

THE WRITINGS OF  
MAO ZEDONG

1949 - 1976

Volume II

January 1956-December 1957

毛泽东  
著作  
言论  
集  
一九四九—  
一九七六

**VOLUME II**

January 1956–December 1957

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MAO ZEDONG**

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1949–1976

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**1949–1976**

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*M.E. Sharpe*

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It is not usual that any scholarly project be sustained by more than one academic institution. In this regard, the Mao's Writings Project has been doubly blessed. For years the project has made its home at Brown University, with the patronage of the late President Howard Swearer and Provost Maurice Glicksman. Under the new presidency of Vartan Gregorian, Brown University has continued to sponsor the project, and we owe our thanks to President Gregorian, to the political science department of Brown University, and to the staff of Brown University's Computer Science Center for their continued support. At the same time, since the fall of 1989, the Project has also made its home at Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff. Without the largesse of President Eugene Hughes, Vice-President Patricia Reed, Associate Vice-President Henry Hooper, and the support of Dean Karl Webb and the history department (especially Professor Curtis Hinsley), this second volume could not have been brought to readiness. An Organized Research Grant from NAU is currently making it possible for us to begin the work on volumes III and IV.

We owe many intellectual debts to the scholars who have kept the study of contemporary China such a lively field of research. We can name here only those who have not only inspired and informed us, but have in fact collaborated with the project and provided us with materials, information, and advice. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Jonathan Unger of the Australian National University



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Our final word of gratitude goes to our readers and reviewers, many of whom have responded to Volume I with messages of tolerant and constructive criticism. We hope that we have somewhat succeeded in responding to these in a positive way in this second volume.

Finally, an announcement. As previously mentioned, since 1989, the Mao's Writing Project has essentially been relocated at Northern Arizona University. For this reason, while keeping everything else generally intact, we have deleted the last paragraph from the Introduction to the publication as a whole in Volume I, reproduced here. In its stead, we would like to reiterate our sincere hope that our readers will continue to grace us with comments, suggestions, and corrections of our mistakes and oversights. Please direct any information to The Mao's Writings Project, Department of History, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, Arizona 86011. In the months ahead, the project hopes to expand its involvement with scholars in the Southwest region of the United States. Any suggestions in regard to this would be most welcome.

Flagstaff, Arizona  
August 15, 1992

John K. Leung

## INTRODUCTION

For nearly half a century before his death on September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong dominated the stage of China's Communist revolution and socialist experiment. The process of violent civil war and political struggle prior to 1949 and the radical political reform and economic change since then cannot be separated from Mao, the charismatic leader, or his theory and strategy of revolution and socialist development. Since his death, in spite of the purge of the "Gang of Four," the downfall of Hua Guofeng, and the growing trend toward political moderation under Deng Xiaoping, the dramatic revolutionary changes and unprecedented radical transformations in China initiated by Mao will long remain unique in human history.

In the world arena, the ebb and flow of Communist movements notwithstanding, Mao Zedong has clearly emerged as the twentieth century's most powerful symbol of political and philosophical radicalism; and "Mao Zedong Thought" has epitomized the ideals of mass mobilization, class struggle, proletarian dictatorship, people's war, and uninterrupted revolution. Today, any political forces that seek a radical alternative for political and social change are likely to turn to Mao and his vision for inspiration and strategy.

The ascendance of Mao Zedong and his thought as the dominant political and ideological force of new China can be seen vividly from the elevation of Mao to the position of indisputable chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong Thought to that of official doctrine of the state. Following the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, Mao was formally exalted as the "greatest revolutionary leader" in Chinese history and the "greatest genius" of world revolution in the modern era. His thought was officially acclaimed as the "guiding principle" for all Party work and glorified as the "zenith of Marxism-Leninism" in our time. From the mid-1940s on, selected writings and speeches of Mao were compiled and published in large quantities for the entire Party to study and follow. Party doctrine held that the thought of Mao Zedong had integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution in China and had brought Marxism-Leninism to a new and higher stage.

The massive publication of Mao's works is indicative of the crucial role that Mao and his thought have played in China's revolutionary developments in recent decades. Prior to 1949, Mao's writing were published in a rather dispersed and unsystematic manner in various "liberated areas." After the founding of the

People's Republic in October 1949, the task of editing and publishing Mao's writings and speeches was centralized under the Central Committee of the Party. The first three volumes of the official *Mao Zedong xuanji* (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, hereafter *Selected Works*), covering the period 1945–49, appeared in September 1960.

According to the Chinese press, 10.8 million copies of the multivolume *Selected Works* were published between 1951 and 1965. In the short span of the three years between 1966 and 1968, the peak of the Cultural Revolution, a staggering 150 million copies of the *Selected Works* were printed and distributed. From 1969 to Mao's death in 1976, an additional 75.8 million copies were reported to have been published. In other words, in the twenty-five-year period during which Mao led China, the Party published as many as 236 million copies of the four-volume set of the official *Selected Works* alone.

During the 1960s and 1970s, it should be noted, the *Selected Works* was by no means the only official sponsored Mao publication. The Party also published, just to cite a few major collections, 140 million copies of *Mao Zedong zhuzuo xuandu, jia-ji zhong ben* (Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong, A and B editions, 1964), 96 million copies of the various versions of the poems of Chairman Mao (1958–1965), and, above all, 740 million copies of the ubiquitous *Mao Zhuxi yulu* (Quotations from Chairman Mao, 1966–69). Soon after Mao's death, 28 million copies of Volume V of the official *Selected Works* were published in 1977–78 under the sponsorship of Mao's immediate successor, Hua Guofeng.

The massive publication of various selected works of Mao on a scale unprecedented in human history was a stunning political phenomenon. For the comprehensive and systematic scholarly study of Mao and his thought, however, the value of these officially sponsored collections is seriously limited.

First, despite the enormous volume of these publications, their contents are incomplete and extremely selective in relation to the total corpus of Mao's works. The materials that were selected for inclusion in the official collections in fact represent only a fraction of all of Mao's writings and utterances over the years. The first four volumes of the official *Selected Works*, for example, contain only 156 selections of Mao's pre-1949 works. By contrast, the two multivolume collections compiled by a group of Japanese scholars, *Mao Zedong ji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, 10 volumes, Tokyo, 1971–72; revised edition, 1983) and *Mao Zedong ji bujuan* (Supplements to Collected Writings of Mao Zedong, 10 volumes, Tokyo, 1983–86), contain as many as 2,212 texts of all types for the years before 1949. When Volume V of the officially sponsored *Selected Works* was published in 1977, only 70 selections from the period between 1949 and 1957 were chosen for inclusion. By contrast, our Project files contain 750 entries of various types of Mao's works for the same period; 522 of these texts, covering the period 1949–1955, are included in the first volume of this publication.

The second limitation has to do with the criteria and methods of the selection and editing of material for the official collections. The task has always been highly sensitive politically and thus subject to political and ideological manipulation. In general, texts were invariably selected and edited by the dominant political group

of the day to reflect and support its own ideological orientation and policy positions. The first four volumes of the *Selected Works* were clearly compiled and published for the purpose of exalting Mao's theory and strategy of revolution and enhancing his ideological and political leadership. The long delay in the publication of Volume V, which finally appeared in 1977, seventeen years after the appearance of Volume IV in 1960 and twenty years after the events of the period covered in the volume (1949–1957), reflects the complex factional conflict and editorial politics of the period since the mid-1950s.

Between 1956 and 1976, the control of the editorship of Mao's works changed hands at least three times: from the Liu Shaoqi-Deng Xiaoping faction (1956–1965), to the Lin Biao-Chen Boda clique (1966–1972), and then the so-called "Gang of Four" (1973–1976). Each group tried to draft its own version of Volume V with the aim of enlisting Mao's thought for advancing its own political cause and legitimizing its own authority. The final version of Volume V (which ultimately was hastily published under the leadership of a new Committee for the Editing and Publication of the Works of Mao Zedong in March 1977, six months after Mao's death) was clearly designed by the Hua Guofeng–Wang Dongxing group to capture the prestige and influence of Mao's personality cult in order to bolster the group's own image and legitimacy.

In addition to the selections included in Volume V, the Hua-Wang leadership also released eight additional Mao works between December 1976 and July 1978, including such texts as "Speech at the Enlarged Work Conference of the Central Committee" (text January 30, 1962, in this publication), "China Will Make A Great Leap Forward" (text December 13, 1964), and "A Letter on the Mechanization of Agriculture" (text March 12, 1966). Clearly, works such as these were selected mainly to legitimize and support the middle-to-left policy orientation pursued by Hua Guofeng at the time.

While Hua and his close associates were being ousted from their top leadership positions between 1979 and 1981, the new leadership under Deng Xiaoping disbanded, in 1980, the editorial and publishing committee for Mao works organized by Hua Guofeng and incorporated its functions into the Office of Archives and Research of the Party Central Committee. Moreover, it discarded a draft Volume VI of the *Selected Works* prepared under Wang Dongxing's editorial control.

In the years since 1979, more official collections of Mao's works have been released, notably three new thematic volumes: *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* (Selections from Mao Zedong's Letters, 1983), *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan* (Selected Writings of Mao Zedong on Newspaper Work, 1983), and *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong on the Investigations in the Countryside, 1983). These new collections were all published in December 1983, ostensibly in commemoration of Mao's ninetieth birthday. The Deng leadership has also selectively published many individual items, such as three letters to Li Da (texts March 27, 1951, September 17, 1952, and December 28, 1953) and a poem in praise of Peng Dehuai written during the Long March in 1935. An analysis of these newly compiled materials reveals without doubt that the current

leadership is stressing the moderate side of Mao and deliberately shunning Mao's more radical writings. These new publications were clearly designed to support and legitimize Deng's pragmatic reform and the pursuit of the "four modernizations." In the long run, while one can expect that more Mao papers will be selected and edited for publication, one can be also sure that the kind of editorial and publishing politics described above will remain in force.

Finally, aside from the problems of extreme selectivity and heavy political editing, there is also the problem of a lack of systematic and comprehensive bibliographic control over the entire corpus of Mao's writings and speeches. Beyond the official collections, there is little systematic information about or access to the myriad of items scattered among a wide variety of Chinese newspapers, magazines, government publications, etc. For the most part buried in obscurity, they are rarely used for systematic research and analysis.

During the Cultural Revolution, many competing Red Guard organizations took advantage of the prevailing chaos to gather a wide range of Mao materials and publish them for various political purposes. At least a dozen large collections of Mao papers, popularly titled *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought) or *Mao zhuxi wenxuan* (Selected Writings of Chairman Mao), were published by Red Guard factions in this period. In addition, thousands of Mao's instructions, conversations, letters, and quotations also appeared in Red Guard publications. None of these materials, however, were ever systematically checked for authenticity or accuracy; nor were they brought under a unified system of bibliographic control.

It was against this background of an urgent need to organize the massive corpus of Mao's works of all types for systematic scholarly research that the Project on the post-1949 Writings of Mao Zedong was launched at Brown University in 1975. The primary objectives of the Project were to be achieved in three phases: (1) to gather every text available anywhere in the world or everything Mao had written or spoken between 1949 and 1976, including essays, speeches, commentaries, instructions, interviews, poems, telegrams, letters, etc. (to which we have applied the rubric "writings"); (2) to translate, edit, annotate, and index all the materials gathered; and (3) to compile and publish these materials in a comprehensive chronological multivolume collection.

As was to be expected, the search for the texts of Mao's works and other relevant bibliographic material and information, the foundation upon which all other activities of the Project were to be carried out, received our highest priority during the initial years of the Project. Our bibliography staff checked most of China's major newspapers and journals, such as *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily), *Guangming ribao* (Guangming Daily), *Hongqi* (Red Flag), *Xinhua yuebao* (New China Monthly), *Renmin shouce* (People's Handbook). We also combed through large collections of new releases, newspaper clippings, and Red Guard publications, notably *New China News Agency (NCNA) News Releases*, *Youlian jianbao ziliao* (Newspaper Clippings of the Union Research Institute), and *Hongweibing ziliao* (Red Guard Publications, 20 volumes, Supplement, 8 volumes, compiled by the Center for Chinese Research Materials). In addition, we also consulted hundreds

of Chinese books and pamphlets that contain a wide range of Mao texts or reports on Mao. As few of these sources have adequate indexes, we undertook a time-consuming process of examining them page by page or, as in the case of microfilm, frame by frame.

In search of Mao's works the Project also systematically screened all major U.S. government translation series, such as *Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP)*, *Extracts from China Mainland Magazines (ECMM)*, *Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM)*, *Current Background (CB)*, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report*, and *Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)*. (A detailed listing of the various sources consulted may be found in the bibliography at the end of this volume.) The Project was particularly fortunate to be able to gain access to a rich source in a special file on Mao maintained at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. By 1982, toward the end of the major drive of material gathering, the Project's text files numbered approximately 2,300 items, totaling nearly 3 million Chinese characters of Mao's works of all types.

In the process of searching for and gathering Mao's texts, we also sought the assistance of major East Asian libraries and research centers and consulted numerous specialists and scholars throughout the world. Furthermore, the Project entered into a close collaborative relationship with two groups of China scholars in Japan (led by Minoru Takeuchi of Kyoto University and Kimiyoshi Nakamura of Sososha) and West Germany (headed by Helmut Martin of the Institute of Asian Studies in Hamburg and later of the Ruhr University of Bochum) which were dedicated to the compilation of, respectively, a Chinese and a German edition of the collected works of Mao Zedong.

Aside from gathering source material, our research staff also spent enormous amounts of time tracing the sources of the hundreds of brief instructions and quotations that, while attributed to Mao, were undocumented. Identifying textual variations among the different versions of the texts was another time-consuming task. The difficulty of these endeavors was exacerbated by the Chinese propensity to quote Mao on all occasions, but without the bibliographic niceties required by scholarly convention.

The task of translating and editing the texts was handled through the teamwork of native speakers of Chinese and native speakers of English, all with bilingual training and competence. With the former having a better grasp of the nuances of the Chinese terms and expressions, and the latter better equipped to assure readability in English, these small bilingual teams edited each draft translation with a single goal: to achieve a high standard of accuracy and readability.

Except in the few rare instances where a text is available only in an English source, the translations published in these volumes were all rendered by the Project. This policy of translating all Chinese texts, even where English translations of a text had been published previously either by Beijing or in the West, was pursued for the purpose of maintaining the independence and consistency of the Project and its publications. For the convenience of the serious researcher, the sources of all Chinese texts as well as all available English translations are cited in the source notes as fully as our bibliographic data permit. The scholarly apparatus that

surrounds each text is explained in full in the technical note to the reader entitled "Editorial Conventions and Devices." The user of these volumes is advised to consult that note beforehand.

The publication of these volumes has been long delayed for many reasons. Among the major factors has been the sporadic, surprise surfacing of additional texts in the years since the Project was begun, which greatly complicated our work plan and publication schedule. To a project like ours, new discoveries of fresh materials are always a mixed blessing of excitement and frustration. On many occasions the Project has been forced to divert its energy and modify its work plan to accommodate these new discoveries. We have been constantly confronted with the dilemma of wrestling with the conflicting goals between publishing the collection according to a preset schedule or delaying it for the sake of attaining a greater comprehensiveness. For instance, when the first volume had just reached the final stage of preparation for typesetting in 1984, Beijing put out, as mentioned earlier, three new thematic collections of Mao's works. Moreover, a year later, several additional versions of unauthorized Red Guard publications, *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought) and *Xuexi wenxuan* (Selected Writings for Studying), became available for the first time outside China. Most of this material was collected by the Mao Project between 1986 and 1990. In 1986, when Volume I was published, since it was too costly and difficult to make major changes of the typeset pages without serious financial and technical complications, we were unable to integrate all of these texts from the 1949–1955 period into Volume I. As much as was possible, we will endeavor to include new material in subsequent volumes, starting with Volume II. Other late arrivals which we are unable to include in the volumes as they are being produced for publication will appear supplementarily in the final volume of this work.

The entire collection of Mao's post-1949 works is scheduled to be published in a comprehensive set of eight volumes. The first seven volumes will contain the texts and annotations, arranged chronologically, with the final volume comprising supplementary texts, cumulative index, chronology of Mao's activities, and bibliography.

\* \* \*

(Note: This introduction was written in 1986 by Professor Kau to explain the premises of the project as a whole and was published in Volume I. In 1992, it is reproduced here for inclusion in Volume II. However, some editorial changes were made in the last part of this introduction, but without compromising the integrity of the essay in general, in order to reflect certain changes that have taken place with regard to the Mao's Writing Project and to the publication of these volumes in the intervening years. —J.K.L.)

## INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II

### I. The Assessment of Mao and the Central Themes of 1956–1957

The years 1956–1957 are generally known in the history of the People's Republic of China as the years of the Hundred Flowers campaign, referring to the policy first instigated by Mao in mid-1956 to forge a broad "united front" of sorts in Chinese society to accomplish the transition to socialism on all fronts. The strategy for forming such a concerted effort beyond the Communist Party leadership itself was to permit, indeed invite, as a matter of policy, intellectuals from the Communist Party as well as from other "democratic parties" and groups to supply the government leadership and the CPC itself with critical opinions, and to elicit the intellectuals' support for the agenda of socialist transformation established by the Party. More precisely, the Hundred Flowers campaign was formally launched by mid-1956, and it came virtually to an end by June 1957. This period is sometimes known as a "springtime" in the history of the CPC, although in retrospect the nature of this springtime is highly controversial. In the course of its development, the Hundred Flowers campaign incorporated the Party rectification (*zhengfeng*) movement in the first half of 1957, and toward the end of the period, it segued ominously into a series of "anti-Rightist" campaigns—first the Party's pointed "retaliation" against intellectuals who had offered perhaps unexpectedly scathing and fundamental criticisms of the Party, and then the merging of the countercriticism against these critics of the Party with the criticism of those within the Party who had, in Mao's view, deviated from the task of socialist transformation and lined up on the opposition's side of what began to loom as a "two-line struggle." Beneath the surface of this springtime, then, lurked momentous ideological and political struggles that foreshadowed even more violent upheavals in the ensuing years, including the Cultural Revolution and beyond. Thus the years 1956 and 1957, covered by this second volume of *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976*, have a particular significance in Mao's life and career, and in the history of Chinese communism and the People's Republic of China.

In a way, the importance of these years is most forcefully captured in the retrospective on the last two decades of Mao's life on the part of his posthumous

critics within the state and Party leadership. On June 27, 1981, almost five years after Mao's death, the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC finally adopted an official party assessment of Mao, the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," a document that was fifteen months in the making. The formula of generously "affirming" Mao's contributions to and leadership of the revolutionary movement, resulting in the founding of the People's Republic, while severely criticizing Mao's "mistakes" of his latter years, is by now familiar to those who have followed Chinese developments. Notably, in enumerating these mistakes, the first named chronologically was Mao's decision to broaden the scope of the anti-Rightist campaign in 1957.<sup>1</sup> So it would appear that in the official assessment of Mao by his "successors," 1957 was clearly the watershed year. In a less clearcut fashion, Chen Yun, a veteran senior cadre of the CPC and a prominent architect of the post-Mao economic reform programs, as well as a vociferous critic of Mao, allegedly remarked: "If Chairman Mao had died in 1956, there would have been no doubt that he was a great leader of the Chinese people."<sup>2</sup>

One does not necessarily have to be completely in tune with the post-Mao Chinese leadership to arrive at a somewhat similar assessment of Mao's mistakes, and particularly with the "timing" aspect of the assessment. In the latest edition of a respected textbook on the history of modern China, Immanuel Hsu writes: "In considering the source of Chinese political stability, the Eighth Party Congress of 1956 was generally viewed as the Rubicon in political development. This Congress . . . stressed Party democracy and free discussion of issues. It affirmed the collective leadership of Mao, Liu [Shaoqi], Chou [Zhou Enlai] and Chu Teh [Zhu De], and the period from 1956 to early 1957 was regarded as a 'springtime' in party history." Hsu continues: "In conclusion, historians would agree that Mao was extremely successful as a revolutionary but disappointingly erratic as a nation builder. His great achievements before 1957 were a source of inspiration to others, but his serious mistakes thereafter must serve as a lesson to all."<sup>3</sup> Neither does one have to agree with such an assessment of Mao's place in the history of the Chinese revolution to acknowledge the watershed significance of the years 1956 and 1957. Maurice Meisner, whose *Mao's China and After* clearly presents the Hundred Flowers period as a pivot in the history of the PRC, writes:

What came to be called the "blooming and contending" of 1956–1957 was a time when the most critical questions were raised and debated. Questions about the relationship between state and society, between leaders and led, and questions involving human and intellectual freedom were discussed more openly and candidly than ever before in the People's Republic. . . . The manner in which the problems or "contradictions" of the time were perceived, the way in which they were resolved or left unresolved, and the outcome of the public debates and the secret Party debates of 1956–1957 are crucial for understanding the nature of socialism in China and the distinctively Maoist theory of socioeconomic development which crystallized during these years.<sup>4</sup>

In a similar vein, Ranbir Vohra calls the 1956–1957 period a "year of reappraisal."<sup>5</sup>

We believe that the focal point of the period of 1956–1957—what brings all the vacillating events and developments of those years into sharper perspective—is twofold. First, in this period a trend that would come to characterize Mao's leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the nation's turbulent affairs for the next two decades came to the foreground. In this "pattern," Mao would observe political and ideological tendencies that were not in keeping with his own idea of how the Chinese revolution ought to develop; he would recognize these tendencies as a "deviationist" political "line" that was evolving within the Party (perhaps clandestinely at the Party center or supported surreptitiously by some other top-ranking leader of the center), and he would then launch, or at least attempt to launch, campaigns from outside the Party in order to "rectify" both the Party and the course of the Chinese revolution as he himself saw it. This type of Party rectification, somewhat reminiscent of the rectifications of the early 1940s in Yanan, which are in fact repeatedly invoked by Mao and others in the Communist Party documents of the 1956–1957 period, became Mao's peculiar imprint on Chinese politics in the 1960s and 1970s. The intertwining of "mass movements" with the ideological and political struggle "between the two lines" within the Party would become the dominant feature of Maoist politics throughout his remaining years and for a number of years beyond Mao's own departure from the scene. This is most certainly the root out of which sprang the calamitous ten years of the Cultural Revolution,<sup>6</sup> the most significant event in the last portion of Mao's long political life and, as assessed in today's China, his most unerasable and unforgivable mistake.

This characteristic also underscores an important irony in Mao's political career that should not be overlooked in any attempt to understand and assess him. Although it is certainly clear to Chinese Communists and has long been recognized by scholars, this irony is not well understood by the broad general public. This irony is that even while Mao was being recognized as the supreme leader of Chinese communism, his leadership was almost constantly in contention, both politically and ideologically, with the Communist Party that he is supposed to have led.

Behind this political pattern stands a more critical ideological issue: it was because Mao became increasingly convinced of and preoccupied with what he saw to be a fundamental ideological difference between his own position and that which he believed to be held by certain others in the central Party leadership that he launched the Party rectifications that would become a constant feature of life in the CPC from 1957 to 1977. Again the posthumous assessment of Mao by the Party is revealing. The 1981 "Resolution" pointedly rejected as groundless the assertion that the Cultural Revolution was a struggle against revisionism and capitalism. This assessment can be interpreted to mean two things: one, that Mao erroneously conceived of those who differed from his ideological position as "revisionists" and "capitalism-restorationists" and the "two-line struggle" was a false dichotomy that existed only in Mao's mind; and two, that the struggle of the Cultural Revolution was at least in great part conducted on political terms and for political purposes (the power struggle theory) rather than for ideological reasons (the two-line struggle theory.) Typically, the Party does not feel obliged to fall in line with one or the other of these interpretations, but incorporates both: "History has shown that

the 'Great Cultural Revolution,' initiated by a leader laboring under a misconception and *capitalized on by counterrevolutionary cliques*, led to domestic turmoil and brought disaster to the Party, the country and the entire people."<sup>7</sup>

For those whose primary quest is not so much to assess Mao as to comprehend his words and deeds and their significance in a historical context, the important fact remains that false or not, the dichotomy did exist in Mao's mind as far back as 1956. For Mao, the central subject of concern was "revolution," then and always. (Notably, the 1981 Resolution speaks little of "revolution" beyond 1949. In referring to the early years of the People's Republic, the term "socialist transformation" is used predominantly, and in fact, Mao's "brilliant success" in those first seven years is "acknowledged.")

Similarly, Mao's concern for the Chinese revolution in 1956–1957 was not only how it would continue, but whether it would continue (by his definitions of what constitutes a revolution) at all. In early 1956, as the First Five-Year Plan drew to a close and as China's Communist leaders, including Mao, reviewed the developments of the past three years, including the processes of collectivization and the cooperativization of agriculture, which Mao had described a few months earlier as an "upsurge of socialism in China's countryside," they had reason to believe that the "transition to socialism" was completed, or on the verge of being completed. And yet as the year progressed, Mao broke ranks with others in the Party over how this situation was to be interpreted, and how far and in what direction this "optimism" was to be taken. On the basis of that assumption, and as they began to chart the course of China's social and economic development beyond the First Five-Year Plan, the leaders of the Party began to focus on one dominant issue—the economic backwardness of China, which the transition to socialism had not solved in a fundamental way. As the plans for socioeconomic development were made in 1956, they became increasingly centered on the "liberation of the forces of production," and not on political or ideological issues. While documentation of the views of certain leaders and their economic advisers at that time is sparse, and while we should hate that some of the characterizations of this viewpoint and focus come in the accusations made in 1957 by Mao himself and Maoists even later, it is rather reliably concluded that in 1956 the Party leadership did head in that direction—one with which Mao, by his own assertion in 1957 and repeatedly since, did not agree. The critical document, however, is the Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPC to the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 made by Liu Shaoqi, which introduced the formulation that the massive class struggles of the revolutionary period had already come to an end, and that the "primary contradiction" of the "present movement" was between the relatively "advanced" socialist relations of production and the backward forces of production.<sup>8</sup>

Although the documents in this volume demonstrate that in general Mao had accepted the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress when it was passed without vocal dissent, they also show that Mao began, by January 1957 at the latest, to place qualifications on that resolution. By April 1957 he had come to oppose the resolution's implications for the course of the revolution, if not specifically its language. In retrospect, Mao's opposition was almost inevitable; his acceptance of

the resolution earlier could have been tactical. Fundamentally, Mao's ideology indicates that in his hierarchy of concepts, the basic idea of revolution as the holistic transformation of society (but with a focus on the transformation of the relations of production first and foremost) takes precedence over the concept of revolution as the material economic transformation of society. Mao was, in the final analysis, a voluntarist in this sense, and he interpreted the "revolutionary truth" of Marxism-Leninism on these terms above all. He was also dedicated to the principle of class struggle, and to the principle of the permanence and ubiquity of contradictions. (In 1957, as he began to express critical opposition to the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress, he would go about it first by articulating the cardinal assumption that contradictions do continue to exist—and therefore have to be dealt with through some form of struggle—even in a socialist society.) As Benjamin Schwartz has suggested, Mao's sense of socialism is one of "eliminative utopianism"—that is, the "good society" can come about only through the elimination of the capitalist mode of production and the private ownership of (or control over) the means of production, and this can only be achieved through voluntaristic revolutionary struggle, including the continued transformation of the consciousness and will of the people.<sup>9</sup>

In Mao's view, then, turning the nation's and the Party's attention to the development of the forces of production while declaring categorically that the class struggle had come to an end (thus implying that there would no longer be a primary need to struggle with the issues of the relations of production, ownership, and so on) would be tantamount to halting the revolution, or at least allowing material-economic developments, rather than socio-economic and political-economic developments, to set the boundaries of the revolution. To Mao, this was no less than an issue of fundamental understanding of Marxism. Since it is clear that Mao's adversaries could rest their case on an "orthodox" interpretation of Marxism, especially in that Marx tended to rely on impersonal, material forces and their development to eliminate the obstructions to the advent of a socialist society, Mao found it necessary to combat this threat to the continuation of the revolution by driving a wedge through the body of Marxism-socialism, between the "economic-determinist theory" and the "Marxist-Leninist theory" of voluntaristic revolution. This explains his heavy reliance on quotations and random invocations of Lenin (especially of Lenin's criticism of Kautsky and Bernstein) in his writings and speeches of 1957. This was the key issue with which Mao grappled in 1956 and 1957, within the Party, and beyond that, in China as well as on the international front. As the passing of the Eighth Party Congress resolution suggests, Mao quite obviously had little success in such an endeavor in 1956, and it is against this background, surely, that the Party rectification campaign, which is really the focal point of developments in 1957, was launched. In the latter half of 1957, the Party rectification and anti-Rightist campaign merged into one for the same reason.

Throughout the unfolding of these issues in China, the impact of international relations, especially the unraveling relations between China and the Soviet Union, was just as important as that of domestic developments. The issue of the continuation of the revolution and the opposition, or at least dissenting opinion, to Mao's

perspective within the CPC had, a decidedly international tinge in 1956 and 1957. When the Hundred Flowers campaign was launched in 1956 to call upon the intellectuals outside the Party to come forward with critical opinions, the target of such criticism, it was assumed, would be bureaucratism within the Party. When, in 1957, the Party rectification campaign was launched to revive the Hundred Flowers campaign, for which the Party apparatus had expressed little enthusiasm (a situation that was duly noted by Mao), the express targets were “bureaucratism, subjectivism, and sectarianism.” For each of these, the influence of the Soviet Union was impossible to ignore. While the rectification of the Party was primarily a Chinese matter, the purpose and effect of such a rectification clearly had to do with Sino-Soviet relations.

Take first the subject of bureaucratism. While Mao’s perception of the course of the revolution focused primarily on the issue of class struggle versus development of the material forces of production and on the threat of halting the revolutionary momentum of destroying the capitalist mode of production thoroughly, it is equally clear that Mao’s deepest and most imminent concern was not so much with the “pure” form of capitalism (i.e., ownership and control of the means of production by private entrepreneurs and capitalists), but with a “new” form of capitalism, namely, control and manipulation of the means of production by a bureaucratic elite operating under the guise of socialism. Mao had not yet come to the point where he would fully identify this bureaucratism with capitalism, but the term “bureaucratic capitalism” was not new, albeit that at least for the time being it was employed primarily in reference to the pre-1949 KMT-dominated situation. Nonetheless, it is sufficiently clear that Mao already believed that this bureaucratism came from China’s borrowing of the Soviet model in the period of the First Five-Year Plan. Together with the unquestionable material and economic successes and benefits of Soviet aid, and the Soviet model’s emphasis on a stable state structure and central planning, this borrowing had also brought in strong, elitist bureaucratic controls, as well as an emphasis on economic modernization and development of the forces of production at the expense of the momentum of revolutionary transformation of the relations of production. The result, as Mao saw it, was a heavily bureaucratized CPC whose cadres were not only losing their ability to lead the country in areas of economic, scientific, educational, and cultural development, but thereby also abdicating its leadership in the one area in which it could least afford to lose it—directing the course of the revolution.

Khrushchev’s repudiation of Stalin in his secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 provided Mao with the sense of urgency to reassess China’s adoption of the Soviet model on other fronts as well. While repudiating Stalin’s subjectivism and sectarianism, Khrushchev, in Mao’s view, had adopted another, even more insidious, sort of subjectivism and sectarianism. Mao and the Chinese leadership accepted the criticism of Stalin’s “serious mistakes,” such as waging class warfare to eliminate his opponents. (As seen in some texts in this volume, Mao’s own criticisms of Stalin in 1956 and 1957 went further than the “official CPC position” expressed in the April 1956 editorial in *Renmin ribao*, “On the Historical Experience of the

Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” which was almost certainly partially drafted by Mao himself, though it is not included in this volume as a personal document of Mao’s.) Khrushchev went on, however, to undermine the basic concept of the revolution that Mao had consistently adopted and was not about to relinquish at this point. In the critique of Stalin, as Mao saw it, Khrushchev came to a point of denying the primacy and permanence of contradictions. In his views on “peaceful coexistence” and *détente* with the capitalist countries, Khrushchev’s “Soviet model” rejected the fundamental premise of the socialist camp—the unmitigatedly antagonistic confrontation of the socialist and imperialist blocs. If China were to continue to adopt the Soviet model, it would have to abandon that premise and thus lose the international-front basis for continuing the class-conflict-oriented revolution in China. Once again, as in the period from the late 1920s to the early 1930s, the leadership in the Soviet Union and in the Communist International threatened the course of the Chinese revolution, except that this time, especially with its status in the socialist world considerably bolstered by the developments of 1955 (in particular the enhancement of its reputation after the Bandung Conference of Asian-African states), China was in a position to do something more willful about it. Another major difference, of course, is the existence of the People’s Republic of China in 1956. That Mao, as we interpret him here, responded to the Soviet position in the way he did illustrates his preoccupation at the time not only with the revolution in China, but also with the continuation of the global revolution. Mao’s reaction was to advance a theory of a Chinese path to modernization, with a heavy reliance on the concept of continued, or uninterrupted, revolution, and an implicit rejection of the Soviet model.

Thus, even in China’s internal affairs, most significantly the Party rectification of 1957, Mao was adopting a line that dealt *simultaneously* with intra-CPC issues, the broader issues of China’s revolution for the whole society, and the international issue of Sino-Soviet relations and the socialist bloc. In a fully integrated way, the Hundred Flowers campaign, the Party rectification, and the anti-Rightist campaign, the three major developments of 1956–1957, dealt with the fundamental issue of the course of revolution in a global sense as well as in the context of China and the CPC itself.

The first theme discussed in this introduction—the forging of Mao’s position as a CPC leader often critical of and in opposition to the CPC itself (and one that by 1957 would, as Maurice Meisner explained, free Mao from the “Leninist discipline of the Party and enable him to criticize the Party from without . . . as the representative of the people”)<sup>10</sup> did not begin in 1956. In 1955, in the ups and downs of the agricultural cooperativization movement, Mao had begun to feel what he believed to be the weight of the Party leadership dragging its feet in revolutionizing China, or transforming the relations in Chinese society. In the latter phase of that movement, Mao did not wait for the Party leadership but appealed directly to provincial cadres to adopt his rapid, higher-level cooperativization policy. He then forced the Party to approve the policy formally in October 1955, and Mao had typically not hesitated to announce that “the mass movement is running ahead of the leadership.”<sup>11</sup> The impact of this recent experience was certainly not lost on Mao in early

1956, before the Hundred Flowers campaign was put into motion, nor was it lost on Mao's critics. The pattern that developed in 1956–1957 therefore had its roots at least in 1955. Without the pattern being worked out as clearly as it was in 1956 and 1957, however, Mao's "opposition" in 1955 would have been an isolated incident, a singularly tactical rather than long-term strategic matter in the history of his career.

Similarly, the significance of 1956–1957 can also be seen in the clear light of Mao's position on the years immediately after. His theory of "uninterrupted revolution," which is surely his most important contribution to socialist theory, and which has been "canonized," for better or for worse, as the core of Mao Zedong Thought, was not fully articulated until it officially appeared in January 1958 and was adopted as the principle underlying Mao's "Chinese path to socialism" and the Great Leap Forward. This theory clearly had its roots in the experiences of 1956–1957, without which it is less likely that it would have emerged as such a full-fledged proposition in 1958.

In summation, then, 1956–1957 was indeed a watershed period, a time of reappraisal that echoed many deep historical sounds in Mao's past and opened up a singular path of the development of Mao's future. It is the beginning of Mao's "ultra-Leftist" period, some would say. Certainly the events in 1956–1957—the advancing of and retreat from the Hundred Flowers policy, the revival of Mao's radical position through the Party rectification campaign in 1957, the diversion into the anti-Rightist campaign, and the employment of the anti-Rightist campaign to continue and complete the "current stage" of the rectification of the Party—do demonstrate what Benjamin Schwartz has called Mao's "instinct for politics as the art of the possible" and his "shifting states of mind,"<sup>12</sup> but at a deeper level one must also see here the fundamental principles of Mao's thought, the inevitability (or, one might also say, obstinacy) of his returning, time and time again with increasing vehemence, to the trajectory of class struggle, of radical and uncompromising continuation of the revolution toward communism, to overcoming anything, including, if necessary, the impurities of the Party itself, that stands in the way of that destination. They also demonstrate Mao's equally strong, instinct for the science of what has to be. In retrospect, one may agree with Schwartz that Mao had always stood pretty much "alone with himself," but at the same time, in his own mind, Mao believed deeply that he did stand "alone with the masses."<sup>13</sup> In 1956, when he felt, for the first time since the founding of the People's Republic, that he could not "stand with the Party," he began to create this identity with "the masses."

## II. The Question of Texts and the Texts of 1956–1957

In the general introduction to *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976* in Volume I, we outlined briefly the shape of Mao's publications as we knew it at the time Volume I was published. Not much has changed since then as far as the availability of original documents is concerned, but as we approach the publication of Volume II, there are a few questions that ought to be clarified.

In various places in that introductory essay, we alluded to a number of Mao's

works published by the Chinese in the 1980s. In addition to the three "special volumes" listed on p. xxviii of Volume I, there are now available two volumes of *Mao Zedong zhuzuo xuandu* (Selected readings From *The Works of Mao Zedong*), *shang* and *xia* volumes (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), as well as five volumes of *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (Documents of Mao Zedong Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China). With regard to this last item, a brief explanation is necessary. This is a *neibu* (internal) publication, that is, one not intended to be publicly circulated, and it was printed, by the Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (Central Documents Publishing Press) in Beijing starting in 1987. It is clearly intended as a massive, definitive compilation of Mao's writings and speeches since 1949.<sup>14</sup> These first five volumes cover, however, only the period from September 1949 to December 1955 (in other words, the exact period covered by Volume I of *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976*). In addition to these publications of the mid- to late 1980s and early 1990s, there is a large quantity of editions and publications that were originally produced in 1960s but were not available outside of China until the mid to late 1980s. We referred to these as "several additional versions of unauthorized Red Guard publications, *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought) and *Xuexi wenxuan* (Selected Writings for Studying)" in Volume I. A selection of critical items from these document collections for the years 1956, 1957, and 1958 has been translated in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward* (Cambridge: The Council on East Asian Studies and Harvard University Press, 1989). Furthermore, four other volumes appear under the title *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought) but are not included among the document collections grouped by MacFarquhar et al. under the heading "New Mao Texts" in their volume. They were, however, made available to the Mao's Writing Project by Jonathan Unger of Australian National University. As Timothy Cheek notes, "The explosion of materials on party history coming out of China in the post-Mao period allows us to view all Mao publications in a fresh light."<sup>15</sup>

The crucial questions for us, as we come to the publication of this second volume of *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976* are: In what ways has this newly available material influenced the shape of the translation and publication of post-1949 works of Mao in this country? And what have we done with this material in our own publication?

The publication of Mao's works carries with it many questions, both political and academic. Several studies of these issues are broadly available. Helmut Martin painstakingly explained the full course of the publication of Mao's works in the People's Republic of China up to 1979–1980 in *Cult and Canon, The Origins and Development of State Maoism* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982). Timothy Cheek's informative essay, "Textually Speaking: An Assessment of the Newly Available Mao's Texts," in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, along with the other introductory chapters in that volume, provides the most exhaustive and up-to-date study of the entire issue of the publication of Mao's works both before and after his death.



Here we would like to return to the question of the publication of Volume V of *Mao Zedong xuanji* (The selected works of Mao Zedong) in 1977 mainly because it covers the years 1949 to 1957. That it incorporates selected Mao documents from 1956 and 1957 is seen to be a major problem by some. As we now know from the careful exposé made by Helmut Martin, the criticism in the CPC of *Xuanji*, V, developed soon after its publication and was closely linked with the unfolding of a number of options regarding the Party's assessment of Mao and its criticism of various "generations" of editors of Mao's "canon" in the past, including Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing, who directed the publication of *Xuanji*, V. The official assessment of Mao in 1981 took 1957 to be the "starting point" of Mao's "serious mistakes," inextricably implicating *Xuanji*, V, and its editorial line. As the Party leadership under Deng Xiaoping moved toward the final assessment of Mao, the volume and its treatment of the major movements of 1957—the Party rectification and the anti-Rightist campaign—became unacceptable. Martin (p. 132) reveals that "between June 14 and June 22 (1978), a debate had taken place between the Wang Dongxing opposition and the Deng faction at the Central Committee Work Conference in Yantai (Shandong Province). . . . The Wang group had backed up their editorial interpretation on Volume V with the argument that the campaign against the right [in 1957] . . . had still to be regarded as correct and lawful although a few mistakes had marred it in the execution. . . . The counterargument of the Deng group was that the editorial selection of documents for Volume V . . . had distorted the actual events, and that the editorial committee [i.e., headed by Hua Guofeng and Wang] had edited 'to suit its own needs.'" Thus, the interpretation of *Xuanji*, V, was a key issue in the political problem of assessing Mao in 1978–1980.

The debates over Mao, and especially over *Xuanji*, V, coupled with the political developments in China in 1978–1981, culminating with Deng Xiaoping's leadership and "De-Maoization," resulted in the dismissal of Wang Dongxing and others and the discrediting of the whole enterprise of the publication of the "selected works" of Mao up to this point. As Helmut Martin reveals, Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing's group had already produced a *Xuanji*, VI, but that was now discarded. "The basic contours of a possible new 'Deng' Volume VI have been established by December 1978,"<sup>16</sup> but as things turned out, the idea of producing a sixth volume of *Xuanji* any time soon was simply discarded.<sup>17</sup> In fact, everything points to the possibility that after the official Party assessment of Mao was published in 1981, the momentum for publishing any further volume of "Mao's canon" was lost.<sup>18</sup> This may well be the background to the publication of Mao's "noncanon," the various special and comprehensive collections of Mao's documents in the mid- to late 1980s that Timothy Cheek calls the "'Historicist' edition."<sup>19</sup>

As for how we are dealing with the "new material" in this volume, we have incorporated the relevant material from the various special volumes covering Mao's works on military affairs, journalism work, and letters.<sup>20</sup> We have also included material from the important two-volume *Mao Zedong zhuzuo xuandu* (Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong).<sup>21</sup> Since the first five volumes of *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (Documents of Mao Zedong Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China) only go up to December 1955, we

will select documents from these volumes and subsequent volumes for inclusion in our planned final volume of supplementary texts and chronology.<sup>22</sup>

Of the second category of new material, we have selected important documents from *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought), cited in this volume as *Wansui* (n.d. 3). We have not yet acquired, however, the full texts of the new material that forms the basis of *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao*, edited by MacFarquhar et al. This is particularly regrettable because this material sheds a very special light on the issues and events of 1956–1957. We do hope to have full access to this material soon, and we will certainly incorporate the documents in our supplementary volume. Meanwhile, readers may consult the *Secret Speeches* volume for a complete list of the items in this batch of new material and informative comments on the contents of each.

Our present volume, even more than Volume I, combines "old" texts with "new ones" in many places; there are many incidences, therefore, of two or even more versions of a document, especially in the case of speeches. These are arranged consecutively, and many cross-references and comparisons have been made in the annotations, although text comparison has not been our primary task.

### III. A Survey of the Texts of 1956–1957

The first important document appears close to the beginning of this book. This is the text of January 20, 1956, Mao's speech to the conference convened by the Central Committee on the "question of intellectuals." At this conference, attended by intellectuals from academic institutions and organizations, many of whom were prominent members of the "democratic parties," Mao and Zhou Enlai attempted to lay the groundwork for a unity among China's scholars, writers, and scientists for the task of a socialist transformation, and their "unity" with the CPC itself. The background for this was, on the surface, simple: boosting China's socialist construction beyond the boundaries of the First Five-Year Plan could not be accomplished without the participation of leaders in all fields of scholarship. There were, however, two particularly significant ramifications. First, in 1955, intellectuals in China had been dealt a blow with the campaign against "anti-Party" intellectuals, epitomized in the "Anti-Hu Feng" campaign (see text January 1955, vol. I). Second, throughout the latter part of 1955, Mao had pressed hard for completing the cooperativization of agriculture. Thus, in the last part of 1955 and 1956, the purpose was to reconcile with the intellectuals and to convince them to take part in riding the crest of what Mao saw to be an "upsurge of socialism," and thus to complete the socialist transformation of Chinese society and economy in all aspects.

Mao's speech here provides an important basis for the entire Hundred Flowers campaign, even though the campaign itself was not officially launched until later. Several telling points of this speech demonstrate, however, what would turn out to be the limitations of the Hundred Flowers campaign and the course of events in the two years to follow.<sup>23</sup> The key lies with the subtle differences in how Mao and Zhou interpreted the social character of the intellectuals. Zhou, representing the

mentality of the CPC leadership in general, had a more straightforward perspective: the contributions of the intellectuals had to be enlisted in modernizing China and expanding China's socialist construction and production. Zhou's point was to confirm this enlistment by assuring that the intellectuals were "part of the working class."<sup>24</sup> Mao's purpose was more complex. He wanted to enlist the intellectuals not only for technical-productive construction, but also for the political-ideological transformation of Chinese society, and to ensure the pursuit of socialist transformation on the part of the CPC itself. Moreover, Mao was not as ready to award the intellectuals with a clearcut independent class status as Zhou was. In his speech, Mao describes the intellectuals as "attached" to class interests "as hair is attached to a skin." Thus, Mao's strategy was to ensure that the "skin" would be transformed by the continued destruction of capitalist forms and the switchover to a socialist mode of production throughout the society, thus depriving everyone, intellectuals included, of the possibility of lingering attachments to a bourgeois "skin." Mao maintained this belief throughout the ups and downs of 1956 and 1957 and repeatedly echoed it in his writings and speeches, especially in mid-1957 (see text April 1957 [2]). However, the gradual realization that the destruction of the bourgeois "skin" was a more arduous task than anticipated, and that there was opposition to this strategic perspective both outside and inside the Party, created more serious problems for Mao and led ultimately to the Party rectification and the termination of the Hundred Flowers campaign in ironic failure.

Mao's speech on the question of the intellectuals was followed up by a speech at the Supreme State Conference (text January 25, 1956), which was convened to discuss the "Forty-Point" Draft Program for the National Development of Agriculture. The speech dealt with the main points of this program and the implicit agenda for socialist construction and transformation. We have only an excerpt of Mao's speech, however, and we believe that a more complete version would shed more light on Mao's position at the time.

The momentum toward launching the Hundred Flowers campaign was interrupted by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in the now-famous "secret speech" at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convened in February 1956. Although the CPC's message of greetings to the Congress, written by Mao (text February 9, 1956) was generally laudatory, it did foreshadow the Chinese criticism of de-Stalinization in the months ahead, and the Sino-Soviet split even further down the line. This message was soon followed by a letter written by Mao to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and others (text February 19, 1956) in which, in addition to stating that "the free expression of viewpoints should not be prohibited" (returning to the "Hundred Flowers" idea), Mao also alluded to a point of difference of opinion on the interpretation of Sun Yat-sen between Mao and a Soviet scholar then visiting China. Behind this minor note lies a deeper divergence of views on how the socialist camp should deal with the issue of imperialism, a divergence that clearly was beginning to emerge between Mao and Khrushchev (and between the Chinese and the Soviets) and would lead to the formulation of Mao's "paper-tiger" thesis (see text July 14, 1956, and text November 18, 1957).

Moreover, before the split between Mao and Khrushchev became evident, the

CPC published two crucial documents that dealt with its assessment of the new developments in the international Communist movement and the Soviet Union's leadership in 1956. These took the form of *RMRB* editorials. One came shortly after Khrushchev's "secret speech" and was entitled "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (April 5, 1956). The second, on December 29, 1956, was entitled "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." By comparing these documents one could trace the development of the critique of the Soviet leadership in China in the crucial presplit year of 1956, and these are unquestionably the key documents in studying the origins of the Sino-Soviet breakup. Neither, however, is included in Volume II, since they were not issued in Mao's name, nor decidedly of Mao's writing, though they clearly bore the imprint of his ideas. Mao did make, however, a number of critical comments about Stalin before he arrived at the openly critical position on Stalin in 1957. These are recorded in texts April [6], 1956; April 1956; August 30, 1956; October 23, 1956(2); and November 30, 1956.

Before the Hundred Flowers campaign was officially launched, Mao continued to promote a speedup in socialist transformation. This is reflected in two sets of directives (texts March 5, 1956, and April 2, 1956). Even more important, there is the clear emphasis on rectifying CPC mentality on socialist relations, and the balance between socialist transformation and production as expressed in what appears to be the most critical document of 1956, Mao's speech "On the Ten Major Relationships" (text April 25, 1956), which came very much in tandem with a speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau (text April 1956).

Like another major speech in 1956, namely, the May 2 speech in which Mao is supposed to have officially enunciated the policy of "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom; Let a Hundred Schools Contend," the "On the Ten Major Relationships" speech is shrouded in mystery. The text of the latter speech has been "published," albeit decades after the event. An "earlier" version appeared in Red Guard publications during the Cultural Revolution, in 1967 and again in 1969. The "official" version, which differs substantially from the 1967/1969 version, appeared twenty years after the occasion of the speech itself, in *Xuanji*, V. It is difficult to ascertain which version was the original or closer to the original. According to the information reported by Timothy Cheek, the *Xuanji*, V version was "put together in 1975 by [Mao's secretary] Hu Qiaomu based on a number of speeches made by Mao in spring 1956" and is therefore a piece of evidence of what Cheek calls "collective wisdom" in the publication of Mao's "canonical" works.<sup>25</sup>

There are several major issues of these speeches at the enlarged meeting(s) of the Political Bureau, (which meant that it [they] was attended by provincial, municipal and autonomous region Party secretaries and key Party cadres at the center as well as members of the Political Bureau) that we may briefly reiterate here. The first is that the "Ten Major Relationships" speech, underscoring Mao's way of perceiving contradictions of perspectives that exist in ten key areas, was critical of the Soviet model and the Soviet socialist system, and in essence proposed a radically different strategy for change and approach to the goals of socialism. Here Mao brought up the issues of bureaucratism, the gap between urban economic

development and rural backwardness, and the withdrawal of ideological progressivism—themes that were essential to the Party rectification in the year ahead, and to Mao's thought in general. This was carried forward in the other speech (text April 1956) in which Mao, for instance, picked out the "single management" system (*yizhang zhi*) for criticism. While the spearhead of criticism here is the experience of the Chinese leadership under Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, who had been severely criticized earlier (see text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I), it was similarly directed toward the Soviet model in general.

Second, the "Ten Major Relationships" speech also enunciated two major slogans: first, "Drumming up energies, strive for the headwaters, and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism," which has significance throughout the period leading up to and through the Great Leap Forward of 1958–1959. Second, "Long-term coexistence [of the CPC with democratic parties] and mutual supervision" is a direct lead-in to the Hundred Flowers campaign, which Mao would launch with his unpublished May 2 speech.

Finally, these speeches at the enlarged meeting(s) of the Political Bureau are heavily laced with references to "Party history," and are therefore clearly linked stylistically to the April 5, 1956, *RMRB* editorial "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." This is even clearer when considered in conjunction with the fact that the enlarged Political Bureau meetings were convened to discuss the CPC's reaction to Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin and Stalinism, and that the *RMRB* editorial was the CPC's first official response to the issue.

Clearly, the remainder of 1956 was taken up primarily by the promotion of the Hundred Flowers campaign. Nonetheless, Mao was still very much concerned with promoting a "Chinese" model of socialism. He spoke on the issue, directly or indirectly, with both Chinese and foreigners. The *RMRB* editorial on cultivating Chinese medicine (text May 27, 1956) and the talk with music workers (text August 24, 1956) contain implicit criticisms of what Mao saw to be dangerous tendencies of the socialist world, under the leadership of Khrushchev's Soviet Union, to lean toward the West and lose confidence in socialism. His interviews with a delegation of Japanese army veterans (text September 4, 1956), and with the German journalist Gunther Wiesenborn (text November 11, 1956) are quite representative. More important, two conversations with Latin American visitors—text July 14, 1956, in which the "U.S. imperialism is a paper-tiger" theme is brought up, and text September 25, 1956, in which Mao speaks of a number of problems in the history of the CPC and proposes that "Communists must not be afraid to make mistakes" but "must find the proper way to unite and continue to promote socialism"—underscore these issues even more vividly. As the CPC headed toward the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, Mao showed himself to be mainly thinking about two issues. On the one hand, he was concerned about "unity," first the unity within the Party, but also the CPC's ability to be "united with all those with whom unity is possible." The promotion of such a unity underlies not only the Hundred Flowers policy, but also what he eventually would propose as the discernment between "contradictions among the people" and "contradictions between the

enemy and ourselves" in early 1957. At the same time, Mao was concerned with some issues emerging in clear profile within the CPC, namely factionalism (or sectarianism) and subjectivism, which would become increasingly major problems leading to the Party rectification of mid-1957. These themes are stressed in his speech to the preparatory meeting for the Eighth Congress (text August 30, 1956).

Let us return to the Hundred Flowers campaign. By now it is clear that the campaign was not as successful as Mao had hoped it would be, or at least double-edged. In the summer of 1956, the intellectuals who had been called upon by the CPC to offer criticisms in the Hundred Flowers campaign in a series of forums convened by the CPC's United Front Department expressed views that went far beyond what had been anticipated and brought into question many fundamental issues of socialism's ideological validity and the CPC's leadership. At Beijing University, student organizations such as the "Hundred Flowers Society" offered criticisms that the CPC considered to be heretical. Meanwhile, the CPC cadres responded to the dissidence of the intellectuals and "democratic parties" with indifference at best and outright hostility in many cases. Although the Party Congress in September gave formal endorsement to the Hundred Flowers policy, the issues of dissidence came into sharp focus, and by that time the campaign had come to a critical impasse. This was aggravated by the occurrence in October of the incidents in Poland and Hungary. The Polish Communist Party, in defiance of the Soviet Union, elected Wladyslaw Gomulka to be first secretary; in Hungary, Imre Nagy, installed as premier as a result of mass demonstrations, called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union's response was violently decisive. In early 1957, reintroduced Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian revolt and executed Nagy, installing Janos Kadar in his place.

Although China (or at least Mao) had been implicitly critical of the Soviet Union's model of development, in the face of the Hungarian and Polish situations the CPC felt obliged, in the interest of the unity of the "socialist bloc," to endorse the Soviet Union's policy. This is reflected in the second *RMRB* editorial on the issue, "More On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," on December 29, 1956, and even more so in the announcements made by Zhou Enlai in Warsaw and Budapest in January 1957 when he was sent on a tour of Eastern Europe to assess the situation. Many questions were being raised in China in the final months of 1956. Could the Hungarian situation (especially the "desertion from socialism") be repeated in China? And, in light of the fact that the mass anti-Soviet movements in Poland and Hungary had been fomented by dissident intellectuals, did the Hundred Flowers campaign not portend similarly dangerous problems for China and the CPC leadership? The opponents of the Hundred Flowers campaign seized upon these developments to step up their counterattack. At the end of 1956, Mao was faced with the need to address these issues: to allay fears that there would be a "Hungarian incident" in China (indeed to explain the incidents in Hungary and Poland in the context of China's own developments), to shore up the basic intent of the Hundred Flowers campaign, and to continue the

promotion of his own vision of socialist transformation through education, mass movements, and class struggle at the same time. These themes are reflected in Mao's speech at the second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, following the Eighth Party Congress (text November 15, 1956). A comparison of the two versions of this speech, especially on the issue of the degree of severity of criticisms of Stalin, and Mao's proposal of a Party rectification in the coming year (where he specifically articulates the targets of "subjectivism, factionalism-sectarianism, and bureaucratism") is revealing. In this speech, Mao also brought up two major issues that would occupy the stage significantly in 1957. The first was the matter of "small democracy and big democracy" (the issue of mass criticism and struggle), and the other, even more critically, the issue of the Eighth Party Congress resolution that the mass-based class struggle was over and that the primary contradiction was no longer in the area of the socialist relations of production, but between the "advanced socialist mode of production and the backward forces of production." This latter issue, is a key to Mao's thought on Party rectification in 1957, to the anti-Rightist campaign in that year, as well as to the formation of the "Maoist" idea of "two-line struggle" in the years to come. At the end of 1956, it was followed up by Mao's explanation of how he perceived the "proper" role of the bourgeois element in Chinese society (especially the "national bourgeoisie") in his speech to delegates of the first meeting of the Second National Committee of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (text December 8, 1956). Furthermore, as a harbinger of Mao's most important document of 1957, a letter to Huang Yanpei (text December 4, 1967) provides the preliminary formulation of the thesis of "contradictions among the people."

The year 1957 began with a conference of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region CPC secretaries in January, at which Mao delivered two major speeches (texts January 18, 1957, and January 27, 1957), for both of which we have two alternate versions, and a set of interjections that were not specifically dated. These documents are an important bridge to the position that Mao took later in the spring of that year, and to the formulation of the Party rectification program, which was built into Mao's February 27 speech "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People."

First among the background issues at the turn of the new year was the continued repercussions of the Hundred Flowers campaign. As noted, especially in the wake of the Hungarian and Polish incidents of October 1956, apprehension had filled the atmosphere as to whether or not there could be a repetition of the incidents in China itself. As it turned out, Mao's late 1956 and early 1957 assurances that the upheavals in Europe could not be duplicated in China were accurate, to a point. There was apparently intensified criticism of the Communist Party among intellectuals, workers, and students, now taking shape as a spate of strikes and petitions, followed by harsher (and, in Mao's view at this time, cruder and more futile) attempts on the part of party leaders to arrest their progress. In the January speeches Mao made references to student demonstrations and petitions that were "repelled"—references that were repeated in his speeches after the thesis of "contradictions among the people" had become openly articulated (e.g., text March 18,

1957). It is also important to note, however, that Mao's observation of the issue was from both sides. Far from simply "predicting" that China would not experience the upheavals of European communism, Mao was, in typical fashion, arguing that China would not see a repetition of the Hungarian and Polish incidents because the CPC would not act in the way the Soviet Union did. He was also issuing an implicit warning to the Party that the proper way to avoid that situation was to learn how to handle appropriately the "contradictions among the people" that the strikes and petitions represented. Mao believed that these were reactions to, and reflective of, problems inside the Party, particularly the emergence of bureaucratism in the Party's workstyle, which led to the mishandling of such critical situations and to suppression of expression of the masses' will. His answer was that China must build upon a unity that comes out of struggle, a unity that is not imposed by the will of the Party, but a "unity of opposites" as the basic law of development (text November 15, 1956) and one that follows the formula "unity—criticism—unity." This theme dominates the speeches of January and February 1957, including those that we have not been able to include in this volume.<sup>26</sup> These speeches were, in our editorial opinion (see editor's comment for text Jan. 18, 1957) intended to bring these messages out to the broad CPC apparatus at the provincial, municipal and autonomous region levels. In March 1957, as Mao examined the situation further, he would impress upon the Party the need to use methods of persuasion (*shuofu*) and not methods of suppression (*ya fu*). Furthermore, in a tantalizing passage (text March 18, 1957, paragraph 5) he clearly stated that "the Liberation Army is to be used against the imperialists, not against the people. The Liberation Army is the children of the people; how can the people's children be used against the people, their father?" (None of this should in the least bit obscure the fact that Mao's political methods were, in the final analysis, authoritarian, or the ferocity with which intellectuals and dissidents were handled in the anti-Rightist campaign later in 1957, or the destructiveness of the Cultural Revolution, for that matter, but the readers of these volumes might find them nonetheless instructive in the light of the Tiananmen Square Incident of June 1989.)

The famous "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People" was therefore a document that simply pressed home this "new theory" of Mao's. The basic gist of the speech and of Mao's concluding remarks at the same Supreme State Conference (text Mar. 1, 1957) was to provide an ideological-theoretical justification for continuing the Hundred Flowers campaign and for the Party rectification that Mao was about to launch. Two major issues arise from this speech that Maurice Meisner calls "prophetic pointers to the Cultural Revolution."<sup>27</sup> The first is that the themes of "unity—criticism—unity," "the mass line," of correct ideas coming out of struggle, and of "fragrant flowers often being at first perceived as poisonous weeds" are all predicated on the assumption that the CPC holds no monopoly over "correct" ideas but is susceptible to error and needs to be criticized and rectified. Here the populist Mao, somewhat artificially, created the category of *renmin* (the people)—an ideal, almost abstract category that he placed above the Party. (By implication, he placed himself, the true socialist, as the spokesman for this "idealized people," above the Party as well.) Both Meisner and MacFarquhar

offer as evidence for this the fact that the “new theory” was first presented officially in a speech to the Supreme State Conference rather than to the Party organization.<sup>28</sup>

The second issue is that behind this populist theme lies also Mao’s perception that the Party—first in following the Soviet model and then in adopting the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress—had come to pursue policies that sought economic progress (development of the forces of production) at the expense of radical social, and socialist, changes (the continuation of revolution in the relations of production and taking this to be the primary contradiction in the socialist phase). In the speeches leading up to “On Correctly Handling Contradictions,” including a conversation with scientists and writers (text February 16, 1957), Mao evinced support, for the thesis of the Eighth Party Congress resolution but began to qualify the meaning of that thesis. He argued that the phase of “large-scale, *violent* mass class struggle” was over. This is a tactical interpretation that differs substantially from the categorical-theoretical repudiation of mass-based class struggle in the resolution. In the “On Correctly Handling” speech the point is driven in deeper; Mao’s theoretical foundation here is that contradictions and struggle continue to exist in socialist society, and although they may be “nonantagonistic” (i.e., “contradictions among the people” rather than “contradictions between the enemy and ourselves”), they must be handled through struggle and criticism, lest they become antagonistic in the end. This crucial distinction foreshadows the unfolding “two-line struggle” and is a fundamental issue of ideology of socialism and basic social-political-economic policy that, as Meisner puts it, is “inseparable from the question of political power.”<sup>29</sup>

“On Correctly Handling Contradictions” was not made public until June 1957, and by the time it appeared in *Xuanji*, V, it had been heavily edited. The unedited version of the speech as it was orally presented is included in R. MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), and we intend to translate this alternate version in our supplementary volume. A comparison of the versions is instructive as to the state of Mao’s relationship with the Party leadership at the time. Also, when reading the translation of the *Xuanji* version in this volume, our readers should pay some attention to the annotations where we demonstrate some variances from the *Xuanji* edition that we can see in other sources, such as *Wansui* (n.d. 3), and *Ziliao xuanbian*.

Mao’s “new theory,” understandably, was not well-received by the Party. “On Correctly Handling” was virtually suppressed. It received no publicity in the Party organ, *Renmin ribao*, a situation that brought much criticism from Mao in the months ahead (see text April 1957). More importantly, what unfolded after Mao’s February 27 speech was a behind-the-scenes struggle over the Party rectification. Mao pressed his point on a number of occasions in the spring of 1957. At a National Conference on Propaganda Work (text March 12, 1957) and at a more casual talk at a forum of the heads of propaganda departments held in conjunction with this conference, Mao spoke extensively about Party rectification and its timing. In March and probably into early April, he toured the country, touching base with Party members and regional Party leaders on the issues that clearly occupied his thoughts at the time, and serving as what he himself called “an itinerant lobbyist.” The tour took him to Tianjin, Shandong Province, Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Shang-

hai. In the speeches on this trip (texts March 17, 1957; March 18, 1957; March 19, 1957; March 20, 1957 (1) and (2); April 1957), Mao pressed the questions of the justifiability of resuming the Hundred Flowers campaign, of integrating that with Party rectification, and the ideological question of unity through criticism and of class struggle that he had expressed in the February 27 speech. He also expressed a candor with the members of the Party concerning the disagreement within the top leadership and the fact that the CPC was being criticized for its inability to lead the country. Mao’s position in these speeches was generally to urge CPC members to confront these issues and take the bull by the horns. The CPC, he argued, had to face the fact that it could not lead the country’s development in all areas, and that it needed the cooperation (in the spirit of unity) of “those with whom unity was possible”—that is, “socialist” intellectuals from all walks of life. The *quid pro quo* would be tolerance for criticism—which meant Party rectification. At the same time, he also argued that the CPC legitimately retained leadership in the critical area of class struggle (albeit with “gentle winds and fine rain”) and the continuation of overall socialist transformation—the other aspect of Mao’s ideological position at this time. Simply put, Mao was bringing his case to the lower levels of the Party and through them to the masses, forcing the Party leadership’s hand toward rectification and revising its position on the Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress.

Meanwhile, it appears that Mao also had come to terms with wooing the Party organ, *RMRB*, to publicize the policy of “contending and blooming.” On April 10, 1957, the newspaper published an editorial that fell in line with the policy and argued for “continuing to let go” and implementing the Hundred Flowers campaign. Although this editorial was not publicly acknowledged to be Mao’s writing, it was the first of many others in 1957 that carried Mao’s unmistakable imprint.

At the end of the provincial tour, on Mao’s return to Beijing, a Supreme State Conference was held, and an official directive to launch the rectification campaign was issued on April 27, 1957. This development is documented in a conversation that Mao had with people in the democratic parties (text April 30, 1957).

Starting in May, with the launching of the Party rectification (on the inside) and the revival of the Hundred Flowers campaign (on the outside), forums were convened to foster what Mao had expected to be a surge of “contending and blooming.” At these forums, in which many non-Communist intellectuals took part, heavy criticism of the CPC began to emerge, until it became evident that it was no longer a “gentle winds and fine rain” situation but a “torrential downpour.” In the critical months of May and June 1957, the situation in Hungary and Poland before the Soviet Union’s crackdown was, in a sense, duplicated in China. These were months of ambivalence on Mao’s part. The scholarly interpretation of developments in 1957 is often caught in a dilemma—was Mao simply alarmed by the spate of criticisms that “went too far,” or was he pressured by other leaders in the CPC whose fears concerning his obstinate pursuit of the Hundred Flowers policy were clearly vindicated? As MacFarquhar points out, scholars still debate this point.<sup>30</sup> An overall reading of the documents in this volume suggests that it may not be an either-or proposition. Undoubtedly, Mao received significant pressure, but equally certainly, he did perceive the criticism arising from the ranks of intellectuals,

especially from people such as Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, and Zhang Naiqi, with dismay and alarm. These he would later label as “poisonous weeds.” At the same time, however, Mao did not abandon his feelings about the need for continued Party rectification or his apprehensions about what he perceived to be antisocialist “revisionism” and bourgeois tendencies arising from within the Party. In the end, Mao would merge the criticisms from outside the Party and the “deviations” within the Party under the label “Rightism,” bringing about the anti-Rightist campaign.

It is possible to trace the development of Mao’s thoughts, ambivalent though they may be, in a number of documents in this volume. There are several *RMRB* editorials of crucial significance, through which a hardening of the position against the criticisms can be followed (texts May 13, 1957; June 8, 1957 [2]; June 9, 1957; June 10, 1957; June 11, 1957; June 12, 1957; June 14, 1957 [1] and [2]; and July 1, 1957). More important, there are directives and speeches that document Mao’s “change of mind” (text May 15, 1957) as well as his tactical shifts (compare texts March 12 1957 and March 17, 1957 [2], and text June 8, 1957 [1]). By early July, the anti-Rightist campaign was in full bloom, with targets outside the Party clearly identified and subjected to extremely heavy criticism. The vision of a nonviolent critical campaign based on a sense of unity was abandoned (see texts July 8, 1957, and July 9, 1957). All of this came to a head at the “Qingdao Conference” in the latter half of July, for which we have several documents (texts July 17, 1957; July 18, 1957; July 20, 1957; and July 1957). Here Mao mounts a vociferous, all-out assault on bourgeois revisionism and the “Rightists.”

By September 1957, the fury of the anti-Rightist campaign had raged for four months and the main issues had been exposed, as far as Mao was concerned. He began to adopt a more conciliatory tone, but he also shifted the attention to the need to continue the struggle against “bourgeois revisionism” in the CPC itself, and therefore resumed the discussion (much to the dismay of other Party leaders) of Party rectification. At the time of the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee and the Supreme State Conference that followed, Mao speculated on continuing the Party rectification well into 1958, and he spoke of rectification (mass struggle campaigns) as a permanent, regular feature of political life and ideological development (texts October 7, 1957; October 9, 1957 [1] and [2]; October 13, 1957; cf. text March 12 1957). This set the stage for the ideological conflict ahead and the economic struggle of the Great Leap Forward period.

The year 1957 ended with Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union in November as head of the Chinese delegation to the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution. In the documents here there is again a subtle duality. On the public side, Mao’s posture was both conciliatory and congratulatory, emphasizing the solidarity of the socialist camp and of Soviet leadership and setting up the position on “selectively learning from the Soviet Union’s experience” that he would articulate in early 1958. At the same time, it is also quite evident that he did not obtain satisfaction from the Soviet Union’s leaders regarding a number of ideological and political questions (see text November 2, 1957, comment). In his many speeches while in Moscow, Mao spoke of the tradition of, and need for, correct Marxist leadership of the socialist movement, of confidence in the socialist

cause, of opposition to the bourgeois West, and so on. Particularly in view of the fact that this was Mao’s first post-Stalin visit to the Soviet Union and first personal exposure to a plenary gathering of socialist leaders around the world, his remarks can be seen to contain a veiled challenge to the Soviet Union’s leadership by his “Chinese model of socialist development.” This is a critical beginning of what would become Mao’s opposition to Soviet “revisionism.”<sup>31</sup>

The documents in this volume end with an unspecifically dated piece, “On the Question of the Primary Contradiction in the Transitional Period.” Through all the momentous political struggles and conflicts of 1956 and 1957, there was a fundamental and critical ideological underpinning: Mao’s view that the primary contradiction was, and would continue to be, throughout the socialist phase, that contradiction between socialism and capitalism. It is this contradiction that led him to plunge China into the conflicts of 1956–1957, as well as bringing him into opposition with other leaders of the CPC. That, at the end of 1957 and as we peer into 1958, is where we leave Mao for the time being.

In this survey we have focused almost entirely on the political documents, since the political and ideological developments in these years are indeed so critical to Mao’s career and to the history of the People’s Republic of China. There are, of course, many other documents that are revealing of other aspects of Mao. Letters, conversations with individuals (particularly with foreign leaders), and even telegrams are also politically significant. (For example, the fact that Voroshilov visited China in May 1957, just at the moment of the consolidation of the Party rectification campaign, could lead to a number of interesting speculations.) There are also documents that reveal the private Mao, where he comes off as a romantic (letter and poem to Li Shuyi, text May 11, 1957) and a visionary, or, in Lucian Pye’s words, “The man in the leader.”<sup>32</sup>

## Notes

1. The Chinese text, “Guanyu jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi,” was published in *RMRB* (July 1, 1981), 1. An English text of the resolution was produced in *Beijing Review* 27 (July 6, 1981), 10–39. Timothy Cheek, in R. MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), p. 83, n. 7 and ff, refers to an annotated edition published by Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shi (Office of Documentary Research, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China).

2. *Ming Pao*, (Hong Kong), (January 15, 1979), 1.

3. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 831.

4. Maurice Meisner (1986), pp. 169–170.

5. Ranbir Vohra, *China’s Path to Modernization*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1987, p. 204 ff.

6. See especially Roderick MacFarquhar (1974).

7. “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (italics added).

8. An English translation of this report, first available in *Eighth National Congress* (1956), is also available in R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. (1962), pp. 165–203. For further discussion and comment, see, among others, text November 15, 1956, Versions I and II (Especially Version I, source note and note 1), and text October 7, 1957, note 1.

9. B. Schwartz, "Thoughts on the Late Mao—Between Total Redemption and Utter Frustration," in R. MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), p. 34.
10. Meisner (1986), p. 194.
11. See text July 31, 1955, vol. I, end of section I.
12. B. Schwartz, in R. MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), pp. 38, 20.
13. R. MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), p. 38.
14. Mao Zedong, *Jianquo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (Beijing: Zhong yang wenxian chubanshe, 1987). We thank Roderick MacFarquhar of Harvard University for sharing the first volume of this material with us in 1989, and Nancy Hearst, librarian of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University for making a photocopy available to the Mao's Writings Project. Harvard University has since acquired volumes 2 to 5, and has turned them over to the Center for Chinese Research Materials (Oakton, VA) for reprinting so that they would be broadly available to scholars in the field. The Mao's Writings Project is grateful for this generosity.
15. Roderick MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), p. 77.
16. H. Martin (1982), p. 90.
17. H. Martin (1982), p. 138, and T. Cheek, in R. MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), p. 92, n. 40.
18. In reference to a parallel case involving the cessation of the publication of Stalin's works in the Soviet Union, see H. Martin (1982), p. 58.
19. T. Cheek, in R. MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), pp. 93 ff.
20. *Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan* (Selected Writings of Mao Zedong on Military Affairs) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun chubanshe, 1981 reprinted, Tokyo, 1985); *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan* (Selected Writings on Journalism by Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1983); *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* (Selected Letters of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983).
21. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986).
22. See Volume I, p. xxx.
23. Maurice Meisner (1986), pp. 171–74, provides a lucid explanation of these problems.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
25. See T. Cheek, in R. MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), p. 88, n. 30.
26. See MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), pp. 113–130.
27. Meisner (1986), pp. 183–184.
28. See *ibid.*, p. 183, and MacFarquhar et al., eds. (1989), p. 11.
29. Meisner (1986), p. 182.
30. See MacFarquhar et al., eds., (1989), pp. 10–13, 24–35, for several scholars' interpretation and analysis of the situation.
31. For a more detailed analytical discussion of these speeches, see Michael Schoenhals, "Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 'Moscow Conference,'" in *The Journal of Communist Studies* 2, 2 (1986): 109–126.
32. L. Pye (1976).

## EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS AND DEVICES: A NOTE TO THE READER

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### FORMAT OF THE TEXTS

Each text by Mao is preceded by the following elements: title, date, source notes, and, in some but not all instances, remarks on the source and/or an explanation of the title, and a contextual and/or critical comment. Annotative notes follow the text.

#### 1. TITLE

In most cases we have created our own descriptive titles, particularly for those documents culled from news articles. They may differ from the title in the original; in many cases the original has no title. Usually the title describes the category of the document (e.g., telegram, letter, speech) and the occasion or event to which it is related (e.g., meeting, conference, anniversary). In some cases, in the interest of brevity, the title has been shortened. For example, a "speech in response" to a presentation by a foreign envoy is characterized as a "reply."

In some cases, particularly that of documents published in such well-known publications as *Xuanji* (Selected Works), Vol. 5, we have used the title from that source. For example, for Mao's speech at the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee (June 6, 1950), we have forsaken the descriptive title for the more familiar "Don't Attack on All Fronts," our translation of the *Xuanji* title.

"(Excerpt)" following a title indicates that the document was excerpted from a larger document by the original publishers. (See, for example, text February 18, 1951.)

Where we have done our own excerpting from a larger document, presenting only the more interesting or significant portions of the original, the title is followed by "[Excerpt]." (See, for example, text Spring 1952.)

The reader should note that as a rule brackets [ ] enclose our own editorial remarks, whereas parentheses ( ) indicate editorial remarks in the original.

## 2. DATE

The documents are presented in chronological order. Documents for which there is a year but no month or day are placed at the end of the year, and documents for which there is a season or month but no day are placed at the end of that season or month. We have usually designated the season as a quarter (e.g., January–March for spring). Documents that overlap months or years are placed at the end of the first month or year.

The date refers to the time when the document was originally written or spoken, not when it first appeared in print. In some cases (especially many of Mao's letters) the differences between these dates can be many years; in other cases (e.g., telegrams from Mao and other Chinese leaders which generally appear in the press the day after they were written) it may be just a day or several days.

When we have no definite information about the date on which a document was produced but are fairly certain that it was not the same day it was released, we have "R" after the date, which would then be the date of release. (See, for example, text October 8, 1950.) This is particularly true of inscriptions that Mao wrote for special occasions such as inaugurations and anniversaries.

Documents produced on the same day appear together, but the sequence is random and does not present any particular order of significance. The same is true for documents of unspecified dates put together at the end of a month, season, or year.

In the second volume of *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976*, we have encountered a considerable number of incidences in which we have discovered, usually in different published sources, more than one version of a document (in most such cases, these are speeches made by Mao), and the versions are so different from one another in substance—and sometimes even in length—that we are compelled to present to the reader each version separately and in its entirety. In such cases our intent is to leave it up to the reader to make textual comparisons between the versions by reading the various versions, although we would often point to important differences in our annotative notes. The notes that pertain to each version follow that particular version. In cases where the different versions appear in their original sources under similar titles, we have placed the versions under one title in this volume, and prepared a composite source note for the texts. (See text Jan. 18, 1957.) Where the versions appear under different titles in their original sources, we have treated them as separate texts in this volume, each with its own source note, although we have labelled them with the notations of "Version I" and "Version II" and so on following the titles. (See text Jan. 27, 1957[1] and text Jan. 27, 1957[2].)

## 3. SOURCE NOTE

The source note generally occurs in three parts:

*Source:* This is the source from which our translation is made. When more than one source is available, we have attempted to determine which is the most complete and made our translation from that one. Significant discrepancies (not, however, minor ones such as typographical errors) are explained in the annotative notes. In

several cases we have drawn our translation from several texts when each is incomplete on its own.

*Other Chinese Text(s):* All other versions of the Chinese document known to us. We have generally listed more complete versions ahead of less complete ones.

*Available English Translation(s):* Previous English translations known to us or available to us at the time when these volumes were committed to press. The order, again, is from the more complete to the less complete.

Whenever "(Excerpt)" appears in any of the above three categories, it means that that source is an excerpt in its original form. In most such cases, this indicates that the source is incomplete and we have drawn our translation from another source or combination of sources as well. Whenever "[Excerpt]" appears, we have ourselves excerpted from the source.

We have investigated as broad a range of sources as possible, including standard reference works and official yearbooks (e.g., *Renmin shouce* [People's Handbook]), documents collections (e.g., *Mao Zedong xuanji* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] and *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* [Long Live Mao Zedong Thought]), the major Chinese newspapers, news agencies releases, the publications of the U.S. government and various official agencies and research institutes elsewhere (chiefly Hong Kong) that focus on events in the PRC, English-language monographs, and a vast number of monographs published in the PRC. We cannot, nor do we, claim to be definitive or comprehensive in our listing of sources.

When we have not been able to acquire an original Chinese text of a document—indeed, in some cases an original Chinese text may no longer exist or may never have existed (see, for example, text October 15, 1951)—we have presented it on the basis of the non-Chinese source that we have, be it English or another language. If the only source is in English, in order to preserve its integrity, we have presented it as is, without editorial corrections, even if there are discrepancies between it and our common usage; such cases are noted in the remarks that follow the source note. (For example, while it is our practice to translate the term "Zhongguo gongchandang" as "Communist Party of China," or CPC, reserving the translation "Chinese Communist Party" for the abbreviation "Zhonggong," this distinction is rarely made by other translators.) While we have not amended grammatical, typographical, or syntactical errors, we have pointed out significant discrepancies in the annotative notes.

## 4. REMARKS

Set in italics, this element, when it appears, follows the source note and provides information about the source or a brief explanation or identification of the context of the document.

## 5. COMMENT

While our main effort in these volumes is translation and not interpretation, in some important instances we have commented on the political, ideological, and



historical significance of a document and its place within the context of the development of Mao's thinking. This element, when it appears, is set in italics with indented margins.

The abbreviations used in the source notes, remarks, and comments are explained in the Bibliography.

## 6. *THE TEXT*

We have rendered our translations as close to the Chinese originals as possible. While this does not mean that they are entirely literal, word-for-word translations, we have made an effort to include every element or term that appears in the original. In order to preserve the integrity of the original, we have occasionally purposely chosen not to render a given term or phrase into idiomatic English when we feel that so doing might destroy the nuance of the Chinese. Our readers must bear in mind that almost all of Mao's speeches and writings were intended primarily for a Chinese audience. His manner of speaking and his writing style are often more earthy than refined, and of course, it is just this that often lends force to his pronouncements and exclamations. In the same spirit, we have rendered Chinese aphorisms in sometimes awkward translations of the original, rather than seek an often dissimilar English aphorism that seems to make the same point. Where necessary, we explain the origin and meaning of these phrases in the annotative notes. For widely familiar but often mistranslated terms such as *xian* and *xiang* (frequently rendered as county and village) for which there is no universally agreed on English translation, we have romanized rather than translated. The titles of Chinese works are also generally romanized, with the English translation following in parentheses.

With the exception of the names of certain historical figures (e.g., Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek), we use the *pinyin* system of romanization.

Salutations in telegrams, etc., are translated as they appear in the original; where there is none in the original we have not provided one. Because the signature apparatus of telegrams is frequently very long, we have often abridged them, and provided this information in parentheses. The signature for letters is generally provided in full, with the date of the letter given as it appeared in the original source.

## 7. *ANNOTATIVE NOTES*

All textual annotations appear in notes at the end of the text.

Because there are many cross references in our annotations, the reader may trace and locate earlier and first appearances of terms and names. (Only rarely, when the meaning of a term may have changed over time, do we annotate more than once.) Understandably, there are many more annotative cross references in the second volume (and, we anticipate, in subsequent volumes as well) than in Volume I. Cross references are keyed to the date of the earlier text (in rare cases cross references are made to a later rather than an earlier text). Many cross references will lead the reader to another volume of this work. It is the general practice of this project that

when a cross reference is made to a document in a volume that is already published, the volume number will be indicated, following the date by which the document is identified. However, when a cross reference is made to a later document, which shall appear in a volume that is not yet published, we would provide only the date by which that later document will be identified, but not by the volume number. The reader should also note that the notation "text 1960(RN)" refers to Mao's "Reading Notes on the Soviet Union's Textbook On Political Economy" written in 1960. Since more than one document may appear under any given date in these volumes, in order to assist the reader in referring to the precise document in our cross references (in the remarks, and commentaries as well as in the annotative notes) we have numbered such documents in our cross references. (For example, "text October 12, 1954(1)" refers to the first of the documents appearing under that date.)

Citations of reference and interpretive works in our notes are made by listing the name of the author (with the first initial) followed by the year of publication in parentheses—e.g., "See D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), pp. 5–9." These citations are given in full in the Reference section of the Bibliography.

## COMMONLY USED ABBREVIATIONS

CC	Central Committee
CPC	Communist Party of China
CPG	Central People's Government
CPGC	Central People's Government Council
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
GAC	Government Administration Council
KMT	Kuomintang (Guomindang)
NPC	National People's Congress
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
U.S.	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

While these abbreviations are used widely throughout the editors' comments and annotations, they are rarely used in the translated texts.

Abbreviations that do not appear on this list are spelled out at least once in any given text. Abbreviations of publications that appear frequently in our source notes and annotations are spelled out in the Bibliography.

## OMISSIONS AND CHRONOLOGY

We have omitted from this collection many documents that we have found to contain interesting references to Mao's activities, but nothing significant enough for quotation. (For example, Mao may have spoken to people whom he visited on

an inspection tour; the activity is notable but the conversation is insignificant.) We have reserved references of this sort for the Chronology, which will appear in the final volume.

## INDEX

The index to Vol. I of *The Writings of Mao Zedong* was published in a separate paperback edition. The index to Vol. II, and to all subsequent volumes, is included in the book. A cumulative index will appear in the final volume.

## VOLUME II

January 1956–December 1957

# THE WRITINGS OF MAO ZEDONG

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1949–1976

# 1956

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## Telegram to Wilhelm Pieck (January 1, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 3, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 3 (Feb. 6, 1956), 29. Available English Translations: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1465 (Jan. 2, 1956), 19–20; HNA, *Daily News Release* (Jan. 3, 1956), 1; FBIS, *Daily Report* (Jan. 4, 1955), AAA9.

President,  
The German Democratic Republic

Dear Comrade Wilhelm Pieck:

On the occasion of your eightieth birthday, please allow us to convey, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, our sincere and warm congratulations to you, the leader of the German Democratic Republic, the most respected and beloved leader of the German people, and the close friend of the Chinese people.

We wholeheartedly wish you good health and a long life, and hope that you will attain even more brilliant successes in striving for the happiness of the German people and the peaceful unification of Germany, and in the cause of the building of socialism in the German Democratic Republic.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council, dated)

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Telegram to the Union of Burma  
(January 2, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 4, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 3 (Feb. 6, 1956), 32. Available English Translations: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1467 (Jan. 4, 1956), 9; HNA, *Daily News Release* (Jan. 4, 1956), 1; FBIS, *Daily Report* (Jan. 5, 1956), AAA2.

Dr. Ba U,  
President,  
The Union of Burma

Your Excellency:

On the happy occasion of the anniversary of the founding of your country, I extend my warm congratulations and those of the Chinese people to Your Excellency and to the Burmese people. May the Union of Burma prosper, may happiness come to the Burmese people, and may Your Excellency be in good health.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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Telegram to William Tubman  
(January 3, 1956)

**Source:** *XHBYK*, 3 (Feb. 6, 1956), 33. Available English Translations: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1468 (Jan. 5, 1956), 7–8; HNA, *Daily News Release* (Jan. 5, 1956), 1; FBIS, *Daily Report* (Jan. 4, 1956), AAA33.

President Tubman,  
The Republic of Liberia,  
Monrovia, Liberia

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Republic of Liberia, allow me to extend my congratulations. Also, may the friendly relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Liberia established during the Asian-African Conference develop with each passing day.<sup>1</sup>  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

**Note**

1. See text Apr. 27, 1955, vol. I, source note.

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Telegram to the People's Republic of Albania  
(January 10, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 11, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 3 (Feb. 6, 1956), 32. Available English Translations: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1472 (Jan. 11, 1956), 17; FBIS, *Daily Report* (Jan. 11, 1956), AAA7.

Comrade Haxhi Leshi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania,  
Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania,  
Comrade Bekhar Shtylla, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania:

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of Albania, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend to you and, through you, to the government and people of the People's Republic of Albania our warm and fraternal congratulations.

In the last ten years, the Albanian people have attained glorious successes in the areas of politics, the economy, and culture and moreover are confidently marching forward on the road to socialism. The fact of Albania's recent admission to the United Nations will certainly enable Albania to play an even greater role in the cause of defending world peace and promoting international cooperation.

Long live the long-lasting, unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Albanian peoples!  
(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

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Letter to Qi Jishu  
(January 14, 1956)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, p. 507. Other Chinese Text: *Shengping ziliao*, p. 346, quoting from Qi Jishu, "Zai Mao zhuxi shenbian" (At Chairman Mao's Side) in *Zhongguo gongren*, 24 (1958), p. 23 (excerpt, slightly different version).

According to the source, Qi was a member of Mao's bodyguards from 1943 to 1946.

Comrade Qi Jishu:

I have received your letter of December 26. I am very happy [to hear from you]. High blood pressure is something that can be cured gradually; you must not be impatient about it. I have already entrusted someone with looking for the medicine [you need]; when and if we find it we will send it to you immediately. If this brand of medicine cannot be found, [I think you] can use another medicine as a substitute. I send, enclosed, a photograph, and wish you the best of health!

Mao Zedong  
January 14, 1956

### Speech on the Question of Intellectuals

(January 20, 1956)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 28–34. Other Chinese Texts: *Buyi*, p. 74 (excerpt); *Wansui* (1967b), p. 13 (excerpt); *Wansui* (n.d.), pp. 61–62 (excerpts); *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 87–89 (excerpts); *Ziliao xuanbian*, p. 161 (excerpt). Available English Translations: *IS*, X (May, 1974), 95–99; J. Chen (1970), p. 21 (excerpt); *CB*, 891 (Oct. 8, 1969), (excerpts).

*The Central Committee of the CPC convened a conference on the issues of the relationship between the Party and intellectuals on January 14–20, 1956. It was attended by 1,279 people, including members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the CPC, the secretaries or deputy secretaries of the Party committees of several major municipalities such as Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, and of provincial and autonomous region Party committees, Party representatives of state organs' national people's organizations, and many institutions of higher education and cultural units. At the conference, Zhou Enlai made a report on the central issue, i.e., the need for the Party to strengthen its concerns for and leadership of intellectuals, the importance of whose contributions to the developing socialist cause of construction was becoming increasingly evident. For Zhou's report, delivered on Jan. 14, see RMRB (Jan. 20, 1956), 1. Liao Luyan, deputy director of the Rural Work Department of the Central Committee, also delivered a speech explaining the need for intellectuals to adapt to the economic imperatives set forth in the draft of the National Program for Agricultural Development (see text Jan. 25, 1956, source note, and text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3.) For more on this conference, see K. Lieberthal (1976), pp. 77–78. This is Mao's closing speech.*

*Throughout this speech, which was made in response to the general question of improving the relationship between the Communist Party and the intellectuals of China—which in pragmatic political terms may be interpreted as “How to elicit the intellectuals' support for the agenda of socialist transformation established by the Party”—Mao repeatedly made references to the program of agricultural cooperativization which had pretty much come to a head in late 1955. In fact, much of what Mao said in this speech can and must be understood in the light of the debate over agricultural cooperativization, its strategic validity, feasibility, and speed, that had been raging since the autumn of 1955, and it is recommended that this document be read in conjunction with others such as texts July 31, 1955, Oct. 11, 1955(1) and*

*(2); Dec. 6, 1955; Dec. 21, 1955; and Dec. 27, 1955(1) and (2) in vol. I. What we see here is an example of the characteristic linkage that Mao makes between the standing of a group or sector of society (in this case the intellectuals) in socialist China and its attitude—support of or opposition to, or lukewarmness and indifference, toward the process of socialist transformation and the Party's schedule in this regard. The underlying proposition here, it seems, is that ultimately the issue of whether or not they rally to the cause of agricultural cooperativization and the impending socialist transformation of industry and commerce and handicraft industries will become the political litmus test for China's intellectuals under the socialist regime. In this speech, however, even though the question is made implicitly clear, Mao appears to be hesitant about how far and how quickly the issue should be pressed. For the time being, he appears to be ready to let the subject lie for awhile. This is consistent with Mao's belief that the intellectuals are not a class in and of themselves, but are “attached” to class interests “as hair is attached to skin.” Thus the strategy is not to attack the hair, but to push forward the processes of transformation on the front of socioeconomic change, and to assume that “when the skin no longer exists, to what would the hair be attached?”—i.e., if the socioeconomic basis of bourgeois capitalism is transformed and removed, the intellectuals, even those previously identifying themselves with bourgeois interests, would come around and be forced to attach themselves to socialism. This is a belief that Mao maintained well into 1957, and we shall see more of this skin-hair analogy in the documents of mid-1957 (especially see text Apr. 1957[2], note 14). However, one must be reminded that this relatively tolerant viewpoint had its limitations, and while it might have been applied to the intellectuals as a whole, it was certainly not applied to those specific cliques whose anti-Party character had been exposed. One must not forget that this speech had come only a few months after the stern campaign against the Hu Feng clique of “anti-Party” intellectuals. (See text May–June 1955, vol. I.)*

The conference has been very good. I am very happy to have listened to the talks given by the various comrades; I can see that our comrades' level of consciousness is by no means low, but is very high; many of the speeches were very good.

What I would like to talk about now is the question of leadership methods. There are two methods of leadership: one is a method that makes an undertaking proceed a bit more slowly, and with somewhat less satisfactory [results]. The other is a method that makes an undertaking proceed a bit more quickly, and with somewhat better [results]. Take such matters of the past year as the cooperativization of agriculture, the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, and the question of the intellectuals; they could have been [handled] in one way or the other, they could have been delayed a bit and not done quite so well, or they could have been done a little earlier and a bit better. When we were in Yanan we organized a Society for the Promotion of Constitutional Government,<sup>1</sup> but we don't have one now. Some people say that the Central Committee is a national society for the promotion of socialism; this conference is also a promotion society, and provincial and municipal Party committees, as well as the various departments, are also promotion societies. Leadership organs can promote progress, or they can promote retrogression; or there can be [both] some progress and some retrogression. The Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek was a Nationalist Government for the Promotion of Retrogression, it promoted the retrogression of the society. Our leadership organs should promote the development of [our] undertakings. It has not been entirely this way, however. For example, the Rural Work Department<sup>2</sup>

was for a time a Department for the Promotion of Retrogression in Rural Work, because it wanted to chop off some of the cooperatives;<sup>3</sup> also, at one time, the Ministry of Public Health was a Department for the Promotion of Retrogression and made a mess of their work.<sup>4</sup> Has this kind of phenomenon also existed in [other] places and departments? When the superstructure is not compatible with the economic base and cannot promote economic development, it loses the function the superstructure ought to have. [There are] the forces of production and the relations of production, which are the base. On top of the relations of production there are still the government, the Party, and the various departments [of the administration], all of which are the superstructure and which must assume the function of promoting the development of the forces of production.<sup>5</sup> If [the superstructure] fails to promote [this development], then it has lost its function. The purpose of opposing Rightist conservative thinking is precisely to solve this problem, that is, to make the superstructure adapt to the base, and [thus] promote the development of society. [The organs of the superstructure] did not pay enough attention to, or make adequate estimates of, the development of objective conditions. Everything has a dual character, and in ten thousand years things will still have a dual character. However, the dual character [of things] this year will not be the same as that of next year. If there were no change at all, there would be no Marxism. But right now Marxism still prevails. Looking at things from [the perspective of] Marxism, agriculture has thrown off much of its backwardness in the last few years. During the past several months the peasants have been going at a very fast pace, and in only a few months they have transformed the individual economy. The bourgeoisie has done likewise. We have always said of them that "profit is their sole objective"; now they have already turned over their factories (which have become joint state-private enterprises). In what way is "profit" their "sole objective"? As to the intellectuals, we have also always said they were no good, but at this conference comrades have said that about 40 per cent of the intellectuals are progressive elements, and about 40 per cent of them are middle-of-the-roaders. There are still backward elements, of course, but they can be transformed, and moreover [we] should promote this kind of transformation. However, some comrades cannot see this kind of transformation, and they want to go and joust in a place where there aren't any opponents [to joust with]. If there are no longer any targets, and one still insists on jousting, one becomes a Don Quixote. Of course there are still targets, but they too are being transformed, and therefore we should welcome this kind of transformation. We should look at the new situation after the transformation of the relations of production. Things were so difficult during the first half of last year that we were cursed everywhere. Inside and outside the Party, people said we were no good; that was merely because of a few handfuls of grain; during the second half of the year we weren't cursed any more. There were several happy events during the second half of last year. The bumper harvest and [agricultural] cooperativization were two big events; the suppression of counterrevolutionaries was also a happy event. In the last two or three years, Chinese society has undergone a drastic transformation, and these circumstances have been rejected among [our] comrades, among the

people, and among the intellectuals. We should be aware of these circumstances and adapt ourselves to them.

While speaking of promoting progress and opposing Rightist conservative thinking, we should at the same time be careful not to undertake things for which there is no basis and which cannot be carried through. Clashing the cymbals, beating the drums, and announcing happy events is good. That is really promoting progress! That exactly demonstrates that the Central Committee is a Society for the Promotion of Socialism! But we can now see that there are some conditions that should arouse our attention and which deserve some discussion. In the Program for Rural Development,<sup>6</sup> a good number of the targets for agricultural production increases have already been put aside; there is Rightist conservative thinking in all areas. Of the two leadership methods, which one should we adopt? I [removed some of the targets] because some of them have not yet been studied and are not set on adequate grounds. For example, the reclamation of 500,500,000 *mu* of land,<sup>7</sup> according to some, would require funds that would be equivalent to one year's budget.<sup>8</sup> How much is that in *renminbi*? Reclamation must be carried on, but whether that much can be reclaimed requires detailed study. Plans must be feasible and must be built on a well-grounded basis; otherwise we will again end up doing things blindly. At present the heads of some comrades have become fevered. It is good to cooperativize rapidly, but don't do it at a pace for which there are no grounds. Comrades in all the provinces should pay attention [to this]. The task of transforming [cooperatives] to a higher stage<sup>9</sup> must be accomplished under conditions in which the overwhelming majority of the people are satisfied. I hear currently that around 30 per cent of the people are still unwilling to let go of the income based on the land shares. If this is the case, then it is better to wait a few months. In the North the changeover can be made in the fall or winter of this year or the spring of next year—next spring would be best. I suggest that you give this some more thought. Comrade Chen Yun<sup>10</sup> said in reference to the joint state-private enterprises that if people send a gift right up to your door, it is not good to refuse it. But the question is whether in their hearts they are actually willing to do so. If not, then we can wait a few months. A few months really isn't very long to wait. Don't think I'm suggesting this in order to block your way, or that I am practicing Rightist opportunism again! We must always make over 90 per cent of the people happy; if more than a few per cent are not happy there will be problems. The targets in the plans of each department must also rest on reliable grounds. Not doing what originally could have been done is not good, but [trying to do things] that rest on an inadequate basis and that cannot be carried through can simply be labeled blindness and constitutes Left adventurism.<sup>11</sup> Even though this is not a major tendency at present, it has nevertheless already become visible. There are some comrades whose minds are not that sober and who are afraid to act on reality. They are afraid of the embarrassing label of rightist opportunism. Once something has undergone investigation and study and has been found to be unfeasible, one should dare to say it can't be done. We should dare to stop it and put the plans on a [more] reliable basis [before proceeding].<sup>12</sup>

Beijing has entered [the stage of] socialism. As far as entering it is concerned,

we've done that, but [the transition to] socialism has still not been completed, and we ought not to say that it has already been completed. To complete it will still require several years' work (let's say another three or four years). [The question of] in what year the "tail" [of capitalism]—fixed interest for the capitalists<sup>13</sup>—will be cut off depends on how the situation develops. The method of self-evaluation used in the clearing of accounts and the auditing of capital by capitalists in Beijing can be recommended.<sup>14</sup> In the future, in the rural areas, [when deciding questions related to] the admission of landlords and rich peasants into the cooperatives, as to who are good people and who are bad, who can be considered members of the cooperative and who can be considered alternate members, and who should participate in production under surveillance—could we also let people evaluate themselves while we provide the leadership? I suggest that each locality try it and see. Let them develop the struggle among themselves.

One more thing, some comrades quote what I said in the Preface to *The Upsurge of Socialism in China's Countryside*: "We can no longer do things entirely according to the way we originally conceived."<sup>15</sup> What I meant by "can no longer . . . entirely according to" was that in general we must still [operate] according to [our original plan]; otherwise wouldn't the five-year plan<sup>16</sup> have ceased to exist? However, some comrades have changed my words into "no longer do things according to" or to "entirely impossible to do things according to. . . ." Obviously their heads have already become a bit feverish.

What Comrade XXX said in his statement was very good.<sup>17</sup> I fully support his opinions regarding language reform. Do you support them or not? It is no great problem for the common people; it will facilitate [their] learning characters. However, there are some people who feel that while the adoption of the Roman alphabet for phoneticization is fine, it's a shame that the Roman alphabet was not invented by the Chinese. [They] have no problems with foreigners imitating things invented by the Chinese, or "using Chinese [things] to transform the barbarians,"<sup>18</sup> but that when foreigners invent things and the Chinese imitate them, using barbarian [things] to transform the Chinese, then there are problems. [But I feel that] Western writing systems are better, and what Comrade XXX said makes sense. There are [only a] few letters [in the alphabet], and in writing you go in one direction; the Chinese writing system is no match. Some professors say, "Of all the writing systems in the world, the Chinese writing system is the best." As I see it, that's not necessarily true. Therefore we have adopted the Roman alphabet. For instance, Arabic numerals were also invented by foreigners, but doesn't everyone use them now? The Roman alphabet originated in Rome, but aren't countries such as Britain, the United States, and Russia using it? I have never studied the history of writing, [but I believe that] in the past, each of [the nations] had its own writing system. It's said that our Chinese writing system was created by Chang Jie,<sup>19</sup> but I don't see it that way. Socialism didn't originate in Russia, [but] Russia borrowed it anyway. We should take over all the good things from foreign countries and make them into things of our own, [so that] in ten or twenty years we can catch up to an advanced level by international standards. This was what happened in the Han and Tang dynasties.<sup>20</sup> The Tang dynasty had seven types of music and dance, of which

six were from foreign countries. The Tang dynasty is well-known [for its music and dance]; after [these types of music and dance] had been performed for a long time they were known as things of the Chinese.

In Comrade XXX's speech there was one thing with which I disagreed.<sup>21</sup> That was when he said, "This is a consequence of the report Comrade Mao Zedong gave on July 31 last year<sup>22</sup> regarding the problem of cooperativization of agriculture, which gravely criticized Rightist conservative thinking and employed a new social outlook and theory to mobilize the masses and organize the masses." "This new kind of outlook and theory can only be produced after the development of the society's material life has placed before society new tasks. After a new outlook and theory have appeared they become the most critical forces, and they can then promote the resolution of the new tasks that have arisen in the course of the development of the material life of the society, and thereby promote the forward development of society."

This kind of talk makes it appear that agricultural cooperativization is something new, that it [involves] a new social outlook and theory. But this is not something new; it has been written about in *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)*.<sup>23</sup> They—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—were the first in the world to do it. Moreover, Marx had already talked about it more than a hundred years ago; and thirty years ago Russia had already done it. What we are talking about now really doesn't represent any new outlook or theory. We really don't have anything new—if we have [something], we'll [say we] have it, and if we don't we won't. In Europe in the past, when new tasks were already placed before Marx and Engels, a new outlook and theory were produced, namely Marxism. Later on, Lenin developed it further. Do we have anything new? Yes, we do; in the area of form and detail, such as the widespread development of mutual aid teams,<sup>24</sup> and [the conversion of] entire trades to joint state-private management,<sup>25</sup> these are new. Regarding the alliance with the bourgeoisie in the period of transition, Lenin had already talked about the theoretical aspects; we merely implemented [these theories] more fully and in a methodical step-by-step manner. This is very good, and there is a need to develop it further. In building socialism we can't let our mutton become unappetizing, and we can't let the Nanjing pressed duck and Yunnan ham become unappetizing. (Is there no more ham in Yunnan now?) We cannot allow a decline in variety in our material [life], or shortages of cloth. And mutton does not necessarily have to be prepared according to Marxism. In a socialist society, mutton and duck should be even tastier, even further advanced. Only in this way can we provide concrete experience of the advancement of socialism over capitalism; otherwise we would no longer have prestige in the eyes of mutton. Socialism must definitely be better than capitalism, and more advanced. We must pay attention to the complexity of situations, and be good at analyzing [things] so as to adapt to all types of complex situations. In a good many [areas of] work, there is still room for development. For instance, the elimination of counterrevolutionaries must be furthered. The [campaign for the] elimination of counterrevolutionaries has now [gone through] a preparatory stage, and much can be done in this regard. It's a good [idea] not to fight a battle unprepared. If the

preparatory work is done well, we can carry out [the campaign] faster and better than [we did] in Yanan,<sup>26</sup> and even [faster and better] than last year. If preparatory work is done poorly, and [we] don't ascertain the true situation, the amount of time [required] will be dragged out and we will make too many enemies. These are all matters related to leadership technique, and there is also a lot of room here for development. Since last summer there has been development in leadership techniques in the work in several areas, such as the anti-Hu Feng [campaign],<sup>27</sup> the cooperativization of agriculture, and the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce. On this basis, we can move one more step forward. In the field of theory, too, we should make some contributions; we should take over what has been said by those who came before us and further develop [it]. But from the October Revolution to the present there has not been any significantly new thing.

On the question of peace: Peace is something we are all concerned about. Is it possible that we will be allowed a twelve-year period [of peace] in which to basically complete our industrialization? It appears that it is possible. Altogether, twenty-one years elapsed between the First World War and the Second World War; we've now gone through ten years since the Second World War, and there will probably be a few more years [of peace]. The situation now is different from that which followed the First World War, primarily because Germany and Japan are not as they were in the past and are not very likely to provoke war. The Americans are preoccupied with making money; they don't do things that [result in] a deficit. There is no one else to carry them in a sedan chair, and they don't want to walk on their own feet. The way the American armed forces are currently deployed does not make it appear that they are going to fight a war. They are setting up bases everywhere, which is like an ox having its tail tied to a post; how can it move effectively? However, we must take into account the possibility of a sudden attack, that a maniac could appear in the world—that must be taken into account. Therefore, the earlier we can complete our work the better, and the more to our advantage it will be.

Our initiative is now increasing day by day, in agriculture, in the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, and so on. In the matter of the intellectuals, we have not yet taken the initiative at present, and we must let some time pass before we can do so. We have not yet taken the initiative in the area of industry either, and we must still depend on foreign countries for large amounts of machinery. We cannot manufacture [very] large machinery either or [very] small (precision) [machinery]; we can only manufacture medium-sized [machinery]: "We cannot manage the two ends, but the middle is all right." We have nothing to brag about even if we wanted to, [because] we are not independent in industry, we are not independent in science, and we are incapable of manufacturing either important industrial equipment or precision machinery. We have lots of land and people, but how many automobiles, tanks, and airplanes do we make ourselves? One automobile and one airplane are just not enough, are they? What is there that calls for our cocking our tails in the air?<sup>28</sup> Some comrades have said some stupid things, such as "We can get along without them,"<sup>29</sup> and "Me, I'm revolutionary

[and that's all it takes]." This kind of talk is wrong. At present, we call for technological revolution and cultural revolution; it is a revolution against stupidity and ignorance. We can't get along without them. It won't do to rely solely on such uncultured people as ourselves. These are wise words, and we must make them clear to the broad [ranks] of [our] cadres. To fight a war nowadays you need airplanes that can reach an altitude of 18,000 meters and travel at supersonic speeds; it's not like the past, when we rode horses. We can't do without high-level intellectuals. Now that we can see these facts we can start to take the initiative. If we're to have large numbers of high-level intellectuals, we must [first] have even more ordinary intellectuals. From now on we must see to it that everyone has the mathematical knowledge of a Hua Luogeng<sup>30</sup> and can read *Capital*. This is possible, if not in twenty years, then in thirty years, or at most in a hundred years or so. Otherwise, how could we call it Communism? Comrades, when you go back you must explain this matter clearly to all sectors [of the population.] China should have a large number of intellectuals. We must first approach world standards and then later catch up with world standards. Our nation's land area is immense, our population is large, our geographic position is good, and our coastline is long (although we don't have steamships,) so we should become the number one country in the world in terms of cultural, scientific, technological, and industrial development. We have a socialist system, and with hard work we can make it. Otherwise, what are 600 million people who are "industrious and courageous" striving for? If in several decades we were still not the number one nation in the world, it would be wrong. The United States now has only a dozen or so hydrogen bombs and [produces] 100 million tons of steel; I don't consider that anything so terrific. China should produce several hundred million tons of steel.

China has some good points: one is that it's poor; another is that it's blank (without knowledge).<sup>31</sup> This also has a dual character; being poor [makes people] want revolution. Lack of knowledge is not good, but it's like this blank sheet of paper; once this side has been written on you cannot do much more with it; this other side that hasn't been written on is clean and blank, and many things can be written on it. In a few decades we can catch up with the foreign countries.

## Notes

1. We have not found any definitive information regarding the existence of this society in the Yanan period of CPC history. There was, however, much controversy surrounding the role of the CPC and how it might work together with other political entities to promote a constitutional united front to govern China in place of single party (be it the CPC or the KMT) domination. These controversies, which suffused the late-Yanan period, encircled the issue of forming a political consultative conference including representation of the various parties (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 2). We therefore speculate that Mao is not referring to an actual society, but to the notion that the CPC played, in the Yanan period, the role of such a society.

2. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, notes 21 and 42, and text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 2.

3. See text July 31, 1955, vol. I, notes 18 and 19; see also text Dec. 27, 1955(2), "Editor's Note" no. 1, early paragraphs.

4. See text 1953, source note, and text Oct. 1953 in volume I.



5. The sentence in *Wansui* (1969) reads “*shengchanli he shengchan guanxi, shengchan guanxi shi jichu, shangmian haiyou zhengfu, dang, ge bumen, zhe do shi shangcheng jianzhu.*” Strictly translated, this would be rendered as “[Between] the forces of production and the relations of production, the relations of production are the base. On top [of these] are the government. . . .” To consider the relations of production as the base vis-à-vis the forces of production would, however, be fundamentally inconsistent with socialist economic analysis. We believe, therefore, that this is a misprint and that the phrase “*shi jichu*” ought to follow the first occurrence of the phrase “*shengchan guanxi*” (relations of production) rather than the second occurrence. If we rearrange the sentence on this assumption, it appears in the manner of our rendition here, one that is more consistent with Mao’s general arguments. It is also useful to note here that Mao disagreed with Soviet theorists as to whether the relations of production are part of the economic base or the superstructure. The Soviets argue that the relations of production, that is, class relations, are part of the superstructure. Since, according to the orthodox Marxist economic theory, the superstructure is determined by the economic base, which in this view consists only of the forces of production, that is, the means of production and their development in the various forms of technology, Soviet theorists place little emphasis on the problem of the relations of production, that is, on class relations. Mao, on the other hand, argued that the relations of production are part of the economic base, and that therefore they, along with the forces of production, must be changed in order to bring about further development in the superstructure. He argued, further, that the superstructure itself is not mechanically determined by the economic base but that it in turn has an effect on the economic base. Hence, as he says here, the superstructure has the function of promoting the development of the forces of production. For a more detailed discussion of this issue see text 1960 RN, Mao’s reading notes on the Soviet Union’s *Textbook on Political Economy*; see also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 42, and surrounding text July 8, 1957(2), note 38.

6. Here Mao’s phrase was *nongcun fazhan gangyao*, but he may have been referring to the Program for Agricultural Development (*nongye fazhan gangyao*), also known as the Forty-Article Program for Agricultural Development. The latter was discussed during the conference at which the present speech was delivered and was put in final form at a meeting of the Political Bureau three days later. See also text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, source note and note 3.

7. The *Wansui* (1969) text reads *wu yi wu shi wan*, which translates as 500.5 million, as rendered here. It is useful to note, however, that Mao might have meant to say (or, if he said it, there could have been a simple typographical error) *wu yi wu qian wan*, which could have translated as 550 million, considering that the target set for land reclamation in Article 16 of the National Program for Agricultural Development (see note 6) was 560 million *mu*.

8. Here Mao is apparently referring to the total expenses in a single year’s national budget.

9. See text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 1.

10. Chen Yun was vice-premier and head of the Ministry of Commerce at this time. For more biographical information on Chen see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 149–153, and text Dec. 18, 1950, vol. I, note 2; text Oct. 15, 1952, vol. I, note 1; text Nov. 23, 1954, vol. I, note 4.

11. See text Oct. 11, 1955 (1), vol. I, pp. 646–647.

12. There are minor discrepancies between the *Wansui* (1969) version and the *Wansui* (1967b) version for the last part of this paragraph, starting with “the targets in the plans of each department.”

13. The paying of fixed interest was part of the so-called “redemption policy” (*shumai zhengce*) by which the state compensated capitalists for the value of the means of production they previously owned and which were gradually “bought over” by the state as the various enterprises went from being solely owned by capitalists, to joint state-private ownership, to full state or public ownership. In the first stage of this redemption policy, the method of *si ma fen fei* (quartering the profits), prevalent before 1956, was implemented. Under this

method, the capitalists shared approximately one quarter of the profits of the enterprises, with the other three quarters going to state revenue, worker welfare funds, and public accumulation funds for the enterprises’ own development. (See text July 9, 1953, note 2, and text Sept. 7, 1953, vol. I, note 9.) From 1956 on, when more and more enterprises became jointly owned and managed by the state and the capitalists, the redemption policy entered a second stage, and it became possible to pay the capitalists dividends according to a fixed percentage interest irrespective of gain or loss. On July 28, 1956, this percentage was fixed at 5 per cent per annum for the capitalists’ share of the profits (in individual cases exceptions were made for a higher percentage), and the capitalists were expected to receive these dividends for a period of seven years, up to 1962. (In 1962, an extension of three more years was stipulated.) See also text Nov. 17, 1955, vol. I, note 4 (we apologize for the fact that at that point we had mistakenly cited reference to text Jan. 20, 1956, note 11, when it should be note 13), and also see, especially, Dec. 8, 1956, paragraphs 2, 9, and 10, where Mao provides an extensive discussion on this issue, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 39, where we describe a debate at that time on the matter of “fixed interest” payments.

14. Since often more than one capitalist owned part of the shares or stocks in an enterprise, it was necessary, while transforming enterprises and turning them over to joint state-private ownership, to determine the face value of each share or stock of the total capitalist share of the enterprise and thus to assess the actual amount of “fixed interest” (see note 11) to be paid to each individual capitalist. This was known as *qinghu hesuan* (cleaning out the accounts and auditing capital).

15. Here Mao is not directly quoting himself but referring to the gist of his argument in the second preface to the book *Zhongguo nongcun shehui zhuyi gaochao* (Upsurge of Socialism in China’s Countryside). See text Dec. 27, 1955(1).

16. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

17. Mao is referring to Zhou Enlai’s speech mentioned in the source note here. See *RMRB* (Jan. 20, 1956), 1. See also text 1951, vol. I, and text May 1, 1955, vol. I, note 1.

18. The terms here are *xia* for “China” and *yi* for “barbarians.” *Xia* was the name of an ancient semi-mythological dynasty, and since it represented the first historically identifiable Chinese government, the name has been taken to represent China and its tradition. *Yi* was identified in the “Wang Zhi” chapter of the *Li Ji* (Book of Rites) as the non-Chinese, or “barbarian,” peoples to the East. In the traditional Confucian Chinese worldview, the division between Chinese (Han) and “barbarians” (known by the phrase *yi xia zhi fen*) was greatly emphasized.

19. In Chinese mythology Chang Jie is known as the official chronicler of the Yellow Emperor (Huang Di) and as the inventor of the Chinese written script. According to this legend the effort to unify and codify the Chinese written language began circa 2500 B.C.

20. During the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 220), the Chinese empire came to include all of China proper as well as northern Vietnam, Inner Mongolia, southern Manchuria, and much of Korea. During the Tang dynasty (618–907) merchants and diplomats from Central Asia, Tibet, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan visited the capital at Changan. The Han and Tang were periods of much cultural borrowing from abroad. They were also considered to be the most splendid of China’s historical dynasties, and to this day the Chinese often refer to themselves culturally as the Han people or the Tang people. Mao, however, had long warned against Han chauvinism. See text Mar. 16, 1953, vol. I. See also text Jan. 31, 1958, point 46.

21. Mao is here referring to Liao Luyan’s speech. (See source note.)

22. This refers to Mao’s speech at a conference of Party secretaries. See text July 31, 1955, vol. I.

23. See text July 31, 1955, vol. I, note 26.

24. See text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

25. See text July 9, 1953, vol. I, comment; text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, notes 11 and 12, and text Sept. 7, 1953, text and note 2.

26. Mao is referring to the Party rectification campaign in Yanan in 1942–43; see text

June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9, and text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 24.

27. See text May–June 1955, vol. I.

28. See text June 14, 1954, note 13.

29. Mao is apparently referring to “getting along without” intellectuals here.

30. Hua Luogeng (b. 1908) had only a high school education. While serving as a clerk at Qinghua University, he studied mathematics on his own and eventually became a professor there. He subsequently lectured in the Soviet Union and the United States. Besides being one of the foremost mathematicians in China, Hua has been held up as a striking example of the possibilities of the kind of self-education that Mao often advocated. He was at this time director of the Institute of Mathematical Studies of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. For more biographical information on Hua, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 755-757.

31. This analysis of the predicament of the Chinese people is one that Mao would elaborate on and make famous in the year ahead, and it is an interesting example of Mao’s dialectical way of thinking. In his famous essay “On the Ten Major Relationships” (see text Apr. 25, 1956), he would further explain his meaning. In the article “Introducing a Cooperative” (see text Apr. 5, 1958), Mao further explicates that “poverty gives rise to the desire for change, the desire for action, and the desire for revolution. On a blank sheet of paper free of any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can be written.”

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### Telegram to India (January 24, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 26, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 4 (Feb. 21, 1956), 29. Available English Translation: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1483 (Jan. 26, 1956), 7.

President Rajendra Prasad,  
The Republic of India

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of India, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend sincere congratulations to Your Excellency and to the Indian people. May the close friendship and cooperation between China and India be increasingly consolidated and strengthened with each passing day in the noble cause of defending peace in Asia and in the world. May Your Excellency and the Indian people attain new and even greater successes in your work of seeking prosperity for the Republic of India.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

### Speech at the Supreme State Conference (Excerpt)

(January 25, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (January 26, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *Ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 161–162; *Wansui* (n.d.), pp. 13-14; *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 90–91); *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, pp. 717–719. Available English Translation: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, (Jan. 26, 1956), 3-4.

*This speech was not presented in RMRB as a complete transcript or direct quotation but in a verbatim news report entitled “Chairman Mao Talks at the Supreme State Conference, Discussions on the National Program for Agricultural Development, 1956–1967, submitted by the CPC Central Committee.” Nevertheless, because of the speech’s importance and the extensive coverage given to it, we believe it is reasonable to include it in this collection as being a reliable representation of Mao’s discussion of this problem.*

*This Supreme State Conference was called to discuss the Draft Program for the National Development of Agriculture, 1956–1967 (also called the “Forty Points”—see text Dec. 6, 1955, source note 3), which had been submitted to it by the January 23 meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and which was published on January 25. Mao’s endorsement of this document at this early date signifies his identification with it through much of its history of ups and downs as the leadership struggled over it. Downgraded throughout much of 1956 and early 1957, it was resurrected in mid- and late 1957 and in 1958 after which it became one of the major documents associated with the Great Leap Forward.*

*Mao’s comments here are quite representative of his other statements during this period.<sup>1</sup> For example, on the one hand it includes his clearest statement up to that time on the role of the relations of production in liberating the forces of production. On the other hand, it clearly puts forward his position at that time—which he would reverse as the complexities of socialism became more apparent—that the socialist revolution would be an easier goal to achieve than the “democratic revolution.”*

At present our country is in the midst of a high tide of the great socialist revolution. The founding of the People’s Republic of China signifies the shift of the Chinese Revolution from the stage of bourgeois democratic revolution to the stage of socialist revolution; that is, it has stepped into the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The work of the past six years was primarily that of the recovery of the national economy and of carrying out the various social reforms that had not been completed during the previous stages of the revolution, primarily land reform.<sup>2</sup> Since the summer of last year, socialist transformation—that is, socialist revolution—has been launched on a most extensive scale and to an extremely profound degree.<sup>3</sup> In approximately another three years, it will be possible for the socialist revolution to be basically accomplished throughout the country. . . .

. . . The purpose of the socialist revolution is to liberate the forces of production. The transformation of agriculture and the handicraft industries from the system of individual ownership to that of socialist collective ownership and the transforma-

tion of privately owned industry and commerce from the system of capitalist ownership to that of socialist ownership inevitably will greatly liberate the forces of production.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the social conditions for a great development in industrial and agricultural production will be created. . . .

