**Brief introduction of Andhra Pradesh and Dandakaranya movements**

**(from 1969 to 2007)**

***[****Few aspects in this article have been published as the brief history of the erstwhile CPI (ML) (People’s War) in the first issue of People’s War. On the occasion of the Fiftieth anniversary of Naxalbari and as its continuation and development, we felt that studying the revolutionary movement in the leadership of CPI (ML) (People’s War), especially the Andhra Pradesh and the Dandakaranya movements would help to develop a theoretical-political understanding. So we edited the above things and added certain important aspects in the post-merger POR and brought it to the readers****.*** *– Editorial Board****]***

**Movement in Andhra Pradesh**

**1. Srikakulam struggle-11th State Conference (from the beginning of 1969 to May 1970)**

The Naxalbari struggle enthused the revolutionary forces across the country. ‘All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries’ was formed in 1967 in the leadership of Comrade Charu Mazumdar to unite the revolutionary forces that came forth breaking revisionism and neo-revisionism and take forward the revolutionary struggles. Among the revolutionaries of Andhra Pradesh who accepted Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought as the guide, Tarimela Nagireddy (TN), Devulapalli Venkateswararao (DV) and others first refused to join this committee. Though they joined the coordination committee unable to bear the pressure from their followers, they took different stands on the assessment of the revolutionary situation, tactics of armed struggle and methods of revolutionary party organization in the specific conditions and refused to lead the Srikakulam struggle. Thus the leadership of Srikakulam rejected their leadership in the interest of revolution and so the coordination committee too dissociated with them. If it did not do so, the great Srikakulam struggle would not have happened. The intense struggle of the coordination committee in the leadership of Comrade Charu Mazumdar with the TN-DV group and the daring leadership of the Srikakulam peasant struggle are inseparable. Revolutionary party was formed in AP through fighting the right opportunism of TN-DV group.

State Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries was formed with nine members in the meeting in Guthikondabilam in 1969 March to consolidate the revolutionary forces in the state. This meeting decided to form Regional Committees and thus before the end of 1969 RCs were formed in Telangana, North Andhra-South Odisha and Rayalaseema.

By then the Srikakulam Peasant struggle was in a good momentum. The meeting in Guthikondabilam helped to spread revolutionary fire across the state and also later sowed seeds for the left deviation in the Party. We made an intense fight against the right opportunism of the TN-DV group and decided in the Guthikondabilam meeting to start annihilation of class enemy in every area where we had contacts in the state, with the aim of diverting the concentration of the enemy on Srikakulam struggle at that time. We did not consider the preparation of the people, their organizational strength and the organisational strength of the Party and started annihilation of class enemy with an adventurist understanding of making struggle without people.

The All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries became the Central Organizing Committee of Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) on 1969 April 22nd. With this the Andhra Pradesh Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries became the State Organising Committee. In this process the eleventh State Conference was held in 1970 May. A nine member State Committee was elected with Comrade Adibhatla Kailasam as Secretary. This Conference saw the depth of the impact of revisionist trends in a few leading comrades of Srikakulam struggle and gave powers to the new State Committee to take appropriate actions.

The Eighth Congress of the Party was held in 1970 May. While delegates from other places of Andhra Pradesh could not attend the Congress some of the Srikakulam comrades attended. This Congress elected Comrades Vempatapu Sathyam, Adibhatla Kailasam, Appalasuri and Nagabhushan Patnaik into the Central Committee from AP.

The eleventh State Conference was successful but group conflicts between the Srikakulam leadership (this was the main part of the then State leadership) arose and they not only led to disappointment but later created great loss to the development of revolution and the organizational development of the Party. Due to these conflicts the Party cadres of Srikakulam district worked as internal groups of the Party in the forest and the plain areas. While Comrades Vempatapu Sathyam and Adibhatla Kailasam led the cadres in the forest areas Comrades Choudari Tejeswara Rao (from the Jail) and Mamidi Appalasuri led the cadres in the plain areas.

In 1969 the Srikakulam struggle achieved many successes facing enemy repression. Starting with the loss of Comrade Panigrahi squad in an attack, there were severe losses in succession. Within a few months of the Party Congress the beloved leaders of the oppressed masses of Andhra, Comrades Vempatapu Sathyam and Adibhatla Kailasam became martyrs at the same time and the struggle stepped back.

In fact the eleventh State Conference took place in the conditions when there was severe enemy offensive on the Srikakulam struggle and losses. The differences in the understanding related to the political outlook and Protracted People’s War in the Party until then hidden surfaced in the form of group conflicts in conditions of loss to the struggle.

Before another meeting of the State Committee, two comrades the Conference elected including the Secretary became martyrs and another four were arrested. Finally two from Telangana and one from Rayalaseema were left in the State Committee. Thus the entire State leadership faced a loss. By that time except for the comrades elected into the State Committee from Srikakulam, members elected from the other areas did not have a state wide recognition or statewide contact.

Before the State Conference, apart from the Regional Committees in Telangana and Rayalaseema there were 8-9 Party professionals. There were two Area Committees in Guntur district. After the State Conference they too became defunct and the members worked as individuals in the respective places. Until 1969 Srikakulam was strong and later Guntur district became organizationally strong. But in this district too group conflicts arose. The District Committees of Krishna, West and East Godavari became defunct by the time of the State Conference and a few individuals remained. The State Committee did not have any contact with them. The District Committees of Visakha and Srikakulam worked in the direct guidance of the State Committee until the Conference.

This is briefly the organizational condition of the Party in the state by 1970. At that time only full time activists were considered to be Party Members. The State Committee was not clear about Party Organisation of part-timers. Party organization and squad formation were alike. Where there was Area Committee or Regional Committee, except for the members of the Committee there was no discretion between organisers and members. All the activists were in the squads and so there was a distinction between the Commander and members of the Squad. Where there was no squad formation, individuals did whatever the Regional Committee told them to.

1. **Attack of opportunists on the Party – Reorganisation of the State Committee – (from 1970 to November 1973)**

Tejeswara Rao and Appalasuri did not like the decisions of the State Conference. They received those decisions with a group attitude. Tejeswara Rao was not at all ready for self-criticism and developed enmity towards the State Committee and Comrade Charu Mazumdar and started collaborating with the TN-DV group in jail. It was a condition where a main part of the State Committee was affected and there was an opportunity to build relations with the rest of the members of the State Committee and the Srikakulam leadership. But Tejeswara Rao did not attempt to do this and he put Comrade Paila Vasu in the centre as a state leader and took up activities in Srikakulam and Visakha districts. In a few days there was a difference of opinion between Tejeswara Rao and Appalasuri regarding appointing Defense lawyer in the court and they inevitably wrote to the State Committee members for their opinion. So in 1971 March the State Committee members got the chance to meet Srikakulam comrades.

The meeting of the State Committee in 1971 March co-opted Comrade Paila Vasudevarao and elected him secretary. In the State Committee that worked from 1971 March to 1972 March with Paila Vasu as the secretary, there were differences in a lot of issues between the secretary and the rest of the members. The secretary agreed during discussions but attempted to implement the directions of Tejeswararao from jail. Due to the internal struggle in the state committee, in its meeting in 1972 February-March it made unanimous resolution**s** that we have to utilize mass organisations and partial struggles, we have to annihilate class enemies as a part of class struggle, to build party with part-time members, not to dissolve squads in Srikakulam, utilize legal opportunities, use Errajenda (Red flag) magazine for internal discussion and that none should distribute Sathyanarayana Singh’s literature in the party (by that time Paila Vasu was distributing). Since all these resolutions were against the policies of the CC, in order to work abiding the rule of democratic centralism, they decided to send two PC members to submit them to the CC. But Comrade Vasu went and directly joined the Sathyanarayana Singh group. Thus Comrade KS was elected secretary of the State Committee.

By that time there was setback in the Srikakulam struggle and shortcomings in the party, utilizing which the right opportunist disruptive forces tried to split and disrupt the party. The competitive party formed in the leadership of Sathyanarayana Singh in mid-1971 was the result of this.

The two members of the State Committee met Comrade CM in 1972 July and discussed the resolutions. After discussions Comrade CM accepted to implement them. Within a few days Comrade CM was caught by the enemy and became a martyr.

The period of 1972 July to 1973 November was a very difficult time in the history of our Party. Since Comrade CM was martyred the PC lost contact with the Central Committee. In the attempt to revive contact with the CC a SCM was arrested in 1972 November. In 1973 February another SCM was arrested and the secretary was left alone.

During this time Souren Bose turned traitor and came to Visakha jail. He and Kanu Sanyal joined hands with the TN-DV group in the jail and attacked Comrade CM. They released an open letter of six in the leadership of Tejeswararao in the name of suggestions from the China party. Various kinds of opportunists and betrayers of revolution attacked the Party policies and Comrade CM inside the jails and outside.

Poets and writers influenced with the Naxalbari-Srikakulam Peasant struggles, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of China and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Thought formed Viplava Rachayitala Sangam (Virasam-RWA-Revolutionary Writer’s Association) in 1970 July. Right from the formation of Virasam the State Committee had close relations with it through a few party members. Virasam made theoretical fight in the initial period with neo-revisionism and later with those in the influence of right politics of TN-DV group and strengthened organizational unity. In this period there was unprecedented amount of revolutionary literature in the history of revolution in Andhra Pradesh.

‘Errajenda’ (Red flag) theoretical magazine was started secretly.

