


Mao Tsetung: From Han Suyin's New Book

December 1976
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
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NewChina

December 1976 Volume 2, Number 3

Cover: Photo by Wayne Decker
Women at Tian An Men demonstration, April 1976

4 USCPFA News

8 **Mao Tsetung and the Road to the Future** – Han Suyin
Excerpts from the new book Wind in the Tower

17 **If It's Tuesday, This Must Be Texas** – Tom Gold
Chinese visitors tour the U.S. at a gallop

22 **The Olympics Rhubarb** – Peter Perl
Who's really playing games with the Games?

26 **Incident at Tian An Men** – Wayne Decker, John Duray, Jane Wheeler
Eyewitness account of historic demonstrations

31 **Worker to Worker** – Sylvia Sandroff
Trade unionists find out how Chinese working people live

35 **China's Nuclear Policies**
Interview with foreign policy analyst Jonathan D. Pollack

39 **Chu Teh 1886-1976** – Dorothy Loo Kehl

40 **Friendship Has A History:**
W. E. B. Du Bois – Michael T. Martin and Lamont H. Yeakey

42 **Film: Making the Break**

47 **USCPFA Addresses**

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NEW CHINA welcomes manuscripts and ideas for articles. Authors should first submit a brief description of their subject and indicate what kind of material will be used to develop it. Please include a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

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
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USCPFA NEWS

Upon hearing of the passing of Chairman Mao Tsetung on September 9, 1976, the following cable was sent to Hua Guo-feng, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries in Peking, and other representatives of the Chinese people:

"On behalf of the members of the U.S.-China Peoples Friendship Associations, please accept deep and heartfelt sympathy on the death of Chairman Mao Tsetung. Chairman Mao's death is a tremendous loss to the people of China and to the people of the world. Mao Tsetung lived a full, meaningful, and productive life. He relied on and trusted the common people, united them, taught them self-reliance, to struggle, to serve each other, and improve the quality of life. We salute the great leader of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. Chairman Mao's thoughts and examples will be the legacy to the common people throughout the world. We pledge ourselves to honor his memory by redoubling our efforts to deepen the friendship between the people of the United States and the People's Republic of China. We will continue to work to implement the Shanghai Communique for the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, the only legal government of the Chinese people.

Frank Pestana

National Chairman, USCPFA"

NEW CHINA also sent a cable to the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries:

"Chairman Mao himself has said that death can be heavier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather. His own death is heavier than many Mount Tais. We feel it deeply, and we sympathize with the grief of our Chinese friends who feel the loss more directly. Chairman Mao wrote in a poem published in January: 'Nothing is hard in this world if you dare to scale the heights.' We will take inspiration from Mao Tsetung's own daring, and, relying on the great American people, we will strive to turn our grief into strength and redouble our efforts to build active and lasting friendship based on mutual understanding between our two great peoples."

"Each convention is livelier and larger than the last. Obviously we are growing!" happily observed William Hinton, the outgoing chairman of the US-China Peoples Friendship Association. More than 700 people assembled at Philadelphia's Sheraton

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


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Airport Inn over Labor Day weekend for the third annual convention of the USCPFA, with delegates representing 77 local chapters throughout the nation (an increase of 19 in one year), 22 new organizing committees, and a membership that has grown steadily to approach 7,000.

Almost unanimously, the convention passed action resolutions on the questions that are uppermost in the minds of the American people at this time:

—A major USCPFA drive was mandated around the normalization of U.S.-China relations and settling the Taiwan issue. Renewing the commitment to normalization made at the 1975 convention, the new resolution also spelled out methods for implementing it: forming coalitions with other concerned groups, letter-writing campaigns aimed at political candidates, conferences, and stressing the theme of normalization in all USCPFA activities.

—A four-year campaign was launched to help ensure the admission of the All-China Sports Federation to the 1980 Moscow Olympics as the sole representative of the Chinese people.

—Locals were urged to make a broad effort to explain China's foreign policy to Americans. Delegates agreed that all members need to learn more about this so they can correct and combat public distortions of China's policy. The resolution reaffirmed that USCPFA members should explain China's stands to audiences but are not obligated to agree with them.

A major focus of discussion during the weekend was how to continue bringing the message of people-to-people friendship to Americans of differing racial and class backgrounds. While all agreed on the aim, there were sharply divergent views on how to implement it. Delegates passed a resolution requiring, among other things, that at least two minority and two working class people participate in every friendship tour.

Many new faces appear in this year's slate of national officers. Elected to the National Steering Committee were:

West Coast: Ellen Brotsky, San Francisco, Calif.; Debby George, Portland, Ore.; Linda Shin, Los Angeles, Calif.
Midwest: Sylvia Fischer, Chicago, Ill.; Sylvia Jackson, St. Louis, Mo.; Joseleyne

Slade Tien, Lansing, Mich. *East Coast:* John Dove, Boston, Mass.; Alan Feigenberg, New York, N.Y.; Roy Johnson, Washington, D.C. *South:* Elaine Budd, Gainesville, Fla.; Bob McFarland, New Orleans, La.; David Nolan, Atlanta, Ga. *At-large:* Koji Ariyoshi, Honolulu, Hawaii; Janet Goldwasser, Detroit, Mich.; Frank Pestana, Los Angeles, Calif.; Margaret Whitman, Nassau County, N.Y.

The NSC elected Frank Pestana as this year's National Chairman.

The convention also unanimously designated five honorary members of the National Steering Committee. Max Granich, William Hinton, Helen Rosen, Dr. Samuel Rosen, and Randolph Sailer were named for their long and steadfast devotion to friendship between the American and Chinese peoples.

The four-day convention schedule was filled with workshops, educationals, and cultural events which allowed delegates to meet people from other parts of the country, exchange experiences, discuss problems, and rejoice in the human richness of the Association. James Veneris, a former

MAO TSETUNG POEMS. First official English translation of 39 poems, including "Reascending Chingkangshan" and "Two Birds: A Dialogue." FLP, 1976. 53 pp. cloth \$1.75 paper \$1.00

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DAWN BLOSSOMS PLUCKED AT DUSK by Lu Hsun. A collection of ten essays written in 1926. FLP, 1976. 120 pp. \$1.00

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WIND IN THE TOWER, Mao Tsetung & The Chinese Revolution 1949-1975 by Han Suyin. Little Brown, 1976. 404 pp. cloth \$12.95

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prisoner of the Chinese in Korea who chose to live in China, gave a brief, moving address. Delegates also heard British writer and filmmaker Felix Greene describe his recent trip to Tibet; Nobel Prize physicist C. N. Yang speak on normalizing relations with China; and Judge George W. Crockett, Jr., a Black jurist, share his impressions of the Chinese legal system.

Peter Perl
Hartford, Conn.

The USCPFA conducted a national campaign during the spring and summer to educate the American people on China and the Olympics and to get the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to admit the All-China Sports Federation to the Olympic Games as the sole representative of China.

A petition initiated by the USCPFA and addressed to the IOC resulted in nearly 4,000 signatures as of mid-July. A number of Associations sent the IOC telegrams supporting the PRC's admission to the Games, and USCPFA members and locals wrote letters answering the many newspaper editorials and articles that totally ignored or misrepresented the facts of the situation. (See "The Olympics Rhubarb" in this issue.)

Acting for the National USCPFA, the New York City Committee on Normalization, together with the Eastern Region Normalization Committee, called a national press conference in New York City on July 9 that brought together prominent U.S. sports figures, USCPFA spokespeople, and the deputy head of the Taiwan Delegation to the Third National Games in Peking in September 1975.

For the press conference, the Norfolk chapter contacted Dr. Richard E. Lapchick, executive director of ARENA: The Institute for Sport and Social Analysis, who spoke about why his organization supports China's admission to the Olympics. Boston arranged for Red Sox pitcher Bill Lee to speak. Other participants were Dr. Philip Shinnick, Director of Sports Studies at Rutgers, former world record holder in the long jump and Olympic Team member in 1964 and alternate in 1968; and Y. Y. Huang, a U.S. resident who was born and raised in Taiwan and pitched on the Taiwan baseball team at the 1975 National Games in Peking.

USCPFA representatives at the press conference included William Hinton, chairman of the 1975-76 National Steering Committee; Helen Rosen, member of the 1975-76 NSC; and Frank Kehl from the New York Association. Press coverage included a column in the *New York Post* and a very positive piece in Long Island's *Newsday*, fifth largest daily in the U.S.

Creative approaches for taking the

Olympics issue out to the American people were developed in a number of cities.

In Philadelphia, USCPFA members distributed 2,000 leaflets at the All-Star game, held a press conference which produced a very favorable article by Jack McKinney in the *Daily News*, participated in three radio talk shows, and sent the entire local membership a letter about the issue and a copy of the petition.

At the end of May, Pittsburgh drew 100 people to an all-day China Fair focusing on normalization of U.S.-China relations, with Frank Kehl as keynote speaker. Pittsburgh also sent letters and mailgrams to the U.S. representatives on the IOC, provided information to local sports reporters, published letters in all major papers refuting anti-China fallacies, and leafleted two professional baseball games. At one Pirates game they got 30-40 signatures on the national petition. Many people were surprised to find out China was not now in the Olympics and glad to learn the facts behind the newspaper headlines. A continuing column on normalization was initiated in the first issue of the Pittsburgh newsletter with an article on "China and the Olympics."

In Eugene, members took the issue directly to some of the Olympic-bound U.S. athletes who came to Eugene in June for the track-and-field trials that determined which athletes would go to Montreal. They collected about 40 signatures on the petition and got much positive response.

Seattle members appeared on a Sunday-evening listener-sponsored radio show to discuss all aspects of the Olympics issue. After the program, half a dozen listeners called in to say they were grateful to finally hear the real story and wanted to know more about the Association. The sports editor of the *Seattle Times* interviewed a USCPFA member from Taiwan who expressed the hope that in the 1980 Olympics Taiwan athletes would be competing under the flag of the PRC.

Champaign-Urbana members took turns soliciting signatures on the petition at the entrance to the University of Illinois student union and collected 500 names.

In Albany the petition also got a good response. Members set up a table at the League of Arts Celebration, July 3-4, and got over 100 signatures. Three members of the steering committee each wrote to a different local newspaper; all three letters were published.


Many other Associations, too numerous to mention, also gathered signatures, wrote letters, and generally participated in taking the issue to the American people and making the campaign a success - although much still needs to be done to ensure China's admission to the next Olympics.

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
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Mao Tsetung and the Road to the Future

by Han Suyin

Excerpts from the new book, "Wind in the Tower: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution, 1949-1975"

Dr. Han's book, completed in 1975, was published shortly before Chairman Mao's death on September 9, 1976.

IN the spring of 1949, before the last military campaigns of the War of Liberation (1946-1949) between the Red armies under Mao Tsetung and the Kuomintang forces of Chiang Kai-Shek had ended, victory was already certain for the former, a military and a political triumph of unparalleled scope. Overnight, China's destiny was changed and also the world balance of power.

In that early, wind-frozen March, the dusty, bleak village of Hsi-paipo in North China was host to the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party assembling for its second plenum. The occasion was momentous; the decisions taken would decide the future of China. Countrywide victory was imminent; the People's Liberation Army stood poised, ready to advance into South China. Although Mao Tsetung was to receive an urgent cable from Stalin asking him to desist from prosecuting the war to the end ("Leave South China to Chiang," Stalin advised), he ig-

nored it, and the plenum would back him. In April, Mao would issue orders for the army to advance, and on October 1 the People's Republic of China would come into being.

Mao Tsetung was 56 years old. The photographs of that year show him more portly than in his youth, master of the situation, and knowing it. His speeches are free of bombast, but also of self-deprecation. "The Chinese people, one-quarter of humanity, have stood up. . . . From now on no one will insult us again."

Twenty-five years later, in October 1974, Mao Tsetung was almost 81 years old. The firecrackers of the October anniversary spread vast bouquets of lights, petals of flame in the Peking sky. A quarter of a century had passed since he had uttered these words, and there had been no turning back. Mao Tsetung was still alert of mind, with flashes of wit and humor as he conversed with the world's statesmen, kings and presidents who now thronged to Peking. He blandly kissed the hand of Imelda Marcos of the Philippines, and satisfied his ever young thirst for knowledge in talks with nuclear physicists.

In those 25 years the People's Republic of China had become a giant poised for prosperity and power, an acknowledged miracle. She had confounded all predictions, accomplished what had been deemed impossible. She aroused hope and fervor in the breasts of millions of the dispossessed, and the name of Mao Tsetung was known throughout the world.

But Mao Tsetung was old, and deliberately made it known to his people. He had long ago prepared for death. In the year 1974 all pictures and portraits of Mao in public squares and streets, which until then had shown him almost farcically young and apple-cheeked, were retouched to show his true face, with wrinkles, and white in his hair. Television films of his interviews implacably revealed his aged appearance. Mao himself had asked

DR. HAN SUYIN, born and brought up in China, is the author of 15 books. *Wind in the Tower* and *The Morning Deluge: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893-1954 (1972)* are based on research and interviews compiled during yearly visits to China over two decades.

The excerpts printed here as a continuous narrative are culled from Chapters 1 and 7. With one exception, Dr. Han's footnotes have been omitted. Emphasis within quotations and all ellipsis marks are the author's. The words in square brackets have been supplied by the editors for continuity.

Copyright © 1976 by Han Suyin from *Wind in the Tower: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution, 1949-1975*. Reprinted by arrangement with Little, Brown and Company.

that he be shown as he was . . . to prepare the people for the time when he would no longer be with them.

Mao's work will remain: his writings, his way of thinking and doing, Mao Tsetung Thought – that body of revolutionary experience and knowledge, practice of day to day revolution, the teaching of a whole people in the science of revolution. Because of Mao, this knowledge is not confined to an elite but has pervaded the minds of the Chinese people, has become a way of living and a way of thinking. China has changed more radically and thoroughly in this quarter-century than any other country in the world, and she has only just begun.

None of this happened without challenge; no moment of these 25 years was free from “struggle,” contention, controversy, polemics, and even war. Not one day of these 25 years but was witness to strife, both overt and covert; continuous high drama.

During this quarter-century the Chinese people transformed the Chinese earth and began to transform themselves. This immense metamorphosis – one-quarter of the world's people live in China – started while the guns were still loud, in that spring of 1949, in the frostbitten village of Hsipaipo. Thirty-four Central Committee members and 19 alternates assembled to discuss the blueprint of the future. In the shambles and chaos of the devastated country, decisions, a “line,” policies were to be devised to cope not only with the enormous immediate problems of famine and chaos, but also to chart the road to the future.

AMID the general exhilaration of a relieved population welcoming the PLA [People's Liberation Army] as liberators, it would have been possible for Mao Tsetung to institute immediately a far more radical program for change than the one he set out at the plenum. Mao enjoyed immense prestige, reinforced by the astonishing good behavior of the armies he led. “The occupation of eight or nine provinces and scores of big cities will require a huge number of working cadres, and to solve this problem the army must rely chiefly on itself” (Mao, February 1949). Army cadres were to learn to manage industry and commerce, run schools and newspapers, handle foreign affairs . . . and so they did.

But Mao never entertained the thought of a military dictatorship drastically enforcing radical measures. He has no taste for massive “purges” or arbitrary shortcuts. Though he thinks that the true way that governs the world of men is the way of radical change, he would not order change from above, imposing a system on a supine and exhausted people. Mao's way is to teach, to involve the people wholly in every transformation undertaken; to educate them into thinking and wielding power for themselves. Mao's vision was to transform China into a “strong, prosperous, independent, modern industrial socialist state” by combining effective leadership with the broadest participation by the people. A radical transformation of society by compulsion would not work.

The whole emphasis of Mao's speech at the second plenum is on a blueprint for civilian order. The army is to be turned into “a working force” of civilian cadres. The Party must rally as many groups as possible, not only workers and peasants but also the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie,* the intellectuals, all those “who can cooperate with us.”

Mao is a dialectician; he knows that every situation carries its obverse within it. The very success of the move, rallying so many diverse individuals and groups, might well drown revolutionary goals in an indecisive liberalism; just so, too, were the well-disciplined forces of the PLA now dangerously swollen with Kuomintang deserters (almost two million of them).

It was therefore essential to set down a clear line, guiding principles, for the period to come. Within the Party itself, Mao Tsetung had to deal with divaricating groups. A strong right wing

*National bourgeoisie: The capitalist sector involved in industry or commerce using its own assets, and not exporting capital abroad.

had as its chief protagonist the Party vice-chairman, Liu Shao-chi, considered Mao's closest comrade in arms. An extreme left wing, small but raucous, called for the total liquidation of the bourgeoisie and immediate communism. And there was the dangerous euphoria of triumph, warping revolutionary will and vigilance. Now the tough peasant guerillas had come to the cities, would the cities corrupt them? No one better understood the danger than Mao. He warned: “With victory, certain moods may grow within the Party . . . arrogance, the airs of a self-styled hero, inertia . . . love of pleasure. . . . With victory, the people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. . . .”

