philippines

Comrades,

It is with the most dramatically conflicting emotions that the Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement has viewed the unfolding of events over the past year in the Philippines. On the one hand that infamous tyrant and imperialist puppet, Ferdinand Marcos, has been forced to flee from his throne, hounded by the wrath of millions of his aroused subjects, into the hands of his awaiting master. This was truly a sight which gave joy not only to the Filipino revolutionaries and oppressed, but to proletarians and oppressed the world over.

Yet at the very moment when the Filipino ruling regime was wracked by crisis and instability, as millions stormed into the streets and the imperialists manoeuvred to shore up their deteriorating position, at that critical juncture, which contained opportunities as well as dangers for the revolutionary struggle, your party, a party which arose out of the same history of revolutionary struggle as have many in the RIM itself, a party which has thousands of men

and women under arms and which has set ablaze a people's war throughout the Philippines, was left paralyzed by the march of events, or worse, trailing in their wake. Indeed, the inability of the CPP to find its bearings amidst the political crisis and ultimate fall of the Marcos regime in order to carry forward the revolutionary war has now given rise to political crisis in the CPP itself, and even to mounting tendencies towards outright capitulation.

This situation has arisen after several years in which Marxist-Leninists around the world have viewed with concern your party's silence on the urgent questions confronting the international communist movement. After hailing Mao and the Cultural Revolution at the time of his death, you then turned around and supported Hua Guo-feng's reactionary coup d'état a short time later; since then you have ignored the virulent assault on Mao Tsetung Thought and the Cultural Revolution which has spewed forth from revisionists and reactionaries around the world, including China, and it now appears that you have made your peace with Soviet social-imperialism. In view of this and especially the perils which immediately confront the CPP, the international communist movement would be shirking its duty if it were to remain silent. Thus we call on you, the leadership and membership of the CPP, to grapple

seriously with the problems of line which threaten the revolutionary character of your party and the people's war it is leading.

This is a matter of serious importance not only for the destiny of the Philippine revolution, but for the proletarian revolutionary movement around the world. At its founding the CPP declared that the Philippine revolution was a component part of the world proletarian revolution. And indeed it is. The CPP itself was born in the flames of the international battle against revisionism led by Mao Tsetung, especially the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. At that time young revolutionaries in the Philippines revolted against the stifling reformism of the revisionist party, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), and, on 26 Dec 1968, the 75th anniversary of the birth of Mao Tsetung, declared the establishment of a new communist party, guided by Mao Tsetung Thought, which it hailed as "the acme of Marxism-Leninism." Immediately thereafter the CPP unleashed people's war to carry out the New Democratic Revolution in the Philippines as the first step on the path to socialism and communism, which the party said would be realised only after "many cultural revolutions."

Since that time, the CPP, though faced with martial law and a bloody counter-insurgency war, has

# Letter to the of the Philippines

## Revolutionary Internationalist Movement

nonetheless grown from a relative handful, armed with a few revolvers and a handful of ancient rifles, into a party of many thousands, leading the New People's Army (NPA) and the National Democratic Front (NDF). Today even the U.S. imperialists must admit that the CPP has become a threat to their continued domination of the Philippines. These developments are a profound affirmation of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought on which your party was founded.

At the same time, the current situation of crisis in the party and the danger of capitulation threatening it are reflections of tendencies which arose and grew in the CPP over the years to depart from these principles. At stake here is not adherence to some abstract dogma, as some would have it, for it is a profound truth that, as the *Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement* observes, "Without upholding and building on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, it is not possible to defeat imperialism, revisionism and reaction in general." The real stakes involved are the victory or defeat of the Philippine revolution itself, and the profound impact — positive or negative — developments there have on the proletarian revolution throughout the world. Summing up the roots of these errors and finding the ways and

means to rectify them is a pressing task for the Filipino revolutionaries today.

### **Aquino — Vacillating Ally or Sworn Enemy?**

Among the most serious indications of the turn in the CPP's line is its treatment of the Aquino government. Innumerable spokesmen for the imperialists and for the new government itself have made abundantly clear that one of the key reasons Marcos had to go was that his regime could not defeat the liberation movement. As the *Economist* put it in a 15 Feb 1986 cover editorial entitled, "Now, Go!": "The longer President Marcos clings to power, the likelier he is to bring on the deluge. . . . It could lead to the storming of Malacanang presidential palace, the closing of America's two biggest bases in Asia and a communist takeover of this archipelagic aircraft carrier." A leading member of Aquino's entourage spoke even more bluntly: "What is going to beat the Left is not the Marcos government. It's a new regime based on the moderate opposition."

Aquino herself has repeatedly argued that the guerrillas should lay down their arms now that Marcos has gone, and she has recently backed this up with the threat that if they don't, the military will pursue the counter-insurgency war until victory, with her support, and that she

will "take up the sword" herself. She has publicly divided the guerrillas into three distinct groups: "those who found themselves joining the rebels to escape the abuses of the Marcos regime — they are ready to come down and join the rest of the people; those who won't come down until they see our proposals; and the hardcore — they will never give up. We may not be able to win them over but we can isolate them. Our economic and social policies will do just that."

Is this anything less than a declaration of war? Isn't the crucial point of Aquino's effort to paralyze, split and isolate the revolutionary combattants so that the military can then finish them off?

Yet the CPP has followed a policy of tailing the Aquino government. In your initial response to the Aquino government's call for a ceasefire 18 March 1986, the CPP Military Commission and the NPA leadership "sincerely acknowledged the popular support gained by President Corazon Aquino," hailed her "positive efforts" and added their "hope that these progressive moves will gather momentum towards the solution of the more fundamental problems confronting our people." Furthermore, the March 1986 issue of *Ang Bayan*, the political organ of the CPP Central Committee, states that, "Mrs Aquino needs popular



support for the measures which, with liberal and progressive forces in and out of government, she intends to pursue." Elsewhere it says, "President Aquino and her progressive allies are enjoying popular support in their moves to dismantle the machinery of fascist rule in the country and pursue other democratic reforms."

Just which reforms are the CPP talking about? Can it be possible that you are wishing well to Aquino's political tinkering which she herself proclaims is aimed at splitting up and isolating the NPA? Are these the "progressive moves" which you hope will "gain momentum"? And could it possibly be any clearer that the main military structures Aquino intends to dismantle are *your own*?! And what does all their talk of "professionalizing the army" and "ridding it of cronyism," etc. amount to: "dismantling the machinery of fascist rule"? Not at all, for here too the imperialists and their agents have repeated that these changes are exactly for the purpose of *making the army more efficient in its pursuit of the revolutionaries*.

Moreover, it should be clear by now that a more general point of Aquino's reformism is to lull the

newly awakened masses back to sleep. For it is as true of the Philippines today as it was of Russia in 1905 that, as Lenin put it, "historic situations arise when reforms and particularly promises of reforms pursue *only* one aim: to allay the unrest of the people, force the revolutionary class to cease, or at least slacken, its struggle." ("A Lecture on the 1905 Revolution") Doesn't this accurately characterize the Aquino government's activity — minor reforms or *promises* of reform, like the supposed agrarian reform which has been postponed over and over again, which are designed to assure the masses that all is being taken care of *for* them, so that the "parliament of the hills and streets" can be adjourned and the parliament of the (new) puppets can assume unchallenged sway in the land?

#### The Political Bureau "Self-Criticism"

The summation of these events by the CPP Political Bureau, including in its "self-criticism" in the May 1986 *Ang Bayan* of the CPP boycott of the snap elections, propels the CPP even farther in the same mistaken direction. The "self-criticism" says that the political

assessment on which the boycott policy was based erred in that it "overestimated U.S. capacity to impose its subjective will on local politics" and "underestimated the bourgeois reformists' capabilities and determination to engage the Marcos regime in a decisive contest for state power." It goes on to note that the CPP "missed opportunities" because of such erroneous assessments of the situation. According to the "self-criticism," the CPP failed to seize the chance to hook up more closely with the Aquino forces, ride along on the anti-Marcos tide, and, implicitly, to wield significant influence within the new government (one "senior Party member" complains openly that "the left was not part of the machinery" of the anti-Marcos electoral campaign activity). Thus the CPP compounds its errors by seriously underplaying the reactionary essence of the Aquino forces, exaggerating their independence from U.S. imperialism, and concluding that it was too "sectarian" towards them. Far from acknowledging the necessity to have persevered in the people's war and delivered blows at the weakened ruling regime, on the contrary, based on your support for Aquino you argued *against* stepping up the armed struggle!

The Philippine ruling class was, and is, seriously split into rival factions, but Aquino and the forces around her are very much connected to U.S. imperialism and acting in its interests, and tied in to the feudal and semi-feudal elements in society. U.S. Secretary of State Schultz hails her, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger rushed her 100 million dollars worth of military aid in order to "support the new democracy" there, Reagan rolled out the red carpet for her while holding Marcos at arms length in Hawaii, *Time* magazine selected her "Woman of the Year," bankers from the Club of Paris to Washington and Tokyo have rescheduled debts on terms *notably more generous* than those for Marcos under the open banner of "Rally Round Mrs Aquino" — despite the overall world financial crisis — such events are daily fare, yet you

offer up an analysis that you "overestimated" U.S. influence on the situation and "underestimated" the "capabilities and determination" of the "bourgeois reformists," and you go on to say that it is the "military bloc" and not the "civilian bloc" that "enjoys U.S. support"!

The political support you are rendering Aquino and the promotion of the bourgeois-democratic illusions which underpin this policy are a reversal of correct verdicts which your own party reached years ago. In *Urgent Tasks*, adopted by your Central Committee in 1976, you warned that the "alliance of the Macapagal, Aquino, Lopez and Manglapus groups is not idle" (emphasis added), and noted that "U.S. imperialism has already assured this alliance that it should do what it can to stand in reserve in the face of Marcos' growing unpopularity."

What happened to this correct verdict? Is the class character of Mrs Aquino different from that of her husband? Was Commander Dante wrong when he said that Mr Aquino was just one of those politicians who ride on the backs of the people (*Ang Bayan*, 15 March 1978). In fact, what has changed since 1976, when Aquino's opposition to Marcos was considered part of the "splits among reactionaries," is not the *Aquinos'* class character but *your* political line. Isn't this evidence that you should have heeded your own warning in *Urgent Tasks* on the necessity to "deliberately and clearly link the anti-fascist movement to the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist movements." "Otherwise," you warned, "we would be merely calling for the restoration of formal democratic rights and worn-out processes of the ruling system. Like bourgeois democrats, and not proletarian revolutionaries, we would be going after forms and we would be missing the content of a people's democratic revolution."

**Smashing the Reactionary State Apparatus — or "Reorganizing" It?** These errors regarding the Aquino government are linked to increasingly reformist notions of the state. In the May 1986 *Ang Bayan* your

Central Committee divides the existing state power into a "civilian bloc" and a "military bloc" — the former, you say, is composed of a "coalition of liberal and progressive personages" and the latter of the "bigger, more organised armed conservative and reactionary forces." According to you, "the progressives and liberals have the initiative" and "can be drawn to support the people's demands or can be neutralised" while the latter "enjoys U.S. support" and must be fought.

This point is worth quoting at more length:

"For the conservatives, especially those who have had a taste of fascist power, naked repression is still the best response against the revolutionary movement. In their view, the Aquino government's popularity and its conciliatory calls are just useful for tricking and weakening the revolutionary movement, the easier to crush it.

"The liberals and progressives, on the other hand, recognise the legitimacy of fighting an unjust social system. They earnestly desire to pursue genuine peace through principled negotiations, to enable the Aquino government to tackle the social roots of the people's struggle. . . .

"The conservatives are hellbent on keeping to the old semicolonial and semifeudal framework, and they are acting as the principal tools of U.S. monopoly capital for this purpose."

*Ang Bayan* goes on to mention Aquino forces who "oppose" the conservatives on issues of imperialist bank loans and "have begun to see the destructive effects of imperialism," and argues that for the U.S. imperialists "Mrs Aquino remains an unknown political factor."

These views are as wrong as they are dangerous. Are the Aquino forces "opposing" imperialist penetration? Not at all. Certainly Aquino has sought better terms for loans, but that's just the point: what she's sought is *better* terms, not at all *an end* to imperialist dependency, or even a step towards such an end. The same with the U.S. military bases: she seeks *better*

*terms* for the leases, but *not at all* to kick the bases out. Hasn't she backed off her promise to do this, now that she's finally in power? And what do you think of her calls to strengthen ASEAN, the U.S. imperialists' regional military alliance? On the issues of most fundamental importance to the imperialists, she comes through for them every time.

And is it the case that the Aquino forces are opposed to the repressive tactics of the military and committed instead to a policy of conciliation so that they can really "tackle the social roots of the people's struggle"? Such views cannot be attributed to mere naiveté. The ruling classes *always* use counter-revolutionary dual tactics — as Lenin put it, they always have need of both the hangman and the priest (or of the "carrot and the stick" as this tactic is often popularly referred to). These are the dual tactics of *the system*, of the ruling classes overall, and even the most brutal fascist regime uses reform and deception, just as the most liberal bourgeois democracy uses torture chambers and pogroms. Which role any given person plays in this reactionary division of labour should deceive only those who are unaware of what *class* rule means. In fact, it often happens that one person can play *both* roles, even at the same time. For example, it was the fair-haired youthful U.S. President J.F. Kennedy who gushed on about democracy and justice and modernisation programs in the Third World on the one hand, while at the same time he threatened the armed nuclear might of U.S. imperialism as he did in the Cuban missile crisis, or presided over bloody counter-insurgency wars, as in Vietnam.

You argue that, "If U.S. imperialism had its way it would make Aquino boot out the progressives and liberals from the government, or it would get rid of Mrs Aquino herself the moment she definitely sets out on a nationalist path." (*Ang Bayan*, May 1986) This is a continual theme of yours, while you minimise or even ignore completely the possibility that the U.S. could have *Mrs Aquino herself* lead a counter-insurgency war to wipe out the revolution. . . even though she

has repeatedly promised that she would "take up the sword" if it becomes necessary! More to the point, she has *already* picked up the sword — she is already at the head of the state, serving as its symbol of legitimacy, as the guarantor of its stability and its law and order, with the support of reaction worldwide, and presiding over its massacres, as of the unarmed peasants in front of Malacanang Palace, and then receiving them afterwards to shed a few crocodile tears of pity. Yet your analysis would lay the responsibility for this recent massacre wholly at the feet of the so-called "military bloc," and thus objectively wipe Aquino's hands of the blood shed by the state she heads, whose power rests firmly on the guns of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines), the police and — it must be added — the U.S. imperialists. The army shoots, Aquino complains, they shoot again, she cries, they shoot yet again, she appoints commissions of inquiry. It reminds us of Peru's Alan Garcia and his commission of inquiry after 350 revolutionary prisoners were executed in cold blood. These tactics are all the more effective if the vanguard abdicates its responsibility to expose such counter-revolutionary dual tactics to the masses and lead them in struggle against the ruling classes and their state.

You must face your own responsibility in this matter too. Didn't you teach the peasants that there was a section of the state power that was for them, that looked after their interests, and that the "liberals and progressives" "had the initiative" and wanted to "tackle the social roots of the people's struggle"? If they then march with empty hands against the guns and bayonets of the state's repressive apparatus, do you bear no responsibility?

With this line of supporting the progressive reforms of the "civilian bloc" against the "military bloc," the CPP has also set itself up to be whipped back and forth by infighting within the Philippine ruling class. The so-called "civilian bloc" dangles promises of democratic reform to entice the NPA fighters down (as Aquino openly said she would) and points to the menace of

the fascist military as the constraint on their ability to implement their reforms, and then the revolutionaries rush to help strengthen the "civilian bloc" against the "military bloc" so as to realise the promise of the new regime. As you put it in *Ang Bayan*, "we should be alert to and thoroughly oppose all the moves of the reactionary forces, especially of those who are most likely to menace Mrs Aquino with a coup threat." Every menace of a coup d'état becomes a new occasion to rally around the "fragile democracy" (and thus a new occasion to forget the class nature of the regime as a whole and the people's war against it...). José Maria Sison, the founding chairman of the CPP CC, in a recent interview with a Western magazine, went so far as to say: "In case of a military coup d'état, the NPA could place itself at the service of the 'People's Power' of Mrs Aquino." Though Sison's present relationship to the CPP is not clear to us, the CPP leadership has not distinguished itself from Sison's political activity, and his statement flows out of the same logic as the CPP's general line. Yet if the task of the people's army is reduced to defending Aquino and the "reformist bourgeoisie," will the people still have an army?!

Here a word must be said about those in your party who, in order to promote the self-criticism that the CPP failed to "get in on" the Aquino movement, have drawn comparisons to the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, saying that what has been (or at least could have been or still could be) achieved was the kind of "dual power" that existed for a time in Russia, that "People's Power" represents this at least to some extent, and it is this that is actually being defended, much as the Bolsheviks had to defend and strengthen "dual power" there. First, this analogy is just wrong. The Soviets in Russia were organs of the masses themselves which carried out certain functions of political power *apart from* the established provisional government. If you want to talk about "dual power" in the Philippines, talk not of the "people's power" movement

of Aquino, but of the political power that rests on the armed revolutionary peasants in the countryside. Second, in the months following the February Revolution, what Lenin sought above all was to dispel illusions about the new provisional government, to unmask its bourgeois character, to show how one of its key goals was to raise the banner of revolution in order to head off a genuinely revolutionary movement. Talking about the "progressive character" of the newly installed provisional government was not Lenin's work, it was the work of his Menshevik opponents.

All this talk of "people's power" and "civilian blocs" opposed to "military blocs" is not so different from the theories of the state promoted by the Soviet revisionists — the offspring of their theory of the "state of the whole people" — which have set up the masses of people for more than one bloody ambush. Specifically, all this recalls the Indonesian Communist Party's "theory of two aspects in state power." In the self-criticism made later by the Political Bureau of their Central Committee, they explain that, according to their previously held theory, "within the state power of the Republic of Indonesia there existed two aspects, the 'anti-people aspect' consisting of comprador, bureaucrat capitalist and landlord classes on the one hand, and the 'pro-people aspect' composed mainly of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat on the other hand." Following this analysis, they had concluded that "a miracle could happen in Indonesia, namely that the state could cease to be an instrument of the ruling oppressor classes to subjugate other classes, but could be made an instrument shared by both the oppressor classes and the oppressed classes. And the fundamental change in state power, that is to say, the birth of a people's power, could be peacefully accomplished by developing the 'pro-people aspect' and gradually liquidating the 'anti-people aspect.'" Under the influence of such thinking, the Indonesian revolutionaries and people were disarmed and completely unprepared for the savage attacks launched by the Suharto

government, in which hundreds of thousands were massacred.

Your own party is intimately familiar with this tragedy. Yet what do you say about the Philippine state power, following the analysis quoted above about the division of the government into the "civilian bloc" of "liberals and progressives" and the "military bloc": "These questions are reflective of the intense fundamental struggle between the imperialists, big bourgeois compradors, landlords and bureaucrat capitalists, on the one hand, and the middle and lower strata of society, on the other hand. *It has never happened before that a contradiction as intense as this is reflected within government itself.*"

(*Ang Bayan*, May 1986 — emphasis added) Here is your Philippine version of the Indonesian "miracle" — an unprecedented event, a state fundamentally rent in two, no longer the organ of repression of the ruling classes, but now "an instrument shared between the oppressor classes and the oppressed classes," as the Indonesian CP argued. Where is the difference?

Indeed, isn't it based on this very analysis, that "People's Power" has captured a section of the state, that you have begun to talk less and less of smashing the repressive armed forces of the Philippines and instead lay out as principal tasks of the CPP "the struggle to dismantle the structures of fascist domination. *Part of this is the thorough reorganisation, reorientation and cleansing of the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines.*" (*Ang*

*Bayan*, April 1986 — emphasis added) Isn't this the same as the Indonesian CP's call to "gradually liquidate the 'anti-people' aspect in state power"? Isn't this talk of "reorienting" and "cleansing" the AFP moving further and further away from the revolutionary task of "the destruction of the apparatus of state power," without which "the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible," as Lenin put it? And isn't this same line reflected in the CPP CC's call to scale down the NPA's armed struggle, first to "active defense," then later to a ceasefire? Why step up the war, after all, if "people's power" is already in possession of a key part of the state apparatus?

**"Except for State Power, All is Illusion"**

In part the CPP's erroneous conception of state power is linked to a misplaced effort to uphold the "power of the masses of people." As *Liberation*, the organ of the NDF, puts it: "Let us remember that it was the struggle of the people behind Corazon Aquino, the courageous widow of assassinated opposition leader Benigno Aquino — and not the U.S. — that ousted Marcos." This seemingly anti-U.S. argument is a key support for the idea that "People's Power" has captured a section of state power.

Certainly it was the masses who laid down their lives against Marcos



A WORLD TO WIN 1987/8

*For years the CPP followed a policy of self-reliance. Here a fighter trains with homemade wooden gun.*

and U.S. imperialism, and certainly it was they who took to the streets at the final hour. Moreover, the imperialists made it quite plain that one of their main reasons for withdrawing support from Marcos was their fear that the people's war would continue to gain strength under his regime.

But it is not new that while the masses do the fighting and dying, the ruling classes zealously guard state power — and once again it is exactly the question of state power, particularly of the repressive apparatus of the army and police, that the CPP obscures. And, to put it concisely, "Except for state power, all is illusion."

Although *Liberation* presents this stand as going up against the U.S., the U.S. imperialists have actually promoted the same theme. The 3 March 1986 *New York Times* notes that most coverage in the Western media of the rise of Aquino has portrayed the U.S. as reluctantly bowing to the democratically expressed "will of the Filipino people." But for the imperialists, presenting Aquino as the expression of the "will of the people" is cynical justification for stepping up military and economic aid to the "new democracy" to be used among other things against the liberation war itself. And while the U.S. imperialists have indeed used the fall of Marcos to try and polish up their image of supporting vicious dictatorships around the world, they are not unaware of the need to work to preserve a certain respectable distance from Aquino herself, at least for now. As the *Economist* editorial observed, "A Mrs Aquino installed by the Americans would lose the legitimacy the voters had given her."

We should bear in mind the bitter experience of Indonesia, where promoting illusions of a fundamental division in state power and of a genuine "people's power" in control of or represented by one section of the state set the masses up for a bloodbath. Further, this line inevitably leads away from the only path to the genuine liberation of the oppressed: the thorough-going smashing of the old reactionary state power.

### Reducing the Enemy to a Small Clique

These bourgeois democratic tendencies are associated with certain errors that arose over the years as the CPP made alliances with broad class forces against Marcos. While some such efforts might have been correct, it is crucial to note, as the *Declaration of the RIM* argues, that "this can only be carried out successfully if the party maintains its leadership, utilising such alliances within the overall and principal task of carrying the revolution to completion *without making a strategic stage out of the struggle against dictatorship* since the content of the anti-fascist struggle is nothing other than the content of the new democratic revolution." (emphasis added) By the late 1970s the anti-fascist struggle began to be regarded by the CPP as taking priority over the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. The target of the revolution tended more and more to be reduced to a fascist clique — Marcos and a handful of his cronies — and the class nature of the state and the imperialist and feudal system of which Marcos and his clique were a part receded into the background.

In 1976 *Urgent Tasks* stated that the CPP "must give first place to the anti-fascist movement." By the early 1980s *Ang Bayan* referred ceaselessly to the Marcos regime as the "dictatorship" and to the movement against it as the "anti-dictatorship front" (Dec 1980). Theoretical underpinnings for narrowing the target to Marcos and his clique were elaborated; in October 1983 an "Urgent Message" by the CPP CC put forward the view that, "Under martial law, the fundamental contradiction between U.S. imperialism and the local ruling classes, on the one hand, and the Filipino people, on the other, took on a sharper form. The principal conflict is now between the people, on the one hand, and U.S. imperialism and the Marcos clique of comprador big capitalists, big landlords and big bureaucrats, on the other." It discussed other changes wrought by martial law: "State power was now the monopoly of the US-Marcos clique. In the ensuing period, it moved to con-

solidate that power. It turned the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) into a vast private army of its own, and the bureaucracy, including the government financial institutions, into its private preserve."

Since the state was now said to be the "private preserve" of the U.S.-Marcos clique, opposition bourgeois and landlord sectors began to be treated as if they were no longer really part of the ruling classes. As the "Urgent Message" stated: "Bourgeois liberal oppositionists *have ranged themselves with the people*, as have more and more businessmen. In increasing numbers, the politically advanced bourgeois liberal oppositionists now declare themselves in favor of armed struggle. Even anti-Marcos bourgeois compradors and landlords are now openly protesting against the regime." (emphasis added) And: "Under present conditions in Philippine society, the national united front also attracts the bourgeois liberal sections of the comprador bourgeoisie and landlord class to further isolate the dictatorship and concentrate the heaviest blows against it." And in the countryside: "a considerable number of landlords could be won to the revolutionary land program on the basis of their anti-dictatorship stand." There has been no basic change in this analysis since then, including with the formal lifting of martial law.

In this way the role of the state as an organ of class rule was obscured — it was now the "private preserve" of Marcos and a handful of cronies, no longer the protector of the *class* rule of the landlords, compradors and imperialists — and class alliances were expanded in a permanent fashion and very broadly, as the fight against Marcos and his cronies more and more was treated as a completely separate stage of struggle with no connection to the new democratic revolution.

This process of narrowing the target of the revolution and widening class alliances reached its climax with the snap elections. Throughout the CPP's agitation concerning the recent elections, the "moderate opposition" was targetted only because their own participation in



22 January 1987. Troops of the Aquino regime opened fire on a peasant protest demanding land reform. At least 18 were killed and over 100 wounded.

the elections was said to play into Marcos' hands, since the purpose of the elections was said to be his efforts to legitimise his rule. The CPP even repeatedly stated that the snap election was held at the initiative of Marcos (*Ang Bayan* Dec 1985). Similarly, it was argued that legitimizing Marcos was the U.S. imperialists' point in going along with Marcos' election manoeuvre.