During this time except for Srikakulam sixteen class enemies were wiped out by our squads in other areas of Andhra Pradesh. By 1970 Srikakulam Peasant Armed struggle setback and Guntur district and Rayalaseema that were to be the centre in the later period fell into temporary stagnation. After Srikakulam, Telangana came forth as the centre of Party activities. It is but natural that such changes occur in the path of Protracted People’s War that advances in waves.

In the end of 1972 Jananatyamandali (JNM) team was formed with Hyderabad city as the centre in the guidance of the State Committee. The activities of JNM created revolutionary enthusiasm among the people of Andhra Pradesh as much as the Prajanatyamandali created before the Telangana struggle.

State Committee started ‘Pilupu’ (Call) magazine from 1972 August with the legal opportunities. The magazine contributed a lot to guide the Party Members on National and International issues and to fight back the political ill propaganda of the opportunists and disruptors on the Party.

There was no Central Committee from the above and no State Committee in the state and in such a situation, removing the theoretical confusion spread in the party ranks, establishing party unity, holding State Conference and electing a new state committee was the main problem before the State Secretary. In conditions where there is no central leadership it is very difficult to take up such a responsibility. Anyhow since Comrade CM accepted the resolutions of the 1972 February-March State Committee meeting, the then secretary discussed with the leading members and took the final decision to tell these resolutions to all the cadres of the party and achieve political unity. The serial articles in ‘Pilupu’ helped to fight back the attacks of the disruptors and highlight the Party line. In this process they came into contact with the centre in 1973 November and so the State Conference was stopped and importance given to establish relations with the centre.

1. **3. Joining the COC-Self-critical report-Reorganisation of the movement (from 1973 November to 1977 May)**

Within a short time of the martyrdom of Comrade CM a Central Committee was established in the leadership of Comrade Mahadev Mukherjee. Though the APPC came into contact with that committee, due to the absolute sectarian conditions for unity, there was no way for discussions with them. But the task at that time was to control the attempts of the disruptors, mobilize all the genuine revolutionaries for this purpose, build a Central Committee that gained the confidence of all such people depending on self-criticism; this work is possible through patient discussions but not closing the doors idiotically by imposing stern conditions.

Only after the failure of all attempts to meet the Bengal comrades due to their stringent conditions the AP secretary met Punjab comrades. By that time the Punjab comrades took initiative and a four member Central Committee was formed. Comrade Sharma of Punjab was the secretary of this committee. Out of them except for the Bihar comrade the rest three were elected in the Congress. This committee lacked political unity. In 1974 January AP secretary joined the CC. But in order to not give chance to those who raise doubts that since this was called CC it would permanently be so, this meeting of the CC resolved to form the Central Committee as the Central Organising Committee, to make a comprehensive self-criticism and formulate tactics regarding the past, to unite the splinter groups into one party to the extent possible and later hold Party Congress and elect an efficient Central Committee. It decided to implement the unanimous decisions of this committee until the Congress.

In 1974 September APPC prepared a self-critical report ‘let us review the past and successfully advance in the path of armed struggle’ [the CC of CPI (ML) (PW) accepted this document in 1980 with little changes]. This document was the guide to practice in Andhra Pradesh since 1974 and to the entire People’s War party from 1980. The positive and negative aspects of our practice mentioned in this document are already mentioned in the foreword to the Central Political and Oganisational Report. Other members of COC prepared two self-critical reports. They formulated the tactical path (path of revolution) unanimously. But since the formation of COC it lacked political unity and so it could not achieve organizational unity too and was disrupted in 1977 May.

With the arrest of the State Committee members there was no State Committee from 1973 March to 1974 July. State Committee was formed in 1974 August with Comrade KS, Comrade Appalasuri who broke from jail and Comrade Mahadev who was released on bail.

As per the resolutions of the PC meeting in 1972 February-March, Party started working in the workers, students and peasantry. PC prepared the document ‘Party work in the urban areas’ in the end of 1973. Radical Students Union (RSU) was formed in the beginning of 1975 only through fighting back the wrong tendencies of keeping the student organisations away from revolutionary politics. Since the beginning of 1974 until the imposition of emergency, we took up wide propaganda in all the corners of the state through Jananatyamandali, Virasam, RSU and other organisations. Party spread to new areas.

The attack of the disruptors was fought back satisfactorily through the ‘Pilupu’ magazine but the mistakes of the party were not made clear. Only after the self-critical report in 1974 the party cadres were educated properly. On seeing this document Comrade Attaluri Mallikharjunarao and very few others criticized that our party took up the revisionist line and left the party to join Lin Piao group. But the activities of our party increased in various areas of the state.

Within a few days of starting our activities in the youth field emergency was imposed in the country in June 1975. During emergency repression on our party exceeded that on the other parties. Government banned our party and all kinds of open activities. Many activists of RSU and Party Members became Professional Revolutionaries. Classes were conducted for them and sent to forest areas. While all attempts in 1969, 70 and 72 failed another attempt was made with much more arrangements. We concentrated on Karimnagar and Adilabad districts.

The party cadres were educated basing on the self-critical report, party unity enhanced and as a part of the attempts to hold the State Conference of the party, First Conference of Telangana Region was held from 1976 December 29th to 1977 January. The conference echoed with the slogans ‘Let us unite with the oppressed masses’, ‘let us build a party invincible to the enemy and entwined with the oppressed masses’, ‘let us make special efforts to create organisers from the oppressed masses’, ‘let us build secret mass organisations to widen the mass base’, ‘let us prepare the people for armed struggle basing on mass line’, ‘let us sow the seeds for the formation of red army by laying foundation to spread into the forest through organizing the tribals by sending two armed squads’.

1. **4. Change of tactics – Karimnagar, Adilabad peasant struggles – (from 1977 May to 1979 March)**

In the parliament elections in 1977 March dictator Indira faced a big defeat and Janata Party came to power. Emergency was lifted. The Janata Party that came to power opposing the emergency rule and propagating democratic rights, released the revolutionaries on bail. Ban on meetings was lifted. Utilizing these changes in the conditions, a document was written changing the tactics to implement the decisions of the first conference of Telangana. This document that was accepted after wide discussions in various districts guided the activities of the party as the ‘August Resolution’.

District Committees were formed on the occasion of the discussions to decide on this document. Comrade Mahadev of the State Committee reorganized in 1974 August was caught by the enemy in 1976 and became a martyr. In 1977 March Comrade KS was arrested and put in jail. Appalasuri was the only person left in the PC. PC was reorganized in 1977 August with another three members. But immediately Comrade Appalasuri was arrested and declared his difference with the August Resolution. Comrade Rawoof in jail criticized that the leadership divorced from armed struggle in the name of change of tactics and split from the party with some others.

As per the changes in tactics PC started openly publishing its political mouthpiece ‘Kranthi’ (Revolution) and revolutionary literature. ‘Radical March’ came out openly as the monthly magazine of radical students and youth. These magazines played a vital role in politically educating the party forces, students and the youth.

There was correct revolutionary guidance to the mass organisations through the documents, ‘Do not distance the mass organisations from the political aim in the name of formation of united mass organisations’, ‘letter to the executive members of RSU’ and radical student and youth organisations were formed all over the state. The word ‘radical’ was a synonym for revolutionaries. In 1978 February and June the conferences of radical students and youth were held.

In 1978 January PC brought the document ‘Coming Assembly elections-Our tasks’ and conducted a campaign for boycott of elections. The slogan ‘boycott the fake Assembly elections, prepare for Agrarian Revolution’ enthused the oppressed masses across the state. PC gave a call ‘students and youth, go to villages’ in the summer holidays of 1978 and conducted the campaign. JNM took up statewide propaganda starting from 1977 September. The political propaganda, the struggle and organisational activities of the student and youth organisations during this period contributed as the preparation for initiating peasant struggles from mid-1978.

Jagityal peasant struggles started as a spate from 1978 June. Within three months the government started repression and announced Jagityal and Siricilla talukas as disturbed areas.

PC prepared a comprehensive action plan to spread these struggles to other areas amidst repression. As a result peasant struggles broke in Karimnagar and Adilabad in a short time. The Jagityal struggle that started in forty villages spread to Karimnagar and Adilabad areas like wild fire. It established people’s power rooting out feudalism. The slogan of all powers to the organization reverberated all over the rural area. Tribals of Adilabad district rebelled against the exploitation of the landlords, money-lenders, forest officers and government. The struggle of the tribal peasantry of Asifabad against the money-lenders and the tribal rebellion of Indravelli in 1981 brought a turn in the tribal movement. Gradually the peasant struggles spread to Warangal, Khamman and later to Nizamabad. By the end of 1979 party activities started in the student, youth, worker, peasant and literary fields to some extent in all the corners of Andhra Pradesh. The spate of the peasant struggles in Karimnagar and Adilabad is the result of the protracted effort to mold the party from the left line into the correct path through the PC meeting in 1972 February-March, 1974 September self-critical report, Telangana Regional Conference and 1977 August resolution.

With the spread of revolutionary activities many joined the party. Many comrades in jail too were released. All of them do not know much about party history and politics. Many more are coming forth in various struggles as activists. In order to consolidate all of them State Committee took up the third campaign of consolidation in 1978 July. Though this campaign helped to consolidate the party it failed to build the party with part-timers at local level. All the organisers and members of the district committee were new and lacked any kind of experience in the building of the party and more over it also failed in providing direct guidance. The second is the main reason. Though the party failed in building in the local level it expanded in 1977-79. By the end of 1979 there were 120 Professional Revolutionaries (PR) in our party. Sathyamurthy was released in 1978 and Comrade KS was released in 1979. They were taken into the State Committee. Until Comrade KS came Mukku Subbareddy was the secretary of the State Committee for a while.