. . . Our method of carrying out the socialist revolution is a peaceful method. In the past, many people, both within and outside of the Communist Party, expressed doubts about such a method. However, since the summer of last year, owing to the upsurge of the cooperativization movement in the countryside, and to the upsurge of socialist transformation in the urban areas in recent months, their doubts have generally been allayed.<sup>5</sup> Given the conditions prevailing in our country, it is possible, by using a peaceful method—that is, a method of persuasion and education—not only to make the transformation from the system of individual ownership to the system of socialist collective ownership, but also to make the transformation from the system of capitalist ownership to the system of socialist ownership. In the last few months the speed of socialist transformation has greatly exceeded people's expectations. In the past some people were afraid that the gate of socialism<sup>6</sup> would be a difficult one to pass through; now it appears that even this gate is easy to pass through. . . .

. . . At present, the political situation in our country has undergone a fundamental change. Many difficult conditions that had existed in the area of agriculture before last summer have now basically changed; many things that in the past had been considered infeasible are now feasible. It is possible for our country's First Five-Year Plan to be accomplished ahead of schedule or accomplished in excess of the targets set.<sup>7</sup> The tasks of the National Program for Agricultural Development for 1956 to 1967<sup>8</sup> are to point out, on the basis of this [current] upsurge in socialist transformation and socialist construction, the prospects for development in agricultural production and rural work, and to serve as the target in the struggle of the peasants and agricultural workers throughout the country. The various areas of work besides agriculture must also catch up rapidly so as to be compatible with the new situation created by the upsurge in the socialist revolution. . . .

. . . The people of our country ought to have a far-reaching and comprehensive plan aimed at striving to change, within a few decades, our country's backward conditions in [the areas of] the economy and science and culture and to rapidly attain the most advanced level [of development] in the world. To realize this great aim, the all-decisive factor is that we must have cadres; we must have scientific and technical experts who are both sufficient in number and excellent in quality. At the same time, we must continue to consolidate and expand the united front of the people's democracy and to unite with all the forces with which unity is possible.<sup>9</sup> The people of our country must also unite with the people of all countries in the world and struggle for the safeguarding of world peace.

#### Notes

1. For example, Mao's January 20, 1956, speech at the conference on the problem of intellectuals; see text Jan. 20, 1956, especially under note 5.

2. See text June 6, 1950(1), vol. I, note 8, and text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 2. See also text June 23, 1950, vol. I, and text Oct. 23, 1951, vol. I.

3. Mao is referring to the cooperativization of agriculture campaign which was carried out, with some ups and downs, in the second half of 1955. This campaign consisted mainly of the extensive setting up of agricultural producers' cooperatives (APCs), which Mao saw as the necessary and logical consequence of the Land Reform program. There are many documents in volume I of this collection on this subject.

4. See text July 9, 1953; text Aug. 12, 1953(1), and text Sept. 7, 1953, all in volume I.

5. See texts Sept. 25, 1955, Oct. 11, 1955, and Dec. 27, 1955(1) and (2).

6. See text June 23, 1950, vol. I, note 8.

7. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

8. See text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, source note and note 3.

9. See text Feb. 18, 1951, note 13, and text Nov. 1, 1951, both in volume I.

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### Letter to Song Qingling

(January 26, 1956)

Source: *Shuxin*, p. 508.

See text Oct. 10, 1952, vol. I, source note.

My dear elder sister:<sup>1</sup>

I have long received your New Year postcard. I am very happy and deeply grateful [for your best wishes]. Jiang Qing<sup>2</sup> has gone abroad for treatment [of her illness] and has not yet returned. How are you? You are sleeping well, I hope? I am still very much the same. I have an excellent appetite for food, and as for sleeping, I can sleep fairly well; so so. I guess for the next few years [at least] I won't have to go to see God. Still, one must recognize the symptoms that one is on the downward side of things. I hope that you will take good care of your health.

Mao Zedong

January 26, 1956

#### Notes

1. Here Mao is employing this form of address out of veneration for Song as well as a certain intimacy of affection. He was, of course, not related to Song.

2. See text May 12, 1950(1), vol. I, note 2.

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### Telegram to Voroshilov

(February 3, 1956)

Source: *RMRB* (Feb. 4, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 5 (Mar. 6, 1956), 65. Available English Translations: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1490 (Feb. 6, 1956), 10; FBIS, *Daily Report* (Feb. 7, 1956), AAA18.

Dear Comrade K. E. Voroshilov:

On your seventy-fifth birthday, we extend our warm congratulations to you on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China.

We wholeheartedly wish you good health and a long life and hope that you will achieve even more glorious successes in leading the people of the Soviet Union in carrying out the great tasks of building communism and safeguarding world peace. (Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council, dated)

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Greetings to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU  
(February 9, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Feb. 16, 1956), 1.

*This message was quite possibly delivered by the Chinese delegation to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, which was convened in Moscow in February 1956. At this Congress, Khrushchev, in a "secret report," denounced Stalin for violating the principles of socialism, for dictatorial methods of leadership, and as a serious obstacle in the road of development of Soviet society. Khrushchev also approved of employing "diverse methods," including parliamentary methods, in lieu of political revolutionary methods, toward the forming of socialist states in many countries. In terms of international communism, Khrushchev approved of the principles of "peaceful transition, peaceful coexistence, and peaceful competition" between bourgeois democracy and socialism. Despite this telegram's laudatory sentiments, which were expressed before the import of the congress became evident, Mao's own critique of this Khrushchevian de-Stalinization would develop quickly in the months ahead. In the Soviet Union itself, the new line triggered the rapid emergence of protest literature, and abroad, new anti-Soviet sentiments (not to mention the release of pent-up anti-Stalinist feelings) precipitated the Poznan riots in Poland and the Hungarian uprising in June and October 1956 (see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27). As a consequence of Khrushchev's new line, which in Mao's view negated the basic significance of socialist revolution, Sino-Soviet relations rapidly deteriorated. See the Russian Institute, ed. (1956), and D. Zagoria (1962). See also text Oct. 9, 1957.*

To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and all comrades attending the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

On behalf of all the members of the Chinese Communist Party and all the Chinese people, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party hereby sincerely extends its warm congratulations to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Since the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,<sup>1</sup> the Soviet Union has victoriously taken yet another great step forward on the road to communism and has also achieved extraordinarily great and important successes

in the area of safeguarding and consolidating world peace. The Chinese Communist Party is overjoyed and greatly encouraged by the magnificent victories scored by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the people of the Soviet Union during this period, and it expresses its warm congratulations.

Owing to the correct leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the people of the Soviet Union have already completed the Fifth Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has firmly adhered to the general line of giving priority to the development of heavy industry; this has promoted a general upsurge in all sectors of the Soviet Union's national economy. The series of correct measures adopted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with regard to the improvement of industrial technology and the improvement of the organization of industrial production have also created expansive prospects for the further upsurge of Soviet industry and for the raising of labor productivity to a new stage.

Owing to the correct leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Soviet agriculture has recently achieved great successes. The series of resolutions that have been passed and the powerful measures that have been adopted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with regard to opening up virgin land; to further promoting the mechanization and electrification of agriculture; and to increasing the production of grain, industrial raw materials, and animal husbandry products are the foundation for the new victories achieved by the Soviet Union in agricultural production.

Along with the rapid development of industrial and agricultural production, the material and cultural levels of the people of the Soviet Union are being raised with each passing day, and a splendid outlook has emerged in Soviet sciences. In the area of the peaceful use of atomic energy, the Soviet Union is ahead of [the rest of] the world. All of this indicates that the Soviet Union, which is making great strides toward communist society, is becoming increasingly prosperous and increasingly strong. The draft directive of the Twentieth Congress with regard to the Sixth Five-Year Plan vividly and brilliantly reflects the fact that the people of the Soviet Union have already scored and will score astounding achievements. It constitutes a milestone in the construction of communist society by the people of the Soviet Union. This plan will certainly be fulfilled ahead of time and beyond the targets. This will make the camp of world peace, democracy, and socialism increasingly an invincible force.

Owing to the correct leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has likewise scored great successes in foreign relations. The further broadening and consolidation of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies of Europe and Asia; the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; the signing of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Austria; the convening of the four-nation summit meeting; the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and Finland and Norway; the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic; and especially the visits of profound historical significance made by the delegations of the Soviet Union to India, Burma, and Afghanistan—all have played an important role in the struggle to safeguard world peace.

The great successes recently scored by the Soviet Union at home as well as abroad cannot be separated from the correct leadership provided by the long-tempered Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union headed by Comrade Khrushchev and the rock-solid unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has abided by the doctrines of communism, has firmly adhered to the Leninist principle of collective leadership, has forged intimate links with the millions of Soviet people, has constantly developed criticism and self-criticism, and has resolutely smashed Beria's traitorous conspiratorial clique.<sup>2</sup> All this constitutes the basic element in guaranteeing that the policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will be victorious wherever they are applied and that the entire Party will consolidate its unity. The more consolidated the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is, and the more magnificent the victories of the Soviet Union in all areas are, the stronger is the proof that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, created by Lenin and nourished by Stalin together with his intimate comrades-in-arms, is strong and invincible.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been in the past, is now, and will be in the future an outstanding model for the communist parties of the various countries throughout the world. It is the first shock brigade of the world's revolutionary movement and workers' movement.<sup>3</sup>

Between the Communist Party and the people of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party and the people of China there exist the most intimate relations. Such fraternal and inviolable friendly relations are developing day by day. They have already become a powerful element in the consolidation of the socialist camp and in the safeguarding of world peace. The Chinese Communist Party will forever stand alongside the communist parties of the countries in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and [alongside] the communist parties of the various other countries, and it will carry on the tireless struggle for the consolidation of world peace and the realization of progress for all mankind.

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will make an enormous and creative contribution to the cause of the further construction of communism in the Soviet Union and to the cause of the defense and consolidation of world peace. It will be a new encouragement to the Chinese people and to the people of the various other countries in the world. Let us shout:

Long live the great, glorious, and ever-triumphant Communist Party of the Soviet Union! Long live the Leninist Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union!

Long live the eternal and indestructible friendship between the peoples of the two countries of China and the Soviet Union!

Long live the victory of the invincible cause of Communism!

Mao Zedong

Chairman

The Central Committee

The Chinese Communist Party

February 9, 1956

## Notes

1. This Congress was convened during October of 1952. The Chinese delegation to the conference was led by Liu Shaoqi and remained in the Soviet Union until January 1953.

2. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 67.

3. The Chinese term *tuji dui*, which is obviously originally a military term, is used often by Mao to connote concentrated forces that are employed for the resolution of urgent problems; see text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 99. At the risk of reading a bit too much into the context here, we feel that there might have been some significance in the Chinese Communists' usage of this term here, rather than the term *xianfeng*, or "vanguard," which is more conventionally used to describe the relationship between the Communist Party and the people, or the socialist movement in general.

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## Toast to Democratic Parties and Democratic Personages

(February 13, 1956)

Source: *RMRB* (Feb. 14, 1956), 1.

*A reception was held on the afternoon of February 13, 1956, in Beijing by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the CPC for representatives and leaders of the democratic parties and for democratic personages with no party affiliations (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1). A list of the organizers and participants is reported in the news article which contains the quotation of the toast made by Mao here.*

May you all have good health, and may you progress smoothly in your work.

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## Letter to Liu Songlin

(February 14, 1956)

Source: *Shuxin*, p. 509.

*According to the source, Liu Songlin (originally named Liu Siqi) married Mao Zedong's eldest son, Anying, in 1949. Mao Anying died in the war in Korea in late 1950 (see text Nov. 1950), vol. I. From 1955 to 1957, Liu was studying in the Soviet Union.*

My dear child Siqi:

I have received all your letters to me; I am very glad. I hope that you will take care of your health so that you can avoid any illness, and do a good job of studying. We are all well; there is no need for you to worry about us. There is now an upsurge

of socialism in our country.<sup>1</sup> Do you get our newspapers where you are? You should get some newspapers to acquaint yourself with the news about China. Don't become alienated from the situation in our country.

My best wishes.

Desheng<sup>2</sup>  
February 14, 1956.

#### Notes

1. Mao was possibly reflecting on the conditions in the Chinese countryside since the second half of 1955. See text Sept. 25, 1955, and texts Dec. 27, 1955(1) and (2), in volume I.

2. This signature, which translates as "gaining victory," is one that we have not seen used by Mao elsewhere.

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### Telegram to Nepal (February 14, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Feb. 18, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 6 (Mar. 21, 1956), 86. Available English Translation: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1500 (Feb. 20, 1956), 9.

King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva,  
Nepal

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of the National Day of the Kingdom of Nepal, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend warm congratulations to the people of Nepal. May the Kingdom of Nepal increase in prosperity and the Nepalese people achieve greater happiness with each passing day, and may Your Majesty be in good health.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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### Letter to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, et al. (February 19, 1956)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, pp. 510–511. Other Chinese Text: *RMRB* (Dec. 25, 1983), 1. Available English Translation: *BR*, 26:52 (Dec. 26, 1983), 17.

Liu [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], Chen [Yun], Peng Zhen, [Deng] Xiaoping, Chen Boda, [Lu] Dingyi:<sup>1</sup>

My view is that this type of free expression of viewpoints should not be prohibited.<sup>2</sup> This is [an expression of] a dissenting view on academic and scholarly thought, and anybody may discuss it; there is no problem of damaging our prestige. Therefore, do not raise the issue with Yudin.<sup>3</sup> If in our own country there are views that diverge, on such academic and scholarly issues, from the opinions of any of our leaders, they should not be banned either. It would be totally erroneous to make any attempt at prohibiting [the free expression of dissenting views on such matters].

Mao Zedong  
February 19

#### Notes

1. For Liu, see text May 19, 1953, vol. I, source note. For Zhou, see text Nov. 18, 1954, vol. I, note 1. For Chen Yun, see text Dec. 18, 1950, vol. I, note 2, and text Jan. 20, 1956, note 9. Chen was, at the time of this letter, secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. Peng Zhen (b. 1902) was one of the major leaders of the CPC since the 1940s. His position had been largely in the area of political and Party organization rather than in the military. Since 1949, in addition to being a member of the CPC Political Bureau (to which he was first elected in 1945 following the CPC's Seventh Congress) and a vice-chairman of the NPC, Peng was also, from September 1956 on, a second secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC. Moreover, Peng wielded considerable political power as the mayor of Beijing and, at one time, as first secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee. From 1954 through the early 1960s, Peng played a very important role as PRC representative in negotiating issues between the CPC and other socialist/Communist parties in the international sphere, chiefly with the USSR. In 1966, Peng was criticized under suspicion of being the power behind the Sanjia cun clique (made up of Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Moshu), and in December 1966, Peng was arrested by Red Guards. As such he has the dubious distinction of being the first Political Bureau-level victim of the Cultural Revolution. For more biographical information on Peng, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 713–718, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 724–727. See also text Sept. 9, 1959, note 4, and text Sept. 11, 1959, note 23. Deng Xiaoping was secretary general of the Central Committee of the CPC at the time of this letter. For more biographical information on Deng, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 819–826, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 942–944. Chen Boda was, at the time of this letter, director of the office of Political Studies of the Central Committee of the CPC. See text Nov. 18, 1954, vol. I, note 1. Lu Dingyi (b. 1901) was the CPC's chief propagandist through the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. As head of the CPC Central Committee's Propaganda Department and deputy director of the Cultural and Educational Commission of the State Council, Lu directed

many of the criticism campaigns of the 1950s, such as the campaign against the film *Wu Xun zhuan* in 1951 (see text May 20, 1951), vol. I; the *Honglougong yanjiu* affair (see text Oct. 1954); the Hu Feng affair (see text May–June 1955, vol. I) and the anti-rightist campaign in 1957. In 1966, Lu was purged of all his official positions and was accused of forming an anti-Party clique with Luo Ruiqing (see text Aug. 8, 1950, vol. I, note 1), Peng Zhen, and Yang Shangkun (see text May 19, 1953, source note) under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi (see text May 19, 1953, vol. I, source note). For more biographical information on Lu, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 661–665, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 660–662.

2. According to the source, this referred to the comments made by a visiting Soviet scholar to the Chinese people in his company regarding how he differed from Mao on the issue of Mao's interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's (see text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, note 7) worldview in Mao's essay "On New Democracy." (See *Xuanji*, II, pp. 649ff., and *SW*, II, pp. 363ff.)

3. P. F. Yudin was the Soviet Union's ambassador to the PRC. See text Dec. 15, 1953, vol. I, source note.

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Telegram to Urho Kaleva Kekkonen  
(February 27, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Feb. 28, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 6 (Mar. 21, 1956), 86. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Feb. 28, 1956), 1; FBIS, *Daily Report* (Feb. 29, 1956), AAA11.

President Urho Kekkonen,  
The Republic of Finland

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of Your Excellency's assumption of the presidency of the Republic of Finland, allow me to extend my warm congratulations. May the friendly relations between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Finland further develop.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

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Telegram to King Norodom Suramarit  
(February 29, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Mar. 2, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 7 (Apr. 6, 1956), 88. Available English Translation: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1509 (Mar. 2, 1956), 6.

King Norodom Suramarit,  
The Kingdom of Cambodia

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of Your Majesty's coronation, I extend warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the Cambodian people on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf.

May Your Majesty be in good health.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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Speed Up the Socialist Transformation of Handicrafts  
(March 5, 1956)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 264–266. Available English Translation: *SW*, V, pp. 281–283.

*According to the source, this document is part of a set of instructions issued by Mao on the question of transforming handicraft industries after receiving the reports of various departments under the State Council dealing with the matter.*

*By October 1955, Mao had basically proved his case within the Party regarding collectivization. This led, in turn, to moves to accelerate the nationalization of industry, commerce, and handicrafts. On October 29, Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Chen Yun addressed over 500 members of the executive committee of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, calling on them to play a role in matching the collectivist upsurge taking place in the countryside (see text Dec. 27, 1955[1] and [2], vol. I, ). In December 1955, after a Central Committee conference held to discuss this issue (November 16–24), Mao made an unpublicized visit to Shanghai to meet with leading businessmen who reportedly urged him to speed up the process of transformation of commerce and industry, accomplishing it in perhaps as little as five years. Mao expressed hesitancy about such a speed-up at that time, saying that he would have to do further investigation and analysis.*

*In December 1955, however, 1957 was set as the target for the completion of this transformation—a date Mao endorsed in his December 6 speech (see text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I). But events overtook these goals. In December 1955 and January 1956, various organizations strove to set the pace for collectivization by trades, and handicrafts enterprises in Beijing were converted to joint state-private ownership, a feat commemorated by a rally in Tiananmen Square attended by Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Liu Shaoqi. By the end of January virtually all major industrial cities had completed the changeover, as none wanted to be left behind. (See texts Jan. 20, 1956, and Jan. 25, 1956.) But also at the end of January, to prevent further dislocations from the rapid transformations, Zhou and Chen Yun attempted to slow down the pace*

of the movement. Mao, however, seems to have been overtaken by the events; this document indicates that he was still willing to speed up the transformation of the handicrafts sector.<sup>1</sup>

1. I feel that the speed of the socialist transformation of handicraft industries [based on] individual [production] has been a bit slow. Even in January of this year, at the time of the conference of provincial and municipal [Party] committee secretaries,<sup>2</sup> I said that [the transformation] was a little slow. Prior to the end of 1955 only two million people had been organized. In the first two months of this year alone [this transformation] has expanded by three million people, so it seems that we can basically complete [the transformation] this year; that's very good. Regarding the gross output value of handicraft production, you are assuming an average annual increase of 10.9 per cent during a period of three five-year plans; this seems a bit low. The First Five-Year Plan<sup>3</sup> set [the goals] low, [and] we suffered some losses. It is not necessary to alter [the plan] at present, but you must get a grip on [this problem] in your work.

2. [As to] the range in size of the handicraft cooperatives, in general, about a hundred people is optimal, [but] some [cooperatives] can have several hundred people while others can have a few dozen.

3. To organize cooperatives of blacksmiths and carpenters to serve agricultural production and go down to the countryside to repair agricultural tools is a very good method; the peasants will definitely welcome [it]. Chinese handicraft industries have been doing this kind of thing for the past several thousand years. After the cooperatives have been organized and the technical [level of their work] has been raised, then they will be able to serve the peasants even better.

4. [In the reports] you said that during the high tide of the transformation of handicraft industry, the repair and service trades concentrated on production, and [consequently] too many [service] stations were closed down, and [now] the masses are dissatisfied. What a mess! What should we do now? "In the general situation in the world, those things which have long been divided will surely be reunited, and those things which have long been united will surely be divided again."<sup>4</sup>

5. In terms of labor productivity, the [rate of the] most efficient semi-mechanized and mechanized production is over thirty times the rate of productivity of the least efficient handicraft production. In terms of average annual per capita output values, it is 20,000 to 30,000 *rmb* in modernized state-run enterprises, 5,000 *rmb* in semimechanized and mechanized cooperatives, 2,000 *rmb* in large-scale [handicraft] cooperatives with over one hundred members, 1,500 *rmb* in small-scale [handicraft] cooperatives, and 800 to 900 *rmb* in individual handicraft industries. It becomes clear from comparing these labor productivity rates that handicraft industries must develop in the direction of semimechanization and mechanization and that labor productivity must be raised.

6. Each of the various handicraft trades does good things. This includes the manufacturing of things to eat, wear, and use. In addition, there are arts-and-crafts products such as *cloisonné*,<sup>5</sup> and the [blown-glass] grapes [made by] the "five maidens of the Chang family [known for its glass] grapes."<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, there is

roast duck [which] can be [considered a] technological export.<sup>7</sup> There are some service trades [that involve] going from street to street and from village to village making repairs, [like] Old Woman Wang who repaired urns.<sup>8</sup> These people have been to many places; their knowledge and experience are broad. The Dongxiaoshi in Beijing [Municipality alone] has more than six thousand types of products.<sup>9</sup>

[I want to] alert you to the fact that there are many good things in the handicraft industry that shouldn't be thrown away. A knife or a pair of scissors made by Pockmarked Wang or Zhang Xiaoquan<sup>10</sup> should not be thrown away even ten thousand years from now. Those good things of our people that have been shunted aside must definitely be revived and, moreover, must be made even better.

7. Improving the standards of arts-and-crafts products and protecting the techniques of the old artists among the people are good things that [we must] do quickly, [even] more quickly [than we are doing now]. You [can] establish organizations yourselves, set up academies, and convene meetings [to achieve this goal]. Yang Shihui<sup>11</sup> is an ivory carver. In fact he is a brilliant artist. He can make a sculpture of me [from memory] after simply sitting together with me at a table to eat and looking at me. As for me, I could look at someone for days and, I'm afraid, still not be able to make a sketch [of that person] at all.

8. [When] the state allocates matériel to the cooperatives, prices should be assigned reasonably. We can't assign prices according to [established] state allocation prices. Cooperatives and state-run enterprises are different, and there are differences between the system of socialist collective ownership and the system of socialist ownership by the whole people.<sup>12</sup> During the beginning period of the cooperatives, they do not have a large economic base and it is necessary for the state to help. It is very good for the state to allocate to the cooperatives, at low prices, old machinery that has been traded in and the machinery and factory buildings that have become surplus after the merger of the factories under the [system of] joint state-private enterprises. "If you want to get something, you must give something first."<sup>13</sup> When the economic base of the cooperatives becomes larger, then the state will collect more taxes and the price of raw materials will be further increased. At that time, while the cooperatives may formally appear to be [under a system of] collective ownership, in fact they will have come under a system of ownership by the whole people.

The state should assist the cooperatives with semimechanization and mechanization, and the cooperatives themselves should work hard to develop semi-mechanization and mechanization. The greater the speed of mechanization, the shorter will be the lifespan of your handicraft cooperatives. The more your "domains" shrink, the easier it will be to achieve our cause. You should work hard to mechanize more quickly [and] pass on a bit more to the state!

9. The value of handicraft production makes up one-fourth of the gross value of national industrial output. Why is [the matter of] supplies, production, and sales [in this sector] not incorporated into the state plan? [Since] handicrafts are so significant, they should be incorporated into the state plan.

10. In some places the Party committees are busy [with other things], and their



handicrafts-related [work] is not even listed [among their priorities]; this is not good. Why are there cadres who aren't quite willing to handle handicrafts-related work? I, for one, would like to get involved in such matters. It is very important!

11. From among the more than sixty thousand handicraft cooperative organizations, you should choose some outstanding examples and compile a reference work on [such] typical examples. It should contain [examples] from every area, from every occupation, from every trade; good ones, bad ones, large ones, small ones, centralized ones, scattered ones, semimechanized ones, and mechanized ones—all of these should be included. You [should] publish [this as] a volume like *The Upsurge of Socialism in China's Countryside*.<sup>14</sup>

### Notes

1. Information for this note is extracted from R. MacFarquhar (1974), pp. 19–25.
2. See text Jan. 20, 1956.
3. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2.
4. This is the first sentence in the classical novel *Sanguo yanyi* (Romance of the Three Kingdoms).
5. Now a world renowned art object, *cloisonné*, also known by the names *fa lang* and, as cited here in the Chinese text, *jingtai lan* (*jingtai* blue) in China, is a popular porcelain technique of the Beijing region, used in the production of flower vases, utensils, decorative pots and urns, and especially in snuff bottles. It was developed in the mid-fifteenth century and became popular during the reign of the Jingtai Emperor of the Ming dynasty (r. 1450–1456), hence the name *jingtai* blue.
6. “This refers to the five women of Master Chang's family in Beijing famous for the glass grapes they blew.” (SW, V, p. 283.) Employing special techniques and chemicals, these workers create a purplish product with white frosting that vividly resembles the characteristics of real grapes.
7. Mao is referring to the special technique of raising ducks for roasting, peculiar to the Beijing area, that provides the duck with a special succulence and flavor. The Quanzhude Restaurant in the district of Beijing Municipality, which was outside the front gates of the old city, was nationally famous for this technique.
8. Mao is referring to a popular skit in traditional opera based on the story of an elderly woman who repaired urns as an itinerant craftsperson in northern China. In her traveling she also collected all manner of local gossip and used this information to her own ends.
9. This refers to an important area of the city of Beijing, located in the Longxugou area of Banbidian, in the Congwen district of Beijing Municipality, where many small arts and crafts peddlers vend their wares. It is known as Dongxiaoshi (Market of the Eastern Dawn) because of the custom by which commerce in this area begins at dawn each day. It was formally constituted as a center for such small vendors' commerce during the period of socialist transformation of private industrial and handicraft enterprises in 1955–56.
10. Wang is the name of a famous store in Beijing; whereas Zhang is an equally famous cutlery producer in Hangzhou. Wang's products are renowned for their keenness, while Zhang's are famous for their precision, lightness of weight, and maneuverability.
11. Born in 1913, Yang began as an apprentice in decorative carpentry and architecture. Later he switched to ivory carving and became a renowned artist in this field. His most famous product was a carving in which Mao was depicted as enjoying the scenery of Wanshoushan in Beijing. In 1956, Yang was the chief of the technical division of the Beijing Ivory Carving Producers' Cooperative and a member of the Beijing committee of the CPPCC.

12. These refer to two transitional forms of ownership of the means of production. Ownership by the collective indicates that the means of production are owned by a unit of the working people rather than by the working people as a whole, and that the products are used primarily to meet the needs of that collective and only secondarily of society as a whole. The collective also maintains the primary right to dispose of its products. Hence members of the collective derive their income from collective production, and their income varies with the level of this production.

Ownership by the whole people, on the other hand, indicates that the means of production are owned by the working people as a whole. The products are used primarily to satisfy the needs of the working people, not of the subunit. Hence, members' incomes are paid directly by the state (as the agent of the whole people) and do not vary with the level of production.

Neither of these ownership forms is intrinsically bound up with any particular form of management within the enterprise itself. Rather, it is these various internal relations of production that have a major effect on determining the success of these various ownership forms as transitional forms from capitalist production to communist production.

13. This saying is derived from Chapter 36 of the Daoist classic *Lao Zi* (a.k.a. *Daode jing*, or *Classic of the Way and Its Power*).

14. See text Sept. 25, 1955; Dec. 27, 1955(1) and (2), in volume I.

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## Instructions on Report on Schistosomiasis-Prevention Conference (March 7, 1956)

Source: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 216.

*This is a set of instructions that Mao issued in response to the “Report on the Preparation for the Convening of the Second [National] Conference on the Prevention and Curing of Schistosomiasis.” We have no information from the source as to by whom, or where, the report was made. On the subject of schistosomiasis and Mao's writing on the topic, see text July 1, 1958, and text Nov. 25, 1958(2), note 17.*

In addition to the six provinces of the lower Yangtze River, you should also invite representatives from other provinces where schistosomiasis has been discovered, such as Sichuan, Guangdong, and Fujian, to attend [the conference]. Please discuss and arrange this with Comrade Ke Qingshi.<sup>1</sup>

While the conference [most certainly should take the] discussion of schistosomiasis as its primary responsibility, the discussion of other most serious diseases, such as the hookworm disease, would also be proper. [At] this conference [the time and place] of the next conference should be set; another conference [should be] held in the latter half of the year. That would be two conferences every year and that should be enough.

### Note

1. See text Dec. 26, 1953, vol. I, source note; see also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 13.

Telegram to Poland on Bierut's Death  
(March 13, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Mar. 14, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 8 (Apr. 21, 1956), 175. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Mar. 14, 1956), 1; FBIS, *Daily Report* (Mar. 14, 1956), AAA4.

*Boleslaw Bierut was head of the Polish Workers' Party from 1949 to 1956. He replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka as general secretary of the Party in 1949 and adhered to a pro-Moscow line during his tenure as head of the Party. On his death he was replaced by Edward Ocheb. After the Poznan riots of June 1956, and at the October plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party, Gomulka resumed leadership.*

Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki, Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Poland,  
Comrade Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland,  
Comrade Stanislaw Skrzyszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland:

On learning the stunning news of the untimely death of Comrade Boleslaw Bierut, on behalf of the Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China we express, with great sadness, our deepest sorrow to you and, through you, to the Polish people and the government of the People's Republic of Poland.

Comrade Boleslaw Bierut was a revered and beloved leader of the Polish people and was also an outstanding fighter in the cause of world peace, democracy, and socialism. His death is a tremendous loss for the people of Poland and for the camp of world peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union.

We are confident that the glorious achievements of Comrade Boleslaw Bierut during his lifetime will forever inspire us in our efforts to further strengthen and develop the unbreakable and eternal friendship between the Chinese and Polish peoples. The Chinese people will forever struggle together with the Polish people to safeguard world peace and to consolidate the camp of world peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the Soviet Union.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

Telegram to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan  
(March 21, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Mar. 23, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 8 (Apr. 21, 1956), 177. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Mar. 23, 1956), 1.

Mr. Iskander Mirza,  
President,  
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the founding of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Your Excellency's assumption of the presidency of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I express warm congratulations to Your Excellency and to the people of Pakistan.

May we achieve further progress in the friendly relations between China and Pakistan.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Directives Regarding Supply and Marketing Cooperatives  
(April 2, 1956)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 91–94.

*According to the source, on April 2, 1956, Zhang XX (most likely Zhang Qilong),<sup>1</sup> Deng XX (most likely Deng Shenxi),<sup>2</sup> and Deng X (most likely Deng Fei)<sup>3</sup> briefed Mao on the work of the supply and marketing cooperatives.<sup>4</sup> Liu XX (most likely Liu Shaoqi), Peng X (most likely Peng Zhen), Li Xiannian, and Ma XX were reportedly present.<sup>5</sup> The document represents excerpts of the conversation, almost entirely made up of the words that Mao spoke, with a number of interjections by others, and with the conversation's subject context given in parentheses.*

(When discussing the subject of the money put up by members of the cooperatives as shares)

Mao: Isn't there a need to return the money put up by the members of the cooperatives? If these cooperatives are to be transformed into state-run commercial [enterprises], then I think [the money] has to be returned!

(When discussing the setting up of an office for the [technical] specialists at the All-China Federation headquarters)<sup>6</sup>

Mao: Do you still have specialists [working with the federation]?

Zhang XX: We have three specialists from the Soviet Union.

Mao: Is there no limit to the time [when we must have] specialists [with us]? I think perhaps we can dispense with hiring them, can't we?

(When discussing the fact that there are a total of 1.43 million workers engaged in the supply and marketing cooperatives)

Mao: You have so many people?

Li Xiannian: If we add to that [the people who have been pulled into the category by] the reforming of the private commercial [enterprises], there would be over 3 million people.

Mao: You have so many people; no other department can match you!

(When discussing the fact that the number of administrative personnel [in the supply and marketing cooperatives' system] represents 25.5 per cent of the total number of workers)

Mao: [It seems to me that] the ratio, of having administrative personnel make up 25 per cent, is a bit too much. Wouldn't that affect cost?

Zhang XX: Lately we are preparing to transfer some of the administrative personnel to the operational departments.

Li Xiannian: The cooperatives do not have a federal company, but there are a bit too many administrators.

(When discussing the phenomenon that the retail amount of agricultural means of production has been increasing gradually through the years)

Mao: There has been an increase in the means of production. This is to take care of you.<sup>7</sup> We will still add more to the means of production; that would only be reasonable, because we want to promote production, and we must run the cooperatives diligently and frugally.<sup>8</sup> When we have put down a good foundation in production, in two years, we would be able to sell more means of production. At the moment we are overwhelmed by the atmosphere of promoting production. In the days ahead, though, there will be a future for the means of consumption. There are, to be sure, difficulties, but for now, let's get more means of production!

(When discussing the financial situation)

Mao: Just the cooperatives by themselves have earned two billion *rmb*.<sup>9</sup> That's why some other people have designs on you! Is the rate of profit of 4.84 per cent high?

Li Xiannian: Not really too high. The rate of profit for commerce is 8.12 percent.<sup>10</sup> That's because the Ministry of Commerce is primarily engaged in promoting wholesale, and [the rate of profit] ought to be higher. The cooperatives, [on the other hand,] are primarily engaged in retail.

(When discussing the number of days it takes for the circulating funds to come round cycle)

Mao: With you [the funds] take seventy-some days to make the cycle once, so, in a year, they can be circulated five times. This is faster than the situation with the Ministry of Commerce. In the Ministry of Commerce, a bit more than two cycles are made [each year]. So you are faster, and they are slower [than you are].

Li Xiannian: The cooperatives are primarily engaged in retail, so they have to be a bit faster; the Ministry of Commerce is primarily engaged in wholesale, and that makes it a bit slower.

(When discussing the fact that the ratio [of enterprises that] operate on [the merchandising of] piecemeal small commodities is increasing [among the supply and marketing cooperatives])

Mao: Why weren't [these enterprises] operated before? Is it that [now] there is profit to be made [and therefore their number has increased]?

Li Xiannian: In the past—and this was a major problem with the Ministry of Commerce—there was not enough attention paid to small commodities.

Zhang XX: In the past, these commodities' [trade] was run by the private merchants; if we were to [take over] its operations [then], we would have crowded them out and forced their collapse, but without having arranged [any settlement] for them.

Peng X: Once the piece-work wage appeared on the scene, things changed. The amount of small commodities increased. There is already a phenomenon of [people] forcibly dragging customers to buy things.

Mao: That's what's so strange about people in this world; as soon as we implemented the piece-work wage, things began to increase [in number].

(When discussing the situation in which it is hard to market means of production)

Li Xiannian: The agricultural producers' cooperatives<sup>11</sup> really know how to stick it to us.<sup>12</sup> For instance, the peasants of *X xian* in Shandong [province]<sup>13</sup> saw that we had transported a large batch of granular fertilizer [to Shandong], but they insisted on not buying [from us].

Mao: There is no seasonal discrepancy price in prepurchasing; that is something that needs to be changed. The agricultural cooperatives know how to count, and they'd wait till they are in need before they would buy.

(When discussing expanding the operations of direct transportation)

Mao: Direct-access transportation [of the goods] means to purchase incoming merchandise according to the administrative regional distinctions. In the past, the merchants did not follow any administrative regional distinction. Those who are in the vicinity of Shashi could have taken in merchandise through Hankou; you didn't have to take it in at Changsha.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, for the people in the area of Jiangxi [province] adjacent to Zhejiang [province], they could take in merchandise in Zhejiang.

(When discussing organizing the localities to produce mixed fertilizers)

Mao: In the past we focused on promoting the big items. The state itself could only produce 500,000 tons of chemical fertilizers. [Now you talk of] 22 million tons of mixed fertilizers; what would that be in terms of how many factories' productive capacity?

(When discussing strengthening the supply items for educational and cultural use)

Mao: There has been a change in the trends of consumption! In the Forty Articles<sup>15</sup> there was an article on running the cooperatives diligently and frugally;<sup>16</sup> that was not meant for commerce. Fewer people are buying fewer things.

Li Xiannian: Right now people do not dare to go to the credit cooperatives<sup>17</sup> to save their money. They dare not buy liquor, cigarettes, sundry merchandise, or cloth.

Mao: Let us wait three years! In China, the rich peasants<sup>18</sup> make up 4 per cent [of the population only]. The conservative ones are not the rich peasants but the well-to-do middle peasants.<sup>19</sup> But there are so many well-to-do middle peasants, and in the end, they will drink liquor. A friend of mine came to Beijing, and when he left I gave him two bottles of wine as a gift. Spending money can be legal. Let us issue a directive [to the effect that people are] free to spend their money as long as they do not affect production [adversely].

(When discussing the need to strengthen research and study and the plan to start up a research office)

Mao: That would be very good. With that we'll have a method of doing things.

(When discussing the idea that the method of doing things by having merchandise taken in according to administrative regional distinctions must be changed resolutely)

Mao: You can talk about it and it would sound very resolute, and it would look nice on paper. After all, there are only four characters to be written and it would take only a few seconds to write them, but then other people would still have no idea about what to do! To take in merchandise according to administrative regional distinction is a matter of regression for Communists!

Peng X: People at the lower levels all have their tasks; they all have to realize the profit-making plans. This is a matter of profit.

Li Xiannian: For several years now there have been proposals for change. This is now an old problem.

Mao: For several years there have been proposals about change, but when will there be change? For how many more years do we have to wait? You have come here to Beijing for several years, but nothing has changed.<sup>20</sup> We absolutely must [have merchandise taken in] according to economic zoning. If we don't change [from the method of taking in merchandise according to administrative zoning] people will be killed. We must be oblivious to administrative [divisions in this

matter]. First we must have Hebei province change its profit planning; the same then goes for Shanxi [province]. In some places [in Shanxi] there is no need to take in merchandise through Taiyuan; and as far as the places outside of Shanhaiguan, merchandise can be taken in at Qinhuangdao, not necessarily through Liaoning.<sup>21</sup>

Liu XX: The problem is complicated. We must hold a special meeting [to discuss it].

Mao: Let's hold a national conference; [but] let's first issue a directive, and let it clearly express the goal that is to be achieved. This is to be put in Li Xiannian's charge.

(When discussing bacterial fertilizers)

Mao: You can set up large numbers of factories and produce [bacterial fertilizers] in large quantities. It should be equivalent to such-and-such a number of factories for chemical fertilizers. If we don't promote it, the dirt from the river beds and bottoms of ponds will be all dug up and exhausted. Besides, we can't pull down walls every year, can we? That would be a very major problem for agricultural production.

(When discussing switching to running enterprises for small batches and scattered products and scrap material)

Mao: Now that the big thing is taken care of, we must deal with the small. A person can only make several revolutions. When we don't ask you to make this revolution, [we'll ask you to] make the other revolution.<sup>22</sup>

(When discussing the redroot and the Siberian prickly fruit seed)

Mao: If there is more of a harvest, then let the peasants grow more. The Siberian prickly fruit seed yields oil at a rate close to that of the soy bean. Right now we don't have enough soy bean, and I hear that it would not be easy to expand the cultivation of soy bean. The land that is used to grow soy bean can be used also to cultivate grain! The purchasing of the prickly fruit seed should be done just as we do the purchasing-harvesting of soy bean. How much is it? How many cents per catty?

Zhang XX: Almost 5 cents.

Mao: You are not purchasing things at equal values. Two catties of prickly fruit seed is equal [in price] to one catty of soy bean. This is a problem of usage.<sup>23</sup> You must set up a scientific research organization to study these things. For such a big unit as yours there ought to be a scientific research institution, or a college.

Liu XX: [These things] can be planted in [broad] plots on the river banks and in undressed land, then they can also be harvested in big plots.

(When discussing the contracts of mergers)

Mao: In this way we could reduce the factor of doing things blindly. Anything can be merged. We just have to set [the rules]. This is a matter of the connection between [those units that are under] the system of ownership by the whole people

and [those that are under] the system of collective ownership.<sup>24</sup> If they are not integrated they wouldn't know what the amount of production is.

(When discussing the problem that owing to the expansion of the area of cultivation of the major crops, the production of the local products that have come thereby to occupy a smaller area has been reduced)

Mao: You should set up a research institute to study the watermelon. See how much oil content there is in the watermelon seed, and whether it is feasible to extract oil from it. Naturally, when we eat the watermelon seed we can also reduce the amount of oil we eat. You go and study the matter—is it more appropriate to export melon seeds, or to export oil? Then you can set up a contract with the department of agriculture and have it produce [what is best].

(When discussing the purchasing of scrap copper)

Mao: You are everywhere, aren't you?<sup>25</sup> But if you collect X tons a year, and there are X tons of copper among the people, then in X years it would be exhausted.<sup>26</sup> We mustn't have that; we can't have the copper collected to the point of exhaustion in several years.

(When discussing the question of the handicraft industry cooperatives collecting and purchasing fragmentary scrap copper)

Mao: It is all right for the handicraft industry producers' cooperatives to get involved in this trade.

Peng X: There is a contradiction here. Bai XX<sup>27</sup> also made sense in what he says. You'll just be involved in a lawsuit, all of you.

(In the briefing session, Mao evinced great interest about all kinds of wildlife, vegetable and animal, as well as in the smaller local products, bacterial fertilizers, and products made from scrap material, etc., and asked many questions at length. When discussing the need to practice economy stringently and to strengthen the work of financial supervision)

Mao: The measures that you wrote up were very vividly described.<sup>28</sup>

(When discussing the question of joining the International Federation of Cooperatives)

Mao: If we do that we would not be able to return the money put up by the cooperatives' members as shares. [But if we don't] it would be false, an empty frame. As soon as things change the news will leak out and people will say that you are only a sham. Will changing affect [our] international activities?

Liu XX: I don't think that there will be much of a problem.

(When discussing the liaison between the State Council and all levels of people's committees and the supply and marketing cooperatives at all levels)

Mao: They are still cooperatives, just that their operational contents have to be modified, just like a special professional department. We should say that there is

[here] a relationship between leader [and led]. Even if we do want to change things, we must not publish it in the newspapers, and we must not commit it to writing. The Standing Committee<sup>29</sup> must not make a resolution [on this], and the State Council also must not issue an order. Use an internal notification and memorandum [instead]. To the outside, the supply and marketing cooperatives [system] is independent, and throughout the world it is independent. In reality there still is a leadership-led relationship.

(Finally, when discussing the issue that [some of the] perspectives and proposals in the briefing may be wrong)

Mao: Don't say that. I don't see much that is wrong with it. It is all right to do things in that way.

## Notes

1. Zhang Qilong (b. 1900) is a Hunanese who joined the CPC in 1924 and was involved in guerrilla activities from 1927 to the time of the War of Resistance Against Japan. After Liberation he mainly did political work in the Northeast (Liaoning province). He became involved with cooperative work in 1950, and became a specialist in this area. He was elected as a member of the supervisory board of the All-China Federation of Cooperatives in July 1950 and a member of the permanent board after the reorganization of the federation in 1952. In 1954, the federation was again reorganized and renamed the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives (*Quanguo gongxiao hezuo zongshe*), and Zhang became the senior deputy director under Cheng Zihua. In this area of work, Zhang headed or took part in many delegations to the USSR and other socialist countries. For more biographical information on Zhang, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 549; D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 13–15, and W. Bartke (1981), pp. 511–512.

2. Deng Shenxi had been a deputy director of the Northern Chinese People's Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, and the manager of the Cooperative Bank of Northeastern China since 1950. He was elected a member of the supervisory board of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives in July 1954 and became one of the federation's deputy directors. For more information on Deng, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 947.

3. We have not been able to discover more information about Deng Fei except that he was named as a deputy director of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. See Gao Chongyan (1969), p. 342, citing *RMSC* (1955).

4. On the supply and marketing cooperatives, see text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 15, and text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 25. Here the reference is implicitly to the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives.

5. We cannot be certain as to who Ma XX might be. Tentatively we would speculate that it may refer to Ma Yinchu. On Ma Yinchu, see text Mar. 1, 1957, note 18. Also refer to *Ma Yinchu jingji luwen xuanji* (1981). On Liu and Li, see text May 19, 1953, vol. I, source note, and text Apr. 1956, note 3, respectively.

6. This must refer to the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. See notes 1 and 4.

7. The original text here has, in parentheses, an annotative remark that this is in reference to Li Xiannian. The term that Mao uses here, which we have translated as "take care of," actually has a sinister sense of "fixing you"; it is the term *zheng* in the sense explained in text May 15, 1957, note 27.

8. This had become a slogan. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 57.

9. An annotative remark in parentheses in the original text here explains that this refers to *zi you zijin* (capital funds that the cooperatives hold by themselves).

10. The All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives was affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce under the State Council, so the comparison being made here is between the whole and a part thereof.

11. The Chinese here reads *nongye shengchan she*, which we take to be an abbreviated form of the term *nongye shengchan hezuo she* (agricultural producers' cooperatives). See text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

12. Here again the term is *zheng*, used in the perjorative sense. See note 7.

13. We cannot identify which locality is being referred to here.

14. Mao's analogy here is a bit baffling. The municipality of Shashi is in the southern part of Hubei province, and Hankou is also in the province of Hubei, about 170 km northeast of Shashi. The two municipalities would therefore fall within the same administrative region. Hankou is a major river port city and would serve a considerable region. Changsha is in the province of Hunan and would not fall within the same administrative region as Shashi. Moreover, it is considerably farther from Shashi than is Hankou, so there would appear to be no natural reason why people in Shashi would use Changsha instead of Hankou. The statement here thus does not appear to be consistent with the following one concerning Jiangxi and Zhejiang.

15. See text Dec. 6, 1955, note 3, text Oct. 11, 1955(1), note 56, text Oct. 11, 1955(2), note 18, and text Dec. 21, 1955, all in volume I.

16. See note 8.

17. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 26.

18. See text Mar. 12, 1950, source note, notes 1 and 2, and text Oct. 11, 1955(1), note 2, all in volume I.

19. See text Mar. 20, 1957, note 20.

20. An annotative remark in parentheses in the text here explains that this refers to Li Xiannian.

21. Taiyuan is the capital city of Shanxi province. Shanhaiguan is a critical mountain pass on the coast that straddles the boundaries between Liaoning province and Hebei province. Thus the term "outside of Shanhaiguan" would refer to places in Liaoning province, north of the pass. Qinhuangdao is a major port in Hebei province and only about 10 km from Shanhaiguan.

22. An annotative remark in parentheses in the text here explains that this means: "If you are not engaged in promoting big batches [of merchandise], you should be engaged in promoting the small batches."

23. An annotative remark in parentheses in the text here explains that this refers to the low price.

24. See text Mar. 5, 1956, note 12.

25. An annotative remark in parentheses in the text here explains that this refers to the idea that the supply and marketing cooperatives collect and purchase many things.

26. The Chinese text here reads, for the respective numbers, "X wan dun" in the first case, "XX wan dun" in the second case, "X nian" in the third case (referring to the number of years). In each case it is rendered as an indeterminate (and indeterminable) number, except that in the first case one character was replaced, while in the second case, two characters were replaced. It is our editorial policy to render all such cases as simply X.

27. We are unable to determine who Bai XX might be, and there is no corroborating evidence.

28. An annotative remark in parentheses in the text here explains that this sentence is directed toward Li Xiannian.

29. Mao is referring to the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC.

## Comment on Stalin

(April [6], 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 6, 1963), 1 (quotation). Other Chinese Texts: *HQ*, 17 (Sept. 6, 1963), 8; *Sugong lingdao*, p. 9. Available English Translations: *PR*, 6:37 (Sept. 13, 1963), 8; *Polemics of the International Communist Movement*, p. 64.

*This source is the first of nine open letters criticizing the Central Committee of the CPSU on the de-Stalinization issue, published from September 1963 through July 1964. This comment by Mao does not appear in the source as a direct quotation. According to a news report in RMRB (Apr. 7, 1956), 1, Mao met with Mikoyan, then member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in the company of the Soviet Ambassador P. F. Yudin, on April 6, 1956, when the Soviet delegation headed by Mikoyan arrived in Beijing. It is not altogether clear whether this comment was made in a conversation held on that day or on subsequent days.*

*This is the first of several comments made by Mao specifically about Stalin in 1956. These comments (see also texts Apr. 1956; Aug. 30, 1956; Oct. 23, 1956(2), and Nov. 30, 1956) relate closely to the two RMRB editorials in 1956 that dealt with the issue of the PRC's assessment of the new developments in the international Communist movement, and particularly with the Soviet Union's leadership in that movement. These editorials are: "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (Apr. 5, 1956), and "Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (Dec. 29, 1956). Neither was drafted by Mao personally, but each bore the imprimatur of his thought.*

*It should be noted that this comment was made some two months after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. (See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.)*

[Stalin's] merits outweigh his faults; [we must] make a concrete analysis [of Stalin's case], an overall assessment [taking all aspects into account].

## Reply to Ambassador of the Kingdom of Denmark

(April 10, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Apr. 11, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 9 (May 6, 1956), 34–35. Available English Translations: *NCNA, Daily Bulletin* (Apr. 11, 1956), 28–29; *FBIS, Daily Report* (Apr. 11, 1956), AAA9.

*At this time Aage Gregerson, who had been minister of the Kingdom of Denmark to the PRC, was installed as ambassador. (See text Dec. 12, 1953.)*

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence signed by the King of Denmark which you have presented, and I am grateful to Your Excellency for your good wishes.

Since the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Denmark established diplomatic ties with each other in May of 1950, the relations between our two countries have developed along a path of friendship. In February of this year, in order to further develop and consolidate relations, our two countries agreed to elevate the level of our legations to each other to that of embassies. In the last few years, a Chinese people's acrobatic troupe and a Chinese classical opera company have produced performances in Denmark, and a Chinese youth delegation has visited Denmark. Furthermore, a Chinese industrial and agricultural exhibition and a Chinese art exhibition were separately held in Copenhagen. Danish trade union and cultural delegations have visited China. In 1955 a trade delegation of the Danish industrial and commercial circles visited China and conducted trade negotiations, and as a consequence trade was expanded between the two countries. These friendly exchanges have promoted the economic and cultural interflow between the two countries and have enhanced the understanding and friendship between the two peoples. The strengthening of friendly relations between our two countries is helpful to promoting international peace.

I am confident that with Your Excellency's effort the long-standing relations of friendship between our two countries are bound to develop further, and the economic and cultural exchanges between our two countries are bound to increase further.

Mr. Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Denmark to the People's Republic of China. In your work of developing the relations of friendship and cooperation between China and Denmark and increasing the economic and cultural ties between the two countries, you will receive the full assistance of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish prosperity for your country and people, and good health for your head of state.

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### Telegram to Tibet (April 20, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Apr. 22, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 10 (May 21, 1956), 1. Available English Translation: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Apr. 22, 1956), 1.

The Dalai Lama, Panchen Gnoertehni,<sup>1</sup> and members of the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region of Tibet:

I am happy to greet the establishment of the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region of Tibet,<sup>2</sup> and express warm wishes that, under your leadership, people of all strata in Tibet will be further united and move forward to score still greater achievements in the political, economic, and cultural enterprises of Tibet.

(Signed and dated)

### Notes

1. See text May 24, 1951, note 2, and text Nov. 23, 1949 (both in volume I) source note respectively for references to the Dalai Lama and Panchen Gnoertehni.

2. In January 1956 the State Council moved to formalize the autonomous region system. The nationalities democratic coalition governments, which had previously been set up to ensure minorities' participation in local government and to protect their rights, were to be abolished with the proviso that these regions either be transformed into autonomous regions or into regular administrative units of the Central People's Government. Committees were set up in various localities to prepare for the transition.

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### On the Ten Major Relationships (April 25, 1956)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 40–59. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (1967c), pp. 19–28; *Buyi*, pp. 75–91; *Xuanji*, V, pp. 267–288; *Wansui* (n.d.), pp. 19–29; *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 97–106; *Ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 162–171; *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, pp. 720–744; *RMRB* (Dec. 26, 1976), 1–4; *HQ* (Jan. 7, 1977), 3–24. Available English Translations: *CB*, 892 (Oct. 21, 1969); S. Schram (1974), pp. 61–83; J. Chen (1969), pp. 65–85; *SW*, V, pp. 284–311; *PR*, 20:1 (Jan. 1, 1977), 10–25.

*The Ziliao xuanbian source gives the date as April 1956 only. This speech has appeared in two widely different versions, an unofficial version published by Red Guard sources during the Cultural Revolution (Wansui [1967c] and Wansui [1969]) and an official version published after Mao's death (Xuanji, V). The two Wansui editions also vary somewhat from one another, although the discrepancies here are by no means as significant as those between the Wansui versions and the Xuanji version. Because Mao tended to edit and revise some of his works before publication (see his comments in Wansui (1969), p. 473, translated in JPRS, Miscellany, II, p. 341), and because the speech was not published at the time it was delivered, it is impossible to determine which, if either, of these two documents is the original talk that Mao actually delivered. Although the revisions in the Xuanji version seem to strengthen the political line of the editors of that volume, it is also possible that some of these changes were revisions to the text that had been earlier altered by Red Guard editors. The*

scope of the differences in these two texts is substantial: approximately 1,500 of the 11,500 characters in the Wansui (1969) version do not appear in the Xuanji version, while the Xuanji version includes some 4,000 new characters. (For further discussion of this discrepancy see S. Schram [Mar–Apr. 1977], 126–135.) Among the various alternate sources, those that were published before the appearance of Xuanji, V, i.e., Buyi, CB, J. Chen (1969), and S. Schram (1974) follow the Wansui version, whereas the RMRB, HQ, and PR sources, which appeared after Xuanji, V, follow the Xuanji version. An article in Feiqing yuebao, 19:8 (Feb. 1977) pp. 87–105, compares the two versions in some detail. In the best of possible circumstances, we would have liked to translate and publish in this collection both versions arranged in such a way that would be most convenient for their comparison. Given the constraints of our publication, however, we had to resort to the translation and publishing of only one of these divergent versions. Hence we have chosen to present our independent translation of the Wansui version, not because we believe it to be more accurate and authentic than the Xuanji version, but simply because the Xuanji version is more easily available (and also in translation through SW, V.) On the other hand, there has been a relatively restricted circulation of the Wansui collections which also makes a comparison between the Wansui text and extant translations of it, such as Schram's and Chen's, much more difficult to achieve. Unfortunately, because the Wansui and Xuanji versions are divergent not only in length and content but are also very different structurally, we are unable to draw comparisons between these two versions in our notes. We can only encourage readers to refer to the aforementioned article in Feiqing yuebao for a detailed, paragraph-by-paragraph comparison.

The high tide of agricultural cooperativization that followed Mao's July 31, 1955, speech had begun a basic transformation of the relations of production in the countryside. In early 1956 the movement to transfer the ownership of most of China's industrial and commercial enterprises to public ownership had been achieved well ahead of the schedule set in the First Five-Year Plan. By the time of this speech of April 1956 it was necessary to lay out the basis on which these two sectors would be concurrently developed so as to lay the basis for communism in China. This was the task that Mao addressed in "On the Ten Major Relationships." Mao delivered this speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on April 25, 1956. The thrust of the talk, its analysis of the major contradictions of Chinese society that were blocking the mobilization of all possible factors for the development of socialism, its focus on the need to place more emphasis on the development of light industry and agriculture at the expense of heavy industry and to decentralize certain decision-making authorities,<sup>1</sup> etc., constituted an unprecedented critique of the Soviet model of development, a factor which helps to account for the long delay in publishing this document, since Mao was, at this time and for a while, willing to be much more critical of the Soviets in private than in public. Although the scope of the changes called for by Mao in this talk—e.g., changing the proportion of investment in heavy and light industry from 8:1 to 7:1—was not as great as might be imagined, the consequences of Mao's approach, of the framework laid out here for the existing structures that were being relied on to help China achieve communism, were significant enough to provoke considerable struggle within the leadership.<sup>2</sup> However, despite the intensity of these struggles, at the time they were not necessarily seen as part of a struggle between two different understandings of socialism, between two basically different policies, or between "two lines." But in light of the fact that, as Mao himself later recalled,<sup>3</sup> 1956 was the year of the basic break between the PRC and the Soviet Union, these struggles can be seen in retrospect as important steps in the process of struggle over different specific policies leading to the clear divergence between the two lines that was unfolding in China's struggle to develop communism.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, in reading this document it is also important to recognize within it the harbingers of Mao's future positions and the future struggles in China. For example, his call for "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" between the Communist Party and the various democratic parties (point 6) predates his more famous and more controversial call for this policy in his February 27, 1957, talk "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." (See text Feb. 27, 1957.) Similarly, Mao's calls here for the use of state funds to set up modern industries throughout the country, for the reorientation of industry to serve agriculture and small-scale industry, and for the mobilization of local resources to improve local production form some of the theoretical underpinnings of the Great Leap Forward, which was to come some two and a half years later. In addition, his recognition of the primacy of the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, of the importance of the continuous transformation of the relations of production and of the importance of controlled social conflict to determine correct policies are among the theoretical underpinnings of his later policies and of the Cultural Revolution.<sup>5</sup>

In the last two months the Political Bureau has heard respectively the work reports made by thirty-four departments having to do with economy and finance at the Center. Some opinions have been exchanged, and the Political Bureau has conducted several discussions [on these matters]. All of these can be synthesized into ten questions, ten contradictions.

These ten questions are raised for the sole purpose of bringing into play all positive factors and mobilizing all forces that can be utilized to achieve greater, faster, better, and more economical results in building socialism.<sup>6</sup>

It has been our long-standing policy to bring into play all positive factors and mobilize all forces that can be utilized. We implemented this policy in the past in order to achieve victory in the people's democratic revolution and to put an end to the rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic-capitalism. Now [we are implementing this policy] in order to carry out a new revolution, that is, a socialist revolution, and to build a socialist country. Regardless of whether it is in the course of revolution or in the course of construction, we must always implement this policy. Everyone is clear about this, but there are still certain problems worth discussing, among them some new things. There are also shortcomings and inadequacies in our work. By discussing and deliberating over these matters and handling these contradictions correctly, we can avoid taking some detours.

First let me read to you the ten questions:

First, the relationship between industry and agriculture and between heavy industry and light industry;

Second, the relationship between coastal industry and inland industry;

Third, the relationship between economic construction and defense construction;

Fourth, the relationships among the state, the production unit, and the individual producer;

Fifth, the relationship between the Center and the localities;

Sixth, the relationship between Party and non-Party;

Seventh, the relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities;

Eighth, the relationship between revolution and counterrevolution;



Ninth, the relationship between right and wrong;

Tenth, the relationship between China and foreign countries.

These relationships are all contradictions. Contradictions exist everywhere in the world. Without contradictions there would be no world. Now let me talk about the ten contradictions mentioned above.<sup>7</sup>

### 1. The Relationship Between Industry and Agriculture and Between Heavy Industry and Light Industry

Heavy industry is the most important thing, and [we] must give priority to its development; no one disagrees with this. As far as the handling of the relationships between heavy industry and light industry and between industry and agriculture is concerned, we have not committed any mistakes of principle. We have not committed the types of mistakes made by some other socialist countries, which have one-sidedly emphasized heavy industry while neglecting light industry and agriculture, and which, as a result, have a shortage of goods in the markets, a shortage of daily necessities, and currencies that are unstable. We [on the other hand] have put more stress on light industry and agriculture. Comparatively speaking, there are enough goods in our markets, unlike the situation in the markets of some countries after revolution. As far as our daily necessities are concerned, we cannot say that they are completely adequate; nevertheless, we do have rather an abundance of sundry goods for people's daily use. Furthermore, our prices are stable, and the *renminbi*<sup>8</sup> is stable. This is not to say that there are no longer any problems; there still are problems, namely, that we need to pay even more attention to light industry and agriculture than we have in the past; that is, we should properly readjust the ratios between investment in heavy industry and in light industry, and between investment in industry and in agriculture, so that we can appropriately increase the proportion of the investment in light industry and agriculture in the total investment in industry and agriculture.

Does doing this mean that heavy industry is no longer primary? [No,] it is still primary. Is it that we are no longer putting emphasis on heavy industry? [No,] even with these [premises] we are now proposing, the emphasis in investment remains on heavy industry.

From now on it will be necessary to invest more in the areas of light industry and agriculture so as to increase their [relative] weight somewhat. With more weight given to [light industry and agriculture], will the emphasis be shifted? [No,] it will not be shifted. Heavy industry will remain the most important thing, but more weight will be given to the areas of light industry and agriculture.

What will result from this added emphasis? The result will be even more growth and better growth in heavy industry, that is, greater and better development in the production of the means of production.

The development of heavy industry requires the accumulation of funds.<sup>9</sup> Where does this accumulation come from? Accumulation [of funds] can come from heavy industry or from light industry and agriculture. However, light industry and agriculture can [produce] a bit more accumulation more quickly.

Here a question arises: Do you really want to develop heavy industry or not? Do you seriously want it or not? If you don't want it, then you can attack [the development of] light industry and agriculture. If you aren't really enthusiastic about it, you can reduce investment in light industry and agriculture. However, if you really want it, then you must develop light industry and pay attention to developing agriculture so that there will be more daily necessities [available] and the accumulation [of funds] can increase. Then, after a few years, there will be more funds to invest in the area of heavy industry. Therefore, this is a question of whether you genuinely want it or are only pretending to want it.

Of course, the question of whether one genuinely wants the development of heavy industry or only pretends to want it does not apply to us. Who [among us] does not truly want it? [The point] is whether or not you want it very much. If you truly want [the development of] heavy industry and want it very much, you should invest more in light industry; otherwise you do not truly want it 100 per cent, only 90 per cent. This is not wanting it very badly; this means that you are not putting full emphasis on heavy industry. If you put full emphasis [on heavy industry], you must pay attention to developing light industry. This is because, first, it can meet the people's daily needs, and second, it can provide more accumulation at a speedier rate.

On the question of agriculture, the experience of certain socialist countries proves that even if agriculture is collectivized, if things are not done well, production will not increase; similarly, even if agriculture is mechanized, production may not increase if things are not done well. The basic reason that some countries fail to increase their agricultural production is that there are problems with their policies toward the peasants. In terms of taxation, they have made the peasants' burden very heavy; in terms of prices,<sup>10</sup> agricultural products are very cheap while industrial products are very expensive. At the same time that we are developing industry, especially heavy industry, we must place agriculture in a definite position [on our list of priorities] and implement correct policies regarding agricultural taxation and the pricing of industrial products.

The importance of agriculture for the national economy as a whole can be seen very clearly from our experience. Facts in the few years since Liberation have demonstrated that times were good in those years in which there was a bumper harvest. This is a matter of regularity.

This is our conclusion: One method is to develop heavy industry by developing less light industry and agriculture; another method is to develop heavy industry by developing more light industry and agriculture. The former method places lopsided stress on the development of heavy industry without taking into consideration the livelihood of the people. As a consequence, the people will be dissatisfied, and [the development of] heavy industry cannot really be done well. From the long-range point of view, this way of doing things can only cause heavy industry to develop at a slower pace and in an inferior way. When the overall account is made a few decades from now, [it will be seen that such a method] did not pay off. The latter method, which places the development of heavy industry on the basis of satisfying the people's daily needs and puts the development of heavy industry on a firmer

foundation, will result in greater and better development of heavy industry.

## 2. The Relationship Between Coastal Industry and Inland Industry

The development of inland industry is correct and primary; however, due consideration must be given to coastal [industry].

We have not committed any gross, fundamental mistakes on this issue, but there have been some shortcomings.

In the last few years, we haven't paid all that much attention to coastal industry. This tendency, I am afraid, should be changed.

How much of the existing industry, both heavy industry and light industry, is located in the coastal areas?

The so-called coastal areas are Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, eastern Henan, Shandong, Anhui, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Seventy per cent of all our country's industry is located in these coastal areas, and 70 per cent of heavy industry is also located in these coastal areas. Only 30 per cent is in the interior.<sup>11</sup>

If we do not pay great attention to this concrete fact and underestimate coastal industry, [or] if we still fail to make full use of the productive capacity of coastal industry, that would be very incorrect.

We should use to the fullest extent the time we may possibly have to enable coastal industry to develop. I am not saying that all new factories should be built in the coastal areas. More than 90 per cent of the new factories ought to be built in the interior, but some can still be built in the coastal areas. The Anshan Iron and Steel Works and [the industry at] Fushun, for example, are in the coastal areas. Dalian, as another example, has a shipbuilding industry, and Tangshan has an iron and steel industry and a building materials industry. There is a chemical industry in Tanggu, and iron and steel and machine building industries in Tianjin.<sup>12</sup> Shanghai has machine building and shipbuilding industries, while Nanjing has its chemical industry. In addition, there are also many other industries [in the coastal areas]. Now we plan to manufacture synthetic oil in Maoming, Guangdong (there is oil shale there).<sup>13</sup> This is also [a branch of] heavy industry.

From now on, the majority of heavy industries, 90 per cent or more, should be located in the interior so that a balance can gradually be achieved in the distribution of industries in the whole country, so that we can have a rational deployment of the industries throughout the country; of this there is no doubt. Nonetheless, a portion of the heavy industry should still be built or expanded upon in the coastal areas.

The foundation of our industries in the past has been primarily in the coastal areas; if we do not pay a lot of attention to coastal industry, we will lose out. By making full use of the plant capacity and technical forces of coastal industries and by effectively developing coastal industry, we can develop inland industry and support inland industry with even greater strength. It is incorrect to adopt a negative attitude toward coastal industry, for such a negative attitude not only hinders the

full utilization of coastal industry but also impedes the rapid development of inland industry.

We all want to develop inland industry. The question is whether you truly want it or are pretending to want it. If you truly want [to develop it] and are not pretending, then you must make more use of coastal industry and foster more coastal industry, especially light industry.

As present data indicate, some light industry factories can be built very quickly and, after being put into the production process and run at full productive capacity, can return the entire amount [originally] invested in one year. In this way, within five years, a factory could build three or four more factories aside from itself [from its own earnings]. Some [such factories] could build two or three additional factories in five years' time, and some [only] one; [but all of them could,] at the least, build half [an additional factory]. This also serves to explain the importance of utilizing coastal industry.

Our long-term plan [indicates that we are] short by 400,000 technical cadres; [however, these] can be trained from among the workers and technical personnel in the coastal [industries]. A technical cadre need not come from the ranks of professional training. Gorky had only two years of primary school education.<sup>14</sup> Lu Xun did not finish his university education, and so in the old society he could only be a lecturer, not a professor.<sup>15</sup> And Comrade Xiao Chunu didn't even attend school.<sup>16</sup> We should have faith in technical workers; they learn through practice and can become very good technical cadres.

Coastal industry has a high technical [level]; its products are of good quality and low cost, and it produces many new products. [Consequently] its development will play a driving role in elevating the technical level and the quality of industrial products throughout the country. We must pay full attention to this matter.

In sum, if we do not develop light industry, we cannot develop heavy industry, and if we do not make use of coastal industry, we cannot construct inland industry. [Thus] we cannot merely maintain coastal industry [at its current level] but must develop it appropriately.

## 3. The Relationship Between Economic Construction and Defense Construction

National defense is indispensable. Would it be all right for us to eliminate all our troops? No, it wouldn't be because we still have enemies who are harassing us, and we are still surrounded by them! We already have a fairly considerable national defense force. Since the War to Resist United States [Aggression] and Aid Korea<sup>17</sup> our military has become even stronger, and our own national defense industry is in the process of being built up. Ever since Pan Gu separated heaven and earth,<sup>18</sup> we haven't known anything about making cars; nor had we known anything about making airplanes. Now we have begun to be able to make cars, and we are also beginning to be able to make airplanes. Our automobile industry has started with manufacturing trucks, not sedans; this is why every day we have to come to meetings in foreign cars. We would like to be patriotic; however, it can't happen so quickly. How good it would be if one of these days we could ride to meetings in cars of our own make!

We still do not have the atom bomb. But in the past we did not have planes or artillery either; [rather] it was by using millet plus rifles<sup>19</sup> that we defeated the Japanese aggressors and Chiang Kai-shek. We are already fairly strong, and we will be even stronger in the future. One reliable way [to become stronger] is to place military and administrative expenditures in an appropriate proportion [by] reducing, in several steps, the weight of these expenditures to around 20 per cent of [total expenditure in] the state budget and by increasing expenditure in [the area of] economic construction so as to achieve greater and faster growth in economic construction. On this basis, national defense construction, too, can make even greater progress. In this way, in not too long a time, we not only could have plenty of planes and artillery, but we could also have our own atom bombs as well.

Do you really want atom bombs? [If you do,] you must reduce the relative weight of military and administrative expenditure and do more economic construction. Or are you, [on the other hand, merely] pretending to want atom bombs? [If so,] then you will not reduce the relative weight of military and administrative expenditure and will do less economic construction. Which way is better in the end? Everybody please study [this matter]. This is a question of strategic policy.

We already raised the issue of streamlining state organs and trimming down military and administrative expenditure at the Third Plenum of the Party's Seventh Central Committee in 1950, [a move,] moreover, that was thought to be one of the three conditions for achieving a fundamental turn for the better in our country's financial and economic situation.<sup>20</sup> However, during the period of the First Five-Year Plan,<sup>21</sup> military and administrative expenditures accounted for 32 per cent of the total expenditure in the state budget, that is to say, one-third of the disbursement was directed to the nonproduction sector. This proportion was much too high. In the Second Five-Year Plan,<sup>22</sup> we should find ways to reduce this proportion so that more funds can be released for economic construction and cultural construction.

#### 4. The Relationships Among the State, the Production Unit, and the Individual Producer

Recently we talked with comrades from various provinces; they spoke about this topic a good deal. As far as the workers are concerned, the productivity of their labor has gone up, and the value produced each work-day has increased. [Thus] wages must also be adjusted properly; to neglect this would be incorrect. The workers' livelihood has improved greatly since Liberation; everyone knows this. Some families that did not have any [member who was] employed in the past now have somebody [in their family] who is employed. Some families that had only one family member holding a job now have two or three persons employed. I [personally] have come across such a family: previously none of the family members held a job; later both the husband and wife and also a daughter were employed. They of course lead a fairly comfortable life when they pool [their income] together. Generally speaking, wages in our country cannot be regarded as high, but many people are employed, and because prices are low and stable, life is stable. The standard of living of the workers simply cannot be compared with [the situation]

before Liberation. [Consequently,] the masses of workers have always maintained a high [level of] enthusiasm.

What has been said above is that we must pay attention to bringing the workers' initiative and enthusiasm into play. The problem of initiative and enthusiasm also concerns the factory, or the production unit, as a whole. There is independence in everything; everything has [an aspect of] unity and [an aspect of] difference. [A thing] cannot have only the aspect of unity and not [the aspects of] independence and difference. For instance, that we are now having a meeting is [an example of] unity. After the meeting has been adjourned, there will be [a display of] independence. Some [of us] will go for a walk, some will read books, some will go eat; that is, everybody will have his or her independence. How can we continue to hold the meeting and let it drag on and on without end? Wouldn't it be the death of us all? For this reason, every production unit must have its own initiative and so must every individual; each must enjoy a certain [amount of] independence; an independence that is related to unity.

Would it be good for the industrialization of the country as a whole if the individual producers were given necessary benefits and the production units were given a certain [amount of] independence? It ought to make things somewhat better. If it makes things even worse, then, of course, we should not do it. It would not be beneficial [for industrialization] if everything were put under centralized [control] and all depreciation funds were taken away from the factories so that the production units were left without any initiative [of their own].<sup>23</sup> We do not have much experience with this issue; nor do the comrades at this meeting, I'm afraid. Right now the problem is under study. We have so many factories [now], and there will be many more in the future. It would definitely be of great benefit to the industrialization of our country if we could bring their initiative into full play.

As for the peasants, our relations with them have always been good, but we have also made an error on the grain issue. Because of floods, the country as a whole suffered a decrease in [grain] production in 1954, [and yet] we purchased seven billion catties of grain more [than we should have].<sup>24</sup> With this decrease [in production] and increase [in purchasing], the peasants became critical. We mustn't think that we haven't any faults whatsoever. Lack of experience and failure to get to the bottom of the situation resulted in the purchase of seven billion catties [in excess of what should have been]; this was a fault. Because we discovered this fault, in 1955 we purchased seven billion catties less and instituted [the system] of "three fixed,"<sup>25</sup> and on top of that, there was a good harvest. With an increase [in production] and a reduction [in purchasing], the peasants had some ten to twenty billion more catties of grain in their hands. Thus [even] those peasants who had a [negative] opinion of us earlier no longer have [a bad] opinion of us, and they all say: "The Communist Party is really good!" The whole Party must bear this lesson in mind.

Just like a factory, a peasants' collective economic organization is also a unit of production. In a collective economic organization, the relations between the collective and the individual must be handled properly and managed appropriately. If they are not handled well and the peasants' well-being is neglected, the collective

economy cannot be run well. Some socialist countries may have made mistakes on this issue; there, some of the collective economic organizations are probably poorly run, while some are not run well at all. Where they are poorly run, agricultural production cannot make much progress. A collective needs accumulation, but we should take heed not to exact too much from the peasants or to make things too difficult for them. Except in the case of insurmountable natural disaster, we must see to it that every year, on the basis of increasing agricultural production, the peasants get more income than the preceding year.

We have discussed the problem of the distribution of the summer and autumn harvests with comrades from the various provinces. By the problem of distribution, we simply mean the question of, first, how much does the state take, second, how much does the collective take, and third, how much does the peasant get, and what methods [does each use] to take [its share]. The state's [share takes the form of] tax. The collective economic organizations' [share takes the form of] accumulation [funds] and expenditures for management and operation. The individuals' [share is in the form of] food grain and money divided among them.

Assets owned by the collective economy are all [geared to] serve the peasants. Management expenses are necessary, not to mention expenditures on production; the public reserve fund is for expanded reproduction, and the public welfare fund is for the peasants' well-being. We should, together with the peasants, work out equitable proportional [relationships]: among the production expenditures, management expenditures, and public reserve funds, and the public welfare funds.<sup>26</sup>

The state needs to have accumulation, so does the collective, but in either case it cannot be excessive. Our state accumulation is collected primarily through taxation and not through pricing. As for the exchange of industrial and agricultural products, here we adopt the policy of narrowing the "scissors" differential,<sup>27</sup> the policy of exchange of equal or roughly equal values.<sup>28</sup> With regard to industrial products, we follow the policies of large sales at a small profit and of stabilizing prices.

In sum, whether between the state and the factory, between the state and the worker, between the factory and the worker, between the state and the collective economic organization, between the state and the peasant, or between the collective economic organization and the peasant, we must take both sides [of the relationship] into account, not just one side. This [relationship] embodies new things. It is a major issue, an issue that affects six hundred million people and that must arouse the attention of the entire Party.

##### 5. The Relationship Between the Center and the Localities

The relationship between the Center and the localities is another contradiction. To resolve this contradiction, what we should now focus our attention on is the need to bring the initiative of the localities more into play so that, under the unified planning of the Center, the localities can do more things.

From the way things look now, [we] probably would need to expand the powers of the localities somewhat. It would be harmful to [the cause of] building socialism

if the powers of the localities were too limited. It is stipulated in our Constitution that localities do not have legislative powers, [all of] which are concentrated in the National People's Congress.<sup>29</sup> However, provided that the policies of the Center are not violated, [that the localities operate] within the framework of [our] laws, and that [specific] conditions and work so require, the localities may also make certain rules and regulations. The Constitution does not place any restrictions on this.

Heavy industry as well as light industry has to be developed, and for this markets and raw material are needed. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to bring the initiative of the localities into play. To consolidate the leadership of the Center, we must pay attention to the interests of the localities.

At present scores of hands are dipping into the localities, making things difficult for them to handle. The various ministries [at the Center] issue orders to the departments and bureaus at the provincial and municipal levels every day. Though neither the Center nor the State Council has any knowledge of these orders, they are all said to come from the Center, [consequently] putting great pressure on the localities. There is such a flood of statistical forms and reports that [the situation] has become disastrous. All this should be rectified, and through discussion we must work out ways to reorganize.<sup>30</sup>

Ministries at the Center can be divided into two categories. The leadership [function] of those in one of these categories extends right down to the enterprises, and the local authorities [merely] supervise the administrative organs and enterprises set up by these ministries in the localities. For those in the second category, their task is that of setting forth guiding principles and mapping out work plans, while the local authorities get things done and make decisions.

We should promote the work-style in which local authorities are consulted in doing things. When it does anything, the Party Center always consults the local authorities. It never blindly issues orders without conferring with local authorities. We hope the various ministries at the Center will pay full attention to this and will consult with the localities on all matters concerning them and issue orders only after consultation has been made.

We must have both unity and particularity. To bring the initiative of the localities into full play, each locality must have the particularities of its local conditions. These are not particularities of the Gao Gang<sup>31</sup> type, the particularities of an independent kingdom,<sup>32</sup> but particularities that are necessary for the interest of the whole and for the strengthening of national unity.

The provinces and municipalities have quite a few [negative] opinions about the departments and ministries at the Center, and they should be allowed to air them. It is possible that the [special] districts, *xian*, districts, and *xiang* may also have quite a few [negative] opinions about the provinces and municipalities. The provinces and municipalities should pay attention and listen to them so as to bring their initiative into play. Proper initiative and proper independence ought to exist, and every province, municipality, [special] district, *xian*, district, and *xiang* should have them. The Center cannot, and should not, place excessively rigid restrictions on the provinces and municipalities; [similarly,] the provinces and municipalities

cannot and should not do this to the special districts, *xian*, districts, or *xiang*.

Of course, comrades at the lower levels should also be told that they must not act just as they please but that they must be cautious. Unity [with the Center] must exist where it is possible and where it ought to exist, but it must not be imposed where it is impossible or unnecessary.

Two initiatives are much better than one initiative, [provided the local initiative is] not motivated by localism or by the interests of individual units, but by the interests of the nation as a whole; their struggle for "status" must be [to promote] the national interest; [in that case] it is something that should be clamored for.

The independence permitted by the Center is appropriate independence and cannot be called an [undue] clamoring for independence. In sum, the localities should have a proper [amount of] power. This will in fact be more beneficial to our construction of a strong socialist state. If the power of the local authorities is too restricted, it probably will not be as beneficial.

Our experience on the question of handling the relationships between the Center and the localities is still insufficient and immature. We hope you will thoroughly study and discuss [this problem].

#### 6. The Relationship Between Party and Non-Party

Here we refer to the relationship between the Communist Party of China on the one hand and the democratic parties and democratic personages without party affiliation on the other.<sup>33</sup> This point is nothing new. However, since we have reached this point, we ought to talk a bit about this relationship.

In the end, which is better, to have just one party or several parties? The way we see it now, perhaps it is better to have several parties. Not only has this been true in the past, but it may still be true in the future, until such a time when all parties naturally wither away. It would be advantageous if the Communist Party and the various democratic parties [practiced] long-term coexistence and mutual supervision.

Parties are products of history. There is nothing in this world that is not a product of history. This is the first point. The second point is that whatever is historically produced will wither away [as] history [moves forward]. The Communist Party is a product of history, and therefore it will eventually wither away one day. The same fate awaits the democratic parties.

Both the proletarian party and the dictatorship of the proletariat will wither away in the future. But it wouldn't do if we did not have them now; without them, we wouldn't be able to suppress the counterrevolutionaries, resist imperialism, or build socialism. To fulfill the above tasks, the dictatorship of the proletariat has to be highly coercive. However, we must oppose bureaucratism, and there must be no huge organization.

I propose that the Party and government organizations be greatly streamlined and [their personnel] cut by two-thirds.

However, streamlining the Party and governmental organs does not mean that we do not want the democratic parties.

Right now, there is a jungle of democratic parties in our country. Among them there are some people who still have a lot of [negative] opinions about us. We adopt a policy of both uniting and struggling with these people in order to mobilize them into the service of socialism.

There is no opposition party in China. All the democratic parties accept the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, but as a matter of fact, some people in these democratic parties are precisely an opposition. Over such issues as carrying the revolution through to the end,<sup>34</sup> leaning to one side in foreign policy,<sup>35</sup> [the movement to] Resist U.S. [Aggression] and Aid Korea, and land reform, etc., they were in opposition and yet not in opposition. They also still have a negative [opinion] about the suppression of counterrevolutionaries. They asserted that the Common Program [of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference] was superb, and so they didn't want to go ahead with drafting a Constitution. But when the Draft Constitution came out, all their hands went up in approval. Things often tend to turn into their own opposites; so it is with the attitude of some people among the democratic parties on many issues. They are the opposition and yet not the opposition; because they are patriotic, they often proceed from being in opposition to not being in opposition.

The relationship between the Communist Party and the democratic parties should be improved. We should allow the personages of the democratic parties to express their opinions. As long as what they say make sense, no matter who says it, we will accept it. This will greatly benefit the Party, the state, the people, and socialism as well.

For these reasons, I hope our comrades will take hold of united front work. Secretaries of the provincial [Party] committees should set aside a specific time to look into the matter and make some arrangements so that this work can be pushed forward.

#### 7. The Relationship Between the Han Nationality and Minority Nationalities<sup>36</sup>

Our policy regarding this issue is sound and has won the approval of the minority nationalities. We emphasize opposing Han chauvinism. There is, of course, local nationalism, but it is not where our emphasis lies. Our emphasis lies in opposing Han chauvinism. The Han people make up the overwhelming majority of the population. It would be very bad if they practiced Han chauvinism and ostracized the minority nationalities. Therefore it is necessary to conduct extensive education among the Han people on [the issue of] a proletarian nationalities policy. A review should be made of the relationship between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities. One such review was made two years ago.<sup>37</sup> There should be another now. If there are [situations in which] the relationship is found to be abnormal, they should be rectified. [We] cannot just talk about it. Now many people are talking about doing away with Han chauvinism; they talk well, but they do nothing about it in practice.

What systems of economic management and finance would be best suited to the minority nationality areas must also be carefully studied.

The minority nationality areas are vast and have plentiful resources, while the Han nationality has a large population. The minority nationality areas have considerable valuable underground resources necessary for the building of socialism. The Han nationality must actively help the minority nationalities to carry out the economic and cultural construction of socialism. By improving the relations among nationalities, [we] are to mobilize all factors, both human and material, that are beneficial to socialist construction.

#### 8. The Relationship Between Revolution and Counterrevolution

What kind of a factor is the counterrevolution? It is a negative factor and a destructive factor. It is not a positive factor but it is an opposing force to positive factors. In that case, can negative factors be changed into positive factors? Can destructive factors be changed into positive factors? [In other words,] is it possible for counterrevolutionaries to change? This is contingent on social conditions. There are bound to be diehards, those who are dead set on counterrevolution. But given the conditions in our society, counterrevolutionaries for the most part will eventually change some day.

Naturally, some of them may not have the time to change before they are summoned by King Yan.<sup>38</sup> And, for some of them, who knows when they will change? [However,] thanks to the great strength of the people and to the correct policy we have adopted toward counterrevolutionaries, which allows them to transform themselves into new people through labor, quite a few of them have switched to no longer opposing the revolution. They take part in agricultural labor and industrial labor, and some of them are quite enthusiastic and have done beneficial work.

There are certain points regarding the work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries that should be affirmed. For example, should the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in 1951 and 1952 have been [carried out] or not?<sup>39</sup> There seems to be a view that we could have done without this campaign. This view is mistaken. [We] must recognize that the campaign of suppressing counterrevolutionaries was necessary.

The methods of dealing with the counterrevolutionaries are: execution, imprisonment, surveillance, or leaving them at large. Everybody knows what execution means. By imprisonment we mean putting [counterrevolutionaries] in prison and reforming them through labor. Surveillance means that [counterrevolutionaries] are to be left in society to be reformed under the supervision of the masses. By leaving them at large, we mean not arresting those [counterrevolutionaries] when it doesn't matter if they are arrested or not and setting free those [counterrevolutionaries] who show good behavior after having been arrested. It is very appropriate that we deal with counterrevolutionaries in different ways according to the different circumstances. We must explain these different ways [of dealing with counterrevolutionaries] to the people so that they understand. What kind of people were those who were executed? They were elements who were deeply hated by the masses and who owed the masses heavy blood-debts. In a great revolution

embracing six hundred million people, the people would not have approved if we had not killed off a bunch of [local despots such as] the Tyrant of the East and the Tyrant of the West but treated them with leniency instead. It is of immediate practical significance to affirm the correctness of having had that group of people executed. It is no good not to affirm this. This is the first point.<sup>40</sup>

Second, it should be affirmed that there are still counterrevolutionaries in the society, although their number has greatly diminished. Our social order is in fairly good shape, but we still cannot relax our vigilance. It would be wrong to say that not a single counterrevolutionary remains and that we can therefore sit back and relax. There are still a small number of counterrevolutionaries engaging in sabotage activities, for example, killing oxen, setting fire to granaries, wrecking factories, stealing information, putting up reactionary posters, etc. As far as the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in society at large is concerned, from now on we must make fewer arrests and carry out fewer executions; for the most part, counterrevolutionaries should be handed over to the agricultural cooperatives, where they can work under supervision and be reformed through labor. Nevertheless, we still cannot promulgate [a policy of] no executions at all; we still cannot abolish the death penalty. Suppose there is a counterrevolutionary who has killed people or blown up a factory; what would you say, should that person be executed or not? Certainly such a person must be executed.

Third, it should be affirmed that in carrying out the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in [government and Party] organs, schools, and army units, we must adhere to the policy started in Yanan of not executing a single one and arresting just a few. Some people have not been executed, not because their crimes do not deserve capital punishment, but because such executions would be of no benefit, whereas if they are not executed they might prove useful. What harm would there be in not killing any of them? Those who are fit for reform through labor should be sent to do labor and be reformed so that rubbish can be turned into something useful. Furthermore, a person's head is not like chives which, cut down once, can grow again. If you cut off [a person's head] by mistake, you have no way to redress the mistake even if you want to.

In suppressing counterrevolutionaries in [government and Party] organs, to adopt a policy of not executing any does not prevent us from taking a strict attitude toward them, but it can serve as a safeguard against mistakes; and if mistakes are made, it can ensure that we will still be able to correct them. [In this way we] can calm down a lot of people. If [counterrevolutionaries] are not to be executed, they have to be fed. For this reason all counterrevolutionaries should be given a chance to earn their living and should be enabled to start anew. Doing so will be beneficial to the cause of the people and will have a good impact abroad.

Protracted and arduous work is still needed in suppressing counterrevolutionaries. None of us can relax [our efforts].

#### 9. The Relationship Between Right and Wrong

Both inside and outside the Party a clear distinction must be made between right and wrong. How to deal with people who commit errors is an important question.

The correct attitude should be one of allowing people to make revolution. When people commit errors, we must adopt the policy of learning from past mistakes in order to avoid future ones and curing the illness in order to save the patient so as to help them to correct their mistakes.<sup>41</sup> *Ah Q zheng zhuan* (The True Story of Ah Q)<sup>42</sup> is a fine piece of writing. I would urge comrades who have read this story before to reread it and those who haven't read it to read it carefully. In this story, Lu Xun writes mainly about a peasant who was backward and [politically] unawakened and whose biggest fear was the criticism of others. He would come to blows with anyone who criticized him. He had some ringworm scars on his scalp which he himself didn't like to talk about, and he was also afraid of other people talking about them. But the more he was afraid of being talked about, the more people would talk about him, consequently putting him in a very passive position. In this story Lu Xun also devoted a whole chapter, Barred from the Revolution, to describing how the Fake Foreign Devil did not permit Ah Q [to make] revolution.<sup>43</sup> In fact, by revolution Ah Q meant grabbing a few things and nothing more. But even this kind of revolution was denied him.

In the past, we committed mistakes within the Party in this regard. That was when the dogmatists headed by Wang Ming<sup>44</sup> held power. They always arbitrarily charged people who were not to their taste with having committed such and such a mistake and barred them from the revolution. Many people were hurt, and the Party sustained great damage. We must learn this lesson well.

It is no good if we bar people in society from making revolution. Nor is it good to prohibit those who have joined the Party and who have made errors from correcting their errors.

We should allow people to make revolution. Some people say we should observe and see whether or not those who have committed errors correct themselves. This statement is right, but only half right. There is another half to it, that is, we must do some work on them and help them correct their errors, give them the opportunity to mend their ways.

For those people who have erred, we must first observe and second give help. We must give work to people who have committed errors and give them help. Don't gloat over others' misfortunes. To deny them work and help is a sectarian way of doing things.

For the revolution, it is always better to have more people. Except for an extremely small number who cling to their mistakes, repeat them frequently, and refuse to mend their ways, the majority of those who have erred can correct their mistakes. Just as people can become immune to typhoid once they have had it, those who have erred may make fewer errors, provided they are good at drawing lessons from their mistakes and are cautious. We hope that all those who have committed errors will become immune. On the contrary, it is those who have not erred who are in danger and need to be more vigilant; because they do not have such immunity, they are prone to become cocky.

We must take note [of the fact] that if people are excessive in rectifying other people who have committed errors they may often end up finding themselves being corrected. They are picking up a rock only to drop it on their own feet,<sup>45</sup> which

causes them to fall flat and be unable to get up. To treat people who have made mistakes with good will can win popular approval. Whether one adopts a hostile attitude or a helpful attitude toward comrades who have erred is one criterion for judging whether one is well-intentioned or ill-intentioned.

Right and wrong must be clearly differentiated. Drawing a clear distinction in the relationship between right and wrong can educate people and unite the entire Party. It is necessary to have controversy, criticism, and struggle within the Party. According to the circumstances, an appropriate degree of realistic criticism or even a bit of struggle is for the purpose of helping people correct their errors; it is to help others.

#### 10. The Relationship Between China and Foreign Countries

We have put forward the slogan of learning from foreign countries, and I think the slogan has been put forward correctly. There are some leaders of countries who do not dare to advance this slogan; nor do such leaders want to. It takes some courage, and histrionics will have to be discarded.

We are willing to learn from the strong points of all countries and all nations in the world. Every nation has its strong points; otherwise how could it exist and how could it develop? Acknowledging that every nation has its strong points does not mean that these nations have no defects, no shortcomings. There are always two aspects: merits and defects, strong points and weak points. The secretaries of our [Party] branches, the company commanders and platoon leaders in our military all understand this [principle]; they've jotted it down in their notebooks; [and indeed,] our meeting here today is for no other [purpose than to discuss this]: in summing up experiences there are two aspects, a strong point and a weak point. Even they know there are two aspects [to everything]; how can we just mention only one aspect, only the strong points and not the weak points? How can there be such a thing? Even ten thousand years from now [everything] will still have two aspects. At that time there will be the two aspects [peculiar to] that time; at present we have the two aspects of the present, and each individual has his or her own two aspects. In short, there are two aspects, not just one. To say that there is only one aspect is to do what we call knowing one side of the story but not the other.

When we call for learning the strong points of foreign countries, naturally we do not learn their weak points. Some of our people here were not clear about this in the past, and they also learned the weak points of others. Then, by the time they were swelling with pride over what they had learned, it was already being discarded by those countries [that had developed it]. As a consequence, they tripped over their own feet and, like Sun Wukong,<sup>46</sup> had to do a somersault.

Some people make no analysis of anything; they just follow the "wind." If the north wind is blowing today, they are of the "north wind" faction; if a west wind blows tomorrow, they join the "west wind" faction. Later, if the north wind blows again, they switch back to the north wind faction. They have no independent opinions of their own. They are absolutists [in following others], often going from one extreme to the other. We shouldn't do this; we can't learn blindly. We must

learn with an analytical and critical eye and avoid the tendency of copying everything foreign indiscriminately or transplanting things mechanically.

For a period of time people here [in our Party] have practiced dogmatism; against this dogmatism we have waged prolonged struggle. Nevertheless, there still exists some dogmatism today, both in academic circles and in economic circles, and we should continue our criticism [of it].

We present the question in this way: Study universal truths while integrating them with China's reality. Our theory is the integration of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution in China. We must be able to think independently.

We publicly advocate the slogan of learning from other countries; learning all that is advanced and good in other countries and always continuing to learn. We publicly admit our nation's weak points and the strong points of other nations. In order to learn from other countries, we must earnestly study foreign languages. Whenever it is possible, it is best for us to know more foreign languages.

As I see it, China has two weak points, which are at the same time two strong points. First, in the past our country was a colonial and semicolonial country that suffered imperialist oppression. [Consequently] its industry is not very developed and its scientific and technological level is low. Except for its vast territory, rich resources, large population, long history, etc., it is inferior to other countries in many areas and therefore is in no position to feel cocky or conceited. However, since they had been slaves too long, [some people] feel inferior in everything and are somewhat going overboard. They can't stand up straight in the presence of foreigners. They are like Jia Gui in *Famensi* (Famen Temple) who, when asked to take a seat, declines by saying that he is used to standing and has no desire to sit down.<sup>47</sup> We need to stir ourselves up a bit in this respect and raise our people's level of self-confidence. We should do as Mencius said: "When [the term] 'superior man' is spoken, scorn it,"<sup>48</sup> and carry forward the spirit of "scorning imperialism," which was fostered during [the movement to] Resist U.S. [Aggression] and Aid Korea. Our policy is to learn from the strong points of all foreigners, learn all that is good [in their experiences] in the political, economic, scientific, and technological fields, and in literature and art.

Second, our revolution came late. Although with the Revolution of 1911 the overthrowing of the emperor came earlier than it did in Russia, the revolution failed in the absence of a political party of the proletariat.<sup>49</sup> The victory of the people's revolution came in 1949, more than thirty years later than the October Revolution of the Soviet Union. On this account, too, we are not in a position to feel haughty. Naturally, in comparison with some other colonial countries, our revolution came somewhat earlier, [but we should nonetheless guard against being haughty].

The foregoing two points are our faults and also our strong points. As I have said, we are very poor and don't have much knowledge. We are first "poor" and second "blank."<sup>50</sup> By "poor" I mean that we do not have much industry and our agriculture is not that well-developed. By "blank" I mean that we are [like] a blank sheet of paper, and our cultural and scientific levels are not high. Poverty gives rise to the desire for change, and only then will [people] make a revolution and stir

themselves up to make [themselves] strong. A blank sheet of paper is good for writing on. Of course, I am talking about things in general. The working people in our country abound in wisdom, and we already have a number of fairly good scientists. [I] do not mean to say that we don't have any knowledge at all.

Being first poor and second blank prevents us from being cocky. Even if industry and agriculture make great progress in the future and our scientific and cultural level is greatly enhanced, we would still have to maintain a modest and prudent attitude and not wag our tails in the air.<sup>51</sup> We still need to learn from others. Even ten thousand years from now we will still need to learn! What's wrong with that?

Altogether I have talked about ten topics. In sum, we must mobilize all positive factors, direct and indirect factors, direct and indirect positive factors, to struggle to build a great socialist state, to struggle to further strengthen and consolidate the socialist camp, and to win victory for the international communist movement.

## Notes

1. The decentralization that Mao suggested here was decentralization to the level of giving decision-making power to lower-level government authorities. This is fundamentally different from the decentralization being proposed in the Hua Guofeng period, and later under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, which argues for decentralization to the level of giving autonomous economic-managerial power to the enterprises themselves. For analyses of these differences, see H. Eastmarsh (1978) and (1980), and F. Schurmann (1970), pp. 175ff.

2. For details of the changes proposed and the struggle over them, see R. MacFarquhar (1974), pp. 57-74. For a discussion of the limits of MacFarquhar's analysis, see R. Levy (1977).

3. See text Feb. 2, 1959.

4. Recent actions by the present leadership in China under Deng Xiaoping, e.g., the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi and others, the denial of the existence of a revisionist line in agriculture prior to the Cultural Revolution (see *HQ*, Dec. 1979:25), suggest that it has a very different perception of this history and of the concept of "the two line struggle."

5. For more on this continuity in Mao's line of thinking, see R. Levy (1976), pp. 184-187.

6. This is an early appearance of the principle that the CPC later expanded into the general line of "guzhu ganjing, li zeng shangyou, duo, kuai, hao, sheng de jianshe shehui zhuyi" (drumming up our energies to the utmost, strive for the headwaters, and achieve greater, faster, better, and more economical results in building socialism). The origin of the idea in Mao Zedong's thought goes back to the observations Mao made of the situation in late 1955 (see text Dec. 27, 1955[1]) when he felt that a significant hindrance to the building of socialism in China was a negativism and defeatism in the minds of certain people responsible for formulating and implementing policies. Here Mao formulated the principle apparently for the first time. (This sentence does not appear in the *Xuanji* version of this article.) In October 1957 at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Mao further elaborated on this principle (see text Oct. 9, 1957). The slogan first appeared in *RMRB* on February 3, 1958, and subsequently the slogan as a whole was adopted by the Second Party Congress of the CPC in May 1958. (For Mao's further elaboration on this slogan at the Congress, see texts May 17 and May 23, 1958. See also text Jan. 11, 1958, note 27.)

7. Because Mao identifies these relationships as contradictions, much of his language in this article therefore relates to his epistemology of contradictions as expressed in his early writings "On Contradiction" and "On Practice," in 1937. (See *SW*, I.)

8. The term Mao used here is *yuan*, which has often been loosely translated as "dollar"



or “Chinese dollar.” The term *yuan* goes back to pre-1949 times, but here, and generally since 1949, it refers more specifically to the PRC currency *renminbi* (*rmb*). In this translation, to maintain the distinction, we translate the term *yuan* as *renminbi* or *rmb*, wherever it is appropriate to do so.

9. The term “*zijin de jilei*” used here has often been translated as “capital accumulation.” We believe this translation to be ambiguous and erroneous. In orthodox Marxist economic usage, with which Mao’s political semantics is generally consistent, “capital” does not merely refer to material that is used and accumulated in the process of production. It is related specifically to a particular system in which money and materials are used in the production process in a particular mode of production (i.e., capitalism). Money, or funds, therefore, are transformed into capital only when used in that particular context. Moreover, Mao appears to have carefully chosen the words *zijin* (funds) rather than *ziben* (capital).

10. Here Mao is discussing the relations between the agricultural and industrial sectors as they relate to the accumulation of resources to fund industrial development. By taxes, Mao refers to the proportion of agricultural production that was taken by the state in the form of taxes for industrial development and other social overhead costs. By prices, Mao is referring to the practice of setting prices of agricultural products (and hence of agricultural labor) lower than for industrial products, thus establishing a further systemic transfer of surplus from the agricultural to the industrial sphere. For more on this problem and the problem of the difference between agricultural and industrial prices, usually referred to as the scissors differential, see text Apr. 1956, note 23. See also Chen Nai-ruenn (July–Sept. 1966), pp. 33–53.

11. The location of the majority of China’s industry in the coastal areas is directly linked to the fact that most of this industry was developed by foreign powers in areas where they could most easily exploit China’s resources to their own benefit. The resistance that some Chinese Communists have against developing coastal industry, of which Mao speaks here, has to do precisely with the image that this industry already has been more heavily capitalized and has acquired, over the years, a patina of “foreign capitalism” whereas the inland industry appears more “indigenous” and relatively underdeveloped.

12. The Anshan Iron and Steel Works, a major industrial complex in China (see text Dec. 14, 1952, vol. I, source note), and the coal industry at Fushun (see text Sept. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 9) are located within 120 km of each other in east-central Liaoning, thus making the region one of the most important industrial areas in China. Anshan is also known as *gangdu* or “steel capital,” and Fushun as *meidu* or “coal capital.” Dalian, translated as Darien in colonial days, is located on the tip of the Liaodong peninsula in Liaoning and has long been an important naval base in China. Tangshan is a major industrial city in eastern Hebei, near Beijing. It was devastated by an earthquake in the summer of 1976. Tianjin is the second most important city in Hebei, next to Beijing, and Tanggu is a district located on the coast within the municipality of Tianjin. For Anshan and Fushun, see also text Sept. 12, 1953, note 9.

13. Maoming is in southwestern Guangdong in Zhangjiang *xian*, some 20 km from the South China Sea.

14. Maxim Gorky (Aleksei Maximovich Peshkov, 1868–1936) was a Russian revolutionary writer. After 1917, Gorky’s novels and drama played an important part in publicizing the revolutionary message of the Bolshevik Party. Gorky’s writings had a great deal of influence on Chinese literary circles during and after the May Fourth period and deeply affected the thought of Chinese revolutionary writers such as Lu Xun (Zhou Shuren) and Ba Jin (Li Feigan).

15. Lu Xun (Zhou Shuren 1881–1936) is, by acclaim, the most influential literary figure in China since the May Fourth Movement. His early writings were mainly iconoclastic and satirical, criticizing Chinese society and civilization for its fatalism and its almost absurd attachment to its own backwardness. In 1929 he joined the Left-wing Writers’ Union and began to contribute his talents to furthering the socialist-communist cause in China. He is quite clearly Mao’s literary hero. For more biographical information on Lu Xun, see H.

Boorman et al., eds. (1967), I, pp. 416–424.

16. Xiao Chun was a Communist Party member and a political instructor at Whampoa Academy during the period of the CPC-KMT United Front (1924–1927). Although lacking formal education he audited courses at Zhonghua University at Wuchang during the period 1919–1920, when he taught school at Wuhan and edited the newspaper *Dahanbao*. He also taught at the Peasant Movement Training Institute in 1926. (For more on this institute see text Sept. 25, 1956, note 4.) He was executed by the KMT in 1927 during Chiang Kai-shek’s purge of Communists in Shanghai. For more biographical information on Xiao see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 327–328.

17. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 1.

18. Pan Gu is a figure in Chinese foundation mythology about the origins of the cosmos. References to Pan Gu are first found in *Wuyun linian ji* (Chronicle of the Cycles of the Five Elements) and in *Shuyi ji* (Discourse on Curiosities), where it is respectively described as the primal living being derived from the originally undifferentiated universe and the prototype of all living things. Later, in popular myth and literature, it was anthropomorphized and came to mean an actual mythological person who was responsible for separating the earth from the heavens and thus creating the universe as we know it now.

19. See text Jan. 28, 1955, vol. I, note 5.

20. The Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC was convened June 6–9, 1950. It followed the recession in the country in the spring of 1950, and one of its tasks was to review thoroughly the question of land reform and the fiscal structure and the development policy of the country. For Mao’s reference to specific conditions, see text June 6, 1950(1).

21. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

22. The Second Five-Year Plan covered the period 1958–1962, and its draft, “Proposal for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy 1958–1962,” was submitted by the Eighth National Congress of the CPC in September 1956 to the State Council for discussion. According to the New Year’s Day Message in *RMRB* (Jan. 1, 1966), the goals of this Second Five-Year Plan were met in 1960, two years ahead of schedule.

23. In the process of production, the value of the capital outlay (i.e., machines, plants, etc.) is spent over a period of years. In conceptual and theoretical terms this value has been gradually transferred to the products for the normal process of reproduction and replenishing of the capital outlay, and value, in the form of funds, has to be extracted from the products and accumulated in a timely fashion in preparation for reinvestment. This is not done, in socialist countries, simply through the market pricing and investment processes, but through a process of planned extraction. The funds thus accumulated are called depreciation funds. These normally would be accumulated directly by the enterprise unit and would be kept at that level. If all depreciation funds were taken away from the enterprise, these production units would not have sufficient resources to replace new means of production as the old means of production were used up in production, assuming, that is, that the means of production were commodities to be purchased rather than being directly supplied. If depreciation funds were taken away from the enterprises, this would imply that all means of production would have to be directly allocated to the various production units by the Center according to a specific plan. This required a level of organization and technical development that Mao, at the time of this document and during the Great Leap, believed had not yet been achieved in China. The relationship between depreciation funds and whether the means of production are commodities to be purchased or goods to be supplied to production units continues to be an issue of intense struggle. See C. Bettelheim (1978). See also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 85.

24. In 1954 the state purchased an excessively large amount of surplus grain from the peasantry in response to the difficulties of production at that time. The excess grain purchase quotas led to grain that was needed for food, seed, and fodder being purchased and taken out of the rural areas, thus harming the next year’s production. To rectify this error, purchase

quotas were reduced and the “three fixed” system was initiated (see note 25 below). For more on the overpurchase and the related grain crisis, see K. Walker (Apr.–June 1966); and T. Bernstein (Oct.–Dec. 1968).

25. See text Oct. 11, 1955(2), vol. I, note 11.

26. Here Mao is referring to two types of funds that are deducted from the income of the cooperative and held in reserve by the cooperative for its own development and expense. Public reserve funds (*gongjijin*) are deducted and withheld for purposes of forming a reserve for expanded reproduction. Public welfare funds (*gongyijin*) refer to the amount deducted from the total income of the production unit to be held by the cooperative and distributed to cover social insurance (e.g., for old and handicapped members of the production unit) and for collective welfare. The exact amount to be deducted is determined on the basis of the need and capabilities of the individual unit itself for the year and is decided at a general meeting of the members of the unit. These categories of funds were formally institutionalized during the period of the formation of the people’s communes in 1956. The public reserve funds are generally not permitted to be greater than 3 to 5 per cent of the commune’s total income, whereas the public welfare fund is no greater than 2 to 3 per cent.

27. See text Apr. 1956, note 23.

28. In socialist economics as opposed to capitalist economics, the value of a commodity is considered to be derived not from an interaction of land, labor, and capital, but solely from labor power. This value is therefore measured in terms of the amount of “socially necessary labor time” expended in the production of the commodity. This is known as the “law of value.” (See also text Jan. 27, 1957[1], note 87.) In the transfer of a commodity from one economic unit to another, or from one sector of the economy to another, the principle of “exchange of equal value” (*dengjia jiaohuan*) is observed, which means that commodities are to be exchanged for commodities that represent, in aggregate perhaps, equal value in terms of labor power and socially necessary labor time. This supersedes the influences of the market. This principle came to be of major political and theoretical significance in the early 1960s in connection with the debate over pricing when agricultural surplus was to be transferred into industrial investment. The various methods of such a transfer involved taxation, or differential pricing, or both. It was argued by opponents of differential pricing (see notes 10 and 27 above) that differential pricing sets the value per unit of agricultural labor below that of industrial labor and therefore violates the law of equal value.

29. Mao is referring to Section 4 of the PRC Constitution of 1954, which deals with the duties and prerogatives of the Local People’s Congresses and the Local People’s Councils, for which Mao here loosely used the term “localities.” For more on the Constitution, see text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1.

30. See Mao’s criticism of the “five excesses,” text Mar. 19, 1953, vol. I.

31. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, source note and note 7.

32. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 52, and text Apr. 1956, note 18.

33. Both the Common Program of 1949 (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1) and the Constitution of the PRC of 1954 (see text June 14, 1954, note 1) provide for the existence, side by side with the CPC, of a number of minor parties, known as the democratic parties. Most notable of these were the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT and the China Democratic League (see text Sept 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1). These parties were subordinate to the CPC but were provided a certain degree of participation and status in the political system, especially in the CPPCC. They were mostly composed of non-CPC intellectuals, the national bourgeoisie, military personnel, and officials in the pre-1949 government. For a more detailed discussion of their significance and function, see L. Van Slyke (1967), chs. 10–11. See also text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13, for information of the United Front Department in the CPC, on whose work this relationship with other parties is based.

34. This refers to the idea that the revolution must be pursued until its ultimate goal of a communist society is realized. This phrase became the title of an essay written by Mao in December 1948 and was published as the 1949 New Year editorial of the Xinhua press. At that time the PLA was on the verge of victory, preparing to cross the Yangtze and capture Nanjing.

35. This refers to the slogan formulated by Mao in the essay “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” published in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the CPC on June 30, 1949. Here Mao argued for the need for China’s new democratic revolutionary forces to be unambiguously aligned politically with socialism. He argued that in foreign policy China cannot remain ambiguous as to “which side” to lean toward; it would have to lean either toward imperialism or toward socialism, and the choice was obvious. Nevertheless, in this article Mao also argued that while this political alignment must be made, the door should also be kept open for economic relations with the capitalist world. This policy was articulated in response to the expulsion of the Yugoslavian Communists from the Cominform in the spring of 1948. This policy of keeping the doors open was, however, extremely short-lived, for in July 1949, Mao’s invitation to U.S. Ambassador Leighton Stuart to visit Beijing, then known as Beiping, was rejected, and in August 1949 the U.S. government proceeded to publish its anti-CPC policy in the State Department’s “China White Paper.”

36. In addition to the five ethnic autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) the ethnic minorities of China are largely scattered in peripheral provinces in northwest, north, northeast, west, and southwest China, as well as in offshore islands such as Taiwan and Hainan Island. For a more detailed list and discussion of China’s minority nationalities and PRC policy regarding them, see J. Dreyer (1976). See also text Mar. 16, 1953, vol. I.

37. Mao is probably referring to the review work undertaken and initiated by the Third Enlarged Conference of the Nationalities Affairs Commission held in June 1953. See also text Mar. 16, 1953, vol. I.

38. Yan Wang (King Yan) also known popularly as Yan Luo Wang, is Yama Raja in Buddhist cosmology, who rules the underworld (or purgatory), renders judgment on the spirits of the newly arrived (i.e., the newly dead), and executes torture for those who have wronged in life, under the supervision of Bodhisattva Kshitigarbha. To go to see Yan Wang, therefore, means to die.

39. See text Dec. 19, 1950, vol. I, source note. See also various texts in Dec. 1950 through Mar. 1952. Mao here appears to include the “Three Anti’s and Five Anti’s” campaigns; see text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note.

40. See texts Jan. 17, 1951, Mar. 30, 1951, and June 15, 1951 in volume I. See also text Apr. 1956, note 21.

41. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.

42. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 38.

43. The Fake Foreign Devil in *Ah Q zheng zhuan* was the son of a prominent villager in Ah Q’s village. He was educated in Japan and had cut his queue and affected foreign costume, passing himself off as a revolutionary with Western ideas. He once beat Ah Q for insulting him, and later, at a village “revolutionary” gathering, he excluded Ah Q from participation. Ah Q’s subsequent manner of expressing his frustration was to steal several things, and he was not protected by the “revolutionaries” of the village. He was then brought up for charges and summarily executed. Lu Xun uses the Fake Foreign Devil to illustrate educated people who believe “revolution” to be a sophisticated, intellectually and culturally refined matter and who have no compassion for the primitive urge to rebel on the part of the poor. See also text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 38.

44. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23, and text Apr. 1956, notes 12, 13, 14.

45. This is a saying that would become greatly popularized in the 1960s to describe policies that backfired on those who instituted them. The saying may have been coined in reference to Mao’s criticism of the Party rectification policy pursued by Liu Shaoqi in 1948. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 11.

46. For the character Sun Wukong or Monkey King, in the classical novel *Xi youji* (Journey to the West) by Ming dynasty novelist Wu Chengen, see text May–June 1955, vol. I, note 7. Whenever Sun had to travel long distances, he had the power to cover 108 thousand

li in one single somersault. See also text Sept. 16–18, 1953, note 21.

47. *Famensi* is an old Beijing opera telling the story of a despotic eunuch, Liu Jin, who usurped the power of the emperor during the reign of Emperor Wuzong of the Ming dynasty. Jia Gui is a low-ranking eunuch and an attendant of Liu Jin in the play. He was invited by Liu Jin to sit down when the two were talking, but in typical slavishness, Jia replied, "Your humble slave is accustomed to standing. I have no desire to sit down."

48. This derives from the second segment of the chapter "Jin xin" in the book *Mengzi* (Mencius). There are different translations of this saying, in which the terms "speak of" and "speak to" and "counselling" are used variably. The term for "superior man" (*da ren*) is also variously translated. Annotations to *Lun Yu* (The Analects of Confucius) interpret the term as referring to sages, whereas the annotations to *Zuo zhuan* (the Zuo Chronicle of the Spring and Autumn Annals) interpret it as referring to high-ranking officials. Mao's meaning here of scorning people who are more powerful or seemingly more powerful than oneself is clear. For a translation of this saying see D. C. Lau, trans. (1970), p. 201.

49. See text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, note 8.

50. See text Jan. 20, 1956, note 31.

51. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

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### Talk at Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau (April 1956)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 35–40. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 94–96; *Ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 171–174. Available English Translations: JPRS, *Miscellany*, I, pp. 30–35.

*This speech was made in one of a series of meetings of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, in March–April 1956 (see K. Lieberthal [1976], pp. 80–81) and probably preceded Mao's famous speech "On the Ten Major Relationships" (see text Apr. 25, 1956). The Wansui (n.d. 3) source cited here indicates that the speech was made on April 25, 1956, the same day as the "On the Ten Major Relationships" speech, but we have no conclusive corroborating evidence for this. It is quite clear that the Wansui (1969) rendition of this speech does not contain the full speech but is a summary of the points, probably taken down by a secretary.*

*During March and April 1956, the Political Bureau met a number of times to discuss how to react to Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU<sup>1</sup> and to hear reports from the thirty-four departments of the Central Committee on finance and economics. In response to Khrushchev's speech, the CPC, on April 4, 1956, published a counterpoint editorial entitled "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." The reports of the various departments were synthesized into ten contradictions, which would form the basis for Mao's famous Ten Major Relationships speech on April 25.*

*The themes in this document are clearly linked to the "Ten Major Relationships" speech which was given to a conference of secretaries of provincial and municipal Party committees. However, in the less public forum of the Political Bureau meeting, Mao's style was more direct and his criticisms of the Soviets more explicit and wide-ranging. In reading this document it is important to be aware that in calling for*

*decentralization, Mao was advocating a specific form of decentralization, i.e., decentralization of decision-making power to the level of provincial and municipal party committees. Although he did advocate further decentralization to lower-level party committees in the "Ten Major Relationships" speech, Mao's model of decentralization continued to be one of confining the extension of the decentralization of decision making within the Party rather than decentralizing decision making directly to production units as had been done in Yugoslavia; Mao believed that production units, if given the powers of decision making, would have a tendency to make decisions solely in economic, rather than political-economic, terms.<sup>2</sup>*

In their speeches [many comrades] displayed a lack of vigor. The relationship of the lower-level [cadres] to the upper-level [cadres] is like that of a mouse when it sees a cat, as though its soul had been eaten away. There was so much [on their minds], but they didn't dare to speak out. This same problem of a lack of democracy also exists in the various provinces. However, there are some model workers who do speak out quite spiritedly. Our Financial and Economic [Work] Conference<sup>3</sup> and the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee<sup>4</sup> had some side effects. Because of several stipulations, people did not venture to speak their minds. At the Economic and Financial [Work] Conference certain comrades did not give appropriate speeches, and there were some who didn't dare to speak up at all.

Another reason [for the lack of vigor] was the inadequate understanding of the situation; thus they did not speak clearly or in depth. Comrades XX<sup>5</sup> and [Li] Xiannian both have their own opinions about the economic and financial system, but this is not a question of individuals; only when the system is changed can the work style be transformed. We must delegate certain powers to the lower levels. Our [system of] discipline has come mostly from the Soviet Union. If the discipline is too strict, we will be fettering people. It is not possible to smash bureaucratism this way. The dictatorship of the proletariat requires an appropriate system. The Political Bureau and the State Council have not yet decided on either the problem of the division of power between the central government and the local areas, or how the one-person management system<sup>6</sup> of the Soviet Union came about. The various provinces should share power, they should not be afraid of being called people who clamor for independence. As the Center has not yet arrived at a decision, all are free to speak up. Every locality can first draw up [its own] regulations, by-laws, and methods, as provided for by the Constitution.<sup>7</sup> We must enable the various localities to be creative, spirited, and full of vigor. Beginning next year we should convene a large conference annually. On May Day we need not hold a large rally; there can be small gatherings for entertainment, and we need not publish the Soviet Union's May Day slogans.

Since the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee we have been somewhat dull and listless. It was necessary to convene the Fourth Plenum. Its resolutions were necessary; otherwise, if Gao Gang<sup>8</sup> had been allowed to go on carrying out his activities for another year, [the consequences] would have been unthinkable. However [these resolutions] led to timidity and over-cautiousness, and some people would not venture to speak up about national affairs. This is not correct. Before the Fourth Plenum there were occurrences of sabotage that had to be overcome. The subversive activities of Gao and Rao had to be blocked, but some

[people] have become overcautious and punctilious and will not talk about national affairs. We ought to clearly distinguish two kinds of national affairs. One kind consists of national affairs that are of a destructive nature, such as [the matter of] Gao and Rao, and should be opposed. One kind consists of national affairs that are of a constructive nature and should be talked about at length. At the Financial and Economic [Work] Conference, some comrades said the wrong things and were criticized, but this must be distinguished from the Gao and Rao affair. In the period of the Great Revolution<sup>9</sup> the Party was full of vigor, but later Chen Duxiu committed the error of Right opportunism, which was subsequently followed by a "Left" deviationist putsch, and after that defeat we lost vitality.<sup>10</sup> For eight years, we were correct [only] for short periods of time after the August Seventh conference, after the Sixth [Party] Congress, and after the Third Plenum of the Central Committee.<sup>11</sup> During the period of the land revolution there were three "Left" deviations, and in the period of the War of Resistance against Japan [period] there was a Right deviation. Two of the "Left" deviations were of our own doing, but the third "Left" deviation was related to the Communist International. [In the] third "Left" deviation, the resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee<sup>12</sup> was written by the Russians and we were forced to accept [it]. The Wang Ming line, in particular, caused the greatest damage to our revolutionary forces which suffered losses amounting to over 90 per cent. In view of this lesson, we should accept things [only] in an analytical and critical way. Zhang Guotao was a Right deviationist.<sup>13</sup> During the period of the War of Resistance against Japan, there was again a Right deviation.<sup>14</sup> The three Right deviations [all involved] extreme centralization and expression of different opinions was not permitted. After a defeat we were not allowed to talk about [it as a] defeat. In light of these historical lessons, we later [switched to] the practice of learning from past mistakes in order to avoid future ones, and curing the illness in order to save the patient,<sup>15</sup> and having [both] unity and struggle. During the period of the War of Resistance against Japan there was a good deal of independence in the base areas, and free rein was given to local initiative, but there was a bit of dispersionism.<sup>16</sup> In some cases the assertion of independence resulted in the publication of some things that should not have been made public. This was related to the Wang Ming line. To correct this phenomenon the Center resolved to strengthen the Party character, to have a unified [leadership], but to preserve a good deal of autonomy. During the War of Liberation, the system of filing reports and requesting instructions was promulgated to rectify the tendency toward excessive decentralization. In the past few years things have become abnormal, there has been a bit too much centralization. How much autonomy, in the final analysis, should the factories, the villages, the cooperatives, and the localities have? For the last forty years the Soviet Union has not gained [sufficient] experience in this matter, we too have not gained [sufficient] experience, so we should study [this question]. There are some things that were not decided upon by the Center or by the localities; they were simply done after [the Soviet] pattern, such as the one-person management system. Only after Comrade [Li] Xuefeng raised [the issue] did the Center discuss it.<sup>17</sup> In the history of our Party there has been the excessive centralization of the Wang Ming line and the excessive decen-

tralization of the second Wang Ming line. An appropriate degree of centralization is necessary, but excessive centralization is incorrect and does not facilitate the mobilization of [our] strength for large-scale economic construction. [I] ask our comrades to study our Party's history well.

