

**BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE MAOIST COMMUNIST CENTRE
OF INDIA (MCCI)
and
CPI(ML)[PEOPLE'S WAR]**

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PREFACE

It is well known that the decade of the sixties of the 20th Century was a decade of upheaval that shook the whole world. In such a background, genuine revolutionaries, inspired by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung thought (now Maoism), gave the clarion call of rebellion against revisionism. The Great Debate was conducted by the CPC under Mao's leadership against Khrushchvite revisionism at that time, and it was under its stirring influence that the communist movement in India, while waging struggle against revisionism, made a fresh beginning.

It was in such a situation that many extraordinary and front-ranking leadership comrades in the course of the struggle waged against revisionism Comrade CM and Comrade KC emerged. During the Seventh Congress of the CPM in 1964, the struggle against revisionism in fact arose clearly as a struggle between parliamentarianism and the path of Protracted Peoples' War. Thereafter, the earth-shaking Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) had a tremendous impact upon this new stirring of the Communist movement in India. In 1967 the Great Naxalbari Uprising under the leadership of Comrade CM occurred as a spring Thunder over India. All over India a new upsurge began against revisionism and a state of political ferment was generated.

In such a situation, on the one hand the CPI (ML) party was formed under the leadership of Comrade CM on April 22, 1969 and in the same year, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) was formed under the leadership of Comrade KC on October 20. Thus the two revolutionary streams forged ahead, all along surmounting many hurdles, though remaining as separate entities, until the year 2004 when, on September 21, their confluence gave rise to one big torrent. The CPI (ML) [PW] and the MCCI together gave birth to the CPI (Maoist).

As was inevitable, although the aims and objective of two parties have

been the same, their history comprises both the aspect of similarity as well as some differences.

Now, as per the decision taken to acquaint the broad ranks with the brief history of both, we hereby present a part that comprises the history of the MCCI in brief.

The inception of MCCI's history

Drawing a clear-cut line of demarcation on political and organizational issues with revisionist views and path, as a firm commitment was made to build a genuine revolutionary party on the basis of revolutionary theory and in the course of revolutionary struggle, soon after the revisionist Seventh Congress of the CPM in 1964 a revolutionary centre was established, followed by the emergence of the organisation as MCC on October 20, 1969.

At the outset, the nature of this organisation formed by the initiative of Comrade KC, Comrade Amulya Sen and Chandrashekar Das was that of a revolutionary centre. This organisation then was very limited in strength and isolated. In such a situation, Comrade KC had described what should be our important duty, which in brief can be summed up thus : as a guiding line for the Indian revolution create public opinion on the basis of a concrete line regarding Strategy and Tactics; build Professional Revolutionary cadres; a line for work in the rural area, adopt a line for work in cities, a line for work among workers, student-youth etc. and, as the principal and central task, adopt a concrete plan for building the Army and Base Areas in accordance with our strength and capacity; and must in fact, to get involved in practice fully..

As concrete reflections of revisionism, the various expressions against which under Comrade KC's able leadership it was then decided to conduct struggle were: (1) Economism, (2) Spontaneity, (3) Legalism, (4) Bureaucratic Centralism, (5) Bourgeois Parliamentary System etc.

The various opportunist perceptions that we had to vigorously struggle against in the course of our struggle against revisionism were: (i) The view that did not accept neocolonialism as a new form of Colonialism, that is the method of indirect exploitation instead of direct exploitation-rule by imperialism; (ii) The view that did not accept the (neocolonial type of) semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the Indian state and rejected the national and democratic character of Indian revolution.

It was in the process of parting ways with the undivided Communist Party in 1964, right since the seventh Congress of the CPM wherein the banner of revolt was raised to rupture ties with the revisionist line of the CPM, that the question emerged as to what should be the correct line of the Indian revolution, what would be the stage and path of Indian revolution and who would be the friends and enemies of revolution, and so on.

In fact to find answers to such questions, an attempt was made through documents called '*Chinta*', published in 1965 [It was to vigorously struggle against revisionism secretly within the then CPI (M) party, that '*Chinta*' was published, of which 6 documents were brought out]. Later in 1966, the political and theoretical debate was continued vigorously against revisionism through a magazine called '*Dakshindesh*'. However, the need was felt for a consistent line through a basic document. In this process, as an effort to find answers to the above questions, Comrade KC presented (for discussion) a document on the *Outline of a Strategic and Tactical Line for Indian Revolution*. Comrade KC had prepared this document basically on the basis of Comrade Lenin's Colonial Thesis and articles on Nationality Problem; Comrade Stalin's article on Nationality, the *History of the Bolshevik Party, Problems of Leninism*; the important documents related to the Great Debate published by the CPC led by Mao, especially the General line of the International Communist Movement (the June 14th letter), *Apologist of Neo-colonialism*; Mao's *On New democracy, Analysis of classes in Chinese society, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, important articles on military matters etc.

Through this document presented by Comrade KC, a sharp line of demarcation was politically drawn with the revisionism of the CPI and CPM. The political points on which the document on Strategy drew a sharp line of demarcation were:

- (a) Indian revolution as an inseparable part of world revolution.
- (b) Indian society today - (i) Has imperialism been eliminated? On the contradiction between imperialism and the broad masses; (ii) Indian polity; (iii) Has feudalism been eliminated? On the contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses; (iv) Indian culture today.
- (c) The character of the present Indian national economy.
- (d) The Indian social system and social crisis.
- (e) The character of Indian revolution; two stages of Indian revolution.

- (f) On the internal relationships and the leadership of National revolution and Democratic revolution.
- (g) The basic duty of democracy : (i) Democratic state and politics - the specificities of the state system; (ii) Democratic economics; (iii) Democratic culture.
- (h) The basis of unity of nationalities.
- (i) The path of revolution - the central task of revolution is to capture political power through Peoples' War; the path of Protracted Peoples' War demonstrated by Chairman Mao is the path of India's liberation.
- (j) The protracted nature of the Peoples' War in India is determined by the specificities of the actual conditions.
- (k) Expose the Treacherous Façade of Elections, Take to the path of Protracted Peoples' War.
- (l) Three Magic Weapons of Revolution.
- (m) The international significance of the great Indian revolution.

Then, the points on which a line of demarcation was drawn with revisionism in the document regarding tactics were:

- (a) The central task of revolution is to seize political power by armed force.
- (b) The path of revolution in Russia or the path of revolution in China? The path of the new democratic revolution of India is the path of the great Chinese revolution.
- (c) The vast countryside is the enemy's weakest area - the stom centre of revolution. The peasant masses are the firmest friends of revolution, the Agrarian Revolutionary War is the basic key that would make the peasant masses join the Peoples' War.
- (d) The focus of all work is to establish Protracted Peoples' War; the primary, principal and central task at present is to form a Peoples' Army and Base Areas in the countryside.
- (e) The work in the rural areas must be principal. On the correct relation between the work in villages and cities, on the line for work in the cities.
- (f) The principal form of struggle and organisation are Peoples' War and Peoples' Army.

The relationship between the main and secondary forms of struggle and organisation.

- (g) Maintain a firm hold over the class line and mass line, centralise work on the working class and poor and landless peasants.

In fact, the above document on Strategy and Tactics presented by Comrade KC is a concrete expression of political views and practical work of the MCCI.

The struggle of sonarpur and our preliminary Experience

If theoretical struggle does not get linked with practical work, then on the one hand the theory becomes somewhat meaningless and on the other, we cannot develop a correct understanding of the theory itself. Besides, on giving the back-seat to actual struggle, neither is it possible for the theoretical struggle to advance too far or extend too far, nor is it possible to isolate the revisionists outright. Therefore, at that time after having got together our forces to a limited extent through theoretical struggle, we took our small force to the countryside to concentrate upon the task of arousing and organising the peasants for guerilla war. We found our first contact in Sonarpur, so it was there that we started our work.

In Sonarpur, even before the organisation could be built up and made concrete and functional to some extent, the enemy began attacking it. In such a situation it was not possible to adopt any tactics other than the method of retreating in self defense. In terms of result and quality, the Sonarpur struggle could not reach an advanced stage.

Even so, it was owing to our direct work at Sonarpur that we could understand better the questions such as class analysis, the peasant problem and agrarian revolution. Moreover, we could also understand that: (a) The revolutionary armed struggle should be built and developed in order to seize state power; therefore constant theoretical and ideological struggle should be conducted against the concrete expressions of revisionism, that is economism, militant economism, legalism, reformism, parliamentarism etc. (b) In our country where the revisionist current has prevailed since long in the name of mass organisation and mass struggle, we should from the very beginning give stress upon secret activist groups as the basic foundation of the party and centring upon them, emphasise upon the formation of Armed Guerilla

Units and Peoples' Militia, and practice the method of carrying our work among the broad masses while keeping the party secret, build mass organisations and mass movements to assist armed struggle, especially emphasise upon the building up of armed resistance struggle and armed struggle as a means of capturing state power and also give special emphasis while building such struggles on building the armed force of the masses, namely Self Defense Squads, Peoples' Militia and Guerilla squads. (c) As an essential condition to build and develop armed struggle in the countryside, prepare cadre and leadership groups from among poor and landless peasants and depend most of all upon poor and landless peasants. (d) Realize the importance of enlightening, organising and involving peasant women and working class women in the armed struggle of the countryside etc.

The revolutionary struggle of Kanksa – Gaya - Hazaribagh could be advanced only after taking Lessons from the Sonarpur struggle

From the Sonarpur struggle the lesson we learnt was that in a vast country such as India, having extreme political and economic unevenness, where the enemy is very powerful and we are weak, it is extremely necessary that we work in some strategic areas that are convenient and conducive to the conduct of guerilla warfare. Therefore, after having obtained some primary and elementary experience during the armed agrarian revolutionary work in Sonarpur, we began working in some selected or strategic areas with Armed Revolutionary Guerilla Struggle and Protracted Peoples' War as the basis. Keeping in mind the concrete conditions of India, how do we at this moment succeed in our political duty through military activities? This was a major question posed before us. In order to resolve this question, we concentrated upon studying some special articles from the military writings of Comrade Mao. We gave special emphasis on studying especially such articles where one could find clear-cut perceptions on the process and method of building the Army and Base Area.

We felt the need to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation on every aspect, which is on political-organisational aspects and the aims, forms and methods of struggle against the trends of reformist, economist and revisionist movements that had been persisting since long in India. With this view, we decided to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation with the old revisionists on

the aims and objectives, orientation and agenda of the peasant movement. While doing so we took notice of the situation in Soviet Russia and the Russian experience, and the situation in China and the Chinese experience, and emphasised upon how the peasant movement could advance in the concrete conditions of India with the orientation and progress of armed revolution. In accordance with this perception and understanding, we decided to give two basic slogans having the underlying political concept regarding the peasant movement, that is the slogans of : “*Land to the real Peasants !*” and “*Political Rule and Power to the Revolutionary Peasant committees!*”

It was by putting into practice this outlook and the corresponding work method and work style that it was possible to begin the development of a new path and new stream of the revolutionary movement and mass movement in Kanksa-Gaya-Hazaribagh etc. areas. Equipped with the above aims, objectives and orientation, the revolutionary peasant masses and toiling masses began to participate in different types of struggles with renewed vigour. During this period they built new kinds of mass organisations and mass movements, and developed them on the basis of their own experiences. They opted such a path and such a stream that enhanced many times their sense of righteousness and confidence. This helped them understand that they can establish their own political power on the strength of their organised armed force, or in other words on the strength of the gun. They promoted and applied such an ideology of revolutionary struggle and such tactics, forms and methods that pave the way to destroy the law and regime of the ruling nexus and establish the law and regime of the people. Now they did not go to the B.D.O. or S.D.O. or to any officer with folded hands, staging dharnas for food and relief or to raise demands as if with a begging bowl. They did not go to the ruling nexus or government servants asking for alms. They believed in their own organised force, we may say on the strength of the gun alone, to solve their own problems for which they are going ahead. Instead of begging at the enemy’s door for pity and relief, they adopted the path and method of depending on their own organised armed force, asserting to forcefully seize what is rightfully theirs.

They thus brought about a sea-change in the forms and methods of struggle and organisation. Instead of Gandhian, unarmed, fully open and legal forms and methods, they stressed upon mainly armed, secret and non-legal forms and methods.

For instance, dividing into small groups in a secret, armed manner, they got together with speed at one place, as if pulling a net, suddenly attacking the houses or dens of big class enemies who perpetrated atrocities or their hired goons, and as if spreading the net, spread themselves in no time. They maintained a strict vigil on the movements and activities of the enemy side. In all work they abided by the directives of the party. They deposited a small portion of the food items seized or recovered as fine from the class enemies and their cohorts evil gentry, and distributed the rest among the masses. Even when seizing crop from the fields of the enemy, they distributed in the same way. In this way, they tried to help the masses solve their food problem. Though not yet enough in comparison to the need, this instilled confidence among the masses at large. They deposited with the party the guns, cash, gold and silver seized from the enemy with the objective of helping take the struggle further ahead. In respect of penalizing the class enemies and their local agents, they adopted the policy of, "*Give the dog his dues.*" Attempts were made to win over some through persuasion while others were threatened with dire consequences, some were subjected to criticism by the masses while others were beaten up and at the same time persuaded or threatened, still others were totally "finished off".

Generally, only those who committed atrocities upon the people with the help of goons or the police, or those who were known to misbehave with women, or those who conspired to have revolutionaries arrested by the police or murdered were meted out capital punishment with the consent of the common masses. Following threats issued or selective beating up of a few odd forest guards according to the needs, the forest guards did not now dare to enter many a forest area. Their exploitation and atrocities that prevailed without restraint in other neighboring areas as well did not continue thereafter. Peasants were now addressed to with due respect in the struggle areas for sure, and also in the nearby areas. In some struggle areas, the big class enemies who perpetrated atrocities fled the villages out of fear to take shelter in nearby towns, from where they tried to maintain their reign of exploitation and persecution with the assistance of agents, goons and the police. In reality, with the passage of time, these class enemies have been increasingly relying on police and military wings.

The popularity of such new forms of mass movements and Red Resistance Struggles of peasants and the indications of this kind of struggle spreading to

wider areas had shaken the ruling areas; the police and the government machinery were shaken out of their wits. On the one hand, in order to crush the struggle by force, they established police camps and conducted encirclement and suppression campaigns. In area after area, they entered the villages, barged into houses, mindlessly letting loose abuse and persecution, trampling upon the dignity of women, damaging property, snatching away everything from fowl and goat to essential household belongings. They sealed property, beat up both men and women with all brutality, carried out large-scale beatings and arrests and well-planned conspiracies, committed murders of revolutionary cadres. All this was done in the name of preserving law and order, in the name of maintaining peace. On the other hand, they also adopted various other dirty ploys to destroy the struggle. They tried to wean away peasants from the struggle by offering various kinds of sops, such as giving land, making good laws, giving money, jobs, installing pumps, digging wells, constructing schools and many other doles. The ruling nexus and their stooges adopted various means such as inciting casteist and caste inequalities, provoking parochialist and nationalist sectarianism, inciting or promoting various kinds regionalist or territorialist ideologies from districtism and stateism etc, thus creating discrimination among the militant masses at large, attempting to destroy the struggle from within in numerous devious ways. Further, holding the threat of police atrocities and persecution, they tried to weaken the morale of the militant common masses and simultaneously to force the militant masses to surrender before the enemy and thereby to push the struggle towards the same old Gandhian reformist kind of path; they tried to wean away the masses from the revolutionary path to entrap them into the same old mire of peaceful legal struggle. However, all such nefarious designs of theirs were to ultimately fail. No force can extinguish the flame of armed revolution held aloft by the Indian masses, neither now nor ever.