The immediate task of transforming Karimnagar, Adilabad, Warangal and Khammam districts into guerilla areas and laying foundation for Protracted People’s War came forth the party by the end of 1979. Then the movement in our state was in four levels – 1. The above four districts where there were peasant struggles and guerilla zone was to be formed. 2. The other districts of Telangana where anti-feudal struggles broke and the Rayalaseema districts. 3. Few districts utilizing legal opportunities and taking up propaganda activities. 4. Urban areas that started work as a part of the strategy of Protracted People’s War.

1. **5. Formation of Central Committee – Guerilla Zone perspective – Twelfth State Conference (from the beginning of 1980 to the end of 1984)**

The Central Committee of CPI (ML) (People’s War) was formed on 22nd April 1980.

According to the decision of the PC regarding guerilla zone perspective the 12th Conference of the State was successfully completed in 1980 September. District, Regional and State Committees were elected for the first time with comrades who were tested in practice to some or the other extent. The State Conference passed the self-critical report of the Central Committee, the document of tactical line, the State Political and Organisational Review, Political Resolution and Party Organisation-Our tasks. There were amendments to Party Program and Constitution. An eleven member State Committee was elected in the Conference. In the PC meeting the next month Comrade KS stepped out from the responsibility of the secretary and new secretary was elected.

In 1980-84 peasant struggles spread to all corners of Andhra Pradesh. Radical Students’ movement continued all through the state. Until 1984 there were 6 state conferences of RSU, 4 of RYL and 3 of RCS. The strength of people’smobilization grew in a considerable manner. JNM teams were formed in various district levels and propagated widely. Writers’ and Civil Rights movements expanded to a big extent. The urban movements in Warangal, Singareni, Hyderabad and Visakhapatnam became strong. Since 1978 students and youth of the rural areas moved in hundreds to the villages in the summer holidays and took up propaganda campaigns. All through this period mass organisations in the leadership of our party widely mobilized the people on many kinds of partial demands and political agitations and became an influential force. Party started to be built in the local level and classes were conducted to party members in various levels. In a way, party organization and the area of operation of the party spread extensively. Class struggle intensified and armed formations began. The movement fought back the attacks of the landlords in various forms and the repression of the government (including encounters from 1982) anddeveloped in waves.

New problems came forth the party in the process of development of the movement. Mainly the leadership fell into spontaneity regarding forms of struggle and organization in the guerilla zone area, formation of squads in the local level and the village defense squads, eradicating the wrong tendencies and other such things (though it released letters and circulars time to time). The lack of collective effort to solve these problems led to the six evils in PC since 1982. These evils became a hurdle to the work of the PC.

The PC identified the six evils in some of its members and took up serious self-criticism-criticism to rectify them in the 1984 July meeting. It changed the state secretary. This meeting decided to eradicate any kind of evils that came up in the specific conditions in the entire party, through criticism-self-criticism.

PC discussed the new Political Resolution that the Central Committee released in 1984 May and decided in this meeting to conduct classes as a part of preparations for the Party Conferences. It engaged in the classes.

Now we need to know the situation of the State Committee. Out of the 11 members elected in the 12th State Conference three were also members in the CC. In 1981, 82 and 83 three members were taken into the PC. After Comrade KS was arrested in 1982 January Mukku Subbareddy was taken as a member of CC. In 1984 February**,** Comrade KS was released from the enemy’s clutches. From 1981 to 1984 July the PC centre worked with three for a while and with five for a while and waslater made the Secretariat.

1. **6. First repressive campaign of the government-First crisis of the Party-13th State Conference-Armed People’s Resistance (from the beginning of 1985 to November 1989)**

There was a qualitative change in the enemy offensive by 1985. There was intense offensive on the people, party and every field of the movement. On the other hand four members in the CC made an opportunist conspiracy and came forth in the February meeting of the CC in the name of internal struggle in the party. As per the decision of the CC, Andhra Pradesh plenum was conducted from May 6th to 11th to solve this crisis. The secretaries of the divisions attended as delegates to this plenum. Plenum understood that without exposing and defeating all the opportunist conspiracies and keeping the party united it would not be possible to face the government offensive firmly and took necessary decisions.

It understood the repression and the massacre on the movement since the beginning of 1985 in a proper manner and met the North Telangana Regional Committee, the Division secretaries of Dandakaranya, the Regional Secretaries of Rayalaseema, South Coastal Andhra, South Telangana from May 13th to 16th to form the guidelines to fight back this offensive (undeclared war) and discussed the character of government offensive, the self-defensive resistance and the forms of struggle and organization in the International and National situations at that time and brought out the document, ‘Let us defeat the government offensive! Let us protect the party and guerilla squads keenly! Let us fight daringly! We shall gain the ultimate victory’.

The second part mentioned about the political and organizational good and bad regarding the crisis in the Party and the 13th State Conference. Anyway the main mistakes of the PC in 1985-89 are like this – when the secretary of the PC was arrested in 1986 May, the meeting in September reorganized it as a shorter committee of five members. This formation of shorter committee created big loss in the development of the PC as a collective leadership team to provide collective leadership according to the intensifying movement and to understand the new problemsconcretely and formulate new tasks of organization and struggle in proper time. It was proved in practice that it was wrong for Andhra Pradesh to form Central Committee. Rectification campaign was planned in an immature manner exceeding the practical strength expecting it to be conducted like the Communist Party of China in 1942 and itfailed. There were severe mistakes politically, regarding mass organisations, education and other such things, there was lagging behind and falling into spontaneity. Since 1980 there were important mistakes in promotions, committee functioning, political and organizational decisions as a result of which two members of the State Committee were expelled from the Party in 1985-87, two were demoted and another was dropped. One member degenerated.

During this period to a large extent PC took correct decisions in the fight against the opportunists in the Central Committee, in the method of Party work, in identifying the mistakes in the style of work-people’s resistance, in developing secret organisations, in conducting rectification and education campaign at least to a limited extent, establishing a secret mechanism and publishing magazines and literature and other such things. The Party provided leadership so that the people can decide the necessity to fight for protection and political power through their own experience and rights. Observing 28th July as martyr’s day in 1989 established a great tradition of sacrifice among the people. During this period people created many new forms of struggle and organization and strengthened the People’s War. We defeated the government repressive campaign. But we paid heavily**.** (We lost 19 District, Regional and State Committee members, nearly 250 organisers, brave guerillas, members of organization, sympathisers and people during this repressive campaign). The mistakes, experiences gained and the sacrifices made during this period are the inevitable value paid for the future struggles and the development of the movement.

1. **7. Change in tactics – People’s wave – (from December 1989 to 1990 November)**

Congress-I lost power in the centre in the elections held in 1989 November. It came to power in Andhra Pradesh. In the background of these consequences the Chennareddy government in Andhra Pradesh invited us to talks. It planned to create illusions through talks, divert us from the path of armed struggle and if we reject talks we could be described as blood-thirsty perpetrators of violence, we could be isolated from the people and given a blow and however it happens they can settle down and then suppress us through heavy repression. PC acted with initiative and took proper decisions to defeat the plans of Chennareddy government and imposed conditions for talks to utilize the contradictions between the enemies.

When the government repressive measures were temporarily stopped, PC stopped armed retaliation and squad actions temporarily and decided not to make any relaxation in the secret organisations. It took the aim to make political propaganda, agitations of the problems of the vast masses and expanding the squads to the areas of the movement and made the necessary changes in tactics.

Though the relaxation in repression was for only a few months we could achieve the maximum of the expected results. We were successful in utilizing the contradictions between the enemies, defeat the enemy tactics and encircling and isolating the enemy with people’s struggles, widely propagating the politics of Protracted People’s War, mobilise lakhs of people in a wave of people’s struggle including land struggles and creating political agitation, mobilizing youth into the local leadership in a big number, enhance recruitment and expand the squads and the area of movement.

But at the same time there were some mistakes in practice. They took place in conducting people’s courts, in solving the contradictions among the people, in punishing, kidnaps and other such things. Few useless persons (a section) penetrated into the local organization. We loosely recruited some into the squads. Since the PC did not take proper decisions in time to mold the people into a collective militant retaliation to fight back police repression, people widely used the form of kidnap for their struggle to protect the leaders of the organization from police repression. Though this is inevitable in a wave of people’s struggle PC continued to fail in educating the cadres and so there were many mistakes. There was also no time to understand the conditions and prepare the cadres in utilizing it. PC realized the mistakes in this movement and started attempts to rectify them from mid-1990 in the process of which another crisis rose in the Party and we could not take up these attempts. On the whole this period gave a big experience to the Party.

In the State plenum in 1990 August an 11 member committee was elected. In the COC elected in the central plenum there were four members of APPC. This is another attempt to develop collective leadership teams.

1. **8. The Second Repressive campaign – Second crisis in the Party – Armed People’s Resistance – Preparations for Conference (from 1990 December to 1994 March)**

The fiasco of Chennareddy’s talks ended with the heroic struggles of the people and repressive campaign started in May, continued with encounters made by the government in 1990 June and intensified with the police firing and massacre on the people in December. With the intensification of encounter massacre by deploying thousands of BSF, ITBF and CISF forces in 1991 November/December, the repressive campaign intensified. The people and guerilla squads were heroically resisting this repressive campaign. During this period the beloved leader of the oppressed masses of Andhra Pradesh and secretary of the State Committee Comrade Anjanna (Sagar), ten members of the District, Regional Committees, 500 organisers, heroic guerillas, members of organisations, sympathisers and people laid their lives. During these three and a half years of attempts to protect and advance the movement we not only lost leadership but also Arms and Ammunition and money. We wiped out the cruel DIG Vyas, many police and Para-military officers and police. We seized many Arms and Ammunition. We marched forward in the People’s War making sacrifices in each and every step.

