

Appendix 2

communist party of india (marxist-leninist) NAXALBARI

To
Central Committee,
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

Dear comrades,

We thank you for the all the assistance given to our delegation as well as the free and frank manner in which you exchanged views about the present situation in Nepal and your new plans.

We have discussed the report of our delegation. It was received with enthusiasm and your present plan was seen as a great step forward. A circular explaining the situation and the new plan has been issued to our ranks. It calls on the whole party to gear up for building a powerful solidarity movement. We solemnly assure you that we will go all out to build support for the new democratic revolution of Nepal and to resist all interventionist attempts, as well as revisionist and dogmatic propaganda that confuse the masses in India about your party's revolutionary credentials and thus isolates the revolution.

...

Though our delegation had raised the main concern we have over your present tactical approach, we thought that it might be good to put it to you once more, particularly since the exchanges of opinions had to be brief. This letter will mainly deal with this.

It is clear that you are facing a very complex and challenging situation. In fact it is almost similar to a new initiation. But one that is more complex and challenging. At the time of the initiation of the People's War you did not have to deal with diplomatic or other similar consequences. Everything was a new beginning. But now you must handle a lot many more aspects and pay attention to properly handling their relations, so that the maximum gain can be retained while making the next leap. ... we are confident with the overall approach you have adopted in this regard. However, we are still concerned with some aspects of your approach.

First of all, there is the question we have already raised – the possibility of the enemies' willingness to accept some of your key political demands such as declaration of a Republic by the present Interim set up. You had accepted this possibility and also mentioned that there already were some indications of this. Recent reports we have seen in the media seem to indicate the possibility of this getting materialised. Evidently, the enemies' are trying to make it as politically expensive as possible for you to come out of the Interim government, if not hoping to induce you to stay on. What worries us is that you had not considered this possibility or its implications and had

not made it a part of your ideological-political preparations. We hope you will probe this more deeply.

We see continuity in this with your earlier understanding that the enemies' won't allow you to join the Interim setup and that this will give you the opportunity to launch a new mass movement aiming at a Republic. At that time you were also indicating that your party's inclination is to stay out of the government, though you may join the Interim parliament. Later you changed your plan and joined the government. We have no differences with this. But we think that you lost initiative from this point onwards – not because you joined the government, but because you were ruling out this possibility earlier and had not prepared for it. As a result, after joining the government, it seems to us that you didn't have any concrete plan for developing the political struggle other than propaganda for Constituent Assembly elections. We still think this was more important than the problems created by your compromise on proportional representation. And we fear that if the enemies decide to meet your main political demand in the present situation, you may suffer a similar loss of initiative, precisely since you had not accounted for this eventuality and made alternate plans. This becomes all the more vital, since in the present situation the most decisive thing, correctly identified by you, is to set up an opposite pole of struggle. As you have properly assessed, this is the mood of the masses and of your ranks. But this revolutionary mood may get dissipated if your breaking out is delayed by getting too tangled up in political moves forced by the enemies' compromising tactics.

No doubt, the most decisive thing now is to break out of the Interim setup, at the very least the government, no matter what it calls for. Only this will create the sharp demarcation and separation so necessary to lay the solid foundation for a new polarisation and impart a new momentum. Of course, this must be done in a tactical manner, giving least room for the enemies. But our assessment is that it will inevitably cause some loss in political support, particularly in the support gained by you in the recent period. This brings us to our second concern. In your explanation of your future plans and the course of development envisaged, this was not mentioned. Maybe this was because the time was too short to go into such things. Our concern here is whether this aspect has been given sufficient weight. If not so, then that would make things more complex. It is evident that there is a section within the party (as well as among the broad masses) that is not happy with the new shift in tactics. This will be strengthened by the enemies' political manoeuvres, even more sharply if it decides to accept the demand for a Republic. We are enthused, and really impressed, by the elaborate process you are carrying out to unify the party and masses and prepare them to carry out the new plan. But we don't see any identification on your part of the inevitable realignment in your support base that will be caused by the present shift in tactics and consequent losses. This will certainly hamper preparations.

Regarding the possibility of the enemies conceding your main political demand, we had explained how we see that possibility in relation to some of the objective compulsions faced by them. To put it in brief again - In the present international situation US imperialism is not that keen to have a direct confrontation with a revolutionary Maoist movement. Such a confrontation will trigger off a polarisation between progressive and reactionary forces at the world level and this will overshadow the present visible conflict with Islamist movements. This will prove very costly to the imperialists and reactionaries who prefer to present their 'war on terror' as a war against religious terrorism since it is convenient to cover up its real anti-people content. In other words, the factors favourable for revolution in the present world situation may themselves force the

enemies to agree to a compromise in Nepal, for the time being. We have seen that this aspect of the situation is not addressed in your recent documents, though they point out the compulsions faced by the revolution in Nepal that make negotiations and diplomatic moves necessary. In your recent explanation of why Indian expansionism adopted a positive approach to your agreement with the 7 Party Alliance also, you point out the differences which emerged between India and the monarchy over its exclusion of pro-Indian political forces from political power after the coup. That is true, but we think that this alone doesn't give the full picture. There is also the important fact that the Indian regime is keen to avoid getting caught up in a direct military intervention in Nepal, particularly since it will have to face a Maoist movement. It very well knows the powerful political fallout this will have within India and the boost this will give to a revolutionary polarisation in this country. We feel that one of the reasons for your repeatedly calculating that the enemies' can't (or won't) accept your political demands and hinging your plans on this, is rooted in your not evaluating the favourable factors in the present world situation, in immediate terms and not just as a future potential. This has implications for your present, correct and bold, plan. In our opinion, it gives you some freedom of action, more than sufficient to outweigh any tactical problems caused by the enemies' compromising and devious tactics.

In the present world situation, a new upsurge in Nepal will have tremendous revolutionary impact. We are sure of this. And we are united with you in realising the great significance of the present turn. We write to you expressing our views frankly, with this spirit, because the victory of your party and the glorious revolution it is leading is of decisive importance today.

With revolutionary greetings,

ajith

Secretary,

Central Organising Committee,

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) NAXALBARI

17th of September, 2007