The right wing in the Party was influential. Its arguments appeared rational, and it was backed by many of the intelligentsia newly rallied to the victors. Paradoxically, it could quote Mao to undo Mao; for only a few years back, not thinking victory could be achieved for a decade at least, Mao had spoken of a “new democratic stage” for “decades.” And the formula Liu Shao-chi put up was “consolidation of the new democratic stage.”

The new democratic stage Mao had talked about in 1940, however, was already outpaced by events in 1949. The phenomenon historians know as the acceleration of history has nowhere been more evident than in the last 30 years, and in China particularly. Mao had not expected victory in three short years. The situation brought about by the swift and total collapse of the Kuomintang meant that all programs must be updated. “To make revolution when conditions are not ripe . . . is adventurism . . . but not to make revolution when conditions are ripe . . . is unpardonable.”

During the nine days of March 5 to 13, Mao Tsetung fought, for the vision, the orientation, the leadership which would transform China, bring it to power and prosperity, but also and above all to social justice, independence, and the true liberation of the minds of its people. The struggle between two views, two concepts, of what China should become was initiated then.

ONCE asked by Edgar Snow what he considered to be the most difficult and painful thing in his life, Mao Tsetung replied, “The intra-Party struggle.” Yet willfully, deliberately, paradoxically, Mao Tsetung also relied on intra-Party struggle to propel the Party forward, to make its members progress in knowledge and understanding.

The Chinese Communist Party had never been a monolithic entity, not since its birth in 1921. Six times during the years 1921 to 1949 it was subject to internecine strife representing opposite ideological concepts, which on at least five occasions threatened its very existence. In the next 25 years, through to 1974, four more major struggles within the Party would occur.

In the long and bitter “major struggle” against Wang Ming, lasting from 1935 to 1945, Mao devised the ways and means of turning intra-Party struggle into a motive force. The great rectification (1942–1945) which climaxed the struggle against Wang Ming had confirmed the efficiency of Mao's methods in dealing with the problem.*

These methods – unity, criticism, self-criticism, unity again – eschewed physical violence and arbitrary punishment; Mao is known as generous to his foes (he insisted in 1945 that his defeated opponent Wang Ming should still be given a place on the Central Committee). But this benevolence knows no *ideological* compromise.

[Mao's principle of collective Party leadership] was designed to

*Wang Ming: In the early 1930s he advocated the adventurist policy of centering revolutionary struggle in the cities rather than the countryside; during the War of Resistance Against Japan he urged capitulation to the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The great rectification: movement to educate the cadres in Marxist-Leninist theory and practice and to eliminate bureaucracy, dogmatism, and stereotyped writing. (Eds.)

prevent the monopolizing of decision making by a single individual: there would be divergent views, and decisions must be taken by consensus. The practice of "democratic centralism" which Mao repeatedly emphasized during his long career was possible only if debate and contention were admitted as normal, necessary and constant within the Party.

Just as there is class struggle in society, so is this class struggle reflected within the Party, where it becomes an ideological confrontation between two "lines" of political thinking.

There is, therefore, a permanent "two-line struggle," overt or covert, latent or erupting into open crisis, at all times within the Party. And this, far from being untoward, is actually as it should be, for it corresponds to the law of dialectics, the unity of opposites, which is a universal law governing all phenomena, events, and things in the universe. Prevalent ideas and trends are incarnate in *people*, idea bearers, who form groups or cliques. The Party cannot escape this universal law.



Chairman Mao in Yenan, 1942. (Photo: China Photo Service)

"Contradictions exist in the process of development of all things." So long as these contradictions remain on the plane of divergences of opinion, and do not harm the course of the revolution or the Party's existence, they can be admitted. Should they escalate to threaten the Party's existence, to split it, or to deviate the Party from its goal, then major struggles take place.

To see in this permanent confrontation merely a "power struggle" between personalities is simplistic. True, personalities do count; with their foibles, their secret desires, their greed, ambition, capacity for intrigue, jealousy, envy . . . But these personal characteristics are secondary. Class standpoint is the framework upon which is grafted attitude and behavior, which will determine the individual's role in the struggle.

Mao's contribution to revolutionary science is to have devised methods of handling these negative elements so as to fuel progress; to have posited these struggles as necessary and inevitable. The preservation of Party unity is founded on the paradox of incessant struggle within the Party. Without ideological struggle, the Party would become ossified and decay. Struggle guarantees its dynamism; progress can only come through "contradictions" to be solved.

Repeatedly during this last quarter-century Mao would bring to attention the "dark side" of the Party; would enjoin Party members to "use their heads," would speak against blind obedience. But it was only because of the cultural revolution that this knowledge

became common among all the people in China, and the notion of two-line struggle within the Party was accepted and evident to each man and woman (and even to schoolchildren). Prior to 1966 no one dared assume that any directive from "on high" could be wrong. The average Party member expected "deviations" and evil to come from below, or from non-Party people, never from the very top of the Party itself. Today it is no longer so. "Higher authority" is not necessarily correct.

ALTHOUGH little publicized, the two-line struggle at the second plenum was intense. It was preceded by abundant discussions on economic problems: restoration of production in the cities; the city-countryside relationship; flow of exchanges between city and countryside.

Liu Shao-chi argued that nationalization of the major industries, which under Chiang Kai-shek had been in the hands of the bureaucratic capitalists as a monopoly, was enough to create a state industrial sector; apart from that the private sector of small capitalist concerns must be encouraged to expand and be given a "free hand." "At the present time it is better to allow the forces of capitalism full play to expand production." This expansion of a private sector would put production back on its feet, increase employment of workers (many of them now unemployed because of industrial shutdowns), and supply consumer needs. These two sectors, one nationalized, one private, would be kept for two or three decades. This was the meaning of "consolidation of the new democratic stage." The capitalists were "essential" for the rehabilitation period. They alone had the knowhow necessary to run enterprises, and the very word "socialism" panicked them — hence it must not be used.

The arguments seemed plausible; the end would have been a system such as prevails in India, which although it dubs itself "socialist" is a nineteenth-century type of capitalism in its exploitative qualities. Though unversed in industrial economics (as he freely acknowledged), Mao Tsetung was aware of the devouring potential of capitalist enterprise. The coexistence of a state sector (which would perforce be sabotaged by the private sector, as occurs in India, or else be inefficient through lack of knowhow) with a private sector would immensely favor capitalist development. But capitalist expansion would mean exploitation of the workers and peasants: betrayal of the revolution.

It all boiled down, in Marxist terminology, to different class stands. Liu, who argued for maintaining "for decades" this ambiguous system, was actually trying to preserve and even to strengthen the capitalist class. He invoked Lenin's New Economic Policy, but this did not impress Mao, who knew his Lenin far better and knew how Lenin's concepts had been distorted in the USSR.

"On whom shall we rely in our struggle in the cities? Some muddleheaded comrades think we should rely not on the working class but on the masses of the poor. . . . Some comrades who are *even more muddleheaded* think we should rely on the bourgeoisie. . . .

"We must wholeheartedly rely on the working class, unite with the rest of the laboring masses, win over the intellectuals, and win over to our side as many of the national bourgeoisie elements as possible . . . or neutralize them. . . .

"Our present policy is to regulate capitalism, not to destroy it, *but the national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolution, nor should it have the chief role in state power.*"

Mao Tsetung through reasoned debate and persuasion carried the vote in the Central Committee. The policy of "controlling, regulating, and restricting" though not forbidding capitalism was passed.

Another problem discussed at the plenum, the city-countryside relationship, was also formulated by some right-wing economists

as an “industry versus agriculture” contradiction. Liberal economists joined hands with Liu’s “Marxist” formulation to argue that the first priority was heavy industrialization; whatever funds there were should be invested chiefly in industrial “rehabilitation.” For had not this been the “socialist road” taken by the USSR? They posited the problem in terms of a “contradiction” between urban and rural development; to divert funds to alleviate the immense misery of the countryside would not be “socialism.”

Bluntly, this meant a continuation of what had been the hallmark of Chinese society before 1949: domination of city over countryside; exploitation of the countryside majority (over 85 percent of the population) by the urban minority.

The point is fundamental: throughout the next 25 years the problem would recur. Mao Tsetung would never give in on this matter. The countryside must no longer be exploited by the cities.

Mao’s refusal to sacrifice the peasantry for “production and rehabilitation” indicates also his refusal to accept blindly the Soviet Russian pattern. The right wing argued that Stalin himself in 1928 had said that the peasantry must make its “tribute” to the buildup of heavy industry as a priority. But Mao replied that it was not possible to build a socialist industry based on a feudal countryside, or one where cruel exploitation held sway. If the countryside remained neglected and exploited and backward while industry flourished, that would mean capitalism and not socialism, whether a “nationalized” state sector in industry was created or not. “Only through socialism . . . can our motherland free herself from a semi-colonial, semifeudal state and take the road to independence, freedom, peace, unity and prosperity,” said Mao at the plenum. And “without socialization of agriculture there can be no complete, consolidated socialism.”

In arguing that the peasant must not be sacrificed, Mao was not only standing solidly on the side of the majority of laboring people, but he also had the rank and file of the Party with him. In 1949, 2 percent of the Party members were from the working class, 73 percent were poor and middle peasants, and 25 percent were from the urban petty bourgeoisie or were intellectuals or rich peasants. However, this 25 percent were influential; they were literate, with technical and administrative ability; wielding an influence disproportionate to their number, holding administrative posts in the newly liberated cities. Already complaints of the “peasant” ways of some of the army cadres (whose tough guerilla habits were alien to urban ways) had come from these urban-oriented officials. It was at this point that the persistent rumor began that Mao as a “peasant” leader did not understand city problems, nor did his rural warriors.

Liu Shao-chi argued that there should not be land reform, so as not to disturb production, but a return to the rent reduction system operated in Yen-an.* Undue socialization in the countryside would bring confusion. The peasant was “basically conservative . . . slothful, easygoing . . . only interested in food and profit,” said Liu.

This contemptuous view of the peasant masses was vigorously resisted by Mao. “Under no circumstances should the villages be ignored and only the cities given attention, such thinking is entirely wrong.” Mao conceded that the minds of the peasantry must be changed by “socialist education . . . this is the most important problem.” However, socialist education must be accompanied by tangible steps: land reform, and collectivization step by step. This would receive the support of the poor and middle peasantry, 70 percent of China’s population.


“Only when each peasant has a farm and three horses can there be socialism in the countryside,” retorted Liu Shao-chi.

The plenum finally passed resolutions that the state economy

*Yen-an: Base area in North Shensi, established in 1935 after the Long March. (Eds.)



“Growing Up by the Side of Chairman Mao”
by the Shensi Creative Arts Group.



and not private economy should be “in the leadership role,” and that agriculture should be led from individual operation to collective development “step by step.” Priority for manufactured goods would go to the rural areas; the supply differences between city and countryside were to disappear.

[But] the two-line struggle on the ideology and strategy of development continued. It would be 1953 before Mao Tsetung won a clear victory on the definition of the period – “consolidation of new democracy” or “transition to socialism.” Liu Shao-chi appeared to surrender to Mao’s policies. But as the ensuing years would show, he continued to hold on to his own views.

WHY did Mao Tsetung, despite his clear knowledge of Liu, despite his bursts of irritation against Liu, keep the relationship going, allow Liu so much latitude and power for so long? Why did Liu become Mao’s heir in 1959, only to be expelled from the Party in 1968? Why was the tremendous upheaval of the cultural revolution “entirely necessary and appropriate,” and the only means whereby Liu Shao-chi could be removed?

The answer to these questions is the story of China’s dynamic building during the past quarter of a century. In this gigantic drama personalities and events intertwine.

What kind of person was Liu Shao-chi? Mao is glowingly, glaringly accessible, his foibles known, his charisma evident. But even Edgar Snow, who met Liu several times, found him unyielding to description. So did the imaginative André Malraux, whose apt description (to the author, in a personal interview) was: “A gramophone record.” Liu could never achieve that immediate warmth which characterized Mao. Tales of Mao’s wit, bursts of laughter or anger, acerbic irony or apt quotation abound. He is a living story, a legend and a reality. But Liu needed an organization around him to come alive.

Liu was probably a far abler committeeman than Mao; he was a good apparatus organizer, a lover of order, rules, and programs. Diplomats found him answering questions in a meticulous style, unlike Mao’s apparently rambling talk. But Liu had no earthiness; he was at ease only in an office. He was an executive of merit but not a mass leader; a man who needed an organization to buttress him, discomfited by spontaneous or unexpected phenomena.

In short, Liu was a typical mandarin, a Confucianist bureaucrat, such as China produced by the millions during 2,500 years of Confucianism.

What of the relationship between Liu and Mao? This relationship, with its built-in “contradiction,” can be dated to 1937, when a disheartened Liu was in Yen-an, “holed up to write his reports” as his “good friend” Chang Kuo-tao says. He produced a long diatribe condemning all CCP policies for the past 16 years, dubbing them “left adventurism,” reproving peasant uprisings as reckless. Liu wanted a merger of the CCP with the Kuomintang, dissolution of the Red Army, and a CCP campaign to “reform the Kuomintang from within.”

This capitulationist stance caused “a severe shock” and was called “outrageous” by some Politburo members. Mao, however, sought Liu out, reasoned with him, and brought him around.

There were personal, practical, and ideological reasons for Mao’s behavior. To begin with, Mao’s behavior towards erring colleagues is to seek them out, talk with them, persuade them to correct their errors. Mao not only taught this method for Party unity, he practiced it. His authority, and the high regard and respect surrounding him (even from those who disagree with him), were earned by this trait in his makeup, which he has established within Party norms. Backbiting, malice, slander, harsh and cruel treatment towards comrades repel Mao. “Save the patient by curing the disease” was Mao’s motto. Ideological deviations are a disease, to be cured by patient teaching, persuasion, criticism and self-criticism. Throughout his life Mao Tsetung would never

believe that men could not change, or that they would be unwilling to do so once they knew the truth.

Party unity was Mao’s overriding concern. To add more antagonism by treating Liu harshly would have strengthened the opposition to Mao. Liu had been frank, openly stating his views. Up to the end of his long and bitter struggle against Liu, Mao would still insist that Liu “did things openly.”

But there were other sound reasons for Mao’s gestures. Liu was leading underground organizations in the areas behind Japanese lines, controlled the liaison links with the cities and the urban intelligentsia, inaccessible to the rural guerillas who had Long Marched their way to the base in Yen-an. Liu thus built up his own headquarters within the Party, side by side with Mao’s. He was valued by Mao as a hardworking organization man. And there is no better evidence of Mao’s concern for Party unity, and the future of the revolution, than that he not only put up with Liu but



Chairman Mao
visiting
Chingkangshan,
1965. (Photo:
Hsinhua News
Agency)

also gave him power and honor, hoping all the while to “convert” him from his right-wing views.

From 1945 onward, when Liu Shao-chi’s position as vice-chairman was secure, the occasions on which he opposed Mao multiplied; he seems to have gone on believing until the end that he was right (he died in 1974 of cancer, aged 76). But the climate introduced in the Party by Mao Tsetung, the style of handling Party unity by admitting debate and opposite views, the “struggle by persuasion,” is the reason that the “alliance and struggle” situation with Liu endured so long.

Until 1965, despite many occasions when Mao Tsetung berated Liu Shao-chi (more or less openly), he would not take action against Liu, because he still hoped that Liu was “curable.” But when the “contradictions” with Liu grew to a point which Mao Tsetung felt jeopardized the future of the Chinese revolution, he called upon the Chinese masses to topple Liu Shao-chi.

The two men differed above all in their concept of revolution, of what a Communist Party should be. For Liu Shao-chi, the Party was an elite of good and honorable men, assiduously striving for correctness, operating an efficiently honest bureaucracy, acting with objective paternalism towards the docile and subservient people, who had to be “led” at all times. This view, whether Liu knew it or not, was elitist Confucianism, related to the “tutelage” concept under which Chiang Kai-shek had operated during 20 years.

For Mao, the Party leaders *could* err; the Party must, therefore, at all times “struggle” with itself and relate itself to the masses; once it became an elite, it betrayed the revolution. The Party’s job was not to do things *for* the people, but to teach the people to become the decision makers, master the policies, and carry them out themselves. “It is to the advantage of tyrants that the people remain stupid; it is to our advantage that they be intelligent.”

Liu was attracted and repelled by Mao’s talent for fruitful chaos, by his great vision and fire and poetry, by the elemental strength which is Mao Tsetung, yet all the more insistent upon his own aloofness, his self-centered gentleman’s pride. Liu must have been irked by Mao’s combination of uncouthness and elegance, jocose ribaldry and classic wit, all those diametrical opposites which make up Mao Tsetung’s personality. The most galling thing of all must have been Mao’s immense popularity with the people; even when going against Mao’s line, Liu would have to quote Mao to get a hearing.

Liu would never have imagined the cultural revolution; that Mao would risk destroying his own organization to protect the revolution could not be understood by a man for whom the organization was all, the revolution a by-product of the Party. Liu would always be afraid of the tempests that Mao called to birth; the release of the masses’ initiative, those immense tidal waves which have shaken China and made her leap forward into her own future.