Regarding the issue of the ratio of income distribution among the individual, the state, and the collective, I agree that 60 to 70 per cent of the total income should be given over to the members of the cooperative, and 30 to 40 per cent should go to the state and the cooperative. At most, this [portion which goes to the state and the cooperative] should not exceed 40 per cent, and optimally it should be 30 per cent. (This includes agricultural taxes, surtaxes, the cooperative's public welfare fund, the common reserve fund, management fees, etc.)

On the question of the socialist economic system: The Party committee system is not to be doubted. Please study Lenin's directives. Factories, mines, cooperatives, and enterprises such as those [concerned with] the process of circulation and the transportation of commerce must have independence to a certain extent, but to what extent is a question that should be studied carefully. Ours is not an independent kingdom<sup>18</sup> of the Gao Gang type, but we should encourage open and legitimate independent kingdoms ([although] not to be stipulated by the Constitution). Only then will things be managed smoothly. Without any [independence] things cannot be managed well. How the State Council should divide up administrative functions is something that should be studied and resolved. A decision will soon be made on how many ministries and departments the Central Government should set up and how much authority [they each] should have. In regard to [the questions of] how many departments the localities should set up, what affairs they should administer, and how much authority they should have, [we] should come up with a draft [resolution] in the next few months. The various ministries and departments of the central government should pay attention to educating the cadres to help the lower levels solve problems. When someone from the localities comes to the Central Government and is unable to see the [appropriate] people, things drag on without being solved. Some problems are left unresolved for years. We should investigate the cause of this. These two problems must be resolved. In what way can [the appropriate] people be seen and the problem be speedily solved? Could the various ministries at the Center please give their attention to this?

The localities have the right to resist all impracticable, unrealistic, and subjectivist orders, directives, instructions, and forms which the various ministries of the Central Government may send down to them. It doesn't matter if the localities exercise a little too much resistance. This right is only given to the provincial and municipal [Party] committees (which are comparatively mature politically). It is not given to [special] district and *xian* [Party] committees.

The Party Constitution ought to embody discipline and creativity and should manifest the mass line.<sup>19</sup> The various provinces should make a study [of this issue]. It would not work to have no discipline, but if the discipline is too rigid, initiative will be stifled. Discipline that stifles creativity and initiative should be abolished. The Party's Constitution provides for the creation of [the office of] a vice-chairman or several vice-chairmen. Is it possible [for us] to imitate the practice of the

Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and designate standing representatives with five-year terms who would have supervisory functions? Everyone please consider this.

In art and literature, to "let a hundred flowers bloom," and in academic studies, to "let a hundred schools of thought contend" (as the hundred schools contended during the Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period) should be taken as our guideline.<sup>20</sup> This was the view of the people two thousand years ago.

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be talked about everywhere. The bad things about Stalin and the Third International<sup>25</sup> can be transmitted to the [special] district [Party] committee secretaries as well as to the *xian* [Party] committee secretaries. These [bad things] were not written into the article<sup>26</sup> out of consideration for the situation as a whole. (In this article there was but one line written: Some bad suggestions were made), and we are not prepared to discuss them in newspapers or among the masses.

## Notes

1. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.
2. During the Great Leap Forward, however, Mao did advocate decentralization to the communes which were to combine politics and production in a single unit. Since Mao's death, however, decentralization of decision making to the purely economic production units themselves has been carried out. For a discussion of this, see Xue Muqiao (1982) and for an analysis of this change, see H. Eastmarsh (1980); for more on the two forms of decentralization, see F. Schurmann (1970), pp. 175–178.
3. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), source note, and text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, notes 7 and 8.
4. The Fourth (Enlarged) Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC was held February 6–10, 1954, in Beijing. See K. Lieberthal (1976) p. 63–64.
5. XX most likely stands for Chen Yun. For more on Chen, see text Jan. 20, 1956, note 9. Li Xiannian was another dominant figure in the field of economic work. Since September 1954, he was a vice-premier and Director of the Fifth General Staff Office of the State Council in charge of finance and commerce, and simultaneously Minister of Finance. For more biographical information on Li, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 499–504.
6. The single-management system, translated from the term *yi zhang zhi* (often translated by other sources as “one-man management system”), refers to the system of management wherein the factory manager, or head of an enterprise, assumes full responsibility and personal authority over the administration and direction of the enterprise. This system contrasts with the system in which the Party, acting through the Party committee within the enterprise, has responsibility and authority over the administration of the enterprise. The single-management system was, in China, developed primarily out of the early experiences of industrial management in Manchuria under Gao Gang, whose thinking on management was heavily influenced by his connections with the Soviet Union. Gao was chairman of the State Planning Commission from its inauguration in 1952 to 1954, and among his general policies was the installing of the single-management system on a nationwide basis. This policy, and Gao Gang himself, were criticized at the meeting of the Political Bureau in December 1953, and eventually at the Fourth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC in February 1954. Gao Gang and several members of his group were purged. That was the beginning of the shift away from the single-management system. See F. Schurmann (1970), pp. 253ff; S. Andors (1977), pp. 52–62.
7. This refers to the Constitution of the PRC, adopted by the First National People's Congress, September 20, 1954. (See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1). Mao is referring to the spirit of Section 4, Article II, of the Constitution.
8. The criticism of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi was a key issue at the Fourth Plenum in 1954. See text Mar. 31, 1955, source note and notes 1 and 7.
9. This refers to 1925–1927, the period of the Northern Expedition, also known as the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War.
10. For Chen Duxiu and the line followed by the CPC during the period of his leadership, see text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23. The “Left deviationist putsch” refers to the Qu Qiubai line. Qu (1899–1935) was elected general secretary of the CPC and secretary of the Provisional Political Bureau of the CPC at the emergency meeting of the CPC Central

Committee on August 7, 1927. This conference denounced Chen Duxiu's “Rightist deviationist” leadership and the united front strategy. Qu advocated the strategy of “continuous revolution” in spite of the major setbacks that the CPC had suffered immediately prior to the conference and opposed the withdrawal of the CPC from the cities. He proposed that the CPC ought to continue to intensify its preparations for the leadership and organizing of armed insurrections in many places, particularly peasant uprisings to coincide with the autumn harvest, and urban workers' uprisings. He advocated also the establishment of underground “revolutionary committees” everywhere, replacing the Party organizations that had already been formed earlier. This was known as the first Leftist putschist line in the CPC's history. In July 1928, Qu went to Moscow to attend the Sixth CPC Congress and in 1933 transferred to the Central Soviet, where he remained after the CPC forces left on the Long March (see text Feb. 19–24, 1953, vol. I, note 6). In February 1935, while on his way to Shanghai, Qu was arrested by the KMT and, after making a confession, executed. For more biographical information on Qu, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 239–244.

11. The eight years refer to the period between the defeat in 1927 and the consolidation of the CPC under Mao's leadership after the Zunyi Conference in 1935. The August Seventh conference of the Central Committee of the CPC was an emergency meeting convened in 1927 shortly after the Shanghai massacre. At this meeting, a decision was made to remove Chen Duxiu from his post as general Party secretary, to formulate the strategy of land revolution and armed insurrection, and to organize the autumn harvest insurrectionary movements in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Guangdong (see note 10). The Sixth Party Congress was held in July 1928 in Moscow. In reviewing the experiences of the Party in the immediate past, this Congress repudiated, on the one hand, Chen Duxiu's line, and, on the other, Qu Qiubai's early line. It promulgated the “Ten Point Political Program,” formulated the resolution on establishing soviets as forms of government, and further consolidated the resolution to carry out land revolution. The Third Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee was held September 24–28, 1930, at Lushan. It was given the task of criticizing and repudiating the Li Lisan line. The Central Committee at this meeting, however, under Qu Qiubai's leadership, struck a pose of compromise and did not carry out the criticism of Li Lisan's line thoroughly. After the meeting there was agitation to carry the task further and, consequently, the Fourth Plenum was convened in January of the following year, which repudiated both the Li Lisan line and Qu's compromise.

12. The three “Left” deviations refer to the Qu Qiubai Line, the Li Lisan Line, and the “first” Wang Ming Line. Li (1896–1967) was elected member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC and head of its Propaganda Department at the Sixth Party Congress in 1928. From June to September 1930, he took over virtual leadership of the Party and, following Qu Qiubai's lead, advocated the immediate organization of urban insurrection and the amassing of the Red Army's forces to take the major cities. In late 1930, after being criticized at the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC, he left for the USSR. After 1949, he returned to China and served in the Labor Department, the Transportation Industry Department and in the North China Bureau. He committed suicide in 1967. (For more biographical information on Li, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. [1971], I, pp. 512–519. For Wang Ming, see text Aug. 12, 1953[1], vol. I, note 23.) The last of these Left deviations, i.e., the first Wang Ming Line, was launched at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee held in January 1931, at which Wang was elected to the Central Committee along with Zhang Wentian, Shen Zemin, and Qin Bangxian.

13. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23.

14. This refers to the “second” Wang Ming Line. Wang returned to China from the USSR in November 1937 and became Party secretary for the Yangtze River (Changjiang) Bureau. He then advocated that the CPC should toe the line of the United Front and relinquish the development of a combat—and political—capacity independent of the KMT.

15. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.

16. See text Mar. 19, 1953, note 1.

17. Li was then head of the Ministry of Industrial and Communication Work. For more

biographical information on Li, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 504–506, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 203.

18. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 52. “Independent Kingdoms” can arise when there is uneven development among the departments or areas, and those who are more advanced are tempted to split off from the leadership and the comprehensive planning for development established by the Party Center and the Central People’s Government. As such, the notion of “independent kingdoms” combines the worst aspects of what is known as *ben wei zhuyi* (departmentalism) and *fenlie zhuyi* (splitism). Gao Gang was one of the earliest Party organizers in northern Shaanxi and played a key role in developing the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia soviet base that became the base area for the CPC Central during the period of the War of Resistance against Japan. Later in 1945, Gao became the regional secretary of Manchuria of the CPC. He was later accused of publicizing, in his position of leadership of Manchuria, the particularity of the Northeast as a region and inflating its role (and his own) in “saving the nation as a whole.” His activities in the Northeast were then seen as the developing of an “independent kingdom.”

19. The Constitution of the CPC was first discussed and adopted in the early 1920s. According to Warren Kuo (1968), 1, p. 72, it was adopted at the Second National Party Congress in 1922, but according to *Concise History of the Communist Party of China* (People’s Publishing House, 1956) and other PRC sources, it was the general program that was passed in 1922, while the CPC Constitution was passed at the First Congress in 1921. This “First” Constitution was revised in 1925, and a new constitution was passed in 1928 at the Sixth CPC Congress. Another revision came in 1945 at Yanan, and at the time of this meeting, 1956, the need to revise the Constitution again arose; hence Mao’s comments here. A new constitution was eventually passed in September 1956. For a definition of the “mass line,” see text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.

20. See text Autumn 1956, note 1. The present text suggests that Mao had thought of this policy perhaps fully a month before the policy was promulgated.

21. Mao’s blanket statement here appears to contradict the facts of the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries in 1951. While throughout the campaign Mao and other leaders continued to qualify, more and more narrowly, the conditions under which certain counterrevolutionaries were to be actually executed, and to urge greater circumspection in the campaign, the record clearly shows that many were arrested and a considerable number were executed. In his speech “On The Ten Major Relationships” (see text April 25, 1956), section 8, Mao alludes to a policy “started in Yanan” (i.e., probably in the early 1940s) according to which “not a single [counterrevolutionary] was executed and just a few arrested.” We have not been able to trace the history of this policy. In the same section of the same speech, Mao argues that certain counterrevolutionaries had to be executed.

22. The viewpoint of bestowing favors on the masses, *enci guandian*, refers to the belief that the masses cannot emancipate themselves and that this emancipation, as well as accompanying benefits, or any goodness that may come of a correct policy, result only from the efforts of a small number of people of foresight and vision, and from their actions. Thus these benefits are not the result of the masses’ struggles but “bestowed” upon them. Such a viewpoint would deny the importance of the role played by the masses in revolution. On the other hand, it is also feared that there may be people among the masses who will also adopt this viewpoint and will not participate in the struggle themselves but wait for the benefits to fall upon them. This, too, would be an undesirable product of the viewpoint. For the mass line, see text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.

23. The scissors differential (*jiandao cha*) derived from the picture presented by a graph showing the increasing differences between the prices of agricultural and industrial goods. Against the position that the accumulation necessary for industrialization could most easily be earned from the countryside by differential pricing in favor of industrial goods, Mao argued that it was necessary to reduce this differential if the peasants were not to be alienated and the worker-peasant alliance were to be consolidated. However, this had to be accomplished within a framework in which the total value of industrial production was only about half of that of agricultural production. The issue of price differentials and its class conse-

quences was the focus of long struggle in the Soviet Union during the 1920s. See, for example, C. Bettelheim (1978), II, and Alexander Erlich (1960). See also text Apr. 25, 1956, notes 10 and 27.

24. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

25. The Third International refers to the Communist International Association of National Communist Parties which was founded in 1919 and is also known as the Comintern. Its guiding principle was to exercise Soviet control over communist movements in all countries, through direct supervision or through a cadre of trained experts and advisers. In the case of the CPC, the broad lines of its revolutionary strategy and its relations with the KMT in the 1920s were largely influenced by the International from its founding until the Zunyi Conference in 1935. The suggestions of the International were responsible for the first United Front policy, for the formulation of the strategy of urban insurrection which led to the almost total loss of CPC organizations in KMT-controlled areas, and for military confrontations later that led to heavy military defeats. (All of which are discussed in this document here in reference to Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, Qu Qiubai, and Wang Ming.) The Zunyi Conference marked Mao’s rise within the CPC and its increasing independence from the Comintern. See J. Rue (1966). The International was dissolved in 1943.

26. By “bad things,” Mao is referring to the criticism of Stalin made by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU held in February 1956. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note. Here Mao specifically refers to an “article” published by the CPC in response to Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin. This most likely refers to the editorial “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” which appeared in *RMRB*, April 5, 1956. The article was subsequently published as a booklet (translated by Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1959) under a similar title and contains an editor’s note suggesting that the article was written on the basis of a discussion at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau. See also text Nov. 15, 1956, notes 38, 39, 40.

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## Telegram to King Mahendra of Nepal

(May 1, 1956)

Source: *RMRB* (May 2, 1956), 1. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (May 2, 1956), 20.

King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev,  
The Kingdom of Nepal

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of Your Majesty’s coronation, on behalf of the Chinese people and myself I extend warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of Nepal.

I sincerely hope that the traditional friendship between China and Nepal will grow with each passing day. May Your Majesty have happiness and good health.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Telegram to Norway  
(May 15, 1956)

Source: *RMRB* (May 17, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 86 (June 21, 1956), 24. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (May 17, 1956), 1.

King Haakon VII,  
The Kingdom of Norway

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of the National Day of the Kingdom of Norway, on behalf of the Chinese people and myself, I extend warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the Norwegian people. May the country of Norway prosper, and may happiness come to the Norwegian people.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

Telegram to Afghanistan  
(May 25, 1956)

Source: *RMRB* (May 27, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK* 86 (June 21, 1956), 24. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (May 27, 1956), 1.

Mohammed Zahir Shah,  
The Kingdom of Afghanistan

Your Majesty:

On the day commemorating the independence of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I express warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the Afghanistan people.

We note with gratification that since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Afghanistan,<sup>1</sup> the traditional friendship between the two

countries has experienced new development. We sincerely hope that such friendly relations will be consolidated and enhanced with each passing day.

May the country of Afghanistan be prosperous, may the people of Afghanistan be happy, and may Your Majesty enjoy good health.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Note

1. Diplomatic relations were established between the Kingdom of Afghanistan and the PRC in January 1950.

*RMRB* Editorial on Cultivating Traditional Chinese Medicine  
(May 27, 1956[R])

Source: *RMRB* (May 27, 1956), 1.

*This essay is written as an editorial for RMRB. Its title is "Jiji peiyang zhongyi, zhuangda weisheng duiwu" (Actively Cultivate Traditional Chinese Medicine to Strengthen the Ranks of the Health Care Work Corps). The date given here is, of course, the date of release; we have no information regarding the date on which this essay was actually written. For Mao's earlier pronouncements on traditional Chinese medicine, see texts July 30, 1954; Oct. 20, 1954; Winter 1954; and 1954(2), in volume I.*

The health care work corps in our country is at this time composed of doctors of Western medicine who have a grasp of the modern medical knowledge and doctors of traditional Chinese medicine who have a grasp of the medical knowledge of our motherland. They form the basis of the enterprise of providing medical treatment and health insurance for our people. As the enterprise of providing health insurance for the people develops, it is necessary, in addition to cultivating a large number of doctors of Western medicine, also to cultivate a large number of doctors of Chinese medicine. Only in this way can the demands of the people's masses in the area of medical treatment and health insurance be met, and the medical legacy of our motherland be passed on and further developed. This is a major task in developing our country's health care enterprise, as well as a historic responsibility determined by the peculiarity of our nation's history. At this moment, the Health Care Department has resolved to direct its efforts toward cultivating new doctors of Chinese medicine in order to strengthen the ranks of the health care corps. According to the plans of the Health Care Department, in addition to having the institutes and schools of traditional Chinese medicine cultivate some doctors of Chinese medicine, we will also cultivate a large number of doctors of Chinese medicine through the method of having doctors of Chinese medicine accept and

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Telegram to Norway  
(May 15, 1956)

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teach apprentices. For this reason, the work of organizing doctors of Chinese medicine to educate apprentices has become a major job for the Health Care Department at this time.<sup>1</sup>

Why must we take the education of apprentices to be the main method of cultivating doctors of Chinese medicine? This is because at this moment, the medical and pharmacological legacy of our motherland has not yet undergone systematic and scientific treatment. The precious medical experience of our motherland is not only scattered among the myriad medical and pharmacological documents, but also reposes broadly and in fragmentary fashion in the hands of several hundreds of thousands of doctors of Chinese medicine. A schoolroom-type education cannot by itself be counted on satisfactorily to transmit the knowledge of doctors of Chinese medicine to the students, and it would be difficult to accept totally the medical legacy of the motherland. For several millennia, although there have been many different methods of transmitting Chinese medical [knowledge] from generation to generation, the primary method has been that of educating apprentices. Although this is a handicraft-style way of transmitting knowledge, [it must be recognized that] it has indeed played, historically, an extremely important role in the passing down of the medical legacy of the motherland and in cultivating doctors of Chinese medicine. Furthermore, at the moment we are still obliged to adopt this method. To accomplish the task of cultivating new doctors of Chinese medicine, the health care departments in the various localities throughout the country must actively encourage and organize doctors of Chinese medicine to educate apprentices, provided that the principle of voluntary combination of teacher and pupil is observed, so as to promote this area of our work.

In the old society the education of apprentices by doctors of Chinese medicine was a very spontaneous matter in which things were allowed to run their course naturally. The ruling class of the old society was totally unconcerned about how the apprentices were trained, or how they learned their trade, or to what use they put their knowledge. At this time, [even though] we adopt the traditional method of training apprentices, we should not do it in the manner of the past. We must, instead, do things in such a way that both cultivating and application are according to a plan. We must give consideration to the people's needs, and to the development of our nation's medicine as well as to the careers and future of the doctors of Chinese medicine whom we cultivate and produce. We must give equal thought to the quantity and the quality of the doctors of Chinese medicine whom we cultivate. As for those new doctors of Chinese medicine who are cultivated and produced, we must not only arrange work for them in a reasonable way, but must also provide the possibility for them to rise in the ranks in the future.

To accomplish the task of cultivating doctors of Chinese medicine, we must first of all have the appropriate number of apprentices to inherit the experience currently scattered among the doctors of Chinese medicine. After a certain period of work, these apprentices should be organized for further education so that they may receive

some modern medical knowledge and their technical level may be elevated. In training apprentices we must place equal emphasis on quantity and quality; we must not overlook either. Crude methods and indiscriminate overproduction are wrong. Doctors of Chinese medicine in the health centers and joint clinics as well as others should be welcome as long as they are willing to train apprentices. However, it is imperative that the apprentices they take on are truly capable of inheriting their teachers' experience, or become fully knowledgeable in one field of Chinese medicine, or acquire and become accomplished at a skill, so that they can carry out the work of treatment independently. After the apprentices have completed the course, the health care departments in the various localities should issue to them certificates attesting to their scholarly accomplishments and take responsibility for arranging work for them in a reasonable way.

At present the various health care departments in the localities have already begun to pay attention to making arrangements for the work of having doctors of Chinese medicine train apprentices. The question for the immediate future is to strengthen the leadership. We must use the work method of the mass line<sup>2</sup> to decide questions such as who is to learn and who is to train, how to learn and how to train, as well as the questions of the various subjects to be studied, etc. If we produced an inflexible, unified regulation, it would not meet the concrete conditions in the various places, and therefore would not be appropriate. We should provide concrete assistance for the health care organizations at the basic level, such as in terms of registering the number of apprentices, appointing auxiliary teaching material, and helping them to resolve difficulties in the process of teaching. Furthermore, the health care departments at the various localities should draw up comprehensive plans for this work in accordance with the concrete conditions in their respective localities and place this work on the current agenda of things to be done. To accomplish tasks that the state has set forth, we must get to the bottom of actual situations and, on the basis of needs and possibilities, place our work plans on a reliable foundation and, moreover, conduct a series of ideological and organizational preparations in order to promote this work.

The cultivation of new doctors of Chinese medicine is a historic task of our generation, and a glorious assignment for the health care departments at all levels, for the many doctors of Chinese medicine in our country as well as for the people's masses. We ought to make an effort to accomplish it.

## Notes

1. For Mao's earlier criticism of the Health Care Department, see text 1953 and text July 30, 1954 in volume I.

2. For a description of the principle of the mass line, see text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.

Conversation during Swimming Trip to the Xiang River  
(May 30, 1956)

**Source:** Yan Dong, Lu Lin, "Mao zhuxi xiangjiang youyong sanji" (Random Notes on Chairman Mao's Swim in the Xiang River), in *Xin Hunan bao* (June 24, 1967), 2.

*According to this source, Mao swam across the Xiang River at Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, on May 30, 1956. The following conversation took place after the swim, when he was at the village of Zhongniutou, between Mao and some villagers, notably Guo Hanjiang. It is one of many snippets of conversation reported in the article, but the only one of any general significance. As a historical reference here, it is notable that Mao was born at the village of Xiangtan, some 45 kilometers southwest of Changsha.*

There are always difficulties. Gradually life will get better. . . .

They are all comrades in positions of responsibility in the provincial [government] and the municipal [government]. In the future, if you have anything to say, you can go look them up and air it [to them].<sup>1</sup>

**Note**

1. Mao was referring to several cadres who had accompanied him, notably Wang Guodong and Yang Peiliang. The province refers to Hunan and the municipality to Changsha.

Reply to Ambassador of Pakistan  
(June 13, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 14, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 87 (July 6, 1956), 32. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (June 14, 1956), 3.

*On March 23, 1956, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was established. Sultanuddin Ahmad, who had been the ambassador of the Dominion of Pakistan to the PRC became ambassador representing the new Islamic Republic of Pakistan. (See text Mar. 21, 1956.)*

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence that appoints Your Excellency as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan to the People's Republic of China. I am also grateful for the good wishes and greetings extended to our government and people and myself by Your Excellency and your president.

The People's Republic of China consistently seeks to establish and develop friendly relations with all countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it carries out a policy of acting as a good neighbor toward all its neighboring countries. The Chinese government and people are very happy to see that since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan,<sup>1</sup> we have maintained friendly relations, and that trade and cultural exchanges between the two countries and mutual friendly visits are, right now, being developed continuously. The Chinese government and I welcome Your Excellency's assumption of office. We cherish greatly the efforts made by Your Excellency in the past year or so in strengthening the friendship between China and Pakistan, and pledge to continue to render Your Excellency full assistance in this regard.

May Your Excellency achieve new successes in your work. Best wishes for prosperity for your country, happiness for your people, and the good health of your head of state!

**Note**

1. Diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Dominion of Pakistan, the forerunner of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, were established in January 1950.

Telegram to President Nasser of the Republic of Egypt  
(June 26, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 27, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 88 (July 21, 1956), 181. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (June 27, 1956), 1.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser,  
Republic of Egypt

Your Excellency:

On learning of your election as President of the Republic of Egypt, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I express heartfelt congratulations to you and the people of Egypt. May you and the Egyptian people attain even greater achievements in your cause of the construction and development of the Republic of Egypt.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

## Reply to Ambassador of Romania (June 28, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 29, 1956), 1. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (June 29, 1956), 18.

*On this occasion Nicolai Cioroiu was installed as ambassador of the People's Republic of Romania to the PRC. The news release in RMRB that contained the text of Mao's speech does not provide the usual salutation. It may indeed not be the full text of the speech.*

The People's Republic of Romania is the first state in Romanian history in which the political power rests in the hands of the masses of people. The founding of the People's Republic of Romania has enabled the Romanian people to step onto the road of socialist construction. Since their liberation the Romanian people have attained tremendous successes both in the cause of building socialism and in the struggle to defend peace in Europe and the world. I am confident that the Romanian people will attain even greater victories in the days to come.

Over the last few years, the cooperation between our two countries in the various areas of politics, economics, and culture has brought about an increasing consolidation and development of the friendship between our two countries. This multifaceted cooperation and brotherly friendship not only is in accord with the interests of the people of our two countries, but also is in accord with the interests of maintaining world peace.

## Swimming: A Poem (June 1956)

**Source:** *Poems*, pp. 51, 53. Other Chinese Texts: *Poems of Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 84, 86; *Shici*, pp. 30–31; *Mao shici*, p. 13. Available English Translations: *Poems*, pp. 50, 52; *Poems of Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 85, 87; *Mao poems*, pp. 31–32; K. Fan (1972), pp. xvi–xvii; J. Chen (1967), p. 346; *PR*, 30 (July 21, 1967), 4.

*In May 1956 Mao swam across the Yangtze River from Wuchang to Hankou, and in June he swam it a second time, crossing from Hankou to Wuchang. This poem is set to the tune of Shuidiaoge tou (the first section of the tune Water Song, a ci pattern derived from the Tang-dynasty daqu by the title of Shuidiao yinhanqu written by Wang Yan). See text Dec. 4, 1956, note 11, for a supplementary explanation regarding the title of this poem.*

I have just drunk of the water of Changsha,  
Now I shall taste the fish of Wuchang.<sup>1</sup>  
Thus have I conquered the endless Changjiang;<sup>2</sup>  
My relaxed eyes roam over the vast expanse of the skies of Chu!<sup>3</sup>  
I care not about the winds a-blowing and the waves buffeting,  
for greater is my enjoyment of them than a leisurely stroll,<sup>4</sup>  
Today my ease is complete!  
Upon such a river, the Master once said:  
Thus flows all life into the past.<sup>5</sup>  
The gale lends movement to the masts, but the Tortoise and the  
Snake are still.<sup>6</sup>  
A magnificent project is formed. The Bridge, it flies! Spanning  
North and South, and a Natural Barrier becomes a thoroughfare.<sup>7</sup>  
A rocky dam shall stand athwart the western river,<sup>8</sup>  
Cutting asunder the mists and rains of Wushan<sup>9</sup>  
Until the precipitous gorges yield a lake of tranquillity.  
The Goddess, should she remain alive today, shall yet marvel  
at changes in the world.

### Notes

1. Changsha is the capital city of Hunan province; Wuchang is one of the tri-cities that make up the municipality of Wuhan, the seat of Hubei province. Mao may here be referring to the fact that he had only recently been swimming in the Xiang River in Hunan Province, near Changsha. (See text May 30, 1956.)

Mao is also alluding, literally, to a phrase in a folk ditty of the people of the State of Wu in the Three Kingdoms period (A.D. 220–264). In A.D. 260 when the Prince of Wu, Sun Hao, proposed to move his capital from Jianye (today's Nanjing) to Wuchang, the people resisted and sang the ditty "Rather drink the water of Jianye than eat the fish of Wuchang." There seems to be a sense of one-upmanship in Mao's literary style here, setting the expansive tone for the entire poem. By being able to both drink the waters of Changsha and taste the fish of Wuchang, Mao certainly proved the superiority of his condition over that of the Prince of Wu, who, though reigning over one of the Three Kingdoms—and the Kingdom of Wu was the one that most intensely fired the romantic imagination—was nevertheless presiding over a waning, rather than a prospering, regime.

2. In our translation we have taken some liberty with Mao's language. Mao's original words included *hengdu* (literally "swam or ferried across"), which we have rendered as "conquered" to conform to Mao's sense of magnificence here. Also, in referring to the river, Mao used the words *wanli Changjiang* or "the Long River, which wends ten thousand li," and we have translated that as "endless." "Changjiang," or "Long River," is the Chinese term for the Yangtze River.

3. Chu is the name of one of the kingdoms of the Warring States period (475–221 B.C.), and Wuchang was its capital.

4. Here Mao used the aphorism *xianting xinbu*, meaning a wherever-one-might-will stroll in a calm courtyard or garden, the epitome of ease and leisure.

5. The "Master" refers to Confucius. The term here is *zi*, which in Chinese simply means "the scholar." However, the early philosophers of the Classical Age in China were all traditionally known by this honorific. Thus, Kong Qiu was known as Kong Zi, which in turn was romanized as "Confucius." The vast majority of Confucius' sayings in *Lun Yu* (The Analects of Confucius) were introduced by the phrase *zi yue* (the Master says). The sentence quoted by Mao here is found in segment 16 of the book *Zihan* in *Lun Yu*.



6. This refers to Tortoise Hill at Hanyang and Snake Hill at Wuchang, which face each other across the Yangtze River and are joined by the Yangtze River Bridge.

7. The bridge connecting Hanyang and Wuchang was then being built and was completed in 1957.

8. Mao is referring to plans to use the rocky cliffs that guard the western reaches of the river on the Hanyang side, controlling the confluence of the Han River and the Yangtze, as the foundation for a dam.

9. Wushan is a mountain in extreme eastern Sichuan near the Sichuan-Hubei border, in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River upstream from Wuhan. This mountain is cleft by the river to form the precipitous gorges of Wu Xia (Wu Gorge) and Jutang Xia (Jutang Gorge) in Sichuan. The geography of the mountain and the gorges has given rise to the literary legend of the Goddess of Wushan, who, in the ballad *Shennu fu* (Ballad of the Goddess), written by Song Yu, a poet of the Warring States period, appeared in a romantic encounter to King Xiang of the state of Zhao in a dream. In the ballad it was said that when she went abroad, it brought mists and rain.

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### Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia (July 9, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 11, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 153. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 11, 1956), 1.

Comrade Jamsarangiyn Sambuu, Chairman of the Presidium of the Greater People's Hural of the People's Republic of Mongolia,  
Comrade Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, Chairman of the Council of the People's Republic of Mongolia,  
Comrade Dasiyn Adilbish, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Mongolia:

On the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the Mongolian people's revolution, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend warm and sincere congratulations to you and to the government and people of the People's Republic of Mongolia.

On July 11, 1921, the Mongolian people overthrew the reactionary feudal rule and attained victory in the people's revolution. In the past thirty-five years, the Mongolian people have not only consolidated a people's democratic system,<sup>1</sup> but have also achieved glorious successes in the economic and cultural construction of their country. These successes bear great significance to the cause of strengthening the forces for peace, democracy, and socialism and consolidating peace in Asia and the world. The Chinese people feel extremely elated at the achievements made by our brothers the Mongolian people.

May the Mongolian people achieve new and even greater successes in their peaceful construction.

May the friendship between the Chinese and Mongolian peoples be further consolidated and developed.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 4, for a definition of the term "people's democracies."

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### Telegram to Laos (July 12, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 14, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 22. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 14, 1956), 1.

King Sisavang Vong,  
The Kingdom of Laos

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of Your Majesty's birthday and the National Day of the Kingdom of Laos, the Chinese people and myself express warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of Laos.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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### U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger (July 14, 1956)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 289–292. Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 308–311; *JPRS, Selections*, pp. 26–29.

According to the *Xuanji* source, this is a part of a conversation Mao had with two Latin American visitors.

6. This refers to Tortoise Hill at Hanyang and Snake Hill at Wuchang, which face each other across the Yangtze River and are joined by the Yangtze River Bridge.

7. The bridge connecting Hanyang and Wuchang was then being built and was completed in 1957.

8. Mao is referring to plans to use the rocky cliffs that guard the western reaches of the river on the Hanyang side, controlling the confluence of the Han River and the Yangtze, as the foundation for a dam.

9. Wushan is a mountain in extreme eastern Sichuan near the Sichuan-Hubei border, in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River upstream from Wuhan. This mountain is cleft by the river to form the precipitous gorges of Wu Xia (Wu Gorge) and Jutang Xia (Jutang Gorge) in Sichuan. The geography of the mountain and the gorges has given rise to the literary legend of the Goddess of Wushan, who, in the ballad *Shennu fu* (Ballad of the Goddess), written by Song Yu, a poet of the Warring States period, appeared in a romantic encounter to King Xiang of the state of Zhao in a dream. In the ballad it was said that when she went abroad, it brought mists and rain.

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### Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia

(July 9, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 11, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 153. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 11, 1956), 1.

Comrade Jamsarangiyn Sambuu, Chairman of the Presidium of the Greater People's Hural of the People's Republic of Mongolia,

Comrade Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, Chairman of the Council of the People's Republic of Mongolia,

Comrade Dasiyn Adilbish, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Mongolia:

On the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the Mongolian people's revolution, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend warm and sincere congratulations to you and to the government and people of the People's Republic of Mongolia.

On July 11, 1921, the Mongolian people overthrew the reactionary feudal rule and attained victory in the people's revolution. In the past thirty-five years, the Mongolian people have not only consolidated a people's democratic system,<sup>1</sup> but have also achieved glorious successes in the economic and cultural construction of their country. These successes bear great significance to the cause of strengthening the forces for peace, democracy, and socialism and consolidating peace in Asia and the world. The Chinese people feel extremely elated at the achievements made by our brothers the Mongolian people.

May the Mongolian people achieve new and even greater successes in their peaceful construction.

May the friendship between the Chinese and Mongolian peoples be further consolidated and developed.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

### Note

1. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 4, for a definition of the term "people's democracies."

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### Telegram to Laos

(July 12, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 14, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 22. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 14, 1956), 1.

King Sisavang Vong,  
The Kingdom of Laos

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of Your Majesty's birthday and the National Day of the Kingdom of Laos, the Chinese people and myself express warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of Laos.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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### U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger

(July 14, 1956)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 289–292. Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 308–311; *JPRS, Selections*, pp. 26–29.

According to the *Xuanji* source, this is a part of a conversation Mao had with two Latin American visitors.

6. This refers to Tortoise Hill at Hanyang and Snake Hill at Wuchang, which face each other across the Yangtze River and are joined by the Yangtze River Bridge.

7. The bridge connecting Hanyang and Wuchang was then being built and was completed in 1957.

8. Mao is referring to plans to use the rocky cliffs that guard the western reaches of the river on the Hanyang side, controlling the confluence of the Han River and the Yangtze, as the foundation for a dam.

9. Wushan is a mountain in extreme eastern Sichuan near the Sichuan-Hubei border, in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River upstream from Wuhan. This mountain is cleft by the river to form the precipitous gorges of Wu Xia (Wu Gorge) and Jutang Xia (Jutang Gorge) in Sichuan. The geography of the mountain and the gorges has given rise to the literary legend of the Goddess of Wushan, who, in the ballad *Shennu fu* (Ballad of the Goddess), written by Song Yu, a poet of the Warring States period, appeared in a romantic encounter to King Xiang of the state of Zhao in a dream. In the ballad it was said that when she went abroad, it brought mists and rain.

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### Telegram to the People's Republic of Mongolia (July 9, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 11, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 153. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 11, 1956), 1.

Comrade Jamsangiyn Sambuu, Chairman of the Presidium of the Greater People's Hural of the People's Republic of Mongolia,  
Comrade Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, Chairman of the Council of the People's Republic of Mongolia,  
Comrade Dasiyn Adilbish, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Mongolia:

On the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the Mongolian people's revolution, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend warm and sincere congratulations to you and to the government and people of the People's Republic of Mongolia.

On July 11, 1921, the Mongolian people overthrew the reactionary feudal rule and attained victory in the people's revolution. In the past thirty-five years, the Mongolian people have not only consolidated a people's democratic system,<sup>1</sup> but have also achieved glorious successes in the economic and cultural construction of their country. These successes bear great significance to the cause of strengthening the forces for peace, democracy, and socialism and consolidating peace in Asia and the world. The Chinese people feel extremely elated at the achievements made by our brothers the Mongolian people.

May the Mongolian people achieve new and even greater successes in their peaceful construction.

May the friendship between the Chinese and Mongolian peoples be further consolidated and developed.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 4, for a definition of the term "people's democracies."

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### Telegram to Laos (July 12, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 14, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 22. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 14, 1956), 1.

King Sisavang Vong,  
The Kingdom of Laos

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of Your Majesty's birthday and the National Day of the Kingdom of Laos, the Chinese people and myself express warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of Laos.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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### U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger (July 14, 1956)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 289–292. Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 308–311; *JPRS, Selections*, pp. 26–29.

*According to the Xuanji source, this is a part of a conversation Mao had with two Latin American visitors.*

*The "paper tiger" theme, which Mao originally articulated in his conversation with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong in August 1946 (see SW, IV, pp. 97-101), is an integral part of Mao Zedong's psychological strategy to remove his followers' fear of superior enemy forces and to bolster their self-confidence by magnifying the enemy's weaknesses and belittling its strong points, while simultaneously inflating one's own strength and downplaying one's own weaknesses. This is applied in strategic military operations as well as in long-range political negotiations. In Mao's revolutionary view, this idea invariably also meant emphasizing human efforts over material equipment since the "enemy" usually possessed far superior hardware than Mao's forces. Here, notably, Mao also took pains to point out the dualistic nature of this formulation; imperialism is a real tiger and a paper tiger at the same time. While it is a paper tiger from a strategic, long-term perspective, it is real and fierce and not to be taken lightly tactically. In reference to later documents, let it be noted that this theme was repeated by Mao in a speech made in Moscow on November 18, 1957, to which the editors of Xuanji, V, gave the title "All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers."*

The United States is waving the banner of anti-Communism everywhere in order to achieve its purpose of aggression against others.

The United States is indebted to everybody. It is indebted to the Central and South American countries, to the countries of Asia and Africa, and furthermore, to the countries of Europe and Oceania. The whole world, including Britain, dislikes the United States. The broad masses of the people dislike the United States. Japan dislikes the United States because the United States oppresses Japan. There is not a single country in the East that has not suffered U.S. aggression. It has invaded China's province of Taiwan. Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Pakistan, all these countries have suffered U.S. aggression—and among them there are some who are allies of the United States! The people are not happy and, in some countries, neither are the authorities.

All oppressed nations want independence.

Everything is subject to change. A decadent big force will give way to a newborn small force. The small force will become big and powerful because the majority of the people demand this change. The great power of U.S. imperialism will diminish, because even the American people are unhappy with their government.

In my own lifetime I have experienced changes of this sort. Some of us here were born under the Qing dynasty, and others were born during the Republican period.<sup>1</sup>

The Qing dynasty has long been overthrown. By whom? By the [political] party led by Sun Yat-sen together with the people. Sun Yat-sen had little strength, and the Qing officials looked down on him. He had attempted many insurrections, but they had all failed.<sup>2</sup> [Yet] in the end, it was still Sun Yat-sen who overthrew the Qing dynasty. The big are not awesome; the big will be overthrown by the small. The small will become big. After overthrowing the Qing dynasty, Sun Yat-sen failed because he did not satisfy the people's demands, such as their demands for land and for opposition to imperialism. Neither did he understand [the necessity] to suppress counterrevolutionaries who were running all over the place at the time.<sup>3</sup> Later he suffered defeat at the hands of Yuan Shikai, the head of the Beiyang warlords. Yuan Shikai's forces were larger than Sun Yat-sen's.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, still

[things went] according to the same law: those with little power are strong if they are linked up with the people; those with great power, but who are against the people, are weak. Later on, Sun Yat-sen's bourgeois-democratic revolutionaries cooperated with us Communists and defeated the warlord system left behind by Yuan Shikai.<sup>5</sup>

When Chiang Kai-shek ruled China, he gained the recognition of the governments of all the countries in the world and ruled for twenty-two years; his forces were the biggest [in China]. Ours was a small force; at first we had 50,000 Party members, but, after the suppression [of our Party] by the counterrevolutionary forces, only several thousand Party members were left.<sup>6</sup> The enemy stirred up trouble everywhere. Nevertheless, according to the same law, the powerful fail because they are divorced from the people; the weak win because they are linked to the people and work for the people. In the end, that was what happened.

During the War of Resistance against Japan,<sup>7</sup> Japan was very powerful and the Kuomintang's troops were driven to the outlying regions. The armed forces led by the Communist Party could only conduct guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines in the countryside. The Japanese occupied the major cities of China such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Guangzhou. Nonetheless, in accordance with this law, Japanese militarism and Germany's Hitler too were toppled after only a few years.

We went through many difficulties. We were driven from the South to the North; we started with several hundred thousand people and were left with only several tens of thousands. After the 25,000-li Long March we were left with only 25,000 people.<sup>8</sup>

In the history of our Party we had many "Left" deviationist and Right deviationist errors of line.<sup>9</sup> The most serious of these were Chen Duxiu's Right deviation and Wang Ming's "Left" deviation. Besides these, there were also the Right deviationist errors of people such as Zhang Guotao and Gao Gang.

[But] there are also good points to committing errors. They can educate the people and the Party. We have had many teachers by negative example, such as the Japanese, the United States, Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao, and Gao Gang.<sup>10</sup> We paid a huge price to study with these teachers by negative examples. Historically, the British have fought many wars against us. Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, tsarist Russia, and Holland all had their eyes on this territory of ours.<sup>11</sup> They have all been our teachers by negative example, and we have been their pupils.

During the period of the War of Resistance, in the fighting against Japan, our troops grew to nine hundred thousand. Then came the War of Liberation.<sup>12</sup> Our guns and cannons were inferior to those of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang maintained an army of four million men, and the fight went on for three years; all told, we knocked out eight million [of their troops]. The Kuomintang, aided by U.S. imperialism, was not able to beat us. The powerful cannot win; the small and weak will always be victorious.

Today U.S. imperialism appears to be very powerful, [but] it is not truly so. Politically it is very weak because it is divorced from the broad masses of the

people; everybody dislikes it; even the American people dislike it. In appearance it is very powerful, but in fact it is not awesome; [it's just a] paper tiger. On the surface it is a tiger, but it's made of paper and cannot withstand the wind and the rain. As I see it, the United States is just a paper tiger.

All of history proves this point—several thousand years of the history of the class society of the human race proves this point—the powerful will give way to the weak. This will hold true in the Americas.

Only when imperialism has been destroyed can there be peace. The paper tiger will eventually be destroyed. Nevertheless, it will not be destroyed by itself; it will have to [be exposed to] the wind and the rain [before it will be destroyed].

When we say that U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger, we say so from a strategic point of view. In an overall sense, we must despise it, but with respect to each particular part, we must take it seriously. It has claws and fangs. To destroy it we must do it one step at a time. For instance, if it has ten fangs, then, if the first time one is knocked out, it will still have nine. When another is knocked out, it will still have eight. When all the fangs have been knocked out, it will still have claws. [But] if we do things in a serious and step-by-step fashion, eventually we can certainly succeed.

Strategically, we must despise it completely. Tactically, we must take it seriously. In fighting against it, in each battle and in each matter, we must take it seriously. The United States is powerful at the moment, but, considered in the broad perspective, in terms of the total picture and in long-range terms, it does not have popular support. People dislike its policies, for they oppress and exploit the people. For this reason, the tiger will surely die. Therefore, it is not frightening, and we can despise it. Nevertheless, the United States is still powerful at present; it produces more than a hundred million tons of steel per year and is attacking people everywhere. Therefore, it is still necessary to struggle against it, to use all our strength to struggle [against it], and to fight with it to win over one position after another. This will take time.

It appears that all that the countries in the Americas and in Asia and Africa can do is to continue to quarrel with the United States, to quarrel to the end, until the storm blows apart the paper tiger.

In order to oppose U.S. imperialism, the European settlers in Central and South American countries must unite with the indigenous Indians. Perhaps it is possible to separate the white European immigrants into two categories; one category would be the rulers and the other category would be the ruled. This way it will be easier for that portion of the whites who are oppressed to draw closer to the natives because their situation is similar.

We are in the same position as our friends in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. We do the same kind of work. We do something for the people in order to alleviate the oppression of the people by imperialism. If things are done well, it will be possible to eliminate completely the imperialist oppression. In this matter we are comrades.

In opposing imperialist oppression we have the same character as you, differing only in our geographical location, national [identity], and language. [On the other

hand] we differ in nature from the imperialists, and the sight of imperialism makes us sick.

Why should there be imperialism? The Chinese people do not want imperialism; nor do the people of the whole world. There is no need for imperialism to exist.

## Notes

1. The Qing dynasty (1644–1911); the Republican period refers to the period of the Republic of China (1911–1949).

2. Before leading the successful Revolution of 1911, which itself was sparked by an uprising in Wuchang in which he did not himself take part (Sun was in Denver, Colorado at the time of the uprising), Sun Yat-sen (see text Aug. 4, 1952, note 7, and text Nov. 12, 1956, source note) had a very checkered career as a revolutionary. From 1895 to 1911, he led, or took part in organizing, ten insurrections, scattered in many parts of South and Central China. After the last of these ten unsuccessful uprisings, the famous Huanghuagang uprising in Guangzhou, Sun fled overseas, but he soon returned, after the successful insurrection in Wuchang in October 1911.

3. See text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, notes 7 and 8.

4. Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) became the president of the Republic of China in 1912 and was the leader of the Beiyang clique. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, in the flood of “self-strengthening” projects (see text Aug. 24, 1956[1], note 2), he was commissioned to train the Qing government’s “New Army” at Xiaozhan near Tianjin. He won the confidence of the Empress Dowager Cixi (see text Aug. 24, 1956[1], note 50) when he took her side in the smashing of the Hundred Days Reform attempt and lent his newly acquired military influence to her cause. In 1902 he succeeded Li Hongzhang as the governor of Zhili province and grand councillor of “Beiyang” (for an explanation of the term Beiyang see text May–June 1955, vol. I, note 55). In 1911, after the outbreak of the Wuchang uprising, and with the endorsement of the foreign powers, Yuan became the prime minister of the Qing cabinet in a last attempt to stave off the bourgeois republican revolution. He then sent troops to reestablish order on behalf of the Qing in Hankou and Hanyang and forced Sun Yat-sen to resign as provisional president. In February 1912 he forced the Xuantong Emperor to abdicate and subsequently became himself the provisional president of the Republic of China. The government he established became known as the Beiyang government. In 1913, with his power intensely consolidated, he signed a treaty in response to the Japanese Twenty-One Demands and began, with Japanese support, a move to make himself emperor. In 1916 he restored a “constitutional” monarchy, taking the title of the Hongxian Emperor. This stirred up much opposition from many sectors of China, including that of some of his own lieutenants as well as other military forces such as that commanded by Cai E. In March 1916, he abolished the monarchy and “resumed the presidency,” only to die soon thereafter in June 1916. A number of books have been written about Yuan’s life and political career, notably J. Chen (1961) and E. Young (1977). Also see text May–June 1955, vol. I, note 55.

5. This refers to the period of the First United Front (1924–1927), which lay the foundations for the Northern Expedition, which defeated the Beiyang warlords and “united China.” (See text Aug. 12, 1953[1], vol. I, note 7, text Apr. 1956, note 9; see also text Nov. 12, 1956, note 7.)

6. This refers to the prosecution of Communists and Communist organizations in the areas controlled by Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT in 1927–1928. Most of the Communist organizations in the First United Front period had been concentrated in major cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. This made them easy targets for Chiang, who, in a purging of the KMT movement, massacred Communists in these cities; the most famous were the Shanghai and Canton massacres of April 1927, and the Wuhan massacre on July 15, 1927, staged by Wang Jingwei’s forces. Only a small remnant of the Communist organizations were able to escape and reconstitute themselves in the Jiangxi Soviet. Mao may also be referring to the

fact that when the column of Communists under Mao's command finally arrived at the Yanan region in northern Shaanxi after the Long March, they numbered only about 8,000 people, although they were to be joined subsequently by some 15,000 others in units commanded by He Long, Zhang Guotao, and Zhu De.

7. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 45.
8. See text Feb. 19–24, 1953, vol. I, note 6.
9. See text Apr. 1956, notes 8, 9, 10, 12.
10. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23; text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, source note, notes 1 and 7; and text Apr. 1956, notes 10 and 13.
11. See text Jan. 28, 1955, vol. I, notes 2 and 3.
12. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 45.

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### Telegram to Petru Groza

(July 18, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 19, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 22. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 19, 1956), 1.

Chairman,  
The Presidium of the Grand National Assembly,  
The People's Republic of Romania

Dear Comrade Petru Groza:

On hearing the news of your illness, the Chinese people and myself are greatly concerned. We would like to convey to you our sincere regards and wholehearted hope for the early recovery of your health.

(Signed and dated in Beijing)

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### Telegram to Ethiopia

(July 21, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 23, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 22. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 23, 1956), 1.

Emperor Haile Selassie I

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of your country's National Day, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend warm congratulations to you and to the people of your country.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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### Telegram to the People's Republic of Poland

(July 21, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 22, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 174. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (July 22, 1956), 1.

Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki, Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Poland,  
Comrade Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland,  
Comrade Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland:

On the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the national day of the People's Republic of Poland, please allow us, on behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, to express to you, to the government of the People's Republic of Poland, and to the Polish people our warm felicitations. The Chinese people have always been concerned about the struggle the Polish people wage to build a better life and to consolidate the system of the people's democracy.<sup>1</sup> We are convinced that under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party and the government of the People's Republic of Poland, the Polish people will achieve new successes in their endeavor to implement the new five-year plan and in the cause of safeguarding peace in Europe and the world. May the fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Polish peoples be ever more developed and consolidated.

(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 4, for an explanation of the term "people's democracies."

Telegram to the Republic of Liberia  
(July 24, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 26, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 90 (Aug. 21, 1956), 22. Available English Translation: FBIS, *Daily Report* (July 27, 1956), AAA20.

President [William V. S.] Tubman,  
The Republic of Liberia,  
Monrovia, Liberia

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of Liberia's National Day, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend warm and sincere congratulations to the people of your country and to Your Excellency.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Telegram to the Swiss Confederation  
(July 29, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 1, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 91 (Sept. 6, 1956), 35. Available English Translation: FBIS, *Daily Report* (July 29, 1956), AAA19.

President Markus Feldmann,  
The Swiss Confederation

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the commemoration of the National Day of the Swiss Confederation, please accept my sincere congratulations. May the Swiss Confederation always grow in prosperity and may the friendly relations between China and Switzerland be developed and become more consolidated with each passing day.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Letter to Cao Yunfang  
(August 11, 1956)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, pp. 512–513.

*According to the source, Cao Yunfang is the widow of Luo Zhe. During the period of the Great Revolution (1925-1927), they both worked with Mao in the Communist underground.*

Comrade Yunfang:

I have received your letter of July 8, and I am very gratified. I have long received some news of the heroic sacrifice of Comrade Luo Zhe.<sup>1</sup> When I saw our friend Zhang Wei<sup>2</sup> in Chongqing in 1945, I asked him for news of your whereabouts. [At the time] he only told me that your sister, Madam Wang, had already passed away; he didn't know anything about your circumstances. I am very happy to find out now that you are still alive and well, and that you have two daughters to carry on the work and heritage of [Comrade] Luo Zhe. Luo Zhe worked hard and arduously for the interests of the Party; to that I can personally attest, although at the time [of his sacrifice] no other certificate or testimony was issued. The question of who should receive the pension money should be decided by the local government. If its decision is to award it to [your] stepson and not to [your] daughters, let it be; there is no need to challenge it, or to quarrel about it. [Luo's] grave can be maintained by the members of his family. I enclose herein three hundred *yuan* (*rmb*);<sup>3</sup> see how you would want to dispose of it and handle the matter. If, in the future, you encounter more difficulties, you may let me know so that I can see what I can do. Of those two children [of mine] that you have met, one gave his life in the war, and the other has become crippled with illness.<sup>4</sup> I send my congratulations for the successful work you have done in Guiyang.

My best wishes for good health and safety.

Mao Zedong

August 11, 1956

Notes

1. Luo Zhe was, according to the source, a native of Zhuzhou, Hunan, and a member of the early CPC who worked with Mao during the period of the Great Revolution (1925–1927) in the peasant movement. He died in 1928.

2. See text Sept. 19, 1950, vol. I, source note.

3. Mao is referring here to the new *renminbi* currency. See text Oct. 2, 1952(1), vol. I, note 4.

4. Mao refers here to his two sons by his first wife Yang Kaihui (see text Oct. 9, 1949, vol. I, note 1, and text May 11, 1957, note 1). The elder son, Mao Anying (1922–1950) was killed in the Korean War (see text Nov. 1950, vol. I). The second son, Mao Anqing, is reported to have had a long history of mental illness. Mao is also known to have two daughters by his third wife, Jiang Qing.

## Talk with Music Workers

(August 24, 1956)

**Source:** *Wenyi luxian*, pp. 6–9. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d.), pp. 37–40; *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 106–109; *Ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 174–176; *RMRB* (Sept. 9, 1979), 1; *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, pp. 745–753; *Wenyi yulu*, pp. 56–57 (excerpts); *Xinwen zhanbao*, 4 (May 23, 1967) (excerpt); *Wenyi hongqi*, 5 (May 30, 1967), 3 (excerpt); *Shengping ziliao*, p. 335 (excerpt); *Meishu fenglei*, 3 (Aug. 1967) (excerpt). Available English Translations: S. Schram (1974), pp. 84–90; *BR*, 22:37 (Sept. 14, 1979), 9–15; *SCMP*, 4000 (Aug. 14, 1967), 17 (excerpt); *SCMM* (suppl.), 22 (Apr. 8, 1968), 10 (excerpt).

*According to the Wenyi luxian source, this is a talk that Mao had with leading members of the All-China Federation of Music Workers and other personnel in the musical circles on August 24, 1956, and the transcript as reproduced in this source had not been inspected by Mao and was allegedly subject to further study and revision. Of our various sources here, the Wansui (n.d.), Wansui (n.d. 3), and Ziliao xuanbian text are similar to the Wenyi luxian document. The RMRB transcript, while it provides generally similar information, is completely different in structure from the Wenyi luxian version and may indeed represent the “study and revision” hinted at in the latter. The Mao zhuzuo xuandu document is a reprint of the RMRB version. The BR translation follows the RMRB version, which was released very much later, while Schram’s and the other translated excerpts follow the Wenyi luxian version. The RMRB/BR version, according to the sources, is reproduced on the basis of notes and records taken by people present at this conversation. Since the RMRB source and the BR translation of it are much more easily accessible to the reader, the Wenyi luxian source is generally unavailable, even though Schram’s translation is accessible. We have therefore made our independent translation only of the latter, here presented as Version I. To allow our readers to easily compare the two versions, we are reproducing the BR translation, as it appeared in that publication, as Version II. This reproduction, in some places, consists also of our own additional annotations, which do not appear in BR. However, subjects annotated in Version I will generally not be annotated in Version II.*

### Version I

The arts of the different nationalities in the world work under the same fundamental principle, though each differs from the other in terms of form and style. The arts of all the socialist countries have socialism as their content, but each also has its own national character. There is commonality and there is difference; there is generality and there is individuality; this is a law of nature. It holds true for all matters, regardless of [whether they fall into] the realms of nature, or of society, or the realm of the intellect. Take the leaves of a tree; they look generally the same at first sight, but they are different from each other when examined closely. It is

impossible to find two leaves that are completely identical.

Class struggle, socialist revolution, and the transition from capitalism to socialism in all the various countries share the same fundamental principles. But, under the direction of [these] fundamental principles, each country varies from the next in terms of minor principles and the forms in which [the principles] are manifested. The October Revolution and the Chinese Revolution are a case in point. The two revolutions were similar with respect to fundamental principles, but they had many differences in terms of the forms they took. For example, in terms of revolutionary development, in Russia it was from the cities to the countryside, while in our country, it was from the countryside to the cities.<sup>1</sup> This is one of the many differences between these two revolutions.

The art of each nationality in the world has its own unique national form and national style. [However,] some people do not understand this. They reject their own national characteristics and blindly worship the West; they hold that everything in the West is better and even going to the extent of advocating “wholesale Westernization.”<sup>2</sup> This is incorrect. Complete Westernization is infeasible; it will not be accepted by the common people of China. Art is different from natural science. For example, medical treatments such as appendectomies and taking aspirin do not have a national form. But art is different; art involves a question of national form. This is because art is the expression of the way of life, thought, and feelings of the people and is closely related to the national custom and language. Its historical development carries with it a hereditary nature within the framework of the nation.

China’s art—China’s music, painting, drama, song and dance, and literature has its own history of development. In order to negate Chinese things, those who advocate “wholesale Westernization” assert that Chinese things do not have laws of their own; [therefore] they are unwilling to study and develop Chinese things. This is an attitude of national nihilism toward China’s art.

Every nation in the world has its own history, its own strong points and weaknesses. [All] things in history are divided into the pure and the dross, which mingle together and accumulate over long periods of time. It is a difficult task to sort them out and distinguish the pure from the dross. But we cannot discard history because of this difficulty. To cut history up and throw away all [our] heritage will not do; the common people would not approve of it.

This, of course, definitely does not mean that we have no need to learn from foreign countries. There are many foreign things that we must study and, moreover, must study well. Basic theory, in particular, must be studied well. Some people advocate Chinese learning as essence, and Western learning for utility.<sup>3</sup> Is this idea correct? No, it is wrong. The so-called “learning” is nothing but fundamental theory. And fundamental theory is the same for China as for foreign countries. There should be no distinction between China and the West [in this regard].

The fundamental theory of Marxism originated in the West, but does that mean that a distinction can be made between China and the West in this connection? Is it possible for us not to accept it? The practice of the Chinese revolution has proven that not accepting Marxism would be detrimental to our own interest. Besides, there



is no reason not to accept it. In the past, the Second International once tried to negate and revise the fundamental principles of Marxism and put forward certain arguments to explain the negations and revisions.<sup>4</sup> [But] all of these were refuted by Lenin. Marxism is a universally applicable general truth, and we must accept it. Nonetheless, this general truth must also be integrated with the concrete practice of revolution in different countries. It is precisely because the Chinese people had accepted Marxism and integrated it with the practice of the Chinese revolution that they achieved victory in the Chinese revolution.

Studying foreign things is for the purpose of studying and developing Chinese things. In this respect the natural sciences and the social sciences are the same. We must make a good study of all good foreign things, and after mastering them, we must develop them [further] in the process of applying them. In the field of natural science, we must also do innovative and creative work; we must also use modern scientific knowledge and methods from abroad to put China's scientific heritage in order until we form China's own schools of thought. Take, for example, Western medical science and other related modern sciences such as physiology, pathology, biochemistry, bacteriology, and anatomy; can you say we do not need to study them? We must study all these modern sciences. But some of those who have studied Western medicine must also study Chinese medicine and must use modern scientific knowledge and methods to put our ancient Chinese medicine and Chinese pharmacology in order and to study them, so that by combining the knowledge of Chinese and Western medicine and pharmacology they can create a new and unified Chinese medical and pharmaceutical science.<sup>5</sup>

If this is the case with the natural and social sciences, it is naturally even more so with the arts. We must learn from foreign countries and absorb all their fine things. But what we learn from foreign countries must be used for the purpose of studying and developing the art of the various nationalities in China; otherwise our research and development [efforts] will have no object. In learning from the arts of foreign countries and studying their fundamental theory and technique, our objective is to create for the various nationalities of China their own new socialist art that bears their particular national form and style.

We must admit that in regard to modern culture, the West is at a higher level than we are, and we have lagged behind. Is this [also] the case with [our] art? In art, we have both our strong points and our weak points. We must be good at absorbing the fine things from foreign countries in order to overcome our own weak points. It would be no good if we stopped moving forward and held fast to the old ways, and if we did not study and introduce foreign literature, or if we did not know how to listen to or how to play foreign music. Do not behave like Empress Dowager Cixi who blindly rejected everything foreign.<sup>6</sup> The blind rejection of all foreign things is in no way different from the blind worship of them. Both are incorrect and harmful.

Regarding the issue of learning from foreign countries, we must oppose both conservatism and dogmatism. Politically we have suffered setbacks because of dogmatism. Copying and rigidly transplanting everything from a foreign country resulted in a great defeat; the Party organizations in the white areas were 100 per

cent destroyed, the revolutionary bases and the Red Army were reduced by 90 per cent, and the victory of revolution in China was delayed for many years.<sup>7</sup> The reason for this is that some comrades did not take reality, but took dogmatism, as their point of departure, failing to integrate the fundamental theory of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Had we not got rid of this kind of dogmatism, we would not have been able to achieve the victory of the Chinese revolution today.

We should also learn this lesson in the area of art and take care not to suffer reverses from dogmatism. Studying foreign things is not the same as importing everything and rigidly transplanting foreign practices. They should be absorbed critically. We learn from the ancients for [the good of] the people today, and we learn from the foreigners for [the good of] the Chinese people.

We should really master the good things from foreign countries as well as the good things in China. Half bottles of vinegar are no good; we must change two half bottles into two full bottles.<sup>8</sup> We must thoroughly study both the good things in China and the good things from foreign countries, and must combine the two sides into an organic whole. This was the case with Lu Xun. He was familiar with things both foreign and Chinese, but his brilliance lay primarily in his creative work rather than his translation.<sup>9</sup> His creative work is different not only from foreign works but also from the old-style Chinese writings, but it is [still] Chinese. We should learn from Lu Xun's spirit and try to have a thorough command of things both Chinese and foreign, absorbing the strengths of both Chinese and foreign arts, fusing them together to create a new art with a unique national form and national style.

Of course it is not easy to effectively combine Chinese and foreign things. It requires a process. It is possible to blend some foreign things in with Chinese things. Take the writing of novels, for example. The language, characters, and background must be Chinese, but the novels do not need to be written in the [traditional] installment form of *zhang* and *hui*.<sup>10</sup> We can also produce a few things that are neither Chinese nor Western. [One may say that] it is neither horse nor donkey, but there is nothing wrong with becoming a mule.<sup>11</sup> When two sides are combined, their form will change. It is impossible for them to remain completely unchanged. Chinese things will change. No matter whether in the political, economic, or cultural [sphere], the face of China is undergoing a tremendous change. But whatever the change, Chinese things still should have their own special features. Foreign things are also changing. The face of the world underwent a fundamental change after the October Revolution. This change has further developed since the Second World War. We must pay attention to absorbing foreign things in a critical manner, especially things from the socialist world and things from the progressive peoples of the capitalist world.

In sum, art must have its own independent creative qualities; it must be marked with a clear-cut national character and a character of the times. On no account should China's art, as more effort is spent on it, relapse more and more into the old [style] or become more and more Westernized. With more effort, it should take on more and more the characteristics of its own time and national [identity]. In this regard we should not be squeamish about "creating things that are novel and

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extraordinary.” Especially in a country like China, which has a long history and a large population, it is even more necessary [to create] “novel and extraordinary” things that will meet the needs of the various nationalities of China. The more things of this “novel and extraordinary” type, which are welcomed by the common people of the various nationalities of China, the better. We do not want uniformity, for uniformity will end up in [stereotyped works like] the eight-legged essay.<sup>12</sup> And all stereotyped works, no matter whether indigenous or foreign, are lifeless things and are not welcomed by the common people of China.

Here the problem of dealing with bourgeois intellectuals who have received a Western education arises. This problem, if mishandled, will have an adverse effect not only on the cause of art, but also on the revolutionary cause as a whole. China’s national bourgeoisie<sup>13</sup> and its intellectuals consist of a few million people. They are not great in number, but they possess a modern culture. We definitely should unite with them and educate and reform them. The comprador class has [its] culture, which is a slave culture. The landlord class also has [its] culture, which is a feudal culture. Having been oppressed for a long time, the Chinese workers and peasants do not yet have much culture or knowledge. Comparatively speaking, the bourgeois intellectuals will have a higher [level of] knowledge and skill with regard to modern culture and technology until such time as a cultural revolution and a technical revolution are realized. Provided our policy is correct and we are able to educate and reform them, they can be made to serve the cause of socialism. Can we get them educated and reformed? Yes, we can. Many of us present here were bourgeois intellectuals in the past but have switched over from the side of the bourgeoisie to the side of the proletariat. So why can’t they switch over too? As a matter of fact, many of them have already switched over. Therefore we must definitely unite with them and educate and reform them. Only if we do this can the revolutionary cause of the working class and the socialist revolution and socialist construction of today be benefited.<sup>14</sup>

You who are present are all musicians studying Western music, and you have many important responsibilities. Putting Chinese music in order and developing it depends on you who study Western music, just as putting Chinese medicine in order and developing it depends on doctors who study Western medicine. The Western things you have learned are useful; only you ought to study things on both sides well, Chinese as well as Western, and must not advocate “wholesale Westernization.” You should emphasize things Chinese and work hard to study and develop them, with the aim of creating a set of Chinese things with a national form and style uniquely its own. Once you have grasped this basic orientation, your work will have greater prospects.

## Version II

The fundamental principles of socialist revolution are the same for all countries. But things are different with respect to minor principles and the forms in which the fundamental principles are manifested. For example, the principles of war are the same; they involve attack and defense, advance and retreat, victory and defeat. But in the waging of war there are differences, and indeed many differences, as to how

to attack or how to defend. In the War to Resist U.S. [Aggression] and Aid Korea, the two sides fought to a stalemate along the 38th parallel.<sup>15</sup> This was a form rarely seen before. Revolution certainly takes a variety of forms. The October Revolution and the Chinese revolution were different in many respects. In the Soviet Union the revolution developed from the cities to the countryside, while in our country it developed from the countryside to the cities.

The fundamental principles of the arts are universal, but their forms of expression should be varied and there should be national forms and national styles. Take the leaves of a tree; at first sight they look much the same, but upon close examination each one is different. There is individuality as well as universality, dissimilarity as well as similarity. This is a law of nature and likewise a law of Marxism. This should also hold for composing music, for song and dance.

To say that things Chinese do not have their own laws is to negate them, and this is wrong. The Chinese language, Chinese music, and Chinese painting all have their own laws. Those people who spoke ill of Chinese painting just hadn’t made a thorough study of their own things, and they thought they had to use the methods employed in Western painting. Of course, you can first learn things foreign before moving on to things Chinese. But things Chinese have their own laws. In music you may apply appropriate foreign principles and use foreign musical instruments. But still there must be national characteristics. We must have our own distinctive style, something that is unique.

“Complete Westernization” of the arts has little chance of being accepted. It’s better to take Chinese art as the basis and engage in our own creative activity while absorbing some foreign things. You can try all sorts of things now; you can take your pick. You have to learn many things from foreign countries and learn them well. You can thus broaden your horizons. But the Chinese people won’t welcome any mechanical transplanting of things foreign into our Chinese art. The case is different with medicine. Western medicine is really effective in curing illness. There is no question of national form in operating on the stomach, removing the appendix, or taking aspirin. Nor has the use of Chinese angelica and rhubarb anything to do with national form. But there is a question of form, of national form, in the arts. The arts are inseparable from the customs, the feelings, and even the language of the people, from the history of the nation. There is a large measure of national conservatism in the arts that can persist for even thousands of years. Ancient art can still be appreciated by later generations.

We should get acquainted with foreign things and read foreign books. That doesn’t mean that Chinese people have to do things in exactly the same way as foreigners, nor does it mean that what is written by a Chinese must read like a translation. For Chinese people our own things should remain primary.

Of course, we favor music with a national character. As Chinese we would be in the wrong to do otherwise. But surely we ought not to have the *suona* horn or the *huqin*<sup>16</sup> fiddle in our military bands; just as in the case of military uniforms, today we wear the present style and not those jackets with the character for “brave” on the back and front.<sup>17</sup> That’s not the way national styles are cultivated. Musical instruments are tools. Whether a tool is good or bad is of course important, but what

is essential is how one uses it. We can make use of foreign musical instruments but must not copy foreign music in our musical composition.

There are 2.7 billion people on this earth, and it simply wouldn't do if all were to sing one tune. Every nationality, East or West, should have things of its own. The Western countries have developed capitalism and have played a role in history. Now the attention of the world is gradually turning toward the East. Would it be right for the countries of the East not to create their own things?

We can also produce some works that are neither Chinese nor foreign in style as long as there are people who enjoy them. Some people have advocated complete Westernization, but this can't be done. The fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism ought to be accepted. It is neither reasonable nor advantageous to reject them. In the past the Second International denied these fundamentals, but Lenin refuted its arguments. China also had its "Second International"—Jiang Kanghu's Socialist Party—but it had very little influence.<sup>18</sup> The forms in which the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism are manifested in practice should differ from country to country. In China these principles must be integrated with the actual conditions of the Chinese revolution. The October Revolution had the national characteristics of a Russian revolution. Socialist in content and national in form—this is the way it is in art as well as in politics. The general principles of Western music must be integrated with Chinese conditions. This will give rise to richer modes of expression.

Chinese bean curd, bean sprouts, preserved eggs, and Beijing duck are Chinese specialties, and no other country can compare in their production; they can be spread internationally. Cuisine and clothing differ from country to country. What is worn in India is quite different from what is worn in China, and it is suited to the Indian environment. Chinese people eat with chopsticks while Western people use knives and forks. It wouldn't make sense to say that it is wiser and more scientific to use knives and forks and backward to use chopsticks.

It's always necessary to pay attention to history. A long history has its advantages and disadvantages. The history of the United States is short, and perhaps there is some advantage in that, for burdens are lighter and it isn't necessary to remember so many things. We have a long history, which has its advantages, too. If we were to throw out our old traditions, people would call it traitorous. You can't chop off history even if you want to. There's no getting around it. And yet it is really rather troublesome to look back over such a long history.

We must learn scientific principles from foreign countries. And we learn these principles in order to apply them in the study of things Chinese. That's why we ask our doctors trained in Western medicine to study traditional Chinese medicine. We must learn the general principles of both the natural and the social sciences. The composition of water, the fact that man has evolved from the ape, these are the same for all countries. But what about the arts? Chinese music, dancing, and painting have their own laws, but we find it hard to explain them because we haven't studied well enough. We should first learn modern things from foreign countries and then use what we have learned to study things Chinese. If we first study Western medical science, anatomy, pharmacology, etc., and then go on to study traditional

Chinese medicine and pharmacology, it should be possible for us to grasp things Chinese more quickly. Marx said that it would be easier to understand ancient society if modern society was studied first. This means reversing the sequence, but it saves time.

The trouble with handicraft art is that it's hard to attract our artists. They look down on Chinese folk art. There's a problem of interest here. We should try to arouse their interest gradually. They may not be persuaded right away, so we must keep up our efforts over a long period of time.

We must oppose dogmatism. We have suffered from dogmatism politically. Everything was learned from Russia and was turned into dogma. This resulted in a great defeat; we lost practically everything in the white areas and 90 per cent of the base areas and of the Red Army, and the victory of the revolution was delayed a good many years. And all this because dogmas, rather than realities, were taken as the starting point. The dogmatists failed to integrate the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Although they said that the Chinese revolution was a democratic revolution, they wanted to overthrow all capitalists. Their approach was wrong; their realm was no longer that of a democratic revolution but that of a socialist revolution. They didn't know the difference. They were wrong in their revolutionary methods and in their handling of inner-Party relations, and as a result, the revolution suffered grave losses. Dogmatism must be opposed. If it isn't, the revolution can't triumph.

If the problems of the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals aren't handled well, the revolutionary cause will be adversely affected. In its treatment of the bourgeoisie, China has been different from the Soviet Union. Although China's bourgeoisie and their intellectuals are few in number, they have modern culture, and we still need to unite with them. The landlord class also has culture, but it's an archaic culture, not a modern one. They can compose a few classical poems and write some essays in the Tong Cheng style,<sup>19</sup> but these are of no use today. Speaking of workers and peasants, the workers have relatively more culture. They have some technical skills but still can't serve as engineers, and they fall somewhat short of the bourgeoisie and intellectuals in culture. We can't say the peasants have no culture—intensive farming, the singing of folksongs, and dancing are also culture. But the majority of them are illiterate and have no modern culture or technical skills. They can wield hoes and plows but can't use tractors. In terms of modern culture and technology, the bourgeoisie is ahead of the other classes, and hence we must unite with them and transform them. Some bourgeois culture is outdated and can't be used, but much of it can. Among musicians, there are many who, in ideology, belong to the bourgeoisie. It was the same with us in the past. But we've changed over. Why can't they do so too? In fact, many already have. Uniting with them is in the interest of the revolutionary cause of the working class. We must unite with them, help them to remold themselves, and win them over. You may all be regarded as Western doctors; you've all studied Western music. We must rely on you. Asking old-style minstrels to run specialized music schools won't do. We must rely on you to do this.

The Chinese revolution has Chinese characteristics. The revolution in Russia

took the form it did because there was no other alternative. Lenin did think of other ways of dealing with the bourgeoisie.<sup>20</sup> But at the time, the bourgeoisie didn't believe the Bolshevik Party would win, so they put up resistance. What's more, at first the proletariat had no army, and there were only 80,000 Party members. Our situation was different from that in the Soviet Union. China was not an imperialist country. We had fought for more than twenty years. We had an army and two million Party members. And the Chinese national bourgeoisie was also oppressed by imperialism. That's why the Chinese revolution took a different form.

It is only natural that forms of expression should be varied. This applies to the arts as well as to politics. Certainly big countries like China should create things new and original, but these should appeal to the masses. The greater the number of these popular creations, the better, and they shouldn't be all of a kind. Otherwise this would lead to stereotypes. In the past, stereotyped writing was the fashion for five or six hundred years. It's no good when only one form prevails everywhere. The sameness in women's and men's clothing can't last. With victory in the revolution women have shunned dressing up for a time, and this signifies a change in the general social mood; this signifies revolution. This is fine, but it can't last. It's better to have diversity.

National forms may incorporate some foreign elements. There's surely no need to write novels in the old style with each chapter headed by a couplet giving the gist. But the language and presentation should be Chinese. Lu Xun was for a national style. But he also advocated very close translation. Personally, I'm for very close translation of theoretical works because it has the advantage of accuracy.

We should be clear on this fundamental idea: It is also necessary to learn basic principles from the West. To insist that the scalpel must be in the Chinese style is absurd. As far as medicine is concerned, we should use the modern science of the West to study the laws of traditional Chinese medicine so as to develop China's new medicine. The basic principles of music are the same in all countries. But they're put into practice differently, and their forms of expression should vary. Consider the writing of travel diaries. Suppose we go on an excursion to the Western Hills<sup>21</sup> together. The places we visit are the same, and yet what each of us writes about them will be different.

It's necessary to learn all that is good in foreign countries. In medicine, for example, we should study bacteriology, biochemistry, anatomy, and pathology. It's also necessary to learn all that is good in China. We should pay due attention to things Chinese; otherwise, much of our research will serve no purpose. In Chinese history there were a good many things that haven't been passed down. Emperor Ming of the Tang dynasty was a poor emperor; during the first half of his reign he was up to his job, but in the second half he was a flop.<sup>22</sup> He did understand the arts. He was a director of plays and he knew how to play the drum, but his skills weren't passed down. We must depend on you. You are "Western doctors," but there should be sinification. When you have mastered a certain subject, you should apply it to the study of things Chinese and thus make what you've learned Chinese.

It's no good if you lose confidence in things Chinese once you've studied things foreign. But this is not to say that you shouldn't learn from foreign countries.

In modern culture, foreign countries are more advanced than we are; this point must be acknowledged. But is it the same for the arts? In some particulars China has its distinctive qualities, while in others foreign countries excel. In novels, foreign countries are ahead, while we have fallen behind. Lu Xun understood things foreign as well as things Chinese, but he didn't look down on things Chinese. Only on Chinese medicine and Beijing opera were his views to some extent incorrect. Chinese medicine couldn't save his father. And he preferred local theater.

Confucius was an educator and a musician. He ranked music second among the "six courses."<sup>23</sup>

By absorbing the good points of foreign countries, we'll be able to make our own things leap ahead. The Chinese and the foreign should be combined and become an organic whole, and there shouldn't be indiscriminate use of things foreign. When we learn the foreign method of making hats, we should use it to make Chinese hats. Useful foreign things should all be learned and used to improve and develop things Chinese, to create new things unique to China. We can borrow a bit, but what is our own should be primary. We need *Dead Souls*,<sup>24</sup> but we also need *The True Story of Ah Q*.<sup>25</sup> Lu Xun translated *Dead Souls*, "Destruction,"<sup>26</sup> and so on; however, his brilliance didn't lie primarily in translation but in his own creative works.

Chinese culture should be developed. It's bad not to be able to appreciate or play foreign music. It's wrong not to translate foreign works. It's wrong to oppose "foreign devils" as the Empress Dowager Ci Xi did. We should learn from abroad and use what we learn to create things Chinese.

Don't be afraid to perform a little foreign music. Of the "nine categories" and "ten categories" of music of the Sui and Tang dynasties, many came from Central Asia and a few from Korea and India.<sup>27</sup> The playing of foreign music hasn't meant the loss of our own music; our own music has continued to develop. If we can digest foreign music and absorb its strong points, this will be beneficial to us. The indiscriminate rejection and the wholesale absorption of Western culture are both wrong.

We should keep on making things Chinese and not make them foreign. This way, your controversy can be resolved. We must oppose dogmatism and conservatism. Neither will do China any good. Studying things foreign isn't equivalent to copying them all. We learn from the ancients to benefit the living, and we learn from foreigners to benefit the Chinese people.

We must study each side well, the Chinese as well as the foreign. Doing two things by half won't do. We've got to take the two half measures and turn them into two wholes.

This isn't the same as taking "Chinese learning as the substance, Western learning for practical use."<sup>28</sup> By "learning" we mean the basic principles, which are applicable everywhere and shouldn't be differentiated as "Chinese" or "foreign." To be neither horse nor ass is also permissible. Mules are neither horses nor asses. The union of horse and ass is bound to change the form; total avoidance of change is impossible. The appearance of China, whether in politics, economy, or culture, should change and not remain old-fashioned. But China's characteristics

ought to be preserved. We should graft foreign things onto a basic Chinese stock. They should be cross-bred and combined organically.

Western things will also change. Not all things Western are good, and it's only the good that we should take. We ought to critically assimilate useful elements from the West on our own Chinese foundation.

In the assimilation of foreign things, they must be transformed and become Chinese. Lu Xun's novels certainly aren't the same as foreign novels, nor are they the same as ancient Chinese novels. They are contemporary Chinese novels.

You are students of Western things, "Western doctors" so to speak; you are our treasures, and we should pay heed to you and rely on you. It's wrong to exclude those who study foreign things. It must be admitted that what they study is advanced, that the modern West is one step ahead of us. To refuse to admit this and just call them dogmatists won't convince people. Dogmatism must be rectified—but it must be rectified in the manner of "a gentle breeze and mild rain."<sup>29</sup> We should pay heed to them, but at the same time we must persuade them to attach importance to things Chinese and not to seek complete Westernization. We ought to study the strong points of foreign countries and use them to sort out and systematize things Chinese, to create things of our own with a unique national flavor. Only thus can we clarify things and make sure that we don't lose our national confidence.

A talk given by Comrade Mao Zedong when he met with leading comrades of the National Association of Musicians on August 24, 1956. This is a record made by those comrades present at the meeting.

## Notes

1. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 30.

2. The slogan "wholesale Westernization" reflected an important concept in the mental struggle undertaken by the Chinese intelligentsia in the twentieth century to come to grips with the reality of prolonged Western imperialist encroachment in China and with the corresponding evolution in China's view of its own cultural identity. In 1929 a number of liberal thinkers, notably Hu Shi (for partial biographical information, see text Oct. 1954[1], vol. I, note 1, and text Oct. 16, 1954, note 7) proposed that China, in order to catch up with the goals of modernization, must undergo a thorough process of Westernization. In 1934–35, under a different context, Hu proposed the slogan again. Thus, Hu has become identified as the chief spokesman for "wholesale Westernization" in modern China.

The "wholesale Westernization" theorem stemmed from several major intellectual debates since the late nineteenth century. A hotly debated review of this idea in conjunction with the circumstances of the First World War and China's own political chaos in the 1910s and 1920s polarized Chinese intellectuals along the lines suggested by this idea of Westernization. On one extreme there were those who believed in sustaining at all costs China's own cultural tradition. These were known as the *guocui pai*, or School of National Essence. A slightly modified, though nonetheless "conservative" position was held by those such as Liang Shuming (see text Sept 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 1), who believed that although China's civilization needed to be modernized, there were fundamental qualitative differences between "philosophies East and West" and that China could not be modernized by means of "Westernization." Then there were also "Westernizers" of many different stripes. In the debate, Hu's vision of modernization through complete or wholesale Westernization stood,

at the time (i.e., in the late 1920s and early 1930s), at the other extreme.

The "wholesale Westernization" idea did not go very far, partially because within the mainstream of the debate itself it was too radical and was rejected not only by traditionalists but also by other Westernizers, and partially because it was misunderstood and was, in fact, a misnomer. Hu Shi did not mean to suggest that the Chinese should totally obliterate all that is Chinese culture and simply adopt, overnight, all that is Western. The idea of "wholesale Westernization" can be understood for what it really was only by examining it in conjunction with Hu's antitraditionalism, and with another idea that Hu called at the time "total cosmopolitanism." Hu was primarily reacting against traditionalists who rejected, out of hand, the notion that Western civilization, though technologically superior, had anything of moral or social value to add to China's cultural tradition. He advocated a conscientious absorption rather than an indiscriminate transplantation of Western culture, much less the substitution of Western civilization for China's own. By "wholesale" he meant "in all aspects," and not in selected areas such as merely in technology. However, quite unfortunately he did commit the semantic error of employing the term *quanpan*, which means "wholesale," rather than the more fitting term *quanmian*, which means "in all aspects." For a detailed discussion of this crucial intellectual issue—one that shaped much of Mao Zedong's own thinking—see J. Grieder (1970), parts II and III, and Lin Yusheng (1979), chs. 2 and 3.

3. This sentence, *zhongxue wei ti, xi xue wei yong* in Chinese, was first suggested, in anticipatory fashion, by the Qing scholar Feng Guifen (1809–1874) in his *Jiaobinlu kangyi* (Personal Protests from the Study of Jiaobin), circa 1860. This idea (i.e., that Chinese learning, together with its attending values and culture, should continue to form the base for Chinese civilization as it moved into the modern world, but Western learning should be imported and absorbed for its practical application, while not being allowed to make any fundamental revisions to the Chinese framework) was popularized by Zhang Zhidong, the late-Qing Han official who was chief educator and guiding light in China's "Self-strengthening" movement of the 1870s through the 1890s. In 1898, in his *Quanxue bian* (Exhortation to Study), Zhang officially inaugurated the slogan.

As it evolved in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this idea pandered both to traditionalists who embraced a chauvinistic sense of China's moral superiority and to more moderate conservatives who somehow believed that cultural interchange between nations could be managed purely on the technological front without impact on social and moral elements.

For biographical information on Feng and Zhang, see A. Hummel, ed. (1943), pp. 241–243, 27–32. For a discussion of the role played by this idea in the "self-strengthening" period, see S. Y. Teng and J. K. Fairbank (1954), chs. 5 and 10.

4. The Second International refers to the period of the development of the international socialist movement from 1889 to 1914. Unlike the "First International" (which in turn refers to the international socialist movement marked by the history of the International Working Men's Association formed in 1864, which was dominated during his lifetime by Marx and which declined in the late 1870s), the Second International lacked a centralized structure and was marked only by a series of international socialist congresses—at Brussels (1891), Zurich (1893), London (1896), Paris (1900), Amsterdam (1904), Stuttgart (1907), Copenhagen (1910), Basle (1912). (In 1889, however, the Swiss government did propose an International Conference on Labor, and in 1900, after the Paris Congress, an International Socialist Bureau was established.) The Second International marked, at least for the period of its existence, the recession of the socialist movement as a revolutionary, conspiratorial movement oriented toward the political overthrow of existing bourgeois or semifeudal regimes, and toward greater parliamentarianism. In the wake of the outbreak of the First World War, the movement disintegrated, with only a handful of the subscribing nations remaining within the structure, and more radicalized and communistic "parties" splitting off into the Third (Leninist and Soviet Union-oriented) International and the splinter Vienna Interna-

tional. See S. F. Markham (1931), ch. 10, and G. D. H. Cole (1956), vols. III:1 and III:2.

5. See texts Winter 1954; July 30, 1954; Oct. 20, 1954, and Winter 1954(2) in volume I.

6. Mao is referring to the Empress Cixi (1835–1908) of the Qing dynasty, who was a concubine of the Xianfeng Emperor (reigning 1851–1861) and rose to supreme power as the mother of the Tongzhi Emperor. As empress dowager she held the reins of the Qing government in her hands throughout the reigns of her son, the Tongzhi Emperor (reigning 1862–1874), and her nephew, the Guangxu Emperor (reigning 1875–1908). In 1889, ostensibly because of ill health, she “relinquished” direct control of the administration to Guangxu, who then, under the tutelage of reformers such as Kang Youwei, dabbled in a program to liberalize politics to a certain extent. In 1898, when the reform programs were just underway, Cixi resumed power, incarcerated Guangxu at Yingtai, imprisoned and executed a number of reformers such as Kang Zhangren and Tan Sitong, and crushed the “Hundred Days Reform” movement. In 1900 she also encouraged the Boxers in their attacks on foreign things in China (see text Jan. 28, 1955[2], vol. I, note 3).

7. This refers to the defeats suffered by the Chinese Communists in 1933–1934 during which time the KMT attacked the CPC base in Jiangxi and forced them to break out in the Long March. (See text July 14, 1956, note 8, and text Feb. 19–24, 1953, vol. I, note 6.) These setbacks, according to Mao, were the result of the erroneous leadership of the CPC under people such as Wang Ming who were influenced by the instructors of the Comintern conveyed by military advisers such as Otto Braun. (For Wang Ming, see text Aug. 12, 1953[1], vol. I, note 23, and text Apr. 1956, note 12.) Secondarily, this passage also refers to the CPC leadership’s mistakes under Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, and Li Lisan (see text Apr. 1956, notes 8 and 10).

8. Mao is referring to the Chinese aphorism: “A half-bottle of vinegar makes a lot of noise; a full bottle does not.”

9. See text Apr. 25, 1956, note 10.

10. Traditional Chinese novels, such as *Shuihu zhuan* and *Xiyou ji*, were written in installments, or chapters, known as *zhang* or *hui*. This was because this literary genre grew out of the folktale storyteller’s art. In traditional China, folklore such as that contained eventually in these novels was popularized by itinerant story tellers, who would, in order to capture their audience’s attention and create business, stop suspensefully when they came to a climactic juncture in the story, entreating his audience to “listen to the next *hui* (or installment),” in which the story would continue to unfold. The allusion to “couplets” that Mao makes in the corresponding passage in Version II of this document is in reference to the practice in these novels of rendering the title of each chapter as two descriptive lines of equal length, summarizing the contents of the chapter. Strictly these “chapter titles” are not couplets, since they are not usually poetic and do not necessarily scan or rhyme. There is, however, also a practice of concluding each chapter with a short poem, or sometimes with a poetic couplet that often conveys the “moral” of the chapter.

11. The saying *fei lu fei ma* (neither a donkey nor a horse), which means “neither here nor there,” is derived from the book “*Xiyu zhuan*” (Records of the Western Region) in the *Han Shu* (History of the Han Dynasty).

12. The term *ba gu wen* (eight-stem writing), generally translated as “eight-legged essay,” refers to the stilted form in which candidates in the imperial examinations from the fifteenth century onward were obliged to cast their compositions. Since in traditional China all scholars studied with the purpose of passing and excelling in the imperial examinations, all scholarship and education became subjected to the strict format of writing these eight-legged essays and the term became synonymous with pedantry and formalism. In 1942, Mao attacked the practice of writing stilted essays within the CPC. See text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 106.

13. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.

14. See text Jan. 20, 1956.

15. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 1, and text Oct. 8, 1950, vol. I, note 1.

16. The *suona* is a woodwind (reed) instrument with a copper-clad, bugle-like stem which originated among the Uighurs. It was introduced to China in the late Tang dynasty in the late ninth century and was popularized during the Ming dynasty as a musical instrument in the military.

The *huqin* (literally the instrument of the hu, or barbarian) is a stringed instrument that originated among the Beifan tribe.

17. In the Qing dynasty, foot soldiers generally wore a short jacket with the Chinese character *yong* (bravery) or the character *Qing* inscribed in a circle on the front and back.

In *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 109, we find, apart from the main body of the text for this speech and under a separate heading as “*Dui yinyue gongzuozhe de zhishi*” (Instructions to Music Workers), a paragraph that resembles the paragraph in Version II here. It reads:

“Of course, we favor music with a national character. As Chinese we would be in the wrong to do otherwise. But surely we ought not to have the *suona* horn or the *huqin* fiddle in our military bands; rather, we must make them philharmonic orchestras [in the Western style]. We must promote music with a national character, but we should also have Western philharmonic music because these things are fashionable throughout the world. This is like when we wear military uniforms; today we wear the contemporary style; surely we can’t wear those jackets with the characters for ‘brave’ written on the front and back. Even [promoting] the national character does not mean going that way. Naturally, our military uniforms are not the same as those of the Soviet Union; [ours] have the flavor of China’s army.”

18. Jiang Kanghu (1883–1954) was an early Chinese socialist whose socialism was deeply affected by his early acquaintance with the ideas of Henry George and with Japanese socialists such as Kotoku Shoshui and Katayama Sen. In the early 1910s his socialist activities and ideas were dominated by his concerns for the social liberation of Chinese women. In 1911 he organized a socialist study society, which grew into the Chinese Socialist Party, established in 1912 with headquarters in Shanghai. The program of the Party was primarily intellectualist rather than politically activist. It was banned by Yuan Shikai in 1913. Jiang’s ideas also came under the attack of the anarchist Liu Sifu. From 1913 to 1920 Jiang was in the United States and taught Chinese at the University of California at Berkeley. In 1920, he returned to China and resumed his socialist activities. In 1925, he reorganized the New Chinese Social-Democratic Party, which was a reformist party aligned with the Beiyang government (see text May–June 1955, note 55). This was disbanded in 1927 on the victory of the Northern Expedition forces. Jiang then went to Canada, with his political career temporarily at an end. In 1934 he returned to China, and in 1938, after the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan, he turned up in Shanghai, active in the so-called peace movement, which was designed to work out a compromise settlement with the Japanese. In 1940, he joined Wang Jingwei’s Japan-sponsored government and began to espouse a political program adjusted to the theories represented by Japan’s East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere strategy. For more biographical information on Jiang, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1967), I, pp. 338–344.

19. This refers to a literary school in the late-Qing dynasty originating with Fang Bao, a native of Tongcheng, Anhui province, and popularized by Liu Dakui and Yao Nai. It was marked by its rigid rules of writing but also by its simplicity and was considered the paragon of late-Qing classical-style prose.

20. In 1918 Lenin proposed that the Soviet government employ a two-prong strategy in dealing with the bourgeoisie. In ways that were echoed by PRC methods later on in the 1950s, Lenin’s strategy, expressed in the essay “Left-wing Childishness and the Petty Bourgeois Mentality” (May 1918), involved eliminating “uncultured” capitalists who wanted to continue their profiteering and exploitative activities while “buying off” others, transforming them into managers of the largest enterprises within the “state capitalism” system. See text July 9, 1953, vol. I, source note, and text Nov. 17, 1955, vol. I, note 4. See also text Jan. 20, 1956, note 12.

21. The Western Hills (Xishan) refer to a suburb of Beijing.

22. This refers to Emperor Xuanzong of the Tang dynasty (reigning 712–756). (See text May–June 1955, vol. I, note 3.) One of the most romantic figures in Chinese history, he reigned under three “reign names”: Xiantian (712–713), Kaiyuan (713–741), and Tianbao (742–756). Of these, the Kaiyuan period was known for its prosperity, but in the Tianbao period, he lapsed into poor judgment, personal corruption, and womanizing (see note on Yang Guifei, text Sept. 16–18, 1953, note 7) and was ultimately forced to flee in the face of rebellious forces commanded by his generals, notably An Lushan. He was known popularly as Tang Ming Wang because he was given the posthumous title of *Zhidao dasheng daming xiao huangdi*.

23. According to the *Zhou Li* (Zhou Book of Rites), Confucius considered six areas to be essential for the education of the *junzi* (superior man). These were *li* (rites), *yue* (music), *she* (archery), *yu* (charioteering or horsemanship), *shu* (literary writing and calligraphy), and *shu* (mathematics). These were known as the *liu yi* (six arts).

24. A novel written by the Russian author Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol (1809–1852).

25. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 38, and text Apr. 25, 1956, note 37.

26. Lu Xun began to translate Gogol's *Dead Souls* (rendered in Chinese as *Shi lingyun*) in 1935, one year before his death. He began to translate the story by Aleksander A. Fadeyev, “Anarchy” (rendered in Chinese as “Huimie” or “Destruction”) in 1930. This story was then published in 1931.

27. According to vol. 15 of *Sui shu* (History of the Sui Dynasty), there was in the Sui dynasty (581–618) the so-called *jiu bu yue* (nine streams of music), which included musical traditions from Qin, Xiliang, Guizi, Tianzhu (India), Kangguo, Suole, Anguo, Gaoli (Korea), and Libi.

According to the *Xin Tang shu* (New History of the Tang dynasty), vol. 21, there was in the Tang dynasty the so-called *shi bu yue* (ten streams of music), including musical traditions from Yan, Qingshang, Xiliang, Tianzhu, Gaoli, Guizi, Anguo, Suole, Kangguo, and Gaochang. Of these, Guizi, Kangguo, Anguo, Suole, and Gaochang were countries to the west of China beyond China's own territory. Mao's description of the state of music in the Tang dynasty here does not conform exactly to an earlier statement he made on the subject in text Jan. 20, 1956.

28. See note 3.

29. The phrase *hefeng xiyu*, as opposed to *jifeng baoyu* (stormy winds and violent rain), has come to epitomize the PRC's selectively applied strategy of modifying certain things gradually and moderately without doing damage to the entity. This is possibly Mao's first use of the term in the post-1949 period.

## Speech at Reception for Laotian Delegation

(Excerpt)

(August 25, 1956)

Source: *RMRB* (Aug. 26, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 92 (Sept. 21, 1956), 5.

*The delegation of the government of the Kingdom of Laos, headed by Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma, arrived in Beijing on August 23, 1956, and on August 25, he signed a joint communique with the government of the PRC announcing the Kingdom of Lao's*

*neutrality and resumption of diplomatic relations with the PRC and also its adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.*

China and Laos are close neighbors. Historically, the two countries have been friendly to each other. Although there have been interruptions in the relations between our two countries in modern times, we have now resumed our historically friendly relations on a new foundation and on the basis of the Five Principles.<sup>1</sup>

### Note

1. According to the *RMRB* version, Mao then went on to express congratulatory sentiments on the restoration of the friendly relations between the two countries and the triumph of the Five Principles. These refer to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 1.

## Reinforce the Unity of the Party and Carry Forward the Party Traditions

(August 30, 1956)

Source: *Xuanji*, V, pp. 293–304. Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 312–323; *JPRS*, *Selections*, pp. 30–38; *CLG*, X:2 (Summer 1977), 19–34.

*According to the Xuanji source note, and as indicated in Mao's first sentence in this document, this is a speech that Mao made at the first preparatory meeting for the Eighth National Congress of the CPC. The Congress was held September 15–27, 1956 (see Mao's opening speech, text Sept. 15, 1956). It dealt with many significant issues, including the formulation of a Party constitution and making proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy. In the speech here, three things, at least, are worthy of special attention. First, we can see hints of how Mao's ideas of socialist development and what would eventually be known as Mao Zedong Thought (i.e., Mao's fundamental theory of socialist revolution) affected the formulation of the Party Constitution. Second, we see also the Maoist position in the “de-Stalinization” debate, and third, Mao spoke at length here, from the perspective of Party unity, about the CPC treatment of people who had made mistakes in the past. This last point reflected Mao's confidence in the struggle against counterrevolutionary activities in the first half of the 1950s and the Party rectification during that period. In some ways, this is a reinforcement of what Mao spoke of in the article “On the Ten Major Relationships” (see text Apr. 25, 1956).*

Today we are holding a preparatory conference for the Eighth Party Congress.<sup>1</sup> This preparatory conference will have to continue for a couple of weeks. The main things to be done [here] are first, to prepare the documents for the Congress; second, to carry out preliminary elections for the Central Committee; and, third, to prepare



the drafts of the addresses to be given at the Congress.

Now I am going to present a few ideas.

The first concerns the goals and purposes of the Congress. What problems does this Congress aim to solve? What goals does it aim to achieve? Generally speaking, [the goal] is to sum up our experiences since the "Seventh Congress,"<sup>2</sup> to unite the whole Party, and to unite all the forces that can be united, both at home and abroad, in order to struggle for the building of a great socialist China.

On the matter of summing up experiences: our experience has been very rich and abundant, but we cannot [just] list a lot of things; rather we must seize upon [only] the important points and, proceeding from reality, sum them up from a Marxist point of view. Such a summing up will lend momentum to our entire Party, so that our work will be even better than before.

Our Party is a great, glorious, and correct Party. This is generally acknowledged by the whole world. In the past some foreign comrades were suspicious; [they asked] "What are you really doing?" Many people didn't understand our policy with regard to the treatment of the national bourgeoisie and don't quite comprehend our rectification campaigns.<sup>3</sup> Today, as I see it, the number of people who understand [us] has increased, and we can say that people in general now understand. Of course there will still be some people who don't understand. At home, even within the Party, there are still some people who don't understand and who believe that the line [we have followed] since the "Seventh Congress" has not been that correct. However, when the facts are put in front of us, [we can see that] we undertook two revolutions: one [was] a bourgeois democratic revolution that seized political power throughout the country; and the other is the proletarian socialist revolution, carrying out the socialist transformation and the building of a socialist nation.<sup>4</sup> In the eleven years since the "Seventh Congress," our achievements have been very great. The whole country acknowledges this, the whole world acknowledges this, even the bourgeoisie in foreign countries can't do anything but acknowledge this. The two revolutions prove that the line followed by the Party Center since the "Seventh Congress" is correct.

When the October Revolution overthrew the bourgeoisie, it was an event unprecedented in the world. The [reaction] of the international bourgeoisie to this revolution has mainly been to curse it, no matter what. They're constantly saying that it's no good. The Russian bourgeoisie is a counterrevolutionary class. At the time [of the October Revolution] they refused to play [their role in] state capitalism; instead they slowed down production, carried out sabotage, and took up guns to fight [the revolution].<sup>5</sup> There was nothing that the Russian proletariat could do but get rid of them. This aroused the anger of the bourgeoisie of the various countries, and they started cursing. In our case, we treat the national bourgeoisie a bit more moderately, and so they feel somewhat more comfortable; they feel that there is still some good [in our revolution]. At the moment, Eisenhower and Dulles forbid American reporters from coming to China; this in fact is an acknowledgment [of the fact] that our policy has these good points. If we were in a mess over here, they would have allowed those people to come here; in any case, [they merely want to] write articles that curse us. What they are afraid of are articles that are not

exclusively devoted to cursing us but may even say something good [about us]; then things would become difficult [for them].

In the past people called China "a great and ancient empire," the sick man of East Asia. Its economy was backward, and so was its culture. No one paid attention to hygiene; they were no good at ball games, or at swimming. The women had bound feet, men wore their hair in queues, and there were eunuchs. [There was also the attitude that] in China the moonlight was not that good and that the moon was always brighter in foreign countries.<sup>6</sup> All in all, there were a lot of bad things [about China], but we have changed the face of China with the reforms carried out in the last six years. Nobody can deny our achievements.

The nucleus that leads our revolutionary cause is our Party. In summing up our experience at this Congress, the first thing we must do is make the entire Party even more united. As of June, our Party had 10.73 million members. We must carry out on a broad scale the work of education, of persuasion, and of creating unity among these more than ten million Party members, so that they can play the role of a nucleus among the people even more proficiently. It is not enough just to have the Party; the Party is [only] a nucleus, and it must have the masses [around it]. Ninety per cent of our concrete work in various endeavors, including work in industry, in agriculture, in trade, in culture and education, and so forth, is done not by Party members but by people who are not Party members. Therefore it is necessary to unite well with the masses, to unite with all those people with whom unity is possible, and to work together [with them].<sup>7</sup> In the past, we still had many problems in uniting the Party and in uniting with people outside the Party. We must push forward propaganda and education [work] during and after this Congress and solidly improve our work in this area.

Internationally, we must unite with all the forces with which it is possible to unite; first of all we must unite with the Soviet Union and unite with fraternal parties and fraternal nations and peoples; we must also unite with all peace-loving nations and peoples and rely on all useful forces. This time, representatives from the Communist parties of more than fifty countries will take part in our Congress; this is a very good thing. In the past, we hadn't attained political power throughout the entire country, we hadn't achieved victory in the two revolutions, and we hadn't attained any success in our [national] construction. But things are different now. Foreign comrades have more respect for us.

What is the purpose of our uniting with all the forces, both within the Party and outside of it, both at home and abroad, with which we can unite? The goal is to build a great socialist country. For such a country as ours, the word "great" can and ought to be used. Our Party is a great party, our people are a great people, our revolution is a great revolution, and the cause which we are building is a great cause. There is only one country on earth that has a population of 600 million, and that is ours. In the past when people looked down on us there was reason for it. It was because we didn't have a contribution to make. We produced only a few hundred thousand tons of steel each year, and even that was controlled by the Japanese. The Kuomintang dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek [ruled the country for] twenty-two years, and each year [steel] production was merely a few tens of

thousands of tons. Even now we still don't have a lot, but things are picking up a bit. This year [steel production] is more than 4 million tons. Next year we will break through the 5-million-ton [mark], in the Second Five-Year Plan<sup>8</sup> we will exceed 10 million tons, and in the Third Five-Year Plan we may exceed 20 million tons. We must strive to realize that goal. Although there are some hundred or more countries in the world, there are only a few that [produce] more than 20 million tons of steel.<sup>9</sup> For that reason, when our country has been built up, it will be a great socialist country. The backward conditions of the last century or so, the conditions of being despised by others, all those miserable conditions will be thoroughly changed. Moreover, we will catch up with the most powerful capitalist country in the world, the United States. The United States has a population of only 170 million people, and the population of our country is several times that; we also have rich resources, and our climatic conditions are similar to theirs, [so] catching up with them is possible. Should we or should we not catch up? We definitely should. What are you doing with your population of 600 million people, sleeping? Should we be sleeping or should we be working? If you say that we ought to be working, then, since they have 170 million people and 100 million tons of steel, can we not produce 200 or 300 million tons of steel? If we cannot catch up [with them], we will have no reason for not [being able to do so], and we will not be so glorious or so great. The United States has been established for only 180 years. Sixty years ago they also had only 4 million tons of steel, so we are sixty years behind them. If we have another fifty or sixty years, we definitely ought to surpass them; this is a kind of responsibility. You have such a large population, such a big piece of territory, and such rich and abundant resources; moreover, I hear that you've established socialism and supposedly that is superior. Therefore, if you develop for fifty or sixty years and are still unable to surpass the United States, how will you look? In that case you should be deprived of your right to live on this earth! Therefore, surpassing the United States is not only possible, but it is absolutely necessary and obligatory. If that does not happen, we, the Chinese people, will have let down all the peoples of the world, and our contribution to humanity will not be a great one.

The second point has to do with carrying forward the traditions of the Party. At this Congress we should continue to promote the superior traditions of our Party in the areas of ideology and work-style and firmly oppose both subjectivism and factionalism; and beyond that, we should also oppose bureaucratism. I'm not going to talk about that matter, bureaucratism, today, I'll just talk about subjectivism and factionalism. These two things recur [even] after they have been swept away [once], and whenever they recur they have to be swept away again.

When we talk about committing errors we mean committing errors in subjective [perception] and mistakes in thinking. The many articles that we have seen criticizing Stalin's errors either don't mention this issue at all, or mention this issue only very infrequently. Why did Stalin commit errors? It's because on some questions his subjective [perception] did not correspond to objective reality. At present, things like this still [occur] frequently in our work. To be subjective is to proceed not from objective reality or from realistic possibility but rather from subjective desires. The things that are stipulated in the documents and the things

that we [will] discuss at this Congress must be in conformity with and be as close as possible to the realities of China. At the same time, on the basis of [our] past experience, we must criticize those views that do not conform to reality; we must criticize this subjectivism and attack it. This is a task that we proposed several years ago. Right now, what we are opposing is subjectivism in the socialist revolution and in socialist construction. In the past, during the democratic revolution, we were hurt by subjectivism for a long time, and we suffered severe penalties [for it]. We almost lost all our bases and more than 90 per cent of our revolutionary forces.<sup>10</sup> Only then did we begin to realize [our error]. The problem was made clear only after the rectification [campaign] at Yanan,<sup>11</sup> in which emphasis was placed on investigation and study and on proceeding from reality. The universal truths of Marxism must definitely be integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution; if they aren't integrated it simply won't work. This is to say that theory and practice must be united. The unity of theory and practice is one of the most fundamental principles of Marxism. According to dialectical materialism, ideology must reflect objective reality, must be examined [in light of] objective practice and proven to be true before it can be considered as truth; otherwise, it doesn't count [as truth]. We have had achievements in our work over the last few years, but there are problems of subjectivism everywhere. Not only do we have them now, but we will still have them in the future. There will always be subjectivism, in ten thousand years, in a hundred million years; there will be [subjectivism] as long as the human race is not destroyed. [And] as long as there is subjectivism, there will always be error.

There is another thing; it is called factionalism. Every region has its own overall situation, every country has its own overall situation, every planet has its own overall situation. At the moment, we won't talk about [planets] beyond the Earth, because lines of communications have not yet been set up. If we discover that there are human beings on Mars or Venus, then at that time we will negotiate the question of uniting with them and establishing a united front. Right now we are talking about the problem of unity within the Party, within the country, and within the whole world. Our principle is that no matter who you are, whether you are [a member of] a foreign [Communist] party, or [simply] a foreigner without a party affiliation, as long as you are of any help to the cause of world peace and human progress, then we should unite with you. The first thing is to unite with the several dozen Communist parties and with the Soviet Union. Since some mistakes have occurred in the Soviet Union and those things have been much talked about, they have been exaggerated, and now there is the impression that mistakes of that kind are really terrible. There is something wrong with such an outlook. It is impossible for any nation not to commit any mistakes at all, and [since] the Soviet Union was the first socialist country in the world, and has had such a long experience, it is impossible for it not to have made some mistakes. Where are the mistakes of the Soviet Union, such as Stalin's mistakes, located [in the scheme of things]? They are partial and temporary. Although we hear that some [of these] things have been around for twenty years already, they are nevertheless still temporary and partial and can be corrected. The main current in the Soviet Union, its principal aspect, the majority

[of its people], was correct. Russia gave birth to Leninism, and after the October Revolution, it became the first socialist country. It built socialism, defeated fascism, and became a great industrial state. It has many things from which we can learn. Of course, we should study the advanced experiences, and not the backward experiences. We have always proposed the slogan of studying the advanced experience of the Soviet Union. Who asked you to learn the backward experiences? Some people say that no matter what, even the farts of the Russians smell good; that too is subjectivism. Even the Russians themselves would admit that they stink! Therefore, things must be analyzed. We've said before that with regard to Stalin, we should [see him as having been] three parts [bad] and seven parts [good].<sup>12</sup> Their main things, and the greater portion of their things, are good and useful; [only] some of their things are wrong. We too have some things that are no good, and we should discard them ourselves; we certainly don't want other countries to learn these bad things. Nevertheless, even bad things count as a type of experience and are very useful. In our case, we had people like Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao, Gao Gang, and Rao Shushi; they have been our teachers.<sup>13</sup> Besides them, we have had other teachers too. On the domestic scene our best teacher has been Chiang Kai-shek. People whom we could not convince were persuaded as soon as Chiang Kai-shek gave them a lesson. What methods did Chiang use to teach? He used machine guns, cannons, and airplanes to teach. Then there was imperialism, the [other] teacher that educated our 600 million people. For more than a century various imperialist powers have oppressed us and [thereby] educated us. Thus, bad things have had an educational effect and have had the effect of allowing people to learn from them.

[With regard to] opposing factionalism, one thing especially worth mentioning is [the problem of] uniting with those who have struggled against you. They fought with you and knocked you to the ground, so you suffered a beating and were humiliated, and even though you were not that bad, they give you the "official title" of opportunist. [In cases] where it is correct to beat [somebody], there should be a beating. [If] you really were an opportunist, why shouldn't you be beaten? Here, [however,] I am talking about beatings that were wrong, and struggles that were wrong. If those people later change their attitude and recognize that they were wrong to beat you, that it was not right to give you the title of King of the Kingdom of Opportunists—as long as there is this [recognition], things will be all right. If there are individuals who still do not recognize this, can we wait? We can wait. By uniting, we mean uniting with those who hold opinions different from ours, those who look down on us, those who do not respect us, those who have quarreled with us, those who have struggled against us, and those at whose hands we have suffered defeats. As for those people whose opinions are similar to ours, they are already united [with us], and with them there is no problem of unity. The problem is with regard to those with whom there is still no unity. By those with whom there is still no unity we mean [people] whose ideas are different from ours or those with gross shortcomings. Now, for instance, there are many people in our Party who have joined the Party organizationally, but who have not yet joined the Party ideologically. Although they have not fought with you or tangled with you yet, since they

haven't yet joined the Party ideologically it is inevitable that the things they do will not be quite right, that there will be some defects [in their work], or that they may do some bad things. We must unite with these people, educate and help them. I said before, that with regard to all those people with shortcomings, with those who have committed mistakes, we mustn't just [watch] to see if they change or not, but must also help them change. One [part of the correct approach] is to watch, and the other is to help. If you only watch and just stand there without moving, [simply waiting to] see what happens [to them] and [thinking that] if they were to do something well that would be good but that if they fouled things up then they would deserve any disaster [that might befall them], that attitude is a negative attitude, and not a positive attitude. Marxists should adopt a positive attitude; we must not only watch but must also help.

The third point has to do with the election of the Central Committee. Just now Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping<sup>14</sup> said that the number of members of the Eighth Central Committee will be between 150 and 170. The Seventh Central Committee was 77 people, and this time we have increased it by a little more than 100 per cent; I think this will probably be a little better. It will probably be more advantageous for us to wait a few years, say five years, before we enlarge it again. At present, [there are still many] good and useful people whose talent was cultivated during the period of the War of Resistance against Japan; these are the cadres who have what we call the "Three-eight style [of work]."<sup>15</sup> They form a very important foundation for our work at present, and we can't do without them. The number of these cadres is very large, however, and if we arranged [to put them all on the Central Committee], the number of members of the Central Committee would have to be increased to several hundred. For that reason we will not consider arranging [to put them on the Central Committee] this time. Comrades, please think the matter over, whether the number suggested by the Party Center, between 150 and 170, is a suitable one or what the best number actually is.

It should be confirmed that the last Central Committee has done its work and has not let the Seventh [Party] Congress down. Over the past eleven years they have correctly led the democratic revolution in China, and they have correctly led the socialist revolution and socialist construction; they have not committed any great errors, and moreover they have combated all sorts of opportunism and error, and have overcome all kinds of elements harmful to the revolution and to the [cause of] construction. They have had their accomplishments, and that includes even some of the comrades who have made errors. This refers to the Central Committee as a whole. As far as individual comrades are concerned, we cannot make this kind of estimation. In particular, there was Wang Ming who, in order to cope with [the situation], wrote a statement at the Seventh [Party] Congress acknowledging that the line of the Party Center was correct, acknowledging [the accuracy of] the political report of the Seventh [Party] Congress, and [announcing his] willingness to abide by the decisions of the Congress. Yet when I talked with him later, he had changed [his position] and had already forgotten what [he had written]. He went home and thought about it, and then the next day he said, "I [already] wrote something admitting my mistake." I said, "You admitted your mistake then, if you

do not admit it now, you can take it back.” He didn’t, however. Later, at the Second Plenum [of the Seventh Central Committee],<sup>16</sup> we hoped that he would talk a bit about his own mistakes, but instead he talked about other things; he just talked about how good people like us were. We said, “You needn’t say these things; please talk a bit about what errors you, Wang Ming, have committed.” But he wouldn’t do it. He promised to write [an essay of] self-criticism after the Second Plenum, but afterward he said that he was sick and couldn’t use his brain. He said that the moment he started to write, he would get sick. Perhaps that was deliberate on his part, but it’s hard to say. He’s been ill ever since and cannot attend this Congress either. Should we elect him [to the Central Committee]? Then there is Comrade Li Lisan. Should he be elected? There are more people who understand Li Lisan, but fewer who understand Wang Ming. As Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping said, if we elect them, the significance would be the same as [when we] elected them [to the Central Committee] at the Seventh Congress. At the Seventh Congress many representatives were reluctant to elect them (not only Wang Ming but quite a few other comrades as well). At the time, we said that if we adopted such a policy we would be committing an error. Why do we say that it is an error for us not to elect people who have committed mistakes? Because then we would be doing things their way. Their method [of struggle] is that, whether you have truly committed an error or not, once you are declared an opportunist, they will abandon you. If we do things this way then we are following their line, that is, following Wang Ming’s line or [Li] Lisan’s line. We will not do such a thing; we will not do things that lead us to follow Wang Ming’s line or [Li] Lisan’s line. The intra-Party relations that they developed were precisely relations of that kind. They want to get rid of anybody who had made errors, or who had struggled against them, or who had called them opportunists. They called themselves 100 per cent Bolsheviks. Later we checked and they turned out to be 100 per cent opportunists, while people like ourselves whom they had labeled “opportunists” turned out to be at least somewhat Marxist.

The most fundamental reason for [our policy] is that they, i.e., [Wang Ming and Li Lisan] are not isolated individuals, but rather represent quite a large portion of the petty bourgeoisie. China is a country with large masses of petty bourgeoisie. Quite a large proportion of the petty bourgeoisie is wavering. Take the well-to-do middle peasants, for example. Everybody can see that they always waver and are unsteady in any revolution. When they are happy they can be delirious, and when they are pessimistic they can become forlorn. Their eyes are always fixed on what little bit of property they have, and this is nothing more than one or two draft animals, a big cart, and a dozen or so *mu* of land. They are worried about keeping what they have and worried, too, about what they might lose; they are afraid that they may lose these things. These people are different from poor peasants. Poor peasants in China make up 50 per cent [of the population] in the North and 70 per cent in the South. In terms of class background, our Party is basically made up of workers and poor peasants, that is, of the proletariat and the semiproletariat. The semiproletariat is also petty bourgeois, but its steadfastness is much greater than that of the middle peasants. Our Party also has taken some intellectuals [into its

ranks]. Approximately one million out of the more than ten million Party members are intellectuals, higher, middle, and petty. It isn’t easy to say that these one million intellectuals represent the imperialists, or that they represent the landlord class, or the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, or even the national bourgeoisie. It would be more appropriate to consider them in the category of petty bourgeoisie. Within the category of the petty bourgeoisie, which segment do they primarily represent? [They represent] those people who, in the cities and in the countryside, [own] a relatively large proportion of the means of production, such as the well-to-do middle peasants. These Party members who are intellectuals are scared of dragons in front of them and tigers behind them. They vacillate frequently, they are fraught with subjectivism, and there is quite a bit of factionalism [among them]. What does our electing these two representatives of the Wang Ming line and the [Li] Lisan line signify? It signifies that there is a difference in our treatment of these people, who have committed ideological mistakes, and our treatment of those counterrevolutionaries and splitters (such as Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Gao Gang, and Rao Shushi). When they engage in subjectivism and factionalism, they hold up torches and brandish their weapons, they beat their gongs and sound their drums, and they bring out their political program to vanquish other people. Wang Ming had his political program; Li Lisan, too, had his political program. Of course, Chen Duxiu also had a political program, but he was engaging in Trotskyism,<sup>17</sup> in splitting [the Party], and in carrying out anti-Party activities outside the Party. Zhang Guotao was engaged in conspiracies and in splitting [the Party] and went over to the side of the Kuomintang. The problem of Wang Ming and Li Lisan, therefore, is not only a problem [that concerns] them as individuals; rather, what is important is that it has a social origin. Within our Party, this social origin is reflected [in the fact] that there are quite a few people in the Party who will waver at important junctures. These wavering elements are just opportunists. What we call opportunism is simply doing a thing if it is expedient to do so here and doing another thing if it is expedient to do so there, without fixed principles, without definite rules, and without a definite direction; [an opportunist] may be one thing one day and something else the next. Wang Ming, for instance, is just like that. He was once terribly “Leftist,” and later he became terribly Rightist.

At the Seventh Congress we persuaded those comrades and elected Wang Ming and Li Lisan. So, have we lost anything in the eleven years since the “Seventh Congress” because of this? Not at all; our revolution didn’t suffer defeat; nor was victory delayed by [even] a few months because Wang Ming and Li Lisan were elected.

