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JPRS: 32,097

TT: 65-32590

22 September 1965

TRANSLATIONS FROM HUNG-CH'I (RED FLAG)

No. 9, 1965

- Communist China -

No. 12

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This serial publication contains the translation of all of the articles in the Chinese-language periodical Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), No. 9, 1965. Complete bibliographic information accompanies each article.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan	1
Natural Science and Dialectical Materialism	31
Forge Ahead in the Course of Exposing and Resolving Contradictions	36
Dialectical Materialism in Analysis of Molecular Structure	40
On the Limitless Divisibility of Matter	45
Materialistic Dialectic, A Theoretical Weapon for Exploring Nature	51
Study the Philosophical Thought of Mao Tse-Tung, Improve the Method of Scientific Research	54

Contents (Continued)

Page

Some Critics of Deborin's School Have Become His Successors	59
Seizure of the Luting Bridge	66
Rural Reforms at Tashiht's	77

PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Following is a translation of an article written by Mao Tse-tung in May 1938 and reprinted in the Chinese-language periodical, Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), Peiping, No 9, 21 August 1965, page 1-20.7

Editor's Note: September 3 this year marks the 20th anniversary of China's victory in its War of Resistance Against Japan. We have specially reprinted in this issue Comrade Mao Tse-tung's famous article "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan." The ideas expounded in this article played a great guiding role in China's revolutionary war. In this connection, the Committee for the Publication of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has given the following explanatory note: "In the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan, many people inside and outside the Party belittled the important strategic role of guerrilla warfare and pinned their hopes on regular warfare alone, and particularly on the operations of the Kuomintang forces. Comrade Mao Tse-tung refuted this view and wrote this article to show the correct road of development for anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. As a result, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which had just over 40,000 men when the War of Resistance began in 1937, grew to a great army of one million by the time Japan surrendered in 1945, established many revolutionary base areas, played a great part in the war and thus, throughout this period, made Chiang Kai-shek afraid to capitulate to Japan or launch a nation-wide civil war. In 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek did launch a nation-wide civil war, the People's Liberation Army, formed out of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, was strong enough to deal with his attacks."

Today, it is very clear that the theory of a people's war found in Comrade Mao Tse-tung's article is of vital practical importance for the Chinese people and for the people of the whole world in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys and, in particular, for the oppressed nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggle for liberation.

CHAPTER I

Why Raise the Question of Strategy in Guerrilla War?

In the War of Resistance Against Japan, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. This point has already been correctly settled. Thus, it seems there are only tactical problems in guerrilla warfare. Why then raise the question of strategy?

If China were a small country in which the role of guerrilla warfare was only to render direct support over short distances to the campaigns of the regular army, there would, of course, be only tactical problems but no strategic ones. On the other hand, if China were a country as strong as the Soviet Union and the invading enemy could either be quickly expelled, or, even though his expulsion were to take some time, he could not occupy extensive areas, then again guerrilla warfare would simply play a supporting role in campaigns, and would naturally involve only tactical but not strategic problems.

The question of strategy in guerrilla war does arise, however, in the case of China, which is neither small nor like the Soviet Union, but which is both a large and a weak country. This large and weak country is being attacked by a small and strong country, but the large and weak country is in an era of progress; this is the source of the whole problem. It is in these circumstances that vast areas have come under enemy occupation and that the war has become a protracted one. The enemy is occupying vast areas of this large country of ours, but Japan is a small country, she does not have sufficient soldiers and has to leave many gaps in the occupied areas, so that our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare consists primarily not in interior-line operations in support of the campaigns of the regular troops but in independent operations on exterior lines; furthermore, China is progressive, that is to say, she has a staunch army and broad masses of people, both led by the Communist Party, so that, far from being small-scale, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is in fact large-scale warfare. Hence the emergence of a whole series of problems, such as the strategic defensive, the strategic offensive, etc. The protracted nature of the war and its attendant ruthlessness

have made it imperative for guerrilla warfare to undertake many unusual tasks; hence such problems as those of the base areas, the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, and so on. For all these reasons, China's guerrilla warfare against Japan has broken out of the bounds of tactics to knock at the gates of strategy, and it demands examination from the viewpoint of strategy. The point that merits our particular attention is that such extensive as well as protracted guerrilla warfare is quite new in the entire history of war. This is bound up with the fact that we are now in the 1930s and 1940s and that we now have the Communist Party and the Red Army. Herein lies the heart of the matter. Our enemy is probably still cherishing fond dreams of emulating the Mongol conquest of the Sung Dynasty, the Manchu conquest of the Ming Dynasty, the British occupation of North America and India, the Latin occupation of Central and South America, etc. But such dreams have no practical value in present-day China because there are certain factors present in the China of today which were absent in those historical instances, and one of them is guerrilla warfare, which is quite a new phenomenon. If our enemy overlooks this fact, he will certainly come to grief.

These are the reasons why our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, though occupying only a supplementary place in the War of Resistance as a whole, must nevertheless be examined from the viewpoint of strategy.

Why not, then, apply to guerrilla warfare the general strategic principles of the War of Resistance?

The question of strategy in our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is indeed closely linked with the question of strategy in the War of Resistance as a whole, because they have much in common. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare is different from regular warfare and has its own peculiarities, and consequently many peculiar elements are involved in the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare. Without modification it is impossible to apply the strategic principles of the War of Resistance in general to guerrilla warfare with its own peculiarities.

CHAPTER II

The Basic Principle of War Is to Preserve Oneself and Destroy the Enemy

Before discussing the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare in concrete terms, a few words are needed on the fundamental problem of war.

All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of the one basic principle: to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy. In a revolutionary war, this principle is directly linked with basic political principles. For instance, the basic political principle of China's War of Resistance Against Japan, i.e., its political aim, is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build an independent, free and happy new China. In terms of military action this principle means the use of armed force to defend our motherland and to drive out the Japanese invaders. To attain this end, the operations of the armed units take the form of doing their utmost to preserve their own strength on the one hand and destroy the enemy's on the other. How then do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? In fact, there is no contradiction at all; to put it more exactly, sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. For such sacrifice is essential not only for destroying the enemy but also for preserving oneself -- partial and temporary "non-preservation" (sacrifice, or paying the price) is necessary for the sake of general and permanent preservation. From this basic principle stems the series of principles guiding military operations, all of which -- from the principles of shooting (taking cover to preserve oneself, and making full use of fire-power to destroy the enemy) to the principles of strategy -- are permeated with the spirit of this basic principle. All technical, tactical and strategic principles represent applications of this basic principle. The principle of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy is the basis of all military principles.

CHAPTER III

Six Specific Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan

Now let us see what policies or principles have to be adopted in guerrilla operations against Japan before we can attain the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. Since the guerrilla units in the War of Resistance (and in all other revolutionary wars) generally grow out of nothing and expand from a small to a large force, they must preserve themselves and, moreover, they must expand. Hence the question is, what policies or principles have to be adopted before we can attain the object of preserving and expanding ourselves and destroying the enemy?

Generally speaking, the main principles are as follows: (1) the use of initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations; (2) co-ordination

with regular warfare; (3) establishment of base areas; (4) the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive; (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare; and (6) correct relationship of command. These six items constitute the whole of the strategic programme for guerrilla war against Japan and are the means necessary for the preservation and expansion of our forces, for the destruction and expulsion of the enemy, for co-ordination with regular warfare and the winning of final victory.

CHAPTER IV

Initiative, Flexibility and Planning in Conducting Offensives Within the Defensive, Battles of Quick Decision Within Protracted War, and Exterior-Line Operations Within Interior-Line Operations

Here the subject may be dealt with under four headings: (1) the relationship between the defensive and the offensive, between protractedness and quick decision, and between the interior and exterior lines; (2) the initiative in all operations; (3) flexible employment of forces; and (4) planning in all operations.

To start with the first.

If we take the War of Resistance as a whole, the fact that Japan is a strong country and is attacking while China is a weak country and is defending herself makes our war strategically a defensive and protracted war. As far as the operational lines are concerned, the Japanese are operating on exterior and we on interior lines. This is one aspect of the situation. But there is another aspect which is just the reverse. The enemy forces, though strong (in arms, in certain qualities of their men, and certain other factors), are numerically small, whereas our forces, though weak (likewise, in arms, in certain qualities of our men, and certain other factors), are numerically very large. Added to the fact that the enemy is an alien nation invading our country while we are resisting his invasion on our own soil, this determines the following strategy. It is possible and necessary to use tactical offensives within the strategic defensive, to fight campaigns and battles of quick decision within a strategically protracted war and to fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. Such is the strategy to be adopted in the War of Resistance as a whole. It holds true both for regular and for guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is different only in degree and form. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks. Although surprise attacks can and should be employed in regular warfare too, the degree of surprise is less. In guerrilla warfare, the need to bring operations to a quick

decision is very great, and our exterior line ring of encirclement of the enemy in campaigns and battles is very small. All these distinguish it from regular warfare.

Thus it can be seen that in their operations guerrilla units have to concentrate the maximum forces, act secretly and swiftly, attack the enemy by surprise and bring battles to a quick decision, and that they must strictly avoid passive defence, procrastination and the dispersal of forces before engagements. Of course, guerrilla warfare includes not only the strategic but also the tactical defensive. The latter embraces, among other things, containing and outpost actions during battles; the disposition of forces for resistance at narrow passes, strategic points, rivers or villages in order to deplete and exhaust the enemy; and action to cover withdrawal. But the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be the offensive, and guerrilla warfare is more offensive in its character than regular warfare. The offensive, moreover, must take the form of surprise attacks, and to expose ourselves by ostentatiously parading our forces is even less permissible in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare. From the fact that the enemy is strong and we are weak it necessarily follows that, in guerrilla operations in general even more than in regular warfare, battles must be decided quickly, though on some occasions guerrilla fighting may be kept up for several days, as in an assault on a small and isolated enemy force cut off from help. Because of its dispersed character, guerrilla warfare can spread everywhere, and in many of its tasks, as in harassing, containing and disrupting the enemy and in mass work, its principle is dispersal of forces; but a guerrilla unit, or a guerrilla formation, must concentrate its main forces when it is engaged in destroying the enemy, and especially when it is striving to smash an enemy attack. "Concentrate a big force to strike at a small section of the enemy force" remains a principle of field operations in guerrilla warfare.

Thus it can also be seen that, if we take the War of Resistance as a whole, we can attain the aim of our strategic defensive and finally defeat Japanese imperialism only through the cumulative effect of many offensive campaigns and battles in both regular and guerrilla warfare, namely, through the cumulative effect of many victories in offensive actions. Only through the cumulative effect of many campaigns and battles of quick decision, namely, the cumulative effect of many victories achieved through quick decision in offensive campaigns and battles, can we attain our goal of strategic protractedness, which means gaining time to increase our capacity to resist while hastening or awaiting changes in the international situation and the internal collapse of the enemy, in order that we can launch a strategic counter-offensive and drive the Japanese invaders out of China. We must concentrate superior forces and fight exterior-line operations in every campaign or battle, whether in the stage of strategic defensive or in that of strategic counter-offensive, in order to encircle and destroy the enemy forces, encircling part if not all of them, destroying part if not all of the forces we have encircled, and

inflicting heavy casualties on the encircled forces if we cannot capture them in large numbers. Only through the cumulative effect of many such battles of annihilation can we change the relative position as between the enemy and ourselves, thoroughly smash his strategic encirclement -- that is, his scheme of exterior-line operations -- and finally, in co-ordination with international forces and the revolutionary struggles of the Japanese people, surround the Japanese imperialists and deal them the coup de grace. These results are to be achieved mainly through regular warfare, with guerrilla warfare making a secondary contribution. What is common to both, however, is the accumulation of many minor victories to make a major victory. Herein lies the great strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance.

Now let us discuss initiative, flexibility and planning in guerrilla warfare.

What is initiative in guerrilla warfare?

In any war, the opponents contend for the initiative, whether on a battlefield, in a battle area, in a war zone or in the whole war, for the initiative means freedom of action for an army. Any army which, losing the initiative, is forced into a passive position and ceases to have freedom of action, faces the danger of defeat or extermination. Naturally, gaining the initiative is harder in strategic defensive and interior-line operations and easier in offensive exterior-line operations. However, Japanese imperialism has two basic weaknesses, namely, its shortage of troops and the fact that it is fighting on foreign soil. Moreover, its underestimation of China's strength and the internal contradictions among the Japanese militarists have given rise to many mistakes in command, such as piecemeal reinforcement, lack of strategic co-ordination, occasional absence of a main direction for attack, failure to grasp opportunities in some operations and failure to wipe out encircled forces, all of which may be considered the third weakness of Japanese imperialism. Thus, despite the advantage of being on the offensive and operating on exterior lines, the Japanese militarists are gradually losing the initiative, because of their shortage of troops (their small territory, small population, inadequate resources, feudalistic imperialism, etc.), because of the fact that they are fighting on foreign soil (their war is imperialist and barbarous) and because of their stupidities in command. Japan is neither willing nor able to conclude the war at present, nor has her strategic offensive yet come to an end, but, as the general trend shows, her offensive is confined within certain limits, which is the inevitable consequence of her three weaknesses; she cannot go on indefinitely till she swallows the whole of China. Already there are signs that Japan will one day find herself in an utterly passive position. China, on the other hand, was in a rather passive position at the beginning of the war, but, having gained experience, she is now turning to the new policy of mobile warfare, the policy of taking the offensive, seeking quick decisions and operating on

exterior lines in campaigns and battles, which, together with the policy of developing widespread guerrilla warfare, is helping China to build up a position of initiative day by day.

The question of the initiative is even more vital in guerrilla warfare. For most guerrilla units operate in very difficult circumstances, fighting without a rear, with their own weak forces facing the enemy's strong forces, lacking experience (when the units are newly organized), being separated, etc. Nevertheless, it is possible to build up the initiative in guerrilla warfare, the essential condition being to seize on the enemy's three weaknesses. Taking advantage of the enemy's shortage of troops (from the viewpoint of the war as a whole), the guerrilla units can boldly use vast areas as their fields of operation; taking advantage of the fact that the enemy is an alien invader and is pursuing a most barbarous policy, the guerrilla units can boldly enlist the support of millions upon millions of people; and taking advantage of the stupidities in the enemy's command, the guerrilla units can give full scope to their resourcefulness. While the regular army must seize on all these weaknesses of the enemy and turn them to good account in order to defeat him, it is even more important for the guerrilla units to do so. As for the guerrilla units' own weaknesses, they can be gradually reduced in the course of the struggle. Moreover, these weaknesses sometimes constitute the very condition for gaining the initiative. For example, it is precisely because the guerrilla units are small and weak that they can mysteriously appear and disappear in their operations behind enemy lines, without the enemy's being able to do anything about them, and thus enjoy a freedom of action such as massive regular armies never can.

When the enemy is making a converging attack from several directions, a guerrilla unit can exercise initiative only with difficulty and can lose it all too easily. In such a case, if its appraisals and dispositions are wrong, it is liable to get into a passive position and consequently fail to smash the converging enemy attack. This may occur even when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive. For the initiative results from making a correct appraisal of the situation (both our own and that of the enemy) and from making the correct military and political dispositions. A pessimistic appraisal out of accord with the objective conditions and the passive dispositions ensuing from it will undoubtedly result in the loss of the initiative and throw one into a passive position. On the other hand, an over-optimistic appraisal out of accord with the objective conditions and the risky (unjustifiably risky) dispositions ensuing from it will also result in the loss of the initiative and eventually land one in a position similar to that of the pessimists. The initiative is not an innate attribute of genius, but is something an intelligent leader attains through open-minded study and correct appraisal of the objective conditions and through correct military and political dispositions. It follows that the initiative is not ready-made but is something that requires conscious effort.

When forced into a passive position through some incorrect appraisal and disposition or through overwhelming pressure, a guerrilla unit must strive to extricate itself. How this can be done depends on the circumstances. In many cases it is necessary to "move away." The ability to move is the distinctive feature of a guerrilla unit. To move away is the principal method for getting out of a passive position and regaining the initiative. But it is not the sole method. The moment when the enemy is most energetic and we are in the greatest difficulties is often the very moment when things begin to turn against him and in our favour. Frequently a favourable situation recurs and the initiative is regained as a result of "holding out a little longer."

Next, let us deal with flexibility.

Flexibility is a concrete expression of the initiative. The flexible employment of forces is more essential in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

A guerrilla commander must understand that the flexible employment of his forces is the most important means of changing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves and of gaining the initiative. The nature of guerrilla warfare is such that guerrilla forces must be employed flexibly in accordance with the task in hand and with such circumstances as the state of the enemy, the terrain and the local population, and the chief ways of employing the forces are dispersal, concentration and shifting of position. In employing his forces, a guerrilla commander is like a fisherman casting his net, which he should be able to spread wide as well as draw in tight. When casting his net, the fisherman has to ascertain the depth of the water, the speed of the current and the presence or absence of obstructions; similarly, when dispersing his units, a guerrilla commander must take care not to incur losses through ignorance of the situation or through miscalculated action. Just as the fisherman must keep a grip on the cord in order to draw his net in tight, so the guerrilla commander must maintain liaison and communication with all his forces and keep enough of his main forces at hand. Just as a frequent change of position is necessary in fishing, so a frequent shift of position is necessary for a guerrilla unit. Dispersal, concentration and shifting of position are the three ways of flexibly employing forces in guerrilla warfare.

Generally speaking, the dispersal of guerrilla units, or "breaking up the whole into parts," is employed chiefly: (1) when we want to threaten the enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive, and there is temporarily no chance to mass our forces for action; (2) when we want to harass and disrupt the enemy throughout an area where his forces are weak; (3) when we are unable to break through the enemy's encirclement and try to slip away by making ourselves less conspicuous; (4) when we are restricted by terrain or supplies; or (5) when we are

carrying on mass work over a wide area. But whatever the circumstances, when dispersing for action we should pay attention to the following: (1) we should never make an absolutely even dispersal of forces, but should keep a fairly large part in an area convenient for manoeuvre, so that any possible exigency can be met and there is a centre of gravity for the task being carried out in dispersion; and (2) we should assign to the dispersed units clearly defined tasks, fields of operation, time limits for actions, places for reassembly and ways and means of liaison.

Concentration of forces, or "assembling the parts into a whole," is the method usually applied to destroy an enemy when he is on the offensive and sometimes to destroy some of his stationary forces when he is on the defensive. Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces for use in one important direction while retaining or dispatching part of the forces for use in other directions to contain, harass or disrupt the enemy, or to carry on mass work.

Although the flexible dispersal or concentration of forces according to circumstances is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexibly. When the enemy feels seriously threatened by guerrillas, he will send troops to attack or suppress them. Hence the guerrilla units will have to take stock of the situation. If advisable, they should fight where they are; if not, they should lose no time in shifting elsewhere. Sometimes, in order to crush the enemy units one by one, guerrilla units which have destroyed an enemy force in one place may immediately shift to another so as to wipe out a second enemy force; sometimes, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, they may have to disengage quickly and fight the enemy elsewhere. If the enemy's forces in a certain place present a particularly serious threat, the guerrilla units should not linger, but should move off with lightning speed. In general, shifts of position should be made with secrecy and speed. In order to mislead, decoy and confuse the enemy, they should constantly use stratagems, such as making a feint to the east but attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit-and-run attacks, and night actions.

Flexibility in dispersal, concentration and shifts of position is a concrete expression of the initiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas rigidity and inertia inevitably lead to passivity and cause unnecessary losses. But a commander proves himself wise not just by recognition of the importance of employing his forces flexibly but by skill in dispersing concentrating or shifting them in good time according to the specific circumstances. This wisdom in sensing changes and choosing the right moment to act is not easily acquired; it can be gained only by those who study with a receptive mind and investigate and ponder diligently. Prudent consideration of the circumstances is essential to prevent flexibility from turning into impulsive action.

Lastly, we come to planning.

Without planning, victories in guerrilla warfare are impossible. Any idea that guerrilla warfare can be conducted in haphazard fashion indicates either a flippant attitude or ignorance of guerrilla warfare. The operations in a guerrilla zone as a whole, or those of a guerrilla unit or formation, must be preceded by as thorough planning as possible, by preparation in advance for every action. Grasping the situation, setting the tasks, disposing the forces, giving military and political training, securing supplies, putting the equipment in good order, making proper use of the people's help, etc -- all these are part of the work of the guerrilla commanders, which they must carefully consider and conscientiously perform and check up on. There can be no initiative, no flexibility, and no offensive unless they do so. True, guerrilla conditions do not allow as high a degree of planning as do those of regular warfare, and it would be a mistake to attempt very thorough planning in guerrilla warfare. But it is necessary to plan as thoroughly as the objective conditions permit, for it should be understood that fighting the enemy is no joke.