The U.S. was undoubtedly surprised by the speed with which events moved in the Philippines, and most of all by the explosion of the masses themselves. But they have been manoeuvring for quite some time now to strengthen the hand of the ruling class opposition and to prepare for replacing Marcos, all the more so since it became apparent that Marcos was in bad health, both physically and politically. These particular elections were to play a significant role in this process. There is in fact much evidence that the elections were held not at the initiative of Marcos, but at that of the U.S. Furthermore, there were numerous signals of what the U.S. was up to in the Philippines — the increasing efforts of the U.S.

to "distance" itself from Marcos, as it became known in official U.S. parlance, which ranged from U.S. complaints about the handling of the General Ver case to exposure of Marcos' fake WW2 exploits, to mounting efforts, especially from U.S. Democratic Party politicians like the liberal imperialist Teddy Kennedy, to unite the bourgeois opposition and to present them as the representatives of the people and the hope for a "restoration of democracy," at whatever point this proved to be necessary.

But in the CPP perspective, it was more and more the tail that wagged the dog: Marcos fully in control, Marcos the real power, U.S. imperialism (and other Philippine ruling class sectors) watching on the sidelines or at best able only to react to Marcos' manoeuvres.

This line also came out sharply with the post-election defection of Enrile, long-time Minister of Defense under Marcos, and Ramos, also a general under Marcos and now Army Chief of Staff, the military revolt that signaled that the rug had been finally pulled out from under Marcos. *Liberation*, official

organ of the CPP-led National Democratic Front, actually polemicised against the idea that the U.S. had anything whatsoever to do with this manoeuvre and declared that Enrile and Ramos' defection "gave the U.S. as well as Marcos a massive shock." Come now! Whether or not the U.S. literally arranged such a defection, Enrile and Ramos are both long-time chiefs of the U.S. puppet army in the Philippines, both trained in the U.S., advised by the U.S., with extensive contacts with U.S. intelligence. Moreover, these so-called military "reformists" were regarded by the imperialists themselves as key to the succession. Again as the *Economist* editorial noted, "If these would-be reformers were quietly assured of both diplomatic support and a big infusion of military resources to help them get on with their proper job of fighting the communists, they might be emboldened to refuse to enforce a new Marcos clamp-down; and they might well carry their troops with them." Need the scenario have been spelled out any more clearly? And this editorial, (Continued on page 68)

## Two Recent Documents from the

### Statement on President Aquino's Call for a Ceasefire

March 1986

We rejoice with the Filipino people in the victorious overthrow of the Marcos fascist puppet regime. We also sincerely acknowledge the popular support gained by President Corazon C. Aquino and the corresponding positive efforts by her and the democratic forces in the new government in unconditionally ordering the release of political detainees of the fascist regime, restoring civil liberties, and carrying out measures to dismantle the fascist structures. In all sincerity, we hope that these progressive moves will gather momentum towards the solution of the more fundamental problems confronting our people.

We assure the President and our people that her call for a ceasefire has not fallen on deaf ears in the ranks of the revolutionary forces and the New People's Army. With just, sincere and prudent moves of the concerned parties, a negotiated ceasefire is possible on a nationwide scale. Moreover, we believe that more than just a ceasefire can be pursued afterwards as more substantial changes are made in the economic, political and military spheres favourable to the broad masses of the Filipino people.

Having said this, however, we must point out that much of the fascist structures remain. And the reactionaries in and out of the government are even now scheming not only to block the President's initiative at democratic reform but to reverse these. We are aware that U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries in the MND-Armed Forces of the Philippines are prodding her to revert to the rabid "counterinsurgency" campaigns of the discredited and overthrown regime. Regular and paramilitary forces of the AFP, including the fanatic and criminal elements in the Civilian Home Defense Forces, continue to sow fascist violence in various parts of the country. And the heavily armed private armies of warlords loyal to the Marcos regime continue to terrorise the masses in countryside and urban areas alike.

These and similar conditions stand in the way of a meaningful ceasefire and

of peace. Nevertheless, we are listening to the President's call.

We look forward to a situation where all the patriotic forces who fought against the Marcos fascist regime can peacefully work together in leading the country towards the attainment of nationalist industrialisation and genuine land reform, and eventually towards genuine national independence and democracy.

The New People's Army has persevered in the last 17 years of armed struggle against the U.S.-Marcos regime because of the latter's intense exploitation and oppression of our people, especially the worker and peasant masses. The landless peasants, who comprise the majority of our people, are impoverished and hungry because they continue to be subjected to the most ruthless feudal and semifeudal exploitation. The people's army, which is largely a peasant army, would not have grown without extensive and deep mass support, without serving the interests of the broad masses of the Filipino people.

The so-called "problem" of insurgency that is raging in the countryside and urban areas cannot be solved by military measures, much less through military "counterinsurgency" schemes sponsored and backed by U.S. imperialism. On the contrary, such schemes are the very fuel that fire up the spirit of the oppressed masses to engage in armed struggle as a just means of defending their interests, of fighting for national liberation and democracy. The history of the Filipino people bears this out. The so-called problem can be solved only by undertaking fundamental economic and political changes.

Compatriots, the historic moment of the Filipino people is unfolding before our eyes, offering us the opportunity to unite in changing our semicolonial and semifeudal society to a just, humane and prosperous society. Let us endeavour towards this goal.

Military Commission  
Communist Party of the Philippines  
General Staff  
New People's Army

### Party Conducts

For more than 17 of the 20 years that the Marcos fascist puppet regime was in power, the Communist Party of the Philippines (reestablished in December 1968) had played a leading role in our people's antifascist, antiimperialist and antifeudal struggles.

In all those 17 years, the Party and the revolutionary forces that it leads have contributed tremendously to exposing, isolating and weakening the regime, leading to its eventual downfall.

Yet, where the people saw in the February 7 snap presidential election a chance to deliver a crippling blow on the Marcos regime, a memorandum by the Executive Committee of the Party Central Committee (EC-CC) saw it merely as "a noisy and empty political battle" among factions in the ruling classes.

And when the aroused and militant moved spontaneously but resolutely to oust the hated regime last February 22-25, the Party and its forces were not there to lead them. In large measure the Party and its forces were on the sidelines, unable to lead or influence the hundreds of thousands of people who moved with amazing speed and decisiveness to overthrow the regime.

This was because of the Party's official policy enunciated by the EC-CC to launch an active and vigorous boycott campaign vis-a-vis the election, a policy that was based — as the events showed — on an incorrect reading of the political situation.

A recent assessment conducted by the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee characterised the boycott policy as a major political blunder.

#### Roots of the Error

As evaluated by the Politburo, the boycott policy erred in its overall assessment of the political situation at the time of the snap election, in its understanding and application of the Party's tactics against the U.S.-Marcos fascist dictatorship, and in its understanding and application of the Marxist-Leninist organisational principle of democratic centralism.

In the main, the political assessment on which the boycott policy was based mechanically analysed the various political forces with regard to their basic

# Communist Party of the Philippines

## Assessment, Says Boycott Policy Was Wrong

class standpoint and subjective intentions. It paid little or no attention to the objective positioning of each of the political forces in motion and in interaction with the others.

Thus it failed to grasp the essence of the whole situation that was in flux at that time.

The assessment had earlier described this period as the setting for an important political battle with a tremendous impact on the people and on the major political forces. But when this came initially in the form of the snap election, the assessment underpinning the boycott policy belittled it as nothing but a noisy and meaningless interfacional contest among the ruling classes.

Specifically, the assessment:

1. Did not correctly understand the character and operation of U.S. policy toward the Marcos regime. It overestimated U.S. capacity to impose its subjective will on local politics and misread the U.S. dilemma over the conflicting needs it had to simultaneously attend to. It failed to appreciate the possible effects on U.S. policy of local developments over which the U.S. did not have full control.

2. Underestimated the bourgeois reformists' capabilities and determination to engage the Marcos regime in a decisive contest for state power.

3. Ignored the fact that the Marcos clique had become extremely isolated and its capacity to rule was fast eroding. It failed to look more deeply into the contradictions developing within the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

4. Above all these, misread the people's deep anti-fascist sentiments and readiness to go beyond the confines of the electoral process in their determination to end the fascist dictatorship.

As practice subsequently showed, the snap election was not just "a noisy and empty political battle." The election and the major events it unleashed constituted the climax of the people's long-drawn struggle against the Marcos regime. During and after the snap election, the historically determined central political struggle was the showdown over the very existence and continuance of fascist rule. The snap election became the main channel of largescale mobilisation and deployment of the masses for

the decisive battle to overthrow the dictatorship.

This being the case, it was tactically necessary for the revolutionary forces to participate critically in the snap election in order to effectively combine and make use of all forms of struggle, march at the head of the politically active masses, and maintain flexibility and an active position in the face of the fast-changing situation. Only by doing so could the revolutionary forces have maximised their political and military capability and reaped the optimum gains for the revolution under the prevailing circumstances.

The boycott policy forfeited all these.

As regards understanding and applying the Party's tactics against the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship, the boycott policy failed to give commensurate political value to the antifascist struggle that assumed primacy during and after the snap election. The antifascist struggle united the various levels of revolutionary, democratic and anti-Marcos sentiments during and after the election, and created a mass force capable of toppling the regime.

The boycott policy not only failed to give enough value to the question of reaching and mobilising the majority of the people. It directly and openly went against the desire of the broad masses to pursue the antifascist struggle by means of critically participating in the snap election.

More specifically, the boycott policy concentrated on addressing and consolidating the advanced section of the people, or the revolutionary forces, at a time when the people were already gearing for the decisive battle with the fascist regime.

This showed an insufficient understanding of the tasks of political leadership during such a time, as well as a lack of appreciation of the current level of mass participation in revolutionary struggles, and confusion regarding the actual needs of the revolutionary armed struggle.

The Party leadership is now encouraging leading Party organs which have not yet done so to sum up their experiences regarding the boycott policy. The results of the different studies and summing-ups will be circulated within

the Party, to develop a common understanding of the lessons from the boycott campaign.

Likewise, a general summing-up will be conducted of the Party's experiences in the struggle against the U.S.-Marcos fascist dictatorship. At the same time, steps will be undertaken to strengthen the Party's ideological foundation and raise the theoretical knowledge of the entire Party.

Steps are being taken to encourage and develop the democratic spirit and democratic way of doing things in the Party. To this end, forums and channels will be created for the full expression within the Party of the various ideas and views on significant questions so as to arrive at a unified understanding and stand.

### The Future is Bright

While we missed out on important political as well as military opportunities and suffered other negative effects as a result of our erroneous boycott policy, the fact remains that the events of last February represented a great victory for our people and for their struggles towards genuine national freedom and democracy.

The Party and its forces are intact, and these are now in the process of strengthening their ranks for new tasks in the post-Marcos period which is highly conducive to the heightened and more extensive politicisation of our people.

While the Party perseveres in strengthening itself ideologically, politically and organisationally, while it looks inward from time to time and learns both from its negative as well as positive experiences, it will continue reaping the people's wholehearted support.

The future is bright for the Party, for the entire national-democratic movement, for the revolution, and for the entire Filipino people.

May, 1986

\*Reprinted from May 1986, *Ang Bayan*, organ of the Central Committee of CPP.



## Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement

Central Reorganisation Committee, Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) • Ceylon Communist Party • Communist Collective of Agit/Prop [Italy] • Communist Committee of Trento [Italy] • Communist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist-Leninist) [BSD (M-L)] • Communist Party of Colombia (Marxist-Leninist), Mao Tsetung Regional Committee • Communist Party of Peru • Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist • Haitian Revolutionary Internationalist Group • Nepal Communist Party [Mashal] • New Zealand Red Flag Group • Revolutionary Internationalist Contingent [Britain] • Proletarian Communist Organisation, Marxist-Leninist [Italy] • Proletarian Party of Purba Bangla (PBSP) [Bangladesh] • Revolutionary Communist Group of Colombia • Leading Committee, Revolutionary Communist Party, India • Revolutionary Communist Party, USA • Revolutionary Communist Union [Dominican Republic] • Union of Iranian Communists (Sarbedaran)

The *Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement* was adopted in March 1984 by the delegates and observers at the Second International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organisations which formed the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. The above are the participating parties and organisations of the RIM. Available in the following languages (partial list): Arabic, Bengali, Chinese, Creole, Danish, English, Farsi, French, German, Gujarati, Hindi, Italian, Kannada, Kurdish, Malayalam, Nepali, Punjabi, Spanish, Tamil, Turkish. 1£ plus 50 p handling. Make cheques payable to *A World to Win*.

For more information write the Information Bureau of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement at the following address:

BCM RIM  
London, WC1N 3XX  
U.K.

## New UIC(S) Document

# On Khomeini's Reactionary Class Character

The following is an excerpt of a pamphlet called "With the Weapon of Criticism — A Summation of the UIC's Past," by the Union of Iranian Communists (Sarbedaran). The UIC(S) has added the introduction and comments noted in brackets to the original text. — AWTW.

The foreword says: "This document covers the majority of the internal debates of the UIC(S) in the reorganisation period following the enemy's major attack and the organisation's disintegration . . . It sums up and synthesizes the UIC's experience in the 1979 uprising and its aftermath. This study reveals how, when a communist force not only departs from the universal science of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, but completely refrains from applying it, that force can lose sight of its basic tasks and to a great degree lose historic opportunities.

"The effective and sincere participation of other forces of the international communist movement in

the development of this critical summation adds to its importance and value. The genuine revolutionary communists in every corner of the world correctly look at the experience of defeat of the communists in Iran as their own. The lost opportunities in Iran, and the emerging ones, were and are opportunities for developing and advancing the world proletarian revolution. Thus, the revolutionary proletariat, regardless of 'national boundaries,' participated in this process of summation and rose to its proletarian internationalist tasks."

The major parts of this summation pivot around the UIC's line and views in the period of the 1979 revolution and the tumultuous years following it, up until 1981; the major questions dealt with are: state power, proletarian internationalism, the question of the party, the line of the UIC in advancing revolution, the land-peasant question, Kurdistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the trial of a group of the leaders, cadres and members of the UIC in 1982. The final part deals with the

rupture that the revolutionary communists of the UIC made with the right opportunist line, a critical summation of the military line and weaknesses of Sarbedaran, the reorganisation of the UIC and its 4th congress (in 1983), and a conclusion.

In the section on the rebellion against the right opportunist line it is stated that this was not something accidental but had roots in the history of the UIC: "...The UIC was a product of the rebellion of the communists against Soviet revisionism and of the Cultural Revolution itself. Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, in the past, determined the direction of our theory and practice..."

The section on the military line of the Sarbedaran (armed detachment of the UIC when it initiated armed struggle in mid 1981) reaffirms the centrality of Mao's line on proletarian warfare — specifically people's war — in charting and carrying out a correct strategy for the victory of the revolution in Iran. It critically sums up the Sarbedaran's line in this regard: "What was prominent in

the military line of Sarbedaran was that it lacked clarity and was eclectic . . . Thus spontaneity was a strong aspect of it; a general military line had not been developed and it was not clear what position each armed action, culminating in the Amol uprising, occupied in an overall plan, and how they served its advance."

"From the start, the strategy of Sarbedaran was not based on protracted war and there was no clear grasp of the protracted nature of the armed struggle under the leadership of the proletariat in the oppressed countries." It is said that this was, of course, an ill left over from the UIC's departure from Mao Tsetung Thought, but it also was a reflection of the fact that the rupture had just started and was not yet thoroughgoing and had not yet penetrated into the military line, which to a certain degree could be expected. For the political line struggle to manifest itself in the military sphere required specific struggle.

The conclusion calls upon all those genuine communists who are still committed to revolution and to the teachings of the great leaders of the proletariat to rise up to the urgent task of forming the "revolutionary communist party of Iran based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung. It should be clear for them — and obvious by now — that the defence of Mao Tsetung and his pathbreaking Thought has been and still is the central question for the advance of the communist movement in the past ten years."

The section reprinted here centres around the UIC's previous assessment of the class nature of Khomeini. The UIC called him and the forces around him the "traditional petite bourgeoisie." In the central organ of the UIC — *Haghighat* — this was explained as follows:

"... primarily composed of small shopkeepers, artisans and craftsmen whose outlook is therefore somewhat narrow. It is the section of the population which is the mass base of Ayatollah Khomeini and is deeply influenced by religious sentiments and backward prejudices. It also has ties with small landowners and thus with the feudal system and can co-exist with feudal-

ism. It is on the one hand anti-imperialist, but because of its feudal ties it can quickly become a tool in the hands of internal reaction against the landless peasants and also urban workers." (*Haghighat*, March 1980, "The Iranian Revolution and Political Developments".)

Furthermore the UIC stated, "the regime which came to power after the overthrow of the royal court, is not and cannot be a regime suitable for U.S. imperialism. Because of its particular class character and position and because of the participation of different class forces in it, this regime is unable and unwilling to solve the fundamental problems of the revolution. Considering its previously mentioned class composition, it is also not a representative of imperialist interests, especially those of U.S. imperialism." (A Report from the 3rd Congress of the UIC — Spring 1980)

"From what has been said however, we can't conclude that the contradictions of our society or their manifestations have changed. Or that revolution will continue in the same form as in the past, only directed against new representatives of the same old system, or that this is already the case. The reason is that in fact, sections of the ruling class show conditional cooperation and alignment, or potential for alignment, with the people against imperialism and reaction. Therefore, it is the duty of communists, in the course of supporting and developing all the genuine struggles of the people of Iran, to establish a correct relationship between these struggles and the positions which must be taken towards different sections of the ruling forces." (Ibid.)

The current UIC(S) pamphlet points out, in a section which precedes the excerpt to follow, that:

"Who were these forces? What made this regime not representative of imperialist interests and particularly U.S. imperialist interests? The UIC analysed three basic forces in the government: 1) representatives of the old exploitative classes, of the comprador and big landlord classes, 2) the national bourgeoisie, and 3) the traditional petite bourgeoisie. The compradors

and big landlords — the representatives of the old Pahlavi alignment of forces — were considered the main target of the revolution. At the same time, the UIC's line was relatively "hard" on the national bourgeoisie, emphasizing their conciliatory nature, that its 'right wing' had already solidly allied itself with the comprador and big landlord classes. The third force was personified by Khomeini, an animal of a different nature, analysed as a representative of the 'traditional petite bourgeoisie.'

"This was fundamentally wrong, and reflected right opportunism on the question of the state and the united front. The presence of the 'traditional petite bourgeoisie' in the government did not in the least mean that there was an anti-imperialist or genuine 'people's aspect' to the government that Khomeini headed which *could not be relied on in any strategic or even short term sense by the masses*. His popularity, an extremely important element of Iran's political terrain in the wake of the February revolution, could in no way be counted on as a factor for carrying through the revolution or even to hold off the onslaught of reaction but in fact *had to be understood as primarily a problem for the revolutionary proletariat*. The UIC tailed Khomeini miserably in the anti-imperialist tasks of the revolution. In tailing the mass anti-imperialist upsurge which was mainly led by Khomeini, the UIC lost sight of not only the long-term interests of the proletariat (viewing the anti-imperialist, democratic stage as a stage toward the socialist revolution and as a component part of the international proletariat's historic struggle for communism), but also ended by metaphysically separating the key democratic tasks of the revolution from the anti-imperialist tasks.

"Our analysis of Khomeini's class nature before his ascent to power, and especially once he established his regime, was fundamentally wrong. Of course, this was not the pivot of the UIC's deviations on the revolutionary road forward in Iran. Even if Khomeini were a representative of the

traditional petite bourgeoisie (which he was not), the criticisms enumerated above [in this pamphlet] on the political-ideological line of the UIC, still hold. But addressing this question is an important vehicle for examining the complexities of the Iranian political terrain as the revolutionary crisis matured and unfolded, and for touching on some important questions of political economy and overall methodology in regard to which the UIC made mistakes, questions important for the entire international communist movement."

\* \* \*

The analysis of Khomeini as a representative of the traditional petite bourgeoisie rested on three factors: 1) That he had a large and loyal base among that class. 2) As a cleric, he had been identified with the less propertied and less powerful of the Islamic clergy (mullahs who in their economic position were petit bourgeois) as opposed to those clerics who owned or controlled large tracts of land or were close cronies of the Pahlavi court. 3) Most importantly, he was analysed as a "traditional petit-bourgeois," which, supposedly, explained on the one hand his militancy and "antagonism" with the U.S. and the Pahlavi regime and, on the other hand, his backwardness, characteristic of the traditional petite bourgeoisie, and hence his undeniable reactionary edge.

In fact all three of these criteria — especially the third one — should have been assessed differently. First, Khomeini was not a representative of the traditional petite bourgeoisie, but of the "traditional clergy" whose relationship to the array of social classes involved in the revolution was more to the point. As the crisis matured and the downfall of the regime became imminent — as well as after his rise to power — Khomeini concentrated the interests of those feudals and compradors in sharp conflict with the U.S. and especially with the existence — and further retention — of the monarchy in particular. This does not mean that the revolution in Iran was a sham, or reducible in any way to a power struggle be-

tween equally reactionary cliques. On the contrary, the February revolution was a genuine revolutionary crisis and upheaval that led to the overthrow of the puppet regime of the Shah and struck a heavy blow especially at U.S. imperialism. Overthrowing the monarchy at that time was definitely in the interests of the proletariat and the masses. While pointing out that the fundamental tasks of the democratic anti-imperialist revolution were not realised with the overthrow of the Shah, the UIC tended to reduce the struggle to a handful of old U.S.-backed reactionaries, calling for exposing, isolating and smashing them. In other words, the UIC tended to view the advancement or completion of this stage as primarily a quantitative question in an almost linear process.

Corresponding to this tendency, the UIC correctly saw the Pahlavi regime as representing and concentrating the interests of imperialism and reaction, but incorrectly treated it as if it were oppressive, parasitic and external to the fundamental contradiction of Iranian society. That is, there was a strong tendency in the organisation to reduce the economic basis for the current crisis in Iran to the "contradiction between a thwarted domestic Iranian capitalist economy and backward semi-feudal relations propped up by imperialism" (all this personified in the Shah), with this "contradiction being compounded and fueled by imperialist plunder and by the crisis of imperialism in the mid-1970s."

In the article, "The Iranian Revolution and Its Political Development," it reads:

"1976-77 saw the onset of the revolutionary crisis which erupted into big battles of the revolution in late 1977-early 1978. But in the final analysis, this crisis was the manifestation of a hard and crushing clash between the rapid development of Iranian capitalism and the rotten, bankrupt and decayed semifeudal relations of our society, which within the framework of dependence on imperialism in our country — which hinders and sabotages this development — reached the point of early and extreme intensification.

"The economic crisis of Iranian capitalism, which was connected with the assault of imperialist capital and commodities on Iran's market and the dominance of big dependent enterprises over small and medium ones in the field of production and distribution, aggravated the fundamental contradiction in society." (*Haghighat* No. 27, page 1)

In this analysis, the character of the economic crisis which racked Iran is defined as ultimately a manifestation of the contradiction between nascent (and thwarted) domestic capital and semifeudal relations within the framework of dependence on imperialism<sup>1</sup>. Instead, the economic basis for the crisis which racked Iran was the qualitative sharpening of the contradictions of the accumulation process of imperialist capital, which, with regard to Iran was manifested as a qualitative sharpening of the contradiction between imperialism and an oppressed nation. The UIC underestimated the degree to which the economies of the oppressed nations have been integrated into the overall dynamic of world imperialist accumulation and overlooked the depth and scope of the relations of structural dependency between imperialism and the dependent countries. This is the key in the shaping up of the production relations internal to these societies. The UIC did not recognise that while imperialism props up and utilises — actually integrates — backward semifeudal relations in the process of accumulation, it also can and must develop the productive forces in these countries (often in "breakneck" and "reckless" ways, like forcing huge dislocations of the rural population); and it does so on the basis of the needs of the accumulation of imperialist capital, in contradiction to both the welfare of the broad masses of these countries and the development of articulated national economies<sup>2</sup>. The exigencies of imperialist capital totally distort and severely disarticulate the economies of these countries (in which one finds the development of huge concentrated modern enterprises side by side with very backward modes, both dominated by imperialist



*Iranian youth making Molotov cocktails by the barricades during the revolutionary upsurge that led to the overthrow of the Shah.*

finance capital and both a source of superprofits for the imperialists), which decisively keeps these oppressed countries off any path resembling independent capitalist development. All this further intensifies the basic contradictions of imperialist accumulation, creating a situation that can and does literally blow up in their face.

Such a situation produces very favourable material conditions for advancing the interests of the proletariat and the oppressed masses. But it also produces conditions where a complex of various forces



and classes will undoubtedly enter into the fray. It is actually not a particularly new phenomenon that obscurantists and fundamentally reactionary forces would rise up in opposition to imperialism.<sup>3</sup> In 1920, in "Draft Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions," Lenin called for "...the need to combat Pan Islamism and similar trends, which strive to combine the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with an attempt to strengthen the position of the khans, landowners, mullahs, etc." (Lenin *Collected*



*Works*, vol. 31, p.149)

But what was actually quite "new" in the February revolution was how these forces rose to the head of an actual country-wide, mass revolutionary upsurge (in alliance with other bourgeois forces), toppled the central government and the existing alignment of pro-imperialist forces and consolidated their dominant position in the government. These forces established a state in the form of a theocracy, which had a comprador economic base and, on the basis of the needs of the new rulers, had forms and trappings of *shariat* (Islamic law); and in a limited period Khomeini's state tried to make Western imperialism, particularly the U.S., understand what

its relation to this "Islamic Kingdom" was to be. This had nothing to do with Khomeini being a "representative of the traditional petite bourgeoisie," but had everything to do with the various necessities imposed on the imperialists by the revolutionary crisis in Iran (or the imperialist system's failures), especially the sharpening contention between the two imperialist blocs.