POET and peasant, classicist and Marxist theoretician, master of the strategy of modern war, and liberator of the creative energy of his people, Mao in his thinking and his vision of the world transcends national boundaries. The most important thing he has taught all men is that there is no end, only perpetual beginnings, in a revolution. At 82 Mao is as ready as at 22 to launch into the future, as determined to press on as when he wrote the poem “Seize the day, seize the hour!”

To change the world and to change man has been man’s age-old dream; Mao has shown that man’s self-willed transformation is a determining factor in societal change. All moral and ethical values of the past are challenged in this self-remolding; so often they are but props of ancient tyrannies. “History has set us a great task, not only to know the world, but to transform it,” said Mao, quoting Marx and speaking as a Communist, in the vanguard of a proletariat whose historical destiny it is to change the world. But for this the proletariat must remold itself as well; the vanguard must constantly overhaul its own assumptions; all too easily can it be perverted and become the very exploiter it sought to lay low. “Socialist society, born out of the old exploiting societies, is . . . still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges,” Marx had said. And Mao repeats it.

Another lesson which Mao has taught the world is that in socialism there must be revolution within the revolution; that the people must have the right to revolt against the leadership when it errs. The legitimation of dissent, revolt, is the guarantee for preserving revolutionary purity; as recently as July 1975 Mao stated it was “healthy for our state and our Party” to put up big-character posters, accusing high-ranking officials in the streets of Peking and other cities.

This perpetual “blooming and contending” is seized upon by those who have not understood Mao’s thinking as evidence that China’s revolution will fail. There is talk of power struggles and of tensions, instability and internecine conflict at Mao’s death; withering corruption and warlordism. How can China achieve the drive, popular mobilization, and technological competence for the gigantic task still before her without using material incentives? Zeal and abnegation sooner or later will yield to “revolutionary fatigue.” The rising tide of consumer expectations

will inevitably catch hold of the Chinese people. Complacency and inertia will slow down, not accelerate, China’s progress. So runs the argument against Mao’s line today. Mao Tsetung would be the last man to gainsay such dire predictions. Every day, for the last five years, the Chinese press has warned against the dangers of revisionism, of capitalist restoration in China. Every day there are exposures of errors and misdeeds; frank and revealing articles debate the two-line struggle and the class struggle which goes on among the 800 millions and in the Party.

Since 1971, and Lin Piao’s death, the consciousness of this danger – revisionism, capitalist restoration – has haunted Mao more than ever. In 1966 already he had written to his wife Chiang Ching: “If the right stages an anti-Communist coup d’etat in China, I am sure they will know no peace either and their rule will most probably be short-lived . . . because it will not be tolerated by the revolutionaries who are 90 percent of the people.” But because the system was not yet consolidated enough, “if people like Lin Piao come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up a capitalist system.”

It is in the full knowledge of this danger that consolidation and political education movements have been undertaken since 1971. The Tenth Party Congress of August 1973 and the new Party constitution; the National People’s Congress of January 1975 and the new state constitution which replaces the 1954 constitution; the movements against Confucius and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat – all are geared towards the ultimate goal: speeding up the continuing revolution of China to attain communism as swiftly as possible.

THE stimulus which made this acceleration possible is undoubtedly the Lin Piao affair, since criticism of Lin Piao, linked to the anti-Confucius drive, is still going on years after his death.

“A bad thing . . . can turn into a good one.” The negative lesson of Lin Piao brought about a profound psychological change among the Chinese millions. One instance is the succession issue.

Mao, after his visit to Moscow in 1957, was perturbed by the changes in the USSR and the crisis of succession after Stalin. He then tried to establish a succession, for he was aware of the deep-rooted tradition of the Chinese people that demands incarnation of supreme authority in one individual. Even up to the early 1960’s peasants would come to kneel before the portrait of Mao in Heavenly Peace Square in Peking and say: “We have a new emperor.”

By 1964 Mao’s views on succession had changed; no single person could be really entrusted with an authority compared to his own. He was beginning to doubt Liu Shao-chi, and he realized that a collective leadership could not stand up against a single unscrupulous figure, who would not exhibit the integrity, forbearance and compunction Mao had shown in using power, because the masses were still not aware of the danger. Mao’s most fetching quality is perhaps his candid and prolonged faith in his colleagues and comrades. “People can change, can’t they?” he said in October 1966, when he was still trying to save Liu Shao-chi. But in 1971, after Lin Piao’s treachery, it was a sad Mao who observed: “It seems very difficult for those who have committed gross errors of line to change.” Undeniably, Lin Piao’s betrayal caused Mao great personal grief.

In order to assure his heritage, Lin Piao had utilized a tradition far older than Marxism: that of the Confucian ruler, superman, genius, representing heaven’s will, adhering to “the rites” and tradition. “Collective leadership weakens personal responsibility,” said Lin Piao. “On his part there was a process of development and self-exposure, and on our part there was also a process of getting to know him,” said Chou En-lai later (August 1973).

In 1964 Mao began his great campaign for training a generation

of "successors," not one but "millions of them." This is to be the Party's central task; it enforces a handing over of power, not to a small clique but to the masses in general. And it makes collective leadership essential. The new constitution of January 1975 repeats: "All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people," who are to exercise this power through elected people's congresses at all levels, and have the power to supervise the deputies elected and to replace them at any time according to provisions of law.

The shock of Lin Piao's treachery and death was salutary; it wrenched millions away from their traditional demand for a father-image incarnation of power; suddenly the two-line struggle made sense for many who had been puzzled by it.

The discovery of betrayal "among the highest" made the idea of a collective leadership acceptable and popular. It was now imperative that there be more and better understanding of political theory, so that it would be more difficult for another Lin Piao to rise. "We should study more, read more Marxist-Leninist works," said Mao. Lenin had said that "On the ground cleared of one bourgeois generation, new ones continually appear as long as the ground gives rise to them."

"For a long time to come there will still be two-line struggles within the Party . . . 10, 20, 30 times . . . Lin Piao will appear again, and so will persons like Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi, Peng Teh-huai."* Thus Chou En-lai, quoting Mao, who had said that even when communism was reached, there would still be contradictions and struggles, albeit in a different form. Even then "some people like Chiang Kai-shek" might still emerge.

The difference is that now people expect such confrontations. The secrecy which surrounded intra-Party struggle and caused a shock every time a crisis occurred is being openly criticized by some of the younger "masses." There is at present possibly too much gossip about the continuing struggle, surmise about who is at loggerheads with whom, which caused *Red Flag* in October 1974 to admonish people "not to listen to alleyway rumor-mongering."

Because the masses now feel they have a right to know, and read the press with so much greater political acumen and critical sense than before the cultural revolution, the two-line struggle may somewhat change in aspect. Explosive situations peter out under the weight of public opinion (inevitable as the arguments develop), and new and as yet unpredictable forms of "struggle" may now occur.

There is no obvious bourgeois class in China; but the example of Lin Piao and his supporters showed how easily it could resur-rect. Where, how, in what manner was a new bourgeoisie engendered in a socialist state? How could it be curbed and prevented from usurping power? This is the meaning of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" over the tenacious bourgeoisie.

"There is no ten-thousand-li Great Wall between the working class and the bourgeoisie in the old society . . . in the transition period, *all* need to transform themselves" (Mao, 1974). The proletariat is not born with *a priori* Marxist correctness; it also has to remold itself; and only when it achieves the emancipation of all mankind will it also be emancipated. The lesson of the USSR was that a neo-bourgeoisie, a new exploiting class, could crop up as a "state capitalist monopolist bourgeoisie of bureaucrats and state functionaries" which would have even more power than ordinary capitalists, with no competition to curb it. The crux of the matter was in the problem of ownership. Who *really* owns the industries, agriculture, the various sectors of the economy? Who really is the decision maker?

*Peng Teh-huai: Minister of Defense from the early 1950s until 1959 who attacked the Great Leap Forward and the formation of the communes, and advocated dependence on Soviet economic and military aid. (*Eds.*)

Lenin had already analyzed the problem. "Small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale." "This also occurs among a section of the workers and a section of the Party members," added Mao Tsetung. "*Both within the ranks of the proletariat and among the personnel of state organs there are people who follow the bourgeois style of life.*"

This wholesale denunciation of the "bourgeois wind" emphasizes the constant vigilance which must be exercised. This can only be done with the most open debate and permeability to criticism from the lower levels upward.

Only a proletariat imbued with scientific Marxist ideas, with a commitment to them, and occupying positions in all sectors, including the universities, the news media, and the administration, can curb and control this perennial rise of "bourgeois" ideas. Once the proletariat allow the newly engendered bourgeoisie – who resent participation in physical labor, who resist having their children work in the countryside and use influence, corruption, and pressure to get them into universities, who will spout but not perform; and who still put family ties, clan ties, above the public good – into positions where they can manipulate government machinery, then China will surely slide into the same state as the USSR, a "state capitalist monopoly bourgeoisie" of bureaucrats and state functionaries.

Just as in 1949, there are in China today a right tendency which wants no change, or change so slow that political advance is endangered, and a left wing which wants immediate and drastic change. Both will damage the goal of accelerated political and economic advance. It is necessary once again to read Mao Tsetung, to see how he functioned in leading the tremendous advance of the Chinese people, step by step, never faltering but flexibly, from medieval to modern times in less than three decades.

The meaning of "all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie" in all spheres and at all stages of development is precisely this awareness and curbing in the ideological sphere, in order to abolish all classes and all class distinctions, all the relations of production and the social relations corresponding to them which give rise to classes. This really means a wholesale revolution of *all the ideas* that result from past social relations. Only careful, vigilant restriction to prevent capitalism in the countryside from re-emergence can do it, and over a certain period of years.

Will this political leap forward jeopardize economic advance? Will there be resistance to it on such a scale that China will become "revisionist"?

The experience of the last 25 years disproves this contention. Despite all dire predictions, China has been advancing so swiftly in the building of her own prosperity because of, not in spite of, the swift ideological prosecution of the revolution. But it will mean that turbulent two-line struggling will continue. From now on it will consciously involve – for it must – the majority, the masses.

Nothing on this scale, or of this importance, has been attempted by any "socialist country," least of all by the USSR, where on the contrary political revolution was halted in favor of "economic advance" and there was a retrogression: inequalities are worse than ever; agriculture is at almost the same production level as before 1917; and the USSR has changed into a predatory imperialist power, with vaulting ambitions of world domination, an economy totally militarized, but backward in consumer goods and amenities for the people.

By pushing her revolution forward China has turned her back on hegemonic ambition, and trusted not only her own people but all the people of the world to do the same one day, including the Russian and American peoples.

And who can say that, in the long term, Mao Tsetung's vision of the future will be wrong? ●

If It's Tuesday, This Must Be Texas

by Tom Gold

Chinese visitors tour the U.S. at a gallop

Between China's Liberation in 1949 and the Shanghai Communique of 1972, when there was virtually no contact between the U.S. and Chinese governments, individual Americans only occasionally visited the People's Republic. A big breakthrough came when the U.S. Table Tennis Team was invited to tour China in April of 1971, and the Chinese accepted an invitation for an exchange visit the following year.

The National Committee on United States-China Relations, a private organization, was selected to help host the Chinese Table Tennis Delegation in April 1972. That fall, the Committee on Scholarly Communi-

cation with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC), another private group supported by several U.S. professional societies, assisted in a visit by Chinese scientists and physicians. The following year a CSCPRC delegation was invited to China and, while there, worked out the first "package" of exchanges with China's counterpart organization, the Scientific and Technical Association.

In the summer and fall of 1974 I was asked to travel with Chinese groups being hosted by the National Committee and the CSCPRC. Below are some of my experiences with two of the delegations.

Friendship is a two-way street. Although much has been written about the experiences of Americans in China, little has been reported here about the visits to our country of several hundred Chinese since the Shanghai Communique of 1972, which paved the way for people-to-people exchanges between the two countries. Having had the good fortune to accompany several groups of Chinese during their tours in the United States, I have seen firsthand the great reservoir of friendship and enthusiasm for China that exists throughout America and have also had a chance to observe how the Chinese react to our society.

The Agricultural Sciences Delegation, for which I helped arrange a tour and was a co-leader, and the Wushu (Martial Arts) Delegation, with which I was an interpreter, offered fascinating contrasts in their interaction with Americans. The latter was an entertainment troupe of 35 people, marvelously skilled in the traditional Chinese boxing, sword play, and acrobatics collectively called *wushu*, who moved constantly amid large crowds, while the former consisted of just ten men and women ranging in age from the 20s to the 70s who sought intensive technical and scientific exchanges about agriculture with small groups of Americans.

Since the American and Chinese scientific communities had been estranged for over two decades, the basic plan of the scientific visit was to whisk the Chinese around to six or seven advanced agricultural research centers dealing with subjects in which they had expressed interest. They could thus get a general impression of the type of research being done in the United States and, it was hoped, would feel inclined to return to spend



At a dinner party, members of the Chinese agricultural delegation present gifts to their American hosts. (All photos: T. Gold)

TOM GOLD is a graduate student in Boston who visited China with the USCPFA in 1975.



To grow better crops: in a Champaign, Illinois, cornfield, Chinese agricultural scientists swap data with their American host, Dr. Howell of the University of Illinois.

more time in just a few places. The Chinese expression for this kind of touring is *zou-ma kan-hua* – “viewing flowers from horseback” – and it describes the situation quite accurately.

The science group was an interesting mixture: older intellectuals, some educated in the U.S. and the Soviet Union; an educated youth who had settled in the countryside; and an interpreter with experience in Asia and Africa. Women held up one-third of the sky.

The members were interested in cotton, corn, wheat, and soybeans. To accommo-

date everyone we twice had to divide the delegation. On the first split, I went with the cotton subgroup of four Chinese to Texas A & M while the wheat subgroup went to the University of Minnesota. Our adventures on the Texas trip will give an idea of one of these galloping tours.

The original plan was to fly to Dallas after a stop in Stoneville, Mississippi, then go by hired van to Texas A & M at College Station, appreciating the Texas landscape en route. But the plane was two hours late and we wound up driving for six hours through the vast Texas darkness. The only glamour was

provided by a Texas Highway Patrol escort the entire way.

In College Station we headed for the Holiday Inn, whose neon sign read “Welcome Chinese Delegates.” Our local coordinator had been patiently waiting all evening. Since it was 11:45 and we had not had dinner, Professor Yu, the head of the delegation, sent the coordinator home and the rest of us went down the highway for a snack at Sambo’s.

It was Saturday night. Sambo’s was the only place in town still open, and it was jumping. Tables were crowded with teenage



girls performing for their male counterparts, and vice versa. A large group of bowlers came in. Our party found a table and ordered sandwiches, with the exception of Professor Yu. He had discovered earlier that his favorite American food was pie, so he asked for chocolate cream pie (the only flavor left) and declined to order anything else. However, while I was explaining what Saturday night means in small-town USA, he consumed someone else's salad and orange juice.

Sunday was a free day. After breakfast (the Chinese loved grits) and a glance through the newspaper, we strolled around

town, visiting a Piggly Wiggly supermarket and a residential area.

That afternoon a reception at a private home enabled us to meet the local notables and the scientists we would be talking with during the next few days. The Chinese presented gifts – fans and silk embroideries – to the host and hostess and then joined small clusters of Americans. Later we toured the house and noted the microwave oven, dishwasher, and sprinkler system.

The formal briefings began at the university on Monday with explanations of land-grant colleges, the peculiarities of Texas agriculture, and the research interests at Texas A & M. Professor Yu spoke a bit about cotton-growing in China.

Then came a round of sessions in labs and field plots at which each expert discussed work in progress and the latest findings. Interspersed were meals and tea and the distribution of many reprints of scientific articles.

Two young women from Taiwan assisted with technical interpreting. Both were apprehensive about meeting “mainland Chinese.” That night one of them brought her husband and a few others to our motel for a chat with the delegation. The Chinese attach much importance to helping their compatriots from Taiwan get a clear picture of the People's Republic to correct the distorted view they grew up with.

I did similar informational work with some Texas A & M people, telling them about Chinese history, the necessity of revolution, and the new China. The Americans were eager to learn about their guests and their country, so I made a great effort to dispel negative preconceptions and answer their many questions. The Americans and Chinese quickly took to each other and got along famously on a scientist-to-scientist and person-to-person level. In some cases, two scientists working on similar projects would begin discussing their work early in the morning and continue non-stop until day's end.

On the final day there was a quick morning briefing and then packing before we boarded a commuter plane to Dallas. A spinoff of Hurricane Carmen hit us a half-hour before takeoff but luckily disappeared as quickly as it had come. At the Dallas airport we had Fritos, Hershey bars, and cokes to tide us over as we waited to complete the trip to Champaign, Illinois, where we were reunited with the other half of our delegation.

I recount details to impress upon readers that these trips are 24-hour-a-day introductions to the most sophisticated and most banal aspects of American life. Things we take for granted – a small-town eatery on Saturday night or the ritual of changing planes – are often matters of great curiosity

to foreign guests. Multiply these impressions by ten and you have an idea of a Chinese scientific visit to the U.S. My role was a mixture of tour leader, interpreter, intermediary, sinologist, public relations man, and constant companion.