The above points serve to explain the first of the strategic principles of guerrilla warfare, the principle of using initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations. It is the key problem in the strategy of guerrilla warfare. The solution of this problem provides the major guarantee of victory in guerrilla warfare so far as military command is concerned.

Although a variety of matters have been dealt with here, they all revolve around the offensive in campaigns and battles. The initiative can be decisively grasped only after victory in an offensive. Every offensive operation must be organized on our initiative and not launched under compulsion. Flexibility in the employment of forces revolves around the effort to take the offensive, and planning likewise is necessary chiefly in order to ensure success in offensive operations. Measures of tactical defence are meaningless if they are divorced from their role of giving either direct or indirect support to an offensive. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, and exterior lines refer to its scope. The offensive is the only means of destroying the enemy and is also the principal means of self-preservation, while pure defence and retreat can play only a temporary and partial role in self-preservation and are quite useless for destroying the enemy.

The principle stated above is basically the same for both regular and guerrilla war; it differs to some degree only in its form of expression. But in guerrilla war it is both important and necessary to note this difference. It is precisely this difference in form which distinguishes the operational methods of guerrilla war from those of regular war. If we confuse the two different forms in which the principle is expressed, victory in guerrilla war will be impossible.

CHAPTER V

Co-ordination With Regular Warfare

The second problem of strategy in guerrilla warfare is its co-ordination with regular warfare. It is a matter of clarifying the relation between guerrilla and regular warfare on the operational level, in the light of the nature of actual guerrilla operations. An understanding of this relation is very important for effectiveness in defeating the enemy.

There are three kinds of co-ordination between guerrilla and regular warfare, co-ordination in strategy, in campaigns and in battles.

Taken as a whole, guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, which cripples the enemy, pins him down, disrupts his supply lines, inspires the regular forces and the people throughout the country, is co-ordinated with regular warfare in strategy. Take the case of the guerrilla warfare in the three northeastern provinces. Of course, the question of co-ordination did not arise before the nation-wide War of Resistance, but since the war began the significance of such co-ordination has become obvious. Every enemy soldier the guerrillas kill there, every bullet they make the enemy expend, every enemy soldier they stop from advancing south of the Great Wall, can be reckoned a contribution to the total strength of the resistance. It is, moreover, clear that they are having a demoralizing effect on the whole enemy army and all Japan and a heartening effect on our whole army and people. Still clearer is the role in strategic co-ordination played by the guerrilla warfare along the Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tatung-Puchow, Chengting-Taiyuan and Shanghai-Hangchow Railways. Not only are the guerrilla units performing the function of co-ordination with the regular forces in our present strategic defensive, when the enemy is on the strategic offensive; not only will they co-ordinate with the regular forces in disrupting the enemy's hold on the occupied territory, after he concludes his strategic offensive and switches to the safeguarding of his gains; they will also co-ordinate with the regular forces in driving out the enemy forces and recovering all the lost territories, when the regular forces launch the strategic counter-offensive. The great role of guerrilla warfare in strategic co-ordination must not be overlooked. The commanders both of the guerrilla units and of the regular forces must clearly understand this role.

In addition, guerrilla warfare performs the function of co-ordination with regular warfare in campaigns. For instance, in the campaign at Hsin-kou, north of Taiyuan, the guerrillas played a remarkable role in co-ordination both north and south of Yenmenkuan by wrecking the Tatung-Puchow Railway and the motor roads running through Pinghsingkuan and

Yangfangkou. Or take another instance. After the enemy occupied Fenglingtu, guerrilla warfare, which was already widespread throughout Shansi Province and was conducted mainly by the regular forces, played an even greater role through co-ordination with the defensive campaigns west of the Yellow River in Shensi Province and south of the Yellow River in Honan Province. Again, when the enemy attacked southern Shantung, the guerrilla warfare in the five provinces of northern China contributed a great deal through co-ordination with the campaigns of our army. In performing a task of this sort, the leaders of each guerrilla base behind the enemy lines, or the commanders of a guerrilla formation temporarily dispatched there, must dispose their forces well and, by adopting different tactics suited to the time and place, move energetically against the enemy's most vital and vulnerable spots in order to cripple him, pin him down, disrupt his supply lines, inspire our armies campaigning on the interior lines, and so fulfil their duty of co-ordinating with the campaign. If each guerrilla zone or unit goes it alone without giving any attention to co-ordinating with the campaigns of the regular forces, its role in strategic co-ordination will lose a great deal of its significance, although it will still play some such role in the general strategy. All guerrilla commanders should give this point serious attention. To achieve co-ordination in campaigns, it is absolutely necessary for all larger guerrilla units and guerrilla formations to have radio equipment.

Finally, co-ordination with the regular forces in battles, in actual fighting on the battlefield is the task of all guerrilla units in the vicinity of an interior-line battlefield. Of course, this applies only to guerrilla units operating close to the regular forces or to units of regulars dispatched on temporary guerrilla missions. In such cases, a guerrilla unit has to perform whatever task it is assigned by the commander of the regular forces, which is usually to pin down some of the enemy's forces, disrupt his supply lines, conduct reconnaissance, or act as guides for the regular forces. Even without such an assignment, the guerrilla unit should carry out these tasks on its own initiative. To sit by idly, neither moving nor fighting, or to move about without fighting, would be an intolerable attitude for a guerrilla unit.

CHAPTER VI

The Establishment of Base Areas

The third problem of strategy in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is the establishment of base areas, which is important and essential because of the protracted nature and ruthlessness of the war. The recovery of our lost territories will have to await the nation-wide strategic counter-offensive; by then the enemy's front will have extended deep into

central China and cut it in two from north to south, and a part or even a greater part of our territory will have fallen into the hands of the enemy and become his rear. We shall have to extend guerrilla warfare all over this vast enemy-occupied area, make a front out of the enemy's rear, and force him to fight ceaselessly throughout the territory he occupies. Until such time as our strategic counter-offensive is launched and so long as our lost territories are not recovered, it will be necessary to persist in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, certainly for a fairly long time, though one cannot say definitely for how long. This is why the war will be a protracted one. And in order to safeguard his gains in the occupied areas, the enemy is bound to step up his anti-guerrilla measures and, especially after the halting of his strategic offensive, to embark on relentless suppression of the guerrillas. With ruthlessness thus added to protractedness, it will be impossible to sustain guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines without base areas.

What, then, are these base areas? They are the strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy. Without such strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achieving the aim of the war. It is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines that it is fought without a rear, for the guerrilla forces are severed from the country's general rear. But guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear.

History knows many peasant wars of the "roving rebel" type, but none of them ever succeeded. In the present age of advanced communications and technology, it would be all the more groundless to imagine that one can win victory by fighting in the manner of roving rebels. However, this roving-rebel idea still exists among impoverished peasants, and in the minds of guerrilla commanders it becomes the view that base areas are neither necessary nor important. Therefore, ridding the minds of guerrilla commanders of this idea is a prerequisite for deciding on a policy of establishing base areas. The question of whether or not to have base areas and of whether or not to regard them as important, in other words, the conflict between the idea of establishing base areas and that of fighting like roving rebels, arises in all guerrilla warfare, and, to a certain extent, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is no exception. Therefore the struggle against the roving-rebel ideology is an inevitable process. Only when this ideology is thoroughly overcome and the policy of establishing base areas is initiated and applied will there be conditions favourable for the maintenance of guerrilla warfare over a long period.

Now that the necessity and importance of base areas have been made clear, let us pass on to the following problems which must be understood and solved when it comes to establishing the base areas. These problems

are the types of base areas, the guerrilla zones and the base areas, the conditions for establishing base areas, their consolidation and expansion, and the forms in which we and the enemy encircle one another.

1. The Types of Base Areas

Base areas in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare are mainly of three types, those in the mountains, those on the plains, and those in the river-lake-estuary regions:

The advantage of setting up base areas in mountainous regions is obvious, and those which have been, are being or will be established in the Chang-pai,¹ Wutai,² Taihang,³ Taishan,⁴ Yenshan⁵ and Maoshan⁶ Mountains all belong to this type. They are all places where anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare can be maintained for the longest time and are important strongholds for the War of Resistance. We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all the mountainous regions behind the enemy lines.

Of course, the plains are less suitable than the mountains, but it is by no means impossible to develop guerrilla warfare or establish any base areas there. Indeed, the widespread guerrilla warfare in the plains of Hopei and of northern and northwestern Shantung proves that it is possible to develop guerrilla warfare in the plains. While there is as yet no evidence on the possibility of setting up base areas there and maintaining them for long, it has been proved that the setting up of temporary base areas is possible, and it should be possible to set up base areas for small units or for seasonal use. On the one hand, the enemy does not have enough troops at his disposal and is pursuing a policy of unparalleled brutality, and on the other hand, China has a vast territory and vast numbers of people who are resisting Japan; the objective conditions for spreading guerrilla warfare and setting up temporary base areas in the plains are therefore fulfilled. Given competent military command, it should of course be possible to establish bases for small guerrilla units there, bases which are long-term but not fixed.⁷ Broadly speaking, when the strategic offensive of the enemy is brought to a halt and he enters the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas, he will undoubtedly launch savage attacks on all the guerrilla base areas, and those in the plains will naturally be the first to bear the brunt. The large guerrilla formations operating on the plains will be unable to keep on fighting there for long and will gradually have to move up into the mountains as the circumstances require, as for instance, from the Hopei Plain to the Wutai and Taihang Mountains, or from the Shantung Plain to Taishan Mountain and the Shantung Peninsula in the east. But in the circumstances of our national war it is not impossible for numerous small guerrilla units to keep going in various counties over the vast plains and adopt a fluid way of fighting, i.e., by shifting their bases from place to place. It is definitely possible to conduct seasonal

guerrilla warfare by taking advantage of the "green curtain" of tall crops in summer and of the frozen rivers in winter. As the enemy has no strength to spare now and will never be able to attend to everything even when he has the strength to spare, it is absolutely necessary for us to decide on the policy, for the present, of spreading guerrilla warfare far and wide and setting up temporary base areas in the plains and, for the future, of preparing to keep up guerrilla warfare by small units, if only seasonally, and of creating base areas which are not fixed.

Objectively speaking, the possibilities of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas are greater in the river-lake-estuary regions than in the plains, though less than in the mountains. The dramatic battles fought by "pirates" and "water-bandits," of which our history is full, and the guerrilla warfare round the Hunghu Lake kept up for several years in the Red Army period, both testify to the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and of establishing base areas in the river-lake-estuary regions. So far, however, the political parties and the masses who are resisting Japan have given this possibility little attention. Though the subjective conditions are as yet lacking, we should undoubtedly turn our attention to this possibility and start working on it. As one aspect in the development of our nation-wide guerrilla warfare, we should effectively organize guerrilla warfare in the Hungtse Lake region north of the Yangtse River, in the Taihu Lake region south of the Yangtse, and in all river-lake-estuary regions in the enemy-occupied areas along the rivers and on the seacoast, and we should create permanent base areas in and near such places. By overlooking this aspect we are virtually providing the enemy with water transport facilities; this is a gap in our strategic plan for the War of Resistance which must be filled in good time.

2. Guerrilla Zones and Base Areas

In guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, there is a difference between guerrilla zones and base areas. Areas which are surrounded by the enemy but whose central parts are not occupied or have been recovered, like some counties in the Wutai mountain region (i.e., the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area) and also some places in the Taihang and Taishan mountain regions, are ready-made bases for the convenient use of guerrilla units in developing guerrilla warfare. But elsewhere in these areas the situation is different, as for instance in the eastern and northern sections of the Wutai mountain region, which include parts of western Hopei and southern Chahar, and in many places east of Paoting and west of Tsangchow. When guerrilla warfare began, the guerrillas could not completely occupy these places but could only make frequent raids; they are areas which are held by the guerrillas when they are there and by the puppet regime when they are gone, and are therefore not yet guerrilla bases but only what may be called guerrilla zones. Such guerrilla zones will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the necessary

process of guerrilla warfare, that is, when large numbers of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated there, the puppet regime has been destroyed, the masses have been roused to activity, anti-Japanese mass organizations have been formed, people's local armed forces have been developed, and anti-Japanese political power has been established. By the expansion of our base areas we mean the addition of areas such as these to the bases already established.

In some places, for example, eastern Hopei, the whole area of guerrilla operations has been a guerrilla zone from the very beginning. The puppet regime is of long standing there, and from the beginning the whole area of operations has been a guerrilla zone both for the people's armed forces that have grown out of local uprisings and for the guerrilla detachments dispatched from the Wutai Mountains. At the outset of their activities, all they could do was to choose some fairly good spots there as temporary rear or base areas. Such places will not be transformed from guerrilla zones into relatively stable base areas until the enemy forces are destroyed and the work of arousing the people is in full swing.

Thus the transformation of a guerrilla zone into a base area is an arduous creative process, and its accomplishment depends on the extent to which the enemy is destroyed and the masses are aroused.

Many regions will remain guerrilla zones for a long time. In these regions the enemy will not be able to set up stable puppet regimes, however much he tries to maintain control, while we, on our part, will not be able to achieve the aim of establishing anti-Japanese political power, however much we develop guerrilla warfare. Examples of this kind are to be found in the enemy-occupied regions along the railway lines, in the neighborhood of big cities and in certain areas in the plains.

As for the big cities, the railway stops and the areas in the plains which are strongly garrisoned by the enemy, guerrilla warfare can only extend to the fringes and not right into these places which have relatively stable puppet regimes. This is another kind of situation.

Mistakes in our leadership or strong enemy pressure may cause a reversal of the state of affairs described above, i.e., a guerrilla base may turn into a guerrilla zone, and a guerrilla zone may turn into an area under relatively stable enemy occupation. Such changes are possible, and they deserve special vigilance on the part of guerrilla commanders.

Therefore, as a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between us and the enemy, the entire enemy-occupied territory will fall into the following three categories: first, anti-Japanese bases held by our guerrilla units and our organs of political power; second, areas held by Japanese imperialism and its puppet regimes; and third, intermediate zones contested by both sides, namely, guerrilla zones. Guerrilla

commanders have the duty to expand the first and third categories to the maximum and to reduce the second category to the minimum. This is the strategic task of guerrilla warfare.

3. Conditions for Establishing Base Areas

The fundamental conditions for establishing a base area are that there should be anti-Japanese armed forces, that these armed forces should be employed to inflict defeats on the enemy and that they should arouse the people to action. Thus the establishment of a base area is first and foremost a matter of building an armed force. Leaders in guerrilla war must devote their energy to building one or more guerrilla units, and must gradually develop them in the course of struggle into guerrilla formations or even into units and formations of regular troops. The building up of an armed force is the key to establishing a base area; if there is no armed force or if the armed force is weak, nothing can be done. This constitutes the first condition.

The second indispensable condition for establishing a base area is that the armed forces should be used in co-ordination with the people to defeat the enemy. All places under enemy control are enemy, and not guerrilla, base areas, and obviously cannot be transformed into guerrilla base areas unless the enemy is defeated. Unless we repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat him, even places held by the guerrillas will come under enemy control, and then it will be impossible to establish base areas.

The third indispensable condition for establishing a base area is the use of all our strength, including our armed forces, to arouse the masses for struggle against Japan. In the course of this struggle we must arm the people, i.e., organize self-defence corps and guerrilla units. In the course of this struggle, we must form mass organizations, we must organize the workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professional people -- according to the degree of their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm -- into the various mass organizations necessary for the struggle against Japanese aggression, and we must gradually expand them. Without organization, the people cannot give effect to their anti-Japanese strength. In the course of this struggle, we must weed out the open and the hidden traitors, a task which can be accomplished only by relying on the strength of the people. In this struggle, it is particularly important to arouse the people to establish, or to consolidate, their local organs of anti-Japanese political power. Where the original Chinese organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy, we must reorganize and strengthen them with the support of the broad masses, and where they have been destroyed by the enemy, we should rebuild them by the efforts of the masses. They are organs of political power for carrying out the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and should unite all the forces of the people to fight against our sole enemy, Japanese imperialism, and its jackals, the traitors and reactionaries.

A base area for guerrilla war can be truly established only with the gradual fulfilment of the three basic conditions, i.e., only after the anti-Japanese armed forces are built up, the enemy has suffered defeats and the people are aroused.

Mention must also be made of geographical and economic conditions. As for the former, we have already discussed three different categories in the earlier section on the types of base areas, and here we need only mention one major requirement, namely, that the area must be extensive. In places surrounded by the enemy on all sides, or on three sides, the mountainous regions naturally offer the best conditions for setting up base areas which can hold out for a long time, but the main thing is that there must be enough room for the guerrillas to manoeuvre, namely, the areas have to be extensive. Given an extensive area, guerrilla warfare can be developed and sustained even in the plains, not to mention the river-lake-estuary regions. By and large, the vastness of China's territory and the enemy's shortage of troops provide guerrilla warfare in China with this condition. This is an important, even a primary condition, as far as the possibility of waging guerrilla warfare is concerned, and small countries like Belgium which lack this condition have few or no such possibilities.⁸ In China, this condition is not something which has to be striven for, nor does it present a problem; it is there physically, waiting only to be exploited.

So far as their physical setting is concerned, the economic conditions resemble the geographical conditions. For now we are discussing the establishment of base areas not in a desert, where no enemy is to be found, but behind the enemy lines; every place the enemy can penetrate already has its Chinese inhabitants and an economic basis for subsistence, so that the question of choice of economic conditions in establishing base areas simply does not arise. Irrespective of the economic conditions, we should do our utmost to develop guerrilla warfare and set up permanent or temporary base areas in all places where Chinese inhabitants and enemy forces are to be found. In a political sense, however, the economic conditions do present a problem, a problem of economic policy which is of immense importance to the establishment of base areas. The economic policy of the guerrilla base areas must follow the principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front by equitably distributing the financial burden and protecting commerce. Neither the local organs of political power nor the guerrilla units must violate these principles, or otherwise the establishment of base areas and the maintenance of guerrilla warfare would be adversely affected. The equitable distribution of the financial burden means that "those with money should contribute money," while the peasants should supply the guerrilla units with grain within certain limits. The protection of commerce means that the guerrilla units should be highly disciplined and that the confiscation of shops, except those owned by proved traitors, should be strictly prohibited. This is no easy matter, but the policy is set and must be put into effect.

4. The Consolidation and Expansion of Base Areas

In order to confine the enemy invaders to a few strongholds, that is, to the big cities and along the main communication lines, the guerrillas must do all they can to extend guerrilla warfare from their base areas as widely as possible and hem in all the enemy's strongholds, thus threatening his existence and shaking his morale while expanding the base areas. This is essential. In this context, we must oppose conservatism in guerrilla warfare. Whether originating in the desire for an easy life or in overestimation of the enemy's strength, conservatism can only bring losses in the War of Resistance and is harmful to guerrilla warfare and to the base areas themselves. At the same time, we must not forget the consolidation of the base areas, the chief task being to arouse and organize the masses and to train guerrilla units and local armed forces. Such consolidation is needed for maintaining protracted warfare and also for expansion, and in its absence energetic expansion is impossible. If we attend only to expansion and forget about consolidation in our guerrilla warfare, we shall be unable to withstand the enemy's attacks, and consequently not only forfeit the possibility of expansion but also endanger the very existence of the base areas. The correct principle is expansion with consolidation, which is a good method and allows us to take the offensive or the defensive as we choose. Given a protracted war, the problem of consolidating and expanding base areas constantly arises for every guerrilla unit. The concrete solution depends, of course, on the circumstances. At one time, the emphasis may be on expansion, i.e., on expanding the guerrilla zones and increasing the number of guerrillas. At another, the emphasis may be on consolidation, i.e., on organizing the masses and training the troops. As expansion and consolidation differ in nature, and as the military dispositions and other tasks will differ accordingly, an effective solution of the problem is possible only if we alternate the emphasis according to time and circumstances.

5. Forms in Which We and the Enemy Encircle One Another

Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensive and is operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and are operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We on our part encircle each of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of the offensive and of exterior-line operations in campaigns and battles by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from exterior lines. This is the first form of our encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai mountain region, or on three sides, like the north-western Shansi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement.