Our principal weakness has been that our masses are not very much active and organised. The areas of our struggle also are very small. The enemy wields a well-organised police and military wing. In an unorganised condition we cannot combat the well organised police and military wings. Then, without extensive areas it is not possible to conduct a guerilla war against the enemy's armed wings.

Therefore, the weaknesses must as far as possible be overcome very quickly. The publicity campaign must be made more creative and more

developed. The political education, fighting morale and level of activity must be advanced many times over. Along with building the guerilla war and building mass struggles to assist guerilla war and red resistance struggles, the struggle must spread out as widely as possible in waves. Mass organisations that would be useful for struggle have to be built. With those who can be organised, Revolutionary Peasant Committees must be built. Revolutionary Peasant Committees must be built as the embryonic form of peoples' power through a process. The Party organisation must be built. All these organisations must be built and gradually developed while maintaining coordination in creative ways between the increasing pace of struggle and the concerns, consciousness and militant mind-set of activists and common masses, We must definitely understand that if we do not correctly put into practice our actual organisational line in coordination with our political and military line, then the political and organisational work would suffer seriously. If we do not understand the mutual relationship between the three aspects, namely, revolutionary propaganda, revolutionary struggle and revolutionary organisation, and fail to build all these three tasks together in creative ways and in a powerful manner, then we became severely weakened. Along with the politics of self-defence and retaliation, a very important task before us is to arouse the masses fully with activity and initiative, and organise and arm them as a consolidated and disciplined force in the above three organisations.

The Three upsurges of the Kanksa struggle

The history of the Kanksa Struggle is one of serial episodes. It began in the year 1970-71. In 1970 some economic and political struggle commenced here and there. Between February-March and June-July in the year 1971, many economic and political struggles were waged under the leadership of the Kanksa police station (Area) Committee. There was a good mass participation in these struggles. Yet, what were the main shortcomings of the struggles of this phase?

(1) Shortcomngs in carrying out political mobilisation in a better way; (2) Lack of organisational preparedness and taking up struggles spontaneously to some extent; (3) Lack of continuity and comprehensiveness in the various forms of programmes; (4) Shortcomings in adopting the guerilla rules and techniques etc.

Basically, the struggle that began since February 1972 generated an upsurge. This struggle was limited to the Kanksa Police Station Area in the main. In this area this upsurge was at its peak from February 1972 to January 1973. It is also noteworthy that the crop defence and crop seizure struggle of 1972-73 had first begun from a small pocket in the village of Ausgram.

In 1973 despite some kind of struggle having occurred in Kanksa, the upsurge in the struggle basically took place in the Ausgram-Budbud Police Station Area.. This struggle was at its peak beginning from March-April 1973 until October-November.

The upsurge of the struggle that followed lasted from March 1974 till June 1975. That is, until the massive military encirclement and suppression that persisted thereafter. In this period, though there was some struggle, the peak in the upsurge of struggle remained only in Ausgram and Budbud in the main.

Thus, three periods can be seen as regards the upsurge in the struggle. We identify these as the three upsurges of the struggle.

On the positive aspects of the experience related to SQUAD formation

First, an outlook was in the making regarding squad formation and actual understanding was being acquired. Gradually a correct perception developed on why we should form an “Army”, who should be in this “Army?” “How and in what process can this “Army” be formed, why were “squads” formed?

On this an enthusiastic atmosphere was created among the people and activists of the entire area.

Activists came from almost every village. The mentality of leaving one’s household to join the squad has become like a festival. We do not say that there was no spontaneity in this mentality. However, that this spontaneity was not the main thing. The reason being that the events that unfolded in later years helped us even more in acquiring the confidence that which working in any area on the basis of “armed agrarian revolutionary” politics, whenever a call is given to form an army, a force can certainly be organised.

At the time of the enemy’s massive conspiracy and counter-revolutionary attack, it is very effective and useful to form a mobile squad.

It becomes convenient to carry out propaganda work in an organised form. It becomes a regular activity for local activists to go in the shape of a squad from village to village, holding meetings. A squad in every work, discipline in every thing - everyone learns from this example.

Even in waging war this mobile squad plays a reliable, powerful and important role. Generating a “Bolshevik spirit” during struggle, how the masses are engaged in struggle in a disciplined manner; how the village-based militia squads are made courageous and experienced - all this has proved to be the brilliant role of the mobile squad.

Be it scorching heat or rain or cold, the hard labour of treading on foot each day, seeking out special secret routes to tread on and to walk on only in this manner, giving up the usual routes to use new routes, using the tough tracts in forests and traverse distances, walking without light at night, holding meeting and then going out in the middle of the night from one place to another, swimming across rivers in spite during heavy rains, advancing the work even in the midst of police camps, encirclement and heavy vigil, facing every kind of situation - how can such a mentality and experience be gained ?

Only as a consequence of forming mobile squads is it possible to have such positive development.

Shortcomings and lessons of the Kanksa struggle

Shortcomings and weaknesses of the struggle and organisation in 1972 with regard to the organisational line (Party, Army, Committee)

Among the decisions taken at a Zonal Committee meeting in August 1973 following a review of the 1972 struggle, the following was mentioned “Merely the attempts of the Party do not suffice. It is also necessary to set up a coordination with the masses along with the attempts of the Party. The three weapons of revolution - Party, Army (Regular Army, Local Guerilla Army and Militia) and Peasants Committee must be formed.” A decision was also taken to form “Peasant committees” and “Militia Squads” from village to village and area to area , and to give them a specific form. Thus the “Organisational line” was discussed at length and decisions taken during this 1973 review.

It was also decided to have not separate programmes at the local or area

levels, but “a concrete agrarian revolutionary programme”. This was decided as there was also a lack of such a programme.

The “agenda” was to be prepared or approval given not by the party committee, but the Peasants committee formed at the village level and area level would prepare the “agenda” (with the help and consultation of the broad masses). The party would only keep an eye on such work, give guidelines, provide assistance. The Peasants Committee was not to be replaced by the Party. If things were done otherwise, not only the efforts of the masses, but also the development of the struggle and organisation would be obstructed. Of course, Party Members would be present among the Peasants Committee and they would in fact be the “organisational linkage” of the Party with the Peasants Committee. In the rural areas, the party unit would be the meeting point of the advanced elements of the Peasants Committee and other mass organisations.

In 1972 itself it was the ideal period to form “Peasants Committee” or give them a definite form. However, although there were means to do so at that time, we could not pay attention to form them. We only thought of Party Committees. (This can be said also for the struggle of 1972). In 1972, it was decided in the review that Peasants Committees would be formed, but we could not implement the decision. (We started implementing it only since 1975). This was the shortcoming in our understanding of the political and organisational line; there was a lack of proper understanding of the process of forging the three weapons of revolutions - the Party, Army and “Peasants Committee”.

It is true that there was broad mass participation in the struggle. However their participation was not in the form of village based militia, in the shape of organised units. The masses from villages got together for the struggle in large numbers. Thereafter, “squads” should have been formed. This was a weakness of the organisation and struggle. In the beginning for quite some time, there was no conscious effort to operate militia squads in the form of regular and definite squads, giving them a “consistent”, firm and more disciplined form. Village-based militia existed in an unorganised and loose form. In some villages although the form of “militia” did exist, yet efforts were not made to give them a conscious and firm political and organisational form.

It was because the task of making political and organisational preparations for extending the area and also within the main area was not fully completed, or there were serious shortcomings in this regard, that the Kanksa struggle was forced to retreat temporarily. This was our bitter experience.

Lessons Of The Gaya - Hazaribagh struggle in undivided Bihar

Keeping in mind the experience of the Kanksa struggle, where the task of timely expansion of the area and political and organisational preparations within the area, that is, the task of preparations regarding the Party, Army and United Front could not be done in good time, an attempt was made now to advance the revolutionary struggle in Gaya-Hazaribagh of former Bihar in a more systematic and planned manner.

By then, we had developed an understanding regarding military matters that in order to carry out military activities in a proper manner, a vast expanse of area was required so as to advance and retreat, or move to one side or move to the other side from time to time. This thinking was later reflected in practice with the formation of the Bihar-Bengal Special Area Committee.

Anyway, in the then Dhanbad and Hazaribagh area (Hazaribagh district then included the present Chattra, Giridih and Koderma districts) and in the Gaya area (Gaya then included Aurangabad, Jehanabad, Navada and such districts) work started with the perspective of advancing with the concrete orientation of building the Army and Base Area in the middle of 1969 and the later half of 1968, respectively.

Hazaribagh had plenty of hills and forests and was Adivasi-populated with nationality movement i.e., influence of the separate Jharkhand movement. Gaya was a vast plain area (also having a few hills and forests), having an influence of the crude feudal system.

The clarion call of Armed Agrarian Revolutionary Guerilla struggle had echoed in the Parasnath and Jilga hills of Dhanbad and Hazaribagh and the Neri-Mehudia hill of Barkagaon and surrounding areas in 1971 itself. Similarly, in the later half of 1972 the red flaming torch of Agrarian Revolutionary struggle was lit in the Chalho hills and surrounding areas of the Gaya area.

In the struggle of the Hazaribagh area, owing to the broad participation

of the adivasi masses as well as non-advasi masses, a revolutionary upsurge-like situation was created. The enemy was alarmed at the revolutionary struggle in this backward and adivasi-populated area. Thus started the brutal “encirclement and suppression” campaign. In order to defeat this “encirclement and suppression” the process of advancing further also began from our side. The “encirclement and suppression” campaign of 1974, was stinging and intense, wherein some comrades were martyred and some other leading comrades were arrested. Therefore, the struggle was forced to retreat for a while.

However, within a year or two the work began to be advanced afresh and with a new plan in a vast expansive area comprising Hazaribagh (including Hazaribagh, Giridih, Koderma, Chattra districts) and Dhanbad (including the present Bokaro district). Especially, as the enemy conducted his “encirclement and suppression” campaign, and efforts were made on our part to defeat it and gradually to expand the struggle further and take it to a higher plane, this process enabled us to acquire new experience in political and military aspects as well as in organisational aspects.

Meanwhile, the struggle in Gaya area too had surpassed the Chalho area, spreading into many new areas. An earth-shaking struggle against feudal landowners, their goons and private armies made it a powerful upsurge. By the thousands, the peasant masses and toiling masses participated in this revolutionary struggle, devastating the old rotten system and taking firm steps ahead to build a new system, that is a peoples’ democratic order.

The idea of forming a special area emerged in order to give practical shape to the task of building the army and base area

Although we had decided very early that building the Army and Base Area was our primary, principal and central task, yet how it would be translated into reality has always been a big question posed before us. In what practical form would Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (then Mao tsetung thought) be implemented in the concrete situation, or concrete specificity of India, has also been posed before us as a big question.

We realized that to seek a proper answer to this serious issue, it would not suffice to merely give a general call regarding the Army and Base area,

but it was also necessary to actually determine a concrete task to form the Army and Base Area. In order to carry out this task, it was also necessary to select some strategic area where a Base Area self-sufficient in economic, political and military aspects could be built.

Therefore, in order to build the Army and Base Area on the soil of our country, the idea emerged of considering Bihar (now Bihar - Jharkhand) and some areas of Bengal (West Midnapore-Bankura-Purulia) as a Special Area.

Efforts began in 1975 itself to form the Special Area, and in mid 1976 a Bihar-Bengal Special Area Committee was formed under the direct guidance and leadership of Comrade Kanhai Chatterji with some leading comrades working in the Kanksa area of Bengal and Dhanbad, Giridih, Hazaribagh, Gaya, Aurangabad, Navada and other districts.

The formation of a committee by the name of Special Area had a very positive impact on us. This nomenclature had aroused in us much interest about why a special Area has been formed and what would be its tasks. Thus, a clear concept was formed to form an Army and Base Area, and to form a Special Area in order to enable this. We understood that we could not take even a single step ahead as regards forming the Army and Base Area if we went about it in a spontaneous manner, without any plan or without the concept of Strategic Area.

In reality, we had, under Comrade KC's initiative and able leadership, begun work first of all by selecting Assam and the border areas of Assam-Tripura as a Strategic Area, and as the second Strategic Area a vast area comprising Bihar (now Bihar-Jharkhand) and some parts of Bengal.

However, since the entire ML movement was dealt a massive blow in Assam on the whole, we arrived at the conclusion that it was not possible to advance the work there as the First Strategic Area. Therefore, in accordance with Comrade KC's advice we took a decision to consider the Second Guerilla Area, the Bihar-Bengal area as the First and to make maximum efforts there, as per our strength and capacity, to build the Army and Base Area.

The stand of the CC of the MCCI on the changes in the domestic and international situation after Com KC's demise

On July 18, 1982 our leader and teacher, Comrade KC passed away. Comrade KC's demise is a great loss to us and to Indian revolution. So far it

was Comrade KC who presented the basic political line, specific line and tactical line and everything, including the corresponding work-method and work-style. Now, in the wake of Comrade KC's demise, this responsibility came upon the rest of the CC.

This CC then reiterated its stand on the following points -

- (i) After the demise of great Mao, the comrades who were arrested as the "Gang of Four" were in fact genuine comrades. The way these four comrades were arrested was in reality a counter-revolutionary coup d'état; in fact soon after the demise of great Mao, the Hua Kuo-feng - Deng Xiao-ping clique arrested the four revolutionary comrades through a coup d'état, changing the colour of socialist China and installing in China a bourgeois dictatorship.
- (ii) The Three World Theory was proclaimed by the degenerated Huo Kuo-feng as a compromise on principles and abandonment of class struggle. [Later when during talks with some revolutionary groups, the M.C.C. was urged to present its views on the Three World Theory in writing, we published a document, titled, "Three World Theory, a Counter-Revolutionary Theory," in which the Three World Theory was rejected].
- (iii) On the international plane, the contradiction between imperialism and oppressed nationalities and people was declared as the decisive and principal contradiction.
- (iv) Feeling the need to reiterate our earlier stand since the time Comrade KC was alive on the reports of the 9th and 10th Congresses of the Communist Party of China, we said that the Report of the 9th Congress regarding continuing the class struggle and advancing the construction of socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat was a Basic Report and that the Reports of the 9th and 10th Congress were not mutually contradictory.
- (v) We held that the interpretation of the current era as a strategic Concept, as presented in the 9th Congress, should necessarily be considered as a correct concept, and at the same time, upheld the interpretation of the historical significance of Mao thought (now Maoism) made in the 9th Congress.

- (vi) In the decade of the nineties, following the disintegration of Soviet Russia, we characterised the Russian superpower as a weak superpower. However, what “weak” meant could not be properly analysed. Later during the November meeting of the CC in 2002, as we understood that it was not correct to characterise Russia as a weak superpower, we decided to characterise it as a powerful imperialist country that had an abundant stock of nuclear weapons.

As regards the question of political analysis of the domestic situation and the political line, the following :

- (i) On the character of the state, the assessment remained the same. That is, India was a neocolonial type of semi-colonial and semi-fendal country; (ii) The comprador and bureaucratic big bourgeoisie of India did not have any relative or partial independence, but they are the compradors and loyal servants of imperialism. Their capacity to bargain is not an indication of any basic change having occurred in their character, but an indication of pocketing some more wealth as a consequence of service as agents, (iii) The perception regarding participating in the elections is not merely related to tactics, but amidst the background of the emergence of Khrushchev revisionism and the talk of transition to socialism through elections or by peaceful means, it acquires the importance as that of strategy; (iv) During the latter part of the Russia-dominated Indira regime itself, the rise of US domination began with the huge amount of loan borrowed from the International Monetary fund, which in the Rajiv period increased even further and US domination became the main form during the NDA regime; (v) The CPI (ML) Liberation was openly declared as modern revisionist and as an opposing element in revolutionary class struggle; (vi) It was decided to give up without delay the mentality of always treading the beaten track or the stereotyped approach in the work of building the Army and Base Area, and further advance and develop the military line, military organisation and military warfare with firmness and in a creative manner.