Why forces such as Khomeini came to the head of the revolutionary movement was itself a product of a number of important political factors. But it also had its material underpinnings in the depth of the crisis racking Iran, the ramifications and results overall of its disarticulated and distorted economy resulting from imperialism's penetration and domination of Iran as well as specifically the major, but partial transformations brought about by imperialism. That is, major transformations took place in Iran in relation to industry and agriculture. But these transformations were incomplete, they did not thoroughly uproot old relations. Thus, aspects of semifeudal relations were preserved while at the same time other elements of semifeudal relations were being undermined. Alongside these transformations in industry and agriculture were the phenomenon of "Pahlavisation," the concentrating of land and comprador wealth in great measure (but not entirely) in the hands of the royal court's narrow clique with a bloated and very centralised state apparatus developed to ensure its supreme authority (and protect and promote the overall political interests of especially U.S. imperialism in Iran and this region of the world). All this meant that the Pahlavi regime was extremely oppressive not only to the vast majority of the toiling masses, but also to many strata including sections which had high economic positions or positions of authority and were from the "privileged" strata (of compradors and big landowners). It was the exigencies of imperialist accumulation that had in part displaced these strata or limited their power. And given the overall crisis faced by imperialism and its

particularly acute impact on Iran at that time, these forces could no longer be contained and were drawn into the political scene and the fight for power. Thus in the ranks of those who rose up to overthrow the Shah, alignments took place with forces that were undoubtedly targets or major obstacles to the masses in carrying through the anti-imperialist, democratic revolution — although for that limited period, they were not the immediate target of revolution. This is not a unique phenomenon in history. Such was the case in the anti-Japanese period in the Chinese revolution. Another example, in some ways more analogous to Iran, is the example of the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Various class forces, including some representing the compradors, rose in opposition to Somoza. Today many of these compradors are with the "contras." The Sandinistas — "Fedayin"-type forces — in Nicaragua, backed by the Soviets, have become the new compradors in command of the regime; Khomeini actually represents an Iranian equivalent more approximating the above mentioned "contras"; even in the high tide of revolution Khomeini did not represent petit bourgeois forces, such as those who have become the new compradors in Nicaragua. These contradictions among the reactionary forces are not surprising; they arise all the time, and should not be identified with contradictions between imperialism and the popular classes.

It is true that Khomeini's mass base was among elements of the "traditional petite bourgeoisie" as well as other sections of the population, but this does not mean Khomeini in power played the role of or represented the petite bourgeoisie. To equate mass base and class character would mean to contend that any political figure with a base among a section of the masses was the political representative of those masses. Even given Khomeini's broad popularity and strong support among the "traditional petit bourgeoisie," defining him as a representative of at least a significant section of the traditional clergy is different than the label of "tradi-

tional petit bourgeois.”

Historically the Islamic clergy were tied to and served the feudal base and superstructure of Iran. Even under the Pahlavi regime, the clergy as an institution (as opposed to individual or particular groups of clergy) represented the dominant class relations and served important elements of semifeudal as well as bourgeois and comprador bourgeois relations. Significant traditional privileges of the clerics [such as control over the educational and legal system] had been undermined by imperialism, especially through the much touted “Westernisation” of Iran during the regimes of the Pahlavi family. But overall, until the early 1960s, they remained a prosperous and influential group. Their religious institutions — from mosques, to shrines, to religious schools, to Islamic relief loans [to support the clergy and enable them to distribute alms to the destitute] were maintained through the mandatory religious tax on wealthy devotees (especially on the wealthier merchants and traders of the bazaar, landlords and others) and through *Moghoofat*, the religious endowments [large tracts of land owned or controlled by high ranking clerics]. Prior to the 1960s the traditional clergy’s authority had been undercut and reduced by the regime. There were sharp conflicts; but this institution as a whole (not simply that section most directly tied to the royal court or those clerics with government-appointed local positions etc.) was used in the service of reaction to help maintain the status quo vis-a-vis the oppressed. Sections of the traditional clergy most certainly had strong ties with the strata that could be described as the smaller bourgeoisie and “traditional petite bourgeoisie,” along with landlords, etc., and in a sense these clergy even “served” the interests of (and were supported by) these strata. But what the UIC tended to ignore was that this “service” remained in the context of and ultimately served the dominant social relations. While in terms of class position narrowly defined — economic status, family origins — sections of clergy could be described as “petit bourgeois,” this status had

little to do with their social role and what class relations the traditional clergy as an institution represented and served. Focusing on the economic status of the “poorer” mullah, with whom Khomeini most identified, was engaging in vulgar economic analysis and ignoring the superstructure and politics overall.

In the 1960s the regime again came into sharp conflict with important sections of the clergy as well as many other sections of Iranian society. This had everything to do with the exigencies of the “White Revolution” and other imperialist-imposed transformations in Iran. These transformations and the political measures taken to bring them into being (such as the dissolving of Parliament, the enfranchisement of women, etc.) gave rise to great turmoil and political upheaval. Many popular strata took the political stage in opposition to the regime in this period; but part of what set this stage was turmoil and contradiction among essentially reactionary classes in the face of these measures. While most of the largest landlords who initially opposed the land reform ended up being “won over” or neutralised, largely by bringing them more directly into the comprador class, etc., many landlords, due to their weaker political and economic authority, were basically cast aside. The traditional authority structure in much of the Iranian countryside began to be replaced by new rural authorities more directly backed by the regime, displacing from positions of authority and privilege many elements linked to semifeudal relations.

Furthermore, many measures were taken by the Shah which were directly aimed at undermining the traditional religious authority in Iran [for example, major religious endowments were taken over and directly administered by the regime] and measures such as the enfranchisement of women indirectly adversely affected this traditional authority. Throughout his reign, the Shah continued his direct and indirect assault on this religious authority structure, especially in the wake of the 1960s upheaval [e.g. in 1971 he set up his own alternative

rural religious corps dubbed the “mullahs of modernisation”; the Shah’s celebration and promotion of Iran’s “Persian” as opposed to “Islamic” heritage, etc.]. The emergence of Khomeini as a significant figure on the Iranian political terrain in this period [1960s] was a product of these imperialist transformations and a reaction to the political measures which followed them.

Evaluating Khomeini as a representative of the mullahs serving comprador and semi-feudal relations (this is way before the seizure of power by them) is not mainly based on the fact that he was a high-ranking cleric [Ayatollah] but on the actual content of his programme, which calls for an Islamic Republic and for the establishment of a theocracy for the strengthening and entrenchment of the traditional clergy in government and society, as well as on who rallied to this programme. His programme was nothing more than a clerical version of bureaucrat capitalism.<sup>4</sup>

The point is not that Khomeini’s contradictions with and opposition to the U.S. and the Pahlavi regime in particular was simply demagogery. But it is a fact of history that imperialism had actually undermined large and significant sections of “traditional reactionary forces in Iran.” And as things developed to a head in Iran, a broad array of reactionaries joined the tide of opposition to the Shah to “save” Iran — to restore order and revive their lost positions — and the Islamic banner and Islamic law and order became the vehicle with which to accomplish this.

We have thus far discussed the overall foundations concerning the material basis for the emergence of the likes of Khomeini [and for his “anti-imperialism” as well as his large mass base]. There were also three very important political factors that played a role in his gaining prominence in the revolution:

1) These traditional clerics not only were organised (and rapidly organised in the wake of the maturing of the revolutionary crisis) but since the 1960s and especially with the beginning of the crisis that led to the 1979 uprising, they promoted



*8 March 1979. Women were a crucial part of the revolutionary upsurge, and they were one of the first targets Khomeini chose in his clampdown on revolution.*

their programme. This also took organisational expression [the role of the mosques for example in the uprisings, but also the aforementioned "charity work" by the high-ranking urban mullahs, the formation of Islamic guild associations, etc.] Khomeini's strong mass influence was also related to some of the specific hallmarks of the Shah's rule, i.e. his attacks on the traditional Islamic culture of Iran and the undermining of traditional religious authority. Consequently there was also a spontaneous pull among many popular strata to uphold and embrace Islam since it was "under attack." These forces also formed alliances with even some of the most traditional backward elements. Thus various bourgeois-democratic trends went along with Khomeini helping considerably to pave the political path for his vast popularity.

2) The international proletariat, for many of the reasons outlined in earlier sections, was extremely weak, exerting neither a powerful

material force nor a political-ideological influence on the course of Iranian revolution.

3) U.S. imperialism, faced with the revolution, "held back" from the fullest conceivable unleashing of its loyal forces in the military against the revolution in order to avoid risking a situation they could not ultimately contain (in the sense of leaving the situation too wide open for the Soviets or for a more thorough-going rupture to take place). This itself was due to the depth and scope of the crisis.<sup>5</sup>

Comrade Bob Avakian, Chairman of the RCP, USA, correctly sums this question up in his article, "Lessons From Iran on Coming From Behind to Build the Party": "The imperialists themselves took steps to see that the thing (Iranian Revolution) would sort of 'get resolved' to a certain point, in the short run, and also to see that forces that they could both work with and also undermine more easily, put pressure on and hopefully win over or partly win over, would be in the

forefront and would come to power." ("If There is to be a Revolution, There Must be a Revolutionary Party," p. 33 — *AWTW*)

Our organisation faltered in its analysis of Khomeini's relationship to the overall anti-imperialist, democratic revolution. Although it was necessary, at that time, to support and give solidarity to the anti-Shah mass movements he objectively led and it was correct to not make him an immediate target, the UIC actually denied that his programme and line were reactionary. Erroneous interpretations of facts such as Khomeini's vast popularity among the masses, imperialist intrigues and the contradictions between his government and the Western powers, influenced the line and policies of the UIC to the extent that the central task of the proletariat — seizure of political power through violence — was ignored. As a result we were unable to clearly and thoroughly delineate our programme and outlook from that of

all other classes on the political terrain, especially those with power and influence; and thus without building an independent proletarian position we lost the possibility of mobilising the masses under its banner. This sharp deviation in the UIC's approach to the historical mission of communists was not due to a wrong analysis of Khomeini's class position, because even if he really had been the representative of the "traditional petite bourgeoisie" or even more radical sections, this should not have altered our central task. The experience of the Iranian Revolution and the emergence of a phenomenon such as Khomeini at the head of the revolution is only testament to the complexity of the revolutionary process in the imperialist era and also to the importance of the class-conscious proletariat not being swept up by spontaneity at any period or stage. The UIC's tailing of the spontaneity and the leadership of the non-proletarian classes manifested itself in its thesis called the "peeling away process of the ruling power," which was based on "exerting political pressure on the ruling power" in order "to expel its reactionary factions, isolate the capitulationist ones and radicalise the anti-imperialist faction." It was on the basis of this thesis that the UIC engaged in the task of criticising "the vacillations of the anti-imperialist petite bourgeoisie in power" on this and that position and measure and giving advice to the new power-holders. For example, *Haghighat*, in an article on "The Danger of an Imperialist Coup and the Role of the Army in It," wrote: "Communists do not believe that people, groups or social classes have experience in everything from the beginning. They are never opposed to people drawing lessons from their experiences. But does history give us only this lesson? The particularity of communists and the working class is that they draw correct lessons from their own experience and from those of others as well. Because of the different experiences in our country and in others, for example the experiences of the Mossadegh period, of Allende in Chile, of Sukarno in Indonesia,

etc., revolutionaries cried out and are still crying out that these are the kinds of armies that make a coup d'état: It makes no difference whether their names are Islamic, nationalist or anything else. Where were the ears with which to hear these cries? They were busy at the time listening to the nonsense of the liberal bourgeoisie and their tongues were busy excommunicating revolutionaries. Wasn't it this way, Ayatollah Khomeini?" (from the article, "Ayatollah Khomeini, the Clergy and the Experience of Power," *Haghighat* 82).

The above quote is taken from an article whose main content is exposure and criticism of Khomeini (actually fairly rare in the UIC's literature from this period). The UIC here raises the experience of Mossadegh, Chile and Indonesia to criticise the "unwise softness" of Khomeini towards the reactionary organs left over from the Shah's period and point out the danger of a coup by the army. Although the UIC correctly pointed out some historical experiences to learn from, they actually fell down on what is a much more central and fundamental lesson. The road promoted by the UIC was essentially not that different from the grave right opportunist errors of the leadership of the Communist Party of Indonesia. Although the UIC did not promote peaceful transition or parliamentarianism, this opportunist policy revealed its particular form in a more covered way as a capitulationist approach towards state power. The UIC called upon the masses to wage struggle and maintain their revolutionary vigilance in order to encourage or force the government (or a "section" of the government) to act in the "people's" or the "nation's" interests! While this model did not stink of the putridness of the parliamentary road (though this might have had to do with the fact that there wasn't much "parliamentary" about Khomeini), it indeed spread the same identical bourgeois-democratic illusions about the nature of the state, that it somehow could represent (in the short run) both the masses and reaction, skirting the issue that the state represents social

relations and is the instrument of class dictatorship. What was identical between the Communist Party of Indonesia's line and the line promoted by our organisation at that period was eclecticism on the question of the armed overthrow of the state machinery and the necessary establishment of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to suppress all reactionary classes. It is not as if the UIC failed to mention the "need" ultimately of proletarian rule or leadership, but at the same time it promoted the illusion that there could be some type of phase in the process of revolution, when it would not be possible to determine the class nature of the state.<sup>6</sup>

Our organisation ignored the fact that one either unleashes revolution against the existing property and social relations or turns into the enforcer and ultimately the inheritor of those relations. Instead the UIC turned to repeatedly arguing that the stage of revolution is democratic and that there is the necessity for the proletariat to "share political power with other classes." The UIC repeated the fact that, in the anti-imperialist, democratic stage of revolution the proletariat, in a way, can "share power" with other classes — even at times with bourgeois forces — but ignored the fundamental point in this relation, i.e. that it must be on the basis of proletarian leadership. The UIC ignored that the struggle around this — who will lead whom — is a decisive one, and will actually go on fiercely and at times be bloody. Instead it reduced this struggle to the level of some ultimately peaceful criticisms.

From the UIC's point of view the new democratic dictatorship was not a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat; it ignored the fact that if the content of the revolutionary anti-imperialist democratic state is not a dictatorship of the proletariat, then how would the transition to the socialist stage be possible? It ignored the fact that with the bourgeoisie or even the "petite bourgeoisie" at the helm, one has a bourgeois dictatorship; and in actuality it denied that in today's world conditions, any bourgeois

dictatorship is bound to, and does, serve imperialism and reaction. It did not see the fact that Khomeini objectively became the political representative of the existing social relations and dominant comprador relations in Iran immediately after the establishment and consolidation of his government.

To conclude, the UIC, like many others in the history of the ICM, became the tragic example of a communist force that opted for what is called the "will of the people" at a time when revolutionary opportunities emerged. It bowed to ignorance and the influence of alien classes among sections of the masses, relinquishing its "revolutionary birthright" — leadership of the revolution. The UIC had been caught in a logic which based itself on distortions of Mao's teachings on the question of the united front; the only thing that the UIC had understood from these teachings had been reduced to this phrase: "the proletariat unites all who can be united including the patriotic bourgeoisie (and at times, even the reactionary elements) in the democratic anti-imperialist stage of the revolution." On the contrary, Mao's contribution on the national and colonial question lies more in the theory and practice of how the proletariat can lead and transform a revolution in which various forces, including bourgeois, are bound to participate, towards its own class interests. Refraining from making conscious efforts to build and implement proletarian leadership cannot result in anything but tailing the alien classes in practice and policies. And it did not have any other result for our organisation.

#### Footnotes

1. This understanding was based, to a great degree, on the Comintern's Theory of General Crisis — especially "Theory of Stagnation" — "imperialism neither can, nor wants to develop capitalism and the extraction of imperialist superprofit was dependent upon thwarting the development of capitalism in its dependent countries." While the UIC's analysis was very mechanical and nonscientific and was not based on a correct understanding of the workings of the imperialist system and its relations with dependent countries, it was also an expression of a bourgeois democratic and nationalist tendency of a Marxist-Leninist force in an

oppressed country — a tendency which influenced various movements and Marxist-Leninist forces in these countries.

2. This analysis is different from the incorrect understanding of the relations between oppressed and oppressor nations in the epoch of imperialism, which is propagated under the name of "Dependency Theory"; this widespread understanding denies the fact that the structural relations between imperialism and the oppressed nations is a production relation; instead dependency theory reduces this relation to one of plunder in the sphere of circulation.

3. [Though Khomeini's call for actually establishing a central government run by clerics, a full theocracy is somewhat unique.]

4. It was this programme that Khomeini first began to articulate in the 1940s — at that time without insinuating the elimination of the monarchy — and which he developed more fully in the 1960s. Its political thrust was rather easily embraced by a political party, the IRP, headed by well-known clerical representatives of the compradors, feudals, etc. [A great number of clergy, especially among the clerical hierarchy, gave tacit and some even quite strong support to the Shah until his downfall was imminent, and then largely — with some exceptions such as Shariatmadari — threw their support behind Khomeini. Khomeini actually stood out among the clerics in being the first to put forward a programme of theocracy, that is, actual rule by clerics. Khomeini spent a great deal of his major written work of the 1960s (Islamic Government) polemicising against the traditional Shiite interpretation of Islam — that a "divine government" was an impossibility until the "hidden Imam" revealed himself back on the earth.]

5. More than once, while in exile and at crucial junctures in the upsurge that built up to the revolution, Khomeini called on the masses to halt the uprising. Is it possible that Khomeini, if he had been able to demonstrate his control over the mass upsurge, was prepared to step into government short of a revolution, if the imperialists had allowed him to based on such a show of strength and control over the masses? This of course has to remain speculation since the actual turn of events did not allow him to put on such a display. Things had gone "too far" and the masses did not heed his suggestions to hold back. After all, immediately after the seizure of power by the Khomeini forces, while many of the forces closest and most loyal to the Pahlavi regime were imprisoned, executed or forced into exile, vigorous efforts were started by the new rulers, led by Khomeini, to save the reactionary state machinery; the royal army was "exonerated," many of its commanders reappointed, its bureaucracy left untouched. Many organs of the government were left untouched. New ministries were set up with representatives of the reactionary classes appointed to head them; generous amnesty was given to ex-SAVAK forces and these criminals were appointed the same tasks in new offices, this time reorganising SAVAK under its new name called SAVAMA. The masses were immediately disarmed ...

6. [Although the UIC sometimes discussed the question of "power" in its publications, seldom did it put forward the question of the

revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. The omission of "dictatorship" went along with making allowances not to "offend" democratic, or possibly Islamic, sensibilities. One either unleashes revolution against existing property and social relations, or else one becomes the inheritors and enforcers of them. History has shown that the proletariat cannot rely on "potential allies" now in the government, no matter how "anti-imperialist" their intentions or how "popular" they might be, to dismantle the reactionary state machinery or somehow "rise above" the reactionary state and social relations that they have become part of to advance the interests of the people. Even genuine representatives of the revolutionary proletariat — as was the case for a while with the PKI in Indonesia — cannot "rise above" the class character of the state apparatus they have "joined," they cannot "share power" with representatives of the comprador and landlord classes, join the reactionary bourgeois state apparatus and try to "strengthen" the "positive aspect" to overcome the "reactionary aspect." This is true even if it is the case that the forces who seize state power are not the ex-comprador landlords, but revolutionary democrats — at times with "Marxist" covering. In keeping the same state apparatus and sitting on top of the same reactionary property and social relations they become the new reactionary classes serving and strengthening the old order, including through annihilation and slaughter of the genuine revolutionaries. Attempts to carry out the above discussed erroneous policy by the genuine representatives of the proletariat are not possible without departing from the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought.

A similar correct approach must be taken towards the "anti-imperialist" fronts. As it is correctly formulated in the *Declaration of the RIM*: "The key to carrying out a new democratic revolution is the independent role of the proletariat and its ability, through its Marxist-Leninist party, to establish its hegemony in the revolutionary struggle. Experience has shown again and again that even when a section of the national bourgeoisie joins the revolutionary movement, it will not and cannot lead a new-democratic revolution, to say nothing of carrying this revolution through to completion. Similarly, history demonstrates the bankruptcy of an 'anti-imperialist front' (or similar 'revolutionary front') which is not led by a Marxist-Leninist party, even when such a front or forces within it adopt a 'Marxist' (actually pseudo-Marxist) colouration. While such revolutionary formations have led heroic struggles and even delivered powerful blows to the imperialists they have been proven to be ideologically and organisationally incapable of resisting imperialist and bourgeois influences. Even where such forces have seized power they have been incapable of carrying through a thorough-going revolutionary transformation of society and end up, sooner or later, being overthrown by the imperialists or themselves becoming a new reactionary ruling power in league with imperialists." □

# THE WEAPON OF CRITICISM

## On the Liberation of Women and the March to Communism

by Y. B. ...

**The Revolution Postponed: Women in Contemporary China**  
Margery Wolf  
(Stanford Univ. Press, 1986)

**Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China**  
Judith Stacey  
(University of California Press, 1983)

**Women in Rural China: Policy towards women before and after the Cultural Revolution**  
Vibeke Hemmel and Pia Sindbjerg  
(Humanities Press: London, 1984)

traditional "patriarchal" development. The third book, by the two Danish authors Hemmel and Sindbjerg, examines the two-line struggle in China from 1959-1976 regarding women. They argue that though there were differences between the revisionist and revolutionary camps, these were not of a fundamental nature, and that there has been exaggerated importance given to the revisionist forces as a factor holding back the progress of women's liberation. They attribute this instead to a basic "ambiguity" in the line of the CCP as a whole.

The book by Wolf, a social anthropologist, is based largely on on-site investigation, including interviews, done in 1980-81 in China. Stacey's work purports to synthesize secondary sources to arrive at a new theoretical understanding of women in China. The two books offer largely congruent interpretations, covering generally the same territory, and differ mainly on their interpretation of the intent of the Chinese revolutionaries. As Wolf explains, "Stacey and I disagree only on the extent to which China's revolutionaries *intended* to model their new society on the patriarchy of the old. Whereas Stacey believes and argues cogently that the CCP used the concepts of patriarchy to win a revolution and transform a society, I would argue, using the same evidence, that the leadership *did* hope to relieve women and young people of the patriarchal burden but were defeated because they did not recognise their own cultural blinders. Despite their good intentions, their patriarchal lenses ruled out alternatives that might have changed China's history and the future of international

"They say I'm a Communist girl and I, dying, know that at least I will not be given to Zhang Jiu\*  
Red and White will ever be divided  
and we shall see who has victory,  
who defeat; the white flowers now  
are fading as our scarlet ones  
burst into eager bloom."

— written by a woman Communist leader on the eve of her execution by the U.S.-backed Kuomintang regime

\* A local Koumintang leader.

The three works reviewed here offer major critiques of the line and practice of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) concerning the liberation of women. Unfortunately, none of them attack the reactionary line being implemented today by the Deng Xiao-ping regime, as it restores capitalism, with all its attendant horrors like rape and even the drowning of baby girls, but instead target the correct line of Mao Tsetung and the experience of building genuine socialism in China. Two of the three books reviewed here, Stacey's and Wolf's, are explicit attempts to correct what Stacey calls the "optimistic interpretations of women's liberation in the People's Republic of China." What they see is not unprecedented advance by women toward liberation under the leadership of Mao and the CCP; instead they level charges of the continual postponement or outright betrayal of women's liberation by the Communists in their pursuit of more

*Chiang Ching, one of the principal leaders of the Cultural Revolution, imprisoned following the reactionary coup d'état.*



feminism." All three sets of authors charge that China's revolutionaries never fundamentally challenged the subordinate position of women or the sexual division of labour.

These three works are part of a larger trend which has arisen in the last few years and which goes against the correct verdict widely established in the 1960s and 1970s among revolutionaries and many others who support the liberation of women that the Chinese Revolution had witnessed an unprecedented turning upside down of women's traditional place in society. Certainly works like those reviewed here existed at the time; but they were to no small extent on the defensive, often sandwiched on bookstore shelves between titles like "Women Hold Up Half the Sky" and others which brought back first-hand accounts of what women were doing in China, and this despite the barrier of lies and silence with which the bourgeoisies of the world tried to surround China. What was happening in China during the Cultural Revolution was unprecedented: a revolutionary headquarters in the party was unleashing mass revolt from below in order to continue the revolution, and in its course the people of China, including the women, were emancipating themselves like no people on earth have ever done before. Former child brides and women whose broken, bound feet testified volumes about women's position in the old society rose up as part of the mass challenge to China's new would-be revisionist emperors, continuing the revolution and leaving no stone unperturbed in the thousands-year old edifice of class society — and this beautiful picture burned itself indelibly into

the minds of millions of the world's exploited and oppressed and also had a big impact on progressive intellectuals, many of whom identify with what is often called the women's liberation movement. It is this legacy, and the lessons of the Chinese masses' world-historic struggle, that these authors turn their backs on and seek to distort and bury beneath a petty pile of vulgar and misused sociological statistics.

Stacey begins by rejecting the analysis of China as feudal or semifeudal and arguing instead that it was a "peasant family economy," whose crisis intersected with international developments to give rise to the revolutionary situation seized on by Mao and the Communists. The latter, she argues, were initially heavily influenced by feminist concern in the urban centres of China, but as they moved to the countryside to organise the People's War, they dropped their "feminism" as they increasingly adapted themselves to the peasants, who were "looking backward to revolution" — by which she means that the peasants were moved principally by desire to restore or "realise" the "Confucian patriarchal family system," not to rupture with it. She attempts to show that throughout the subsequent development of the revolution the Communist Party policies on women were invariably subordinated to the need to mobilise the CCP's main ally in the countryside, the "patriarchal peasants," and that this was reflected in what she calls a patriarchal political line.

Wolf and Stacey spend a large part of their analysis on the Land Reform and the Marriage

Law Reform of the early 1950s; central to the arguments of all three sets of authors is that the CCP failed to do away with the family. They agree that though the position of women in Chinese society improved somewhat, they claim this progress was never meant or allowed to challenge the domination of men and their superior position in the division of labour, especially in the home. Stacey thus argues that, "Far from abolishing the family, the communist revolution in China rescued peasant family life from the precipice of destruction"; "A radical redistribution of patriarchy was the revolutionary essence (of the new democratic patriarchy)." This meant, for Stacey, that, "Chinese patriarchs" had "a new, more democratic basis for their unity — one that future Chinese feminists would find intensely difficult to challenge." Whatever quantitative improvements women made were at the cost of sacrificing the opportunity to achieve "real emancipation" and full equality with men, an opportunity which Stacey considers that the CCP consciously threw away, and which Wolf and the Danish authors believe was lost due to contradictions in the CCP's line.

#### Shortcuts

On a certain level the argument of all three sets of authors is similar and straight-forward: the Chinese revolution didn't lead to very fundamental changes in women's position much less achieve full equality between women and men, therefore this must have been the result of the patriarchal policies of its leaders, intentional or not. This is true even of the Danish authors, though they

are the most supportive of the real progress made by Chinese women. In discussing the Campaign to Criticise Lin Piao and Confucius, an important episode in the Cultural Revolution in 1973-1974 that took up the struggle against women in a major way, they argue, "The campaign's weakness is that it does not tackle the problem; this is clearly evident by the fact that 27 years after the revolution women are still suppressed." For her part, Stacey targets "the inadequacy of socialist theory" and Marxism's "inherent limits in its capacity to theorise the sources of women's oppression." As a direct consequence, "socialism has not liberated women because a socialist mode of production has proven to be compatible with a patriarchal sex-gender system."