We fought another undeclared war launched by the central government in the three states (AP, MP and Maharashtra) from the end of 1990, with ‘defensive war’ tactics. During this period we faced severe losses of leadership in AP. Starting from 1985 AP, MP, Maharashtra and Orissa police machinery have been modernised and turned fascist as never before. On the other hand, people’s armed resistance too has grown.

Again, from the end of 1990, the armed offensive by the enemy was stepped up throughout AP, a ban was imposed on the CPI(ML)(PW) and the mass organizations in May 1992. Fake encounters grew phenomenally and there was a virtual reign of white terror all over North and South Telangana regions and East Division. The Party confronted this brutal offensive boldly through defensive war, organized ambushes and raids, both opportunity and deliberate, and mobilized the people’s militia units in some places into armed actions against the police and state property. Armed clashes with the police and paramilitary forces have become more intense and emerged as the main form, while the clashes with the local enemies became secondary. The guerilla squads of PW took up planned retaliation and resistance during the 1990s. In 1992 a BSF van was blasted in Station Ghanpur, there was an ambush in Bhupalapalli and in 1994 December there was Lenkalagadda ambush. Several police stations and camps were raided and weapons were seized. After the series of raids in 1996 like those on Karkagudem and Sirpur(U) police stations-cum-APSP-CRPF camps, several camps and police stations were withdrawn by the government from the interior areas. Ambushes deterred the police and para-military from venturing into the interior areas. Special forces that were brought from other states such as the Punjab Commandos received severe blows. The heroic armed resistance by the guerillas gave a fillip to the mass movements which increased after 1995. Class struggles on various issues and Land occupation struggles became a common feature and organs of people’s democratic power along with various people’s committees emerged in several villages of North Telangana. The initiative of the oppressed masses was released after we won a few victories against the police.

PC reviewed the experiences from the 13th State Conference until now and concentrated on political work to unite all the party cadres theoretically, politically, organisationally and militarily in the light of the lessons. Mukku Subbareddy, Nimmaluri Bhaskararao and other such degenerated elements were pushed aside and the entire Party and revolutionary people were totally confident that the Andhra Pradesh comrades would ideally continue their role in the light of the martyrs shedding blood in every step.

**Dandakaranya**

By the end of 1979 the landlords and the government indulged in much more cruel repression to eliminate the peasant struggle in Karimnagar and Adilabad. It was inevitable to expand the movement and take it to a higher level in order to sustain this condition and advance. So though the peasant struggles in Warangal and Khammam did not rise to the level of the struggles in Karimnagar and Adilabad, there was a chance that the enemy took these four districts as a whole and intensify repression. So it was decided to develop guerrilla zone comprising Karimnagar and Adilabad districts including Warangal and Khammam districts.

The AP State Committee sent peasant guerrilla squads to the forest (Dandakaranya) in 1980 April-June with the protracted view that if class struggles in the above four districts of the guerrilla area intensify and the brutal measures of the government reach an unbearable level for the party organisation we would have to retreat to this area on the other side of River Godavari temporarily so as to protect the movement of these districts. As a part of it seven squads were sent to the forest area of Adilabad, Gadchiroli, Chandrapur, Khammam, Bastar border, Visakha-East Godavari districts. The APSC decided two main tasks for the squads thus sent to the forest area on the border of the states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh (Dandakaranya). The guerrilla zone document clarified thus -

1. ‘To protect the temporarily retreated squads from the four districts in the guerrilla area (North Telangana) and help them to counter attack the enemy.
2. To organise the tribals in the forest area, build the Party and Revolutionary Army from among them and expand the struggle, as the second task gains prominence, concentrate all the activities of the squads in the forest form a special organisation like the Forest Committee to advance towards a higher objective’.

Our squads followed the decisions of the APSC regarding the formation of squad, the primary duties of the squad, the important tasks of the squad, the precautions to be taken in view of the necessity to identify with the masses for protection in the primary phase, made the necessary changes in practice, sustained and advanced step by step.

We faced many difficulties and repressions, made sacrifices and sustained in the forest. We gained the love and affection of the tribal people and became their leaders. Though there were certain failures, party organisation spread in the forest area from 1982 speedier than the APSC expected in 1980. As the squads were expanding the necessity to form a special Party Committee for the forest movement came forth. FLC was formed under the SC with the aim to bring uniformity in squad formation and military skill among the squads in the guidance of various committees. A coordinator was appointed for two squads for coordination.

Struggles began against those who exploit the tribal and the non-tribal oppressed masses, the contractors, the paper mill capitalists, bureaucrat forest officials and landlords. By 1982 tendu leaf struggles spread all over the forest areas. The tribal peasantry of Adilabad, Visakha, East Godavari and Bastar districts mobilised in a big scale, cut the forest and occupied thousands of acres of land. People were mobilised in many kinds of struggles for wages, for remunerative prices for forest produces, against illegal money-lending, to reduce the price of liquor and were consolidated in the organisation. In this process our squads had to advance by facing the joint repressive measures of the Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh governments. APSC made special effort to impart political, organisational and military training to the Dandakaranya movement in 1981, 82 and 83. This improved military sense in the commanders and the squad members to some extent.

Thus, until 1984 there was a lot of effort to spread the movement in the forest. With this the class struggle intensified, enemy repression increased and there were many changes in the number and formation of the squads and it developed into a movement of four divisions. Adilabad district that was separated from North Telangana was made part of Dandakaranya organisations. With this Adilabad, Gadchiroli, Bastar and East divisions were decided to be as one organisation and to develop it as a guerilla zone with the higher aim to establish liberated area. As a part of it the Second Conference of Adilabad division that was working under a district committee and First Conferences of the new Gadchiroli and East divisions were held in 1984 December and 1985 January. Due to lack of leadership teams the Conference of Bastar Division was not held. These Conferences made some amendments and passed the Political Resolution.

In the Dandakaranya organisation, by 1985 there were three squads in Adilabad division, 8 rural and urban centres, four squads in Gadchiroli division, four squads and two centres in Bastar division and four squads and eight centres in East division, two squads and one centre in Mahadevpur-Eturu Nagaram area.

The APSC had the understanding right from the beginning that if the movement reaches a certain level a special committee would be formed to function under the direct leadership of the CC. We formed the Forest Liaison Committee in 1982 to give a shape to this understanding in a process. Since the State Committee was not clear about the guerilla zone there were elaborate discussions. Since alien class tendencies started in the State Committee in 1984 and due to the crisis, the FLC could not fulfil the aim of its formation and the State Committee directly guided the Dandakaranya movement until the Forest Committee was formed. It was decided to hold the First Dandakaranya Conference in the direct leadership of the Central Committee and elect the Dandakaranya Committee (FC) by 1985, but due to the crisis in the CC in 1985 February this decision did not come into practice.

By 1985 there was qualitative change in the enemy offensive. There was severe attack on the people, party and every field of the people’s movement. On the other hand four members of the Central Committee made opportunist conspiracy and came forth in the CC meeting in February in the name of internal struggle in the Party. As per the decision of the CC the Andhra Pradesh plenum was held from May 6th to 11th to solve the crisis. The secretaries of various divisions were the delegates to this plenum. Plenum saw that without exposing and defeating the opportunist conspiracies and sustaining the Party unity, it is not possible to firmly face the offensive of the government and so took the necessary decisions.

There was education campaign by conducting study of documents, classes in Adilabad, Gadchiroli, Bastar and East divisions in 1986 December and 1987 January. The First Conference of Bastar division and plenums in the rest of the divisions were held. The First Conference of Dandakaranya party took place with the delegates from four divisions in an enthusiastic manner in February and March. The Conference elected a Committee with the secretaries of four divisions and one comrade sent by the SC to work in DK. The review of the past seven years made in all the plenums and the First Conference of Bastar division was read in the Conference of DK. In all these plenums and Conferences, the documents of the majority in the CC were rejected and those of the minority were passed.

Thus after the discussions, classes, plenums and Conferences in the lower level, the Thirteenth Conference of Andhra Pradesh was held in 1987 May. The Conference expelled the betrayers of revolution Sathyamurthy and Sivaji who were the main reason for the bad trends in the Party, were against the Party and did not have the minimum self-criticism. It cancelled the membership of Narayanareddy who did not put forth proper self-criticism. Thus all the opportunist conspiracies were totally defeated and Party unity sustained. Through the self-criticism-criticism from the top to bottom in the Party, the evils in the party were eliminated and there was a conscious effort to imbibe correct proletarian perspective.

The government offensive was serious in Adilabad and East divisions that were part of the state of Andhra Pradesh. Repression in Gadchiroli and Bastar divisions was relatively less. Efforts were made to defeat the all-out war of the enemy through self-defensive war with the necessary tactics with the understanding in the circular ‘let us defeat the government offensive…’ and implement them in Adilabad and East divisions in Dandakaranya. Ambushes were conducted in Daragadda and Allampalli in 1987 July and August as a part of the planned program to give a blow to the enemy’s aggressiveness in which 18 policemen died. These ambushes not only gave a momentum for the people to prepare for big struggles but also practically helped to present our path of struggle militarily before the people of the country. Thus by the end of 1987 we could gain relatively upper hand on the enemy. There was a qualitative change in the struggle in achieving great experience in self-defensive war by mid-1988. While many young people laid their valuable lives in the murderous offensive of the enemy to protect and advance the revolutionary movement in Dandakaranya, a few lost heart and left the movement. In the period of 1985-87 the initial confusion and lack of experience out of the cruel murderous offensive of the enemy was overcome, the fact that self-defence is possible only through retaliation was learnt and the party, squads and the people were prepared with self-confidence for struggle.