Because we elected them [to the Central Committee], does that mean that people who committed mistakes are to be rewarded? Since those who committed mistakes have become Central Committee members, let us all commit mistakes together, whatever may happen. There is still a chance of becoming a Central Committee member—would this happen? No, this wouldn’t happen. Take a look, the more than seventy Central Committee members that we have [now]: they didn’t deliberately commit a few mistakes so they could be members of the Central Committee again. Will those who have not been members of the Central Committee, whether

they [joined the leadership] before, during, or after the [campaign to promote] the “Three-eight style [of work],” emulate Wang Ming and Li Lisan and develop two more lines of their own, thus creating four lines [altogether], in order to struggle to be appointed to the Central Committee? No, this will not happen, nobody is like that. On the contrary, they will observe and reflect on the mistakes of [Wang Ming and Li Lisan] and will be more cautious themselves.

Moreover, in the past, people have said such things as “it’s better to be a revolutionary-come-lately than to be an early revolutionary, and it’s better not to be a revolutionary than to be a revolutionary.” If such is the case, will the election of these people [who have committed mistakes] raise the problem of “it’s better to commit mistakes than to be correct, and it’s better to commit big mistakes than to commit small mistakes?” Wang Ming and Li Lisan have committed mistakes. If they were elected Central Committee members, the result would be that two seats would have to be vacated by people who have been correct, or who have committed [only] small mistakes, so that they could climb onto the stage. Isn’t such an arrangement the most unjust in the world? From this point of view, it is very unjust: Look, those who are correct or who have committed only small mistakes have to relinquish their seats to people who have committed a big mistake; this is very obviously unfair; there is no justice in this. If we compare things in this manner, then we will have to admit that “it’s better to commit mistakes than to be correct, and it’s better to commit big mistakes than to commit small mistakes.” But from another point of view, such is not the case. It is well known throughout the country and the world that they have committed errors of line, and the reason for electing them is precisely because they are well known. What can you do? They are famous, and those of you who have not made mistakes or who made [only] small mistakes do not have as big a reputation as they do. In our country, which has such a large petty bourgeoisie, they are [its] banner and standard. If we elect them, many people will say that the Communist Party is still waiting for them [to change] and would rather vacate two seats for them to help them correct their mistakes. Whether or not they do change is another problem; that is a very small matter, [since there are] only the two of them. The [larger] problem is that in our country there is such a large petty bourgeoisie, and in our Party there are so many petty bourgeois wavering elements, and among the intellectuals there are many people who waver like that. They all want to watch this example. If they see that the two banners are still standing, they will feel at ease; they will be able to sleep, and they will be happy. Once you topple these two banners they will panic. Therefore the question is not whether or not Wang Ming and Li Lisan change; whether or not they change is insignificant. What is significant is that a million [people] in our Party who waver easily and who have come from a petty bourgeois background, especially the intellectuals, are watching to see what attitude we take toward Wang Ming and Li Lisan. This is just like our treatment of rich peasants during the land reform; we didn’t touch the rich peasants, and so the middle peasants felt at ease.<sup>18</sup> If in the “Eighth Congress” we adopt the same attitude toward these two people as the one we did in the “Seventh Congress,” our Party will reap a benefit, an advantage, which is that it will be somewhat easier [for us] to transform the broad [masses] of

the petty bourgeoisie throughout the country. This will even have ramifications throughout the world. In foreign countries, it is very rarely, virtually never, that an attitude such as ours is adopted toward people who have made errors.

This preparatory meeting for our Congress will only last a couple of weeks or so, starting today. If the arrangements are made well, however, it is entirely possible for the preparatory work to be accomplished. We believe that this Congress can be a good one; the level [of political consciousness] of the representatives is sufficient to ensure a good Congress. We must, however, be cautious and alert, and everybody must work hard.

## Notes

1. The Eighth Congress of the CPC was held Sept. 15–27, 1956. It is significant in that it was the first Party Congress held since Liberation (1949) and took on the task of affirming and consolidating the Party line set forth by the Seventh Congress some eleven years earlier. For an outline of the Congress, see K. Lieberthal (1976), pp. 85–87.

2. The Seventh CPC Congress was held in April–June 1945 at Yanan.

3. Mao is referring to the policies set forth in the early 1950s (see text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3) and the “third” Party rectification movement, which began in 1950. This should not be confused with the first rectification in 1942 and the second rectification in 1947–1948.

4. For Mao’s differentiation between these stages of revolution, see text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), note 26.

5. For the early formulation of Soviet policy vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie, see text Aug. 24, 1956, note 20. According to Communist interpretation, this policy of redemption and transformation, proposed by Lenin in 1918, was aborted because of the eruption of the civil war in the USSR, and thereupon the Russian bourgeoisie as a whole turned against the revolution, thus giving the proposed policy no chance for implementation and success.

6. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 29.

7. This idea of “uniting with all these people with whom unity is possible” becomes an almost sloganistic preoccupation with Mao in this part of 1956. It was suggested, in an earlier part of this document, as one of the goals of the Eighth Congress of the CPC, which would be held in mid-September, and Mao would go on to reiterate the same notion a few times in this document. It then reappears, as anticipated, in the early paragraphs of Mao’s opening speech at the Eighth CPC Congress (text Sept. 15, 1956).

8. The Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy was to follow the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) and was to cover the period 1958–1962. The proposal for this development plan was made at the subsequent Party Congress and was officially announced on Sept. 27, 1956. See text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 117.

9. According to statistics released by the United Nations in 1963, those countries that produced more than 20 million tons of raw steel in 1955 included the United States (106.17 million), the Soviet Union (45.27 million), West Germany (21.33 million), and Great Britain (20.1 million). Also, according to Chinese statistics, the 20-million-ton plateau in steel production was not achieved by China until 1971.

10. See text Aug. 24, 1956, note 7.

11. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24.

12. This is probably the first public articulation of this formula of assessing Stalin’s faults versus his merits, a formula that became quite ubiquitous in Mao’s own writings and speeches in subsequent years. See text Apr. [6], 1956, for an earlier statement by Mao on Stalin. Although the issue of assessing Stalin’s record came up and was, up to this point, perhaps most extensively elaborated in the *RMRB* editorial of Apr. 5, 1956—an editorial based on the discussions of the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau and titled “On the

Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat''—this particular formula did not appear there. Ironically, this same formula was suggested for the PRC's own assessment of Mao's record several years after his death.

13. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23, text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, notes 1 and 7, and text Apr. 1956, note 10.

14. Deng Xiaoping was at the time general secretary of the CPC and presumably made a key speech at this conference. For detailed biographical information see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 819–826.

15. There are two interpretations of this term. One is that this refers to the work-style suggested by the Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Main Points for Attention (see text June 30, 1953, note 6). In the other interpretation the term refers to cadres who joined the Party after the start of the War of Resistance against Japan in 1938 (hence *san ba* or three-eight). According to this interpretation, this term is synonymous with the term *kangri ganbu* (War of Resistance cadres), which relates to *changzheng ganbu* (Long March cadres), *jiefang ganbu* (Liberation cadres), and *xin ganbu* (new cadres, i.e., post-1949 cadres).

16. See text June 6, 1950(2), vol. I, note 1.

17. For a scholarly and historical discussion of the CPC's criticism of Chen Duxiu as a Trotskyist, see R. Kagan (1974).

18. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I.

## Interview with Delegation of Japanese Army Veterans

(September 4, 1956)

**Source:** Doi Akio, "Motakuto shuseki to-no kaidan-ki" in *Tairiku mondai kenkyu* (Continental Problems Studies) (12 Dec. 1956), pp. 1–12. Available English Translations: Quotation in *Kyodo* (Tokyo) (Sept. 6, 1956), noon edition; Quotation in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Sept. 6, 1956), HHH1.

*According to the Kyodo source, Mao had a one-hour interview on Sept. 4, 1956, with a visiting delegation of Japanese army veterans. The mission consisted of fifteen members, all veterans of the Sino-Japanese War of the 1930s and 1940s, and was headed by Endo Saburo. According to Doi's records, the interview took place at Qinzhengdian (a conference and audience chamber that had been a throne room in the old palace). Mao was accompanied by Liao Chengzhi, Zhao Anbo, Zhang Xiruo (chairman of the Chinese Association of Diplomatic Studies), Qiao Guanhua, Xie Nanguang, and Xu Xiangqian.*

*We have included in this translation parts of the conversation contributed by the Japanese visitors. These sections are presented in parentheses.*

We welcome our Japanese friends sincerely. Please observe carefully that we welcome you with our whole heart. [Our] relationship will improve through discussion. Let us remedy the past events and change our relationship into a friendly one.<sup>1</sup> You stated that the number of delegates shrank owing to [certain] restrictions, and the visit was delayed.<sup>2</sup> It does not matter if you have come late, or if fewer came. You yourselves, and your government, should be the judge of who should

come. If the government thought that it is too early [for you to come], then it would have been all right if you had come at a later time. If the number [of delegates] had been too large, fewer could have come. [In some cases,] alternate members could have come. The exchange of visitors will become more frequent in the future. The traffic of people will become more extensive and freer. Whatever questions you have, please raise them freely.

Let us forget all about the past. Let us think of the future, and of the present. If we cannot make you our friends, we'll be disappointed. We are Asians. There are numerous countries in Asia and Africa, but few big nations.

Japan is a great country in Asia. Compared to any other state, it has a more advanced economy and culture. I once told the following to a delegate [from Japan] who visited China: In talking about learning, we [the Chinese] must learn first from you. Gratitude should be mutually exchanged. We appreciate the role that Japan has played. We hope that you will play larger and more varied roles in the future. In the past, world opinion condemned you, as you were holding colonies at the time. The situation, however, has changed completely since the war. The world has changed, and Japan and China have changed as well. You no longer have any colonies. Instead, Japan has become a semi-independent country lacking complete independence.<sup>3</sup> Under such circumstances, you have a strong cause.

You must hold onto this cause firmly. Now you have the right to criticize other countries that have colonies. We hope that you will maintain the present status of having no colonies, and also that you will win complete independence. We hope also that your nation becomes prosperous and strong and replaces its passive position [in the world] with an autonomous one.

The San Francisco Treaty has entrapped you into a passive position. You need friends in order to correct the present position. I will offer you my service, if you wish, by becoming Japan's chief of staff.

We are standing on the common ground of anti-imperialism. Yours is not an imperialist nation. You and we are under the oppression of a single imperialist state—the United States, to be more specific. There are no imperialists in . . . [copy not legible]. Yet Taiwan is occupied by imperialists, and consequently our nation cannot join the United Nations. They call us the invaders and are enforcing an economic embargo against us.

As you have seen, we have just begun our [national] construction. It would take several decades [to complete]. We need time, a peaceful environment, friendship, and the assistance of other countries. We hope to improve our relationship with Japan and turn it into a friendly one. You may need friends, too. You should make any nation your friend, as long as they can help you in your [effort toward] independence, regardless of their whereabouts—be it in Europe, Asia, Africa, or America. We hope to become one of them. We welcome even those who exchanged blows with us in the past, or those who denounced communism. You may continue your work after you return. You may visit us again even after you speak ill of us. Such traffic of people over a long period of time will result in much greater understanding [than can other-

wise be achieved]. How long are you staying?

(Endo: Ten more days.)

Gentlemen, please come again. You can come either as individuals, or as a group. The government leaders will be welcomed, too. Were you with the navy, Mr. Kanazawa? You had a powerful navy. We, being poor, have only a small naval force.

(Kanazawa: Japan now builds merchant ships and exports them. In real terms, shipbuilding occupies the top position in Japan's trade.)

What is the total tonnage of ships you have today? What was the tonnage at the peak of the war?

(Kanazawa: It is about 3 million tons today. The highest during the war was about 6 million tons.)

In any case, it is difficult to build a navy.

(Kanazawa: To improve the quality of a navy, the staff on board must be treated well and with affection.)

Our army and navy are in a mutually supplementary relationship. We would like to learn from Japan in the area of the shipbuilding industry. What do you do, Mr. Doi?

(Doi: I have founded and have been managing Tairoku Mondai Kenkyujyo [Institute of Continental Studies], which conducts research on the Soviet Union and your country in the fields of international politics and military affairs. I have been to the Soviet Union three times in the past, but I still have some questions about communism that are beyond my comprehension. So this time I came to your country.)

We have yet to establish a specialized institute concerning Japan. You are studying us very well. We know very little about Japan. Our study and understanding are not sufficient.

(Doi: Since our institute is very small, the chairman may not have noticed it. I would like to visit and study your country more often. I would like you to help me in my China studies.)

China is a country worth studying. What do you do, Mr. Horige?

(Horige: I am a critic on military affairs, trying to enlighten the [Japanese] people.)

[Speaking to all]: Do you have anything else to discuss?

(Endo: You said that you are hoping for a friendly relationship with Japan. We became involved in fighting [each other] too hastily in the past. This time we hope to achieve a friendly relationship with equal speed.)

Our two nations face a common enemy. This enemy is big and powerful. I would like to make this point clear to you. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France occupy vast territories in the world. There are a great many people. Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the better part of Europe are controlled by these states. Such a statement can be made not only by us [the Chinese], but also by the Japanese as well. You have no debts to pay to others. Others owe you some debts. On the economic, cultural, and other fronts, both of our nations need to be reconstructed. We have the political capital in our hands, and it is plentiful. Besides, we do not borrow others' capital. In short [the nations of] Asia, Africa, and Latin America can form a single united front. I am not instigating wars, I am talking reason and theory. We are simply demanding that everything that they have borrowed be returned.

(Endo: Mr. Higashikuni could not come.<sup>4</sup> We apologize for having raised serious troubles in China in the past. I convey messages from Mr. Higashikuni and Mr. Katayama to you that they believe that without there being friendship between China and Japan, there would be no peace in Asia or in the world, and that they are working toward Sino-Japanese friendship.)

Please convey to Mr. Higashikuni my words of gratitude. There is nothing to be discussed further about the first point [i.e., the Sino-Japanese War], as it is a matter of the past. On the second point, I agree with them completely. It is impossible to obtain peace in Asia without Sino-Japanese friendship. I have received a letter from Mr. Katayama. Please convey my greetings to him. Anything else [to talk about]?

(Doi: I have one request. The Japanese are now engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union over our diplomatic relationship. We are somewhat anxious about this. I wonder if the great China could undertake the task of being a mediator for the Russo-Japanese talks? It is easy for the powerful Soviet Union to be oppressive toward a much too small and defeated Japan. Yet the signing of a peace treaty under oppression will not make the Japanese truly friendly toward the Soviet Union. It will result only in our holding distrust and anxiety toward the Russians. This will be unfortunate for your country as well. Your country and the Soviet Union are bound to one another as comrades, as you have often stated. Thus this [ill relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union] will be disadvantageous to your country. I also believe it would benefit your country if you could mediate between the two, so that the peoples of Japan and the Soviet Union can sign the peace treaty under acceptable conditions.)

Your understanding of the Soviet Union is slightly different from ours. The distance between China and the Soviet Union is much closer than that between Japan and the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union wishes to become oppressive, they

would do so toward us first, before they oppress Japan. Although there is a long border between China and Russia, no pressure is felt. As you gradually come to understand [the Russians], you may be able to eliminate the sense of threat. By the way, is there any possibility now for the normalization of relations between your country and ours?

(Doi: One cannot say that there is no possibility. As Prime Minister [sic] Zhou Enlai had stated, it would become possible after obstacles have been removed.)<sup>5</sup>

Is it the problem of the Kuomintang?

(Endo: The Kuomintang and the United States are the problems.)

We do not wish to make haste. The sooner the better, but please act on it whenever you believe the time is right. What is the thinking of Mr. Hatoyama on this issue?<sup>6</sup>

(Endo: He wishes to restore diplomatic relations, but there is some opposition within the government. It is difficult to carry it out right now. I believe the problem can be solved as a result of popular demand.)

(Doi: There is anxiety in Japan about the disposition of the Communists. Without resolving this, difficulties [for normalization] will remain.)

I can understand, thinking in your terms, that you are worried about the fact that the communist propaganda of the Soviet Union and China is reaching Japan. Even before the restoration of diplomatic relations, we would not engage in activities that are advantageous only to one side, and harmful to the other. We do not propagate communism [in Japan]. Liao Chengzhi, Guo Moruo, and Mei Lanfang<sup>7</sup> have led delegations to Japan, but they have engaged in activities that were only beneficial to you.

(Doi: Even though you do not do it, the radicals of the Japan Communist Party and the Socialist Party are taking advantage of your country[’s name] in trying to take over the government. We, the Japanese, like you, wish for the welfare of the masses. We wish to follow the middle road by adopting the merits of both communism and capitalism. Please leave Japan alone, and watch how it goes. Instead of intervening [in Japanese affairs], please construct the Asian form of socialism at an early date, as you seem to be pursuing that goal, and show us the model. You may be thinking of a communist regime being established in Japan, but the majority of the Japanese people, including myself, are hoping to take the third road.)

I will not intervene no matter what ideas you profess. It is your business. Can you see His Majesty, the Emperor?

(Endo: Yes, we can.)

Please convey my greetings to His Majesty. He is a biologist, isn’t he? How old is he? He seems to take field trips often. We respect Laos and Cambodia, which are also monarchical states. Without such respect, we cannot become friends. We

pay our respect to His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan. I wish for the welfare of the Japanese people, and for the health of His Majesty.

## Notes

1. Mao is referring to the war between China and Japan during the 1930s and 1940s during which the Japanese army invaded China and occupied a large portion of its territory. This history serves as an important background to this conversation.

2. This suggests that there were some last minute complications as to the composition of the Japanese delegation before the tour left Japan. The Japanese newspaper articles reporting the visit made no reference to this situation.

3. The PRC considered Japan, under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1949 and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as only “semi-independent.” The treaties put Japan unmistakably into the anticommunist camp headed by the United States in the cold war period. Both treaties were signed on September 8, 1949. The San Francisco Treaty, a peace treaty, deprived Japan of its overseas possessions but levied no reparations on Japan for its wartime aggression. The Mutual Security Treaty permitted U.S. troops to remain indefinitely in Japan and required Japan not to allow any other nation to have bases and military authority in Japan without prior U.S. consent.

4. This probably refers to Higashikuni Naruhiko, a former member of the Japanese imperial family. He became an army general in 1933 and served briefly as Japan’s prime minister from August to October 1945.

5. This may be referring to something that Zhou Enlai said when he met with this delegation on August 19. The Japanese texts here employed a term that technically translates as “prime minister.” Zhou’s official title is premier of the State Council of the PRC.

6. Hatoyama Ichiro became interim prime minister of Japan on December 9, 1954, and on the victory of his government in the spring elections of the following year, he became prime minister on February 27, 1955.

7. Liao Chengzhi (b. 1908) was, in the late 1940s and after 1949, a prominent figure in the government of the PRC, especially as a leader and organizer of mass organizations. He was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the First Session of the CPPCC, a member of the Board of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, and a vice-chairman and secretary general of the China Peace Committee. Above all, Liao’s function in the PRC has been as a principal liaison official vis-à-vis Japan, a role for which he was particularly suited by virtue of his fluency in Japanese and the rich experience he had as a student for many years in Japan. Liao played such a key role in Sino-Japanese relations (during the long period in which there was no official diplomatic relations between the two countries)—he was China’s chief negotiator in 1953, under the aegis of the Chinese Red Cross Society, for the repatriation of Japanese nationals detained since the beginning of the war in China, and in that capacity visited Japan in October–November 1954—that when a Chinese delegate’s office, serving as a surrogate diplomatic mission, was set up in Tokyo in 1962, it was known as the “Liao Chengzhi Office.” Guo Moruo, well known also as a Chinese writer, philosopher, and historian, was chairman at one time of the Chinese Peace Committee. He was a vice-chairman of the Peace Liaison Committee for the Asian and Pacific Regions, deputy leader of the Chinese delegation to the World Congress of Peoples for Peace in Vienna in 1952–53, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries established in May 1954. He led the Chinese delegation to the Asian Countries Conference in April 1955 in New Delhi. We have not discovered information regarding the trip to Japan referred to by Mao here. For information on Mei Lanfang, a veteran Beijing opera performer, see text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 18.

For more detailed biographical information on Liao and Guo, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 544–550, and 458–466, respectively.



Memorandum to Endo Saburo  
(September 5, 1956)

**Source:** Endo Saburo, *Ni-chu senso to wa* (Tokyo, 1974), frontispiece.

*In August and early September 1956, Endo led a group of Japanese Army veterans of the Sino-Japanese War on a visit to China. They interviewed Mao on September 4. (See preceding text.) At the meeting, Endo presented Mao with a samurai sword as a gift. The following is a note, written by Mao himself, that accompanied the gift Mao made to Endo in return.*

On receiving a generous gift of a treasured object from Mr. Endo Saburo, I, having nothing of comparable value to give in return, respectfully present this painting of bamboo by Qi Baishi<sup>1</sup> as a gift.

Mao Zedong  
September 5, 1956

This is to be presented to Mr. Endo Saburo.<sup>2</sup>

**Notes**

1. See text Oct. 5, 1952, vol. I, source note.
2. Mao wrote this note in the classical style, which accounts for the rather peculiar format of address.

Conversation with Zeng Wen  
(September 15, 1956)

**Source:** *Mao jingwei*, pp. 8–9. Other Chinese Text: *RMRB* (May 23, 1960), 3.

*Zeng was a member of Mao's security guard. For more on Mao's exhortation to the members of this corps to xue wenhua (i.e., become educated and, at least, literate), see text May 1955 and text mid-July 1955, vol. I. For more bibliographical information on the source, see text May 1955, vol. I, source note.*

From now on you people should not be called a military unit; you should simply be called a school for culture, and each of you should simply be called a student. . . .  
. . . Would you like to have me to be your principal? . . . (Zeng Wen: Good!)  
I will be the honorary principal and then find you a vice-principal. You can study

here for seven or eight years, until you reach a level [comparable to] middle-school graduates or university graduates. Do you think that would work? (Zeng Wen: Yes!)

You are still very young; you're only in your twenties. I think it would be possible. Comrade Zeng Baojin, who served as a security guard for me before, herded cows for people and worked as a hired hand in the past. He had never been to school. [Afterward,] he went to study at the People's University<sup>1</sup> and placed first in the examination. (Zeng Wen: The comrades are now very enthusiastic about learning cultural matters.)<sup>2</sup>

After studying at this school for seven or eight years, you will become university students who have come from the workers' and peasants' ranks. At present there are still very few university students who have come from worker and peasant backgrounds, but in the future there will be many.

**Notes**

1. On December 16, 1949, at the Eleventh Meeting of the Government Administration Council, the PRC Central People's Government decided to establish a Chinese People's University (Zhongguo renmin daxue). This was opened in Beijing on September 1, 1950, with Wu Yuzhang as principal.
2. See text May 1955, vol. I, note 1.

Opening Speech at the Eighth National Congress of the CPC  
(September 15, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 16, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d.), pp. 40–42; *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 109–111; *Ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 177–179; *Buyi*, pp. 92–95; *Fagui huibian*, pp. 1–4; *XHBYK*, 22 (Nov. 1958), 6 (excerpt). Available English Translations: *Eighth National Congress*, I, pp. 7–11; K. Fan (1972), pp. 143–147; NCNA, *Weekly Bulletin*, 44 (Nov. 1, 1971), 17 (quotation); *PR*, 6:51 (Dec. 20, 1963), 9 (quotation).

*The Eighth National Congress of the CPC was held Sept. 15–27, 1956, in Beijing. (See text Aug. 30, 1956, for more background information.) According to a news report in RMRB on the same day on which the transcript of this speech appeared, a total of 1,021 CPC delegates at various levels of the Party organization attended the Congress. For more details see this news report. See also K. Lieberthal (1976), pp. 85–87. Major speeches, records, and resolutions of this Congress are reprinted in RMSC (1957), pp. 8–141 (a chronicle of the Congress is provided on pp. 137–141).*

*The sentences in parentheses in this translation, which are obviously not part of Mao's speech, appear in the RMRB original as well as in the other Chinese sources.*

Comrades:

The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China is now in

session. (All rise. Prolonged enthusiastic applause.) During the eleven years since the Seventh National Congress of our Party<sup>1</sup> there have been many comrades and friends, throughout China and the whole world, who have fought heroically and worked diligently for the cause of communism and the liberation of humanity and who have consequently laid down their lives. We should always honor their memory. (All rise. A moment of silent mourning.)

The task of this Congress of ours is to sum up the experiences since the Seventh National [Party] Congress, to unite the whole Party, and to unite with all forces both inside and outside the country with which it is possible [for us] to unite in order to fight to build a great socialist China. (Enthusiastic applause.)

In the eleven years since the Seventh National [Party] Congress, in a big country with a vast territory and a large population, in which the situation has been very complex, we have thoroughly completed the bourgeois democratic revolution and also have won a decisive victory in the socialist revolution.<sup>2</sup> The practice of these two revolutions has proven that, from the Seventh National [Party] Congress to the present, the line [pursued] by the Party's Central Committee has been correct and that our Party is a great, politically mature Marxist-Leninist political party. (Enthusiastic applause.) Our Party is now more united and more consolidated than at any time in the past. (Enthusiastic applause.) Our Party has already become the central force in uniting people throughout the entire country to build socialism. (Enthusiastic applause.) We have made great achievements in every area of work. Our work has been done correctly, but we have also made some errors. At this Congress, we need to sum up the major experiences of our work, including the experiences of successes and the experiences of mistakes, so that those experiences that are beneficial [to us] can be popularized and lessons can be drawn from the experiences of errors.

In terms of domestic conditions, our success has been achieved by relying on the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class and by extensively uniting with all forces with which it was possible to unite. In order for us to carry out our great construction work, we have before us extremely heavy and complicated tasks. Though we have more than 10 million Party members,<sup>3</sup> they make up only an extremely small minority of the entire population of the country. In our various state organs and in various social enterprises we still have to rely on non-Party personnel to perform a large amount of the work. If we were not good at relying on the masses of the people and at cooperating with non-Party personnel, we would not have been able to do the work well. While we continue to strengthen the unity within the entire Party, we must also continue to strengthen the unity among the various nationalities, democratic classes, and democratic parties, as well as among the different people's organizations, and continue to consolidate and expand our people's democratic united front and earnestly rectify any kind of unhealthy phenomenon that may crop up in any sector of our work and that harms the unity between the Party and the people.<sup>4</sup>

In the international framework, our success was achieved by relying on the support of the socialist camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union (enthusiastic applause) as well as on the profound sympathy of the peace-loving

people throughout the world. (Enthusiastic applause.) At present, developments in the international situation have become even more favorable to our country's cause of [socialist] construction. Our country, as well as other socialist countries, all need peace. The peoples in the various countries of the world also need peace. Only certain monopoly-capitalist groups in a few imperialist countries who rely on aggression to make profits crave war and are opposed to peace. Owing to the unflagging efforts on the part of the peace-loving countries and peoples, the international situation is already moving toward relaxation. (Applause.) To win lasting world peace, we must further develop friendly cooperation with the various fraternal countries in the socialist camp (enthusiastic applause) and strengthen our unity with all peace-loving countries. (Enthusiastic applause.) On the basis of mutual respect for territorial [integrity] and sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit, we must endeavor to establish normal diplomatic relations with all countries that are willing to co-exist with us in peace.<sup>5</sup> We must give active support to the movements for national independence and liberation of the various countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as to peace movements and just struggles in all the countries of the world. (Enthusiastic applause.) We resolutely support the Egyptian government in its completely legitimate action of taking back the Suez Canal Company; we are firmly opposed to any attempt to encroach upon Egypt's sovereignty or to conduct armed intervention against Egypt.<sup>6</sup> (Enthusiastic applause.) We must completely thwart the imperialists' conspiracy of creating tension and preparing for war. (Prolonged enthusiastic applause.)

The victories we have achieved in revolution and construction are all victories of Marxism-Leninism. To closely integrate Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution has been a consistent ideological principle for our Party. For many years, especially since the rectification campaign in 1942,<sup>7</sup> we have done a great deal of work in the area of strengthening Marxist-Leninist education within the Party. Compared with [the situation] before the rectification campaign, our Party's Marxist-Leninist ideological level has now already been raised a step higher. However, we still have serious shortcomings. Among many of our comrades there still exist viewpoints and work styles that run counter to Marxism-Leninism, namely, subjectivism in regard to ideology, bureaucratism in regard to work, and factionalism in terms of organization. All such viewpoints and work-styles are isolated from the masses and from reality. They are harmful to the unity [between those] inside and outside the Party and block the progress both of our cause and of our comrades [themselves]. We must use the method of strengthening ideological education within the Party to make a great effort to overcome such serious shortcomings in our ranks. (Applause.)

After the October Revolution, Lenin proposed for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the task of "Study, and study again." The comrades and people of the Soviet Union acted according to Lenin's instruction and scored extremely brilliant achievements within not too long a period. (Prolonged enthusiastic applause.) Not long ago the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convened its Twentieth National [Party] Congress, which formulated many correct policies and criticized shortcomings existing inside the Party.<sup>8</sup> It can be assumed that they will

achieve extremely great development in their work from now on. (Prolonged enthusiastic applause.)

The tasks confronting us today are generally the same as those that the Soviet Union faced in the initial stages after its founding. To transform a backward, agricultural China into an advanced, industrialized China, we face a difficult and bitter task, and our experience is far from adequate. Therefore it is absolutely necessary [for us] to be good at learning. We must be good at learning from our predecessors, the Soviet Union (applause), be good at learning from all People's Democracies<sup>9</sup> (applause), be good at learning from all the fraternal parties in the world (applause), and be good at learning from the people of all countries of the world. (Applause.) We must never assume an arrogant great-nation [chauvinist] attitude, and we must never be proud and arrogant because of the victory of the revolution or because [we have] scored some achievements in construction. Every country, big or small, has its merits and shortcomings. Even if we had made extremely great achievements in our work, there is still no reason whatsoever [for us] to become arrogant and get on a high horse. Modesty helps one to make progress, whereas conceit makes one fall behind. We must always bear this truth in mind. (Enthusiastic applause.)

Comrades, I and everybody [here] all believe that the Chinese people who have already achieved liberation possess inexhaustible strength. Furthermore, we have the assistance of our great ally the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries (applause), and we also have the support of all the fraternal parties in the world (applause), as well as the support of all those who sympathize with us in the world. (Applause.) We do not have the feeling of being isolated. Consequently, it is certain that we will be able to build our country step by step into a great socialist, industrialized country. (Enthusiastic applause.) Our present Congress will play an important role in pushing forward the progress of the cause of construction in our country. (Applause.)

Present at this meeting today are representatives of communist parties, workers' parties, labor parties, and people's revolutionary parties from more than fifty countries.<sup>10</sup> (Prolonged enthusiastic applause.) They are all Marxist-Leninists, and they share a common language with us. (Applause.) They have traveled a long distance to our country to participate in this Congress of our Party with a [spirit of] noble friendship. This is a great encouragement and support to us. (Enthusiastic applause.) We extend to them our hearty welcome. (All rise. A prolonged enthusiastic applause.)

Also present today are representatives of our country's various democratic parties and democratic personages without party affiliations.<sup>11</sup> (Enthusiastic applause.) They are our close friends working together with us. (Applause.) They have given us much help all along. (Applause.) We extend to them our warm welcome. (All rise. A prolonged enthusiastic applause.)

## Notes

1. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 2.
2. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 4.
3. See paragraph 8, text Aug. 30, 1956.
4. Mao's focus on intra-Party unity and CPC unity with certain non-CPC elements in

the society and polity, here reasserted, was the central theme of his speech on Aug. 30, 1956. This opening speech therefore should be read in conjunction with the Aug. 30 speech. For the terms "democratic parties" and "people's organizations," see text Sept. 21, 1949, note 1, and text Oct. 1, 1949, vol. I, note 2, respectively. For the organizational structure of united front work, see text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.

5. These terms echo what is known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 1.

6. Since its completion in 1869, the Suez Canal was controlled by the International Suez Canal Company, which in turn was controlled by the British and French governments. In 1936 Britain and the Egyptian government under King Farouk signed a treaty that permitted the British government to station troops along the Canal Zone for twenty years. On July 26, 1956, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became president of the Republic of Egypt on June 23, declared the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. On August 2, the governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States issued a joint communiqué declaring the "internationalization" of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian government rejected this demand. Casting ahead to events that had not yet occurred at the time of this speech by Mao, on October 29, 1956, the Israeli army invaded the Sinai Peninsula. On Oct. 31, British and French troops invaded and occupied the Canal Zone. After some two months of intermittent military exchanges, and facing strong resistance from the Egyptian army, the British and French troops withdrew from the Canal Zone on December 22, under pressure from the United States and the United Nations. In March 1957 the Israeli troops also withdrew from the Sinai. The entire incident was known as the Suez Crisis.

7. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9 and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24.

8. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note. This was the Congress at which Khrushchev made a secret speech criticizing Stalin.

9. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 4.

10. For details of these participants, see news report, *RMRB* (Sept. 16, 1956), 1.

11. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1; also see news report, *RMRB* (Sept. 16, 1956), 1.

## Reply to Ambassador of the Republic of Egypt (September 17, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 18, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 96 (Nov. 21, 1956), 38. Available English Translation: NCNA, *Daily Bulletin*, 1646 (Sept. 19, 1956), 23–24.

*On September 17, 1956, Hassan Ragab became the ambassador of the Republic of Egypt to the PRC.*

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence which appoints Your Excellency as the first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Egypt to the People's Republic of China, and I am grateful for Your Excellency's friendly greetings to myself. I would like to take this opportunity to express to President Nasser through Your Excellency the sincere respect of the Chinese people and

myself. The Chinese government and people will to the best of their ability support the Egyptian people in their heroic struggle to defend the sovereignty of the Suez Canal and are confident that the Egyptian people will achieve the final victory in this struggle.<sup>1</sup>

China and Egypt are the two countries with the oldest civilizations on earth. Indeed, as Your Excellency has pointed out, the traditional friendship between our two peoples is one that has a long history. Colonialists once obstructed the development of the traditional relations between China and Egypt, but the Chinese and Egyptian peoples, who have respectively won national independence, have again established new relations of friendship and cooperation. The Chinese people value these relations of friendship and cooperation with the people of Egypt and are confident that these relations will grow more consolidated and be developed with each passing day. Because China and Egypt are two peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa, the friendship and cooperation between them will undoubtedly make an important contribution to the maintenance and consolidation of peace in Asia, Africa, and the world.

Mr. Ambassador, I warmly welcome Your Excellency's appointment as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from the Republic of Egypt to the People's Republic of China. In Your Excellency's work of developing the friendship and cooperation between China and Egypt, you will receive my full assistance and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

May your country prosper. May your people thrive, and may His Excellency President Nasser be in good health!

#### Note

1. See text Sept. 15, 1956, note 6.

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### Speech to Foreign Delegates to the Eighth Congress of the CPC (Excerpts) (September 21, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 22, 1956), 1.

*These excerpts are quoted in a news report on a banquet given by the Presidium of the Eighth CPC Congress for representatives of "fraternal parties" from fifty-five foreign countries and political entities. For dates of the Eighth Congress, see text Aug. 30, 1956, note 1; also see text Sept. 15, 1956, penultimate paragraph of text.*

Delegates from fraternal parties of fifty-five countries are attending this Congress of our Party. This demonstrates the strength of the great friendship and unity

among the working classes of all countries. . . .

We wholeheartedly thank your parties and people for the inspiration and support they have lent us. . . .

[Let's drink:]

To the common cause of communism; to the unbreakable unity among the working classes, communist parties, workers' parties, laboring peoples' parties, labor parties, and people's revolutionary parties of all countries; and to the glorious enrichment and promulgation of the invincible teachings of Marxism-Leninism! Bottoms up!

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### Some Historical Experiences of Our Party (September 25, 1956)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V. pp. 305–310. Available English Translation: *SW*, V. pp. 324–329.

*According to the Xuanji source, this is part of a talk that Mao had with representatives of some Latin American communist parties.*

United States imperialism is your adversary; it is also our adversary; it's the adversary of the people of the whole world. It is a little harder for U.S. imperialism to intervene in our affairs than to intervene in your affairs. One factor is that the United States is very far from us. Nevertheless, the hand of U.S. imperialism stretches a long distance; it has stretched to such places as our Taiwan, and to Japan, South Korea, South Viet Nam, and the Philippines. The United States has troops stationed in Britain, France, Italy, Iceland, and West Germany, and it has military bases in North Africa and the Middle and Near East. Its hand reaches throughout the world. It is a worldwide imperialism. It is the teacher by negative example for the people of the whole world. The people of the whole world must unite together and help each other to chop off its hands wherever [they are stretched]. Each [time we] chop off one of its hands, we will be a little more comfortable.

China is also a country that has suffered the oppression of imperialism and feudalism in the past; [so] our situations are quite similar. There is a bad side to a country having a large rural population and the existence of feudal forms; however, it is also a good thing for the revolution led by the proletariat [because] it gives us the broad [masses of the] peasants as an ally. In Russia before the October Revolution, feudalism was prevalent, [but] because the Bolshevik Party had the support of the broad [masses of] the peasants, the revolution triumphed. This was even more the case in our country. Ours is an agricultural country with more than 500 million people living in the countryside. In the past we mainly relied on the

peasants in fighting. At present it is also because the peasants have been organized and agricultural cooperativization has been accomplished that the urban bourgeoisie in our country is very rapidly submitting to socialist transformation. Consequently, the Party's work among the peasants is extremely important.

As I see it, in countries where feudalism is most prevalent, the political party of the proletariat must go to the countryside to seek out the peasants. If intellectuals going to the villages to seek out the peasants have a bad attitude, they will not be able to gain the confidence of the peasants. The urban intellectuals do not quite understand the affairs of the countryside or the psychology of the peasants. They can never solve the problems of the peasants properly. According to our experience, it is only after a long period [of time] and after we have truly become one with them and have convinced them that we are fighting for their benefit that a victory can be won. We definitely must not think that the peasants will come to trust us at once. We must always remember not to think that the peasants will trust us once we've given them a little bit of help.

The peasants are the chief ally of the proletariat. At first our Party did not understand the importance of working among the peasants either, so it made work in the cities primary, and work in the rural areas secondary.<sup>1</sup> As I see it, the [communist] parties in some Asian countries—for example, the Indian and the Indonesian [communist] parties have not done their rural work well.

When our Party first did work among the peasants, it was not successful. The intellectuals had an air about them, an intellectual air. Those with such an air were unwilling to go to the countryside and looked down on the countryside. The peasants, too, looked askance at the intellectuals. At that time, our Party had not yet found the method of understanding the countryside. Later, when we went [to the countryside] again, we found the way to understand the countryside; we analyzed the various classes in the countryside, and we understood the demands of the peasants on the revolution.<sup>2</sup>

During the first period, we did not see [the situation] of the countryside clearly. At that time, the Rightist opportunist line of Chen Duxiu abandoned the peasants, [our] chief ally.<sup>3</sup> Many of our comrades had a two-dimensional perspective on the countryside; they did not see the countryside in a three-dimensional way. That is to say, they did not understand [the need] to employ the class viewpoint in looking at the countryside. Only later, after they had grasped Marxism, did they use a class viewpoint in looking at the countryside. In fact, the countryside is not two-dimensional, but there are the rich and the poor as well as the poorest [of people there]; there are differences between the hired agricultural laborers, poor peasants, middle peasants, rich peasants, and landlords. During this period, I studied the countryside and organized several terms of the Peasant Movement Training Institute.<sup>4</sup> Although I knew a bit of Marxism, I still did not have a very in-depth perspective [on the situation in the countryside].

For [what happened during] the second period,<sup>5</sup> we should be thankful to our good teacher, that is, Chiang Kai-shek. He drove us to the countryside. This was a very long period; there were ten years of civil war; we fought against him for ten years, and so we simply had to study the countryside. In the first few years of this

ten-year period we still didn't have such a deep understanding of the countryside; only later did we understand more and have a deeper understanding. During this period, the three "Left" opportunist lines represented by Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Wang Ming<sup>6</sup> brought the Party very great losses, especially Wang Ming's "Left" opportunist line, which caused the collapse of the majority of our Party's base areas in the countryside.

Later, there was the third period, the period of the War of Resistance against Japan. [When] the Japanese imperialists invaded [China], we ceased fighting with the Kuomintang in order to fight against the Japanese imperialists. During that time our comrades could go openly to cities in Kuomintang areas. Wang Ming, who had previously committed the error of [pushing] a "Left" opportunist line, then committed the error of [pushing] a Rightist opportunist line.<sup>7</sup> Previously he carried out the most extreme "Leftist" policies of the Communist International, then he carried out the most Rightist policies. For us, he too was a very good teacher by negative example who educated our Party. In addition we had another very good teacher by negative example, Li Lisan. At that time their main mistake was dogmatism and mechanically transplanting the experience of foreign countries [to China]. Our Party purged itself of their erroneous lines and actually found the way to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete conditions of China. Only because of this was it possible, during the fourth period when Chiang Kai-shek attacked us,<sup>8</sup> for us to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and establish the People's Republic of China.

The experience of China's Revolution—that of building rural base areas, using the countryside to encircle the cities, and finally seizing the cities<sup>9</sup>—may not necessarily be completely applicable to many of your countries, but it can serve as a point of reference for you. Let me sincerely advise you, you must always remember not to mechanically transplant China's experience. The experiences of any foreign country can only serve as reference, and cannot be taken as dogma. It is absolutely necessary to integrate two things—the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete conditions of [your] own countries.

If you are to win the peasants over and rely on them, you must investigate [conditions in] the countryside. The method of doing this is to spend a few weeks' time in investigating one, two, or several villages and clarifying [your understanding of] the problems of the class forces, the economic conditions, and the conditions of life in the countryside. Major leadership personnel, such as the general secretary of the Party, should personally take part in the actual work and should understand a couple of villages; they should manage to find some time to do this; it is worthwhile. Although there are many "sparrows," it is not necessary to dissect all of them; dissecting a couple of them is sufficient.<sup>10</sup> When the general secretary has investigated a couple of villages and has gained confidence [in his understanding of the countryside], he can then help comrades understand the countryside and get a clear picture of the concrete conditions in the countryside. As I see it, in the [communist] parties of many countries, the general secretaries do not take dissecting a couple of sparrows very seriously; they may know something about the countryside, but not very much. Consequently, the instructions they issue do not

correspond very closely to conditions in the rural areas. Comrades in responsible positions in the various leadership organs of the Party, including those at the national level and those in the provinces and the *xian*, must also investigate a couple of villages personally and dissect a couple of “sparrows.” This is what is known as “anatomy.”

There are two ways to investigate things; one is to look at flowers on horseback; the other is to dismount from the horse to look at the flowers.<sup>11</sup> If one looks at flowers on horseback, one cannot be penetrating because there are so many flowers. Your coming from Latin America to Asia is like looking at flowers on horseback. Your own countries have so many flowers; it is simply not enough for you to only take a look, take only a glance around, and then leave when you go to your own countrysides to study. You must still employ the second method, which is to dismount from your horse and look at the flowers carefully and in detail; you must analyze a “flower” and dissect a “sparrow.”

In countries oppressed by imperialism, there are two types of bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie<sup>12</sup> and the comprador bourgeoisie. Do your countries have these two types of bourgeoisie? In general they do. The comprador bourgeoisie is always the running dog of the imperialists and is a target of the revolution.

The comprador bourgeoisie is also divided [into groups that] adhere to cliques of monopoly capitalists of the United States, England, France, and other imperialist countries respectively. In the struggle against the comprador groups, we must exploit the contradictions among the imperialist countries [in order to] deal with one of them first and strike at the principal enemy of the moment. In the past, for instance, among the comprador bourgeoisie in China, there were those who were pro-British, others who were pro-U.S., and still others who were pro-Japanese. During the War of Resistance against Japan, we utilized the contradictions between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Japan on the other to first defeat the Japanese aggressors and the comprador group that clung to them, and then we turned to oppose the aggressive forces of the United States and Britain and defeated the pro-U.S. and pro-British comprador groups. There are different groups within the landlord class, too. Only a minority are extremely reactionary; we mustn't lump those who are patriotic and who approve of opposing imperialism together with [the reactionary ones] and attack them all as one. Moreover, we must distinguish between the big landlords and the small landlords. We must not attack too many enemies at any one time; we must fight with only a few. Even in dealing with the big landlords, one should only attack that handful who are the most reactionary. Fighting everyone [at one time] may appear very revolutionary, but in fact it is very damaging.

The national bourgeoisie is our old adversary. There is a saying in China: “You only meet each other when you are adversaries.”<sup>13</sup> One experience of the Chinese Revolution is that we must be cautious in dealing with the national bourgeoisie. It is opposed to the working class, [but] at the same time it is opposed to the imperialists. In view of the fact that our main task is to oppose imperialism and feudalism and that the people cannot be liberated unless both these enemies are defeated, we must win the national bourgeoisie over to oppose imperialism. The

national bourgeoisie has no interest in opposing feudalism because they have close ties with the landlord class. Besides, it oppresses and exploits workers. Therefore we must struggle against it. However, in order to win the national bourgeoisie over to our side in opposing imperialism together, our struggle against them must stop at the appropriate time; it must be justified, beneficial, and restrained. That is, the struggle must have a reason behind it, we must have confidence that we will win, and when an appropriate victory has been won, we must exercise self-restraint. Therefore, we must investigate the circumstances on both sides; we must investigate the circumstances of the workers and those of the capitalists as well. If we only understood the workers and not the capitalists, we would not be able to hold negotiations with the capitalists. In this area, too, investigations of typical cases should be undertaken, a couple of “sparrows” must be dissected; and both the methods, looking at flowers on horseback and dismounting to look at the flowers, must be used.

Throughout the entire historical period of opposing imperialism and feudalism, we must strive to win over the national bourgeoisie and unite with it, so that it will stand on the side of the people and oppose imperialism. [Even] after the task of opposing imperialism and feudalism has been basically accomplished, the alliance with it must still be maintained for a certain period. Doing things this way is advantageous to us in dealing with imperialist aggression; it is beneficial to developing production and stabilizing the market and advantageous in [the work of] winning over and transforming the bourgeois intellectuals.

At the moment, you have not yet won state power but are preparing to seize it. You should adopt a policy of “both unity and struggle” toward the national bourgeoisie. Unite with them to oppose imperialism and support them in all their words and deeds that are anti-imperialist; [but] also carry out suitable struggles against them for their words and deeds that are reactionary, anti-working class, and anticommunist. To be one-sided is wrong; to have struggle and no unity would be [to commit] a “Left” deviationist error; to have unity without struggle would be [to commit] a Rightist deviationist error. Our Party committed both of these errors, and the experiences were very painful. Later, we summed up these two types of experiences and adopted the policy of “both unity and struggle”; when struggle is necessary, struggle; when unity is possible, unite. The purpose of struggling is to unite with them to win a victory in the fight against imperialism.

In countries oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, the political party of the proletariat must take the national banner in its own hands. It must have a program of national unity and unite with all those forces with whom unity is possible, excluding the running dogs of imperialism. Let the people of the whole country see how patriotic and peace-loving the Communist Party is, and how much it desires national unity. Doing things this way will be advantageous in isolating the imperialists and their running dogs and in isolating the big landlords and big bourgeoisie.

Communists must not be afraid of committing mistakes. Mistakes have a dual character. One aspect of mistakes is that they hurt the Party and the people. The other aspect is that they are good teachers; they have done a lot of good in educating the Party and the people, and that is beneficial to the Revolution. Failure is the

mother of success. How can failure be the mother of success unless it has its good points? When too many mistakes have been committed, [the situation] will definitely turn around. This is Marxism. When things go to an extreme, they will turn into their opposites.<sup>14</sup> When mistakes have piled up, the light will appear.

### Notes

1. Mao is referring to the period of the late 1920s and the early 1930s when the CPC was under the leadership of Qu Qiubai and Li Lisan who espoused what Mao has called the Leftist opportunist line of leadership. For details see notes on Qu and Li in text Apr. 1956, notes 8, 9, and 10, and J. Rue (1966). See also text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 30.

2. Mao himself was always in the thick of the struggle to make class analysis a necessary basis and precondition for any major innovation in CPC strategy toward the transformation of the countryside. Thus some of his own writings serve as good evidence for what he is talking about here. In 1926, Mao published the article "An Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" (see *SW*, I, pp. 13ff), which was, however, a rather primitive analysis. Slightly less primitive was the "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (Mar. 1927, see *SW*, I, pp. 23–62). By 1933 Mao had become seasoned in the debate with the leadership in the CPC, which had deemphasized the rural struggle, and his "How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas of October 1933" (see *SW*, I, pp. 137–140) was much more sophisticated and practical. Other important documents by Mao on this issue in subsequent years before Liberation include the preface and prologue to "Rural Surveys in March–April 1941" (see *SW*, III, pp. 11–16), which served as a prelude to the preliminary land reform programs instituted at Yanan, and a number of articles in 1948 (see *SW*, IV, pp. 193–260, *passim*), when the CPC was faced with the task of carrying out land reform in the newly liberated areas. Then, finally, in 1951–55, before and during the agricultural cooperativization movement, Mao again wrote articles that further analyzed the classes (particularly middle and rich peasants) in the countryside as they underwent the experience of socialist transformation. These essays are translated in this collection. Most notable are texts Mar. 12, 1950; Dec. 15, 1951; Oct. 15, 1953; and several others written in the second half of 1955, all in volume I.

3. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23.

4. From July 1924 to November 1925, five "terms" or sessions of the Peasant Movement Training Institute (Nongmin yundong jiangxisuo) were held in Guangzhou. At that time Mao was not its principal. In March 1926 he became the institute's principal and from May to September of that year organized and taught the sixth term of the institute, attended by 327 cadres from 21 provinces. Then, in March–April 1927, Mao organized the Seventh Central Peasant Movement Training Institute at Wuchang. See G. Berkley, article in *Modern China*, 1 (Apr. 1975), 132–160.

5. Mao is referring here to the period from 1927 to 1937, or the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War.

6. See text Apr. 1956, notes 8 and 10, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23.

7. See text Apr. 1956, note 12.

8. Mao is referring to the period of the Third Revolutionary Civil War, or the War of Liberation, from 1945 to 1949.

9. This refers to the line advocated and pursued by Mao for carrying out revolution in the countryside, "gathering strength in the villages, using the villages to encircle the cities, and then taking the cities." This was opposed to the line pursued by some of Mao's rivals within the CPC at this time, and it was not until the mid-1930s that Mao's argument overcame the opposition. (See text Apr. 1956, notes 8, 9, 10.) In 1949, however, Mao was to say that this had been the "center of gravity of our work since 1927." Although from the early 1930s on this line of encircling the cities had been put into practice, it was not articulated in this precise fashion until Mao made the statement referred to here on March 5, 1949, in his report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC. (See *SW*, IV, p. 363.)

See also note 1 of the current document, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), note 30.

10. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 34.

11. See text Mar. 16, 1953, vol. I, note 1.

12. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3. It should be noted here, however, that although Mao's suggestions with regard to the treatment of the national bourgeoisie here are generally consistent with what he had been saying when the policy was formulated in 1953, his rather categorical criticisms later on in this document, where he says that the national bourgeoisie "is opposed to the working class" and "oppresses and exploits workers," reflects a possibly newly gained severity that was not present, at least explicitly, in 1953.

13. This saying is derived from the fourteenth-century Yuan-dynasty opera, *Chu Zhaogong*, by Zheng Tingyu, and from the twenty-ninth *hui* of the classical novel *Hongloumeng* (Dream of the Red Chamber). The Chinese term for "adversaries" is *yuanjia*, which is also used, with a sense of literary irony, for young people who are in love, indicating, as the entire aphorism does, that in any romance there is always a love-hate relationship rather than simply love or straightforward hate. Nevertheless, the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie remain, in the final analysis, adversaries rather than allies.

14. This saying, *wu ji bi fan*, is derived from the *Huai Nan Zi*, in the chapter "Tai zu xun," and from the book "He Guan Zi: Huan Liu" in the "Yiwenzhi" (Gazette of Art and Literature) of the *Han shu* (History of the Han Dynasty). It expresses a cardinal tenet of the philosophy of the *Yi Jing* (Classic of Changes) and is a concept extrapolated and developed by the Daoists.

## Telegram to the Kingdom of Nepal (September 25, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 26, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 94 (Oct. 21, 1956), 196.

*On September 20, 1956, the delegations of the Chinese and Nepalese governments signed an agreement in Katmandu on the maintenance of friendly relations between the PRC and Nepal and of trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibetan region of the PRC and Nepal. This superseded all previous treaties between China and Nepal and between Tibet and Nepal. This agreement was accompanied by several exchanges of notes between the two countries effecting the withdrawal of Nepalese troops and military personnel from Tibet, the establishment of consulates-general by each in the other country, and the exchange of diplomatic envoys, and also by a joint communique.*

*On September 23, King Mahendra sent the PRC a telegram expressing congratulations at the signing of the agreement, and on September 26, Prime Minister Tanka Prasad Acharya of Nepal visited China.*

King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva,  
Katmandu,  
The Kingdom of Nepal

Your Majesty:

We have received your congratulatory message on the occasion of the signing of the Sino-Nepalese Agreement. On behalf of the People's Republic of China, the

Chinese people, and on my own behalf, I extend sincere thanks to Your Majesty and to the government and people of the Kingdom of Nepal. May the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and Nepal become more consolidated and be developed with each passing day on the basis of this Agreement signed in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.<sup>1</sup> May Your Majesty enjoy good health.

(Signed as Chairman of CPC and dated)

#### Note

1. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 1.

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### Speech at Banquet for Prime Minister Acharya of Nepal (September 29, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 30, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 95 (Nov. 6, 1956), 47.

*See text Sept. 25, 1956, for background to this speech. In a later part of this speech, not presented here because it did not appear as directly quoted in the source, Mao toasted the health of King Mahendra of Nepal and the health of his guests from Nepal as well as those from India, and he expressed his best wishes for the solidarity among China, India, and Nepal, the restoration of diplomatic relations, and the signing of the recent agreements between China and Nepal.*

There has been a historical relationship between Nepal and China, and a deep friendship has existed between the people of these two countries. Our countries are separated by a mountain range which is the highest one in the world. This mountain range connects not only China and Nepal but China and India as well. Therefore India, Nepal, and China are all interconnected; we are all close neighbors.

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### Speech at Reception for Foreign Guests (September 30, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 1, 1956), 1.

*This reception was held on the eve of the anniversary of the founding of the PRC.*

Friends and Comrades,

Welcome to our country. We welcome you to take part in celebrating our National Day. We wish good health to all our friends and all our comrades.

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### Memorandum to Hakamata Satomi (September 1956)

**Source:** Quoted in Hakamata Satomi, *Shi-no sengoshi*, published in *Shukan asahi* (June 2, 1978), 130.

*Hakamata Satomi was a high-ranking member of the Japanese Communist Party in the 1950s. According to the article that contained the quoted passage here, he was a guest attending the Eighth Congress of the CPC when Mao talked with him. The Congress was held September 15–17, 1956. (See K. Lieberthal [1976], pp. 85–86.) In Kyoto daigaku (1980), on page 100, Japanese scholars deduce the date of the meeting to be September 21, 1956. Hakamata, as hinted by the subtitle of the Shukan asahi article, later left the Japanese Communist Party. The title of his book translates as My Personal History Since the War.*

Comrade Hakamata, we Communists must make known to the public what we are thinking.

Communists and the Communist Party are eager to resolve all problems peacefully. This is true regarding the revolution, too. We want to carry out the revolution in a peaceful manner.

However, the ruling classes do not accept our proposals. The obstinate reactionary government employs military power in suppressing us. At such a time, what are we to do? We are also compelled to use force in combating their bloody suppression.

I think it is wise for us to state this explicitly.

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### Conversation with High-Level Cadres and Leaders of Democratic Parties (Excerpts) (Autumn 1956)

**Source:** *Shengping ziliao*, p. 343, quoting from Zhou Jingwen (1962), p. 137.



*We have no further information regarding the date of these comments and the meeting at which they were made. It is possible that the meeting took place in conjunction with the Second National Congress of the CPC in September 15–27, 1956, since leaders of the democratic parties were invited as guests to the Congress. (See text Sept. 15, 1956.)*

In the last few years things have been made too difficult for the people; we ought to let them catch their breath. . . .

Promoting socialism is a happy matter; we must not make things such that everybody feels as if he has a thorn in his side. . . .

The democratic parties<sup>1</sup> have all taken their places in the regime; everybody has a piece of the action and ought to supervise each other. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Let's see who is better at contending, who is better at blooming; when someone is good at contending and good at blooming, we should applaud.<sup>3</sup>

### Notes

1. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

2. This is a partial echo of the guideline for the interaction between the CPC and the democratic parties that Mao articulated in the sixth point in his "On the Ten Major Relationships" speech (see relevant section in text Apr. 25, 1956). Mao would go on to reiterate this several more times at the end of the year. (See text Nov. 15, 1956, and text Dec. 8, 1956.)

3. The Chinese terms for "contending" and "blooming" are *ming* and *fang*, which literally translate as "making a noise" and "opening up." The idea of *ming* connoting contention probably derives from the saying "*bu ping ze ming*" (whenever things are not in a state of stability—or equitability—they make a noise, or contend) in the essay *Song Meng Dongye xu* (Preface to the poem "Sending off Meng Dongye") by the Tang-dynasty scholar Han Yu. In a speech at a Supreme State Conference on May 2, 1956, Mao had announced the cultural policy of "let a hundred schools of thought contend, and let a hundred flowers bloom" (*baijia zhengming, baihua qifang*). The first, alluding to the coexistence and the phenomenon of contentiousness among many schools of philosophical thought in the Spring and Autumn (ca. 770–475 B.C.) and the Warring States (ca. 475–221 B.C.) periods in Chinese history, was to be applied to the areas of natural and social sciences. The second half of the slogan, alluding to the earlier dictum of "let a hundred flowers bloom, abolish the old and promote the new" (*baihua qifang, tui chen chu xin*) suggested in 1951, was to be applied to the arts and literature. (See text Sept. 26, 1952.) The connotations of the slogan were elaborated and explained by Lu Dingyi, then director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, on May 26, 1956. See *RMRB* (June 13, 1956), and R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. (1962), pp. 151–164. Subsequently a campaign based on this slogan, also sometimes known as the *daming dafang* (great contending and great blooming) campaign and more commonly known as the Hundred Flowers campaign, was launched. This slogan and policy was reiterated by Mao in the essay "On Correctly Handling Contradiction Among the People" in February 1957, which then promoted the *ming fang* campaign to an even higher level and broader scale and ushered in the Party rectification campaign of the spring and early summer of 1957.

For a more scholarly discussion of the contending and blooming campaign and its political significance, see R. MacFarquhar (1960) and D. W. F. Fokkema (1965), chs. 3 and 4.

## Speech and Toast at Banquet for President Sukarno (October 2, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 3, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 95 (Nov. 6, 1956), 11. Available English Translation: FBIS, *Daily Report* (Oct. 3, 1956), AAA2–3.

*President Achmed Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia arrived in Beijing on September 30, 1956, and remained in China until October 14, 1956, as part of an extended tour of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia as well as China. See *RMSC* (1957), p. 377.*

Your Excellency Mr. President, Distinguished Guests from Indonesia, Ladies, and Gentlemen:

We warmly welcome President Sukarno, good friend of the Chinese people, in his visit to our country. We are grateful to President Sukarno for bringing to us the fraternal friendship of the eighty-two million Indonesian people.

The Indonesian people are a great people. The Chinese people have the greatest respect for the Indonesian people and President Sukarno. Indonesia, which has been under colonial rule for 350 years, has finally won national independence after a prolonged and arduous struggle. Currently the Indonesian people are in the midst of carrying on a courageous struggle to safeguard national unity, to gradually wipe out the remnant forces of colonialism, and to defend world peace. The outstanding role played by President Sukarno in this struggle and the tremendous successes that he has scored during his recent visit to the countries of Europe and to the United States have been unanimously acclaimed by the Chinese people and all the peace-loving and justice-loving peoples of the world. The struggle waged by the Indonesian people for the abrogation of the Round-Table Conference Agreements and for the recovery of West Irian is righteous.<sup>1</sup> The Chinese people resolutely support you [in this struggle].

For Indonesia to implement an active and independent foreign policy has great benefit not only for the Indonesian people but for world peace as well. The Bandung Conference<sup>2</sup> has already produced an extensive and far-reaching influence, and Indonesia made a great contribution to the convening of this conference. Indonesia is playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. We the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America who love freedom and independence are all fighting against colonialism. On the issue of Egypt's [attempt to] nationalize the Suez Canal Company,<sup>3</sup> we the people of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and of the entire world who love peace must continue to provide resolute support for the just struggle of Egypt. The colonialists would like to see us disunited, uncooperative, and unfriendly [toward each other]. We must answer them with strengthened unity and strengthened friendship and cooperation. We must cause the colonialists' plots to become thoroughly bankrupt.

The Chinese and Indonesian peoples have historically been very good friends. Lately the friendship between our two peoples has been further strengthened in our

common cause of opposing colonialism and defending world peace. I am confident that the friendly and cooperative relations between China and Indonesia, which are built on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence,<sup>4</sup> will certainly become further consolidated and be developed with each passing day from now on.

I propose that we all drink . . .

To the friendship of China and Indonesia,

To peace in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and throughout the world,

To the prosperity of the Republic of Indonesia and the happiness of its people,

To the health of President Sukarno. Bottoms up!

### Notes

1. The sovereignty of West Irian (Irian Djaja, or West New Guinea) was, at this time, a matter of dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands. When the independence of the Republic of Indonesia was declared through the final negotiations between the National Front for Indonesian Independence and the government of the Netherlands at what came to be called the Round Table Conference at the Hague in August–November 1949, the fate of West Irian was left undecided. Each side subsequently lay claim to sovereignty over the territory. Indonesia argued that the 1948 Renville Agreements and the 1949 Roem-Van Royen Agreements which preceded the Round Table Conference had provided for the “real and complete” transfer of sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies. The Dutch claimed that the Round Table agreement, which provided that the status quo of the residency of New Guinea should be maintained with the stipulation that its political status would be determined by negotiations within one year of the date of the transfer of sovereignty, superseded all previous agreements. While the first four years after 1949 saw the two countries locked in debate over the issue but operating largely within the framework of the Netherlands-Indonesia Union, from 1954 onward the Indonesian government began to press its claim in the United Nations. Although the issue appeared on the UN agenda every year, however, Indonesia failed to win the two-thirds support required to pass a resolution favoring negotiations on the matter. In February 1956, the Sukarno government unilaterally abrogated the statute establishing the Netherlands-Indonesia Union and subsequently revoked privileges of Dutch citizens in Indonesia. In August, the Indonesian government repudiated its three-billion-guilder debt to the Netherlands, which had been acquired in the sovereignty-transfer agreement. In December 1957, large-scale anti-Dutch reactions led to nationalization of Dutch property and businesses and virtual expulsion of some forty-six thousand Dutch nationals from Indonesia. From 1960 onward, Sukarno stepped up the pressure even more intensely, calling for a “revolutionary liberation of West Irian.” The threat of war continued until August 15, 1962, when an agreement was reached by which West Irian was to be a UN-administered territory until December 31, 1962, at which point it was to be jointly governed by the United Nations and an Indonesian force until May 1, 1963. After that Indonesia would take sole possession of West Irian provided that a plebiscite were held before 1969 on whether the people of West Irian wished to remain in Indonesia. For a more detailed discussion of the West Irian dispute, see J. Reinhardt (1971), pp. 67–72.

2. See text Apr. 27, 1955, vol. I, source note.

3. See text Sept. 15, 1956(1), vol. I, note 6.

4. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), note 1.

## Speech at Banquet Given by President Sukarno

(October 5, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 6, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 95 (Nov. 6, 1956), 24. Available English Translation: FBIS, *Daily Report* (Oct. 8, 1956), AAA11–12.

*See text Oct. 2, 1956, source note.*

Friends, Comrades, Mr. President,  
Your Excellency:

On this important occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the founding of the Indonesian Army, I want first to express my sincere congratulations to President Sukarno, the supreme commander of the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia. It is my sincere wish that the heroic armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia will achieve even greater successes in the struggle to realize the ideals of the Indonesian people.

What are the ideals of the Indonesian people? President Sukarno has already clearly articulated them in the several important speeches he recently made to us. They are the ideals of independence, peace, and a new world. These are precisely the same ideals of the Chinese people. The Chinese people, in order to strive to realize these ideals, stand together with the Indonesian people on the same front and will always remain the faithful comrades-in-arms of the Indonesian people.

Your Excellency Mr. President, in the last six days you have already seen how the Chinese people welcome and respect you. Your visit has already brought our two peoples closer together than ever before. Tomorrow, you will leave Beijing; in a short while you will leave China. Although we will again be several thousand kilometers apart, our hearts and the hearts of our peoples will be closely linked together.

I propose [a toast],

To the everlasting friendship between our two peoples,

To the health of Your Excellency, President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia, the supreme commander of the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia. Bottoms up!

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## Comment on Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama's Trip to Moscow

(October 6, 1956)

**Source:** *Akahata* (Tokyo) (Oct. 8, 1956), as cited and translated in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Oct. 9, 1956), HHA7.

*According to the FBIS source, this comment was made by Mao during his visit to the Japanese Trade Exhibit in Beijing. (See text Oct. 6, 1956[2].) We have discovered no Chinese transcript or record of this comment, and what is presented here is a verbatim transcript of the FBIS translation. For information on Hatoyama, see text Sept. 4, 1956, note 6.*

China wishes to be friendly with all countries. Please extend my best regards both to Premier Hatoyama<sup>1</sup> and the Emperor. I believe that relations between China and Japan will surely be normalized eventually. I am not in a hurry. I support the visit of Premier Hatoyama to the Soviet Union, and I hope that he will visit China on his way back home.

#### Note

1. The FBIS translation is, technically speaking, in error here. Hatoyama's title should be prime minister.

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### Inscription for Japanese Trade Exhibit (October 6, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 8, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 96 (Nov. 21, 1956), 96.

*The Japanese Trade Exhibit took place in Beijing from October 6 to October 29, 1956, and in Shanghai from December 1 to December 26, 1956. For a Chinese report and comment on this exhibition, see *RMSC* (1957), p. 399.*

After viewing the Japanese Trade Exhibit, I thought that it was very good. I congratulate the Japanese people on their achievements.

Mao Zedong

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### Telegram to the USSR (October 11, 1956)

**Source:** *FBIS, Daily Report* (Oct. 19, 1956), BB17.

*We have no Chinese text of this telegram. The FBIS transcript is represented here as it appeared in the original; it does carry a signatory statement. The telegram was a joint telegram signed and issued in the names of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai.*

Comrade K. E. Voroshilov, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet;

Comrade N. A. Bulganin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers;  
Comrade D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.<sup>1</sup>

On behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people we express deep-felt gratitude to the Government and the peoples of the Soviet Union for the congratulations on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China.

All along the lengthy way of their struggle the Chinese people have had the steady, fervent support of the Soviet people and at the present time they also enjoy the tremendous assistance rendered by the Government and the peoples of the Soviet Union in socialist constructions.

The feeling of great friendliness the Soviet people have for the Chinese people inspires the entire Chinese people to struggle for the earliest implementation of socialist industrialization of their country.

The friendship between the peoples of China and the USSR has already become a powerful mainstay of the defense of peace in Asia and throughout the world. Its influence goes deeper and deeper and it is precious for the peace-loving peoples of the whole world. We are fully convinced that the great friendship between the People's Republic of China and the USSR will continue to grow from day to day and will live forever.

Availing ourselves of the opportunity, we send to the Soviet people our best wishes. I wish the Soviet people still greater and more splendid successes in the construction of communism and the maintenance of world peace.

#### Note

1. This form of address is as presented in the FBIS transcript. It does not conform to the normal form of address adopted in our own translations for this collection.

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### Toast to Prime Minister Suhrawardy of Pakistan (October 23, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 24, 1956), 1. Available English Translation: *FBIS, Daily Report* (Oct. 24, 1956), AAA5.

*A joint communiqué was signed on Oct. 23, 1956, between the government of the PRC and that of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Prime Minister Suhrawardy was in China from October 18 to October 29.*

I propose [a toast],

To the prosperity and happiness of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

To the friendship between the peoples of China and Pakistan, to the unity of all Asian countries, and to world peace,

To the health of His Excellency President Mirza of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Bottoms up!

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### Remarks about the Criticism of Stalin

(October 23, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 6, 1963), 1, (quotation). Other Chinese Texts: *HQ*, 17 (Sept. 6, 1963), 9; *Sugong lingdao*, p. 9. Available English Translations: *PR*, 6:37 (Sept. 13, 1963), 8–9; *Polemics of the International Communist Movement*, p. 64.

*See text April [6], 1956, especially source note; text Apr. 1956, source note; and texts Aug. 30, 1956, and Nov. 30, 1956. The comment here was made to P. F. Yudin, the Soviet ambassador to the PRC.*

Stalin should be criticized, but we have differing opinions as to the form the criticism ought to take. There are some other questions, too, on which we disagree.

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### Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(October 27, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 29, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 97 (Dec. 6, 1956), 44. Available English Translation: *FBIS, Daily Report* (Nov. 2, 1956), FFF5–6.

Premier,  
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Comrade Kim Il Sung:

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the War to Resist U.S. [Aggression] and Aid Korea,<sup>1</sup> we received your congratulatory telegram. On behalf of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I express sincere gratitude and respect to you and, through you, to

the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to the Korean people.

The fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples is increasingly consolidated and developed with each passing day through the just struggle to defend peace and the enhancement of economic and cultural relations between the two countries. We sincerely wish you even greater success in the great cause of restoring and developing your national economy and striving for the peaceful unification of your homeland.

(Signed and dated)

### Note

1. See text Oct. 8, 1950, vol. I, note 1.

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### Telegram to the USSR

(November 6, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 7, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 97 (Dec. 6, 1956), 149–150. Available English Translation: *FBIS, Daily Report* (Nov. 8, 1956), BB8.

Comrade K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Comrade N. A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Comrade D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

On the occasion of the thirty-ninth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution, on behalf of the government and the people of China, we extend sincere and warm congratulations to you and, through you, to our brothers, the government and the people of the Soviet Union.

In the past year, the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government, have attained outstanding successes both in the cause of building communism and in the struggle to ease international tension. These successes have inspired countries that are in the midst of building socialism and the peoples of all nations who are engaged in the struggle for a happy future.

The unity and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the various socialist countries has also undergone new development. We note with delight the declaration recently issued by the government of the Soviet Union on the development and further strengthening of the foundations of friendship and cooperation between

the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.<sup>1</sup> This declaration fully exemplifies the Soviet Union's faithful adherence to the mutual interests of the great solidarity of all socialist countries and to the principle of proletarian internationalism. These steps taken by the Soviet government undoubtedly will further strengthen the unity and the relations of friendship between the socialist countries, thus promoting their common economic upsurge.

The great friendship and cooperation between China and the Soviet Union has already had an overall development. The Chinese people are deeply aware from their own personal experience that the everlasting friendship between China and the Soviet Union conforms to the fundamental interests of the people of our two countries and of the whole of progressive humanity. The further consolidation and development of this friendship will greatly strengthen the forces for peace, democracy, and socialism and will contribute greatly to the cause of preserving world peace and the progress of humanity.

May the everlasting fraternal friendship between the Chinese and the Soviet peoples become consolidated and be developed with each passing day.

Long live the Great October Socialist Revolution!  
(Co-signed as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. On October 30, 1956, the Soviet government issued a "Declaration on Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States" (see *Pravda*, Oct. 31, 1956). This declaration stated that "the countries of the great commonwealth of socialist nations can build their relations only on the principle of full equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in the domestic affairs of one another." This declaration was obviously designed to prevent the defection of Hungary from the Soviet camp and to define the new conditions created by the events in Poland in June-July and in Hungary in October-November.

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### Telegram to the Kingdom of Cambodia

(November 7, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 9, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 97 (Dec. 6, 1956), 44. Available English Translation: FBIS, *Daily Report* (Nov. 9, 1956), AAA12.

King Norodom Suramarit,  
Kingdom of Cambodia

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of the anniversary of the independence of the Kingdom of

Cambodia, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend warm congratulations to you and to the Cambodian people. May the relations of cooperation and friendship between China and Cambodia be further strengthened and developed.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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### Comment on the Article "We Are Going to Raise Twenty Thousand Hogs in One Commune"

(November 9, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Dec. 23, 1956), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 111; *Ziliao xuanbian*, p. 179; *XHBYK*, 101 (Jan. 25, 1957), 72. Available English Translation: FBIS, *Daily Report* (Dec. 27, 1956), BBB5.

*This comment was written for the article (herein named) written by Song Baoen, deputy director of the Shimensong xiang APC in Yanggu xian, Shandong province. This article appeared in Nongcun gongzuo tongxun (Rural Work Bulletin), 8 (Dec. 20, 1956). It, together with Mao's comment, was printed and issued to cadres attending the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC, Nov. 10-15, 1956. The Ziliao xuanbian source gives the date of this comment as Nov. 19, 1956; we believe this to be a mistake.*

Comrades in positions of responsibility of each province, municipality, and [autonomous] region, please take note: If you agree, then reprint this article and distribute to all agricultural cooperatives so that they can use it for reference, and follow its example. It should be known that Yanggu xian is the birthplace of the tiger-slaying hero Wu Song.<sup>1</sup> But in this area, hog raising was not a common practice. This cooperative has changed this custom and has started to raise hogs. The first year was a failure; the second year was a success; the third year saw development; and the fourth year saw tremendous development with an average of two hogs for each person and a total of twenty thousand. [If] this cooperative can do it this way, why can't other cooperatives also do it this way?

#### Note

1. Wu Song is a key character in the classical novel *Shuihu zhuan* (Water Margin). The story of how he killed a tiger was told in the twenty-second *hui* of the novel. Wu Song has become a hero in Chinese folklore.

## Conversation with Gunther Weisenborn

(November 11, 1956)

**Source:** *Liaoning ribao* (Apr. 14, 1957).

*This conversation, which took place on November 11, 1956, was reported verbatim in G. Weisenborn's article "Gesprach mit Mao Tse-tung" in Sonntag, 51 (December 16, 1956), (Berlin). This then appeared in Russian translation in Literaturnaia Gazeta (Moscow) (Jan. 3, 1957), and the Russian was subsequently translated into Chinese and appeared in the journal Mengya (no. 4, Feb. 1957) (Shanghai). The Liaoning ribao text used here is a reprint of the Mengya translation. Weisenborn's article does not lend itself easily to the culling of Mao's end of the conversation from the entire dialogue. The interview, as apparent from the translation here, was rendered largely in the third person. In order not to damage the original record, we have presented it here in the form of reported speech as in the original, rather than in dialogue form. As such, the pronoun "I" in this document generally refers to Weisenborn.*

*There is considerable discrepancy between the Chinese version as printed in the Liaoning ribao/Mengya source and the German and Russian sources. Where the difference is important (e.g., where a paragraph or a passage in the German or Russian source has been omitted in the Mengya translation) we have noted the omission or discrepancy in our annotations. In such cases we have also provided, in the notes, a translation of the omitted passage from the German or Russian source. Minor discrepancies are simply indicated in the text in brackets. Our translation of the document as a whole, however, is made from the Liaoning ribao source.*

*A report of Weisenborn's meeting with Mao (without transcript of the conversation) is in RMRB (Nov. 12, 1956, 1).*

Mao Zedong inquires in detail about my journey. I talk about his poems and tell him that his works are very widely known in Germany. He avoids this topic and says that he is no longer involved in literary work. He smiles [and says that] he has too much [other work] to do. I say that I plan to write a book about my trip. He turns very serious and says: "You should not write only about positive things, but should also write about the negative things in that book. It is important also to point out the shortcomings. Mistakes are made everywhere in the world where people work. China has suffered oppression for a long time; hence its economy and culture are not strong enough yet. We are still in a transitional period. Every form of society will meet with obstacles; these obstacles have to be overcome."

I mention that I was deeply impressed by one thing, which is that I found the images of two Germans, Marx and Engels, on Chinese postage stamps. He laughs and replies: "Yes, we have brought Marx here; we feel he is needed here every day, and for the time being we have no plans to return him to you. [But] there will surely come a day when these two great Germans will also be respected in your country, in West Germany."

Mao Zedong says that he has studied the materialist philosophers Feuerbach and Haeckel, but also Kant, Hegel, and Leibniz. He adds that one should also study idealist philosophy, otherwise one would still be an ignoramus and would not be able to correctly understand materialism. Because of this, he believes that there is a need to establish a teaching chair<sup>1</sup> to study Kant and Hegel, so that students can become acquainted with idealist philosophy. In China, however, he says, not only the German philosophers but also the German writers as well are known. Guo Moruo<sup>2</sup> [for one] has translated Goethe's works into Chinese, and many other writers have been translated as well.

There is a pause and Mao Zedong puts a cup of tea on the armrest of the sofa on which I am sitting. Then he asks about the political situation in West Germany and inquires about the date of the next elections to the Bundestag. I reply: "They will take place in the fall of 1957." He asks about the Social Democratic Party and says: "It ought to be supported; a victory for it would be appropriate." He says: "In West Germany, as in China, there are many interesting things. One can study in detail anything in China." I reply: "I have studied the figures of the Second Five-Year Plan,<sup>3</sup> and I think they are remarkable." He laughs and says: "All that is still terribly inadequate. We want to produce 10 million tons of steel in 1962." He adds: "In its Third Five-Year Plan,<sup>4</sup> China would be able to produce as much steel as West Germany." He laughs and says: "In West Germany, too, one can be sure that steel production will be increased, although it is hard to say what the situation of [its] steel production will be in the future."<sup>5</sup>

Mao Zedong asks me what about China has made the deepest impression on me. I reply: "I have been very deeply impressed by the cheerfulness of the people in the streets and in the cities." He shows surprise and asks: "Is that so? How is it then in Europe?" I reply: "There is little cheerfulness in people's hearts in Europe." He inquires with a tone of concern: "Why is there such a difference?" He then immediately answers his own question, and says: "The Chinese people have taken their destiny into their own hands, they realize that their lives are improving day by day, and therefore they are full of hope."

There is another pause. Then he asks: "What have you written? Are you [mainly] a novelist or a poet?" I answer: "I write drama and novels." I add: "I am delighted to find some of my books listed in the reference catalog of the library of Beijing University. I am especially happy to find that one of my books, *Memorial*, is not unknown here." He shows great interest about the content of the book. He asks whether or not the book has been translated into Chinese. I reply: "No, it hasn't." He says that it should be translated and turns to the secretary of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and says: "You'll have to remind me about this in the future."<sup>6</sup> I suggest that [they should] first of all translate the works of Bertolt Brecht. I say that he [Brecht] was, in his lifetime, fond of Chinese culture and had written a play entitled *The Good Woman of Sichuan*, which was set in China.<sup>7</sup>

I inquire: "Is it possible for other West German authors to visit China?" His reply to the question is immediate and positive: "But of course. No matter which West German author, as long as he or she wants to come, may come and may stay

for as long as he or she should want to, one or two or three months. We can invite them to come here. Those who do not want to be invited can also pay for their own passage. No matter what, no one starves in China. All writers can come—writers of the Left, center, and Right, even people who are against China. Let all of them come see for themselves.” I oppose [this idea], saying: “No, it is probably better not to let them [all] come; I don’t think this is right.” Mao Zedong frowns and says: “No, it is right to let them come. In every country there are people on the Left, people in the center, and people on the Right.”

The conversation turns to the [subject of the] Soviet Union. [Mao explains:]<sup>8</sup> “It is the first socialist country in the world. [It is a country with] very rich experience. We must learn from them. They have also made some mistakes there. We must also learn from their mistakes, so that we can avoid detours and reach our goal along the shortest route. We treat the capitalists and the intellectuals in this way: we try to win them over so that they will not join the side of our enemies.”

I add: “The visit of Bundestag member Schwann to China has been widely discussed in West Germany.” He repeats once again: “Anyone can study anything in China. China is very interesting for Europeans.”

The conversation took place in a very relaxed, personal setting and made a deep impression on me.

## Notes

1. The notion of a “teaching chair” (perhaps referring to a chair professorship?) comes to us from the German source. The Chinese rendered it *jiangzuo*, which is closer to the meaning of a “lecture series.”

2. See text Sept. 4, 1956, note 8.

3. Weisenborn is probably referring to proposals made at the Eighth CPC Congress, September 15–27, 1956, for the Second Five-Year Plan. The actual figures for the plan itself had obviously not been made public at this point. On the proposals, see text Aug. 30, 1956, note 8.

4. The Third Five-Year Plan, as anticipated that time, would have begun in 1962, following the completion of the Second Five-Year Plan. However, in reality it was not launched until 1966.

5. The Chinese text here does not have a paragraph that can be found in the German and Russian texts. It reads: “[Mao]: ‘West Germany produces 20 million tons annually. You see, that is more. In Sweden the situation is that the per capita production is 2,000 tons.’ He makes a mental calculation and after some thought elaborates that if these figures were applied to China and were made to correspond to [the size of] its population, production there would have to be 1.2 billion tons.”

It ought to be noted that the translation of these figures is not entirely certain. While the German “milliarde” and “millionen,” which appear in the German text, translate as “billion” and “million” respectively, the German term “billionen,” not expressed here, translates as “trillion.” Mao may have been erroneous in his calculations, if Weisenborn was correct in his recording, or else the error may have been on Weisenborn’s part. In any case, if Mao had used the figure of 600 million for the Chinese population, which he was wont to do at this time, the steel production in China would have to be 1.2 trillion tons to match what he thought to be the per capita level of Sweden. Furthermore, in the German text, the paragraph “In its Third . . . as West Germany” was spoken by Weisenborn, not by Mao. This appears to make better sense than as presented in the Chinese text.

Also see text Dec. 8, 1956, note 44.

6. In the German text, Mao turns to the secretary in question and reminds him (i.e., Mao reminded the secretary, instead of instructing the secretary to remind him, Mao).

7. In the Chinese text, this title is rendered as *Sichuan lai de hao ren*, which translates as “The good person from Sichuan.” We think there is a typographical error here, and that the text should have read *Sichuan lai de hao furen*. The title *The Good Woman of Sichuan* or *The Good Woman of Szechwan* is the commonly used English translation of the title of Brecht’s drama. In the *Sonntag* (German) source, this is given as “Der gute Mensch von Sezuan.”

8. Here, in the German text, one sentence is added: “The Soviet Union had many successes after the revolution.”

## In Commemoration of Mr. Sun Yat-sen

(November 12, 1956)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 311–312. Other Chinese Texts: *RMRB* (Nov. 12, 1956), 1; *Wansui* (1969), pp. 59–61; *Wansui* (1967b), pp. 13–14; *Wansui* (n.d.), p. 42; *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 111–112; *Ziliao xuanbian*, p. 179; *XHBYK*, 23 (Dec. 6, 1956), 1; *Buyi*, pp. 96–97; *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, pp. 754–755. Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 330–331; *SCMP*, 1411 (Nov. 13, 1958), 12–13; *CB*, 891 (Oct. 8, 1969), 22; *FBIS, Daily Report* (Nov. 13, 1956), BBB4-5; J. Chen (1970), pp. 19–20; K. Fan (1972), pp. 149–150; quoted in *CR* (Dec. 1966), 11; quoted in *PR*, 12:9 (Feb. 28, 1969), 6.

*The Wansui (n.d. 3) source gives the “date” of this essay as simply November 1956.*

*On November 11, 1956, a grand memorial gathering of all the people’s organizations and other political, cultural, and social organizations, under the sponsorship of the CPPCC and the State Council, was held in memory of Sun Yat-sen at the auditorium of the CPPCC. Representatives of some 30 foreign countries and 160 foreign guests also attended.*

*Sun (1866–1925), named Sun Wen, was well known in China as Sun Zhongshan, but was known more commonly in the West by his other zi, Yat-sen. He was the leader of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Qing dynasty and established the first Chinese Republic. He became China’s provisional president in January 1912. To the Kuomintang and to many other non-Communist Chinese he is known (officially in China before 1949 and on Taiwan since then) as “Guo fu,” or the Father of the Nation. See text Aug. 4, 1952, note 7.*

Let us commemorate our great revolutionary forerunner, Mr. Sun Yat-sen!

Let us commemorate him for the keen struggle he waged against China’s reformists during the preparatory stage of China’s democratic revolution,<sup>1</sup> taking the clear cut position of a Chinese revolutionary democrat. He was himself a banner for China’s revolutionary democrats in this battle.

Let us commemorate him for his great contribution during the period of the 1911 Revolution<sup>2</sup> when he led the people in overthrowing the imperial order and establishing the republic.

Let us remember him for the great contribution of developing the old Three People's Principles into the New Three People's Principles during the first period of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China.<sup>3</sup>

He has left behind for us much that is beneficial to us in the area of political thought.

Except for a small handful of reactionaries, all Chinese who live in this age are successors to Mr. Sun's revolutionary cause.

We have completed the democratic revolution which Mr. Sun had not finished and have developed this revolution into a socialist revolution.<sup>4</sup> We are in the midst of completing this revolution.

All things develop. Since the Revolution of 1911, that is, the Xinhai Revolution,<sup>5</sup> it has been no more than forty-five years, and yet the face of China has completely changed. In another forty-five years, that is, by 2001, which is when we step into the twenty-first century, the face of China will have undergone even greater changes. China will become a powerful socialist industrial country. China ought to achieve this. Owing to the fact that China is a country with a territory of 9.6 million square kilometers and a population of 600 million, China ought to make a greater contribution to humanity, and yet this contribution has, in ages past, been too small. This makes us feel ashamed.

Nevertheless, we must be modest. Not only should we be so now, but so we ought to be forty-five years from now; we should always be modest. In the area of international relations, the Chinese people ought to resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly, and totally eradicate great-nation chauvinism.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Sun was a modest man. I heard him speak many times and felt that he had a great spirit. From the fact that he paid attention to studying China's historical conditions and its contemporary social situation, and from the fact that he paid attention to studying the conditions of foreign countries, including those of the Soviet Union,<sup>7</sup> one knows that he was very modest and open-minded.

He worked, heart and soul, for the cause of the transformation of China and dedicated his entire life's energies to that cause. This is truly a spirit of total and unflinching devotion, even unto death.

Just as many great historical figures who have stood in the forefront directing the current of the times have all had their shortcomings, Mr. Sun, too, had his shortcomings. Nevertheless, this must be explained in light of historical circumstances so that people will understand; we must not demand too much of our predecessors.

## Notes

1. By reformists, Mao is referring to the people such as Kang Youwei, Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, and Tan Sitong who from the 1860s to the 1890s advocated fundamental political and social reform in China on the basis of the Qing monarchical and dynastic order. They did not advocate revolution, but believed that China could be changed around through enlightened reforms in the political system without removing the monarchical regime. This reformist movement culminated in the abortive Hundred Days Reform Movement in 1898. (See text Aug. 24, 1956, note 6.) Even after the failure of this reform movement, diehard reformists such as Kang Youwei continued to call for a constitutional monarchy and

pinned their hopes on the restoration of the Guangxu Emperor. They thus raised the slogan of "bao huang" (protect the emperor) and argued that protecting the emperor is tantamount to revolution. This was totally rejected and denounced as nonsense by Sun Yat-sen and other bourgeois democratic revolutionaries such as Song Jiaoren, and severe polemics were waged throughout the 1910s, with Sun's revolutionary platform coming through increasingly loud and clear in the pages of *Minbao*. The opposition of the reformists against the revolutionary movement that aimed to overthrow the Qing monarchy entirely made Sun's task of organizing the latter extremely difficult. Several times, for instance, Kang exerted his influence to cut off support for Sun's movement among overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, Hawaii, and the United States. However, the revolutionaries, in the end, gained the upper hand, and the 1911 Revolution effectively brought the debate to an end.

2. On October 10, 1911, the revolutionary societies of the Wenxue she (Literary Society) and the Gongjin hui (Association for Common Advancement) in Wuchang, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen's Tongmenghui headed locally by Huang Xing, successfully accomplished an armed insurrection, taking the offices of the Qing governor of Hubei, and occupied the city of Wuchang, subsequently also taking the adjacent cities of Hankou and Hanyang. This swept the country into a frenzy of revolutionary activity, and within one month, seventeen provinces declared independence from the Qing government. On New Year's Day 1912, the establishment of the Republic of China was declared, and on February 12, 1912, the Qing emperor, Xuantong, abdicated.

3. The Three People's Principles that Sun Yat-sen originally advocated in the early phase of the bourgeois democratic revolution were the principles of *minzu* (nationality), *minchuan* (people's rights), and *minsheng* (people's livelihood), which, integrated with the slogan *quzu talu, huifu Zhonghua, jianli minguo, pingjun dichuan* (drive out the barbarians, restore the Chinese state, establish the people's state, and equalize the people's rights to the land), became the guiding thought for the bourgeois revolution and the establishment of the Republican government. Many elements of this thought system did not become implemented, however, and China soon collapsed into a state of disintegration, with political power falling first into the hands of Yuan Shikai, and eventually, on Yuan's death, into the hands of vying warlord factions whose armies ravaged China for a decade.

From 1922 to 1924 Sun began to rethink these principles, and his thought began to show a tendency toward anti-imperialism and socialism. According to Communist interpretation, Sun incorporated anti-imperialism and national liberation into his "nationality" principle; liberation of the political system from exclusive bourgeois and feudal domination into his "people's rights" principle; and socialist economic principles such as "equalization of land rights," "control and curtailment of capital," and "to each toiler his own land" into the "people's livelihood" principle. This became known as the New Three People's Principles. This, according to CPC interpretation, was accomplished during the last years of Sun's life. The concrete manifestations of this transition, according to this interpretation, was Sun's formulation of the "three major policies" of "Alliance with the Soviet Union, Tolerance for the Communist Party, and Assistance to the workers and peasants" (*lian-E, ronggong, fuzu nonggong*), which Sun advocated in his final years and which formed the basis for the first KMT-CPC united front of 1924–1927. See text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, notes 7 and 8.

4. For the distinction between the national democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, see text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

5. The two characters *xinhai* relate to China's traditional system of determining chronology by "heavenly cardinals" and "terrestrial branches," forming a duodecimal cycle. See text Nov. 22, 1950, vol. I, note 1.

6. This may be a subtle jab at the Soviet Union's interference in the Polish and Hungarian incidents of June and October 1956. It may be of interest to note that in November 1971, when the PRC government recovered its right to represent China at the United Nations, the first speech made by the PRC's delegate in that world body specifically addressed this point (i.e., of China's eschewment of the attitude of a superpower and of interference in other countries' affairs).



7. This refers to Sun's growing connections with the Soviet Union, through Comintern advisers such as Joffe, in the early 1920s, and his final formulation of the policy of alliance with the USSR and KMT tolerance for the CPC. (See note 3.)

## Speech at the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee (November 15, 1956)

**Source:** Version I: *Xuanji*, V, pp. 313–329. Other Chinese Texts: *RMRB* (Apr. 22, 1970), 2 (excerpts); *HQ*, 5 (May 1, 1970), 7–8 (excerpts); *Wansui* (n.d.), p. 43 (excerpts). Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 332–349; *JPRS, Selections*, pp. 39–43 (excerpts).

Version II: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 112–118.

*The two versions of this speech are vastly different from each other even though there is some overlapping of subject and language. The Xuanji, V., version is the "official release" version of 1977 and has been translated in other sources. The Wansui (n.d. 3) version, as we see here, stands alone. This is most certainly an earlier publication than Xuanji, V. A sense of how substantially edited (and changed) Mao's writings and speeches may have been in Xuanji, V, can be obtained by comparing the two versions of this speech here. Since the differences are so many and so substantial, however, we leave it to the reader to make his or her own textual comparison of the two versions presented consecutively here. It should be noted that the criticism of Stalin is much harsher in Version II than in Version I, and the final paragraphs of Version II, where the reorganization of army units is discussed, do not appear at all similar to the last parts of Version I.*

*Mao gave this speech to the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, which was held November 11–15, 1956, i.e., some seven months after his "Ten Major Relationships" speech (and two months after the Eighth Party Congress). Throughout that seven-month period, although numerous economic and administrative changes had been made along the lines suggested by Mao in "Ten Major Relationships," the struggle over the "adventurist advances" and the Leap Forward continued, with opponents of the Leap gaining in strength.*

*This speech contains many of Mao's ongoing themes: the dominance of imbalance over balance; the stress on the spirit of diligence and self-sacrifice; education through class struggle; and the acceptance of the position adopted in the Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress that the transformation of China's economic base had been basically completed and that the contradictions with the bourgeoisie had been basically resolved (a position he would reverse in 1957).<sup>1</sup>*

*This speech also reveals the process of change in Mao's thought at this time. His treatment of the Soviet Union is a mix of positive and negative. In Version I he strongly defends Stalin (another position he would subsequently revise) while strongly criticizing the practices of the CPSU under Khrushchev, although in Version II his criticism of Stalin is much more extensive and strongly worded.<sup>2</sup> As such, the timing of this speech (i.e., it preceded the CPC's second RMRB editorial on Stalin and the Soviet Union, "Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the*

*Proletariat," by about a month and a half) suggests to us the lines of transition that were being formed at the time. Perhaps the most important aspect of this speech, however, is Mao's discussion of the handling of internal contradictions among the people. This presages his better-known speech on the subject in 1957. (See text Feb. 27, 1957.)*

*No doubt forced to deal with this issue by the events in Poland and Hungary, Mao's notion of internal contradictions among the people and between the people and the Party, and his support for strikes as a means of dealing with these contradictions, represent a criticism that could not be restricted to the Soviet practice after Stalin, but that would eventually have to include Stalin himself. The issue of internal contradictions among the people and how they are to be dealt with would absorb much of Mao's attention and become another issue of struggle in the period ahead.*

### Version I

I'm going to talk about four problems: the problem of the economy, the problem of the international situation, the problem of Sino-Soviet relations, and the problem of big democracy and small democracy.

1. We must analyze problems thoroughly and completely before we can solve them correctly. Whether we are going to advance or withdraw or whether we are going to mount the horse or dismount from it, we must do all these according to the dialectical method. In this world there will always be [situations in which people] mount or dismount, in which people advance or withdraw. How can anybody mount a horse, ride for a day, and not dismount? When we walk, we don't move both legs at once; there is always unevenness. On the first step, one foot goes in front, and the other foot stays behind; on the second step, the second foot goes forward, while the first foot remains behind. When we watch a movie, the characters on the screen are moving all the time. But if you took a copy of the film and examined it, [you would discover that] not one small frame moves. In the chapter "Tianxia" in *Zhuang Zi* it says that "The image of a bird in flight does not move."<sup>3</sup> All things in the world are dialectic like this; they move and yet they do not move. There is no such thing as pure inactivity; nor is there any such thing as pure motion. Motion is absolute, while inactivity is temporary and conditional.

Our planned economy is both balanced and unbalanced. Balance is temporary and conditional. When balance is established temporarily, changes will immediately follow. The first half of the year may be balanced; the second half will be unbalanced. What is balanced this year will be unbalanced next year. To have everything balanced without breaking the balance at all is impossible. We Marxists believe that imbalance, contradiction, struggle, and development are absolute, while balance and calm are relative. By "relative" we mean that they are temporary and conditional. In that case, regarding our economic problem, do we advance, or do we withdraw? We should tell the cadres and the broad masses that there is advance and [at the same time] withdrawal. The principal aspect is still advance; but not in a linear manner; rather it is in a wave-like manner. Although there are times when we dismount, we are still mounted for the larger part of the time. Are our Party committees, departments, and government bodies at various levels promoting progress or are they promoting retrogression?<sup>4</sup> Basically they are still promoting progress. Society will always advance; to advance is a general tendency, as is development.

Was the First Five-Year Plan correct?<sup>5</sup> I agree with the opinion that it can clearly be seen from the situation in the previous four years that the First Five-Year Plan was fundamentally correct. As for mistakes, indeed there were some, but these were unavoidable since we lacked experience. In the future, after we have undertaken several five-year plans and have gained experience, will we still make mistakes? [Yes,] it will still be possible for us to make [mistakes]. There is no end to learning from experience. Will there be no mistakes at all when we draw up plans ten thousand years from now? What may happen ten thousand years from now is not our concern, but one thing we can be sure of is that there will still be mistakes. People make mistakes when they are young, but is it true that older people can avoid making mistakes? Confucius said everything he did conformed to objective laws when he was seventy.<sup>6</sup> I just don't believe it, that's bullshit. Construction items that exceeded the norm [set] in our First Five-Year Plan were partly designed for us by the Soviet Union, but mostly we designed them ourselves.<sup>7</sup> Do you think that the Chinese people are incompetent? We are competent, too. Yet we must admit that we are still a bit incompetent because there are certain items that we still cannot design on our own. In the preceding few years, there was a problem in our construction [work], which, as some comrades said, was to pay attention only to the "bones" and not pay much attention to the "flesh." Plants, machinery, and facilities were set up, but there was no corresponding development in municipal construction and in the service establishments. This problem could become very serious in the future. The way I see it, the effects of this problem will be felt not in the First Five-Year Plan, but in the Second, or even in the Third, Five-Year Plan.<sup>8</sup> As to whether the First Five-Year Plan is correct or not, we can draw some conclusions now and draw some conclusions again next year, but as I see it, we'll have to wait until the last stages of the Second Five-Year Plan before we can draw the final conclusions. In all of this it would be impossible not to be guilty of a bit of subjectivism. It's not too bad to commit some errors. Achievements have a dual nature, as do mistakes. Achievements can encourage people and at the same time can make people arrogant; mistakes depress people and cause people anxiety; they are enemies, but at the same time they can be our good teachers. Generally speaking, right now we cannot find anything seriously wrong with the First Five-Year Plan, any mistake of a basic nature.

We must protect the enthusiasm of the cadres and the masses of the people and must not pour cold water on them. At one time, some people poured cold water in regard to the issue of socialist transformation of agriculture.<sup>9</sup> At that time there was a "committee to promote retrogression."<sup>10</sup> Later we said that we shouldn't pour cold water, so we set up a committee to promote progress. The original arrangement was to use eighteen years' time to basically accomplish socialist transformation in the area of the ownership system, but once there was an effort to promote progress, things developed quite rapidly. It has been written into the Draft Program for Agricultural Development that the higher stage of agricultural cooperativization should be accomplished in 1958.<sup>11</sup> Now it appears that this [goal] can be realized this winter or next spring. Although there are quite a few defects, it's still better than the ["committee to promote retrogression.[''] The peasants are happy, and

agricultural production has been increased. Without this cooperativization, we wouldn't have been able to increase production by more than 20 billion catties in a year with calamities as great as this year's.<sup>12</sup> Besides, with cooperatives in the disaster-stricken areas the [work] of relief through production can be more easily done. With the protection of the cadres' and masses' enthusiasm as our basic requirement, we must criticize their shortcomings as well as our own. In this way, they will have the drive [to move forward]. We must, and certainly can, explain clearly to the masses about those things that the masses have demanded be done but that cannot be done for the moment.

The national budget for each year should be decided after three examinations.<sup>13</sup> That is to say, we comrades of the Central Committee and some other comrades concerned should hold three meetings to discuss [the budget] before it is decided. This way everybody can understand the contents of the budget. Otherwise, it's always those comrades who have taken an active part [in drafting the budget] who understand it better, and people like ourselves only raise our hands [to vote on the issues]; whether or not we [really] understand [the budget] or not is still a question. It's called understanding and [at the same time] not understanding; that is, we understand it, but not too well. Can we say that if the method of decision after three examinations is adopted we will understand [the budget] thoroughly? Not necessarily; [our understanding] will still fall short of those comrades who have taken an active part [in drafting it]. They are like the actors on a stage; they know how to sing. We are like the audience; we don't know how to sing.<sup>14</sup> However, if we have been watching plays for a long time we can make a more correct judgment as to who is a better actor and who worse. Whether a play is well-performed or not is still for the audience to judge. Correcting the actors' mistakes still depends on those who watch the play. This is exactly where the audience excels. A play can continue to be performed if people always like to watch it. Other plays that people do not like to watch should be changed. This is why we have the contradiction between the experts and nonexperts within the Central Committee. The experts have their strong points, while the nonexperts [also] have strong points of their own. The nonexperts can distinguish between what is right and what is wrong.

The phrase "safely reliable" was used in the Report on the National Budget of 1956; I suggest it be changed into "completely reliable" from now on.<sup>15</sup> At the conference on the problem of intellectuals in January this year,<sup>16</sup> I mentioned the need to be "completely reliable." "Safe" and "reliable" are redundant terms. To use "safe" to modify "reliable" does not add anything to the meaning of the term, nor does it qualify anything. Adjectives are modifiers on the one hand and qualifiers on the other. By saying "completely reliable" limits are placed [on the word "reliable"] in terms of degree, namely, it is not reliability in a general sense but in the sense of complete reliability. Complete reliability is not easy to achieve. When the [national] budget was being ratified at the National People's Congress in June this year, everybody said it was reliable.<sup>17</sup> From the way things look at present, [only] less than 10 per cent of the budget is unreliable. There are some cases in which the priority of items has been incorrectly arranged and too much money is spent on some items.<sup>18</sup> So, from now on, we must pay attention to giving

proper [priority] to items in the budget. Whether or not [priorities] are properly arranged depends, in the final analysis, on the experts paying attention and at the same time on our paying attention, especially on the comrades at the provincial level paying attention. Naturally, all of us should pay attention [to the problem].

People like us and our secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees must take hold of finance and planning. We had some comrades before who didn't take hold [of this] with great effort. Comrades, please pay attention to the problems of grain, pork, eggs, and vegetables. These problems are quite significant. Last winter we concentrated our attention on developing grain [production] and neglected [the production] of sideline occupations and cash crops. Later, we rectified this deviation and emphasized the development of sideline occupations and cash crops. In particular, there were fixed price ratios between twenty or thirty items. There were so-called ratios of prices between such items as cotton and grain, oils and grain, pork and grain, tobacco and grain. The peasants then started to become immensely interested in the sideline occupations and cash crops, and grain [production] deteriorated. The first deviation was [an overemphasis] on grain [production]; the second one was an [overemphasis] on sideline occupations and cash crops. When the price of grain is low, it can hurt the peasant.<sup>19</sup> If your price for grain is too low, the peasants won't grow it. This problem is worth a great deal of attention.<sup>20</sup>

We must build our country through frugality and diligence and be opposed to waste and extravagance.<sup>21</sup> We must promote hard work and plain living and the sharing of joy and sorrow. The comrades have suggested that directors of factories and principals of schools can sleep in huts. I think that would be a good idea, especially in times of difficulty. On our Long March, when we crossed the marshlands, there were no houses at all, and we just slept [without them].<sup>22</sup> Commander-in-Chief Zhu<sup>23</sup> walked forty days to cross the marshlands, and even he slept in that way; and we all made it. When our troops had nothing to eat, they ate the bark and leaves off trees, and they shared weal and woe with the people. This is what we did in the past; why can't we do it now? So long as we do things in this way, we will not be divorced from the masses.

We must take hold of the newspapers. The Central Committee and Party committees at all levels must see operating newspapers as something of major importance wherever newspapers are published. This year the newspapers propagandized about the improvement of the people's livelihood in a one-sided and unrealistic manner, and they have given little effort to propagandizing such things as building the country through diligence and frugality, opposition to waste and extravagance, promotion of hard work and plain living, and sharing joy and sorrow [with the people]. From now on the focus of propaganda in newspapers should be shifted to this aspect. Things broadcast on the radio are probably also taken from the newspapers. Therefore we should get the journalists and people who work on the newspapers and in broadcasting together for a meeting to exchange views with them and tell them about the guidelines for propaganda.<sup>24</sup>

Here something also has to be said about the issue of suppressing counterrevolutionaries. Those local bullies and bad gentry, those hooligans, and those

counterrevolutionaries who have committed heinous crimes, would you say that we ought to execute them or not? They ought to be executed. Some of the democratic personages say that it is bad to execute [these people]. We say that it is good to execute them; this is just a competing show. In this drama we have always been singing in disharmony with the democratic personages. The ones we are executing are "little Chiang Kai-sheks." But, as for the "big Chiang Kai-sheks," people such as the Xuanton Emperor, Wang Yaowu, and Du Yuming,<sup>25</sup> we haven't executed any of them. However, if those "little Chiang Kai-sheks" aren't executed we will have "earthquakes" beneath our feet every day, and we will not be able to liberate the forces of production or to liberate the laboring people. There are only two parts to the forces of production: toilers and tools. If the counterrevolutionaries are not suppressed, the laboring people will not be happy. The oxen will not be happy either; nor will the plows; and the soil will not be comforted. This is because the laboring people who use the oxen, the plows, and the land are not happy. Therefore, we must execute some counterrevolutionaries; apart from that, we must arrest some and put some under surveillance.<sup>26</sup>

2. In general, the international situation looks good. What's a few imperialist [powers]? There would be nothing to fear even if there were a few dozen more imperialist [countries].

At this moment there are two places that present problems: one is Eastern Europe, and the other is the Middle East. There is trouble in Poland and Hungary,<sup>27</sup> while Britain and France are mounting an armed invasion of Egypt.<sup>28</sup> I believe all these bad things are also good things. From a Marxist's point of view, bad things have a dual nature, one aspect being bad and the other aspect being good. Many people, when they see the character "bad" accompanying the character "thing" think of it only in terms of the bad aspect. We say that there is yet another meaning; it is also a good thing. This is what is meant by [the saying]: "Failure is the mother of success." Given certain conditions, all failures, all disasters, and all mistakes can produce good results. Whether in Poland or Hungary, since there is already fire, things will inevitably burst into flames. Is it better for it to burst into flames or not? Paper cannot contain flames; now things are on fire; it's good that things are on fire. There are so many counterrevolutionaries in Hungary, and this time they have been exposed. The Hungarian affair educated the Hungarian people and at the same time educated some comrades in the Soviet Union and educated our comrades here in China. The emergence of Beria was a stunning blow; how could a socialist country give rise to a Beria?<sup>29</sup> The emergence of Gao Gang<sup>30</sup> was another great cause for alarm. It is precisely from such things that we must learn our lesson. Such things are to be expected and will always occur.

In the future when the imperialists throughout the world have been overthrown and all classes have been eliminated, would you say that there would still be revolution? I believe that there would still be revolution. The social system would still need reform and the term "revolution" would still be in use. Of course, revolution in that period would be of a different nature than revolution during the period of class struggle. At that time there would still be a contradiction between the relations of production and the forces of production, and a contradiction

between the superstructure and the economic base. If the relations of production are unsuitable, they should be overthrown, and if the superstructure (including ideology and public opinion) protects the type of relations of production that the people dislike, the people will change it. The superstructure is also a type of social relationship. The superstructure is built upon the economic base. The economic base simply means the relations of production, primarily the system of ownership. The forces of production are the most revolutionary factor. With the development of the forces of production there will always be revolution. The forces of production fall into two categories: one is people; the other is tools. Tools are created by people. Tools demand revolution; they speak through people, through the laborers; [they demand] the destruction of the old relations of production and old social relations. "The gentleman argues but does not fight;" the best method is to use one's mouth, but if good words go unheeded, force will take the place of speech. What if there are no weapons available? The laborers have tools in their hands; if they do not have tools, they can pick up rocks; if they don't even have rocks, they still have their fists.

Our state organs are state organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Take the courts of law for instance. They are there to deal with the counterrevolutionaries, but they are not there solely for dealing with the counterrevolutionaries; they [also] have to settle many problems that arise from disputes among the people. It appears that there will be a need for courts of law even ten thousand years from now. This is because, even after classes have been eliminated, there will still be contradictions between the advanced and the backward, there will still be struggle among the people, and there will still be fights and various kinds of trouble. How can you get along without setting up a court of law! However, the nature of the struggle will change; it will no longer be the same as class struggle. The nature of the courts of law will also change. Also at that time, the superstructure may create problems. For instance, people like ourselves can commit mistakes, and if we were to lose in the struggle we could be toppled and [people like] Gomulka<sup>31</sup> could take power and someone such as Rao Shushi<sup>32</sup> could be brought to the front of the stage. You say such things can't happen? I believe they will still be happening in a thousand or [even] ten thousand years.

3. Everything in the world is a unity of opposites.<sup>33</sup> By unity of opposites we mean a unity of two things that have different characters and that are opposed to each other. For instance, water is a compound of the two elements hydrogen and oxygen. Hydrogen by itself without oxygen, or oxygen by itself without hydrogen is not enough to make up water. I hear that there are already more than a million chemical compounds that have been given names; and we don't even know how many more compounds there are that have not yet been named. Chemical compounds are unities of opposites of things that are different in character. Things are the same in society. The Center and the localities are a unity of opposites; separate departments are also in a unity of opposites.

Two countries are also a unity of opposites. China and the Soviet Union are both known as socialist [countries]; are there dissimilarities between them? Yes, there are. The nationalities of the Soviet Union and China are different. The October

Revolution took place in the Soviet Union thirty-nine years ago, whereas we have held political power in this country as a whole for only seven years. There are a lot of differences in the things we have accomplished. For example, our collectivization of agriculture has gone through several stages, and this is different from theirs; our policy of dealing with the capitalists is different from theirs; our policy of [regulating] the market and prices is different from theirs; our way of handling the relationship among agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry is different from theirs, and the systems we have instituted in our armed forces and our Party are different from theirs. We have told them, ["We do not agree with some of your things, and we do not approve of some of the ways in which you do things.["]]

There are some comrades who simply do not [approach problems] with the dialectical method; they do not analyze [things] but say that all of the Soviet Union's things are good and forcibly transplant everything that the Soviet Union has. In fact all things, whether Chinese or foreign, can be analyzed, and in each case there are some good things and some bad.<sup>34</sup> The same applies to the work in each of the provinces, there are achievements and there are failures. It also holds true for every one of us. We all have two aspects: strong points and shortcomings. We do not just have one single aspect. The theory [that maintains that each thing consists of] a single aspect<sup>35</sup> has been in existence since ancient times, so has the doctrine [that maintains that each thing has] dual aspects. They are known as metaphysics and dialectics [respectively]. As an ancient Chinese saying goes: "Yin and yang together make up the *Dao*."<sup>36</sup> Things do not work with only *yin* and no *yang*, or with only *yang* and no *yin*. This was the doctrine of dual aspects in ancient times. Metaphysics is the single-aspect doctrine. At present, the single-aspect doctrine is still quite difficult to erase among a considerable number of our comrades. They look at problems one-sidedly. They think that all the Soviet Union's things are good and adopt everything without modification; they even have adopted quite a few things that should not have been adopted [at all]. Those things that have been incorrectly adopted and that are not suitable for our land have to be changed.

Here I'd like to talk about the problem of having "illicit relations with foreign countries." Do we have people in China who are giving intelligence to foreign countries behind the [Party] Center's back? I think there are. Gao Gang, for instance, is such a person. This has been proven by many facts.

On December 24, 1953, at the Center's meeting to expose Gao Gang,<sup>37</sup> I announced that there were two headquarters in Beijing; one headquarters was that of people like us, this headquarters blew a *yang* wind and set a *yang* fire; then there was the other headquarters, which was an underground headquarters; it also blew up a wind and set a fire, a *yin* wind and a *yin* fire.<sup>38</sup> One of our ancients, Lin Daiyu, said that if the East wind does not prevail over the West wind, the West wind will prevail over the East wind.<sup>39</sup> At present, if the *yang* wind and *yang* fire do not prevail over the *yin* wind and *yin* fire, the *yin* wind and *yin* fire will prevail over the *yang* wind and *yang* fire. Their purpose in blowing a *yin* wind and setting a *yin* fire is to prevail over the *yang* wind, to put out the *yang* fire, and to topple a great number of people.

Among our high-ranking and middle-ranking cadres there are some other individuals (not many) who have illicit relations with foreign countries. This is not good. I hope that our comrades will make this problem clear to the people in the leading Party groups and the Party committees, and at the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region levels, and [warn them] that such things must not happen again. There are things about which we disagree with the Soviet Union; our Party Center has discussed these things with them quite a few times, but there are some questions that have not yet been discussed and will be discussed in the future. If there is any discussion it should be conducted via the Central Committee. Intelligence must not be passed on [to the Soviet Union].<sup>40</sup> That kind of intelligence is totally useless; it can only do harm. It will damage the relationship between our two Parties and between our two countries. People who do such things get themselves into an embarrassing situation because when they do things behind the Party's back, there's always a feeling of guilt in their hearts. If there's anybody who has passed on intelligence, let him speak up and the matter will be closed. But if he doesn't speak up, we will investigate, and when he is found out he'll be given proper punishment.

I'd like to say something about the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.<sup>41</sup> As I see it, there are two "knives": one is Lenin and the other is Stalin. The Russians have now relinquished the knife represented by Stalin. Gomulka and some people in Hungary have picked up this knife to kill the Soviet Union, [by] opposing the so-called Stalinism. The Communist parties of many European countries are also criticizing the Soviet Union; the leader [of these parties] is Togliatti.<sup>42</sup> The imperialists are also using this knife to kill people; Dulles, for one, picked it up and played around with it for some time. This knife was not loaned out; it was thrown out. We, the Chinese, did not discard it. Our first [principle] is to defend Stalin; the second is also to criticize Stalin's mistakes; [so] we wrote the essay "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."<sup>43</sup>

We are unlike some people who smeared and destroyed Stalin. Rather, we have acted in accordance with the actual situation.

Are parts of the knife represented by Lenin now also being discarded by people in the Soviet leadership? As I see it, much of it has already been discarded. Is [the experience of] the October Revolution still valid? Can it remain a model for all other countries? Khrushchev's report at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU stated that it is possible to achieve political power through parliamentary means.<sup>44</sup> This is to say that other countries no longer need to emulate the October Revolution. Once this door is opened, Leninism will basically be abandoned.

Leninist doctrine is a development of Marxism. In what areas does it represent a development of Marxism? First it developed [Marxism] in the area of worldview, that is, in the areas of materialism and dialectics; second, it developed [Marxism] in the areas of revolutionary theory and revolutionary strategy, especially with regard to such questions as class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the proletarian party. Lenin also [developed] a doctrine of socialist construction. Ever since the October Revolution in 1917, construction has been a part of the

revolution. [Lenin] had seven years of practice [in construction], which is something that Marx did not have. What we are learning is precisely these basic principles of Marxism-Leninism.

In both the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, we have mobilized the masses to carry on class struggle, and through the struggle we have educated the masses of the people. We learned to wage class struggle from the October Revolution. During the October Revolution, the masses were fully mobilized to carry out class struggle, both in the cities and in the countryside. The people now sent by the Soviet Union to the other countries as experts were either only a few years old or in their teens at the time of the October Revolution, and many of them have forgotten what it was like. Comrades in some countries say that China's mass line is not correct,<sup>45</sup> so they themselves have very happily adopted the approach of dispensing favors.<sup>46</sup> If they want to adopt that approach there's nothing we can do about it. In any case, we uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, noninterference in each other's domestic policy, and mutual nonaggression.<sup>47</sup> We do not attempt to lead any other country. We only lead one place, and that is the People's Republic of China.

The basic problem with some Eastern European countries is that they have not done a good job in waging class struggle, and there are so many counterrevolutionaries left who have not been cleaned out. They have not trained their proletariat, through class struggle, to distinguish clearly between their enemy and themselves, between right and wrong, and between idealism and materialism. Now they are reaping the fruits of their own mistakes, and the fire is being brought upon their own heads.

How much capital do you have? All you have is a Lenin and a Stalin. But you have discarded Stalin, and most of Lenin too. Lenin's legs are gone, perhaps there's still a head left, or perhaps one of Lenin's two hands has been chopped off. We study Marxism-Leninism, and we learn from the October Revolution. Marx has written so much, and Lenin has also written so much! Relying on the masses and taking the mass line are things we learned from them. It is very dangerous not to rely on the masses in waging class struggle and not to distinguish between the enemy and ourselves.

4. There are a few intellectual cadres at the level of department or bureau director who propose having great democracy and who say that small democracy is not enough fun. The "great democracy" that they want means adopting the bourgeois parliamentary system of the West and emulating such stuff as Western "parliamentary democracy," "freedom of the press," and "freedom of speech." This proposal of theirs lacks a Marxist perspective and lacks a class viewpoint. It is wrong. Nevertheless, using the terms "great democracy" and "small democracy" [to describe the situation] is very graphic, and we can borrow them for our use.

Democracy is a method [the utility of which] is contingent on the people to whom it is applied and the subject for which it is applied. We like great democracy; what we like is the kind of great democracy that is led by the proletariat. We mobilized the masses to fight Chiang Kai-shek; we fought for more than twenty

years and we toppled him. In the land reform movement the peasant masses rose in struggle against the landlord class, and after three years of struggle they seized the land.<sup>48</sup> These are all examples of great democracy. The “Three-Anti’s” [campaign] was a struggle against [government] staff personnel who had been corrupted by the bourgeoisie; the “Five-Anti’s” [campaign] was a struggle against the bourgeoisie [itself], and a fierce struggle it was.<sup>49</sup> These were all heroic mass movements and also [examples of] great democracy. A few days ago the masses went to the office of the British chargé d’affaires in China to demonstrate, and several hundred thousand people gathered at Tiananmen Square in Beijing to hold a big rally to support Egypt in its resistance to British and French aggression. This too is great democracy; it is opposition to imperialism. Why shouldn’t we like this type of great democracy? We certainly do. What does this type of great democracy oppose? It opposes imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and capitalism. The socialist transformation of private industry and commerce is directed against capitalism. The socialist transformation of agriculture is [aimed at] abolishing the system of private ownership of small-scale producers. Its character is also one of opposition to capitalism. We used mass movement as the method to carry out the socialist transformation of agriculture and mobilized the peasants to get themselves organized, mainly the poor and lower-middle peasants first, so that upper-middle peasants could do nothing but agree to it. As for the capitalists beating drums and striking gongs to demonstrate their support for the socialist transformation, that was [only] because there was nothing else they could do when the upsurge of socialism in the countryside drew near and the masses of the workers applied pressure on them from beneath.