What unites all of these arguments is a kind of pragmatic idealism: the CCP *could* have *completely* eliminated women's oppression, it didn't and thus it is patriarchal. This appears to be very radical: seeming impatience with the continued inequality of women is the first line of attack. In fact, in their case it is a smokescreen for avoiding the tumultuous struggle that is the indispensable condition of proletarian revolution and women's liberation.

How could thousands of years of the subordination of women be done away with in a mere 27 years?! Or the elimination of classes, for that matter? If anyone has discovered how to do this, they should let the world know, and now. Unfortunately, not one of our authors allows their readers in on their secret, and so the oppressed are probably doomed to a long wait for such miraculous shortcuts and will, in the meantime, have to resort to more difficult means: mass revolutionary struggle. As we shall see, this is precisely what the authors' line averts; their secret shortcut will prove to be a well-known dead-end.

### Pushing the Family "Over the Precipice"

As noted, a central pillar of the argument of all three is the CCP's policy on the family. Stacey, with her contention that the CCP

"rescued the family from the precipice of destruction," develops this in the most depth. Is there any truth to the picture she paints? In a certain sense — family life undoubtedly was stabilised after Liberation. But what were the revolutionaries supposed to do? Join in with all the oppressive forces that had decimated the ranks of the masses, that had driven them, starving, from one end of China to the other, wrenching families apart; a poverty so grinding, a social order so cruel that husbands even sold off their wives and parents their girl daughters as child brides or, failing this, sometimes drowned them in desperation at their inability to care for or protect them; where hundreds of thousands of women turned to prostitution to survive, and rape by landlords and feudal gangsters was the order of the day. This is what Stacey's "family crisis" looked like in the real world, and damn right the revolution abolished all this, practically immediately too. Is this evidence of "patriarchy" — or of eliminating oppression? In these conditions, Stacey's analysis that the family was "on the precipice of destruction" and so should have been pushed over the edge amounts to a demand to *intensify the ruin caused by the workings of class society*; however much Stacey may want, radical leaps are not shortcuts made by intensifying oppression, they are instead the product of mobilising masses in revolutionary struggle against oppression so that they themselves consciously create and forge new, higher forms of organisation — including by struggle *in their own ranks*.

And real radical leaps were made in China; what the New Democratic Revolution accomplished in China almost immediately was, by the standards of world history, little short of miraculous. The Land Reform turned over land to men *and* women: at the ceremonies organizing this many women heard their names spoken in public for the first times in their lives. The Marriage Law became widely known as the "divorce law" or the "women's law;" nearly a million divorces were carried out in 18 months, an unprecedented event in any feudal

society, as women freed themselves especially from the arranged marriages, including as child brides, that many had been forced into. Go into a feudal village in India or Afghanistan today to try and imagine what kind of controversy *this* stirred up. Landlords, goons, wife-beaters and rapists were hauled into mass public meetings, called "speak bitterness" sessions, where women poured out their rage and organised punishment for the criminals. Prostitution was eliminated almost literally overnight — 60,000 women in Shanghai alone were given training, education, work, and lodging — and rape became virtually unheard of. Female infanticide disappeared. A constitution was adopted that abolished all forms of legal discrimination against women and in doing this went farther than any constitution ever adopted by the big modern bourgeois democracies like England or the U.S. In sum, a society came wrenching forward from a position as one of the most backward on the face of the earth, and leaped decades ahead through the violent means of mass revolution — yet the authors would belittle this as patriarchal!

Mao was always clear that the struggle against the domination of women by men was part and parcel of the New Democratic Revolution: "A man in China is usually subjected to the domination of three systems of authority (political authority, clan authority and religious authority). . . As for women, in addition to being dominated by these three systems of authority, they are also dominated by the men (the authority of the husband). These four authorities — political, clan, religious and masculine — are the embodiment of the whole feudal-patriarchal ideology and system, and are the four thick ropes binding the Chinese people, particularly the peasants." ("Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan") It is worth noting that Mao wrote this not in the city but while doing a great deal of investigation among the peasants, where Stacey pictures him as having capitulated to their backwardness.

So it must be affirmed that the victory of the first stage of the revolution *was* indeed a great step forward for society and for the emancipation of women as well. However, it is also true that exactly because the New Democratic Revolution is still a *bourgeois* revolution, its program, for example, calls for "land to the tiller" and not yet for the collectivisation of agriculture, and this has contradictory implications for the position of women in the new society. Stacey argues that the distribution of the land among the peasants led to strengthening the material basis for the family in Chinese society and, instead of advancing the emancipation of women, transformed the feudal patriarchy into "new democratic patriarchy." Hence her charge that "a radical redistribution of patriarchy was the essence" of the new democratic transformations.

What she is observing, but from a bourgeois feminist viewpoint, is the fact that New Democratic Revolution does not yet do away with capitalism, nor with many of the values and practices associated with it. As Mao put it, new democracy opens the door for capitalism. . . *but* he went on to add, *it opens the door for socialism even wider*. This is the material basis for the struggle between the two roads that took place after liberation in China; Mao fought fiercely *against* those who wanted to "consolidate new democracy" (which meant, in effect, consolidating capitalism) and the institutions associated with it, and he instead led the class struggle forward so as to begin socialist transformation. Yes, land reform could not, in itself, undermine the basis for "patriarchy" — but it did lay the basis for the next, more deep-going stage of the revolution that would begin to do away with capitalism. Stacey, by concentrating attention on this earlier stage, and then more or less simply asserting that "new democratic patriarchy" *was consolidated* and didn't undergo any fundamental change thereafter, denies the more profound changes that took place with the collectivisation of agriculture in the Great Leap Forward, which was

Mao's initial big leap towards socialist transformation, and even more so in the Cultural Revolution. It is *Stacey*, and not Mao who ignores the need to deepen the revolution.

Let us look further at Stacey's analysis of the family and the CCP's attitude towards it, as this question is a sticking point for the authors of all three works. Central to Stacey's argument is an effort to raise the family as the pivotal unit of organisation of the mode of production, or at least co-equal with any other category, specifically class; hence her characterisation of the crisis in China as a "realisation crisis" of the Confucian "family system," and her contention that, "The Chinese Communists never intended to wage a feminist revolution; . . . Believing patriarchy derivative of 'feudal' social structure, regarding gender oppression as a nonantagonistic contradiction, the CCP did not seek to eliminate patriarchs as a class, but merely to eliminate a particular class of patriarchs."

Unfortunately, despite Stacey's repeated charges of the Maoists' "atheoretical" orientation on women's oppression, nowhere in this 300 page book on the "patriarchal socialist revolution" do we find any discussion of what patriarchy is, apart from this reference to patriarchs — which presumably includes all men — "as a class." Yet what on earth does this mean? Stacey apparently considers that by creating a "class of patriarchs," she thus elevates and emphasises the struggle of women. Instead, she degrades it and sets it on the narrow footing which underpins the structure of her book (and similar reasoning heavily influences the other two as well). Men as a group do occupy a "patriarchal" position vis-a-vis women, but they do not constitute a *class*, which is determined by the relationship to the means of production. The implication of Stacey's analysis is that women too constitute a class.

It is beyond the scope of this article to thoroughly explore this question — especially since Stacey herself does not do so — but it is worth stating that her confusion

here obscures the central role of the ownership and control of the means of production (land, factories, communication and transport systems, etc.) and the social surplus product in the division of society into classes. The establishment of the proletarian state and the socialisation of ownership makes a radical rupture with all hitherto existing social formations by placing these in the hands, not of another exploiting minority, but, for the first time ever, of the broad masses themselves. Based on this, the class struggle of the proletariat, including its women fighters, is to carry forward the revolution to eliminate *all* exploitation and oppression — and the oppression of women is certainly a key link in this — and advance, as part of the world revolution, to communism. As Marx put it, socialism is "the *declaration of the permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship* of the proletariat as the necessary transit point to the *abolition of class distinctions generally*, to the abolition of all the relations of production on which they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, to the revolutionising of all the ideas that result from these social relations." (*The Class Struggle in France*) Stacey's revision of classes to make men and women each a class, instead of helping to shed light on the full roots of women's oppression in class society, actually narrows these to the relations between men and women.

First, this view misses the truth that it is class society which breeds and reinforces oppression of all kinds; the oppression of women being a key example. The fact that even the oppressed and exploited men are used by the system to act as its agents in keeping women in their place is a product of and reinforced by the division of society into classes. The elimination of patriarchy will not be a product of the elimination of "patriarchs as a class," as Stacey puts it, but the elimination of class society altogether along with all the social divisions and inequalities which are associated with it. Second, Stacey's revision also belittles the important

place that the oppression of women has in this system, by narrowing its roots, and thus she degrades the importance of the struggle against the oppression of women as part of the overall revolutionary process, and the role of women in that struggle.

It should not be surprising then that, in her lengthy indictment of Mao and the CCP as "patriarchal socialists," Stacey devotes *scarcely a single paragraph* to the events of the Cultural Revolution. When Stacey (and Wolf too) ignore the path-breaking activity of millions of women in the Cultural Revolution as they leapt to the fore of an epoch-making truly mass struggle and challenged tradition in all spheres — not least of all culture and the thousand-years old image of women as inferior, submissive, good for housework and making babies but not for running society — and instead put forward as the decisive question whether after 10 years women got 60% or 70% of men's workpoints, whether they formed 20% or 30% of the number of cadres, and so on and so forth, they are true to their own logic: the logic of reformism and formulating petty demands for women instead of upholding their crucial, qualitative role in the fight to emancipate all mankind.

Stacey's redefinition of class and the raising of the family above and outside of the context of the proletarian revolution, with her conclusion that patriarchy and socialism are quite compatible, degrades the dictatorship of the proletariat and its world-emancipating tasks. It makes socialism something other than the thorough-going revolutionary struggle to tear up all the roots of exploitative class society and all social divisions and inequalities, including between men and women, to advance to communism.

Part of this is the ignoring (Stacey) or the downplaying and distortion (the Danish authors) of how the Cultural Revolution did just that. Its principal battlecry was "It's right to rebel against reactionaries" — and this meant *everything* reactionary, not everything *except* patriarchal tyranny, or everything except women's

inequality (including that women got only 60-70% of men's incomes in the countryside). It is not possible to leave untouched a single link in the chain of exploitation and inequality, whether it be of one nationality over another, of men over women, of intellectuals over manual labourers. It is in this sense that the revolutionaries in China popularised the citation of Marx above concerning the "declaration of the permanence of the revolution" as Marx's "Four Alls," in that the socialist revolution must uproot not just some but *all* of the remnants of exploitative class society. For the logic that turns aside from struggling against any particular division or inequality, that leaves unchallenged the idea that men are better than women or more suited for important tasks, or that puts off tackling women's subordination to men "for later," or postpones mobilising women against their own oppression or thinks that this is just something that concerns women, or however such a refusal is "justified" — all such thinking reinforces the logic that is behind *every other division* in society as well and will thus objectively give support to the bourgeoisie (and, under socialism, to their efforts to reverse revolution and restore capitalism). Is it possible for anyone to actually be a representative of the proletariat — the class which can emancipate itself only by emancipating all mankind — and tolerate or overlook for even one moment the oppression of *any* section of society, much less half of society itself?

No it is not. Furthermore, it is not even possible to make revolution without the active participation of the masses of women; without waging battle against the chains that hold back women's revolutionary energy, even the men proletarians cannot be transformed to fit the necessities of advancing a thorough-going revolution at any stage, whether it be new democratic or proletarian-socialist. It is for these reasons that Mao argued that the advance of the Chinese revolution could be measured by the position of the women in the revolution. Mao is also reported to have stated

## Militia Women

Inscription on a  
photograph

February 1961

How bright and  
brave they look,  
shouldering  
five-foot rifles

On the parade  
ground lit up by the  
first gleams of day.

China's daughters  
have high-aspiring  
minds,

They love their  
battle array, not  
silks and satins.

By Mao Tsetung



*Women guerilla fighters during the national liberation war.*



that, "the next cultural revolution will be made by the women, for the women," and, "as long as there is a single woman in the world who has not been liberated, no one will really be liberated," and "the day when the women all over the country rise up, that will be the day of victory for the Chinese Revolution." (first two quotes from Michelle Loi, *Half the Sky*, the last from *Socialism and Feminism*, by Elisabeth Croll, an earlier, more sympathetic examination of the liberation of women in China). Indeed, it is a profound truth that it has been at those times when the revolution has posed the deepest and most all-around challenge to every shackle in tradition's chain that the fury of women has been unleashed as a mighty force for revolution.

Certainly then the kind of continuing sexual inequality that Stacey, Wolf and the Danish authors all amply document were not unimportant matters, and in fact these links in the chain holding down women also hold down all the oppressed. But socialism is exactly a *transition*. It is not some static utopia achieved by passing a few new laws or even reorganising a particular institution like the family, it is indeed the "declaration of the permanence of the revolution." If these authors had left their critique at simply saying that there was still inequality, that it was still severely marked by patriarchy, that there was still commodity production and elements of private property, and still many barriers to the full liberation of women, including from powerful capitalist-roaders in the top ranks of the CCP itself, and hence the Chinese Revolution had a long path yet to travel, there could be no disagreement. As Mao himself put it, "Our country practices a commodity system, the wage system is unequal too, as in the eight-grade wage scale, and so forth. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat such things can only be restricted. Therefore, if people like Lin Piao come to power it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system." (In *Marx, Engels and Lenin on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, 1972) Mao was fully

aware that socialist revolution was a long protracted battle.

But there *was* a fundamental change. The proletariat, led by its communist party, had seized power, and ownership had been socialised; based on this, the masses were being led to restrict the inequalities and break down the divisions in society, through continuing the revolution. And as for the masses of women, including China's hundreds of millions of peasant women, they too went further along the road of challenging every link in this chain of oppression, breaking down the centuries-old divisions in society, than has ever been done before.

### The Cultural Revolution

Where else have women stormed out of their jobs and homes to struggle over the direction of the entire society in the way they did in China in the Cultural Revolution? Under the battlecry "Women hold up half the sky" — never mentioned in Wolf's or Stacey's book — millions of Chinese women took part in the Red Guards, in "iron women's detachments" of workers and peasants, to study philosophy, political economy, and debate and struggle out everything from the organisation of the family to matters of science, philosophy, and art — and above all to defeat those capitalist-roaders high up in the CCP seeking to halt the further advance of the revolution and seize power back from the masses. Tradition was challenged everywhere; contrary to the popular Confucian proverb that said that "chicken feathers don't fly up to heaven," the masses of women stormed heaven, as they burst into every sphere of society, however male-dominated. There could be seen everything from hydroelectric dams run exclusively by teams of women to illiterate peasant women relying mainly on their own efforts to set up factories to produce transistors, motors, etc., in far-flung villages; not a few learned to read by studying a combination of complex electronic diagrams and the Quotations of Mao Tsetung (the "Little Red Book"). Millions of young women Red Guards left the comfortable life of the cities to come to live in the countryside, to spread the

revolution to their sisters and brothers among the peasants, their first duty being to aid the peasants to study the laws of class struggle in socialist society. Commenting on such new things, Mao remarked that China then seemed to be part of another universe, one where the women — who previously seemed to have only the duty of producing infants — undertook "strange things," "unthinkable tasks."

Was male supremacism perhaps the one icon to be left standing, protected by the "patriarchal" line of the CCP? Hardly — look, for example, at the revolutionary works produced during the Cultural Revolution: *Red Detachment of Women*, *The White-Haired Girl*, the Chinese-style opera *On the Docks*, and more, where women are portrayed as revolutionary leaders, including of the armed struggle. The portrayal of these revolutionary heroines was hardly fortuitous. It reflected that the struggle against women's subordination was taken up in *all* spheres of society, including art, and it showed the importance the revolutionaries attached to transforming people's thinking on this question. One observer, Nancy Milton, commented at the time, "It is difficult for a male supremacist in China today to go to the theatre or even to watch TV without being bombarded with stories of heroic women." And these weren't, just to make things very clear, Soviet revisionist-style "model production workers," but women who were engaged in the battle over the destiny of China and the world revolution.

Yes, despite the heroic efforts of the Chinese masses, including the women, as Mao pointed out in many ways things did not change and many inequalities remained. But the seizure of political power by the masses, led by the proletariat and its Marxist-Leninist vanguard, was a qualitative transformation that set China out on an entirely new and different trajectory. This is what is distorted and ultimately denied by the sociological method of the three sets of authors; they look at the narrow "facts" that inequality and divisions still existed in China and were not on the verge of being eliminated to obscure the

undeniable fact that they *were* being progressively dug up, which was part of and reflected the proletariat's advance in the on-going class struggle under socialism.

This outlook shows itself, for instance, in the books' treatment of some of the concrete advances actually made in the course of the Cultural Revolution. One of these measures was the organisation of "iron girls" detachments, shock troops composed entirely of women who undertook collective tasks to go all-out in socialist construction and demonstrate in practice the capacities of women (including for the purpose of breaking through smug attitudes of male superiority and to spur *everyone* on to new heights). For example, peasant women mobilised for large-scale cooperative projects like the Red Flag Canal, where they were 90,000 out of the 250,000 workers. Another one of these measures involved the alteration of the system for determining how peasants were paid for work on the collective farms. The peasants were allotted work-points based on hours put in and actual output; women generally got 60-70% of men's work-points (in the 1960s). During the Cultural Revolution, a new factor was added: one's collective thinking and attitude towards the community at large. Meetings were held at which the peasants did self-assessment: a strong young peasant man might stand up and say that, though he actually had a greater output than female comrade X, he had noticed that during her break she had brought water to the team or helped a less experienced member master some new technique, and so he thought her points should be raised. This observably and concretely lowered the importance of sheer physical strength in the determination of work-points, and thus lessened inequality, including of women.

The Danish authors look briefly at such things, observe that they were not the dominant practice, and conclude that, "these tendencies do not alter the fact that most women are still tied to their families and their family duties." These people are like horses with blinders on, who



*During the Cultural Revolution.*



only see what is immediately before their nose and not what's new, arising, fighting for birth in combat against the old world — and those blinders are their narrow vulgar materialist conception, which has nothing in common with the dialectical materialism of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought.

Is it any wonder that sharing this general perspective and methodology, neither Stacey nor Wolf believes that the 1976 reactionary coup d'état which has placed Deng and Co. in power will have any major implication for women (the Danish women offer no comment). Both consider this as simply another "rightward turn" in an already thoroughly compromised history. Yet take one example of the new rulers' outlook, cited by Wolf: *China Youth News* printed that, "if female infanticide continues, in 20 years this will cause a social problem — not enough women so that men will have wives." The problem for these revisionist pigs is not increasing female infanticide, but that in 20 years *men* might not have enough wives! This shocking outlook reflects the rule of the new bourgeoisie, with its battlecry "To get rich is glorious," which is expanding divisions everywhere, between town and country, between mental and manual labour, and between the workers and the peasants, and strengthening the domination of men over women. China now belongs to the bourgeoisie. This is no mere "rightward turn," but a *complete reversal* which, though it might not restore every single form of women's oppression from old Confucian patriarchal China, has already started and will certainly continue to revive every bit of its horror-filled content for the oppressed, including women.

Nor do any of the authors have anything to say about Chiang Ching and the heroic battle she led to carry the revolution forward, nor about how she has been vilified and attacked by the revisionists in all kinds of misogynist ways, including for wanting to establish a "petticoat kingdom." Chiang Ching personally led many of the transformations in literature and art that were so critical in the Cultural Revolution,

and even more importantly was a political leader of the proletariat in the overall battle. Today she is one of the two main political prisoners in China, along with Chang Chun-chiao, and she has maintained her uncompromising revolutionary stand. Two roads were posed in China — yet the authors, bereft of any real class analysis, are unable to distinguish between them.

#### The Declaration of the Permanence of Subordination

That all of the authors choose to ignore (and actually cover over) the challenge of the political and ideological activity of women in the Cultural Revolution — and it is on this that the good majority of the "optimistic feminist interpretations of women's liberation in the PRC" (which the authors hope to disprove) were based — in part seeks to use the ignorance of readers perhaps too young to be familiar with these events. But, again, there is something more hidden here: an attempt to direct women's eyes down to the level of the family and the economic sphere, and away from things which have never been "women's affairs," the broader issues of society and the world and of course revolution and state power. Stacey tries to support this theoretically by arguing that a cardinal error of the CCP was to have treated the woman question — and specifically the family — too much in the realm of the superstructure, especially as an ideological matter, and not enough in the realm of the economic base. (One can also assume that she considers this further justification for ignoring the superstructure and political power, and specifically the Cultural Revolution.) Further, Stacey argues that the CCP had a metaphysical line on the family, that they treated it as an institution which would and should exist forever, and so as a sacred sphere. She offers a quote, which she says exemplifies "the historically predominant CCP approach to family life," that the family "will never be eliminated" because its existence "is dictated not only by physiological differences of sexes but also by the perpetuation of the race," and that this holds true even under communism. She

follows this with data on the strength of the family in the 1950s, and on women's traditional role within it. Thus her conclusion: the CCP "never wanted a feminist revolution" and so, far from revolutionising the family and doing away with it as part of emancipating women, has even fortified it and consequently undermined the possibility for liberating women.

#### The Family — Base and Superstructure

Stacey's first charge — that the CCP "believed family reform to be 'superstructural'" and "failed to recognise that family reform revised both the base and the superstructure" — is one of the more interesting theoretical questions she poses. Yet though she puts "superstructural" in quotes, though her book is heavily referenced and although this charge is a key plank in her critique and is made several times, Stacey does not give any reference whatsoever for this charge . . . and, unfortunately for Stacey, it does *not* appear to represent the line of the CCP, certainly not of the revolutionary headquarters led by Mao, nor of Marxism-Leninism in general. An article which appeared in *Hongqi*, the theoretical journal of the CCP Central Committee, in 1960 argued, "The family appeared with the birth of private ownership. From the start, it had blood relationship as its natural basis and private property as its economic basis; thus it was an economic unit of society." (reprinted in *The Women's Movement in China*, a valuable collection of original documents concerning the liberation of women in China, gathered by Elisabeth Croll). The article goes on to cite Marx, "The modern family contains in embryo not only slavery (*servitus*) but serfdom also, since from the very beginning it is connected with agricultural services. It contains within itself in *miniature* all the antagonisms which later develop on a wide scale within society and its state." (cited by Engels in *On the Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*) This approach hardly treats the family as simply a superstructural phenomena, as Stacey charges.

It is ironic that while Stacey con-



*Peasants during the Cultural Revolution, holding Quotations of Chairman Mao Tsetung. Collectivisation of agriculture helped lay the basis for the liberation of women.*

siders that a cardinal problem of the CCP was its treatment of the family as an ideological phenomenon, Wolf considers that the CCP didn't pay *enough* ideological attention to the family: "Social planners in China, alas, have ignored the fact that patriarchal thinking, the ideology of the men's family system, pervades every aspect of Chinese society and continues to inhibit women's full participation in political as well as economic life. Although there were brief spurts of ideological retraining in 1953 during the Marriage Law campaign, and again in 1974-75 during the Anti-Confucius campaign, the restructuring of the Chinese family has been left to the natural erosion expected to result from other societal changes. Of more concern to the CCP was the destruction of the power of the lineages and of the landlord class

controlling that power. The ideological basis of male supremacy on which the power rested has largely been ignored, or at least discounted as of no further threat to the state."

This from an author who systematically ignores the political and ideological battles of the Cultural Revolution and all questions of political power and has nothing to say about the portrayal of women revolutionary fighters in the sphere of culture. The line of the CCP is concisely expressed in an editorial in June 1958 by *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), which, summing up the experience of the Great Leap Forward, when millions of women were mobilised into production and political activity, observed, "Numerous facts gleaned from the Great Leap Forward have proved that only by enabling women to obtain their ideological emancipation

will it be possible for them to develop their infinite source of power." Furthermore, it was stressed that women themselves must play a vital role in the struggle on the ideological front, so that, as articles at the time put it, never again would men be in a position to monopolise and manipulate their knowledge to the disadvantage of women. This included building up contingents of women theorists, and here too all-women teams were formed. "To strike iron," they said, "we must first have a strong body."

In fact, there is reason to suspect that it is Wolf, not the CCP, who looks down on ideological struggle; she comments, for instance, that, "When young women glibly answered my questions with political slogans and spoke scornfully of their parents' feudal ideas, I had to fight back my impatience with their

shallow understanding. . . .” What’s so bad about scorning feudal ideology?! Maybe Wolf’s real problem is not that there wasn’t enough ideological struggle, but *what kind of ideology* the struggle was against — Wolf’s own ideology is so “compassionate” and “understanding” of feudalism that she even comes up with the observation that, “There are good things to be said for arranged marriages”!

In sum, Wolf agrees with Stacey on their basic argument, yet one thinks the CCP’s error was treating the family too much as an ideological question, the other too little. The one thing that is clear here is that both lack an understanding of the political process of revolution and the dialectic between transforming the base and the superstructure, and the particular position of the family in this process.

The basic role and structure of the family in China did not depend on the will of the CCP or even of any group or class, but on the fact that it corresponded to the overall level of development of the socialist society in China. With the vast majority of people engaged in agriculture, generally non-mechanised, and with collective ownership and a rather low-level cooperative organisation of the peasants in production, the family still served to carry on certain social functions, and this would continue to hold true for some time under socialism. Furthermore, additional transformation of the role and structure of the family was bound up with the transformation of the production relations in general.