However, if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to the battle fronts of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own -- rather like a game of weichi.⁹ Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matter of "dominating the spaces" that the great strategic role of guerrilla base areas in the rear of the enemy is revealed. We are raising this question in the War of Resistance in order that the nation's military authorities and the guerrilla commanders in all areas should place on the agenda the development of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and the establishment of base areas wherever possible, and carry this out as a strategic task. If on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, and the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as other strategic units, we shall then have one more form of encirclement against the enemy than he has against us and bring about exterior-line operations in the Pacific region by which to encircle and destroy fascist Japan. To be sure, this is of little practical significance at present, but such a prospect is not impossible.

CHAPTER VII

The Strategic Defensive and the Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War

The fourth problem of strategy in guerrilla war concerns the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive. This is the problem of how the policy of offensive warfare, which we mentioned in our discussion of the first problem, is to be carried out in practice, when we are on the defensive and when we are on the offensive in our guerrilla warfare against Japan.

Within the nation-wide strategic defensive or strategic offensive (to be more exact, the strategic counter-offensive), small-scale strategic defensives and offensives take place in and around each guerrilla base area. By strategic defensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive; by strategic offensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive.

1. The Strategic Defensive in Guerrilla War

After guerrilla warfare has broken out and grown to a considerable extent, the enemy will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas, especially in the period when his strategic offensive against the country as a whole is brought to an end and he adopts the policy of safeguarding his occupied areas. It is essential to recognize the inevitability of such attacks, for otherwise the guerrilla commanders will be caught wholly unprepared, and in the face of heavy enemy attacks they will undoubtedly become alarmed and confused and their forces will be routed.

To wipe out the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy frequently resorts to converging attacks. For instance, in each of the four or five "punitive expeditions" directed against the Wutai mountain region, the enemy made a planned advance in three, four or even six or seven columns simultaneously. The larger the scale of the guerrilla fighting, the more important the position of the base areas, and the greater the threat to the enemy's strategic centers and vital communication lines, the fiercer will be the enemy's attacks. Therefore, the fiercer the enemy's attacks on a guerrilla area, the greater the indication that the guerrilla warfare there is successful and is being effectively co-ordinated with the regular fighting.

When the enemy launches a converging attack in several columns, the guerrilla policy should be to smash it by counter-attack. It can be easily smashed if each advancing enemy column consists of only one unit, whether big or small, has no follow-up units and is unable to station troops along the route of advance, construct blockhouses or build motor roads. When the enemy launches a converging attack, he is on the offensive and operating on exterior lines, while we are on the defensive and operating on interior lines. As for our dispositions, we should use our secondary forces to pin down several enemy columns, while our main force should launch surprise attacks (chiefly in the form of ambushes) in a campaign or battle against a single enemy column, striking it when it is on the move. The enemy, though strong, will be weakened by repeated surprise attacks and will often withdraw when he is halfway; the guerrilla units can then make more surprise attacks during the pursuit and weaken him still further. The enemy generally occupies the country towns or other towns in our base areas before he stops his offensive or begins to withdraw, and we should encircle these towns, cutting off his grain supply and severing his communications, so that when he cannot hold out and begins to retreat, we can seize the opportunity to pursue and attack him. After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, and, by smashing them one by one, shatter the converging attack.

A big base area like the Wutai mountain region forms a military area, which is divided into four or five, or even more, military sub-areas, each with its own armed forces operating independently. By employing the tactics described above, these forces have often smashed the enemy's attacks simultaneously or successively.

In our plan of operations against a converging attack by the enemy, we generally place our main force on interior lines. But when we have the strength to spare, we should use our secondary forces (such as the county or the district guerrilla units, or even detachments of the main force) on exterior lines to disrupt the enemy's communications and pin down his reinforcements. Should the enemy stay put in our base area, we may reverse the tactics, namely, leave some of our forces in the base area to invest the enemy while employing the main force to attack the region whence he has come and to step up our activities there, in order to induce him to withdraw and attack our main force; this is the tactic of "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei".¹⁰

In the course of operations against a converging attack, the local anti-Japanese self-defence corps and all the mass organizations should mobilize for action and in every way help our troops to fight the enemy. In fighting the enemy, it is important both to enforce local martial law and, as far as possible, to "strengthen our defence works and clear the fields." The purpose of the former is to suppress traitors and prevent the enemy from getting information, and of the latter to assist our own operations (by strengthening our defence works) and prevent the enemy from getting food (by clearing the fields). "Clearing the fields" means harvesting the crops as soon as they are ripe.

When the enemy retreats, he often burns down the houses in the cities and towns he has occupied and razes the villages along his route, with the purpose of destroying the guerrilla base areas; but in so doing he deprives himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage recoils upon his own head. This is a concrete illustration of what we mean by one and the same thing having two contradictory aspects.

A guerrilla commander should not think of abandoning his base area and shifting to another, unless it proves impossible, after repeated operations, to smash the enemy's heavy converging attacks. In these circumstances he must guard against pessimism. So long as the leaders do not blunder in matters of principle, it is generally possible to smash the converging attacks and hold on to the base areas in the mountainous regions. It is only in the plains that, when confronted by a heavy converging attack, the guerrilla commander should consider other measures in the light of the specific circumstances, namely, leaving many small units for scattered operations, while temporarily shifting large guerrilla formations to some mountainous region, so that they can return and resume their activities in the plains once the main forces of the enemy move away.

Generally speaking, the Japanese cannot adopt the principle of blockhouse warfare, which the Kuomintang employed in the days of the civil war, because their forces are inadequate in relation to China's vast territory. However, we should reckon with the possibility that they may use it to some extent against those guerrilla base areas which pose a

particular threat to their vital positions, but even in such circumstances we should be prepared to keep up guerrilla warfare in those areas. Since we have had the experience of being able to maintain guerrilla warfare during the civil war, there is not the slightest doubt of our greater capacity to do so in a national war. Though, in point of relative military strength, the enemy can throw forces that are vastly superior in quantity as well as in quality against some of our base areas, there remain the insoluble national contradiction between us and the enemy and the unavoidable weaknesses of his command. Our victories are based on thorough work among the masses and flexible tactics in our operations.

2. The Strategic Offensive in Guerrilla War

After we have smashed an enemy offensive and before the enemy starts a new offensive, he is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic offensive.

At such times our operational policy is not to attack enemy forces which are entrenched in defensive positions and which we are not sure of defeating, but systematically to destroy or drive out the small enemy units and puppet forces in certain areas, which our guerrilla units are strong enough to deal with, and to expand our areas, arouse the masses for struggle against Japan, replenish and train our troops and organize new guerrilla units. If the enemy still remains on the defensive when these tasks are under way, we can expand our new areas still further and attack weakly garrisoned cities and communication lines and hold them for as long as circumstances permit. These are all tasks of the strategic offensive, and the purpose is to take advantage of the fact that the enemy is on the defensive so that we may effectively build up our own military and mass strength, effectively reduce the enemy's strength and prepare to smash the enemy methodically and vigorously when he mounts an offensive again.

It is essential to rest and train our troops, and the best time for doing so is when the enemy is on the defensive. It is not a question of shutting ourselves off from everything else for rest and training, but of finding time for rest and training while expanding our areas, mopping up small enemy units and arousing the people. This is usually also the time for tackling the difficult problem of getting food supplies, bedding, clothing, etc.

It is also the time for destroying the enemy's communication lines on a large scale, hampering his transport and giving direct support to the regular forces in their campaigns.

At such times the guerrilla base areas, guerrilla zones and guerrilla units are in high spirits, and the areas devastated by the enemy are gradually rehabilitated and revived. The people in the enemy-occupied territories are also delighted, and the fame of the guerrillas

resounds everywhere. On the other hand, in the camp of the enemy and his running dogs, the traitors, panic and disintegration are mounting, while there is growing hatred of the guerrillas and their base areas and preparations to deal with them are intensified. During the strategic offensive, therefore, it is impermissible for the guerrilla commanders to become so elated as to underrate the enemy and forget to strengthen unity in their own ranks and to consolidate their base areas and their forces. At such times, they must skilfully watch the enemy's every move for signs of any new offensive against us, so that the moment it comes they can wind up their strategic offensive in good order, turn to the strategic defensive and thereby smash the enemy's offensive.

CHAPTER VIII

Development of Guerrilla War Into Mobile War

The fifth problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan is its development into mobile war, a development which is necessary and possible because the war is protracted and ruthless. If China could speedily defeat the Japanese invaders and recover her lost territories, and if the war were neither protracted nor ruthless, this would not be necessary. But as, on the contrary, the war is protracted and ruthless, guerrilla warfare cannot adapt itself to such a war except by developing into mobile warfare. Since the war is protracted and ruthless, it is possible for the guerrilla units to undergo the necessary steeling and gradually to transform themselves into regular forces, so that their mode of operations is gradually regularized and guerrilla warfare develops into mobile warfare. The necessity and possibility of this development must be clearly recognized by the guerrilla commanders if they are to persist in, and systematically carry out, the policy of turning guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare.

In many places, such as the Wutai mountain region, the present guerrilla warfare owes its growth to the strong detachments sent there by the regular forces. The operations there, though generally of a guerrilla character, have contained an element of mobile warfare from the very beginning. This element will gradually increase as the war goes on. Herein lies the advantage which makes possible the swift expansion of the present anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and its rapid development to a higher level; thus the conditions for guerrilla warfare are far superior to what they were in the three northeastern provinces.

To transform guerrilla units waging guerrilla warfare into regular forces waging mobile warfare, two conditions are necessary -- an increase in numbers, and an improvement in quality. Apart from directly mobilizing the people to join the forces, increased numbers can be attained by amalgamating small units, while better quality depends on steeling the fighters and improving their weapons in the course of the war.

In amalgamating small units, we must, on the one hand, guard against localism, whereby attention is concentrated exclusively on local interests and centralization is impeded, and, on the other, guard against the purely military approach, whereby local interests are brushed aside.

Localism exists among the local guerrilla units and local governments, which are frequently pre-occupied with local considerations to the neglect of the general interest, or which prefer to act each on its own because they are unaccustomed to acting in larger groups. The commanders of the main guerrilla units or of the guerrilla formations must take this into account and adopt the method of gradual amalgamation of part of the local units, allowing the localities to keep some of their forces and expand their guerrilla warfare; the commanders should draw these units into joint operations and then bring about their amalgamation without breaking up their original organization or reshuffling their cadres, so that the small groups may integrate smoothly into the larger group.

As against localism, the purely military approach represents the wrong viewpoint held in the main forces by those who are bent on expanding their own strength and who neglect to assist the local armed units. They do not realize that the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare means not the abandonment of guerrilla warfare, but the gradual formation, in the midst of widespread guerrilla warfare, of a main force capable of conducting mobile warfare, a force around which there must still be numerous guerrilla units carrying on extensive guerrilla operations. These guerrilla units are powerful auxiliaries to the main force and serve as inexhaustible reserves for its continuous growth. Therefore, if a commander of a main force has made the mistake of neglecting the interests of the local population and the local government as a result of a purely military approach, he must correct it in order that the expansion of the main force and the multiplication of the local armed units may both receive due attention.

To raise the quality of the guerrilla units it is imperative to raise their political and organizational level and improve their equipment, military technique, tactics and discipline, so that they gradually pattern themselves on the regular forces and shed their guerrilla ways. Politically, it is imperative to get both the commanders and the fighters to realize the necessity of raising the guerrilla units to the level of the regular forces, to encourage them to strive towards this end, and to guarantee its attainment by means of political work. Organizationally,

it is imperative gradually to fulfil all the requirements of a regular formation in the following respects -- military and political organs, staff and working methods, a regular supply system, a medical service, etc. In the matter of equipment, it is imperative to acquire better and more varied weapons and increase the supply of the necessary communications equipment. In the matter of military technique and tactics, it is imperative to raise the guerrilla units to the level required of a regular formation. In the matter of discipline, it is imperative to raise the level so that uniform standards are observed, every order is executed without fail and all slackness is eliminated. To accomplish all these tasks requires a prolonged effort, and it cannot be done overnight; but that is the direction in which we must develop. Only thus can a main force be built up in each guerrilla base area and mobile warfare emerge for more effective attacks on the enemy. Where detachments or cadres have been sent in by the regular forces, the goal can be achieved more easily. Hence all the regular forces have the responsibility of helping the guerrilla units to develop into regular units.

CHAPTER IX

The Relationship of Command

The last problem of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan concerns the relationship of command. A correct solution of this problem is one of the prerequisites for the unhampered development of guerrilla warfare.

Since guerrilla units are a lower level of armed organization characterized by dispersed operations, the methods of command in guerrilla warfare do not allow as high a degree of centralization as in regular warfare. If any attempt is made to apply the methods of command in regular warfare to guerrilla warfare, its great flexibility will inevitably be restricted and its vitality sapped. A highly centralized command is in direct contradiction to the great flexibility of guerrilla warfare and must not and cannot be applied to it.

However, guerrilla warfare cannot be successfully developed without some centralized command. When extensive regular warfare and extensive guerrilla warfare are going on at the same time, their operations must be properly co-ordinated; hence the need for a command co-ordinating the two, i.e., for a unified strategic command by the national general staff and the war-zone commanders. In a guerrilla zone or guerrilla base area with many guerrilla units, there are usually one or more guerrilla formations (sometimes together with regular formations) which constitute the main force, a number of other guerrilla units, big and small, which

represent the supplementary force, and many armed units composed of people not withdrawn from production; the enemy forces there usually form a unified complex to concert their operations against the guerrillas. Consequently, the problem arises of setting up a unified or centralized command in such guerrilla zones or base areas.

Hence, as opposed both to absolute centralization and to absolute decentralization, the principle of command in guerrilla war should be centralized strategic command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles.

Centralized strategic command includes the planning and direction of guerrilla warfare as a whole by the state, the co-ordination of guerrilla warfare with regular warfare in each war zone, and the unified direction of all the anti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla zone or base area. Here lack of harmony, unity and centralization is harmful, and every effort must be made to ensure all three. In general matters, that is, matters of strategy, the lower levels should report to the higher and follow their instructions so as to ensure concerted action. Centralization, however, stops at this point, and it would likewise be harmful to go beyond it and interfere with the lower levels in matters of detail like the specific dispositions for a campaign or battle. For such details must be settled in the light of specific conditions, which change from time to time and from place to place and are quite beyond the knowledge of the distant higher levels of command. This is what is meant by the principle of decentralized command in campaigns and battles. The same principle generally applies in regular operations, especially when communications are inadequate. In a word, it means guerrilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative in our hands within the framework of a unified strategy.

Where a guerrilla base area constitutes a military area divided into sub-areas, each comprising several counties, each of which is again divided into districts, the relationship between the various levels, from the headquarters of the military area and sub-areas down to the county and district governments, is one of consecutive subordination, and every armed force must, according to its nature, be under the direct command of one of these. On the principle that has been enunciated, in the relationship of command at these levels matters of general policy should be centralized in the higher levels, while actual operations should be carried out in the light of the specific circumstances by the lower levels, which should have the right of independent action. If a higher level has something to say about the actual operations undertaken at a lower level, it can and should advance its views as "instructions" but must not issue hard and fast "commands." The more extensive the area, the more complex the situation and the greater the distance between the higher and the lower levels, the more advisable it becomes to allow greater independence to the lower levels in their actual operations and thus give those operations a character conforming more closely to the


local requirements, so that the lower levels and the local personnel may develop the ability to work independently, cope with complicated situations, and successfully expand guerrilla warfare. For an armed unit or bigger formation which is engaged in a concentrated operation, the principle to be applied is one of centralization in its internal relationship of command, since the situation is clear to the higher command; but the moment this unit or formation breaks up for dispersed action, the principle of centralization in general matters and of decentralization in details should be applied, for then the specific situation cannot be clear to the higher command.

Absence of centralization where it is needed means negligence by the higher levels or usurpation of authority by the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the military sphere. If decentralization is not effected where it should be, that means monopolization of power by the higher levels and lack of initiative on the part of the lower levels, neither of which can be tolerated in the relationship between higher and lower levels, especially in the command of guerrilla warfare. The above principles constitute the only correct policy for solving the problem of the relationship of command.

Notes

1. The Changpai mountain range is situated on the northeastern border of China. After the Japanese invasion on September 18, 1931, the region became a base area for the anti-Japanese guerrillas led by the Chinese Communist Party.
2. The Wutai mountain range is situated on the borders between Shansi, Hopei, and what was then Chahar Province. In October 1937 the Eighth Route Army led by the Chinese Communist Party started building the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei anti-Japanese base area with the Wutai mountain region as its center.
3. The Taihang mountain range is situated on the borders between Shansi, Hopei and Honan Provinces. In November 1937 the Eighth Route Army started building the southeastern Shansi anti-Japanese base area with the Taihang mountain region as its center.
4. The Taishan Mountain is one of the chief peaks of the Tai-Yi mountain range in central Shantung. In the winter of 1937 the guerrilla forces led by the Communist Party started building the central Shantung anti-Japanese base area with the Tai-Yi mountain region as its center.

5. The Yenshan mountain range is situated on the border of Hopei and what was then Jehol Province. In the summer of 1938 the Eighth Route Army started building the eastern Hopei anti-Japanese base area with the Yenshan mountain region as its center.
6. The Maoshan Mountains are in southern Kiangsu. In June 1938 the New Fourth Army led by the Communist Party started building the southern Kiangsu anti-Japanese base area with the Maoshan mountain region as its center.
7. Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved that it was possible to establish long-term and, in many places, stable base areas in the plains. This was due to their vastness and big populations, the correctness of the Communist Party's policies, the extensive mobilization of the people and the enemy's shortage of troops. Comrade Mao Tse-tung affirmed this possibility more definitely in later directives.
8. Ever since the end of World War II, the national and democratic revolutionary movement has been surging forward in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In many countries the people, led by their own revolutionary and progressive forces, have carried on sustained armed struggles to overthrow the dark rule of imperialism and reaction. This demonstrates that in the new historical circumstances -- when the socialist camp, the revolutionary forces of the people in the colonial countries and the forces of the people striving for democracy and progress in all countries are taking giant strides forward, when the world capitalist system is weakening still further, and when the colonial rule of imperialism is heading for disintegration -- the conditions under which the people of various countries conduct guerrilla warfare today need not be quite the same as those which were necessary in the days of the guerrilla warfare waged by the Chinese people against Japan. In other words, guerrilla war can be victoriously waged in a country which is not large in territory, as for instance, in Cuba, Algeria, Laos and southern Viet Nam.
9. Weichi is an old Chinese game, in which the two players try to encircle each other's pieces on the board. When a player's pieces are encircled, they are counted as "dead" (captured). But if there is a sufficient number of blank spaces among the encircled pieces, then the latter are still "alive" (not captured).
10. In 353 B.C. the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan, capital of the state of Chao. The king of the state of Chi, an ally of Chao, ordered his generals Tien Chi and Sun Pin to aid Chao with their troops. Knowing that the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao and left their own territory weakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the state of Wei whose troops withdrew to defend their own country. Taking advantage of their exhaustion, the troops of Chi engaged and routed them at Kueiling (northeast of the present Hotse County in Shantung). The sieze of Hantan, capital of Chao, was thus lifted. Since then Chinese strategists have referred to similar tactics as "relieving the state of Chao by besieging the state of Wei."



NATURAL SCIENCE AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

-- Looking at the Bankruptcy of Idealism and Metaphysics from the Development of Modern Physics. --

Following is a translation of an article by Chu Hung-yuan (2612 3163 0337) in the Chinese-language periodical Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), Peiping, No. 9, 21 August 1965, pages 21-25.

Editor's note: Recently, a number of natural science workers and philosophers workers of Peiping held a forum to discuss the question of using dialectical materialism in scientific and technical work. Following are a few of the statements made at the forum. We hope that everyone will discuss them. This publication is preparing to continue to put out articles on this type of question.

Hung Ch'i's publication of Pan-t'ien Ch'ang-i's (0978 3944 2490 0001) "Dialogue on the New Basic Particle View" was a very enlightening article.

Japanese theoretical physics came into full bloom late. During the first 30 years of this century, the rise of the theory of relativity and the formation and development of quantum mechanics caused soaring changes in theoretical physics, but no Japanese theoretical physicist made any great contributions in this. Today, Japan's "basic particle" theories, represented by the Pan-t'ien Ch'ang-i scholarly group, stand in the foremost ranks of the world. With regard to experimenting on the physics of basic particles, Japan lacks facilities found in some European countries and in America. Japan has done some experimental research on cosmic rays, and apart from this, only one betatron with a capacity of one billion electron volts. However, Japanese theoretical physicists have put forward the mezon theory in nuclear power, the exceed-much-time theory in the quantum field, the chung-cheng-hua (6850 2973 0553) theory, the hypothesis on two types of mesons and two types of neutrinos, the Hsi-tao-- kai-erh-man (6007 1497 -- 4146 1422 2581) principles, the method for dividing categories of SU_3 mass basic particles, and so forth. Thus they have made a series of important contributions which have exceeded those made by some European countries and America where experimental conditions are better.