If another [campaign for] great democracy were to be staged now, I’d give my consent. You are afraid of the masses taking to the streets; I’m not, not even if they come out in the hundreds of thousands. “He who is not afraid of death by a thousand cuts and mutilations dares to pull the emperor from his horse.” This is an ancient saying. The person who said it was called Wang Xifeng, also known as Sister Feng.<sup>50</sup> The [campaign of] great democracy initiated by the proletariat is directed against its class enemies. The enemies of the nation (which are none other than the imperialists and the foreign monopoly capitalists) are also class enemies. Great democracy can be used to oppose those who practice bureaucratism as well. I said just a while ago that there would still be revolution even ten thousand years from now. It would still be possible for great democracy to be staged at that time. If there are people who are tired of living and who therefore engage themselves in bureaucratic practice, and if, when they meet the masses, they have nothing good to say about them and only scold them, and if they refuse to solve the masses’ problems whenever such problems arise, such people, then, are bound to be overthrown. At present this danger exists. If people are divorced from the masses and refuse to solve the masses’ problems, the peasants will beat them with their carrying-poles, the workers will go to the streets to demonstrate, and the students will cause trouble. Whenever such things happen, the first thing to do is to say that it is good; this is the way I see it.

A few years ago, an airfield was to be built at a place in Henan, but arrangements

were not made with the peasants beforehand. The reasons [for building the airfield] were not clearly explained, and the people were just forced to move. The peasants in the village said that if you take a long stick to poke at a bird’s nest in a tree and cause it to fall down, even the birds will make some noise. Deng Xiaoping, you too have a nest; if I were to mess it up, wouldn’t you make some noise? So the masses there set up three lines of defense: the first consisted of children, the second of women, and the third of young and strong men. The people sent there to make surveys were all driven away. In the end, it was the peasants who won. Later, the situation was explained clearly to the peasants, and arrangements were made for them. They eventually moved their homes, and the airfield was built. Such things are not uncommon. Right now there are certain people who [behave] as if they can sit back and relax and ride roughshod over [the people] now that they have the country in their control. Such people are opposed by the masses who would throw stones at them and hit them with their hoes. From my point of view, this is what they deserve, and I find it most welcome. Besides, there are times when nothing but a beating can solve the problem. The Communist Party has to learn its lessons. If the students take to the streets, and if the workers take to the streets, in short, if anything of this sort happens, our comrades must see it as a good thing. More than one hundred students from Chengdu wanted to come to Beijing to present a petition. The students on one train were stopped at the Guangyuan station in Sichuan, another trainload of students reached Luoyang but couldn’t get to Beijing. In my opinion and in Premier Zhou’s opinion, they ought to be permitted to come to Beijing and visit the departments concerned. We must permit the workers to strike and permit the masses to demonstrate. There are constitutional bases for parades and demonstrations. In the future when the Constitution is revised, I propose that we add [an article on] the freedom to strike; we must permit the workers to strike. This will be helpful in solving the contradictions among the state, the factory directors, and the masses. They are just contradictions, that’s all. The world is full of contradictions. The democratic revolution solved the set of contradictions between ourselves and imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. At present, in the area of the system of ownership, our contradiction with the national bourgeoisie<sup>51</sup> and with production by small-scale producers has also been basically resolved. However, contradictions in other areas have stood out, and new contradictions have surfaced. There are several hundred thousand cadres at the *xian* level and above, and the fate of the country lies in their hands. If they do not do their jobs well, if they become divorced from the masses, if they do not struggle hard, the workers, peasants, and students will have cause to disapprove of them. We must be vigilant and must not allow a bureaucratic work-style to develop. We must not form an aristocracy divorced from the people. The masses are justified in removing anybody who has a bureaucratic work-style, who doesn’t solve the problems of the masses, who scolds the masses, who oppresses the masses, and who never changes. I say it’s better to remove [these people]; they ought to be removed.

At this moment, the democratic parties<sup>52</sup> and the bourgeoisie oppose the proletariat’s great democracy. They will not approve of having another earlier “Five-Anti’s” [campaign]. They are very much afraid that if we engage in great

democracy, the democratic parties would be destroyed and they would not stand a chance of coexisting [with the proletariat] over a long period of time.<sup>53</sup> Do the professors like great democracy? That is difficult to say. I think they are sort of wary and are fearful of the proletariat's great democracy. If they want to engage in the bourgeoisie's great democracy, I would propose a rectification [campaign], that is, [a campaign] of ideological reform. We will mobilize all the students to criticize them. A gate will be set up at every school. Everybody must clear the gate, and only if you do will your account be considered settled.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, the professors are still afraid of the proletariat's great democracy.

Here I'd like to address myself to the problem of the Dalai [Lama].<sup>55</sup> The Buddha has been dead for 2,500 years, and now the Dalai and his group of followers want to go to India to pay homage. Should we let him go or not? The Center believes that it is better to let him go and that things would be worse if he's not allowed to go. He'll be leaving in a few days. We advised him to take the plane; he wouldn't. He wants to go by automobile, which will take him through Kalimpong.<sup>56</sup> But there are spies from different countries in Kalimpong, and there are also the Kuomintang's secret agents. We must take into account the possibility that the Dalai may not come back. Not only that, but he may curse us every day and say such things as "The Communists have invaded Tibet." He may even declare "Tibetan independence" in India, or he may instigate the reactionary elements in the upper stratum of Tibetan society to raise a hue and cry for an insurrection to try to throw us out, while for himself he gives the alibi of not being there and hence will take no responsibility. These possibilities are all speculation from the bad side of things. If such bad situations were indeed to arise, I'd still be happy. Our Working Committee and our armed troops in Tibet must be prepared, build fortifications, and store up more food and water. We have just a handful of troops there; anyway, one is free to do what one likes. If you intend to fight, we'll be on our guard; if you attack, we will defend. We should never be the first to take the offensive; let them attack first, and then we'll launch a counterattack to beat the attackers soundly. Would I be sad if we lost one Dalai? If there were nine others and all ten got away, I would still not be sad. We have had an experience, that of Zhang Guotao<sup>57</sup> running away, which was not so bad. You can't have a husband and wife [relationship] simply by tying two people together. If a person no longer likes your place and wants to run away, let him go. What harm to us is there if he runs away? There's no harm in it except that he will curse us. We Communists have been cursed by other people for thirty-five years, the curses are no worse than those that say that the Communists are "the most ferocious and evil," "[Communists] share their property and their wives," and "their cruelty is beyond human reason." Add a Dalai, or add any other person [to those who curse us], what does it matter? Let them curse us for another thirty-five years; that only makes seventy years. I don't think it is good for a person to be afraid of being cursed. Some people are afraid that our secrets will leak out. Didn't Zhang Guotao know many of our secrets? Still, we've never heard that because Zhang Guotao leaked our secrets, our affairs went awry.

There are over a million experienced cadres in our Party. Most of these cadres

of ours are good people; they were born on the land and grew up on the land; they are linked up with the masses and have sustained the test of protracted struggle. We have a corps of cadres from the period of the Party's founding, from the period of the Northern Expedition, from the period of the War of the Agrarian Revolution, from the period of the War of Resistance against Japan, from the period of the War of Liberation, and those who have [joined the Party] since the Liberation of the country.<sup>58</sup> They are all invaluable treasures to our country. Some Eastern European countries are not very stable; one of the main reasons for this is that they do not have a corps of cadres like ours. Since we have such a corps of cadres who have been tested and seasoned through many different stages of the Revolution we can "sit tight in the fishing boat, regardless of the tossing of the wind and the waves." We must have this confidence. If we are not afraid of any imperialism, why should we be afraid of great democracy? Why should we be afraid of students taking to the streets? Nevertheless, some of our Party members are afraid of great democracy. This is no good. Those who practice bureaucratism and are afraid of great democracy must study Marxism assiduously and reform themselves.

We are prepared to launch the rectification campaign next year. [We will] rectify three kinds of work styles: the first is the rectification of subjectivism; the second is the rectification of factionalism; the third is the rectification of bureaucratism.<sup>59</sup> After the Center has made the decision, it will first issue a notice that will list the items [to be rectified]. For instance, bureaucratism includes many things, such as not being in contact with the [subordinate] cadres or with the masses, not going down [to lower levels] to acquire an understanding of the situation, not sharing joy and sorrow with the masses, and also such things as graft and waste. If we issue the notice in the first half of the year and carry out rectification in the second half of the year there will be a few months in between. All those who have embezzled public money must admit to their mistakes, and they can be allowed to return the embezzled money during this period, or pay it back later in installments, or [in some cases] where they cannot even manage to pay it back in installments, we'll have [no choice but] to exempt them from repayment. All these alternatives are permitted. The point is, however, that they must admit their mistakes and voluntarily give an account of themselves. This is building a stairway to let them slowly come downstairs. As for mistakes of other kinds, the same method can be adopted. We can issue a notice beforehand to announce that rectification will be conducted at a certain time. Then this would not be punishment without prior admonition<sup>60</sup> that would be a method of small democracy. Some people say that if this method is adopted, there will be nothing much left to rectify by the second half of the year. This is precisely the goal we'd like to achieve; we hope that by the time the rectification campaign is formally conducted, subjectivism, factionalism, and bureaucratism will all have been greatly reduced. Rectification has been proven an effective method in our history. From now on all problems among the people or issues within the Party are to be dealt with through rectification and are to be resolved by criticism and self-criticism and not by force. We advocate gentle breeze and fine rain.<sup>61</sup> Naturally, [however,] it is inevitable that some individuals in the course [of rectification] might [suffer] a bit more severely, but the general tendency

is to cure the illness and save the patient.<sup>62</sup> We truly want to achieve the purpose of curing the illness and saving the patient, and it's not just talk. Our first [principle] is to protect the person, and the second [principle] is to criticize him. We must first protect him because he is not a counterrevolutionary. This means to proceed from the desire to [maintain] unity and to arrive at a new unity on a new basis through criticism and self-criticism. In dealing with those among the people who have made mistakes, we must use the method of both protecting and criticizing. In that way we will be able to win over people's hearts, unite the people of the whole country, and bring into play all the positive factors among the 600 million people in building socialism.

I agree that in peacetime the discrepancy in wages between cadres in the armed forces and those who are not in the military should be gradually reduced, but this does not mean total egalitarianism. I have always held that the army must withstand hardships and struggle hard and be a model [to others]. In 1949 when we had a meeting here, one of our generals suggested that the wages for the personnel in the military should be increased and many comrades approved of it. I opposed it. The example he raised was that while a capitalist eats a five-course meal, the soldier in the People's Liberation Army eats only salt water and a bit of pickled cabbage with his rice. He said that this wouldn't do. However, I said that it was precisely that which was good about it. You eat a five-course meal, we eat pickled cabbage. It is precisely from this bit of pickled cabbage that [our] politics was nurtured and that models are brought forth. It is precisely because of this bit of pickled cabbage that the People's Liberation Army has won over the hearts of the people. Of course there are also other [factors]. Today the food of our troops has been improved; it's different from the days when they ate only pickled cabbage. Yet the essential thing is [still] for us to promote [the spirit of] sustaining hardships and hard struggle; to sustain hardships and to struggle hard are our distinctive political qualities. The area around Jinzhou produces apples. It was autumn when the Battle of Liaoxi<sup>63</sup> was being fought, and there were plenty of apples in people's homes. However, our soldiers did not take one single apple [from the people]. When I read about that I was very moved. About this question [of whether to eat the apple or not], our soldiers thought, consciously, that it would be noble for them not to eat any and that it would be despicable if they did, for the apples belonged to the people. Our discipline is built precisely on this [spirit] of consciousness, which comes as a result of our Party's leadership and education. People must have some spirit. The revolutionary spirit of the proletariat is born from this. They did not take a single apple to eat, but did anyone die of starvation? Nobody died of starvation. There was still millet and pickled cabbage to eat. If it becomes necessary, all of us here will have to live in huts. When we were crossing the marshlands we didn't have any huts, and we survived all the same. Now we have huts; why can't we live in them? The armed forces have been holding a conference these few days; they are imbued with a very lofty and noble spirit and are resolved to exercise self-denial. If the army is like that, other people should strive even more to sustain hardships and struggle hard. Otherwise, the army will checkmate you. Among those of us present here there are civilian as well as military personnel. We take the military

personnel [as an example] to challenge the civilian personnel. The People's Liberation Army is a good army; I like this army very much.

Political work must be reinforced. No matter whether it is in the civil administration or in the military, or in the factories, in the countryside, in shops, in schools, in the army, in the Party and state organs, in the mass organizations; in all of these areas we must greatly reinforce political work and raise the level of political [consciousness] of the cadres and masses.

## Notes

1. The Resolutions of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC stated that "the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in our country has basically been solved . . . the major contradiction in our country . . . is between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces of society." See *RMSC* (1957), pp. 5557. An English translation of the Resolutions is available in *Eighth National Congress*, pp. 113–134. Mao had opened the Eighth Party Congress with a short speech in which he emphasized that China had "achieved a decisive victory in the socialist revolution" (see text Sept. 15, 1956). However, by April 1957 Mao had rejected this position (see text Oct. 7, 1957). This issue continued to be a major focus of disagreement during the Cultural Revolution and after Mao's death. For example, in his June 18, 1979, "Report on the Work of the Government," then premier and Party chairman Hua Guofeng stated: "According to Comrade Mao Zedong's teachings, the basic contradictions in socialist society are still those between the relations of production and the forces of production and between the superstructure and the economic base," thus ignoring Mao's oft-stated position that the principal contradiction was that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. For Hua's speech, see *BR*, 29:10 (1979). See also text Oct. 7, 1957, notes 16 and 38.

2. Official Chinese sources tend to use 1956 as the date of the birth of Soviet revisionism, thus removing any of the onus from Stalin. The practice has been followed by many other communist groups. However, although Mao never publicly criticized Stalin as a revisionist, this is the inevitable implication of many of his criticisms of Soviet revisionism.

3. This saying contains one of the key postulates of the chapter "Tianxia" (Under Heaven) in the book *Zhuang Zi*, a representative chapter expounding the relativistic cosmology and metaphysical dialectics that Mao consistently sees as a key component in the Daoist worldview. The book *Zhuang Zi* (Book of Master Zhuang) itself is a third century B.C. anthology attributed to the Daoist philosopher Zhuang Zhou of the Warring States period, but it contains the writings of other contemporary Daoist thinkers as well as writings compiled by Zhuang's pupils.

4. See text Jan. 20, 1956, second paragraph.

5. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

6. This is derived from the passage (section 4) in "Chapter II, Wei zheng" (On Government, Part II) in the *Lun yu* (The Analects) where Confucius claimed, "At fifteen, I set my mind on learning; at thirty, my principles became firm; at forty, I became free of confusion and doubt; at fifty, I knew the decree of Heaven; at sixty, my ears became obedient for the reception of truth; and at seventy I could follow whatever my heart desired, without transgressing what is proper." In making the linkage between "what is proper" according to Confucius and "conformity to objective laws," Mao is creating an anachronistic distortion in the reading of the original. For a translation of this passage, see J. Legge (1933), pp. 13–14. (See also note 1 in *SW*, V, p. 349.)

7. The term "construction items that exceed the norm" refers to one of two categories of basic construction items in the period of the First Five-Year Plan. During that period the Planning Commission designated a certain limit, or norm of investment amount, as the dividing line between major construction items and average construction items. Those major



items whose required investment size equals or exceeds the norm are then managed by the state organs, whereas those that are below the norm are managed by relevant branch departments or by local authorities. In a number of heavy industry enterprises, especially the machine building, metallurgy-related, and automobile industries, the norm was fixed as 10 million *rmb*. For lighter industries such as chemical industries, the norm was fixed at 6 million *rmb*. For a more detailed explanation of the "above-norm" construction projects, see note 1 in Li Fuchun's "Report on the First Five Year Plan" delivered to the Second Session of the First NPC on July 5–6, 1955. (Transcript in *RMRB* [July 8, 1955], 2. Available translation in R. Bowie and J. Fairbank [1962], pp. 42–91, relevant note on p. 49.) For the estimated number of above-norm construction projects at this time (i.e., in mid-1955), see R. Bowie and J. Fairbank (1962), p. 50.

8. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2, text Apr. 25, 1956, note 22, and text Nov. 11, 1956, note 3.

9. See note on policy of "drastic reduction," text July 31, 1955, vol. I, note 18.

10. The "committee to promote retrogression" (*cu tui weiyuanhui*) that Mao refers to is a play on the phrase "promoters of progress" (*cu jin pai*), which was a slogan that had been used to praise those supporting the high tide of socialism in late 1955 and early 1956. His purpose here is to ridicule those opposing these policies.

11. See text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3; see also text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

12. According to the Report of the Central People's Government delivered by Zhou Enlai at the Fourth Session of the First NPC on June 26, 1957, the scope of the natural disasters that occurred in 1956 were the most severe since Liberation. Over 230 million *mu* of agricultural land and over 70 million people were affected. See *RMSC* (1958), p. 201.

13. This is an allusion to the system in imperial China in which scholars rose to the very top through three levels of examinations, namely, the provincial examination, the metropolitan examination, and the palace examination. The term *bang* here in the Chinese text refers to the bulletin that posted the names of successful candidates at each level of these examinations.

14. The type of drama to which Mao is referring is in fact operatic and involves the actors in acting as well as singing.

15. Mao is actually referring to the "Report on the 1955 National Budget and the 1956 Draft Budget" delivered by Li Xiannian to the Third Session of the First NPC on June 15, 1956. For a text of this speech, see *RMSC* (1957), pp. 159–166.

16. See text Jan. 20, 1956, source note.

17. The Third Session of the First NPC was convened June 15–20, 1956, in Beijing.

18. The Chinese text here reads *yong qian tai duo*, which we translate as "spending too much money." This is translated as "allocate too much money" in *SW*, V, p. 335.

19. Mao here quotes half of an often-used adage, *gu jian shang nong, mi gui shang min* (when grain is cheap, it can hurt the peasants; when rice is dear, it can hurt the people [as consumers]). This aphorism expresses the fundamental dialectical nature of price in China's traditional agrarian economy and has been held as a cardinal principle in all of China's agronomic treatises. We have not been able to trace the original source of this aphorism.

20. For Mao's earlier discussion of the pricing system, see texts Mar. 19, 1953, and Aug. 12, 1953 in volume I. Mao's comment here may also have been prompted by the problem in the pricing system enumerated by Li Xiannian in a speech he made on September 22, 1956, at the Eighth National Congress of the CPC. (See *RMSC* [1957], pp. 95–98, for Li's speech.)

21. This is a slogan that developed out of, and became integrated with, the earlier slogan of running cooperatives diligently and frugally; see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 57. It is a slogan proposed by the CPC Central Committee in 1956 as a basic policy for building socialism throughout the country. On April 3, 1956, the Central Committee issued a "Joint Directive Concerning Running Cooperatives Diligently and Frugally," designed to correct shortcomings of waste and extravagance and of ignoring sideline production in the course of expanded cooperativization. The Central Committee then followed up by proposing that

the same principle should be applied to all manner of enterprises and undertakings as socialist collectivization was extended throughout the society. The idea was that all enterprises must practice economy on the premise that as a whole a socialist country can be built only on the foundations of thrift and diligence. Subsequently the dual slogan of "building the country with diligence and frugality; running each household with diligence and frugality" (*qin jian jianquo, qin jian chijia*) was promulgated.

22. This refers to the experience of the Red Army in the autumn and early winter of 1935, when it was located in the marshland area of northern Sichuan province. In July 1935 the Red Army under Zhu De and Mao was stationed in the Maoergai area of Sichuan. After a Party Center conference in which Zhang Guotao, who disapproved of the Red Army's strategy to march northward to engage the Japanese, was purged, the Red Army began to move northward through what is now the Abei-Zhuang Autonomous District of northern Sichuan. Here they encountered the marshes. That winter proved to be one of the most difficult in the experience of the Communist forces. For more on the Long March, see text Feb. 19–24, 1953, vol. I, note 6.

23. Zhu De (1886–1976) was the chief military commander of the Communist forces throughout the late 1920s and the 1930s. A leading participant in the Nanchang Uprising (August 1927), he joined forces with Mao in early 1928 and became commander of the Fourth Army (the core of the Communist forces) on its formal establishment at Jinggangshan in May 1928. During the Civil War period, Zhu became the commander-in-chief of the PLA in 1946, and remained in that position until 1954. For more biographical information on Zhu De, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 245–254, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, appendix, pp. 24–27.

24. According to K. Lieberthal (1976), p. 89, a symposium of the directors of propaganda departments of provincial Party committees was held on November 20, 1956. Whether the subject that Mao suggested here was on the agenda of this symposium is unclear.

25. Xuanton was the name given to the reign of the last Qing emperor, Aisin-goro Puyi (1909–1911), who abdicated in 1911. It was not for this, or for his being a puppet for the attempt made by Zhang Xun in 1921 to restore the Qing dynasty, but for his position as chief executive of Manzhouguo (a.k.a. Manchukuo), the puppet state set up by the Japanese in Manchuria in 1932, that Puyi was condemned as a war criminal. He was tried as such in 1956 and sentenced to life imprisonment, but was released in a general amnesty in 1959.

Wang Yaowu (b. 1907) was an officer in Chiang Kai-shek's KMT Army. During the period of the War of Liberation, he commanded the KMT forces in the Second Liquidation Zone in North China and was chairman of the provincial government of Shandong. He was captured by Communist forces in 1948. After being granted amnesty in 1959, he became an academic and, in 1964, a member of the National Committee of the CPPCC.

Du Yuming was also a KMT military officer under Chiang Kai-shek. He was commander of the northeastern forces and commander-in-chief for the KMT forces in the Xuzhou campaign. He was arrested by the Communist forces in the Battle of Huaihai. His experience after 1949 paralleled that of Wang Yaowu.

For more biographical information on Xuanton and Du, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1970), III, pp. 80–86; 326–328.

26. See text Apr. 1956, note 21. See also text Apr. 25, 1956, section 8.

27. On June 28, 1956, riots broke out among industrial worker organizations in the industrial city of Poznan in western Poland. The demonstrators, demanding better economic and working conditions, attacked Communist Party headquarters and government institutions, including the prison. The riots were suppressed by government forces on the same day, resulting in over 50 deaths and nearly 300 other casualties.

On October 21, 1956, university students in Budapest demanded liberalization of government policies and the opening up of the parliament to non-Communist, nonsocialist parties. A revolutionary situation soon developed. Government forces, with the assistance of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, tried to quell the uprising. This brought to the forefront the demand that Soviet troops withdraw from Hungary. In the following days, the scope of

the insurrectionary forces expanded to include some merchants, some military officers, and some mass organizations in addition to students and intellectuals. On October 24, Imre Nagy, who had been premier in 1953–55, but had been purged from the Communist Party for right-wing deviationism in 1955 and readmitted on October 13, 1956, became leader of the rioters. Meanwhile, the demonstrators had attacked the parliament, communications installations (including radio stations and newspapers), and the arsenal in the capital on the previous day. Overnight the government was reorganized and Nagy emerged as premier. The rioting, which by now took on a distinctly anti-Russian character, continued and began to spread throughout the country. On October 25, the leadership of the Communist Party switched from Erno Gero to Janos Kadar. On October 27, Nagy promised in a radio speech that the government would work for the speedy withdrawal of Soviet troops and pledged that free elections would soon be held to bring an end to one-party rule. Meanwhile he also appointed members of the Small Holders' Party, a bourgeois party opposed to the Communist Party, to his cabinet. On October 30, Soviet troops began to withdraw from Budapest, and on November 1, Nagy declared the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact Organization. He demanded that Hungarian neutrality and integrity be guaranteed by Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union and that the status and situation in Hungary be settled in the United Nations. During these several days many parties and political organizations, some of which had been suppressed in the early 1950s, revived, notably the "Petofi Club." On November 3, Nagy further "reorganized" the government, purging the cabinet of Communists. Many Communists were arrested, and Communist-related mass organizations were closed down. This prompted quick reaction from the Soviet Union. On November 4 the withdrawal of Soviet troops was halted; they moved in, and within twenty-four hours smashed the "uprising" and replaced Nagy as premier, installing Kadar. On November 14, the Soviet troops, whose actions were condemned by the UN, crushed the last of the rebel forces in Csepel Island, and on November 22, Nagy was arrested.

The Chinese Communists of the Maoist era have interpreted these two major anti-Soviet "counterrevolutionary" incidents of 1956 as having been stirred up by profound feelings of uncertainty and loss of direction within the international Communist movement triggered by the "de-Stalinization" line promoted by Khrushchev at and following the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (see text Feb. 9, 1956, source note). They also believed that in early November 1956, in the face of the Hungarian crisis, the CPSU leadership under Khrushchev was on the brink of giving in to the counterrevolutions. These events and this interpretation have had a profound impact on China's own analysis of the international Communist movement and on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

28. See text Sept. 15, 1956(1), note 6.

29. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 67.

30. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 7.

31. Wladyslaw Gomulka (b. 1905) was reinstated as first secretary of the United Worker's Party of Poland on October 19, 1956, under pressure from Khrushchev following the Poznan riots (see note 27). Since Mao saw Gomulka's rise to power as a consequence of Khrushchev's incorrect policies, including his secret criticism of Stalin at the February 1956 Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, he used Gomulka as an example of how leaders with incorrect lines could get into leadership positions.

32. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 7.

33. The concept, or law, of "unity of opposites" is a fundamental law in Mao's view of dialectical materialism and of Marxist epistemology. It holds that everything in the universe consists of a unity of contradictory aspects that, while existing together in a unity under specific conditions and depending on one another for their existence, are also mutually contradictory, i.e., they stand in opposition to one another and struggle incessantly against one another. They also cause mutual transformation in each other under specific conditions. Thus the struggle between them, causing mutual transformation in them, brings about qualitative change and "leap-like" mutation within the thing itself, by way of the splitting up of the old unity, and its destruction and replacement by a new unity of opposites. This

process of destruction, the creation of a new form, and then its destruction goes on, according to Mao, infinitely, and describes the process of change in all things in the universe, including social and political entities. It also describes, therefore, the internal dynamics of change in everything and epitomizes the dialectical worldview that everything is mutative and not static. For more on this law, see Mao's discussion in his speech "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People" (text Feb. 27, 1957[2]). It should be noted that other important Maoist concepts of dialectical materialism, such as the "one divides into two" concept, are linked to and stem from this "fundamental law." (See text Oct. 13, 1957, note 45.)

34. See text Apr. 25, 1956, section 10; text Aug. 24, 1956, note 2, and text Sept. 4, 1956.

35. While the term Mao uses here, *yi dian lun*, is often translated as "monism" (which itself is often translated in the Chinese as "*yi yuan lun*,") it should be noted that Mao's concept of a "dualistic universe" is very different from that of classical dualism. By "dualism" and "monism" we usually mean, respectively, the theory that holds that the universe (and all its contents) is made up of two elements, spirit and matter, that are mutually independent though connected; and the theory that the universe is made up of one element, be it spirit (i.e., monistic idealism) or matter (monistic materialism). These theories are what are usually referred to in Chinese as *er yuan lun* and *yi yuan lun*. Mao's concept, which he holds to be the foundation of Marxist materialist epistemology, is that the universe is dualistic but in a different way. He holds that the division is not between the material universe and the spiritual universe, or between spiritual elements and material elements, since in his view what is mental or spiritual depends on a material base for its existence. (Hence, Mao is "materialistic.") But at the same time the universe, and everything in it, does not consist of merely one aspect, but is a unity of opposing, i.e., contradictory, aspects (see previous note). Therefore, it would be erroneous to translate *yi dian lun* as "monism"; we prefer here to translate it as the "theory that everything consists of a single aspect."

36. This saying is derived from Part I of the Chapter "Xi ci" in the *Zhou yi* (Zhou Book of Changes) and represents one of the most prevalent concepts in classical Chinese cosmology. The *dao*, which stands for the underlying principle of all matters spiritual and corporeal in the universe, is seen as being made up of two forces; the *yang* force, which represents the positive, aggressive, forward-moving, generative aspect of things; and the *yin* force, which stands for the negative, retreating, elastic, degenerative aspect. These two forces are seen as coexisting in the universe as a whole as well as in any given matter at any given time, although one may temporarily be ascendant over the other. They are seen as contradictory forces that oppose each other and yet also replace each other's ascendancy in an ebb-and-flow manner. This very ebb and flow, constituting a basic relativism, as a fundamental universal law underlies this philosophy of the interrelationship of all things. Mao often relies on such basic concepts, which, though later constituting the fundamental precepts of Daoism, actually antedate the formal founding of Daoism as a school of thought, to illustrate the notion that dualism, and even dialectical materialism, is a fundamental and primeval philosophy in human thought. For Mao's discussion of the two headquarters and the *yang* wind and *yin* wind, see text Mar. 31, 1955, note 14.

37. Gao Gang and Rao Shushi were purged at the meeting in Beijing of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC on December 24, 1953 (see K. Lieberthal [1976] p. 62). The text of Mao's remarks at this meeting, alluded to here, is as yet unavailable to us. (See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, source note.)

38. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 14.

39. Lin Daiyu, of course, is not really one of China's "ancients," but rather a fictional character of the famous novel *Hongloumeng* [Dream of the Red Chamber]. In the eighty-second *hui* of this novel, Lin, discussing the internal rivalry of her own family and that of powerful clans in China's feudal society in general, makes the remark cited here by Mao. Within the original context, East and West refer to divisions within a family, usually to the division between the branches of the family represented by the first wife, or official wife, of the master of the household and her offspring, on the one hand, and the other wives and

concubines and their offspring, on the other. Mao has consistently employed these terms to represent revolutionary forces in the world and the forces of counterrevolution. The most famous formulation of this usage was made by Mao in his speech at a meeting with Chinese students and trainees in Moscow during his visit to the Soviet Union in November 1957 (see text Nov. 17, 1957).

40. Although Gao Gang and Rao Shushi were purged from the Party in 1953 and there was a severe criticism campaign against the Gao-Rao anti-Party clique in 1955, vol. I (see text Mar. 31, 1955), at that time Mao made no specific reference to the clique's passing intelligence illegally to the Soviet Union. That this issue is brought up at this point in 1956 provides us with a clue to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, as well as to the specific bone of contention in the rift. It also suggests the significant role that the Gao-Rao affair played in exacerbating the falling out between China and the Soviet Union, which on the surface was largely initiated by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization.

41. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.

42. Palmiro Togliatti (1893–1965), secretary general of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from 1927 on. Following Stalin's instructions on his return to Italy from Moscow at the end of World War II, Togliatti led the PCI along the lines of promoting parliamentary reform and "structural reformism," rather than mass revolution. Throughout the Stalinist period and after, the PCI maintained certain independence from the international Communist movement dominated by the CPSU, but after the "de-Stalinization" campaign was launched, Togliatti moved the PCI into greater harmony with the CPSU, now under the guidance of Khrushchev's line. There is strong evidence that when Mao criticized Togliatti, he was indirectly criticizing those in China, particularly Liu Shaoqi, who were supportive of Togliatti's positions.

43. This article, published as an editorial in *RMRB* on March 30, 1956, represents one of the earliest statements made by the CPC on the issue of Khrushchev's line and the CPSU's criticism of Stalin. It is generally believed that Mao was involved in the drafting of this document in some uncertain capacity. (For a translation of this article see R. Bowie and J. Fairbank (1962), pp. 144ff.) Also see text Apr. 1956, source note. Subsequently, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, so to speak, the CPC would publish two critical editorials on the subject of its divergence with Togliatti. These are: "Tu-li-a-ti tongzhi tong wuomen de fenqi" (The Divergence Between Comrade Togliatti and Ourselves), *RMRB* (Dec. 31, 1962) and "Zai lun Tu-li-a-ti tongzhi tong wuomen de fenqi: Guanyu Lie-ning zhuyi zai dangdai de ruogan zhongda wenti" (Again On the Divergence Between Comrade Togliatti and Ourselves: Some Major Problems Concerning Leninism in the Present Era) in *HQ*, 3–4 (1963). For both, see *Fanxiu wenxian*, Part 2, pp. 21–64, 137–322 respectively.

44. Mao is referring not to the secret speech here, but to Khrushchev's formal report to the Congress, the text of which was published, in translation, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VIII:4 (1956).

45. See text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7. From the famous *RMRB* editorial of April 5, 1956, "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," it is evident that the Central Committee of the CPC had given the mass line and the subject of correct leadership methods of the Party some serious thought in early 1956. (See *RMRB* [Apr. 5, 1956], 1; *RMSC* [1957], p. 150, and R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. [1962], pp. 148–149.) The "mass line" concept was, therefore, evidently ratified as a guideline for the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" of 1957. (See also text May 2, 1956, source note.) Here, at the end of 1956, one should also note that Mao's mention of this concept in this article seems to be a harbinger of the role this idea, and its attendant views of the masses' revolutionary potential, would play in the events of 1957—namely, the Party rectification, and ultimately the Anti-Rightist campaign. In this connection it would be pertinent to note that, after all, this concept originally came out of the experience of an earlier CPC rectification campaign in Yanan in 1942.

46. See text Apr. 1956, note 22.

47. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 1.

48. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 2.

49. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note.

50. This was cited by Wang Xifeng, a character in the novel *Hongloumeng* (Dream of the Red Chamber) (*hui* 68), as a common saying. It refers to a slogan adopted by the masses in Chinese history in their struggles to topple their feudal rulers. (See also text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 18.)

51. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.

52. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1. It may be worth noting that here Mao seems to be expressing a sharper concern for the contradiction between the CPC's positions and the attitude of the democratic parties and—earlier in this document—the democratic personages. The language that he is using is of a deeper level of severity than in earlier speeches and writings. See also text Sept. 25, 1956(1), note 12.

53. In fact, the democratic parties never recovered from the Anti-Rightist campaign in the fall of 1957, which followed the Hundred Flowers period in the spring and summer of 1957. See R. MacFarquhar (1960), chs. 15 and 16.

54. The term here is *guan*. See text June 23, 1950, vol. I, note 8.

55. See text May 24, 1951, vol. I, note 2.

56. A border town in Northeastern India near the Tibetan Border. (See *SW*, V, p. 349.)

57. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23.

58. The dates of these periods are as follows: Party's founding (1921–1925); Northern Expedition (1926–1927); Agrarian Revolution (1928–1936); War of Resistance (1937–1945); War of Liberation (1946–1949).

59. This echoes the structure of Mao's speech at the preparatory meeting for the Eighth National Congress of the CPC. See text Aug. 30, 1956.

60. An aphorism derived from the chapter "Yao yue" (Yao says) in the *Lun yu* (The Analects of Confucius) wherein Confucius defines "executing people without prior admonition" as a form of tyranny, an abuse of political power that must be eradicated.

61. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 19.

62. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 25.

63. See text June 6, 1950(1), vol. I, note 4.

## Version II

### 1. Problems of the Economy

Economic construction does not progress in such a way that there is only going forward and not a single bit of going backward at any time, or in a completely stabilized, balanced manner. Sometimes there can be more construction and at other times less. Sometimes the horse runs a bit faster, sometimes a bit slower. There are times when we are mounting; at other times we are dismounting.<sup>1</sup> These kinds of situations are entirely possible. This is because, first of all, we lack experience, and secondly, our economic construction depends on, and must change with, the circumstances. For example, in the past, economic construction might have been promoted at a more rapid pace; that was because at the time there was a war [prone] situation. If we were to fight imminently, it would have been necessary to promote more of heavy industry. The process of economic construction is wave-like; there are ups and downs, with one wave chasing another.<sup>2</sup> This is to say that there is balance, a rupture [of the balance], and then, after the rupture, a [new] balance can be restored. Naturally, such a wave-like up-and-down must not be too big; we mustn't [for instance] all of a sudden be [so strongly] opposed to conservatism. However, it is inevitable that things must develop and go forward

in accordance with the laws of the waves. If we acknowledged this point, it would not be so horrible if this year we had a bit of "adventurist advance",<sup>3</sup> or if next year we did not get to promote as much. In general, our First Five-Year Plan is correct.<sup>4</sup>

The 165 projects are key projects that will determine [the success or failure] of China's industrial and agricultural development.<sup>5</sup> We cannot help but promote these, but perhaps we have promoted them a little bit too quickly. The implementation of the First Five-Year Plan, so far, is already into its fourth year. The general situation is good; production has made progress, the workers' incomes have increased, and the people's lives have been somewhat improved. Although there has been some tension in the society, things have been tolerable. The achievements in basic construction have also been good. Many factories have been built. We can now promote [the manufacturing of] many products that we could not have produced by ourselves in the past. Things have begun to change around from the backward situation of the past in which we had to rely on some foreign country for everything. In the area of industrialization, we have put down a certain foundation. That's why we ought to affirm that the First Five-Year Plan is correct. Of course there have been mistakes; that was primarily because we did not have enough experience. Furthermore [we must expect] that there will be mistakes hereafter, because we can by no means say that after we have summed up the experience of these four years of economic construction we would have completely grasped the law of economic construction and we would not make any mistake. That would be impossible.

There are 165 core projects in the First Five-Year Plan; as for [construction] items that are above norm, there are a total of 800. Of these, the vast majority are items that we have promoted by ourselves. In only some 150 of them have we been helped in the designing by the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup> In some other cases we have been assisted by the fraternal countries of Eastern Europe, but in the main, we have largely designed these things ourselves. Who can say that we are no good [at it]? [Still,] even though, in terms of numbers [of projects], we have promoted many ourselves, the Soviet Union has helped us design the larger projects, and we have promoted [only] the smaller ones. If we can handle even the large ones all by ourselves, then we [can claim that we] are truly capable. As I see it, if we were to say that there are shortcomings and mistakes in the First Five Year Plan, the biggest shortcoming and mistake would have to be that we did not have [enough] experience. When we constructed factories, we had bones but no flesh. That is to say, we built up such things as factory buildings and set up the machinery and equipment, but we did not set up correspondingly many of the other things such as the sewage system, roads, postal and telecommunication hook-up, [even such things as] teahouses, restaurants, [workers'] dormitories, theaters, and so on. In reality, if we are really to construct an industrial city, it would not do not to include these things. Right now there are many difficulties in the Northwest, and things are very tense there; this is because the cities do not have a [solid] foundation. The factories have been developed, but there are no barbershops, nobody to make and mend clothes, no roads and highways, not enough automobiles, so the material resources cannot

be [conveniently] imported into [the region]. Therefore, in promoting industry, it is not enough only to design the factory itself, rather, we must include in the plans all the many auxiliary facilities attached to the factory, facilities that are of a service character, and welfare facilities. In the past, however, we have [generally] failed to include [these] in the plans. The investment and operating expenses that we have [set up] for the 800 items themselves are sufficient, but [we must anticipate that] as soon as we develop [the situation], the necessary operating expenses are bound to increase, but we have also not included this in the planning, and that is going to be a very major loophole [in the plans]. The problem is not too severe this year, but the bigger problem lies in the future. If we did not discover the problem of the relationship between skeleton and flesh in the construction of factories this time around, [and if we continued to] promote only [the setting up of] factory buildings and machinery and equipment, but failed to promote [setting up] auxiliary facilities, the factories could get erected, but there would be many, many problems.

Even though we might have committed errors of subjectivism in construction, we [must also acknowledge that] it would be impossible not to make any mistakes at all. If we made mistakes because we lacked experience, then we will know what things can be done and what things cannot be done, and from that, learn our lesson. The main thing is that we must correct our mistakes, and that should do. We must not pour cold water. We must protect the activism of the cadres and the masses, and it is on such a premise that we should criticize the shortcomings in our work. With regard to the things that the masses demand but which, for the time being, we cannot achieve, we must, absolutely, openly speak to the masses [about them] and repeatedly explain things clearly to the masses.

From now on, when we are handling the budget, we must convene the plenary sessions of the Central Committee twice a year, and a national people's congress once a year to discuss it, [and let it go through] three examinations before the result is decided.<sup>7</sup> This is because the budget is a framework;<sup>8</sup> the speed of economic construction is mainly decided by the budget. Comrade XXX spoke well in one of the speeches.<sup>9</sup> He said that at the moment, if we are to determine whether a certain year's plans represent "adventurist advance" or not depends on the size of the fiscal income of that year, and the expenditure. In the future, for the rate of construction to remain consistent and steady, it would be a very important issue for us to do a good job with the budget. That is why it is reasonable for the Central Committee to put it on the agenda of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee for discussion; the purpose is to have everyone concerned about this matter. In fact, it is not enough to just discuss it once. We should hold another plenum of the Central Committee, and a national people's congress, to discuss it [further]. The result of doing so would be to make our budget more accurate; at the same time, we would put our economic construction on a fully reliable foundation.

The comrades in positions of responsibility in the provincial [Party] committees, the municipal [Party] committees, and the various departments at the Center must grasp the work of finance, of economics, and of planning. Right now, the majority is made up of those who have not grasped [these matters], and we must quickly correct this shortcoming. The Party committees at all levels, after the reform has

been accomplished, must promote construction; but if the Party committees do not grasp the work of finance, economics, and planning, how can they do a good job of promoting construction? If the Party committees are amateurish<sup>10</sup> they would not be able to provide leadership; if they wish to become professionally competent, they must delve in deeply, and grasp the issues. The Central Committee has now already turned its attention toward grasping the financial and economic work and the work of planning.

The problems of grain and pork [provision] are very major ones. Although in a nationwide sense we will be increasing the production of grain, there is, nonetheless, a very large area of territory under calamity. Because we have not tightly grasped [the matter of] the marketing and selling of grain, in the last half year we have marketed a very large amount [of grain], and there has also been very great waste. We must study the grain problem seriously for a bit, to see how we can on the one hand guarantee supply, and on the other hand also prevent problems from cropping up; how we can avoid waste and also avoid overselling. The supply of pork and [other] secondary foodstuffs is also very short; none of these is a simple problem. In particular, when he was talking about the problem of the prices of agricultural products, Comrade Deng Zihui<sup>11</sup> issued a telegram from Fujian. In the main, the gist of his comment was that the [state] prices of agricultural products are too low, especially in the case of the price of grain. Therefore the peasants do not want to produce grain [and foodstuffs]. He proposed that we raise the price of grain, and at the same time the Central Committee also proposes that the [state] purchasing price for live hogs be raised a bit. Right now, to resolve the problem of grain [supply], on the one hand [the method would have to be] to economize. We must take hold of things firmly and not oversell. On the other hand, [however,] we still have to make the peasants willing to produce more grain; this will have a very close relationship with the resolving of the [issue of the] supply for secondary foodstuffs, especially of pork. This is because if the peasants are not willing to produce grain, there will not be [enough] animal feed, and we won't be able to raise any pigs. If, [instead,] we get more grain, and then we raise the price of live hogs a bit, it would be a more reliable [basis] for developing [the raising of] live hogs. In any case, an appropriate price must be set for agricultural products. Some comrades hope to even out [the prices and eliminate] the scissors price differential between industrial and agricultural products as soon as possible.<sup>12</sup> This would not be possible. This is because, with regard to the scissors differential right now, the situation is such that if we take the national income as 100, the scissors price differential would make up 30 per cent [of that], and the direct taxation burden on the peasantry across the nation averages only 10 per cent or so. If we were to demand that the scissors price differential be completely eliminated [right now] so as to arrive at exchange at equal values,<sup>13</sup> the national accumulation would be [adversely] affected. However, it is also a mistake for the scissors price differential to be too great, such that the peasant could not make a profit. In sum, on the condition that the national accumulation not be affected, it is absolutely necessary to reduce gradually the scissors price differential between industrial and agricultural products, so as to raise [the standards of] the peasants' lives.

No matter what, in our economic construction we must advocate and promote "building the nation with diligence and frugality; strive and struggle arduously." If we spend ten cents worth of money, we must not be doing only eight cents worth of things; we must, rather, do things worth eleven cents, or twelve cents. At this time, when there is difficulty, some of our comrades would want the state to put up some money to resolve the difficulty. Naturally, that, too, is needed, but we should also have an ulterior method, which is that when there is difficulty, we will not rely on money [to resolve it], but rather, we can resolve problems also by relying on our exemplary effect and our [readiness to] struggle arduously. Why do we say so? I hear that in Lanzhou,<sup>14</sup> when they were constructing a factory, the first thing to get erected was the office building, but there were no dormitories for the workers. The workers could only sleep in tents.

When we promote economic construction, we must also rely on the newspapers.<sup>15</sup> We must make the newspapers play a very positive role in the economic construction, in the work as a whole. We must take a firm grasp of the newspapers. If there are any difficulties we can explain things clearly to the masses through the newspapers, and thus enhance the masses' awareness; [let them know that] if we would all endure some suffering for the moment in order to promote construction, after construction is completed, life would be better. [But] if we only enhanced [people's] lives, but did not enhance the masses' awareness, there would still be problems. For example, the [standard of] living of the people of Hungary has been enhanced; although not by much, [the situation] is not bad. However, because education is lacking and the level of the masses' awareness has not been enhanced, petty bourgeois and bourgeois thought is very influential, and the trouble that has come of this has been very great.

Furthermore, from now on we ought to put more emphasis on our [willingness] to share the lives of our people, both their sweetness and their bitterness.<sup>16</sup> First of all we must propagandize that the cadres in positions of leadership in the organs must play an exemplary role, and only then can we expect the masses to struggle and strive arduously. Building socialism is an arduous and tremendous task, and only through arduous struggle can we accomplish the construction of socialism. Therefore, we must emphasize production. Only when production is enhanced can the people's lives be gradually enhanced. We must emphasize the [willingness to] struggle arduously among the leadership cadre of our [government] organs, promote and give play to the arduously struggling and modest workstyle of the past, and at the same time call upon the people to share our lives, both the sweetness and the sorrow.

## 2. The Problem of the International Situation

In the current international situation, the places where problems are cropping up are the Middle East and Eastern Europe. It seems as if in either case the news is not good, but perhaps we can, [in another sense,] think of it as good news. Because of the occurrence of the Polish and Hungarian incidents,<sup>17</sup> the fact is demonstrated that there are problems and there are contradictions. Well, where you have a problem, the problem will be exposed, and the eruption of [these] incidents

been accomplished, must promote construction; but if the Party committees do not grasp the work of finance, economics, and planning, how can they do a good job of promoting construction? If the Party committees are amateurish<sup>10</sup> they would not be able to provide leadership; if they wish to become professionally competent, they must delve in deeply, and grasp the issues. The Central Committee has now already turned its attention toward grasping the financial and economic work and the work of planning.

The problems of grain and pork [provision] are very major ones. Although in a nationwide sense we will be increasing the production of grain, there is, nonetheless, a very large area of territory under calamity. Because we have not tightly grasped [the matter of] the marketing and selling of grain, in the last half year we have marketed a very large amount [of grain], and there has also been very great waste. We must study the grain problem seriously for a bit, to see how we can on the one hand guarantee supply, and on the other hand also prevent problems from cropping up; how we can avoid waste and also avoid overselling. The supply of pork and [other] secondary foodstuffs is also very short; none of these is a simple problem. In particular, when he was talking about the problem of the prices of agricultural products, Comrade Deng Zihui<sup>11</sup> issued a telegram from Fujian. In the main, the gist of his comment was that the [state] prices of agricultural products are too low, especially in the case of the price of grain. Therefore the peasants do not want to produce grain [and foodstuffs]. He proposed that we raise the price of grain, and at the same time the Central Committee also proposes that the [state] purchasing price for live hogs be raised a bit. Right now, to resolve the problem of grain [supply], on the one hand [the method would have to be] to economize. We must take hold of things firmly and not oversell. On the other hand, [however,] we still have to make the peasants willing to produce more grain; this will have a very close relationship with the resolving of the [issue of the] supply for secondary foodstuffs, especially of pork. This is because if the peasants are not willing to produce grain, there will not be [enough] animal feed, and we won't be able to raise any pigs. If, [instead,] we get more grain, and then we raise the price of live hogs a bit, it would be a more reliable [basis] for developing [the raising of] live hogs. In any case, an appropriate price must be set for agricultural products. Some comrades hope to even out [the prices and eliminate] the scissors price differential between industrial and agricultural products as soon as possible.<sup>12</sup> This would not be possible. This is because, with regard to the scissors differential right now, the situation is such that if we take the national income as 100, the scissors price differential would make up 30 per cent [of that], and the direct taxation burden on the peasantry across the nation averages only 10 per cent or so. If we were to demand that the scissors price differential be completely eliminated [right now] so as to arrive at exchange at equal values,<sup>13</sup> the national accumulation would be [adversely] affected. However, it is also a mistake for the scissors price differential to be too great, such that the peasant could not make a profit. In sum, on the condition that the national accumulation not be affected, it is absolutely necessary to reduce gradually the scissors price differential between industrial and agricultural products, so as to raise [the standards of] the peasants' lives.

No matter what, in our economic construction we must advocate and promote "building the nation with diligence and frugality; strive and struggle arduously." If we spend ten cents worth of money, we must not be doing only eight cents worth of things; we must, rather, do things worth eleven cents, or twelve cents. At this time, when there is difficulty, some of our comrades would want the state to put up some money to resolve the difficulty. Naturally, that, too, is needed, but we should also have an ulterior method, which is that when there is difficulty, we will not rely on money [to resolve it], but rather, we can resolve problems also by relying on our exemplary effect and our [readiness to] struggle arduously. Why do we say so? I hear that in Lanzhou,<sup>14</sup> when they were constructing a factory, the first thing to get erected was the office building, but there were no dormitories for the workers. The workers could only sleep in tents.

When we promote economic construction, we must also rely on the newspapers.<sup>15</sup> We must make the newspapers play a very positive role in the economic construction, in the work as a whole. We must take a firm grasp of the newspapers. If there are any difficulties we can explain things clearly to the masses through the newspapers, and thus enhance the masses' awareness; [let them know that] if we would all endure some suffering for the moment in order to promote construction, after construction is completed, life would be better. [But] if we only enhanced [people's] lives, but did not enhance the masses' awareness, there would still be problems. For example, the [standard of] living of the people of Hungary has been enhanced; although not by much, [the situation] is not bad. However, because education is lacking and the level of the masses' awareness has not been enhanced, petty bourgeois and bourgeois thought is very influential, and the trouble that has come of this has been very great.

Furthermore, from now on we ought to put more emphasis on our [willingness] to share the lives of our people, both their sweetness and their bitterness.<sup>16</sup> First of all we must propagandize that the cadres in positions of leadership in the organs must play an exemplary role, and only then can we expect the masses to struggle and strive arduously. Building socialism is an arduous and tremendous task, and only through arduous struggle can we accomplish the construction of socialism. Therefore, we must emphasize production. Only when production is enhanced can the people's lives be gradually enhanced. We must emphasize the [willingness to] struggle arduously among the leadership cadre of our [government] organs, promote and give play to the arduously struggling and modest workstyle of the past, and at the same time call upon the people to share our lives, both the sweetness and the sorrow.

## 2. The Problem of the International Situation

In the current international situation, the places where problems are cropping up are the Middle East and Eastern Europe. It seems as if in either case the news is not good, but perhaps we can, [in another sense,] think of it as good news. Because of the occurrence of the Polish and Hungarian incidents,<sup>17</sup> the fact is demonstrated that there are problems and there are contradictions. Well, where you have a problem, the problem will be exposed, and the eruption of [these] incidents

cleared the air on [these] problems, made them clearer. In this way we will be able to discover the causes, take measures [to deal with the problem] and correct the shortcomings and mistakes in [our] work. [If] we can resolve the problem and make Poland's and Hungary's [situations] even more consolidated, we could say, from that angle, that it is good news. All problems are bound to erupt sooner or later; better sooner than later. When the problem erupts sooner, it might be smaller, and easier to resolve. [As the saying goes:] "Failure is the Mother of Success." In the wake of failure there is a good aspect [of things], and that is that we may learn lessons from experience. If indeed we learned from failures we would have reaped something, and that would be what is good. For example, the Polish and Hungarian incidents educated the revolutionary people of Poland and Hungary, but they also educated the Soviet Union, and we, too, got educated at the same time. Problems there will be, always and continuously. Even when we get to be a communist society there will still always be problems. The word "revolution"<sup>18</sup> will probably never be erased from the dictionary. What is revolution? That is to say, where there are contradictions there will be struggles; the method of resolving contradictions is what we call revolution. The revolution right now refers to the elimination of classes; in the future, the content and character of revolution may be different, but as long as there is contradiction there will be struggle, and if we are to resolve the contradiction we will have to struggle; this much is consistent in the sense of the future, of the present, and of the past. In the days ahead, after classes have been eliminated, the contradiction might be of a character different from that of the past, but there will still be contradictions nonetheless. For example, in today's China, the class contradiction has already been basically resolved, and the primary domestic contradiction is the contradiction between an advanced social system and backward forces of production. Generally speaking, this contradiction is not of an antagonistic [nature] to begin with, but if it is not resolved properly, it is possible that it could turn into an antagonistic contradiction.<sup>19</sup>

### 3. The Problem of Sino-Soviet Relations

At the moment, within the socialist camp, the leadership position of the Soviet Union cannot be shaken. If the Soviet Union's leadership position were shaken, the entire socialist camp would plunge into an even more chaotic state. We support the Soviet Union, not for other reasons, but mainly because we are all Communists, and we are opposed to imperialism and capitalism. Since we have [these] common goals between us, and [since] the Soviet Union can play a bigger role [in this], why should we not support it? Naturally, supporting the Soviet Union does not mean supporting everything about it blindly. Some things are not compatible with the conditions in China and we have not adopted them. Our general principles, policies, and lines in China's revolution and in [our] work have all been independently formulated by our Party in accordance with China's characteristics and conditions. We should say that it is appropriate that the Soviet Union should occupy a position of leadership in the socialist camp, because the Soviet Union is the first country in the world to accomplish the construction of socialism, and it has a [formidable] industrial base. There are still many advanced experiences in the Soviet Union.

Even though there have been some shortcomings in the Soviet Union in the past, and in some of the ways they have done things they have not been sufficiently effective or appropriate, all these can be corrected. There is no perfect thing in the world. In the past some of our comrades have, precisely, one-sidedly looked upon the Soviet Union as perfect. Now, [some have] switched to the other side and look upon it as bad in every aspect. These are expressions of onesidedness.

A Marxist-Leninist must not look at problems one-sidedly. With [all] things there is a distinction between the true, the beautiful, and the good [side] and the false, the ugly, and the evil [side], but then again [these two sides] are juxtaposed [against each other relatively].<sup>20</sup> With regard to the way we look at the Soviet Union, in the past we should not have looked at everything in the positive light, and today we should not think that everything is bad. As a matter of reality, in recent times the Soviet Union has made a good deal of effort in many [areas of] work and in [the area of] international relations. There has also been very great improvement, and the direction has been toward the better side. This demonstrates that basically the Soviet Union is good; it was good in the past, it is good in the present, and in the future it may become even better. Naturally, there are [and were] shortcomings. The methods with which it has handled and settled some problems have not been sufficiently appropriate, and there have been some mistakes in the area of theory as well.

From the very beginning our Party has emulated the Soviet Union. The mass line,<sup>21</sup> our political work, and [the theory of] the dictatorship of the proletariat have all been learned from the October Revolution. At that time, Lenin had focused on the mobilization of the masses, and on organizing the worker-peasant-soldier soviet, and so on. He did not rely on [doing things by] administrative decree. Rather, Lenin sent Party representatives to carry out political work. The problem lies with the latter phase of Stalin's leadership [which came] after the October Revolution. Although [Stalin] was still promoting socialism and communism, he nonetheless abandoned some of Lenin's things, deviated from the orbit of Leninism, and became alienated from the masses, and so on. Therefore, we did suffer some disadvantages when we emulated the things of the later stages of Stalin's leadership and transplanted them for application in China in a doctrinaire way.<sup>22</sup> Today, the Soviet Union still has some advanced experiences that deserve to be emulated, but there are some other [aspects] in which we simply cannot be like the Soviet Union. For example, the socialist transformation of the capitalist industries and commerce, the cooperativization of agriculture, and the Ten Major Relationships in economic construction;<sup>23</sup> these are all ways of doing things in China. From now on, in our socialist economic construction, we should primarily start with China's circumstances, and with the special characteristics of the circumstances and the times in which we are situated. Therefore, we must still propose the slogan of learning from the Soviet Union;<sup>24</sup> just that we cannot forcibly and crudely transplant and employ things blindly and in a doctrinaire fashion. Similarly, we can also learn some of the things that are good in bourgeois countries; this is because every country must have its strengths and weaknesses, and we intend chiefly to learn other people's strengths.

Stalin had a tendency to deviate from Marxism-Leninism.<sup>25</sup> A concrete expression of this is [his] negation of contradictions, and to date, [the Soviet Union] has not yet thoroughly eliminated the influence of this viewpoint of Stalin's. Stalin spoke [the language of] materialism and the dialectical method, but in reality he was subjectivist. He placed the individual above everything else, negated the group, and negated the masses. [He engaged in] the worship of the individual; in fact, to be more precise, [in] personal dictatorships. This is antimaterialism. Stalin also spoke of the dialectical method, but in reality [he] was metaphysical. For example, in the [*Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)*],<sup>26</sup> he wrote of the dialectical method, [but] put [the theory of] contradictions [only] at the very end. We should say that the most fundamental problem of dialectics is the unity of contradictory opposites.<sup>27</sup> It is [precisely] because of his metaphysical [character] that a one-sided viewpoint was produced, in which the internal connections in a thing are repudiated, and problems are looked at isolatedly and in a static way. To pay heed to dialectics would be to look at problems and treat a problem as a unity of opposites, and that is why it would be [a] comprehensive [methodology]. Life and death, war and peace, are opposites of a contradiction. In reality, they also have an internal connection between them. That is why at times these oppositions are also united. When we [seek to] understand problems we cannot see only one side. We should analyze [it] from all sides, look through its essence. In this way, with regard to [understanding] a person, we would not be [taking the position] at one time that he is all good, and then at another time that he is all bad, without a single good point. Why is our Party correct? It is because we have been able to proceed from the objective conditions in understanding and resolving all problems; in this way we are more comprehensive and we can avoid being absolutists. Secondly, the mass line was seen as tailism by Stalin.<sup>28</sup> [He] did not recognize the good points about the mass line, and he used administrative methods to resolve many problems. But we Communists are materialists; we acknowledge that it is the masses who create everything and are the masters of history. [For us] there are no individual heroes; only when the masses are united can there be strength. In fact, since Lenin died, the mass line has been forgotten in the Soviet Union. [Even] at the time of opposing Stalin, [the Soviet Union's leadership] still did not properly acknowledge or emphasize the significance of the mass line. Of course, more recently, attention has begun to be paid to this, but the understanding is still not [sufficiently] deep. Furthermore, class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat were [items] that Lenin had emphasized. At one time, the divergence between Lenin and the Third International and the Second International<sup>29</sup> was mainly along the lines that the Marxists emphasized the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat whereas the opportunists were unwilling to acknowledge them. One of the lessons to be learned from the occurrence of the Polish and Hungarian Incidents, in addition to [the fact that] there were shortcomings in the work [of the Communist parties], is that after the victory of the revolution they had not properly mobilized the masses to weed out thoroughly the counterrevolutionary elements. In other words, they did not seriously subject the counterrevolutionaries to a dictatorship, thus giving counterrevolutionaries openings to exploit, in which they produced trouble. Finally, in the relationship between our countries, we have always advocated treating one another as an equal.

[Naturally] there are big countries and there are small countries, [but] each has its strengths. All our fraternal nations share common goals, and therefore we must be united and treat one another as equals. We cannot have any sense of superiority. Since the Zunyi Conference,<sup>30</sup> our Party has carried out its policies and decided on its guidelines independently; it has maintained a posture of independence, and handled our matters in accordance with China's circumstances. After the founding of the Republic, we had proposed [the slogan of] "leaning to one side," meaning that in political matters we must be united with the countries in the socialist camp, and must stand on the side of the socialist countries, that we cannot have one foot on the side of Western capitalism and another foot on the side of socialism. That is why "leaning to one side" expressed our determined separation from the bourgeois countries in political matters, [in order to] dispel all illusions on the part of Western countries. [It signified that] China cannot take the road of capitalism, and cannot compromise with the imperialists; rather, it must resolutely oppose imperialism and oppose capitalism.<sup>31</sup>

The Sino-Soviet relationship must be improved. With regard to the leadership position that places the Soviet Union at the head, that cannot be shaken, otherwise it would be very detrimental to the interests of our socialist camp. We should affirm that in general orientation the Soviet Union is good, and within the socialist camp we must take the Soviet Union as its leader. With regard to this issue, we must reinforce education inside the Party and without, and do a good job explaining things clearly.

#### 4. The Problem of Big Democracy and Small Democracy<sup>32</sup>

Recently, both inside the Party and outside, there are people who have demanded the implementation of big democracy. In fact, the proposal to call for implementing big democracy among the people<sup>33</sup> is a mistaken one. What, after all, do we mean by big democracy? Big democracy is something that you use against the enemy. From the perspective of our history, when Chen Sheng and Wu Guang raised on their bamboo poles the banner of rebellion against the Qin dynasty,<sup>34</sup> when Wang Mang deposed Ziyang and usurped the Han throne,<sup>35</sup> when the Yellow Turbans rose in rebellion during the time of Emperor Lingdi of the Eastern Han dynasty,<sup>36</sup> when, in the period of the Three Kingdoms, Cao Cao, Liu Bei, and Sun Quan vied for the kingdom,<sup>37</sup> and when, in the Qing dynasty, Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xinqing and company rose up in rebellion at Jintian, . . .<sup>38</sup> and so on, those were big-democracy ways of doing things. When we engaged in a revolution to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, we were also doing things in the big-democracy way. This time, when we carried out a demonstration and parade in protest against British and French aggression against Egypt,<sup>39</sup> that is big democracy. [Thus] it should be said that we approve of promoting big democracy. But we must [equally] affirm that big democracy is to be used against the enemy, against a ruling class. Among the people we cannot use big democracy. Similarly, when the imperialists and our class enemies deal with us, they also use the measures of big democracy. The Hungarian Incident this time demonstrated clearly that the imperialists and the reactionaries use big democracy against the Communists and against the people. However, some of our comrades do not understand this line of reasoning. In fact,



we have always adopted [the methods of] big democracy against the enemy; just that today, under the conditions in which, domestically speaking, class contradiction has already been basically resolved, when we deal with the bourgeoisie we no longer adopt, and no longer need to adopt, [the methods of] big democracy; rather, we adopt the method of rectification, the method of carrying out ideological education in a gentle-winds-and-soft-rain way.<sup>40</sup> However, before the class contradiction had been resolved, we always adopted [the methods of] big democracy in dealing with antagonistic classes.

Naturally, big democracy is also applicable in dealing with bureaucratism,<sup>41</sup> when [those people] are divorced from the masses. When, in their work, they have created great loss and deeply malignant results [for the people], and when the masses have been pushed to an intolerable point, why should they not use [the methods of] big democracy against the bureaucratic elements? In Chengdu some students went on strike. Because the problem was [still] not resolved, they wanted to come to Beijing to petition. They sent "troops" in two columns. One train went as far as Baoji, and the other got to Zhengzhou.<sup>42</sup> When the Second Machine Industry Ministry got wind of this, they sent people to persuade the students to turn back. We should have let them come to Beijing; when you have done something wrong and will not admit your mistake, and people then [want to] come to Beijing to petition, [how could you] stop them? You have no way to persuade them, [then] let us admit the mistake to them. Why did you not ask them to come? Is it because you are afraid that it would have a bad influence? Or is it because you fear that would add to our troubles? In fact there is nothing to fear, because whether they come here or not, the influence is the same. It wouldn't be increased if they did come, and it wouldn't be [reduced] even if they didn't come. If they really came, then we should have received them however busy we might have been, and we would have to admit the mistake to them.

When the masses have a reasonable petition to make, they should be permitted [to make it], absolutely. In the future we can give some thought to adding an article in the Constitution<sup>43</sup> permitting the workers to strike. This would be of beneficial influence to correcting the bureaucratic workstyle of the factory leadership, because as soon as the workers go on strike, the directors of factories and the leadership will get excited, and they will no longer dare simply to sit in the directors' offices and issue commands. Rather, they will have to go among the workers' masses to make an on-the-spot observation. If we are not alert, and if we do not correct the bureaucratic workstyle, the result could be the formation of a special stratum [of privilege], and our being divorced from the people, and in the end we will be toppled by the people.

We approve of big democracy, [but] if we use it now to resolve problems, I'm afraid the democratic personages,<sup>44</sup> the university professors, the capitalists, and some people in the Party (such as the bureaucratist elements) will not approve, because once we carry out big democracy, the masses will rise up to settle accounts<sup>45</sup> [with them] and to "rectify" them.<sup>46</sup> Through all these many political movements, these people have already been dealt with to the point of choking, and if there was another [round of] big democracy, they will suffer "rectification"

again. So we can easily imagine that they would not welcome it. In fact, although the big democracy is used to deal with the enemy, it can also be used with the bureaucratist elements. However, we need not be afraid of it. The problem is that if only we can do our work well, earnestly overcome our shortcomings, and correct our mistakes, the masses will only support [us] and will not promote so-called big democracy to oppose [us].

##### 5. The Problem of Minority Nationalities

With regard to the minority nationalities, we definitely must do a good job of uniting [with them]; we cannot take this problem [too lightly or put it in an] overly simple [light]. In the last several years, although we have done some work on the [issue of the] minority nationalities, and have resolved some problems, there are still quite a lot of problems right now. At the same time [let us be aware that] the [minority] nationality problem will exist for a long time. It appears that if we can do our work well, the problems with regard to it can be reduced. The problem that [we see] currently in the mutual relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union and between Hungary and the Soviet Union contains, in both cases, some issues [related to the fact that their minority] nationality problem has not been satisfactorily resolved. [Similarly], in China, the [minority] nationality issues in the Tibetan region have not been fully resolved.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, the Central Committee has proposed several times that we must pay a lot of attention to the problems in this area. Don't assume that it is a very easy thing to unite [with] the minority nationalities. We must oppose Han chauvinism,<sup>48</sup> and must earnestly and thoroughly unite with the minority nationalities.

We must have confidence that the shortcomings that existed in the past in our work with regard to the [minority] nationalities can be corrected. We need not fear the opposition. It is because there are shortcomings that other people opposed [us], and when the shortcomings are eliminated, they will no longer oppose [us]. The circumstances of the Communist Party of China and those of the parties in other countries are not entirely similar. Our Party's cadres are native born and bred. Some of the cadres come from the period of the Northern Expedition, some from the period of the agrarian revolution, some from the periods of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, and there are also those from the era of construction.<sup>49</sup> But all have gradually grown out of the [process of] struggle. Not only that, but our Party's leadership is entirely correct, our armed forces are faithful and reliable. Therefore, we ought to be confident. We must not be afraid of rebellions; we must achieve [a confidence of] "sitting tight in the fishing boat no matter how strong the winds and waves may be." Let us not be pessimistic, not be afraid of big democracy. Nevertheless, we must do a very good job of correcting our mistakes and resolutely overcome [the malaise of] bureaucratism; otherwise, things would be dangerous.

##### 6. The Questions of Rectification [of Workstyle] and of Reorganizing<sup>50</sup>

We must carry out a rectification movement on a big scale. The major targets would be to rectify subjectivism, bureaucratism, sectarianism, corruption, and waste, as well as the forced-commandism workstyle of the cadres at the lower

levels. Next January the Central Committee must issue a directive on the issue, to set the methods and contents of the rectification, and to mobilize the whole Party to make the proper preparations so that, after July, [the movement] can be implemented.<sup>51</sup> Before July comes around, [we would] mainly be making preparations, and making personal inspections. If before the rectification [is launched, someone] has already corrected his or her mistakes, then he or she would not need to be rectified. With regard to those who have not corrected [their mistakes], if the problem is of a general nature, we should still adopt [only] a method of education. It is only with regard to those people who have committed relatively serious mistakes and have not corrected their mistakes that we should do some focused criticism. The purpose of rectification is to correct mistakes, so wouldn't it be better if there is a correction without rectification? The Central Committee's idea is that in this rectification, we must do things thoroughly. It is not [just] to sweep up a storm, not to engage in a sudden-attack type of movement. We must not carry out sudden attacks [on people], and we must be careful not to damage [our] strength and vigor. This is to say, we are not to adopt a big-democracy method of kicking up a rough wind and heavy torrents; rather, we must adopt the method of small democracy, of fine winds and gentle rains. [We must] do a thorough [job of] ideological preparation beforehand so as to achieve the purpose of raising the level of the cadres' ideological consciousness, and [thus to] correct the shortcomings and mistakes in [their] work.

In the rectification of the past, there were some big-democracy methods. In particular, [owing to] the limitations of time, things have been done somewhat too simply and crudely, resulting in hurting some good people. This time, with sufficient time, we must achieve [the purpose of] curing the illness to the save the patient.<sup>52</sup> Not only must we do this with regard to our own comrades, but we should do the same with regard to the transformation of some bourgeois elements and petty bourgeois elements. In all cases we must use the small-democracy method, patiently carry out persuasion and education, raise [the level of] understanding, correct mistakes, and improve the work. We should achieve [a situation in which] there is protection, and yet also struggle: Only then can we unite [with] all forces with which unity is possible to serve the cause of socialism.<sup>53</sup>

[I] agree that in times of peace we should reduce the size of the armed forces somewhat, [but] we must carry out the [work of] reorganization [of the troops] well and properly. At the same time [in the] localities we must also greatly contract [the size of military enlistment and] grouping. All of us must do [some] ideological preparation [for this]. At the moment there is a very bad practice in which whenever people speak of work, they speak of first [enlisting and] grouping; they want to have [more] people. Moreover, they assume that only when they have the larger grouping and more people can there be a way to get the work done, as if without these things the work cannot be carried out. In reality that is not so. Often when we have larger groupings and more people, we have an increase in our bureaucratism. At the moment, when they are doing their work, some comrades give very little consideration to how they can enhance their rate of efficiency and play up the masses' enthusiasm and spirit of activism, or exploit the potential that lies in all

areas. Instead they want such and such a size of grouping and such and such a number of people at the drop of a hat. That is why this time the Central Committee is resolved to change around this situation thoroughly. The armed forces must be streamlined in a big way, and the regrouping in the localities must also be greatly compressed.

At the same time, we must oppose the specialization of the leading cadres.<sup>54</sup> Right now there is too great a gap between the salaries that high-ranking cadres get and the standard of living of the people. In the future we may give thought to reducing some salaries, and, moreover, eliminating special treatment [so that the cadres can] become one with the masses. [In our view of] struggling arduously and enduring hardships, we cannot be divorced from the people. As I see it, the special treatments that deserve to be given consideration in this regard are, number 1, material supplies [awarded to the cadres] and number 2, that they have too many security guards. We must carefully pay attention to changing these things around. Only when we make ourselves the examples can we call upon the people to struggle arduously, and share their sweetness as well as their bitterness.

The atmosphere of inflated luxury and enjoyment in the Party is a consequence of the corroding influence of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology. We must strengthen ideological education in order to criticize and overcome this unhealthy air.

#### Notes

1. For Mao's usage of this metaphor, see text July 31, 1955, vol. I, section 9, and text Oct. 11, 1955(2), vol. I, section 2. Also see Version I of this current speech, paragraph 2.

2. See Version I, paragraph 3. In the year or so ahead, Mao would develop this paradigm of understanding the philosophical model in which things progress. He would also supplement it with the notion of "spiral-like development." (See text July 9, 1957.)

3. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 22.

4. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2. See also Version I, note 5.

5. In Version I, Mao does not give figures for these items. We are unable to determine which 165 construction projects Mao is referring to here. However, in Li Fuchun's report on the First Five-Year Plan (see Version I, note 7), section II, Li does mention that "industrial construction . . . comprises 694 above-norm construction projects, the core of which are the 156 projects which the Soviet Union is designing for us, and which will lay the preliminary groundwork for China's socialist industrialization." We are uncertain as to whether the phrase: "165 key projects" represents an echo, though misprinted, of Li's "156 projects," or if Mao has put together a figure here that represents those 156 projects and, in addition, 9 unidentified key agricultural projects. Note that Mao repeats this "165" number in the next paragraph in the current version of the speech, and he specifically mentions there that "in some 150 of them have we been helped in the designing by the Soviet Union."

6. Li Fuchun's report on the First Five-Year Plan (see Version I, note 7), as noted in note 5 above, specifically mentions "156 projects" that the Soviet Union was designing for the PRC as part of the latter's First Five-Year Plan. This figure is mentioned several times in Li's report (see R. Bowie and J. Fairbank [1962], pp. 49 and 83). For further information and discussion on Soviet assistance to the PRC on these projects, see Li Choh-ming (1959). It should be noted, however, that the 800 above-norm construction projects that Mao mentions here does not agree with any of the figures in Li's report (694 above-norm industrial projects, or over 1,600 overall).

7. See Version I, note 13.

8. The term that Mao uses here is *kuang kuang*, literally, the frame that is put around

anything, as in a picture frame. This is a term commonly used by Mao, and in later years it would take on negative connotations, in which the word *kuang* is used as a verb, meaning to limit or restrict the development of something or someone, or to “box something in” (see text Mar. 5, 1959, note 17).

9. We are not certain who XXX refers to here, but a reasonable guess is that it could be Premier Zhou Enlai, who made a “Report on the Plan of National Economic Development and the Control Figures of the Budget for 1957” at this plenum. According to the report on this plenum in *RMSC* (1957), p. 147, Zhou proposed in his report that there needed to be retrenchment and compression of the budget for 1957. (See also K. Lieberthal [1976], p. 88.) See Version I, paragraphs 6 and 7.

10. For a development of this argument, see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 72.

11. For Deng Zihui, see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 42, and text Mar. 18, 1951, source note.

12. On the scissors differential, see text Apr. 1956, note 20.

13. See text Apr. 25, 1956, note 23.

14. Lanzhou is the chief city of Gansu province in Northwest China. It is located in South-Central Gansu on the banks of the Yellow River.

15. In the year ahead, Mao would have much to do with the struggle to take hold of the issue of newspapers' stances on political matters. In April 1957, for instance, Mao would criticize even *RMRB*. (See text Apr. 1957.) See Version I, paragraph 10.

16. This is a common aphorism, *tong gan gong ku*, that is derived from the second *hui* of the novel *Er nu yingxiong zhuan* (The Romance of the Young Heroes and Heroines). This sentence has the sense of paragraph 9 of Version I but expresses the meaning in a very different style.

17. See Version I, note 27.

18. The Chinese text here technically translates as “the two words,” since the term for “revolution” in Chinese is *geming*.

19. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 18, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 9. See also Version I of this text, note 1, and text Oct. 7, 1957, notes 16 and 38.

20. For a development of this view, see text Mar. 12, 1957, note 29 and surrounding text.

21. See text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7; text May 2, 1956, source note, and Version I, note 45.

22. It should be noted that Mao's assessment of Stalin in this version, starting here and consisting of the next several paragraphs, is substantially more harshly critical than what we see in Version I, and includes specific points of criticism developed later in Mao's speeches and remarks in 1957. This reinforces the oft-held scholarly judgment that volume 5 of *Xuanji* is a “cleaned up” edition of Mao's works of this period.

23. See text Apr. 25, 1956.

24. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 27, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 34.

25. See Version I, paragraphs 22–24. For a comparative textual view of Mao's criticism of Stalin, here and considerably later, in 1958, see texts Apr. 6, 1958 and May 8, 1958. The comparison shows that what is often considered a critical perspective on Stalin that Mao developed later, during or after the events of 1957, had in fact probably been developed much earlier in 1956.

26. This refers, we believe, to the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Bolshevik (Short Course)*; see text July 31, 1955, vol. I, note 26.

27. See Version I, note 33.

28. The term “tailism” (*weiba zhuyi*) refers to an attitude and workstyle among the leaders when, rather than leading the masses to move forward, standing in the vanguard of the masses, and responding to their “correct” demands, they fall behind the masses' level of consciousness and mistake the opinion of some backward elements for the opinion of the masses. Thus the leaders become the tail of the masses instead of their head. The term is derived from the German political expression *langsambezugung*. Mao had described this

term in his essay of April 24, 1945, “On Coalition Government” (see *SW*, III, p. 266).

29. On the Second International, see text Aug. 24, 1956(1), note 3; on the Third International, see text Apr. 1956, note 22.

30. See text Apr. 1956, note 9; see also text Mar. 10, 1958, note 8.

31. On the PRC's policy of “leaning to one side” (*yi bian dao*), see text Apr. 25, 1956, note 35.

32. See Version I, section 4 (paragraphs 28ff).

33. The term “among the people” here is, in the Chinese text, *renmin neibu*. For a more extensive explanation and discussion of the connotations of this expression, for which we feel the translation “among the people” may sometimes be too simplistic, see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

34. See text June 10, 1952(2), vol. I, note 3.

35. See text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 112. In A.D. 6, Wang Mang assassinated Emperor Pingdi of the Western (Former) Han dynasty, and chose thereupon to install an infant son of the Han (Liu) royal family as crown prince. This child's name was Ying, and on assuming the position he was known, somewhat derogatorily, as “Ruzi Ying” (Weakling Child Ying). Wang Mang then ruled as regent for this child-prince, and then later, in A.D. 8, deposed him and took his place, installing himself as emperor. The once child-prince was subsequently assassinated by the troops of Liu Xuan (“Emperor” Gengshidi), one of the contestants for the throne at the end of Wang Mang's reign. Since Ying was never actually crowned as emperor, he had, historically speaking, no reign title, and is known to history only by that unpleasant moniker, “Ruzi Ying.” The reference that Mao makes here to the name Ziyang is a mistake, however, since the name more properly belongs to the grandson of Emperor Shihuangdi of the Qin dynasty, who was installed as king by Zhao Gao and who surrendered to Liu Bang (who, as the founder of the Han dynasty would be known later as Emperor Gaozu) in 206 B.C.

36. The Yellow Turban (Huangjin) Rebellion took place in A.D. 184 when three Daoist mystics, the brothers Zhang Jiao, Zhang Liang, and Zhang Bao, founded the secret sect of Daoism known as Taipingdao, and raised an army of rebels against the Eastern Han dynasty. (Emperor Lingdi ruled from 168 to 189.) The rebellion started in the Julu area, in what is today Hebei province, but spread subsequently to eight *zhou* (or prefectures), covering parts of what are today the provinces of Shandong, Hebei, Hubei, and Anhui. The soldiers of the rebellious army wore yellow scarves on their heads as means of identification, thus the name. The rebellion was put down within the year.

37. For Cao Cao, see text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 3; and for Liu Bei, see text Apr. 1957(2), note 47. Sun Quan (182–252) ruled from 229 to 252 as the king of the kingdom of Wu, which he had founded. He succeeded to his elder brother Sun Ce's possession of six shires (*jun*) in the eastern and southern part of the Yangtze River basin and was able (in an alliance with Liu Bei) to repel the forces of Cao Cao in the year 208. Later he defeated Liu Bei's chief general, the redoubtable Guan Yu, and took the prefecture of Jingzhou back from Liu Bei, forcing him to retreat to what is today Sichuan province. Then in 229 he declared himself king of the Wu kingdom at Wuchang (in today's Hubei province). However, he later made his capital at Jianye, which is today's Nanjing (in Jiangsu province). Politics, military history, and romance aside, a very significant historical contribution of Sun Quan and the kingdom of Wu in this period is that it represented the first major development of the socioeconomic and cultural structure of the lower Yangtze basin and Central-South China. On the Three Kingdoms period, see also text May 17, 1958, note 70.

38. Mao is referring to the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864); see text Mar. 27, 1951, vol. I, note 4. Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864) was the leader of the Taiping Rebellion. He was a native of Huaxian, Guangdong province. Failing three times in the provincial examinations, he relinquished hopes of becoming a government officer. Responding in part to the suffering of the people in the wake of the Opium Wars, he nurtured a strong animosity against the Qing dynasty. Subsequently he came under the influence of Christianity through the impact of missionaries in Guangzhou, and he began to formulate his own cultish variation of the

religion, culminating in the founding of the Bai Shangdi Hui (God Worshipper's Association) in 1843, in which he was joined by childhood friend Feng Yunshan. Hong then went to Guangxi province to spread his teachings, and blending Christian teachings with Chinese Confucianist ethics and a protosocialistic utopianism and millenarianism, he wrote a number of tracts that formed the theoretical foundation of the movement he headed. On January 11, 1851, Hong and his forces declared an insurrection against the Qing at the village of Jintian (in today's Guiping *xian* in Guangxi province) and called the "kingdom" that they served the "Taiping Tianguo" (Heavenly Kingdom of Great Harmony). Hong himself assumed the title "*Tian wang*" (Heavenly King). The movement spread over all of the southern half of China, and in March 1853, the Heavenly Kingdom made its capital at Nanjing. Ultimately, however, as a result of a combination of internal weakening owing to interfactional conflict and the resurgence of Qing forces (largely in the shape of provincial militia raised and led by generals such as Zeng Guofan and Zuo Zongtang, joined by Western-equipped and Western-trained armies), the Taiping Kingdom fell, and Hong died in 1864. Yang Xiuqing (d. 1856) was one of the other top leaders of the Taiping movement and a chief architect of the strategy that brought Hong Xiuquan to power. He was also a major actor in the declaration of the uprising at Jintian, and subsequently a chief strategist for Taiping military affairs. As *dong wang* (King of the East) he was second in the Taiping hierarchy under Hong Xiuquan. The other chief figures in the Taiping Rebellion were Xiao Chaogui (ca. 1820–1852), titled *xi wang* (King of the West), Feng Yunshan (1822–1852), titled *nan wang* (King of the South), Wei Changhui (1823–1856), titled *bei wang* (King of the North), at whose hands Yang Xiuqing died, Shi Dakai (1823–1863), titled *yi wang* (King of the Wing), and, later in the movement, Li Xiucheng (1823–1864) and Chen Yucheng (1837–1862).

39. Mao is referring to the Suez Crisis. See text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6.

40. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 43.

41. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 61.

42. Chengdu is in Sichuan province; Baoji is in western Shaanxi province. Baoji and Zhengzhou were the two major switching points on the way for these petitioning students if they were to reach Beijing from Chengdu. Reaching Baoji would be less than one-third of the journey, but reaching Zhengzhou would mean that more than two-thirds of the journey had been completed. Note that the information here differs significantly from that given in Version I (paragraph 31).

43. This refers, we think, to the PRC Constitution of 1954. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1. Also see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 66.

44. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1, and text Winter 1949, vol. I, source note and text.

45. The term here is *qingsuan*, which is an abbreviation of the expression *qinghu suanzhang* (literally, to clear up account holders and count up the debts). It has come to be a general term commonly used in the PRC to denote "settling accounts" (mostly political ones). As such it has assumed a sometimes ominous connotation in which it conveys the sense of someone being exposed and criticized.

46. Here and in the next sentence, the term *zheng* ("rectification") carries a threatening sense. See text May 15, 1957, note 27. Indeed, in the second of these sentences, the term in the text is *ai zheng* ("suffering" rectification).

47. See text Apr. 6, 1952, vol. I, and text Feb. 27, 1957(2), note 78.

48. See text May 16, 1953, vol. I, source note and text.

49. In Version I, the Party's founding is added as a "period" in front of this list, and the era of construction is omitted. See Version I, note 58.

50. The terms here, *zhengfeng* and *zhengbian*, both have the idea of *zheng*, or putting things in order. The term *zhengbian* is, however, almost always used with regard to the reorganizing of armed units. In this case, Mao is referring specifically to the reorganization of the *bianzhi* (or establishment) of the troop units, in particular to their staffing and recruiting.

51. See, for a general sense of the development of the rectification movement in 1957, text Mar. 12, 1957, source note and note 19.

52. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.

53. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 7.

54. The term here is *teshu hua*, which we have translated as "specialization." The term means the changing of people into persons with special privileges. In the PRC, to engage in or promote this (in Chinese, and jargonistically, *gao teshu hua*) is to seek and acquire personal privileges.

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## Remarks Made to Peng Bai's Mother

(November 16, 1956)

Source: *JFJB* (Nov. 17, 1956).

*This remark was made at a reception for delegates to the national congress of family members of revolutionary martyrs, family members of soldiers, disabled soldiers, demobilized service personnel, and activists for socialist construction.*

*Peng was an early member of the Communist Party whose work was primarily in the area of organizing peasants in revolutionary activities. In 1923 he organized the Haifeng Federation of Peasant Associations. He was elected to the Central Committee of the CPC in April 1927 at the Fifth National Party Congress. In November of the same year, he founded and became chairman of the Hailufeng Soviet government, which lasted only until May 1928, when it was completely crushed by KMT troops. Peng was arrested in Shanghai in August 1928 and was executed one year later. For biographical information on Peng Bai, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1970), III, pp. 70–73, and Zhonggong renming lu, appendix, p. 93.*

Comrade Peng Bai was our good comrade and you have been a good mother to us.

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## Telegram to People's Republic of Albania

(November 28, 1956)

Source: *FBIS, Daily Report* (Dec. 5, 1956), LL5.

*We have no Chinese text for this telegram. The text of the FBIS source is presented here in its original form. The telegram was addressed to president Haxhi Lleshi, president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the PRA; Mehmet Shehu, chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Behar Shtylla, foreign minister. It was signed by Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai.*

On the occasion of the 12th anniversary of Albania's liberation, on behalf of the Chinese People's Republic and Chinese people, we express to you and through you to the Government of the Albanian People's Republic and the Albanian people our warm and fraternal greetings.

During these 12 years, the Albanian people, who have glorious revolutionary traditions, led by their Workers Party, have obtained great victories in building socialism and played an active role in strengthening unity and cooperation between socialist countries in defending peace in the world and strengthening international cooperation. The Chinese people are attentively following the successes achieved by the Albanian people and are deeply happy about these victories. The fraternal friendship between China and Albania is being developed in all directions. This friendship and our unity and friendship with the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, are based on Marxist-Leninist principles and proletarian internationalism. The continual development and strengthening of these friendly relations is the real guarantee for defending peace in the world and progress of mankind.

Long live the unbreakable friendship between the Albanian and Chinese people.

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### Comment on the Criticism of Stalin

(November 30, 1956)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 6, 1963), 1 (quotation). Other Chinese Texts: *HQ*, 17 (Sept. 6, 1963), 9; *Sugong lingdao*, p. 9. Available English Translations: *PR*, 6:37 (Sept. 13, 1963), 9; *Polemics of the International Communist Movement*, p. 64.

See text April [6], 1956, source note. According to the source, this remark was made to the Soviet ambassador; see text Oct. 23, 1956, source note.

The fundamental policy and line during the period of Stalin's administration were correct; methods employed against the enemy mustn't be used against our own comrade.

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### Letter to Huang Yanpei

(December 4, 1956)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, pp. 514–515. Other Chinese Text: *RMRB* (Dec. 25, 1983), 1. Available English Translation: *BR*, 26:52 (Dec. 26, 1983), 17–18.

See text Feb. 17, 1951, vol. I, source note.

Mr. Renzhi:<sup>1</sup>

I have received your gracious letter.

Let me express my feelings of felicitations on the success of your meetings.<sup>2</sup>

Within your Party, among the people in the industrial and commercial circles nationwide, and among the high-level intellectuals, the method of criticism and self-criticism is working!<sup>3</sup> And, moreover, it is being perfected day by day. This is indeed good news. The society is always filled with contradictions. This is true even of socialist and communist societies, only that the nature of the contradictions [in those societies] would differ from [that of contradictions] in a class society; that is all.<sup>4</sup> As long as there are contradictions, we must seek to expose and resolve them. There are two ways of exposing and resolving [contradictions]: One is [by treating them as contradictions] between the enemy (here I am talking of special agents and saboteurs)<sup>5</sup> and ourselves; the other is [to treat them as contradictions] among the people, (this includes intra-Party [contradictions] and inter-Party [contradictions]).<sup>6</sup> With the former [type of contradiction] we will use a method of suppression; with the latter, a method of persuasion i.e., of criticism. The class contradictions within our country have already been basically resolved (which is to say that they have not yet been entirely resolved. Those that are expressed in terms of ideology will continue to exist for a long time. In addition, a small handful of special agent elements will also continue to exist for a long time).<sup>7</sup> [Therefore] the people, as a whole, ought to be united. However, the problems among the people continue and will continue to crop up one after another. The method to resolve [them] is to proceed from [a standpoint] of unity and to arrive at unity through criticism and self-criticism.<sup>8</sup> I was very happy to learn of the way in which the Minjian Association held its meetings.<sup>9</sup> I hope that the same method can be adopted wherever there are problems.

There are many troublesome problems on the international scene, but there are bound to be methods of resolving them.<sup>10</sup> I am an optimist, and I believe that you will feel the same way I do.

With my respect,

Mao Zedong

December 4, 1956

[P.S.] I wrote a *ci* poem last year and another one this year.<sup>11</sup> I have copied them [here] to show you and to ask for your critique, hoping to repay you, sir, for your kindness in sending me your poems so many times in the past.

### Notes

1. See text Feb. 17, 1951, vol. I, note 1, and text Oct. 15, 1949, note 1.

2. This refers to two meetings held by Huang's organization, the China Association for Democratic National Construction: an enlarged session of the Standing Committee of its Central Committee in October 1956, and the Second Plenary Session of that association's First Central Committee in November the same year. For more details of these meetings, see *RMSC* (1957), p. 252.

3. See the resolution adopted by the Second Plenary Session of the First Central

Committee of the China Association for Democratic Construction on November 16, 1956. (See *RMSC* [1957], pp. 252–254.)

4. See text Mar. 20, 1958, note 26 and text.

5. See text Jan. 17, 1951, vol. I, note 1, and text June 6, 1950(1), vol. I, paragraph 2.

6. Here Mao clearly anticipates the distinction between these two types of contradictions, which was discussed and spelled out in the *RMRB* editorial “Zai lun wuchan jieji zhuanzheng de lishi jingyan” (More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat), *RMRB* (Dec. 29, 1956). Mao took up the question again at the Eleventh Session of the Supreme State Conference. (See text Feb. 27, 1957.)

7. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 2.

8. See text Feb. 27, 1957(2), note 9.

9. Minjian is the abbreviated name of Zhongguo minzhu jianguo hui (China Association for Democratic National Construction). See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, note 7, and text Mar. 15, 1952, vol. I, source note. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 59.

10. Mao appears to have had such international issues as the Suez Canal Crisis (starting September 1956), the stalling of the ambassadorial-level talks between the PRC and the U.S., and the alleged intrusion of a U.S. military aircraft into the PRC airspace on August 23, 1956, as well as, quite possibly, the riots in Kowloon, Hong Kong (October 1956) on his mind. For the Suez Crisis, see text Sept. 15, 1956(1), note 6, and for the Kowloon riots, see texts Dec. 8, 1956, note 11.

11. Here, as the source indicates in a note, “last year” should be “year before last.” Mao was referring to the poem *Beidaihe* (to the pattern of *Langtaosha*), written in 1954 (see text Summer 1954), and to the poem *On Swimming* (to the pattern of *Shuidiaoge tou*), written in 1956. As shown in the following document, text Dec. 5, 1956, the title that Mao originally gave to this latter poem was *Changjiang* (The Yangtze River). We are told here that the title was changed to *Youyong* (On Swimming, to the pattern of *Shuidiaoge tou*) when the poem was published.

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### Letter to Zhou Shizhao (December 5, 1956)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, pp. 516–517.

See text Oct. 15, 1949, vol. I, source note.

My dear Dunyuan:<sup>1</sup>

I have received both of your gracious letters. I am greatly elated by your enthusiasm and kind thoughts. What you told me of the conditions you have inspected is particularly useful to me.<sup>2</sup> I still have not written the plaque for the school, because I haven't been able to put my mind to it.<sup>3</sup> However, it is very much in my thoughts, and one of these days, sooner or later, I will pay up. I often recall the line [in your poem] that says something about passing by Xuchang in the autumn wind.<sup>4</sup> There is so little I can write in response [to your gift of that poem]. This year I went swimming in the Yangtze River, and wrote a [poem in the pattern of] *Shuidiaoge tou*; this I copy here for your inspection and correction.

[Title and text of poem omitted.]<sup>5</sup>

For the time being I will not be going abroad. Your opinion [on the matter] is an accurate one.

My best wishes for your health!

Mao Zedong

December 5, 1956

### Notes

1. See text Oct. 15, 1949, vol. I, note 1, and text Mar. 14, 1950, vol. I, note 2.

2. See text Nov. 24, 1955, in volume I.

3. It is unclear here as to what assignment Mao was referring to. Zhou had requested of Mao to write a plaque, or billboard, for the First Normal School of Hunan Province, and according to texts Dec. 29, 1950(1) and (2), vol. I, Mao had already complied.

4. According to the source, this refers to a poem that Zhou wrote when he passed Xuchang (in central Henan Province) on his way to Beijing for the National Day celebration in late September 1950. The poem was titled *Guo Xuchang* (Passing Xuchang). It translates as follows:

In the popular histories we hear of Cao Cao  
 Passing through Xuchang in the brisk autumn wind.  
 The deserted citadel stalks the bleak wilderness  
 While the severed stela falls in the slanting sun.  
 [Today] the market place is overflowing with the smoke and the aroma of cooking  
 And the long tendrils of pea leaves stretch from field to field.  
 The people have arrived upon a new age;  
 Who still knows anything about the King of Yezhong?

The poem refers to Cao Cao, Emperor Wudi of the Wei kingdom (see text June 30, 1953, vol. I). Cao made his capital in the area of Xuchang (Yezhong, then known as Ye, and which is now Linzhang *xian* in Henan Province, is nearby). The “severed stela” (*duan jie*) that Zhou referred to here is probably an allusion to the name Jieshi, mentioned by Mao in his 1954 poem *Beidaihe* (see text Summer 1954, note 3), although they are really two different things.

5. See text June 1956 for this poem. An explanation regarding the title is in text Dec. 4, 1956, note 11.

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### Speech to a Symposium of Delegates to the First Meeting of the Second National Committee of the ACFIC (December 8, 1956)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 61–73. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 216–221; *Waijiao yulu*, pp. 11, 12, 19–21, 32–33, 103 (excerpts). Available English Translation: JPRS, *Miscellany*, I, pp. 36–45.

While the source here dates this document Dec. 8, 1956, it is reported in *RMSC* (1957), p. 542, that Mao invited delegates of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) (see text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, note 5) to a symposium on Dec. 3, 1956. The report suggests, but does not completely assure us, that this document may be more appropriately dated Dec. 3, 1956. It should be noted that this symposium was held before (by one account two days and by another a week) the opening of the Congress of the Second National Committee of the ACFIC. For other documents of this congress, whose contents in some ways reflected Mao's pronouncements here, see *RMSC* (1957), pp. 542-548.

*With the basic completion of the transformation of private industry and commerce into joint state-private enterprises in early 1956, nearly a year ahead of schedule, certain issues concerning the urban bourgeoisie remained unsolved: What was the nature of the urban capitalist class and its various strata now that its relations to the means of production had been transformed? How should these various strata be treated politically?*

*Mao's lengthy discussion of these issues here represents his strongest recorded overture to the capitalists. The capitalist audience no doubt influenced the tone of the speech and induced Mao to dwell at such length on the dangers of attempting to deal with the United States and the other imperialist powers. Nonetheless, the conciliatory tone toward the capitalists was very much in line with Mao's perspective in 1956 as a whole (although there are exceptions, as noted in texts Sept. 25, 1956, and Nov. 15, 1956). In general, Mao saw the struggle with the bourgeoisie as basically decided in favor of the proletariat, and therefore he anticipated minimal danger from cooperating with individual members of the former class. Moreover, the Party's subsequent adoption of Mao's two main suggestions in this speech focusing on the big capitalists and limiting fixed interest payments to seven years<sup>1</sup> suggest that the overtures were real.*

*In the following months Mao attempted to work out a modus vivendi with the national bourgeoisie. But when, by mid-1957, the national bourgeoisie proved itself to be untrustworthy in Mao's eyes and even more so in the eyes of other Party leaders,<sup>2</sup> a new strategy for developing China had to be evolved (see text May 15, 1957). The seeming impossibility of working with the national bourgeoisie to build a communist China was one of the key factors in leading Mao to the strategy of the Great Leap Forward, which aimed at, among other things, building a proletarian intelligentsia to fill the gap vacated by the bourgeois intelligentsia.*

*Although Mao's comments here certainly need to be understood specifically within the context of developments in China in 1956 (and, indeed, also in the context of what may have loomed in Mao's mind as projections for 1957, such as the impending rectification of the CPC), many of the economic issues mentioned here were raised back in 1953. Therefore, it is suggested that this document be read in reference to texts July 9, 1953; Aug. 12, 1953(1); Aug. 1953; and Sept. 7, 1953, in volume I.*

I am an outsider in the field of economics, so I will only say a few words as a layman. You have raised many problems, and this is very good and has been very helpful to me. I have already listened to a few [questions], even though [the meeting] has not been held very long. Yesterday I called the chairman and vice-chairmen<sup>3</sup> for a meeting: I heard some [of the problems] and came to understand some of the conditions. As for the details, you will discuss them at your meetings. Besides, vice-premiers Chen Yun<sup>4</sup> and XXX<sup>5</sup> will make reports to you. For problems that you want to resolve, the government will confer with you and

negotiate a way [in which they can be resolved]. All solvable problems will eventually be resolved. I have not studied [the problems you have raised] and cannot provide answers for certain problems. You may simply raise all the problems, the government will study them, and Vice-Premier Chen Yun will deliberate on them so as to resolve the problems that can be solved.

I think that great progress has been made in industrial and commercial circles during the period since the inauguration of joint state-private enterprises.<sup>6</sup> We feel that we have become more familiar with you than in the past, and you have come closer [to the Party]. Since the initiation of joint state-private enterprises, the only remaining problem left with regard to the capitalists is the question of fixed interest, and [at present] their reputation in society is different [from before]. Furthermore, their enthusiasm for study is very high. They study politics, current events, technology, and management methods. I have heard that lecture and study classes have been established everywhere; in each city several hundred people attend; in Shanghai several thousand people attended during one session, and if there were ten sessions, there would be several tens of thousands attending—this reflects great patriotism and enthusiasm for study on the part of the industrial and commercial circles of our national [bourgeoisie]. They are willing to work for the new state, to study economics and learn skills; big, medium, and small [capitalists] all want to study.

With regard to the capitalists, [we draw distinctions among] the large, medium, and small ones. In comparison with the past, I have made some progress in my views on the capitalists and in my demands on them. Heretofore, I believed it would be very difficult to transform them, and you yourselves did not expect it to take place so rapidly or that there would be such a high tide in their enthusiasm for study. Do you conduct self-criticism or not? (Reply: We do.) Last year when the Federation of Industry and Commerce met, many people undertook self-examination; this method is a method of our Communist Party, and we want to promote this method among the democratic parties, too. However, we have not met with much success in developing this. At the recent conference of the China Democratic National Construction Association,<sup>7</sup> this method was used to unfold criticism and self-criticism. This is the method to solve problems among the people by putting forward opinions, setting requirements, solving the problems, and achieving unity.

Of our two revolutions, the bourgeois democratic revolution is already past and no longer poses a problem. The socialist revolution has now been basically completed, but its final completion is yet to come, and it still poses many problems.<sup>8</sup> For example, there are the problems of the cooperativization of agriculture, the cooperativization of the handicraft industries, and [the operation of] joint state-private enterprises. Even when, in the future, a total transformation has been completed, there will still be many problems; problems emerge endlessly. The problems are [simply] contradictions, lack of coordination, and imbalance. The problems of livelihood, work, domestic and foreign problems, they all are contradictions—they are all replete with contradictions. Previously, people have asked why Russia produced a Beria.<sup>9</sup> Later, [it was found out that] Stalin also made mistakes, China produced a Gao Gang,<sup>10</sup> and there was disturbance in Hong Kong<sup>11</sup> as well. Furthermore, there is still the Polish problem, the Hungarian problem, and the Suez

Canal problem<sup>12</sup>—the world is full of problems. The problems we have raised today belong to one category, namely, the problem of industrial and commercial circles, the problems of the large, medium, and small [capitalists].

I will now discuss the present situation.

Do you think socialism will succeed or not? Do you have any well buckets? Is it like using fifteen buckets to fetch water, with seven going up and eight going down?<sup>13</sup> Are you afraid that socialism will not succeed? Will the socialist camp collapse? I think even if it collapses, this will not be a great matter and will not be such a big deal. I believe it will not and cannot collapse. The socialist camp is primarily the Soviet Union and China. As long as China and the Soviet Union stand together this policy is correct. Right now there are still some people who are skeptical about this policy and say, We need not stand together, and who still believe that we can adopt a position of [adhering to] a middle line and stand between the Soviet Union and the United States, serving as a bridge. This is the device of Yugoslavia; this method is to get money from both sides, from this side and that side. Is this a good method? I maintain that to take a middle position is not a good method and is not in the interest of the nation, because on one side there is a strong imperialist country, and China suffered imperialist oppression for a long time. If we were to stand between the Soviet Union and the United States it would appear very good; we would [appear to] have become independent, but actually we would not be independent. The United States is not reliable. They will give you some things but not very much. How can the imperialists give you enough to satisfy your hunger? They will not satisfy your hunger. Imperialism is what oppresses Asia, Africa, and Latin America. India was oppressed for more than 200 years and was never given enough to satisfy its hunger. Imperialism is miserly. Imperialism is [represented by] such countries as Britain, the United States, France, and Holland; it is the Eight-Power Allied [Expeditionary] Forces. They burned the Yuanmingyuan<sup>14</sup> and chopped Hong Kong and Taiwan away from us; Hong Kong belongs to China, why should it have been taken away from us? Why was the Bandung Conference<sup>15</sup> able to unite the Asian and African countries? It was because imperialism harbors the intention of oppressing other people; this imperialism is the United States. When people from Latin America come to China they are very friendly to us. Just today I met a Brazilian representative.<sup>16</sup> Brazil is a large country, it has a population of 60 million people, its land area is about the same as China's, and Brazil has always been oppressed by the United States. The fantasy that China can serve as a bridge between the United States and the Soviet Union and that it would be profitable is wrong. We still do not know how to design big factories. Who is designing big factories for us now? For example, who is designing [plants for] our chemical industry, iron and steel industry, petroleum industry, and for our production of automobiles, tanks, and airplanes? Britain had never designed anything for India, but because the Soviet Union recently designed a steel plant for India, Britain followed suit and designed one [for India], and afterward the United States designed one too.<sup>17</sup> It's because they wanted to win over India that they designed [these things] for her. India's first alkali plant was designed by Mr. Hou Debang, an engineer from our country.<sup>18</sup> Imperialist [powers] want to protect their

secrets; not a single imperialist [power] has designed [anything] for us. There still exists within the mentality of the democratic parties, the democratic personages without party affiliations, the higher-level intellectuals, the religious circles, and the industrial and commercial circles, and even within a section of the proletariat, the fantasy that the United States will help us, that Britain will help us. All of us must do propaganda work [on the issue of] whether, in the end, it is correct to lean to one side.<sup>19</sup> Our leaning to one side is to stand together with the Soviet Union; our leaning to one side is on an equal footing [with the Soviet Union]. We do not feel that [we will] have the same problems that erupted in Poland and Hungary. We believe in Marxism, and we do not rigidly copy the experiences of the Soviet Union; to rigidly copy their experiences is a mistake. For example, the transformation of [our] industry and commerce and the cooperativization of [our] agriculture are different from that of the Soviet Union. Several years after they cooperativized agriculture their production decreased, whereas our cooperativization of agriculture [has led to] an increase in production. In the transformation of the capitalist industrialists and businessmen, not only have we eliminated them as a class, but we have also [subsequently] absorbed them as individuals. Industrial and commercial circles are not a burden on the state; instead they are a source of wealth, and in the past they have played an active role. Economically, they have been modernized and are no longer [in the] handicraft [stage]. Politically, they oppose imperialism; therefore they have a dual nature, and being revolutionary is one aspect of their nature. Since the establishment of the people's political power they have cooperated with the government, and now [their] enterprises have become joint state-private [enterprises]. In these good things one cannot say that the bourgeoisie was not useful to us; instead, they were useful, they were very useful. Workers do not quite understand this point, because previously they fought with the capitalists in the factories; [therefore] we should clearly explain [the situation] to the workers. Especially since the high tide of study among the industrial and commercial circles took place, [since] you are [now] anxious to study, the workers will change their attitude toward you. With regard to the capitalists, we must propagandize [the need to] relate personal matters to state affairs and promote patriotism [among them]; in short, they must always think of the affairs of the nation. The slogan used in the cooperativization movement in Hebei in the past was "To make the family prosperous, plant cotton," and, as a result, everyone only attended to family [affairs].<sup>20</sup> Afterward they felt that the slogan was not properly phrased and changed it to "Cherish the nation, make the family prosperous, plant more cotton," a slogan that brought the family and the state together. You must now link the family with the nation because you, too, have a share in the nation. Our country is a poor country, in fact very poor. This year we only produced 4.5 million tons of steel, and only next year will we be able to produce 5 million tons. Japan produces 7 million tons. We want to catch up with Japan. We will have to wait until the Third Five-Year Plan before we can produce 10 million tons.

The focus of this conference of yours is to discuss your affairs; at the same time, you must link them to the affairs of the nation; when you return to [your posts] to



do [the work of] propaganda and education, you must also relate [the problems] to the affairs of the nation. It will take decades and centuries for us to produce tens of millions or hundreds of millions of tons of steel. We must promote patriotism. Why must we start joint state-private enterprises and engage in socialism? They are for the purpose of facilitating the development of our country. Compared with the system of private ownership, [the joint state-private system and socialism are] more advantageous to the development of the country's economy and culture and [will] make the country independent. Economically, we are not yet independent; we cannot manufacture large machinery; nor can we manufacture small precision machines; we can only manufacture medium size ones. We have just begun to produce airplanes; the same is also true of automobiles. What country is designing [these things] for us? It is the Soviet Union. We should cooperate with the Soviet Union. Within our country among the industrial and commercial circles or among the youth and university students we do not have that anti-Soviet trend and anti-Soviet feeling that existed in Poland and Hungary. Seventy per cent of our university students are children of the bourgeoisie or landlords, and we must unite [with them] and educate them. Because they are your children, the solving of your problems will have an impact on them. The Youth League must solve problems such as that of admission to schools, admission to the Youth League, student subsidies, and the wearing of red scarves.<sup>21</sup> The problem of financial aid should be determined by [the students' achievements in] study and family [background]. Those from big [and wealthy families] need not be subsidized; those from medium and small [families] and in poor circumstances should be subsidized. This should also be the criterion for admission to the [Youth] League and the Party. It is totally possible for this to be implemented in China. It is a fact that they are uniform in neither color nor thought,<sup>22</sup> and they have a dual nature, which is progressive in one aspect and backward in another aspect. Therefore, there is one task [for them], and that is to study. If everyone were good then everyone would be Confucius. If everyone we pass on the street is a sage, then if we pass Chiang Kai-shek or Hitler on the street, are they also sages? Are those who invaded Egypt, or secret agents, also sages? People are different. On the whole we can say that capitalists are patriotic, but they have shortcomings. There are positive things in their nature, as well as negative elements, and consequently they have the task of studying; if it were otherwise they would have no need to study and they would be sages. Kang Youwei<sup>23</sup> himself said that before he was thirty he was well able to develop [some ideas] when writing essays, but at thirty he reached the zenith of his studying. That he subsequently became a restorationist is not without cause. A person should never be satisfied; there is still much that you do not know even when you are seventy or eighty. There is much in this world that we do not know; we must step up our studying. Venerable [Mr.] Chen, you are a Hanlin [scholar];<sup>24</sup> you know everything from astronomy to geography, all the different ancient philosophers and authors, the three religions and nine schools of thought, but are you an expert in all these fields?<sup>25</sup> You are a Hanlin [scholar]; I am not; I am not even a *xiucai* and know very little. We must acknowledge our own shortcomings; it is good for us. Among you there are *xiucai* and *jueren*, so you have a responsibility to study.<sup>26</sup>

Was the eruption of the Hungarian Incident good or bad? Insofar as there were problems it could not but erupt. It is better that it erupted. If there is a pustule it must emit pus. Work has not been done well in those countries, and there has been a wholesale imitation of Soviet methods without taking specific conditions into consideration, so things have gone amiss. This has therefore produced a lesson, namely, that we must handle [our] affairs according to the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism and by integrating them with the specific conditions of China. We proposed the slogan of studying the Soviet Union's experiences, but we have never proposed studying their backward experiences.<sup>27</sup> Do they have backward experiences? Yes, for instance [their] suppression of counterrevolutionaries was handled by their public security department, whereas ours was conducted by government offices and schools under the leadership of local Party committees, and not with the public security department shouldering the major responsibility. We carried out [our movement] through total mobilization and under a blaze of banners and sound of drums, while they carried theirs out secretly. [Here] the democratic parties carried out [the movement] by themselves. Are there now people who are afraid of carrying out the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries? [Are they afraid of having the suppression] come down on their own heads? You have your difficulties and the workers have theirs. The government must listen to the views of both sides. You have your employment problems and so do the workers. You have unemployment problems that have not been solved. The workers also have unemployment problems that have not been solved. The Hungarian Incident proves that [in that country] there were many counterrevolutionary elements hidden in the state who had established a counterrevolutionary headquarters [and that they] had [begun to] make preparations months in advance and were in collusion with foreign countries. China is entirely different. The counterrevolutionary elements [in the country] have been basically eliminated; in the industrial and commercial circles it is the same; there are only individual [counterrevolutionaries] remaining. As for [people] who had been in collusion with or had contacts with the Kuomintang in the past, especially important [figures] who did so because they had no choice but to collude with them, we will not count [these people as counterrevolutionaries]. Even our Party has collaborated with the Kuomintang. I have served as a councillor<sup>28</sup> in the capacity of a [“]notable[”] and attended a meeting [of the council] in Chongqing. [Those who] joined the Kuomintang or the San min zhuyi Youth Corps<sup>29</sup> in the past may just report it and need not be counted [as counterrevolutionaries]. What we call counterrevolutionaries are those who are at present engaged in [counter-revolutionary] activities. If anyone is engaging in [counterrevolutionary] activities, it is no good regardless of what class [that person belongs to]. I believe there are very few of them. At present the Federation of Industry and Commerce is relatively clean, and the present industrial and commercial circles are not the same as those before. There are fewer counterrevolutionary elements, and I can tell you all not to worry; [as for certain] individuals, they are exceptions. [An incident like the] Hungarian Incident will not erupt in our country. From the Pan Hannian and Hu Feng incidents<sup>30</sup> of last year to this moment, more than 4

million people have been investigated, of whom 160,000 were found to be suspect elements, and we found out that only 38,000 of those who were actually hiding were counterrevolutionary elements; they account for only 1.2 per cent of the total. Our past estimates were around 5 per cent, but our estimate was wrong and was subjective; it did not correspond with objective reality. Actually there was only slightly over 1 per cent in the government organs and schools and even less in the society [at large]. These are bacteria that, if not eliminated, will multiply from one to two, from two to three, and from three into all sorts of living things and stir up trouble from within. Eliminating them would also be an education for the broad masses. We announced that the rest of the 120,000 suspects were not guilty; to those we wronged we apologize [for our mistake]. Not one of those more than 30,000 counterrevolutionaries was killed, about 1 per cent of them are undergoing labor reform, and the rest continue to work in their present units. This year we have arranged for a cleaning up among X people,<sup>31</sup> and the methods are even more elaborate. There are four million people left who will still have to be cleaned up. The major industrial plants and private enterprises will not be cleaned up now to avoid agitating everyone, so everyone can rest assured. In future clean-ups, you will participate; the Federation of Industry and Commerce, the China Democratic National Construction Association, and the urban organizations of the Communist Party will all participate and conduct the clean-up together. It will still be aimed at individual cases of real counterrevolutionary elements and must not involve those who had relations with the Kuomintang in the past. Those who had joined the Kuomintang and the San min zhuyi Youth Corps, [and] those who did bad things in the past but who later did good things will not be counted. What I have talked about today is the political problem, while what you are concerned about is the economic problem, and I am afraid that you are unable to absorb [what I have said]. To sum it up, the situations [both] in China and in foreign countries are good. The Hungarian matter has been basically solved, but there will still be disturbances; disturbances will still occur in the world. Do not think that because there has been a Gao, a Beria, and because Stalin made some mistakes that this is such a big thing, [or] that the Hungarian Incident is such a big thing; we can all sleep comfortably. On October 10 some people in Hong Kong were unable to fall asleep. After a few days they were able to. If you are of the opinion that the government has not given you sufficient help, you can express it; we can give you a little more help. You are all familiar with the characteristics of our government; we are the people who confer with the people in managing affairs, who confer with the workers, peasants, capitalists, petty bourgeoisie, and democratic parties in handling affairs. It can be called a consultative government. We do not put on a stern face and lecture people; nor do we strike people if their opinions are not correctly expressed, knocking them head over heels. We are called the People's Government, and you can express your opinions to the fullest extent; we will not use them as a pretext to punish people.

You are concerned about how [we will] solve the question of large, medium, and small [capitalists], and how [we will] solve the problems of fixed interest. The large, medium, and small [capitalists] ought to be divided into different strata. I am

now suggesting an idea; please give some thought to whether it is correct or not. The small [capitalists] who make up 80 or 90 per cent of the whole should not be put in the category of the bourgeoisie but [should be] called the upper-level petty bourgeoisie, as was done before. For instance, doctors with one or two apprentices are also [counted as] petty bourgeoisie. Fishermen or boat people who employ ten or so people are also not considered as bourgeoisie. During the land reform, there was a type of small [landowner] who leased out a little land, and they were not called landlords.<sup>32</sup> Tens of thousands of people benefited from this; they were very interested in the label of [small land lessor].<sup>33</sup> If the capitalists' agents and those [capitalists] with little fixed interest are unwilling to carry on [as bourgeois elements] and want pensions [instead], we can discharge them from this category not this year but next year or the year after next so that we can avoid making 90 per cent of the people give up fixed interest and thus make [the remaining] 10 per cent of the people uncomfortable. Those remaining will be the so-called big [capitalists]. According to the study of economics, this is also done in the United States; a [factory] with thirty or more employees is considered a large [factory]. Those [capitalists in China] with less than fifteen or twenty [employees] can give up [fixed interest] if they want to, and if not we'll tell them to keep on receiving it. Everybody is very concerned about the problem of the duration of the fixed interest [payments]. There is one principle [we must observe], and that is to solve problems and not to damage their interests, especially the interests of the big [capitalists]. Do the big ones play a bigger role in the national economy and the peoples' livelihood, or do the small ones play a bigger role? The [category of] small [capitalists] includes a lot of people; they make up 90 per cent [of the capitalists], but their economy does not determine the economic life of the nation. The large [capitalists] are the ones that play a bigger role in the national economy. You may say that the Chairman takes care of the big capitalists but not the smaller ones, and isn't that Right opportunism? You analyze it; is this [not] taking care of the small [capitalists]? The small capitalists are far greater in number; it is wrong not to make arrangements for them; we must solve problems for them in all fields. [We take care] of big ones simply because they are big and for no other reason; one big one is equal to tens of thousands of small ones. Our Party also had [in the past] a line regarding the capitalists [that was advantageous to] medium and small [capitalists], for example, the United Front Department.<sup>34</sup> This line ought to be recognized as wrong. The middle and small [capitalists] will definitely be taken care of, [but] at present we resolve [this problem] by putting them in the petty bourgeois category. The peasants are petty bourgeoisie; they are the rural petty bourgeoisie. The urban areas also have petty bourgeoisie. [For example,] at present small [capitalists] who receive fixed interest [worth] only a few packs of cigarettes are the petty bourgeoisie. The capitalists' agents are also put in that category. The national significance of the joint state-private [enterprises], of nationalization, and of the large [capitalists] is very great. Without industry we couldn't live; without agriculture we wouldn't have rice to eat. If we didn't take care of the big capitalists, if 90 per cent of the bourgeoisie had their labels [as capitalists] taken off, leaving only a few, it

would put the few to shame. If everyone else is red, it would look bad to remain white.