Work was done to advance the movement by enlightening the people amidst the encounter massacres that took place in Dandakaranya, by retaliating the enemy and helping the people come out of fear and apprehensions from the massacre. The labourers working in the bamboo forest that is the raw material taken to the mills of Thapar, Birla, Bangur and other such Comprador bourgeoisie intensified their struggles for hike in wage rates every year. There were struggles for occupation of waste and forest lands. Two lakh acres of forest was cut and brought to use. There were struggles for remunerative prices of forest produces. People’s courts were a normal feature regarding social oppression, suppression of women, facing the atrocities of the landlords and the hierarchs and other such problems.

In 1987-90 many new struggles came forth in the four divisions. Famine raids, paddy collection and distribution for relief in famine, destruction of government properties, burning of houses of the home-guards, police officers and police who are revengeful on the movement, ambushes, kidnaps, workdays and other such things helped to enhance the foundations of the people’s movement and advance.

The struggles for occupation of patta lands of the landlords here and there until 1989 extended as a large scale mobilisation of people in Adilabad and East divisions during the relaxation in repression in 1990. Ten thousand acres of land was occupied and most of it was distributed. In the place of decreasing the price of liquor the struggle for ban of liquor began. There were successful struggles for the hike in the remunerative prices of turmeric, tobacco and cotton.

**Mobilising the people in Mass Organisations**

In 1980-84 as the struggles were developing Girijan Rytu Coolie Sangam (Tribal Peasant Labour Organisation) came forth as the leading organisation. While in Adilabad and East divisions it was Girijan Rytu Coolie Sangam, in Gadchiroli it was Rytu Coolie Sangam in 1980, Adivasi Kisan Sheth Mazdoor Sangam (AKSS) since 1985 and in Bastar it was Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangh (AKMS) that mobilised people into organisations. In the undeclared war that started in 1985 the organisation in Adilabad and East divisions was affected and was revived again by 1988 due to reorganising it in a semi-legal manner. In Bastar and Gadchiroli divisions we sustained in the repression in the primary phase, mixed with the people, developed class struggle and consolidated the people in the organisations.

Thus the organisations developed into village, area/range and the division levels and by 1989 a state level organisation with a single name of Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangh (DAKMS) was formed. As the squads extended in Gadchiroli, Bastar divisions and Balaghat sub-division from 1988 to 1993 organisations too extended. They extended to the districts of Bhandara, Chandrapur, North Bastar, Rajnandgaon, Balaghat and Malkangiri.

Right from the beginning women have been participating in class struggle in Dandakaranya. In Adilabad, East, Bastar and Gadchiroli the tribal women’s organisations were formed on village basis and by 1991 Kranthikari Adivasi Mahila Sangham (KAMS) was formed in all the divisions. In Gadchiroli division KAMS was formed in the village, range and district levels while in the other divisions they were in village, range/area committee levels.

In addition to this there was an organisation with the name of KAMS organisers and women were directly mobilised through this. KAMS is leading all kinds of struggles for wages and land and against the traditional oppressing customs especially unleashed on women.

During the period of relaxation in Andhra Pradesh in 1990 there were large scale activities and meetings of the mass organisations in Adilabad and East divisions. During this period there was a failure in the functioning of the Executive Committees of the organisations without being exposed. Since December 1990 there was intense offensive in which the mass organisations were affected and started working in a secret manner. On the 21st of June, 1992 the Congress-I government of Andhra Pradesh banned the Party and the mass organisations. DAKMS was banned in AP. Repression intensified in Gadchiroli and Bastar divisions and Balaghat sub-division and the organisations were affected. In Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh there was undeclared ban on DAKMS right from the beginning. In the severe repression in 1991-93 the organisations were temporarily affected and later revived.

**Repression-resistance**

In 1985-89 the aim of government repression was to distance the people from the party and the squads and mainly to wipe out the squads and the leadership of the party in Adilabad and East Divisions. Then Congress-I was in power in the centre and in AP the regional party Telugudesam was in power. Both these parties unleashed repressive policies jointly. In Bastar and Gadchiroli divisions we sustained in the repression in the primary phase and in the process of intensifying class struggle repression went on intensifying. Many sacrifices had to be made to retaliate the enemy offensive bravely and sustain the squads. Filling up the losses the Squads gradually advanced.

There was a surge in land struggles in the period of relaxation in 1990. Repression began from July 1990 again. In December 1990 another repressive campaign was unleashed all over the state of AP. In Bastar and Gadchiroli repression gradually increased and the situation of class struggle and repression were almost alike in the four divisions. In the place of different tactics in retaliating the enemy similar decisions had to be made including Balaghat. In 1991-93 while in Adilabad and East divisions we had to face Para-military forces, in Gadchiroli and Bastar divisions and in Balaghat district we had to face campaigns like Jan Jagaran, Santhisena, Gaonbandi, Gaonyojana and the deployment of special forces of those states.

**Formation of joint Command**

Before 1991 there were coordination meetings for many years with the higher officials of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha. Since the movement was rooted strongly the central and the various state governments formulated a joint scheme to take up repressive campaigns in all these areas under one Command. IG and DIG level officers were deployed in many important areas. Communication network was modernised to intensify vigilance. Centre provided all kinds of support to all the states including forces, funds, arms and training.

**Repression intensified in the following forms in 1985-93**

Hundreds of police attacked the villages and tortured the people en masse. Thousands were foisted in TADA and sent to jail. Crops were destroyed, houses were demolished and the leaders of the Sangh, DAKMS organisers, sympathisers and people were killed in an extremely brutal manner. Thus the enemy tried mainly to create severe fear and apprehensions in the people, isolate the party and the squads from the people and kill the local leadership in large numbers.

In 1985-89 and in 1990-93 many leading committee members, Commanders, squad members, party members, leaders of KAMS and DAKMS, members of the organisations and people were martyred. In a period of 14 years more than 175 comrades became martyrs.

**Resistance**

With the resistance to the local enemies, special police and Para-military forces, the people were increasingly confident in the Party and the squads. The role of people continued to rise even in repression. The militant role of the people along with the squads in punishing the landlords, their agents and the police informers who came in the way of struggles increased. In 1985-93 people and mass organisations beat and chased away the police on some occasions. When the leaders of the Sangh were arrested the people fought and beat the police and got them released. People observed bandhs in protest to the repressive actions of the government and fake encounters, retaliated the attacks on the Action Committees in actions of burning and the attacks of the police on the squads and thus the aim of the enemy to wipe out the Party and the revolutionary movement was nullified. Moreover we became strong in terms of politics, organisation and military. In 1987-89 though it was mainly the work of squads, from 1989 to 1993 the role of militants in ambushes went on increasing. With the increase of enemy attacks and the retaliation from our militants and our squads we could make many attacks on the enemy forces. In this background the experience of the people, militants, squads and the Party enhanced. These ambushes were reviewed and appropriate lessons taken.

**Expansion**

By 1985 the area under every squad grew. With the expansion of squads the total area of movement grew. Expansion was possible only by sending members and leadership from one division to another division. Every squad that went for expansion had to retaliate enemy offensives and sustain. In 1985-89 we filled the losses in Adilabad and East divisions, reorganised the squads, sustained and developed. In Adilabad division we vacated few centres and towns and some CO centres were attached to the squad area. The forest squads gradually spread in almost all the forest and semi-forest areas. The CO centres in the East division were changed as semi-forest squads and in 1988 they too were made forest squads. In 1988 one squad was totally changed to Malkangiri sub-division in Odisha. In Gadchiroli division one CO centre was reduced, there was gradual expansion from 1988 to 1993 and five forest squads were increased. Thus movement spread to the Northern part of Gadchiroli, Bhandara and Rajnandgaon districts. In Bastar division two CO centres were brought together with the forest squads and the National Park squad was changed to Abujmarh. Later Keskal, Kondagaon, Bhanupratappur areas were spread to North Bastar as four squads. In the beginning of 1990 Balaghat was decided to be developed as a new division and the squad sent for extension gradually sustained in work. Thus the second forest squad and a semi-forest squad were formed. These three squads worked in Balaghat and Rajnandgaon districts.

**Squads-Development in squad formation**

The forest squads that started with five in 1980 grew with the expansion and development of the movement and became 7-9 and 11 member squads. The CO method of organisation too changed from five to seven semi-forest squad formation. In view of organisational necessities Party cells were formed in the squads starting in 1983 and were completed in all the squads in 1987. Party cells were working in the semi-forest squads right from the beginning.

The post of deputy Commander and Pilot team were newly formed. There was double sentry day long, weapon power was enhanced and the area of operation of the squad was increased. There were changes in the movements and the routes of the squad. The shortcomings in sentry, military practice and other such things were rectified, ‘standing orders’ and duties of squad members were formulated to strengthen the squad life and they were keenly implemented. Discipline is increasing in the squad life. In Adilabad division local recruitment was the main source since 1982 while the rest of the divisions mainly based on Andhra Pradesh until 1985. Later local recruitment is the main source. Thus now local youth are the majority in the composition. The number of Party members too increased.