Two-line struggle is the basic key to party’s development

While writing the history of the CPSU, Comrade Stalin said that the history of the Soviet Party is a history of internal struggle, and Mao put this in such words that the Party is a unity of opposite things.

Looking back at our own history too, these facts seem to be quite correct. For instance: (a) A sharp two-line struggle against CPM revisionism, prior to rupturing relations with the CPM; (b) The debate on what is right and what is wrong among Communist Revolutionaries after having ruptured relations with the CPM; (c) The debate and discussion on the process and method of party formation; (d) A sharp two-line struggle against the wrong line that emerged within the MCC on encountering white terror during 1970-71 according to which “it would certainly not be appropriate right now to wage armed struggle in the city and the rural area adjoining the city, and for that matter even in the remote countryside,” and a two-line struggle against a handful of leadership comrades who fled the arena of struggle at 24 Parganas, Kanksa and Hooghly raising the issue that “The MCC was practising a ‘left’ line;” (e) A two-line debate on an issue raised by a leading comrade of Assam-Tripura in 1971-72, that “in the present condition we can advance only by making continuous squad attacks on the class enemy and state power;” a two-line struggle carried out in varied forms since 1977-78 with Badal when he raised the issue that “The line in Dakshindesh (or Lal Pataka) Special Issue No. 1 was a ‘left’ line” etc. This two-line struggle went on since the demise of Comrade KC in 1982 until 1994-95. Later, there was a bitter two-line struggle between 1999-2001 (which we shall discuss shortly). Thus through every debate and two-line struggle our line and practice was further strengthened.

The sharp two-line struggle between 1999 and 2001 shook-up the MCCI and helped us in every aspect in taking a qualitative leap

From the very beginning in our organisation Mao Tse-tung thought and Maoism have been synonyms. This has been a general understanding. Then many a time a strong voice was raised for using the term, Maoism. In 1986-87 some arguments were raised in this regard in the Kolkata City Committee. However, the debate could not be concluded then. The reason being that the situation had not become ripe enough to conduct two-line struggle on this issue.

However, it was apparent that within the CC of our organisation, the then CCM Badal was of the firm opinion that it would be politically wrong to consider that “*Mao thought and Maoism were synonyms and it would be*

more precise to use the term, Maoism". It took a few more years for this argument to be advanced, and finally in 1996-97 it did get expressed as such. The fact was that after our Second Central Conference of 1996, within our CC, virtually all except one comrade were of the firm opinion that the use of Maoism instead of Mao thought would be more precise, scientific and appropriate.

Then in 1999 a sharp debate began within the CC on the serial order in which to arrange the portraits of the founders of the MCC - in the order of Comrade KC, Comrade Amulya Sen, Comrade Chandrashekhar Das or of Comrade Amulya Sen, Comrade KC, Comrade Chandrashekhar Das. It was decided in the CC that the question of arranging photographs would be resolved during the CC meeting of August 1999 and the question of using the term, "Maoism" would be resolved during the CC meeting of January 2000.

In the August 1999 meeting, in the course of a lengthy debate and polemics a decision was arrived at by consensus with all CCMs signing it. Accordingly, the order of arranging the portraits was to be as follows : Comrade KC, Comrade Amulya Sen and Comrade Chandrashekhar Das.

Yet on returning from the CC meeting, Badal and Bharat adopted a course a clique formation within the Party in a conspiratorial manner against this decision, and confusion began to spread among party members and cadres.

Then in the CC meeting held in January 2000, after nearly 7 days of discussion, debate and polemics, it was decided with consensus that it would be appropriate and correct to use the term, Maoism , instead of Mao thought.

However, it was on returning from this meeting that Badal and Bharat stooped to engage in mal-propaganda and cliquism through non-organisational procedures and conspiratorial methods. Now the polemic on "Maoism" occupied the centre-stage. Along with this, they also added some other points, such as : (a) Comrade Stalin should not be assessed according to the Great Debate, but the assessment should be done afresh; (b) There should be no relationship with RIM; (c) The declaration of unilateral cease-fire with the PW was wrong etc. etc.

On all these questions, it becomes necessary to conduct a two-line debate within the party, culminating in a decision at Plenum or Conference, but the wrong attitude adopted by Badal and Bharat on this made this impossible. All the same, there was an intense discussion throughout the organisation on

these questions. Ultimately except for Badal, Bharat and a handful of comrades from West Bengal, 98 percent of the membership extended wholehearted support to the CC's line and there was warm support for the decision to use the term, Maoism.

As has already been said, in the course of this two-line struggle, we underwent a qualitative change in every aspect. This two-line struggle shook us up so much, that we were motivated to cast away our many weaknesses and filth. It inspired us to understand our serious shortcomings in relation to the dark chapter of mutual clashes between the MCC and PW, and to openly offer self-criticism. It helped us to shed the dogmatist and sectarian trends from within us. Also, it helped us understand the need to form Military Commissions from the Central level to the Special Areas and to two Regional levels under it, and a state level, and to form the Peoples' Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) from the armed military forces of the people, as the form of the Peoples' Army in the present condition. It accelerated the task of building the Army and Base Area. Finally, it helped us advance towards uniting with the RCCI (M), RCC (M), CPI (ML) Second CC, RCCI (MLM) and other such genuine Maoist revolutionaries, and especially the CPI (ML) [PW], in order to build an all-India Party.

Extension of the struggle in many other places and accelerating the work of building base areas

On taking lessons from the struggle of Kanksa and Hazaribagh, when the struggle developed in the then Hazaribagh-Dhanbad districts and Gaya-Aurangabad districts, it then rapidly developed in Ranchi-Singhbhum and some districts Orissa under the former Jharkhand Regions and in Deoghar, Dumka, Jamui, Munger, Banka. Bhagalpur of Bihar and other areas, until the level of Guerilla Zone could be reached. Meanwhile, the struggle of Gaya-Aurangabad under the former Bihar Region also developed and expanded very fast, helping extend the organisation rapidly in the Chatra, Palamu, Latehar, Gumla, Lohardagga, Garhwa districts of present Jharkhand; Sarguja, Jaspur, Koriya, Korba districts of Chattisgarh; Rohtas, Bhojpur, Bhabhua districts of South Bihar; further on to Sonbhadra, Chandauli and Mirzapur districts of Uttar Pradesh and Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Vaishali, Madhubani, Khagariya, Sitamarhi, Sheohar, West Champaran, East Champaran, Katihar, Purnea and other districts of North Bihar, thus leading to the development of

the struggles there and raising the struggle even in this region to the level of Guerilla Zone. The struggle of North Bihar soon had an impact on the northern part of Uttar Pradesh and thereon extending to the Uttarakhand area of Uttaranchal, thus building and accelerating the struggle.

Thus, with the development and expansion of the struggle under the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area, in a very short time the work of constructing the Army has gathered speed in a natural manner. As the struggle developed in the Guerilla Zone, the development and expansion of military formations also gathered speed. Beginning with Self Defence Squads and Peoples' Militia Squads and going on to form Local Regular Guerilla Squads, they were imparted education and training in political and military matters. Then, with Squad Members trained and tested in struggles, Platoons and Companies too were formed. Well-systematising all these military forces, on April 22, 2003 the PLGA was formed and this was declared. At the same time, evaluating the revolutionary struggle in a SAC meeting held in February 2003, 80-85 percent of the struggling area under the Bihar-Jharkhand-Bengal Special Area was identified as a Guerilla Zone and 8 areas were selected as Guerilla Bases. In order to develop these as Base Areas, the struggle is being continued with the perspective to obtain the desired objective within a definite time frame as part of a definite Plan. One after another many important successes have also been achieved as the struggle continues to advance steadily. Now what is needed is to take a big leap.

The end of a separate history as the MCCI and the Beginning of the history of the CPI (Maoist)

Comrades,

The very formation on September 21, 2004 of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) as a new and unified party following the merger of the MCCI and CPI (ML) [PW] meant the end of the separate history of the MCCI. Comrade KC had said that the genuine revolutionaries of the CPI (ML) would certainly unite one day with the genuine revolutionaries of the MCCI. His dream has now been realised. Today we are all known as CPI (Maoist). Let us now march ahead under the banner of CPI (Maoist) to successfully accomplish all the various tasks before us.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CPI(ML)[PEOPLE'S WAR]

INTRODUCTION

The Maoist movement has now been in existence in our country for the last three-and-a-half decades. In the process the CPI(ML) has traversed a torturous path, giving thousands of martyrs to the great cause of creating an exploitation-free society. In this period it has tread a zig-zag path, facing great advances and serious set-backs. It has witnessed death-defying sacrifices too. Yet, it has advanced significantly over this long period. In this period of over 35 years it has brought lakhs of people under its influence beating back the vicious repression of the state. Though it faced a serious setback in 1972 it was able to revive, fighting back the right and left, principally right opportunist trends, who sought to divert the entire movement, while correcting the left errors of the earlier period. Throughout this period it also played a major role in fighting modern revisionism in the country as part of the worldwide struggle against modern revisionism in the International Communist Movement, which has always been the main ideological danger to communism worldwide. It kept flying the red flag of Maoism on the Indian soil, drenched with the blood of the most dedicated and self-sacrificing comrades - the cream of Indian society.

In the course of advancing the revolutionary movement in the country it built the armed guerilla forces of the people. For the first time ever in the history of the Indian revolution a people's army has been systematically built up, culminating in the formation of the PGA on December 2, 2000. Our people's armed force led by the Party played a glorious role in the history of the country by waging a prolonged, consistent and fierce armed struggle against the reactionary Indian state forces and advancing the armed agrarian revolution with the aim of establishing base areas. Thus it is in the course of this PPW that the Party got consolidated and the Army took birth and developed.

In addition, the CPI(ML)[PW] had consolidated the gains of the revolutionary movement and extended them to newer areas where the communist party itself was hardly known to the people. Also, for the first time

it formed revolutionary mass organisations and strengthened them in many parts of the country and thereby deepened the mass base of the Party.

A similar history has been witnessed by the MCC. And now these two major streams of Indian revolution have merged to form a mighty river that will sweep away all the enemies and accomplish the NDR as the first step in the long march to socialism and finally communism. The task is huge and the responsibilities are immense. Given the size, population, complexity and geo-political position of our country, the victory of the democratic revolution in India will severely weaken the imperialist chain, acting to change the balance of forces not only in Asia but throughout the world.

We present below a brief history of the CPI(ML) from the time of its birth up to the present.

The Tumultuous 60's and their impact on the indian political scene

The tumultuous events of the 1960s, starting with the Great Debate and culminating in the GPCR, brought forth a new polarisation among the ML forces all over the globe. New Marxist-Leninist parties began to emerge by taking MLM as their guiding ideology.

The armed peasant revolution that started in Naxalbari in 1967 was a great turning point in the history of the Indian democratic revolution. Naxalbari marked the turning point of the armed peasant revolution, after the revisionist leadership betrayed it in Telangana after 1951. It is a matter of pride for the CPI(ML) to have begun and continued the armed peasant revolution as heir to the heroic armed peasant struggles of Punapra-Vayalar, Tebhaga and Telangana. Naxalbari struggle was a leap over the great Telangana peasant armed struggle, because it was the fruit of intense ideological struggle and revolt against the entrenched revisionist leadership in the Indian Communist Movement.

The armed peasant revolutionary struggle, which began in Naxalbari under the guidance of MLM, was the first serious blow against revisionism that had plagued the Indian Communist Movement like cancer. That is why the revisionists and the Congress rulers jumped into the arena to drown the armed peasant revolution in rivers of blood. The peasant

revolution inspired an entire generation across the country, as much as it scared the ruling classes out of their wits. The spark of Naxalbari spread to various corners of India—Srikakulam, Mushahari, Debra-Gopi Vallabhapur, Lakhimpur-Kheri and Birbhum. Thousands of martyrs, the best sons and daughters of India, gave their lives for the revolution.

Although later, the revolutionary movement suffered a temporary setback, the bright red banner of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the flames of Naxalbari continued to shine in various parts of the country. By now, the seeds of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism were sown very deep in the Indian landscape. Fighting against right opportunism and left deviations, the revolutionary movement regained its strength and began to advance to levels well beyond what was reached in 1972. The heroic sacrifices of those who fell to enemy bullets did not go in vain. The enemy's war of suppression was beaten back and the movement began to grow at a higher plane.

The history of the emergence and development of the CPI(ML)[People's War] and CPI(ML)(PU) are inseparably linked with this stormy period. During the last 35 years of history, they had not only continued to uphold the shining red banner of MLM with pride, but also continued to apply it in their revolutionary practice in the concrete conditions of India. In the course of this practice these parties had further enriched and developed the revolutionary line by analyzing and synthesizing the positive and negative experiences of their respective movements on the basis of MLM. In this light they achieved many remarkable successes in continuing and developing the protracted people's war through developing agrarian revolutionary guerilla war in the countryside by mobilizing and relying on the peasant masses, especially the poor and landless peasants. They continued this struggle by resisting the continuous severe repression and many suppression campaigns unleashed by the reactionary ruling classes with the support of imperialism.

It is in the course of advancing the people's war and implementing the line of building the people's army and establishing Base Areas that the two parties that had continued the legacy of Naxalbari and the CPI(ML)—CPI(ML)[PW] Nad CPI(ML)[PU)—merged into the unified CPI(ML)[PW] in August 1998. Both these parties had been part of the CPI(ML) that was formed on April 22, 1969. They had continued the revolutionary line adopted by the 8th Congress of the united CPI(ML) Party or the first Congress of the

reconstituted revolutionary proletarian party of India, ie. CPI (ML). Both had adopted the Party Programme and the Party Constitution of the 8th Congress and summed up the experiences of the CPI (ML) since the Naxalbari peasant uprising and continued their entire subsequent revolutionary practice based on the lessons drawn from the synthesis of past experiences.

The new Party succeeded in developing a guerrilla army -the PGA- and guerilla zones whose direction was towards establishing a full-fledged PLA and Base Areas in the vast countryside of Andhra, Jharkhand, Bihar, Dandakaranya and Orissa in accordance with the PPW strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside. In several areas, it established the revolutionary people's political power, the embryonic form of the New Democratic Government at the local level.

In this period of three and a half decades, thousands of comrades of CPI(ML) and the various splintered organizations of CPI(ML) as well as of other Maoist organisations had laid down their lives in the course of advancing the revolutionary movement in the country. These include many senior leaders of the parties and even a large number of intellectuals. The Party had developed through a process of continuous reviews in plenums, conferences and other review meetings, finally culminating in the 9th Congress of the Party. The practice based on the enriched line of the 9th Congress of the CPI(ML)[PW] in the past 3 ½ years advanced the movement as a whole in spite of the decline of the movement in some states.

The Ideological-Political Basis for The New Revolutionary Line

It was Com. CM's historic Eight Documents, written between January 1965 and 1967, that had laid the ideological-political basis for the qualitative rupture of the revolutionary stream within the Indian Communist Movement with revisionism and paved the way for the outbreak of the great Naxalbari uprising. These documents were a creative application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought in the concrete situation of India. These are historic in the sense that a sharp departure from parliamentary cretinism began to take place and revolutionary politics was resolutely put forward combating revisionism which was well entrenched in the communist movement in India until that time.