Chinese-American exchanges are of great significance, but to the participants, as time passes, they boil down to experiences in human interaction. One thing that impressed the Chinese even more than the high level of science and technology, the advanced equipment, the skyscrapers, the wealth, or the landscape was the friendliness of the Americans they met. I can only speculate as to their preconceptions, but their comments showed they were truly overwhelmed by what they experienced – the ovations, the autograph seekers, and the moving farewells.

After a visit to a family farm near Champaign, Liu Yu-xiang, a woman scientist, and I were chatting about our impressions of each other. She said, “You are like the sun at eight or nine o'clock in the morning” – a famous quote from Chairman Mao. Then she added, “You young people have a great hope for the future.”

In Champaign I learned that *Fiddler on the Roof* was to be on television. I was eager to see how the Chinese would react to that story. In the afternoon we attended a reception given by the Chancellor of the University of Illinois. Afterwards we stopped off at a Kentucky Fried Chicken (fried chicken had become a favorite food) and bought dinners to go. We convened in a motel room to eat and watch the film. I explained the historical setting and then translated.

The Chinese were greatly interested. If I laughed at something impossible to translate, they would badger me to explain it. As I had hoped, they began to discuss the movie's relevance to their own history and struggle. Oh, yes, they had had arranged marriages, and low status of women, and family oppression, and other feudal remnants of Confucius, but now all that was changed. Later, in discussing some aspect of the old China, they would smile and exclaim, “Tradition!”

On the bus to Ames, Iowa, Ms. Xie and Mr. Xu elaborated. Ms. Xie felt the ending was bad – it should have shown the younger people with their hopes for the future, and not made us sympathize with the old man threatened by the loss of his old-fashioned ways. Mr. Xu said each daughter suffered from a different kind of oppression: money and feudal tradition, czarist political oppression, and the racism of the old czars.

*

The Wushu Delegation toured for 25 days, visiting and performing before enthusiastic standing-room-only crowds in Honolulu, San Francisco, New York, and Washington, D.C. There were receptions, visits to a fac-



The Wushu troupe visits the UN building in New York City.

tory, a museum, a ranch, schools and homes, a picnic complete with frisbees, a trip to the White House, and get-togethers with local chapters of the US-China Peoples Friendship Association. We tried to reach as many people as possible through personal contact and the media. Everywhere we went there was a mob scene.

Members of the delegation came from different occupations, backgrounds, and regions of China. They included officials of the All-China Sports Federation, physical education teachers, truck drivers and other workers, a typist, and students, among them three children. There is no formal Wushu group as such in China, comparable to the Shenyang Acrobats who are famous as a team. The Wushu performers were selected from all over China after competitions at various levels.

The plane trip from San Francisco to New York gave the visitors a chance to experience American society in microcosm. I translated a Walt Disney film that was shown in flight. It concerned a bourgeois careerist who gets his daughter admitted to college through the back door, is appalled when she drops out and takes up with leftist protesters, but convinces her to return to the good life after treating her to lunch at a swank Fisherman's Wharf restaurant. The Chinese liked the slapstick. We leafed through the airline's magazine and I explained the ads and the



Members of the Wushu troupe visit Sea Life Park in Honolulu.

meaning of “the good life” as personified by an unctuous-looking headwaiter in a tuxedo. Two Girl Scouts in uniform paraded up and down the plane’s aisle but I never succeeded to my own satisfaction in explaining to my Chinese companions the difference between the Girl Scouts of America and the Red Guards.

We had a snack of lox and cream cheese and worked together to polish up my translation of a speech to be delivered upon arrival. As I sat between Gao Xi-an and Kang Ge-wu, they requested that I write out the English alphabet. Gao was a 30-year-old worker in a factory in Xian (Sian) that makes parts for bridges. Although he had never studied a foreign language, he carefully and imaginatively transcribed the English sounds in Chinese characters. Kang, a student at the Peking Physical Education College, wrote the lyrics of the children’s song “I Love Peking’s Tian An Men” in my notebook and we ran through it until I could do it solo.

After we landed, our buses to the city were stuck in traffic and this provided an opportunity to point out landmarks of the New York skyline.

Zhang Fu-yun was a 29-year-old physical education teacher from Shanghai whose Wushu skill electrified the audiences. One night, riding back to the hotel after a Madison Square Garden show, he told me with great feeling: “When I am on stage after a performance and see the American friends standing and smiling and applauding us, I know I am serving the people. The Americans are truly a great people.”

Captain of the 13 women performers was Chen Dao-yun. After her return to China I was glad to read an article she had written, published in *People’s Daily*, describing her favorable impressions of Chinese-American friendship. Among them she cited the Biltmore Hotel chef in New York who prepared a special cake for the delegation. In icing it bore the Tian An Men seal, the Wushu team pennant, and “Bon Voyage” in Chinese.

“This was no ordinary cake,” Chen wrote. “This was a symbol of Chinese-American friendship.” And she added, “During this visit and these performances, I felt deeply that foreign friends watch the show so enthusiastically not only because they like Wushu, but because they desire to understand China and promote friendship.”

To see something of American middle-class life, the Wushu group visited Columbia, Maryland, a planned community located between Washington and Baltimore. After looking at the recreational facilities, we split up and went to separate homes for lunch. I accompanied a group visiting a Black family.

Chen Dao-yun, who is about five feet tall, affectionately greeted one of the daughters of the house and asked how old she was. When the girl, who was about five feet five,



Zhang Fu-yun (back to camera) performs a dazzling Wushu maneuver for an American audience.

replied “eleven,” Chen was flabbergasted. Then the girl asked Chen the same question; when the answer came back “twenty-five,” it was the daughter’s turn for amazement. Excitedly, she told another child, “She’s twenty-five!”

As we toured the house, a local news reporter tried to ask the Chinese some provocative questions. Gao Xi-an was puzzled at the idea of a 30-year mortgage. He told his hosts about his own small rent, which covered everything. The reporter asked, “Would you like a house like this?” Gao replied, “In the future we’ll have houses like this too.” The reporter persisted, “But would you *like* a house like this?” Gao chose not to reply.

After a light lunch we looked at the playroom, which contained a pool table. Li Lian-jie and Qiu Fang-jian, aged 11 and 19, caught on instantly and were hard at it until we had to leave.

As the entire delegation reassembled, photos were snapped and farewells said. Zhou Tao, an ebullient truck driver from Shandong (Shantung) intent on learning some English, burst into “Home on the Range,” singing in unison with his host family. The Chinese had learned the song phonetically before leaving China and sang it on several occasions for American friends.

*

Since I traveled with these friends from China we have not been out of touch. I have exchanged letters with several of the Wushu

Delegation and when in China last year I met friends from both groups. They told me how they fondly recalled their trips to America and how they had told friends about the places they visited and people they met. The agricultural scientists were utilizing information gained during their tour.

The exchanges between our two countries have been going on now for several years and it appears that short-term trips will be the rule for some time to come. Many obstacles remain before we can increase the number of longer visits. But each exchange leads to greater understanding on both sides and there is a cumulative effect.

When discussing intellectuals, Mao Tsetung once wrote: “Our government workers, writers, artists, teachers, and scientific research workers should seize every opportunity to get close to the workers and peasants. Some can go to factories or villages just to look around; this may be called ‘looking at the flowers while on horseback’ and is better than nothing at all. Others can stay there for a few months conducting investigations and making friends; this may be called ‘dismounting to look at the flowers.’ Still others can stay and live there for a considerable time, say two or three years or even longer; this may be called ‘settling down.’”

The potential of viewing from horseback has in large part been realized. Both Americans and Chinese can hope, before too long, to enter the next stage and *xia-ma kan-hua* – “dismount to look at the flowers.” ●

The Olympics Rhubarb

by Peter Perl

Who's really playing games with the Games?

In July 1976, headlines all over the world broke the startling news that athletes representing the Chiang regime on Taiwan were barred from the summer Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada. International Olympic Committee (IOC) members, many sports-writers, and U.S. government officials expressed outrage at the Canadian government's position – which was, simply, that these athletes could not enter Canada to compete in the games so long as they claimed to represent the “Republic of China.” IOC chairman Lord Killanin of Ireland solemnly announced that “the whole world is absolutely fed up with politics interfering with sport,” thereby ignoring the fact that it is precisely political maneuvering which has kept the Chiang regime in the Olympics and excluded the 800 million people – one-fourth of humanity – of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Despite efforts by groups such as the US-China Peoples Friendship Association to publicize the history behind the Canadian decision, Canada has been vilified in much of the Western press for depriving “poor little Taiwan” of its “rightful” place in the Olympics. The facts are that the “Republic of China” on Taiwan has *never* been officially voted into the Olympic Movement, whereas the People's Republic of China has.

Athletes representing the Chiang regime have competed in former Olympics solely by virtue of unilateral actions taken in the 1950s by then IOC president Avery Brundage, an American, and through the acquiescence over the years of certain other IOC members.

No one – including the U.S. government,

the People's Republic of China, and the so-called “Republic of China” – claims that Taiwan is an independent nation, or anything but an integral part of China. The “Republic of China” does not claim to be the government of Taiwan, but the *legitimate government of all of China*. The claim of



Shi Yu-gui of Taiwan Province, now living in Japan, in competition at the Third National Games. (Photo: Hsinhua News Agency)

PETER PERL is a journalist who has worked on daily and monthly publications in Connecticut.

The chronology on page 23 has been excerpted from “Why Is China Not at the Olympics?”, Montreal Canada-China Society and Amitiés Québec-Chine, 1976; ARENA: The Institute for Sport and Social Analysis, news release, July 9, 1976; “The Historical Background to the China Question and the IOC,” Iranian National Olympic Committee, Teheran, July 10, 1976.

course dates back to 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek, his leadership totally rejected by the Chinese people, fled to the Chinese island province of Taiwan. The government he set up (now led by his son Chiang Ching-kuo) includes legislators who, having fled the mainland in 1949, are periodically “re-elected” to represent provinces in which they have not set foot for almost 30 years!

Most nations, including Canada, have long since rejected what Canadian Premier Pierre Trudeau calls the “Alice-in-Wonderland” quality of the Chiang regime’s claims, and now recognize the People’s Republic as the sole legitimate government of China. The PRC has been seated in the UN, and the Chiang regime expelled. A number of national sports federations recognize PRC delegates as the only rightful representatives of China at national and international games. The position that the PRC should be represented in the Olympics, and the “Republic of China” expelled, is supported by the Supreme Council of Sports in Africa, the Asian Games Federation, a host of Third World countries, Japan, Yugoslavia, and many other nations. The U.S. government and the IOC – whose membership is weighted toward men of position and wealth from the larger Western countries – are among the dwindling number of Chiang supporters.

The People’s Republic, after being voted into the Olympic Movement and competing in the 1952 Helsinki Games, withdrew in 1958 after its protests on the status of Taiwan were ignored. The Chinese position is that they cannot participate in any international body – whether it is the UN or the Olympic Movement – which also recognizes the Chiang regime. Such participation would imply some form of endorsement for that regime as the rightful government either of China or of Taiwan Province. The Chiang forces have thus clung tenaciously to membership in a variety of world organizations, trying to take advantage of China’s principled stand in order to keep it from participating in world bodies.

A brief look at the historical record (see box) clearly shows that it is the IOC, not the Canadians or the PRC, which has made the Olympics a political football on the China question. Despite the 1954 vote to recognize the PRC All-China Sports Federation as sole representative of China, and the 1959 ruling that the regime on Taiwan “no longer represents sports in the entire country of China,” a whole series of IOC back-room maneuvers has kept the fictional “Republic of China” in the Olympics – even at the expense of the IOC’s own rules. These twists and turns of policy have moved the IOC from a “two Chinas” stance, which managed to recognize *both* the PRC and the “Republic of China,” to a “one China, one Taiwan” position,

1952: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) sends a team representing all of China to the Helsinki Olympics.

1954: The annual meeting of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) votes 23-21 to recognize the PRC All-China Sports Federation as sole representative of China. But Avery Brundage, American president of the IOC, unilaterally declares: “The IOC also recognizes Taiwan.”

1956: At the IOC Melbourne meeting, China protests Brundage’s unilateral reinterpretation of Olympic rules.

1957: At the IOC Sofia meeting, China protests again.

1958: With no change in the situation, China withdraws from the Olympic Movement.

1959: The IOC declares that the “Republic of China” (the Chiang Kai-shek regime) can no longer claim to be the “Chinese Olympic Committee” since “it does not administer sport in China.” After strong objections from the U.S. government, Avery Brundage proposes that Chiang regime representatives be readmitted not as the “China Olympic Committee” but as the “Republic of China.”

1960: During the Rome Olympics, the IOC obliges Chiang regime representatives to march under the banner of “Formosa,” an old Portuguese name for Taiwan Island. The “Republic of China” protests, but participates anyway.

1964-72: The Chiang regime is allowed to compete in the Tokyo, Mexico City, and Munich Olympics as the “Republic of China.”

1970: Learning of attempts by certain IOC members to make friendly overtures to China, Avery Brundage, despite overwhelming rejection by the Executive Committee, reports to the IOC General Assembly that the Executive Committee recommends Henry Hsu – a Chiang regime representative – for membership. Hsu is elected.

1971: Despite heavy U.S. government pressure on smaller nations, the United Nations votes overwhelmingly to seat the PRC as the legitimate government of China and to expel the Chiang regime.

1973: The Chiang regime has itself designated as an “area” under IOC rules – even though other IOC rules allow “areas” separate status only by permission of a national Olympic Committee, which in this case could only be that of the PRC.

1974: The USSR admits athletes from the “Republic of China” to the World University Games held in Moscow. During the World Bicycle Championships in Montreal, the Canadian government refuses entry to cyclists from Taiwan claiming to represent the “Republic of China.”

1975: In April Canada informs the IOC’s Lord Killanin that it cannot assure entry of athletes claiming to represent the “Republic of China.” In May, at a joint Rome meeting of the IOC Executive Committee and the National Olympic Committees, 17 nations urge the Olympic Movement to accept the application of the PRC which had been submitted at the IOC’s request. At the IOC Executive Board meeting in Lausanne, there is an all-day debate on the PRC application; the U.S. and Bulgaria oppose admission of the PRC, while the USSR boycotts the debate. No decision is reached.

1976: On May 28, the Canadian government restates its official position to the IOC – that it would not allow Taiwan Province athletes to enter Canada so long as they claimed to represent the “Republic of China.” On July 1, Monique Berlioux, current IOC Executive Secretary and former personal secretary to Brundage, threatens to decertify the Montreal Olympics if the Canadian government does not back down. On July 16, after two weeks of maneuvering by pro-Chiang IOC members; of sensationalistic news coverage which portrays the Chiang regime as the “underdog” without giving the true history of the regime’s membership in the IOC; of U.S. government pressure on the Canadian government and boycott threats by the U.S. Olympic Committee; of one compromise proposal after another to save face for the IOC and the Chiang regime – the outcome is announced: the Canadian government holds firm to its basic position, the Games are *not* canceled, and Chiang regime representatives refuse to compete unless they can officially call themselves the “Republic of China.” During this two-week period, the question of the PRC’s readmission to the IOC is never discussed by the IOC.



The Taiwan delegation to the 1975 Third National Games in Peking. (Photo: Hsinhua News Agency).

which recognizes the Chiang regime but leaves rather murky the question of exactly what it represents (a "nation," an "area"?).

In 1976, faced with the Canadian refusal to go along with the farce of recognizing the Chiang regime's athletes as "China's" delegation to the Olympics, the IOC did its best to whip up sympathy for the Chiang regime as an underdog and threatened to cancel the Games entirely if Canada did not change its stand. When this proved unpopular, and Canada refused to buckle under to combined IOC-U.S. pressure, the IOC brought forth various compromise proposals designed to

allow "Republic of China" athletes to compete under another label and to save face for those caught in these inconsistencies.

Even sportswriters who had criticized Canada became fed up with these maneuvers. The U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC), which had threatened to boycott the Games, was faced with a rebellion in the ranks of its athletes and coaches, and backed down. The Chiang regime sports representatives, left high and dry by their erstwhile USOC and IOC allies, refused to compete under any label but "Republic of China."

Even after the "Republic of China"

athletes packed their bags and left, however, the distortions continued. The IOC and the U.S. government have portrayed Canada as caving in to Chinese pressure for fear of jeopardizing trade relations with the PRC. The IOC also accused Canada of waiting until the last minute before the July Games before announcing the "Republic of China" ban. But both claims are false.

Canada has stood on the principle of "one China, the PRC" since it severed ties with Chiang and recognized the PRC in 1970. "Republic of China" representatives have not been permitted to enter Canada since

then. Even manufactured goods are not allowed into Canada if they bear the misnomer "Republic of China" instead of "Made in Taiwan." Canada had officially informed the IOC as early as May 28 that it would not recognize "Republic of China" athletes in the July Olympics, and in an Olympics-related boxing tournament earlier that year three boxers so designated were refused entry into Canada.