Why did the Japanese theory on basic particles, represented by the

Pan-t'ien Ch'ang-i school of thought, develop so rapidly and reach such a relatively high level?

During last year's scientific discussions meeting in Peiping, I learned from talking with professor Pan-t'ien Ch'ang-i that, during the last part of the 1920's, he had read Engels' Natural Dialectics, and that later he had gradually striven to consciously use dialectical materialism to direct his scientific research work. He and his colleagues emphasized research on methodology in theoretical physics. When the viewpoint of the Ke-pen-ha-ken school of thought swept through the field of theoretical physics, he was able to stand his ground, not to blindly follow the West, and to forge along his own path. I believe that this is an important reason for their later acquiring prominence.

If we want to overtake the world's advanced levels in science, we must study and use dialectical materialism, strive to seize the initiative in theoretical thought, smash through old wornout ideas, and dare to pursue our own path. If we simply blindly follow the lead of foreign countries, we will never catch up the advanced international levels.

If we examine the history of the development of modern physics, we will discover that many crooked paths have been followed in research. Since the previous people went astray, their successors can rise to the top. However there is one condition for this: their successors must follow fewer crooked paths; they must follow the correct path, their own path. If the successors go along the same twisting paths that their predecessors did, they will not even be able to catch up with them.

We can see that in the course of the development of modern physics, idealism and metaphysics have thrown up serious obstacles towards the development of theory.

In explaining macroscopic physical phenomena, classical physics has made achievements; these achievements have made neutronian mechanics and Maxwell-Faraday electro-magnetic theories appear to be absolute, unchanging truths, the ultimate theories in the world of physics. After neutronian mechanics was able to explain basically the movement of the planets around the sun in the solar system, this metaphysical viewpoint even caused Laplace to produce a similar erroneous theory; he held that if the original position and the moving capability of all particles in the universe could be calculated, the future stages of the entire universe could be plotted.

However, after the experimental research of physics had penetrated the microscopic world, the limitations of classical physics were revealed, and sharp contradictions between a series of new experimental facts and classical physics theories arose. With regard to dialectical materialists, contradictions between experiments and theories constitute an important moving force in the developments of science, and they should be greeted with open arms. However, with regard to the metaphysicists who present their theories of classical physics as the ultimate truths, these contradictions are an inexplicable monster, which must be concealed and buried. But, contradictions cannot be concealed or buried. All such attempts to do so are in vain; they objectively serve the function of blocking the development of science.

The dual nature of particles-waves constitutes a basic characteristic differentiating the microscopic world from the macroscopic world, and it is a basic contradiction in the microcosm. The metaphysical method of thinking held by physicists prevented them for a long time from being able to accept this dialectical thinking.

Today, Jui-li-- Chin-ssu's theory on black body radiation has been described as the midwife of quantum theory; it is said to have broken through the contradiction between experimental fact and classical physics theory. However, this is not the way history is. Jui-li and Chin-ssu themselves wanted to explain the frequency distribution of energy of black body radiation within the scope of classical physics. When they discovered that the energy density formula, which classical physics theory provided, tended towards infinity following the frequency, that this was in sharp contradiction with experimental facts, they had no intention of revealing the contradiction. Quite the opposite, they put forth a number of irrelevant reasons in an attempt to conceal the contradiction between classical physics and the results of experiments.

The quantum theory concerning black body radiation, which was advanced by Planck in 1900, was a clarion call to smash through the concepts of classical physics. But for five years afterwards, nobody paid any attention to this revolutionary theory. What makes a person take pause is that, during the next 15 years, Planck tried to obliterate the revolutionary quantum concepts which he himself had proposed, and attempted to put everything back into the old basket of classical physics.

The photon hypothesis which Einstein put forth in 1905 revealed the dual particle-wave motion nature of rays. Still, not only did Planck, the creator of the quantum theory, think that this hypothesis was extreme, but even in 1922, P'o-erh, the determiner of the quantum theories on atomic structure, thought that the photon hypothesis would not hold water. This situation caused few people to continue Einstein's work for a long time. It was only in 1924 that Te-pu-lo-i carried the dual wave-particle hypothesis into microscopic bodies. On the basis of his work, Hsieh-ting-e quickly put forward the basic equation for quantum mechanics -- the Hsieh-ting-e equation. It can be imagined that physicists could have put forward this hypothesis on the dual particle-wave nature for microscopic bodies not long after 1905. It would seem that one of the important reasons why this did not appear until 1924 was due to the metaphysics in the thinking of the physicists.

The process of the establishment of quantum mechanics shows that physicists voluntarily follow the path of metaphysics, and it is extremely tortuous for them to arrive at the dialectical path. It is truly like Engels said: "This return (referring to the return from metaphysics to the dialectic -- the writer) can be achieved by differing paths. It could be arrived at naturally from the discoveries themselves of natural science, for these discoveries would prevent them from continuing to be held in shackles of old metaphysics. However, this is a rather long-term, rather difficult process, and many obstacles must be overcome in this process." (1)

For scientists themselves to get out of the old trap of metaphysics, there are not only many pitfalls involved, but there is also much blindness, so that it is very easy to run into the embrace of idealist theories.

Long ago in 1908, Lenin said: "The primary reason why new physics has fallen into idealism is that the physicists do not understand the dialectic. They oppose metaphysical ... idealism and its one-sided 'mechanistic aspect', but at the same time they throw out the baby with the bath water." (2) The history of the Copenhagen school of thought is an outstanding example.

The Copenhagen school of thought made important contributions to the establishment of quantum mechanics. If we analyze the method used by this school in establishing matrix mechanics, we discover that two points served the main functions:

(1) They took the new experimental results, which classical physics couldn't explain at all, and accepted them as objective facts, and moreover made them into the foundation for setting up new theories.

(2) They applied the corresponding principles to handle classical physics; they discarded the parts of classical physics which were not suitable for describing the microcosm, and absorbed those parts which were. Based on the basic features of the microcosm, they undertook deep revisions of those parts of classical physics theories which were appropriate for describing the microcosm, and made this into their springboard for arriving at new theories.

No matter how sharp the contradictions which existed between the new experimental facts and classical theory, they still accepted the facts, and the new theories which were built up on this basis reflected the essential difference between the microcosm and the macrocosm. When establishing the new theories which reflected the special laws of the microcosm, they did not discard the whole of classical physics theory. On the one hand they considered the difference between the microcosm and the macrocosm and the special nature of the microcosm, and on the other hand, they considered the relation between the microcosm and the macrocosm, their mutual points. From the viewpoint of dialectical materialism, these scientific methods were correct.

However, because this approach by the Copenhagen school was not conscious, because dialectical materialism was not their vigorous guide, the metaphysical method again reared its ugly head when they summed up their philosophical experience and lessons from their scientific achievements. They one-sidedly emphasized the function served by this method which negated classical physics concepts, and made this method into an absolute. They developed this to the point of negating all physics theories which could not be, or which had not been, measured by instruments. In the realm of scientific research, they held that results directly probed by instruments were everything, and in actuality this is the viewpoint in bourgeois philosophy that "perception is everywhere." This is the viewpoint of positivism.

To make phenomena into absolutes, to deny the basic nature behind things -- this is to put roadblocks into the path of the development of understanding. Within the past 40 years, the positivism of the Copenhagen school has had an extensive influence in the world of theoretical physics. It has muddied the waters of theoretical physics and has led the development of theoretical physics onto many by-ways. A classical example of this is Po-erh's contention in the 1930's that energy is not stable in beta decay.

At that time they held that all things which had not been directly demonstrated by experimental technique, even if there was strong proof for their existence indirectly in experiments, were just empty subjective constructs. Under the pressure of this sort of atmosphere, even in 1937, Fei-mi did not dare to conscientiously regard his own theory of beta decay which had the neutrino hypothesis as its basis. Due to a similar reason, professor Pan-t'ien Ch'ang-i's hypothesis of two types of mesons was buried for five years, and his hypothesis of two types of neutrinos was buried for 20 years.

Another classical example is Hai-sen-pao's S-matrix theory on basic particles which he put forward in 1942. This theory denied all theories on microscopic bodies, except energy levels, decay life, and impacts on surfaces which could be directly tested in experiments. With the negation of the basic nature behind phenomena, there was only an empty framework remaining to theory. In order to add content to this empty framework, G. Chew trusted to an hypothesis about the mathematical form of theory -- the so-called hypothesis that the mathematical form of a theory has the largest explainable nature. In recent years many theoretical physicists have entered this dead-end street, have followed many twisting paths, and have come up with few results.

In his article "Dialogue on a New Basic Particle Viewpoint," professor Pan-t'ien Ch'ang-i pointed out: The positivism of the Copenhagen school created this sort of atmosphere in the world of theoretical physics: It was almost a crime to consider that basic particles were things which had their own inner structure. The reason why the metaphysical view that basic particles were the origin of matter could be prevalent so extensively for such a long time in the world of physics, and could block off experimenting on the structure of basic particles by physicists, was in large part due to the influence of the positivism of the Copenhagen school.

These historical lessons repeatedly remind us that scientists must consciously strive to use dialectical materialism to guide their own work.

Every time that there is a major revolution in the world of physics, mankind's understanding of the natural world is deepened, and contradictions particularly at this deeper level of understanding will be ferreted out; and these are new contradictions which the previous levels could not have contained. Our revolutionary scientific research workers should use the method of dialectical materialism to guide their own work, consciously understand the limitlessness of the world, the infinite divisibility of matter; they should act as Engels has taught and take each new discovery to be a "'link' in the infinite series in the cutting up of matter. It certainly does not conclude the series, but it rather determines a distinction in essence." (3) In this manner, we will never be satisfied in our scientific research; we will constantly feel that there is a force pushing us ahead to probe the as yet unknown truths of the objective world. Thus we will continually make even more even better contributions towards the development of natural science.

Footnotes:

(1) Natural Dialectics, People's Publishing House, 1955, page 25.

(2) "Materialism and Empirical Criticism", The Complete Works of

Lenin, Vol. 14, People's Publishing House, page 276.

(3) Selection of Correspondence between Marx and Engels,

People's Publishing House, 1962, page 200.



FORGE AHEAD IN THE COURSE OF EXPOSING AND
RESOLVING CONTRADICTIONS

[Following is a translation of an article by Kao Ch'ung-shou (7559 1504 1108) in the Chinese-language periodical, Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), Peiping, No 9, 21 August 1965, pages 25-27.]

Characteristics may be observed in two aspects from the development of modern physics in the past several decades. On the one hand, it has been a period of rapid development of physics. Since the late 19th century experiments have constantly discovered numerous new phenomena and have had their impacts on the traditional idea. Classic physics which had long been recognized as the ultimate theory has exposed its limitation, compelling one to revise fundamentally many important concepts. The theory of relativity has been founded, so as the quantum mechanics. On this foundation various branches of modern physics have gained a rapid development; one's knowledge of the structure of matter and its law has been enriched; and immense contributions have been made to the development of advanced technology.

On the other hand, in the process of rapid development many twists and turns have always emerged and a number of physicists, who had made important contributions to the development of physics, have by and by taken the wrong path and made no progress in their subsequent research work. Moreover, it frequently happened that people repeated again and again the errors made by their predecessors. Instances like this are numerous and worthy of our deep thought.

Lenin pointed out in the early period of this century that by its progress modern physics has constantly confirmed the dialectical-materialistic conception of the world. But proceeding from their conception of the world many western bourgeois scientists have found it difficult to accept this point. Frequently they pursued within the circles of idealism and metaphysics and could not get out of these circles. When we look at the past and view the present we may find that this is an important reason why past errors are often repeated and devious patch is constantly followed in the development of modern physics.

Things are always divided into two aspects. A "one divides into two" attitude should be assumed to any scientific theory. Proceeding from the metaphysical viewpoint, one finds it difficult to understand this and is likely to go to two extremes: (1) Confines one's view to the problems found in existing theory and assumes a too negative attitude toward it. (2) Confines and views to the success achieved by the theory and gives little consideration to the problems that may exist in the theory. Both of these tendencies impede the development of scientific theory.

The task of moving the existing theory forward is often realized by some new persons who dare to break the confines and know how to carry on the work of their predecessors. It frequently happens that ranks of fighters pioneering science are constantly reformed along with the reform of theory. Several founders of the quantum mechanics took the place of the authority on the old quantum theory and, in the subsequent development of the quantum theory, they were relegated to the secondary position.

Such a phenomenon frequently appeared in the development of modern physics over the past decades. Having contributed to the development of theory many theoretical physicists often kept themselves within the confines of their success and could no longer break through them. An important reason for this was that they were fettered with metaphysical thought.

All things have contradictions which are the driving force behind the development of things. The development of scientific theory is, in the final analysis, moved forward by the contradiction between theory and practice.

Many western theoretical physicists are very afraid of contradictions. When new massive experiments demonstrate a sharp contradiction with the old theory, there is always a group of people who try everything possible to avoid and cover up the contradiction and uphold the old theory. From the viewpoint of classic mechanics, the law of mechanics as observed by one on a running train is the same as that observed by one on the ground, but things are different with the electromagnetic law. The contradiction inherent in this basic viewpoint demonstrates the need for development of theory.

In the late 19th century a series of experiments were made on the propagation of light; the results obtained came into serious clash with the traditional concept, thus aggravating the contradiction. People made various kinds of experiments in their attempt to reconcile this contradiction by means of many strange characters of the propagation of light but they never solved the problem. It was only after experiments discovered that the speed of light remains constant in vacuum (same for various inertial systems) that the conceptual confines of the class mechanics were broken and a new theory - restricted theory of relativity - was founded, thereby resolving this contradiction.

There were some people who, having fully exposed the sharp contradiction between new experiments and the old theory, spontaneously adopted an attitude of recognizing and resolving the contradiction and, in doing so, contributed to the development of theory. But after they resolved this contradiction and made theoretical progress, they often took the conceived aspects of the matter as the total law of the material world and no longer gave consideration to the fact that more profound contradictions might exist in the objective world. They no longer consciously paid attention to the new contradictions revealed in their experiments. Instead, they indulged in polishing the existing theory in their attempt to make it the ultimate theory which is all-embracing and free of contradictions. Herein lay the reason why some theoretical physicists made important contributions at the early stage but were no longer able to make new, important contributions afterwards.

Heisenberg, one of the founders of the quantum mechanics attempted to find an ultimate theory that would give a unified description to the "fundamental particle" but he worked for many years without achieving any important results.

In the last decade a theory of dispersion relationship was evolved in the study of the theory of fundamental particle. This is an important progress for it has overcome certain difficulties in the original theory and enabled the study of the theory of fundamental particle to take a step forward. But some western scientists consider that the theory of dispersion relationship is a rudiment of the ultimate theory, and some of them even claim that it will not take long before they will make a breakthrough. This of course cannot be realized.

Practice is the foundation of theory and the criterion of truth. The fundamental particle physics is a young science and the experimental data available are still not complete. This means that theoretical workers must make good use of these incomplete data and make more experiments.

On the other hand, experiments continue to uncover new phenomena and have their impacts on the old concept and theory. This means that theoretical workers must make explorations in multiple fields, including application of abstract mathematical instruments, bring forward new concepts and hypothesis which are abstract, and turn them into new theories through practice and test.

Yet it is in these circumstances that some of the western physicists take a great interest in a mass of so-called theoretical exploration in complete disregard of experimental basis. This reflects this trend of thought: It seems that the significance of their "theories" will depend on whether they are harmonious in themselves and whether they form an integral system. As to whether these "theories" can stand the test of practice, they have the mentality of making a chance hit.

This trend of thought reflects an idealist view on the relationship between theory and practice. It leads theoretical exploration astray. This type of work can hardly make important contributions to the progress of the theory of fundamental particle but will create illusions and divert one's attention.

From the above it will be seen that idealism and metaphysics impede the rapid development of science. If scientists cannot consciously apply materialistic dialectics in directing their work, they may conform to the spirit of materialistic dialectics and achieve some important success for a given period and in certain work but are likely to go astray. That western bourgeois scientists find it difficult to free themselves from the bondage of idealism and metaphysics is dictated by their outlook on the world. With a view to rapid development of our science, we should, under the leadership of the Party, study strenuously the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, study Comrade Mao's works, arm ourselves with Marxist-Leninist outlook on the world and learn how to apply materialistic dialectics consciously in directing our science work.

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DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IN ANALYSIS OF MOLECULAR STRUCTURE

Following is a translation of an article by Hsu Kuang-hsien (1776 0342 2009) in the Chinese-language periodical Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), Peiping, No. 9, 21 August 1965, pages 28-31.

Hung Ch'i's publishing of Pan-t'ien Ch'ang-i's (0978 3944 2490 0001) article was very enlightening to us. In his research on "basic particles," he consciously used the viewpoint and method of dialectical materialism. We have very good conditions for studying and using dialectical materialism. If we can consciously use the pointer of the thought of Mao Tse-tung, conscientiously sum up the path of development of the scientific realms we are probing, recall the profitable experiences and lessons of the false ways, and if we can shake off the influence of metaphysical thought, there will certainly be an even faster, even better development in our country's natural sciences.

Here, with regard to the path and prospect of the development of theory on molecular structure, we will put forward a few immature opinions. We ask for criticism by our comrades, and discussion.

In modern theories on molecular structure, there are three main schools: The Chia-chien (0116 6943) theory, the molecular track theory, and the coordination place theory; all were developed not long after quantum mechanics was put forward. The chia-chien theory stresses the principle that electrons between two atoms couple together to form a link; this is the same as the chia-chien concept well known by chemists, and it developed rather rapidly. However, the concept of electrons coupling together to form a single, double, or triple chien (6943) cannot explain the structure of benzene and other conjugate molecules. This is a great, basic contradiction.

In science, when contradictions are discovered between important experimental results and existing theory, this is frequently a turning point in the development of theory. At such a time, the guidance of methodology plays a large role. And the correctness of the method adopted by scientists to handle this sort of contradiction will directly advancement in theory.

When the contradictions between experimental results and existing theory are basic in nature, scientists often resort to a few appropriate

suppositions which have a basis. They thus add to and revise the existing theory, unify the experimental results and the existing theory, so that the theory is enriched and developed.

However, when these contradictions are basic in nature, the situation is quite complex. At such a point, scientists can adopt three differing methods:

(1) They may get help from some hypotheses which often lack a basis, or which at times are obviously inappropriate, so as to reconcile the contradictions between the experimental results and the existing theory. They fill things out and draw them into the web of the existing theory. After doing this, some scientists are immensely pleased for having upheld an old theory which is widely accepted by people. As for whether or not their hypothesis is reliable, they don't think this is too important.

(2) They may completely discard the old theory and establish a new theory, or they may develop another set of theories already known but neglected by people for some reason. Because the correct, appropriate parts of the old theory are completely thrown out, the results of this approach are often to form another school of theory which has serious defects in it.

(3) They may treat the existing theory with the one divides into two method. They carefully examine the whole contents of the theory, intentionally arrange experiments and gather data, so as to reveal as fully as possible the contradictions between the theory and the experimental results. Later they dialectically negate, (according to Lenin's approach, this is a negation for developing links; it is a negation which includes an affirmation), on the basis of having overcome the contradictions between the experimental results and the existing theory, the existing theory; they critically absorb the rational elements in it, and then create a new theory which is in accord with, or close to, objective laws. If at this time another theoretical school exists, the one divides into two method should be applied, so as to examine carefully its strong and weak points; there should be repeated testing by experiment, so as to help throw out errors, to absorb the correct content, and to enable the newly created theory to be even more complete.

Methods one and two above are one-sided, and errors will unavoidably result if they are used to handle contradictions of a basic nature between theory and experiment.

In the course of the development of modern theories on molecular structure, in order to handle contradictions in the chia-chien theory about the benzene molecule and other conjugate molecular structure, Pao-lin in the 1930's put forward the "resonance theory." A few years ago, scientists had differing opinions about the value of the "resonance theory." I believe that the above method number one was used to handle this contradiction. Its main characteristic was to preserve the old four types of basic bonds (the single bond, the double bond, the triple bond, and the ionic bond) in the classical theory of structure. Use of this person's hypothesis of "structural resonance" to fill out the old theory will not account for the problem of conjugate molecules.

Using the second method to handle contradictions brings in the

molecular track theory. This theory stressed the entirety of the molecule, holding that the electrons in the molecule are possessed by the entire molecule; it ignores the linking into bonds of the electrons between atoms inside the molecule. Although it has overcome many defects in the chia-chien theory, in particular the resonance theory, it has not absorbed the strong points of the chia-chien theory, and thus cannot become a theory unanimously acknowledged by everyone.