Many of the aspects of the revolutionary line of the new Party to be formed can be found in Com. CM's Eight Documents that were written in the course of the Ideological-Political struggle within the CPI and CPI(M). They served as the theoretical foundation for the historic Naxalbari struggle. These documents also served as the political and ideological basis for the founding of the new Party and the further growth of the revolutionary movement. Not only that, com. CM also played a role in the international debate in the struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism. He was one of the first to categorise the Soviet Union as social-imperialist. He laid the foundation to take the experiences of the GPCR to the other countries of South Asia.

The Naxalbari Uprising

Though the uprising was suppressed in a short period, it assumed tremendous significance in the history of the Indian communist movement. It became a water-shed in India politics. It is not an exaggeration to say that Indian politics was never again the same after Naxalbari for its impact left no sphere untouched. The spark of Naxalbari soon became a prairie fire engulfing vast tracts of rural India like Srikakulam, Birbhumi, Debra-Gopivallabhpur, Mushahari, Lakhimpur-Kheri, and so on. The armed peasant movement spread to over a dozen states in the next few years.

The CPC hailed the Naxalbari uprising as the Spring Thunder over India. It also called upon the revolutionary communists in India to *“boldly arouse the peasant masses, build up and expand the revolutionary armed forces, deal with the armed suppression of the imperialists and reactionaries-who are temporarily stronger than the revolutionary forces-by using the whole set of the flexible strategy and tactics of people's war..”*

The Naxalbari uprising was an integral part of the worldwide revolutionary upsurge of the late 1960s. It was a product of the great ideological-political ferment that rocked the world led by the CPC under the guidance of com. Mao. The Great Debate between the revolutionary CPC led by Com. Mao on the one hand, and the revisionist CPSU under renegade Khrushchov on the other, had unleashed a process of polarization among the Communist Parties throughout the world.

As in other countries of the world, in India too, this struggle assumed acute proportions within the Communist camp. Naxalbari thus

represented this sharp struggle between revisionism and revolution in the Indian communist movement as much as it did in the International Communist Movement. It became the rallying point for the revolutionary forces within the revisionist CPI and CPI(M) who began to initiate the process of the formation of a new revolutionary party. The revolutionaries within the CPI(M) held a meeting in Calcutta and formed the 'Naxalbari Peasants Struggle Aid Committee', which was to become the nucleus of the new Party. By placing armed struggle once again on the agenda of the Indian revolution it became a clarion call of the Maoists in the sub-continent.

Naxalbari also showed the path of armed struggle to the people of the country in practical terms. It not only made a clean break with revisionism in theory but also showed the way in practice. Thereby it also laid the seeds for the people's war and the path of seizure of power by armed force. 'Naxalbari Ek Hi Raastha' became the slogan of all the genuine revolutionaries of India and even in the whole of South Asia.

The party formation and the armed peasant upsurge (1967-72)

It is in the background of the spread of the Naxalbari-type of struggles as a prairie fire in the various states in the country that a single coordinating Centre and a centralized, revolutionary, underground party—a Leninist Party of a new type—became the urgent need of the hour.

The new Party was formed two years after the outbreak of the Naxalbari uprising although the ideological-political struggle for the formation of the revolutionary party can be said to have begun right from the time of the 7th Congress in 1964. As already mentioned, com. CM's Eight Documents between 1964-67 had provided the ideological-political basis for such a Party. Naxalbari and similar type of movements soon after accelerated the process of formation of the revolutionary party due to the urgent need for coordination of these armed agrarian revolutionary movements. The first organizational step towards the formation of the new Party was taken with the formation of an All-India Co-ordination Committee in November 1967. It issued a Declaration which was also broadcast by Peking (Beijing) Radio.

Six months later, on 14 May 1968, on the eve of the first anniversary of the Naxalbari peasant uprising, the Committee decided to issue a new declaration and also to change its name to *All India Co-ordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries(AICCCR)* with comrade SushitalRoy Chowdhary as its Convenor. The revolutionaries brought out the political papers '*Liberation*' in English and '*Deshabrati*' in Bengali. Following the Naxalbari upsurge several revolutionaries revolted against the CPI(M) leadership and left it and joined the Co-ordination Committee.

The new Declaration of the AICCCR correctly explained the targets and friends of the Indian revolution and the path of liberation of the country.

It appealed to all the revolutionaries to unite forces to build a new Party: *"In this historic hour we appeal once again to all revolutionaries throughout India, who accept the thought of Chairman Mao, to unite their forces and coordinate their struggles so that the victory of the Indian revolution may be nearer. Let us all rally under the red banner of Chairman Mao's thought, let us apply his thought to the concrete conditions in India, and let us build up a true Communist Party of India in the course of revolutionary struggles of the Naxalbari type, for revolution cannot be victorious without a revolutionary party."*

Under the leadership of the AICCCR, State Coordination Committees were formed in about 13 states to coordinate and lead the growing waves of armed agrarian struggles in their respective states.

Under the leadership of Com. CM who guided these movements, the AICCCR passed a resolution on Party Organization for the building of a Party of a new type and the CPI(ML) took birth on 22nd April 1969, the hundredth birth anniversary of comrade Lenin. After conducting several struggles in various regions of the country and acquiring an all-India character, the Party held the 8th Congress in May 1970 and Com. CM became the Secretary of the Central Committee.

The 8th Congress of the Party was the culmination of the consistent ideological-political struggle against the deeply entrenched revisionist trends that had begun after the publication of the first document of comrade Charu Majumdar in January 1965. It synthesized the experiences of the revolutionaries in various states in leading the armed peasant movements

and their struggles against revisionism and economism.

By concretely applying the theory of MLM in the concrete conditions of India, the Congress had correctly analyzed the character of Indian society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal, put forward the general line of new-democratic revolution with a socialist perspective and advanced the strategic line of protracted people's war of surrounding the cities from the countryside. The historic Congress is a qualitative turning point in the annals of the Indian Communist Movement that brought to an end decades of revisionist practice and blazed a new revolutionary path for the Indian revolution. It was a repudiation of both the Khrushchevite revisionism of the CPI, and the neo-revisionism of the CPI(M), which characterised the Party since the 7th Congress in 1964 in the name of equidistance from the CPSU and the CPC. The CPI(ML) was a Party of new-type - an underground Party which rejected the parliamentary path, opposed all varieties of revisionism and finally advanced the line of protracted people's war of seizing power in the countryside and finally encircling the cities and achieving countrywide victory.

As the first Congress of the reconstituted Communist Party in India, as the first Congress that completely broke with revisionism of all hues once and for all, as the Congress that had established the new revolutionary line for the Indian revolution, the 8th Congress stands out as unique and finds a permanent place in Indian revolutionary history.

Spread of The Movement—The Prairie Fire

Like a prairie-fire, peasant armed struggles erupted soon in Srikakulam, Lakhimpur-Kheri(Terai), , Mushahari, Debra-Gopivallabhpur, Birbhum and other regions of the country, like Punjab, other parts of West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, UP, etc., following the path of Naxalbari. The armed revolutionary peasant struggles thus spread from Naxalbari to several parts of the country and had a strong base in the states of AP and Bihar, apart from the epi-centre of the movement in West Bengal.

As a result of these movements, the revolutionary authority of the people was established in embryonic form through the formation of the Revolutionary Committees for the first time in the country. This was particularly significant in Srikakulam, Birbhum and also in other areas. Also, for the first time, arms were seized from the enemy forces and landlords, guerrilla formations in the

embryonic form of the people's army took place. It is for this reason that the path of protracted people's war came into existence, not only through theory but also through the concrete practice of the above revolutionary armed struggles.

Martyrdom of Com. CM

On July 16, 1972, comrade CM was arrested from a shelter in Calcutta after obtaining information from a courier through brutal torture. Comrade CM was suffering from cardiac asthma at the time of his arrest. He was not allowed to see anyone during the 12 days of police custody. He died in the early hours of July 28 in the police lock-up. So scared was the police even after his death that the whole area was cordoned off and no one was allowed to come near his dead body except his immediate family members.

Comrade CM's martyrdom was a great loss to the Indian as well as the world revolution. It had brought to a close the first glorious chapter in the history of the reconstituted CPI(ML) and the revolutionary movement in India that was initiated on a sound ideological-political foundation after decades of betrayal by the revisionists.

The post-72 setback and preparations for a new upsurge (1972-77)

This crucial period can be analysed based on four major aspects:

Firstly, it was the toughest times for the communist revolutionaries in the history of the communist movement in India. Every communist in the Marxist-Leninist- Maoist camp was put to the test - as to who would withstand the enemy onslaught and who would capitulate; who would stand firmly with the oppressed masses and who would flee to the enemy camp; as to what lesson they would take, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist or revisionist; as to who would really take initiative to re-organise the people for the People's War or merely indulge in debates; and who would emerge as genuine and capable leaders or as pseudo ones.

Secondly, it was a period of political and ideological confusions in the midst of enormous repression by the State's forces. This was compounded by desertions, betrayals, splits and inactivity.

Thirdly, it was also a period that witnessed great and heroic sacrifices, enormous courage in swimming against the tide and persistence of the armed struggle in some pockets.

And lastly, it was a crucial period for reviewing the past, taking lessons, initiating efforts for the reunification of CRs, making preparations for a new upsurge on the one side, and exposure of opportunist elements on the other.

Setback Of The Movement And Party Splits

Owing to political and organisational weaknesses, including tactical errors, severe repression and big losses, inexperience, disruptive acts of right opportunists internally, and the resulting setback and political/ideological confusion, the Party began to split. The Party's first split took place in November 1971 by the betrayal of SNS. Within a year after the martyrdom of Com. CM, it broke up into several splinter groups. Within just the span of two years after the 8th Congress a large number of CCMs became martyrs, some were arrested and some others detracted or betrayed. The remaining two CCMs, comrades Sharma and Suniti Kumar Ghosh, did not have live relations with state committees.

The post-72 phase in the revolutionary movement in India has thus seen the splintering of the Party into several small groups, some of which gradually became consolidated into independent parties having their own distinct lines and practice. While some of them claimed themselves to be the real inheritors of the revolutionary legacy of the glorious struggles of 1967-72 and formed new CCs, some others proclaimed their desire for unifying all the revolutionary forces and reorganising the CPI(ML).

The 1972 setback and the disintegration of the party into several splintered groups was the darkest chapter in our party's history. The absence of a centre for Indian revolution due to the disruption of the CC naturally gave rise to isolated groups and parties which were confined to limited areas/states until 1980.

The revival of the movement in some parts of the country led by the new centers of the erstwhile CPI(ML)[PW] and CPI(ML)[PU], and some others on the one hand, and the MCC on the other, raised new hopes among the revolutionary masses. Some of the groups of the CPI(ML) became defunct, some became splintered further and some turned revisionist by the 1980s.

Three trends in the ML camp

In this period the forces belonging to the CPI(ML) and other Communist Revolutionary groups became clearly polarised into three broad trends in the late 1970s :

The first trend consisted of the revisionists represented by the renegades SNS, Kanu Sanyal, Ashim Chatterjee; the right deviation-ists like TN-DV, CP Reddy etc., all of whom launched malicious attacks on the Naxalbari movement and on Com. Charu Mazumdar. They deviated from the basic line and programme of the Party. All these parties began to participate in parliamentary elections by the end of the 1970s. Although some of these maintained armed squads, they were immersed neck-deep in reformist practice and did not have a concrete programme with the aim of seizure of political power. (Over the last couple of decades this trend witnessed continuous splits resulting in liquidation, disintegration and passivity or even betrayals. In the course of time many of the genuine revolutionary sections/elements joined the third trend).

The second trend was represented by the left adventurist groups, such as those led by Mahadev Mukherjee and other pro-Lin Piao groups as well as some anti-Lin Piao groups like the Vinod Mishra group for the first few years after the martyrdom of com. Jowhar. This latter organisation gradually turned to its opposite by the early 80s pursuing the parliamentary line. These left adventurist groups dogmatically upheld the annihilation tactics a line, rejecting the need to take up any other forms of struggle and organization except armed struggle and refused to take any lessons from the past mistakes. This trend barely exists today as many were killed by the enemy or became passive, while the remaining either joined the first or the third trend.

The third trend was represented by those ML forces which summed up the past basically from a Marxist-Leninist view-point, assimilated all the positive aspects of the Naxalbari movement and line of the CPI (ML), repudiated the left-sectarian tactics and began to engage them-selves in serious revolutionary practice with a mass line. The AP State Committee of the CPI(ML) led by Com.KS, Com. Shar-ma of Punjab, Com. Suniti Ghosh from West Bengal and later the CPI(ML)(PU), and some other groups belonged to this trend. All of these belonged to the original CPI(ML).

Splits and unity of groups and individuals became a special characteristic of Indian revolutionary politics in the post-1972 period. No two groups could achieve lasting revolutionary unity due to dogmatism in matters pertaining to M-L-M ideology, narrow sectarianism in organisational matters, left or right opportunism and petty-bourgeois egoism in the leadership.

Summation of the Setback and Its Lessons

The achievements and shortcomings and lessons from the Naxalbari uprising, the post-Naxalbari upsurge throughout the country, and the subsequent setback were summed up in “*Our Self-critical Report*” {*Summing up the Past let us Advance victoriously along the Path of Armed Struggle*}, which is an important History Document of our Party, since its formation, till 1972. This was prepared in 1974 by the AP State Committee, when it was in the COC. This was enriched in 1980 at the time of formation of the CPI(ML)(PW).

The “*Self-critical Report*” defended the positive revolutionary content of the great upsurge, the great path-breaking role of comrade CM and the 8th Congress while self-critically evaluating the deviations in respect of the tactics, method and style of work to implement the strategy.

On the whole, the SCR played a major role in the revival of the revolutionary movement and laid the basis for the reunification of the genuine communist revolutionaries within India. Firstly, it helped the Party come out of the previous left adventurist trend and educated new forces for re-building the movement and helped to reorganise the party on a proper basis. Secondly, it helped the polemical debate against both right opportunism (which was rampant in the period of setback) and left sectarianism, particularly the former. Thirdly, it helped to lay the theoretical basis for a resurgence of the movement. Fourthly, by strongly upholding the achievements of the earlier period, though critically, it facilitated the process of the re-unification of communist revolutionaries. And lastly, by taking a balanced approach on the role of comrade CM, it helped give a rational understanding of the role of leadership in the communist movement.

Attempts to reorganise the party

In March 1972, the remaining three members of the AP state committee (two of whom were arrested in November) sought to correct the errors of the Naxalbari period by maintaining its revolutionary essence. This committee decided to build revolutionary mass organisations, take up the class struggles of the masses and spread to new areas. It also decided that the annihilation of class enemies should be conducted only as part of the class struggle.

In August 1973 the Party launched its political magazine ‘*Pilupu*’ (*The Call*) to rally the revolutionary forces. This magazine, besides dissemination of the stand of the Party on national and international issues, conducted an ideological-political battle to repulse the attacks of the right opportunists within the CPI (ML) and from those outside APCCCR. ‘*Pilupu*’ played an important role in defense of the CM-line and repulsed the right and ‘left’ deviations rampant in the movement at that time and for steering the movement onto a correct path. In August 1974 a three-member state committee was reconstituted in AP under the leadership of Com. KS.

The APPC led by KS made attempts to contact central committee members in other states and joined the reconstituted Central Organising Committee comprising Com. Sharma of Punjab, Com. Suniti Ghosh of Bengal and Com. Ramnath of Bihar. The COC resolved to undertake thorough self-critical evaluation of the past and formulate tactics; to unify all the splinter groups into a single Party as far as possible; and then to conduct a Congress to elect a Central Committee. However, due to political differences, the COC could not forge itself into a single organisation and, with the collapse of this first attempt to reorganise the Centre, the AP comrades concentrated on building a strong agrarian revolutionary movement in the state.