Those who have criticized Canada's stand have also accused the PRC of trying to block Taiwan Province athletes from competition (while virtually ignoring the longstanding exclusion of athletes from the mainland). But, in fact, since the 1950s, the PRC has invited athletes from Taiwan to compete for spots on China's national team, guaranteeing full passage and travel visas between Taiwan Province and the mainland. The Chiang regime has never permitted this. However,

Taiwan-born athletes who now live elsewhere (either on the mainland or overseas) have regularly participated in the Chinese National Games and as part of the Chinese delegation to the Asian Games in Teheran in 1974.

To date there has been no decision on acceptance of the PRC as the sole representative of the Chinese people at future Olympics. The Chiang regime still clings to its position in the IOC, and certain forces in that body seem determined to maintain the status quo – although from past experience it seems clear that the "Republic of China" will be repackaged under whatever label seems salable at the time. In the 1975 debate on the issue, the U.S. delegate opposed admission of the PRC, while the Soviet delegate boycotted the discussion. Soviet officials at Montreal, when questioned about what would happen at the 1980 Olympics in

Moscow, answered with deceptive simplicity that the USSR as host would recognize whomever the IOC recognized.

The Olympics controversy over the "Republic of China" dramatizes the continuing U.S. failure to uphold its commitment expressed in the 1972 Shanghai Communique: "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position." Since then, however, despite popular support for recognition of the People's Republic, the U.S. government has failed to disengage itself from the Chiang regime.

While reducing troops and withdrawing some aircraft, the United States simultaneously increased its arms sales by almost 100 percent in 1975 and arranged for the Northrop Corporation to build 180 F5E jet fighters on Taiwan – more than offsetting the withdrawal of fighter planes. Massive new private investments have been encouraged, and five new "Republic of China" consulates have been opened in this country. Threats by President Ford and the head of the U.S. Olympic Committee to withdraw from the Olympics if Chiang regime athletes were blocked were ultimately futile attempts to ensure the continued usurpation of China's rightful position in world athletics.

China's friends in the international Olympic Movement will undoubtedly press to seat the PRC and to expel the Chiang group – as the National Olympic Committee of Iran, among others, already has. China's friends in the United States, with the US-China Peoples Friendship Association playing an important role, can be expected to pick up the baton as well. During the furor over the Montreal Olympics, the USCPFA campaign to set the record straight attracted widespread support. Several thousand Americans signed USCPFA petitions urging the IOC to recognize the PRC and change Taiwan from full-nation status to its proper position as a province of China, whose athletes could compete as part of the regular national delegation. This position was endorsed also by several sports groups, including ARENA: The Institute for Sport and Social Analysis, which includes a long list of sportswriters and athletes.

When the People's Republic of China finally takes its rightful place in the Olympic Movement, it will not just be a victory for the Chinese athletes from all provinces who will finally be able to compete in the Games. The real winners will be the sports fans and Olympic competitors from all over the world who will be able at last to see the athletic representatives of one-quarter of humanity – and to judge for themselves the Chinese practice of "friendship first, competition second."

Ex-Olympian Speaks Out

29 June 1976

To the International Olympic Committee:

As a member of the 1972 U.S. Olympic Track and Field team, a member of the 1971 and 1975 U.S. Pan-American teams, a member of the U.S. track team which visited the People's Republic of China, and a veteran of some 17 years of competition, I am writing to urge the acceptance of the People's Republic of China into the Olympic Movement. . . .

The fact that the athletes of the world's most populous nation are not included in the world's greatest attempt at promoting friendship through athletics most certainly hinders the objectives of the Olympic Movement. The "friendship first, competition second" motto with which the Chinese have received visiting athletic teams certainly fits in with the Olympic ideals. . . .

The reality is that there is only one China, and that China and its 800 million people are not now represented in what cannot yet be called a worldwide movement.

Realistically, as well as idealistically, the admission of the People's Republic of China to the Olympic Movement will be mutually beneficial. Action to include the People's Republic of China should be taken as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

P. Michael (Mike) Manley

Eugene, Ore.

Incident at Tian An Men

by Wayne Decker, John Duray, and Jane Wheeler

Eyewitness account of historic demonstrations

What really happened in Peking's Tian An Men Square on April 5? We were among a group of American visitors who witnessed some of the dramatic events in a week that included violent counterrevolutionary incidents, the removal of former Acting Premier Deng Xiao-ping (Teng Hsiao-ping) from all his leadership posts, the election of Hua Guo-feng as the new Premier, and the largest major street demonstrations in China since the Cultural Revolution. Why did these things happen, what did they mean?

Eyewitness to History

When we arrived in Peking on the evening of March 30, we saw thousands of people involved in a tribute to Chou En-lai. Long lines of workers, students, and neighborhood groups were carrying wreaths honoring the late Premier to be placed at the Monument to the People's Heroes. Our guides told us that this was the time of the traditional Qing Ming (Ching Ming) festival, an ancient holiday commemorating the dead. This year in Peking, Qing Ming was being celebrated on a larger scale than in recent years because it was focused on the revered Premier Chou.

When we asked whether our group might also present a wreath, we were politely told it was best not to. Our friends suggested that we could honor Chou by remembering him in our hearts and emulating his revolutionary spirit. The government was trying to discourage extensive celebration of the feudal holiday. This was our first inkling that tension surrounded the Qing Ming activities

and that some people may have had other motives for participating than honoring Chou's memory.

On Monday, April 5, as our group was returning from Dazhai (Tachai) around 5 P.M., some of us drove past Tian An Men. The square was filled with thousands of

people. Shortly afterward, from our hotel windows, several of us noticed smoke rising from the direction of the square. We heard rumors from other foreigners at our hotel that the removal over the weekend of the hundreds of wreaths that had piled up near the monument had brought a large crowd to



WAYNE DECKER, JOHN DURAY, and JANE WHEELER are USCPFA activists from the Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and West Side Los Angeles Associations respectively. They and 19 others were part of a National Activists Study Tour that visited China during the events described.

A small group of counterrevolutionaries manipulate the spontaneous sentiments of grief and respect for the late Premier. Urging the people to bring wreaths to the Monument to the People's Heroes, they planned to symbolically link the revolutionary Chou with the capitalist-roader Deng Xiao-ping, provoke a violent incident, and claim that the army was "suppressing the people." Instead, Peking's Workers' Militia - volunteers from local factories - led in putting a swift end to their plan. (Photo: J. Duray)

the square during the day and that violent incidents of some proportion had occurred.

Those who visited Tian An Men on Monday night encountered an exceedingly tense atmosphere, with soldiers, militia, and police on duty. We were free to walk around the square, but when we stopped, a militiaman politely but firmly asked us to keep moving. We noticed that wreaths had been removed and that no one was sitting in front of the gate to the old imperial Forbidden City, as is the custom in quieter times.

The rumors about Monday's violence were corroborated by the absence of people in the usually crowded square on Tuesday and Wednesday, but the Chinese press did not speculate on the as yet unclear nature of events. Two days later we learned from Radio Peking that although as many as 100,000 people had gathered at the square on April 5, only a fairly small number were involved in the violence; the others "came to see what was happening." (Remembering our ride past the square on Monday afternoon, we found this quite believable.) The violent events of that day had included the burning of cars, the looting and burning of a People's Liberation Army barracks, and personal attacks with knives and daggers against army soldiers and other citizens who tried to stop the vandalism.

Early Wednesday evening a few of us walked to Tian An Men where we saw a large crowd of people listening to radio broadcasts from loudspeakers. As we returned to the hotel a large formation of people marched out of the night, carrying red flags, beating a cadence on drums and cymbals, and shouting slogans. This parade struck us as an event of great significance, but we had no idea of the reasons behind it, since we had been unable to understand what was being said through the loudspeakers.

Back at the hotel we met with others from our group. Since about one-third of our 22 people read and spoke Chinese with varying proficiency, we were able to ask the workers on our floor if such a parade was common. In an excited conversation carried on in both English and Chinese, they told us that a radio broadcast had announced that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had removed Deng Xiaoping, the Acting Premier and Vice-chairman of the Party, from all his leadership posts and had elected Hua Guo-feng as Premier and First Vice-chairman of the Party, a newly created post.

Why had this happened? One factor, they told us, was the strong suspicion of Deng's involvement in Monday's violence at Tian An Men. It seemed that a number of people had tried to use the Qing Ming commemoration of Chou En-lai to create a "counter-revolutionary political incident" in support of Deng Xiaoping and his policies and had

tried to link Deng with the popular late Premier. When we asked the workers about the connection between Chou En-lai and Deng, they made a very clear distinction. While Chou had always taken the lead in supporting the masses of the Chinese people, our friends in the hotel felt that Deng's

policies favored the establishment of a small ruling elite in China. One worker, obviously disturbed by the question, said pointedly, "Don't speak of Chou En-lai and Deng Xiaoping in the same sentence. Premier Chou En-lai was a very great man."

It was after talking to these hotel workers



"The area was the scene of mass parades. Trucks crowded Changan Boulevard for hours. It was the kind of scene you remember for the rest of your life." (Photo: C. Mellor)



The people of Peking pour into the streets after the Party Central Committee announces Deng Xiaoping's dismissal from office and the appointment of Hua Guo-feng as the new Premier. (Photo: W. Decker)

that we heard the earlier-mentioned report of Monday's incident on Radio Peking. When the program was over, we suddenly realized that all the workers except one were gone from our floor. Then we heard loud noise from outside the hotel and went running out to see what was happening. We found a large parade, much like the one a few of us had seen earlier in the evening, and when we moved closer to the marchers we recognized some of the hotel workers from our floor. Though it was a very cold night in Peking, some of them had not stopped to put on their overcoats and wore only their thin white cotton service jackets.

This was the beginning of a night of vigorous marches and celebrations supporting the two decisions of the Central Committee. The din of cymbals, gongs, and drums was punctuated only by the shouting of chants as the entire area quickly filled up with more and more people. Trucks loaded with militia, peasants, industrial workers, and neighborhood groups crowded Changan Boulevard for hours to the accompaniment of militant drumbeats. The drama of the scene was tremendous; it was the kind of event you remember for the rest of your life.

At first, recalling the tension of the previous three days, we felt it was inappropriate for us to try to mingle, even in small groups. But, wanting to absorb as much of the scene as possible, we put aside our misgivings and walked up and down Changan Boulevard, through Tian An Men Square, watching the celebration. We felt we were watching history in the making – history being made by the people.

The demonstrators greeted us with warm smiles, and some on foot and in passing trucks clapped as they noticed us on the streets. We applauded in return. At one point an especially enthusiastic member of our group raised his fist and shouted *Mao Zhuxi wan sui!* – “Long live Chairman Mao!” When the shout was returned by a group of Chinese on a passing truck, our misgivings completely disappeared.

In light of the number of “dateline Peking” and “eyewitness” accounts that appeared in the Western press about these events, it is perhaps significant that we saw no other Westerners in or around the square during that whole long evening. As the night wore on there were fewer foot-marchers, but the truck convoys continued. Finally, at 3:30 in the morning, the last of us returned to the hotel, utterly exhausted – but the demonstration was still going on in the streets.

After a brief sleep, we awoke at 7 A.M. to find the parades still going strong. Thursday's marches, however, had much more of a holiday feeling. Crowds of schoolchildren in brightly colored clothes filled the streets, waving flags and banners. Despite the holiday atmosphere, however, factories, schools,



At Qinghua (Tsinghua) University outside Peking, in a courtyard set aside for the purpose, rows and rows of big-character posters, signed by teachers, students, and cadres express support of the Central Committee decision. (Photo: Hsinhua News Agency)



Home-made flags flying, trucks bring people from factories and outlying communes to central Peking to join the celebration. (Photo: C. Mellor)



On foot, by bicycle, or in hastily decorated trucks, more and more people join the demonstrations – clapping, cheering, singing, and shouting slogans. (Photo: D. Gunnell)

and stores were still operating as usual – people found time during their regular work or school schedules to join the celebration, much as the hotel workers had done the night before.

Peking's mood was duplicated in other cities we visited, where mass parades and rallies had been held simultaneously with the events in the capital. Wall signs and big-character posters supporting the two decisions of the Central Committee were everywhere.

Friends of China may wonder, as we did ourselves, how all of this fits into the broader context of the continuing Chinese Revolution. Our conversations in China and our reading of Chinese press materials helped us place the dramatic events of April in perspective.

Cultural Revolution Deepens

We were aware before our departure for China that Deng Xiao-ping and possibly others in government were under serious criticism (although not by name) in the current political campaign to “beat back the right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts” – in other words, the campaign to prevent misleaders from undoing the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. To

put it very simply, the aims of the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 were to stop the development of a new elite, a special intellectual/managerial class; to ensure that China's government serves the interests of the broad masses of the people; and to guarantee that China's political and cultural life is shaped by full, active, and knowledgeable participation by the workers and peasants.

Deng Xiao-ping stood accused of attempting to negate these aims and of trying to restore pre-Cultural Revolution standards and goals in many fields. During our group's visit to Qinghua (Tsinghua) University in Peking, we learned that the current political campaign against Deng and others like him grew out of a debate at Qinghua about the merits of the educational changes in China since 1966. Overall, the campaign is considered a continuation and deepening of the Cultural Revolution. The “socialist new things,” as they are called, which emerged from the Cultural Revolution were pointed out to us and held up for praise wherever we went.

“Socialist new things” in government and administration include:

- the establishment, at all levels from work-shop floor or peasant brigade on up, of

Revolutionary Committees with worker and peasant representation to handle the daily operation of factories and communes;

- cadre schools, combining study and manual labor in six-month terms;
- a requirement that all cadres participate regularly in physical labor on the job, to remind government and Party officials of their duty to “serve the people” and help them to keep in touch with the masses.

In education, the new forms and institutions include:

- “open-door” education, which links the classroom with society by sending students and teachers to factories and communes to learn the practical problems of production, and by bringing workers and peasants to schools and universities as instructors;
- agricultural and technical institutes established by peasants and workers within their communes or factories, stressing the idea that scientific and technical knowledge is not the private property of a select few;
- “open-door” scientific and technical research linking the scientist in the lab with mass experimentation by people at the grass-roots level.

“Socialist new things” in health care include:

- a network of paramedical workers known



At Tian An Men Square, site of the original incident, a huge parade of workers, peasants, and soldiers caps the celebration. (Photo: Hsinhua News Agency)

as “barefoot doctors” and “Red medical workers”;

- the establishment of cooperative medical health services in the countryside.

The new developments in art and culture are typified by:

- modern revolutionary operas and plays stressing the heroism and outlook of working people;

- “spare-time” worker and peasant artists, such as the Huxian (Huhsien) peasant painters, who create works reflecting their daily lives and concerns.

These “socialist new things” from the Cultural Revolution are the very features that initially excited many Americans’ interest in the People’s Republic, and are so much a part of our image of new China that we tend to take their existence for granted. Yet Deng Xiao-ping and those linked to him, we were told, voiced harsh criticisms of the “socialist new things” in order to undermine and do away with them – thereby “reversing correct verdicts” and trying to carry China back to the pre-1966 period.

What sort of criticisms did Deng Xiao-ping and his supporters make? One common thread ran through all they said: the desire to put “experts” and “authorities” in command, coupled with disdain for the abilities of ordinary workers and peasants. According to Chinese sources, Deng promoted the idea that leadership should be based on technical expertise or professional ability, rather than on the will to serve the people wholeheartedly. “Relying on the workers,

peasants, and soldiers is only relative,” he said, in contrast to the revolutionary belief that relying on them is how history is made. Moreover, Deng thought that young cadres who emerged during the Cultural Revolution had been promoted too fast, and he wanted large numbers of them removed from their leadership posts. This was seen as

an attempt to sabotage the “three-in-one combination” (old, middle-aged, and young) of the Revolutionary Committees.

Deng reportedly insisted that the Communist Party leadership in China erred in “not understanding professionalism,” whereas the workers, peasants, students, and cadres we spoke to all across the country welcomed the fact that these “socialist new things” try to integrate technical experts and high-level research with the workers’ and peasants’ own efforts to increase production and improve technology.

Deng Xiao-ping’s attacks on the achievements of the Cultural Revolution struck at something close to the hearts of China’s working people. They view him as the latest representative of a long line of “capitalist roaders.” These are people who achieved responsible posts in the government and the Communist Party, and then attempted to steer China’s development along a path of specialization and bureaucratic decision-making, ignoring the needs of the people and downgrading their ability to participate effectively in all areas of society.

One old cadre in Shanghai summed up the sentiment of the people we encountered throughout our three-week visit. Asked about the significance of the current campaign, he explained that for the Chinese people, identifying and combatting the influence of “capitalist roaders” among Party leaders had been a long and continuing process, and that the current struggle represented a major turning point: “For 27 years we weren’t clear about this question: now we are clear.”