With the development of science, a new type of contradictions appeared, that is, neither the chia-chien theory nor the molecular track theory could explain in sufficient quantity many features of complex things. Thus in the past ten years there has been a very fast development of another school of molecular structure theory, that is the coordination place theory. In the aspects of fixed calculation of the complex spectrum and magnetic nature, this theory has arrived at encouraging results. But it has its defects and limitations.

In the past 15 years, as compared with the molecular track theory and the coordination place theory, the chia-chien theory and the resonance theory have been in a stagnant state. Then, is there any future for the chia-chien theory? Yes. I think it has a long future development. The classical molecular structure, which is the mainstay of the chia-chien theory, is still applicable within a certain scope. However, with regard to the fact that the basic classical bonds cannot reflect contradictions in some molecular structures, we should use the third method for handling contradictions. We should as much as possible reveal these contradictions, and on the basis of summing up large quantities of new experimental data, we should dig out new chemical bond types; we should theoretically analyze the nature of these new bonds, absorb the successful methods and profitable concepts in the molecular track theory and the coordination place theory. As much as possible we should use the effective methods of theoretical physics (such as group theory and modern calculation techniques) to elucidate the principles and features in bond-formation in the new types of bonds.

Like any other objectively existing thing, molecules include a unified whole of internal contradictions. Every aspect of their structure must be unified. The fact that existing theories on molecular structure cannot explain in a unified manner the various phenomena already discovered in the structure of a molecule shows that they cannot in an overall way reflect the actual conditions of molecular structure. Therefore, my idea is: use a sensitive "camera" so that the entirety of a molecule may be observed from a rather high angle and a rather long distance (this involves the molecular track theory); this would also analyze from a rather close angle the conditions of bond-formation between atoms within a molecule (the chia-chien theory). We could also use a multiple section and projection (for example, the coordination place theory and others). Moreover, we could use the method of dialectical materialism as an ideological weapon, and take all the photographs taken from every angle, along with scientific experiments, and production experience, the data collected therefrom, retain the valuable and discard the useless, keep the true and throw out the false. We could proceed from this point to that point, from the superficial to the basic, and put forward methods for mathematical handling which are

more in accord with the model, and more in accord with reality in an overall way. These could be returned to the laboratory for repeated experiments, and the results of the experiments could be constantly modified, so that there would gradually be formed a rather complete set of new theories on molecular structure.

Below, I will give a brief outline of my proposed approach.

The viewpoint of electrons belonging to molecules and the viewpoint of joined electrons should be unified. We hold that molecules are an integral whole composed of the nuclear structure of atoms and the electrons around the nucleus. This viewpoint is taken over from the molecular track theory, and it is also correct. But in the process of forming molecules, some electrons play a primary role, while some play a secondary role. If these are not differentiated and research done separately, the laws for the binding power of molecules will not be easy to clarify. The electrons which play a primary role in the formation of molecules are especially called chia (0116) electrons. The internal electrons which play only a secondary role are to be called inner stratum electrons. The concept of chia electrons comes from the chia-chien theory, but its significance lies in including not only binding electrons, but also anti-binding electrons, non-binding electrons, isolated electrons, as well as d electrons in complex things, f electrons in some compounds. Therefore this is much more extensive than the chia electrons referred to in the chia-chien theory. One of the weaknesses of the molecular track theory is that it does not respect the chia-chien theory. The chia-chien theory has made the sphere of the chia electrons too narrow, so that many facts cannot be explained. To differentiate chia electrons and inner stratum electrons, to sum up the various types and the subordination of the chia electrons -- this is the important content of the new molecular structure theory.

In 1954, comrade T'eng Ao-ch'ing (0781 2407 1987) put forward the theory of functions and a calculating method for double electron bonds (1). In 1955 comrade P'eng Heng-wu (1756 1854 2976) proposed the theory of functions of multiple electron bonds. (2) I think that these can be used to replace the single electron situation, that is, the molecular track, and this will provide a very good basis for a new development in the chia-chien theory. This new method unifies the strong points of the chia-chien theory and the molecular track theory, and this can overcome the weak point in the molecular track theory of not considering the "instantaneous linking" between electrons.

The principle of binding related in the chia-chien theory is primarily one of electron coupling. The uses of this are many, but its limitations are also great. The binding principles of the new theory will contain even richer content, and it should include the formation conditions and essence for every type of new bond, as well as the new binding factors in the old bonds, and so forth.

The new molecular structure theory can also try to unify the coordination place theory with the chia-chien theory.

The development of the new theory should pay attention to relating to reality. It should give priority consideration to chemical problems as for example, extraction chemistry, complex chemistry, the catalytic function,

semiconductors, the receive-stimulation radiation, and molecular biology, all of which are in important scientific spheres. In this way, we will on the one hand spur development in these spheres, and on the other hand, because of the special leaps taken in the research work in these spheres, new contradictions and new bonds will be rather abundant, and priority research in these realms will be very advantageous to the development of chemical bond theories.


Due to limitations of level, these suppositions have not necessarily been put forward correctly, nor will they necessarily work out. My purpose was simply to stimulate discussion, so that there will be mutual research on how to consciously study and use dialectical materialism, so that we may develop our own path in research on chemical binding theory.

6722

CSO: 3530-0

Footnotes:

- (1) Chemistry Journal, Vol. 20, Issue No. 2.
- (2) Physics Journal, Vol. 11, Issue No. 2.



ON THE LIMITLESS DIVISIBILITY OF MATTER

Following is a translation of an article by Kung Yu-chih (7895 5148 0037) in the Chinese-language periodical Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), Peiping, No. 9, 21 August 1965, pages 31-36.

Let's discuss a few ideas on the question of the limitless divisibility of matter.

(1) In a note on Pan-t'ien Ch'ang-i's (0978 3944 2490 0001) article, the Hung Ch'i periodical deliberately stressed the thought of the limitless divisibility of matter. This is an important concept in dialectical materialism.

When the dialect talks about "division", it refers to "one divides into two", the contradictions inside a thing, the unity of opposites and struggle within things.

Metaphysics denies contradictions inside things, holding that "one" is simply "one," and indivisible. The dialectic also talks about "one." However, the dialectic holds that "one" is the unity of opposites, and is divisible. No ultimate, absolute, indivisible "one" exists in the universe. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said: "In human society and the natural world, the unified body always tends to split into different parts; it is just that under different concrete conditions, the content will be different, and so will the form." (1)

The development of society is always in the manner of one divides into two; there never appears any absolute indivisible "one". The metaphysical viewpoint which holds that contradictions no longer exist in socialist society is already bankrupt both in practice and in theory. Comrade Mao Tse-tung summed up the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country and internationally, and penetratingly pointed out: In socialist society, classes, class struggle, and class contradictions still exist. And this is not all. In society 10,000 years later, people will still tend to split into advanced and backward groups, and there will still be contradictions and struggle between them. The difference is that under different social systems, the "division" of society will have a different nature and take a different form.

In the natural world, there will never appear any absolute, indivisible "one" in the splitting of matter. The viewpoint which holds that the

atom is absolute and indivisible (this term atom is from the Greek, meaning indivisible. Our country first translated this as "indestructible bit") has long since been bankrupt. Metaphysics has withdrawn its camp from the atom to the "basic" particle. Now, it is basically wavering with regard to this "basic" particle. The development of natural science daily proves: The series in the splitting of matter is infinite without an ultimate point. It is only that at different stages of development and on different levels of structure, the "division" of matter has a different nature and form.

To deny the universality, the absoluteness, and limitlessness of "division" is to deny the limitless development of the natural world and society, to deny the infinite development of understanding, to cause the dialectic to be severed in the middle, to bring to a halt and to destroy natural science and social science.

(2) Some comrades express doubts about the infinite divisibility of matter. They feel that the concept of "division" can not necessarily be applied forever. Let's discuss this question for a moment.

Whether or not to recognize the limitless divisibility of matter has been an ancient dispute in philosophy. This occurred both in China and abroad.

In the "T'ien-hsia" chapter of Chuang-tzu, there is recorded this idea by the "dialecticians": "If one cuts the length of a foot into half all day long, he would not come to a halt in 10,000 generations."

I think that this idea, in crude form and from the aspect of quantity, shows the brilliant concept of the limitless divisibility of matter.

Many people cannot accept this concept; they cannot understand how a finite object can be divided into infinite parts. The reason for this is that they do not understand the dialectic of the finite and the infinite, nor that the infinite is constructed out of the finite and that the finite contains the infinite within it.

From the pure aspect of measurement, the finite measurement of "the length of a foot", by means of repeated halvings, indeed opens into an infinite series:

$$\frac{1}{2} \quad \frac{1}{4} \quad \frac{1}{8} \quad \frac{1}{16} \quad \frac{1}{32} \quad \dots$$

This mathematical series has the aspect of being infinite, but its total is a finite number -- 1.

After infinitesimal calculus was established in the modern era, it was very easy to demonstrate the dialectical relationship between the finite and the infinite in the aspect of measurement.

Of course, the infinite divisibility of matter cannot be considered only from the side of measurement. Even more important is that it also has a content of infinite, multi-faceted quality.

In his "Philosophical Notes," Lenin copied down Hegel's idea: "The finite nature is nothing more than a leaping out of the self; therefore, the finite nature contains the infinite nature, that is, the other of the finite nature itself." Along side this Lenin commented: "The dialectic of things themselves, of the natural world itself, of events moving on themselves." "This can be applied in the relationship between atoms and

electrons. In sum, this is the deep and distant infinity of matter. ..."
(2)

If we don't limit ourselves to a consideration of abstract quantity, but rather go to the dialectic in the concrete natural world itself, then the above idea quoted from Chuang-tzu cannot fully explain "the deep and distant infinity of matter."

"Half" is a concept of quantity. "One" divides into two "halves", but there is no change in the thing in regard to quality; it is only that it is smaller by one-half.

The dialectic cannot interpret "division" as being simply a splitting of quantity.

The dialectic speaks of quantitative changes becoming qualitative changes. The splitting of quantity, when it reaches a certain stage, brings about a change in quality.

This is not to say that when a measure loses a certain length, it will lose its basic nature of being a measure. When the splitting of matter reaches molecules, it has reached a qualitative turning point. A further "division" will cause the molecules to be divided into its component atoms. And atoms are not half molecules; they are qualitatively essentially different from molecules.

If the atom is further divided, it will split into electrons and a nucleus. And these are not half atoms, for they are essentially different things.

Things proceed like this.

Engels very early pointed out for philosophy: Molecules and atoms are not at all the "ultimate limits of divisibility", but are rather individual links in "the endless series of splitting." They do "not conclude this series, but rather demarcate differences in quality." (3) They "determine the existing form of different quality in matter in general." (4)

The great merit of the atomic theory in the history of science is that it actually pointed up a qualitative change in the process of the splitting of matter, and this induced people to do research on an extremely important qualitative form of existence in matter. The error of the old atomic theory was that it made the qualitative change in the process of the splitting of matter into an absolute, so that it became the ultimate limit in the divisibility of matter.

It is a metaphysical viewpoint to simply talk of quantitative changes, and to deny qualitative changes.

(3) Some comrades raise questions: Doesn't the infinite divisibility of matter smack of the following: The atom resembles a small solar system with its nucleus (the "sun" at the center) and electrons (the "planets" which surround it); then the electrons will resemble, along with other "basic" particles, an even smaller solar system, which can be divided into its own "sun" and "planets". Things proceed on and on like this, so as to form an infinite series of ever smaller "solar systems".

Toyshops have a certain kind of doll. If the large doll on top is opened, a similar smaller doll is found in its stomach. If this smaller doll is opened, its stomach also contains an even smaller doll ...

Is the infinite divisibility of matter really like this? No. We

do not use this viewpoint to handle the structure and splitting of matter.

The infinite divisibility of matter is not in the form of an infinite, monotonous repetition of a certain "division."

Engels, and Hegel as well, both criticized the so-called negative infinity. A characteristic of this infinity was the endless repetition of the same thing. This is a metaphysical viewpoint of the infinite.

The infinite of the dialectic contains new quality on endless levels.

The infinite divisibility of matter is a universal question of contradiction; the concrete form of the "division" of matter at different stages of development and at different levels of structure is a specialized question of contradiction.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said: "Every actual, non-concocted process of development for all forms of movements is of a different quality. Our research work must emphasize this point, and must start with this point."

(5)

At every new crucial point in the splitting of matter, taking scientific experiment as the basis, to proceed to probe the new nature, the new form, the new laws which were not known before, to constantly bring about new developments in the natural sciences -- this is what the method of dialectical materialism demands of natural scientists. Dialectical materialism will not allow any known, deeply embeded formula to be imposed on the natural world, to be imposed on natural sciences.

In fact, to say that the atom resembles a small solar system is just a crude metaphor. They have completely different natures and laws. Research of the new essence, new form, and new laws in the "division" of the atom has enabled classical physics to develop into quantum physics; this was a tremendous leap in the history of the natural sciences.

Although modern physics has not provided clear research on the "division" of "basic" particles, we can without hesitation predict that a new essence, form, and laws will appear. And research on them will impell physics towards an even newer stage.

New development in this aspect by the natural sciences will further enrich such dialectical concepts as "division", the unity of opposites, and the relationship of the whole with the part; it will infuse new content and new understanding into these ideas.

If we deny the infinite diversity of "division" in quality, and explain this to be endless repetitions of the same type of thing, then the natural world will become a poverty-stricken world, and research on nature will be monotonous work; natural scientists will have nothing to discover or to invent, and the natural sciences will not advance, but will stagnant for the rest of their lives.

In sum, we must firmly hold to the dialectical concept of the infinite divisibility of matter, and oppose the metaphysical idea that the ultimate, absolute, indivisible "one" exists; we must hold to the dialectical view of "division", and oppose the metaphysical view of "division."

(4) Matter is infinitely divisible, and this is true with theories of matter. It is always one divides into two. With a scientific theory, there is always an anti-scientific theory opposed to it; with a correct theory, there is always an erroneous theory opposed to it; with materialism

and the dialectic, there will definitely be idealism and metaphysics in opposition. With the resolution of old oppositions, new ones will come to the fore, and this goes on without ceasing forever.

The laws of the development of this truth are also demonstrated in the history of the development of the natural sciences. A very good example of this is the history of the development of the atomic and "basic" particle theories.

When the theory, which had occupied the supreme position in the history of science for so long, that atoms marked the extreme limits of divisibility, was later conclusively proved through scientific practice to be in error and was then discarded by scientists generally, when the concept that atoms were divisible was accepted as the truth by scientists in general because of incontrovertible facts, then there began the struggle between the dialectical viewpoint that "basic" particles were divisible and the erroneous viewpoint which held that "basic" particles (at least certain types among them) marked the extreme limits of divisibility.

When those idealists (Mache and his ilk), who had denied the objective existence of the atom, holding that the atom was only a "mental construct", a "mathematical model" which was convenient for repeating certain facts, were later thrown into complete disarray by the glorious achievements of scientific research -- so much so that some of their representatives had to publicly admit their errors -- a new struggle was put before materialist scientists -- the struggle of opposing the new idealist viewpoint which denied the existence of "basic" particles, which held that they were nothing more than concepts created for standard readings on calculating and measuring instruments in logic (Fu-lan-k'e), and which held that ultimately they were "only mathematical forms" (Hai-sen-pao).

Human knowledge about matter has advanced in such constantly repeated, bitter struggles.

We must study and do research on the history of the development of the sciences. From the rich data acquired in this research, we must master the dialectic of understanding, sum up the historical experience of understanding, and employ this to direct our present scientific research work.

It is regrettable that so few natural scientists pay attention to research on the history of the development of the sciences. Moreover, some books always one-sidedly describe the history of science as though it were simply a constant accumulation of correct knowledge. It would seem that, with regard to knowledge about nature and matter, it had been simply a going from one correct bit of knowledge to a new one, that there had been no errors, no opposition, no struggles. Those things which in history had been held to be true, which had restricted man's thinking and blocked the advance of science, are felt by people, after they are shown to be in error, to be no longer worth bringing up in the history of the natural sciences. In this way they are gradually completely forgotten. Later people then no longer know that those scientific truths which they studied were established through constant struggle with erroneous things.

This is to treat the history of the natural sciences with a metaphysical viewpoint. This sort of history will not let the people acquire profitable lessons from history.

We must definitely use the viewpoint of "one divides into two" to analyze the history of the natural sciences, to analyze the history of development in the struggle between the true and the erroneous; we must sum up the historical experience of knowledge from the aspects of the positive and the negative. We must use the "one divides into two" viewpoint to analyze the present status of the natural sciences, to reveal every opposing theory, viewpoint, and concept, and the contradictions and struggle involved in them. We must establish a study style which dares to criticize and dares to create. In this way, we will be able to stand higher and see farther in the realm of thought; we will be able, rather consciously, to follow fewer false paths, to make even more, even better achievements in the history of the natural sciences.

Footnotes:

(1) "Speech at the CCP All-China Propaganda Work Conference," Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. A, People's Publishing House, 1964, page 513.

(2) Complete Works of Lenin, Vol. 38, People's Publishing House, pages 114, 115.

(3) Selected Correspondence between Marx and Engels, page 200.

(4) Natural Dialectic, page 248.

(5) "On Contradictions", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, People's Publishing House, second edition, 1952, pages 298, 299.

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CSO: 3530-D

MATERIALISTIC DIALECTIC, A THEORETICAL WEAPON FOR EXPLORING NATURE

[Following is a translation of an article by Ai Ssu-ch'i (5337 1895 1142) in the Chinese-language periodical, Hung ch'i, (Red Flag), Peiping, No 9, 21 August 1965, pages 36-38.]

I have not made a specialized study of natural science but I am willing to learn from comrades in the circles of natural scientists. Research in Marxist-Leninist philosophy must be closely integrated with the class struggle and production struggle; at the same time, importance must be given to the achievements in natural science. By introducing their new discoveries and new theories in their specialized fields, natural scientists may help cadres and the masses increase their knowledge of natural science. At the same time they may give much help to the comrades engaged in study of philosophy and make it possible for them to deepen their understanding of dialectical materialism on the basis of the new achievements in natural science.

M. Itada's "Conversation on New Conception of Fundamental Particle" expounds, from the theory of "fundamental particle" in modern physics, a thought of great value concerning materialistic dialectics.

Materialistic dialectics is not only a theoretical weapon used by the proletariat and the masses for class struggle but also a powerful theoretical weapon for exploring nature.

Each new discovery and new progress in natural science enable materialistic dialectics to gain a new proof or development. Metaphysical thinking always tries to interpret the existing achievement in science as the last word; yet each new progress in science causes this attempt to go bankrupt. Materialistic dialectics tells us that the divisibility of matter is infinite and the development of the universe and the development of human knowledge are endless. The development from the theory of atom to the theory of fundamental particle has testified to this truth of materialistic dialectics with ever greater force and smashed the erroneous view of metaphysics which is contrary to this truth.

The achievement made by theoretical physicists like Itada proves to us that natural scientists, if they can consciously master materialistic dialectics, will find it possible to speed up their work. Japan's theoretical physicists have studied fundamental particle only for a comparatively short period of time but they have achieved unique success in certain respects. That several scientists including Itada are able to apply materialistic dialectics to their work cannot but be regarded as one of the important reasons for their success. This event eloquently refutes the view of those who are against using Marxist-Leninist materialistic dialectics for directing scientific research.

The need for development of social production is the most fundamental material condition for the development of natural science. But the guidance of correct thought has an important part to play in the development of natural science.

The development of capitalist social production once gave an impetus to the development of natural science. With capitalism becoming decadent at the stage of modern imperialism, the development of natural science is impeded and deformed. Further, this process of development of natural science in capitalist countries is often handicapped by ideological conditions in the subjective aspect. Like in other domains, capitalist outlook on the world always occupies a predominant position in the circles of natural scientists in capitalist countries. Various shades of metaphysical and idealist views extensively affect study of natural science in general and theoretical natural science in particular. Those who advocate the theory that philosophy is of no use do not recognize that the thinking activity of natural scientists is inevitably influenced by a definite philosophical view of the world, either the proletarian view of the world or the bourgeois view of the world and that none is free from the influence of a certain world outlook. The view of those who advocate the theory that philosophy is of no use is bound up with the bourgeois view of the world, particularly with the view of "positivism." The view of "positivism" is essentially agnosticism and subjective idealism under the disguise of "science." It is a reactionary philosophical view prevalent in the capitalist world. It constitutes a serious ideological obstacle to the development of modern science.