The resurgence and spread of the people’s war (1977-2004)

The quarter century from 1977 saw the gradual revival and spread of the armed agrarian revolutionary movement to new areas in AP, Dandakaranya, Orissa, Bihar-Jharkhand, West Bengal, Maharashtra etc. The epi-centre of the revolutionary movement in AP shifted from Srikakulam to North Telangana. This period saw the formation of the CPI(ML)[PW] and

CPI(ML)[PU] and growth of the revolutionary movement under their leadership while most of the groups of the CPI(ML) degenerated into reformist, Parliamentary parties, or Right opportunism.

Having faced a set-back in 1972, after taking lessons from the earlier period through a thorough review, and in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, the Party, primarily led by the erstwhile CPI(ML)(PW) and the CPI(ML)(PU), gradually regained strength. The entire Party was educated in the new understanding, systematically consolidated and expanded. In the process it developed unity with some other genuine forces and established stronger centres. Slowly the Party's influence began to grow in many parts of the country. Internally too it was able to overcome crises, defeating the right opportunist lines that emerged, thereby strengthening itself politically and ideologically. It also developed and deepened its relations with fraternal parties abroad. Finally the two major streams of the CPI(ML) merged in August 1998 to form a single Party under a unified Central Committee. In the wake of this merger a number of other genuine revolutionaries also joined the process.

In this period, the mass base of the Party significantly developed making a breakthrough in the anti-feudal peasant revolutionary armed struggle. It also expanded its influence amongst students, youth, workers, women, dalits and intellectuals. It was also able to deepen the anti-imperialist movement in the country through propaganda, agitation and struggles. Overall, the Party's mass base was strengthened and extended to new areas.

In this period, the revolutionary movement advanced through numerous twists and turns. The Party, analyzing the changes that have taken place in the country, internationally and in the movement, has accordingly changed its tactics, taking the revolutionary movement in the country forward, as a part of the international proletarian movement.

Most importantly, in this period of a quarter century, it developed the armed guerrilla squads and armed itself, seizing arms from the enemy. The armed formations gradually grew in strength and were able to beat back the enemy onslaught, thereby sustaining the armed struggle throughout this period. Through this it was also able to build the PGA and set up the embryonic forms of the organs of People's Power in some strategic areas of the country.

Finally, it waged a continuous ideological and political battle against

revisionism and neo-revisionism combating both the Soviet and Deng varieties. Within the country it had also countered all forms of right opportunism and propagated widely Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the line of protracted people's war.

Reorganization and the Development of Erstwhile PW

Although several changes had occurred in the APSC in the decade of the 1970s, it made serious efforts to bring the Party cadres out of left adventurism by basing on the self-critical review.

After the COC became defunct in 1977, the APSC did not immediately make attempts to unite with other revolutionary groups. The past experience had shown that attempts at unification without building any significant movement, only basing on a review of the past, was proving futile. Therefore the APSC concentrated upon building an extensive revolutionary movement in AP basing on the SCR. As a result of this, it could not only build powerful statewide revolutionary movements among students, youth, literary and cultural fronts, but also developed the revolutionary peasant movement in Karimnagar, and Adilabad districts. It was only then that the APSC initiated unity measures based on the successful development of the movement. The outbreak of the movement vindicated the correctness of the self-critical review, which could then act as the basis for unity efforts. Hence, basing on the SCR and the movement built based on the lessons drawn, attempts for unity with other ML groups like the Party Unity, and TN State Committee of the CPI(ML) began when they approached the APPC lead by Com. KS.

At that historical juncture, it became the foremost task of the genuine revolutionaries to expose the revisionists and Right opportunists who claimed themselves to be revolutionaries while negating the historic significance of great Naxalbari and other movements and the line represented by the CPI(ML). Throughout this period, the Party waged fierce polemical debates with SNS, Kanu Sanyal, Ashim Chatterjee, Nagbhushan Patnaik and others who concentrated their attack on the armed struggle, Party line and com. CM.

While fighting both the right and the "Left" trends, principally the Right opportunist trend, we enriched our line and developed the correct tactics in our 'Our Tactical Line' after a thoroughgoing evaluation of the positive and negative aspects in the Party line and taking appropriate lessons as summed up in our 'Self Critical Report'.

Telangana Regional Conference

The Telangana Regional Conference was held in February 1977 to conclude the discussion on the Party line and to adopt the Party documents. The Conference took three major decisions: (i) to broaden the party 's base amongst the masses (ii) to hold a series of political classes to train the big influx of new cadre and (iii) to send squads into the forest for launching armed struggle. Finally, the eight districts of Telangana, excluding Hyderabad, were divided into two regions and two regional committees were elected.

Change in Tactics -The August 1977 Resolution

In the Parliamentary elections of March 1977, the fascist Indira Gandhi was utterly routed and the Janata Party came into power. The Emergency was lifted. The Janata Party came into power by opposing the Emergency and by campaigning for the restoration of democratic rights. It released most of the revolutionaries on bail. The ban on the Party was lifted. To take advantage of the changed political situation and implement the decisions of the first Telangana Regional conference, a document - "*Present Political Situation and our Tasks*"- was prepared. This document, which came to be known as "*August resolution*", was passed after extensive discussions in different districts and provided proper tactics to the party during this period. It was, however, wrong to have used the phrase "temporary suspension of armed struggle" in the August Resolution that created needless apprehensions and confusion in the Party and the ML camp.

In accordance with the change in tactics, the PC started the *Kranti* (Revolution) fortnightly as its official organ and started printing revolutionary literature openly. '*Radical March*' was brought out legally as a monthly magazine of the RSU and RYL. These organs played a key role in educating the Party ranks, and students and youth politically

The word Radical became a synonym for revolutionaries. The Boycott election campaign and the 'Go to villages campaign' which were taken up extensively by the RSU and RYL, helped in integrating with the rural poor and in spreading the politics of New Democratic Revolution and its axis, the armed Agrarian Revolution. While the first campaign in 1978 involved around 200 students, the number grew to 1100 students and

youth by 1984, organised into 150 propaganda teams, which took the politics of agrarian revolution to 2419 villages.

The rapid growth of the revolutionary student movement, the radicalization of student and youth in AP and their integration with the rural peasant masses, unnerved the ruling classes. The RSU had spread to 18 out of the 21 districts of AP and organized state-wide strikes of students on various issues. It captured the students unions in several colleges in the state and organized political movements against imperialism, war, communalism and in support of the working class, peasantry and nationality movements. It took the initiative to form the AIRSF. By the beginning of 1985, the ruling classes began their all-out attack against the student and youth organizations along with the offensive against the peasant and working class movement. The mass organizations began to function in total secrecy from then on.

The Party thus utilized the immediate post-Emergency period effectively by unleashing a wave of struggles of the working class, peasantry, students and youth and massive campaigns by the cultural and literary organizations throughout the state. Civil Rights Movement also gathered momentum prior to and immediately after the lifting of the Emergency. The tactics taken up by the Party during this period greatly helped in the resurgence of the revolutionary movement by consolidating and expanding the revolutionary mass base among the various sections of the people and making the preparations for waging armed struggle at a higher plane. The legal and illegal forms of struggle and organization were effectively combined. The Party maintained its secret structure intact while organizing open as well as underground mass activity through legal, semi-legal and secret mass organizations and a combination of these forms depending upon the enemy tactics.

Outbreak Of Karimnagar And Adilabad Peasant Struggles

In June 1978, the peasant struggle of Jagityal rose like a hurricane. Within three months, the government unleashed brutal repression and declared Jagityal and Siricilla tehsils as Disturbed Areas in October. The State Committee made a comprehensive plan to extend these struggles and consolidate amidst the repression. As a result, the peasant struggles erupted

all over Karimnagar and Adilabad within a short span. By the end of 1979, Party work in student, youth, worker, peasant and literary fronts extended to every nook and corner of Andhra Pradesh. The wave of the Karimnagar and Adilabad peasant struggles was the result of long efforts- to transform the Party from the left adventurist line to the correct revolutionary line- made through the resolutions of the State Committee meeting of February-March 1972, Self-critical Report of 1974, first Telanga-na regional conference of January '77, and the August '77 resolution.

By the end of 1979, developing Karimnagar, Adilabad, Warangal, and Khammam into a guerrilla zone with the perspective of establishing Base Areas, and laying the foundation for the protracted people's war, came as the immediate task before the Party. The movement in Andhra Pradesh was then at four levels: 1) The above four districts where peasant struggles should be organised and turned into a guerrilla zone; 2) other districts of Telangana and Rayalaseema where anti-feudal struggles had already started; 3) South Coastal districts where socio-economic conditions are different, utilising the legal opportunities, propaganda programmes and work in agricultural labour and poor peasants were taken up; and 4) Work in towns and cities as part of the strategy of pro-tracted people's war.

Formation of the PW

The CPI(ML) (People's War) was formed on 22nd April 1980 by merging of the APSC, and the TNSC. Later, in May a group of genuine revolutionary forces of Maharashtra joined the CPI(ML)(PW). The Party then had a few Party members in Karnataka. The position of the Party in these states by that time was as follows:

The movement in TN could not develop after the martyrdom of Com. Appu one year after he was elected the TNSC Secretary in December 1969 (he was also elected as a CCM in the 8th Congress) and the arrest or loss of several leaders. The TNSC did not make any review of the movement from the State Conference in December 1969 up to 1980.

In the period covering the decade of the 1970s, the Party in Tamil Nadu split into four groups. One faction joined the Vinod Mishra group and another followed the SNS line. The third group pursued the CM line and by 1979 recognised the need for mass organisations to some extent.

However, it pursued a sectarian standpoint in the main. This group split once again in 1977 with one faction following Com. Kannamani and the other rallying under the leadership of Com. Manickam. This latter group united with the APSC to form the People's War Party in April 1980. At the time of the formation of the People's War Party in Tamil Nadu, there was no leadership that had the confidence of the Party rank and file and the people in the state.

In Maharashtra, Party units emerged in 1972 due to the coming together of some comrades who were attracted towards Naxalbari and Srikakulam struggles. Some comrades broke away and formed a separate unit in 1975 in opposition to the then Maharashtra leadership who participated in the SNS-CPR merger. Influenced by the struggles in Karimnagar and Adilabad this unit established links with the APSC and joined the PW and held a Bombay City Conference in June 1980, which adopted the Party's basic documents.

After the formation of the PW in 1980, the movement spread to entire Telangana, North Andhra and Dandakaranya.

Perspective of building guerrilla zones as a part of base area

The PW commenced its rural work with a concrete plan and perspective of transforming the backward region of NT into a Guerrilla Zone and to develop the adjoining Dandakaranya region into a Rear with the perspective of transforming it into a Base Area in the course of consolidation of the movement and intensification of the armed struggle. Such a perspective was drawn up by the APSC under the leadership of comrade KS, in 1980 itself keeping in view the mounting repression.

In fact, State repression began in September 1978, i.e. within a few months after the initiation of the peasant struggles and police camps began to be set up on a massive scale. The Jagityal & Siricilla taluqs were declared in October as 'Disturbed Areas'. Keeping in view the prospects of massive onslaught by the enemy's armed forces, the Party drew up first the Jagtyal Perspective and later the Guerrilla zone perspective entitled, "Get prepared to take the Karimnagar and Adilabad peasant struggles into a newer stage". Accordingly, armed peasant squads were sent to the forest in NT, Eastern Ghats of AP and to bordering

Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh(now Chhattisgarh). Gradually an extensive mass base was built in Dandakaranya according to plan, and a separate Forest Committee was formed in February 1987 covering the forest regions of the Adilabad and the East Division (comprising of the Districts Vishakapatnam and East-Godavary) in AP and parts of Maharashtra, MP and Orissa.

It is due to this perspective and concrete plan and consistent persuasion and direct leading role of the higher committees, that we could expand the armed struggle over a wide contiguous area and develop three guerrilla zones in NT, DK and AOB regions in the process. This, in turn, had immense influence over struggles in the other regions and states. Armed struggle also spread to the South Telangana region, Rayalaseema and later to some backward parts of the South Coastal districts in AP. Guerrilla zones also came into existence in the South Telangana and Nallamala regions of AP by the time of the 9th Congress in 2001. The plan that was developed for DK, NT and AOB as guerrilla zones with the aim of establishing them into Base areas was a turning point, in the revolutionary movement of India, led by the PW.

Two Major Internal Crises Of The Party

Four years after the formation of the PW a crisis broke out in the CC. In fact, it was decided to hold the 9th Congress within a year after the constitution of the CC in April 1980. But it was postponed due to the deliberate delay on the part of Veera Swamy (VS)-Manickam, the CC members from TN, in writing the state POR and not holding the state conference of TN. It was once again decided in the CC meeting in May 1984 to hold the Congress in the first quarter of 1985 after a Political Resolution was adopted due to changes in the international situation. But due to the crisis created in the Party by the opportunist clique led by Satya Murthy (SM) and VS in the beginning of 1985, the Congress could not see the light of the day. Thus the first CC of the erstwhile PW which was formed in April 1980 and functioned till the beginning of 1985 and became paralysed during the crises of 1985-87 and finally dissolved itself in April 1987.

The main reason for the crisis should be seen in relation to solving the problems confronting the movement. The movement at that time confronted several questions concerning the tactics to be adopted in order to further advance the armed struggle. The Party leadership was not in a

position to find a correct solution to these questions and, instead of addressing these questions seriously, a section of the Central leadership created a crisis in the Party in 1985 through conspiratorial methods. To cover up their weaknesses in advancing the movement and not preparing themselves for undertaking self-criticism of their failures, the SM-VS clique in the CC put forth an alternative line cloaked in “Left” phraseology but actually Right in essence. But the anti-Party methods pursued by the liquidationist-opportunist clique prevented a thoroughgoing two-line struggle against their wrong line. The movement could advance only after defeating this anti-Party clique and the Party, by and large, was united more firmly around the Party line. After a lapse of over 3 years when the four State Units of AP, Tamilnadu, Karnataka & Maharashtra functioned separately without a central leadership, a new centre - COC - was elected in the Central Plenum in Aug, 1990.

But once again an internal crisis broke out in the Party in mid-1991 due to the opportunist- KS-Bandaiah clique which could not play any role in advancing the movement by adopting the appropriate tactics. To cover up its failures and to push forth its subjective assessments and Right opportunist tactics on some political issues, the KS-Bandaiah clique resorted to anarchic and ultra-democratic methods and tried to split and liquidate the party. The entire Party, barring a handful of opportunist elements, stood united in waging a principled struggle against this clique and defeated its disruptionist designs. The crisis dragged on for an year until this clique was expelled from the Party in June 1992.

The second inner-Party crisis and the methods adopted to fight it, served as a great education campaign and rectified the Party’s style of work, developed collective leadership and team functioning in the CC and strengthened the functioning of all Party Committees based on democratic centralism. It raised the ideological-political level of the entire Party and drew up new tasks.

To sum up, the Party rank and file struggled against the opportunist cliques led by the then CC Secretaries during the inner-Party crises of 1985-87 and 1991-92, defeated their disruptionist designs and stood firmly united. Both times, the Party succeeded in countering the enemy’s severe suppression campaigns and emerged stronger than before. This became possible due to the political education imparted to Party cadres, rectification campaign taken

up in the Party against weaknesses and deviations, and the high level of revolutionary commitment of the Party rank and file and their firm adherence to armed struggle.

For instance, there was a consistent struggle against the alien class trends such as bureaucracy in 1981 and against the “six evils” - opportunist alliances, bureaucracy, legalism, tech violations, financial extravaganza and misbehaviour with women comrades - in 1984. A rectification campaign was taken up against the “six evils” from 1984 until 1987 in AP. As part of this Rectification Campaign, criticism-self-criticism was conducted in all Party committee meetings and political classes and discussions were held for all the Party cadres on Party history to learn from it and rectify the six evils. Most of the documents related to Party history were published in five volumes and education was taken to the entire Party in AP and DK.