Members of the USCPFA National Activists Study Tour – eyewitnesses to many of the Tian An Men events – pose with their Chinese guides. (Photo: D. Gunnell)

Worker to Worker

by Sylvia Sandroff

Trade unionists find out how Chinese working people live

"Answers, answers, you're always looking for answers," our Chinese guide laughed. "What may be answers for here, today, may be different for there, tomorrow. Take back impressions, not answers."

But our group of trade unionists from 11 different industries knew that when our tour of the People's Republic was over, the people back home would want answers about the new China. In particular, we wanted to know how the Chinese system of government affected the lot and life of working people.

Before we could begin to satisfy our curiosity, we had to overcome the decades of isolation from China that had left us Americans with little knowledge. And, for their part, the Chinese knew little about our group. Expecting American union members to be only from heavy industry, they had arranged our trip to emphasize factories and mines. They were surprised by the presence of teachers, entertainers, hospital, office, and government workers. They hastily shifted the tour to cover the interests of our group, and as we went along we requested other changes. Our repeated requests resulted in our paper mill workers visiting two paper mills not on the schedule, our baker promoting a visit to a noodle factory, and our construction worker leading the group to an apartment house site where we were given bamboo hard-hats to wear.

After many hours of trading information, we began to understand the essential fact about Chinese economic life – that the country is run by and for the working people. Since Liberation, China has been able to plan its economy. Wages and prices are set centrally, with the National People's Congress – the highest law-making body – responsible for the wage system. Workers

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Many women – like these workers in a machine tools plant – now hold jobs that were formerly "for men only." (Photo: N. Woronov)

have a strong voice in deciding their production quotas.

Although overall planning is done at the national level, benefits, wages, and working conditions do vary from place to place because of uneven resources and political development. In a brand-new factory, for example, safety conditions are superior to those of an older plant. In China's largest auto factory, in Changchun, we learned that while the government sets wages according to an eight-grade system, workers are assigned to their grades by their own committees, according to the work they do, their skill, and how long they have worked, with high-seniority workers getting the higher salaries. This unequal wage system is seen as a hold-over from the old society, however,

not the way of the future, and wherever possible, the inequalities are being reduced.

The pay of auto workers ranged from \$16.75 to \$57 per month. People who work under dangerous or difficult conditions are entitled to supplements which are called "reliefs." For example, workers in very dusty areas are given extra wages for nutritional relief; those working in extremes of heat or cold get extra pay for special clothing. Workers at the gigantic forge we visited got nutritional relief and also a break every two hours with refreshments provided by the plant.

A bench worker we spoke to at the auto plant was in the sixth wage grade, earning \$33.50 a month plus reliefs, for a total of \$42.50, so the reliefs made an appreciable




Clinics provide free medical care for workers and their families. (Photo: D. Bronson)

difference. To illustrate the actual buying power of his wages, this worker told us that before Liberation his father earned the money equivalent of about 107 pounds of rice a month; the son's wages would buy 534 pounds, though of course he does not spend all of his earnings on rice.

We asked to eat at the auto workers' cafeteria rather than to return to our hotel for lunch. Here, as elsewhere, the food was very cheap and as good as any we got in our hotels. A dish of pork and beans was four cents; soup with meat and vegetables was seven cents. Many workers and their families eat three meals a day at the plant; a full-course dinner, we were told, costs about 20 cents.

When we visited the home of Ms. Zou, an auto worker, she described her budget without a trace of hesitation. Her family's income is \$85 a month for three workers. Her monthly rent, including utilities, is \$6.25, and food and other expenses run about \$50. "What are you saving for?" I asked, and she answered, somewhat surprised, "I have three daughters!" as if expecting us to understand. Our guide explained: "We have no dowries, but when our children get married we like to give them nice presents."


A radical difference between pay scales in China and the United States is that



While their parents work, pre-school children play at day-care centers on the factory grounds. (Photo: H. Glasser)



A textile worker wears a mask to protect her lungs from the lint generated by the spinning process. (Photo: N. Woronov)



Lathe operator. (Photo: C. Kissinger)

managerial positions do not generally carry a higher salary. Since the Cultural Revolution, leadership is viewed as a responsibility, not a privilege. As we went through the Heavy Machine Plant in Shenyang we were introduced to a man working on one of the machines who was the "responsible person" for this enormous factory. He was doing his "labor time," spending at least one month every year on the shop floor to keep in touch with the actual experience of production and to maintain close ties with the workers. Although he was vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, his salary was the same as it had been when he was a machinist.

A highlight of our factory tours was a visit to a metal ware plant in Tianjin (Tientsin) in which 109 blind workers, 5 deaf mutes, 9 physically handicapped, and about 50 non-handicapped people work. Special buses bring the handicapped workers to the factory, local grocery stores make deliveries, a team of tailors comes in once a week to mend clothes, and Braille books and orthopedic appliances are supplied free. The responsible person of the factory was a blind man who recalled the life of a blind person before Liberation. They were at the very bottom of society. They could only get money through begging on the streets and "nobody cared whether we lived or died." In new China, handicapped people are encouraged to fully participate in the political and social life of the community. The

metal ware factory we toured, the first of its kind in Tianjin, served as a model for the additional 13 now in operation. As if to cap their achievements, the workers ended our visit with a magic show and musical performance in which the blind vice-chairman sang in a lovely tenor voice.

Grievances

The day-to-day work of the American trade union officials in our tour group consists of interpreting union contracts and settling workers' grievances. We asked a lot of questions about workers' rights in China and how their grievances are handled. The concept of "grievances" was hard to explain to the Chinese, who no longer live with the "boss versus worker" situation. When we finally made clear what we meant, they said complaints of any kind are brought to the factory Revolutionary Committee and can be appealed to the next higher body, usually the municipal Revolutionary Committee. Everyone has the constitutional right to "speak out freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character posters." Moreover, the Constitution specifically guarantees workers the right to strike.

Another right of workers is to refuse to work if they feel that conditions are unsafe and may endanger their lives. We were told of the miner in Tangshan who reported to his team leader that a pipe was leaking and might be dangerous. The team leader, in his eagerness to meet the production quota, told the workers it wasn't really risky - to go ahead and work. The workers discussed the possible danger among themselves and voted not to work. The team leader then had no choice but to call the maintenance department. Workers can't be fired in China, and he couldn't have gotten a court injunction against their work stoppage even if he had wanted to, because in China the people are the owners of the mine.

Safety

As trade unionists we were particularly alert to safety precautions on the job. At the No. One Auto Factory in Changchun, our electrician pointed out some exposed wires to the committee escorting us, which hastily had them taken care of. The senior workers have a particular responsibility for safety and there is an ongoing safety education program with special meetings held twice a month. The relatively small number of accidents, 11 during the first nine months of the year for this large plant, attested to the effectiveness of the program.

At Shenyang Wool and Textile Mill a member of the Revolutionary Committee brought up the problem of their "industrial environment." The looms generate tremendous noise and throw a lot of waste and dust

into the air. He felt the matter required more attention than was presently being given. Our group offered criticism of the open sandals worn by many factory workers (especially in the south) and the general lack of safety footwear in the factories we visited.

The most impressive advances in safety we found were in the Lin Shi mine in Tangshan. The mine had a 90-year history of occupation by foreign owners, and suffered two notorious massacres during the Japanese occupation. The mine owners had treated the workers as "tools that could talk." They paid a death benefit of \$20 for a miner killed at work, but \$100 for a mule killed in the same accident. The British and Japanese abandoned the mine because it was no longer profitable, but after Liberation it was reopened. "We need the coal and we had the people who could get it out," our guide explained; "under the new system it is profitable."

The once common disasters of floods, gas explosions, and cave-ins are no longer a danger at Lin Shi because of strictly enforced safety regulations. Ventilation is carefully controlled by state law; if a mine cannot supply 6 to 9 cubic meters of air per person, the miners are not permitted to go down to work. The temperature is kept cool enough so the workers don't have to strip to the waist anymore.

Our group was quite thrilled at the invitation to journey deep into the pits clothed in heavy miner's clothing. We saw how strong jets of water are used with the coal-cutting machine to keep the dust down - a precaution against black lung disease, which we were told is now under control. Yet, even with all the safety precautions, the life of a miner is still a very hard one. That is why miners retire at 55, five years earlier than other male workers. One retired miner we met volunteers his time at the orchard run by the mine. "After 44 years in the mine," he told us, "anything I do out in the sun is not work."

Benefits

Wages, working conditions, and grievances are not the only concerns of active American trade unionists. The medical insurance, pension plans, and welfare funds of American unions are examples of efforts to improve the total living conditions of working people. In China, free on-the-job medical care, day care for workers' children, and decent housing are also considered workers' rights. Under China's socialist system, these benefits are part of a highly integrated system to meet all human needs.

An example of how the housing need is being met was revealed to us on a construction site in Shenyang. The site was near our hotel, and though not on our schedule, a

visit was arranged after we repeatedly requested it. The buildings were similar to those of a New York City housing project. We were told that the foundation had been dug by high school students as part of their participation in production. The guide pointed out that the painters working on the sills and frames of the casement windows were women. (It seemed our constant questioning on the role of women had preceded us because they pointed out the women workers without our first asking.) One-quarter of the workers on this site were women.

We asked who pays for these buildings and they said "us." The rent paid by the people in the city goes to their equivalent of a housing authority and is used to construct new housing. I was disappointed that the new apartments would have shared toilet facilities and no showers, so that residents would have to use public baths. The auto workers' homes we had visited in the north were built in 1958 but had better facilities. The guide explained that the need for housing in this area was very acute. He pointed out the row of sheds, without sanitary facilities, where people who will occupy the new buildings now live. "The first priority," he said, "is to get people out of the hovels now, rather than wait until we can afford to build the ideal housing for all."

The spirit of friendly confrontation marked many of the question-and-answer sessions between the guides and our group. In the first few places we visited we were asked to submit all questions in advance, but we found this very unsatisfactory and asked that our questions be answered one by one. We persisted in this and in most places our proposal was accepted, so we were able to trade information in earnest with the Chinese. On our last night, when our guide chided us about wanting "answers, answers," we told him we expected to be asked many questions when we got home. He grinned and kidded us: "Have them submit their questions in advance - and ignore those you don't know."

Since returning I've had to admit ignorance on many aspects of China, because a three-week trip does not make one an expert. But there's one question I always have pleasure answering. When someone asks how the Chinese feel about American workers, I always recall a warm day outside a miner's home in Tangshan when we noticed a grape vine loaded with big purple grapes. One of our group told the hostess that in our country the grape pickers had been on strike and that we had been boycotting grapes for a long time. Hearing this, the neighbors immediately ran to the vines and brought us cluster after cluster of the grapes, until we had to plead "enough." ●

China's Nuclear Policies

An interview with Jonathan D. Pollack

“The atom bomb is a paper tiger.” It's people, not weapons, that count

Is China's current nuclear capacity a threat to the U.S.?

That's really two or more questions. One has to look not just at Chinese capacities, and their conduct in developing and deploying nuclear weapons, but at their *intentions* – the underlying policies which guide these developments. Since 1963, even before their first nuclear test, official Chinese policy has been that “at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.” China has in fact never deviated from this defensive posture, either in its stated policies or in its actions.

But purely in terms of *capabilities* – that is, appropriate weapons and a delivery system that could reach the U.S. mainland – the Chinese are not even close to being a “threat.” The Chinese have no military bases outside of China from which to launch an attack, and no submarine-based missiles. They do not have even a limited-range ICBM – intercontinental ballistic missile – system. The Chinese purportedly tested such a missile as early as 1970, but have never deployed it. To reach even the nearest mainland cities, the Chinese would need missiles or bombers with a range of 6,000 miles or more. According to the best available estimates, China's principal delivery system now consists of:

Number	Kind	Range in Miles
50	Medium-range ballistic missiles	700
20–30	Intermediate-range missiles	1,750
400	Medium-range bombers	1,000
65	Intermediate-range bombers	2,000

In quantity of weaponry, sophistication,

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or “reach,” advanced nuclear technology is still really a two-power game between the U.S. and the USSR. China's entire weapons stockpile is somewhere around 300 nuclear and thermonuclear warheads. To put that in



Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack

context, estimates of U.S. stockpiles, worldwide, go as high as 20,000 warheads, including 1,054 land-based ICBMs; the Chinese have zero. In terms of sophistication, China's current weapons systems are roughly equivalent to systems deployed by the U.S. and the USSR since the late 1950s. Their medium-range bomber, for instance, is based on a Soviet-designed plane of 1950 vintage. By no conceivable calculation, then, do China's present capacities threaten the U.S.

Is this generally accepted now? Haven't we been warned a number of times about the danger of a Chinese nuclear attack?

Indeed, succeeding secretaries of defense – MacNamara, Clifford, Laird – issued grim warnings about the potential Chinese threat. From the time of the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, there was evidence of technological capabilities beyond what we expected them

to have. Then, the fourth Chinese test was fired from a rocket, and China took only some 32 months to go from its first nuclear to its first thermonuclear explosion – a shorter time than it had taken any other nuclear power. So, from very early on, Chinese nuclear power was feared because their progress seemed so rapid.

The China issue also got wrapped up in the politics of the anti-ballistic missile debate. For some time the official rationale for deploying a “thin” ABM system was as a defense against Chinese missiles – since the system obviously couldn't cope with the vastly greater Soviet capacity. This rationale later changed but at the time it argued for an exaggeration of Chinese potential. Only since the early 1970s has there been a general reassessment, partly due to the quasi-normalization of Chinese-American relations, and partly because of the way the Chinese nuclear program has proceeded – and *not* proceeded.

How has the Chinese program “proceeded and not proceeded”?

The whole development and disposition of Chinese nuclear forces strongly suggests a limited, defensive program. Let me explain. In a purely offensive or first-strike strategy the idea is to strike without warning and totally disarm your enemy's ability to retaliate. For that, you need to match or exceed your opponent's warmaking capacities while keeping up your own defenses against a possible first strike. Your delivery systems must be geared toward very rapid release, and it helps to get your weapons as close to the enemy as possible – on foreign bases if necessary, or aboard submarines.

A second-strike or purely defensive strategy is quite different. It involves the ability to inflict *some* unacceptable damage on an attacker *if* you are attacked; the idea is to deter an attack. De Gaulle once talked about French nuclear strategy as the capa-

city to “tear off an arm” of the Soviet Union if the Soviets attacked France. The Chinese have dispersed their missiles widely, hidden them in caves, camouflaged them, put up dummy missiles, and they rotate their bombers from airbase to airbase. A Soviet military planner, then – and the Chinese believe an attack is most likely to come from the USSR at this time – can’t be certain he’s identified and located every Chinese warhead, which would presumably make him hesitate before ordering an attack.

The disposition of Chinese missiles – placing them in caves, and so on – and the fact that they presently rely on liquid-fuel missiles rather than the more “rapid-fire” solid-fuel missiles employed by the Americans and Soviets, are also signs that China’s systems are simply not geared toward quick release of nuclear weapons in a first strike.

But given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear forces, isn’t their strategy of necessity defensive at this point?

Certainly. But there is also considerable evidence they are quite content to have a defensive force only. Despite early fears that they would do so, they have deployed no nuclear forces abroad, either on bases or submarines. They have shown no inclination to use nuclear weapons to intimidate or control small non-nuclear nations, or in general to make their military weight felt in international affairs. Finally, since the early 1970s the Chinese have refrained from deploying systems which they have shown themselves *perfectly* capable of deploying, such as intermediate-range missiles and bombers. Some argue that the Chinese are merely concentrating on research for long-term developments instead of present deployments, and certainly Chinese research continues. But I can see no sign that they are taking certain steps – increased testing, and so on – they would *have* to be taking if they were really going “full speed ahead.”

The limitations on the Chinese program also coincide with debates in the Chinese press which indicated some individuals were placing an overly great credence in the power of nuclear weapons in world politics. It seems evident to me that the opposite viewpoint, which has always been Mao Tsetung’s viewpoint and a major influence in Chinese foreign policy, carried the day. All these developments of course are thoroughly consistent with China’s stated goal – a credible defense, not a reaching after “superpower” status.

Don’t other nuclear nations claim that their weapons systems are essentially defensive?

Certainly no nuclear nation except China has made a flat “no-first-use” declaration. The notion of keeping one’s options open runs very deep in Soviet and American mili-

tary planning. The idea is that, for example, if the U.S. can threaten the USSR with unacceptable damage for certain kinds of acts, such as a conventional invasion of Western Europe, the mere threat would deter an invasion. And, for that, one must retain the “first-use” option.

Is that what’s called “nuclear blackmail”?

Not exactly. Nuclear blackmail can be roughly defined as an instance where a nuclear nation threatens use of those weapons to gain advantages it otherwise could not have. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 involved mutual nuclear blackmail – the Soviets threatening nuclear retaliation if the U.S. invaded Cuba, and the Americans threatening the USSR unless the missiles were removed from Cuba.

In fact, most of the blatant instances of

were more interested in war than in peace, but since then the Chinese arguments have gained considerable support, since both treaties in fact tend to certify a world divided into two categories – the nuclear and non-nuclear powers.

Giving the nuclear nations . . .