But none of this meant that the family was some sacred, untouchable institution which the CCP sought to strengthen, as Stacey implies. In fact, the statement she cites as typifying the “predominant approach of the CCP to family life” isn’t typical at all. It actually comes from a *provincial newspaper* that came out in 1959. True, one could probably find other such quotes, but what Stacey, who is ever eager to disparage the Marxist-Leninists’ lack of theoretical understanding of the family, never does cite is the stand of any of the great Marxist-Leninist leaders on this subject. Ma-

jour CCP articles quoted, for example, Engels’ statement that, “Participation in social labor by all women is a prerequisite to their emancipation. To attain that aim, it will be necessary to eliminate the family as an economic unit of the society.” More instructive still is Mao’s summation: “Under socialism private property still exists, the small group still exists, the family still exists. The family, which emerged in the last period of primitive communism, will in future be abolished. It had a beginning and will come to an end. . . . Historically, the family was a production unit, a consumption unit, a unit for the procreation of the labour force of the next generation, and a unit for the education of children. Nowadays the workers do not regard the family as a unit of production; the peasants in the cooperatives have also largely changed, and peasant families are generally not units of production. They only engage in a certain amount of subsidiary production. As for the families of government workers and members of the armed forces, they produce even less; they have become merely units of consumption, and units for rearing and bringing up labour reserves, while the chief unit of education is the school. In short, the family may in future become something which is unfavourable to the development of production. Under the present system of distribution of ‘to each according to his work,’ the family is still of use. When we reach the stage of the communist relationship of distribution of ‘to each according to his need,’ many of our concepts will change. After maybe a few thousand years, or at the very least several hundred years, the family will disappear. Many of our comrades do not dare to think about these things. They are very narrow-minded. But problems such as the disappearance of classes and parties have already been discussed in the classics. This shows that the approach of Marx and Lenin was lofty, while ours is low.” (“Talks at Chengtu: Against Blind Faith in Learning,” March 1958, from *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, ed Stuart Schram) Why is it not true

that it is such positions, and not those of some provincial paper, that characterised the line of the CCP — after all, Mao was its Chairman!

Moreover, doesn’t Mao’s remark accurately assess the actual transformations the Chinese Revolution did make in the family? In the cities, private property and inheritance were abolished; children spent large amounts of time in public nurseries and schools, which was unheard of in old China, especially, of course, for workers’ and peasants’ children — not a few children went in Monday morning and came out Saturday afternoons to spend the weekend with parents; divorce was far easier. These and other changes meant that, as Mao pointed out, the family was transformed and was more restricted as a unit for raising labour power and educating children than it had been.

Even in the far more backward countryside, there were dramatic changes, based on the collectivisation of agriculture. This mainly eliminated small-scale private farming and inheritance, which had been one pillar of the old patriarchal family system. Production was now carried out by teams, which, though sometimes influenced by family ties, also went beyond them to a great extent, and later larger units, known as production brigades, took on a more critical role in the production process. Women were mobilised into production on a great scale, mainly into agricultural labour, but including often in small factories designed to help the collectives become self-reliant, into political activity, and into the militias, where high-school girls learned military skills as part of the policy of training a vast guerrilla force to defend revolutionary China. All this meant that the family no longer had the same strength or configuration as in feudal China.

Nonetheless, the more backward objective and subjective conditions made it impossible to introduce as thorough a transformation as in the cities. For instance, parents still preferred male offspring, and favoured their education and advancement, child-care was less available, women tended to be more tied to the home. This reflected not

only the greater strength of feudal ideology but also that, as the revolutionary headquarters in the CCP (the bourgeoisie calls them the "Gang of Four") pointed out, the collective ownership in the countryside represented a lower form of ownership than did state ownership (which had to do with the level of the productive forces), and so weighed more heavily on the revolutionaries' efforts to narrow differences. In a number of villages, there was still not even running water, sewers, electricity, phones, etc. and traditional structures of the organisation of production, like the family, were strong. In some villages parents even pulled children — more frequently, girls — out of school at 10-years-old to care for younger children. But here too the CCP mobilised to counter the pull of tradition, including by encouraging fewer children, later marriages, and even "part-time" schools where children brought their baby brothers and sisters along with them into the classroom.

Furthermore, Mao and the revolutionaries recognised that the persistence of tradition's force made more urgent than ever the waging of ideological struggle for the liberation of women. Contrary to Wolf's assertion that little ideological struggle was carried out, the family was dealt with in a way never seen in history. Recognising its persistence as a social unit, the revolutionary headquarters determined to treat it as a *political unit* too. This meant, for instance, that young Red Guards went literally right into the homes to organise family study groups, including on the roots of women's oppression and her subjugation to the man, on Mao's instruction that "anything men comrades can do women comrades can do too," using examples from the class struggle such as how women played leading roles in certain peasant revolts in China's history.

An Italian visitor to China in the early 1970s, M.A Macchiocci, at the time a member of the revisionist Italian Communist Party, recounts how she was told by one woman cadre: "There must also be a revolution in the families: we must

penetrate there with revolutionary criticism aimed at destroying the five old conceptions and giving rise to the five new ones — we must destroy the thesis of the uselessness of women and ensure the triumph of the thesis that women must courageously conquer half the sky; we must destroy the feudal ideals of a submissive woman and a good housewife and implant in their place the ideal of revolutionary proletarian women; we must destroy the mentality of dependence on and subordination to men, and reinforce an iron determination to fight for liberation; we must destroy bourgeois ideas and implant proletarian ideas; we must destroy the ideal of narrow family interests so as to create in the family an openness to the whole nation and the whole world." (*Dala Cina*, 1971) Macchiocci notes that these five theses were often cited in the Chinese press.

Where, it must be asked, have such politics been taken up right in the hearths of the masses themselves? Or is this just another example of that "shallow understanding" exhibited by the young women who "glibly" "scorned their parents feudal ideology" which so enraged the erudite sophisticated Dr. Wolf? This advanced political understanding as well as the many changes wrought in the organisation of the family and the role of women within society were possible exactly because the proletariat held political power. Wielding such power, the masses could carry out and defend changes in the organisation of society which can only remain pipe-dreams under the rule of the bourgeoisie.

The particular ways this power was wielded in dealing with the family was based on the fact that on the one hand the family corresponded to the level of development in China at that time, yet on the other hand, politically and ideologically it often played a conservative role so that its social role had to be restricted and transformed as part of the advance towards communism. In particular, within the family the man generally plays the role of the agent of the old order, the guardian of its morals, values,

and outlook, so that for the woman and children it is, as one article by the CCP put it, "a small prison."

From one side, the CCP made great efforts to liberate women from the narrow confines of the home. In addition to state efforts of enterprises and communes to socialise domestic work through canteens, childcare centres, etc., they encouraged the local initiative of the masses in such matters.

From the other side, the CCP carried on intense political and ideological education in order to counter-act the conservative influence of the family in society, and as part of this to get men to share in the housework at home. An article in *Hongqi* discussed this on the eve of the anti-Lin Biao anti-Confucius campaign: ". . . due to the influence of the idea of the exploiting classes of looking down upon women and the restrictions of the material conditions, the question of household chores has not been completely solved. To solve this question, it is most essential to criticise the feudal thinking of looking down upon women . . . and to solve contradictions between revolutionary work and family work. It is necessary to promote the practice that men and women must share household chores. At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to the specific characteristics of women and help them solve specific problems. Late marriage and planned parenthood should be promoted. It is essential to do a good job in running social public welfare facilities, such as health, insurance for women and children, and nurseries." (cited in *Socialism and Feminism*, Croll)

The Danish authors argue that one of the principal manifestations of the CCP's failings on the family was that it never paid women for the unpaid labour they performed in the home. This misses the more important point about housework stated emphatically by Lenin: ". . . woman continues to be a *domestic slave*, because *petty housework* crushes, strangles, stultifies and degrades her, chains her to the kitchen and to the nursery, and wastes her labour on barbarously unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stultifying and

crushing drudgery. The real *emancipation of women*, real communism, will begin only when a mass struggle (led by the proletariat which is in power) is started against this petty domestic economy, or rather when it is *transformed on a mass scale* into large-scale socialist economy." ("Women and Society") Making paying women for staying in the home a central point of policy was more than just a pious pipe-dream in a still backward, largely agricultural country, it also would counteract the task of the proletariat to *liberate* women from this "small prison," to free her from its political and ideological bars so as to play the full role which is required for her own emancipation together with that of all mankind.

#### The "Automatic" Line

Wolf and Stacey also both critique the CCP for holding an "automatic" line: that bringing women into production would "automatically" lead to women's liberation, a view which would serve to justify ignoring the overall struggle for liberation and equality. And no revolutionary would want to challenge all the quotes they found saying such things, for there were powerful forces in the CCP who promoted such revisionist lines, and even held sway in the party, for instance, during much of the 1950s, and this is also a line which has had influence in the international communist movement historically. But once again Stacey and Wolf try to "disappear" Mao and the revolutionary headquarters in the CCP who fought this thinking tooth-and-nail and mobilised the masses in the Great Leap Forward and especially the Cultural Revolution to defeat exactly this kind of "production first" line and the revisionist headquarters behind it.

As one Chinese woman wrote, "Touched by the poison of Liu Shao-chi, according to whom 'women are backwards', some women are still in a situation which leads them to go out and cultivate the land and then to come back home to prepare the meals and, during meetings, to rest seated in a corner without saying a word. Party

committees have organised meetings of the women for recalling the past with them, the fierce exploitation under the old society, so as to reinforce their understanding of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This has evoked strong class sentiments among large masses of women, who have profoundly understood that the cruel past came from the fact that they didn't have power, and that all their happiness stems from the fact that today they can wield power."

It was exactly against the "production first" line of Liu Shao-chi that Mao declared, "Of course it was necessary to give women legal equality to begin with. But from there everything remains to be done. The thought, culture and customs which brought China to where we found it must disappear, and the thought, customs and culture of proletarian China, which does not yet exist, must appear. The Chinese woman does not yet exist either, among the masses; but she is beginning to want to exist. And then to liberate women is not to manufacture washing machines. . . ." (Mao to André Malraux)

This spirit is captured in the stories of visitors returning from China of peasant women who talked of "raising pigs for the world revolution," or of saving grain to support the Vietnamese national liberation war, and so on. It is unfortunate that, swamped in a wrong world outlook, all of the authors treat such women as if they were dupes of the CCP, deceived into working for nothing instead of demanding equal pay! Far better that they should have been proud of their sisters working not for the betterment of their own narrow family interests as women have been taught to do for centuries, but for the cause of emancipating humanity from all class exploitation and oppression.

#### Women Organising Women: Neighbourhood Factories

In the Great Leap Forward, Mao called on the masses of women who were still in the homes to break out and seize the initiative to make a contribution to socialism and the world revolution. One widespread

initiative taken by women was forming side-line enterprises: backyard steel plants, coops, neighbourhood factories that complemented large state factories by providing them material inputs, accessories, etc. Stacey and the Danish authors look at these and decide that the women weren't very well paid and didn't have as good social welfare as others, that the factories weren't very viable, *and that the government didn't give them much help(!)*, so they really weren't very progressive undertakings at all. This is all in the context of Stacey's and Wolf's summation that the Great Leap Forward was simply an effort to expand production, and as Wolf says, that "it was the PRC's first unmitigated economic disaster."

What were these factories all about in the first place? The Italian writer, Macchiocchi, described a visit to one of them in the early 1970s. The women were generally in their late 30s, the majority of them had been housewives all their lives, most were illiterate; in response to the CCP's call in the Great Leap Forward they mobilised to set up a shoe-string operation which produced wooden boxes, and then later, in the Cultural Revolution, went on to tackle making transistors. The women in fact did get some help from the government — bank loans, plus a technical advisor for several years — but were largely self-sufficient. They determined their own economic arrangements, including contracts and salaries.

Was this revolutionary? Liu Shao-chi, the revisionist capitalist-roader overthrown in the Cultural Revolution, opposed these enterprises, for mainly the same reasons as Stacey(!): he argued that they were marginal enterprises, and that from a narrow economic point of view they just weren't worthwhile. Mao vigorously countered him. Such enterprises unleashed the enthusiasm of these women to help build socialism, they helped establish self-reliance in the local areas, since they often provided parts needed by larger local factories, and so contributed to balanced development of the Chinese economy. In the mid-1970s in Shanghai alone one-third of a

million women worked in these types of factories, and in Peking they produced 11% of the total output of industry. But perhaps most importantly this activity brought the women out of their isolation in the homes, taught them cooperative labor and proletarian habits, strengthened their position in society (including vis-a-vis their husbands!) and, whether or not there were short-term economic shortcomings, prepared the women for flying even higher in the battles which were yet to come.

### Class Struggle in the Women's Movement: Choosing Sides

A major source for Stacey's quotes purportedly revealing the sexism of the CCP is the Women's Federation. Yet when it is dissolved in the Cultural Revolution, she is outraged: "When the Communists sought to disturb this isolation (of the women) by organising women's associations, they proceeded cautiously and placed the women's organisations under the authority of the male-controlled peasant associations. This pattern was exaggerated in the PRC, where the National Women's Federation was to survive at the pleasure of the male-controlled socialist state." "The development of a centralised single-party state in the PRC consolidated the formal subordination of the women's movement to the administrative structures and political priorities of its male-dominated polity. As we have seen, even the subordinate Women's Federation was entirely suspended when it fell out of favour in the Cultural Revolution."

Stacey is determined to defend the Women's Federation simply because it is the organisation of women *and covers over the fact* that its central staff was promoting the capitalist-restoration line of Liu Shao-chi which widened the divisions and inequalities in society, and pushed a very backward approach to the woman question. For years the Women's Federation magazine, *Zhongguo Funu*, had been publishing such articles as "A Good Material Life is Happiness," "What Do Women Live For?" and "Whom to Love?" In 1964 *Hongqi*

initiated criticism of their line: "Bringing up the question of 'What Do Women Live For' amounts to saying that women, because of their sex and not because of their class, can have their own specific view on life and world outlook." Specifically, the assumption of *Zhongguo Funu* is that what revolutionary women live for is different from what revolutionary men live for, and it should be no surprise that what this meant first of all was their husbands and children. This criticism deepened with the launching of the Cultural Revolution, when especially young female Red Guards lashed the Women's Federation leadership: "Displaying the signboard of solving so-called personal problems of women, *Zhongguo Funu* published revisionism and tried to make the women's class viewpoint blurred and lead the women to show no concern over major state affairs but merely to show concern over the life of their individual families and go after so-called happiness of husbands and children. It tried to dissolve the women's revolutionary fighting spirit and make a breach in China for the comeback of capitalism. . . the individual and the personal."

Stacey does not counter such Red Guard women, nor even mention them — nor do the other authors. Presumably they were victims of the manoeuvring of the "male-dominated polity."

### Equal Pay for Equal Work

All three authors put continuing economic inequality alongside the persistence of the family as principal proofs of the patriarchal character of the CCP's line. In fact the Chinese made great, even unprecedented progress in narrowing sexual inequality as part of the struggle for continuing the revolution (and restricting what they called "bourgeois right"). But even here this was not treated by the Chinese revolutionaries as a victory mainly because of narrow economic reasoning. They had a more far-sighted perspective: "The realizing of equal pay for equal work for men and women is a step towards heightening the political position of women.

When the great masses of women are liberated from the small prison of family life and work and study together with the men, then their class-consciousness and consciousness of the two-line struggle is incessantly heightened." (emphasis added) (*Hongqi*, 1972)

But they *did* narrow these differences too, and this was a crucial task. Let us accept the figures generally agreed on by the three books: that women made roughly 50% of men's workpoints in the 1950s, roughly 60-70% following the Great Leap Forward in the 1960s. This means that in a country where a generation earlier it was customary for women's feet to be bound, where most rural women never had any income of their own, women progressed in two decades *to achieve a higher percentage of men's income than in such modern wealthy bourgeois democracies as England or the U.S.* (where the figure is about 57% and *not* growing — unlike it was in revolutionary China). Furthermore, the figures are even more favourable to women in the cities, and most favourable of all for the younger generation. All this is belittled by Stacey, who objects, "but China is ideologically committed to sexual equality, and the United States is not." And this is a *historian* talking!

Such ahistoricism is breathtaking: to the extent that what these authors repeatedly object to is simply that the CCP didn't eliminate the family, income inequality, patriarchal thinking, etc. in two decades, then one is tempted to dismiss this as simply academic cynicism. In fact, their reasoning forms part of a worse disease: imperialist feminism. This is manifested repeatedly: in, for example, the Danish authors' dismissal of the value of Chinese childcare centres because their personnel are less qualified than those in Denmark(!), or in Wolf's observation that, though there are some childcare centres in the countryside their real value is questionable because "by American standards they are overcrowded." And just how available are childcare centres in the American *countryside*, which is, after all, what we're talking about here in China?! Or how about the

South Bronx ghetto?! What does one make of the statistic that in the mid-1970s in the cities, 50% of the 1-3 year old children of Chinese working women attend child care centres, or 80% of 3-5 year olds? Let us compare *that* with India or some country which was near China's level of economic development. (It might even compare favourably with the U.S. — but in doing so it would have to be kept in mind that advances in socialising household tasks in China were made on the path of eliminating divisions and inequality and the subordination of women, while such "social services" in the U.S. rest on the U.S.' plunder of the oppressed nations and come at the cost of the devastation and oppression of many millions.) That these kinds of objections enter print in discussing the gigantic strides made in liberating women in China is proof of the power of imperialist chauvinism in shackling the minds of some editors and authors.

Stacey follows this "imperialist feminist" logic to its conclusion: she argues that peasant societies "provide a weak basis for the development of an autonomous feminist movement that is strong enough to play an independent role in the revolutionary process." And: "China's socialist revolution. . . by successfully resolving the prerevolutionary family crisis, may have curtailed the future development of an indigenous feminist ideology and movement. . . . Patriarchy and socialism coexist in China due to the success of a patriarchal family revolution. . . . This suggests that socialist modernisation, like capitalist modernisation, is compatible with patriarchy. . . . Patriarchy may even be more compatible with socialist than with capitalist development processes." "While capitalism has not liberated women, many capitalist societies have been able to provide richer soil for the growth of feminist consciousness and an independent feminist movement."

Having belittled every step forward the masses of women took in rural China, Stacey now concludes that, really, there is not much hope for these backwards peoples, that the real prospects are in the imperialist countries. Isn't it evident

that what Stacey is interested in is not at all the liberation of all the oppressed and exploited, and not really even the masses of women — who after all are still mostly peasants in today's world — but a *bourgeois* women's movement? It is for *this* kind of women's movement that the imperialist citadels offer the best soil — whereas the strides made in unleashing the hundreds of millions of China's women, the steps they took towards emancipation and the lessons learned in the course of the unprecedented debates and struggles over how to accomplish this — the struggle of these poor backwards step-sisters of Stacey's bourgeois women's movement is pooh-poohed and even attacked as just new forms of patriarchy. To rest complacent with Stacey's conclusion that the cause of women's liberation is essentially hopeless in peasant societies stamps her feminist theory with a hideous imperialist chauvinism which does not aid the masses of women anywhere.

"I prefer imperialism, thank you," she says, in essence — at a time when the contradictions of imperialism are rapidly intensifying, thereby heightening the dangers and opportunities for revolutionary struggle as well. Today, what women do determines more than ever whether the revolts of the oppressed and exploited will be able to push ahead towards a whole new epoch of human history. In this critical situation, when the bourgeoisie themselves are doing their utmost to reinforce the barriers holding women in their place, Stacey has chosen to shoot her arrows at the proletariat and its struggle to do away with all oppression, and encourages women to look instead to the "preferable" soil of imperialism — a society in which, in the U.S. for instance, one out of every four women will be the victim of a sexual attack in her lifetime. That she prefers this soil to that of socialist revolution should make apparent that hers is not a programme for the liberation of any women, anywhere, anytime. □




# Ode to the Plum Blossom

— to the tune of *Pu Suan Tzu*  
December 1961

by Mao Tsetung

Wind and rain escorted Spring's departure,  
Flying snow welcomes Spring's return.  
On the ice-clad rock rising high and sheer  
A flower blooms sweet and fair.

Sweet and fair, she craves not Spring for herself alone,  
To be the harbinger of Spring she is content.  
When the mountain flowers are in full bloom  
She will smile mingling in their midst.



## Philippines

(Continued from page 39).

from 15 Feb 1986, was made *before* Ramos and Enrile's manoeuvre.

Far from these puppet generals' act really "shocking the U.S.," it is much more the case that *the CPP's tendency to reduce the target to Marcos blinded you to the larger manoeuvring by U.S. imperialism and its key agents in achieving the transition.* This led to the incongruous situation where the CPP was trying to target Enrile and Ramos as leading elements in the "fascist structures still to be dismantled," but at the same time the NDF was obscuring their real nature as imperialist puppets by trying to somehow uphold their revolt and claim that it had nothing whatsoever to do with the U.S. Is it any wonder that many of the masses were left confused and disoriented, and thus all the more susceptible to Aquino's efforts to sweep these fascists' bloody crimes under the rug as she and the U.S. worked to smooth over differences and stabilise a new ruling coalition?

Furthermore, your assessment that the elections were simply an exercise by Marcos to legitimise himself, your focus on the corruption and manipulation Marcos used to rig the elections, and your subsequent conclusion that he was bound to win, amounted to a bourgeois democratic critique of the elections, as if the *problem* were that they were not being held under fair or just conditions and that the bourgeois opposition consequently did not have a real chance of winning, a theme which you repeated over and over in your election agitation.

Because of all this, the CPP was not prepared to deal with the manoeuvrings of U.S. imperialism, which resulted in a significant number of middle forces, some of whom had been influenced by the CPP, to be drawn into the electoral path and brought under the sway of pro-U.S. reactionaries. As the election approached, even many members of the CPP, including some in leadership, began to go with the tide and advocate participation in the polls.

The CPP, in its "self-criticism"

and elsewhere, has also criticised the boycott policy for its passivity; but what it means by "passivity" is that the party failed to join up with the Aquino forces and the electoral tide and sat out the snap election. Such activity would have been no better, to say the least, than the passivity manifested by the party around the election.

What the election offensive cried out for was a bold revolutionary response: exposing the manoeuvring of *all* the bourgeois forces, conducting revolutionary Marxist education on the nature of the state and the elections as part of that, and the launching of revolutionary offensives in the countryside to strengthen and highlight the only real alternative to the reactionary imperialist-dominated state power: the new embryonic state power of the masses themselves, based on their armed struggle. Especially in the cities the CPP needed to go against the petit bourgeois prejudices that were being swept up into a big tide by the imperialist programme as represented by Aquino. And there *was* a basis to do this. The CPP itself noted that the peasants were hardly drawn onto the Aquino bandwagon, and certainly there was unprecedented in-fighting in the ruling classes' own ranks. Yet the CPP failed to seize on this or to make efforts to step up the military struggle or to meet the political offensive in general.

It is sometimes the case that, for many reasons, including the narrow base of support for the ruling classes in the oppressed countries, sections of them come into sharp conflict with the dominant ruling cliques and the dominant imperialist power(s). But, especially in the context of imperialism's deep worldwide crisis, things can change very rapidly and such forces can be swiftly brought onto the seats of power (as was Aquino, who never really opposed U.S. imperialism at all). This requires that even when such forces are not yet in power the proletarian vanguard must prepare the masses to understand their class character so that they are not disoriented by any changes in the form of rule which might accompany the rise of these opposition

forces to power. The proletariat cannot let down its guard on the grounds that these reactionary forces are in conflict with another section of ruling strata currently in power.

That there exist serious deviations in your understanding of state power is further indicated by the revised programme of the NDF, which came out in early 1986. (While the NDF is not the same as the CPP, your party founded it and leads it, and it was the NDF that negotiated the ceasefire with the Aquino government.) Consider how the NDF describes the way in which the new people's democracy will be organised:

"A constituent assembly shall be elected to draft the constitution of the new state. After ratification of the constitution, general elections shall be held, and the democratic coalition government inaugurated.

"In its constitution and practice, the people's democratic republic shall uphold the essential elements of a genuine modern-day republic: people's sovereignty and national independence; all political authority emanating from the people; democratically elected officials who shall be their representatives and servants; elected representative assemblies at all levels that express the will of the people, rather than a single individual making laws; determination of the popular will through free and clean elections and other democratic means. . . ."

What "genuine modern-day republic" in today's world did you have in mind as a model — India, perhaps, or West Germany? All modern-day republics have class content! Yet there is no difference here from what any bourgeois democracy inscribes in its formal documents. New democratic revolution relies on the masses; the organs of revolutionary political power it establishes — first in base areas and, upon victory, nationwide — grow out of and are built on *the fighting detachments of the masses themselves*, on organisation formed and forged in the furnace of revolutionary war, just as the masses themselves are tempered and gain the consciousness required to rule in the process of the revolu-

tionary struggle and especially revolutionary war. These are the genuine forms of popular power, not the bourgeois electoral institutions of the "modern-day republic" enshrined in the NDF Programme, which have been perfected over decades of experience in channeling the masses' discontent into voting booths in order to yield all power to so-called representatives who stand over them, alienated from them, and ultimately ruling them. Furthermore, these sham democratic institutions of the West have a pitiful, ludicrous character in the oppressed nations, which can afford only the thinnest democratic trappings for their repressive apparatus (as, for example, in India, the "World's Largest Democracy," where the army is called out to establish order every few days!).

Yes, new democratic revolution is a bourgeois democratic revolution, but it is a bourgeois revolution of a new type; as Mao pointed out, it is led by the proletariat, it forms part of the world proletarian revolution and goes up against imperialism; it opens the door to capitalism but it opens the door to socialism even wider. Experience has proven that only the proletariat can lead the new democratic revolution, and it can do so only by *rejecting the form and content of the old-style bourgeois revolution* and establishing a dictatorship of the revolutionary classes led by the proletariat to suppress the comprador-feudal forces. This understanding is not reflected at all in the NDF Programme. Infatuated with these forms of bourgeois democracy, is it any wonder that as the imperialists and the Filipino ruling strata sought to use the elections for their own ends the CPP was unable to go up against this, expose it and present a genuinely revolutionary alternative?

Given these bourgeois-democratic roots of the CPP's errors, it is doubly disturbing that criticism emanating from leading centres of the CPP goes even further in the same direction. The Editorial Board of *Praktika*, the "bilingual theoretical journal of the Party in the national urban centre," argues in its first issue that a major cause

of the erroneous boycott line was, "First place should have been given to creating a broad anti-fascist unity committed principally to overthrowing the fascist dictatorship," that the boycott error was "just the latest and, perhaps, the costliest manifestation of a tendency to slur over the anti-fascist movement and to give undue importance to the comprehensiveness of national democratic politics in formulating tactics in the open mass movement," and it speaks of "rabid insistence on a national democratic orientation."