Development of the Political-Military Line of the Party

The political-military line of the CPI(ML) was the result of a consistent, uncompromising polemical struggle with the revisionist line of the CPI and the CPI(M) and concrete class struggle that took the form of Naxalbari-Srikakulam and other armed uprisings. The new revolutionary line emerged only through a complete rupture with the old revisionist line. The line was further enriched in the long course of development of the protracted people’s war in different parts of the country. It is the synthesis of the experiences of class struggle, armed struggle, and of the polemical struggles with the various shades of revisionism and with the Right and “Left” trends in the revolutionary movement, of the ups and downs, ebb and flow, setbacks and upswings. It is linked to the forging of the three magic weapons of the revolution-the proletarian Party, People’s Army and the revolutionary United Front.

The various Conferences, Plenums, special meetings, committee meetings had continuously summed up the experiences, assimilated the positive and rejected the negative aspects of the movement, and drew the appropriate lessons and tasks from time to time. The significant among these were: the first Telangana Regional Conference of 1977, 12th State Conference of AP in 1980, 13th state conference of 1987, the All India Special Conference of 1995 of the erstwhile PW and the Central Conferences of PU in 1987, 1993 and 1997.

In the course of long revolutionary practice, we have formulated new tactics, when we were confronted with a new situation. We have summed up our practice from time to time. We have enriched our basic documents in the Party conferences and Congress. After the 8th Congress, we prepared many important documents. They are: “*Present situation and our tactics*” (August 1977 Resolution of APSC); SCR-1980; OTL-1980; *Jagityal Perspective-1978*; *GZ Perspective-1980*; APPOR-1980, CC resolution on CPC-1983; *Political Resolutions-1980, '84, '92*; AISC documents of 1995; two-line struggle documents of CC-1985 and several circulars issued from time to time by the CC and state committees. Apart from this five volumes of party documents were published as a part of the rectification and education campaign and many polemical and other important attacks in PW and other magazines. By all these we have developed our Party line further and strived to raise the ideological-political-organisational-military level of our Party.

Although the essence of the political line was developed by comrade CM in the Eight Documents and adopted by the 8th Congress, there were serious deviations with regard to tactics such as: the rejection of the various forms of mass struggle and mass organizations and treating annihilation of class enemies as the only form of struggle, boycott of trade unions, overemphasis on urban guerilla warfare, left adventurist tactics of attacking bourgeois educational institutions, boycott of bourgeois courts, etc. The tactic of annihilation of class enemies was elevated to the status of a line at the 8th Congress, which caused much damage to the movement and led to isolation of the revolutionary forces in course of time. The mistakes in the Party's political line were rectified in the SCR of 1974 and the new understanding was reflected in the practice in AP after the setback. Several mass organizations were built and class struggles were initiated in a big way based on revolutionary mass line.

During the 1970s, some of the erstwhile ML groups like those of Kanu Sanyal, TN-DV-CPR, PCC of SNS and so on, criticized the line of the 8th Congress by branding it as “Left Adventurist”, “Left Sectarian”, and even “anti-people”. They advocated a revisionist or right opportunist line and counterposed mass line to the line of PPW. Some ML organizations such as the 2nd CC, Vinod Mishra's Liberation, etc., refused to make any criticism of Comrade CM's mistakes, dogmatically insisted on his “revolutionary authority”, rejected every form of mass organization and mass struggle, and

hailed the annihilation of class enemies as the “only form” of struggle (the “Liberation” group, swung to the other extreme and joined the camp of Right revisionists by the early 1980s).

As against these wrong standpoints of the various ML groups, the APSC, and later, the CC of the CPI(ML)[PW], defended the revolutionary line of comrade CM and the 8th Congress, frankly identified the shortcomings and began to rectify these boldly. It is due to this Marxist-Leninist dialectical method and approach that the line could be further enriched and also tested in practice.

A more concrete analysis of the Indian society was taken up by the PW and the PU, the specific characteristics of the revolutionary war in India and the similarities and differences with the conditions in pre-revolutionary China were studied which contributed to the development of the political and military strategy and tactics. Concrete study of the peculiarities and special features of the country such as the caste question, nationality question, adivasi question, women’s question and the question of religious minorities had helped in drawing up specific tactics to mobilize them into the new democratic revolution.

Concrete application of the line of PPW

As part of the process of applying the line of protracted people’s war to the specific conditions of our country, the APSC had taken the decision to take the flourishing peasant struggles in Karimnagar and Adilabad to a higher stage, and gave a call - “*Get prepared to take the Karimnagar and Adilabad peasant struggles into a newer stage.*” As part of the efforts to implement the plan of building the four districts of Karimnagar, Adilabad, Warangal, and Khammam districts (northern Telangana) into a guerrilla zone, seven armed peasant guerrilla squads were sent to the strategic area (Danda-karanya) on the borders of AP, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh in 1980. We conducted peasant struggles and built political movements on several issues of various sections of people in north Telangana and Dandakaranya in a militant way during the period 1980-84.

In 1985 the central and state governments launched an undeclared war on us. To fight back this undeclared war we have formulated the

defensive war tactics in May 1985. 1985-87 was a black period when we suffered many losses and the enemy had an upper hand. Between 1987-88, rebuilding the mass organizations and consolidating the mass base and the squads as well as forming new squads in plains and forests, we could withstand the enemy by attacking with arms in various forms. Starting from the middle of 1988, the mass resistance and armed resistance movement gained the upper hand by the end of 1989 and thus defeated the “undeclared war” of the government. Armed struggle was intense during this period. Counter-attacking the government forces and their agents continued to be the main programme.

We broke the enemy’s first major offensive of 1985-87 by organizing ambushes such as the Daragadda ambush in East Division and the Allampalli ambush in Adilabad in 1987 which together wiped out 18 policemen and seized several rifles. These daring ambushes demoralized the enemy and stalled the enemy advance for some time while they boosted the people’s morale and helped unleash a wave of militant mass struggles and armed actions by the people from 1988.

In 1990, utilising the contradictions among the ruling classes, we changed tactics and consolidated the mass base, built extensive mass struggles, expanded and consolidated the armed units, and extended the movement.

We fought another undeclared war launched by the central government in the three states (AP, MP and Maharashtra) from the end of 1990, with ‘defensive war’ tactics. During this period we faced severe losses of leadership in AP. Starting from 1985, AP, MP, Maharashtra and Orissa police machinery have been modernised and turned fascist as never before. On the other hand, people’s armed resistance too has grown.

Again, from the end of 1990, the armed offensive by the enemy was stepped up throughout AP, a ban was imposed on the CPI(ML)[PW] and the mass organizations in May 1992. Fake encounters grew phenomenally and there was a virtual reign of white terror all over North and South Telangana regions and East Division. The Party confronted this brutal offensive boldly through defensive war, organized ambushes and raids, both opportunity and deliberate, and mobilized the people’s militia units in some places into armed actions against the police and state property. Armed clashes with the police and paramilitary forces have become more intense and emerged as the main form, while the clashes with the local enemies became secondary.

In the planned retaliation and resistance by the guerilla squads of PW during the 1990s, several police stations and camps were raided and weapons were seized. After the series of raids in 1996 like those on Karkagudem and Sirpur(U) police stations-cum-APSP-CRPF camps, several camps and police stations were withdrawn by the government from the interior areas. Ambushes deterred the police and para-military from venturing into the interior areas. Special forces that were brought from other states such as the Punjab Commandos received severe blows as in the ambush in Lenkalagadda in December 1994. The heroic armed resistance by the guerillas gave a fillip to the mass movements which increased after 1995. Class struggles on various issues and Land occupation struggles became a common feature and organs of people's democratic power along with various people's committees emerged in several villages of North Telangana. The initiative of the oppressed masses was released after we won a few victories against the police.

Basing on the principles of guerilla war as laid out by Mao, we evolved various forms according to the local conditions. The special feature of the revolutionary war in India is that the Communist Party here does not have a people's army unlike in China and people's army has to be built up from small guerilla squads and gradually expand to higher military formations. Due to the absence of a separate people's army, the armed guerilla squads have to undertake both organizational and military tasks and responsibilities for a long time. Likewise, the establishment of Base Areas will take relatively longer time and guerilla zones will exist for a longer time in India due to the absence of a strong people's army and the superiority of the centralized Indian state.

In the document '*Guerilla zones—Our Perspective*' and '*Strategy-Tactics*', we analysed the conditions in the various regions in the country, categorized the strategic areas into three types and formulated the tactics to be taken up in the three types of areas. This concrete analysis had enriched our understanding of guerilla zones and Base Areas and helped the various state committees in selecting the perspective areas for developing guerilla zones with the aim of establishing Base Areas.

In this period, apart from north Telangana, and Dandakaranya guerrilla zones, our movement has grown throughout Andhra Pradesh. There are variations in different areas with regard to the social, geographical conditions and the intensity of class struggle and the state of people's consciousness.

Enemy has also intensified efforts to enhance repression in all the areas to crush the movement by armed methods. Therefore, by the end of the 1980s, armed squads were formed not only in north Telangana and Dandakaranya, but in the other areas of Andhra Pradesh as well.

In the course of the protracted people's war waged under the leadership of our Party we gained rich experiences concerning the forms of struggle and forms of organization, and our practical and conceptual understanding of guerilla war, people's army, people's political power, guerilla zones, guerilla bases and Base Areas had further enhanced. In the guerrilla zones, the guerrilla army, and the guerrilla war will be the main forms of organisation and struggle. As the People's Guerrilla army goes on consolidating, the guerrilla war intensifies.

We synthesized our rich experiences of armed struggle and concluded that in the Guerrilla Zones there will be, in the main, a contention for political power between the enemy and us. There will be the destruction of enemy's political power, and construction of people's political power. But destruction is main construction will be secondary. When the guerrilla forces put up a tough fight and gain the upper hand over the enemy's forces, people's power will be established. On the other hand, when the guerrilla forces are forced to retreat in the face of severe enemy onslaught, the enemy will reestablish his rule. Therefore, there is a severe contention for power in the guerilla zones or, in other words, the political power in the guerilla zone changes hands often depending on the armed strengths and mass support of the guerillas and the enemy i.e., it remains in a state of flux for a long period until the guerillas liberate it completely from the hands of the enemy and transform it into a Base area.

Hence, dual rule will not go on in one area simultaneously. It is either the rule of the guerillas or that of the enemy classes. Power may change hands more frequently but cannot remain in the hands of both classes in the same place at the same time. Hence, during the course in which the guerrilla war develops and the people advance to the battle field on an extensive scale, in order to consolidate the peoples' political power in the guerrilla zones, we should start the work of developing guerrilla bases as part and parcel of base areas in strategic areas, which are unfavourable to the enemy and where the mass base and terrain are favourable to us.

The guerrilla war will be more protracted in the plain areas. But very

temporary guerrilla bases can be developed and political power can be built for a short time in areas in the plains where the terrain is favourable, taking advantage of seasons. During the same time guerrilla war can be developed, arousing the people by carrying on the programme of agrarian revolution, and increasing recruitment in a big way and developing the people's guerrilla army. The establishment of power in the plains will be very unstable and will be in a wave-like manner. Organs of political power will get formed in some villages where the people's consciousness is developed. But one should keep in mind that it is not possible to develop these political organs and to establish people's power until the state wherein the people's guerrilla army defeats the enemy in a big way sets in.

Organising workers, students, youth and intellectuals in the towns of guerrilla zone areas was taken up as an important task and clandestine methods of work were developed in the urban areas. The work was oriented to serve the interests of the people's war in the countryside and in close coordination with the rural work. Towns served as supply centres, as recruiting centres for cadres, technical staff, medical personnel and others, as centers of solidarity to the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist movement in the villages. Anti-imperialist political movements were developed to some extent. Extensive campaigns were undertaken to refute enemy's malicious propaganda against the revolutionary movement.

However, the work in the urban areas had several lapses and serious losses of leading cadres occurred that resulted in the gradual decline in the urban movement in AP where it was relatively strong until the mid-1990s.

The AISC and its significance in the development of the Party line

The All India Special Conference, after thoroughly analyzing the significant political, economic and social changes that had taken place nationally and internationally since the 8th Congress, and the experiences gained in the revolutionary movement and the Party over the past 25 years, passed the amended Party Programme and Party Constitution, the documents on Strategy and Tactics, Guerilla zones—our Perspective, and the new Political Resolution (Present Political Situation and Our Tasks). It also approved the 1980 Self-Critical Review regarding the past, taking it as a basic document. It also reviewed the one-and-a-half decades of practice through Political

Organisational Reviews and brought out a central Political Organisational Report. The AISC enriched the political, organisational and military line of the Party through this process of upholding its basic line, while simultaneously analyzing the developments in the different spheres and our prolonged practice, all in the light of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. This success of the Conference is a most significant achievement after the 8th Congress.

In the prolonged two-and-a-half decade gap since the 8th Congress, facing enormous difficulties with many twists and turns, victories and defeats, and a new resurgence since 1978, there emerged a leadership at all levels in the process of rebuilding, consolidation and development of the Party. In the process of the AISC this leadership got elected at district, state and central-level Conferences. It was the first time since the 8th Congress that a leadership was elected democratically throughout the Party, as a campaign. This was the another significant achievement of the Conference.

The AISC also formulated important tasks for the Party, the most important being the strengthening of the three magic weapons, principally with the aim of building the People's Army and Base Areas to march forward victoriously. The AISC remains as an important turning point in the history of CPI (ML)[PW].

Formation And Development Of The Erstwhile PU

The CPI (ML) (Party Unity) was formed in November '78 by a handful of com-rades who came out of jail. While in prison, they individually and collectively developed similar ideas on some basic issues concerning the review of the past. All were active in the CPI (ML) under CM's leadership and later some joined into the 2nd CC led by Mahadev Mukherjee. After getting released from jail, they tried to unite with any of the revolutionary groups on the basis of the past review. But those efforts failed and they realised that their effort could not be materialised without developing revolutionary struggles on the basis of the past review. This realisation led them to form an organisation and hold a conference. It was held in November 1978 and adopted three documents- on the historic significance of CPI(ML), on Unity, and another on the line of annihilation. Efforts were on to unite with like minded revolutionaries. In this conference, it was decided that an organization be formed to lead the struggles. Accordingly a leading committee was formed. It was decided to build revolutionary peasant movement in the then South

Central Bihar, which was chosen for strategic purposes. Work also began in other parts of the Bihar and Nadia and Murshidabad areas of West Bengal.

‘When PU was formed in 1978 three resolutions were taken. First one, on CPI (ML). The resolution on CPI (ML) says that it upheld party’s ideological, political line, party’s formation and party programme’s basic line taken by the Party Congress of 1970. It also upheld the outstanding role played by Com. Charu Majumdar fighting revisionism and neo-revisionism, in establishing ideological-political basis of the Indian revolution and armed struggle and in leading the Naxalbari struggle and formation of the Party. It also pointed out that though the party programme was basically correct, there were some lacunae remained, such as the wrong assessment on the question of Era and world war, overassessment of the then international and national situations, the concept of quick victory, rejection of taking part in the mass organisations, i.e., TU activities, student unions, Employees’ union, other mass organisations and mass movement etc, etc. The other resolution was adopted on annihilation line. This resolution repudiated the annihilation line adopted by the 70 Congress. This was considered as general tactical line which would resolve all the problems facing the revolution. This resolution while repudiating annihilation line, adopted annihilation of class enemies as one of the forms of struggle. The third resolution was on the unity line. It assessed the then situation of the ML movement and stated that there were broadly three trends in the ML movement. First one was the right deviationist - liquidationist line which on the plea of rectifying left mistakes of the past gave up the revolutionary essence of Naxalbari and CPI(ML). This out and out revisionist line was adopted by SNS, Kanu Sanyal, Ashim Chatterjee etc, etc. Second one was not recognising any mistakes of the past and continued to practice those erroneous policies and developed a ‘left’ opportunist line led by 2nd CC. The third one represented those who acknowledged the past mistakes and took initiative to rectify those mistakes and develop the line through serious practice.