It is commendable that a natural scientist like Itada is able to break the traditional bondage of bourgeois world outlook, break off with "positivism" prevalent in Europe and America and consciously take up such a really scientific weapon as materialistic dialectics. It is a victory for materialistic dialectics.

The socialist society possesses social conditions far superior to those of the capitalist society. Under such social conditions the development of science and technology like the development of other undertakings should take a big leap forward beyond the means of the capitalist society. The requirements of quantity, speed, quality and economy set in our socialist construction are well founded. As testified by what has happened in China over the past decade and more, a country which was originally poor and backward, once


it establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat and seriously adheres to the line of socialist revolution and socialist construction, will rapidly head for an advanced position at startling strides and will open a broad world for the development of science and technology.

But the guidance of Marxist-Leninist world outlook and methodology must be added to the superior social conditions before science and technology work can develop more smoothly and constantly achieve new successes. Under socialist conditions, a violent struggle still exists between proletarian world outlook and bourgeois world outlook. If science workers are unable to accept the guidance of proletarian world outlook and methodology, it is entirely possible that they will be influenced by bourgeois world outlook and the trend of thought that runs counter to dialectics. If so, the progress of science work will be impeded.

Our Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung constantly called upon the cadres in all fields to apply dialectical materialism to their practical work and to free philosophy from the study and turn it into a weapon in the hands of the revolutionary masses. This call is entering ever deeper into the minds of all. In recent years, science and technology workers in all fields in our country have enthusiastically responded to the call of the Party and achieved many successes in various domains, including the most advanced branches of science. All these achievements are inseparable from their conscious study and application of the materialistic dialectics. What is more gratifying, more and more technical personnel and ordinary workers and peasants directly engaged in production activities have opened up their intelligence through study of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's philosophical works in recent years; they are able to analyze and resolve various contradictions in their work, break many old confines of production technique, continue to create and invent things and solve many problems by themselves. In these circumstances, Marxist-Leninist philosophy is increasingly becoming a strong force for transforming the world. There is no doubt that as long as we forge ahead in this direction we shall before long scale the pinnacle of science and raise China's science and technology to a modern, advanced level.

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CSO: 3530-D



STUDY THE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG,
IMPROVE THE METHOD OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

[Following is a translation of an article by Yu Kuang-yuan (0060 0342 6678) in the Chinese-language periodical, Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), Peiping, No 9, 21 August 1965, pages 38-41.]

The Hung-ch'i Editorial Department emphatically points out in its comment on the article by M. Atada: Materialistic dialectics must be consciously applied and idealism and metaphysics must be opposed in scientific research work. This poses an extremely important problem to us science and technology workers: We should take Comrade Mao Tse-tung's philosophical thought as the guide and improve our method of scientific research.

Scientific research is a work to explore the unknown. It consists in a particularly complicated activity of knowledge on the basis of social practice (including scientific experiment). Apart from study of Marxist-Leninist materialistic dialectics and Comrade Mao Tse-tung's philosophical thought -- the highest results of philosophy in its development -- what else can we do if we want to master this art of knowledge? If science workers consciously study and apply materialistic dialectics and Comrade Mao Tse-tung's philosophical thought in their research work, it will be possible for them to gain an insight into the substance of things in the complex natural phenomena and find the best approach to problems. Otherwise, they will inevitably go astray or take a more devious path, thus hindering their research work.

As early as the 70's of the last century Engels pointed out: "In natural science, its own development has made it impossible to hold metaphysical views." (1) "Dialectics divested of mysticism becomes an absolute necessity." (2) Further Engels pointed out "how complications and confusions hold sway" over the natural scientists who do not know how to apply dialectics. (3)

(1), (2) and (3) Dialectics of Nature page 1, 168 and 25.

If they are able to accept the positive results of philosophical development "they will be freed from endless crooked way and waste of infinite time and labor in the wrong direction." (1)

Since Engels made the above remarks, natural science has advanced by leaps and bounds and more and more achievements in natural science have made it impossible for one to deny the dialectical nature of the natural world which is clearly manifest. However, natural science has entered a new domain far beyond the limit of one's everyday experience, its abstraction is raised to an ever higher degree, and theory and concept are constantly going through violent changes. This state of affairs has brought about some new complications and confusions in philosophy. Today many natural scientists are still constrained by bourgeois prejudice and serve as "slaves to the worst philosophy." (2) Natural scientists like Atada are still not large in number in capitalist countries. In capitalist countries, "the natural scientists who have learned how to think in terms of dialectics can still be counted on fingers" in the words of Engels. (3)

The majority of science and technology workers in our country study hard and apply materialistic dialectics in their research work. This is the results of great achievements by Marxism-Leninism in our revolution and construction. It is the result achieved by science and technology workers in constantly remolding their thoughts in the practice of revolution and construction. It is the result of ideological work conducted by the Party among science and technology workers. Although knowledge and degree of consciousness vary with different persons and although the experience and result acquired in improving the method of scientific research by way of materialistic dialectics are still initial ones, yet it is after all a new phenomenon of great significance. It marks a victory Marxism-Leninism begins to score in the domain of natural science in our country.

To be sure, some problems of thought and understanding are still found among the science and technology workers and remain to be solved.

Some science and technology workers think that study of philosophy is the business of a few people engaged in theoretical natural science or the personal business of those scientists who take a special interest in philosophy and that "ordinary" science and technology workers need not interest themselves in it. They consider the study of philosophy to be the business outside scientific and technological research and to be extra work of science and technology workers and not business within the scope of scientific and technological research and not the proper job of science and technology workers.

This view is virtually one of conforming to the view prevalent among the bourgeois intellectuals. Revolutionary intellectuals may not view the Marxist-Leninist philosophy in this light.

(1) and (2) Dialectics of Nature p. 9, 173

(3) Anti-Duhring, People's Publishing House, 1956 ed. p. 21

Materialistic dialectics of Marxism-Leninism is a great revolution in philosophy. It is fundamentally different from the bourgeois philosophy monopolized by a few spiritual aristocrats. It is a spiritual weapon used by the working people and revolutionary intellectuals in class struggle, production struggle and scientific experiment. Under the socialist system, with the broad masses of people becoming masters of society and masters of science and culture, it has opened a broad way to the development and popularization of Marxist-Leninist materialistic dialectics.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has issued this call: Let the Marxist-Leninist philosophy be acquired and mastered by cadres and the masses, free philosophy from philosophers' classroom and change it into a sharp weapon in the hands of the masses.

A great ideological movement for study of the thought of Mao Tse-tung and materialistic dialectics is vigorously spreading among the worker and peasant masses and revolutionary cadres in our country. It is a movement for popularizing the Marxist-Leninist philosophy and a movement for raising the thought and cognition level of the broad masses of people in our country. This movement greatly increases our initiative and consciousness in class struggle and struggle against nature. How can our revolutionary science and technology workers remain fettered with the viewpoint of bourgeois intellectuals and fall behind this movement? How can they regard study of materialistic dialectics as the business outside their province and not within their province? How can they place this thing outside their scientific and technological research work instead of letting it run through their research work?

Further it should be realized that our task is to make a great and new revolution in science and technology which can be translated into reality only under the socialist system. We must draw on all the scientific and technological achievements in the world which are of value. But we may not merely follow the footsteps of foreign bourgeoisie as their followers. We must traverse our own road. We must arm the science and technology workers with advanced philosophy.

The bourgeoisie materialized a scientific and technological revolution in history, leaving the backward and outmoded production techniques of the feudal society behind. In line with this scientific and technological revolution, the bourgeoisie materialized a philosophical revolution -- substituting the materialistic philosophy (from Bacon to Diderot) which was progressive in the ascending period of the bourgeoisie for the decadent and stifling scholasticism of the declining feudal class. While their materialism was confined to metaphysics, yet it did represent a revolution in the history of philosophy. Without this philosophical revolution, the development of modern science and technology would have been impossible.

In the imperialist era the bourgeoisie heads for a decline, so does its philosophy which changes from metaphysical materialism to idealism and mysticism. The contradiction between idealism and mysticism of the decline bourgeoisie on the one hand and the developing modern science and technology on the other shows the crisis of scientific thought in the capitalist world.

If we want to materialize a new, great revolution in science and technology we must materialize a new revolution in philosophical thought, a revolution greater than in the ascending period of the bourgeoisie -- substituting Marxist-Leninist thought of materialistic dialectics for metaphysics, idealism and mysticism of the bourgeoisie and enable science and technology workers consciously to head for materialistic dialectics, the "only correct method and the only correct philosophy of natural science." (1)

Some science and technology workers find it very difficult to study and apply materialistic dialectics. They are afraid that they cannot apply it to good purpose. Before solving the problem, "whether it can be applied to good purpose," we think we must solve the problem of "whether we will apply it or not." As long as one is willing to apply it, one will certainly be able to apply it after exertion of efforts. Exertion of efforts means none other than this: study with reference to particular problems, learn from practice and learn from error; continue to sum up experience and solve problems in the course of study. Several persons are to tackle a problem which cannot be solved by a single person; problem that cannot be solved for the time being should be studied over long period of time. This way of study will certainly be fruitful.

Some science and technology workers feel that they are too busy with their proper jobs to study materialistic dialectics. We feel however that, no matter how busy he is, one engaged in scientific research should not keep himself so busy that he has no time to consider improvement in the method of scientific research. The more busy one is the greater the necessity of seeking the guidance of correct methodology and the greater the necessity of squeezing time for study purposes.

As a matter of fact, "difficult" and "busy" are more excuses. The fundamental problem is still whether one has adequate appreciation of full application of materialistic dialectics in research work. If one appreciates that study of materialistic dialectics is an important feature of revolutionization of work, is absolutely necessary for success in one's work and is the duty of every revolutionary science or technology worker, then "difficult" and "busy" will not be taken as reasons.

In capitalist countries and countries swamped with revisionist ideas, the guiding role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in natural science is wantonly denied and idealism and metaphysics are being widely preached while the new

(1) "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," Collected Works of Lenin Vol 14, p. 330


results of natural science are distorted. To criticize this reactionary trend of thought is an important task of the militant materialists. Engels' "Dialectics of Nature" and Lenin's "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" sum up the experience in the development of natural science from the standpoint of Marxist philosophy and provide this criticism with a shining example. We, too, should sum up the new achievements and new experiences in the development of natural science of the contemporary time, deal fatal blows to the fashionable bourgeois philosophy in the guise of modern science, and preach and develop Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Realization of this task will call for not only efforts of the philosophy workers but also the participation of science and technology workers as well as an alliance between the two sides.

Every science department has its own method of research peculiar to itself. It embodies concrete application, in a given department, of such a universally applicable scientific methodology as materialistic dialectics. To study the method of research peculiar to each science department is a necessary work of learning how to apply materialistic dialectics in solving every concrete problem of science and technology.

The division of specialized labor is brought to ever greater perfection in science and technology, and mutual cooperation is increasingly called for among science and technology workers. If science and technology workers do not learn specialized knowledge from each other, do not try to enlarge the domain of their knowledge and cannot form a scientific conception of nature from the whole and development of the natural world, it would be very difficult for them to avoid having a narrow outlook due to division of specialized labor and sinking into the quagmire of metaphysics.

Conscious study and application of dialectics in the process of scientific and technological research is not the private business of science and technology workers in our country. For this reason, this thing must be well organized and guided. It is part of the politico-ideological work done by the Party among science and technology workers and is the royal road to combination of politico-ideological work with professional work. Here the Party's policy of letting all flowers bloom and all schools of thought contend must be carried out. Over academic problems, different thoughts and views should be allowed and encouraged to conduct discussion. Through this discussion and through debate and practice are the right and wrong of different viewpoints to be ascertained. A viewpoint is not to be enforced or opposed by arbitrary means or by means of administrative orders. We must promote a Marxist-Leninist style in study, discourage idle talks, avoid formalism and endeavor to integrate study of materialistic dialectics with scientific experiment.

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SOME CRITICS OF DEBORIN'S SCHOOL HAVE BECOME HIS SUCCESSORS

Following is a translation of an article by Li Che (2621 0772) in the Chinese-language periodical Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), Peiping, No. 9, 21 August 1965, pages 42-47.

In recent years in the world of Soviet philosophy, there has appeared a central point -- a counter-current to the laws of the unity of opposites -- which distorts and revises dialectical materialism. It vociferously proclaims that the "theory of the merging of contradictions" now obtains, that under the socialist conditions the law of the unity of opposites has "already been outmoded," that "contradictions cannot be described as the moving force in socialist society, "that conciliation and absolute unity" are now the "source and moving force" behind the development of socialism, and so forth. Some of the critics of the Menshevik idealism and metaphysics represented by Deborin in the 1930's have today loudly proclaimed the merging of contradictions; thus they have become the successors to Deborin's school. They have put forward a so-called formula which goes "dialectical opposites and contradictions have changed into differences, and the differences have fused into a unity." (1) This formula expresses the essence of the theory of the merging of contradictions.

1.

Under Stalin's leadership in the past, some of the persons, who had participated in the struggle against the Menshevik idealistic and metaphysical philosophical viewpoint represented by Deborin's school, have, after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, gradually become defenders of the Khrushchev revisionist clique, thus betraying Marxism-Leninism and surrendering to Deborin.

In criticizing Deborin in the past, these persons said: "The Menshevik idealists have departed from Lenin's conception of the law of the unity of opposites. They outline a completely mechanistic form of expression, and relying on this, we first meet up with simple differences; later we discover opposites, and it is only still later that we meet contradictions. Similar to Plekhanov, they restrict the universal nature of the law of

the development of contradictions. Lenin took the opposite approach, however; he emphasized pointing out the conditional nature, the temporary nature, and the relative nature in the unity of opposites, in unity, and in mutual penetration. And their mutual negation, mutual rejection, and struggle -- which was the moving force in development -- possessed an absolute nature." (2)

Now these persons have made a 180 degree turn away from their old position.

It was said in the past: "Matter ... in all its stages of existence and development contains contradictions within it." (3) "Differences contain contradictions."

It is now stated however: "Dialectical opposites and contradictions have become differences."

It was said in the past: "Everything which exists changes by means of the struggle of opposites, regardless of the nature of these opposites themselves." (4)

It is now stated however: "The transition from socialism to communism will be completed by means of the path of unanimous strength inside, by means of mutual suitability in every aspect of material and spiritual life in society." (5)

It was said in the past: "Contradictions, the contradictions internally which determine the movement and development of society, will still be present in the socialist era." (6)

It is now stated however: "Under socialist conditions, new phenomena and new processes have developed in social life. For example, dialectical opposites and contradictions have changed into differences, and the differences have fused into a unity." (7)

What's going on here? Do you mean to say that the Marxist-Leninist theory on the law of the unity of opposites, which they propagated in the 1930's, has lost its validity in the 1960's?

No. The law of the contradiction of things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of dialectical materialism. This law universally exists whether in the natural world, in human society, or in people's thinking. It was applicable in the past, and it is now, and will be in the future. It applies to capitalist society, to socialist society, and it will apply to the proletarian communist society of the future. It is just that in different societies, the essence and circumstances of the contradictions are different. The law of the unity of opposites will never lose its validity. The problem is that the past critics of Deborin's school have now become propaganda tools for the Khrushchev revisionist clique. They have betrayed revolutionary dialectical materialism, and they have picked up Deborin's bankrupt philosophical banner which they had criticized in the past.

2.

This formula of "opposites and contradictions have become differences, and the differences have fused into a unity", which these successors to Deborin's school have put forward, appears on the surface to be opposite to

Deborin's so-called formula that "we proceed from pure gradations, pass through differences and opposites, and arrive at extreme contradictions." (8) However, if we carefully analyze these for a moment, we see that there is no essential difference between the two.

Although in denying the universality of contradictions, they approach the matter differently than did Deborin, they are essentially in complete agreement. Deborin said: "Undifferentiated unity is a pure state, and all existing things should arise out of this 'pure' state, that is, from an undifferentiated abstract unity. Unity turns into differences, differences turn into opposites, and these later turn into contradictions." (9) Deborin held that contradictions didn't arise at the start of the process; they appeared after differences, and differences were not contradictions. The successors to Deborin's school now hold that when contradictions develop to a certain stage, they turn into differences, and the contradictions no longer exist. In this the approach is different, but it is only a simple transposition of logic. There is no essential distinction, for they both hold that in the course of the development of things, there is no movement of contradictions which exist from first to last; contradictions are not universal nor absolute.

Deborin held that contradictions don't appear in the beginning of the process, but that they only appear after the process has developed to a certain stage. This is to say, contradictions don't run through the overall process of the development of things. Thus, before that particular time, the development of things is not caused by internal forces, but by external forces. In this manner, Deborin returned to the metaphysical theory of external causes and the mechanistic theory. Now when Deborin's successors say that contradictions turn into differences, they are saying that contradictions exist at the beginning of the process, but not after reaching a certain stage of development, for then they become differences. They are just like Deborin in not admitting that contradictions are present from first to last in the developmental process. In this manner, this sort of conclusion is inescapable: When things have developed to a certain stage, the moving force of development is no longer internal contradictions, for the development of things is then determined by external causes. It can be seen that, similar to Deborin, his successors have fallen into the quagmire of the metaphysical theory of external causes and the theory of mechanistic causes.

The Marxist-Leninist dialectic tells us that contradictions are universal and absolute, that there are contradictions within everything, that the movement of contradictions exists from first to last in the process of development. Without contradictions there would be no movement or development of things. Without contradictions there would be no world. Lenin said: "Knowledge about unified things splitting into two parts and about contradicting parts ... is the essence of the dialectic." The unity of opposites is "to acknowledge (discover) that in all phenomena and processes in the natural world (including the spirit and society) there exists a contradicting, mutually repudiating, opposing tendency." (10) These successors to Deborin acknowledged in the past that Deborin's philosophical viewpoint was completely opposed to Lenin's. However, they have now betrayed

the truth which they had already approved, headed out on Deborin's old path of denying contradictions and annihilating them, and have come into complete opposition with Lenin's viewpoint.

On the matter of handling contradictions, the successors of Deborin are in complete agreement with him. They have adopted the method of reconciling contradictions. Deborin said that the development of things is: "When all the necessary stages of development -- from pure unity, through differences and opposites, to extreme contradictions -- have passed, it is time to 'solve contradictions'." (11) But how were they to be solved? In Deborin's opinion, the resolution of contradictions wasn't by means of struggle, but by means of mutual reconciliation. He said: "The positive dialect holds that positive points and negative points are not mutually rejecting opposites, but rather mutually reconciling opposites." (12)

The present successors of Deborin made correct criticisms of his viewpoint on reconciling contradictions in the past. They said: "The Menshevik idealists have betrayed Lenin's classical explanation on the law of the unity of opposites, ... They don't explain it as the law of struggle or the law of development; they rather explain it as the law of 'fusion', the law of the reconciling of opposites." "Deborin put forwards his Menshevik explanation of this law and proceeds to oppose Lenin's formula which most perfectly and most concentratedly expresses the nature of the development of the world and the nature of the struggle in society. This explanation of this law in dialectical materialism is something which all revisionists have; it is in fact the theoretical manifestation of their traitorous line in the ranks of the workers' movement." (13)

It can be seen that, according to the formula of these successors to Deborin, opposites and contradictions turn into differences, which are mutually reconcilable and which merge into one. This means that the resolution of contradictions is not by means of the struggle of opposites, but by their fusion and reconciliation. Isn't this in exactly the same vein as Deborin's viewpoint? Their present pretext is: "Under socialist conditions, new phenomena and process develop in social life," and they use this as the reason why contradictions under socialist conditions can be fused. However, they had already said in the past: "All existing things change due to the struggle of opposites." "Contradictions, internal contradictions which determine social movement and development, also are present in the socialist era." In this they are self-contradictory and refuted themselves.

Lenin has already clearly pointed out: "The unity of opposites (unity, agreement, equality, and so forth) is conditional, temporary, easily dissolved, and relative. The struggle between mutually repudiating opposites is absolute, just as development and movement are absolute." (14) In Marxist-Leninist philosophy, contradicting opposites are both in unity and in struggle, and from this the development and change in things are brought about. The struggle of the contradictions is absolute, while the unity is relative. All contradictions can only be resolved by means of struggle, and to deny struggle is basically to deny contradictions, to deny the development of things. In contradictions there is the division of opposing natures and non-opposing natures; there is no division between those which can be reconciled and those which cannot be. No contradiction can be reconciled. Contradictions can only be resolved through struggle. This is true even under socialist conditions.