This turns reality upside down! Was the CPP's failure to grasp the dynamics of the snap election crisis due to *not giving enough* emphasis to fighting Marcos? Or wasn't it due instead to *narrowing everything down to Marcos alone*, failing to see the larger functioning of imperialism and its local appendages, its manoeuvrings and preparation for replacing one puppet with another?

In like manner, the National Student and Youth Department writes: "Cory Aquino has clearly proven that she is a staunch and steadfast anti-fascist. Hence, she is an ally, i.e., she is an objective tactical ally of the national-democratic movement. True, Aquino may flip-flop on issues concerning imperialism and feudalism. But she has also shown in words and in deeds her determination to wipe out fascism." Not only is Aquino's character wrongly portrayed, but she is proclaimed an ally of the "national democratic movement" even if she is pro-imperialist and pro-feudal! Opposing fascism without thoroughly opposing feudalism and imperialism inevitably means reducing oneself to supporting bourgeois democratic masks on imperialist domination in the oppressed nations. In Latin America, U.S. imperialism has played the game of trying to whip the masses back and forth between military juntas and civilian rule for decades, and the revisionists and social-democrats have rendered them great service in promoting the pursuit of parliament and other democratic trappings.

This is the context in which should be situated the CPP "self-criticism" that the boycott

"directly and openly went against the desire of the broad masses to pursue the anti-fascist struggle by means of critically participating in the elections." Others have concisely summarised this as "violating the will of the people," and failing to apply the "mass line." But isn't it the task of communists to help combat illusions and certainly not to trail such illusions, specifically illusions about Aquino? And after all, whose "will" did this boycott violate: that of the workers and peasants, or that of the bourgeoisie? All of this treats the mass line as a public opinion poll — not as requiring the application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought to unleash the masses and synthesise their experience in revolutionary struggle. Should the majority of people in England favour voting for Thatcher, would your "mass line" require the vanguard to go along with this too?! Isn't this yet more evidence of deeply rooted bourgeois-democratic tendencies infecting your party?

#### More on The United Front

As pointed out earlier, the tendency of the CPP to narrow the target of the revolution to a single clique and to obscure the class nature of the state is linked with errors made in broadening the class alliances the proletariat enters into in its quest for power. Even as the CPP was busy drawing all sorts of forces into the NDF and other mass organisations, it neglected to grasp sufficiently the basic point by Mao Tsetung that, "It is also necessary to combat the error of identifying the programme, policy, ideology, practice, etc., of the proletariat with those of the bourgeoisie, and neglecting the differences in principle between them. The error here consists in neglecting the fact that the bourgeoisie (and especially the big bourgeoisie) not only exerts an influence on the petite bourgeoisie and the peasantry, but does its utmost to influence the proletariat and the Communist Party in a strenuous effort to destroy their ideological, political and organisational independence, turn them into an appendage of the bourgeoisie and its political party, and ensure

that it will reap the fruits of the revolution for itself or its political party alone." ("Introducing *The Communist*")

Today it is a fact that the U.S. imperialists and the reaction have managed to affect the alignment of class forces especially in the cities and have temporarily brought under their influence and outlook large numbers of the more bourgeois and petit-bourgeois forces. This, in itself, hardly constitutes a fatal blow to the revolutionary movement — far less, in any event, than if the representatives of the proletariat forget Mao's point and allow *themselves* to become obsessed with or fall under the influence of these other class forces.

Unfortunately this is the direction that the CPP's recent "self-criticism" takes, when it raises that one of the party's more serious errors was underestimating the "capabilities and determination" of the "reformist bourgeoisie" — this at a time when the national bourgeoisie and some other middle forces have, by uniting around Aquino, actually shifted significantly *away* from the revolutionary camp! And just what does your term "reformist bourgeoisie" mean anyway? Not only does it blur over the politically vital distinction between the comprador bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, but it also substitutes a new main division within the bourgeoisie: between supposedly fascist and "reformist" sections.

Furthermore, this gaping at the "reformist bourgeoisie's" strength must be placed in the context of the practical measures the CPP is taking, based on this assessment, specifically your scaling down the armed struggle and concluding a ceasefire, while promoting parliamentary work in the cities, for instance, around the Constitutional Commission hearings. Isn't this repeating the error Mao warned of, and taking up the bourgeoisie's programme, which centres on this sort of work in the cities, and trying to compete with them on their own turf? This forgets the important analysis made by your own party in its early years, that, "The danger of cooperation with the national bour-



*Sailors from Subic Naval Base in the Philippines, perhaps the U.S.'s single most vital foreign military base.*

geoisie is that there is always a tendency to consider political activity in the cities as the principal form of political activity." (*Main Tasks of the Party*) Or as you put it even earlier: "In line with Mao Tsetung Thought, the Party must consciously shift its centre of gravity to the countryside. All previous party leaderships have suffered failures that were singularly characterised by political activity that had its centre of gravity in the city of Manila." (*Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, 1968)

In part the CPP's obsession with trying to maintain organisational unity at all costs with these various bourgeois forces, particularly the national bourgeoisie, reflects a tendency to treat them as a constant and stable ally of the proletariat and to forget or ignore the previous assessment made in *Philippine Society and Revolution* by Amado Guerrero, the *nom de guerre* of José Maria Sison, which argued that, "The correct policy is to unite with (the national bourgeoisie) only to the extent that it supports the revolution at a given time and at the same time to criticise it appropriately for its vacillations or tendency to betray the revolution. This policy will always keep us vigilant."

Lacking vigilance, you tended to ignore that the truly firm ally of the proletariat in the oppressed coun-

tries is the poor peasantry, that the foundation for the united front is the agrarian revolution and people's war, that the relations between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie will generally follow a zig-zag course, and that it is only by making advances in the people's war that the national bourgeoisie might be drawn into a united front (or at least neutralised) under proletarian leadership — and not by scaling down the people's war and centring the party's work on the bourgeoisie's own terms and turf.

#### **Reversing the Verdict on Soviet Social-Imperialism**

The portrayal in *Ang Bayan* over the last few years of oppressed countries in the thrall of the Soviets as "revolutionary" is part of a larger reversal of the CPP's longstanding verdict on the Soviet Union itself. Beginning in the early 1980s the CPP dropped all references to "social-imperialism," and refers increasingly to "the socialist countries" and to the "great progress" in "socialist construction" going on in "more and more countries." Apparently this even includes China, despite Deng Xiaoping's backstabbing of the Philippine revolution. Who else this includes became clearer recently when, following crescendoing praise for the Soviet neo-colonies like

Cuba, a report appeared in the March 1986 *Ang Bayan* on the 27th Congress of the CPSU which refers to the "socialist economy" of the USSR and uncritically repeats Gorbachev's supposed "calls for peaceful coexistence" and "striving for world peace."

What, might we ask, has changed since, for instance, 1980, when your Central Committee referred repeatedly to "Soviet social-imperialism" and noted the danger of "interimperialist world war" between the two rival blocs?! Or since the late 1970s when you denounced the leadership of Angola and Vietnam as "pawns of Soviet imperialism"? In recent years the reactionary imperialist nature of the USSR has been demonstrated with the invasion of Afghanistan, the smashing of the workers movement in Poland, and the rapidly escalating war preparations on the part of both imperialist blocs. The class character of the Soviet Union is a question of crucial importance for the international communist movement, yet your party — which not only had its origins in the battle Mao launched against Soviet revisionism but which also denounced Soviet social-imperialism for over ten years — has not publicly issued a single word in explanation of your change of line!

It must be said frankly that this lack of explanation over the years for reversing a verdict on such a question is singular testimony to the deterioration of your grasp of the decisiveness of revolutionary principles in leading proletarian revolution, not to speak of your commitment to struggling over cardinal questions within the international communist movement.

The Soviet question is bound up with another vital question of revolutionary principle: that of self-reliance in the revolutionary struggle. In an interview with *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Satur Ocampo, who was named to head up the ceasefire negotiations with the Aquino government, replied to a question on external aid that, "depending on the level of armaments that the AFP would utilise against the NPA, the NPA would determine whether external sources

of arms would be necessary." Such questioning of whether external aid would be "necessary" has appeared more and more frequently alongside continued upholding of "self-reliance" in other interviews with leading CPP figures. Isn't it apparent that treating the Soviet Union as "socialist" prepares the path for accepting military aid, particularly in case of difficulty — or at least using the threat of such aid to "strengthen" potential CPP bargaining positions in any future negotiations?

Taking up such a position would represent yet another sharp reversal of your earlier line, when you issued such bold revolutionary declarations on the need for "self-reliance" as the following, in *Urgent Tasks*: "When the people's combative spirit is kept high by continuous political education and military training, they will make do with any weapon and will use every trick and ruse to disarm the enemy even with bare hands. Caught by surprise in any one of so many possible situations, a full enemy squad can be easily overpowered by our militia with bolos or even with bare hands. The most important thing is the people's revolutionary determination and wisdom." Do you now regard this as "infantile naiveté"? — if so, it is far preferable to the "maturity" of opening your arms to those you earlier denounced so fiercely and righteously.

It is also unfortunate that it is on *nationalist* grounds that you seem prepared to judge friends and enemies. As the NDF Programme puts it, "We wage people's war on the fundamental principal of self-reliance, but we also consider international support as an integral part of our struggle. Thus, we seek the political and material support of other countries and revolutionary movements and organisations abroad. *Those who extend such support prove themselves true friends of the Philippine revolution and the Filipino people.*" (emphasis added) Would Soviet arms trickling in, or even flowing into the Philippine revolutionary movement really prepare you to hail them as "true friends of the Filipino people"? And what of the people of

Afghanistan? The nationalist blinders on your eyes that steer you towards such conclusions forget even the history of the Philippines itself — after all, U.S. imperialism sent in arms and men to throw out the Spanish colonialists. . . and then turned around and established their own domination. The character of the Soviet Union is imperialist whether or not they give you arms — and even if they do, it will only be with the same ends and means as they did to the Vietnamese, Angolans, etc. Once you swallow this bait, the hook sticks deep — the Vietnamese leadership eclectically combined talk of "self-reliance" with support for "fraternal" Soviet aid, and their promises faded away into the bitter reality of Soviet naval forces in Cam Ranh Bay.

This question has been hotly debated in the Philippine revolutionary movement, and for a long time your party took a better line. Again, to hail the Soviets and their puppets as "socialist" can only open the door to accepting their "fraternal aid" and ultimately to collaboration with these enemies of the Filipino people.

The CPP has also opened the door to Soviet "aid" in the economic development of the country, which is one important way in which Soviet social-imperialism attempts to penetrate the oppressed countries. In Angola, for example, the Soviets actually gave material aid to the MPLA liberation movement, then, once it came to power, encouraged it to nationalise certain strategic holdings. But was that anything but a mere change in legal form? Did it do anything to really restructure internal relations in Angola and break its dependency on imperialism — or didn't it just take new forms? In fact, using the leverage the Soviets had built up over the years of the liberation war, and with its protegés in control of the state sector, the Soviets further secured their hold with military aid and advisors (Cuban, E. German, etc.).

The CPP appears, unfortunately, to be less and less averse to this kind of "development." Issues of *Ang Bayan* over the past two years

have hailed the “victories” of the “revolution” in Angola, Nicaragua, etc. The January 1984 *Ang Bayan* reported: “For the first time Cubans are masters of their own country.” In these words, President Fidel Castro described what the revolution has achieved for the people of Cuba.” Yet Castro presides over a one-crop sugar economy as dependent as ever on an imperialist overlord, only now the Soviets, and, in exchange for the financial infusions necessary to keep Cuba afloat, has turned over the command strings of the entire society to his Soviet masters, so that now Cuba’s soldiers jump to the bark of Russian generals!

Finally, while you speak of “international solidarity” with other revolutionary movements, in reality your party, especially through the NDF internationally, concentrates on “solidarity work” with Catholic Church groups, social democrats, revisionist trade unions, etc. Any one of these initiatives might be justified, but it is impermissible to forget that the firm real allies of your people’s war, which at its birth you declared part of the world proletarian revolution, are the workers and oppressed of all countries, and their genuine revolutionary leadership, the Marxist-Leninists. Your conception of “international solidarity” departs from the correct proletarian internationalist viewpoint.

#### What Road to Power?

Closely related to the errors already noted — particularly the narrowing of the target of revolution, the promotion of bourgeois democratic forms, the obscuring of the necessity to smash the reactionary state power, and your new openness to social-democracy and social-imperialism — is a conception emerging within the CPP CC of another road to political power, one which is different from and opposed to the Marxist-Leninist path and one which cannot enable the CPP to achieve its original goal of overthrowing “imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.”

The essence of this road is that it calls into question the strategy of protracted people’s war in the

Philippines, and instead argues the possibility of achieving power more rapidly through uprisings in the city combined with compromises with sections of the ruling classes; it models itself to a large degree on the experience of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

In June 1984 *Ang Bayan* printed an article entitled “Long Live the Nicaraguan Revolution!” As the title indicates, the article lauds the Sandinistas, specifically their land reform. It goes on to hail the Sandinista land reform as offering “a good example of the correct approach to revolution” and “blazing a new path in agrarian struggle” — this despite admissions in the article that the Sandinistas “have placed no limit on land ownership and guaranteed the right to private landholdings as long as the landowners. . . make the land produce efficiently,” and that the “Sandinista government believes that the continued existence of a mixed economy in the countryside is not only politically expedient but economically advantageous.” Whether or not this is a new path to agrarian struggle — and it seems to be only too familiar — it is most definitely not a “correct approach to revolution.”

The article goes on to say that the developments in Nicaragua “speak well for the policies and tactics undertaken by the national leadership” and that “the history and struggle of the Nicaraguan people have much in common with our own.” Of particular interest is the favourable assessment given to the “broad popular front” set up by the Sandinistas “which included various political groups with different political tendencies” and “was supported even by anti-Somoza groups within the local ruling classes.” Here the resemblance to some of the policies already adopted by the CPP — efforts to unite with ruling class opposition forces, the narrowing of the target to the Marcos clique, etc. — are striking.

Since that time, the “Sandinista” road has been the subject of an important discussion in your party. Satur Ocampo, for instance, in the interview with the *Far Eastern Eco-*

*nomie Review* cited earlier, stated that, while the CPP still considered the armed struggle principal, “it doesn’t leave out the possibility of achieving its ends through political means. Now we are looking more towards the probability of developing a very strong unarmed movement among the people with a moral force that would enable the people’s forces, armed and unarmed, to overthrow the Marcos dictatorship with as little bloodshed as possible.”

This holding out of the “possibility of achieving the CPP’s ends through political means” is an eclectic formulation typical of the revisionist parties, and stands opposed to a long-standing fundamental principle of the CPP. As put in an early *Ang Bayan* (19 March 1971): “Holding high the spirit of the Paris Commune, Chairman Mao teaches us that, ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.’ This is not only the essence of the people’s democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat in China but of every revolutionary battle led by the proletariat during the 100 years since the Paris Commune. *No movement or proletarian party has ever seized political power without having followed the principle of armed revolution.*” (emphasis added)

Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that the unleashing of “self-criticism” in the CPP has been accompanied, at least in certain quarters, not by determination to deepen an understanding of the path of people’s war, but by open flirtation with this Sandinista path. Both major articles in the aforementioned *Praktika* seem to support this path, and a series of papers by a certain Marty Villalobos, described as “a senior Party member,” which are circulating for discussion in your party and in the Philippine revolutionary movement, openly do so. Villalobos’ papers have the merit of being a clear and concise statement of a thoroughly opportunist line which should be vigorously repudiated by your party.

The critique launched in *Praktika* is ostensibly against the boycott policy, but, as the authors

from the National Youth and Student Board note, "behind the boycott tactics lurk the deep-rooted problems concerning. . . the whole strategy and tactics of the Philippine revolution." Both articles sound the battlecry, "Dare We Win?" — the theme is that the recent events offered (and perhaps still do) the possibility of linking up with and leading much broader forces in the city, including many liberal democrats, towards the successful seizure of power by the revolutionaries, and that the failure to do this, the "slurring over" of the "anti-fascist component of the united front," and the underestimation of work in the cities resulted in the fact that "the revolutionaries ended up without a medal" — which appears to mean above all that they didn't maximise their influence in the new government.

These same themes are taken up by Villalobos, and generalised. For Villalobos, the root evil behind these "failures" is the strategy of protracted people's war itself. He argues that protracted people's war is a gradualist strategy that is responsible not only for the boycott position but more generally for the CPP missing the opportunity for leading a successful Sandinista-style "insurrection" in the cities. Speaking of protracted people's war, he says: ". . . victory against the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship would only be achieved in at least five years, maybe seven years, or even ten years. While the CPP- NDF were preparing for the leap *in the next few years* into the next substage of the strategic defensive. . . the Marcos fascist regime was toppled in three months. There can be no evidence more damning than this that the Party was pursuing an incorrect strategy." ("On the Insurrectional Strategy") Villalobos argues that, while protracted people's war was suitable for a certain period, the CPP should have gone over to an "insurrectional strategy" several years ago, at the time of the major urban demonstrations following Benigno Aquino's assassination.

He enumerates the differences between protracted people's war and the "insurrectional strategy": (1)

"the insurrectional strategy is more urban-centred, since the mass movement, which is the focal point of the struggle in the insurrectional strategy, converges mainly in the cities." (2) "In the insurrectional strategy, the political forces play the decisive role and the military forces the supportive role. Humberto Ortega, commander-in-chief of the Sandinista People's Army, . . . clarified: 'The mass movement is the focal point of the struggle and not the vanguard with the masses limited to merely supporting it.'" (3) "In the insurrectional strategy, victory is envisioned in a relatively much shorter time. . . ." (4) "In the insurrectional strategy, guerrilla warfare is intensified but it does not develop into regular mobile warfare or positional warfare." Instead, the insurrectional strategy envisions combining general strikes, mass uprisings, and guerrilla warfare to defeat the government. (5) "A flexible policy of alliances with opposition bourgeoisie may be considered a distinct feature of the insurrectional strategy." Finally, the insurrectional strategy counts on support from powerful forces internationally; Villalobos specifically cites the Socialist International (France's Mitterand, Spain's Gonzalez, Peru's Alan Garcia, etc.) as potential supporters to be courted.

Might this be "faster" than protracted people's war? Perhaps — but if so, for one simple reason: Villalobos' scenario has nothing whatsoever to do with uprooting *a system* of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. In rejecting the path of people's war for the Philippines, Villalobos has rejected revolution altogether.

How could this strategy be expected to overthrow imperialism and feudalism when, despite its claim to promote the role of the masses and all its feigned humility about not "limiting the masses to supporting the vanguard," it raises unity with bourgeois and international forces above relying on the masses and raises the city above the countryside in a land where the great masses of exploited and oppressed are peasants? It is indeed noteworthy that the peasants figure only in passing in Villalobos'

papers. There is a logic to this however: why mobilise the millions of peasants in people's war if the plan is to retain a "mixed economy" and large private landholdings anyway? Nor are the peasants of much use if one's strategy relies not on rousing a mighty red army, of which peasants would definitely form the bulk, but on demonstrations, strikes, etc., and especially parliamentary work with the ruling class opposition and diplomatic work with social-democratic imperialists. For Villalobos the word "masses" doesn't mean the masses of oppressed and exploited, but the urban middle forces, and especially the national bourgeoisie and the ruling class opposition. This is the heart of Villalobos' "insurrection strategy": rejection of making the workers and peasants the focal point of the revolutionary strategy.

The Sandinista path seeks to mobilise the revolutionary forces to contend with the bourgeoisie on their grounds and on their terms; it stands in stark opposition to Mao's defiant statement of military strategy, "You fight your way, I'll fight mine" — while the reactionaries base themselves on their technological superiority, on ignorant conscripted soldiers, and military doctrines suited to these features, the proletarian revolutionaries base themselves on the conscious mobilisation of the masses of people. In the Philippines, this means, above all, the peasantry. While the strategy of people's war must be able to take account and make use of the kind of urban upheavals that you have recently experienced, it is still true that the countryside is principal and that protracted people's war is the basic path for the Philippine revolution, as your party spelled out at its origins.

All this is a reflection of the truth that there are no easy short-cuts to victory in revolutionary war, for there is no easy way to destroy the enemy's repressive apparatus (i.e., smash the existing state power) and uproot centuries of class rule along with all the old habits, traditions and ideas which prop it up, nor to prepare the masses to run society themselves. Yet this is what

Villalobos' "insurrectional strategy" amounts to above all: the illusion of an easy, quick path to victory, easy and quick because it *bypasses* any real revolution. Genuine revolutionaries have only too often sought to pursue such shortcuts, especially in times of mass upheaval, when principles are jettisoned as it appears that bending to nationalism and bourgeois democracy offer quick paths to victory.

Villalobos continues this same tact in his raising of the political struggle above the military struggle, as if this too promoted the role of the masses. Quite the opposite. The armed struggle is, as Mao put it, the highest form of struggle because it is the seizure of power by the masses, the battle to destroy the old state and establish the new, and thus to take control of and reorganise all society. In Villalobos' view, guerrilla warfare is not a means for mobilizing the masses, especially the poor peasants, over time so as to build the red army and eat up the old state power and finally destroy its repressive apparatus altogether; no, instead of correctly viewing guerrilla warfare as a critical component of protracted people's war, guerrilla warfare is just one more *means of pressure* to be brought to bear, along with strikes, demonstrations, and political and international pressure from bourgeois forces. This is no revolutionary strategy for seizing and holding power through armed struggle, and it certainly has nothing to do with the Bolsheviks' mass insurrection and all-out civil war to establish proletarian rule. This is just reformist mush, a slightly warmed-over version of the Cuban foco-ist theory, which has always combined peaceful mass movements with a dash of guerrilla warfare and a big helping of support from bourgeois forces.

Everything about this version of the "insurrectional strategy" points not at the overthrowing of imperialist-backed rule, but a different goal: the mere toppling of *one clique* of the ruling classes, and at most the establishment of some bourgeois democratic trappings. Look at what Villalobos himself holds up as such "damning" proof

of the failure of the protracted people's war strategy: that while it envisioned victory only after a number of years, Marcos was toppled in three months. All this is proof of is that what Villalobos thinks the revolution is all about is *getting rid of a single clique*. Is this the goal of protracted people's war — or isn't it overthrowing the entire imperialist-feudal system, liberating the Filipino people from all forms of oppression as they embark on the path of abolishing class society, as part of the world proletarian revolution?

Villalobos virtually admits that his is not a program for a real rupture with imperialism. In lamenting how up to the present, "unfortunately the Chinese influence has been more pervasive (than the Sandinista)," he says that one major difference between the two is that the objective of the Chinese model is "complete victory of the democratic forces," whereas that of the Sandinista model is "decisive victory of the democratic forces." What a difference a word makes! For the Chinese revolution did indeed shatter the reactionary state apparatus of Chiang Kai-shek and his U.S. backers, imperialism was tossed out on its heels, and the revolution was continued for several decades against all imperialism. But this is *not* Villalobos' goal. He openly acknowledges his willingness to settle for less — and anything less than a "complete" break with imperialism can only mean settling for resting in the embrace of imperialist relations, for breaking with centuries of class society and with continuing imperialist encirclement will be a most arduous uphill battle.

The real lesson of the Sandinista path is summed up by the statement in the *Declaration of the RIM*: "History proves the bankruptcy of an 'anti-imperialist front' (or similar 'revolutionary front') which is not led by a Marxist-Leninist party, even when such a front or forces within it adopt a 'Marxist' (actually pseudo-Marxist) colouration. While such revolutionary formations have led heroic struggles and even delivered powerful blows to the imperialists they have been proven to be ideologically and

organisationally incapable of resisting imperialist and bourgeois influences. Even where such forces have seized power they have been incapable of carrying through a thorough-going revolutionary transformation of society and end up, sooner or later, being overthrown by the imperialists or themselves becoming a new reactionary ruling power in league with imperialists."

### The Ceasefire Negotiations: Tit-for-Tat?

In the last few months your party has sat down at the negotiating table and concluded a ceasefire with the representatives of a government that defends the "three mountains" of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism that still rest on the back of the Filipino people. This action sharpens even further the serious questions facing the CPP. Leaving aside whether the negotiations are a legitimate tactical step, we are compelled to ask: what politics are in command of these negotiations?

Mao Tsetung noted that "Sometimes not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat." And as he pointed out, "How to give 'tit-for-tat' depends on the situation." ("On the Chungking Negotiations") Mao himself of course sat down with Chiang Kai-shek to conduct negotiations, but he was always clear that armed revolutionary warfare is the only road to genuine liberation and he never harboured or promoted any illusions about the nature of Chiang Kai-shek and his U.S. masters or the possibility of achieving fundamental change through the negotiations. On the contrary, even as they opened negotiations with the KMT, Mao led the CCP in exposing Chiang Kai-shek's fascist repression of the people, his character as a representative of the compradors, feudals and bureaucrat capitalists, his ties to the U.S., and his preparations for launching a civil war to re-establish the old order. Furthermore, he pointed out that the main danger would be "failing to struggle hard and in making a voluntary gift to Chiang Kai-shek of the fruits which should go to the people," and

he called on the party and the troops "to be mentally prepared well in advance (for civil war). This is a very important point, and it makes a world of difference whether or not there is such preparedness." (The Situation and Our Policy after the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan)

You too have been negotiating — but what politics are leading? What are you preparing your cadre and troops for, when instead of exposing those with whom you negotiate, you promote illusions about their "progressive" character, about the "democratic reforms" they are engaged in, and you hide and obscure their ties to imperialism? And what, after all, are *they* preparing for — with imperialist military aid pouring in on a heightened scale, economic debts being renegotiated, while all the imperialists pull together to support the Aquino government — if not restabilizing the old order, through a bloody civil war if necessary? It must be asked bluntly: are these negotiations, in your view, a means to advance people's war to thoroughly smash the old reactionary order and establish a revolutionary dictatorship of the people led by the proletariat? Or is it the case that guerrilla warfare is being reduced to just one among several means of bringing leverage against the government for achieving some other, ultimately non-revolutionary, objectives, which you hope the negotiations are serving to advance?