The document on Unity advocated for unity with this third trend identifying them as communist revolutionary camp such as APSC, COC, MCC etc, etc. It also identified that the right opportunism and liquidators pose the most serious and main danger to the movement today, while fighting both right and left opportunism and dogmatism. This helped in enriching the SCR and Tactical Line documents prepared by the APSC and incorporating some

of these aspects when these were made into joint documents of APSC and PU in end of 1979.

The first unity of PU was with the Communist Kranthikari Sanghatan (CKS), a small organisation, which was one of the members of the AICCCR of Bihar. CKS did not join in the CPI(ML), because of the differences between CKS and SNS, who was the then secretary of the Bihar state committee. There was a split in the CKS and one section which had some work bordering Aurangabad and Palamau districts, merged with the CPI(ML)(PU) to form CPI(ML)(UO) in 1980.

In January 1982, the UO and a section of the erstwhile COC, CPI(ML), led by Coms. Sharma and Appalasuri merged to form the PU. Both these organizations had wide agreement on ideological matters of Marxism-Leninism-Mao thought and a number of basic issues such as strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution, the domestic and international political situation, despite some difference on some important issues like the state character of China. The COC was holding that China was still a socialist, while PU in 80 itself declared China as a revisionist. It was decided that final decision on the question of China will be taken later by the joint organisation after study. Both the organizations were constructively self-critical towards certain major drawbacks in the past line.

Some more small organizations too merged with the PU. A fraction of CPI(ML)[CT], known as the Co-ordination centre,(or Sangram group) Punjab united with the PU in 1990. The Bihar faction of the CCRI(ML), a small organisation of West Bengal, united with PU in 1988.

In 1987, PU held a Central Conference. It is most significant in two aspects. One, it fought against a right deviationist line placed by the then GS and two, it adopted new party programme and constitution which incorporated some of the important new aspects in the programme, while retaining the salient features of '70 program. It incorporated the aspects of the 78 resolutions and also assessment of some new objective conditions while upholding the basic line 1970. The salient features of '87 programme were: a) character of the Indian society is semi-colonial, semi-feudal, b) Indian big bourgeoisie's comprador nature, c) Indian ruling classes are big comprador bourgeoisie and big landlord classes; d) targets of the revolution – imperialism including social imperialism, comprador big bourgeoisie and big landlord class; e) Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung

Thought is the ideological basis; f) Seizure of power through protracted people's war, building up guerrilla zones, base areas and people's army. It also incorporated some new aspects in the programme, such as, a) in the overall structure of semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, there have been some changes in the agricultural sector, particularly through abolition of the old Jamindari system and "green revolution". Within the very semi-feudal structure there has been infiltration of capitalist elements, as a result of this, one type of capitalism – distorted, stagnant and marked by feudal remnants – has developed on a regional basis in some areas such as Punjab. This change has led to the emergence of some new classes in rural areas. b) Comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie is the ruling class and one of the obstacles in the way of development of our country and revolution. It is the main vehicle of imperialism. It is one of the targets of the revolution. That is why it included the contradiction between comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the broad masses as one of the major/basic contradictions of the Indian society. We characterised the Indian CBB as subservient to imperialism and that it has got distinct identity and not merely a mechanical puppet of imperialism, that it enjoys "comparative independence of bargaining-power and manoeuvrability with imperialism and social-imperialism" in aspiring for growth within the framework of basic dependence. This comprador monopoly bourgeoisie serves imperialism in order to serve itself. While deciding this as a major contradiction, Party Unity overassessed the aspect of manoeuvrability and bargaining power of the CBB. Its over-emphasis on the question of relative independence of the CBB caused much apprehension in the communist revolutionary camp about PU's understanding of the Indian state character. Their characterization of the CBB gave an impression that of an "independent" class. This became a major political difference between PU, PW and MCC. So it also decided that on the question of unity it will remain flexible on this point. So in 1998 in unity with PW it accepted the proposal to drop this contradiction. c) It also identified "majority of small and middle bourgeoisie are national bourgeoisie. Though they are dependent on imperialism and comprador bourgeoisie to some extent." d) It identified Indian working class will play more important role than China in our revolution as development and size of the Indian working class is considerably big etc. etc.

The PU built a significant anti-feudal struggle in Magadh region of Bihar by the mid-1980s after which it began to extend to Koel-Kaimur (Palamau district). The movement's direct influence spread across thousand villages in the four districts of Magadh region. Half of the villages had Village Committees of Mass organisation- MKSS - and Gram Raksha Dals were formed in over 200 villages. Four to five armed guerrilla squads with full-timber& part-timmers were functioning around this time. The notorious private army of the landlords such as Bhumi-sena was defeated through armed mass resistance with the help of the armed squads. Squad was occasionally seizing arms from police forces. This led to a historic mass upsurge in the entire Magadh region. Over 50 arms were also seized from the landlords.

The State began its suppression campaign as early as 1983 when the police conducted an armed attack on the State Conference of the MKSS in which dozens of comrades were injured. The first fake encounter took place just prior to the Conference when an activist of the MKSS was shot dead by the police. In 1985 the Bihar government deployed a Special Task force to suppress the movement. But this only gave rise to a more massive resistance by the masses, with lakhs of people getting mobilised all over against the atrocities of the STF. Mass rallies and meetings were held all over the region in which thousands participated. In one such meeting held jointly with other ML Parties around 50 thousand people turned up after which the STF was forced to retreat temporarily. But on April 19, 1986, the State enacted a mini-Jallianwallah Bagh by brutally attacking a meeting in Arwal massacring 23 people and injuring 70 others. Responding to the call by the joint front of various revolutionary and democratic organisations thousands marched to the State Assembly protesting against this massacre and 40 thousand people were detained all over Bihar. A few days prior to the rally the MKSS was banned by the State government.

By 1985 there were over 2000 activists of the MKSS at the village level and around 20 thousand membership. Social boycott of landlords, crop seizures, strikes, holding people's panchayats, annihilating of goondas etc., were the common forms of struggle adopted. In the wake of the rout of the private armies and repression by the State, the people's movement began to acquire an anti-State character around the 90s'. The time was then ripe for advancing the slogan of building the guerrilla zone and establishing organs of people's power in the Magadh region

with the perspective of building the people's army and Base Areas in the KK region. But the '87 Central Conference only summed up thus: "the development of peasant struggle in South-Central Bihar border region deserves the party's attention." The failure to advance the slogans in time and formulating concrete plans conforming to the needs of the struggle, led to stagnation and later decline of the movement.

Although the Party entered Palamau district in 1978 itself recognising its strategic importance, it was in 1985, that the Party's activities spread to three blocks of Palamau, and one block of Rohatas district in Koel-Kaimur region and two squads were functioning. By 1988-90 there was a mass upsurge in KK region too. Some squads were also formed in this period. But due to lack of a concrete plan to build a guerrilla zone in KK region and the arrest of a major section of the leadership, the movement entered a period of stagnation after 1991.

In the history of the PU, there were two major inner-Party struggles; the first one in 1987 and the second in 1997. The alternative line which came up in 1987 threatened the very basic line of the CPI (ML). Though the advocates of this line assessed subjectively and said that there were fundamental changes in the semi feudal relations as capitalist relations have developed in agriculture and agrarian revolution is obsolete. After having said this, they did not put concrete tactics though its logical culmination would have been an armed insurrection. However, this line was defeated at the 1987 Central Conference of PU and the line of Protracted People's War with agrarian revolution as the axis of the New Democratic Revolution was reaffirmed. The Party was thus unified on a higher basis.

Some vital questions on the party line were raised by a COC member in 1993, they were placed before the 93 conference but not taken up seriously. The Bihar State Conference of 1996 evaluated the failures in advancing the struggle in Magadh region in 1985-86. But this was also rejected by the COC. It culminated as a full fledged struggle at the '97 Central Conference when a review of 18 years was taken up as part of the unification process with PW. Critique Document was not passed at the Central Conference in spite of the approval by the majority in the Bihar State Conference, some valuable and correct criticism made by the critique document were incorporated in the POR by the Central conference. The two line struggle of 1997 led to the enrichment of the PU's political line and also had a positive impact on the

unity process between the PU & PW.

The influence of alien class trends in the erstwhile PU is reflected in the decisions and tactics of the leadership at critical turning points in the course of the development of the movement or in continuing the same old forms of struggle and forms of organisation. Particularly subjectivism and Right trend are seen in not giving the slogan of building the Guerrilla Zone in Magadh-Koel Kaimur region in time, and, after taking up the task, not making concrete plans to fulfill it. Likewise, during the mid-1980s, after mobilising the peasantry in Nadia in West Bengal into struggles in a big way, not advancing the struggle to the higher stage also reflects the subjectivism and the Right trend in the Party leadership. In some important political issues too, such as inordinate delay in declaring the CPC and “Liberation” group as revisionist, liberalism is seen on the part of the leadership. Liberalism is also seen in not checking legalism, non-professionalism, and ultra-democracy in some regions. These alien class trends led to the retardation and stagnation in the movement in some areas.

Alien trends such as subjectivism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy were quite strong at the time of its Central Conference in 1997 but only spontaneity, liberalism and legalism were identified. But no serious efforts were made to rectify these wrong trends in time, which showed a negative impact on the movement.

Unity between PW and PU

Both CPI (ML)[PW] and the CPI(ML)[PU] gave the utmost importance to the question of unity from the very beginning. Both emphasized for the unity of genuine CRs, irrespective of whether they are part of CPI(ML) or not.

During the ‘70s the PW considered unity among the genuine ML parties an urgent task and in order to implement this task, a criterion was drawn up in 1980 that divided the ML forces into those who participated in elections and those who boycotted them.

In accordance with the above categorization, unity talks were held between the APSC of the CPI (ML) and the CPI (ML) (PU) in 1979-80. They came to a common understanding on the evaluation of the past, on the Tactical Line, but unity could not materialize due to differences on

the concept of the Party and on forming the CC and holding the Congress. The PU insisted that various CPI (M.L) organisations were only groups, in spite of practicing democratic centralism, and that they were part of the original CPI (ML) and hence could not be considered as Parties. It held that the Party and the CC could be formed only after the unification of the major revolutionary groups of the CPI (ML).

The PU proposed that merger could take place first and the debate on the above question could be taken up later in the unified Party on the basis of democratic centralism. The PW felt that the concept of forming a unified Party and a CC was an important question, and hence it would not help real unification of the two Parties if there was a serious difference on the very question of forming the CC and holding the Congress. Going by the record of several attempts for unity and ensuing splits among the CPI (ML) groups during the 1970s, the PW insisted that the differences on the question should be resolved before the merger and only thus democratic centralism could be really implemented.

In the process of unity between the APSC, TNSC and PU, when differences arose with PU, both APSC and TNSC went ahead to form the PW in April 1980. Later the PU party also merged with com. Sharma's COC group of Punjab. After the failure of the unity talks between the PW and PU there was no regular relation between the two. Later, at the end of the 80s', when the PU took a firm stand on the question of China, regular contacts were resumed. It was only in 1991, that the PW again decided to meet and exchange views with the PU on various ideological and political issues.

The PW and MCC met for the first time in 1981 and, since then, cordial relations existed between the two parties. Gradually both opined there was a basis for unity, and coms. KS and KC initiated unity talks. So naturally both the parties gave first priority to continue the talks.

When joint activities started between the four parties in 1992/93 (PW, MCC, PU and MRPW) some positive understandings were achieved among all the four, the unity talks between the erstwhile PW and MCC were going ahead at this juncture. However, these merger talks failed in 1995. After this, in the course of exchange of opinions on the domestic and international situation between the delegations of PW and PU, both the parties opined that there was a common understanding between them on many political aspects and hence unity talks were started in 1996.

Accordingly discussions were held between the two parties. The PW insisted that as a pre-requisite for unity both parties must make a thoroughgoing evaluation of the past and prepare the PORs. The PW completed this at its Special Conference in 1995, while the PU adopted its POR at its Special Conference in 1997. And after achieving unity on all the basic documents, they merged on a principled ideological-political-organisational basis thereby completing the unity process by forming a single centre unified CPI(ML)[PW]-the Central Committee (Provisional). Preparations for the 9th Congress also began in this process. This merger, by unifying most of the genuine revolutionaries who have been continuing in the revolutionary legacy of the CPI (ML), enthused the revolutionary camp in the country.

However, it was recognized by the new Party that the process of unification of the genuine CRs should be given prime importance as a major force, the MCC, However, it was recognized by the new Party that the process of unification of the genuine CRs should be given prime importance as a major force, the MCC, remained outside the CPI(ML) stream. It was also decided to hold talks with the various organisations in the Marxist-Leninist camp on ideological and political matters while carrying on united activity against the common enemy.

Forging the three magic weapons of the revolution

The correctness or incorrectness of the political-military line of the Party is reflected in the progress made in the construction of the three magic weapons of the revolution and in the overall advance of the people's war in the country. The revolutionary movement led by the erstwhile unified PW had spread to several states in the country and became a force to be reckoned with in the Indian political scene.

Building a genuine proletarian party

After the martyrdom of com. CM in July 1972, there was no Central leadership, i.e., the CC. Most of the Party Committees too, from top to bottom, were damaged and the Party was split into many splinters in every state; the revolutionary upsurge receded and all the peasant struggles suffered a setback. In this most difficult period our foremost task was to come out of it, to rebuild the Party from scratch.

We had started to reorganise our Party by taking lessons from the past

gained with tremendous sacrifices of the martyrs. The reorganization and resurgence had brought a new generation of people from various walks of life into the Party. The resurgence also remoulded most of the old cadre, who played a great role in building and leading the movement. In the course of struggle in a few years, hundreds of Party members were trained. Party committees were setup. A new leadership had emerged mainly at the state and district levels.

The erstwhile CPI(ML), since its inception in 1969, has been a clandestine Party. It developed in the course of decades of bitter armed struggle, by facing a cruel war of suppression campaigns. Thousands of martyrs including many great leaders gave up their lives by shaping the bright, red path of revolution. In spite of gaining great experience in clandestine functioning, we committed several mistakes in strict underground functioning and suffered many big losses. Problems of effective coordination of open and legal work with secret and illegal work still exist.

The erstwhile PW got steeled in the two major inner-Party crises and achieved greater internal unity. The method of self-criticism, criticism became an integral part of party's life. We identified wrong trends at the time of the AISC and later in the 9th Congress. Serious attempts were made to purge the Party of various petty-bourgeoisie tendencies through rectification campaigns particularly after the 9th Congress of PW.

Successfully holding the AISC and consolidation of the Party in these newly extended states, gave the erstwhile PW an all India stature. The merger between PW and PU increased the unified party's stature. The failure of talks with MCC at that juncture was definitely a negative development. It was a great disappointment for the revolutionary forces.

The three-and-a-half-decade history of Party building reveals several positive achievements while it also brings to light the serious problems we faced in building a genuine, proletarian Party in semi-colonial, semi-feudal India.