Regarding the actual duration of the fixed interest [payments], the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has discussed this and feels that it should not be too short. [If we are to adopt a policy of] redemption,<sup>35</sup> it ought to be true redemption and not a swindle; it won't cost much money. There are those who raise the question of actually how many more years. In the documents of the "Eighth Congress" something like this was already implied;<sup>36</sup> we still have to consult with you—can the problem be solved [according to that idea]? The small [capitalists] will oppose this; the workers will oppose this; the workers will say that this is giving the capitalists too great an advantage. According to the reasoning of the workers, we ought to eliminate [payment to the big capitalists] immediately, and [the payments] to the middle and small capitalist ought to be carried on for [only] one or two years, which ought to be enough. Why [make it] such a long period? There are two [areas of] opposition: the first is the workers; the second is 90 per cent of the medium and small [capitalists]; their eyes are all red [with envy because] you lead a better life. These [people] must be persuaded that if we [adopt a policy of] redemption, we must carry it out consistently and not [adopt a policy of] half-redemption and half-confiscation. China's national bourgeoisie has a dual nature with a revolutionary aspect. But actually they don't have a lot of assets. Private investment in industry is only about 1.7 billion [*rmb*]. In terms of U.S. dollars, that's not even 700 million. With only such a little bit, how can our country not be at a disadvantage? There is a reason for imperialism to take advantage of us. Since the assets of the national [bourgeoisie] are just this tiny bit, if we are to redeem any of it we might as well redeem all of it, and not pinch a few pennies. We have to persuade the working people that we shouldn't damage the interests of the big capitalists, that this is beneficial to the whole nation. We shouldn't be miserly with a few pennies, we shouldn't start with the energy of a tiger and trail off like a snake; we mustn't begin things and not finish them. We can even drag a tail [of fixed interest] and drag it on until the Third Five-Year Plan. What do you think? Many people still have the vestiges of a tail. The seven years [of installments] will be [like] the tiger's head and body; if we cannot yet resolve the problem, then we can still drag [a tail] along; we can drag it along to the Third Five-Year Plan as long as there are no hard feelings.<sup>37</sup> The number of medium and small [capitalists] is quite large, so we must help them solve [their] problems. There are fewer big capitalists, but their capital is large, so their role is greater than that of the medium and small [capitalists]. Therefore a line [favoring] medium and small [capitalists] would be incorrect. It ought to be a big, medium, and small line. The [China] Democratic National Construction Association takes the line [that favors the] big [capitalists]; taking the big [capitalists] as its major concern is correct. Representatives of the medium and small [capitalists] make up the majority at the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce Conference. We must help them solve problems and at the same time explain to them [that we should] not harm the benefits of the big [capitalists] because the big [capitalists] play a very big role in the national economy, and it is inconceivable that harming their interests would be beneficial

to the workers, to the peasants, to the country, or to the medium and small [capitalists]. It is in the interests of the medium and small capitalists that their [capitalist] hats be removed at the earliest possible time, [but] the big [capitalists] want to drag it out. People can do it their own ways; those who want to rid themselves of [the capitalist] hat early can do so early; in the seven years of tiger's head and body those medium and small [capitalists] who want to get [their interest] can still receive [the payments]. Can we do it this way? At present we don't have any laws regulating this; you all can discuss it; if the problem is not solved in seven years, it is all right to drag a tail, because a tiger always has a tail. Our first [priority] is to take the interests of the workers into consideration. There are 1,600,000 workers in capitalist industry and 900,000 store personnel in capitalist commerce; altogether 2.5 million. [The problem] also involves workers and store personnel in the state-run enterprises. They will oppose [the long duration of fixed interest] too. On this question they are in contradiction with the Party. Is this Right opportunism or isn't it? Have we become the Party of the capitalists? We have to explain to them that this benefits the whole nation; it is beneficial to the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the medium and small manufacturers and merchants alike. At first they will not understand what this benefit is. Seventy per cent of university students are the children of the bourgeoisie; they do not want inheritance rights, and they will be satisfied with the way the government is treating the capitalists. The democratic parties, the democratic personages without party affiliations, the high-level leaders of the minority nationalities, and religious circles will agree [with this policy]. If we eliminate fixed interest quickly they will be dissatisfied. There are also the foreigners. When foreigners visit China, they all go to Shanghai and see Mr. Rong Yiren<sup>38</sup> to see how many cars he has, whether he has one or two, and whether or not he has a piano in his house. After his visit [to Mr. Rong] a French capitalist said that if the French Communist Party were to do [what we are doing] he would have no worries. This will have a great influence on Asian, African, and [even] some Western European nations as well. Therefore, hurrying to eliminate fixed interest has no advantages; on the contrary, it may [involve] a serious loss. Actually, it wouldn't be very much money, just 125 million [*rmb*] a year—some say only 110 million—and over seven years a total of 800 million. This money is not being given to the Japanese or to the Americans; it is being given to Chinese people. In short, "the fertile water isn't flowing into others' fields," [rather] it is a "bow lost by Chu's [king] would be recovered by another man of Chu."<sup>39</sup> This money is the purchasing power of the state, also the potential target against which buyers of the state bonds are to be redeemed; [it] can also [be used to] open factories, so the problem should be viewed from various angles. The representatives of medium and small enterprises make up the majority at this conference of yours. Clear explanation must [therefore] be made for problems that need to be solved.<sup>40</sup> In giving reasons to the medium and small [capitalists] the representatives of the medium and small [capitalists] must bear the responsibility of explaining; it wouldn't be easy for [the representatives of] the big [capitalists] to explain. If the big ones explained a few of the good points [about the policy]

and said that it would take seven years, it would be a difficult thing [for them] to say. Vice-premiers XX and XXX<sup>41</sup> must go and explain, and the representatives of medium and small [capitalists] present at the meeting must also go and persuade people [on the issue of] whether the Communist Party should eliminate the fixed interests of the big [capitalists]. Mr. Rong Yiren's capital is equal to one and a half times that of [all the capitalists in] Beijing; people all keep their eyes on him. Of the more than 100,000 capitalists in the whole country, there are only about a few thousand big capitalist households; [people] only look at these few thousand and don't look at the 120,000 [or so] medium and small capitalist households. [If we] want to rectify the big capitalists, it would be easy [simply] to raise a high tide, beat the gongs and drums, and they would fall. We don't want to take the hats off the medium and small [capitalists] in a gust of wind. We shouldn't report it in the newspapers, [because] once it is publicized, it [a gust of wind] will arise; we will not raise a high tide [in this matter]. If this conference is to be reported, just say that the representatives and group leaders of the [All-China] Federation of Industry and Commerce and the China Democratic National Construction Association participated, and that I spoke about internal and external politics, made an analysis, and spoke a bit about economic questions, [but] don't mention the content. If the content were made public, the workers and the medium and small capitalists would all scold me. The Communist Party is [supposed] to communize property; how can there be reason for not communizing? People say that the Communist Party has three heads and six arms and is very fierce; actually we have only one head and two hands. When we do things, we must "obey the heavenly principles, be in accord with human feelings, and be in accord with the currents of the world and the needs of the people, for if [we] do such things with perseverance and as people with foreknowledge and forethought, [we] will never be unsuccessful."<sup>42</sup> It is the great revolutionary Mr. Sun Yat-sen who said this. Our two revolutions are carrying forward Mr. Sun Yat-sen's [unfinished] work. We have completed the bourgeois democratic revolution and subsequently are completing the socialist revolution. These revolutions are [for the purpose of] clearing the path for construction; they are both questions of means. They are aimed at changing the relations of production and the superstructure, at transforming the government, ideology, law, politics, economy, culture, and art, all these [parts of] the superstructure, but we still haven't resolved the basic question. The goal [of these revolutions] is not in establishing a new government or new relations of production; the goal is the development of production. In the last seven years we have developed a bit, but very little. We can bullshit for half a day, but in reality we only have 4 million tons of steel; next year [we will have] only 5 million tons, and in five more years only over 10 million tons. In our nation of 600 million people, this cannot be considered much. [It is] possibly more than Japan or France, but it will take forty or fifty years before we can hope to catch up with the United States. Please turn your targets in this direction. Comrade Chen Yun saw a Swedish friend<sup>43</sup> [and although] Sweden has a population of only a few million [people], they [nevertheless] average two tons of steel per capita. [If we] figure this according to their population, it would mean [a target of] several hundred million tons [for us].<sup>44</sup> The United States now has only 100

million tons; in order for us to reach the Swedish [per capita] figure we must exceed the United States by several times. Therefore in the past we carried out the bourgeois democratic revolution, and now we are carrying out the socialist revolution. When the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce meets, and the China National Democratic Construction Association meets, what do you all study? Simply, [you must study] how to reach these goals, how many hundred million tons of steel. Furthermore, there is the need for schools, radios everything. Everyone in the whole country must at least be graduated from lower middle school, [and] in a number of years, street sweepers, cooks, everyone will be university students. They will know [everything from] astronomy to geography [and in between]; all of our work is directed toward achieving this goal. Chiang Kai-shek deserves a beating precisely because he never did a single good thing; in twenty years he only produced fifty thousand tons of steel. In eight years [since Liberation] (up to [and including] next year) we will have 5 million tons. He was not concerned about [these things]. I hope that [you,] my friends, will lead these more than 10 million people toward production; only after a few more decades of work can we expect to free ourselves from the old yoke culturally. So we must unite people who can be united.

This January, at the Supreme State Conference,<sup>45</sup> when I said that the socialist revolution could probably be basically completed in about three years, it caused quite a stir. Some people questioned whether [we could do it] so quickly. I used so many qualifiers, such as "probably," "basically," and "about." What is meant by [saying] "basically"? This simply refers [to the fact] that the joint state-private enterprises have not yet eliminated fixed interest; there is still a tail. Total completion is the elimination of fixed interest. I feel that it would be good to set the time limit a bit longer and [then] complete it a bit sooner. No one expected joint management [of industry] by whole trades to be carried out this fast.<sup>46</sup> Now, nationalization cannot be so fast; [such] speed will not be beneficial to the nation or the people. We are taking care of the big capitalists. [This] is beneficial to the whole people, not much money is spent, and [this way] we keep our word. This can influence foreign capitalism and will be helpful in reforming the capitalists of the world. Nehru, Sukarno, U Nu, and even the French capitalist Pathe Corporation are all watching us, watching Rong Yiren. . . . The present situation and [the situation about] which I spoke last spring are the same; I simply said basically, referring to [the fact that] total completion of joint state-private enterprises will take another seven years, [that is,] another six years apart from this year. We have to take care of all aspects of domestic affairs. [We must] explain [this] clearly to the bourgeoisie, to the democratic personages without party affiliations, to those in industry and commerce, to [those in] handicraft industries, to [those in] government offices and schools, and to the functionaries; if they don't understand, it will be no good.

## Notes

1. See text Jan. 20, 1956, note 13; see also text July 9, 1953, vol. I, source note, and text Nov. 17, 1955, vol. I, note 4.

2. See R. MacFarquhar (1974), pp. 169–310, for a discussion of Mao's attempt to work with the national bourgeoisie and the efforts of other Party leaders to discredit him for his "Rightist" position.

3. Chen Shutong (see note 24, this document, see also text Dec. 18, 1950, vol. I, source note) was chairman of both the executive and standing committees of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) beginning in December 1953; there were fifteen vice-chairpersons of the ACFIC at this time, of which, according to *RMRB* (Dec. 20, 1956), 1, only seven were present at this meeting. These were Li Zhuchen, Xu Dixin, Sheng Peihua, Rong Yiren, Chen Jingyu, Huang Changshui, and Gong Tianmin. Here in the text, Mao uses the term *zhuren*, which is more appropriate in referring to the title of directors of a bureau in the government than in this context, where we believe him to be referring to the *zhuxi* (chairmen) of the ACFIC.

4. See text Jan. 20, 1956, note 10.

5. This might refer to Bo Yibo, since he appears to be the only vice-premier of the State Council of the PRC reported to have been present at this convention of the ACFIC. He made his report on December 10, the first day of the meeting. For the text of this report, see *RMSC* (1957), pp. 545–546. For more biographical information on Bo, see text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 5.

6. The formation of joint state-private enterprises constitutes the third stage in the policy to transform China's industry and commerce through the form of state capitalism (see texts July 9, 1953; Sept. 7, 1953). This particular stage was inaugurated in late 1955 and early 1956. The transformation was designed to take place in two steps. In the first step, enterprises were transformed individually; in the second, entire trades (e.g., that of food processing) would be transformed as a whole. The policy of redemption and of compensating capitalists (private owners) by paying them fixed interest while the enterprises were taken over was introduced at this last step. See also text Mar. 5, 1956, especially "comment" and point 8.

7. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, note 7. Mao is probably referring to the Second Plenary Session of the First Central Committee of the CDNCC, November 5–16, 1956 (see *RMRB* [Nov. 6, 1956], 2, and [Nov. 7, 1956], 1. See also text Dec. 4, 1956, note 2). The close relation between the CDNCC and the ACFIC is apparent from the fact that four of the eight chairmen and vice-chairmen of the CDNCC were also vice-chairmen of the ACFIC, and eleven of the fifteen vice-chairmen of the ACFIC sat on the central committee of the CDNCC.

8. See text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

9. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 67.

10. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 5. "On Stalin's mistakes" and criticism of them, see text Apr. [6], 1956, and text Nov. 30, 1956.

11. In Hong Kong, on October 10, 1956 ("Double Tenth," National Day of the Republic of China), a nationalist flag hoisted in celebration by KMT supporters was torn down by an employee of the Hong Kong government, on the grounds that the British government recognized the PRC and not the ROC. Pro-KMT groups were quickly formed, partly organized by the triad secret societies, and marched on the industrial suburb of Tsuenwan, where there were a number of pro-PRC textile factories and labor union headquarters. When these establishments refused to hoist the Nationalist (KMT) flag, they were broken into and the occupants assaulted, resulting in a large number of casualties. For the text of the PRC's protests to the British Government via the latter's chargé d'affaires in Beijing, on Oct. 16 and 19, 1956, see *RMSC* (1957), pp. 356–360.

12. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27; text Sept. 15, 1956(1), note 6.

13. This is a very common saying referring to a state of psychological insecurity. One common method of irrigation in rural China involves the balancing of a long pole, to which are attached a number of buckets on a fulcrum. Each side is dipped into the stream in succession, subsequently bearing up water to irrigate the fields on both sides of the pole.

14. There appears to be an historical confusion in this statement. The burning of

Yuanmingyuan, the imperial summer palace in Beijing, occurred in 1860 when the allied forces of France and Britain attacked Dagu, Tianjin, Tongzhou, and eventually Beijing. This episode resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Beijing between China and Britain and France. (See text Jan. 28, 1955[2], vol. I, note 2.) The invasion of the Eight-Power Allied Expeditionary Forces occurred in 1900 in reaction to the Yihetuan Rebellion (commonly known in the West as the Boxer Uprising). The eight powers were Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, the United States, and Japan. This again resulted in the sacking of such major northern Chinese cities as Tianjin and Beijing, as well as the Yiheyuan (but not the Yuanmingyuan) summer palace, the flight of the Qing emperor and his court to Xian, and finally, the signing of the treaty between China and eleven nations (the "eight powers," plus Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands). This treaty inaugurated the period known in modern Chinese history as "the scramble for concessions" by foreign powers on Chinese soil. (See text Jan. 28, 1955[2], vol. I, note 3.) Hong Kong was ceded to Britain after the First Anglo-Chinese War in 1842 by the Treaty of Tianjin. Taiwan was ceded to Japan as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in March 1895 following the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–95.

15. See text Apr. 27, 1955, vol. I, source note.

16. This refers to Madam Maria Martins, a Brazilian sculptor. (See *SCMP* [Dec. 12, 1956], 38.)

17. An agreement was signed between the USSR and India at New Delhi on February 2, 1955, by which the Soviet Union agreed to finance the building of an integrated iron and steel plant in Bhilai, India. On April 4, London and New Delhi announced that another iron and steel plant would be built with British financial backing at Durgapur. Finally, on November 22, the Henry J. Kaiser Corporation of the United States concluded an agreement with the Tata Corporation of India to expand the Tata Iron and Steel Company's production capacity from 1.3 million tons to 2 million tons annually. Mao is, however, inaccurate in his judgment that Western capitalism offered aid to India only after the USSR announced its plans. On August 15, 1953, the German firms Demag and Krupp signed an agreement to construct a steel plant for the Indian government. (See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1954: 13338; 1955: 14103; 1956: 14792.) On the subject of the Soviet Union designing industrial enterprises for China, which Mao mentions here, see text Nov. 16, 1956, note 7.

18. Hou Debang (b. 1890), a prominent chemical engineer, was trained in the United States. He enrolled at M.I.T. in 1913, where he attained his baccalaureate degree in chemical engineering. In 1918 and 1920 he gained his master's degree and doctorate respectively at Columbia. He traveled between China and the United States and other parts of the world frequently before returning to China permanently in the spring of 1949. Since then he has been active in the Chinese Academy of Sciences and in organizing various scientific associations, such as the Association of Chinese Natural Sciences Workers and the Chinese Association of Chemical Industries. At this meeting of the ACFIC he was elected as a member of its standing committee. Subsequently, he also became vice-chairman of the Chinese National Commission of Science and Technology in 1958 and deputy minister of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the State Council of the PRC. Mao is here referring, with some exaggeration, to his capacity as consulting engineer to the Tata Chemical Industry Corporation of India in 1946–47.

19. See text Apr. 25, 1956, note 35.

20. The first of these slogans was prevalent even in pre-Liberation days in cotton growing areas nationwide. During the Korean War, cotton raw material suffered a shortage because of the embargo on China, and many textile factories had to suspend production. The peasants were called upon to grow more cotton as part of the Resist U.S. Aggression–Aid Korea Campaign. The slogan was then changed. (See *RMRB* [June 1–15, 1951], various editorials.)

21. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, source note.

22. Mao is obviously not referring to ethnicity here. By color he means the extent to

which one's political mentality and disposition tends toward being either "red" or "white."

23. For an explanation of the reference Mao makes here to Kang Youwei as a "restorationist," see text Nov. 12, 1956, note 1. Mao's reference to people who have no need to study and who would then be sages is a not-too-subtle stab at Kang's well-known egotism. Kang was a prominent Confucian scholar who made his mark especially by his reinterpretation of Confucius as a political and social reformer, and he aspired to be a sage on a par with Confucius himself. Kang adopted for himself the scholar's honorific (*zi*) "Changsu," which is a reference to the title "suwang" (unadorned prince) that was given to Confucius by his disciples. The reference that Mao makes here to Kang's comment about his own progress in learning is not actually a statement made by Kang, but inferred from Kang's *Kang Nanhai xiansheng ziding nianpu* (An Autobiographical Chronology of the Life of Mr. Kang Nanhai)—Nanhai *xian*, Guangdong province, was Kang's birthplace.

24. Chen Shutong (1876–1966), an important intellectual and government official in the very early years of the Republic of China. He was relieved of his post as secretary general of the State Council of the Republic when he was implicated in the movement to overthrow Yuan Shikai. He subsequently became involved in commercial, especially banking, activities in the 1930s and played an important part in the student and youth movements against the Japanese invasion of China and against the KMT's policies in the early stages of the War of Resistance. He was a leading figure in organizing the economic affairs in the early years of the PRC, a member of the Preparatory Committee of the ACFIC, and vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC. Here Mao calls him Chen Shu *lao*, referring to his elder and revered standing in the ACFIC. See text Dec. 18, 1955, vol. I, source note. Chen attained the academic degree of the *hanlin* (the highest-ranking collegium of scholars under the traditional imperial academic system, see note 26 below) in 1903.

25. The phrase *tianwen dili* (astronomy, or pattern of the heavens, and geography, or principle of the earth) is often used to denote the broadest possible range of human knowledge. The term *zhuzi baijia* (the various masters and the hundred schools) refers to the myriad schools of thought in classical China, but more specifically to the state of philosophical blossoming in the Spring and Autumn (732–475 B.C.) and Warring States (475–221 B.C.) periods. (See text Autumn 1956, note 1.) The term *san jiao jiu liu* (the three teachings and the nine streams) refers to the three main classical Chinese schools of moral teaching—Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism—and the major schools of the late Spring and Autumn period, which include the Confucianists, Daoists, *yin yang* school of dualism, legalists, school of nomenclaturists, Mohists, *zongheng* school, eclectic school, and agrarianists. Together these three terms simply exaggerate the breadth and completeness of knowledge and learning.

26. *Xiucai*, *juren*, and *hanlin* are terms that indicate different levels, or degrees, of academic achievement in the traditional Chinese examination system. The term *xiucai* stands for one of the lower rungs in this ladder of achievement. Although its meaning has changed somewhat through the centuries, under the system prevalent in the Ming and Qing dynasties it was used to denote scholars who had passed the examination at the prefectural level and were studying in various colleges in preparation for the provincial-level examinations. Under the same systems, those who passed the provincial-level examination were known as *juren*. A higher level of examination was known as the metropolitan examination, and it was held at the capital, attended by all *juren*. Those who emerged successfully from the metropolitan examination, known as the *gongshi*, then sat for the test examination and ultimately for the palace examination. Those who were successful in this final hurdle, known as *jinshi*, were classified into three grades, or *yuan*. Those who were selected for the highest honor, given the title of *yi yuan zhidi* (meaning that they were of the highest grade and that the honor fell equally to their entire families), were usually three in number and are known as *zhuangyuan*, *bangyan*, and *tanhua*. These persons, as a rule, were then nominated by the emperor himself

to the Hanlin (Forest of Learned People) Academy, which was the highest-ranking collegium of scholars in the nation and serves as a supreme research academy as well as a consulting body to the emperor. *Hanlin* scholars were usually given the honorific *daxueshi* (scholar-magnates).

27. The slogan "learn from the Soviet Union" was coined by Mao at the Fourth Meeting of the First National Congress of the CPPCC held in late 1949.

28. The term Mao uses here, *chanyi yuan*, is ambiguous and can be translated as "senator" as well as "councillor." There is no evidence that Mao ever served as councillor to any national governmental body or as a senator in any of the various "national assemblies" convened by the KMT. He did, however, serve as a member of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the KMT in March 1924, during the First United Front period, and as an alternate member to the KMT Central Committee in 1924. Mao may also be alluding to the "canzheng hui" of 1938. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 72.

Mao's reference to the Chongqing trip may be another thing altogether and may be an allusion to the Chongqing negotiations between Mao and Chiang Kai-shek in August-October 1945, the failure of which resulted in the outbreak of full-scale civil war. See text Sept. 16-18, 1953, vol. I, note 5.

29. For the reference to the San min zhuyi Youth Corps, see text Apr. 2, 1951, vol. I, note 2. As for the issue of joining the KMT itself, it is likely that Mao is referring to people who were members of their own volition, rather than through institutional merger. During the period of the First United Front in the mid-1920s, the members of the CPC, including leaders such as Mao himself, joined the KMT, though only as individuals (thus carrying dual membership in both parties) and not in terms of a formal party merger. Since that was a tactical move on the part of the CPC, it is unlikely that Mao is referring to people who once joined the KMT in this way. The Second United Front, however, did not result in such a merger, and while the Communist military forces were organized into the military system dominated by the KMT, the party membership remained completely separate. Of course, many KMT members remained on the mainland and were accepted to active political positions after 1949. For instance, the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang of China, one of the "democratic parties" in the CPPCC, was largely made up of old KMT members. (See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.)

30. Pan Hannian (b. 1905) was an active member of the CPC from the period of the Jiangxi Soviet on. He was deputy mayor of Shanghai from 1949 to 1955 and implicated as an accomplice in the Gao-Rao Affair (see text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, notes 1 and 7), and was arrested as a counterrevolutionary and a secret agent of the CC clique of the KMT in 1955. For more information on Pan, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, appendix, p. 114. See also text Oct. 11, 1955(2), vol. I, note 2. For the Hu Feng affair, see text May-June 1955, vol. I, source note.

31. The Chinese text here contains three X's indicating that the figure involved is rendered in three characters in the Chinese. This, however, is rendered meaningless in translation, since the X's can be anything. We have therefore adopted the general policy of collapsing it to X in such cases.

According to a report made by Luo Ruiqing, minister of public security, over 100,000 reactionary and bad elements were sorted out between June 1956 and July 1957.

32. Mao is referring here to the category of rich peasants whose right to retain small amounts of land to be cultivated by hired labor or to be rented out was protected by Article 6 of the Land Reform Act of 1950. Under this same act, the category of landlords was so defined that its number would not exceed 4 per cent of the population. See T. Chen (1967), pp. 184–185, 196–203, and text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 1.

33. The Chinese term here, *dai maozi*, has been very commonly used, especially during the Cultural Revolution period, to connote the idea of labeling people as members of a certain class or a certain group. It literally means "to wear a hat" but is almost as a rule used in a derogatory sense. A common variation is *kou mao zi*, or "slapping a hat on." Another related term is *zai mao zi*, or "take off the hat."

34. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.

35. See text Jan. 20, 1956, note 13. See also text July 9, 1953, vol. I, source note, and text Nov. 17, 1955, note 4.

36. This refers to the political report made by Liu Shaoqi to the Eighth National Congress of the CPC on September 15, 1956.

37. The term *tuo weiba* (dragging a tail) means allowing for some vestiges of a certain phenomenon to remain. Chen Yun repeated this sentence almost verbatim in his report to the ACFIC at this meeting and received a most enthusiastic response from the delegates.

38. Rong Yiren (b. 1916), a major capitalist in pre-1949 China and a representative figure among former capitalists who have found, as members of the "national bourgeoisie," an active role to play under the new social and economic system of the PRC. He was director of the Shenxin Textile Factory in Shanghai. In February 1950 Rong attended, as an observer, the Second Meeting of the First National Committee of the CPPCC; in December he was elected a member of the Preparatory Committee for the China Democratic National Construction Association, and at the present meeting he was elected vice-chairman of the Second Executive Committee of the ACFIC. In January 1957 he became a deputy mayor of Shanghai and in September 1959 became the deputy minister of the Ministry of Textile Industries of the State Council of the PRC. For more biographical information on Rong, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 871–872.

39. The first of these is a very common vernacular saying whose locus classicus is probably already untraceable. The second is an aphorism derived from the chapter "Hao sheng" of *Kong zi jiyu* (The Homely Analects of Confucius). Both refer to "keeping the goods within the family." Also, it should be noted that the text here reads "*chu ma chu de*," in which the character *ma* refers to a horse. This is inconsistent with the original source of the saying, in which a bow (*gong*), rather than a horse, is mentioned. We have returned to the original translation because we believe that the text here contains a typographical error: the writing for the Chinese character, *ma*, for horse, in the PRC's style of simplified characters can be mistaken for the character *gong*, for bow.

40. The sentence here is a bit garbled. We have given here what we hope is a reasonable reading of the sentence: "*Jiu yao jie jue de shuoming wenti la.*" We also feel, however, that there is a possibility of there being a typographical error in the Chinese text here, and that the term "*jie jue*" in the sentence may be a mistake for the term "*jian jue*." In this case, the sentence should be translated as: "Then [they] must explain the problems firmly and resolutely."

41. This may refer to Chen Yun and Bo Yibo. See notes 4 and 5 in this document.

42. This is from the opening paragraph of chapter 8, *Sun wen xueshuo* (Teachings of Sun Wen [Sun Yat-sen]). Mao's quoting from Sun here may have been motivated by the fact that Sun was the leader of the democratic bourgeois revolution and a hero in the eyes of many of those present at this conference. For more on Sun, see text Nov. 12, 1956, source note.

43. This is most probably a reference to a member of the Swedish trade delegation, headed by Gosta Brandt, who visited China in May–June 1955. Chen Yun was acting premier of the State Council during Zhou Enlai's absence; Zhou was then attending the Bandung Conference.

44. See text Nov. 11, 1956, note 4.

45. A Supreme State Conference was held on January 25, 1956, in Beijing. For Mao's statement, see text Jan. 25, 1956.

46. See note 6 above. This particular step, the last step in the movement to transform the formerly privately owned and managed enterprises, was not originally expected to be completed until late 1956–early 1957. By mid-January 1956, however, in major cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Shenyang, reports announced that this step had already been accomplished in these regions. See R. MacFarquhar (1974), pp. 19–25.

## Letter to Yang Kaiying

(December 16, 1956)

Source: *Shuxin*, p. 518.

According to the source, Yang Kaiying is a cousin of Yang Kaihui, Mao's late wife (see text Oct. 9, 1949[1], vol. I, note 1).

Comrade Kaiying:<sup>1</sup>

I received, a long time ago, a letter from you. I was very happy to hear from you. However, [things being what they were,] I was very tardy and failed to respond. Then later I was unable to find out your address. Lately Mao Shimei<sup>2</sup> and others came to see me, [and from them] I found out that you are [now] a dean of studies at Yuying Middle School in Dalian.<sup>3</sup> They also told me that you are still suffering from tuberculosis; I am very concerned. I send you, herewith, a bit of money for your medical expenses; if you have need for more, please let me know. I am fairly well. Old Madam Yang and Yang Zizhen and his wife are still in contact with me.<sup>4</sup> I would like to know more about your circumstances at your convenience.

My best wishes.

Mao Zedong

December 16, 1956

### Notes

1. For this usage, see text Nov. 15, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

2. Mao Shimei (who, according to the source, is now known as Mao Zhen) is a distant grandnephew of Mao Zedong.

3. According to the source, Yang was a dean of studies at Third Middle School of Dalian. The name used by Mao may be the original name of the school.

4. Old Madam Yang refers to Yang Kaihui's mother (and Mao's mother-in-law). Yang Zizhen is another name for Yang Kaizhi (see text Oct. 9, 1949[1], vol. I, note 1, and text Apr. 13, 1950, vol. I, source note).

## Letter to Zhou Shizhao

(December 29, 1956)

Source: *Shuxin*, p. 519.

See text Oct. 15, 1949, vol. I, source note.

My dear Dongyuan:<sup>1</sup>

I am very happy to receive your letter and poem. I am fairly well. I would like

very much to read Mr. X's writing in the *chuci* style.<sup>2</sup> Please convey my regards to my dear friend Jiang Zhuru and to Mr. Cao Zigu,<sup>3</sup> and thank him [Cao] for the gift of his poem and the history of Nanyue.<sup>4</sup>

I wish you peace.

Mao Zedong  
December 29

### Notes

1. "Dongyuan" is another *zi*, or honorific name, of Zhou. See text Oct. 15, 1949, vol. I, note 1. The source also indicates that Zhou was at this time deputy director of the Department of Education of Hunan province.

2. The source gives no indication of who Mr. X might be. For an explanation of the *chuci* style, see text Aug. 16, 1959(3), notes 2 and 3.

3. See text May 1, 1955, vol. I, source note, and text Oct. 4, 1955, vol. I, note 3, respectively.

4. The term here is *Nanyue zhi*, and it could be the title of a book of geography or history, although in the text it is not presented in the way in which a book title is conventionally presented. The term *zhi* could refer to a historical description of either an object or a place, and it is often translated as "gazetteer." The term *nanyue*, literally "southern range," refers to the Hengshan mountain range in Hunan province, which runs between the Xiang River and the Zi River.

### Remark at Small Group Leaders Session at the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee (Excerpt)

(December 1956)

Source: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 231.

For the Second Plenum, see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 5, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 4. Note that the Second Plenum's dates were November 10–15, 1956; therefore, the date for this "remark" given by the source may be incorrect. (It could mean the date of public release of the remark, rather than the date on which the remark was originally made.)

There is just so much money and material. The annual budget of 1957 must, in certain areas, represent an appropriate contraction based on that of 1956, so that while the key point construction [items] can be guaranteed,<sup>1</sup> the needs of the people's lives can also be taken care of. The focal point of this compression lies at the Center, [but] the localities should also reduce as much as possible. Even so, in general, our enterprise of construction will move forward. . . . As for the issue of construction, we must make reasonable arrangements, and not allow trouble to arise. When there is a shortage of material, we should first support the necessary production, and at the same time pay attention to [maintaining a] balance.

### Note

1. See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II, notes 5 and 6.

### Conversation with Security Guards (1956)

Source: *Mao jingwei*, p. 7. Other Chinese Text: *RMRB* (May 23, 1960), 3.

See text Sept. 15, 1956(1), source note.

Why do you only study two subjects—language and arithmetic? You should learn some more cultural and scientific knowledge!

### Commentary on *RMRB* Editorial (1956)

Source: *Wansui* (n.d.3), p. 106. Other Chinese Text: *Xinwen zhanxian*, p. 10.

According to the sources, *RMRB* published an editorial on June 20, 1956, titled "Yao fandui baoshou zhuyi, ye yao fandui jizao qingxi" (*We Must Oppose Conservatism, but We Must Also Oppose an Impetuous Mood*). These sources claim, or report to claim, that this editorial was written by the "people in the old Propaganda Department of the Central Committee" (*jiu zhongxuan bu de ren*) instigated by Lu Dingyi<sup>1</sup> under orders from Liu Shaoqi.<sup>2</sup> The *Xinwen zhanxian* source, a combatant Red Guard publication of the Cultural Revolution period, calls this editorial a "big poisonous weed."<sup>3</sup> Both sources call it a "black editorial" and claim that it was published only after it was inspected, revised, and endorsed by Liu Shaoqi, Lu Dingyi (both sources), and Hu Qiaomu and Deng Tuo<sup>4</sup> (only the *Xinwen zhanxian* source.) The date for Mao's "rebuttal" is not given. Naturally it has to be after June 20, 1956. The first sentence here, if accurately reported, suggests that the comment was written, or spoken, in 1956.

The editorial of June 20 contains an error of principle. [It suggests that we] must oppose a tendency toward conservatism, [but that at the same time] we must also oppose an impetuous mood. This editorial talks about opposing the Right, but [that opposition campaign] had not been going on for more than half a year; [and it] believes that there has been [already] very great achievement in opposing the Right. [It has] overestimated [the achievements]. We cannot say that this editorial does not have the slightest bit of Marxism-Leninism. The manner in which the editorial proposes [the question] is similar to the method [adopted by] Wei Zhongxian;<sup>5</sup> [it is a method] of [appearing to be] a gentleman [but really being] a villain. It cited my words, but snipped off the top and cut out the bottom. It only cited [those words



that had the effect of] opposing the Left. This is not right. It did not use the whole passage of [my words in context]. That is like Qin Qiong buying a horse — he only wanted the middle section and didn't want [to buy] the head or the tail.<sup>6</sup> The method is one-sided. The front part speaks of how [to deal with] a minority; the last part speaks of how [to deal with] a majority. In form it opposes both sides, but in reality it opposes the Left.<sup>7</sup>

## Notes

1. Lu Dingyi was director of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPC. See text Oct. 13, 1957, note 51.

2. See text May 19, 1953, vol. I, source note.

3. For the meaning of this usage, see text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

4. On Hu Qiaomu, see text May 22, 1950, vol. I, note 2. Deng Tuo (b. 1911) was a major figure in journalism work in the CPC. He was editor-in-chief of *RMRB* from 1952 to November 1957 when he was replaced by Wu Lengxi. (Deng remained managing director of *RMRB*.) Deng had also been a contributor on a regular basis to the CPC's major theoretical journal, *Xuexi* (Study), before it was supplanted by *Hongqi* (Red Flag) in 1958. Deng was accused in the Cultural Revolution of attacking socialism through his writing, and of being a representative of Khrushchevian revisionism in China. At issue, particularly, was the publication of a set of essays known as the "San jia cun zaji" (Notes of Three Household Village) in the CPC organ *Qianxian* (Frontlines) from October 1961 to July 1964. These essays were written by Wu Han, Deng Tuo, and Liao Mosha (the last two under the names Ma Nanbang and Fan Xing respectively). This trio—known then as the Wu-Nan-Xing anti-Party clique—was accused of being an anti-socialist, anti-Maoist conspiratorial faction. Deng Tuo was particularly criticized for his writing of *Yanshan ye hua* (Nocturnal Words from Yanshan), which was published in serial form from 1961 to September 1962 in *Beijing wanbao* (Beijing Evening News). He was stripped of all positions in June 1966. For more biographical information on Deng, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 831–833, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 948.

5. Wei Zhongxian (d. 1627) was an infamous eunuch of the Ming dynasty and probably the most notorious in Chinese history. He came at the end of a series of tyrannical eunuchs who usurped royal power, a political malaise characteristic of the Ming dynasty, particularly in its last period. This isolated the court from the social and political problems of the time and abetted partisan strife in officialdom. Wei organized the so-called Dongchang (a secret-police type imperial guard organization) and with it brutally persecuted hundreds of officers who dared to oppose him, or simply fell under suspicion. Many of these were in a conservative reform group known as the Donglin (Eastern Woods) party. On the ascension of Emperor Sizong, Wei was finally forced to commit suicide. See text Mar. 22, 1958, note 80.

6. Qin Qiong (d. 638) is also known by the name Qin Shubao. He was a famous warrior of the late-Sui dynasty and early-Tang dynasty. Starting out as a young warrior in the army of the Sui general Lai Huer, he was part of a force dispatched to suppress the rebel army of Li Mi, one of many contestants for power at the collapse of the Sui. Later he surrendered to Li Mi, and subsequently to Wang Shichong. Finally, he joined the forces of Li Shimin, and as Li's star rose Qin served well in many victories. When the Li family succeeded the Sui dynasty and founded the Tang dynasty, Qin became deputy marshal of the Tang imperial forces. (See also text Mar. 22, 1958, note 53.) The story told of Qin, and alluded to by Mao here, is apparently a vulgarized popular story, but one that we have not been able to trace.

7. The *Xinwen zhanxian* source gives quotation marks before and after the word "zuo" (Left).

# 1957

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## Inscription Written for the Egyptian Newspaper, *Al-Gamhouria* (January 1, 1957[R])

Source: Quoted in *Gongren ribao* (Jan. 4, 1957).

*The Gongren ribao source carried a news report released by the Xinhua News Agency on January 3, 1957, which indicated that on New Year's Day, 1957, the Egyptian newspaper Al-Gamhouria (The Republic) published a special issue pamphlet on the People's Republic of China. This pamphlet carried an inscription written by Mao for this special New Year's Day issue, as well as an inscription written by Egypt's President Nasser. It appears from the news report that the bulk of the material in this pamphlet was focused on the issues of trade and economic cooperation between the PRC and Egypt. It is not clear whether this quotation is the full text of Mao's inscription or an excerpt.*

The development and consolidation of the friendly relations between China and Egypt have great significance for the promotion of friendship and cooperation among the Asian and African countries and for the defense of world peace. The Chinese people are in total support of the just struggle undertaken by the Egyptian people, under the leadership of President Nasser, to resist the foreign aggressor and to defend their own independence and sovereignty.<sup>1</sup>

### Note

1. See text Sept. 15, 1956(1), note 6.

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## Telegram to the Union of Burma (January 2, 1957)

Source: *RMRB* (Jan. 4, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 101 (Feb. 10, 1957), 36. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Jan. 4, 1957), 1.

Dr. Ba U,  
President of the Union of Burma

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of your country's National Day, I convey my warm congratulations and that of the Chinese people to Your Excellency and, through you, to the Burmese people. May the Union of Burma grow in prosperity and be strengthened and may the traditional friendship between China and Burma increase with each passing day.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

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Letter to Voroshilov  
(January 6, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 22, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 102 (Feb. 25, 1957), 67. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Jan. 22, 1957), 1.

*The letter sent by Voroshilov in response to the invitation herein, dated January 18, 1957, is represented in translation in all three sources cited above. See text Apr. 15, 1957(1), for information on Voroshilov's eventual visit to the PRC.*

Chairman,  
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,  
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Dear Comrade Voroshilov:

On behalf of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I warmly invite you, respected and beloved Comrade Chairman, to make a visit to our country. I am deeply confident that your visit will further consolidate and develop the close cooperation and great friendship between our two countries. If you agree, please inform us as to what date is suitable for your visit. Along with all the Chinese people I look forward to your visit with great happiness.

With highest regards,  
Mao Zedong  
Chairman  
The People's Republic of China  
January 6, 1957  
Beijing

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Inscription on the Tomb of Liu Hulan  
(January 12, 1957[R])

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 12, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: URI (1976), p. 11.

*There is no specific date for this inscription, written in Mao's own calligraphy, which was released on January 12, 1957, in RMRB. The source also indicates that Mao had written an inscription on Liu's tomb earlier, and that this was a second inscription.*

*Liu Hulan was a revolutionary martyr who joined the guerrilla fighting against the Japanese and later, still at a very young age, was executed by the KMT forces in the War of Liberation period (in 1947). Her tomb is located at Yunzhouxi Village, Wenshui xian, in Shanxi Province.*

A Great Life,  
A Glorious Death.

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A Letter about Poetry  
(January 12, 1957)

**Source:** *XHBYK*, 102 (Feb. 25, 1957), 108. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (1967b), p. 14; *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 129; *Shuxin*, pp. 520–521; *RMSC* (1958), p. 619; URI (1976), p. 5; *Buyi*, p. 98. Available English Translations: *CB*, 891 (Oct. 8, 1969), 23; URI (1976), p. 7; H. Engle and P. Engle (1972), p. 17; *CB*, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969), 3 (excerpt).

*The recipient of this letter was Zhang Kejia, himself a prominent contemporary poet and novelist. He was vice-chairman of the Federation of Chinese Writers. In 1957, he organized the publication of the magazine Shikan (Poetry). According to the Buyi source, Zhang and Mao discussed the writing of poetry, and particularly new-form poetry, in January 1957, over a dinner at Mao's home. (This experience was reported in an article Zhang wrote in HQ, 21–22 [combined issue, 1961].)*

*Mao's poems, mentioned in this letter, were published in the inaugural issue of Shikan in January 1957 and immediately thereafter were reprinted throughout the country, in large and small newspapers, as well as in all sorts of professional and popular periodicals. They were also reprinted in RMSC (1958), pp. 617–619. An English translation of the poems, published by the Foreign Languages Press, appeared in 1958 as Eighteen Poems in the Classical Style by Chairman Mao. See also text Dec. 21, 1958.*

Comrade Kejia and other comrades:<sup>1</sup>

Your letter was received quite a while ago. My apologies for being so tardy in

replying! As you wished, I have now copied, on the enclosed sheets, all the old-style poems [of mine] that I can remember, together with the eight that you sent to me, making eighteen altogether.<sup>2</sup> Please check and take appropriate action.

Up to now I have always been unwilling to publish these things formally because they are written in the old style.<sup>3</sup> I was afraid that this might incidentally encourage a wrong trend and exert a bad influence on young people. Besides, they are not much as poetry and there is nothing outstanding about them. However, since you feel that they can be published and in doing so you will also correct the inaccurately written characters in some of these poems, versions of which are already in circulation, then do what you think is best.

It is good that the magazine *Shikan* [Poetry] is being published. I wish it well in its growth and development. In speaking of poetry, of course, it should be written mainly in the modern style. A few old-style verses may be written, but it would not be advisable to promote this among the young people because that kind of style constricts thought and is also difficult to learn. These words are merely for your consideration.

Comradely salutations!  
Mao Zedong  
January 12, 1957

#### Notes

1. The *Buyi*, *Wansui* (1967b), *Wansui* (n.d. 3), and *CB* sources have “Comrade XX” in place of “Comrade Kejia” here.

2. The eighteen that were subsequently published in *Shikan* in January 1957 under the title “Mao Zhuxi jiuti shici shiba shou” (Eighteen Old-Style *Shi* and *Ci* by Chairman Mao) were the following: “Changsha” (1925, to the pattern of *Qinyuanchun*), “Yellow Crane Pavilion” (Spring 1927, to the pattern of *Pusaman*), “Jinggangshan” (Autumn 1928, to the pattern of *Xijiangyue*), “New Year’s Day” (January 1930, to the pattern of *Rumengling*), “Da bodi” (Summer 1933, to the pattern of *Pusaman*), “Huichang” (Summer 1934, to the pattern of *Qingpingyue*), “Loushan Pass” (February 1935, to the pattern of *Yiqine*), “Three Sixteen-Character Short Poems” (1934–1935, counting here as three items), “Long March” (October 1935), “Kunlun” (October 1935, to the pattern of *Niannujiao*), “Liupan Mountain” (October 1935, to the pattern of *Qingpingyue*), “Snow” (February 1936, to the pattern of *Qinyuanchun*), “Reply to Mr. Liu Yazhi” (April 29, 1949), “Reply to Mr. Liu Yazhi” (October 1950), “Beidaihe” (Summer 1954, to the pattern of *Langtaosha*), and “Swimming” (June 1956, to the pattern of *Shuidiaoge tou*).

3. Mao is referring to the classical Chinese verse forms of *shi* and *ci*. The *shi* (a term that doubles as the generic term for poetry) has a strict tonal pattern and rhyme scheme. There are two popular forms of *shi*: the *lu* form, which consists of eight lines of five or seven characters (syllables) each, in which the third line parallels the fourth (and the fifth line parallels the sixth) in both tonal pattern and sense. The entire poem follows one of several rhyme patterns which are common to all poems. The *jue* form consists of four lines of seven or five characters each and is a sort of truncated *lu*. The third and fourth lines are counterpointed in tone but not juxtapository in sense. The *shi* form of poetry flowered in the Tang dynasty (618–907).

The *ci* form, which originated in the Tang and flourished in the Song dynasty, are poems written and sung according to standardized patterns derived from prototypes. Each prototype prescribes a unique pattern, with a tonal and rhyming pattern that is to be followed by every

*ci* subsequently written to that tune. (Later variations were developed.) It also prescribes the number of lines and the length of each line. Poems written in the *ci* form often do not bear their own titles (or do so only as a subtitle) but bear the title of the prototype.

The classical forms of poetry, therefore, are very rigidly patterned and, in the hands of pedantic rather than creative people, have the tendency of becoming rather stale and stilted.

New forms of poetry, highly popularized in the May Fourth era of the 1920s, were, on the other hand, considered to be much more liberal and creative. Ironically, much of the new-form poetry that Mao wrote during his lifetime contained quite a few classical elements.

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### Inscription on the Grave of Martyrs (January 16, 1957 [R])

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 16, 1957), 4.

*This inscription was written and subsequently engraved on the Tomb of Revolutionary Martyrs at Dongtou Island. The tomb, which was erected for 132 members of the PLA and militia who died in the various battles to defend the Dongtou Island district from August 1949 to January 1952, had been completed shortly before this writing. There is no definite date of the writing itself; January 16 is the date of release in RMRB.*

In giving their lives for their country, they live forever.

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### Speech at Conference of Provincial, Municipal, and Autonomous Region Party Secretaries (January 18, 1957)

**Source:** Version I: *Xuanji*, V, pp. 330–339. Available English Translation: *SW*, V, pp. 350–359. Version II: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 118–120.

*Sometime in January 1957 Mao was present at a conference of secretaries of Party committees from the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. The dates of this conference have not been traced, although this speech made by Mao on January 18 and another on January 27 (texts Jan. 27, 1957[1] and [2]) suggest that the conference might have been held in the second half of the month. In particular, the January 18 speech here might have been an opening address or remarks made near the beginning of the conference. For information on this conference, see K. Lieberthal (1989), pp. 47–48. There are five different documents relating to Mao’s participation at the conference. One, entitled “Interjections at the Conference of Provincial and Municipal Party Secretaries” (*Wansui* [1969], pp. 73–81), presented here at the end of January 1957, is a Red Guard collection of Mao’s various interjections at the conference. The second and third are presented here as Version*

*I and Version II of Mao's January 18 speech at the conference. These two versions are generally similar in content. In organization and often in syntax, however, there are a large number of appreciable differences. Again, it is almost certain that the Xuanji, V version is the "official release" version of 1977, whereas the Wansui (n.d. 3) version, which is labeled as a collection of the "main points of the speech," is an earlier publication. A sense of how substantially edited and changed Mao's writings and speeches may have been in Xuanji, V can be obtained by comparing the two versions of the speech here. In the Xuanji, V version, Mao's statements are much more elaborate, and in some cases are more easily understood by the reader. In particular, the last parts of the Wansui (n.d. 3) version, which contain some terse remarks, are excised from the Xuanji, V version. Because the variations are so profuse, however, for the most part we leave it to the reader to make his or her textual comparison of the two versions. The last two documents, one a Red Guard version (Wansui [1969], pp. 81–90) and one an official version (Xuanji, V, pp. 339–362), are different records of the same speech Mao gave on January 27 and are presented in our translation here as texts Jan. 27, 1957(1), and Jan. 27, 1957(2).*

*These speeches and versions of speeches, in the main, touch on the same themes: ideological struggle, or contending and blooming; the Chinese position on the debate in the international Communist movement, the problem of mental preparation to forestall events in China taking the course of those in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union, etc. Interestingly, Mao also spoke at length about issues of leadership, falling back on his fundamental philosophy of contradiction, but elucidating its practical application within the context of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Here we have solid pronouncements of the principle of following the mass line, identifying and consolidating the interest of the proletariat, and the epistemology of unity of opposites and its practical expression in unity-criticism-unity, things that eventually became critical ingredients of Mao Zedong Thought.*

*These five articles therefore ought to be studied together. "The Interjections," presented at the end of January 1957, is the most clearly organized of the four, though brief and sometimes textually garbled. The January 18 speech that we have here seems to set the mood for the conference, and the January 27 speech appears to be a summing up.*

*Furthermore, there are many arguments in Mao's comments made at this conference that hark back to his thesis some nine months earlier, i.e., the "Ten Major Relationships" article (see text April 25, 1956), as well as cast forward to his thesis "On Correctly Handling the Contradictions Among the People" (see text Feb. 27, 1957) and his speech at the National Conference on Propaganda Work (see text Mar. 12, 1957). All these speeches and articles appear to be interlocked and ought to be studied together. The line of progression followed by these speeches may be generally summed up in the following way. In response to the events on the international scene and particularly in the Communist movement worldwide in the latter part of 1956 (i.e., Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, and the Hungarian and Polish incidents), and to the reaction on the part of some people in the CPC and in China (especially in the democratic parties) to these events, Mao and the CPC leadership perceived the need to affirm that the ideological trend followed by the CPC and its major policies of socialist transformation since 1954–1955 (e.g., agricultural cooperativization) were correct. At the same time, taking a lesson from the CPSU, Mao believed that the Communist Party was not in itself unassailable and was, in fact, susceptible to a number of weaknesses in its work style (e.g., bureaucratism) that were liable to alienate the Party from the masses. The conference of Party secretaries in January 1957 was convened to communicate these points and to inaugurate a general policy to deal with the situation. The two major*

*speeches on January 18 and January 27 (the latter with two versions here) reflect that. By late February, Mao had already consolidated that general policy, which was essentially a rearticulation of the "Hundred Flowers" formula, but at the same time had escalated it to become a full-fledged policy for Party rectification. In the same period, Mao had also come to perceive more forcefully the position adopted by some people in the democratic parties or simply outside the CPC. The February 27, 1957, speech at the Supreme State Conference, a major theoretical and policy announcement by all accounts, dealt primarily with these two issues. Finally, by early March, the policies were to be launched into the implementation stage, and this was to be done by and within the Propaganda Department of the CPC first; hence the significance of the March 2 speech.*

### Version I

This conference will discuss primarily three problems: the problem of ideological trends, the problem of the rural areas, and the problem of the economy. Today I'd like to talk a bit about the problem of ideological trends.

The problem of ideological trends is something that we must firmly grasp. Here, I'll raise it as the first problem [to be discussed]. At present, many problems have emerged in connection with the ideological trends in our Party and in the society which deserve our close attention.

There is one type of problem that has emerged from our own household. For instance, some comrades are now fighting for fame and fortune, and profit is foremost in their minds. In the process of making assessments and assigning grades, there are some people who were not satisfied with being promoted one grade and who still lay in their beds and cried even after they were promoted two grades; it would probably take a three-grade promotion to get them out of bed.<sup>1</sup> The problem is solved: we just don't assess and assign grades for cadres [any more], but [simply] let the wages be generally equalized with slight differences, and that's it. In the past, in the Beiyang warlord government,<sup>2</sup> there was a prime minister called Tang Shaoyi, who later became the magistrate of Zhongshan *xian* in Guangdong Province.<sup>3</sup> If a prime minister in the old society could become a *xian* magistrate, why can't our department heads do the same? As I see it, those people who make a fuss about grade differences and who can accept promotions but not demotions are even worse in this regard than this bureaucrat of the old [society]. They are competing with one another not on the basis of hardships suffered or on the basis of doing more work and enjoying fewer luxuries, but on the basis of pomposity, grade differentials, and status. There is a great increase of such ideas within the Party at present, and it demands our attention.

Is there or is there not, after all, hope for the cooperativization of agriculture? Is the cooperative better, or is the individual economy better? This question has also been raised once again. Last year there were no problems in the areas with bumper harvests, nor were there problems in areas of serious disasters. It was in cooperatives where the calamities, if there were any, were not serious, or in cooperatives where the harvest was not particularly good that problems arose. In cooperatives of this sort, the promises made at the start about the value of work points were too

ambitious.<sup>4</sup> These later turned out to be not as great [as anticipated], and [not only] did the income of the members of the cooperatives not increase, but it actually decreased. Thus, criticism has come up: Is the cooperative still a good thing? Should it be retained? This sort of discussion is also reflected among some of our cadres in the Party. Some cadres say that the cooperatives don't have any superior qualities. Some heads of departments and ministries went to the countryside to take a look and, when they returned to Beijing, spread a disturbing view, saying that the peasants were in low spirits, that they were no longer doing their farming enthusiastically, and that it looked as if there was a tendency for the cooperatives to collapse and become extinct. Some directors of cooperatives find it difficult to hold their heads high, and they are scolded everywhere they go. They are criticized from above as well as in the newspapers. In some Party committees, the directors of the propaganda department do not dare to propagandize about the superiority of the cooperatives. According to Liao Luyan, minister of agriculture and deputy director of the Rural Work Department of the Party Center,<sup>5</sup> he himself is disheartened, and the cadres in positions of responsibility beneath him are also deflated. [They feel that] nothing is working and that the Forty-Article Program for Agricultural Development is no longer valid.<sup>6</sup> What can we do about this deflation [of spirit]? It's simple: if you lack spirit we can give you a little encouragement.<sup>7</sup> The propaganda in the newspapers has now switched to talking at length about the superiority of the cooperatives, concentrating on the good points and not mentioning the bad ones. Let's do that for a few months; [everybody] will gain some encouragement from it.

The year before last we opposed Right deviation; last year we opposed "adventurist advance," and as a result of our opposition to "adventurist advance" the Right deviation has reemerged.<sup>8</sup> The Right deviation that I'm talking about is the Right deviation with regard to the question of the socialist revolution, primarily the question of the socialist transformation of the countryside. A gust of wind like a typhoon has blown up from among our cadres, and it especially requires our attention. A considerable number of our ministers, deputy ministers, department and bureau heads, and cadres at the provincial level have come from landlord, rich peasant, or well-to-do middle peasant families. Some have fathers who were landlords and they still do not have the right to vote.<sup>9</sup> When these cadres go home, their families say bad things [about the cooperatives], and say nothing except that the cooperatives are no good and cannot develop. The well-to-do middle peasants are a vacillating stratum; their idea of going-it-alone is once again rearing its head. Some people want to withdraw from the cooperatives. This gust of wind among our cadres reflects the ideology of these classes and strata.<sup>10</sup>

Cooperativization can certainly be developed well, but this cannot be fully accomplished in a year or two. We must explain this to the comrades in the various circles—the Party, the government, the military, and the people. The cooperatives have been around only for a short while; most cooperatives have a history of no more than a year or a year and a half and have acquired very little experience. Even people who have been engaged in revolution for their entire lives can make mistakes, so how can you expect those who have been on the job for only a year

or a year and a half to be completely free of mistakes? Saying that the cooperatives will not work whenever there is a little bit of wind and rain is itself a great mistake. In fact, most cooperatives are well-managed, or relatively well-managed. As long as we can cite a single cooperative that is well-managed we can defeat all the absurd arguments raised against cooperativization. If this cooperative can be well-managed, why can't others? If this cooperative can have superior qualities, why can't others? You can then go everywhere and talk a lot about the experience of this cooperative. Each province should be able to find one such typical model. [We] should look for a cooperative that began with the worst conditions, the worst geography, one that had a very low yield in the past and that was very poor; [we] should not look for the cooperative that had very good conditions to begin with. Of course, it's all right if you can run a few dozen [successful cooperatives], but even if you can only run one successfully, we'll count that as a victory.<sup>11</sup>

Problems have emerged in the schools as well. In many places the students are causing trouble. In one school in Shijiazhuang, a number of the graduating students could not get jobs for the time being, so their studies have been extended for an extra year.<sup>12</sup> This has caused [these] students to become dissatisfied, and so a few counterrevolutionaries have taken the opportunity to fan the flames and organize a demonstration and parade, saying that they wanted to take over the radio station in Shijiazhuang and proclaim a "Hungary."<sup>13</sup> They put up many posters, and among them were these three slogans that were the most outstanding: "Down with the fascists!" "We want war, not peace!" "There's nothing superior about socialism!" According to them, the Communists are fascists, and people like ourselves must all be brought down. The slogans that they proposed were so reactionary that they did not win the sympathy of either the workers, the peasants, or the masses in any sector [of society]. There's a student at Qinghua University in Beijing who publicly announced, "One of these days I will kill thousands or tens of thousands of people!"<sup>14</sup> When the hundred flowers bloomed and the hundred schools contended, even this "school of thought" emerged.<sup>15</sup> Comrade Deng Xiaoping<sup>16</sup> once went to that university to speak and said that if they wanted to kill thousands and tens of thousands of people, we will have to install a dictatorship.

According to the survey done by the city of Beijing, most of the students in our institutions of higher learning are children of landlords, rich peasants, bourgeoisie, and well-to-do middle peasants. Less than 20 per cent come from worker or poor- and lower-middle peasant backgrounds. The whole country, probably, must be in more or less the same situation. This situation has to change, but it will take time. Gomulka is rather popular among most of the students. Tito and Kardelj, too, are rather popular.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, it's the landlords and rich peasants in the countryside, and the bourgeoisie and the democratic parties and groups in the cities who, for the most part, are relatively obedient and compliant with the rules. Even during the time of the upheaval in Poland and Hungary they didn't cause trouble, and did not jump out and declare that they would kill thousands or tens of thousands of people. We should analyze their obedience and compliance. [They are obedient and compliant] because they no longer have any [political] capital; the working class and the poor- and lower-middle peasants do not listen to them, and there is

ambitious.<sup>4</sup> These later turned out to be not as great [as anticipated], and [not only] did the income of the members of the cooperatives not increase, but it actually decreased. Thus, criticism has come up: Is the cooperative still a good thing? Should it be retained? This sort of discussion is also reflected among some of our cadres in the Party. Some cadres say that the cooperatives don't have any superior qualities. Some heads of departments and ministries went to the countryside to take a look and, when they returned to Beijing, spread a disturbing view, saying that the peasants were in low spirits, that they were no longer doing their farming enthusiastically, and that it looked as if there was a tendency for the cooperatives to collapse and become extinct. Some directors of cooperatives find it difficult to hold their heads high, and they are scolded everywhere they go. They are criticized from above as well as in the newspapers. In some Party committees, the directors of the propaganda department do not dare to propagandize about the superiority of the cooperatives. According to Liao Luyan, minister of agriculture and deputy director of the Rural Work Department of the Party Center,<sup>5</sup> he himself is disheartened, and the cadres in positions of responsibility beneath him are also deflated. [They feel that] nothing is working and that the Forty-Article Program for Agricultural Development is no longer valid.<sup>6</sup> What can we do about this deflation [of spirit]? It's simple: if you lack spirit we can give you a little encouragement.<sup>7</sup> The propaganda in the newspapers has now switched to talking at length about the superiority of the cooperatives, concentrating on the good points and not mentioning the bad ones. Let's do that for a few months; [everybody] will gain some encouragement from it.

The year before last we opposed Right deviation; last year we opposed "adventurist advance," and as a result of our opposition to "adventurist advance" the Right deviation has reemerged.<sup>8</sup> The Right deviation that I'm talking about is the Right deviation with regard to the question of the socialist revolution, primarily the question of the socialist transformation of the countryside. A gust of wind like a typhoon has blown up from among our cadres, and it especially requires our attention. A considerable number of our ministers, deputy ministers, department and bureau heads, and cadres at the provincial level have come from landlord, rich peasant, or well-to-do middle peasant families. Some have fathers who were landlords and they still do not have the right to vote.<sup>9</sup> When these cadres go home, their families say bad things [about the cooperatives], and say nothing except that the cooperatives are no good and cannot develop. The well-to-do middle peasants are a vacillating stratum; their idea of going-it-alone is once again rearing its head. Some people want to withdraw from the cooperatives. This gust of wind among our cadres reflects the ideology of these classes and strata.<sup>10</sup>

Cooperativization can certainly be developed well, but this cannot be fully accomplished in a year or two. We must explain this to the comrades in the various circles—the Party, the government, the military, and the people. The cooperatives have been around only for a short while; most cooperatives have a history of no more than a year or a year and a half and have acquired very little experience. Even people who have been engaged in revolution for their entire lives can make mistakes, so how can you expect those who have been on the job for only a year

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According to the survey done by the city of Beijing, most of the students in our institutions of higher learning are children of landlords, rich peasants, bourgeoisie, and well-to-do middle peasants. Less than 20 per cent come from worker or poor- and lower-middle peasant backgrounds. The whole country, probably, must be in more or less the same situation. This situation has to change, but it will take time. Gomulka is rather popular among most of the students. Tito and Kardelj, too, are rather popular.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, it's the landlords and rich peasants in the countryside, and the bourgeoisie and the democratic parties and groups in the cities who, for the most part, are relatively obedient and compliant with the rules. Even during the time of the upheaval in Poland and Hungary they didn't cause trouble, and did not jump out and declare that they would kill thousands or tens of thousands of people. We should analyze their obedience and compliance. [They are obedient and compliant] because they no longer have any [political] capital; the working class and the poor- and lower-middle peasants do not listen to them, and there is

nothing solid under their feet. [But] if there is a great change in the world, if an atom bomb were to blow Beijing or Shanghai to smithereens, wouldn't these people then change? That would be difficult to say. At that time, the landlords, rich peasants, the bourgeoisie, and the democratic parties will split up [and form new alignments]. They are experienced in the ways of the world, and most of them are, for the time being, in hiding. Their offspring, these school kids, do not have experience, and so they bring out into the open such [slogans] as "I'll kill thousands and tens of thousands of people," and "There are no superior qualities in socialism."

There are also various kinds of strange arguments among some of the professors; for instance, [they say] they don't want the Communist Party, the Communist Party cannot lead them, socialism is no good, and so forth.<sup>18</sup> They have these ideas which they did not talk about in the past, but, with the contending of a hundred schools of thought allowing them to speak out, these remarks have emerged. Have you seen the movie *Wu Xun zhuan* [The Life of Wu Xun]?<sup>19</sup> There's a writing brush in that movie that was several *zhang* long<sup>20</sup> symbolizing the "literati." The sweep of that brush was really something! Now they want to come out; I think they want to sweep us away. Isn't that a desire for a restoration?

Last year several great storms raged in the international sphere. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union kicked up a row against Stalin.<sup>21</sup> Following that, the imperialists cooked up two major anti-Communist storms, and in the international Communist movement also there were two big storms of debate.<sup>22</sup> Some of the [Communist] parties in Europe and America felt the impact of these upheavals and suffered considerable damage, but the damage sustained and the degree to which the [Communist] parties in the countries in the East were affected was relatively small. With the convocation of the "Twentieth Congress" of the CPSU, some people who had supported Stalin enthusiastically in the past have now become very vigorous in their opposition [to him]. I don't think these people are practicing Marxism-Leninism; they do not analyze problems, and they are also lacking in revolutionary ethics. Marxism-Leninism also includes [the code of] revolutionary ethics of the proletariat. You supported [Stalin] so very enthusiastically in the past; before making such a big switch now, you must at least give some reason [for doing so]. [Instead,] you offered no reason at all, but made such a sudden 180-degree turn and acted as if you had never supported Stalin, although actually you supported him very strongly in the past. The Stalin problem involves the entire international Communist movement, and the parties in all countries have become involved.<sup>23</sup>

With regard to the "Twentieth Congress" of the CPSU, the overwhelming majority of the cadres in our Party are dissatisfied with it, believing that it was too harsh in its treatment of Stalin. This is a normal feeling and a normal reaction. Among a minority, however, there is stirring. Whenever a typhoon approaches, the ants will leave their holes before the rain comes. They have very sharp "noses," and they understand meteorology. When the typhoon of the CPSU's Twentieth Congress approached, in China too, some ants left their holes. These are the vacillating elements in the Party; they vacillate whenever they get the chance. When they heard that Stalin was knocked off with a single blow, they felt very

comfortable about it and swung over to the [other] side, shouting "Long live [Khrushchev]!" and saying that everything about Khrushchev was good and that they'd always held that view. Later, when the imperialists hit back with a few blows, and a few blows were delivered from within the international Communist movement itself, even Khrushchev had to change his tune, and they again swung back over to this side. Compelled by the general trend, they had no choice but to swing back. [It's like] a tuft of grass on a wall; when the wind blows it sways to one side and then the other.<sup>24</sup> To swing back was not their true intention; their true intention was to swing over to the other side. Those people within the Party and outside it who gloated about the Polish affair and the Hungarian affair made a good show of it! They talked about Poznan one moment and about Hungary the next. In this way they exposed themselves; the ants left their holes, and even the turtles have come out.<sup>25</sup> They followed Gomulka's baton. When Gomulka said [he wanted] big democracy, they too said that [they wanted] big democracy.<sup>26</sup> The situation has changed now, and they do not utter a sound. Silence [,however,] is not their true intention; their true intention is to make a lot of noise.

Whenever a typhoon blows, the vacillating elements who cannot stand up to it will sway back and forth; this is a law. I advise everybody to pay attention to this problem. Some people, after swaying a few times and gaining some experience, will not sway again. There are those people who will always sway; they are like crops such as rice which, because they have slender stalks, will sway whenever the wind blows. Sorghum and corn are better because their stalks are thicker. Only a big tree can stand straight and not budge. There are typhoons every year; similarly, there are ideological typhoons and political typhoons both at home and abroad every year. This is a natural social phenomenon. Political parties are a type of society; they are a political type of society. The primary category in political society is the political party. A [political] party is a class organization. Our Chinese Communist Party is the political party of the proletariat, formed primarily by workers and by people who came from a semiproletariat poor-peasant background. But there are also many Party members who come from landlord, rich peasant, or bourgeois families, or from well-to-do middle peasant and urban petty-bourgeois backgrounds. Quite a few of them, although they have been through many years of hard and bitter struggle and have undergone forging and tempering, still haven't learned much Marxism; in terms of ideology and spirit they are still like rice, and will sway whenever the wind blows.

Some comrades have passed various ["gates"] in the past,<sup>27</sup> but find it difficult to pass this gate of socialism. There are people typical of that; Xue Xun<sup>28</sup> was one. She was originally the deputy secretary of Hebei's provincial [Party] committee and its deputy governor. When did she sway? It was when the implementation of unified purchasing and unified marketing by the state began.<sup>29</sup> Unified purchasing and marketing is an important step in the implementation of socialism. However, she resolutely opposed it, and insisted on opposing it no matter what happened. Another example is Meng Yongqian, the deputy director of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives.<sup>30</sup> He wrote a letter of petition, in which he also firmly opposed unified purchasing and marketing. When we carried out the

cooperativization of agriculture, some people in the Party also rose in opposition. In short, there are high-ranking cadres in the Party who cannot pass the gate of socialism and are vacillating. Have such things come to an end? No. In ten years will these people become resolute and truly believe in socialism? Not necessarily. Ten years from now, if any problem crops up, they might still say that they had foreseen that long ago.

We are distributing [some] material to you comrades that reflects the ideological trends of some cadres in our armed forces. Although there are some reasonable things contained in the opinions of these cadres—for instance, [their criticism] that some cadres' wages are too high and the peasants cannot tolerate it—nevertheless the general orientation of their opinion is not correct, and their fundamental line is wrong. They make the criticism that our Party's policy has become too Left in the countryside and too Right in the cities. Although China has [a territory of] 9.6 million square kilometers, in all, there are only two pieces of land, one called the countryside, the other called the city. According to what they say, [we] have been wrong in both.

By saying that our policy in the countryside has become too "Left" they mean that the income of the peasants isn't much and is less than that of the workers. We should apply some analysis to this issue; we cannot go by [the size of] income alone. Indeed, generally speaking, the income of the workers is larger than that of the peasants, but the value of what they produce is also greater than that of what the peasants produce, and their necessary living expenses are also higher than those of the peasants. The improvement in the standards of living of the peasants mainly depends on the peasants' own efforts in developing production. The government, also, is giving the peasants a lot of help, such as constructing water conservation [projects] and issuing loans to the peasants, etc. Our agricultural taxes, including taxes on [the products of] side-line occupations, are approximately 8 per cent of the gross value of the peasants' production, and on many side-line occupations there is no tax at all. When the state purchases grain, the purchase is made in accordance with the normal price; also the profit derived by the state from the peasants in the exchange of industrial for agricultural products is very small. We do not have a system of obligatory sale such as in the Soviet Union;<sup>31</sup> our [principle] with regard to the exchange of industrial and agricultural products is to reduce the "scissors" differential<sup>32</sup> and not to expand it like the Soviet Union has done. Our policy is very different from that of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it can't be said that our policy in the countryside has become too "Left."

Among the high-ranking cadres in our military forces, some people, either when they themselves went home or [when they] invited relatives to stay with them, have listened to the well-to-do middle peasants, the rich peasants, and the landlords. They have been affected by these words, and they are [“]voicing grievances on behalf of the peasants.[”] In the first half of 1955, quite a few people in the Party [“]voiced grievances on the peasants' behalf,[”] echoing the clamor of people like Liang Shuming,<sup>33</sup> as if only these two groups of people represented the peasants and only they recognized the suffering of the peasants. In their eyes, our Party Center does not represent the peasants, nor do the provincial [Party] committees,

nor do the majority of our Party members. In Jiangsu an investigation showed that in some areas, among the cadres at the three levels of *xian*, district, and *xiang*, about 30 per cent voiced grievances on behalf of the peasants.<sup>34</sup> Later, upon investigation, it was discovered that most of these people who [“]voiced grievances for the peasants[”] came from relatively wealthy families who had surplus grain to sell. What actually was meant by their so-called “grievances” was that they had surplus grain. By “helping the peasants,” “taking care of the peasants,” they actually meant that they didn't want to sell the surplus grain to the state. Who do these people who voice grievances actually represent? They do not represent the broad peasant masses; they actually represent the minority of rich peasants.

As for saying that our policy in the cities has become too Right, it does look a bit like that too since we have tolerated the capitalists, and, what's more, we've paid them fixed interest for seven years.<sup>35</sup> What will we do after the seven years? That remains to be seen. It's better to drag a tail along<sup>36</sup> and still give them some fixed interest. By spending a little bit of money we've bought over this entire class. The [Party] Center has given this policy very careful consideration. The capitalists, plus the democratic personages and intellectuals connected with them, have, in general, a higher cultural, technical, and intellectual level. We've bought this class over and deprived them of their political capital so that they can't say anything. The methods by which we deprived them [of their political capital] are, first, spending money to buy them out, and, second, making arrangements to assign them jobs.<sup>37</sup> By doing this, political capital is no longer in their hands but in ours. We must strip them clean of their political capital, and if there's anything left that hasn't yet been stripped away, it must still be stripped. Therefore, neither can it be said that our urban policy is too Right.

Our policy in the countryside is correct, and so is our policy in the urban areas. Therefore, big, nationwide trouble such as the Hungarian affair cannot be stirred up here. There can be nothing but a few people stirring up some trouble here and there, wanting to launch the so-called big democracy. Big democracy is actually not that frightening. I differ with you on this matter; some comrades among you seem to be very afraid. I say should there be a big democracy, first let's not be afraid; second let's do some analysis; see what they say and do. When they are engaged in big democracy, those bad people will certainly do some wrong things and say some wrong things and thereby expose and isolate themselves. Is “killing thousands and tens of thousands of people” a way to solve the contradictions among the people? Can it gain the sympathy of the majority of the people? They say: “Down with fascists” and “There's nothing superior about socialism”; isn't this in flagrant violation of the Constitution? The Communist Party and the state power under its leadership are revolutionary; socialism is superior; this is all stated in the Constitution and acknowledged by all the people in the country. They say: “We want war, not peace.” Fine, so let them call the people to arms! With the few people you have altogether, you don't have enough soldiers, and your officers are also not well-trained. These kids have gone crazy! At that school in Shijiazhuang, when they put those three slogans to a discussion, only about a dozen of the seventy delegates agreed with them, and more than fifty opposed them. Later, these slogans



were brought to the four thousand students for discussion, and in the end nobody approved them. This dozen or so people then became isolated. Those ultra-reactionaries who proposed and firmly supported these slogans were only a handful. Had they not engaged in “big democracy,” had they not gone about posting slogans, we wouldn’t have even known what they intended to do. Once they engaged in big democracy they got caught by their tails. One of the benefits of the Hungarian Incident is that it lured these ants in China out from their holes.

In Hungary, with the coming of the big democracy, the Party, the government, and the military were all toppled. This will not happen in China. Unless we are all good-for-nothings, the Party, the government, and the military will not fall apart just because some school kids attack us. Therefore, don’t be afraid of big democracy. Trouble being stirred up will help to cure the inflamed sore. This is a good thing. We weren’t afraid of imperialism before, nor are we afraid of it now. We’ve also never been afraid of Chiang Kai-shek. Should we now be afraid of big democracy? I don’t think we need to be afraid. If any people use what they call big democracy to oppose the socialist system and to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party, we will impose the dictatorship of the proletariat on them.

On the problem of the intellectuals, there is now a tendency to emphasize arranging [positions] for them and not to emphasize reforming them. More [work] has been done about making arrangements [for jobs] but less about reforming [these people]. With the blooming of the hundred flowers and the contending of the hundred schools, people no longer dare to reform the intellectuals. We dared to reform the capitalists, why don’t we dare to reform the intellectuals and the democratic personages?

A hundred flowers are blooming, and I think they should continue to bloom. Some comrades think that we can only let the fragrant flowers bloom, and not the poisonous weeds.<sup>38</sup> This point of view shows that they really understand very little about the principle of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools contend. Generally speaking, counterrevolutionary speeches and arguments naturally must not be allowed to bloom. However, since they don’t appear in the guise of counterrevolutionary [ideas] but rather in the guise of revolutionary [ideas], there’s nothing [we] can do but let them bloom; only that would help us to differentiate them [from the others] and struggle against them. Two things grow in a field; one is grain, the other is weeds. Weeds have to be dug up every year, several times a year. If you say that we want only the fragrant flowers to bloom and not the poisonous weeds, then that’s equivalent to saying that there can be only grain growing in the field and not a single weed. Although you can say things like that, anyone who has been in a field knows that as long as you don’t take the trouble to dig them out, there actually will always be a lot of weeds. There is one good thing about weeds, which is that if you turn them over they become fertilizer. Do you say that they are useless? We can change what is useless into something useful. The peasants have to struggle against the weeds in the fields every year. The writers, artists, critics, and professors in our Party also have to struggle against the weeds in the realm of ideology every year. By people who are forged and tempered we mean people who have weathered the struggle. When you weeds grow, we’ll dig

you out. These opposites [in the contradiction] will appear continuously. There will still be weeds ten thousand years from now, and that’s why we’ll have to be prepared to struggle for ten thousand years.

In short, last year was a very eventful period of time. On the international scene it was a year in which Khrushchev and Gomulka stirred up storms. Domestically it was a year of very vigorous socialist transformation. It is still a very eventful season right now, and all sorts of ideas will continue to be exposed. I hope that our comrades here will pay attention to them.

## Notes

1. Up to this time, according to the CPC Constitution, Party cadres were assigned to one of twenty-four grades. See also text Mar. 18, 1957, note 3.

2. See text May–June 1955, vol. I, note 55.

3. Tang Shaoyi (1860–1938), was a consultant to Yuan Shikai in 1895 when Yuan was assigned to train the “New Army” for the Qing monarchy at Xiaozhan, near Tianjin. Later Tang served in the Qing government in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Board of Communications and Postage, as well as in the capacity of provincial governor (*xunfu*) of Fengtian. When Yuan became provisional president of the republic after the Revolution of 1911, Tang became the first prime minister of Yuan’s cabinet. In 1917, he left the Beiyang clique to align himself with Sun Yat-sen’s “Government of the Army to Defend the Constitution” in Guangzhou, and served as its minister of finance. In 1931, he served in major posts in the KMT government and from 1931 to 1934 was appointed by Chiang Kai-shek to be nominally the magistrate of his native district of Zhongshan *xian* in Guangdong. Tang was assassinated in Shanghai in 1938. For more biographical information on Tang, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1970), III, pp. 232–236.

4. See text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 53.

5. Liao Luyan (b. 1908) was the deputy director of the Rural Work Department of the CPC Central Committee from 1953 to 1955 and in September 1955 became the minister of agriculture of the State Council. His divergence from Mao’s views on cooperativization began to show around the time that Mao, in early 1956, defended the continued upsurge of socialism (i.e., cooperativization) in China’s agricultural plans, an “upsurge” that Mao had observed, endorsed, and written most favorably about at the end of 1955 (see texts Oct. 11, 1955[1] and [2], Dec. 6, 1955, and Dec. 27, 1955[1] and [2], in volume I). In 1965, Liao was removed from his post and labeled as a “Three-Anti’s element.” For more biographical information on Liao, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 552–553.

6. See text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3.

7. The Chinese text here translates more literally as “if you are deflated, we will pump some air into you.”

8. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 22, and text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 10.

9. In the early years of the PRC, especially in the land reform program, landlords and people considered “bad elements” who had gravely exploited or previously treated the peasant masses very badly were deprived of their civil rights, exemplified chiefly by their right to vote. It was stipulated that they could regain their right to vote when their performance in labor had convinced the people that they had changed their ways. What Mao appears to be saying here does not merely refer to a legal status, but to people who have not yet convinced the masses that they have turned over a new leaf.

10. For definitions of peasant classifications mentioned in this paragraph, see text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 1. For Mao’s views specifically on the classes that can and cannot be relied upon in the process of cooperativization, see text Sept. 7, 1955; text Oct. 11, 1955(1), section 5; and text Dec. 27, 1955(2), especially p. 731, of volume I.

11. Mao is here reviving the argument made in late 1955 for the exemplary influence of “poor peasant cooperatives” that turned themselves into model cooperatives in what Mao considered the general “upsurge of socialism in China’s countryside” at the time. See text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 5.

12. Shijiazhuang is the capital of Hebei Province. See Version II, note 8.

13. See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version I, note 27.

14. Qinghua University, established in 1908, is one of the oldest universities in China. It is located in the western suburbs of Beijing. It was founded on the funds returned to China by the United States government from the Boxer indemnity paid by China to the various nations who claimed damages from the Boxer (Yihetuan) rebellion. (See text Jan. 28, 1955, vol. I, note 3.) In its early years it was primarily an institution training Chinese students for study abroad in the United States. It was not until 1925 that Qinghua became a full-fledged university. In 1928, it was nationalized. Today it is a premier university in China, with emphasis on the engineering sciences and poly-technical and industrial studies. There is no indication of who the student is. However, in much the same way that Qinghua before 1949 was an institution enrolling mostly the children of important government officials and the financial elite, from 1949 up to the mid-1960s it mostly enrolled the children of high-ranking cadres in the CPC and officers of the PRC government apparatus. There is no information available on the action of the student mentioned here, or on Deng Xiaoping’s speech.

15. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

16. Deng was at this time general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC.

17. For Gomulka, see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 31. Tito (Josip Broz, 1892–1980) was president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1953 to his death. In 1948, Tito refused to submit Yugoslavia to the economic and political directives of the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia was expelled from the “Soviet bloc” and an economic and political blockade was imposed on it by the USSR and other Eastern European socialist countries. Tito continued to defend Yugoslavia’s nationalist independence throughout and after the Stalin era, aided by Western arms and economic support, insisting on Yugoslavia’s right to find its own “path to socialism.” In 1955, full diplomatic relations were established between China and Yugoslavia, but Tito was critical of Chinese subservience to the Soviet Union. It was not until 1958, however, that severe mutual criticism between the two countries came to the forefront.

Edvard Kardelj was vice-president of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia, member of the Central Executive Committee, secretary of the Secretariat of the League of Communists, and secretary general of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia.

18. Mao appears to be harking back to problems discussed at the conference on the problem of dealing with intellectuals; see text Jan. 20, 1956.

19. See text May 20, 1951, vol. I. The part of the film to which Mao refers in the following passage is the episode in which Wu Xun gets involved in an altercation with a character named Zhang, who is a scholar with the imperial-period standing of *ju ren*.

20. The *zhang* is a Chinese measure of length approximately equivalent to 3.33 meters.

21. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.

22. By the two major anti-Communist storms, Mao is certainly referring to the Polish and Hungarian incidents (see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27). By the two debates, Mao is probably referring to those reflected in the writing of the two essays “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” and “Once More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.” The first of these was published as a *RMRB* editorial on April 5, 1956, and the second one appeared on December 29 of that year. See text April 1956, source note, and note 26; also text Nov. 15, 1956, Version I, notes 43, 44, 45.

23. For reference, see Mao’s own evaluatory comments on Stalin in 1956, in text April [6], 1956; text Aug. 30, 1956; text Oct. 23, 1956; text Nov. 30, 1956, and, most importantly, text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II.

24. This is a saying (of untraceable origin) that Mao came to use often in his description of vacillators.

25. The term for “turtles” here, *wugui wangba*, is an insulting term in Chinese slang alluding to the uncertainty of the ancestry of the subject.

26. See text Nov. 15, 1956, section 4 in both versions, for what appears to be an operative description for the term “big democracy” in Mao’s mind at this time.

27. The term here is *guoguan*, or “pass the gate,” but it has the connotation of passing tests. See text June 23, 1950, vol. I, note 8.

28. Xue Xun was a member of the people’s government council of Hebei in 1948 and in 1949 became the director of the Organization Department of the Hebei provincial committee of the CPC. In 1952, she became the vice-chairman of the Hebei provincial people’s government. In 1959 she was the vice-principal of the Normal University of Beijing.

29. The policy of having the state take charge of planned purchasing of important commodities, particularly raw materials, and supplying them either to the consumers as collectives or to processing units for remanufacturing was stipulated in the Common Program, Article 28. It was applied to cotton yarn, grain, edible oils and cotton cloth between 1953 and 1954. In August 1957, a formal classification system for categorizing agricultural products to be submitted to this policy was drawn up, and further streamlining into three major categories was done in February 1959. We can see, therefore, that here Mao is talking about a developing situation and a policy still in the early stages of its evolution, rather than a completely consolidated policy. The policy of *tonggou tongxiao* (Mao here breaks up the two component phrases) is often translated as “unified purchasing and unified marketing.” See also text Nov. 4, 1953, vol. I, note 16.

30. Meng was a member of the Finance and Economic Commission of the GAC and director of the Bureau of Cooperative Enterprises of the Central Committee of the CPC in 1949. He assumed the post of deputy director of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives in 1954. (For this type of cooperative, see text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 15.) He was also vice-chairman and a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Commission on Defense of World Peace, and a vice-president of the Association for Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries. He was an accepted specialist on industrial organizations and on the United States economy. For more biographical information on Meng, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 690–692.

31. From 1932 to 1958, the policy of obligatory sales of agricultural products by the peasant units to the state was implemented in the Soviet Union. Under this system, the collective farms and other peasant organizations and individual peasants were obliged regularly to sell to the state various types of agricultural products at a price and quantity stipulated by the state; these products were in turn provided by the state to the industrial sectors of the population. This is understood as an agricultural in-kind taxation. Over 25 per cent of agricultural products were requisitioned in this manner. The price was often too low to defray agricultural costs and the quantity too high to leave enough for the agricultural population to expand and thrive. Another complementary method was for the state to require the peasant units to pay for the use of tractors provided by the state in kind, again at a very high rate of exchange. Together these methods established direct state control over more than 50 per cent of agricultural production.

32. See text April 1956, note 23.

33. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 1.

34. See text May 17, 1958.

35. See text July 9, 1953, source note; text Nov. 17, 1955, note 4, (both in volume I); text Jan. 20, 1956, note 13; text Dec. 8, 1956, source note, notes 6 and 46. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 39.

36. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 37.

37. See texts Jan. 20, 1956, and Dec. 8, 1956.

38. The terms “fragrant flowers” (*xianghua*) and “poisonous weeds” (*duchao*) were derived from the poem “Li sao” by the ancient poet Qu Yuan (343–277? B.C.). Here, and frequently in his own writing, Mao uses the terms to denote things that are either beneficial or harmful to the people. A footnote written on this by Takeuchi Minoru in *Mo Takuto senshu, dai-go-ken* (the Japanese-annotated translation of volume 5, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*), pp. 149–150, ingeniously connects this subject to other things in Mao’s life. He points out, for instance, that the phrases *wei*, *liuyi*, and *jiecao*, referring to the “fragrant flowers” in the *locus classicus* here, the long poem “Li sao” in the *Chu ci* collection of poems by Qu Yuan are names of plants indigenous to Mao’s home province of Hunan. Qu Yuan is described as one of Mao’s favorite poets in the Chinese classical tradition, and one often quoted by Mao in his own writings. According to this note, a tattered volume of Qu Yuan’s *Chu ci* can be found among the relics of Mao from his days of youth at the First Normal School of Hunan Province. The note also mentions that on the occasion of the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan in 1972, Mao presented then Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, who was visiting China, with an annotated copy of *Chu ci*. The issue of distinguishing between the “fragrant flowers” and “poisonous weeds” was particularly significant during the rectification and anti-Rightist campaigns of 1957, and Mao proposed standards for the distinction in his article “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” (see text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8). During the Cultural Revolution period these terms were further extended to indicate actual people whose records were either acceptable or unacceptable to the Red Guards.

## Version II

This conference will study primarily three problems: the problem of ideological trends, the problem of rural work, and the problem of economic work. We will study some other problems as well, such as the questions of increasing production and practicing economy, of the legal system (including suppressing counter-revolutionaries), of organizational structuring (primarily streamlining), of the division of authority between the Center and the localities, of taxation, of the United Front, of minority nationalities, of areas hit by calamities, of students ([including] college and university [students], middle school [students], and primary school [students]), of thinking of every possible method to resolve the difficulties of the current year, of food grains, of the mountainous areas, and of the rectification of work style, and so on.<sup>1</sup>

The problem of ideological trends: [both] the ideological trends in the Party and the ideological trends in the society ought to be firmly grasped.

Some are matters in [our] own household. [The phenomena of people] fighting for fame and fortune and having “profit foremost in their minds” have experienced a very great development in the Party. [There are those] who would not rise from

their beds [even if] they were promoted by one grade; [and even if they were] promoted by two grades [they] still cried; only when [they were] promoted by three grades [did they] rise from their beds.<sup>2</sup> In the Party [people] are competing [with one another] not on the basis of hardships suffered and the arduousness of the struggle, or on the basis of doing more work, but on the basis of how well they are paid, and status. In the past, there was in the Kuomintang a Tang Shaoyi who went from being a prime minister to becoming a magistrate of Zhongshan *xian* in Guangdong Province.<sup>3</sup> Our Communist Party has not yet had a department director become a *xian* magistrate. In any case, it’s just that [people] can accept promotions, but cannot take demotions; [they are] comparing [themselves to those who are] better off [than they are,] but not comparing [themselves to those who are] worse off; [they are] competing on the basis of [their] lavishness, but not on the basis of [their ability to endure] hardships.

Another issue: A question of how [people] look at the socialist transformation. Is there, after all, hope for the [agricultural producers’] cooperative? After all, is cooperativization better, or is it better [to have] the individual economy? I hear that there are no problems either in areas of serious disasters or in areas with bumper harvests; it is in those areas where there have been calamities, but not serious ones, and where there has been [a decent but] not a bumper harvest that the problems have arisen. Some people have not had an increase in income but [in fact have suffered a] reduction, and therefore criticism has come up. This is reflected inside the Party as well. Some of the directors in Beijing went down to the countryside, and, coming back, said: “The peasants are in low spirits; they don’t have a high enthusiasm for production.” Some cadres criticized: “It is highly likely that cooperativization will become extinct and collapse”; [or] “There is nothing much superior about cooperativization.” Some of the directors of propaganda at the localities don’t even dare to make propaganda about the superiority of cooperativization. The directors of cooperatives can’t hold their heads high, and they are encountering criticism wherever they go, suffering scolding from all three sides. The Department of Agriculture convened a meeting; the two systems—the Rural Work Department and the Department of Agriculture—became deflated.<sup>4</sup> Even the need for the Forty Articles, and their practicality, came into question.<sup>5</sup>

The year before last we opposed Right deviation, and adventurist advance<sup>6</sup> appeared. Last year we opposed adventurist advance, and Right deviation reappeared. (By Right deviation I am primarily referring to [the situation in] the countryside; I have not studied other aspects [of the matter as yet].)<sup>7</sup> Here there is a gust of wind; it could be in all the areas, just that there are differences in magnitude; just as there are, in the case of typhoons, some that are of the eighth grade and some that are of the twelfth grade.<sup>8</sup> There is one thing among the cadres that deserves our attention: most of the families of cadres are landlord [families, or families of] rich peasants and well-to-do middle peasants. (The well-to-do middle peasants are a vacillating class.)<sup>9</sup> After they hear what people at home have to say, they say that the cooperative is no good. No matter what, cooperativization is going to develop well. However, it would be impossible to accomplish it well in a year

or two. In fact, we have had only a year and a half of history of cooperativization; we need three years of history, and if we have five years of history, then it would be impossible for [cooperativization] to be blown down.

[In some places] schools have been set up, [but] it has not been possible to allot jobs to the graduates, [and so they are] dissatisfied. The geology department has a school of geological studies in Zhengding *xian* of Shijiazhuang special district.<sup>10</sup> There are more than a thousand people there who, because they were not given jobs, held strikes and made trouble. They want to come to Beijing. Among their placards and slogans there are several that say: "Down with the fascists!" "We want war, not peace!" and "Socialism is backward; It has no superiority!" One student at Beijing University openly declared: "One of these days I will kill thousands and tens of thousands of people."<sup>11</sup> Comrade XXX went there to speak and said: "You want to kill people; I'll have [to impose] a dictatorship."<sup>12</sup> Over 80 per cent of the students in the institutions of higher learning in Beijing are children of landlords, rich peasants, well-to-do middle peasants, and big, medium-sized, and smaller capitalists. Less than 20 per cent are children of workers and poor peasants. Gomulka used to be an opponent of dogmatism. His words are quite popular among the students. However, now that [he's] turned around to oppose Right deviation, it's not working so well [for him]. Tito's speeches, and Kardelj's, are also welcomed by some people.<sup>13</sup> I hear that in the countryside the landlords and the rich peasants are in fact rather compliant and obedient with the rules, and in the cities the [people of the] democratic parties and the capitalists are also more obedient and compliant. That's because these people have nothing under their feet; they have no [political] capital. If, however, there is [a great] change in the world; if an atom bomb were to fall on Shanghai, or Beijing, it would be difficult to predict if these people would not change. Right now these kids have no experience, and they are not as well-versed in the ways of the world as their fathers are, and that is why they have stuck their heads out and are making a big scene yelling and screaming.

After the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,<sup>14</sup> the great majority of the people in our Party [remained] normal and secure, [but] there was a tremor among a small number of people. Before it rains, there are bound to be ants leaving their holes. In China, too, a small number of ants wanted to leave their holes to engage in some activity. Now Khrushchev has changed, and the ants have withdrawn, gone back [into the holes]. After the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, two big storms came up. The [Communist] parties in many countries suffered damage: The British Party lost one-fourth [of its membership], the Swiss [Party] half; and the United States made chaos throughout the world. The Eastern parties and the Party in China were not quite so severely affected. The problem of Stalin has involved the entire Communist movement. Some people criticize Stalin without making any analysis. The people who were most staunchly supportive of Stalin in the past are precisely the most vehemently opposed to Stalin now. They have suddenly turned around 180 degrees; they no longer talk of Marxism-Leninism, or of ethics. In the Party, some people begin to teeter as soon as there is any rustling in the wind. Some sway once or twice and

then stop swaying; some will go on swaying forever. Saplings, the stalks of rice, barley, corn, and the grass on the wall always sway when they see the wind coming;<sup>15</sup> only the big tree will not sway. There are typhoons every year, but there is not necessarily a political typhoon every year. This phenomenon is a natural phenomenon in society and politics.

The Chinese Party is a proletarian [and] semiproletarian party, but many members come from rich peasant, landlord, and capitalist family backgrounds. Some Party members, even though they have struggled hard and arduously for many years, have not learned Marxism-Leninism well, and cannot endure typhoons ideologically and politically; they ought to pay attention. Some people in the Party have passed every gate except this gate of socialism.<sup>16</sup> Xue Xun, deputy secretary of the Hebei Provincial [Party] Committee, was a representative in the petition delegation of students who went south after the "September 18 [Incident]."<sup>17</sup> In [the period of the implementation of] unified purchasing and unified marketing she vacillated, and she resolutely opposed unified purchasing and unified marketing.<sup>18</sup> Meng Yongqian, deputy director of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing, also submitted a letter discussing the matter; he also resolutely opposed unified purchasing and unified marketing.<sup>19</sup> In fact, unified purchasing and unified marketing is a major step toward the realization of socialism. These people just can't pass the gate of socialism. In our Party, this phenomenon has not yet come to an end, and it may not have come to an end in ten years' time. We can't tell whether in ten years' time all the people will have become true believers of socialism. Whenever we encounter a problem, someone will say that he had already anticipated that long ago.

We must be analytical about the reflection on the lives of the peasants among cadres in the army. There are parts that are reasonable (for example, [the issue of] salaries being [too] high), and there are also parts that are inaccurate. It is possible that some people are voicing grievances on behalf of the peasants [because] they have been listening to [people] at home. In the early half of 1955 Liang Shuming also voiced grievances on behalf of the peasants.<sup>20</sup> There are people inside the Party who are making that kind of noise, as if the Party Center and the provincial [Party] committees do not represent the peasants, and only they represent the peasants. In Jiangsu [Province] an investigation was made, [and it was discovered that] most of those who voiced grievances were people who have surplus grain at home that they would not sell [to the state].<sup>21</sup> A comrade in the army reflected: "[The Party's policy has become] too Left in the countryside, and too Right in the cities." This argument is fundamentally wrong. Let's take an example. Say a peasant has an income of 60 *rmb* a year, and a worker has an income of 60 *rmb* a month, but a worker feeds four people, an average of 15 *rmb* per person. If we go by household, a worker [household] earns 720 *rmb* a year, and the peasant [household] earns 240 *rmb* a year. However, the expenses in the urban areas are great while the expenses in the countryside are small. The peasants must rely on their own production to improve their lives; the state cannot issue wages to them. In the countryside, many side-line productions have been exempted from taxation; taxation has taken from the peasants 8 per cent of their income, and the scissors differential has taken away

a bit more from the peasants,<sup>22</sup> [but] not quite 12 per cent; altogether, combining the two, it is not quite 20 per cent, which is much lower than the 45 per cent in the Soviet Union. As for unified purchasing, it is done according to the market price. The ways in which the state assists the peasants are primarily in such things as fertilizers and water conservancy (the smaller-scale water conservancy [projects] are left to the peasants; the large-scale and medium-scale water conservancy [projects] are handled by the state). It would appear as if [the policy] has become a bit too Right in the cities. In the past, the capitalists have taken 150 million *rmb* each year, and over six years have taken 900 million *rmb*. Now we are setting fixed interest<sup>23</sup> at seven years, and we will give them [another] 800 million, making a total of 1.7 billion *rmb*. When the time comes we will still have to see what the situation then looks like. This involves an issue of international relations. We are putting up this bit of money to buy over this class (including its intellectuals and [people in the] democratic parties—about eight million people altogether). They represent a class with more knowledge and intellect. If we are to strip them clear of their political capital, one method is to buy them out with money, and the other method is to create [political] positions and arrange jobs for them.<sup>24</sup> The Communist Party plus the Leftists add up to two-thirds; [then] there is [the other] one-third, and they have to raise their hands [to vote]; otherwise they would not have rice to eat. Their children want to emulate [the situation in] Hungary[?]<sup>25</sup> Bring them over to their fathers and their asses would be whacked.

We give the university students scholarships and financial assistance; we ask you to [devote yourselves] to studying. You want big democracy; I am not afraid.<sup>26</sup> When I encounter big democracy, I first welcome it, and then secondly I analyze it. That which is correct I accept; that which is wrong I shall expose. If I have been unreasonable I shall admit my mistake and resolutely amend the mistake. [But if] you have been unreasonable I shall grab hold of your little queue.<sup>27</sup> There were strikes and trouble at that geological school, but as soon as there was discussion [the ranks of the protesters] separated. Among the seventy delegates only a dozen or so supported the three slogans, and more than fifty opposed them, and then these issues were put to a discussion among some four thousand people and they all disagreed [with the slogans]. So the dozen or so became isolated. Expanded democracy is a good thing. Without big democracy it would not be possible to suppress the counterrevolution in Hungary. It is a good thing for trouble to erupt. When there is a sore, things will be resolved when the pus breaks out. Don't be afraid of trouble; in the past we weren't afraid of the imperialists or Chiang Kai-shek; should we be afraid of big democracy [now]? How would it look for the Communist Party to be afraid of big democracy? We wouldn't look as good as Duan Qirui!<sup>28</sup> Today, the Party and the government are a revolutionary party and a revolutionary government; this is something that has been included in the Constitution.<sup>29</sup> The kids have gone crazy yelling: "Down with the fascists!" "We want war"—that is in violation of the Constitution. The Chinese Party, China's government, and the armed forces will not be toppled by these kids. If we allow several student kids

to topple us, then we would be good-for-nothing idiots.

Last year was a very eventful period of time; it was the most intense and dramatic year in China's socialist transformation.

I have spoken only on this one problem.<sup>30</sup>

On other problems: [about] increasing production and practicing economy there is [already] a document.

The suppression of counterrevolutionaries must be resolutely upheld. Wherever there is a counterrevolutionary, he must be suppressed. It won't do [for us] to be hesitant, but the legal system must be obeyed.<sup>31</sup>

We must promote the streamlining [of the government organization] determinedly.<sup>32</sup> The first item [there] is to reduce the number of personnel, and the second is to make [proper] arrangements [for jobs and positions]. We simply must first make proper [job] arrangements for people before sending them out of the organs.

With the center and the localities sharing power you do not feel too happy. [You say:] "First there is no money; second there is no power." What do you want? Please speak up, by all means.

There is a tendency toward emphasizing making [position] arrangements and not emphasizing the reform [of the democratic parties] in the area of United Front work.<sup>33</sup>

In the blooming of the hundred flowers and the contending of the hundred schools<sup>34</sup> we didn't have the courage to reform the intellectuals. The opinions expressed about the work of art and literature by Ma Hanbing and three other comrades are not good.<sup>35</sup> In the Soviet Union, [while] down below people were approving of [the policy of] letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend, someone up top said: "Only fragrant flowers can be allowed to bloom; but we cannot let poisonous weeds bloom."<sup>36</sup> Our opinion is we will only not let the counterrevolutionary flower bloom; but if it employs a revolutionary outlook, then we have to let it bloom. There are rice stalks in the field, as well as weeds and grass. If we were to say we would only let the rice grow, and not the grass, in reality it simply could not be accomplished. When the grass and weeds are hoed over, they become good fertilizer. The task for our writers is to struggle against the weeds.<sup>37</sup> Every year weeds will grow, and every year they have to be eliminated. Without the Kuomintang, we can't show how good the Communist Party is. Without idealism, we can't show how good materialism is. Without opposition, there will not be struggle. Only that which emerges from struggle can withstand the test. Contradictions continuously occur; there must be continuous struggle, and the continuous resolution [of contradictions]; in a billion years, this will remain so. After one learns about the positive things, one must also learn about the negative things. If we only talked about materialism and didn't say anything about idealism, or if we only talked about dialectics and said nothing about metaphysics, you wouldn't know anything from the negative side, and the things on the positive side would also not be consolidated. Therefore, not only do we have to publish a collection of Sun Yat-sen's works, but we have to publish a collection of Chiang Kai-shek's works as well.<sup>38</sup> We'll

talk about Hegel, Kant, Confucius, Mencius, Lao Zi, the two Cheng [brothers], Zhu [Xi], Wang [Yangming]; we'll talk about all of them.<sup>39</sup> If you hadn't read anything written by Chiang Kai-shek, you wouldn't be able to do a good job of opposing him. Someone said that since we proposed letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools contend, [the standards of] literature have declined. Comrade XXX's report has been out only for five months, and literature has declined?<sup>40</sup> How can it be so fast? A major work takes a long time to prepare; it cannot be written over a short time. Writers have to work; if they do not work we won't give them rice to eat. If the writers sat home without going to the lower levels, they would have no substance in their bellies; how can they write good things then?

The question of not promoting cadres and of reducing their salaries has to be studied.

In the problem of the students there are two questions; one of entering [the universities] and one of employment [on graduation].

The problem of the minority nationalities is rather serious.

I am very much in agreement on the question of thinking of every possible method [to resolve the difficulties of the current year]. ([This is] a great invention on the part of Ke Qingshi.)<sup>41</sup>

## Notes

1. The latter part of this paragraph, starting with "we will study some other problems as well," does not appear in Version I.

2. See Version I, note 1.

3. See Version I, notes 2 and 3.

4. See Version I, note 5, and surrounding text.

5. See Version I, note 6.

6. See Version I, note 8.

7. See Version I, note 8.

8. See text Nov. 4, 1953, vol. I, note 3, and text May 15, 1957, note 21.

9. See Version I, note 10.

10. Version I does not identify either the *xian* or the school. See Version I, note 12.

11. See Version I, note 14. Version I has Qinghua University instead of Beijing University here.

12. Version I identifies Comrade XXX as Deng Xiaoping. See Version I, note 16.

13. See Version I, note 17.

14. See Version I, note 21.

15. See Version I, note 24, and surrounding text.

16. See Version I, note 27.

17. See Version I, note 28. The "September 18 Incident" here possibly refers to the so-called Mukden Incident, which took place on September 18, 1931, when Japanese troops, trumping up the charge that a Mukden (Changchun) section of the South Manchurian Railroad had been bombed by Chinese troops, sent forces into Manchuria and quickly overran the region. This is often considered the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, which would last until the surrender of Japan in 1945. After the Mukden Incident, many Chinese students in northern China formed groups who went south to petition the government of the Kuomintang to take stronger action against the Japanese in the north.

18. See Version I, note 29.

19. See Version I, note 30.

20. See Version I, note 33.

21. See Version I, note 34.

22. See Version I, note 32.

23. See Version I, note 35.

24. See Version I, note 37.

25. See Version I, note 13.

26. See Version I, note 26.

27. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 17.

28. See text May–June, 1955, vol. I, note 25.

29. For reference to the Constitution of the PRC, see text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1.

30. The remainder of this speech in Version II does not appear in Version I.

31. Here we believe Mao is referring simply to the system of maintaining lawful order in the country, and the legal system that functions through law enforcement organs and the people's court system. In this situation Mao is not using the term sarcastically as he does in text Jan. 27, 1957(1). (See text Jan. 27, 1957[1], note 84.)

32. See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II, note 50. See also final paragraph in text Jan. 1957.

33. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.

34. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

35. We have not been able to find biographical information on Ma Hanbing, but for reference to this article, see text April 10, 1957, note 2 and surrounding text.

36. See Version I, note 38.

37. See text Feb. 26, 1957, paragraph 5.

38. See last part of text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 42, and text Jan. 27, 1957(2), text surrounding note 35.

39. On Hegel, Kant, Confucius, and Lao Zi, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 42, 45, and 46. Mencius is the Latinized name for Meng Ke (ca. 370–290 B.C.), a pupil of Zi Si (Confucius's grandson) and arguably the most illustrious developer of the system of Confucianism. For that he is revered by Confucianist scholars as "Yasheng" (Second Sage). The two Cheng brothers refer to Cheng Hao (a.k.a. Cheng Mingdao, 1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (a.k.a. Cheng Yichuan, 1033–1107), philosophers of the Northern Song dynasty who played a major role in laying the foundations of the school of thought known generally as "neo-Confucianism." Both Cheng brothers held that the *dao*, or cosmic principle inherent in all things, is spiritual and metaphysical, whereas things themselves (described as *qi*, or "vessels") are physical. It is probably in this context, then, that Mao mentions them here. Zhu Xi (1130–1200) succeeded to the ideas of the Cheng brothers and developed them into the orthodox mainstream of neo-Confucianism. In particular he advocated the presence and dominance of an inherent principle (*li*) in all things. From this philosophy he developed the "school of principle" (*lixue*), which remained the largest and most powerful school of Confucianist teaching for centuries. In the late Southern Song dynasty, however, some philosophers such as Lu Jiuyuan began to challenge and critically modify the philosophy of principle, and the criticism culminated during the Ming dynasty in the advocacy of the philosophy of the mind (*xinxue*) by Wang Yangming (a.k.a. Wang Shouren, 1474–1528).

40. It is most likely that Mao is referring to Lu Dingyi's speech at Huairan Hall on May 26, 1956. (See text Autumn 1956, note 3.) Lu's speech, or "report," was not officially published until June 13, 1956, in *RMRB*. Even so, it makes the time between the publication of Lu's speech and Mao's speech here longer than the five months that Mao mentions.

41. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 13, and text.

Telegram to India  
(January 25, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 26, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 102 (Feb. 25, 1957), 67. Available English Translation: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Jan. 26, 1957), 1.

Dr. Rajendra Prasad, President,  
The Republic of India

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of your country's National Day, I express warm congratulations to Your Excellency and to the great Indian people. May the relations of close unity and friendly cooperation between China and India become more consolidated and develop with each passing day. May the Republic of India prosper and may the people of India have happiness.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated)

Speech at the Conference of Provincial, Municipal,  
and Autonomous Region Party Secretaries

(January 27, 1957)  
Version I

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 339–362. Available English Translation: *SW*, V, pp. 350–383. One excerpt quoted in *Jiaoyu yulu*, p. 16.

See text Jan. 18, 1957, source note. Owing to the apparent similarities of topics covered and specific remarks actually made by Mao in this document and in the one that follows (text Jan. 27, 1957[2]), whose sources are *Wansui* (1969) and *Wansui* (n.d. 3), we believe that these are actually two versions of the same speech. We accept as authoritative the date given by *Xuanji*, V, for this speech.

These two versions of the January 27 speech are very different in length and presentation even though quite similar in other respects, and it is difficult to compare them even on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis. Therefore we have chosen to present them sequentially, beginning with the *Xuanji* version. We should note here that *Xuanji* provides a specific date for this speech, but without specifying that it was a summation of the conference, whereas *Wansui* (1969) and *Wansui* (n.d. 3) merely give January 1957 as a date, and yet label the speech as a summation. These sources also leave out "autonomous region" in the title.

In reading these two versions, it is important to remember that while some differences

result from the fact that the official version is a transcript of the speech, whereas the *Red Guard* document, i.e., the *Wansui* (1969) and *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version, seems to be hand-taken notes on the content of the speech, other differences appear to be political revisions. For example, the official version concludes with a positive reference to Deng Xiaoping, which is nowhere to be found in the *Red Guard* version. Since it is impossible to establish such points as whether Mao did in fact make this reference, which was then omitted by the *Red Guard* source, or Mao did not make the reference and it was subsequently added by the editors of *Xuanji*, we can merely try to make readers aware of major differences, leaving them to draw their own conclusions.

Therefore the following method has been adopted. Where politically important differences exist between the two versions, readers' attention will be drawn to these differences in the notes to the version first presented. However, where the two versions seem to cover the same topic but vary in length, phraseology, order of exposition, or use of examples, readers will be left to make these comparisons on their own.

Aside from this speech (and the other speeches in this volume that were made by Mao at this conference of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party secretaries), and Mao's later reference to the fact that at this conference the forces opposed to the "adventurist advances" in agricultural cooperativization had gained ground,<sup>1</sup> little is known about the conference itself.<sup>2</sup>

Nonetheless, Mao's discussion here with the provincial and municipal leadership on the issues relating to the "Hundred Flowers"<sup>3</sup> is important as a clear preview of his more famous speech, "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People" (text Feb. 27, 1957). On the one hand, this talk anticipates some of the specifics of that later speech, e.g., his support for strikes and his call for open struggle between correct and incorrect ideas. But this speech is even more important for its clear exposition of the basis of Mao's later speech, i.e., his reliance on controlled social conflict as a means of moving toward communism. In other words, in response to what Mao observed as contradictions that had surfaced inside the international Communist movement in 1956 and early 1957, and in China itself and even more specifically within the CPC, Mao had begun to draw the conclusion that at this time it was necessary on his part to present a "theoretical basis" for "the correct handling" of these contradictions. In the January 18 speech he had focused on delineating these contradictions, but in the "summing up" address to the conference he focused on the "theory-related" ways in which these contradictions are to be observed, detected, and handled. Here, therefore, he emphatically suggests the watchwords of "dialectical materialism" and "unity of opposites." Ultimately in the February 27 speech to the Supreme State Conference, he would issue a point-by-point (and clearly much better prepared) exposé of both the theoretical positions and the political strategy that he had in mind.

Also of importance in this speech is Mao's admission in paragraph 13 that there are contradictions between China and the Soviet Union. This is possibly the first time that this admission, which had a significant impact on events to come, was made in public.

At this time I'd like to voice a few opinions.

The first point is that we must fully assess our accomplishments. In our revolution and construction, our accomplishments have been the principal aspect, [although] we also have had shortcomings and have made mistakes. We've had so many accomplishments; [of course] we mustn't exaggerate them, but if we underestimated them we'd be making a mistake, possibly a big mistake. Originally this problem was solved at the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, but it

has been discussed again many times at this conference; [therefore] it is clear that the problem has not yet been solved in the minds of some of the comrades.<sup>4</sup> Among the democratic personages<sup>5</sup> in particular there is an argument that says, “You people always say that accomplishments are the basic [aspect], but this doesn’t solve problems. Who doesn’t know that accomplishments are the basic [aspect]? However, there are still shortcomings and defects [to account for]!” Nevertheless, accomplishments are indeed the basic [aspect]. Unless we affirm this we will become disheartened. For instance, there have been some things that cause disheartenment with regard to cooperativization!

The second point has to do with comprehensive planning with due consideration to all sectors so that each may be provided for.<sup>6</sup> This has always been our general policy. We adopted this general policy at Yanan. In August 1944, *Dagong bao*<sup>7</sup> carried an editorial that said, “don’t set up a separate kitchen.”<sup>8</sup> At the time of the Chongqing negotiations<sup>9</sup> I told the person responsible for that paper that I agreed very much with what he said, provided Generalissimo Chiang took care of the meals. If he didn’t take care of feeding us, what could we do but set up a separate kitchen? At that time we suggested to Chiang Kai-shek the slogan that everyone be provided for. Now we are managing things. Our principle is to have a comprehensive plan with due consideration of all sectors and to have everyone provided for. This includes taking over all the military and government personnel whom the Kuomintang left behind; even those who have run off to Taiwan may return. With regard to counterrevolutionaries, we reform all those who were not killed and arrange a way out for them in giving them [opportunities to make] a living.<sup>10</sup> As for the democratic parties,<sup>11</sup> we’ll keep them around, coexist with them for a long time, and arrange jobs for their members. In short, we are taking care of the entire population of 600 million throughout the country. As another example, [by instituting] state-planned purchasing and marketing, we take care of the entire urban population as well as the households with a short supply of grain in the countryside.<sup>12</sup> Another example is the young people from the cities; whether they go to school, to the countryside, to the factories, or to the border regions, arrangements must be made for them. Furthermore we must provide relief for families in which no one has a job, our principle always being not to allow anybody to starve to death. All these are [within the scope of] comprehensive planning with due consideration to all sectors. What kind of policy is this? It is [a policy of] mobilizing all positive forces in order to build socialism. This is a strategic guideline. It’s better that we carry out this kind of policy; there will be fewer [chances for] trouble. We must explain to the public this idea of comprehensive planning with due consideration to all sectors [so that they may understand] clearly.

Comrade Ke Qingshi said that we must exhaust all possible methods.<sup>13</sup> This is well said. We must indeed think of all possible methods to solve difficulties. This slogan ought to be propagated. The difficulties we are faced with right now are not that big; there’s nothing that terrible about them! At least they are somewhat easier to live with than the ten thousand-*li* Long March, during which we climbed snow-capped mountains and crossed the marshlands, are they not? During the Long March, after we had crossed the Dadu River, we [were faced with the question of]

where we should go. High mountains piled upon each other to the north, where there is a very sparse population.<sup>14</sup> We then called for a thousand methods and a hundred plans to overcome the difficulty. What did we mean by a thousand methods and a hundred plans? By a thousand methods we mean adding one method on top of the nine hundred and ninety-nine methods. By the hundred plans we mean adding one plan on top of the ninety-nine plans.<sup>15</sup> At this moment, you still haven’t proposed [even] a few methods or a few plans. How many methods and plans do the various provinces and the various departments of the Central Committee actually have? If only we exhausted all possible methods, the difficulties would be solved.

The third point has to do with the international question. In the Middle East, the Suez Canal affair has erupted. One man, namely Nasser, nationalized the canal; another man, namely Eden, sent in an army to fight for it; soon thereafter a third, namely Eisenhower, wanted to drive away the British and hegemonize the area for himself.<sup>16</sup> The British bourgeoisie has always been the most cunning and most experienced of sly foxes; it is a class that knows best how to compromise at the appropriate moment. [But] now it has delivered the Middle East into the hands of the Americans. This is a big mistake! How many mistakes like this can one find in its history? Why was [the British bourgeoisie] so muddle-headed this time to commit such a big mistake? It was because the pressure that the United States put on it was too fierce; it could no longer control itself and wanted to grab back the Middle East and stop the United States. Is the spearhead of the British aimed against Egypt? No. The big fuss kicked up by the British was aimed at the United States, and that of the Americans was aimed at the British.

From this affair we can see the crux of the current world struggle. Of course, the contradiction between the imperialist countries and the socialist countries is a very acute contradiction; however, they are now using the opposition to communism as an excuse to fight among themselves for spheres of influence. What sphere of influence are they fighting for? They are fighting for the sphere of influence populated by the one billion people in Asia and Africa. At the moment their contention is focused on the Middle East, an area of very great strategic significance, especially the Suez Canal zone in Egypt. In the conflict in that area, there are two types of contradictions and three forces.<sup>17</sup> The first of the two types of contradictions [is the contradiction] between the imperialists themselves, that is, the contradiction between the United States and Britain and between the United States and France. The second type of contradiction [is the contradiction] between the imperialists and the oppressed peoples. Of the three forces, the first is the strongest imperialist, the United States; the second is made up of the second-rank imperialists, Britain and France; the third is the oppressed peoples. For the time being, the main areas of conflict for the imperialists are Asia and Africa. In all of these areas national independence movements have emerged. The methods adopted by the United States [in dealing with these movements] are both violent and nonviolent. This was the case in the Middle East.

[The fact that] they are causing trouble is to our advantage. Our policy ought to be to consolidate [the position of] the socialist countries and not yield a single inch



of territory. If there is anybody who wants us to yield, we will certainly fight with him. Beyond this sphere, let them go ahead and cause trouble. In that case, are we going to speak up? We're going to speak up. We insist on supporting the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in their struggle against imperialism and supporting the revolutionary struggles of the people in different countries of the world.

[The relationship] between our country and the imperialist countries [is one in which] there is part of them in us, and there is part of us in them.<sup>18</sup> We support the people's revolution in their countries, and they engage in subversive activities in ours. We have some of our people in their countries, namely in the Communist parties over there and among the revolutionary workers, peasants, intellectuals, and progressive people. [But] we have among us some of their people [too]. In the case of China, this refers to the many people in the bourgeoisie and in the democratic parties. Then there is also the landlord class. At present it looks as if they are rather compliant; they have not yet caused trouble. But if the atom bomb is dropped on Beijing, what will they do? Won't they rebel? That is highly questionable [for any of them]; and as for those who are undergoing labor reform, those who took the lead in making trouble in that school in Shijiazhuang, and that university student in Beijing who wanted to kill thousands and tens of thousands of people, there is even less doubt [as to what they would do].<sup>19</sup> We must definitely assimilate them, and transform landlords and capitalists into laborers. This is a strategic principle. It will take a long time to eliminate classes.

In short, with regard to our observation of the international problem, our perspective is still like this: The contradiction between the imperialists themselves in their contention for colonies is the greater contradiction. They use the contradiction between themselves and us to cover up the contradiction among themselves. We can exploit their contradiction; there is much that we can do in this area.<sup>20</sup> This is a major issue related to our foreign policy.

Let's talk a bit about Sino-U.S. relations. At this meeting we have printed and distributed a letter written by Eisenhower to Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>21</sup> I think that the primary [purpose of] this letter was to pour cold water on Chiang Kai-shek, and then to pump him up a bit again. Where the letter says it is necessary to remain calm and not be rash, it means that [Chiang] should not go to war but should rely on the United Nations instead. This is pouring cold water, because Chiang Kai-shek is in fact a bit rash. As for pumping him up, that's [where it] says that they will continue to adopt a hard policy against the Communists and place their hopes on trouble coming from within our [camp]. According to his view, trouble has already started, and the Communists have no way of stopping it. Well, everybody is entitled to his or her own observation!

I still think it is better to establish diplomatic relations with the United States a few years later. That would be more to [our] advantage. It was seventeen years after the October Revolution that the Soviet Union established relations with the United States. In 1929 the worldwide economic crisis erupted, and it continued until 1933. In that year, Hitler stepped onto the [political] stage in Germany, and Roosevelt stepped onto the stage in the United States. It was only then that the Soviet Union and the United States established diplomatic relations. It may not be

until after the completion of the Third Five-Year Plan that we establish relations with the United States, which is to say, after eighteen years or more.<sup>22</sup> We are in no hurry to join the United Nations, just as we are in no hurry to establish relations with the United States. We have adopted this policy in order to deprive the United States of as much political capital as possible, so that it will find itself in an unreasonable and isolated position. If they don't want us to join the United Nations or if they don't establish relations with us, fine; the longer you delay, the more you owe us. The longer you delay, the more unreasonable your [position] will be and the more isolated you will become both at home in the United States and in [the area of] international public opinion. At Yanan I told an American that America may refuse to recognize this government of ours for 100 years, but I don't believe you can refuse to recognize it in a 101 years.<sup>23</sup> There will be a day when the United States will want to establish relations with us. At that time, when the Americans come to China and take a look, they'll deeply regret [their past actions] because this land, China, will have changed; the house will have been cleaned, and the Four Pests will have been eliminated;<sup>24</sup> they will no longer be able to find many friends, and spreading a few germs won't do them much good.<sup>25</sup>

Since the Second World War, the capitalist countries have not been stable at all; they have been in great turmoil, and the people are anxiety ridden. All countries in the world feel anxiety, including China. But at least we are a bit more secure than they are. You can study the matter and see; between the socialist countries and the imperialist countries, primarily the United States, who, actually, is afraid of whom? I say we are all afraid of each other. The question is, who is more afraid of whom? I tend [to believe that] the imperialists are more afraid of us. There may be a danger in this estimation which is that we may all go to sleep and doze off for three days without waking. Therefore we must always take into consideration two kinds of possibilities. Apart from the good possibility, there is also the bad possibility, which is that the imperialists may go berserk. The imperialists have no good intentions; they always want to stir up trouble. Of course, it's not easy now for the imperialists to instigate a world war either. They have to consider the consequences of such a conflict.

Now let's talk a bit about Sino-Soviet relations. As I see it, there will always have to be some squabbling. Don't think that there will be no squabbling between Communist parties. How can anything in the world be without squabbling?<sup>26</sup> Marxism itself is a doctrine of contention, concerning itself with discussing contradiction and struggle. Contradictions are always present, and where there is contradiction there is struggle. At the moment there are some contradictions between China and the Soviet Union. The way they think and act, their history and their customs are different from ours. Therefore, we must do some work on them. I've always said that we must do some work among our comrades. Some people say: Since you are all Communist Party members, you must all be equally good, so why must you still do work [among yourselves]? [If you] do any work it should be in promoting the United Front<sup>27</sup> and working among the democratic personages; why would you still have to work among members of the Communist Party? This point of view is wrong. There are still many different opinions within the Commu-

nist Party. Some people have joined the Party organizationally, but ideologically they still have unsolved problems. There are even some old cadres who don't speak the same language we do. Therefore, we must have frequent heart-to-heart talks, we must hold discussions individually or in groups, and we must hold many meetings to straighten out our ideas.