The present successors to Deborin admitted in the past that his philosophical viewpoint was in complete opposition with Lenin's viewpoint. However, they are not just like Deborin and in open opposition to Lenin.

According to their present viewpoint, the moving force for the development of socialist society is no longer the unity and struggle of contradicting opposites inherent in society, but it is an "inner unanimous strengthening." Isn't this a similar "betrayal of Lenin's classical explanation of the law of the unity of opposites?" Isn't this similarly not to consider contradictions as the "law of struggle," the "law of development," but to consider them as the "law of fusion," the "law for the reconciliation of opposites?" Isn't this to use a subjective, arbitrary formula to oppose Lenin's formula? In the past they said that Deborin's viewpoint "was something common to all revisionists, that in fact it was the theoretical manifestation of the traitorous line in the ranks of the workers' movement." Can't these ideas be strictly applied to Deborin's successors today?

Deborin's formula and that of his successors are not any new "invention", but it is rather a crude imitation of the conservative aspect of Hegelian philosophy.

We know that in Hegelian philosophy there was a "rational inner kernel", that is, the concept of the development of the dialectic. However, this "rational inner kernel" was based on the philosophical system of objective idealism. Consequently, we cannot strictly apply Hegel's dialectic, but we must thoroughly criticize its conservative, reactionary aspects. As for the "rational inner kernel," we must rescue it from the system of idealism, and undertake revolutionary reform with it. This great task was already completed by the great intellects of Marx and Engels.

However, Deborin did not simply follow the principles of Marx and Engels, criticize Hegel's reactionary idealistic philosophy, and, on the basis of this criticism, absorb "the rational inner kernel." On the contrary, ignoring black and white, he extracted the dregs from Hegel. Hegel held that "absolute spirit", in the "logical stage" of self-development, proceeds from unity, differences, opposites, and reaches contradictions, and finally it returns once more to this "absolute spirit." This formula is obviously the idealistic dregs in the system of Hegelian philosophy. Moreover, even Hegel, when discussing unity, doesn't admit of any abstract absolute unity, for in his opinion, unity itself contains differences. He said: "Don't consider unity to be an abstract unity, thinking that it is a 'sameness' with all 'differences' rejected." (15) In other words, contradictions are not instantly manifested in their most sharp form, for first of all they take the form of differences and opposites. Of course, Hegel was an idealist dialectician, and here this is a question of the development of concepts. These ideas in themselves are muddled and mysterious. But Deborin says: "In the environment of absolute unity, before opposites have formed due to this condition or that, there cannot be any development." (16) This means that Deborin views unity as an abstract unity which does not include any differences.

The present successors to Deborin's school sharply pointed out in the past that Deborin has made a Hegelian revision of the dialectical

materialism of Marxism, that he had attempted to use Hegel's theories to "supplement" Marxism. However, they are now the same as Deborin and have absorbed the dregs from Hegelian philosophy. Hegel held that contradictions only operated at a certain stage, that when the "absolute spirit" was at its highest stage of self-development, all contradictions would be reconciled, that movement and development would come to a halt. The formula of "dialectical contradictions and opposites turn into differences, and these differences merge a unity", held by the present successors of Deborin's school, is a viewpoint copied from Hegel's theory of the reconciliation and fusion of contradictions; it is a poisonous revision of Marxist-Leninist dialectic.

3.

Although Deborin's formula and that of his successors appeared under different historical conditions, their common goal is to defend the political line of revisionism.

Deborin's distortion and revision of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic, in particular the law of the unity of opposites, are politically reactionary. When Deborin made his poisonous distortion of, and attack on, the revolutionary dialectic of Marxism-Leninism, this was the period during which the Soviet people, under the leadership of the CPSU (Bolshevik) and Stalin, were struggling to carry out Lenin's general line for socialist industrialization and agricultural collectivization throughout the country. In the wake of the deepening development in agricultural collectivization and socialist industrialization, the rich peasant class and bourgeoisie put up a break-neck resistance; the class struggle was sharp and complicated. This struggle was similarly sharp in the ideological realm. Such a violent class struggle in society had to be reflected inside the party. At this time within the Soviet party there appeared the anti-party clique headed by Trotsky and Chi-no-wei-ye-fu, and the right opportunist clique headed by Bukharin and Li-k'e-fu. In order to defend the interests of the rich peasant class and the capitalists, they frantically opposed the party's and Lenin's general line for building socialism in the Soviet Union; they opposed the dictatorship of the proletariat, touted class cooperation and the elimination of class struggle. Bukharin and other opportunists put forward the stinking "theory of the extinction of class struggle," along with the "theory of equilibrium" in the development of the national economy, advocating that the socialist sector should peacefully coexist with the capitalist sector, that there should not be a situation of struggle between socialism and capitalism, that there should be an equilibrium. They suggested that capitalism and the rich peasant economy "would peacefully grow into" socialism. At this crucial point, Deborin publicly stood up and attacked the revolutionary dialectic, putting forward the viewpoint of Menshevik idealism and metaphysics, so as to provide a "theoretical" weapon for the counter-revolutionary clique.

According to Deborin's viewpoint, under the then Soviet conditions, there were only differences, but no contradictions, between the rich peasants and the workers and peasants. This was in complete harmony with Bukharin's reactionary theory of denying class struggle in saying that capitalism and the rich peasant economy could "peacefully grown into" socialism.

Since this was Soviet society, there were only differences, not contradictions, and therefore any class struggle, any socialist revolution was actually superfluous. The Deborin school's distortion of, and attack on, the law of the unity of opposites were for the purpose of meeting the needs of Bukharin's anti-party clique, which was opposing revolution and the realization of socialism in the Soviet Union. It helped them to propagate the theories of class reconciliation and class cooperation and the theory of the fusion of contradictions.

Now, the theory of the fusion of contradictions concocted by the successors to the Deborin school has appeared at a time when the Khrushchev revisionist clique has, by means of plotting, usurped the right of leadership over party and state, and at a time when a revisionist line is being carried out at home and abroad. Its purpose is to create a philosophical foundation for Khrushchev revisionism.

Deborin's philosophy has been bankrupt for a long time. The philosophy of his successors will go bankrupt following the bankruptcy of the Khrushchev revisionist line.

* * *

For persons who once criticized revisionism to turn into revisionist is not without precedent in the history of the international working class movement. Kautsky once made some criticisms of Bernstein's revisionism (although these criticisms were ineffectual and calculated to put things off), but later he completely betrayed Marxism, surrendered to Bernstein, and became a supporter of Bernstein. Plekhanov also had struggled with Bernstein and some Menshevik viewpoints, but later on he also fell into the quagmire of revisionism and became a Menshevik.

Some of the critics of Deborin's school in the 1930's have now become his successors, defenders of Khrushchev revisionism. This has again provided an important lesson for the theoretical workers of Marxism-Leninism.

Footnotes:

(1) "The CPSU 22nd Congress and Scientific Work Tasks Within the Realm of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy," the Soviet Problems of Philosophy, No. 4, 1962.

(2)(3) Mi-ting: Dialectical Materialism, Life Bookstore, 1948, edition four, pages 261, 515.

(4)(6) Ibid. pages 262, 486.

(5) "Deterioration of Bourgeois Ideology," the Soviet Communist, No. 10, 1962.

(7) Same as footnote No. 1.

(8) Quoted from Mi-ting: Dialectical Materialism, page 516.

(9) Deborin: Philosophy and Politics, a 1961 Russian-language edition.

(10) "Discussion of Dialectical Questions," Complete Works of Lenin, Vol. 38, People's Publishing House, pages 407, 408.

(11) Same as footnote No. 8.

(12) Deborin: On the Dialectics of Kant.

(13) Same as footnote No. 8, page 522.


(14) Same as footnote No. 10.

(15) Hegel: Brief Logic, The Commercial Printing Shop, 1964, page 258.

(16) Deborin: Philosophy and Politics, a 1961 Russian-language edition.

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SEIZURE OF THE LUTING BRIDGE

[Following is a translation of an article by Yang Ch'eng-wu (2799 2052 2976) in the Chinese-language periodical, Hung-ch'i (Red Glag), Peiping, No 9, 21 August 1965, pages 48-54.]

A Glorious Task

On May 22, 1935, the 1st Regiment of the Red 1st Division victoriously crossed the Tatu River at Anshunch'ang. However, a bridge could not be erected because of the rapids, and there were but a few small boats at the ferry. It took them several tens of minutes to make a round trip, and if the several hundred thousand troops depended on them alone to cross the river, nobody could tell how many days it would take. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek had ordered the troops under the command of Yang Sen and other Szechwan warlords to blockade the Tatu River, and sent the troops under the command of Hsueh Yueh and Chou Hun-yuan in hot pursuit. It was at Anshunch'ang that Shih Ta-k'ai -- the famous general of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo -- was finally destroyed by the Manchu forces. Chiang Kai-shek also dreamed of making another Shih Ta-k'ai of the Red Army. At that time, many patriotic, progressive people also had misgivings: Would the Red Army share the fate of Shih Ta-k'ai? Would the historical tragedy be repeated?

In order to cross the Tatu River quickly so as to smash the plot of counterrevolution to encircle and attack us from the front and the back, we must quickly seize the Luting Bridge. It was at this critical juncture that the Red 4th Regiment, the vanguard of our left wing, was ordered by Lin Piao, commander of the Army Corps, to make a determined effort and take quick action to seize the Luting Bridge.

After crossing the Tatu River, our right wing -- the Red 1st Division -- pushed northward along the eastern bank to support the seizure of the Luting Bridge by the 4th Regiment of our 2nd Division.

The First Day of Victory

Early in the morning on May 23, our regiment set out from Anshunch'ang and rushed along the western bank of the Tatu River toward the Luting Bridge.

The whole course was 320 li long, and according to order we were required to reach there in three days. We marched through a winding and zigzag narrow path which sometimes ran uphill and sometimes downhill. On the left side was a steep cliff that rose into the clouds. There was perpetual snow halfway up the mountain. The snow was dazzling to the eyes and the cold was bone-piercing. On the right side, the billowy Tatu River flowed several dozen feet below. The trip was perilous because a slip would mean sure death.

However, we paid no attention to this danger. Our only thought was to push forward faster so that we might take over the Luting Bridge at an earlier date.

After we covered about 30 li, the enemy troops on the other bank began to shoot at us. In order to avoid unnecessary casualties, we had to climb the mountain to take a different route, thus making a detour of several ten li. Much time was thus wasted.

After covering about 60 li, there rose before us a big mountain. Our vanguard company came into chance contact with an enemy company. The fighters charged forward like tigers pouncing upon a flock of sheep, and the enemy troops were overwhelmed. This mountain was more than 10 li high. Having scaled the mountain, we came across a small river. The bridge there had been destroyed by the enemy. Although the river was not wide, it was rather deep and could not be forded. Chi Kuang-shun, commander of the 1st Battalion, promptly organized his men to cut trees to build a bridge.

After the taste of victory, our morale rose as we marched. We went on to climb the mountain amidst piecemeal rifle shots. Suddenly, our scouts rushed back to report that in a big depression to the right in front of us, there was a battalion of enemy troops blocking our way of advance. Comrade Wang K'ai-hsiang, commander of the regiment, and I led the cadres forward to survey the topography.

In the middle of the mountain, there was only a path which was so steep that when a person looked upward, his cap would fall from his head. On the summit and at the entrance of the path, there were stone forts. The river was on the right side, and there was no way to make a detour. It seemed that there was no way for us to make a frontal charge or to charge from the right side.

On the left side, there also rose a perpendicular cliff, on which some small trees and brambles grew. From the top of the cliff, a higher peak rose. After a careful survey, we came to the conclusion that by scaling the cliff on the left side, we would make our way to the flank and back of the enemy and raid the entrance to the pass from the back of the enemy.

We promptly ordered Comrade Tseng Ch'ing-lin, commander of the 3rd Battalion, and Comrade Lo Hua-sheng, secretary of the general branch, to lead a company to scale the cliff on the left side, and organized two other companies to make a mock attack from the front.

The enemy troops madly fired their machine-guns to seal off the entrance to the pass. In less than an hour of time, we heard reports of rifles from the rear of the enemy. We took advantage of the opportunity to press on with our frontal attack, and the enemy troops, attacked both from the front and the rear, were quickly overwhelmed. Following this, we went in hot pursuit, and the three enemy companies were completely annihilated at the foot of the cliff. We captured alive a battalion commander and a company commander and more than 200 men. The enemy had wanted to depend on their strongholds to check our advance, but after we went in hot pursuit, we pushed forward even faster.

240 Li Covered in One Day

On the following day, we were fed one hour earlier than the time set in the original order and set out at 5 o'clock. After covering several li, we saw a big black horse galloping from behind directly toward the position of the headquarters of the regiment. I soon discovered that he was a dispatch-rider from the headquarters of the Army Corps. He handed us an order. The commander of the regiment and I rode side by side to read it carefully.

The order read: "Wang and Yang: The Military Affairs Committee has set May 25 as the date for the left wing of the army to seize the Luting Bridge. You must march at the highest speed and use measures expedient to the fulfillment of this glorious and great task. In this battle, you must break the past record set by you when you took Taochow and the record set by the 5th Regiment which covered 160 li in one day to seize Yach'i. You are heroes of the firing-line and models in the Red Army. We trust you can accomplish this task. We are making preparations to congratulate your victory." At the end of the order was the forceful signature of Comrade Lin Piao, commander of the Army Corps.

After reading the order, the commander of the regiment and I looked into each other's eyes for a while and said: "This is a most glorious and most arduous task!"

"September 25!" That meant tomorrow! Between where we stood and the Luting Bridge, we had 240 li to cover. This meant to say we must cover a two-day journey in one day. Nobody had expected that the task would be so urgent!

The covering of 240 li in one day was a very difficult problem. The distance must be covered step by step. Moreover, we had numerous enemy barriers to break through. But this was the order. It was an important task bearing on the whole army. It must be firmly executed. There was not one minute or one second of time for hesitation.

The Luting Bridge was originally guarded by two regiments of enemy troops. Now two brigades were on their way to reinforce the defense of it. They deployed part of their forces to block the advance of our Red 1st Division, while the greater part of them pushed eastward along the eastern bank of the river. They and us were pushing forward in the same direction on the two banks of the river. If we were able to reach the Luting Bridge earlier than the enemy forces, there was hope for victory. Otherwise, it would be difficult and even impossible for us to make our way through to Luting Bridge. We must beat the enemy in the race for time! We must beat the enemy in our race! As we marched, we called on the battalion and company cadres and the cadres of the headquarters and the political section to study jointly the way to accomplish this urgent task. The slogans we put forward were: "The Red 4th Regiment, with its glorious history in combat, must firmly fulfill this glorious task and uphold its glorious tradition!" "Learn from the Red 1st Regiment which took Anshunch'ang, emulate the Red 1st Regiment and be resolved to take the Luting Bridge!" "The task is glorious but most arduous, and we must be able to pass the test!" The troops were required to reach the Luting Bridge before 6 o'clock tomorrow. After the meeting, they went separately to their companies to mobilize the men.

Comrade Lo Hua-sheng, secretary of the general branch, and I rushed to the head of the march column. We stood on a small mound to announce the order of the chief of the Army Corps to the troops on forced march and to conduct political agitation. The troops marched past us like gusts of wind, but we saw every face and every pair of eyes very clearly. As the troops marched by us, the slogan "Firmly fulfill the task and take the Luting Bridge" rose and fell. This voice prevailed over the roar of the Tatu River and shook the mountains. The troops moved forward at a faster rate.

In the march column, a group of men suddenly gathered together. As soon as this group dispersed, more groups of men appeared. They talked in excitement as they marched. The Party branch committees and the Party groups attached to the companies were holding meetings as they marched. The time was so pressing that we could not halt for meetings. It was necessary to discuss the ways to fulfill the Party's task during the forced march. The comrades called this way of meeting "flying meeting."

When mobilization work for the urgent task was completed, the troops had come close to Menghukang.

Menghukang was a precipitous high mountain which led 30 or 40 li uphill and the same distance downhill. On its right side was the Tatu River and on its left side the peaks were even taller. A narrow path ran through it. This was the strategical place between Anshunch'ang and the Luting Bridge.

On the summit, the entrance to the pass was held by a battalion of enemy troops. At that time, there was heavy fog, and things could not be seen five paces away. The enemy troops were unable to see clearly where we were. In terror, they just fired blindly at us in the direction of our

advance from their defense works. We made use of the fog to give us cover, and organized our troops to grope their way up the mountain. Their order was not to fire a shot and to use bayonets and handgrenades to disable the enemy troops at close quarters.

Not long afterward, we heard a series of explosions made by handgrenades, and battle-cries rose from all sides. The terror-stricken enemy troops were put to rout.

Our vanguard battalion hotly pursued the fleeing enemy all the way to the neighborhood of Mohsimien village. There we encountered a battalion and a regiment of the enemy. We charged them in the flush of victory, overwhelmed them and occupied Mohsimien village.

The abominable enemy had destroyed the bridge spanning the river to the east of the village. This added a new difficulty to our movement for it took us two hours to restore the bridge.

We continued with our thrust and covered 40 or 50 li in one breath. When we came to a hamlet with a little more than ten families by the side of the Tatu River, it was already seven o'clock in the evening. From there to the Luting Bridge, there was still a distance of 110 li to cover.

Difficulties came one after the other. All of a sudden, there were pouring rains accompanied by lightning and thunder. It was so dark that one could not see the five fingers before him. The troops had eaten nothing for the whole day and they found the hunger unbearable. The road was very muddy and we could not move very fast. The animals of burden which were laden with supplies were unable to keep pace with us. When we moved downhill from Menghukang, we clearly saw that the enemy forces on the opposite bank were marching at about the same rate as we did.

The more serious were the difficulties, the more it was necessary to intensify political work. We explained all the difficulties before us to the Party branches and all Party members, CYL members and activists. We also made it clear to them that we must strive to reach the Luting Bridge before six o'clock tomorrow. We called on everybody to get hold of a stick so that he might walk with the support of it when he was unable to walk on. As there was no time to cook meals, they were urged to gnaw at rice in the raw state and to drink cold water. Like a torch, this call set the troops burning with enthusiasm for combat. It looked as though they could make a breakthrough even when there was a mountain of swords lying before them.

But how could we cover 110 li of the muddy and slippery road in pitch darkness? This question weighed like a thousand-catty rock on my heart.

Suddenly, a few bits of light appeared in a depression on the mountain at the opposite bank. In no time, a string of torches were lit. The enemy troops were lighting torches to carry on with the march.

The enemy torches gave us a hint. "Let us also march under the light of torches." This thought flashed in my mind, and I was thinking of studying the matter with the commander of the regiment, the chief of staff and the general branch secretary. But another thought also turned in my mind: "Since the enemy and we were only separated by a river, if the enemy should try to contact us, discover that we are the Red Army, and open fire on us, what are we going to do?"

"One must act with courage when everything proves to be difficult." We decided to make use of the insignia of the three enemy battalions which we had destroyed and overwhelmed today and yesterday to disguise ourselves and to deceive the enemy.

Thereupon, we ordered the troops to buy all bamboo fences in the village from the villagers. Every person was required to tie up a torch and every squad should light one without waste to enable the troops to cover more than ten li an hour. The signalmen were required to acquaint themselves with the signals for contact captured from the enemy, so that they might establish "contact" with the enemy in case of need. Since all the enemy troops hailed from Szechwan, we also picked out the Szechwan comrades and the captives to answer the interrogations of the enemy.

In order to march faster, we left behind all animals of burden, and supplies and heavy weapons -- including the mounts of the regiment commander and mine. They were placed under the care of a platoon under Ho Ching-shih, head of the administration division, and Lieutenant Teng Kuang-han.

At that time, the wound on my leg had not completely healed, and it was not very convenient for me to walk. All comrades -- especially the commander of the regiment -- advised me to ride. Since it was the time for cadres to play an exemplary role, how could I ride? So I made a challenge to the comrades by saying: "Comrades, let us walk together and see who can walk faster and who reaches the Luting Bridge first."

The troops held high the torches and marched forward in high spirits. The torches of the enemy and ours on the two banks shed light on each other. They looked like two fiery dragons in the distance, and the light was reflected on the water of the Tatu River. Through the roar of the Tatu River, came the clear sound of bugles and the faint voice: "Identify yourselves!" The enemy troops were trying to contact us. Our signalmen sounded the bugles to give the enemy contact signals, and the Szechwan comrades and captives also shouted at the top of their voices to give the answer. The enemy troops never dreamed that the troops who marched side by side with them were the heroic Red Army which they wanted to destroy day and night. In their ignorance, they marched with us for twenty or thirty li. Later, it rained harder, and by 12 o'clock at midnight, the fiery dragon on the opposite bank disappeared. They had probably called off the march because the hardship was too great for them. The news quickly spread throughout the regiment, and all the comrades said: "This is our chance! Let us walk faster!" So they moved forward in a hurry.