Exactly – the potential to dominate, if they so wish, the non-nuclear nations. And given the pre-eminence of the U.S. and the USSR in nuclear weaponry, the treaties can be seen as an endorsement of dominance by the two superpowers. The Chinese are also highly skeptical of *any* arms control agreements involving only the two superpowers, such as the SALT negotiations, which the Chinese term a “smokescreen” behind which the superpowers continue to “contend for hegemony.” Now whether or not one believes the

The atom bomb is a paper tiger. This famous saying by Chairman Mao Tsetung is known to all. This was our view in the past and this is still our view at present. China is developing nuclear weapons not because we believe in the omnipotence of nuclear weapons and that China plans to use nuclear weapons. The truth is exactly to the contrary. In developing nuclear weapons, China’s aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons. “Detonation Statement” following China’s first nuclear test, October 16, 1964.

nuclear blackmail have been directed against China. In 1953, just after President Eisenhower assumed office, the U.S. stated it would use “all military means at our disposal” if the Korean armistice negotiations did not proceed to end the fighting in Korea. During the Taiwan Strait incident of 1958 – as we know from documents of the time, since declassified – not only did the U.S. hint at possible use of nuclear weapons, but contingency plans were made for such use. Various sources report that Soviet military planners were considering a pre-emptive strike on Chinese nuclear facilities during the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969. At any rate there was during this whole period some reason for the Chinese to feel threatened and to develop a defensive nuclear force.

Why has China refused to endorse the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 or the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968?

The Chinese reject the essential premises of these treaties – their argument being that no nation has the right to dictate the terms of another nation’s defense program. Acceptance of these treaties would necessarily prevent non-nuclear nations from developing nuclear weapons systems – as it would have prevented China’s own nuclear development. At the time, China’s refusal was seen as an indication that the Chinese

U.S. and the USSR are locked in a struggle for world dominance, the Chinese criticisms are in essence quite accurate. The wholesale upgrading of American and Soviet strategic forces has actually continued, independent of any agreements reached.

Don’t the Chinese support any disarmament proposal?

Oh, yes. The Chinese propose that *all* nations, not just the nuclear ones, take part in a conference for “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.” As an earnest of intent, the Chinese also call upon the nuclear nations, especially the superpowers, to adopt “no-first-use” declarations and withdraw nuclear armaments within their own borders. So far no nuclear nation except China has adopted such policies or shown much interest in the Chinese proposals.

In view of the Chinese attitude toward “non-proliferation” – that it is wrong to deprive another people of means of defense – have the Chinese supplied nuclear technology to Third World countries or revolutionary movements?

No – neither weapons, materials, nor technology. Reportedly both Libya and Egypt sought at different times to buy nuclear devices from the Chinese, but were politely turned down. If this seems inconsis-

tent with China's stated policy, let me offer a quote from a 1965 press conference by then Foreign Minister Chen Yi, as reported in *Peking Review*: "Any country with a fair basis in industry, . . . science and technology will be able to manufacture atom bombs, with or without Chinese assistance. . . . [But] in our view, the role of atom bombs should not be overstressed."

The Chinese argument seems to be that if a state has the wherewithal and wants to spend the money to develop nuclear weapons, the Chinese will not interfere, nor discourage it, but neither will they contribute to it. I think this accords with the Chinese attitude that atomic weapons are a sometimes necessary, but regrettable, evil, and that one should not place too great a reliance on them.

Mao Tsetung once called the atomic bomb a "paper tiger" . . .

Yes; that statement and others by Mao have been seen as evidence that he and other Chinese leaders underrate the dangers of nuclear war, and that this would lead to a certain recklessness in Chinese policies. In my judgment the Chinese have made some rather realistic estimates of the possibilities and limitations of nuclear weapons. Let me give you another Mao quote, from a December 12, 1958, Politburo speech: "Only with man can there be soil, only with soil can there be wealth; if a man is killed, what's the use of occupying soil? I don't see the reason for the atom bomb. Conventional weapons are still the thing."

His meaning is that an imperialist nation would not be likely to use nuclear weapons on a large scale against a nation it meant to control, because in the process the imperialist nation would destroy precisely the things it desired—resources, manpower, productive capacities, or markets. He has also been quoted to the effect that China has less to fear from nuclear attack than other nations because China's population is so huge and so highly dispersed—a simple statement of fact. One could theoretically destroy all of China's major cities and still not even begin to conquer China's vast land area, its people, or indeed its productive capacities. The same is true, though to a lesser extent, of some other countries. In 1963, the USSR made some proposal about using nuclear weapons

Upon China's first nuclear explosion, the Chinese Government solemnly declared to the whole world . . . that at no time and in no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. We always mean what we say. Speech by the Chairman of the PRC delegation, Chiao Kuan-hua, at the Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly, November 24, 1971.

to support revolutionary movements; on November 19 of that year the Chinese asked, via the editorial departments of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*:

"How would a socialist country use nuclear weapons to support . . . revolutionary struggle . . . ? Would it use nuclear weapons on an area where a war of national liberation or a revolutionary civil war was in progress, thereby subjecting both the revolutionary people and the imperialists to a nuclear strike? Or would it be the first to use nuclear weapons against an imperialist country which was waging a conventional war of aggression elsewhere? Obviously, in either case it is absolutely impermissible for a socialist country to use nuclear weapons."

Basically, Mao believes there will be a certain "rationality" in using nuclear weapons, and, as in these instances, such weapons do *not* always provide a means of obtaining one's real objectives. "Conventional weapons are still the thing."

What about using weapons for nuclear blackmail?

The Chinese are rather contemptuous of nuclear blackmail, not only in principle but also as a *practical* strategy. Suppose you threaten nuclear attack, and your bluff is called, what do you do? Attack, and risk retaliation from the threatened nation or a third party? Or back down, risking embarrassment and serious loss of "credibility" for future actions? Thus, in the Chinese view, nuclear weapons are powerful, but not necessarily decisive, and a nuclear nation should not fool itself into believing those weapons give it more power than it actually has.

The corollary of course is that people should not submit to nuclear blackmail or be terrorized by a nuclear attack which may never occur. One of Mao's classic dictums is "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere,

never seek hegemony," and as most people know, the Chinese have built numerous tunnels for civilian defense against nuclear attack. Now I seriously doubt the tunnel system provides complete protection; certainly it does not mean, say, that in a massive attack on Shanghai all Shanghai's people would survive safely underground. And I think the Chinese are perfectly aware of this. But the tunnels do convey, visibly and directly to every Chinese citizen, a sense that while there is danger and one must prepare for the worst, one must also prepare to survive for the world which comes after the "worst"—and that the Chinese will survive as a people. Which takes us back to the original quote. Atomic bombs have "tigerish" aspects—they are dangerous—but they have "paper" aspects as well, and one must not, in Mao's view, confuse respect for the tiger with fear of paper bombast.

After the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson said: "The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program is a tragedy for the Chinese people who have suffered so much under the Chinese regime. Scarce economic resources that could have been used to improve the well-being of the Chinese people have been used to produce a crude nuclear device which can only increase the sense of insecurity of the Chinese people. Other Asian nations have wisely chosen instead to work for the well-being of their people through economic development and peaceful use of the atom."

Has even a limited nuclear program been a heavy economic burden to the Chinese? How does Chinese spending compare with Soviet and American spending?

Let's accept the fact that highly specific assessments of Chinese defense spending—or comparisons between American, Soviet, and Chinese spending—are almost impossible. I am quite skeptical of the methods used to calculate these costs. The Soviets and Americans at least publish "defense budgets," and we can and do then quibble about their accuracy and relative sizes; the Chinese publish no figures. Estimates of China's defense budget range between 10 and 15 billion dollars, but that's a very murky figure. As a very rough comparison, the official American budget goes slightly over 100 billion, and the Soviet budget—well, just within this past year the CIA virtually doubled its estimate of Soviet spending to an

The Chinese Government is loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We believe in the people. It is the people who decide the outcome of war, and not any weapon. The destiny of China is decided by the Chinese people, and the destiny of the world by the peoples of the world, and not by the nuclear weapon. . . .

We are convinced that nuclear weapons, which are after all created by man, certainly will be eliminated by man. "Detonation Statement," October 16, 1964.

Fall/Winter/Spring Vacations

ITCs, OTCs, and TGCs have, during 1976, entered the traveler's lexicon, and should be part of yours. The abbreviations stand for Inclusive Tour Charters, One-stop Tour Charters, and Travel Group Charters, and they're just the thing for budget-conscious travelers. To wit (all prices from New York):

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equivalent of about 103.8 billion in American dollars. I would stress that none of these figures is really trustworthy.

In my view a more effective measure of defense effort may be actual military forces deployed and the kinds of technology or weaponry they have. And here it seems quite evident that in terms of defense effort versus civilian needs, the Chinese have done considerably better than the U.S. or the USSR. In sheer numbers or sophistication, as I've said, the Chinese nuclear effort is *extremely* modest compared to Soviet and American forces. China's army, navy, and air force depend on weapons essentially derived from 1950s technologies. The navy is a small coastal defense force. The army – by all accounts a talented, well-educated pool of people – performs vital functions in the civilian economy in production, construction, social services, and what we would call management functions. In effect the army may make net *contributions* to the civilian economy rather than being a drain upon it. This is one reason comparisons of defense spending are so difficult.

China has *not* engaged in the constant round of updating and acquisition of advanced weapons systems that can add so enormously to defense spending, since they involve heavy industry and electronics – high technology areas requiring heavy investments. The Chinese have said for some time that their priorities are agriculture first, light industry second, and heavy industry last. With the exception of iron and steel, useful in the civilian economy, it seems to me the Chinese are quite conscious of these priorities. In 1967 and 1968, for instance, scientists connected with the nuclear defense program came under heavy attack not only for "elitist" tendencies but for monopolizing more than their share of economic resources and scientific manpower. And in August 1971, *People's Daily* stated: "Electronic technology is a new technology, used in developing the national economy and national defense industry. Together with atomic technology and jet engine technology, it is generally regarded as a criterion or measure of development of a country's industry. However, advances in special technology are one thing, while the foundation and center are another. . . . The various branches of industry in China . . . must be developed proportionately."

It's interesting to note that Lin Piao, defense minister in the period of China's initial nuclear development and strongly identified with that program, was coming under attack at about this time for other "errors." And certain limitations on the program became clearly visible by late 1973 – just about the time lag one might expect if the decision to set these limits coincided with Lin's downfall, flight, and

death. This suggests to me, though I have no real proof, that Lin led a faction supporting major developments in weaponry and heavier defense spending, while Mao and his supporters insisted on limits.

I'm also impressed by the frequent Chinese press attacks on the "militarization" of the Soviet economy, meaning the overwhelming Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and defense rather than civilian needs. I think these attacks not only express a genuine Chinese distaste for this kind of priority, but are an indirect way of criticizing those in China who might favor heavier defense spending.

If I can sum up, the Chinese are basically wary about the defense drain on the civilian economy; they attempt to limit spending to provide only for genuine defense needs, and no more. This inevitably suggests – and it is a point I would want to make – that much Soviet and American spending may be, simply, superfluous.

Many people are concerned these days about the dangers of accident or sabotage to nuclear reactors. Have the Chinese taken any notice of this problem?

What you're talking about are the large-capacity, power-generating reactors. The Chinese have avowed little interest in nuclear energy to generate electricity. China has some 20 percent of the world's proven coal reserves, large amounts of oil, and substantial amounts of still untapped waterpower. From their point of view it would make little economic sense to invest in nuclear power sources, particularly since their energy needs are not nearly so great as in the more developed countries. The Chinese do have a few small research reactors, used in their weapons program; so far as I know they have had no problems containing dangerous radioactive substances or preventing accidents and sabotage.

Overall, has the possession of nuclear weapons made any significant differences in China's foreign policies?

I honestly don't think so. From the first, China's position was that their nuclear program was a burdensome but necessary defensive measure and that they had no "superpower" ambitions, and they have in fact developed a highly limited, defensive program. Contrary to expectations, they have *not* indulged in nuclear blackmail or grandiose foreign adventures. They haven't entered into the familiar spiral of weapons acquisition, such that a new system is barely in place before it is judged obsolete. I find this encouraging. China thus far seems to have avoided the pattern set by the two superpowers: an endless, costly arms race which generates ever more anxiety and frustration, and which perhaps has no real end in greater security. That, I think, is the overall conclusion I would want to offer. ●

Chu Teh

1886 - 1976

by Dorothy Loo Kehl

“For pure military strategy and tactical handling of a great army in retreat nothing has been seen in China to compare with Chu Teh’s splendid generalship of the Long March. [He had the] sheer personal magnetism of leadership, and the rare human quality which inspires in followers that . . . faith and devotion that gives men the courage to die in a cause. . . .” – Edgar Snow in *Red Star Over China*.

Chu Teh died July 6 at the age of 90. He was a leading member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Together with Chairman Mao Tsetung, Chu Teh founded the Red Army which later became the People’s Liberation Army.

He was born in Yilong County, Sichuan (Szechuan) to a poor peasant family. As a young boy, he had to do hard physical work, like all other boys from peasant families. Thus from very early on he understood the plight of millions of Chinese peasants. He also trained his body to excellent health.

When the 1911 revolution started, led by Sun Yat-sen, Chu Teh was a cadet in the Yunnan Military Academy. He joined the revolution to bring the Manchu Dynasty down. Later, in 1915, as a 29-year-old brigadier-general in the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) Army, he revolted against Yuan Shih-kai’s attempt to restore the monarchy.

With great sympathy for the suffering of the common people and a fervor to find a way to save China, Chu Teh left Yunnan, traveled to Shanghai, and with iron determination shook off the opium habit he had acquired while in the KMT Army. In 1922 he set sail for Germany to learn more about social revolution. There he met Chou En-lai and joined the Communist Party of China as a secret member. While in Germany, he

studied Marxism-Leninism, attended many workers’ and other political meetings, and walked every street in Berlin, looking and listening, in order to understand the situation there. Later, he went to Moscow to deepen his knowledge of Marxist theory.

Returning to China in 1925, he rejoined the KMT Army, this time to carry out tasks as a communist. The Nanchang Uprising in 1927 marked his public renouncement of the now counterrevolutionary KMT. He then

led part of the peasant and worker soldiers into the countryside, finally to the Jinggang (Chingkang) Mountains to meet with Mao Tsetung’s troops. There they organized their soldiers into the Fourth Army of the Red Army. Chu Teh was elected commander-in-chief with Mao Tsetung as the political commissar.

Stories of his devotion to his soldiers are numerous and moving. While fighting the revolutionary war in the countryside, he lived and ate like the rank and file. He would make his rounds to the soldiers every night and sit with them telling stories and listening to their talk. The soldiers always gathered around him, touching him with their big rough hands, and he would put his arm around their shoulders as they talked. He loved the soldiers like a father.

Chu Teh served as the commander-in-chief of the Red Army throughout the Long March, the War Against Japan, and the Civil War against Chiang Kai-shek which ended in 1949. After Liberation, he became the Vice-chairman of the People’s Republic. Up until his death, he served in leading positions in the People’s Liberation Army, the National People’s Congress, the Party Central Committee, and the Politburo of the Central Committee.

He joined the revolutionary movement in his youth, and he did not leave it until the day he died. ●



Mao Tsetung and Chu Teh discuss military operations during the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45). Chu was commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army. (Photo: Hsinhua News Agency)

W. E. B. Du Bois

by Michael T. Martin and Lamont H. Yeakey

Scholar, teacher, lecturer, writer, editor, political activist – the great African-American Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963) was all of these in a life that spanned three continents and decades of tireless effort to achieve equality for Black Americans and other oppressed peoples, particularly in Africa. He was a friend of China as well.

Born at a time when Blacks in America had just discarded the shackles of chattel slavery, Du Bois did pioneering investigations of the history and social conditions of Black people and organized an 18-year cycle of conferences at Atlanta University (where he taught from 1897 to 1910) on aspects of Black life in America. He helped found the Niagara Movement in 1905, the immediate forerunner of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People which Du Bois also helped found four years later and whose paper, *The Crisis*, he edited until 1934.

Among his numerous activities, Du Bois was a strong friend of the Chinese people, aiding them in their fight against imperialism and publicizing the achievements of their revolution. His interest in Asia began early, a direct outgrowth of his involvement in the struggles of Blacks in America and Africa. Studying the forms and consequences of contact between racial groups, he observed that throughout the world peoples of color were being exploited and oppressed by European and U.S. colonialism. “The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line,” he wrote in 1900 – the same year in which, at a Pan-African Conference, he delivered an address “To the Nations of the World” calling for recognition and support of Asian peoples.

The connections that Du Bois drew between the struggles of Blacks in America and the anti-colonial struggles of African and Asian peoples grew firmer as he began to develop a philosophy and program of action



On October 1, 1962 – China’s National Day – Dr. Du Bois and Shirley Graham Du Bois with Chairman Mao Tsetung. (Photo: Hsinhua News Agency)

that would demystify racist social theories, generate solidarity among the non-white majority of the world, and elevate African and Asian peoples to a position of absolute equality with white peoples.