As I see it, circumstances are more powerful than individuals, more powerful even than high officials. Under the pressure of circumstance, the great-power chauvinism that some die-hards in the Soviet Union still insist on practicing no longer works.<sup>28</sup> Our present policy is still to help them, and the method is to talk with them directly, face to face. This time, [for instance,] our delegation to the Soviet Union pierced through their [arguments on] some problems. On the telephone I said to Comrade Enlai, these people are blinded by profit,<sup>29</sup> and the best way to deal with them is to give them a thorough tongue-lashing.<sup>30</sup> What profits are we referring to? None other than the fifty million tons of steel, 400 million tons of coal, and eighty million tons of petroleum. What does that amount to? It's negligible, [but] their heads got all swollen when they saw these few things. What kind of Communist Party member is that? What kind of Marxist is that? I say, multiply it ten times or a hundred times, and it is still negligible. All you did was dig something out of the Earth, make it into steel, [and then] make that into things like cars and airplanes. What's so great about that? Yet you shoulder it like a great piece of baggage and pay no heed to every principle of revolution. Wouldn't you call that being blinded by profit? You could be blinded by profit, too, if you became an important official. It's also a kind of profit to become a first secretary.<sup>31</sup> This too can easily make your head swim. When someone gets really terribly confused, then we must find some way of giving him a thorough tongue-lashing. This time Comrade Enlai did not mince words with them in Moscow; he contradicted them and made them argue back in return. This is good; we cleared things up face to face. They want to influence us, and we want to influence them too. We didn't pierce through all their [arguments at once] because one mustn't use up all of one's tricks at one time; so we kept a few tricks up our sleeves. There will always be contradictions. As long as we can generally tolerate the present situation, we can seek common ground while maintaining differences.<sup>32</sup> As for the differences, we can discuss them later. If they persist on the same path then it is certain that one day, all [the problems] will be brought to the surface.

For our part, we must not exaggerate when we do external propaganda work. We must remain modest and prudent at all times, and tuck our tails a little tighter between our legs.<sup>33</sup> We must still learn from the Soviet Union, but we must be selective in learning; we must learn the advanced things and not the backward things.<sup>34</sup> We have a different way of learning from backward things, which is not to learn them. If we know their mistakes, then we can avoid committing those mistakes. We must learn those things they have that are useful to us. We must learn the things of every country in the world that are useful to us. In seeking knowledge one must search everywhere; to look for it only in one place would get monotonous.

The fourth point: Let a hundred flowers bloom and let a hundred schools contend.<sup>35</sup> This policy was proposed after the Hu Feng counterrevolutionary clique

was criticized, and I think it is still a correct policy.<sup>36</sup> It conforms to the dialectical method.

Lenin once said, regarding the dialectical method, "We can simply define the dialectical method as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. In this way we can grasp the essence of dialectics, but it [still] requires explanation and development."<sup>37</sup> It is our job to explain it and enlarge upon it. We must explain [the dialectical method]; as yet we have made too little explanation of it. Moreover we must enlarge upon it. We have had abundant experiences in the revolution, and we ought to enlarge upon this doctrine [of dialectics]. Lenin also said, "The unity (uniformity, identity, and balance) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transient, and relative. On the other hand, mutually exclusive, antagonistic struggle is absolute, just as development and motion is absolute."<sup>38</sup> It is with this perspective as a point of departure that we have proposed the policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools contend.<sup>39</sup>

Truth stands in contrast to falsehood and is developed out of the struggle against it; beauty stands in contrast to ugliness and is developed out of the struggle against it.<sup>40</sup> The same is true of good and bad things. Good things and good people stand in contrast to bad things and bad people and are developed out of the struggle against them. In short, fragrant flowers stand in contrast to poisonous weeds<sup>41</sup> and are developed out of the struggle against them. It is a dangerous policy to forbid people to meet face to face with false, ugly, and antagonistic things, to meet face to face with idealistic and metaphysical things, or to meet face to face with things [related to] Confucius, Lao Zi, and Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>42</sup> Such [a policy] would lead to the deterioration of people's ideology; it would only be shadow boxing [and would lead to] people being incapable of facing the outside world, and unable to meet the challenge of a rival.

In philosophy, materialism and idealism are a unity of opposites and struggle with each other. Two other things, dialectics and metaphysics, are also a unity of opposites that struggle against each other. Whenever philosophy is discussed, these two pairs [of contradictions] cannot be avoided. At present, the Soviet Union is not developing pairs, it is only developing "singles."<sup>43</sup> They say they are letting only fragrant flowers bloom and not poisonous weeds; they refuse to acknowledge that idealism and metaphysics exist in socialist countries. In fact, no matter what the country, idealism, metaphysics, and poisonous weeds will always exist. In the Soviet Union, many poisonous weeds have appeared in the guise of fragrant flowers. Many weird arguments have appeared there wearing the hat of materialism, or socialist realism.<sup>44</sup> We publicly acknowledge the struggle between materialism and idealism, between dialectics and metaphysics, and between fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds. This struggle will continue forever and will move one step forward at each stage.

My advice to the comrades here today is that if you [already] understand materialism and dialectics, then you still need to supplement it by learning a bit about their opposites, idealism and metaphysics. Those things on the opposing side, Kant's and Hegel's writings,<sup>45</sup> Confucius, and Chiang Kai-shek's books, ought to be read. If you don't understand idealism and metaphysics and have not undergone

a struggle against these things of the opposing side, your materialism and dialectics would not be solid. The shortcoming of some of our Communist Party members and Communist intellectuals is precisely that they know too little about the things on the opposite side. They read a few books written by Marx and proceed to talk about them accordingly; this is relatively monotonous. Their speeches and writings [therefore] lack persuasiveness. If you don't study things on the opposite side you cannot refute them. Marx, Engels, and Lenin were not like that. They all studied energetically and learned all sorts of contemporary and historical things; moreover, they counseled others to do the same. The three component parts of Marxism were produced through the process of studying the things in bourgeois [society], studying German classical philosophy, British classical economics, and French utopian socialism, and struggling against them.<sup>46</sup> Stalin was a bit less sound. For instance, during his time German classical idealist philosophy was said to be a kind of reaction on the part of the German aristocracy to the French Revolution. To draw a conclusion like that is to totally negate German classical idealist philosophy.<sup>47</sup> He [also] negated German military science, saying that [since] the Germans had been defeated, their military science was impractical, and Clausewitz's book needn't be read any more.<sup>48</sup>

Stalin had a lot of metaphysical [ideas], and he taught many people to engage in metaphysics. In the *Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)*, he said that Marxist dialectics had four basic characteristics.<sup>49</sup> The first that he talked about was the relationship between things, as if all things were related for no reason. In fact, how are things related? The relationship is actually between the two aspects of a contradiction. In everything there are two aspects in opposition to each other. The fourth [characteristic] he talked about was the internal contradiction in things. Again, he only talked about the struggle between opposites, but not about the unity of opposites. According to this unity of opposites—this basic law of dialectics—opposites struggle against each other, and at the same time they are united; they are mutually exclusive and also interrelated, and under certain conditions they transform themselves into each other.

The entry on "identity" in the fourth edition of the *Concise Dictionary of Philosophy* compiled in the Soviet Union reflects Stalin's point of view.<sup>50</sup> The dictionary says, "Phenomena such as war and peace, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and life and death have no identity because they are fundamentally opposed to and mutually exclusive of each other." This is to say that these phenomena which are in fundamental opposition to each other do not have identity in the Marxist [sense], are mutually exclusive rather than interrelated, and cannot transform themselves into each other under certain [necessary] conditions. This interpretation is fundamentally incorrect.<sup>51</sup>

In their view, war is war, and peace is peace, and these two things are only mutually exclusive; they are not interrelated at all; war cannot be transformed into peace, and peace cannot be transformed into war. Lenin used the words of Clausewitz, "War is a continuation of politics through other means."<sup>52</sup> Struggle in peacetime is politics; war is also politics but [carried on] by special means. War and peace are mutually exclusive [but] are also interrelated, and under certain

[necessary] conditions they are transformed into each other. If war is not brewed during times of peace, how can war come so suddenly? If peace is not brewed during war, how can there be peace so suddenly?

If life and death do not transform into each other, tell me, where do living things come from? In the beginning there were only nonliving things on earth; living things came only later, by way of the transformation of nonliving, i.e., dead, things. All living things have metabolism; they grow, they propagate, and they die. In the active process of life, life and death also constantly struggle against each other and transform into each other.

If the bourgeoisie and the proletariat cannot transform themselves, then how is it that after the revolution the proletariat becomes the ruler and the bourgeoisie the ruled? For instance, we and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang are fundamentally opposed to each other. As a result of the mutual struggle and mutual rejection between these two opposite sides, our position and that of the Kuomintang have both undergone a change. From being rulers they have become the ruled; from being ruled we have become the rulers. No more than 10 per cent of the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan; 90 per cent remain on the mainland. We are in the midst of transforming those who remain; this is a unity of opposites under new conditions. As for the 10 per cent who fled to Taiwan, we are still in a unity of opposites with them, and we still must transform them through struggle.

Stalin was unable to make the connection between the struggle and unity of opposites. The thought of some people in the Soviet Union is just metaphysical and petrified like that; they view things in either this way or that way [arbitrarily] and do not acknowledge the unity of opposites. Therefore, they make mistakes in politics. We uphold the viewpoint of the unity of opposites and adopt the policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend. At the same time that fragrant flowers are blooming, there will inevitably be poisonous weeds blooming too. This is nothing to fear, and, under certain conditions, it may even be beneficial.

For a period of time, some phenomena will be unavoidable. But after they spring up, there will be ways [of dealing with them]. For instance, in the past we exercised a very rigid control over the repertoire of performances in drama, and we didn't allow performances of either this [play] or that. Now that things have been relaxed, everything, including *Wupanji*, *Tianleibao*,<sup>53</sup> and all the demons and ogres, has run onto the stage.<sup>54</sup> Then we can criticize those plays and reform them or ban them. Some people say that some local plays are no good and that even the local people oppose them. I think it's all right to perform some of these plays. Whether or not [a play] can stand on its feet and how much of an audience it can attract can be left to be judged by practice; we needn't be in a hurry to ban it.

Now we have decided to expand the circulation of *Cankao xiaoxi*<sup>55</sup> from two thousand copies to four hundred thousand copies so that people both in and outside the Party can read it. This is the Communist Party publishing a newspaper for imperialism; it is going to print even the reactionary arguments that malign us. Why are we doing this? The purpose is to put the poisonous weeds and the non-Marxist and anti-Marxist things in front of our comrades, in front of the masses of people

and the democratic personages, so as to temper them. We mustn't quarantine things; quarantining things is actually dangerous. On this matter, our way of doing things is different from that of the Soviet Union. Why do people get vaccinations? It's in order to artificially introduce a virus into the human body to carry out "germ warfare," to fight with you so that your body may generate immunity. The circulation of *Cankao xiaoxi* and the publication of other material for [teaching by] negative example is to get [people] "vaccinated" in order to strengthen the political immunity of our cadres and the masses.

With regard to some harmful arguments we must offer timely and powerful rebuttals. For instance, that essay "On 'Unavoidability'" in *Renmin ribao* argues that the mistakes in our work are not unavoidable, [but] that we use the term "unavoidable" to excuse mistakes in our work.<sup>56</sup> This is a harmful argument. It seems to me that this essay need not have been published. Since it was to be published, then we ought to have prepared a timely rebuttal, put on a rival show.<sup>57</sup> Our historical experience has proven that it is indeed unavoidable that, in our work of revolution and construction, we make some mistakes. The essay "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" is a major [explication of the] theory of unavoidability.<sup>58</sup> Who among our comrades wants to make mistakes? Mistakes are always recognized only after they are made; to begin with we all think of ourselves as 100 per cent Marxist. Of course, we mustn't think that it's all right to make some mistakes simply because mistakes are unavoidable. Yet we must still admit that it is indeed impossible not to commit any mistake at all in our work. The point is to make fewer and smaller mistakes.

All ill winds in society must be subdued. No matter whether they are in the Party, among the democratic personages, or among the young people and students, all ill winds—that is, not errors of individuals but errors that have become common practice—must be subdued.<sup>59</sup> The way of beating down [ill winds] is to reason with [them]. If only we are persuasive, we can beat down the ill winds. If we are not persuasive and can only shout a few curses, then the gusts of ill wind will become stronger and stronger. We must make complete preparation with regard to matters of importance so that when we are confident about it we can publish rebuttals that are completely persuasive. The [Party] secretaries should manage the newspapers personally and write their own articles.

Of the two mutually opposed and struggling aspects in a unity [of opposites], one aspect is always primary and the other is secondary. In our country, with a dictatorship of the proletariat, of course we cannot allow poisonous weeds to grow everywhere unchecked. Whether in the Party or in the intellectual, literary, and art circles, we must strive hard [to ensure that] it is the fragrant flowers and Marxism that are in the primary and ruling position. As for the poisonous weeds and the non-Marxist or anti-Marxist things, they can only be in the position of being ruled. In a certain sense, this can be compared to the relationship between the proton and the electrons in an atom. The atom is divided into two parts; one is called the nucleus, the other is called the electrons. The nucleus is very small but very heavy. The electrons are very light; an electron is approximately no more than one eighteen-hundredth the weight of the lightest nucleus. The nucleus itself can be

split, but it is relatively solid. The electrons [on the other hand] have some "liberalism." Some can run away, and others will come over [from other atoms]. The relationship between the nucleus and the electrons is also a unity of opposites, with [one of them being] the primary [aspect] and [the other] the secondary. From this point of view, the blooming of a hundred flowers and the contending of a hundred schools is beneficial, not harmful.

The fifth point: the problem of disturbances. In a socialist society, disturbances caused by a few people are a new problem well worth examination.

Everything in society is a unity of opposites. A socialist society is also a unity of opposites. There is a unity of opposites among the people themselves, and there is also a unity of opposites between the enemy and ourselves. The fundamental reason that there are still a few people in our country causing trouble is that there are still all sorts of opposites—positive and negative—in our society; there are still opposing classes, opposing people, and opposing ideas.

We have basically accomplished the socialist transformation of the system of ownership of the means of production, but we still have the bourgeoisie and still have the landlords, rich peasants, local bullies, and counterrevolutionaries. They are classes that have been expropriated. At this moment we are oppressing them; they harbor hatred in their hearts [for us], and many will give vent to it once they have the opportunity. At the time of the emergence of the Hungarian affair,<sup>60</sup> they had hoped to turn Hungary into a mess and also hoped possibly to turn China into a mess. That is their class instinct.

The weird arguments espoused by some of the democratic personages and professors are also in opposition to us. They espouse idealism; we espouse materialism. They say that the Communists are incapable of controlling science, that there's nothing superior about socialism, that cooperativization is very bad; we say that the Communists are capable of controlling science, that socialism has superior features, and that cooperativization is very good.

There are also quite a few students who are opposed to us. At the moment the majority of university students come from families who were of the exploitative classes, so there is nothing strange about the fact that there are people among them who oppose us. There are people like that in Beijing, in Shijiazhuang, and in other places too.

There are also some people in society who revile our provincial [Party] committees as "mummies." Are the provincial committees mummies? As I see it, our provincial committees haven't even died yet; how could they have become mummies? Their curse that our provincial committees are mummies and our claim that our provincial committees are not mummies are also opposed to each other.

In our Party, there are also all sorts of opinions that are in opposition to each other. For instance, there are two opposing views regarding the CPSU's knocking off Stalin in one blow at the "Twentieth Congress"; one supports [the CPSU's action] and the other opposes it. Differences of opinion in the Party are a common occurrence. If opinions happen to coincide, after a month or two, new and differing opinions will again emerge.

In the area of people's way of thinking, realism and subjectivism are opposed

to each other. As I see it, subjectivism can happen in any year. [Can we believe that] ten thousand years from now there will not be a single bit of subjectivism? I don't believe it.

[In] a factory, a cooperative, a school, an organization, or a family, in short, in any place and at any time, there will be aspects that are in opposition to each other. Therefore, having a small number of people causing trouble in society [is something] that will occur every year.

As for trouble, should we be afraid of it or not after all? Wouldn't it be a little strange if we, the Communists, who have always been fearless of imperialism, of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, of the landlord class, and of the bourgeoisie, were to be afraid of the students causing trouble and of the peasants raising a fuss over the cooperatives now? Only Duan Qirui<sup>61</sup> and Chiang Kai-shek were afraid of the masses stirring up trouble. Beyond that, there are some people in Hungary and the Soviet Union who are afraid too. Regarding [the fact that] a few people are causing trouble, we ought to take an active attitude and not take a passive attitude, which is to say that we must not be afraid and must be prepared. Fear is no solution. The more afraid you are, the more ghosts will come [to visit you].<sup>62</sup> Only if you are not afraid of trouble and are mentally prepared can you avoid being trapped in passivity. I think we must be prepared for big trouble. If you are prepared for big trouble, it may not happen at all; but if you are not so prepared, disturbances will occur.

There are only two possibilities—the good and the bad—in the development of things. Whether in international problems or in domestic problems, we must anticipate these two possibilities. You say that it may be peaceful this year, and that may be so. Yet, if you base your work on this sort of estimation, it won't be good; the best thing is to think about things on the basis of the worst possibility. Internationally, the worst eventuality would be for there to be a world war and for atom bombs to be dropped. Domestically, the worst eventuality would be for there to be great nationwide disturbance, for there to be a "Hungarian affair" [here], and for there to be several million people rising up against us, occupying several hundred *xian* and even fighting their way to Beijing. [In that case] we'd just go back to Yanan; that's where we came from, anyway. We've been in Beijing for seven years now. What would we do if we were asked to go back to Yanan in the eighth year? Would we all lament [that the cause was lost] or weep bitterly? Of course, we have no intention right now of going back to Yanan, or of merely "making a feint with our spear, then turning our horse around and retreating." At the time of the "Seventh Congress,"<sup>63</sup> I said that we should anticipate seventeen difficulties, including having thousands of *li* of our territory scorched, having great natural calamities and no rice to eat, or even losing all our *xian* capitals. It's because we anticipated things so completely that we were able to take the initiative from beginning to end. Even now that we've gained control of the entire country, we must still envision the worst possibilities.

That a few people cause trouble is due in some cases to the existence of bureaucratism and subjectivism in the leadership and mistakes made in either political or economic policy.<sup>64</sup> Then there are also cases where it has not been the

policy but the method of its implementation that has been at fault; it has been too rigid. Another factor has been the existence of counterrevolutionaries and bad elements. It is impossible completely to avoid trouble being caused by a few people. Here is another case of the theory of unavailability. However, unless a great error of line is committed, great nationwide disturbances will not happen. Even if we made a great error of line and great nationwide disturbances did occur, I think they would subside very soon, and the nation would not perish. Of course, if we do not handle things well, it is still very possible for history to backtrack a bit and for there to be a bit of regression. The 1911 Revolution [for instance] backtracked. It got rid of an emperor, but then another emperor and the warlords came along.<sup>65</sup> There are revolutions only where there are problems, but after revolution problems again arise. I believe that if we have a great nationwide upheaval, there will always be the masses and their leaders—who may be ourselves, or who may be others—to pick up the pieces. After great trouble like that, after the sore breaks open, our country can only be even more secure. China will always march forward.

Regarding [the fact that] there are a few people causing trouble: one, we do not promote it, but two, if some people insist on causing [trouble] we'll let them do it. We have provisions in the Constitution for the freedom of parades and demonstrations; there is no provision for the freedom to strike, but there's no prohibition against that either.<sup>66</sup> Therefore strikes are not in violation of the Constitution. If there were people who wanted to strike or submit a petition, it would be bad if you insisted on obstructing them. I think that whoever wants to cause trouble should be allowed to do so for as long as he wants. If a month is not sufficient, give him two months; in short, don't stop the show until he's had enough. If you stop the show too hastily, one of these days he will cause trouble again. In whichever schools students are causing trouble, don't give the schools a vacation; insist on fighting a hard battle like the Battle of Chibi.<sup>67</sup> What good will come out of this? [The good] will be that we will expose the problem fully and distinguish right from wrong, so that everybody will be tempered and so that the unreasonable and bad people will be defeated in the fray.

We must learn such an art of leadership. We can't just stifle everything all the time. When people come up with some weird arguments or strike or present a petition, you beat them back right away because you always believed that such things should not occur in this world. Why have things occurred that should not occur? It [simply] shows that they are things that ought to occur. If you don't allow people to strike, to petition, or to say bad things, if you put them down every which way, if you continuously put them down, one day you will turn into a Rakosi.<sup>68</sup> This is true both inside and outside the Party. It's best to expose all the weird arguments, strange activities, and contradictions. We must expose contradictions and solve them.

As for [people] causing trouble, we must handle them according to various types of circumstances. One type is where causing trouble is correct, [in which case] we ought to admit our mistakes and correct them. Another type is where causing trouble is incorrect, [in which case] the trouble should be rebuffed. If there is reason for causing a disturbance then it ought to be caused, but if it is a disturbance for

which there is no reason, then it will get nowhere. Still another type [of circumstance] is where there are some valid [reasons for stirring up trouble] and some invalid [reasons as well]. We accept the reasons that are valid and criticize those that are not; we cannot go backward with every step and, in total disregard of principle, make promises on each and every demand. Except [in the case of] large-scale, genuine counterrevolutionary riots, in which case military suppression is necessary, we must not apply military force too readily and must not open fire. The "March 18" Massacre, which Duan Qirui instigated, was just this method of opening fire, and as a consequence [Duan] himself was toppled.<sup>69</sup> We must not emulate Duan Qirui's methods.

We must do good work among those who cause trouble and differentiate them, and make a distinction between the majority and the minority [among them]. We must give the majority good guidance and education so that they will gradually change; we must not hurt them. I think that, in every place, there are few [people] at either extreme and many in the center. We must gradually strive to win over the middle-of-the-roaders. In this way we will be at an advantage. We must analyze people who play the leading role in causing trouble. Some of those who dare to take the lead in causing trouble may become useful people after being educated. Except for those who have committed the most serious crimes, we must not arrest the small number of bad people or lock them up or dismiss them [from school or office]. We must keep them at their original units, but strip them of all their political capital, isolate them, and use them as teachers by negative example. As for that Qinghua University student who wanted to kill thousands and tens of thousands of people, when our Comrade Deng Xiaoping went to make a speech there, he asked him to become a teacher.<sup>70</sup> A person like that is unarmed; he doesn't have a pistol, so why should you be afraid of him? If you expelled him, your unit would be very clean, but you would not have won over people's hearts. If you expelled him, he would go elsewhere to look for work. Therefore, expelling these people in a hurry is not a good method. These people represent the reactionary classes; this is not a problem of a few individuals. The simple way of handling them may be very quick and expedient, but their function as teachers by negative example cannot be used to full effect that way. In the Soviet Union, when the university students caused trouble, they just expelled a few of the leaders. They do not realize that we can use a bad thing as teaching material. Naturally, [however], we would have to impose a dictatorship on the extremely few people [who instigate] counterrevolutionary riots and disturbances such as the Hungarian Incident.

We must allow the democratic personages to stage their play opposite ours,<sup>71</sup> and let them go ahead and criticize. If we don't do this, we would be somewhat like the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was very afraid of being criticized. Every time they went to a Political Council session they did so with trepidation.<sup>72</sup> There are only two types of criticism from the democratic personages: one type is incorrect, the other type is correct. [The criticisms] that are correct can [help] remedy our shortcomings; those that are incorrect must be rebutted. As for people like Liang Shuming, Peng Yihu, and Zhang Naiqi, if they have to fart, let them fart.<sup>73</sup> It's more beneficial [to us] if they fart; let everybody smell it and see whether

it smells good or stinks; then, through discussion, we can win over the majority and isolate those people. If they want to cause trouble, let them do it until they've had enough of it. Those who commit too many injustices will destroy themselves.<sup>74</sup> The more incorrect the things they say are, the better it is [for us]; the bigger the mistakes they make are, the better. In this way they will become more isolated, and better able to educate the people by negative example. In dealing with the democratic personages we must both unite with them and struggle against them, and, distinguishing between different circumstances, in some cases we ought to take active measures, in others we ought to let them expose themselves before striking them, rather than [staging a] preemptive attack.<sup>75</sup>

The struggle against the bourgeois ideology and against bad people and bad things is a protracted one that will last several decades or even several centuries. The working class, the laboring people, and the revolutionary intellectuals will gain experience and be tempered through struggle; this is very beneficial [to them].

Bad things have a dual character; one aspect is bad, [the other] is good. At the moment many comrades are still unclear about this. Bad things contain good elements. To see bad people and bad things only as bad is to look at problems one-sidedly and from a metaphysical point of view, not from a dialectical or Marxist point of view. On the one hand, bad people and bad things are bad; on the other hand, they [can be put to] good use. For instance, a bad person like Wang Ming<sup>76</sup> has [been put to] good use as a teacher by negative example. Similarly, good things also contain bad elements. For instance, the great victories we have achieved in the seven years since Liberation, especially the big victory achieved this last year, have made some comrades swollen-headed and arrogant, so much so that they are quite surprised at the sudden arrival on the scene of a few people stirring up trouble.

The fundamental reason for being afraid of trouble and for handling these matters in a simple way lies in not recognizing ideologically that socialist society is a unity of opposites and that there are contradictions, classes, and class struggle within it.

For a long time Stalin refused to recognize that under the socialist system contradictions between the relations of production and the forces of production and contradictions between the superstructure and the economic base [continue to exist]. It was only when he wrote *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*<sup>77</sup> one year before his death that he hesitantly discussed the contradictions between the relations of production and the forces of production under the socialist system and said that if policies were incorrect or improperly regulated, problems would arise.<sup>78</sup> Even so, he still did not present [the problem of] contradictions under a socialist system between the relations and the forces of production and between the superstructure and the economic base as an issue of overall significance, he still did not recognize that these contradictions are the basic contradictions that propel socialist society forward. He thought that his state was secure. We mustn't think that the state is secure; it is secure and, at the same time, insecure.

According to dialectics, just as people inevitably die one day, the socialist system as a historical phenomenon will also inevitably die one day. It will be negated by the Communist system. If we say that the socialist system is imperish-

able, that socialist relations of production and superstructure are imperishable, then what kind of Marxism is that? Isn't that the same as religious dogma, or like a theology that preaches that God is imperishable?

How to handle contradictions between the enemy and ourselves and contradictions among the people in a socialist society is a science that deserves careful study. Under the conditions prevailing in our country, some of the current class struggles are contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, but the majority express themselves as contradictions among the people. At this moment, this situation is reflected in the small number of people who are causing trouble. If the earth is to be destroyed in ten thousand years, then within these ten thousand years at least, there will [always] be the problem of trouble occurring. However, we are in no position to control things in such a remote future as ten thousand years hence. What we do have to do is earnestly to gain some experience in handling this problem within several five-year plans.

We must strengthen our work and correct our mistakes and shortcomings. What work needs strengthening? In industry, agriculture, commerce, education, the military, the government and also the Party, in all these areas, political and ideological work must be strengthened. At the moment everybody is preoccupied with vocational [duties], preoccupied with day-to-day work—such as the routine work of economic affairs, of cultural and educational affairs, of national defense, and of Party affairs—and not engaged in promoting political or ideological work; that's very dangerous. Our General Secretary, Comrade Deng Xiaoping, has now gone personally to Qinghua University to make a report, and I ask all of you also to go and deal with problems personally.<sup>79</sup> The leading comrades in the Party committees of the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions must all go personally to do political and ideological work. Since the Second World War, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the parties in some countries in East Europe have no longer concerned themselves with the fundamental principles of Marxism. They are no longer concerned about class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Party, democratic centralism, and the connection between the Party and the masses.<sup>80</sup> The [political] atmosphere is thinning out. Consequently, the Hungarian affair has occurred. We must firmly uphold the fundamental theories of Marxism. Every province, municipality, and autonomous region must promote theoretical work and cultivate Marxist theoreticians and critics in a planned way.

We must streamline our organization. The state is an instrument of class struggle. Class is not the same as the state; the state is formed by some people (a small number) from the class that is in the dominant position.<sup>81</sup> Office work requires some people, but it is best to have as few as possible. At the moment the state apparatus is huge with a great many departments. Many people are squatting in the office with nothing to do. This problem has to be solved. The first thing [that must be done] is that the number of personnel must be reduced; the second thing is that arrangements must be made for those [whose positions] we are planning to cut so that all of them have some secure place to go. This should be done in the Party, the government, and the military.<sup>82</sup>

We must go down to the lower levels to study problems. I hope that all our comrades at the [Party] Center, and all the comrades in positions of major responsibility in the provinces, the municipalities, the autonomous regions, and in all departments will do this. I hear that now many comrades in positions of responsibility are no longer going down; this is not good. The offices at the Center are miserable places; one can't learn anything at all staying here. If you want to learn something, it won't be found by squatting here in the office. The place where knowledge is truly produced is in the factory, the cooperative, and the shop. From inside the offices it is impossible to get a clear idea of how to run factories, cooperatives, and shops. The higher the level of the office, the less [knowledge] you can find. To solve problems you simply have to go down yourself, or ask someone down there to come up. If, first of all, you don't go down, and second, you don't ask people from below to come up, you cannot solve problems. I suggest that the secretaries of the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees also take a supplementary position as *xian* [Party] committee secretaries, or maybe factory or school [Party] committee secretaries. The [special] district and *xian* [Party] committee secretaries should also take a supplementary position as [Party committee] secretaries at lower-level units. In this way they can gain experience and direct the overall situation.<sup>83</sup>

We must be closely linked to the masses. [If we are] divorced from the masses, [if we practice] bureaucratism, we will surely be given a beating. The Hungarian leadership did not conduct investigation or study and did not understand the situation among the masses. When big trouble came, they still didn't know what the cause was. Currently we have some leaders in the [central] departments, and in the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees, who do not understand ideological trends among the masses. Some people have been fermenting trouble and riots, and yet [these leaders] haven't known the first thing about it, and when these things have occurred, they have been caught unaware. We must take this as a warning. The comrades at the Center and the comrades in major positions of responsibility in the various provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions and at the departments must go, for a period of time each year, to such basic-level units as factories, cooperatives, shops, and schools, to carry out investigation and study and to get a clear idea of the situation among the masses, to find out how many progressive, moderate, and backward [people] there are [in each place] and to find out how well our work among the masses has been done, so that they know how things stand [at the lower levels]. We must rely on the working class, on the poor and lower-middle peasants, and on the progressive elements; we must always have something to rely on. Only then can we avoid such an affair as that in Hungary.

The sixth point: the problem of the legal system.<sup>84</sup> I want to make three points: we must obey the law, we must suppress the counterrevolution, and we must affirm the achievements made in the suppression of the counterrevolution.

We must obey the law and must not damage the revolutionary legal system. Law is [part of the] superstructure. Our laws have been formulated by the laboring people themselves. They maintain the revolutionary order, protect the interests of

the laboring people, protect the socialist economic base, and protect the forces of production. We demand that everybody obey the revolutionary legal system; we are not demanding that only the democratic personages obey the law.

We must suppress the counterrevolution. Where the suppression of the counterrevolution has not been accomplished according to plan, it should be completed this year, and if there are still some cases left unsolved, they must be finished next year. There are some units where suppression of the counterrevolution has taken place but has not been thorough; [in places such as these] suppression should take place thoroughly step by step, through struggle. There are no longer many counterrevolutionaries; this is something that should be affirmed. Where trouble is stirred up, the broad masses will not follow the counterrevolutionaries; those who follow the counterrevolutionaries are only a few and do so only temporarily. At the same time we must also affirm that there still are counterrevolutionaries and that the work of suppressing them has not ended.

We must affirm the achievements in suppressing counterrevolutionaries. The achievements in suppressing counterrevolutionaries have been very great. There have also been mistakes, and of course these should be dealt with seriously. We must back up the cadres who are doing the work of suppressing the counterrevolution. We must not soften up just because some democratic personages scold us. If you scold every day, if you find nothing to do besides eating but to scold people, that's your business. I think the more you scold the better. The three things that I've mentioned here cannot be refuted by scolding.

The Communists have withstood who knows how much scolding. The Kuomintang maligned us and called us the "Communist bandits"; when other people communicated with us, they were accused of "communicating with the bandits." In the end, those who were "bandits" proved better than those who were not "bandits." Since time immemorial nothing progressive has been welcomed at its inception. It always suffers scolding. Marxism and the Communist Party have been maligned from their very beginnings. Even in [another] ten thousand years progressive things will be scolded at their inception.

The suppression of the counterrevolution must be maintained; wherever there are counterrevolutionaries they have to be suppressed. The legal system must be obeyed. To do things according to law is not to be bound hand and foot. If there are counterrevolutionaries and they have not been suppressed, [then we are] bound hand and foot, and that's not right. We must free our hands and feet [by acting] in accordance with the law.

The seventh point: the problem of agriculture. We must strive for a bumper harvest this year. If we have a bumper harvest this year, the people will feel reassured, and the cooperatives can become rather consolidated. In the Soviet Union and in some Eastern European countries, when they promoted cooperativization, they always had a reduction in the production of grain for a certain number of years. We've promoted cooperativization for several years now; last year the promotion was very vigorous, and not only have we not had a reduction in production, but instead we have had an increase in production. If there is another bumper harvest this year, then it would be an unprecedented event in the history

of cooperativization and in the history of the international Communist movement.

The whole Party must stress agriculture. Agriculture has an extremely significant effect on the national economy and the people's livelihood. We have to pay attention to it; it is very dangerous not to get a grasp on [the problem of] grain. If we do not take hold of the grain [situation], one of these days there will be great disorder throughout the country.

First, agriculture affects the problem of feeding 500 million people in the countryside, of [supplying] meat, edible oil, and other noncommercial agricultural products for daily consumption. The portion that the peasants provide for themselves is a huge amount. For instance, last year some 360 billion catties of grain were produced, and of these, commodity grain, including grain delivered to the state, made up approximately eighty-some billion catties; less than one-quarter. More than three-quarters went to the peasants. When agriculture is well-developed and the peasants can provide for themselves, the livelihood of 500 million people will be stabilized.

Second, agriculture also affects the problem of feeding the population of cities and industrial and mining districts. Only when [production] of commodity agricultural products is developed can the needs of the industrial population be met, and only then can industry be developed. On the basis of the development of agricultural production, we must gradually increase the ratio of commodity agricultural production [to noncommodity agricultural production], especially in grain. If there is food to eat, then we needn't fear a few people stirring up trouble in the schools and factories.

Third, agriculture is the main source of raw material for light industry, whereas the countryside is the major market for light industry. Only when agriculture is developed can light industrial production be provided with sufficient raw material and a broad market be found for the products of light industry.<sup>85</sup>

Fourth, the countryside is also a major market for heavy industry. For instance, chemical fertilizers, different kinds of farm machinery, and a portion of the electric power, coal, and petroleum are supplied to the countryside. The railways, highways, and large-scale water conservation constructions also serve [the needs of] agriculture. Now we have established a socialist agricultural economy, and, whether for the development of light industry or for the development of heavy industry, the countryside is an extremely large market.

Fifth, at the present moment the primary export goods are agricultural products. When agricultural products get transformed into foreign currency, we will be able to import all sorts of industrial equipment.

Sixth, agriculture is an important source of accumulation. If agriculture is developed, it can provide more funds for the development of industry.

Therefore, in a certain sense we can say that agriculture is industry. We must persuade the industrial departments to turn their attention to the countryside and to support agriculture. If we are to carry out industrialization well, that is what we ought to do.

What, after all, is the optimum ratio in the income of the cooperative between accumulation for [reinvestment in] agriculture itself and the accumulation that the



state derives from agriculture? Let's give it some study and come up with a suitable ratio. The purpose is to allow agriculture to expand reproduction so that it can become an even larger market for industry and an even greater source of accumulation. We must first let agricultural accumulation expand; only then can it provide greater accumulation for industry. If agriculture only accumulates for industry, but very little or not at all for itself, it would be like draining the pond to catch the fish<sup>86</sup> and would actually be unfavorable for industrial development.

The ratio between the accumulation of the cooperative and the income of the members of the cooperative must also be considered. The cooperative must use the law of value to engage in economic accounting, must be run diligently and frugally, and must gradually increase its accumulation.<sup>87</sup> This year, if we have a bumper harvest, accumulation should be slightly higher than last year, but not too much [higher]. We should still let the peasants eat a bit more first. During years with bumper harvests, accumulation can be greater; then, in years of natural calamity or near-calamity, we will not make accumulations or will accumulate less. This is to say that accumulation will occur in a wave-like, or spiral-like, fashion. Because everything in this world is a contradiction and a unity of opposites, its movement and development occur in a wave-like fashion.<sup>88</sup> When the sun's rays approach they are called light waves; [the signal] emitted by a radio station is called a radio wave; when sound is transmitted there are sound waves; water has waves; heat has heat waves. In a certain sense, walking is also wave-like. When we walk step by step we are walking in a wave-like pattern. Singing an opera is also the creation of waves. After you sing the first line you go on to sing the second. Nobody can sing seven or eight lines in a single breath. Writing, too, is wave-like. You write one character after another; you can't write several hundred characters at a single stroke of the brush. This is the characteristic of the complexity of the movement of opposites in all things.

In short, we must do things according to dialectics. Comrade Deng Xiaoping has said this. I think that the entire Party should learn the dialectical method and promote the dialectical way of doing things. The entire Party should pay attention to the work of ideology and theory, build up a corps of Marxist theoreticians, and strengthen the study and propagation of Marxist theory. We must use the Marxist doctrine of the unity of opposites to observe and handle the new problems of class contradictions and class struggle in socialist society and the new problems in the international struggle.

## Notes

1. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 8.
2. See text Jan. 18, 1957, source note.
3. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 15.
4. The Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee was held November 10–15, 1956 (see text Nov. 15, 1956, source note). Opposition was raised at this plenum to the "adventurist advances" in cooperativization, and consequently a compromise set of seven articles dealing with the issue was drawn up. However, it is clear from Mao's comment here that he is by no means certain that the issue had been laid to rest in early 1957.

5. The term "democratic personages" refers to those patriotic personages of democratic parties or of no particular party affiliation who at one time patronized the people's democratic cause and supported the people's democratic dictatorship with positive action. See Y. Lau et al., eds. (1977), p. 251. See also text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

6. The term *tongchou jiangou* has become a slogan establishing the principle that in a socialist economy, all sectors have to be taken care of. It is derived from the term *tongyi guihua* (comprehensive planning), which Mao began speaking of in late 1955 (see text Oct. 11, 1955, section 3, and text Oct. 11, 1955[2], section 3, both in volume I). This is obviously in reaction to criticism that the Communist system, in an effort to modernize the economy, is likely to ignore the needs of agriculture and light industry in favor of heavy industry. The Soviet Union's experience has become a favorite target used as a negative example to support this criticism. Mao's insistence on comprehensive, and not partial, planning had been suggested in his thesis "Ten Major Relationships" (see text April 25, 1956). The second phrase here, *ge de qi suo*, is not part of the slogan, but is a saying derived from the chapter "Xi Ci," in the *Yi jing* (Classic of Changes), that clearly and aptly reinforces the slogan itself.

7. The *Dagong bao*, sometimes known as *L'Impartial*, is a newspaper that began publication in the late Qing dynasty and later was taken over by the Zhengxue (Political Study) clique in the KMT. During the years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, its headquarters were located in Chongqing, with separate editions published in Guilin and Hong Kong. At that time it played a generally impartial role among the various political parties and interests. It supported the United Front policy but also strongly supported a central KMT leadership. It was not until late 1947 that its editorial staff, especially Wang Yunsheng, became pro-Communist.

8. The phrase here, *ling qi lu zao*, is a slang expression meaning to set up another system of doing things when the old or existing method has been proven to be inadequate.

The article referred to here is the editorial "Thoughts on Visiting Yanan," of August 5, 1944, in *Dagong bao* (Chongqing). It was written after a delegation of Chinese and foreign journalists visited Yanan, then the center of CPC activity. It reflected a general attitude on the part of moderates and conservatives in the country at the time that China, after several decades of national disintegration and seven years of war against Japanese imperialism, should be reconstructed after the war along the lines of national unity and interparty compromises. Thus in their opinion the nationalist government, dominated by the Kuomintang but allowing for the coexistence of secondary parties, including the CPC, should be the legitimate "national center" government during a period of peaceful reconstruction.

By the time of the Chongqing negotiations of August 28 to October 10, 1945, the situation had somewhat changed. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Kuomintang, was enjoying unprecedented prestige as a result of the Japanese surrender; U.S. policy vis-à-vis China, represented by Patrick Hurley's support for the Kuomintang, had also begun to solidify. The Soviet Union was also applying pressure on the Chinese Communists to take part in the negotiations. Thus the Kuomintang saw no need to compromise and adopted a hard line with regard to concrete issues that emerged in the negotiations. The two sides were unable to come to terms on the questions of the relative status and size of the CPC forces, their control of liberated areas in North China and Inner Mongolia and of several key cities, and whether or not the Communist forces could disarm and accept the surrender of Japanese forces under their control. The communiqué that came out of those negotiations merely called for the convocation of a Political Consultative Conference and represented a theoretical agreement on the principle of peaceful settlement. In fact, however, large-scale fighting between the two sides broke out only three weeks later.

The persons then in charge of *Dagong bao* were Wang Yunsheng, editor-in-chief; Li Zikuan, publisher; and Hu Zhengchi, general manager. (See *SW*, IV; pp. 1–65, and L. P. Van Slyke [1967], pp. 577–581.)

9. The Chongqing negotiations were talks between the CPC and the KMT from August 28 to October 10, 1945, in Chongqing, then the seat of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government.

It was the third time that Chiang had invited the CPC leadership to negotiate, but the two earlier invitations had been turned down. The CPC delegation was composed of Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei. The main issues on the agenda were the method of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in local areas in China, the size and disposition of the Communist forces and KMT forces, and the division of areas such as cities and industrial zones to be placed under the control of these two forces. See text Sept. 16-18, 1955, vol. I, note 5. On the subject of the term "Generalissimo Chiang" as a translation for the Chinese "Chiang *weiyuanzhang*," see text Mar. 1, 1957, note 19.

10. On the subject of executing counterrevolutionaries earlier on in the campaign to suppress these "elements," see text Jan. 17, 1951; text Mar. 9, 1951; text April 2, 1951; text Jan. 15, 1951; and especially text May 15, 1951, all in volume I. It should be noted that in the years from 1951 to 1957, with the unfolding of criticism against the Communist Party and the Communist Party's counter-criticism campaigns on several fronts, the definition of what constituted a counterrevolutionary had probably expanded considerably. For the most part, however, the "new counterrevolutionaries," so to speak, would not be dealt with in the same ways as counterrevolutionaries were in 1951-1952, the severest of which was execution, but by political measures. Thus when Mao speaks here of counterrevolutionaries who "were not killed," he is speaking of a very large number of people.

11. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

12. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 29.

13. Ke Qingshi (1902-1965) was at this time a member of the CPC Central Committee (elected at the Eighth Party Congress, 1956), and first secretary of the municipal committee of the CPC of Shanghai. He became a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in 1958. It is likely that Ke, in his capacity as municipal Party secretary of Shanghai, made a speech at this conference. For more biographical information on Ke, see text Dec. 26, 1953, vol. I, source note. See also last sentence of text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II.

14. See text Feb. 19-24, 1953, vol. I, note 6, and text Nov. 15, 1956, note 22.

The Dadu River is a Yangtze tributary cutting through the mountain ranges of western Sichuan. It was a perilous natural obstacle that stood in the path of the Communist forces in late May 1935.

15. Here Mao is referring to the aphorism *qianfang baiji*, which literally means a thousand methods and a hundred stratagems, and is conventionally used to describe the exhaustion of possibilities. The saying is derived from the *yulu* (analects) of the Southern Song dynasty scholar, Zhu Xi.

16. See text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6. Anthony Eden was prime minister of Britain at the time of the Suez Crisis.

17. This seems to be an early formulation of what Mao would eventually come to espouse as his "Three Worlds" thesis.

18. The pseudopalindromic saying that Mao uses here, *ni zhong you wuo, wuo zhong you ni*, is one of Mao's typically earthy expressions to explain in a simplistic way what would otherwise be a complicated philosophical concept. It would become an oft-repeated explanation in Mao's speeches and writings. Mao's central concept here is the unity of mutually opposed elements (whether antagonistically or nonantagonistically opposed) in any entity. This is one of the themes of the current speech. Mao appears to have been preoccupied with this idea in these days while he was struggling to help the Chinese Communists to make sense (in Mao's own way) of what was going on in the international sphere. What Mao seemed to be anxious to explain here is the "law" that in every country or social system itself, whether it be an imperialist country or a socialist one such as China or the Soviet Union, there is, inevitably, the existence of a combination of mutually opposed elements. It should be noted, however, that Mao has apparently already begun to develop his thesis that in understanding the phenomenon of the unity of opposites, it is necessary to adopt the method of dialectical analysis, i.e., that of "one dividing into two" (*yi fen wei er*) rather than the method of eclectic harmonization, or that of "combining two into one" (*he er wei yi*). This

is a thesis that Mao would develop further in his February 27, 1957 speech "On Correctly Handling Contradictions" (see text Feb. 27, 1957).

19. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, paragraph 7 and notes 12, 13, 14; and text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, paragraph 6 and notes 10 and 11.

20. Mao uses here the term *zuo wenzhang*, which refers literally to writing an essay, but is a somewhat slangish aphorism meaning "to make a point of it" or "to make something out of a given situation." In addition to referring to essays, or literary compositions, the term *wenzhang* has a more classical meaning referring to the style, and particularly the embellished style, of a literary creation, also known as *wencai*. Thus, to "*zuo wenzhang*" can also mean to embellish or to elaborate.

21. Mao may be referring here to a letter written by John Foster Dulles to Chiang Kai-shek dated October 1954, regarding the Quemoy-Matsu crisis. In the letter, Washington attempted to persuade Chiang to bring the Taiwan Straits crisis before the United Nations and to obtain a ceasefire resolution. This was aimed at blocking Communist capture of the offshore islands and at the same time avoiding the commitment of U.S. troops to their defense.

22. See text Nov. 11, 1956, note 4.

23. It is commonly believed that the discussion Mao refers to here was held with Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. See text Nov. 18, 1957, note 39.

24. See text Dec. 21, 1955, vol. I, note 9.

25. This could be a stab at the alleged employment of germ warfare by the U.S. troops during the Korean War. See text Dec. 8, 1952, vol. I, note 1.

26. The term Mao uses here is *che pi*, or part of the Shaanxi-Shanxi slang expression *che pi long jin*. The expression literally translates as "pulling off the skin and twisting the muscles" and refers metaphorically to "deliberately making things difficult for someone." We have, for simplicity's sake, translated it here merely as "squabbling."

27. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.

28. See text Nov. 12, 1956, note 6.

29. This saying, *li ling zhi hun*, is derived from the *Pingyuan jun yuqing liezhuan* (The Biographies of the Officers of the Court of the Prince of Pingyuan) in *Shiji* (The Records of the Historian).

30. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 introduced two new elements into Soviet policy. In his secret speech of February 24-25, Khrushchev denounced Stalin, thus launching the so-called de-Stalinization process. Furthermore, Khrushchev also formally accepted the thesis of "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful transition" to socialism. These matters therefore became significant issues of contention between China and the Soviet Union. In January 1957 Zhou Enlai, heading a delegation that included He Long and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Jiaxiang, visited Poland and Hungary, where the disturbing incidents of 1956 occurred. He gave the governments of these two countries assurance of Chinese support, yet he also emphasized to them the significance of the leadership of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp. Subsequently he visited Moscow and on January 18, 1957, had a discussion with CPSU leaders wherein he criticized their errors of a "total lack of an overall analysis of Stalin" and having failed "to consult with the fraternal Parties in advance." The resulting "understanding" between the two countries was published in a communiqué on January 18, 1957.

Earlier in this passage, where Mao spoke of "face-to-face" discussions, he might have also referred to the conversations that he himself had with P. F. Yudin, the ambassador of the USSR to the PRC, on October 23, 1956 and November 30, 1956 (see texts in this volume for those two dates). See also the *RMRB* editorial, "The Origins and the Development of Divergences of Opinion Between Ourselves and the Leadership of the CPSU," on Sept. 6, 1963, the Chinese version of which is cited in our bibliography as *Sugong lingdao*.

31. This may be referring to Khrushchev as first secretary of the CPSU.

32. The phrase that Mao used here, *qiu tong cun yi*, was iterated as the basis for the formation of a United Front between the CPC and the KMT against Japan in the period of

the War of Resistance Against Japan and was adopted as a basic principle of United Front work upon the establishment of the PRC.

33. As opposed to "cocking one's tail" (see text June 14, 1953, vol. I, note 13), to tuck in one's tail and to grip it between one's legs connotes taking a retrenching, defensive position and being prepared to take some losses and persevere.

34. Mao is repeating a statement that he had made about two months earlier (see text Dec. 8, 1956, paragraph 8 and note 27). It is of some importance, however, to note that the December 1956 statement was made prior to the Chinese delegation's visit to Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, whereas the statement here, made in late January 1957, was made after that delegation had returned to China (see note 30 above). Thus the December 1956 statement could be seen as a tentative, somewhat exploratory statement, while the statement here appears to be a confirmation of the critical position that Mao was adopting toward the now Khrushchev-led CPSU, a position seemingly hardened by the reports of the delegation.

35. See note 3 above.

36. See text May-June 1955, vol. I, source note.

37. The SW, V (p. 383) note for this reads: "V. I. Lenin, 'Conspectus of Hegel's *The Science of Logic*.'" This essay is in *The Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, vol. 38.

38. The SW, V (p. 383), note for this reads: "V. I. Lenin, 'On the Question of Dialectics.'" This essay can also be found in *The Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, vol. 38.

39. This paragraph does not appear in the Red Guard version of this speech (i.e., text Jan. 27, 1957[2]), although it does appear in toto in the other Red Guard document, *Wansui* (1969), p. 76 (i.e., text Jan. 1957).

40. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 87.

41. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38.

42. Confucius and Lao Zi were both philosophers of classical China. Confucianism, the code of ethical behavior and human relationships espoused by Confucius, dominated Chinese society for three thousand years and was the source of much political and social theory in traditional China. Confucianist classics also formed the basic curriculum of Chinese education from the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) to the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), and thus dominated Chinese social structure and mobility. Daoism, the school of thought founded by Lao Zi, emphasizes relativity in nature and in human relations, and sees things as impermanent and constantly changing within a basic unity of the cosmos, thus stressing, for the search of knowledge, the way of understanding the causes and effects of transformations. Daoism has always been a prominent undercurrent in Chinese traditional philosophy. In the light of Marxist dialectical materialism both Confucianism and Daoism are incorrect and detrimental to social development. Confucianism is criticized for imposing a "reactionary metaphysical" straitjacket on Chinese thought, and for its notion of society as well-ordered and harmonious without recognition of the realities of material and social conflict. Daoism, for all its relativity and dialectics, is idealist and metaphysical. Furthermore, its emphasis on relativity has led it to espouse a very individualistic and in some cases asocial code of moral behavior in that, for Daoists, it is the individual's mind, not material or social realities, that is the unit of analysis in the attempt to arrive at knowledge and understanding. For these reasons, Mao, as a Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialist, was critical of both of these schools of thought and saw it appropriate to lump them together with the thought of Chiang Kai-shek.

In the Red Guard version of this talk, however (i.e., text Jan. 27, 1957[2]), Mao does not mention either Confucius or Lao Zi. Rather he calls for the publication of the collected works of Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen, and Kang Youwei. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, final paragraphs. For Sun and Kang, see text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, note 7; text Nov. 12, 1956, source note and note 1, and text Dec. 8, 1956, note 23.

43. Here, in describing "pairs" of opposites, Mao used the term *dui zi*, which refers to the combination of pairs of "cards," or domino-like tiles, in the game *gu pai*. The term he used that is translated as "singles" here is actually the expression *dan gan hu*, or "going-it-

alone household," which was used to describe households of peasants who, in the period of cooperativization, preferred to strike out on their own instead of joining a cooperative.

44. For the term *maozi* (hat) and its usage here, see text Dec. 8, 1956, note 33. On the term "socialist realism," Mao appears to be invoking the memory of the suggestion made by Stalin in 1932 for "a realistic and revolutionary style" of literary work. This was adopted by the Chinese Communists in the Yanan period as a principle of writing in the revolutionary style.

45. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1832) were leading thinkers in the German idealist school of philosophy. Kant is known mostly for his rationalist moral philosophy and for his idealist epistemology in which he recognizes no reality except that which exists in the mind. Hegel took Kant's epistemology one step further and resolved the problem of knowing in the formula of what is known as dialectical idealism. The main works of Kant include *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical Reason*. The main works of Hegel include *The Science of Logic*, *The Philosophy of Right*, and *The Phenomenology of the Mind*. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, final paragraphs.

46. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), George W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), and Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) are, as far as the development of Marx's own ideas is concerned, the chief representatives of the tradition of German classical philosophy. In addition, the English classical economists, represented by Adam Smith (1723-1790), Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), and David Ricardo (1772-1823), and the French utopian socialists, principally Henri St. Simon (1760-1825) and Charles Fourier (1772-1837), all influenced the ideas of Karl Marx. Marx was, self-admittedly, stimulated by these thinkers, and in some cases adopted their ideas with reservations. In other cases, his reaction to their ideas was violently critical. Marx's ideological relationship to Hegel and Feuerbach is best represented in his *The German Ideology* and in Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*. Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* expresses his evaluation of the ideas of the classical economists, and *The Communist Manifesto* contains the most famous critique and indictment of utopian socialism. What Mao does here is to reflect Lenin's 1913 essay on the subject of the impact of these three strands of thought on Marx and Marxism. See Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism" (March 1913), in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (1975), I, pp. 44-48.

47. This assessment of German idealist philosophy was made in the *Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union*, and in the *Concise Dictionary of Philosophy* (see note 50), in both cases under the entry for "Hegel." Both of these publications appeared in Stalin's time.

48. The SW, V (p. 383) note for this reads: "Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), the well-known German bourgeois military scientist. Among his chief works is *On War*. For Stalin's comment on Clausewitz, see Stalin's 'Letter in Reply to Comrade Razin.'" 49. See text July 31, 1955, vol. I, note 26.

50. This refers to the Chinese translation of the Soviet reference book, *Kratkii Filosofskii Slovar'*, by Rozental' and Yudin which first appeared in Moscow in 1939. A Chinese translation was made in 1940 and was reprinted in 1949 and 1951 by the Sanlian shudian in Beijing. It was published under the title *Jianming zhexue cidian* (A Concise Dictionary of Philosophy). The fourth edition of the Soviet book, published in 1954, was translated and edited by the Bureau for the Translation of the Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and was published by Renmin chubanshe in Beijing in 1955. We believe that this is the edition to which Mao was referring here. This book has been modified and edited time and again to reflect the evolving ideological positions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

51. A detailed defense of their position put up by Soviet philosophers and a critique of Mao's criticism can be found in Krivtsov and Sidikhmenov (1972), pp. 5-61.

52. The SW, V (p. 383) note for this reads: "V. I. Lenin, 'War and Revolution.'" This essay can be found in *The Collected Works of V. I. Lenin*, vol. 24.

53. These are two classical Beijing operas dealing with stories of superstition and with supernatural matters, both set in the Song dynasty (979-1280). The first, also known as

*Qiyuan bao*, and also *Dingyuan xian*, tells of how the spirit of a murdered man named Liu Shichang, whose corpse was mixed with mud and made into a basin, sought and attained his revenge. This was based on one of the famous Magistrate Bao (Bao Gong) stories. The second, also known by the title *Qingfengting*, tells the story of an unfilial son, by the name of Zhang Jibao, who was struck dead by lightning.

54. This phrase, *niu gui she shen* (literally, “the ox devil and the snake god”), is a saying derived from a poem by the Tang dynasty poet Li He, describing a realm of fantasy. (See also the *Preface to the Poems of Li He [Li He shi xu]* by Du Mu, another Tang-dynasty poet.) In the Cultural Revolution period, this term was used to describe all sorts of people whose positions were antithetical to the Cultural Revolution, particularly to the Red Guards.

55. *Cankao xiaoxi* (Reference News) is a Party publication of news reports and comments collected and translated from the non-Chinese press. Here Mao suggests increasing circulation from 2,000 to 400,000. In March 1957 he said the authorities were prepared to increase circulation to 300,000, of which some issues could be sold to people, regardless of Party membership, down to the *xian* level. (See text Mar. 2, 1957, paragraph 7.) In the early to mid-1970s, circulation of *Cankao xiaoxi* was estimated to be approximately 900,000 with a readership about ten times that great. There is also an additional publication, *Cankao ziliao* (Reference Material), which is published twice daily and is restricted to higher-level cadres. For more information, and a critical commentary of *Cankao xiaoxi*, see Henry G. Schwarz (July–Sept. 1966).

56. This refers to an essay published in *RMRB*, (Oct. 29, 1956), in which the author, Yuchi Kui, quoting from another other article by Shi Ju in *Wenhui bao* (Shanghai), (Oct. 10, 1956), accused that the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries was in violation of humane principles. The leading cadres of the CPC, the article charged, have been using the notion of inevitability (i.e., the unavoidability of some errors being committed in a mass movement) as an excuse for their own serious mistakes and violations. By stating ahead of the fact that mistakes are unavoidable, they have, so the argument goes, not made any effort to correct or minimize errors, but have complacently attributed everything to “inevitability.” This essay goes on to attack broadly the movement and the CPC.

57. The term that Mao uses here, *dui tai xi*, translated as “rival performance,” refers to the fact that in traditional China operatic performances were often clustered together during festivals, and so performances by different troupes of actors would be staged one after another. However, at certain times, the troupes would put on performances at the same time, competing for the same general audience and perhaps even for the use of the stage(s). In these instances they were known as *dui tai xi*, or performances opposing each other’s stage. Mao frequently uses this metaphor to describe the fact that the Communist Party must learn to compete fairly and fearlessly with other political and social persuasions for the loyalty of the masses.

With regard to the suggestion of a “timely rebuttal” mentioned here, Mao probably had in mind the essay written by Liu Xiaoru and published in *RMRB*, Dec. 30, 1956, in which such a rebuttal of the essay “On Unavoidability” was made.

58. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 22.

59. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 51.

60. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27; see also text Jan. 18, 1957, notes 13 and 22.

61. See text May–June, 1955, vol. I, note 25.

62. Mao is clearly alluding to the somewhat slangish aphorism *xin zhong you gui* (literally, having a ghost in one’s mind), which refers to a psychological condition of a guilt complex, or a phobia. This is a theme on which Mao would touch repeatedly, though mostly lightly, in his speeches and writings of 1957 and 1958, and thereby escalate into a theory of sorts on how to deal with the problems that the Chinese people were facing. In January 1961, under the editorship of He Qifang (see text May–June 1955, vol. I, note 50), the Institute of Literature of the Chinese Academy of Sciences published a book, *Bu pa gui de gushi* (Stories of People Who Are Not Afraid of Ghosts), which compiled classical stories of people’s encounters with, and overcoming the fear of, ghosts and all sorts of other superstitious and

supernatural “phenomena.” There was, however, clearly a political message in the book. This also foreshadowed the emergence of the controversy over the so-called “It’s all right to have ghosts theory” (*you gui wa hai lun*), which also emerged in 1961. For more details on the above, see text Jan. 24, 1961(1), source note. See also text Mar. 20, 1957, note 67.

63. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 2, and text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 3, all vol. I.

64. See texts Jan. 5, 1953; Feb. 7, 1953; Mar. 8, 1953, and, especially, Mar. 19, 1953.

65. “Another emperor” here refers to Yuan Shikai, who made himself “constitutional” monarch of China for the short period from December 1915 to March 1916. Warlord politics dominated China after Yuan’s death in 1916 through the greater part of the 1940s. On the Revolution of 1911, see text Nov. 12, 1956, note 2, and text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, notes 7 and 8; on the warlord situation, see text May–June 1955, vol. I, note 55; and for more on Yuan Shikai, see text Jul. 14, 1956, note 4.

66. For information on the Constitution of the PRC in 1954, see text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1. Mao is here loosely referring to Article 87 of the Constitution, which provides for the citizens of the PRC to have the right to demonstrate, but does not deal specifically with the right to strike. On the other hand, Article 28 of the 1975 Constitution and Article 45 of the 1978 Constitution recognize the citizen’s right to strike and to write big-character posters.

67. The Battle of Chibi (A.D. 208) was one of the most celebrated battles in Chinese history. It took place during the period of the Three Kingdoms between the alliance formed by the kingdoms of Han and Wu, on the one hand, and the expeditionary forces of the kingdom of Wei, on the other. (See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 3.) Mao here is referring to the need to let things eventually be resolved by a great conflict, and to the successful strategy employed by the tacticians of Han and Wu in that historical battle, which was characterized by patience and subtlety, waiting for the internal contradictions within the enemy’s camp to develop and expose themselves. This strategy ultimately carried the day. The story of the battle is told, with great romanticism and imagination, in Luo Guanzhong’s *Sanguo yanyi* (The Romance of the Three Kingdoms), a very popular Chinese novel of the early Ming dynasty.

68. See text Mar. 7, 1952, vol. I, source note. In July 1956, when de-Stalinization reached Hungary, Matyas Rakosi was dismissed as Party secretary on charges that he promoted the personality cult and sabotaged socialist order. In October 1956, during the Hungarian uprising, he emigrated to the Soviet Union where he stayed until his death in 1971. He was expelled from the Hungarian Communist Party in 1962.

69. In March 1926, battle was waged in Tianjin between the troops under the command of the warlord Feng Yuxiang and those commanded by the warlord Duan Qirui (see note 61). As a result of the hostilities, the port of Dagukou at Tianjin was blockaded by Feng’s forces, since it had been used by foreign shipping to transport arms and munitions for Duan’s troops. On March 10, the diplomatic missions of the eight countries that had signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with China protested to the Duan government that the blockade was in violation of that treaty, and on March 15 an ultimatum was issued. Meanwhile, foreign naval vessels were collected at Dagu. On March 18, the general headquarters of the trade unions of Beijing and several student bodies organized a demonstration at Tiananmen to protest against foreign encroachment. Under the leadership of Li Dazhao, then secretary of the North China Party Committee of the CPC, the demonstrations proceeded to the executive offices of Duan’s government to petition that the government take sterner measures against the foreigners. Duan’s troops were brought in and were ordered to fire on the demonstrating masses, resulting in over 200 casualties and forty-seven deaths. That evening the writer Lu Xun wrote the famous essay “Wu hua de changwei zhi er” (A Second Essay on the Rose Bush Without Flowers), in which he called it the darkest day since the founding of the Republic. On March 20, the CPC issued a denunciation of the Duan government, sparking a spate of anti-Duan, anti-imperialist demonstrations in Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Shanghai. Duan’s government stepped down under military pressure in April.

70. See note 19.

71. See note 57.

72. The *canzheng hui* (political council) was set up in the Kuomintang-dominated government of the Republic of China in 1938 as a consultative body to advise the government. Of the some 200 "political councillors" (*canzheng yuan*), however, some 150 were members of the KMT. According to a note on this subject in *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, p. 866 (note 364), this political council did not have any authority to restrict the KMT-dominated Nationalist government's executive powers, and the councillors were all appointed by the KMT. Although there were members of the council who were in fact members of non-KMT parties and organizations, they were not allowed to stand in the council *as members of these parties*, but only as appointees of the KMT under a special rule of the organization of the council. See Mao's commentary written on July 10, 1945, "The Hurley-Chiang Duet is a Flop" (*SW*, III, pp. 281-284), for a criticism of the *canzheng hui*.

73. For information on Liang Shuming, see text Sept. 16-18, 1953, vol. I, source note, notes 1 and 2. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, note 33.

Peng Yihu, an ex-landlord and former head of a model *xian* in Hunan under Chiang Kai-shek, served as the vice-director of the Advisor's Office to the Hankou Municipal People's Committee. In 1950, at the discussion on beginning land reform in Hunan, he was said to have opposed it as premature. In 1954, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Democratic Association for National Construction (see text Nov. 1951-Mar. 1952, vol. I, note 7), he wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the CPC criticizing the policy of unified purchase and supply of grain. In 1957, after attacking the general policy of the CPC, he was branded a Rightist.

Zhang Naiqi was vice-chairman of the Democratic Association for National Construction. He was purged as a Rightist during the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957. Prior to that he had been a member of the GAC, minister of food, vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and a deputy to the First National People's Congress.

74. Mao's expression here is *duo xing buyi bi zi bi*, a classical Chinese aphorism from the chapter on "The First Year of the Reign of Duke Yin" in *Zuo zhuan* (The Zuo Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals).

75. Mao's expression here, *hou fa zhi ren, bu yao xian fa zhi ren*, is derived from the aphorism *xian fa, zhi ren* in the chapter "Xiang Zhi zhuan" (Biography of Xiang Zhi) in the book *Han shu* (History of the Han Dynasty). In the original, the saying can be translated as: "He who takes action first controls [the opponent]; he who takes action afterward is controlled by [the opponent]." This is very close to a more slangish saying: *xian xia shou wei qiang* (he who acts first is the stronger), which is itself derived from the popular novelette *Dan dao hui zhuanqi* (Romance of the Meeting of Heroes with Single Swords). Here, however, Mao twists the meaning of the saying somewhat by suggesting that instead of acting first, it is equally possible, and strategically advantageous, to let the "opponent" act first, thus committing and exposing himself, and then striking in reaction to his actions. Thus, instead of the aphorism's *hou fa zhi yu ren*, Mao has *hou fa zhi ren*.

76. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23.

77. See texts Nov. 1958 (1) and (2), source notes. The book was published in 1952.

78. On Mao's own perception on this subject prior to this time, see his "Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC" (*SW*, IV, pp. 361-375).

79. See note 19.

80. The basic principle of class struggle is, of course, fundamental to classic Marxism, just as the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the proletariat are fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. By the 1940s, the principle of *minzhu jizhong* (democratic centralism) had also become fundamental to the ideology of the CPC. Mao had been speaking of the principle of democratic centralism in all the years since the late 1920s, but particularly in the Yanan years (see *SW*, I, p. 91; I, p. 292; *SW*, II, pp. 56-57; and *passim*), culminating in the famous formula of 1945, which he articulated in the essay *Lun lianhe zhengfu* (On Coalition Government):

"Democratic centralism is to be centralized on the basis of democracy and to be democratic under centralized guidance" (*SW*, III, p. 280). The idea of the mass line, which is alluded to here but not stated as such, is the critical embodiment and manifestation of the principle of democratic centralism. These had both been ratified by the Constitution of the PRC in 1954 as guiding principles for all political and organizational practice. For more on the principle of democratic centralism, see text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I; for information on the mass line, see text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.

81. Mao's definition here of a state as composed of a small number of people from the dominant class is a rather simplistic and reductionist one. While most Marxist-Leninists agree that the state functions as an instrument of the ruling class, there is considerable struggle over the interpretation that it functions as an instrument of the dominant class, pure and simple, rather than also as a site of class struggle dominated by the dominant class. Mao's summary of the state here is also simplistic and reductionist in that he argues that the state is composed of people, rather than a set of practices, relations, and institutions, and that these people come from the dominant class alone.

82. Mao appears to be repeating criticisms he had made in 1953. See especially text Mar. 19, 1953, vol. I.

83. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 9.

84. The term Mao uses here is *fazhi*, which translates literally as "legal system." However, it is obvious that, rather than talking about the mechanical aspects of setting up a legal system, Mao is alluding to the question of "socialist legality," a dissident idea being fomented in places such as Hungary and Poland since mid-1956. The term was used first by the Petofi Club (a group of dissident Communist and non-Communist intellectuals in Hungary) to criticize the Hungarian Communist Party leadership under Matyas Rakosi, and it is a representation of their demands that the Party itself must be subject to a legal system that is practically a copy of bourgeois constitutional legalism, although allowing for the leadership of socialist motivations. This they called "socialist legality," and the term was picked up and adopted by dissidents in the Soviet Union and in China. Its orientation was antithetical to the notion of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to the political leadership of the Communist parties. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, note 31.

85. The argument in this and the following paragraphs strongly echoes the argument proposed by Mao in the relevant segments of "On the Ten Major Relationships" (see text April 25, 1956).

86. A classical Chinese aphorism from the chapter "Yi shang" in *Lushi chunqiu* (Lu [Buwei]'s Spring and Autumn Annals), meaning to act to the detriment of long-term interests in one's rash anxiety to reap immediate gains. The original aphorism is: "If one drains the marshes in order to catch fish, of course one would get fish, but, I fear, there will be no fish next year."

87. The term *jiazhi guilu* or *jiazhi faze* (both translated as "law of value") is a crucial concept in Marxist political economy. It is based on what is referred to in Marxist analysis as the labor theory of value. This theory postulates that the value of any product is equal to the value of the labor necessarily expended in its production. The exchange value of the product, if it is a commodity, will therefore be equal to this value. The policy goal related to this theory, or law, is to maintain a consistency between the value of a commodity and its price, and to eliminate the fluctuations and, generally, inflation in price which in a capitalist system pervades the processes of free market exchange. On the basis of this fundamental Marxist postulation, this law ramifies into such ancillary laws as the "law of exchange of equal value" (*dengjia jiaohuan*). For a more extensive description of this theory of law, see Xu He et al., eds. (1975), pp. 58-61. See also text April 25, 1956, note 28. On the subject of "economic accounting," see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 58. On the subject of running the cooperatives diligently and frugally, see text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 7.

88. See text Nov. 15, 1956, paragraph 3.

72. The *canzheng hui* (political council) was set up in the Kuomintang-dominated government of the Republic of China in 1938 as a consultative body to advise the government. Of the some 200 "political councillors" (*canzheng yuan*), however, some 150 were members of the KMT. According to a note on this subject in *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, p. 866 (note 364), this political council did not have any authority to restrict the KMT-dominated Nationalist government's executive powers, and the councillors were all appointed by the KMT. Although there were members of the council who were in fact members of non-KMT parties and organizations, they were not allowed to stand in the council *as members of these parties*, but only as appointees of the KMT under a special rule of the organization of the council. See Mao's commentary written on July 10, 1945, "The Hurley-Chiang Duet is a Flop" (*SW*, III, pp. 281-284), for a criticism of the *canzheng hui*.

73. For information on Liang Shuming, see text Sept. 16-18, 1953, vol. I, source note, notes 1 and 2. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, note 33.

Peng Yihu, an ex-landlord and former head of a model *xian* in Hunan under Chiang Kai-shek, served as the vice-director of the Advisor's Office to the Hankou Municipal People's Committee. In 1950, at the discussion on beginning land reform in Hunan, he was said to have opposed it as premature. In 1954, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Democratic Association for National Construction (see text Nov. 1951-Mar. 1952, vol. I, note 7), he wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the CPC criticizing the policy of unified purchase and supply of grain. In 1957, after attacking the general policy of the CPC, he was branded a Rightist.

Zhang Naiqi was vice-chairman of the Democratic Association for National Construction. He was purged as a Rightist during the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957. Prior to that he had been a member of the GAC, minister of food, vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and a deputy to the First National People's Congress.

74. Mao's expression here is *duo xing buyi bi zi bi*, a classical Chinese aphorism from the chapter on "The First Year of the Reign of Duke Yin" in *Zuo zhuan* (The Zuo Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals).

75. Mao's expression here, *hou fa zhi ren, bu yao xian fa zhi ren*, is derived from the aphorism *xian fa, zhi ren* in the chapter "Xiang Zhi zhuan" (Biography of Xiang Zhi) in the book *Han shu* (History of the Han Dynasty). In the original, the saying can be translated as: "He who takes action first controls [the opponent]; he who takes action afterward is controlled by [the opponent]." This is very close to a more slangish saying: *xian xia shou wei qiang* (he who acts first is the stronger), which is itself derived from the popular novelette *Dan dao hui zhuanqi* (Romance of the Meeting of Heroes with Single Swords). Here, however, Mao twists the meaning of the saying somewhat by suggesting that instead of acting first, it is equally possible, and strategically advantageous, to let the "opponent" act first, thus committing and exposing himself, and then striking in reaction to his actions. Thus, instead of the aphorism's *hou fa zhi ren*, Mao has *hou fa zhi ren*.

76. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23.

77. See texts Nov. 1958 (1) and (2), source notes. The book was published in 1952.

78. On Mao's own perception on this subject prior to this time, see his "Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC" (*SW*, IV, pp. 361-375).

79. See note 19.

80. The basic principle of class struggle is, of course, fundamental to classic Marxism, just as the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the proletariat are fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. By the 1940s, the principle of *minzhu jizhong* (democratic centralism) had also become fundamental to the ideology of the CPC. Mao had been speaking of the principle of democratic centralism in all the years since the late 1920s, but particularly in the Yanan years (see *SW*, I, p. 91; I, p. 292; *SW*, II, pp. 56-57; and *passim*), culminating in the famous formula of 1945, which he articulated in the essay *Lun lianhe zhengfu* (On Coalition Government):

"Democratic centralism is to be centralized on the basis of democracy and to be democratic under centralized guidance" (*SW*, III, p. 280). The idea of the mass line, which is alluded to here but not stated as such, is the critical embodiment and manifestation of the principle of democratic centralism. These had both been ratified by the Constitution of the PRC in 1954 as guiding principles for all political and organizational practice. For more on the principle of democratic centralism, see text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I; for information on the mass line, see text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.

81. Mao's definition here of a state as composed of a small number of people from the dominant class is a rather simplistic and reductionist one. While most Marxist-Leninists agree that the state functions as an instrument of the ruling class, there is considerable struggle over the interpretation that it functions as an instrument of the dominant class, pure and simple, rather than also as a site of class struggle dominated by the dominant class. Mao's summary of the state here is also simplistic and reductionist in that he argues that the state is composed of people, rather than a set of practices, relations, and institutions, and that these people come from the dominant class alone.

82. Mao appears to be repeating criticisms he had made in 1953. See especially text Mar. 19, 1953, vol. I.

83. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 9.

84. The term Mao uses here is *fazhi*, which translates literally as "legal system." However, it is obvious that, rather than talking about the mechanical aspects of setting up a legal system, Mao is alluding to the question of "socialist legality," a dissident idea being fomented in places such as Hungary and Poland since mid-1956. The term was used first by the Petofi Club (a group of dissident Communist and non-Communist intellectuals in Hungary) to criticize the Hungarian Communist Party leadership under Matyas Rakosi, and it is a representation of their demands that the Party itself must be subject to a legal system that is practically a copy of bourgeois constitutional legalism, although allowing for the leadership of socialist motivations. This they called "socialist legality," and the term was picked up and adopted by dissidents in the Soviet Union and in China. Its orientation was antithetical to the notion of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to the political leadership of the Communist parties. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, note 31.

85. The argument in this and the following paragraphs strongly echoes the argument proposed by Mao in the relevant segments of "On the Ten Major Relationships" (see text April 25, 1956).

86. A classical Chinese aphorism from the chapter "Yi shang" in *Lushi chunqiu* (Lu [Buwei]'s Spring and Autumn Annals), meaning to act to the detriment of long-term interests in one's rash anxiety to reap immediate gains. The original aphorism is: "If one drains the marshes in order to catch fish, of course one would get fish, but, I fear, there will be no fish next year."

87. The term *jiazhi guilu* or *jiazhi faze* (both translated as "law of value") is a crucial concept in Marxist political economy. It is based on what is referred to in Marxist analysis as the labor theory of value. This theory postulates that the value of any product is equal to the value of the labor necessarily expended in its production. The exchange value of the product, if it is a commodity, will therefore be equal to this value. The policy goal related to this theory, or law, is to maintain a consistency between the value of a commodity and its price, and to eliminate the fluctuations and, generally, inflation in price which in a capitalist system pervades the processes of free market exchange. On the basis of this fundamental Marxist postulation, this law ramifies into such ancillary laws as the "law of exchange of equal value" (*dengjia jiaohuan*). For a more extensive description of this theory of law, see Xu He et al., eds. (1975), pp. 58-61. See also text April 25, 1956, note 28. On the subject of "economic accounting," see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 58. On the subject of running the cooperatives diligently and frugally, see text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 7.

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What I am going to say is nothing new. Our achievements must be given sufficient recognition; we cannot exaggerate [them], but gross underestimates will lead to making mistakes, even serious mistakes . . . .<sup>1</sup>

For the last year, our achievements have been the basic [aspect of things]. The Second Plenum of the [Eighth] Central Committee has already settled this question.<sup>2</sup> However, there are still problems in the viewpoints of the democratic personages and some comrades.<sup>3</sup> They maintain that there are many errors and shortcomings. So it is necessary to talk [about it] again. If the achievements are underestimated, the cooperatives are bound to be discouraged . . . .

Our principle has consistently been to support the public dining halls and not the establishment of separate kitchens, but we must provide [people with] food. In 1946, Wang Yunsheng<sup>4</sup> in an editorial in the *Dagong bao* of Chongqing said: “Don’t establish a separate kitchen.” I said, in that case “Generalissimo Chiang” will have to provide [us with] food, but “Generalissimo Chiang” didn’t provide [us with] food.<sup>5</sup> Now we are managing things and [pursuing a policy of] comprehensive planning with due consideration to all sectors so that everybody is provided for.<sup>6</sup> All parties and groups and all the democratic personages are taken care of; even the Kuomintang people are taken care of. This is in order to mobilize all positive factors in building socialism. This is a strategic policy. This policy is better and produces fewer troubles. Unified purchasing and unified marketing is simply a way of providing food for all 600 million people.<sup>7</sup> It provides for both rural households that are short on grain and urban households that are without grain. Even the counterrevolutionaries get a share of food. Since people have intestines and stomachs, they must eat. The Soviet Union’s method is not like this; it does not provide for everyone. [Even with] a comprehensive plan that takes all sectors into consideration, still not all the students can enter college, but proper arrangements must be made for all of them. They must be either given make-up studies, or assigned to rural areas, or sent to frontier regions, or given relief. This idea must be clearly explained to those comrades who are not clear about it. We cannot let people starve to death. Everybody must be provided for. This principle will create fewer troubles.

Explore all possible ways to increase production and to practice economy, so as to resolve difficulties. After all possible ways are explored, difficulties can be overcome. The bit of difficulty [we are encountering] is no big deal. It is easier to handle than crossing the marshland during the Long March.<sup>8</sup> There were no houses on the marshland, only open air. After crossing the Dadu River [we didn’t know] which way to go and explored a thousand schemes and a hundred plans to find a way out.<sup>9</sup> Now we can hardly [say that we] have come up with any schemes or plans. [Only when you] go one-up on nine hundred ninety-nine schemes [can you talk about] a thousand schemes; only when you have added one plan to ninety-nine others can you talk about having a hundred plans.

[Regarding] the international problem, Eisenhower’s letter to Chiang Kai-shek first dashes cold water on him and then boosts his morale. [Eisenhower] wants Chiang to stay cool and not be impulsive. [Their] hopes rest on trouble breaking out in our internal situation.<sup>10</sup>

An incident occurred over the Suez Canal. This was a strange affair. Nasser cropped up and wanted to take back the canal; Eden sent troops [to stop him].<sup>11</sup> The British bourgeoisie is worldly-wise and is an old hand at trickery and deception. It does not get into this kind of trouble very often, but this time Eden lost his head, made a mistake, and gave the Middle East to the United States. The principal contradiction is with the United States, not with Nasser. All these were tricks used by the United States to oppose Great Britain. The United States wants to take over the Middle East. The basic contradiction in the world is the contradiction between socialism and imperialism. The imperialists are using an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist pretext to contend [with each other] for Africa and the Middle East. Two groups of imperialists are competing for colonies. The biggest imperialist is the United States, and next come Britain and France. National independence movements have emerged in the colonies. The United States used coercion in dealing with Japan and Taiwan. It is using both persuasion and coercion in the Middle East. When they squabble, it is to our benefit.

We are [practicing] “conservatism” and “Right opportunism” and have put 600 million people under our hegemony.<sup>12</sup> We won’t retreat a single step from the Elbe River, or from the thirty-eighth parallel or the seventeenth parallel.<sup>13</sup> Beyond these borders, let them squabble, but we can [still] speak out. Both sides are engaging in subversive activities—they have [their people] here in our midst (the landlords, the bourgeoisie, the democratic parties . . . need I mention the convicts undergoing labor reform?). We have [our people] there in their midst too (the Communist parties, the workers, and the progressive elements).<sup>14</sup> The elimination of classes requires a very long period of time. Turning capitalists into workers takes decades. When we say elimination in a basic way, we are referring only to large-scale struggles. The Soviet comrades are unwilling to probe deeply into this problem. There are great contradictions within the imperialist [world resulting from] competition over colonies. There are many things that can be done by taking advantage of its contradictions. This is a strategic guideline.

China’s relations with the United States[:] It would be more beneficial for us to wait a few years before establishing relations with the United States. The Russian

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China’s relations with the United States[:] It would be more beneficial for us to wait a few years before establishing relations with the United States. The Russian



Revolution was in 1917, but [the Soviet Union] established relations with the United States seventeen years afterward in 1934. At that time the United States was in an economic crisis, and Roosevelt came to power.

During the Middle East crisis, the Soviet Union sent a letter and all the armed forces of the United States were put on alert. Who actually is afraid of whom? Both sides are afraid. Who is more afraid? I tend [to feel] that the imperialists are a bit more afraid of us [than we are of them], [but even] with this kind of estimate, it would be dangerous for us to go to sleep and not wake up for three days. We must also foresee the worst possibility, that the imperialists could go mad.

At the present time it would not be easy for another world war to break out. They must consider the consequences if [a war] does get started. I told Sukarno that we are not anxious to join the United Nations nor anxious to establish relations with the United States.<sup>15</sup> [In this way] we will make it [the United States] appear unreasonable both at home and abroad, deprive it of all its political capital, and cause it to become isolated. Eventually there will be a day when we will establish relations [with it]. When we establish the relations a hundred and one years from now, [the United States] will be even more impotent, [but] it will be too late for regrets. Our house will already have been swept clean. The Four Pests will have been eliminated,<sup>16</sup> and [the United States] will no longer be able to find its friends . . .<sup>17</sup> It will be too late for regrets. The imperialists have evil intentions. We are not afraid of the defeated countries. Our principal concern is with the United States.

Sino-Soviet relations[:] There will always be squabbling; we must not think that there will be no squabbling in this world.<sup>18</sup> Marxism is an ideology of squabbles because there are always contradictions. When there are contradictions there will be struggle. At present there are a few disputes between the Soviet Union and China, but they are not great, and we have become closer together and more united than before. Their methods are not the same as ours. [We] must wait and do some work on them. In our Party there is a variety of opinions. We must work on the Party members too. We must talk, hold meetings, and have heart-to-heart talks. When we went south and crossed the [Yangtze] River, there were many snakes and many mosquitoes there.<sup>19</sup> The weather was hot, and there were no *mantou* [steamed buns],<sup>20</sup> thus, even though the river was crossed, ideologically we have not made the crossing. Organizationally we have entered the Party, but not ideologically. Ideological work is just a lot of trouble, but we should not be afraid of trouble. To have different ways of saying things within the Party is a common occurrence. Meetings are held precisely for the purpose of resolving these problems.

Circumstances are stronger than individuals. Circumstances have given our Soviet comrades no choice but to make some changes step by step. Their old ways of ruling wouldn't work at home or abroad. Some use can still be made of the Twentieth Congress [of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union].<sup>21</sup> The imperialists make use of it; Tito makes use of it;<sup>22</sup> we, too, can make use of it. We should help them. However, we must not hurry but should proceed slowly and talk to them face to face. We shouldn't use up our trump cards all at once. "The list for gain that blinds one's wisdom"<sup>23</sup> is merely the fifty million tons of steel, 300 million tons of iron, and twenty million tons of petroleum. Yet these things don't count.

Twice those amounts or ten times those amounts still don't count. They are no more than scraps taken out of the earth. When one attains high office, becomes the first secretary, one may become swell-headed too.<sup>24</sup> If one is swell-headed, then one should be scolded severely. This time Zhou [Enlai] made a sharp criticism [of them] face to face and argued with them directly.<sup>25</sup> Just as nine out of ten fingers are together and one is apart from the rest,<sup>26</sup> the central authorities can also have some differences with the provincial and municipal authorities. There will always be contradictions. We should seek common ground and retain differences.<sup>27</sup>

We must tone down international propaganda a bit. The cultural-work teams and exhibitions ought to reduce somewhat their excessive propaganda and tuck their tails in between their legs.<sup>28</sup>

We must still learn from the Soviet Union. They have many good things which are worth learning. [But] we must learn selectively. Their advanced and useful things must be studied, and even their mistaken things must also be studied, [though in this case] critically.<sup>29</sup> We should learn so that we will have in our hands all their basic things within three five-year plans. We should also learn from other countries. Zhou's slogan for going abroad is to seek peace, to seek friends, and to seek knowledge.<sup>30</sup> Knowledge should be searched for everywhere. Searching in only one place is too monotonous.

Letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is still correct.<sup>31</sup> Truth emerges out of struggle with error. Beauty emerges out of comparison with and struggle with ugliness. Good deeds and good people emerge out of comparison with and struggle with evil deeds and evil people.<sup>32</sup> Fragrant flowers emerge from the comparison with and struggle with poisonous weeds.<sup>33</sup> Materialism emerges out of the comparison with and struggle with idealism. Many people hate Chiang Kai-shek, but they don't know what a bastard Chiang Kai-shek really is.<sup>34</sup> Therefore we should publish the collected works of Chiang Kai-shek. We should also publish the collected works of Sun Yat-sen and the collected works of Kang Youwei.<sup>35</sup> To prohibit people from coming into contact with ugliness, error and fallacies, idealism, and metaphysics is a very dangerous policy. It would cause people's thinking to deteriorate and ossify; it would make them one-sided and incapable of facing the world or meeting the challenge of a rival show.<sup>36</sup> We Communists know too little about the opposite side, so we are comparatively monotonous and can hardly produce any persuasive statements. Neither Marx, nor Engels, nor Lenin was like this. They all strenuously studied contemporary and historical matters and also instructed other people to study in a like manner. Stalin was a bit inferior. He rejected German philosophy (Kant and Feuerbach), and because Germany was defeated in war he also rejected German military teachings.<sup>37</sup> Germany's classical philosophy is the forefather of Marxism. Stalin was in reality metaphysical [in his ideas], and he did not recognize the unity of opposites. In the *Dictionary of Philosophy*<sup>38</sup> they employed a metaphysical way of putting things. [In it,] war does not turn into peace, nor does peace turn into war; the two things are separate and unrelated; they are not mutually transmutable; they only struggle [with each other], but there is no unity. Lenin said that war was an extension of politics and a special means, and that peace was a result of war. [He

said that] politics was struggle during the time of peace, and that it is during times of war that peace is fomented and it is during times of peace that war is fomented.<sup>38</sup> Stalin misled many people. These people had a lot of metaphysics in their minds and became rigid in their thinking, thus they committed political mistakes. When others disagreed [with them] occasionally, they were ostracized. [When one was deemed a] counterrevolutionary, the only [fate one could meet was that of] death by execution, and whoever disagreed with the Soviet Union was called anti-Soviet. But in real life Stalin could not do all things in this way. Stalin didn't execute or jail everybody. In 1936 and 1937 he killed many people. In 1938 he killed fewer, and in 1939 he killed even fewer. It is not possible to execute everyone who disagrees. We, for one, had disagreements with Stalin. We wanted to sign a Sino-Soviet Treaty, but he didn't want to sign; we wanted the Chinese-Changchun Railway back,<sup>40</sup> but he didn't want to give it up. Even so, it is still possible to snatch the meat out of a tiger's mouth.

We have not refuted some harmful arguments in the press but have published some articles that ought not to have been printed. For instances, the article "On Unavoidability" needn't have been published.<sup>41</sup> There is a big theory of unavoidability in "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."<sup>42</sup> Who wants to make mistakes? Errors are only known in retrospect. In the beginning things are always 100 percent correct, but errors will always be made in implementation. This is historical experience, and our principle is just to make fewer mistakes. Newspapers should make a reply only after they have become thoroughly prepared and have fully developed their power of persuasion. If they are not fully prepared, then there is no need to answer in a hurry. There are some works that take ten or more years to complete, such as major literary works. Some mistakes cannot be avoided for a certain period of time. For example, in the past we exercised very strict controls over what pieces of drama were performed; now, when we relax them, the demons, monsters, and ogres all come out.<sup>43</sup> In the past you couldn't see them; now it won't harm you to take a look at them. Don't scold them as soon as they come out; they will not have much impact on the increase in the production of grain or cotton, nor will they have much impact on finance. A few plays about love affairs can also be staged. Let the audience make the judgment and don't be in a hurry to ban them.

Things that occupy a primary and dominant position and for which we must strive are the fragrant flowers. It is not good to have a whole bunch of stinking ones. As long as the poisonous weeds occupy [only] a secondary position, they can do no harm. For example, the Communist Party [should be] in the dominant position and the democratic parties in the secondary position, again, like [the relationship between] the nucleus and the electrons. Although the nucleus is small, it is very heavy. Pulling it apart requires the energy of many railroad engines. On the other hand, the electrons that surround the nucleus are very light. They are the liberals; however, it won't work if there are no electrons. This, too, is a unity of opposites.

We are prepared to publish 400,000 copies of *Cankao xiaoxi*<sup>44</sup> so as to publicize the imperialist and bourgeois things on behalf of the imperialists. The purpose of

this is to put non-Marxist things and poisonous weeds in front of the comrades and the non-Party people so as to temper everyone. Otherwise they will only know Marxism and nothing else, and that wouldn't be good. But [at the same time] we must strengthen our leadership. It is like a smallpox vaccination which causes struggle inside the human body and produces immunity. Reading *Cankao xiaoxi*, talking about idealism, and publishing the collected works of Chiang Kai-shek are simply a kind of smallpox vaccination.

Disturbances among the people are well worth studying. This is a new problem. In the past we struggled together with the people against the enemy. We and the people formed one side of the contradiction and the enemy formed the other side of the contradiction. Now<sup>45</sup> . . . a problem has arisen, the people look at us with hostility. We must be prepared for [the fact that] each year a small segment of the people will create disturbances. As long as we are mentally prepared, we won't be caught in a passive situation. Secretaries and their assistants, ministers and vice-ministers, secretaries and deputy secretaries, must regularly discuss this problem with each other, analyze it, and exchange opinions on it. From my experience this kind of study is very beneficial. Rakosi and Gero were not mentally prepared for the events in Hungary.<sup>46</sup> The disturbance caused by thirty thousand people in XX *xian* was a "great 'contribution.'"<sup>47</sup> An amnesty order was issued, and all the landlord labels were taken off. The *xiang* authority was toppled. This was tantamount to taking a shot of immunization and a shot of smallpox vaccination. XXX they gave up the battleground step by step because they were totally unprepared mentally.<sup>48</sup> In the XX forestry school 300 people created a big uproar, but nothing could be done about it.<sup>49</sup> [We] Communists are not afraid of Chiang Kai-shek or the imperialists, but we are afraid of students making trouble or peasants creating a disturbance in the cooperatives. This is a new problem. If there are two possibilities, we must plan for the worse possibility. If no disturbances had erupted in Tibet, there would have been two possibilities: the Dalai Lama either would have run off to the United States or he would have stayed in India. Even if the Dalai Lama doesn't return, the Chinese mainland will not sink into the sea.<sup>50</sup> The reasons for the disruptions are: we have committed economic and political errors; our work methods are rigid, and there are [still] counterrevolutionary elements around. So it is impossible totally to avoid disturbances. It is good enough to make no mistakes of line and to avoid trouble on a nationwide scale. Even if mistakes of line were made and great chaos [spread over] the entire country, and even if several provinces and *xian* were occupied [by the enemy], even up to West Changan Street in Beijing, the country wouldn't collapse as long as the military was solid. [As a matter of fact,] the country might become even more consolidated. We must act like Kadar,<sup>51</sup> who could not go to sleep in the Parliament building for one month. We should have this kind of mental preparedness. It is possible for history to reverse itself and to repeat itself. The Revolution of 1911 overthrew an emperor, but another emperor emerged again.<sup>52</sup> Will our system be ultimately consolidated? There are two possibilities; it could be gradually consolidated, or we could make mistakes and create chaos. If chaos erupts there will always be heroes or great people who will emerge to take care of the situation. So in the end the system will be consolidated.

How should we deal with disturbances? When disturbances are justified, we should admit our mistakes and satisfy [the people's] demands. When disturbances are not justified, we cannot compromise, and we should criticize them, win over the masses, and isolate the bad people. Except where violence or murder is involved, we shouldn't go around arresting people indiscriminately. We shouldn't frustrate the activism of the students. We must guide them step by step. We must cultivate the art of leadership. When they create disturbances, let them squabble until they have had enough, for if they have not had enough, they will create more disturbances later on. Do not be in a hurry to expel bad people; we must strip them of all their political capital. In XX sixty people were arrested. The handling [of the situation] there was oversimplified.<sup>53</sup> When there was a disturbance in XXX, it was suggested that [everything] be closed for a vacation.<sup>54</sup> In my view there shouldn't be a vacation. The vacation should come only after the right or wrong of the matter has been cleared up, and we should make use of them as a sort of teaching material.

In dealing with the people, we absolutely mustn't shoot or arrest people lightly. If one must shoot, one can only shoot a few rounds into the air. Don't be afraid of disturbances. If they have a reason, they ought to make the disturbance. If they have no reason, then the disturbance will not last long. It won't be like the "December 9" [Incident].<sup>55</sup> We, too, emerged through making disturbances in the past.

Each minister and each province and municipality [authority] must study the ideological trends. In the past you were busy with routine work and did not study the ideological trends. This is not good and must be changed. We must avoid the use of military force by all possible means. We mustn't emulate the method of the Kuomintang. XX's method was close to that of the Kuomintang.<sup>56</sup> Only when it is a genuine case of counterrevolutionary uprising should military force be used to deal with it.

We must strengthen our work and correct our shortcomings. We must strengthen the political work among workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers. Now, everyone is busy with routine work and does no political work. This is very dangerous. Comrade XX always goes to the universities personally and makes reports;<sup>57</sup> everyone ought to go to the schools and make reports. Schools and the military are the [most] important. Some people say that the political ideology of the cadres in the military has deteriorated. What are we going to do? We must give it a good overhaul in [the drive for] increasing production and practicing economy and in [the campaign of] rectification, so as to strengthen the will of the cadres. The students of XX want to come to Beijing to present a petition.<sup>58</sup> It wouldn't be good not to allow them to come. In fact there would be advantages to their coming. It is good if life is a bit more complicated, otherwise it is too boring. Even in the game of *majong*, it is hard to play a hand if you aim at nothing but the best results.<sup>59</sup>

The Youth League<sup>60</sup> must reinforce its work in the schools, and the trade unions must reinforce their work in the factories. Let the democratic personages criticize and put up a rival show. There are only two kinds of criticism: the correct criticism would help remedy our shortcomings; as for the incorrect criticism, the more incorrect it is the better, since once they take the stage and speak [their fallacies] will be exposed. Liang Shuming, Peng Yihu, and Huang Yanpei<sup>61</sup> have all

criticized us, and later they have made self-examination. [People like] Zhang Naiqi<sup>62</sup> criticized our United Front Department. We gave them a free hand to criticize, and once they had criticized us they were themselves isolated. After there was a struggle against the China Democratic National Reconstruction Association,<sup>63</sup> they were still provided with food to eat and were retained in their ministerial positions. The greater the mistake, the greater the educational significance it has. Don't be afraid of their criticism; don't be like the Kuomintang in fearing criticism. Criticism must be treated differently according to the differences in circumstances. In some cases we must take the initiative [in making the attack]; in other cases we will strike only after the enemy has struck and by doing so control the battle. Unity and struggle; such a struggle will last for a long time. The working class, the laboring people, and the intellectuals [all] benefit from struggle and are tempered [by it]. There is a dualistic nature to bad people and bad deeds, and there are some good effects hidden in them somewhere. Many comrades have not been able to understand this principle, as is shown in the issue of choosing Wang Ming.<sup>64</sup> Bad events contain good elements, and good events also contain bad elements. To consider trouble as a bad thing whenever it arises and not to analyze it is a metaphysical point of view. Last year's great victory contained negative elements; we got swell-headed.

We are in the period of reconstruction and do not have sufficient experience with class struggle (which is partial) and struggle among the people (which is primary). This is a branch of science that ought to be studied very thoroughly. Even ten thousand years from now there will still be people who will cause disturbances. We must gain our experience within the span of three five-year plans.

On the issue of the legal system<sup>65</sup>—we must uphold the law; we must suppress counterrevolutionaries; we must affirm achievements.<sup>66</sup> To uphold the law is to uphold socialist law. We cannot undermine the legal system. The law has been established by the working people. To protect the interests of the working people, to protect the productive forces, and to protect the economic base, we must uphold the law. Continue to suppress counterrevolutionaries where the task has not yet been completed; this should be completed in one year. There seem to be many cases where there has been suppression [of counterrevolutionaries], but where they have not been thoroughly mopped up. We must mop them up gradually as incidents emerge. Affirm past achievements and back up cadres who are [in charge of] suppressing the counterrevolutionaries. If the democratic personages scold us, let them scold. We should not be afraid to take action just because they scold us. Those who dare to make disturbances may become talented and useful people after they are reformed. Xu Maogong created disturbances when he was twelve.<sup>67</sup> Later he became a prime minister. The mistakes made in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries should be sternly criticized. We should do our work with a free hand within the bounds of the legal system and not be overly cautious.

Strive for a bumper harvest this year in order to set people's minds at ease. The cooperatives can be consolidated. Beginning with the [setting up of] primary-stage cooperatives,<sup>68</sup> it should take us five years to have them all consolidated. Agriculture is first and foremost concerned with the problem of feeding 500 million people.

Noncommodity products make up a very large part of the picture, and two-thirds of the agricultural products are for a self-sufficient economy; if the 500 million people could be self-sufficient, the entire country would be stabilized. Second, [agriculture] provides the raw materials and markets for light industry. Third, it is largely a market for industry. The primary markets for [the products of] heavy industry, such as chemical fertilizers, farm tools, railroads, nearly all highways, electricity, coal, petroleum, large-scale water conservation projects, building materials, etc. are in the countryside. The United States does not have a feudal system, so its market is vast. Fourth, exports are primarily agricultural [products]. Agricultural products can be turned into foreign exchange and [in turn] support industry. So [in a sense] agriculture is just industry. Fifth, the development of agriculture is the primary source of accumulation for the state. Therefore we must persuade cadres to go to the rural areas; if we want to industrialize, then we must engage in agriculture.<sup>69</sup> A ratio of accumulation must be worked out. Stalin emphasized accumulation too much, which had a [negative] impact on industry. What ratio is actually desirable still needs to be studied. In short, we must make the cooperatives expand reproduction so that we can be assured of even greater accumulation. We must not drain the pond to catch the fish.<sup>70</sup>

Agricultural producers' cooperatives must have economic accounting, utilizing the law of value to figure out the costs.<sup>71</sup> The price of commodity grain should be raised by 5 per cent at a certain stage. At present there are ten million catties of commodity grain in the entire country. In twelve years we must produce fifty million catties.<sup>72</sup> As the volume of commodity grain grows, who will still plant it if the price is too low? I am not saying that the price should be raised right now, but we have to study our pricing policy.

Accumulation by the cooperatives themselves should increase annually, but it can't be too much. Let the peasants eat a bit more. If there is a bumper harvest this year, the sectors with increases in production can withhold more for the common reserve funds. Accumulate a bit more in years of bumper harvests so that it will average out with the years of poor harvests.

Everything is wave-like or spiral-like. Walking, holding meetings, electric current, sound waves, singing opera, speaking, and writing are all wave-like.<sup>73</sup> [I] support the study of dialectics.

## Notes

1. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version adds here: "Hu XX underestimated the achievements of the land reform [and] issued a self-incriminating edict. [He claimed that] there are no more landlords. [This] elicited attacks from all sides (from the Catholics, the democratic parties, and the intellectuals), but now this has been corrected."

On the term "self-incriminating edict" and on the identity of "Hu XX" (apparently Ho Chi Minh), see text Jan. 1957, note 37.

2. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 4.

3. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 5.

4. As noted in text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 7 and 8, Wang Yunsheng was in charge of *Dagong bao* in Chongqing during the period of the War of Resistance. Wang (b. 1899) was actually editor-in-chief of the paper. It was under his editorial guidance that *Dagong bao*

turned pro-Communist. He remained editor and publisher of the paper after 1949 when it was moved to Shanghai and afterward to Beijing. Since then he has been prominent in China's journalistic circles and in international affairs. He was also active in several national political organizations, such as the Chinese People's Consultative Conference and the National People's Congress. For more biographical information on Wang, see URI (1970), II, pp. 705–706.

For more on the *Dagong bao*, and on the expression cited here, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 8.

5. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 8 and 9.

6. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 6.

7. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 29.

8. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 14.

9. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 15.

10. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 21.

11. See text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 16.

12. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source gives the figure "900 million" here.

13. Although the Elbe River flows through much of East Germany, there is a segment of the river, in its lowest stretches just before it empties into the North Sea, where it served as a border between East and West Germany. The thirty-eighth parallel and the seventeenth parallel were the divisions between North and South Korea and North and South Viet Nam at this time, respectively.

Behind Mao's statement lies the notion that these three countries were forcibly divided by imperialism and that their liberation and unification are (at least at the time) uncompromisable goals of the international Communist movement. They were not specifically mentioned in the *Xuanji* version.

14. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 18. We should note, however, that here in the *Wansui* (1969) and *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version, Mao's words do not contain as keen an ideological and theoretical connotation as do the words in the *Xuanji* version.

15. We are not certain as to when Mao communicated with Sukarno, the president of the Republic of Indonesia at this time, on this subject, but Sukarno had visited China in October 1956. It appears that the *Xuanji* V, version of this speech refers to a discussion between Mao and "an American" at Yanan, instead of to a discussion between Mao and Sukarno.

16. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 24.

17. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source adds here (in place of the ellipses): "Just as they did [in the case of] the Soviet Union."

18. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 26.

19. Mao is referring to the final major military push of the Communist forces in mid-1949 to oust Chiang Kai-shek's government. In early April 1949, a KMT delegation sent by Li Zongren, who had assumed the presidency at Chiang's resignation in late January, negotiated with the Communists in Beijing for an agreement on the ending of the civil war. On April 20, the terms of the agreement were rejected by the Nanjing government, and on the following day Mao and Zhu De signed the order to the PLA for a countrywide advance. On that day, April 21, 1949, the Communist second and third field armies, under the command of Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi respectively, crossed the Yangtze on a 300-mile front, and two days later took Nanjing.

20. *Mantou*, a steamed bun made of wheat flour, is the staple in the diet of the northern Chinese, as opposed to rice which makes up the standard diet of the central and southern Chinese. Here Mao alludes to the need for ideological adjustment, just as one has to make allowance for climatic and dietary adjustments.

21. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note; for cross references here, see text Jan. 18, 1957, note 21, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 30.

22. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 17.

23. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 29.

24. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 31.
25. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 30.
26. This is a saying, of unknown origin, which Mao has come to use frequently to elucidate, metaphorically, the problem of internal unity. Mao also often says that out of ten fingers (ten things, or ten ways to look at a situation), not all ten can be bad; there has to be one, or several that are good, in which case the good ones should be differentiated from the rest and should be taken as the key to resolving the problem.
27. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 32.
28. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 33.
29. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 34.
30. See note 25. With regard to the last part of this motto, it also implies “seeking to find out the truth (knowledge) about things.” In other words, the CPC leadership needed clarification about the rumors about Khrushchev, about the CPSU’s stance on socialism, on Stalin, etc. that had been circulating for a few months. It also seems as if there is here an echo of Lenin’s comments, in his essay “Left-Wing Communism—An Infantile Disorder” of 1920: “For about half a century—approximately from the forties to the nineties of the last century—progressive thought in Russia . . . sought eagerly for a correct revolutionary theory, and followed with the utmost diligence and thoroughness each and every ‘last word’ in this sphere in Europe and America. Russia achieved Marxism—the only correct revolutionary theory—through the *agony* she experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice . . . devoted searching, study, . . . verification, and comparison.” So it seems that Mao’s suggestion is that if China’s grasp of the correct revolutionary theory must be attained and affirmed, it must be done in the context of learning the truth and the lessons of the Soviet Union (in the contemporary context of the experience of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU). For Lenin’s statements quoted here, see V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (1971), III, pp. 352–353.
31. See text Autumn 1956, note 3; for cross references here, see text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 15, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 3 and 35.
32. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, text surrounding notes 36, 37, 38 for comparison with the text here. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 40, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 87.
33. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 41.
34. The derogatory term that Mao uses for Chiang Kai-shek in this document is *wangba dan*, an intensely insulting expression, literally meaning a “turtle’s egg,” and metaphorically, a “whore’s son.” This was purged, we think, when the “official version” of *Xuanji*, V was published. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 25.
35. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 42.
36. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 57.
37. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 45, 46, 47. The *Wansui* (1969) and *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version is much more direct and blunt here in its criticism of Stalin than the *Xuanji*, V version, although many of the same expressions are used. Where the *Xuanji*, V version says “Stalin had a lot of metaphysical [ideas], . . . he only talked about the struggle between opposites, but not about the unity of opposites,” the *Wansui* (1969) and *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version pointedly states: “Si-da-lin *shiji shang shi xing-er-shang xue, bu chengren duili tongyi*” (italics added)—i.e., “Stalin was *in reality* metaphysical [in his ideas], and he *did not recognize* the unity of opposites [italics added].”
38. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 50.
39. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 52.
40. See text Dec. 31, 1952, vol. I, note 1.
41. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 56.
42. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 22, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 58.
43. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.
44. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 55.
45. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source adds here (in place of the ellipses): “classes will soon be

eliminated, and we must be engaged in promoting construction; the counterrevolution will soon come to an end and there will no longer be any enemies [for us]. Although there are [still] imperialists out there, they have not made a move. That is why . . . .”

46. For information on Rakosi, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 68. Erno Gero became first secretary (and thereby de facto leader) of the Hungarian Communist Party in July 1956. He was instrumental in introducing the armored units of the Soviet Union to suppress what had developed into a rebellious action against the Hungarian government, and the Communist Party which dominated it, in October 1956. (See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.)

47. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source identifies XX as Linru *xian* in Henan Province.

48. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source identifies XXX here as “At Shijiazhuang.” See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 12.

49. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source identifies XX here as “Gansu [Province].”

50. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 55, and surrounding text.

51. Janos Kadar, a centrist leader of the Hungarian Workers’ Party who, in the early stages of the Hungarian Incident (see text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 13, and text Jan. 27, 1957[1], note 60), supported Imre Nagy’s premiership. Later, alarmed by Nagy’s rapid radicalization of Hungarian internal and foreign policy, Kadar and others, including Ferenc Munnich, negotiated with the Soviet Union, bringing on the cessation of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, the crushing of the pro-Nagy forces, and eventually the installation of a new government under Kadar’s leadership.

52. After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, two attempts were made to restore a monarchy in China. One was by Yuan Shikai (see text July 14, 1956, note 4) in 1915–1916, and the other was by Qing loyalists, under the leadership of Kang Youwei and the warlord Zhang Xun, to place Aisin-goro Pu Yi (formerly the Xuantong Emperor) back on the throne in 1917. From the other version of this speech (text Jan. 27, 1957[1], see note 65), it is clear that Mao was talking about Yuan Shikai.

53. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source identifies XX here as “Gansu [Province].”

54. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source identifies XXX here as “Shijiazhuang.”

55. The December 9 Incident, known as the *yi er jiu shijian* or the *yi er jiu yundong*, refers to the large-scale protest movement that took place beginning on December 9, 1935 in Beijing in response to the formation of the Qi-Cha (Hebei and Chahar) Political Affairs Council, which signified and served as a front for the Japan-sponsored so-called Northern China Independence (Self-Government) Movement, whose import was to split territories already overrun by Japan’s invasion forces away from the control of China’s government. For a more detailed discussion of this incident, see J. Harrison (1972), pp. 261–264. Here the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source has *yi er jiu yundong* (i.e., placing a period between the character *yi* and the character *er*), which would render the phrase, in translation, as “January 29 Movement.” We believe this to be a typographical error.

56. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source identifies XX here as “Gansu [Province].”

57. This appears, from information in texts Jan. 18, 1957, and Jan. 27, 1957(1), to refer to Deng Xiaoping. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source has XXX here.

58. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source identifies XX here as “Sichuan [Province].” See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II, note 42. From information in text April 1957 (see text surrounding note 30 in that document), we know that students from Guangdong also wanted to go to Beijing to petition.

59. The metaphor that Mao uses here is that of achieving a hand of “one color” (*qing yi se*) in the popular Chinese game of *majong*. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 12.

60. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, source note. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.

61. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 73. The name of Huang Yanpei was not mentioned in the *Xuanji*, V version. For more on Huang, see text Feb. 17, 1951, vol. I, source note.

62. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 73.

63. The China Democratic National Reconstruction Association, whose Chinese title is often abbreviated as “Minjian” (for Zhongguo minzhu jianguo hui), was one of the “democratic parties” (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1). Its membership was primarily made

up of intellectuals and national bourgeoisie. The reaction of the association to the “socialist transformation” of the economy and the increasing state takeover of economic enterprises in 1956 was by no means a positive one. The struggle Mao mentioned here refers to a struggle targeted not specifically against the association but against some of its members. The struggle against Liang Shuming, an influential member, going back as far as mid-1953, was particularly severe. The association, unlike the Democratic League, was not banned. See also text Dec. 8, 1956, note 7, and text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, note 7.

64. See text Aug. 12, 1953, note 20, and for cross reference here, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 76. The issue of electing Wang Ming (and others such as Li Lisan) to sit on the CPC Central Committee, as an example of how certain “bad” elements, too, must be allowed to have their place in the system, was a subject addressed by Mao in the speech at the First Session of the Preparatory Conference for the Eighth CPC Congress. (See text Aug. 30, 1956.)

65. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 84.

66. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 10.

67. Xu Maogong (a.k.a. Xu Shiji) was a famous general of the early Tang dynasty (circa A.D. 600). In the general situation of chaos and uprising at the end of the preceding Sui dynasty in A.D. 618, Xu joined Li Mi, one of the strongest leaders of the mutually contending rebel forces. Later Xu joined the Tang forces and aided Li Shimin, who later became the Emperor Taizong, in conquering the other forces that were vying for the kingdom. Later, Xu was given the honor of bearing the family name of the emperor, and thus became better known in history as Li Ji. In the mid-seventh century he also commanded the Tang army in conquest of what is today Korea.

68. See text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

69. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 85.

70. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 86.

71. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 87.

72. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source has XXX for these figures in both cases.

73. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 88.

## Interjections at Conference of Provincial and Municipal Party Secretaries

(January 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 73–81. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 121–125; URI (1976), pp. 17–24; *Ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 180–184. Available English Translations: JPRS, *Miscellany*, I, pp. 46–53; URI (1976), pp. 25–34.

*Although the source labels this document as interjections at the conference of Party secretaries, and thereby implies that these remarks were made during the conference, or, in other words, most likely sometime before the speech of Jan. 27, 1957 (identified in the Wansui [1969] version of that speech as the summary address [zongjie], or closing speech), nonetheless, since we do not have a definite date for this set of remarks (i.e., the “interjections”), in accordance with the convention of this publication, we have had to place this document at the end of January 1957. The reader should, however, be mindful that the comments here were probably made by Mao first, followed by more definitive, conclusive remarks in the January 27 speech. Two of the last three paragraphs in this document—the*

*paragraph starting “Ho Chi Minh” and the first paragraph under “(10) Others”—are in the Wansui (n.d. 3) and the Ziliao xuanbian sources only. The final paragraph is only in the Ziliao xuanbian source.*

### (1) The Problem of Ideological Struggle

Since the latter part of last year there has been a gust of Rightist opportunistic wind blowing above the earth’s surface and below the cloud layer. Inside and outside the Party there is a reverse current of antisocialism.

This deviant wind in society must be subdued. The method of subduing [it] has to be convincing. It is not enough simply to do a little bit of scolding. If [the method] is simplistic and crude, the bad wind will blow even harder and harder.

There will be an abundance of weird arguments at the National People’s Congress in May and the Political Consultative Conference in June.<sup>1</sup> One such [argument] will be on the [problem of establishing] a legal system;<sup>2</sup> another on the sufferings of the peasants;<sup>3</sup> yet another on the absence of meat in people’s diets. The gist will be whether or not socialism is [a] superior [system]. We have to be prepared for these two battles. Those present who are delegates [to these meetings] must personally take part in the battles. Everyone must prepare a [speech] and have an analysis.

The struggle against petty-bourgeois ideology, and especially that of well-to-do middle peasants,<sup>4</sup> has to be waged repeatedly for many years. The well-to-do middle peasants have great influence. They are especially formidable. We ought to pay attention [to this].

Merely attending to matters of daily routine without doing ideological work will get one into trouble.

Every province needs a couple of [theorists like] Marx and a couple of [writers like] Lu Xun.<sup>5</sup> You should write articles. All those under sixty should write.

Every province should train theorists. Nowadays we train opera singers and painters, but not people who are engaged in theoretical [work]. This is also a problem of the system. You depend upon the Center, but the Center does not forbid you to undertake [such tasks].

### (2) The Problem of [People] Making Trouble

Should we be afraid of [people] making trouble? I think we should not. We should not be afraid even if more trouble is made. There is bound to be trouble every year, and it will increase in the future. What is the use of being afraid of it? Contradictions have to be exposed before problems can be solved. Society is the unity of opposites. There will always be contradictions between the professors and students, on the one hand, and ourselves, on the other.<sup>6</sup> There will always be disputes. Twenty years from now the old ones will have died, but there will be problems with the new ones. Forty years after the revolution, the Soviet Union still has [people making] trouble. Thirty per cent of those in [our] factories come from landlord, rich-peasant, and capitalist origins. In the universities, 80 per cent come from landlord, rich-peasant, and capitalist origins. We must not be afraid of their making trouble; not even if they come to Beijing to make trouble. We should adopt

a positive, not a negative, attitude. On returning from Yugoslavia to Budapest, Gero reprimanded the masses.<sup>7</sup> All at once he lost his prestige and was driven from power. We must be prepared that big trouble may arise, and then perhaps nothing serious will occur. Should something [catastrophic] happen, we must adopt a positive attitude, correct [our] methods, and strive to cause division [among the troublemakers]. A capable person is one who can open up a [new] situation under circumstances such as those in Poznan and Hungary.<sup>8</sup>

We wish only for peace in the world. But we must be prepared for the worst, and for the biggest trouble. We came from Yanan, and we are prepared to return to Yanan. In the past we had not seen Mei Lanfang's opera.<sup>9</sup> Now we have seen it for seven years. We are prepared to return to Yanan in the eighth year.<sup>10</sup> At worst there might be fighting with atom bombs, a world war, mistakes committed [by us], or a Hungarian Incident. As long as we are mentally prepared for the worst we will be afraid of nothing. If we are not prepared, we will end up weeping. The Seventh Congress raised seventeen possibilities of [trouble such as] having "a thousand *li* of land laid waste."<sup>11</sup> Now what does it matter if some incidents should happen in a country of 600 million people? If the heaven wants to rain or if one's mother wants to remarry, we can do nothing about it.<sup>12</sup>

Concerning strikes in factories and schools, and petitions, the Constitution has made stipulations in some areas, and has not [specifically] forbidden them in others.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, first, we mustn't advocate [such things ourselves], but second, if people want to strike and make petitions, whether with or without reason, let them. If their demands are reasonable, we should make corrections. If their demands are not reasonable, we should explain [this to them]. If professors want to publicize their opinions, let them do so. It is better to unearth contradictions in order to solve them, and not to strike [them] to death with one blow. On the other hand, if we are always making compromises, we would become [another] Nagy.<sup>14</sup>

The petty bourgeoisie wants to exercise dictatorship. They want to topple you so that they can assume dictatorship. They want to have another Hungary; we'll have to fight them for ten, twenty years. Every province should hold mass meetings, public speeches, and public debate meetings so as to get arguments going and see which side will win. But we must make preparations beforehand. In small gatherings they look truculent; but they will be at a loss about what to do at large meetings. You call for big democracy, and we do it your way.<sup>15</sup> If they have something to fart about, let them fart; otherwise it will be harmful to us. If it's out, then one can decide whether it smells good or bad. When society splits, we must win the people over. If the people think their [the petty bourgeoisie's] fart stinks, they will be isolated.

Don't be afraid of [people making] trouble. The bigger and longer, the better. After people have made this kind or that kind of trouble, something will always come out of it, and then we can figure out [who is] right and [who is] wrong. No matter how much trouble there is, don't be afraid. The more afraid you are, the more the demons will come against you.<sup>16</sup> But we must not open fire. Shooting is never a good thing to do, no matter at what time.

It is impossible to get the entire nation embroiled in big trouble. Wherever there

are boils and bacteria, there will eventually be eruptions. In a big province there are about 50,000 people—in a medium-sized province 30,000 people, and in a small province 10,000 people—who are ready to make trouble. When we balance the books at the end of the year, if the numbers are not that high, we can say we've done a good job.

To be prepared to face these troubles, we have to convene *xian* and [special] district secretaries' meetings and make preparations. [Special] district committee secretaries and district chiefs and those higher up must be mentally prepared. Should there only be peace and no trouble, and should we grow inactive and afraid of trouble, we would be in a passive position when trouble arises. This would lead first to mental sluggishness and then to acceding to every demand [put forth by the troublemakers].

Problems cannot be solved without a fight. Contradictions can be resolved only through struggle. XX Hui people, because of the restrictions placed on slaughtering cattle, rose up and fought the cadres.<sup>17</sup> As soon as they beat the cadres, the problem was solved. There is fighting with good reason and fighting without reason. Fighting, even without reason, is a good thing. When there is pus in a boil it has to be drained.

In dealing with bad people, is it good to expel all of them? I think it is better not to be hasty in expelling them. Nor should we execute them (except for counterrevolutionary criminals); we should use them to perform work, use them as political teaching material, and deprive them of their political capital.<sup>18</sup> An oversimplified way of dealing with them means ideologically not to recognize the unity of opposites.

As for people like Xiao Jun and Ding Ling,<sup>19</sup> it is not appropriate to kill them or to imprison them or to put them under surveillance. What we should do is to grab their many smaller mistakes and expose their stench in society.

Concerning Party members who have engaged in troublemaking in schools, we should discuss the matter clearly before expelling them from the Party. We should not be hasty in expelling them from the Party. And we can't expel them from the schools.

The survey of the [class] backgrounds of workers in Shaanxi was well done. In Hungary no [such] survey was done, so when the incident occurred, nobody knew why. Taking this as a lesson, we must be clear about the backgrounds of workers, and know how many are reliable, how many are in the middle, and how many are questionable. According to the present survey, only 25 per cent are reliable. We must increase the proportion of those coming from working-class backgrounds. We may gradually change this situation after three five-year plans. The backgrounds of university students cannot be changed until about twenty years from now. Right now it is impossible to enroll large numbers of workers and peasants in the universities.