The terrential rains beat hart at the fighters, and the mountain torrents rushed down the peaks into the Tatu River. Washed by the rains, the narrow path became even more slippery. The walking sticks were also useless. As soon as a person exercised less care, he would slip. It could be said that they stumbled once in every three or five steps. The troops were simply rolling forward.

Notwithstanding the circumstances, many fell asleep. Some people stood still after taking a few steps, and when they were urged to go forward by those behind them, they woke up and moved forward again. Later, they untied their leggings and tied them together to pull one another forward.

After a whole night of forced march, we victoriously reached the Luting Bridge shortly after six o'clock in the morning the following day, and occupied the western bank and bridgehead. That day, apart from fighting and building bridges, we covered a distance of 240 li. We were indeed fleet-footed.

We Want the Bridge, Not Your Rifles

We occupied several buildings and a Catholic church at the western end of the bridge. The fighters were busy with making preparations for combat. Regiment Commander Wang and I led the battalion and company cadres to take a look at the topography.

The Luting Bridge was really in a strategic position. Even people like us who cut their ways through mountains, erected bridges across rivers and took strongholds standing in their way were chilled by it. Looking downward, we saw the red brown water rushing down like cataracts from gorges at the upper reaches. It washed against the ragged rocks standing on the bed of the river, giving off white sprays more than ten feet high. The roaring water was deafening. In such a river, it was difficult for a small fish to stay a while. It was entirely impossible to ford it or cross it by boat.

Now, let us look at the bridge itself. It was not built with stone or wood, but an iron-chain bridge. The eastern and western banks were linked with thirteen thick iron chains, each as thick as a rice bowl. There were two chains on each side for use as the fences. The body of the bridge comprised nine chains lying side by side. Formerly, the bridge was lined with boards. Now, the enemy had removed the boards into the city. There were only the iron chains left. At the head of the bridge was a stone tablet on which were cut the words: "By the side of the Luting Bridge, mountains are piled on one another with a thousand li of peaks piercing the clouds."

At the eastern end of the Luting Bridge, lay the Luting city. Half of this city reclined on the Eastern Mountain and half of it lay close to the bank of the Tatu River. The city wall was more than 20 feet high. The western gate of the city opened directly to the bridgehead, and after crossing the river, one must pass through the city gate and there was no other say.

The city was guarded by two regiments of enemy troops. On the slope, defense works had been erected. Machine-gun positions were concentrated in the neighborhood of the bridgehead. They fired on us continuously, and their mortar shells also rained on us. With such a natural barrier for defense, the enemy frantically shouted at us: "You fly over! We are going to hand over our rifles." Our fighters shouted in reply: "We do not want your rifles; we only want your bridge."

After looking over the topography, we promptly organized a battalion to block the approach road for enemy reinforcement on the east bank. This was because the east and west banks were alike in that there was only one approach road between the mountain and the river. The enemy could only approach the Luting Bridge by this road.

Following this, we went separately to the companies to mobilize fighting for the seizure of the bridge. A wave of enthusiasm swept through the troops as they vied with each other for playing the role of shock troops in the seizure of the bridge. All companies sent in their lists of commandos and asked to be assigned with the task of making the shock attack.

At noon, we called all cadres of the regiment to a meeting held at the Catholic church to study and approve the commando unit. As the meeting began, the opposite bank fired a salvo of mortar shells at us. A shell blasted a big hole in the roof of the Catholic church, and the shrapnel and tiles rained on us. Nobody moved, however. I availed of the opportunity to give them some agitation and said: "The enemy is mobilizing us. We must promptly fight our way across the bridge. Now let us discuss which company should carry out the shock attack."

No sooner had I finished, Liao Ta-chu -- commander of No. 2 Company who was rather reticent at normal time -- stood up unceremoniously. His stocky body was trembling with excitement and his dark face was red to the ears. With effort, he said:

"The No. 1 Company performed an act of merit and became a model company during the crossing of the Wu River. We want to learn from the No. 1 Company and to make a heroic company of our company by seizing the Luting Bridge."

Without waiting for Liao Ta-chu to finish, quick-tempered Wang Yu-ts'ai commander of No. 3 Company, stood up and said: "The bridge-seizing task must be given to us No. 3 Company." There he stood like an iron pagoda, and he talked in a way as though he was firing a machine-gun. He went on to say: "The No. 3 Company have never lagged behind in any battle, and we guarantee this time that the bridge will be taken." In the end, he said: "If we were not made the commando unit, I, as commander of this company, would be unable to face my men."

A fierce debate then ensued, and it looked that nobody was willing to give the task to another party. We leaders must make the decision.

After Regiment Commander Wang discussed things with me, he briefed the cadres with bridge-seizing task and designated No. 2 Company as the commando unit. Next, I rose to add a few words: "We have plenty of battles to fight, and we'll fight them by rotation. Last time, the crossing of the Wu River was spearheaded by No. 1 Company. This time, it is No. 2 Company's turn. The 22 Party members and activists of No. 2 Company will make up the commando unit under the command of Comrade Liao Ta-chu. I think this is a good idea and would like to know if you have any objection."

The meeting applauded the decision and Liao Ta-chu leaped with joy. Only Wang Yu-ts'ai looked crest-fallen and muttered something.

I then pointed a finger at Wang Yu-ts'ai and said: "The task of No. 3 Company is also not light. Your company will be the second echelon to charge after the commando unit. You are also required to assume the task of laying boards on the bridge so that the rest of the troops can quickly dash into the city. Have you anything to say?" This made Wang Yu-ts'ai smile.

Finally, we ordered all companies to feed their men for battle. After the meeting, general branch secretary Lo Hua-sheng went personally to No. 2 Company to help make preparations for the shock attack.

The general offensive began at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The regiment commander and I stood on the bridgehead to direct the battle. The signalmen of the whole regiment were mustered to sound the charge. We fired all kinds of weapons at the enemy on the opposite bank. The bugle call, the reports of big-guns and rifles and the battle-cries rocked the mountains and valleys. The 22 commando heroes were armed with Sten guns or pistols. Each carried a saber on his back and tied 12 handgrenades around his waist. Led by platoon commander Liao Ta-chu, they braved the bullets raining on them, grabbed at the bridge fences, and charged along the iron chains toward the other bank. Close on their heels, were the men of No. 3 Company led by Wang Yu-ts'ai. Besides carrying arms, each carried a board, and they laid these boards on the bridge as they charged.

When the shock troops charged to the bridgehead at the other end, a big fire suddenly leaped up at the west gate. The enemy attempted to halt us with fire on the bridge and to destroy us with guns. The fire lighted up half of the sky, and the bridgehead was surrounded by the big fire.

This was the most critical moment. The 22 heroes, seeing the raging fire at the city gate, seemed to be taken aback. All people standing with me and the regiment commander shouted in one voice: "Comrades, this is the key to victory! Charge! Don't be taken aback by the fire! Don't hesitate! Charge! The enemy is collapsing." These shouts gave the heroes courage, determination and strength. As the bugles sounded the charge, they quickly

charged into the fire. The cap of Liao Ta-chu, who led the charge, caught fire. He threw it away, and pressed on with the charge bareheaded. The other commandos closely followed platoon commander Liao. They charged through the flames into the street.

Street-fighting began. The enemy counterattacked in full force. The 22 heroes had used up their bullets and handgrenades, and the situation was extremely critical. They seemed to be unable to hold on any longer.

At this critical juncture, platoon commander Wang Yu-ts'ai and his No. 3 Company charged forward, and the regiment commander and I also quickly led the rest of the troops across the bridge into the city. After two hours of fierce fighting, most of the two enemy regiments were annihilated and the rest were put to rout. By evening, we had occupied the whole of Luting city and were in firm control of the Luting Bridge.

The chief task at that time was to guard against the enemy's counter offensive and to make sure of the safety of the Luting Bridge. We promptly sent the elite battalion of the Army Corps attached to and under the command of our regiment to keep watch in the direction of Tachienlu, because there were still several enemy regiments there. In order to deal with the two enemy brigades sent to give reinforcement to the Luting Bridge, we sent a battalion southward along the river.

At 10 o'clock in the evening, the patrol squad fired. At that time we thought that the enemy reinforcements had arrived, and made preparations for another hard battle. A part of the troops of that battalion took up positions, and a charge was organized.

We met a wounded soldier, and upon inquiry, we learned that he was a comrade of the 3rd Regiment of our Red 1st Division, and knew that the 1st Division had arrived. We felt relaxed, knowing that there was no need to make intense preparations for fighting a life-and-death battle with the enemy. We learned that the two enemy brigades were caught by our Red 1st Division, and a battle was fought at the Chulinp'ing area 60 li south of the city. Later, fearing that they might be attacked by us from both sides, the enemy troops retreated in a hurry in the direction of Hualimp'ing.

We promptly sent men to take General Chief-of-Staff Liu Po-ch'eng and Political Commissar Nieh Jung-chen of the Red 1st Division into Luting City. We were very happy to see each other.

It was already two o'clock in the night. General Chief-of-Staff Liu Po-ch'eng was still in high spirit, and wanted me to take him and Political Commissar Nieh Jung-chen to see the Luting Bridge. I carried a hurricane lamp and accompanied them to walk from the eastern end to the western end of the bridge. General Chief-of-Staff Liu Po-ch'eng carefully inspected each chain and even each iron link as though he wanted to keep an impression of the whole Luting Bridge in his brain. When we returned from the western end to the central part of the bridge, he stopped for a while. Putting his


hands on the fence, he looked down into the torrents of the Tatu River. He forcefully stamped one of his feet on the bridge board for three times, and remarked lamentably: "Luting Bridge! Luting Bridge! We have spent a lot of energy and consumed much heart's blood because of you! Now we have triumphed! We have won!"

Among the documents captured from the enemy, we found an urgent message. This message said that the communist troops were doomed to be another Shih Ta-k'ai. It said that with the Tatu River in their front and the Chinsha River at their back, there was a good chance to destroy the communist troops. This illusion of the enemy very quickly blew up. Although we took the route once taken by Shih Ta-k'ai, we would not repeat his historical mistake. This was because ours were the people's armed forces led by the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao.

On the third day, Army Corps Commander Lin Piao arrived with the main forces of his army corps. He warmly congratulated us for accomplishing the task and gave us great encouragement. After that, Chairman Mao also arrived. The army of thousands of men and horses crossed this natural barrier called Tatu River by way of this heroic Luting Bridge.

(This article is supplied by the editorial department of Hsing-huo Liao-yuan.)

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RURAL REFORMS AT TASHIHT'A

-Data of the Problem of Agrarian Reform During the Period of
War of Resistance Against Japan-

[Following is a translation of an article by Hsu Chih (1776
4460) in the Chinese-language periodical, Hung-ch'i (Red Flag),
No 9, 21 August 1965, pages 55-57.]

This is a piece of data written by Comrade Hsu Chih after his participation in agrarian reform in Northwest Shansi in 1947. He originally planned to write more about the various things which he went through when the agrarian reform movement was carried out in this village during the spring of 1947. However, because he had other things to do, he had no time to put in order the rest of the data. This section is now published for the reference of our comrades and for their investigation and study.

Tashiht'a is one of the natural villages of P'anchiachuang administrative village of Chingle hsien, Shansi Province. This administrative village includes the four natural villages of P'anchiachuang, Changchiachuang, Tashiht'a (also called Tashengt'ang) and Ch'engtungkou, and P'anchiachuang is the principal village.

During the period of war of resistance against Japan, this liberated area lay close to the guerilla area.

In the spring of 1936, the eastern expeditionary force of the Red Army passed through this place, and the masses knew for the first time this army of the Chinese people. When the war of resistance against Japan broke out in 1937, the 8th Route Army reorganized from the Red Army marched through this place in November that year. In June, 1940, the 8th Route Army annihilated more than 500 Japanese bandits at Miyu chen, 15 li from this place. That was one of the well-known battles fought in Northwest Shansi. In October, that year, the Japanese bandits passed through this place. They burned down houses and set fire to the grain stock, but did not stay. A month later, they came back to carry out a "mopping up" action. They stayed a few days

and went on to burn down houses, to slaughter people and to rape the women there. After that, they came to the place at least two or three times each year. More people were slaughtered and more women were raped by them. They took away the things which they could take away and set fire on things which they could not take with them.

The Japanese bandits brought untold miseries to the people, but it was also amidst this kind of ruthless warfare that the people -- under the banner of Chairman Ma Tse-tung and guided by the policies of the Chinese Communist Party -- gradually steeled themselves. Awakened, they drove away from Japanese bandits and changed the features of the old feudal system in the countryside.

Now among the landlords in this administrative village, the Kao family of Tashiht'a was the oldest and the biggest landlord. Counting from Kao Shih-ch'eng alone, it had lasted four generations. Kao Shih-ch'eng was doing business at Loufan chen, 40 li from this place. He bought grain when it was cheap and sold it when it was dear in a year of dearth. He made use of the years of dearth to buy up land. For example, more than 200 mow of fertile land in P'anchiachuang were bought by the Kao family in the 4th year of the reign of Kuanghsu -- a year of dearth -- at the cheap price of three pints of rice per mow. At its peak, that family owned more than two thousand mow of fertile land in its own and other villages. It had many tenants in its own and other villages, and it received more than one thousand piculs of grain per annum. It paid a little more than 80 taels of silver in grain tax, and kept all the grain until it could be sold at a high price.

During the rule of Yen Hsi-shan, among the 50 families comprising 350 people in that village, there were four landlords who were related by blood with Kao Shih-ch'eng, and they owned 565 mow of the 938 mow of land in the whole natural village. This was to say, the landlords who made up 8 percent of the total number of families (about 12 percent of the population of the whole village) owned about 60 percent of the level land -- also the best level land. Among these four landlord families, the family of Kao Teng-han -- the oldest grandson of Kao Shih-ch'eng -- owned 245 mow, equivalent to 26 percent of the level land in the whole village. That family also owned about 240 mow of level land in other villages, making a total of more than 480 mow. This landlord of the Kao family was also the political ruler of the whole administrative village. Kao Teng-han served as village chief for 13 years under Yen Hsi-shan, and he integrated feudal agrarian exploitation with political exploitation.

During the rule of Yen Hsi-shan, besides the landlords of the Kao family, there was also a landlord family named Chang who owned 66 mow of fertile level land. With this family included, the landlords who made up 10 percent of the total number of families (and 14 percent of the population) in the whole village owned in all about 17 percent of the level land in that village (631 mow).

Of the three families of rich peasants in that village -- who made up 6 percent of the total number of families (and 7 percent of the population) in the whole village -- two families owned 54 mow of level land each, and one family owned 29 mow (66 mow with the land bought from the landlords of the Kao family taken into consideration). They owned a total of 147 mow of level land, equivalent to more than 15 percent of the level land in that village -- also fertile level land. One of these families had gone bankrupt before the war of resistance against Japan.

There were originally only seven families of middle peasants who owned level land. They made up 14 percent of the total number of families (11 percent of the population) in the whole village. They owned in all 143 mow of level land, equivalent to 15 percent of the level land in the village, but most of the land was of lower grade.

The fertile level land of the whole village was concentrated in the hands of the landlords and rich peasants who made up 16 percent of the total number of families or 21 percent of the population. There was no level land for 70 percent of the total number of families or 68 percent of the population in that village. In this connection, the basic agrarian problem was the problem of level land.

Before the war of resistance against Japan, the landlords of the Kao family had sold most of their land in other villages. They also sold a part of the land in their own village. The four families were thus split into six families, but the total number of people was fewer. The heyday of the landlords of the Kao family could be called a thing of the past. But the large-scale transfer of land from the landlords of the Kao family took place only after the 8th Route Army created the liberated area there and brought with it the Communist Party's policy of rational burden which called for reduction of rents and of interest rates.

Among the 565 mow of level land owned by the six landlords of the Kao family, 105 mow were sold before the war of resistance. During the war of resistance, 303 mow were transferred to the hands of peasants by deeds of sales, 69 mow were liquidated due to reduction of rents, and 18 mow were transferred on other grounds. They totaled 390 mow, and with the land sold before the war of resistance added, the total amounted to 495 mow, equivalent to 87.6 percent of the level land originally owned by the landlords of the Kao family. The majority of such transfers were effected by deeds of sales. After the policy of rational burden was brought into force, the donation movement between 1939 and 1940 started the tide which led to the sales of land group by group. The climax was reached in 1944 -- the year following the genuine implementation of the rent reduction movement in 1943.

Such sales were fundamentally different from the sales effected before the war of resistance. On the one hand, before the war of resistance, land was only sold by individual landlords for private reasons or on financial grounds. After the place became the liberated area, land was generally sold by the landlords because the Communist Party adopted the policy of opposing

feudalism and aiding the peasants and because of the widespread peasant movement. On the other hand, land sold before the war of resistance fetched a rather high price. For example, the more than 200 mow of level land at P'anchiachuang bought by the Kao family at a cheap price were sold at the high price of 40 yuan per mow in 1929. Working on the basis that ordinary land could fetch 10 yuan per mow before the war of resistance, it could only be sold at between three and five yuan per mow at that time. Especially in 1944, land could be bought at one peck of rice per mow in many cases. The price was sometimes higher, but such cases were few. Generally speaking, by 1944, that was the year before the victory in the war of resistance, under the leadership of our Party, the system of feudal exploitation there had basically been crushed by the power of the masses.

When the work team for effecting agrarian reform came to this place in the spring of 1947, the situation of land ownership was mainly the same as that established after the big transfer in 1944. At that time, the total land owned by the landlords of the Kao family had been reduced to only 70 mow -- that was from the original 60 percent to 7.5 percent of the level land of the whole village. The Chang family of landlords had also undergone fundamental changes. Due to rent reduction and as a result of transfer and distribution of land to its relatives, the land it owned had been reduced from 66 mow to ten mow of level land. The two families of rich peasants had also transferred some of their land due to the implementation of rational burden and the reduction of rents and interest rates.

Before the war of resistance, there were 27 tenant families -- equivalent to 54 percent of the total number of families -- in Tashiht'a, and there were 35 families without level land, equivalent to 70 percent of the total number of families. After the place became a liberated area, however, with the exception of two or three families, most families owned some level land.

For many generations, level land was beyond the reach of the majority of the peasants. Under the policy of the Communist Party, however, it was rather easy for them to acquire land in several years.

This was the fundamental difference between the new and old societies. It was the principal economic foundation which made the peasant masses there give active support to the war of liberation for resisting the Japanese aggressors and opposing the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique as well as the principal economic foundation for them to support the Communist Party, the Liberation Army and Chairman Mao. When this kind of agrarian reform is overlooked, we cannot understand what constitutes the fountainhead of the unlimited strength of the Chinese people's war of liberation, and why Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: "The war of resistance against Japan is essentially a peasants' war."

Such transfer of land on a large scale was the outcome of the correct guidance of the policy of the Communist Party. The people here said in one

voice: "The policy of the Communist Party is good, and the laws and decrees of the democratic government are correct." Didn't it mean then that the agrarian problem in the democratic revolution had been entirely resolved at that time?

There were still problems at that time. Generally speaking, they were:

First, when reduction of rents and settlement of accounts were carried out, the fruit of the struggle should be fairly distributed according to the economic conditions of the peasant families. However, at the initial stage of the movement, benefits went only to those who had accounts to settle. Because of this, only those tenants with rents and debts to pay could acquire land. Some poverty-stricken peasants who had no rents to pay or debts to settle found it not easy to acquire land, or were able to acquire less land.

Second, when land was transferred from the landlords to the peasants by deeds of sales, since the selling price was rather low, organized readjustment should have been made and the people's government should have extended financial assistance to the destitute peasants so as to make a more rational distribution of land possible. But this was not done. As a consequence, those with some purchasing power could buy land or buy more land, while those with little or no purchasing power could buy very little land or nothing.

These two points owed their origin to the lack of a more systematic and self-conscious mass movement.

In view of this, our Party has put forward a task: We must go all out to mobilize more thoroughly the masses, firmly depend upon the poor peasants and hired farmhands, and solidly unite with the middle peasants so as to abolish thoroughly the feudal and semi-feudal system of land ownership and to accomplish the agrarian reform.

It is precisely this task -- the task advanced by the Party Central Committee -- that the work team for effecting agrarian reform has brought to Tashiht'a to conduct test work.

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