The squads were armed with Party made weapons (tapanch and 12 bore guns) in the beginning. Later they seized weapons from the landlords and hunters and gradually seized .303, SLR and LMG rifles and ammunition from the police. The squads bought some powerful arms and improved relatively.

Squads increased in number, sphere and the level of movement and so there was a need for sub-divisional committee (in the jurisdiction of 2 to 4 squads) under the Divisional Committee to coordinate the squads and take up political, organisational and military tasks. Party cells, auxiliary cells and village protection squads developed and the party cells in the squads had limitations in taking up the increased organisational and military tasks. So Squad Area Committees were formed and came into function including those in the level of deputy Commander. At that time there were four Divisional Committees, seven Sub-divisional Committees and 15 Squad Area Committees under the Dandakaranya Forest Committee.

**The AISC and its significance in the development of the Party line**

The All India Special Conference, after thoroughly analyzing the significant political, economic and social changes that had taken place nationally and internationally since the 8th Congress, and the experiences gained in the revolutionary movement and the Party over the past 25 years, passed the amended Party Programme and Party Constitution, the documents on Strategy and Tactics, Guerilla zones–our Perspective, and the new Political Resolution (Present Political Situation and Our Tasks). It also approved the 1980 Self-Critical Review regarding the past, taking it as a basic document. It also reviewed the one-and-a-half decades of practice through Political Organisational Reviews and brought out a central Political Organisational Report. The AISC enriched the political, organisational and military line of the Party through this process of upholding its basic line, while simultaneously analyzing the developments in the different spheres and our prolonged practice, all in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. This success of the Conference is the first and most significant achievement after the 8th Congress.

Along with this North Telangana and Dandakaranya were identified as primary guerilla zones and it was decided to develop them into higher level guerilla zones (later the Congress realised that it is not proper to separate the guerilla zone into two phases). Later in the process of development of the movement South Telangana developed as a guerilla zone by 2000. East Region too developed as guerilla zone.

In the prolonged two-and-a-half decade gap since the 8th Congress, facing enormous difficulties with many twists and turns, victories and defeats, and a new resurgence since 1978, there emerged a leadership at all levels in the process of rebuilding, consolidation and development of the Party. In the process of the AISC this leadership got elected at district, state and central-level Conferences. It was the first time since the 8th Congress that a leadership was elected democratically throughout the Party, as a campaign. This was the second significant achievement of the Conference.

The AISC also formulated important tasks for the Party, the most important being the strengthening of the three magic weapons, principally with the aim of building the People’s Army and Base Areas to march forward victoriously. The AISC remains as an important turning point in the history of CPI (ML)(PW).

The three-and-a-half-decade history of Party building reveals several positive achievements while it also brings to light the serious problems we faced in building a genuine, proletarian Party in semi-colonial, semi-feudal India.

Firstly, the formation of CPI(ML) was a major breakthrough in the history of the Indian Communist movement. It had shown to the oppressed people of the country how a revolutionary Party should be- a Party that is strictly underground with the most committed, advanced elements forming the nucleus; that functions on the basis of democratic centralism in the real sense; and rectifies itself in the course of intensifying armed struggle. We succeeded in building the revolutionary party by recruiting thousands of professional revolutionaries as a core but failed in building a vast network of part-timers among various sections. It was more a problem related to the concept and understanding regarding part-timers. Party membership was given only to those who came out to work full-time for revolution.

Though this wrong understanding was rectified in the later period and membership was given to part-timers, the role of part-timers is still not of much significance in the Party. When compared with the influence of the Party on the oppressed masses of the country, the number of Party cells of part-timers is very less. The local Party leadership is weak and there is a dependency of the masses on the PRs or the squads for solving their problems or in resisting the enemy. This has given rise to several non-proletarian trends in the Party such as bureaucracy, individualism and subjectivism etc.

Secondly, the formation of a single directing center for the Indian revolution has been plaguing us ever since the setback and disintegration of the CC in 1972 after the martyrdom of Com. CM. The merger of PW and PU in 1998 was a major step in the direction of evolution of a single centre and this was basically completed after the merger of PW and MCCI.

Thirdly, the Party succeeded to an extent in building relatively strong and able Party committees at various levels unlike in the initial period. The consolidation and strengthening of the central leadership was achieved in the course of a protracted struggle-both inner-Party struggle and the armed struggle against the class enemies and the state but lack of continuity of leadership persists as a serious problem at various levels at all times in the Party.

Fourthly, attempts to strengthen the Party through taking up rectification campaigns to get rid of the various non-proletarian trends and ideological-political weaknesses have yielded positive results in some states and special zones. The Party leadership and the cadre have been able to grasp the deviations and weaknesses more deeply and come out of these to an extent but the problem still persists seriously in one section of some leading committees of some states. Despite some improvement over the past few years, the problem of subjectivism, liberalism, spontaneity, sectarianism, bureaucracy, legalism, etc., still haunt the Party at various levels. There is also the problem of lack of professionalism.

Lastly, the Party’s class basis, which was more petty-bourgeois in character in the initial period, gradually changed to that of the basic classes.

By 1995 the movement in AP expanded and strengthened and with this there were difficulties in coordinating. In view of this and the development in the movements**,** party took up geographical changes with the aim of specific concentration in Andhra Pradesh and Dandakaranya. Thus North Telangana was separated from Andhra Pradesh and Adilabad district in Dandakaranya was attached to it. The East Division that was part of Dandakaranya was made part of AP. Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee was formed without Adilabad and East divisions. Thus AP State Committee, North Telangana Special Zonal Committee and Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committees came into existence. In order to strengthen the guerilla zones and help for establishing liberated area the East Region in Andhra Pradesh was upgraded to AOB Special Zonal Committee in 2000. Thus State/Special Zonal Committees were formed and in AP Regional Committees, District Committees and ACs led the movement, in North Telangana district committees, SACs and in DK Divisional Committees, Sub-divisional Committees and SACs in the lower level led the movement. In the villages there were scores of party cells and hundreds of became Party Members. Thus Party strengthened.

The majority of the Party cadre hails from the most oppressed sections-the landless and poor peasantry-while the lower sections of the middle peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie constitute a considerable section. As a result of special attention paid to recruitment and promotion of cadre from special social sections particularly after 1995, the Party now has a good number of cadres from Dalits, women and Adivasis. However, there is need for even more concentration on these oppressed sections especially in promoting them to leadership positions.

A major weakness in our Party building has been the lack of concentration on the working class. As a result, there are very few cadres from working class background. Although in a semi-feudal society like ours the peasantry is the principal source for recruitment, the huge number belonging to the organized and unorganized working class underscores the need to concentrate on this basic motive force and promote them into leadership positions so that they play their leading role in the revolution.

**Building the people’s army**

Building up of the people’s army has been a consistent problem in the history of the Indian Communist Movement. Leaving out the history of the pre-Naxalbari period when revisionism dominated, it was after the seizure of arms from the enemy forces by the people’s guerillas in Magurjan that we first declared the formation of the PLA in embryonic form. This could not be developed due to the serious setback to the movement in 1972.

We are building the army from scratch and hence are facing much complexity in the work of building the People’s Army. Our party has been working from the beginning with the strategic concept of seizing political power through armed force and settlement of the issue through war. After the setback of the Naxalbari and Srikakulam movements, we tried to build guerilla squads in Telangana and DK. These squads performed both organisational and military tasks. Since then our Party has been developing guerilla squads and guerilla war.

In some areas, we formed special military squads as early as 1993 but these did not become a generalized form for a long period. Special Guerrilla Squads were formed to fight against the state from 1994-95 but we did not give them a generalised form at that time. Thus, by undertaking specialization, separate squads were formed for military and organizational tasks. But LGSs, CGSs and platoons were not brought under a separate military command.

The military formations in Dandakaranya, Andhra Pradesh and North Telangana are specifically like this. In Dandakaranya LGS - …Military squads - …Platoons - ….were formed. In North Telangana there were two platoons, 51 LGS and Action Teams in 1995-99. In AP there were 3 SGS, Protection Squads and later a platoon was formed.

To specialize and concentrate in the military sphere, a separate sub-committee, central SCOMA, was formed in 1996 as well as some state SCOMAs. All this resulted in specialization in the military sphere and improved our armed resistance. Yet, we did not have clarity on how to build the PGA and separate command structures. Hence, although the situation was ripe by the time of 1995 Special Conference itself, the task of forming the PGA was not taken up due to subjectivism and spontaneity in the CC. At first SCOMA in Dandakaranya and after that SMCs in Dandakaranya, AP and North Telangana were formed. The decision to form the PGA was taken by the CC in August 2000 and was implemented on December 2, 2000.

However in the course of development we acquired knowledge through direct and indirect knowledge and experience, which culminated in the formation of the PGA and a separate full fledged CMC to guide and lead the People’s army directly.

In 1995, we took up the task of building the Organs of People’s Political Power in NT and DK Guerrilla Zones and in the East Division. From the very beginning, we emphasized on the task of educating the people with the slogan : “All power to the Revolutionary People’s Committees!”

These Gram Rajya Committees (GRCs) or Revolutionary People’s Committees gave leadership to the people as organs of people’s political power at a time when the authority of the state along with that of the feudal forces and caste/tribal elders was undermined as a result of people’s struggles and armed resistance. These organs established people’s power in an embryonic form. Although GRCs were established only in a few villages, through these we could enhance the consciousness of the people in the GZs regarding new political power.