### **Departing from Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought Means Death for the Revolution**

We have analysed above some of the key erroneous trends that have infected the line of the CPP over the past years and have given rise to the current situation in which a party founded on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, on the strategy of people's war led by the proletariat, with the goal of establishing the revolutionary democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and moving forwards towards classless society through many cultural revolutions, has more and more given way to a party mired in crisis and on a dangerous

path. We cannot sum up the full process that gave rise to this situation — but one thing can be said with certainty: the dangerous tendencies infecting your line are bound up with your refusal to deal correctly with the cardinal questions of line in the international communist movement which arose in the wake of the death of Mao Tsetung and the reactionary coup d'état in China in 1976.

Whether or not you acknowledged it, and despite advances in your own armed struggle in the Philippines, the reversal of proletarian rule in China and the subsequent attacks on Mao Tsetung Thought and the Cultural Revolution dealt a serious blow to the international communist movement and raised profound questions of political and ideological line. These put revolutionaries around the world to a test: whether or not to rise up against the reactionary onslaught on Mao Tsetung Thought and defend it as the highest pinnacle yet reached by the world proletarian revolution, as the "acme of Marxism-Leninism," as your party once put it.

At the time of Mao's death, the CPP circulated a statement by its chairman upholding Mao Tsetung Thought and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and condemning the revisionist line of the unrepentant capitalist roader Deng Xiao-ping. Shortly thereafter, the CPP turned around and hailed the reactionary coup d'état of Hua Guo-feng and virulently denounced the so-called "Gang of Four," though without any real explanation or analysis of the class struggle in China. Since that time, as Deng was brought back, as the policies of the Cultural Revolution were reversed one after another, as the attacks on Mao Tsetung escalated in China and around the world, the CPP stood, and still stands, silent. You also turned a deaf ear to the efforts of genuine Marxist-Leninists trying to regroup internationally to wage a riposte to these attacks.

Agnosticism or indifference to this battle in fact amounted to indifference to the battle to defend the revolutionary science of the proletariat and thus to indifference to advancing the world proletarian

revolution itself. As our movement declared in its *Declaration*, "Upholding Mao Tsetung's qualitative development of the science of Marxism-Leninism represents a particularly important and pressing question in the international movement and among the class-conscious workers and other revolutionary-minded people in the world today. The principle involved is nothing less than whether or not to uphold and build upon the decisive contributions to the proletarian revolution and the science of Marxism-Leninism made by Mao Tsetung. It is therefore nothing less than a question of whether or not to uphold Marxism-Leninism itself." And, as was quoted earlier, "Without upholding and building on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought it is impossible to defeat revisionism, imperialism and reaction in general."

This is proved by the history of the CPP itself. Its very origins were a product of the battle launched by Mao Tsetung against revisionism. In the Philippines, it was forced to break with and expose the revisionist PKP, which had declared its own supposed "principled independence" from the "Sino-Soviet split," and soon showed just where that centrist path led as it slid further than ever into the Soviet revisionist grip and wound up capitulating to Marcos in a ceremony broadcast on television. At that time you declared that Mao Tsetung Thought was "the line of demarcation between true and false revolutionaries" — is that any less true today? Has this changed because the forces attacking Mao Tsetung Thought appear stronger and have intensified their attack, having seized state power in China. . . or isn't it the case that defending the contributions of Mao Tsetung to Marxism-Leninism is more than ever a fundamental line of demarcation between revolution and revisionism, and that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought is the basis for the international communist movement to regroup and advance? It is ironic that the end result of your wrong assessment of the developments in China (i.e. your support for the reactionary coup

d'état) and your refusal to correct this view has not been to trail Chinese revisionism but rather to get closer and closer to the Soviet Union!

Furthermore, the CPP's apparent abandoning of its line upholding the necessity of "many cultural revolutions" and of continuing revolutionary struggle against the new bourgeoisie which is inevitably engendered under socialism — nothing on any of this has appeared for years now in the CPP press — means that it would be impossible for you to preserve national independence even if it were won by force of arms. For in the oppressed countries, without the proletariat's continual victory over emerging new bourgeois forces and its on-going revolutionisation of the production relations, it is impossible even to develop a relatively self-sufficient economic system and thus prevent the re-emergence of neocolonial relations of dependency, much less advance in the direction of communist society. The reactionary coup d'état in 1976 in China illustrated this, as the new revisionist bourgeoisie quickly reversed verdicts and re-opened China's door to imperialist economic penetration and undid the achievements in building an independent socialist economy.

In sum, the depths of the ideological and political deterioration of the Party, which results in no small way from the refusal to take a clear stand between Mao Tsetung Thought and revisionism, have become truly alarming: — The class nature of the regime you were fighting was lost sight of, the necessity to smash the entire repressive apparatus increasingly downplayed, bourgeois-democratic notions of "modern-day republics" were promoted, as wrong conceptions of the path and goal of the revolution have come to the fore; — The proletariat has been progressively subordinated to other class forces, imperialist puppets are promoted as "progressives" and "reformists," and one of the original strengths of the CPP, that of rallying the peasants in a genuine people's war as the main force for revolution, is increasingly put on a par with (or even subordinated

to) united action with bourgeois strata in the cities; — Imperialist countries are treated as socialist ones, dependent countries as independent revolutionary regimes, and eventually the necessity or possibility of completely rupturing with imperialism begins to give way to "practical" plans to come to terms with imperialism, possibly under the banner of the "necessity" of Soviet aid.

The "insurrectionary strategy" is one important manifestation of these dangerous tendencies, but it is not the only such manifestation.

### **Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought is the Key to the Philippine Revolution!**

Despite whatever twists and turns the revolution might be obliged to pass through, in the final analysis the situation is excellent for persevering in the people's war and making genuine advances towards the revolutionary goal. The imperialists themselves understand this clearly — their accelerated military aid is not a sign of strong, confident expansion, but of their sober awareness of the fragility and vulnerability of the ruling regime. They can offer no fundamental solution to the profound crisis gripping the Philippines.

But in order to advance the armed struggle it is necessary to carry on two-line struggle as well. The central political question facing the Philippine revolution today is the question of persevering in people's war and continuing on the path of Mao Tsetung. But this cannot be reduced to simply continuing to carry out armed actions, for political errors have been distorting the character and role of the armed struggle. The experience of the Huk Rebellion of the 1950s, when thousands of armed fighters under the leadership of the old communist party, the PKP, were led to defeat, has already provided the basis for showing that only a correct line based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung can lead to victory. Without defeating erroneous lines, continued advance of the people's war will be placed in jeopardy; yet at the same time such rectification must be carried out in the course of

carrying on and advancing the people's war, for opportunist and capitulationist tendencies must be defeated both in theory and in practice.

Today's conditions of great danger and great opportunity in the Philippines make it all the more urgent that the leadership and membership of the Communist Party of the Philippines rise to the challenges before you and carry out your obligation to the Filipino people and the international proletariat. But fulfilling these noble obligations is not simply a question of intentions; it is above all a matter of political and ideological line. For the crisis in which the CPP finds itself caught today is not brought on, as some currents argue, by the party's Marxist-Leninist line and hence by its allegedly dogmatic and sectarian character, but on the contrary it is a crisis brought on by *the failure to systematically take up and apply Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought*. Resolving this crisis demands not the abandoning of revolutionary principles in pursuit of some illusory shortcut, but a return to them in order to sum up the serious errors committed, rectify them and then move ahead to advance the Philippine revolution as part of the world proletarian revolution.

In conclusion, it is worth citing from the Report to the 10th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China: "Chairman Mao teaches us that 'the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything.' If one's line is incorrect, one's downfall is inevitable, even with the control of the central, local and army leadership. If one's line is correct, even if one has not a single soldier at first, there will be soldiers, and even if there is no political power, political power will be gained. This is borne out by the historical experience of our Party and by that of the international communist movement since the time of Marx. . . . The crux of the matter is line. This is an irrefutable truth." □

Fraternally,  
Committee of the RIM  
March 1987

## Peru

(Continued from page 13)

later when we take up its building we'll deal with its present role. Since its very beginnings Marxism has held that there must be a Party to lead the struggle to seize state power; this was reiterated by Leninism and emphatically reaffirmed by Maoism. Without a revolutionary party of a new type, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, there can be no revolution for the proletariat and the people. This is a great truth that no communist can evade without ceasing to be one, a truth we Peruvian communists had to confront. The Communist Party of Peru was founded October 7th 1928 on a solid Marxist-Leninist basis by José Carlos Mariategui, who provided it with basic theses concerning Peruvian society, the land question, imperialist domination, the role of the Peruvian proletariat, as well as programmatic points and a general political line and consequent particular lines. But the founder died in 1930, less than two years afterwards; even a first congress remained pending, so that the Party did not have time to consolidate itself before trends that had already been developing took a leap, Mariategui and his line were openly put into question, and the line was changed by Ravines. Thus opportunism usurped Party leadership and imposed its authority in the two-line struggle within the Party, with the gravest consequences for the class and the revolution. This road led to the parliamentary cretinism manifested in the 1939 elections, in the service of the comprador bourgeoisie represented by Prado. Later, during World War II, there was a phony "founding congress" which adopted the general political line of "national unity" under the guidance of Browderite revisionism, an expression of capitulation to Yankee imperialism's domination and the domestic rule of the comprador bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords, under the pretext of the struggle against fascism. Subsequently this situation led to the Party's participation in the 1945 elections as part of the "National



Democratic Front" with the APRA party, with the excuse of bringing about a democratic opening; this new electoral adventure ended when the balloon the Party had become blew up after Odria's 1948 coup d'état.

In the beginning of the sixties the fraction founded by Chairman Gonzalo began to develop within the Ayacucho Regional Committee. By fraction, what is meant is what Lenin taught: "A section in a party is a group of like-minded persons formed for the purpose primarily of influencing the party in a definite direction, for the purpose of securing acceptance for their principles in the party in the purest form. For this, real unanimity of opinion is necessary." The fraction arose as the product of the development of the class struggle on the world level, especially the great struggle between Marxism and revisionism that spread Mao Tsetung Thought, as Chairman Mao's development of Marxism-Leninism was known in the mid-1960s. This was the principal and decisive factor giving rise to the fraction. At the same time, a substantial basis for it was provided by the development of Peruvian society, the advance of bureaucrat capitalism, the sharpening class struggle of the masses, the intensification of political activity and growing propaganda about armed struggle, and by developments in the region itself where the fraction arose, a region where the decrepitude of semifeudalism was becoming increasingly stark and where the peasantry was beginning to awaken in a particularly militant fashion reflecting a similar process going on throughout the country. Within the Party at that time, the struggle between Marxism and revisionism deepened. The fraction

headed by the Ayacucho Regional Committee fought the revisionism of Del Prado and his followers and took part in the IV National Conference where Del Prado and Company were expelled. From then on the fraction developed within the Party nationwide. The development of Marxism-Leninism by Chairman Mao and the great lessons and experiences of the Communist Party of China played a vital and decisive role in this initial process. Since then both our initial commitment to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and our application of it to our conditions have developed further.

After the V National Conference in November 1965, in the two-line struggle within the Party the fraction came to fight for building the three magic weapons of the revolution: the party, armed forces and united front, demanding that these tasks be fulfilled in the light of the political line of the Conference which had established the building of revolutionary armed forces for the armed struggle as the principal task. But in a thousand ways the dead weight of revisionism hindered and opposed the fulfillment of the principal task; under these circumstances the fraction, reaffirming the necessity of an ideologically united and organisationally centralised Party, called for the "Reconstruction of the Party" based on "the heroic fighter." This process was carried out in three periods, each with its corresponding political strategy: 1) Defining the Problem of Reconstruction, guided by the political strategy of "surrounding the cities from the countryside." At that point the problem was to build a Party to lead the armed struggle on this path, which meant that the peasant and land question acquired tremendous importance and it was vital to put the Party's centre of gravity in the countryside. Further, the decisive question of ideological and political line centred on "basing ourselves on Mao Tsetung Thought," as it was said in those days, and on "reclaiming and developing Mariategui," with development being the outstanding aspect of this. It was not enough to reclaim him for two key reasons: the development of

Marxism-Leninism by Chairman Mao Tsetung, and the development of bureaucrat capitalism in Peru. This phase took place during the struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism and its manifestations in various spheres of Party life and ended with the January 1969 VI Conference which approved "the Reconstruction of the Party" "on the basis of Party unity around Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought (as was said in those days — now it is Maoism), Mariategui's Thought and the general political line."

The following period, 2) Carrying Out the Reconstruction, was guided by the political strategy of "Reconstruct the Party" in accordance with the Party's basis of unity. October 1968 saw the coup d'état of Velasco, who took on the task of deepening the development of bureaucrat capitalism, carrying out the corporativisation of Peruvian society guided by a fascist political outlook and suppressing the rising mass movements. This period divides into two parts: first the struggle against right liquidationism, a form of revisionism which sought to destroy the Party by centring it on open, mass work and pushing it into legalism; on the strictly political level this line put forward expropriating the land instead of confiscating it and above all denied the fascist character of the government. When these liquidationists couldn't take over the Party they perversely attempted to destroy it and the fraction took up the Party's defense. In February 1970 a split took place and the fraction assumed the leadership of the Party; from then on it led the process of Reconstruction. In the second part there was a struggle against "left" liquidationism, another variant of revisionism that tried to destroy the Party by shutting it up behind four walls, denying the importance of peasant work and the possibility of any mass work because, according to them, mass work and organisations are impossible under fascism. They reduced fascism to simply a question of violence, and worse, to an irresistible violence in the face of which nothing could be done but wait for

better times. They put forward the "relative stability of capitalism" and consequently of the social system. They said "the line is enough" and that there was no reason to develop Mariategui further, and called Maoism into question, bragging about being "pure Bolsheviks." This "left" liquidationism was smashed in 1975 at a Central Committee plenum. During this period, our political understanding of Peruvian society deepened, especially our understanding of bureaucrat capitalism, based on Chairman Mao Tsetung's thesis. This question is fundamental for understanding and leading the democratic revolution. In fact this concept slammed the door on the opportunist tendency to tail a faction of the big bourgeoisie while pretending to unite and struggle with the national bourgeoisie, and to support the Velasco's fascist and corporatist plans, "reforms" and measures, and it continues to be extremely useful today. The ideological-political building of the Party also advanced, especially regarding the understanding of Mariategui's thought and general political line — synthesised for the first time in five basic points taken from his works — as well as the necessity to develop it further. The relationship between secret and open work was delineated and the latter was developed according to the Leninist criteria of areas of support for the Party's mass work; thus mass organisations were created by the Party to develop the links between the Party and the masses.

The last period, 3) the Culmination of the Reconstruction, was guided by the political strategy of "Culminate and Lay the Basis," in other words, culminate the reconstruction and lay the basis for launching the armed struggle. With the unfolding of the process the Party was approaching the conclusion of its Reconstruction and so had to sum up what had been achieved, define and sanction the general political line, continue the building of the Party on a national level with its centre of gravity in the countryside, define the specifics of the armed struggle and lay the basis to launch it by developing the work

among the peasants. The left fought tenaciously to attain these objectives, waging intense and sharp struggle against rightism. This rightism developed into a right opportunist line that first opposed the Culmination and then launched an onslaught against the general political line, labeling it "ultraleftist," and ended up rabidly opposing the initiation of the armed struggle. Nevertheless, with firmness and wisdom the left repeatedly defeated right opportunism, another form of revisionism opposed in the last instance to revolutionary violence, to armed struggle, to people's war, to the Party's fulfillment of its role of fighting to seize power for the proletariat and the people, and to the proletariat's advance in its historic mission. In April 1977 the left defeated the right opportunist opposition to Culminate, with the approval of the national plan to build the Party under the slogan "Build for the purpose of launching the armed struggle"; the left again resoundingly defeated the right in September 1978 with the approval of the "Summation of the Reconstruction," the sanctioning of "Mariategui's general political line and its development," and the drafting of the "Outline of the Armed Struggle." Finally it thoroughly and completely defeated the right opportunist line at the May 1979 IX Expanded Central Committee Plenum, when under the slogan "Define and Decide" the agreement was taken to "Initiate the Armed Struggle." A long chapter of the Party's history had closed and another one opened: the Reconstruction had been culminated and a new stage would open, that of the armed struggle. It should be clearly and firmly emphasised that during this period of the Culmination, when Chairman Mao died, the Party pledged to the international proletariat and the revolution that it would always hold high the banners of Marx, Lenin and Mao, and declared that "To be a Marxist today is to be Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tsetung Thought" (now Marxist-Leninist-Maoist). Thus when the Hua-Deng coup took place, with the latter of course

in charge at the end of the day, the Party condemned it as a counter-revolutionary coup against the dictatorship of the proletariat in China, against the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, for the restoration of capitalism and against the world revolution.

In sum, then, the Communist Party of Peru was reconstructed and became a Party of a new type, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, and so once again there existed the organised vanguard of the proletariat, capable of leading it to the seizure of state power. In this way "Define and Decide" can be considered the first milestone of the people's war unfolding today. Later the Party achieved the second milestone, that of Preparation; a period of the sanctioning of the Party Programme, the general political line of the Peruvian revolution and the Party statutes whose norms guide us today, the resolution of strategic political questions regarding revolutionary violence, people's war and the Party, the army and the United Front. The following decision was taken: "Forge the First Company in Deeds! Let violence flourish concretised in initiating and developing the armed struggle; let us open up a new chapter with lead and offer our blood to write it, a new chapter in the history of our Party and people, and let us forge the First Company in deeds! Peru, 3rd December 1979."

And the Communist Party of Peru began to lead the people's war going on today.

*Regarding the people's war.* Taking international experience as its magnificent starting point, so valuable and rich in positive as well as negative lessons, principally taking people's war as the military theory of the proletariat, and taking the concrete conditions of the country into account, the VIII Central Committee Plenum sanctioned the "Outline of the Armed Struggle." In essence this plan held that people's war in Peru must develop as a single revolutionary war in the countryside and cities, with the countryside the principal theatre of armed actions, following the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside. Furthermore, for

social and historic reasons and especially their impact on military affairs, it took into account the importance of the mountains, especially the stretch that runs from the central to the southern region, as well as that of the capital city. It also analysed Peru within the context of Latin America as a whole, particularly South America, and within the context of the international situation and the world revolution. With this outline in mind the Party prepared the armed struggle dealing with two questions: 1) Questions of political strategy which define the content and objectives of the people's war in the long and short run, as well as its necessary directives and military plans and the building of the three instruments — the Party, Army and Front — and their relation to the new state power. 2) The launching of the armed struggle, a key and decisive question, merited the Party leadership's very special attention; it was solved with the "Starting Plan" guided by the slogan "Launch the armed struggle!", the concretisation of the overall politics which were to take military form (every plan has an overall political line which guides it). Its contents included, first, the political tasks to be carried out, that is, to initiate the armed struggle, boycott the elections, foment the peasant struggle for land — arms in hand — and lay the basis for new-born things, especially political power; second, forms of struggle — guerrilla fighting, sabotage, armed propaganda and agitation, selective liquidations; third, forms of military organisation — armed detachments, with or without modern arms; fourth, timetable, starting date and duration of the plan, specific simultaneous actions on specific dates; fifth, the slogans — "Armed Struggle!", "Workers and Peasants Government" and "Down with the new reactionary government!"

The first two periods of the people's war — the periods of defining and preparing its beginning — were completed. On May 17th 1980 — not May 18th as the reaction claims to confuse it with the date of the elections and which others repeat —

the people's war in Peru began, entering its third period, that of actually beginning it, lasting all of 1980, through two successfully completed campaigns which laid the basis to go over to the fourth period, "Develop guerrilla warfare," in 1981, a period which continues today. May 17th was a political blow, a defiant and far-reaching blow which unfurled rebel red flags and raised hammers and sickles proclaiming "It's right to rebel" and "power grows out of the barrel of a gun," calling on the people, on the poor peasants especially, to stand up, arms in hand, to light the bonfire and shake the Andes, to write a new history in the fields and every corner of our tumultuous geography, to tear down the rotten walls of the old oppressive order, to conquer the peaks, to storm the heavens guns in hand and bring about a new dawn. The beginning was modest, almost without modern arms; we fought, advanced and built from small to large, the weak initial fire became the great turbulent and raging flames which are now spreading, throwing off sparks of revolution and exploding the people's war forward.

The Peruvian state launched its counter-revolutionary war and its Armed Forces carried out their infamous genocide and cut down the lives of the people by the thousands; together with this they launched their propaganda, dreaming of smashing the revolutionary war with ink, paper, lies and tricks. Opportunism played its part by snitching, sending in "leaders" to stir up the masses against the revolution, propagandising and agitating against it and in defense of bourgeois democracy and the vote in pursuit of velvet seats in parliament. World reaction, the superpowers, especially the Yankees as well as the social-imperialists, and the other imperialist powers, gave their immediate support and sent the government their advisors; among them an outstanding role was played by the Chinese arch-reactionary clique whose black heads Deng, Li Hsien-nien, etc., were among the first to stand up as judges to condemn us. As was to be

expected, the reaction opened up its hells and let loose its demons, plagues and horsemen of the apocalypse against the people's war; soaked in blood, drunk with arrogance, they bragged of triumphs and victories, crushing defeats, setbacks and retreats, withdrawals and routs, the turning back and defeat of the revolution. But what really has happened? How have the armed struggle and afterwards the genocide unfolded? What has really been the reality of the last two years and of the sixth year of the people's war?

Apurimac. They also took place in the coastal region, in its cities and especially in the country's capital, and in the jungle highlands and the important cities there; so the revolution is fighting throughout the whole country. Furthermore, these military actions have developed and increased in quality: blows waged against Armed Forces anti-guerrilla bases, ambushes, destruction of strategic hamlets, land invasions, devastating sabotage, higher-level selective annihilations and intensified armed propaganda and agitation — all these show a very

in the region of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac, predominantly peasant zones, and the aim is to develop it in all regions, even, in a specific form, in Lima. Clearly guerrilla warfare is the very centre of the armed actions and the other forms only serve to aid it and push it forward, because it is the form that most directly aims to destroy the enemy's military organisations, especially the Armed Forces. It is also notable that armed propaganda and agitation make up more than a third of the actions. This shows the importance people's war gives to politically educating and mobilising the masses; obviously this work is directed principally towards the peasants and in the cities towards the proletariat, and although in the countryside it is mainly carried out in oral form, it is complemented by campaigns with posters and illustrated leaflets. This kind of work is most prominent in new areas, but it is given great importance in all areas, occupying second place overall. Sabotage, for its part, is in third place, with the aim of dealing economic blows to the reaction, especially imperialism and the state economy, big capital and big landlords. In regard to the latter, tearing down the semifeudal relations of production is extremely important to the peasantry. Finally, only 8.2% of the total is made up of selective annihilations of enemies of the people, carried out either against those who have been condemned directly by the masses in people's tribunals or against incorrigible enemies of the revolution who owe blood debts, people who have carried out massacres, torturers, infiltrators, spies, etc. These actions are carried out without any cruelty but rather as simple and expedient justice, and in the majority of cases have been approved by the masses. Nevertheless the media has portrayed them as something monstrous, clumsily distorted them and exaggerated their number. Clearly we must underline here that the monstrosities imputed to the people's war are crimes cynically carried out by the Armed Forces themselves who then attribute them to the revolution. In conclusion, the

The Interior Minister himself recently gave this data:

Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	TOTAL
Attacks	219	715	891	1123	1760	2050	6758

These figures testify to the yearly increase of our actions, as well as those of the Armed Forces and their police assistants; their policies, methods and even their genocide have not held back the growth of the armed struggle, at least as far as quantity is concerned, according to the APRA Minister himself. Nevertheless, the total 6758 is very far from correct, firstly because of the state's rather understandable desire to minimise the dimensions of the people's war, and secondly because they don't take into account all the various forms the revolutionary war takes, such as armed propaganda and agitation, for example, nor do they count actions carried out in distant and isolated areas. Consider that actions carried out even in the department of Lima itself aren't reported for a week, and in general a cover of silence and lies is used to maintain the so-called public calm and the prestige of the repressive forces. During the six years of people's war 30,000 actions have been carried out in all but two of the country's 24 departments, leaving out only Amazonas and Madre de Dios, while including even the constitutional district of Callao. These actions developed basically in the Peruvian mountains and principally centred in the region of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and

important and far-reaching qualitative advance. It should be made clear that more than half of the six years' actions were carried out between June 1984 and today, and a third of the 1980-1986 total have been carried out in the last year. This is the clear and concrete reality. What are the great results of the counter-revolutionary war, its genocide and its offensives of '83-84? Obviously they failed; they haven't even been able to hold back the development of the people's war, let alone put an end to it.

Table 1 shows the four forms of struggle through which the people's war in Peru is developing. The principal form is guerrilla warfare and the other three are complementary forms of guerrilla actions: sabotage, selective annihilations and armed propaganda and agitation. It can be seen that 45.9% of the total actions carried out in the country are guerrilla engagements (fought by detachments in the city and in the countryside by platoons and companies), while sabotage only comprises 11.2% and selective liquidations scarcely 8.2%, and armed propaganda and agitation reach 34.1%. These figures clearly show that guerrilla warfare is the essence and heart of the people's war in the country; it is significant that the percentage of guerrilla warfare reaches its highest level, 54.4%,

**Table 1. Great Leap, Forms of Struggle and Zones**

Forms of struggle of people's war	Whole country %	Ayacucho, Huanca. & Apurimac %	Centre, North South & Huallaga %	Metro. Lima %	Other %
Guerrilla warfare	45.9	54.4	36.0	12.0	16.8
Sabotage	11.8	8.0	18.6	23.7	26.9
Selective annihilations	8.2	9.6	9.2	3.8	1.7
Armed prop. & agitation	34.1	28.0	36.2	60.1	54.6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

**Table 2. Distribution of Actions by Region (June 1984 — June 1986)**

Total Actions	100.0%
Ayacucho, Huancavelica & Apurimac	63.4%
Other Regions	28.2%
Metropolitan Lima	8.4%

**Table 3. Forms of Struggle and % by Regions (June 1984 — June 1986)**

Forms of Struggle	Whole Country %	Ayac., Huancav., Apurimac %	Other Regions %	Metro Lima %
Guerrilla warfare	100%	75.1%	22.6%	2.3%
Sabotage	100%	43.3%	39.7%	17.0%
Selective annihilation	100%	74.0%	22.1%	3.9%
Armed Prop. & Agit.	100%	52.0%	33.0%	15.0%

chart makes the guerrilla character of all the armed revolutionary actions unmistakably clear and shows that guerrilla warfare, the very substance of people's war, is their principal aspect and essence; thus it completely disproves the absurd accusation that tries to pin the label of "terrorism" on the revolutionary war going on in this country. In fact, as we have been saying since 1980, those who repeat this lie without any proof — and there is none — are only parroting Reagan and the Peruvian reaction. What is developing in Peru, while the whole world watches, is simply and completely a people's war and nobody with an ounce of brains can deny it.