Firstly, the formation of CPI(ML) was a major breakthrough in the history of the Indian Communist movement. It had shown to the oppressed people of the country how a revolutionary Party should be- a Party that is strictly underground with the most committed, advanced elements forming the nucleus; that functions on the basis of democratic centralism in the real sense;

and rectifies itself in the course of intensifying armed struggle. We succeeded in recruiting thousands of professional revolutionaries but failed in building a vast network of part-timers among various sections. It was more a problem related to the concept as Party membership was given only to those who came out to work full-time for revolution.

Though this wrong understanding was rectified in the later period and membership was given to part-timers, the role of part-timers is still not of much significance in the Party. The local Party leadership is weak and there is a dependency of the masses on the PRs or the squads for solving their problems or in resisting the enemy. This has given rise to several non-proletarian trends in the Party such as bureaucracy, individualism and subjectivism etc.

Secondly, the formation of a single directing center for the Indian revolution has been plaguing us ever since the setback and disintegration of the CC in 1972 after the martyrdom of Com. CM. The merger of PW and PU in 1998 was a major step in the direction of evolution of a single centre and this was basically completed after the merger of PW and MCCI.

Thirdly, the Party succeeded to an extent in building relatively strong and able Party committees at various levels unlike in the initial period. The consolidation and strengthening of the central leadership was achieved in the course of a protracted struggle-both inner-Party struggle and the armed struggle against the class enemies and the state but lack of continuity of leadership still persists at various levels in the Party.

Fourthly, attempts to strengthen the Party through taking up rectification campaigns to get rid of the various non-proletarian trends and ideological-political weaknesses have yielded positive results in some states and special zones. The Party leadership and the cadre have been able to grasp the deviations and weaknesses more deeply and come out of these to an extent but the problem still persists seriously in some leading committees. Despite some improvement over the past few years, the problem of subjectivism, liberalism, spontaneity, sectarianism, bureaucracy, legalism, patriarchy, etc., still haunt the Party at various levels. There is also the problem of lack of professionalism.

Lastly, the Party's class basis, which was more petty-bourgeois in character in the initial period, gradually changed to that of the basic classes. The majority

of the Party cadre hails from the most oppressed sections-the landless and poor peasantry-while the lower sections of the middle peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie constitute a considerable section. As a result of special attention paid to recruitment and promotion of cadre from special social sections particularly after 1995, the Party now has a good number of cadres from Dalits, women and Adivasis. However, there is need for even more concentration on these oppressed sections especially in promoting them to leadership positions.

A major weakness in our Party building has been the lack of concentration on the working class. As a result, there are very few cadres from working class background. Although in a semi-feudal society like ours the peasantry is the principal source for recruitment, the huge number belonging to the organized and unorganized working class underscores the need to concentrate on this basic motive force and promote them into leadership positions so that they play their leading role in the revolution.

Building the people's army

Building up of the people's army has been a consistent problem in the history of the Indian Communist Movement. Leaving out the history of the pre-Naxalbari period when revisionism dominated, it was after the seizure of arms from the enemy forces by the people's guerillas in Magurjan that we first declared the formation of the PLA in embryonic form. This could not be developed due to the serious setback to the movement in 1972.

We are building the army from scratch and hence are facing much complexity in the work of building the People's Army. Our party has been working from the beginning with the strategic concept of seizing political power through armed force and settlement of the issue through war. After the setback of the Naxalbari and Srikakulam movement, we tried to build guerilla squads in Telangana and DK. These squads performed both organisational and military tasks.

Armed squads were formed in the Magadh region of Bihar from 1981. These were formed as armed peasant squads to confront the landlords and their private armies. They comprised of both guerillas and militia members. Along with these squads, temporary squads were also formed at times by merging the Party organisers keeping the organisational and repression aspects in view.

In some areas, we formed special military squads as early as 1993 but these did not become a generalized form for a long period. Special Guerrilla Squads were formed to fight against the state from 1994-95 but we did not give them a generalised form at that time. Thus, by undertaking specialization, separate squads were formed for military and organizational tasks. But LGSs, CGSs and platoons were not brought under a separate military command.

For specialization in the military sphere, a separate sub-committee, central SCOMA, was formed in 1996 as well as some state SCOMAs. All this resulted in specialization in the military sphere and improved our armed resistance. Yet, we did not have clarity on how to build the PGA and separate command structures. Hence, although the situation was ripe by the time of 1995 Special Conference itself, the task of forming the PGA was not taken up due to subjectivism and spontaneity in the CC. The decision to form the PGA was taken by the CC in August 2000 and was implemented on December 2, 2000.

In Bihar, in the erstwhile PU areas, “Commanders Committees” were formed in 1987 under the leadership of the RCs, and later transformed into the “Sainik Sanchalan Teams (SST)” in 1993. They fulfilled the military and fatigue needs of the squads. These coordinated the armed attacks. This was formed first in Magadh and later in Koel-Kaimur. Although these were formed with the understanding of command, they did not develop in the direction of command due to lack of concrete study and planning. In 1997, a Military Affairs Committee (MAC) was formed in Bihar by the erstwhile PU.

However in the course of development we acquired knowledge through direct and indirect knowledge and experience, which culminated in the formation of the PGA and a separate full fledged CMC to guide and lead the People’s army directly.

In 1995, we took up the task of building the Organs of People’s Political Power in NT and DK Guerrilla Zones and in the East Division. From the very beginning, we emphasized on the task of educating the people with the slogan : “All power to the Revolutionary People’s Committees!” These Gram Rajya Committees (GRCs) or Revolutionary People’s Committees gave leadership to the people as organs of people’s political power at a time when the authority of the state along with that of the feudal forces and caste/tribal elders was

undermined as a result of people's struggles and armed resistance. These organs established people's power in an embryonic form. Although GRCs were established only in a few villages, through these we could enhance the consciousness of the people in the GZs regarding new political power.

In the Guerrilla Zone of NT the GRCs became defunct due to severe enemy repression. It had also become difficult to build the GRCs in those areas in DK where the enemy repression was intense like Gadchiroli. The existence of the armed forces of the people and a higher level of consciousness among the people is indispensable if the GRCs are to sustain the new political power and effectively confront the enemy. It is only in the course of smashing state power by defeating state repression and reforms that the people's political power can be strengthened. If we do not link up the new political power with the PGA, it can't be sustained and developed further. As we could not grasp this aspect clearly, we could not sustain the GRCs.

Although we recognised the role of people's militia, we did not make much headway in building an extensive network of People's Militia. Hence our resistance too did not become extensive. The People's Militia is essential for establishing new political power in the villages and for the people to wage war against the enemy under the leadership of the GRCs. Due to weak militia we could not suppress the local class enemies, check the informers, take up harassment activities against the enemy and arm the masses.

Preparing the Masses for the People's War

After 1972, we rectified the earlier defective understanding regarding the role of mass organizations. We realized that it is through the mass organisations that the masses get organised, are drawn into the class struggles and come to realise through the struggles that there is no other alternative before them but to overthrow the state power of the exploiting classes and establish in its place their own political power in order to liberate themselves from all oppression and exploitation.

While building the mass organisations, we adhered to the Maoist guideline that from the beginning, our orientation, perspective and the method of building mass organisations and mass struggles should be to serve the preparation for war and the war, in turn, would help to further advance the mass movement. Basing on this dialectical interrelation between mass struggle

and armed struggle, we tried to mobilize the masses in thousands and even lakhs in various struggles. In the development of our revolutionary movement the mass organizations played a significant role, gave several cadre to the war, sacrificed several hundred leaders and members and achieved political prestige, influence and popularity.

All our mass organisations were steered in the midst of armed struggle mainly. The valiant struggles shook up the base of feudalism, and threatened their ruling classes and their armed forces. The struggles of oppressed sections in thousands of villages and several cities have struck at the hegemony and the economic, political and social oppression by the ruling classes. They played a great role in smashing the socio-economic and political domination of landlords and later they became the foundation for the Organs of People's Political Power.

In AP, NT and AOB, we succeeded in breaking the lull of 1992-'94 when the massive enemy offensive created serious obstacles to our work among the masses. The post-1995 period has seen a resurgence of mass movements in several states led by our revolutionary mass organisations or by the various cover organisations formed through our initiative. In spite of the massive enemy offensive several struggles were taken up in AP, NT, AOB, DK, Bihar, Jharkhand, Bihar-Bengal-Orissa border region, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and other parts of the country. That is why the state had to step up its attacks further by deploying more special police forces and para-military forces specially trained and equipped with the most sophisticated weaponry. It drew up a plan for better coordination and cooperation between the five states of AP, MP, Maharashtra, Orissa and Bihar, formed a Joint Coordination Committee headed by the Centre in June 1998 and a JOC in April 2000. At the same time, the state had also taken up reforms and dole programmes in a big way in order to divert the masses from militant revolutionary struggles.

While our mass organisations in the initial period functioned openly in some areas of AP for a short period, in the main, they functioned secretly. In some other areas where class struggle was weak they worked openly while in Dandakaranya our mass organisations were underground and worked secretly from the beginning. Though the mass organisations were officially banned in AP for the first time in 1992, there was an undeclared ban since 1980 in NT, from 1985 in entire AP, and from the initial days itself in entire DK. In Bihar

the MKSS was banned in '86. In spite of this, huge mass rallies have been taking place continuously in these states.

Overall, in the mass front, our achievements are primary, and shortcomings secondary. These shortcomings are: Failure in consolidating the forces which came into these struggles; low level of membership; failure in developing continuity of leadership for mass organisations, failures in coordination between higher and lower bodies, failure in coordination in secret and open work, sectarian trends in mass struggles, over emphasis on open work before 1984, spontaneity in building mass organisations and mass movement, lack of planning in extending to new areas, etc. Generally these shortcomings apply to state and all India mass organisations.

The weaknesses in the Party committees at various levels, lack of clarity, specialization and experience in the particular field as well as the prevalence of spontaneity and the enormous work pressure on the committees are preventing them from timely and proper guidance to the mass organisation committees at their respective levels. One major problem faced by the Party committees in giving close guidance to mass organisations is the enemy's concentration in the areas and the white terror through encounter killings of the MO leadership.

There is a mechanical understanding in some of the Party units regarding the forms of struggle and organisation. There cannot be rigid or fixed forms of struggle and organisation. They keep on changing according to the changing conditions and stage of the struggle. Copying mechanically the forms prevalent in one region in another region will produce adverse results. Even in the same region the forms practiced today may not be the same tomorrow. Creatively applying tactics to changing conditions and quickly changing from one form to another is a skill that should be acquired by the various Party committees and the mass organisation leadership.

Legalism in our mass work is manifested mainly in the form of relying on legal/open methods of work and legal/open struggles to solve the sectional demands and other demands of a general democratic character. Legalism arises from an overestimation of the prospects of legal or open mass movement in India and due to lack of clarity regarding the protracted nature of people's war in our country.

Petty bourgeois individualism and egoism, anarchical attitudes and a lack of discipline, a sectarian approach, bureaucracy etc., are some of the commonly found features in the leaderships of the mass organisations.

Cover organizations are indispensable in areas where our mass organisations are not allowed to function openly. We may also form these organisations in other areas according to necessity. The purpose behind forming cover organisations is to keep our forces unexposed to the enemy while carrying on open mass work. We must keep in mind that cover organisations are not a substitute for the legal or underground mass organisations. We must form the Party units within the cover organisations and direct them.

Although the attempts to form cover organisations in AP, NT and AOB began since 1985, it was only in the post-'95 period that we achieved some progress. We succeeded in mobilising a large section of the people through the cover organisations thereby foiling the attempts of the ruling classes to render the people leaderless by imposing a ban on our mass organisations.

Some of the shortcomings in running cover organisations are: these are exposed due to loose talk; huge mass mobilisations by the Party to the programmes of the cover organisations thereby leading to their exposure; calling exposed speakers to the meetings of cover organisations; meeting the leaderships of the cover organisations in the areas thus exposing them to all the Party and squad members and the people of the nearby villages; the Party and squads getting involved in struggles led by the cover organisation and even issuing threats to the enemy in order to make the struggles a success; selecting progressive or radical-looking names for the cover organisations; giving our slogans and singing our songs on the platform of the cover organisations; forming cover organisations overnight thereby drawing the attention of the police; and so on. Sufficient number of able and experienced PRs and organisers are not allotted for work in the cover organisations.

We did not concentrate properly on the UF work and there was no specialization at any level. This had a serious negative effect on UF activity. We failed to allot forces for intervening in the spontaneous people's movements or in building joint forums with other organisations. Hence we did not succeed in winning over the forces belonging to the revolutionary classes. Sectarianism is also quite serious in the movement, leadership and

the lower levels in the party. This is seen in two forms; one, not going for joint activity on the common issues with other organisations even when they showed interest and two, engaging in sectarian activities which led to the breaking up of joint action committees.

Due to the ban on erstwhile PW and mass organisations, comrades who are allotted for UF work have to work under severe limitations. Hence it is only by persevering in patient and persistent work over a long period of time that we will be able to establish our leadership over the united front.

9TH Congress and after

The 9th Congress of 2001 saw the emergence of an ideologically and politically mature party —a party of a new type—that had steeled itself in decades of intense class struggle. The party had acquired an All India character with its organisation in over a dozen states, a people’s guerrilla army - the PGA - and several departments.

The Congress saw the further consolidation and enrichment of the party line. While adhering firmly to the party’s basic line that was formulated in the 8th Congress in 1970, the 9th Congress made the necessary changes and enriched several concepts basing on the rich experiences acquired over the years and taking into account the political developments of the preceding three decades. It firmly fought both the “Right” and “Left” deviations that were seen in the forging of the three instruments of revolution - the party, Army and the UF - and in the formulation of tactics. It achieved a higher level of understanding regarding the concepts of people’s army, guerrilla zones, Base Areas and the revolutionary united front.

The 9th Congress thus rectified the shortcomings in the understanding of AISC of PW of 1995 and the Central Conference of PU of 1997 regarding the above concepts and thereby created the ground for achieving a fresh breakthrough in the ongoing people’s war in the country. The Congress firmly resolved to intensify the people’s war and extend it to other parts of the country. It called upon the entire party to exert its utmost to establish liberated zones and chalked out concrete plans to achieve the same. It expressed its determination to achieve coordination with the ongoing national liberation movements in the country and to continue with the task of unification of the Communist Revolutionaries in all earnestness. It called on the party to cleanse itself of the various non-proletarian trends by undergoing a thoroughgoing

rectification campaign and thereby proletarianise the party and make it fit enough to carry out the immense tasks before the party.

Shortcomings identified by the Congress

The Congress identified the lapse that we could not establish organs of people's democratic power on par with the level of the people's war. In hundreds of villages, the old authority of the feudal forces was overthrown and the state much weakened, but the resulting vacuum was not be filled up by the New Power of the people.

The weaknesses in Party building such as a weak network of part-time PMs, lack of professionalism even in some of the leading Party committees were identified as some factors that hampered the pace of the movement.

The Congress gave the call for overcoming the weakness in formulating appropriate tactics to counter the enemy's tactical offensives and their reform and dole programmes in time, to undertake concrete study of the actual conditions, adopt flexibility in the deployment of forces and take up the tactics of temporary retreat of forces from some areas in face of massive enemy offensives, to overcome the defects in the work methods in respect of urban work, and to effectively link the mass struggles to the ongoing people's war.

Basing on the evaluation of the 9th Congress and the lessons drawn, the erstwhile PW drew up concrete tasks with regard to Party and Army building, building GBs in selected pockets in the strategic areas, organs of people's democratic power, Rectification campaigns and campaigns of Tactical Counter Offensives in a planned manner and achieved significant successes in some states. It could foil the enemy's attempts to suppress the ongoing people's war through massive repression and reforms, and various other forms.