In the Guerrilla Zone of NT the GRCs became defunct due to severe enemy repression. It had also become difficult to build the GRCs in those areas in DK where the enemy repression was intense like Gadchiroli. The existence of the armed forces of the people and a higher level of consciousness among the people is indispensable if the GRCs are to sustain the new political power and effectively confront the enemy. It is only in the course of smashing state power by defeating state repression and reforms that the people’s political power can be strengthened. If we do not link up the new political power with the PGA, it can’t be sustained and developed further. As we could not grasp this aspect clearly, we could not sustain the GRCs.

Although we recognised the role of people’s militia, we did not make much headway in building an extensive network of People’s Militia. Hence our resistance too did not become extensive. The People’s Militia is essential for establishing new political power in the villages and for the people to wage war against the enemy under the leadership of the GRCs. Due to weak militia we could not suppress the local class enemies, check the informers, take up harassment activities against the enemy and arm the masses.

**Preparing the Masses for the People’s War**

After 1972, we rectified the earlier defective understanding regarding the role of mass organizations. We realized that it is through the mass organisations that the masses get organised, are drawn into the class struggles and come to realise through the struggles that there is no other alternative before them but to overthrow the state power of the exploiting classes and establish in its place their own political power in order to liberate themselves from all oppression and exploitation.

While building the mass organisations, we adhered to the Maoist guideline that from the beginning, our orientation, perspective and the method of building mass organisations and mass struggles should be to serve the preparation for war and the war, in turn, would help to further advance the mass movement. Basing on this dialectical interrelation between mass struggle and armed struggle, we tried to mobilize the masses in lakhs. In the development of our revolutionary movement the mass organizations played a significant role, gave several cadre to the war, sacrificed several leaders and members and achieved political prestige, influence and popularity.

All our mass organisations were steeled in the midst of armed struggle mainly. The valiant struggles shook up the base of feudalism, and threatened the ruling classes and their armed forces. The struggles of oppressed sections in thousands of villages and several cities have struck at the hegemony and the economic, political and social oppression by the ruling classes. They played a great role in smashing the socio-economic and political domination of landlords and later they became the foundation for the Organs of People’s Political Power.

In AP, NT and AOB, we succeeded in breaking the lull of 1992-’94 when the massive enemy offensive created serious obstacles to our work among the masses. The post-1995 period has seen a resurgence of mass movements in several states led by our revolutionary mass organisations or by the various cover organisations formed through our initiative. In spite of the massive enemy offensive several struggles were taken up in AP, NT, AOB, DK. That is why the state deployed more special police forces and para-military forces specially trained and equipped with the most sophisticated weaponry. It drew up a plan for better coordination and cooperation between the five states of AP, MP, Maharashtra, Orissa and Bihar, formed a Joint Coordination Committee headed by the Centre in June 1998 and a JOC in April 2000. At the same time, the state had also taken up reforms and dole programmes in a big way in order to divert the masses from militant revolutionary struggles.

While our mass organisations in the initial period functioned openly in some areas of AP for a short period, in the main, they functioned secretly. In some other areas where class struggle was weak they worked secretly while in Dandakaranya our mass organisations were underground and worked secretly from the beginning. Though the mass organisations were officially banned in AP for the first time in 1992, there was an undeclared ban since 1980 in NT, from 1985 in entire AP, and from the initial days itself in entire DK. In spite of this, huge mass rallies have been taking place continuously in these states.

**Working class movement**

Regarding building of Trade Unions ‘We need not build special Trade Unions and split the already split working class. We must guide the workers identified with our politics to work in the already existing Trade Unions. We must actively participate in the TU activities but in any conditions should not be an office bearer. We must join the TUs and enhance the struggle character of the workers, work to unite the workers, make the workers realise that democratic revolution is the only way for solving the worker’s problems’. We decided to take up this as our primary task.

We took these guidelines regarding the functioning of Trade Unions from the teachings of Comrade Charu Mazumdar. We decided this policy in view of the experience of the Indian working class movement mired in economism for a long time and the condition of our subjective forcesin the initial period.

The guidelines that we have to join the organisations where there are majority workers, should not be in leadership and should not build organisations from our side were correct to a large extent in the primary phase but it does not apply in all times. There was a speed change in the conditions in the process of struggle. The leadership of the revisionist and neo-revisionist TUs where there are majority workers are creating a lot of hurdles for us to work actively. It is easier to work among the workers in other organisations that are relatively favorable. But majority workers are not in these organisations. Though they implemented the decision that we should not come into leadership, few comrades lost the initiative and lagged behind the workers. The workers are immediately ready to have our active comrades as their leaders whether they are exposed or not. In such conditions the efforts in Singareni (Singareni is a coal mine in Telangana) led us to form ‘Singareni Karmika Samakhya’ (Sikasa-Singareni Workers’ Federation) in 1981.

The Singareni movement has many distinct features in the working class movement. It broke the existing strong revisionist bourgeois TUs and brought the majority working class into the arena of struggle. In this process revolutionary Trade Union Sikasa was formed and the working class movement took new leaps. Perhaps Singareni movement is the only experience in the Indian working class movement that took up legal and illegal forms of activities for a long time. One more distinct aspect is that the worker’s struggles united with the peasant struggles on many occasions.

From the experience in Singareni, Hyderabad, Visakha, Warangal and other areas we understood that there is no need to join only in organisations where there are majority workers, that we have to also fight for leadership, that we have to form new organisations in some kinds of organisations, that we should not make rigid principles regarding forming new Trade Unions and that we have to work in other organisations for a long time in the fields of P&T, Railways, RTC, Teachers, government employees, police and military. There is a difference between the central and the state organisations. Moreover we have to take decisions in view of the changes basing on the phases of revolutionary struggle. In industries, mines and commercial centres and others, though we initially work in other organisations we need not hesitate to form organisations basing on our position among the workers or to come into the leadership. The experiences in building Trade Union vary in Singareni, Hyderabad, Visakha, Warangal and other towns. There were organisations where mainly our forces were in the leadership and as ordinary members. There were organisations where our comrades were only in the leadership and majority of the members were ordinary workers. We worked in some organisations and formed secret units of revolutionary worker’s organisation. We were in leadership together with others and the members were ordinary workers. We had the main aim of protection in enemy repression and joined other organisations to build worker’s movement. Thus the building of revolutionary TU continued in various forms. These were our main experiences regarding Trade union movement.

Overall, in the mass front, our achievements are primary, and shortcomings secondary. These short comings are: Failure in consolidating the forces which came into these struggles; low level of membership; failure in developing continuity of leadership for mass organisations, failures in coordination between higher and lower bodies, failure in coordination in secret and open work, sectarian trends in mass struggles, over emphasis on open work before 1984, spontaneity in building mass organisations and mass movement, lack of planning in extending to new areas, etc. Generally these shortcomings apply to state and all India mass organisations.

The weaknesses in the Party committees at various levels, lack of clarity, specialization and experience in the particular field as well as the prevalence of spontaneity and the enormous work pressure on the committees are preventing them from timely and proper guidance to the mass organisation committees at their respective levels. One major problem in giving close guidance to mass organisations is the enemy’s concentration in the areas and the white terror through encounter killings of the MO leadership.

There is a mechanical understanding in some of the Party units regarding the forms of struggle and organisation. There cannot be rigid or fixed forms of struggle and organisation. They keep on changing according to the changing conditions and stage of the struggle. Copying mechanically the forms prevalent in one region in another region will give adverse results. Even in the same region the forms practiced today may not be the same tomorrow. Creatively applying tactics to changing conditions and quickly changing from one form to another is a skill that should be acquired by the various Party committees and the mass organisation leadership. Legalism in our mass work is manifested mainly in the form of relying on legal/open methods of work and legal/open struggles to solve the sectional demands and other demands of a general democratic character. Legalism arises from an overestimation of the prospects of legal or open mass movement in India and due to lack of clarity regarding the protracted nature of people’s war in our country.

**Cover organizations**

Cover organizations are indispensable in areas where our mass organisations are not allowed to function openly. We may also form these organisations in other areas according to necessity. The main purpose behind forming cover organisations is to keep our forces unexposed to the enemy while carrying on open mass work. We must keep in mind that cover organisations are not a substitute for the legal or underground mass organisations. We must form the Party units within the cover organisations and direct them.

Although the attempts to form cover organisations in AP, NT and AOB began since 1985, it was only in the post-’95 period that we achieved some progress. We succeeded in mobilising a large section of the people through the cover organisations thereby foiling the attempts of the ruling classes to render the people leaderless by imposing a ban on our mass organisations.

Some of the shortcomings in running cover organisations are: these are exposed due to loose talk; huge mass mobilisations by the Party to the programmes of cover organisations thereby leading to their exposure; calling exposed speakers to the meetings of cover organisations; meeting the leaderships of the cover organisations in the areas thus exposing them to all the Party and squad members and the people of the nearby villages; the Party and squads getting involved in struggles led by the cover organisation and even issuing threats to the enemy in order to make the struggles a success; selecting progressive or radical-looking names for the cover organisations; giving our slogans and singing our songs on the platform of the cover organisations; forming cover organisations overnight thereby drawing the attention of the police; and so on. Able and experienced PRs and organisers are not allotted for work in the cover organisations.

**United Front**

We did not concentrate properly on the UF work and there was no specialization at any level. This had a serious negative effect on UF activities. We failed to allot forces for intervening in the spontaneous people’s movements or in building joint forums with other organisations. Hence we did not succeed in winning over the forces belonging to the revolutionary classes. Sectarianism is also quite serious in the movement, leadership and the lower levels in the party. This is seen in two forms; one, not going for joint activity on the common issues with other organisations even when they showed interest and two, engaging in sectarian activities which led to the breaking up of joint action committees.