The region of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac deserves particular attention. This is where the fraction first became active and

in a word was its cradle; furthermore, it is where the first actions of the war took place, in Chuschi, and where the heroic people and above all the poor peasants have generously spilt their blood to light the flames of the people's war and keep them burning and ceaselessly rising. The masses of this region have suffered the most vile and insatiable genocide; it is where the reaction has concentrated its Armed Forces and carried out its most elaborate plans; it is where the reactionaries have bragged about their anticipated triumph and about how the area is "almost" pacified, only to have to eat their words later in the face of the revolution's new offensives, which never stops them from once again crowing victory. What is the present situation in this region and how has the revolu-

tionary war developed there in the last two years?

Tables 2 and 3 show that in the last two years 63.4% of the total actions in the country were carried out in Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac, and that furthermore 75.1% of the guerrilla actions, 43.3% of the sabotage, 74.0% of the selective annihilations and 52.0% of the armed propaganda and agitation were carried out in this region. So how can it be said that a slackening of the people's war has taken place there? There is no basis whatsoever except the subjective and ever-changing statements of the authorities and military chiefs who have never even given any sort of official report, not the government nor the Joint Command nor the Political-Military Command, despite the fact that the region has been under a state of emergency continuously since March 1982 and sporadically before that during the police operations carried out since the beginning of 1981. Clear and concrete facts show that this region continues to be the main battlefield between the armed revolution and the armed counter-revolution; while the reactionaries dream of sweeping away the people's war it resists all assaults and continues to be like a thunderstorm whose centre is Ayacucho. Almost since the beginning of armed action, more persistently since the Armed Forces came in and usually in parallel with the reaction's offensives and campaigns, coffee-house strategists, scribblers, opportunists, "Senderologists" and mistaken or vacillating revolutionaries have advised or pontificated upon the impossibility of keeping the people's war going in the region of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac, saying that we should abandon the region and retreat to other areas, in order, as they sometimes said, to "preserve" the armed struggle and launch it again under new and better conditions. We should point out that in general these are the same people who have fought against the people's war either openly or covertly in the name of "widening the democratic space" or simply of "defending democracy." We are convinced of

the great truth of what Chairman Mao said about how an area should not be abandoned until it has repeatedly proved impossible to defend; since the most ferocious genocide in the history of the Republic has been met head-on and overcome in this region for several years now, what else needs to be said? Who would the recommended retreat have benefited? Simply and purely the counter-revolution; it would have been a great favour to the enemy to dismantle and dissolve the best and most proven bastion of the people's war. But irrefutable facts prove that whatever may be said against the people's war, it continues to develop defiantly and proudly in Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac, firmly linked to the masses, brimming with heroism, daily writing new pages in the armed revolution which is transforming Peruvian society, and which precisely in recent months has been unleashing devastating blows even within the city of Ayacucho itself, blowing up the phony showcase of peace in the country's most militarised city, as was done for example with the car-bombs in the Republican Guard barracks and more recently in the Civil Guard's IX Command headquarters on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the people's war, a blast which shook the city and threw all the repressive Armed Forces and police into confusion and virtual panic. In conclusion, you can't hide the sun with your finger: Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac continue to be the great bonfire of the people's war and the most defiant revolutionary challenge.

As can be seen in these three tables the armed revolution carried out only 8.4% of its total actions in Metropolitan Lima, while carrying out 17% of all sabotage and 15% of the armed propaganda and agitation there. These data disprove the so-called "retreat" or concentration of the revolution in Lima claimed by the reactionary press, military chiefs and government authorities, who seek in this way to give some basis to their claims that the revolution is suffering hard blows in the Ayacucho region, on the one hand, and on the other to give some ex-

planation for the resounding actions which have shaken the capital in the last two years. An analysis of Table 1 shows that during the two years studied 60% of the work in Lima was directed at armed propaganda and agitation, 23.7% at sabotage and only 3.8% at selective annihilations. Thus we can see from the percentages of the forms of people's war in Lima and their proportions in relation to the rest of the country that the endless clichés about the revolution's retreat are baseless fabrications. The point is that because of conditions in the capital actions there have big repercussions — the large-scale economic concentrations make large-scale sabotage possible, such as the Bayer factory or the Hogar department store; the big central state institutions there can be sabotaged, such as the blows dealt to the Government Palace and the Joint Command; foreign bigshots visit there, so there are occasions for big blackouts such as the one that greeted the Pope; obviously the central authorities are located there, so there are opportunities for selective annihilation such as that of Rear Admiral Ponce Canessa. Furthermore, the repercussions immediately sharpen the contradictions among the reaction — the case of this same Rear Admiral is an example — while actions there are more difficult to hush up due to the concentration of media and the presence of international news agencies and all kinds of foreign representatives. Thus the capital cannot be neglected in people's war, all the more if we keep in mind some international experience on this point; what is required is better organised work increasingly capable of warding off blows and infiltration, with stepped-up ideological training so as to be able to face any risk and give priority to the development of work linked to the masses of workers and the neighbourhoods and shantytowns. When all positive forces are brought into play, it is these conditions, and not any so-called retreat of the work from other areas, which make it possible to wage revolutionary war in the capital as well and to raise it to a higher level.

Ambit and expansion. With the

slogan "Stoke the bonfire, spread the flames, unleash the class struggle of the masses especially in its armed form and let the repression spur us on," the spread of the people's war was taken up with the aim of drawing a compass of action extending from the department of Cajamarca on the border with Ecuador in the northwest down to the department of Puno on the border with Bolivia in Peru's southeast, throughout the mountains that are the historic axis of Peruvian society and its most backward and poor area, in order to convert this ambit into a great theatre of revolutionary war and advance this war. Achieving this scope was an important part of the "Great Leap Plan" and its concretisation. As can be seen in Table 2, 28.2% of the armed actions were carried out in "Other Regions," that is, outside of the regions of Ayacucho-Huancavelica-Apurimac and Metro Lima, as were 26.2% the guerrilla warfare, 39.7% of the sabotage, 22.1% of the selective annihilation and 33% of the armed propaganda and agitation. In this way the people's war is firmly advancing in the country's central region, vital to the whole economy because of its mining, agricultural products and communication and transportation trunk lines and because it is at the heart of the state's geopolitical plans. In the same way the revolutionary war is rapidly advancing in the country's North, centred in the mountains, as well as in the Huallaga River basin. Both are large and rich regions with important economic potential and a growing population, especially the North. The people's war is also spreading in the South, similarly centred in the mountain countryside, an extremely poor area, especially in highly explosive Puno. This has come to worry the present government greatly because it is exactly in the area where they plan to build their "showcase of development" that the revolution is hitting them and undermining their plans. Our work there is not something new or only recently taken up; it is as old as the people's war itself, since from the period of preparing the war this work was conceived



Government agents search civilians suspected of "terrorism".

and organised according to a national plan which established regions classified according to their importance, giving each one its due attention according to specific conditions; of course these regions have developed unevenly. Thus the war was not conceived in terms of one single region but in terms of simultaneous though uneven development in several regions, with one of them principal (which one that is could change according to necessity), all within the framework of a strategically centralised and tactically decentralised plan.

The undertaking of the work in each region and its impact can be judged by the following: in July 1984, in the Huallaga River Basin, the department of Huanuco and Mariscal Caceres province in the department of San Martin were declared under a state of emergency and placed under the control of Political-Military Command Number 7. This situation has more or less continued until today. In the central region in November of that same year a state of emergency was declared in the province of Alcides Carrion in Pasco department, under the command just mentioned, and this later spread to the important mining province of Pasco. In the North armed actions have rocked the departments of Cajamarca, An-

cash and especially La Libertad; the countryside has been profoundly shaken by land invasions promoted by the People's Guerrilla Army. The police forces and Army headquartered in Command Number 7 have replied by unleashing repression but it is being insisted that this region too be placed under a state of emergency and that the Armed Forces come in fully. In the South, above all in Puno which has been thrown into an uproar, police outposts have been assaulted, as happened for instance at San Anton, towns such as San Jose and Chupa have been seized, SAIS (large state-linked farms — *trans.*) have been sabotaged and burned down, and 10,000 peasants have been mobilised in armed land invasions aimed at these SAIS which control immense extensions of land. This has led the police forces to declare "red zones" in the provinces of San Roman, Azangaro and Melgar; reactionary clamour has mounted in favour of the proclamation of a state of emergency and the intervention of the Armed Forces. Poverty, natural calamities and armed action are combining to make Puno an extremely explosive volcano.


To the preceding we would add that successive guerrilla actions have penetrated deeply into the department of Apurimac, to the very

doorstep of its capital, Abancay. With this, the basic task of extending our scope throughout the central mountains has been practically completed. Today the people's war is spreading, extending through the Sierras northward to Cajamarca and southward to Puno, from one border to the other, from Ecuador to Bolivia. This great goal was achieved through tenacity, striving and blood; it has opened up new possibilities for the ongoing Peruvian revolution. But although this would be sufficient, there is more: fighting not only in the Sierras but also in the jungle highlands, in two key places, in Apurimac at the strategic convergence of the departments of Cuzco, Apurimac, Ayacucho and Junin, and in the Huallaga River area, a rich region where imperialism and the state plan giant enterprises; furthermore, the struggle is unfolding on the Coast, especially in its central and northern regions, and, as we've emphasised, in Metropolitan Lima itself, a city whose strategic importance lies in its being the capital and in its tremendous concentration of people, with the majority of the Peruvian proletariat as well as enormous masses of the poor in its neighbourhoods and shantytowns. In synthesis, the people's war has not only won this expansion throughout the mountain ambit; it is spreading in the Sierras, the jungles and the coast, vigorously pushing ahead, building the new and opening up the future.

To complete this picture let's look at some outstanding actions. In the department of Ayacucho, blows dealt against the Armed Forces anti-guerrilla bases (there are 70 in the region, according to a recent statement by the Minister of War), in San José de Seque and Aqomarca, for example, hitting the foundations of the APRA government's pilot project for the region after the genocide of Aqomarca; attacks against 14 strategic hamlets — forced groupings of peasants carried out by the present government after the farce of the so-called "surrender of Senderistas" at Llochegua — whose destruction means liberating the masses from reactionary military control; ambushes carried out

against the Army, Marines and police, in San Pedro, Yanamonte and elsewhere; engagement and even repeated engagements mocking the Armed Forces' encirclement, wiping out and wounding soldiers; sabotage of the setting up of the microregions (government local economic development projects — *trans.*) which are to serve as the basis for corporativisation; the blowing up of 27 high-tension towers of the new Corbiza-Ayacucho electrical network, sabotaged even before its official inauguration; car-bomb attacks against the Republican Guard and even the IX Civil Guard Command Headquarters in the city of Ayacucho itself as we've already mentioned. In Huancavelica, the blowing up of six bridges and 35 electrical towers of the Mantaro power lines, the main power network in Peru; the razing of the Cinto and Vichincha agricultural enterprises, whose land was seized and livestock redistributed. In Apurimac, a new upsurge of armed actions in the department, including even Abancay, the capital city, where the Matara power plant was sabotaged, as was the plant in Chincheros, and attacks on police outposts.

In Peru's central region, the attacks spread and escalated; ambushes such as the one in Michivilica against the Republican Guard; sabotage of the Centromin (state mines — *trans.*) power substation and its steam-shovels, paralysing the area's only open-pit mines; sabotage of the SAIS Tupac Amaru; blowing up of the railroad bridge which paralysed the Huancaayo train for months and hindered the shipment of minerals from Huancavelica and Cobriza; sabotage and harassment in Huancaayo with exposure of and battles fought against the II Rimancuy. In the northern region, land invasions under the slogan "Seize the land!" mobilised 160,000 peasants and led to the confiscation of 320,000 hectares of land, mainly pastureland, and 12,000 head of cattle, mostly first class, which were redistributed to the peasants; sabotage of the Norperu, the country's only oil pipeline; sabotage in the APRA's



heartland, Trujillo, during the APRA's national birthday celebrations presided over by Garcia personally, right in the main plaza of APRA's "capital." In the South and especially in the convulsed department of Puno, the previously mentioned actions aimed at solving the land problem, the motive force of the class struggle in the countryside. In the Huallaga River region, the assault on the police outpost at Aucayacu; the attack against the vigilante bands at Agua Blanca; razing of the big tea plantation; ambush of the Republican Guard at La Muyuna; engagement with the UMOPAR (the Civil Guard's Mobile Rural Patrol Unit) at Alto Morona and firefight with a 30-man Army patrol at Patayrondos.

In the city of Lima, sabotage of embassies, including the biggest blow against a foreign representative so far, the recent attack against Soviet social-imperialism's embassy; sabotage of dozens of APRA's local offices; a car-bomb in the middle of the Plaza de Armas in front of the Government Palace during the visit of Argentine President Alfonsin and the subsequent burning of the Scala store on the same square, which provoked tremendous shooting and threw the palace guards into great confusion; the car-bombings of the police headquarters, the Armed Forces Joint Command and the international airport; the usual total blackouts such as on December 3rd

and during last March and July; fires, such as the Maruy department store, also right on the Plaza de Armas, with the result that the entire capital of the Republic was put under a state of emergency and a curfew established under Armed Forces authority from last February to the present; selective annihilations, including hitting the chairman of the National Elections Board during the general elections, and Armed Forces and police officers and recently a Navy Rear Admiral, as well as the APRA organisational secretary, which sharpened the contradictions within the reactionary camp and gave rise to an enormous political uproar and thunderous threats; and, June 7th, Army Day, the ceremonial pledge of allegiance to the flag presided over by Garcia was sabotaged by explosive charges, one of them only 20 metres away from the official reviewing stands, thus demonstrating that despite the state of emergency and major military and mounted police presence for the preceding 24 hours, the revolution can hit wherever and whomever necessary.

The struggle of the prisoners of war and those who have come to their direct support merits special mention. Although these struggles have been waged for several years now, stubbornly and heroically going up against and overcoming torture, abuses, subhuman conditions, murder plots, reprisals, assassinations and even genocide, turning the reactionary dungeons into shining trenches of combat, still the struggles taken up since the middle of last year should be given special emphasis. On July 13th 1985 the

prisoners of war in the trenches at El Fronton, Lurigancho and Callao began a united struggle to win special prisoner status; in daring warrior actions they forced the Belaunde government to sign an agreement and recognise them as such, with the rights that such status implies. This struggle took the government by surprise and dealt it a defeat, turning the period of the transfer of the presidency to good political advantage. The government prepared to get revenge. The new APRA government took charge of carrying this out; it scarcely had taken office when it began to repudiate the agreement. A difficult and complicated struggle arose, with the government trying to manoeuvre and double deal; when this failed it cooked up and hatched the October 4th genocide, deliberately unleashed a few days before the anniversary of the Party's founding, seeking to inflict a moral defeat on the prisoners of war in the trenches and on the revolution. But the Lurigancho prisoners of war not only stood up to the genocidal attack with heroic daring; at the cost of their own blood, they turned it around so it backfired on the government itself, and with class solidarity, especially that of the other imprisoned fighters, they celebrated October 7th with exultant revolutionary communist ardor and exemplary optimism. They continued their struggle, and once again correctly taking advantage of circumstances, on October 31st forced the reactionary APRA government to sign the agreement it had repudiated, only this time it was signed by higher level authorities. But the struggle did not end and reaction never ceases plotting and manoeuvring against the sons and daughters of the people. The government proposed the prisoners' transfer to Canto Grande to further its plan to wipe them out; in the face of this the prisoners launched a campaign called "Expose and Resist," declaring their firm resolve to oppose the transfer even at the cost of a new genocide, and powerfully exposing the government. This struggle culminated January 15th 1986, when a clash between family members of the prisoners of war

and the Civil Guard led to the killing of one of the relatives and the wounding of 20 others, forcing the Minister of Justice to declare that "there will be no transfer to Canto Grande because the prison is not for 'terrorists.'" A chapter in the campaign against the new genocide closed but the problem persisted: in violation of their public promises, faithful to their own reactionary nature, they have begun to transfer new prisoners there, while the press clamours for more transfers and the Navy represses visitors. The struggle continued and new chapters remained to be written, as we'll see when we examine the infamous June genocide. With their high morale and proven combativity the prisoners of war have taught and continue to teach how revolutionaries can and must turn the prisons into shining trenches of combat.

The actions carried out between June 1984 and June 1986 demonstrate a development not only in quantity but especially in quali-



ty, across a wide scale; they provide irrefutable proof of the development of a real people's war through six years of unyielding battle in the countryside and cities of Peru, "and let the traitors say what they like."

*On Building the New State Power.* To complete the analysis of the people's war in Peru, we must take up the question of the new state power, the new state, the building of base areas — the essence of surrounding the cities from the countryside, the question of political power, the joint New Democratic dictatorship which must transform the old society so that with the culmination of the democratic revolution socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat advances and guarantees the march to communism. We'll take up this point within the context of the building of the three instruments, since the state is inextricably linked to the Party and the army.

We have already dealt with why the Party is necessary and how the Communist Party of Peru was reconstituted so that it could take up the task of leading the people's war; still to be concisely considered are some important further aspects of its development in the course of the last six years. The Party set itself the task of its militarisation at the 1979 National Conference, when preparations for the war were being discussed. Concretely, insofar as what needs to be discussed here, we understand the militarisation of the Party as the ensemble of the transformations, changes and adjustments necessary to lead people's war as the principal form of struggle giving rise to the new state and the joint dictatorship that will transform society and replace the rule of imperialism, bureaucrat capitalism and semifeudalism with a New Democratic People's Republic, thus culminating the democratic revolution, and further — within the framework of world imperialism and reaction which are sinking and will sink in the midst of wars, attacking and seeking to destroy all that is new and revolutionary, especially everything proletarian — to defend and develop the revolution in its socialist stage, preserving the dictatorship of the

proletariat and preventing the restoration of capitalism, tightening the omnipresent links with the world revolution by serving as a base area for the joint war of the proletariat and peoples to sweep imperialism and reaction off the face of the earth, and continue along the road of repeated cultural revolutions until communism. It is within these general outlines that we conceive of the development of a specific people's war fighting against an equally specific counter-revolutionary war, taking place within the framework of an era of many varied wars in which imperialism is sinking, in short, a great clash between people's war and counter-revolutionary war on a world level, the highest form of struggle and the one that will decide the issue. Looking at things in the broadest terms, as long as there are classes the advance to communism itself through cultural revolutions will take place in the shadow of people's war as the proletariat's military line, with its ongoing development. Consequently our Party and all communist parties face this necessity and these prospects no matter what specific forms they may take.

To be specific about the militarisation of the Party, our Party as a whole has plunged into the people's war, throwing all its members into it; in short, "Our cen-

tre is combat," as our Central Committee decided. Another important question is that of concentric construction, meaning, in brief, to take the Party as the axis around which to build the army, and around these instruments, together with the unleashing of the masses in people's war, to build the new state. An outstanding question is "the training of Party members first and foremost as communists, and as fighters and administrators," so as to carry out the three great tasks demanded by the revolution. Mass work must be developed through and for the people's war. Leadership is key and there must be a Headquarters. The two-line struggle must be firmly and consistently developed, so as to strengthen the Party and other organisations for the people's war. A vital and decisive question is the further development of the political line: we have achieved a considerably deeper understanding of Peruvian society, of the political conjuncture and principally of military line, people's war and how to lead it, especially regarding the specifics of war in Peru and how it unfolds simultaneously in the countryside and city without forgetting that the countryside is principal. Finally, as was inevitable, the number of Party members has increased considerably, with peasants becoming a very high percentage and a considerable number of youth and women entering the Party, which entails some obvious problems but more importantly a great future as well, as long as proletarian ideology is strengthened. As the crowning aspect of our advances, the people's war has allowed the Party to more firmly and clearly grasp Maoism as the third and highest stage of Marxism and take up the task of "Upholding, defending and applying Marxism-Leninism-Maoism" and struggle to put it in command of the world revolution, with the consciousness that this will serve communism, the proletariat and the oppressed peoples; furthermore, more firmly grasping the class outlook and fusing it with the people's war has led to the further development of Guiding Thought. Finally, the people's war itself has

made it possible to further train the Party membership in proletarian internationalism.

Regarding our armed forces, the people's war, the masses of people and the Party have given rise to the People's Guerrilla Army, an army of a new type to carry out the political tasks of the revolution established by the Party and take up the tasks consecrated by the international experience of the proletariat: to fight, to produce and to mobilise the masses, which means politically educating them, mobilising them, organising and arming them. It is a peasant army under the absolute leadership of the Party according to the principle "the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party." Its foundation is work to build it up ideologically, with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and its application, that is, Guiding Thought, the Party's general line and policies; building the army politically is complemented by organising the Party within the army, with Party leadership of all political work within the army as well as of the army's mass work. Militarily the army is built on the basis of the theory of people's war and the Party's military line and plans; it is organised in detachments in the city and platoons, companies and battalions in the countryside, always under the double command system, one political and the other military, guided today by the slogan "develop the companies and strengthen the platoons aiming for battalion." This building of the People's Guerrilla Army is also based on Lenin's great thesis regarding the people's militia and its three functions as police, army and administration. Military training takes place with the aim of developing bellicosity so that actions are thoroughly and successfully carried out. The armed forces started out as armed detachments without arms, because as Lenin taught the lack of arms cannot be used as a pretext for not organising an armed apparatus; later they armed themselves with whatever they could, including with dynamite, which is still very important, since rudimentary and traditional





**VIVA LA LUCHA ARMADA!**

**PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU 1980-1983**

weapons play a fundamental role. Though we strive to get modern weapons by snatching them from the reactionary forces, we follow Chairman Mao Tsetung's great teaching, which history has proven: "Since history began, revolutionary wars have always been won by those whose weapons were deficient, lost by those with the advantage in weapons. . . . If one cannot fight unless one has the most modern weapons, that is the same as disarming oneself." The People's Guerrilla Army, with its thousands of combatants, has proven itself; it has been steeled in the forge of the people's war and is the pillar of the new state power.

The new state power, the new state in the form of People's Committees, the developing base areas and the New Democratic People's Republic in formation — this is the highest achievement of six years of people's war. Taking Chairman Mao Tsetung's thesis on the state into account, we consider this question very linked to the united front, especially taking into account the specific conditions in which we are developing and the tradition of opportunist electoral "fronts" in our country. The Central Committee has instructed that the People's Revolutionary Defense Front be built only in the countryside, in the concrete form of the new state power, based on People's Committees; while in the cities the People's Revolutionary Defense Movement is being built. The People's Committees arose towards the end of 1982, first in Ayacucho, after the police forces were dealt humiliating blows and withdrew from large parts of the countryside. These are united front committees that give concrete expression to the joint dictatorship of the workers, peasants and petit bourgeois, the three classes taking part in the armed revolution today: the proletariat, the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie. These people's committees, taken as a system of state, are the concrete form of the New Democratic dictatorship whose system of government, in turn, is based on the people's assemblies. Although the national bourgeoisie is not taking part in the revolution

now, its interests are respected. The Committee is elected by a Delegate Assembly according to the three-thirds rule: one-third communists as representatives of the proletariat, one-third poor peasants as representatives of the peasantry and one-third middle peasants and progressive elements as representatives of the petite bourgeoisie. Like all the forms of the new state power, the Committees are based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the proletariat represented by the Communist Party and supported by the People's Guerrilla Army. The Committee is made up of five commissioners, called this to emphasise that they have been commissioned to perform a specific task and can be recalled at any time. Within the framework of the programme of the democratic revolution — the destruction of imperialism, bureaucrat capitalism and semifeudalism — they organise the social life of the masses in all spheres: the organisation of production, especially agriculture, and commerce, which are guided towards collective work; justice, education and recreation, as well as seeing to the progress of the people's organisations and guaranteeing collective and individual security. The basis of this work is the introduction of new social production relations. The development of the hundreds of People's Committees and of the base areas for which they are the foundation follows the fluidity of guerrilla warfare, since they are principally a product of guerrilla warfare following the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside and of the people's war as a whole, and they have suffered the assaults of the counter-revolutionary war. Thus an acute struggle is being waged around the new state power, between the armed revolution and the armed counter-revolution. For instance, the struggle between restoration and counter-restoration waged especially during the years 1983 and 1984 is very significant. On this subject, it is worth pointing out that during the last two years the People's Guerrilla Army carried out 180 counter-restorations and in connection with this sharp contention seiz-

ed 591 towns. In short, the vortex of the war between the People's Guerrilla Army and the reactionary Armed Forces and police is the question of the new state power, the creation, defense and development of the people's committees, the base areas and the continuing advance in the formation of the New Democratic People's Republic, the new state, which shines and will continue to shine against wind and rain, like a blazing, defiant torch calling on the people to surge forward with the flaming waves of the people's war, devouring the past and vigorously opening the future for the proletariat and the people forever.

And what has been the cost in lives? The reactionary policy of setting masses against masses, of genocide and disappearances has already cost the lives of 11,300 of our people. Adding to that the 1,668 dead of the Armed Forces and police, plus police agents, informers, feudal tyrants and despots, and the 1,738 fallen of the People's Guerrilla Army, this adds up to approximately fifteen thousand dead as of May 1986. This is the truth, not the doctored statistics the reaction publishes to cover up its sinister genocidal policies.

This is the people's war in Peru. Its analysis and comprehension demand that four questions be taken up — Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, the Party, people's war and the new state power — whose consideration has brought us to a clear and concrete conclusion: the people's war in Peru is an authentic people's war which is turning the country upside down; the "old mole" is burrowing deeply in the bowels of the old society and no one can stop him; the future already dwells among us — the old and rotten society is sinking hopelessly and the revolution shall prevail. Long live the armed struggle!

Develop the People's War To Serve the World Revolution!

Glory to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism!

Long Live the World Revolution!

Long Live Chairman Gonzalo!

Central Committee

Communist Party of Peru

Peru, August '86.



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