Though his efforts against colonialism and imperialism were primarily devoted to the emancipation of Africa through the Pan-African movement which he helped to organize after World War I, Du Bois realized that the struggles in the East were a significant part of the worldwide anti-colonial movement that would shape the future. He therefore used every means at his disposal – publication, lectures, debates, conferences, and even the Pan-African Congresses he sponsored – to promote solidarity among black, brown, and yellow peoples.

Du Bois’ first visit to China occurred in 1936, at a time when Japan had already invaded northeast China but little was known abroad about the heroic struggles of the Chinese Communist Party and its army. Perceiving the importance of this vast

country to the future of the world, Du Bois wrote:

“China is inconceivable. . . . And this I know: any attempt to explain the world without giving China a place of extraordinary prominence, is futile. Perhaps the riddle of the universe will be settled in China, and if not, in no part of the world which ignores China.”

In concrete support of the Chinese people, he contributed to relief organizations and opposed the Japanese aggression against the mainland. But he believed that the British and Americans posed an even greater threat to China’s sovereignty and would help China only to further their own ends. He argued that once Japan was defeated, the West would move to re-establish control over China. Yet he was convinced that in spite of “Great Britain, France, and the United States” having their “eyes fixed upon the wealth of China and her possibilities as a subject nation,” China would rise again. Anticipating the future victories of its

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In 1917, Dr Du Bois (upper right) was one of the leaders of a demonstration against the lynching of Black people in the United States. His struggles against racism and oppression in his own country led him to support the struggles of the peoples of Asia and Africa against imperialistic Western nations, and to rejoice with the Chinese in 1949 when they at last freed themselves from foreign domination. (Photo: Schomburg Collection)

people, he wrote: "In the history of Chinese culture there has been repeated retrogression and recovery; but there has always remained that fine central core of effective human progress. Given time and opportunity, China will again become great and powerful."

In 1945, Du Bois presided over the Fifth Pan-African Congress, and for the first time the organization expressed specific support of China's liberation struggle. The resolution adopted there said in part: "We desire to see freedom and real national independence in Egypt, in China, and in India." Over the next decade Du Bois maintained and strengthened his bond with the Chinese people. In 1948 he was an honorary member of the China Welfare Fund headed by Soong Ching Ling, widow of Sun Yat-sen. He applauded the success of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, and opposed the Korean War that began in 1950, warning Black Americans not to become tools of U.S. interest in Asia:

"Perhaps worst of all today is the use of American Negro troops in Korea. Not only is this bound to leave a legacy of hate between yellow nations and black, but the effect on the Negroes of America at being in a sense compelled to murder colored folk who suffer from the same race prejudice that Negroes in the United States have long suffered and still suffer; at being almost forced to be the dumb tools of business corporations seeking to dominate China and Asia - this is bound to result in the exacerbation of prejudice and inner conflict here in America."

In 1956, Du Bois was invited by the People's Republic to lecture and participate in the 250th anniversary commemoration of the birth of Benjamin Franklin, an international friendship project sponsored by the

World Council of Peace in several countries. The U.S. government, which had been politically persecuting Du Bois since 1951 for his role in the Peace Information Center and his stand on the Korean War, refused to validate his passport and Du Bois was unable to attend.

Two years later, however, while on a trip that would traverse half the planet, Du Bois and his second wife, Shirley Graham Du Bois, a prolific writer and political activist, received a cable inviting them to China. Defying the U.S. State Department's prohibition, the Du Boises proceeded via the Soviet Union to Peking in early February 1959. Asked at the airport whether he wanted his visit kept secret, Du Bois replied: "My wife and I were honored by an invitation from the People's Republic of China. We were happy to accept it and here we are. So far as we are concerned you can tell the whole world!"

The Du Boises spent three months in China traveling from Peking to Shanghai to Wuhan, then up the Yangtze River to Zhongjing (Chungking), on to Chengdu and still farther west in Sichuan (Szechuan) Province to visit the national minorities that live near the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and then back east to Guangdong and Guangzhou (Kwangtung, Kwangchow). It was while Du Bois was in Wuhan that he finally met Mao Tsetung. Discussing his work with Mao, Du Bois mentioned the mistakes he felt he had made in his efforts to help liberate Black Americans. Shirley Graham Du Bois recalls Chairman Mao's reply: "The only deplorable mistake a man makes is when he lies down and lets the enemy walk over him. . . . The Communist Party of China has made all the mistakes there are to make! . . . But we never give up!

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Mistakes are but stepping stones upon which one may climb higher and higher. . . ."

Throughout China, Du Bois saw the results of the people's determination to free themselves from exploitation and oppression. The Chinese worker, he wrote, "has exorcised the Great Fear that haunts the West; the fear of losing his job; the fear of falling sick; the fear of accident; the fear of inability to educate his children; the fear of daring to take a vacation . . . the Chinese sit high above these fears and laugh with joy."

The changes in the situation of Chinese women, among the most oppressed of China's exploited millions before Liberation, struck Du Bois sharply. At the steel plant he and his wife visited in Wuhan, he was surprised to see a crane that moved 100 tons being operated by a driver with red-ribboned braids and a rosy face. "Look Shirley, it's a girl!" Du Bois shouted.

"The women of China are becoming free," he wrote in admiration. "They wear pants so that they can walk, climb and dig; and climb and dig they do. . . . They occupy positions from ministers of state to locomotive engineers, lawyers, doctors, clerks and laborers . . . they are strong and healthy and beautiful not simply of leg and false bosom, but of brain, brawn, and rich emotion."

"China is not utopia," he said. "Fifth Avenue has better shops where the rich can buy and the whores parade. Detroit has more and better cars. The best American housing outstrips the Chinese, and Chinese women are not nearly as well-dressed as the guests of the Waldorf-Astoria. But the Chinese worker is happy."

The Chinese people respected Du Bois' achievements and while he was in Peking celebrated his 91st birthday as a national event. A pre-birthday dinner was hosted by Premier Chou En-lai and at a birthday banquet he received numerous gifts from the Chinese people as well as greetings from friends and supporters throughout the world, including the leader and "Wise Old Man of China," Chairman Mao.

That day, prior to the banquet, Du Bois had spoken at Peking University. In an atmosphere ignited by urgency and purpose, he addressed not only the students and faculty before him but, by radio broadcast, the peoples of Africa as well. Warning Africans of the West's intentions, he reiterated what he had on so many occasions stated: "China is flesh of your flesh and blood of your blood. China is colored and knows to what a colored skin in this modern world subjects its owner. But China knows more, much more than this: she knows what to do about it."

Du Bois meant that new societies would require not simply national independence but also the establishment of socialism. He

had long ago noted that capitalism perpetuated the "color line" and concepts of racial inferiority "in order to make profits out of cheap labor, both black and white." At the 1957 All-African Conference in Ghana, in a speech written by him and delivered by his wife, he had urged his listeners: "Your bond is no mere color of skin but the deeper experiences of wage slavery and contempt. . . . Africa, awake, put on the beautiful robes of Pan-African Socialism."

In China Du Bois saw the embodiment of values and the force of will he so earnestly hoped Africa would one day possess. China's secret, he felt, "is that the vast majority of a billion human beings have been convinced that human nature in some of its darkest recesses can be changed, if change is necessary."

And change, Du Bois believed, was necessary. To emancipate all African and Asian peoples required the development of a revolutionary outlook opposed to every form of foreign colonialism and oppression and to the formation of privileged classes within the liberated nations. This was the outlook he found in China.

"I have traveled widely on this earth since my first trip to Europe 67 years ago. . . . I have seen most of the civilized world and much of its backward regions. Many leading nations I have visited repeatedly. But I have never seen a nation which so amazed and touched me as China in 1959."

In 1961, Du Bois accepted the invitation of Kwame Nkrumah to live in Ghana and direct the preparation and publication of the *Encyclopedia Africana*. The next year, while Du Bois was convalescing from a serious operation he had undergone in London, his wife suggested that they return to China for a period of recuperation. "Where had he found the greatest hope for abundant life? The answer was clear in my mind: China. . . . Where could he better recharge himself?"

The Du Boises arrived in Peking in time to celebrate the 13th anniversary of the People's Republic and stayed there until Du Bois had recovered his strength and could resume his monumental work in Accra. He became a Ghanaian citizen shortly before his death in 1963.

W. E. B. Du Bois' identification with China was deeply rooted in the knowledge of colonial exploitation and racial persecution experienced by African and Asian peoples. A realist, he understood that societies are constructed by "unfinished" people and that no society, China's included, is a utopia. He recognized, too, that there are cultural, political, and historical differences between the Chinese people and the peoples of Africa. Nevertheless, he hoped that there would be mutual cooperation and friendship among them in the worldwide struggle against colonialism and imperialism. ●

Film

Making the Break. A feature film in color, with English subtitles on a separate film strip. Produced by the People's Republic of China, December 1975. 16 mm. 2 hours. Available through locals of the USCPFA.

Although set during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) when education in the People's Republic first came in for serious revolutionary criticism, *Making the Break* is very much a film about China today. Produced last year in only 70 days as workers in the film industry rushed to join the nationwide debate and struggle now blazing over the future of education, it asks, in dramatic form: Whom, and what, is education for? Who should be admitted to college? Shall graduates be a privileged group set apart from those whose labor made their education possible? Who should make educational policy?

The film illustrates the conflicts implied by these questions through a highly moving and exciting story which left this reviewer overwhelmed and drained after the first viewing and only slightly critical after the second. *Making the Break* is a departure from many earlier Chinese movies in that the characters are not mere stereotyped carriers of correct and incorrect ideas, but complex human beings shown in the process of struggle. The hero does not come ready-made with all the correct answers. Backward forces are found among the peasants and enemies exist within the Party - just as in real-life China today. While some scenes are stretched a bit larger than life to make a point, the sentiments expressed by the characters are so genuine that American viewers will readily relate to them.

The story begins when Lung Gwo-zheng is asked to leave his position as head of a tree farm to be president and Party Secretary of Pine Mountain Agricultural College, a branch of the new Jiangxi (Kiangsi) Communist Labor University. President Lung is a former cowherd and a graduate of Kang Da (Resist Japan Military and Political College), which was set up in Yan'an (Yenan) during the Japanese invasion to train worker and peasant leaders. The new university is to provide higher education for workers and peasants after the model of Kang Da.

Zao Zhong-he, a veteran educator trained under the old system, is made vice-president and takes charge of preparations. He wants to establish the college in a big city far from the farmland and to admit only students with the best academic records.

Sun Zi-jing, dean of education and teacher of veterinary science, is also a hard-line traditionalist at the beginning of the film. Although he wants the college ultimately to serve the needs of the local farmers, he is

blinded by his training and his awe of "credentials" into following Vice-president Zao.

When President Lung arrives at Pine Mountain, Zao and Sun try to convince him to build in the city because there are no qualified students in the countryside and no contractors to oversee the construction of the school.

"No students?" exclaims Lung, "I don't believe it!" He goes to the admissions building and finds students demanding to get in: "In the old society, we poor couldn't get into school. Now the Chinese Communist Party has brought the schools to our doorstep, but we still can't get in!"

President Lung insists that an agricultural college must be near agriculture and that traditional academic standards must not be used to prevent politically well-qualified students from enrolling. After all, what is the purpose of education - to make work easier through knowledge or to exempt students from work because they can pass exams? He enlists the help of a representative from the Poor and Lower Middle Peasants' Association to select students who have won the admiration of their neighbors for hard work and community leadership. These students know the needs of the farming population and will be able to put their new knowledge to work in the fields. Lung succinctly makes

his point when the young blacksmith, Jiang Da-nian, is admitted: "These calluses on his hands are excellent qualifications!"

Other successful candidates include a pig-keeper, Xu Niu-zai, and young Li Jin-feng who, refusing to be tied down by motherhood, has become known as a grower of good seeds. These students are not as literate as people from more privileged backgrounds, but they have a higher degree of socialist consciousness.

After admission, the students anxiously ask where the classrooms, dormitories, and labs of Pine Mountain College are located. With a sweep of his hand President Lung indicates the mountainous woodlands. The camera cuts to a scene of students and teachers and President Lung working up a sweat felling trees and building the campus themselves.

As school opens, conflicts break out about what should be studied and where. The students want to coordinate their book learning with field experience. But the traditional curriculum follows the academic rather than the agricultural calendar, so planting is taught in the fall and harvesting in the spring. Dean Sun uses up precious time showing endless pictures of horses the world over and teaching about the functions of horses' tails. But there are no horses in the area, and he has little to say about the native



Scene from *Making the Break*.
(Photo: *China Reconstructs*)

pigs and water buffaloes. A student asks: "Are we being trained to go to Inner Mongolia to raise horses?"

The teacher replies, "Our present system of education is the crystallization of many generations of educators; it has its own built-in logic. How can country bumpkins have better ideas on the teaching curriculum than famous scholars?"

President Lung supports the students, but Vice-president Zao and his colleague, an official named Zhao, arrange for Lung to take a field trip to study "well-known" agricultural colleges in cities. They hope he will see the wisdom in traditional education and be humbled. Lung is gravely disappointed on this tour. He finds that students at "well-known" colleges have for-



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gotten who sent them to school. When a mother brings some home-made cloth shoes to her son, he cries, "These shoes are for hillbillies! Take them back. I'll never go back to that little mountain gully." Lung is broken-hearted: "Who will benefit from this kind of education?" Yet, although he knows the old system is wrong, he is not sure what the next step should be.

While Lung is away, a commune near Pine Mountain College is threatened with an insect blight. Students have to choose between helping their neighbors save the crop or getting a good mark on a surprise exam Vice-president Zao has sprung on them. We see one student nervously trying to memorize formulas while worrying about the crops and finally dashing out to help the peasants with his mind still on the formulas. When 15 worker-peasant students are expelled from the college because they missed the exam to deal with the emergency, students and local farmers are outraged: "Are we here to get grades or to learn to help our neighbors? How can education be so divorced from people's needs?"

"The goal of school," says Vice-president Zao, "is to train high-quality personnel; if worker-peasant students can't keep up, they'll just have to drop out. That's the law of natural selection."

"But we want to be the masters of knowledge, not the slaves of books," reply the students. Xu Niu-zai, the pig-keeper, puts up a poster: "Less about horses, more about pigs and water buffaloes!"

Zao orders Xu to tear it down and stop disturbing order in the school - "Students should listen, not tell their teachers what to do." As Xu tears it down, his classmates are appalled. How could he capitulate before such injustice? But in a moment he has put up a still bigger poster and is loudly cheered.

Zao and his cohorts are indignant at these working-class victories. "Are we running a college or a farm?" "Who ever heard of classes in the fields or students with bare feet?" "Remember what Marx said, 'From each according to his ability.' Students should study; let the farmers go back to farming."

As the struggle deepens, Vice-president Zao tries to send his daughter off to a "well-known" college. She is humiliated when he gives her an acceptance letter he obtained through influence. This fully exposes him as someone plotting to resurrect a system of special privileges and consciously trying to steer society away from socialism. His daughter criticizes him for expelling her friends from a school they have built with their own hands and chooses to stay at Pine Mountain College and make it serve the working class.

After difficult struggle and soul-searching, Dean Sun is won over to revolutionary

education and joins the campaign to inoculate water buffalo. He is proud to see one of his students come back to school after having quit under pressure from his father to earn extra money as soon as he learned the special skill of castrating pigs. The student returns the money to the peasants and vows to use his skills to help them rather than to profit from their needs.

The battles in education overlap with struggles in other areas of society. The young student and mother, Li Jin-feng, leads a fight against private farm plots, a new Party policy instigated by the then president of China, Liu Shao-chi. "It means dividing up the land and going it alone! That's going backward," she says. Over the objections of several Party leaders, she mobilizes the farmers and reverses Liu's policy.

The "break" in *Making the Break* is not a clean one. The cultural legacy of the old system dies hard; those plotting counter-revolution try again and again to discredit socialist innovations. Conservative bureaucrats and educators, persisting in their lost cause, try to fire President Lung, expel him from the Party, and close down the college. Lung, together with the new breed of students, teachers, and farmers, is eager to consolidate each progressive change, but with each new setback they must overcome disillusionments and rally to fight back. *Making the Break* graphically demonstrates that the struggle for a classless society will be long and difficult, and that not every battle will be won. But it also shows that when working people stand together, those who seek to turn back the clock and restore the old system of privileges are bound to fail.

A potential problem in showing this film is that the subtitles are on a separate film strip and cannot be easily coordinated with the dialogue. I hope this will be corrected soon, because *Making the Break* is bound to be popular in the U.S.

James T. Caldwell
New York, N.Y.

Note on Spelling of Chinese Words

Chinese proper names in *NEW CHINA* are generally spelled in *Hanyu pinyin*, the romanization system now used in the People's Republic to render pronunciation in the official common dialect. Since *pinyin* is relatively new to Americans, in most cases the more familiar spellings are given in parentheses at a word's first appearance in each article. In book titles or direct quotations using other forms of romanization, the *pinyin* follows in square brackets. A few familiar proper nouns are spelled as they usually appear in U.S. publications.



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