Due to the ban on erstwhile PW and mass organisations, comrades who are allotted for UF work have to work under severe limitations. Hence it is only by persevering in patient and persistent work over a long period of time that we will be able to establish our leadership over the united front.

**9th Congress and after**

The 9th Congresssaw the emergence of an ideologically and politically mature party — a party of a new type-that had steeled itself in decades of intense class struggle. The party had acquired an All India character with its organisation in over a dozen states, a people’s guerrilla army - the PGA - and several departments.

The Congress saw the further consolidation and enrichment of the party line. While adhering firmly to the party’s basic line that was formulated in the 8th Congress in 1970, the 9th Congress made the necessary changes and enriched several concepts basing on the rich experiences acquired over the years and taking into account the political developments of the preceding three decades. It firmly fought both the “Right” and “Left” deviations that were seen in the forging of the three instruments of revolution - the party, Army and the UF - and in the formulation of tactics. It achieved a higher level of understanding regarding the concepts of people’s army, guerrilla zones, Base Areas and the revolutionary united front.

The 9th Congress thus rectified the shortcomings in the understanding of AISC of PW of 1995 and the Central Conference of PU of 1997 regarding the above concepts and thereby created the ground for achieving a fresh breakthrough in the ongoing people’s war in the country. The Congress firmly resolved to intensify the people’s war and extend it to other parts of the country. It called upon the entire party to exert its utmost to establish liberated zones and chalked out concrete plans to achieve the same. It expressed its determination to achieve coordination with the ongoing national liberation movements in the country and to continue with the task of unification of the Communist Revolutionaries in all earnestness. It called on the party to cleanse itself of the various non-proletarian trends by undergoing a thoroughgoing rectification campaign and thereby proletarianise the party and make it fit enough to carry out the immense tasks before the party.

**Shortcomings identified by the 9th Congress**

The Congress identified the lapse that we could not establish organs of people’s democratic power on par with the level of the people’s war. In hundreds of villages, the old authority of the feudal forces was overthrown and the state much weakened, but the resulting vacuum was not be filled up by the New Power of the people.

The Congress identified the weaknesses in Party building such as a weak network of part-time PMs, lack of professionalism even in some of the leading Party committees were identified as some factors that hampered the pace of the movement.

The Congress gave the call for overcoming the weakness in formulating appropriate tactics to counter the enemy’s tactical offensives and their reform and dole programmes in time, to undertake concrete study of the actual conditions, adopt flexibility in the deployment of forces and take up the tactics of temporary retreat of forces from some areas in face of massive enemy offensives, to overcome the defects in the work methods in respect of urban work, and to effectively link the mass struggles to the ongoing people’s war.

Basing on the evaluation of the 9th Congress, the erstwhile PW drew up concrete tasks with regard to Party and Army building, building GBs in selected pockets in the strategic areas, organs of people’s democratic power, Rectification campaigns and campaigns of Tactical Counter Offensives in a planned manner and achieved significant successes in some states. It could foil the enemy’s attempts to suppress the ongoing people’s war through massive repression and reforms, and various other forms.

**The Unity Congress-Ninth Congress of the CPI (Maoist) in 2007 reviewed Andhra Pradesh and Dandakaranya movements thus –**

In AP**,** (AP, NT, AOB), we tried to utilise the situation during the period of talks. The mass political campaign during the period of talks until the end of 2004 had created a good political impact and increased our subjective strength in the three zones. But we began to suffer losses soon after the breakdown of talks from the beginning of January 2005. The enemy’s plan of multi-pronged offensive, which was going on since 1996, was carried out at a rapid pace with the full assistance of the World Bank and imperialist aid. Combining reforms with repression the enemy had redoubled his planned effort to isolate us by weaning away the masses through various means. He selected one zone after another and concentrated his forces on a massive scale for a certain period of time so as not to give breathing space. His aim is to destroy our leadership in each zone through a well-planned, well-coordinated strategy basing on his vast network of informers and other intelligence networks and by carrying out surprise attacks based on precise information. Besides this, private armed gangs, covert agents are also used on a considerable scale for eliminating the leadership. Fortifications of all stations, even multi-layered in many cases, in all our areas of armed struggle is making it quite difficult to inflict serious losses through raids. Roads and communications are developed to a considerable extent with the help of the World Bank to suppress our movement. Enemy had developed extremely cruel methods in suppressing our movement. Any arrested comrade, whether it is a CC member or a squad member, is never produced before courts but is eliminated in fake encounters.

We did not adopt the correct tactics to counter the above tactics of the enemy in time. We suffered the heaviest losses in AP part during the period of enemy’s Action Plan since November 2005, particularly February 2006. This led to gradual decline of the movement finally resulting in a temporary setback in the state as a whole. The main reasons for the temporary setback are as follows:

Firstly we did not have a correct assessment of the timing and scale of the impending enemy attack during talks. Although we made some preparations militarily during the period of talks, these were not completed by December 2004. When the period of cease-fire was over in December 2004 we thought that the enemy attack may not be serious until another two months i.e., till February 2005. As a result we did not complete our preparations to face the brutal enemy offensive. This was one of the factors that had contributed to losses initially when the enemy began his massive onslaught by the beginning of January itself. But immediately we began to counter the enemy offensive but due to the weaknesses that are persisting since a long period of time we could not offer effective resistance. Second, we did not drive the entire Party to preserve our forces while undertaking planned actions through various means. Third, we did not take up the tactics of retreat in AP part when the situation was clearly unfavourable to us. This shows the lack of deep understanding of PPW and its concrete application. Instead of talking a step back when the enemy was trying to encircle our pockets with the aim of wiping us out, we continued to plan intensification and continuous resistance. Fourth, we had to withdraw our guerrilla squads from the plain areas with increasing repression. We tried to adopt alternative forms of struggle and forms of organisation in the plain areas, achieved some results but these were not sufficient enough in the face of massive enemy repression. Fifth, we did not give serious thought to extend the area of struggle in the earlier period which had a serious effect on the maneuverability of our forces as our areas had shrunk, particularly in AP. Most important of all, our intensification of war did not fetch the desired results as the active participation of the masses had reduced gradually over the years. Although we have a wide mass support we had failed to bring the masses into our organizational fold. We had been planning time and again regarding the involvement of the masses but the increased enemy repression is making it difficult for us to involve them at a scale corresponding to the enemy attack. Moreover, we did not have proper plan to counter the enemy’s multi-pronged strategy i.e., reforms, incentives, psy-war, and various other means besides brutal repression. Overall, lack of consolidated mass base had a serious effect on the scale and quality of our resistance. As a result it became a war between our PLGA and the enemy forces. The CC, PB, CRB and the leadership in charge of the three zones of AP are mainly responsible for the failure in not taking appropriate tactics and preventing the losses. Today we can conclude that the situation in AP as a whole has received temporary setback. It is only by overcoming the above-mentioned shortcomings, building a consolidated mass base, and enhancing the active participation of the masses in the people’s war through a systematic plan of work, painstaking effort and creative methods of work in the midst of heavy repression that we can regain initiative in AP. Tactics should be adopted in the three zones of AP in accordance with the specific conditions in each zone.

In DK, we achieved a breakthrough in building organs of people’s revolutionary power and establishing GBs, actively involving the masses in the war, building militia in large number, and successfully carrying out several tactical counteroffensives. Today our revolutionary war is facing the counter-revolutionary war and coordinated attack by the combined forces of the state administrative machinery, salwa judum, various political parties and police forces on our movement. As the enemy’s attempts to create a network of informers had failed, he has hit upon the strategy of destroying entire villages, following a policy of “*kill all, burn all, loot all”* by using the terrorist organisation of salwa judum to attack the people, and to use helicopters to quickly ferry the police forces to interior areas. The chief form of the enemy offensive since June 2005 has been through the so-called salwa judum campaign that is aimed at clearing up entire villages and herding the people into concentration camps in the name of providing relief i.e., a policy of draining out water to kill the fish. Enemy has succeeded in pitting a section of adivasis against our movement and creating a wedge between Koya and Muria tribes. Thousands of adivasis were forced to become SPOs and are pitted against our movement. Accompanied by the police and para-military forces, these gangsters enforce the cruelest methods of killing and torturing people in our strong-hold villages and force them to join their counter-revolutionary campaign against us. Carpet security system was formed with police-paramilitary camps in close proximity with the aim of destroying our party, PLGA and other revolutionary forces. Pucca roads are being built, communication network is developed at a rapid pace, and enemy fortifications are more strengthened.Local adivasis are subjected to extreme economic distress and tremendous pressure due to the forcible closure of the weekly *haats*. After starting the salwa judum campaign, a vast informer network is built along with the system of SPOs. We lost over 250 people in this mopping up operation unleashed by the central and state government of Chattisgarh along with the private armed gangs.

There are shortcomings in controlling the reactionary forces and the enemy forces. We could not assess the situation in time and take prompt actions on the informers and reactionary elements who had fled from the villages and are organising the adivasis against us. Due to our neglect of work in road-side villages we could not exercise control over the salwa judum gangs. Another major weakness of our movement is our insignificant presence among the various sections of people and weak base in urban areas. But the people made innumerable sacrifices against salwa judum and came forth in a militant manner in struggle. The countrywide democratic forces came forth against salwa judum and declared their solidarityto Adivasis. They took up legal struggles against salwa judum. PLGA in the leadership of our Party wiped out the leadership of salwa judum through guerilla actions. Thus by 2007-08 salwa judum met a total defeat.