At the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU they killed Stalin with one blow.<sup>20</sup> It was very satisfying [for them]. Now Stalin has come to life again. When they swayed over that way they were sincere, and when they swayed back this way, they were not.<sup>21</sup> The imperialist countries gave them one blow, and the socialist countries gave them several. So they are swaying back this way. They talk incessantly of Poznan and Hungary, [but] they don't admit their insincerity [in talking about it].

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### (3) The Problem of Philosophy

To know how to analyze is to understand the dialectical method. Lenin said, "The dialectical method can be regarded simply as the theory concerning the unity of opposites. In this way one can grasp the nucleus of the dialectical method. But this requires explanation and elaboration." Again he said, "The unity of opposites (uniformity, oneness, balance) is conditional, temporary, transient, relative, and mutually exclusive. The struggle of opposites, on the other hand, is absolute, just as development and movement are absolute."<sup>22</sup> Equilibrium is temporary, constantly [in the process of] being destroyed. In some cases equilibrium is destroyed in just a few days or a few months; no sooner has equilibrium been attained than it will immediately become disequilibrium. Unity is uniformity, oneness, and unification. When there are disagreements in the Party, we convene a meeting to bring about unity; a couple of months later, new problems crop up again, and we convene another meeting. Being [objectively] realistic and subjectivism are a unity of opposites. There will be subjectivism even in ten thousand years.

Materialism and idealism are a unity of opposites, and dialectics and metaphysics are also a unity of opposites. With philosophy there is always struggle; to discuss philosophy you have to struggle. Some people, when they discuss philosophy, only talk about one side [of the issue]; [when they talk about] letting a hundred flowers bloom, they only talk about letting fragrant flowers bloom, and not about getting rid of poisonous weeds.<sup>23</sup> We acknowledge that opposites exist in socialism. Stalin had his metaphysics, and his subjectivism. The Soviet Union does not acknowledge the existence of opposites [within socialism], and forbids [their existence] by law; as a matter of fact, many wrong things are hidden behind the front of socialism. Lenin believed that merely talking about materialism could not solve problems. To solve problems, one must struggle with idealism. To struggle with it, one must study idealism. The three component parts of Marxism are the result of struggle after having studied capitalist things.<sup>24</sup>

The realm of philosophy consists of two opposing things struggling [against each other]: World view is the struggle between materialism and idealism; epistemology is the struggle between dialectics and metaphysics. We and Chiang Kai-shek are a unity of opposites; we and the democratic personages are also a unity of opposites. Everything has within it the relations between two contradictory aspects. Stalin made some errors in his dialectics. "Negation of the negation."<sup>25</sup> The October Revolution negated capitalism. But he did not recognize that socialism could also be negated. We believe that the world is at once stable and unstable. Socialism, too, will one day cease to exist. To say that there is a society whose superstructure will never become extinct would not be Marxist, it would be like religion.

### (4) The Problem of the Countryside

It is important to have a good harvest. Last year the Soviet Union had a good harvest and it made many things easier. We have had one year's experience [in cooperativization], and this year we should try to reap a good harvest. If we all work hard to achieve a good harvest this year, it will be of very great significance

to the world Communist movement. This will be an unprecedented event in the history of the socialist movement. Historically, socialist cooperativization has always brought about an [immediate] reduction in production. Our production increase in 1956 was not great; we should increase production a great deal in 1957.

One of our goals is for more than 90 per cent of cooperative members to realize an increase in income; we shall see if we can reach [this goal] in three to four years. Hubei has had a good harvest, but still about 15 per cent of the members of cooperatives there have had no increase in income. We should explain clearly to Party members, government functionaries, military personnel, and civilians that cooperativization has only had a history of one to one and a half years. We who have participated in the revolution all our lives are still making mistakes. How can we expect those who have had only a little over a year's experience [in cooperativization] not to make mistakes? Given a trial period of three years, it will be possible to increase the income of more than 90 per cent of the members of the cooperatives.

About 10 to 15 per cent of the peasants have led a hard life. It is not correct to make a blanket statement that peasants have [all] had a hard life. There should be an analysis.<sup>26</sup> The so-called hardship of the peasants is that the well-to-do middle peasants' income has been reduced; some veteran cadres' families have become prosperous, and they have begun to reflect the thinking of landlords, rich peasants, and well-to-do middle peasants.

The Forty Articles<sup>27</sup> were discussed at last year's National Party Congress. They should be publicized. We should strive to reach the production targets of 400, 500, and 800 catties per *mu* [per year] ahead of schedule by one year and complete the Twelve-Year Plan in eleven years.<sup>28</sup>

The first three steps are the most difficult. To accomplish things one has to pass through three difficult stages. This year we have passed through only the first difficulty. We need three five-year plans before we can accomplish our task.

Since ancient times, all progressive things have invariably elicited rebuke at the outset. The theory of evolution, Marx, Sun Yat-sen,<sup>29</sup> and the Communist Party have all elicited rebuke. Ten thousand years from now, progressive things will still elicit rebuke.

As long as one cooperative shows the superiority [of the cooperative system], we'll be able to refute all [kinds of] nonsense. We can use it for propaganda.

### (5) Economic Problems

Each province [should] establish its own chemical fertilizer plants.

We should pay attention to food grain production. It is very dangerous not to. When we have grain, we have everything. If there is food to eat even during strikes in factories and schools, no great disturbance will occur in the nation. Cooperatives should take over [the production of] oil products and pork. The state concerns itself only with collecting the [amount requisitioned] and not with distributing. Food grains, when they are collected, are to be handled in the same way (except in cash crop areas). The state is only concerned with unified state purchasing, not with the marketing in the countryside.<sup>30</sup> Cooperatives and brigades should handle these matters themselves.

Two years from now, [the problem] will not be the government competing with people for grain, but rather that the state may not purchase [the grain]. We should only have unified purchasing but not unified marketing. The situation in Xiaogan *xian* in Hubei Province is like this at present.

State farms<sup>31</sup> should be established in new industrial and mining districts to solve the problems of grain, oils, meat, vegetables, etc.

Big factories are essential, but we do not need too many of them. There is an even greater need for smaller factories; there can't be too many of them. People all grow from small to big. Small [factories] should be based on the principle of availability of raw materials and accessibility to markets. The number of large [factories] to be built should be based, in principle, on the magnitude of the resources available to the state.

#### (6) The Problem of Schools

Agricultural science should be added to the curriculum of junior middle schools.

Provincial and municipal [Party] committees should send cadres to strengthen the schools and to focus their attention on the schools. All cultural and educational work should be dealt with in this way.

Comrades from the provincial, [special] district, and *xian* [Party] committees should educate students group by group and area by area. Every province [should] hold a students' congress and a teachers' congress once a year. Adequate preparations should be made beforehand. One day [should be set aside] for reports and three days for discussion and solving problems. If no arrangements have been made for work on the students, [such] arrangements should be made. Each year we should hold one or two meetings and give one or two talks. We must pay attention to discovering problems, and not wait until problems explode to find solutions. Get after them now. Factories, cooperatives, stores, and schools are the units concerned here.

#### (7) The Problem of Literature and Art

There is an advantage in having a hundred schools contend in that it lets all the evil demons, devils, and bastards come out [and show themselves].<sup>32</sup> All the provinces should pay attention to this: Concerning significant problems that are ripe [for solution], one person should take charge and organize people to write articles [on them]; preparations should be made [to publish] one article per month to put down all the bad influences.

Vaccination can create immunity (by putting some "opposite matter" inside your body).<sup>33</sup> Why can't we vaccinate literature and art?

The Propaganda Department should hold one or two press conferences every month or two. Once every two months is all right too. Right now, there is not even one press conference a year.

#### (8) The Problem of Cadres

Cadres are always being promoted to higher positions; but after being promoted, they have no work to do. We have made a mistake in this regard. Now we only

permit them to go down to the lower levels and not to be promoted upward. The fewer people in leadership organizations the better; [the work there] is nothing but writing articles and talking on the phone.

The state is an apparatus for class struggle. Only a small number of people can comprise the state.<sup>34</sup> How could all 500 million people become the state? What kind of promotion do university professors get? Don't they remain professors all their lives, even when their hair turns white? How do workers and peasants get promotions? Don't they remain workers and peasants all their lives, even when their hair turns white? It's not that [the practice of] promotion is to be dispensed with altogether; when somebody dies there should be a replacement.

Ultrademocracy and ultra-equality will never work. Yan Yuan, without going through a grading, was [deemed] a second-class sage.<sup>35</sup> The ratio between cadres from outside and local cadres should be adjusted. In the case of *xian* [Party] committee members, the numbers of outsiders and locals can be about half and half.

#### (9) The Problem of Leadership

Members of the Central Committee, secretaries of provincial [Party] committees, and heads of departments must pay a visit to the factories and villages every year to familiarize themselves with the conditions there. Only in this way can they avoid becoming [like] Rakosi.<sup>36</sup>

What the secretaries of provincial and *xian* [Party] committees have seen in the departments amounts to nothing. [They must] go [instead] and dig into the factories and cooperatives.

Real knowledge comes from the factories, cooperatives, stores, and schools. The higher you go, the less substance there is. [There are two ways] to solve problems: one is by going to the lower levels; and the second is by summoning people up to report. Beijing is not a good place, because one cannot acquire much knowledge [there]. The provinces are a bit better. You must go down. Heads of departments in charge of industries should go down to the factories, and heads of departments in charge of agriculture should go to the countryside.

Central Committee members, heads of departments, and secretaries of provincial [Party] committees must each take some time every year to visit the rural areas and study the problems there. It takes only two months to get a clear picture of a *xian* or a *xiang*. If they don't read telegrams for two months they can still understand them [when they pick them up again later]. I hear that people don't go down any more [because] there is too much office work to do.

The secretary of a provincial [Party] committee can serve concurrently as the secretary of a *xian* ([or] municipal) [Party] committee. The original *xian* ([or] municipal) committee secretary can be demoted to second secretary. Secretaries of provincial committees having gone down, secretaries of [special] district and *xian* committees will also go down. Secretaries of municipal committees can serve concurrently as factory heads, school principals, and secretaries of Party committees. In this way, [we] will be able to penetrate reality and absorb knowledge.

It is better to have the secretaries of the district [Party] committees meet twice a year. This way you will be compelled to study problems. Farts from on high do

not all smell good. Here, too, there are opposites—some of them smell good and some of them smell bad (including Beijing). You have to smell them [to know].

All provinces should take note [of this fact]: In cities we rely on the working class, in the countryside we rely on the poor peasants, and in schools we rely on the Leftists. There always has to be something to rely on.

Ho Chi Minh<sup>37</sup> is mistaken on the problem of relying on the poor peasants. [In his case] it was not correcting a “deviation,” but correcting what was “correct” [in the first place]. On the land reform issue [he] did not affirm the achievements but spoke only about the mistakes. [He] issued a [self-]incriminating [“]edict[”]—a letter to the peasants.<sup>38</sup> [Then] the landlords were transformed into peasants instantly. The democratic parties are opposed to having a single party<sup>39</sup> [maintaining a] dictatorship; the intellectuals are opposed to the Party. Someone [there] proposed that they should emulate China [and have] a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools contend. But [he] wouldn't allow them to emulate [us], saying that they had [already] made a mistake in the past in emulating China. As a result, [there they had] a single flower blooming in solitude, and one school sounding off by itself. Now things have changed [a bit].

#### (10) Others

Each province [should] engage in streamlining [organization] on its own. Those [cadres] who have a way out<sup>40</sup> should start to be [transferred] downward first. As much as possible [they] should be transferred back into production. Those who do not have a way out yet should wait.

When there is a [borderline] situation where someone can either be arrested or not, we should put it in the category of those who can be arrested; when there is a situation where someone can be either executed or not, we should put it in the category of those who can be executed.<sup>41</sup>

#### Notes

1. The reference here is to the Fourth Session of the First National People's Congress, which in fact was not convened until June 26, 1957, and lasted through July 15. The transcript is also somewhat in error regarding the meeting of the CPPCC. The Third Session of the Second National Committee of the CPPCC was held March 5–20, 1957. On Mao's usage of the term “weird arguments,” see text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 9, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 34.

2. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 84.

3. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 34, and surrounding text.

4. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 10.

5. See text April 25, 1956, note 15.

6. Mao appears to be harking back to problems discussed at the conference on the problem of dealing with intellectuals; see text Jan. 20, 1956.

7. See text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 46. We are not entirely certain what Mao is referring to by Gero's return from Yugoslavia.

8. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27; see also text Jan. 18, 1957, notes 13, 17, and 22.

9. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 18.

10. See text Oct. 26, 1949(2), vol. I, note 1, and text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 33, for information on the Yanan period of CPC history. In this connection, since the CPC emerged

from the caves of Yanan to wage the War of Liberation, which they finally won, and to found the People's Republic of China, going back to Yanan connotes losing power. For this reference, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 41.

11. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 61.

12. Mao is apparently employing a rather slangish folk saying whose origin is unknown to us. The Chinese characters for the saying are *tian yao xia yu, niang yao jia ren, wu ke neihe*. 13. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 66.

14. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.

15. See text Nov. 15, 1956; see also text Jan. 18, 1957, note 26.

16. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 62.

17. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source identifies XX as “Henan”; thus this would read “The Hui people in Henan [Province].” The Hui people, an ethnically identifiable minority nationality, are almost totally Moslems, in whose diet beef represents a staple, and for whom such eating habits constitute a major part of their religion. We are unable to identify specific events corresponding to Mao's description, although in 1958 it was reported in several articles in *Zhongguo qingnian* (Chinese youth) that the Hui people, in the spirit of national integration, were beginning to give up their insistence on using special restaurants and ritual bath-halls set up for them and were prepared to join the public mess halls where they were treated as everyone else. For more on this issue, see J. Dreyer (1976), pp. 161ff.

18. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 10.

19. Xiao Jun was the *nom de plume* of Li Tianjun (b. 1908), a modern Chinese novelist. Among his early works, the most famous was *Bayue de xiangcun* (The Village in August), which he completed in late 1934 and for which Lu Xun wrote a preface. In 1940 Xiao went to Yanan and taught at the Lu Xun Art Institute. In 1941 he joined the CPC. In 1942, he suffered some mild criticism during the Yanan rectification campaign. In 1947, he went back to his native northeast China and founded the *Lianhua bao* in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province. He began publishing articles that were critical of the land reform program and the pro-Soviet tendencies of the CPC. In 1949, he was attacked at the Northeast Literature and Art Conference and was sent by the CPC Central Committee to Fushun for labor reform. In 1953–1954 he wrote, on the invitation of Zhou Yang, then director of the Cultural Department, a long novel entitled *Wuyue de kuangshan* (The Mines in May). This novel, though already heavily edited by others before publication, was still attacked in 1955. Xiao and others were implicated in the struggle between the CPC Center under Mao and writers such as Hu Feng in mid-1955. (For the Hu Feng affair, see text May–June 1955, vol. I, source note and note 12.)

Ding Ling was the *nom de plume* of Jiang Bingzhi (1906–1985), a writer whose active career began in the late 1920s. She joined the CPC in 1931, and was arrested as a Communist in May 1933 in Shanghai. After her release in 1936, she went to Yanan. There she became the editor for the literary page of the *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily). From 1942 on, her writing career and her political career followed a checkered pattern, and the two often got in each other's way. In 1950, however, she became the director of the newly established Literary Studies Institute of the Party Center and edited the *Wenyi bao* (Literature and Art Journal) and *Renmin wenxue* (People's Literature). In September 1954, because of Yu Pingbo's articles on *Honglougong* (see text Oct. 16, 1954, vol. I, note 1), the *Wenyi bao* was implicated and so was Feng Xuefeng, who had replaced Ding Ling as its editor. Subsequently, Ding herself was implicated and purged. In December 1957 she was severely reprimanded for her continued resistance to Party discipline and was removed from CPC membership. Here the *Ziliao xuanbian* version has a typographical error, rendering Ding Ling as “Ding Ri”; the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version also contains an error rendering Ding Ling as “Ding Xue.”

For more biographical information on Ding, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 846–847, and URI (1970), II, pp. 626–627.

20. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 21 and paragraph 11, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 30 and paragraph 37.

21. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 24.
22. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 38.
23. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 15, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 3, on the hundred flowers; see text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 41, on the fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds.
24. This alludes to Lenin's famous essay, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism"; see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 46.
25. The "law" known as the law of "the negation of the negation" (in Chinese, *fouding zhi fouding*) is one of the fundamental "laws" of dialectics (the others being the law of contradictions, and the law of transition from quantitative change to qualitative transformation). It is part of the basic way of dialectical thought that connects it to the classical syllogistic mode of thinking, in which the first thesis (the original thesis) is negated by the antithesis. In the "negation of the negation" dialectical mode of thought, the function of the third phase of the syllogism, the "synthesis," is not merely to synthesize the thesis and the antithesis and the relationship between them, but beyond that, it also negates the antithesis, or, in other words, is the "negation of the negation." The idea of the negation of the negation serves as the basis for the fundamental notion that all development and evolution of matter depends on, and is a measure of, the contradiction and struggle within the matter itself. This is therefore a notion basic to Mao's almost all-embracing concept of contradiction, as well as to the crucial idea of the unity of opposites that Mao was, at this time, escalating from the sphere of basic theory to the sphere of strategic practice. It is also an important philosophical foundation for Mao's radical interpretation of contradictions in the unity of opposites, which he ultimately formulated as the theory of "one divides into two" (*yi fen wei er*). Although Mao does not appear to have made public announcements about this latter formulation until October 1957 (see text Oct. 13, 1957), his ideas at this time (i.e., in early 1957) are already clearly pointed in that direction. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 35; also see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 18.
26. Mao appears to be still mindful here of the criticism of the CPC made by people such as Liang Shuming. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, source note and note 1; also see text Jan. 18, 1957, notes 33 and 34.
27. See text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3; see also text Jan. 18, 1957, note 6.
28. See text Dec. 21, 1955, vol. I, point 11 and note 8.
29. On Sun, see text Nov. 12, 1956, source note, and text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, note 7; on the theory of evolution, see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 84.
30. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 29.
31. See text Mar. 19, 1953, vol. I, note 4.
32. On the term "contending," see text Autumn 1956, note 3; on the terms "demons, etc." see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54, and text Jan. 18, 1957, note 25. The source here reads somewhat differently from the usual rendition of these terms. Instead of the usual *niugui sheshen* for "demons and ogres," Mao has *niutou sheshen*, in which the Chinese character for *shen* is different from the usual one. The words here literally mean "those with ox heads and snake bodies," where the conventional phrase means "ox ghosts and snake gods." The basic reference, however, remains the same. Following that, Mao has here *guizi wangba*, in which we think that the character for *gui* here, literally meaning "ghost," is a typographical or recording error for a word of the same sound but different tone, meaning "tortoise." Taken together, the four characters would mean "sons of tortoises," or bastards.
33. This is not a poor translation for "antibodies"; Mao is using the word *duili wu*.
34. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 81.
35. Yan Yuan, also known as Yan Hui, or, in the *Lun Yu* (Analects of Confucius), simply as Hui, was a disciple of Confucius. He was well-known for his intelligence and for his sense of perseverance and serendipity. Why Mao chose him as example here is uncertain. Yan certainly did not pass any of the "socialist" examinations, nor any of China's traditional imperial exams. Mao is also referring, however, to the fact that Yan

was revered by the epithet of *Fu sheng*, or "Once again a sage."

36. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 68.

37. See source note. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source has "Hu XX" for "Ho Chi Minh." See also text Jan. 27, 1957(2), paragraph 1 and note 1.

38. The original in *Wansui* (1969), URI (1976), and *Ziliao xuanbian* is missing a word. The term Mao uses, according to the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source, is *zuiji zhao* (the original reads *zui zhao*), which refers to the rare practice in traditional China when the emperor issues an edict accepting responsibility for some mistake, or severe calamity.

39. The Chinese here in *Ziliao xuanbian* reads *yi zhang zhuan zheng*, which we believe is a typographical error for *yi dang zhuan zheng*, as it appears in *Wansui* (n.d. 3).

40. We believe Mao is referring to people who are given positions or assignments. See the final paragraphs of text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II (in a part of that speech that does not appear in Version I).

41. We believe Mao is referring to the handling of counterrevolutionaries.

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## Letter to Huang Yanpei (February 11, 1957)

Source: *Shuxin*, p. 522.

See text Feb. 17, 1951, vol. I, source note.

Mr. Renzhi:<sup>1</sup>

I thank you for the moving, kind thoughts in your gracious letter. Since those things already got into print, it is all right not to correct them.<sup>2</sup> When I swam in the Yangtze River, it took some two hours and I drifted for over thirty *li* before I reached the other bank. It is possible to see from this how strong the current was. I swam on my back or sideways the entire time; that's why I found it more appropriate to use the words: "My relaxed eyes roam over the vast expanse of the skies of Chu."<sup>3</sup> Let me send my deep respects.

Mao Zedong

February 11, 1957

### Notes

1. See text Feb. 17, 1951, vol. I, note 1, and text Oct. 15, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

2. The language of this letter and the source do not provide further information about what "those things" that "got into print" are, but we surmise that, in the context, it most likely refers to the publication of Mao's "old-style" poetry in the new publication *Shikan* (see text Jan. 12, 1957[2]).

3. This is a line from Mao's poem "Swimming" (see text June 1956). From the context here, it may be that Huang Yanpei had suggested some poetic editing, but we cannot be sure. We do know, from the source here and from text Dec. 4, 1956 (postscript), that Mao had sent a handwritten copy of this poem to Huang in December 1956.

Conversation with Second Committee of  
the All-China Federation of Students  
(Excerpts)

(February 14, 1957)

**Source:** Quoted in Di Shuxun, "Yong bu wangji di shike," in *Mao qunzhong*, pp. 9–12. Other Chinese text: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 129.

*This conversation took place on February 14, 1957, at the Qinzhengdian, (originally a throne room in the old imperial palace and since 1949 an office that serves as the main official chambers of the chairman or head of state of the PRC.) At the time, the Second National Committee of the All-China Federation of Students was holding a conference in Beijing.*

*This article was first published in Henan ribao (Henan Daily) (Mar. 19, 1957).*

*In addition to the paragraph presented in this translation as a direct quotation, Mao also said a number of things that were reported indirectly in the article. These we have presented in brackets in an introductory paragraph in order to provide a context for the reader. The part starting with the mention of the Opium War, and including the remainder of this document, is presented, however, as a direct transcript in the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source, which cites Henan ribao as its original source.*

*Mao's conversation with the students of China at this meeting of the Second National Committee of the All-China Federation of Students is particularly meaningful in the context of the students' role in the protests and unrest that emerged among some parts of the student population in January 1957, to which Mao had alluded several times in the speeches that he made to the conference of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party secretaries. See texts Jan. 18, 1957 (Versions I and II), Jan. 27, 1957 (1) and (2), and Jan. 1957. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of text Mar. 1, 1957 should also be read in reference to the problem of students' protests in early 1957 and in conjunction with the present document.*

[The Chairman first discusses four issues that were raised by the students at his request: (1) concerning the problem of asking the persons in charge of local Party committees to make reports; (2) concerning the fact that the Party committees in some schools have not made full use of the student associations and have not convened many student representative meetings; (3) [that] their courses in political studies are not sufficiently related to reality and do not hold the students' interest; (4) a request that they be allowed to visit factories. The Chairman then gives the students a short summary of modern Chinese history, explaining how China has been involved in revolution for 110 years, or since 1840 when Lin Zexu burnt the opium stocks.<sup>1</sup> He goes on to say that even though in these 110 years the revolution had overthrown the Qing dynasty,<sup>2</sup> the Beiyang warlords,<sup>3</sup> and the Chiang Kai-shek government, the relations of production had not yet been transformed. He says that

the transformation of the relations of production was something that took place later. Only beginning in 1949 was land reform carried out throughout the country. He adds that as for socialist transformation, that came even later.]

You see, revolution is such [a] prolonged [process]; [we] have only engaged in construction for a few years; how can there be no difficulties? There are over 600 million people in our entire country. It is unlikely that we won't encounter any difficulties if our goal is to build in a country with a population of this size. Construction is even more difficult than revolution.

... The difficulties belong to the young people. The young must succeed the older generation. This is why you must be well-prepared. In the future, the country will be managed by you.

Notes

1. Lin Zexu (1785–1850) was appointed, in late 1838, as imperial commissioner for the Qing court to investigate and deal with the problem of the importing and use of opium by Chinese, which was sapping the energies as well as the economy of China by creating a vast outflow of silver and other valuable resources. When he arrived in Guangzhou in early 1839, Lin took drastic measures, ordering the British and the Chinese *hong* merchants to surrender the opium stock, which at the time was being imported at an estimated of thirty thousand chests per year. After taking forceful and not at all diplomatic measures to force their surrender, Lin piled up the opium at the Bogue outside Guangzhou and, in June 1839, mixed it with salt and lime and let it sink into the sea, thus "burning" it. This was a major economic and diplomatic setback for the British, and later that year, seizing on the case of a Chinese sailor, Lin Weixi, the British marched into Guangzhou and the Anglo-Chinese War ensued. China was confronted with superior arms, and the British were able to take such ports as Amoy and Ningbo. By 1842, the British had taken Shanghai and Baoshan and were threatening to overrun the lower basin of the Yangtze. In the Nanjing Treaty that was subsequently signed, the Chinese government conceded to many humiliating terms, including the cession of Hong Kong to Britain and the opening up of five major ports to free trade with Britain. The reason that Mao cites this as an example of revolution here is that the Nanjing Treaty was the first of many unequal treaties that China was forced to sign, and thus also marked the beginning of intensified imperialist encroachment in China. Imperialism is one of the three main targets of the Chinese Revolution.

For more on Lin Zexu, see A. Hummel (1943), pp. 511–514, and Chang Hsin-pao (1964).

2. See text July 14, 1956, note 1.

3. See text May-June 1955, vol. I, note 55.

Conversations with Scientists and Writers on  
Contradiction Among the People  
(February 16, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 130–131.

*The Wansui (n.d. 3) source describes this as records of a conversation or speech that was circulated.*

*We have no information regarding the context of this conversation or speech—where it was held, and who Mao's "audience" was. In light of the fact that these remarks were made only ten days before Mao's major speech on the subject of the contradictions among the people at the Supreme State Conference (see text Feb. 27, 1957), this could be considered an important "rehearsal" for that more famous speech.*

Let us make a bit of an investigation of Wang.<sup>1</sup> A young person who just started writing novels [is bound to have] some shortcomings; we must help him—even with regard to the generals of the insurrection, we have to assist them.<sup>2</sup> At this time we have many writers who can be distinguished from Hu Feng [and his ilk].<sup>3</sup> We ought to protect [them] and also criticize [them]; criticize [them] under [the conditions of] protecting [them]. Where he writes about people on the positive side, he is weak; where he writes about people on the negative side, [his style] is lively and vivid. There are factors of [his] life [experiences here], as well as factors of [his] viewpoint. It is also not just a problem of Wang X alone. Some comrades criticize that in the vicinity of the Center there cannot be bureaucratism. This viewpoint is wrong. Why [do we think that] in the vicinity of the Center bureaucratism cannot be produced? Even inside the Central Committee itself bad people have emerged. According to the viewpoint of these comrades, people who write essays like this should be sliced into pieces. In any case, many comrades have not yet understood clearly the guidelines that we adopt with regard to how we should deal with the mistakes that have emerged among the people; in fact many people are opposed [to our guidelines]. "Proceeding from the hope for unity, going through criticism, so that a new unity may be attained on a new foundation."<sup>4</sup> [Those who] criticize this piece of writing say that the location is all wrong, the timing is all wrong; this viewpoint is incorrect and lacks persuasiveness. There often are abnormal things in the Party. Under the conditions that throughout the country as a whole [the Party] has had great achievements and [enjoys] great prestige, nonetheless some bad work styles have been bred; this is in violation of the law and disrupts order and discipline, and is riding roughshod [over people], bullying [people]. Our country is a large country of the petty bourgeoisie; the real proletariat makes up no more than twelve million people—and even that includes both the true [proletariat] and the false. Why do people say that the Communist Party's shortcomings cannot be exposed? Just that viewpoint alone is wrong enough. In the Party, those who actually approve of the Party's United Front [policy]<sup>5</sup> are still only a minority. We have repeatedly said that we must "plan comprehensively with due consideration to all sectors so that each may be provided for."<sup>6</sup> Some comrades do not proceed from [a wish to] help, but simply kick people aside. This method is the most simplistic; the simplest thing to do is to open fire—that would be the Kuomintang's work style. There are in the society still some landlords, rich peasants, bourgeoisie—the largest number are the petty bourgeoisie; this is an objective reality.<sup>7</sup> In the [agricultural producers'] cooperatives it is chiefly some well-to-do middle peasants<sup>8</sup> who are dissatisfied; in the schools, 80 per cent [of the students] come from petty bourgeois [backgrounds] or from even more well-off economic [backgrounds],<sup>9</sup> but the majority of the people are not engaged in

promoting a Hungary.<sup>10</sup> Many of our comrades are simply scared of the Hungarian Incident. Things have a duality; everything has two characters. The Hungarian Incident is good, and it is also bad. When something that is bad is turned over it becomes good. To use [one kind of] one-sidedness to oppose [another kind of] one-sidedness would be a metaphysical, dogmatic method. Wang X did not do so well writing his novel; we need to help him correct himself in practice. Li Xifan<sup>11</sup> started out writing good essays, [but] the things he wrote later are not outstanding. Perhaps when he got to *Renmin ribao* he got divorced from [real] life.<sup>12</sup> We should live in the life of reality. [Some people] are good when they are daughters-in-law, but when they become mothers-in-law they are no good.<sup>13</sup> We cannot [effectively] criticize people if we use dogmatic methods, because there is no strength in [these methods]. Please take a look at how Lenin wrote "On Empirio-Criticism."<sup>14</sup> In the latter part [of his life] Stalin changed. He no longer discussed issues on an equal footing; rather, he was collecting a vast amount of material to publish his opinion. Some things were written well; in some other cases he was simply sitting on a hill picking stones to hit people, and it does not make people comfortable to read [that stuff].<sup>15</sup> Once we get power and become officials we should be alert. We mustn't scold people as if we were scolding our sons. We should not have a relationship like that between a master and a humble servant.<sup>16</sup> We can't use [one kind of] one-sidedness to oppose [another kind of] one-sidedness. Dogmatism is not Marxist-Leninist. There were some good pieces of writing criticizing Hu Shi, but later [all his merits were simply] canceled out in one stroke of the pen.<sup>17</sup> After a time [this situation] can be amended a bit. Even [the merits] of Kang [Youwei] and Liang [Qichao] can't be completely annulled, [even though Kang] made himself out to be [one of the] six greatest statesmen in history.<sup>18</sup>

Even with people like that—people who have [committed] serious ideological errors and people who are ideologically opposed [to us]—we should unite with them and reform them;<sup>19</sup> only then can we implement the guideline of "planning comprehensively with due consideration to all sectors so that each would be provided for." Even in writing essays we must make arrangements—one loud shout: "keep the man alive under the [force of the] brush."<sup>20</sup> We must be persuasive, and we ought to implement resolutely the guideline of "learning from past mistakes in order to avoid future ones, and curing the illness in order to save the patient."<sup>21</sup> This applies to the [effect of the] pen as well. Within the Party, 50 or 60 per cent [of the people] do not understand this guideline. We have so many petty bourgeoisie; is that good or bad? We must rely on them to promote socialism. We must use appropriate methods so they can be reformed. Even in Wu Tianbao's case we will not expel him [from school].<sup>22</sup> We are not advocating that we should use nationwide workers' strikes and student strikes to deal with the government; rather, we must give consideration to the historical conditions. Our people have become accustomed to using this sort of antagonistic method of struggle, and indeed the Constitution provides for such a freedom.<sup>23</sup> Making trouble is not tantamount to staging an uprising. . . . In a population of 600 million, I would think of it as a normal condition if every year there were a million people making trouble. To have 1 per cent of the people making trouble may well be something that will last forever;

at least in [the period of] three five-year plans [that is to be expected].<sup>24</sup> There could be counterrevolutionaries [among] those who make trouble, [but] we cannot say that [they are all] counterrevolutionaries. Among the things that the troublemakers clamor for, those that are unreasonable we cannot grant, but we should grant those that are reasonable. In all the things that are reasonable we should stand on the side of the masses; otherwise we will become divorced from the masses, [and they will say]: “You are all people of the government.”<sup>25</sup> The people do not have many weapons, but they have their fists and their carrying poles.<sup>26</sup> It is entirely possible for things to come in [a wave of] ups and downs—this going up and that coming down. That would be a normal phenomenon. Even the bourgeoisie permitted troublemaking; why don't we permit it?

Our contradiction is temporary, but if the contradiction is not resolved, and instead lies hidden, it would not be good. It is best, if there is a sore with pus, to have it cut out.<sup>27</sup> We can't say that we, as veterans of the revolution, should not permit troublemaking . . .

Marxism-Leninism cannot grow out of a vacuum; it can grow and develop only in the struggle with opposing ideologies and in absorbing from them those things that are reasonable.<sup>28</sup>

Our danger lies in having no trouble in all four directions once the revolution has succeeded. To strike one-sidedly cannot bring forth good pieces of literature and art from the [crucible of] tempering.<sup>29</sup> The idea of permitting only fragrant flowers but not poisonous weeds<sup>30</sup> is wrong. Fragrant flowers grow out of the struggle with poisonous weeds. There are wild weeds in the field every year. When the wild weeds are turned over, they become fertilizer.<sup>31</sup> The grain and wild weeds grow together. [This is like, as the verse goes:] “The setting clouds and the lone heron share the same wing.”<sup>32</sup> We cannot only permit the growth of grain; rather, we ought to have fragrant flowers and wild weeds bloom together.

Stalin is fundamentally a materialist. He also has some [sense of] dialectics, but not quite that much of dialectics.<sup>33</sup> Dogmatism is not dualism, but monism.<sup>34</sup> When our comrades look at things, they ought to [employ a viewpoint of] dualism. [Then] again, within the one-point [view] there are also two points. . . . In the past, people advocated allowing only one school to be heard by itself; under the historical constraints, if that were not done we could not have toppled the one school that was heard alone for twenty years.<sup>35</sup>

When we write things, we must collect enough material first. We will not fight battles for which we are not prepared; we will not fight battles about which we are not confident.

Since we have so many people who come from petty-bourgeois backgrounds, we'll have to educate them. We must rely on the minority to educate the majority. Expelling people is very easy to do, very simple. It is most assuredly not a good method. We should understand that even bad elements have a duality. One side is that they are no good; the other side is that they can serve as teachers [by negative example]. All things have a duality: they arise, develop, and are destroyed. Perhaps in a thousand years' time [what we have now] will not be called Marxism-Leninism. If it is eternal, it would not be called Marxism-Leninism. [“]In every five hundred

years there is bound to be a [new] king.[”] (Three students who went abroad to study overturned the theory of eternity.<sup>36</sup> A new revolution has come to the propulsion of atomic energy.)<sup>37</sup>

Some things can be overthrown; some things cannot. For example, the Earth will always rotate. There is bound to be a day when the human race will negate itself; it will be negated. There is bound to be a day when it cannot adapt, and it will be transformed into another kind of human being. The human race today has itself gone through who knows how many changes: three thousand years ago there was the neolithic age, then the bronze age (the pure [bronze age], and the bronze [age]), and later there was the iron age (the old [iron age], and the new [iron age]). The animals may oppose us, but they cannot talk; the plants may be grateful to us; we rely on each other. Marx never lived to see socialism, and Lenin only saw it for a brief moment. The time that socialism has had is still not yet a long time, and we have not yet gained full experience [of it]. The Soviet Union has made achievements, but it also has problems. We must not be afraid of accumulating experience.

Many problems call for creativity and development. We need not be afraid of ill winds.<sup>38</sup> We should not be afraid of currents. Things would not work if there were not two currents. They need to cross swords. The more struggle there is, the richer things will be. Truth becomes clearer with debate. We should especially XX<sup>39</sup> after we come into grasp of the political power, think of using simplistic methods to beat someone down. Why are people afraid of blooming—letting a hundred flowers bloom? [They are] afraid that their rice bowls would float across the river. It is not that scary for young people to oppose bureaucratism. [It is] because they have not yet taken responsibility for things [and so] bureaucratism has not yet descended upon them.

It is permissible to oppose the big [offenders] of bureaucratism. All those who are afraid of [people who] reprimand [people for] bureaucratism are simply afraid of being reprimanded themselves.

[On the subject of] philosophy, can you try to get hold of the writings of Dühring<sup>40</sup> and take a look? Hegel, Mach.<sup>41</sup> [In the journal] *Xin jianshe*, Zhou XX discussed *Logic*—there is some truth [to his argument there].<sup>42</sup>

It is wrong, in the schools, to listen only to the opinion of the principals and not to those of the students. . . .

## Notes

1. We have not been able to identify the young writer to whom Mao is referring.
2. The term that Mao uses here is *qiyi jiangling*, which has come to be used in CPC terminology for leaders of protest movements (including protest movements against, or critical of, the CPC and the Communist government). The term was originally a reference to the military leaders (actually warlord types) of rebellious forces at many moments of Chinese history. In many cases these were peasant armies (such as those at the end of the Han dynasty, the end of the Tang dynasty, and the end of the Yuan dynasty). Thus, in a sense, the generals of the insurrections were (and are) also leaders of the masses. Although the term itself does carry a certain sense of irony, Mao's usage here may not be intentionally sarcastic. See also text July 9, 1957, note 31.

3. See text May–June 1955, vol. I, source note and text.
4. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.
5. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13, and text Nov. 1, 1951, vol. I.
6. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 6.
7. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 10.
8. See text Mar. 20, 1957, note 20.
9. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, paragraph 8.
10. See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version I, note 27.
11. See text Oct. 1954(1), vol. I, note 3, and text April 20, 1957, note 4.
12. Mao's jab at *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily) here foreshadows his much more direct and sterner criticism of that paper a month or so later. See text April 1957.
13. Mao is alluding to the notion that in China's traditional feudalistic society, the role of the mother-in-law toward the daughter-in-law is authoritative, often even oppressive. Thus, to behave as a daughter-in-law is to be meek and obedient, whereas to behave as a mother-in-law is to be in a position of power, and to be domineering.
14. Mao's citation reads "jingyan pipan lun." It refers to a piece of Lenin's writing whose title should be transliterated "Weiwu zhuyi yu jingyan pipan lun" (in English, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*). See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 14, pp. 17–361.
15. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 23. More important, refer to Mao's rather stern criticism of Stalin in text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II.
16. The terms that Mao uses here are *laoye* (which we have translated as "master") and *xiaoren*, which, strictly speaking, translates as "a person of low standing" or, in the Confucianist moral language, "a mean, or base, person." We have translated it as "humble servant" for the sake of balance. The term *xiaoren* is also often used to refer to oneself, in conversation with an equal or superior, to show modesty and polite deference.
17. See text Oct. 16, 1954, vol. I, note 7.
18. The Chinese is a bit garbled here. For Kang Youwei, see text Dec. 8, 1956, note 23, where an explanation is given of Kang's egotism. Kang saw himself as a true heir of Confucius's teachings and aspired to be a sage. However, Mao appears to have overstated his case when he suggests here that Kang thought of himself as one of China's six greatest statesmen. Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was Kang Youwei's pupil, and in the early half of his career followed closely in step with Kang. Both were involved in the 1898 reform movement, known as the Hundred Days Reform. Liang subsequently became a prominent scholar in his own right and was perhaps the most influential thinker in China in the early decades of this century. Liang was a reformist and, in a limited sense, a revolutionary of the 1911 Revolution generation. (He did not support Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary efforts, but was a rather radical constitutionalist reformer; nonetheless, after the Republic of China was established in 1912, he supported the republican principle, whereas Kang, his erstwhile mentor, had become a monarchist.) Yet Liang was generally anti-Communist in his thought and actions. For biographical information on Liang, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1968), II, pp. 346–351; and also text Mar. 22, 1958.
19. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 7.
20. Mao is referring to the classical allusion *dao xia liu ren* (keep the man alive under the sword); i.e., the classical fiction writer's reference to a stay of execution for those who were condemned to death by being beheaded. Mao's words here are *bi xia liu ren*, thus equating the force of the critic's pen with the force of the executioner's sword.
21. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.
22. We have not been able to identify Wu Tianbao. Perhaps he was a leader of the protesting students at Beijing University or Qinghua University mentioned by Mao in the January 18 and January 27 speeches. For more on the subject of not expelling students, see text Jan. 4, 1958, text Jan. 28–30, 1958, part 6, and text Jan. 31, 1958, point 34.
23. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 66.
24. At this time, the First Five-Year Plan, started in 1953, was coming to a close. (See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2.) Thus Mao was likely to be referring to three more five-year

plan periods starting in 1958, which would mean the entire period from 1958 to 1972. The actual historical progression of the PRC's five-year plans did not, however, follow this scheme. In the end, the Second Five-Year Plan did cover the years 1958 to 1962, and was in fact subsequently declared (in 1966) fulfilled ahead of schedule by two years in 1960. The Third Five-Year Plan was not launched in 1961, however, but in 1966, and covered the period from 1966 to 1970. The Fourth Five-Year Plan was launched in 1971.

25. The term Mao uses here is *gongjia ren*, which strictly refers to "people of the public sphere."

26. The Chinese term for "carrying pole" is *bian dan*, which refers to the bamboo pole that a porter uses to carry heavy objects by balancing the objects suspended from both ends.

27. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, paragraph 10.

28. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, penultimate paragraph; Version II, final major paragraph; text Jan. 27, 1957(1), text surrounding note 41ff; text Jan. 27, 1957(2), text surrounding note 31ff; and section 3 of text Jan. 1957.

29. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraphs 28 and 44. See also text July 8, 1957(2), note 13.

30. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38; see also text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, last major paragraph.

31. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, last major paragraph.

32. Here Mao is quoting an extremely well-known line in classical Chinese literature, from Wang Bo's (650–676) *Teng wang ge xu* (Prefatorial Inscription for the Pavilion of Prince Teng).

33. See note 14.

34. See text Nov. 15, 1956, version I, note 35. See also text Oct. 13, 1957, note 58.

35. The paragraph here is a bit garbled throughout. Mao is using the phrase *yi jia du ming* (one school sounding off by itself) to play off against the slogan *bai jia zheng ming* (a hundred schools contending) (see text Autumn 1956, note 3). See also text April 1957(2), note 18. We believe that in the last sentence Mao is referring to the notion that over the preceding twenty years it was the Kuomintang government that monopolized control over ideas and their expression.

36. The words that Mao uses here are *yong heng lun*, which we have translated as "the theory of eternity." Mao has made a mistake here. He is actually referring to the theory, or law, of parity conservation, which is translated into Chinese as *yucheng shouheng dinglu*. Mao is speaking of three Chinese scientists, Yang Zhenning, Li Zhengdao, and Wu Jianxiong, who challenged the theory in their study of theoretical physics. (By this time, the three were established scientists and professors at prestigious institutions in the United States—Yang and Li were at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton, and Wu, who carried out the experimental part of the study, was at Columbia University. Perhaps Mao's usage of the term *liuxuesheng*, which we have translated as "students who went abroad to study," is a bit of a misnomer.) In 1957, Yang and Li received the Nobel Prize for physics.

37. Again the text is garbled here. Mao's words are *tuidong yuanzineng laige xin de gexin*. It could be translated as: "propelling the force of atomic energy, [we] bring about a new transformation."

38. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 51.

39. In the text here, in parentheses, there is an annotation that two characters in the original text are illegible. The reader should be careful at this point, since the meaning of the entire passage could well depend on what these two characters are.

40. It is likely that Mao was thinking not so much of the writings of Dühring, but of Engels' *Anti-Dühring*, a critical philosophical essay written by Frederick Engels in 1878. In Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, which Mao mentions earlier in this text, Lenin draws rather heavily on Engels' *Anti-Dühring* and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. It is therefore quite possible that Mao was reading Lenin's work around the time that he made this speech/conversation, and that this prompted him to make these rather offhand remarks here.



41. On Hegel, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 45. Ernst Mach (1838–1916) was an Austrian physicist and philosopher who cofounded the school of empirio-criticism. Again, the connection between Mao's mind and Lenin's work (cited earlier) can be easily discerned, since in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin heavily criticized Mach's theories.

42. The text here is somewhat garbled. *Xin jianshe* (New Construction) was a social sciences monthly published in Beijing at this time, but the characters were not underlined in the text; thus we are only speculating that this is a reference to this journal, since we also have not been able to trace this reference. We do not know for sure to whom "Zhou XX" refers. The term *da luoji*, however, is the Chinese title for Hegel's *Logic*.

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### Telegram to Nepal (February 17, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Feb. 18, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 105 (April 10, 1957), 60. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Feb. 18, 1957), 2.

King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva,  
Nepal

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of your country's National Day, I sincerely express my warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of Nepal. May the traditional friendship between China and Nepal become more consolidated and develop with each passing day and may the Kingdom of Nepal prosper, and may the people of Nepal have happiness.

(Signed as Chairman of the PRC and dated.)

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### On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People (February 27, 1957)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 363–402. Other Chinese Texts: *RMRB* (June 19, 1957), 1–4; *Renmin neibu maodun* (1957); *XHBYK*, 13 (July 10, 1957), 1–14; *Xuandu A*, pp. 327–364; *Wubian zhaxue zhuzuo*, pp. 115–192; *Buyi*, pp. 99–127; *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, pp. 756–798; *RMSC* (1958), pp. 9–20; excerpts in *Jiaoyu yulu*, pp. 3, 7, 17, 18, 24, 25, 27; *Mao jiao*, p. 1; *Mao liang*, pp. 42–43, 174–175, 244, 263–264, 298–300, 301–303, 303–304, 304–305, 305–307, 307–309, 310, 311, 382, 391; *Mao Zedong lun caizheng*, pp. 16, 22; *XHBYK*, 21 (Nov. 10, 1958), 7; *XHBYK*, 22 (Nov. 1958), 2, 6–7, 8; *Xuandu B*, pp. 170–189. Available English translations:

*SW*, V, pp. 384–421; *NCNA, Daily Bulletin* (June 19, 1957), 1–26; *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* (1957); *SR*, pp. 432–479; *Four Essays on Philosophy*, pp. 79–133; R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. (1962), pp. 275–294; K. Fan (1972), pp. 151–196; excerpts in S. Schram (1969), pp. 304–312; *CB*, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969), 26; *CB*, 888 (Aug. 22, 1969), 6–7; *CCSD*, pp. 78–85, 155; *SCMP*, 4195 (June 11, 1968), 14.

*This was a speech that Mao gave at a meeting of the Supreme State Conference. There is no available text of the original speech. Two tape recordings of the speech are said to have been played to selected audiences throughout China. The only extended quotation from either of these versions is the series of extracts obtained by Sidney Gruson in Warsaw and published in the New York Times, June 13, 1957. A revised and edited version of the speech, which is what is translated here, appeared in RMRB on June 19, 1957. (R. MacFarquhar [1974], pp. 262–266, suggests that the timing of the New York Times publication of the extracts forced the Chinese government to release the revised version.) Monographs (Renmin neibu maodun, and, in English, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People) appeared within 1957.*

*The versions published later which are listed here are said to contain substantial corrections and revisions. For more on the various versions of the speech and the struggle over its publication, see R. MacFarquhar (1974), pp. 184–199, 261–269.*

*This is certainly Mao's most important speech of 1957, and a major component of Mao's theoretical statement in the post-1949 period. It is the basic theoretical thrust of this speech that the reader should first attempt to grasp. The fundamental position that Mao takes in this controversial speech is that class contradictions and class struggle do continue to exist under socialism. This position would eventually put Mao in virtual opposition to the premise adopted by the Eighth Congress of the CPC in September 1956 that class contradiction and class struggle have been basically resolved in China, even though the manner in which Mao advanced his position in this speech was quite tentative and did not represent a clear break. Indeed, in the days immediately ahead, Mao would often refer to the Eighth Congress resolution affirmatively, seeking only to sort out the proper way to handle its theoretical implications rather than to disagree with it altogether. It would not be until April 1957 (after Mao had an opportunity to reassess the impact and import of this speech in light of the developing criticism in China) that Mao more explicitly disagreed with the Eighth Party Congress resolution that the primary contradiction in China then was between the forces and the relations of production. For the moment, that is, in late February, 1957, Mao was chiefly concerned with asserting that even if the class struggle were basically concluded, that does not mean that contradictions were ended. Even under socialism, the general theory of contradiction must continue to serve as a fundamental principle for understanding the world. (Insofar as that there always seems to be a practicality-oriented side of Mao, one can easily see here that he could not have been oblivious to the fact that as the Hundred Flowers policy unfolded in early 1957, contradictions were increasing and intensifying, not decreasing and abating.) Thus, given the assertion above, it follows that the most important issue for the time being would be to find a theoretical "location" for the contradictions that exist and are increasing—that is, to see them specifically as contradictions internal to "the people"—see note 3—and to describe the proper way to deal with this specific category of contradictions that would be theoretically sound and also practically effective, and do so by focusing on the attitudinal guidelines that must be adhered to.*

*Although it should not be seen in separation from the theoretical issues, the*

*practical policy impact of this speech is more visible, if not more important. The Hundred Flowers Campaign, which had begun the previous year, had brought about considerable turmoil in China in January 1957 (as seen in the January speeches to the conference of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committee secretaries) and quite a heavy dose of criticism for the Communist Party. The pressing question was how the Communist Party would respond. Up to this time, and for at least another few weeks, Mao held a relatively optimistic position on the matter, the theoretical foundation for this being that while it should be acknowledged that contradictions do exist under socialism, it must also, and more importantly, be acknowledged that within the ranks of the people contradictions are nonantagonistic. Therefore they can, and ought to, be resolved by noncoercive methods. Here we find Mao arguing that under socialism, the contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie have both antagonistic and nonantagonistic aspects, but if treated correctly, the antagonistic aspect can be transformed into a nonantagonistic aspect. The proper method of handling these contradictions included not only the Hundred Flowers policy—which up to then had been implemented only in a limited way—but also such policies as “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” between the CPC and other parties in China, and, most boldly stated of all, the frank and open admission of mistakes by the Party and the open, indeed organized, criticism of those mistakes by people both inside and outside the Party. In this way, Mao intended to escalate the Hundred Flowers policy by integrating it with a Party rectification campaign in 1957, and, especially, to make it an “open-door Party rectification,” allowing criticism of the Party from outside. All this was consistent with Mao’s statement about ten days before this speech was made: “Why do people say that the Communist Party’s shortcomings cannot be exposed? Just that viewpoint alone is wrong enough.” (See text Feb. 16, 1957.)*

*This speech itself provoked considerable struggle in the Party. The policy implications, though carried out for the moment, would remain controversial for the remainder of the year, and, arguably, led to grave consequences in the middle of 1957. This may have something to do with the reasons why the original version of this speech has never been published. It was a revised edition that appeared some three and a half months later and is presented in translation here. Thus it is as much the whirling maelstrom of a rapidly developing situation that surrounded this speech as the speech itself and its ideas that played a critical role in the development of Mao’s thought and policies. Moreover, in reading this speech, it would be prudent to bear in mind that in later years, Mao reassessed and then rejected the key theoretical underpinnings that are reflected here (e.g., the idea that the primary contradiction in socialist society is the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production and not between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie). Nonetheless, this speech represented Mao’s fundamental problem-resolving posture at a most crucial moment and played a critical role in shaping the class struggle not only in China, but eventually in the international Communist movement as well.*

The issue of how to correctly handle contradictions among the people is the general subject. For the convenience of discussion, [I] have divided it under twelve subordinate headings. In the process [I] will also talk about the issue of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, but the focus will be on discussing the issue of contradictions among the people.

#### 1. Contradictions of Two Different Natures

Our nation is now [in a state] of unprecedented unity. The victories of the bourgeois democratic revolution and the socialist revolution as well as our achieve-

ments in socialist construction have rapidly changed the face of old China.<sup>1</sup> A still more beautiful future for our homeland lies in front of us. The state of national disintegration and chaos that the people loathed is gone, never to return. Led by the working class and the Communist Party, the 600 million people of our country, united as one, are engaged at this very moment in the great [endeavor of] building socialism. The unity of the country, the unity among the people, as well as the solidarity among the various nationalities in the country:<sup>2</sup> these serve as the basic guarantee of the inevitable victory of our cause. Nevertheless, this does not mean that our society is free of any contradictions. It would be a naive delusion [to hold] that there are no contradictions, an idea that does not conform to objective reality. Confronting us are two types of social contradictions, namely those between the enemy and ourselves, and those among the people.<sup>3</sup> They are two types of contradictions completely different in nature.

To acquire a correct understanding of these two different types of contradictions, [i.e., the contradictions] between the enemy and ourselves and [the contradictions] among the people, we ought first make clear what is meant by the people and what is meant by the enemy. The concept of the people varies with different countries and with different historical periods of the various countries.<sup>4</sup> Take our country’s situation, for instance: during the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan,<sup>5</sup> all classes, strata, and social groups opposing Japan fell under the rubric of the people, while all the Japanese imperialists, Chinese traitors,<sup>6</sup> and pro-Japan factions were the people’s enemies. During the period of the War of Liberation,<sup>7</sup> U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, that is, the bureaucratic-capitalist class,<sup>8</sup> the landlord class, and those representing these classes, namely, the Kuomintang reactionaries, were all enemies of the people, while all classes, strata, and social groups that opposed these enemies came under the rubric of the people. In the current stage, in the period of constructing socialism, all classes, strata, and social groups that approve of, support, and participate in the endeavor to construct socialism fall under the rubric of the people, while all social forces and social groups that resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or undermine the construction of socialism are the people’s enemies.

The contradiction between the enemy and ourselves is an antagonistic contradiction.<sup>9</sup> As for contradictions among the people, those among the laboring people are nonantagonistic in nature, while those between the exploited classes and the exploiting classes have, apart from a nonantagonistic aspect, an antagonistic aspect as well. Contradictions among the people didn’t just start today, but they are different in content [now] during the period of the construction of socialism from [the way] they were during the various periods of revolution [in the past]. Under the prevailing conditions in our country today, by contradictions among the people we mean to include contradictions within the working class, contradictions within the peasant class, contradictions among the intellectuals, contradictions between the working class and the peasantry, contradictions between the workers and peasants on the one hand and the intellectuals on the other, contradictions between the working class and other [sections of the] laboring people on the one hand and the national bourgeoisie<sup>10</sup> on the other, contradictions within the national bourgeoi-

sie, and so on. Our People's Government is a government that truly represents the people's interests and dedicates itself to the service of the people. Even so, certain contradictions exist between it and the masses of the people. These types of contradictions include contradictions between the interests of the state and the interests of the collective, on the one hand, and the interests of the individual, on the other, contradictions between democracy and centralism, between the leadership and the led, and contradictions arising from the bureaucratic work style of some personnel in state organs in relationship to the masses. These types of contradictions are also contradictions among the people. Generally speaking, contradictions among the people are contradictions based on the fundamental unanimity of the interests of the people.

In our country, contradictions between the working class and the national bourgeoisie belong to the category of contradictions among the people. Class struggle between the working class and the national bourgeoisie is in general a class struggle within [the ranks of] the people. This is because the national bourgeoisie in our country has a dual character. During the period of the bourgeois democratic revolution, it had a revolutionary facet and also a conciliatory facet. During the period of the socialist revolution, it had a facet that exploited the working class to make profits, and yet at the same time it also had the facet that supported the Constitution and was willing to accept socialist transformation.<sup>11</sup> The national bourgeoisie is different from the imperialists, the landlord class, or the bureaucratic-capitalist class.<sup>12</sup> Between the working class and the national bourgeoisie there is a contradiction between the exploited and the exploiter, a contradiction that was originally antagonistic in nature. Under the specific conditions in our country, however, the antagonistic contradiction between these two classes can be transformed into a nonantagonistic contradiction if properly handled. This contradiction can be resolved through peaceful means. If we mishandle [the contradiction], [if we] fail to adopt the policy of uniting with, criticizing, and educating the national bourgeoisie, or if the national bourgeoisie refuses to accept this policy of ours, [then] the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie will change into a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves.

The two types of contradictions, those between the enemy and ourselves and those among the people, are different in nature and [should be] resolved by different methods. To put it briefly, the former involves an issue of distinguishing between the enemy and ourselves, and the latter involves an issue of distinguishing between right and wrong. Of course, the issue between the enemy and ourselves is also an issue between right and wrong. The question of who is in the right, we or the reactionaries at home and abroad, namely, the imperialists, the feudalists, and the bureaucratic-capitalists, for example, is also an issue between right and wrong. Nevertheless, this is a type of right-or-wrong issue that by its nature stands apart from the issue among the people. Ours is a country of the people's democratic dictatorship<sup>13</sup> led by the working class based on the worker-peasant alliance.<sup>14</sup> What is this dictatorship designed to do? The dictatorship's first function is to suppress the reactionary classes, reactionaries, and exploiters who resist the socialist revolution within the country, and to suppress those who sabotage the construc-

tion of socialism; this is for the purpose of resolving the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves at home. For example, to arrest certain counterrevolutionaries and convict them, to deprive the landlords and bureaucratic-capitalists of their right to vote and deny them freedom of speech<sup>15</sup> for a certain period of time—all this falls under the category of dictatorship. To keep social order and safeguard the interests of the broad masses of people, we must also exercise dictatorship over thieves, swindlers, murderers, arsonists, hoodlum gangs, and various kinds of evildoers who seriously disrupt the social order. This dictatorship has yet a second function, which is to protect [the country] from the subversive action and possible aggression of the enemy outside the country. When such conditions arise, then, the dictatorship is entrusted with the task of resolving the contradiction between ourselves and the enemy outside. The aim of the dictatorship is to protect all the people in their peaceful labor so that they can build our country into a socialist state with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture. Who, then, is to exercise the dictatorship? Naturally, the working class and the people under its leadership. The dictatorship system does not apply within [the ranks of] the people. The people cannot exercise dictatorship over themselves, nor is it possible for one section of the people to suppress another. Lawbreakers among the people must also be punished according to law, but this is [a case] different in principle from the dictatorship exercised to suppress the people's enemies. Within the ranks of the people we adopt the system of democratic centralism.<sup>16</sup> It is stipulated in our Constitution that citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration, religious belief, and so on.<sup>17</sup> Our Constitution also provides that the system of democratic centralism must be practiced in state organs, that they must rely on the people's masses, and that their personnel must serve the people. This socialist democracy of ours is a democracy of the broadest kind that cannot be found in any bourgeois state. Our dictatorship is called the people's democratic dictatorship which is based on the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class. This demonstrates that a democratic system is being carried out within the ranks of the people, whereas the working class, uniting with the entire people who enjoy civil rights—in the first place with the peasantry—exercises a dictatorship over the reactionary classes, the reactionary factions, and all those elements who resist socialist transformation and socialist construction. By civil rights we mean, in a political sense, the rights of freedom and democracy.

But this freedom is freedom under leadership, and this democracy is democracy under centralized guidance. In no way does it represent a state of anarchy. A state of anarchy is at variance with the interests and wishes of the people.

After the Hungarian Incident took place,<sup>18</sup> some people in our country felt happy. They hoped a similar incident would happen in China, with thousands upon thousands of people taking to the streets in demonstration against the people's government. This hope of theirs ran counter to the interests of the people's masses, and it was impossible for it to win the support of the people's masses. Some of the masses in Hungary, deceived by counterrevolutionary forces both at home and abroad, mistakenly resorted to violent action against the people's government. As

a result, both the state and the people suffered losses. The economy, damaged by the few weeks of turbulence, will take a long time to recover. There were some other people in our country who displayed vacillation over the Hungarian issue.<sup>19</sup> This is because they did not understand how things actually stand in the world. They thought that there is too little freedom under our people's democratic system and that it is better to be under a Western parliamentary democracy where there is more freedom. They demanded that a two-party system, [like that] of the West, be instituted [in China], with one party on the stage and the other off the stage.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, this so-called two-party system is nothing more than a device to sustain the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; it can in no way safeguard the working people's freedom and rights. As a matter of fact, in this world, freedom and democracy exist only in the concrete; there is no abstract freedom or abstract democracy. In a society where there is class struggle, the laboring people will have no freedom from exploitation if the exploiting class has the freedom to exploit the laboring people. As long as there is democracy for the bourgeoisie, there can be no democracy for the proletariat and the laboring people. Some capitalist countries allow the legitimate existence of the Communist Party, but only to the extent that it does not pose a danger to the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie. Nothing is permitted beyond that limit. Those who demand freedom and democracy in the abstract view democracy as an end but do not recognize that democracy is a means. This thing we call democracy, sometimes it may appear to be an end, but as a matter of fact it is only a means. Marxism tells us that democracy is a part of the superstructure and falls under the category of politics. That is to say, in the final analysis, it services the economic base. The same holds for freedom. Democracy and freedom are both relative, not absolute; both come into existence and develop in the course of history. Within the ranks of the people, democracy is relative to centralization and freedom is relative to discipline. All these [democracy and centralization, freedom and discipline,] are contradictory facets of a unity; they are contradictory and at the same time united. We should not place one-sided emphasis on one aspect while negating the other. Within the ranks of the people, freedom is indispensable, and so is discipline; democracy is indispensable, and so is centralization. Such a unity of democracy and centralization, of freedom and discipline, constitutes our system of democratic centralism. Under this system the people enjoy extensive democracy and freedom, while having at the same time to restrain themselves with socialist discipline. These principles are intelligible to the broad masses of the people.

We advocate freedom with leadership and democracy under centralized guidance. In no sense is this construed to suggest that problems of ideology and questions of distinguishing right from wrong among the people can be resolved through coercive measures. Any attempt to resolve ideological problems or issues of right and wrong through the method of administrative orders or the method of coercive measures is not only ineffectual but also harmful. We cannot abolish religion by administrative orders, nor can we force people not to believe in religions. We cannot coerce people into relinquishing idealism, nor can we coerce people into espousing Marxism. All questions of an ideological nature and all issues

of debate among the people can be resolved only through a democratic method, the method of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education, and cannot be resolved by the method of coercion or repression. In order to carry out production effectively, and carry on with their studies, or to lead a life in normal order, the people require their government, their leaders in production, and those in charge of cultural and educational institutions to issue all sorts of administrative ordinances that are appropriate and that carry the force of coercion. Without such administrative ordinances, maintenance of social order would be out of the question, a fact that comes within people's common sense. This and the method of resolving contradictions among the people by means of persuasion and education are two [mutually] complementary aspects.<sup>21</sup> Even then, administrative orders that are issued for the purpose of maintaining social order must also be accompanied by persuasion and education; in many cases administrative orders alone do not work.

In 1942, we boiled down this democratic method of resolving contradictions among the people into a concrete formula, namely, "unity-criticism-unity."<sup>22</sup> To explain it in greater detail, it means proceeding from a desire for unity, resolving the contradiction through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis. Our experience shows that this is a correct method of resolving contradictions among the people. In 1942 we adopted this method in resolving the contradictions inside the Communist Party, that is, the contradiction between the dogmatists and the broad masses of Party members, and the contradiction between the ideology of dogmatism and the ideology of Marxism. Previously the "Left" dogmatists had resorted to a so-called method of ruthless struggle and merciless blows for intra-Party struggle. It was a wrong method.<sup>23</sup> When criticizing "Left" dogmatism, we didn't employ this old method; instead, we adopted a new approach, namely, proceeding from the desire for unity, distinguishing between right and wrong through struggle or criticism, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis. We used this method in the rectification [campaign] of 1942.<sup>24</sup> After a few years, by the time the Chinese Communist Party held its Seventh National Congress in 1945,<sup>25</sup> lo and behold, we actually achieved the purpose of unity throughout the Party, and thus won the great victory of the people's revolution. What is needed here is first of all to proceed from the desire for unity, because if subjectively we do not have such a desire for unity, things would certainly be thrown into confusion and get out of hand once the struggle is started. Wouldn't this be the same as "ruthless struggle and merciless blows?" And how then could there be any Party unity? From this experience we arrived at the formula "unity-criticism-unity." Or, in other words, ["]learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the illness to save the patient.["]<sup>26</sup> We extended the use of this method to outside the Party. In dealing with the relationships between the leadership and the masses, between the army and the people, between officers and soldiers, between the different units of the army, and between the different sections of cadres in the various anti-Japanese base areas,<sup>27</sup> we applied this same method and achieved great success. The issue, in our Party's history, can be traced back to still earlier times. The method had been used to deal with the relationship between the Party and the masses, between the army

and the people, between the officers and soldiers as well as other relationships within the ranks of the people ever since we established the revolutionary armed forces and base areas in the south in 1927.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, by the time of the War of Resistance Against Japan, we had established the method on a more conscious basis. Since the liberation of the entire country we have employed the same method of "unity-criticism-unity" toward the democratic parties<sup>29</sup> and the industrial and commercial circles. Our current task is precisely to continue to extend the method within the entire ranks of the people and make still better use of it, requiring all the factories, cooperatives, shops, schools, [government and Party] organs, and [people's] organizations, in short, [all] the 600 million people, to employ this method in resolving their internal contradictions.

Under ordinary circumstances, contradictions among the people are not antagonistic. However, if they are mishandled or if [we] lose our vigilance or are numb or careless, antagonism may occur. In a socialist country, such circumstances are generally speaking only a local and temporary phenomenon. This is because in a socialist country the system of exploitation of human beings by others has been eliminated, and the interests of the people are fundamentally in unanimity. Antagonistic actions on a considerably extensive scale such as those that took place in the Hungarian Incident were the result of the effect of counterrevolutionary factors both within [Hungary] and abroad upon [the situation]. It was a special and also a transient phenomenon. [In that case] reactionaries inside a socialist country colluded with the imperialists and took advantage of contradictions among the people to sow discord and stir up trouble in an attempt to achieve [the aims of] their conspiracy. A lesson such as the Hungarian Incident deserves our attention. Many people have the feeling that using the democratic method to resolve contradictions among the people poses a new issue. In fact this is not true. It has been the consistent belief of Marxists that the cause of the proletariat can only depend upon the masses of the people, and that the Communists can only employ the democratic method of persuasion and education when working among the laboring people; under no circumstances are they allowed to take a commandist<sup>30</sup> attitude or resort to coercive measures. The Communist Party of China has faithfully observed this Marxist-Leninist principle. We have consistently advocated that under the people's democratic dictatorship two different methods, one dictatorial and the other democratic, be used to resolve the two types of contradictions that are different in nature, namely, contradictions between the enemy and ourselves and contradictions among the people. This notion has been discussed time and again in many previous documents of our Party and in speeches by many of the people in positions of responsibility in the Party. In the article "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" written in 1949, I said: "The combination of these two aspects, democracy with regard to matters among the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, is the people's democratic dictatorship.

In resolving problems among the people, [I added], "the method we employ is democratic, the method of persuasion, not of compulsion."<sup>31</sup> In a speech delivered at the Second Session of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference in June 1950, I again said this: "The people's democratic dictatorship

has two methods. One, which applies to the enemy, is the dictatorial method, which means that when necessary they can be forbidden to participate in political activities, forced to obey the laws of the People's Government, and forced to take part in labor and to reform themselves through labor in order to become new people. For the people it is exactly the opposite. It is not the coercive method, which is to say that they must be permitted to participate in political activities. We will not force them to do this or that but will use democratic methods to carry out the work of education and persuasion among them. This type of educational work is the work of self-education among the people. The method of criticism and self-criticism is the basic method of self-education."<sup>32</sup> [Thus], in the past, we have already discussed many times the issue of resolving contradictions among the people by a democratic method, and we have in the main applied it in our work. Many cadres and the people are well aware of the problem in practical terms. Why then are there now people who think that it is a new issue? This is because the struggle between the enemy and ourselves, both at home and abroad, has been intense in the past, and the contradictions among the people have not commanded as much attention as they do today.

Many people cannot distinguish between these two types of contradictions that are different in nature, those between the enemy and ourselves and those among the people. They are prone to confuse the two. It should be admitted that at times these two types of contradictions can be easily mixed up. We ourselves mixed them up in our work in the past. In the work of purging and cleaning out counterrevolutionaries, some good people were mistaken for bad.<sup>33</sup> Such instances happened before, and still happen now. That our mistakes have not expanded [out of bounds] is due to the fact that we have stipulated in our policy that a distinction must be drawn between the enemy and ourselves, and that mistakes be corrected whenever they are discovered.

Marxist philosophy holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe.<sup>34</sup> This law exists universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in people's thought. The opposites which are in contradiction with each other exist as a unity and at the same time are struggling against one another; and it is this that impels things to movement and to change. Contradictions exist everywhere, but their natures differ in accordance with the different natures of different things. In any given specific thing, the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, and transitory, and hence relative, whereas the struggle of opposites is absolute. Lenin made a clear exposition of this law, and in our country a growing number of people have come to understand it. Nevertheless, to many people it is one thing to admit this law and another thing to apply it in observing and handling problems. Many people dare not openly admit that contradictions remain a fact among the people in our country, and that it is precisely these contradictions that propel our society toward forward development. By failing to admit that contradictions still exist in socialist society, quite a few people become overcautious and hesitant when they are confronted with contradictions in society, and thereby put themselves in a position of passivity; they do not understand that in the course of continuing, uninterruptedly, to correctly handle and resolve contradictions, the

unity and the solidarity within a socialist society will be reinforced with each passing day.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, there is the need to make explanations among the people; first of all among the cadres, to guide people in understanding contradictions in socialist society and in learning to use correct methods to handle such contradictions. Contradictions in a socialist society are fundamentally different from those in old societies, for example in a capitalist society. Contradictions in a capitalist society manifest themselves as acute and violent antagonisms and conflicts, as intense class struggle. Contradictions of that sort cannot be resolved by the capitalist system itself; they can only be resolved through socialist revolution. Contradictions in a socialist society are a different matter. [In a] precisely contrary [way], they are nonantagonistic contradictions and can be resolved continuously through the socialist system itself.

In socialist society the basic contradictions remain those between the relations of production and the forces of production and those between the superstructure and the economic base. It is just that compared with the contradictions between the relations of production and the forces of production and between the superstructure and the economic base in old society, these contradictions in socialist society are basically different in nature and circumstances. The current social system of our country is far superior to the social system of the old days. Otherwise, the old system would not have been overthrown and it would not have been possible for the new system to be established. In saying that the socialist relations of production can better accommodate the character of developing forces of production than did the relations of production in the old days, we mean that [the new relations] allow the forces of production to develop at a speed that was never found in the old society. Consequently, production will expand ceaselessly and, with that, a situation will be produced in which, step by step, the people's ever-growing need can be met. Under the rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic-capitalism, the development of the forces of production in old China has always moved at a snail's pace.<sup>36</sup> In the more than fifty years prior to Liberation, steel output in the whole nation, excluding the northeastern [provinces], had always amounted to no more than several tens of thousands of tons [a year], and the peak annual output of the country [even] with the Northeast included, was never more than some 900,000 tons. In 1949, the steel output of the whole nation was only between 100,000 and 200,000 tons. [Now,] merely seven years have elapsed since the Liberation of the entire country, and [the national] steel output has come up to more than four million tons [a year].<sup>37</sup> There was hardly any machine-building industry in old China, to say nothing of automobile- and airplane-manufacturing industries; now they have all been established. Now that the people have toppled the rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic-capitalism, which way should China turn? To capitalism or to socialism? Many people were unclear in their way of thinking about this question. Facts have now provided an answer to this problem; only socialism can save China. The socialist system has promoted a phenomenally rapid development of our country's forces of production; this is a fact that even our enemies abroad cannot deny. However, our country's socialist system is still in its initial stage of establishment; it has not been completed nor fully consolidated. In the joint

state-private enterprises<sup>38</sup> in industry and commerce, capitalists still receive fixed interest.<sup>39</sup> That means exploitation still remains a fact. As far as the ownership system is concerned, enterprises under this category are not completely socialist in nature. Some of the agricultural producers' cooperatives and the handicraft industries' producers' cooperatives are also still only semisocialist in nature.<sup>40</sup> [Even] with the completely socialized cooperatives, there are still some specific problems regarding the system of ownership that need to be addressed with continued effort. Relations between production and exchange in the various economic sectors are still in the process of being gradually established in accordance with socialist principles, and we are in a step-by-step process of finding more appropriate forms for them. Within [the economic sector under] ownership by the whole people and [the sector of the economy under] ownership by the collective, within these two forms of socialist economy, the issue of [the ratio of] distribution between accumulation and consumption is a complex problem, and it is not easy to find a perfectly rational solution for it all at once.<sup>41</sup> In sum, socialist relations of production have been established, and they correspond to the growth of the forces of production. However, they are far from perfect, and the imperfections stand in contradiction to the development of the forces of production. Aside from this situation wherein there is, simultaneously, a correspondence and yet also a contradiction between the relations of production and the forces of production, a situation also exists wherein there is also, simultaneously, a correspondence and yet also a contradiction between the superstructure and the economic base. [Aspects of] the superstructure, such as the state system and the law of the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist ideology guided by Marxism-Leninism, have played a positive role in propelling the victory of our country's socialist transformation and the establishment of its socialist labor organization. It conforms to the socialist economic base, that is, to the socialist relations of production.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, that there is a bourgeois ideology, a certain bureaucratic work style in our state organs, and flaws in certain links of the state system is in contradiction with the socialist economic base. We must, in the future, continue [our efforts] to resolve the above-mentioned contradictions in light of the specific conditions. Of course, after the solution of these contradictions, new problems will crop up. Further efforts are needed for the solution of new contradictions. For example, objectively, the contradiction between social production and the needs of society will long remain a fact and will have to be constantly regulated through state planning. Every year our country draws up an economic plan to establish a proper ratio between accumulation and consumption so as to achieve an equilibrium between production and needs. Equilibrium means a temporary, relative unity of opposites. Taken as a whole, such an equilibrium will be upset by the struggle of contradicting [opposites] after one year's time; such a unity will undergo change; equilibrium will become disequilibrium, and unity will become disunity. Hence the need to work out an equilibrium and unity for the next year. This is where the superiority of our planned economy lies. As a matter of fact, this equilibrium and unity are partially disrupted each month and each quarter, and partial readjustment needs to be made. Sometimes, because [our] subjective arrangement does not conform to objective

circumstances, contradictions arise that upset the equilibrium; this is what we call committing a mistake. The continuous emergence of contradictions and their continuous solution is the law of dialectics in the development of things.

This is how things stand right now: The large-scale and rough-winds-and-torrential-rains type of class struggle<sup>43</sup> waged by the masses during the times of revolution has basically come to a halt, but class struggle is not completely over. On the one hand, the broad masses welcome the new system, while on the other hand they do not feel quite accustomed to it yet. Government functionaries are also still inadequately experienced and should continue their study and exploration of specific policy issues. In other words, our socialist system still needs to go through a process of continued construction and consolidation, the masses of the people need to go through a process of getting themselves accustomed to this new system, and the government functionaries need [to go through] a process of studying and gaining experience. At this juncture, therefore, it is imperative for us to raise the issue of drawing a line of distinction between the two types of contradictions, those between the enemy and ourselves and those among the people, and the issue of correctly handling contradictions among the people, so as to rally the people of all nationalities and throughout the country to fight a new battle—the battle against nature, to develop our economy and our culture, and to help the people as a whole to travel more smoothly through the current transitional period, reinforce our new system, and build up our new state.

## 2. The Issue of Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries<sup>44</sup>

The question of eliminating counterrevolutionaries is a question of a struggle involving the contradiction between the enemy and ourselves. Among the people, there are some who see the issue of eliminating counterrevolutionaries in a different light. Two types of people hold views differing from ours. Those with a Right-deviationist [way of] thinking make no distinction between the enemy and ourselves, and take the enemy to be our own people. They regard as friends those who are regarded as enemies by the broad masses [of the people]. Those with a "Left"-deviationist thinking magnify the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves to the point where they see some contradictions among the people as contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, and regard as counterrevolutionaries persons who actually are not counterrevolutionaries. Both views are erroneous. Neither of them makes it possible to handle correctly the issue of eliminating counterrevolutionaries or correctly assess our work in this regard.

To evaluate correctly what we have done in eliminating counterrevolutionaries in our country, we may as well take a look at the impact the Hungarian Incident has had on our own country. After the incident took place, there was some unrest among a section of intellectuals in our country, but it did not touch off any turbulence. What are the reasons for this? One of them, it should be said, is that we have fairly thoroughly eliminated the counterrevolutionaries.

Of course, the consolidation of our country does not primarily come as a result of the elimination of counterrevolutionaries. The primary factor for the consolidation of our country is that we have a Communist Party and a Liberation Army

tempered through decades of revolutionary struggle, and a laboring people who have been tempered likewise. Our Party and army have taken root among the masses; tempered in the flames of a protracted revolution, they are combat-worthy. This people's republic of ours was developed step by step out of the revolutionary base areas; it was not a regime established all of a sudden. Certain democratic personages<sup>45</sup> have also been tempered in varying degrees and have gone through thick and thin together with us. Some intellectuals were tempered in the struggle against imperialism and the reactionary forces, and many of them have, since Liberation, gone through an ideological remolding aimed to [help them] draw a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves. On top of that, the consolidation of our country is also due to the fact that our economic measures are basically correct; the people's life is secure and keeps on improving gradually, and we have pursued a correct policy toward the national bourgeoisie and other classes, and so on. Nevertheless, our success in eliminating the counterrevolutionaries is doubtlessly one of the major factors behind the consolidation of our country. Because of all this, our university students, with a few exceptions, are patriotic and supportive of socialism, even though there are still many of them who come from non-working-class families.<sup>46</sup> They did not have any unrest during the Hungarian Incident. It was the same with the national bourgeoisie, to say nothing of the basic masses of workers and peasants.

After Liberation, we purged and weeded out a batch of counterrevolutionaries. Some counterrevolutionaries who had committed serious crimes were sentenced to death. This was absolutely necessary and was the demand of the broad masses. It was done to liberate the masses who for a long time had been oppressed by the counterrevolutionaries and all sorts of [local] despots and bullies;<sup>47</sup> in other words, it was done to emancipate the forces for production. Had we not done so, it would be impossible for the masses to lift up their heads [with dignity]. Since 1956, however, things have undergone a basic change. Taking the country as a whole, the main bulk of the counterrevolutionaries' forces have already been ferreted out and eliminated. Our basic task has changed from that of emancipating the forces of production to that of safeguarding and developing the forces of production under a new [set of] relations of production. Some people do not understand that our present policy applies to the present situation and our previous policy applied to the situation in the past. They intend to make use of today's policy to reverse past decisions<sup>48</sup> in an attempt to negate the tremendous achievements we have made in the past in eliminating the counterrevolutionaries. This is completely mistaken, and the masses of the people will not permit it.

In our work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries, achievements were the principal aspect, but we also made some mistakes. There were instances both of excess and of counterrevolutionaries slipping through the net. Our policy is counterrevolutionaries must be eliminated whenever found, and mistakes must be corrected whenever discovered. The line that we have followed in the work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries is one in which the masses [themselves] are eliminating the counterrevolutionaries. Of course, even with adopting the mass line, mistakes may still occur.<sup>49</sup> But there can be fewer occasions for things to go

wrong, and the mistakes will be easier to rectify. The masses will gain experience through the struggle. From things done correctly [they will] gain the experience of how to do things right, and from the mistakes made [they will] gain the experience of how mistakes are made.

For mistakes already discovered in our work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries, we have taken, or are in the process of taking, steps to correct them. For mistakes yet to be discovered, we are prepared to rectify them as soon as they come to light. Reversal of mistaken [decisions] should be announced at a scope as wide as when the decisions were originally made. I propose a general review be made of the work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries either this year or the next year<sup>50</sup> in order to sum up the experience, promote justice, and stem evil trends.<sup>51</sup> At the Center, the review [should be] in the charge of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the Political Consultative Conference; at the local [level] it should be in the charge of the people's councils and the committees of the Political Consultative Conferences in the provinces and municipalities.<sup>52</sup> When conducting the review, we must help the broad [masses] of cadres and active elements, not douse them with cold water. To douse the broad [masses of] cadres and the active elements with cold water would be a mistake. However, mistakes must be corrected once they are spotted. Whether it is the public security organs, the procurators' offices, the judicial departments, prisons, or organs administering labor reform, all must take such an attitude. It is our hope that members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, members of the [Standing] Committee of the Political Consultative Conference, and people's deputies, whoever can do it, will take part in such a review [project]. This will be helpful in making our legal system<sup>53</sup> healthy and complete, and in dealing correctly with counterrevolutionary elements and other criminal elements.

As for how things stand with the counterrevolutionaries now, they can be boiled down to the following line: There are still counterrevolutionaries, but not many. In the first place, counterrevolutionaries still exist. Some people say there are no more [counterrevolutionaries] and all is well, and therefore we can puff up the pillow and have a good sleep.<sup>54</sup> This is not in tune with the facts. The fact is, there are still [counterrevolutionaries] (of course, this is not to say that they can be found in every place and in every unit), and we must continue to struggle against them. We must understand that the hidden counterrevolutionaries yet to be ferreted out and eliminated will never take things lying down; they will avail themselves of every opportunity to stir up trouble. The U.S. imperialists and the Chiang Kai-shek clique are still constantly sending their secret agents to carry out subversive activities in our territory.<sup>55</sup> Even after we have ferreted out and eliminated all the existing counterrevolutionaries, it is still possible for some new counterrevolutionaries to emerge. If we lose our vigilance, we shall be taken in [by the enemy] and suffer badly. Wherever the counterrevolutionaries are found making trouble, they must be stamped out resolutely. However, as far as the whole nation is concerned, there are indeed not that many counterrevolutionaries any more. It

would be a wrong opinion [to assume] that there still are large numbers of counterrevolutionaries across the country. Acceptance of such an assessment would certainly mess things up.

### 3. The Issue of the Cooperativization of Agriculture

Our country has an agricultural population of more than 500 million people. How things stand with the peasants has an extremely important bearing on the development of our country's economy and the consolidation of our political power. As I see it, the situation is basically good. With the completion of [agricultural] cooperativization, the major contradiction in our country between socialist industrialization and the individual peasant economy has been resolved. The rapid accomplishment of the cooperativization [movement] caused apprehensions among a number of people who were concerned that something might go wrong.<sup>56</sup> Fortunately, [while] there were some mistakes, there was nothing of a major kind, and [the movement] was basically sound. The peasants are vigorous in production, and grain output in the whole nation registered an increase last year despite the fact that disasters caused by floods, drought, and gales were the worst in years. But now there are people who assert that cooperativization does not work, that it has no superiority. Thus they whip up a miniature typhoon.<sup>57</sup> Does cooperativization have superiority or not? Among the documents distributed at today's meeting is material about that Wang Guofan Cooperative in Zunhua *xian*, Hebei Province.<sup>58</sup> You may all give it a reading. The place where this cooperative is located is a hilly area that had always been very poor and every year had to depend upon relief grain sent by the people's government. When the cooperative was first set up in 1953, people called it the "paupers' cooperative."<sup>59</sup> After four years of hard and bitter struggle, things have been getting better year after year. The overwhelming majority of the cooperative's members now have become households with surplus grain. What can be achieved by the Wang Guofan Cooperative should also be possible for other cooperatives to achieve under normal conditions, or, [if need be,] in a bit longer time.

From this it can be seen that the argument that something has gone wrong with cooperativization is groundless. From this it can be seen likewise that cooperatives have to be built through hard and heroic struggle. Any newly born thing has to experience difficulties and setbacks in its growth. To imagine that the cause of socialism does not have to experience difficulties and setbacks, does not exact tremendous efforts, but is always smooth sailing and easy success—such an idea is nothing but an illusion.

Who are the people in active support of the cooperatives? The overwhelming majority of the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants,<sup>60</sup> who constitute more than 70 per cent of the rural population. Most of the other people also pin their hopes on the cooperatives. Only an extremely small minority are dissatisfied. Many people have not analyzed this situation and have failed to make overall investigation into the achievements and shortcomings of the cooperatives as well as the roots that have given rise to these shortcomings, and they have taken the local [situations] and one-sided [findings] to be the general picture. This is why a miniature typhoon has been stirred up among a number of people who insist that the cooperatives are devoid of superiority.



How long will it take before the cooperatives can be consolidated and arguments such as those that cooperatives do not have superiority cease to be [aired]? Judging from the experience of how a large number of cooperatives have developed, it will probably take five years, or a little longer. Now the majority of cooperatives in the nation have only a history of a bit more than one year. It is unreasonable for us to ask them to be that good. As I see it, it will be good enough if we set up the cooperatives during the First Five-Year Plan period, and consolidate them during the Second Five-Year Plan period.<sup>61</sup>

The cooperatives are now undergoing a process of being gradually consolidated. Some contradictions that need to be resolved still exist in them. For example, between the state and the cooperatives, and in and between the cooperatives themselves there are still some contradictions that remain to be resolved.

We must pay constant attention to handling the above-mentioned contradictions from [the angle] of the problems of production and distribution. On the issue of production, the cooperatives' economies must, on the one hand, obey the leadership of the unified economic plan of the state, and, at the same time, retain a certain flexibility and independence of their own on the premise that they do not violate the state's unified plan, or the state's policies, laws, and regulations. On the other hand, every household that joins the cooperative, aside from [dealing with] its private plot<sup>62</sup> and other individually operated economic undertakings in regard to which it can make its own appropriate plans, must comply with the general plan of the cooperative or the production team.<sup>63</sup> On the issue of distribution, we must take the interests of the state, the collective, and the individual all into consideration.<sup>64</sup> The three-way relationship among the state [agricultural] tax, the cooperatives' accumulation [funds], and the peasants' personal income must be properly handled,<sup>65</sup> and we must take care to make constant readjustments [so as to resolve] the contradictions among them. The state must have accumulation, so must the cooperatives, but neither accumulation can be excessive. We must do everything possible to ensure that in normal years the peasants can increase their personal income year after year through the increased production.

Many people say that the peasants live in hardship.<sup>66</sup> Is this opinion correct? In a sense it is. That is to say, due to more than a century of oppression and exploitation by the imperialists and their agents, our country has been reduced to destitution. Not only do our peasants have a low living standard, but that of the workers and intellectuals is low as well. It will take us several decades, and it must be through strenuous efforts, before we can gradually raise the living standard of the people as a whole. In this sense, hardship is an appropriate [description]. In another sense, however, it is incorrect; that is, [when the phrase is meant] to say that in the seven years since Liberation there has been no improvement in the peasants' livelihood; that we have only improved the livelihood of the workers. As a matter of fact, the livelihood of both the workers and the peasants, except for an extreme few, has shown some improvement. Since Liberation, the peasants have been relieved of the landlords' exploitation and [their] production has grown year after year. Take grain, for example. In 1949, the entire country produced only some 210 billion catties of grain. By 1956, the grain output had risen to more than 360 billion catties,

an increase of nearly 150 billion catties.<sup>67</sup> The agricultural tax levied by the state cannot be deemed heavy, only something over 30 billion catties a year. And the [state] purchase of grain from the peasants at regular prices only amounts to a little over 50 billion catties.<sup>68</sup> These two items together total 80-some billion catties. And more than half this grain is sold and marketed back to the rural areas and nearby towns. From this it can be seen that it is impossible to assert that there is no improvement in the peasants' life. We are prepared generally to stabilize the [total annual] amount of the grain tax and the grain purchased [by the state] at 80-some billion catties within the next few years so that agriculture can develop and the cooperatives can be consolidated. In this way, the small number of grain-deficient households still existing in the countryside will no longer be short of grain, and all peasant households, except for those specializing in growing cash crops, will become households with grain to spare or self-sufficient households. There will no longer be poor peasants in the countryside, and the entire peasantry will have a living standard of the middle peasant and above. Simply to compare the peasants' average annual per capita income with that of the workers, alleging that one is too low and the other too high, is [therefore] inappropriate. A worker has a much higher labor productivity than a peasant, and the living expenses of a peasant are much more economical than a city worker's. Therefore we cannot say that the workers are given special favorable treatment by the state. The wages of a small number of workers and some personnel working in state organs are a little too high, and it stands to reason for the peasants to be dissatisfied with that. It is necessary to make some appropriate adjustments according to the circumstances.

#### 4. The Issue of the People Engaged in Industry and in Commerce

With regard to the transformation of our country's social system, in 1956, besides the cooperativization of agriculture and handicraft industries, the transformation of privately owned industry and commerce into joint state-private enterprises was accomplished as well.<sup>69</sup> That this was done so rapidly and smoothly was closely related to the fact we treated the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as a contradiction among the people. [But] has this class contradiction been completely resolved? No, not yet. A complete solution will require as yet a fairly long period of time. Nevertheless, some people now say that the capitalists have been so well remolded that they are almost like the workers, and that no further remolding is necessary. There are even people who allege that the capitalists are even better than the workers. Still others say that if remolding is necessary, why is the working class not remolded? Are these arguments correct? Of course not.

In the process of building a socialist society, everyone needs to go through remolding. The exploiters have to be remolded, and so do the laborers. Who says that the working class needs no remolding? Naturally, the remolding of exploiters and the remolding of laborers are two remoldings that differ in nature from each other; [the two] cannot be lumped together. The working class must remold the entire society through class struggle and the struggle against nature, and in the process remold itself. The working class must continuously learn in the course of

work; it must gradually overcome its own shortcomings and must never stop [moving forward]. Take people such as ourselves, for example. Many of us make some progress each year; that is to say, we are remolding ourselves every year. Personally, I had all kinds of non-Marxist ideas before, and it was only later that I accepted Marxism. I learned a bit of Marxism from books and made some initial remolding of my ideology. But in the main, it was only through the long-term [participation in] class struggle that I was remolded and changed around. Furthermore I must continue to learn from now on in order that I may make still some more progress, otherwise I shall lag behind. In contrast, can the capitalists be so great that, in fact, they do not need any more remolding?

Some people say that China's bourgeoisie today no longer has two sides to its character, that it has only one side. Is this a fact? No, it is not. On the one hand, bourgeois elements have already become administrative personnel in the joint state-private enterprises and are in a process of transformation in which they are changing from exploiters into laborers who live by their own labor.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, they still receive fixed interest in the joint state-private enterprises. That is to say, they have not yet cut themselves loose from their roots of exploitation. Between them and the working class there is still a fairly wide distance in terms of ideas, sentiments, and habits of life. How can it be said that they no longer have two sides to their character? Even when they have stopped receiving the fixed interest and their bourgeois hat<sup>71</sup> has been removed, they still will need a considerable period of time to continue to go through ideological remolding. If one is to believe that the bourgeoisie no longer has a dual character, then the capitalists would no longer have the task of remolding themselves and studying.

It should be said that not only does such an opinion not conform to the actual situation of the people engaged in industry and commerce; it is also not consistent with the desire of most of these people themselves. In the previous few years, the majority of the people engaged in industry and commerce were willing to study and have made marked progress. Their thorough remolding, however, can only be [realized] in the course of work. They should labor alongside the staff and workers in the enterprises and regard the enterprises as a base where they can conduct self-remolding. But it is also important for them to change some of their old views through study. Such study for those engaged in industry and commerce should be [conducted] on a voluntary basis. Many of the people in industry and commerce, after studying at some lecture and learning classes for a few weeks, find that they have more of a common language with the worker masses and representatives of the state's [portion of the ownership of the enterprises] upon their return to the factories. They have thus improved the conditions of [their own] working together with others. From their personal experience, they have learned that it is to their benefit to keep on studying and remolding themselves. The opinion that there is no need to study and remold, as mentioned above, represents the view of only a few of the people engaged in industry and commerce, and cannot [be taken] to represent the opinion of the majority among them.

##### 5. The Issue of the Intellectuals

The contradiction among the people in our country is also manifesting itself among the intellectuals. The several million intellectuals who served the old society in the past now have switched over to the new society. Herein is contained the question of how they can adapt themselves to the needs of the new society and how we are to help them to achieve this. This, too, comes as a contradiction among the people. The great majority of the intellectuals in our country have already made marked progress in the past seven years. They have expressed their approval of the socialist system. Among them are many who are studying Marxism diligently, and some of them have already become Communists. Although this segment is now still in the minority, it is steadily growing. Of course, among the intellectuals there are still some who are skeptical, or disapprove, of socialism; nevertheless, they only account for a small proportion.

Our country's formidable and arduous undertaking of constructing socialism needs the service of as many intellectuals as possible. We should confer trust on all those intellectuals who are truly willing to serve the cause of socialism; we must improve our relations with them from the ground up and help them resolve all sorts of problems that need to be resolved in an effort to enable them actively to give full play to their talents. Many of our comrades are inept at uniting with intellectuals; they treat them with rigidity, show no respect for their labor, and interfere improperly in some [areas of] scientific and cultural work in matters where interference is uncalled for.<sup>72</sup> All these shortcomings must be overcome.

Although the broad [ranks of] intellectuals have made progress, they should not therefore feel complacent. To meet fully the needs of the new society and unite as one with the workers and peasants, the intellectuals must continue to remold themselves, gradually do away with [their] bourgeois world view, and establish a proletarian, Communist world view. The transformation of [one's] world view is a fundamental change, and currently most of [our] intellectuals cannot be said to have completed this change. It is our hope that our country's intellectuals will continue to move forward, and in the course of their work and study, gradually establish [for themselves] a Communist world view, learn well [the teachings of] Marxism-Leninism, and become one with the workers and the peasants. [We hope that] they would not stop half way, or, what is worse, slide back; there will be no way out for them if they slide back. Due to the fact that there is already a change in the nation's social system, the economic base for the bourgeois ideology has already been fundamentally eliminated. Thus it becomes not only imperative but also possible for the intellectuals in vast numbers to transform their world view. However, a thorough transformation in world view takes a very long time; we should work patiently [among them] and must not be impetuous. As a matter of fact, there are bound to be a number of people who ideologically will always be unwilling to accept Marxism-Leninism or communism. We should not demand too much of this segment of the people; as long as they comply with the demands of the state and engage in legitimate labor, we should allow them opportunities to do suitable work.

Recently political and ideological work has been weakened among the intellec-

tuals and young students, and some [erroneous] deviations have surfaced. In the eyes of a number of people, there seems to be no necessity to be concerned about politics, the future of the homeland, or the ideals of humanity. It is as if although Marxism was all the rage for a while, it has now gone out of fashion. In response to these circumstances, we must now strengthen ideological and political work. Regardless of whether they are intellectuals or young students, they must study hard. Aside from the study of their specialized subjects, they need to study Marxism, current events, and politics so that they can make progress both ideologically and politically. Not having a correct political viewpoint is tantamount to not having a soul.<sup>73</sup> Ideological remolding previously conducted was necessary and has produced positive results. However, it was done in a somewhat crude way and a number of people got hurt. This is not good. This drawback must be avoided in the future. Ideological and political work is the responsibility of all departments [and organizations]. The Communist Party should hold itself responsible [for the work]; so should the Youth League,<sup>74</sup> the government departments in charge of the work, and especially the headmasters and teachers of schools. Our educational policy should enable the educated to develop in all the various areas of moral education, intellectual education, as well as physical education—[so that] they can become laborers with both a socialist consciousness and culture. We must advocate [the idea of] building our country through diligence and thrift,<sup>75</sup> and we must let all the young people know that ours is still a very poor country and such a state of affairs cannot be radically changed in a short period of time. It is only through our younger generation and the entire people joining hands in unity and struggling hard and heroically for several decades that we can build a rich and powerful country with our hands. The establishment of the socialist system has opened for us a road leading to an ideal state, but the realization of such an ideal state depends on our hard work. Some young people believe that everything should be good once we arrive at a socialist society, and that they can enjoy a ready-made happy life without putting in any effort. The idea is unrealistic.

#### 6. The Issue of the Minority Nationalities

Minority nationalities in our country total more than thirty million. Even though they only make up 6 per cent of the nation's entire population, [the territory] they inhabit extends over vast regions that account for some 50 to 60 per cent of China's total area. Thus it becomes necessary to handle well the relations between the Han people and the minority nationalities. The key to this problem lies in overcoming Han chauvinism.<sup>76</sup> At the same time we must overcome regional nationalism where it exists among the minority nationalities.<sup>77</sup> Whether we are speaking of Han chauvinism or regional nationalism, both are detrimental to the unity of [all the] different nationalities. They are also a type of contradiction among the people that should be overcome. In this regard we have already done some work, and in most of the areas inhabited by minority-nationalities there has been great improvement in the relations among nationalities as compared with before. But there are still some problems that remain to be resolved. In a number of areas, there is still a grave problem of both Han chauvinism and regional nationalism, and to this we must pay

adequate attention. Through the efforts of the people of different nationalities over the last few years, the overwhelming majority of minority nationality areas in our country have basically completed democratic reforms and socialist transformation. Democratic reforms have not yet been carried out in Tibet due to the fact that conditions there are not yet ripe. According to the Seventeen-Article Agreement concluded between the Central [People's Government] and the local government of Tibet, reform of the social system there must be implemented, but the time for the implementation can only be decided by the great majority of the Tibetan people and [local] leaders when they see fit. We cannot be impetuous. Now it has been decided that reform will not be carried out during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan. Whether reform should be implemented in the period of the Third Five-Year Plan will be decided according to the conditions at that time.<sup>78</sup>

#### 7. Comprehensive Planning While Giving Consideration to All Sectors, and Proper Arrangement<sup>79</sup>

The comprehensive planning while giving consideration to all sectors discussed here refers to the comprehensive planning and overall consideration for the 600 million people [of the whole country]. In drawing up plans, doing things, and thinking over problems, we must proceed from the fact that our country has a population of 600 million; under no circumstances should we forget this. Why should we raise such a question [at this time]? Can it be possible that there are still people who do not know that our country has a population of 600 million? [We all] know it for sure, but when it comes to doing things, some people forget about it; to them it seems, the fewer the people, the smaller the circle, the better. People who harbor such a "small circle" mentality resent the idea of mobilizing all positive factors, uniting with all those with whom unity is possible, and doing everything one can to turn negative factors into positive factors so that they serve the great cause of building a socialist society. I hope these people will broaden their field of vision and truly admit that our country has a population of 600 million people; they should recognize it as an objective fact and that it is an asset for us.<sup>80</sup> The huge population we have is a good thing and, of course, also involves difficulties. Our undertakings of construction are vigorously moving forward on all fronts and have achieved great success. However, in the present transitional period of tremendous social changes, we still face many difficult problems. At once there is progress and difficulty—this is contradiction. Not only is it necessary for us to resolve any contradiction, but it is entirely possible to have it resolved. Our policy is comprehensive planning, giving consideration to all sectors, and making proper arrangements. Whether it is a problem of food, of natural calamities, employment, education, the intellectuals, the united front of all patriotic forces, the minority nationalities, or anything else, all must be resolved by proceeding from the viewpoint of comprehensive planning and overall consideration that embraces the whole people. Proper arrangements must be made in light of what is actually possible at a given time and a given place through consultation with people of all walks of life. Under no circumstances should we complain that there are too many people, that others are backward, and that things are too troublesome to handle,

thus pushing them outside the door and leaving it at that. In saying this do I mean that the government should take care of everybody and everything? Of course not. In many cases we can let the social organizations or the masses directly figure out ways to handle things. They are capable of coming up with many good solutions. This, too, comes within the scope of the principle of comprehensive planning, giving consideration to all sectors, and making proper arrangements. We should guide social organizations and the masses of different localities everywhere in doing this.

8. On Letting a Hundred Flowers Bloom and a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend,<sup>81</sup> and on Long-term Coexistence and Mutual Supervision<sup>82</sup>

“Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend,” and “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision”—under what conditions are these slogans advanced? They are advanced in light of the specific situation in China, on the basis of recognizing that various contradictions continue to exist in socialist society, and in keeping with the country’s urgent need rapidly to develop its economy and culture. The principle of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is a principle to promote the development of the arts and progress in the sciences; it is a policy to enhance the flourishing of the socialist culture in our land. Different forms and genres of art can develop freely, and different schools of science can contend and debate freely. Using administrative force to impose one particular genre coercively, or one particular school, while banning another genre or school, is, we believe, detrimental to the growth of art and science. Issues of right and wrong in art and science should be resolved through free discussion in artistic and scientific circles and through the practice of art and science. We should not try to settle them with a simplistic method. To determine whether something is right or wrong frequently takes a trial period. In history, new and correct things often could not win recognition from the majority of people at the start, and they had to move forward by twists and turns in struggle. People tend to deny correct things, good things, as fragrant flowers at the outset; instead, they regard them as poisonous weeds.<sup>83</sup> Copernicus’s theory of the solar system and Darwin’s theory of evolution<sup>84</sup> were both regarded at one time as erroneous, and both experienced bitter struggle. In our country’s history, there are also many similar cases. Compared with the old society, a socialist society [provides] basically different and far better conditions for the growth of new things. However, it is still a common occurrence for newly emerging forces to be held back and for reasonable opinions to be suppressed. Even when the suppression is not deliberate, lack of clarity in discernment alone can hinder the growth of new things. Therefore we should adopt a cautious attitude toward [questions] of right and wrong in science and art. [We must] encourage free discussion and avoid making hasty conclusions. Adopting such an attitude, we believe, will help the sciences and arts progress in a relatively smooth manner.

Marxism itself develops through struggle. Marxism sustained all kinds of blows at the beginning and was regarded as a poisonous weed. Even now it continues to be on the receiving end of attacks and is still seen as a poisonous weed in many

parts of the world. In the socialist countries, however, Marxism has a different position. But even in the socialist countries, non-Marxist ideologies remain, and so do anti-Marxist ideologies. In our country, although socialist transformation in regard to the ownership system has been basically completed and the large-scale rough-winds-and-torrential-rains type of class struggle of the masses characteristic of the revolutionary period has also basically come to an end, remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador<sup>85</sup> classes still exist, the bourgeoisie still exists, and the petty bourgeoisie is just in the midst of being remolded. Class struggle has not come to an end. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the various political forces, and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological sphere will still be protracted, tortuous, and even violent at times. The proletariat wants to transform the world according to its own world view, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this regard, the question of whether socialism or capitalism will win [in the battle between them] has not yet really been settled.<sup>86</sup> Whether among the entire population or among the intellectuals, Marxists remain a minority. Therefore Marxism still has to develop through struggle. That Marxism can only develop through struggle holds true not only for the past and present but will also inevitably hold true in the future. A correct thing always develops in the course of struggle with the wrong thing. Things that are true, good, and beautiful always exist by contrast with things that are false, evil, and ugly, and develop in the struggle with such things.<sup>87</sup> By the time a certain erroneous thing comes to be rejected universally by humankind, or a certain truth comes to be universally accepted, truths of a still newer kind will already have begun to struggle with new erroneous ideas. Such struggle will never end. It is the law of the development of truth, and naturally, also the law of the development of Marxism.

[The question of] whether socialism or capitalism will win out in our country in the ideological struggle between them will take as yet a fairly long period before it can be resolved. This is because the influence of the bourgeoisie and of the intellectuals who have come [over] from the old society will long remain in our country. They will long remain as a class ideology. Failure to understand this situation adequately or to understand it at all will lead to the gravest mistake, [the mistake of] neglecting necessary ideological struggle. Ideological struggle is different from other [forms of] struggle; it can only use the method of painstaking reasoning rather than the method of crude coercion. Currently, in the ideological struggle, socialism possesses the conditions to win. The basic strength of the state power rests in the hands of the laboring people led by the proletariat. The Communist Party has mighty strength and enjoys a high prestige. Even though there are shortcomings and mistakes in our work, every fair-minded person can see that we are loyal to the people, that we are determined and have the ability to stand shoulder to shoulder with the people to build [our] homeland, and that we have already achieved tremendous successes and will continue to achieve still greater ones. The bourgeois elements and intellectuals who have come [over] from the old society are for the overwhelmingly greater part patriotic; they are willing to serve the socialist homeland which is becoming more prosperous every day. They are

aware that if they are divorced from the socialist cause and are alienated from the laboring people led by the Communist Party, they will have nothing to rely on and it will be impossible for them to have any bright future.<sup>88</sup>

Some people raise the question: [Since] Marxism has been accepted by the vast majority of people in our country as the guiding ideology, can criticism be leveled at it? Of course it can be criticized. Marxism is a scientific truth and fears no criticism. If Marxism were afraid of criticism and if it could be toppled by criticism, then it would be worthless. In fact, aren't idealists making every form of criticism against Marxism every day? And aren't those who harbor bourgeois ideas and who are reluctant to change also criticizing Marxism in every form? Marxists should not be afraid of being criticized by anyone. On the contrary, it is precisely in the midst of others' criticism and in the storm and stress of struggle that Marxists can temper and develop themselves and expand their [strategic] positions. To struggle with erroneous ideas is like getting vaccinated; under the effects of being inoculated with a vaccine, one will develop greater immunity [against disease].<sup>89</sup> Things nurtured in greenhouses cannot have strong vitality. Implementing the policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend will not weaken the leading position of Marxism in the ideological field; on the contrary, it will strengthen such a position.

What principle should we adopt toward non-Marxist ideas? Regarding those who are obviously counterrevolutionaries and saboteurs of the socialist cause, the matter is easy; [simply] depriving them of their freedom of speech will do. Things are different with erroneous ideas among the people. Will it work to ban such ideas and deprive them of any opportunity for expression? Of course not. To handle ideological issues among the people, issues involving the mental world, with simplistic methods is not only ineffective but also extraordinarily harmful. Even if we deny erroneous opinions their expression, erroneous opinions will continue to exist. Whereas correct opinions, if they are fostered in greenhouses and have not been exposed to rough weather, and have not acquired immunity [from disease], will not be able to win the battle against erroneous opinions when they encounter them. Therefore, it is only by employing the method of discussion, criticism, and reasoning that we can truly develop correct opinions and overcome mistaken ones, and that we can really resolve problems.

The bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie are bound to give expression to their ideas and mentalities. Invariably they will resort to every possible means to stubbornly assert themselves over political and ideological issues. It is impossible for them not to reflect [on things] or give expression of themselves. We should not use the method of suppression to prevent them from expression; rather we should allow them expression, and at the same time that [such ideologies] are expressed, debate with them and make appropriate criticism [of them]. Doubtlessly we should criticize erroneous ideas of all kinds and all stripes. Of course it wouldn't work if we made no criticism and simply looked on as erroneous ideas spread unchecked and allowed them to take over the market. Criticisms must be made whenever there are mistakes, and struggle must be waged wherever poisonous weeds crop up. Nevertheless, such criticism should not be dogmatic. Rather than using the meta-

physical method, we must strive to use the dialectical method, with scientific analysis and convincing argument. Dogmatic criticism cannot [help to] resolve any problem. We are against poisonous weeds of any kind, but we must exercise caution in discerning what is really a poisonous weed, and what is really a fragrant flower. Together with the masses we must learn to distinguish carefully between fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds, and together we will fight the poisonous weeds with correct methods.

At the same time that we criticize dogmatism, we must also pay attention to criticizing revisionism. Revisionism, or Right opportunism, is a bourgeois tide of thought even more dangerous than dogmatism. Revisionists, as well as Right opportunists, carry Marxism on their lips too, and they, too, attack "dogmatism" [with equal ardor]. But what they attack are precisely the things that are most fundamental to Marxism. They oppose or distort materialism and dialectics; they oppose or try to weaken the people's democratic dictatorship and the Communist Party's leadership; they oppose or try to weaken socialist transformation and socialist construction. [Even] after the socialist revolution has won the basic victory in our country, there are still some people in society who dream of restoring the capitalistic system. They will struggle against the working class in every area, including in the sphere of ideology. The revisionists will serve as their best aide in this conflict.

Judging them literally, the two slogans ["letting a hundred flowers bloom"] and ["letting a hundred schools of thought contend"] do not have a class character. The proletariat can make use of them, so can the bourgeoisie, and so can other people. Also, in defining what a fragrant flower is and what a poisonous weed is, the various classes, strata, and social groups are each able to have their own criteria. Then, from the perspective of the broad masses of the people, what are our criteria for distinguishing between fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds today? In the political life of our people, how should they judge right from wrong in our words and deeds? Based on the principles of our country's Constitution and in keeping with the will of the vast majority of our country's people as well as the common political advocacy made public by our country's various [political] parties on many occasions, we are of the opinion that such criteria can be defined, in broad terms, as follows:

- (1) [Whether something] helps to unite, not split, the people of all different nationalities across the country;
- (2) [Whether something] is beneficial, not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction;
- (3) [Whether something] facilitates the consolidation of, and does not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship;
- (4) [Whether something] facilitates the consolidation of, and does not undermine or weaken, the system of democratic centralism;
- (5) [Whether something] facilitates the consolidation of, and does not cut loose from or weaken, the Communist Party's leadership;
- (6) [Whether something] is beneficial, not harmful, to the international unity of socialism and the international unity of the peace-loving people in all the world.

Of these six criteria, the most important are the two criteria concerning the socialist road and the Party's leadership. These criteria are put forward to help the people develop free discussion on all kinds of issues; they are not intended to hinder such discussion. Those who disapprove of these criteria may still set forth their own views and argue their case. However, with the majority of people having clear and definite criteria to go by, it will be possible for criticism and self-criticism to develop on the right track. These criteria can then be applied to determine whether one's words and deeds are correct and whether they are fragrant flowers or poisonous weeds. These are political criteria. Of course, to determine whether scientific arguments are correct or erroneous and to appraise the artistic standards of works of art, we need some other criteria respective [of the subject]. These six political criteria, however, apply also to any scientific and artistic activity. In a socialist state like ours, can there be any beneficial scientific or artistic activity that runs counter to these criteria?

The above-mentioned views proceed from the specific historical conditions in our country. In different socialist countries and in different Communist parties the situations are not the same. Therefore we do not hold that they must or should adopt China's method.

The slogan of "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" is also a product of China's specific historical conditions. This slogan was not proposed abruptly; it has gone through quite a few years of fermentation. The idea of ["long-term coexistence"] has [in fact] been in existence for quite a long time. By last year [when] the socialist system had been basically established, these slogans were set forth in firm and explicit terms. Why are we going to allow bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democratic parties<sup>90</sup> to exist alongside the political party of the working class for a long time to come? This is because we have no reason not to adopt a policy of long-term coexistence toward all those parties that genuinely dedicate themselves to uniting the people in the cause of socialism and enjoy the people's confidence. Back in June 1950, at the Second Session of the Political Consultative Conference, I had already stated: "As long as somebody is truly willing to work for the people and has indeed helped the people at a time when they were still having difficulties, has performed good deeds and has consistently continued to do so without giving up halfway, then there will be no reason for the people or the People's Government not to want such a person, and there will be no reason not to give such a person a chance to make a living and serve [the people]."<sup>91</sup> What [I] said there constitutes the political basis for the possibility of the long-term coexistence of the various parties. It is our desire and also our policy that the Communist Party will exist alongside the democratic parties for a long period of time. As to whether the democratic parties can exist for a long time to come, [this question] will be decided not merely by the desire of the Communist Party alone but also by how the democratic parties acquit themselves and whether they can win the people's confidence. Mutual supervision among the various parties, too, has long existed as a fact; that is, it has long been [a practice for] the various parties to offer suggestions to each other and make criticism of each other. By mutual supervision, naturally we do not mean [that supervision comes from] one side

alone; [while] the Communist Party can exercise supervision over the democratic parties, the democratic parties can also exercise supervision over the Communist Party. Why should we allow the democratic parties to exercise supervision over the Communist Party? This is because a party is like a person; one needs to hear different voices. As we all know, the Communist Party is mainly under the supervision of the laboring people and the masses who make up its membership. However, to have [the supervision from] the democratic parties [also] will redound to its benefit. Of course, the opinions that the various democratic parties and the Communist Party offer to each other and the criticisms that they make of each other can play a positive role of mutual supervision only under the conditions that they conform to the six political criteria we mentioned above. Therefore it is our hope that the various democratic parties will pay attention to ideological reform and strive to coexist with the Communist Party for a long period of time and exercise supervision over each other in an effort to meet the needs of the new society.

#### 9. On the Question of Disturbances Caused by Small Numbers of People<sup>92</sup>

In 1956, in a few places, incidents occurred wherein small numbers of workers and students went on strike.<sup>93</sup> The immediate cause for these people creating disturbances was that some [of their] material demands were not met. Of these demands some should and could have been met, while others were inappropriate or excessive and could not be met for the moment. But a more important cause of the disturbances was the leadership's bureaucratism.<sup>94</sup> In some cases, the organs at higher levels should be held responsible for the mistakes of bureaucratism; we cannot put the blame entirely on the lower levels. Another cause for the disturbances was the lack of ideological and political education among the workers and students. In 1956 there were also incidents in which small numbers of cooperative members made trouble in the cooperatives.<sup>95</sup> The main causes for this were also the leadership's bureaucratism, and lack of education among the masses.

It should be admitted that some of the masses often are prone to pay attention to immediate, partial, and personal interests, and do not understand, or do not quite understand, long-term, national, and collective interests. Because they lack experience in politics and the life of society, quite a few young people are not good in making comparisons between the old China and the new; it is not easy for them to understand deeply what hardships the Chinese people had gone through in their struggle before they could free themselves from the oppression of imperialism and Kuomintang reactionaries, and what long years of hard work are needed before a fine socialist society can be built. Therefore we must constantly conduct lively and true-to-practice political education among the masses. We should constantly explain to them truthfully about the difficulties that emerge and study together with them ways for overcoming the difficulties.

We do not approve of disturbances, because contradictions among the people can be resolved through the method of "unity-criticism-unity," while disturbances are bound to entail losses and are harmful to the development of the socialist cause. It is our belief that the broad masses of people in our country support socialism; they observe discipline and are very reasonable, and they will never make trouble

without reason. But this is not to say that there is no more possibility for the masses to create disturbances in our country. On this issue we should pay attention to the following: (1) to eradicate the cause of disturbances, we must resolutely overcome bureaucratism, effectively strengthen ideological and political education, and properly resolve all contradictions. If we accomplish this, disturbances, generally speaking, will be out of the question; (2) if it is because we have not done our work well that disturbances occur, then we should guide the masses involved in creating the disturbances onto the right track and use the disturbances as a special device for improving our work and educating the cadres and masses in order to resolve problems that were previously left unresolved. In the process of handling the disturbances, we must carry out painstaking work. We must not resort to any oversimplified method in handling the problems or "hastily call back the troops." As for the ringleaders in the disturbances, they should not be summarily or lightly fired, except in the cases of those who are criminal offenders or active counter-revolutionaries who would have to be punished according to the law. In a large country like ours, it is not worthwhile to make a fuss about small numbers of people who create disturbances. Instead, [such disturbances] may help us overcome bureaucratism.

In our society there are also a few people who are inconsiderate of the public interest, impervious to reason, and prone to violence and violation of the law. Such people may take advantage of our policies and distort them, and deliberately set forth unreasonable demands to instigate the masses, or deliberately start a rumor to create trouble and disrupt the normal order of society. As for this kind of people, we are not in favor of letting them get away with it. On the contrary, necessary punishments, according to law, must be taken against them. To punish such people is the demand of the broad masses in society, and not to punish them would be against the masses' will.

#### 10. Can Bad Things Be Turned into Good Things?

As I said above, disturbances created by the masses are bad things in our society, and we do not approve of them. However, when such incidents have occurred, they can prompt us to draw lessons, overcome bureaucratism, and can educate the cadres and masses. In this sense, even bad things can be turned into good things. Disturbances have a dual nature. We can apply this viewpoint in dealing with all disturbances.

As we all well know, the Hungarian Incident was not a good thing. But it, too, had a dual character. As the Hungarian comrades acted properly in the course of the development of the incident, the Hungarian Incident has eventually turned from a bad thing into a good thing. Hungary is now more consolidated than ever, and all countries in the socialist camp have learned a lesson.

Likewise, in the latter half of 1956 there was a worldwide anti-Communist and anti-people storm, and that, of course, was a bad thing. But it educated and tempered the Communist parties and the working classes in all the countries, and thus turned into a good thing. In many countries a number of people withdrew from the [Communist] parties during this storm. Withdrawal of some members from the

Party curtails the size of its membership and is, of course, a bad thing. Nevertheless, there is a good aspect about that, too. With the wavering elements who are unwilling to carry on [the struggle] quitting the Party, the majority of staunch Party members can be united even better for the struggle. What is so bad about that?

In sum, we must learn to view a problem in all its aspects. Not only must we see the obverse side of things, but we must see the reverse side as well. Under certain conditions, a bad thing can lead to a good result, and a good thing to a bad result. Said Lao Zi more than two thousand years ago: "Good fortune lieth within bad; bad fortune lurketh within good."<sup>96</sup> When the Japanese fought their way into China, they called it a victory. Vast stretches of China's land were seized [by the Japanese enemy], and the Chinese people called it a defeat. But victory was conceived in China's defeat, and defeat was conceived in Japan's victory. Hasn't history so proved?

Now people in countries all over the world are discussing whether or not a third world war will break out. With regard to this issue, we must also be mentally prepared and must have analysis. We firmly stand for peace and against war. However, if the imperialists insist on launching a war, we have no need to fear. Our attitude toward this question, the same as our attitude toward any "disturbance," is: After the First World War, the Soviet Union emerged, with a population of 200 million. And after the Second World War, the socialist camp came into existence, with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists insist on unleashing a third world war, we can be certain that several hundred million more people will switch to the side of socialism, and there may not be much turf left for the imperialists.<sup>97</sup> It is even possible that the system of imperialism will fall apart altogether.

As a result of the struggle between the opposing aspects of a contradiction, they invariably will each transform into the other under given conditions. Here it is the conditions that are important. Without given conditions, neither of the two contradictory aspects can transform itself [into its opposite]. In this world the one that is most willing to change its position is the proletariat, and next comes the semi-proletariat, since the former does not own a thing in the world and the latter barely anything. The situation now in which the United States controls a majority of votes in the United Nations and dominates many parts of the world is only temporary; this situation is bound to change one of these days. China's position as a poor country and a country without power and rights internationally will also change. The poor country will become a rich country; [the country] without power and rights will change into [one that] enjoys them—a transformation of itself into its opposite. The decisive conditions here are the socialist system and the people's unity and unanimity in a heroic struggle.

#### 11. On Practicing Economy

Here I would like to talk briefly on the issue of practicing economy. We wish to undertake large-scale construction, but ours is still a very poor country. This is a contradiction. Practicing strict economy everywhere and in a lasting way is one method to resolve this contradiction.

During the "Three Anti's" movement in 1952, we fought against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism, with the emphasis on fighting corruption.<sup>98</sup> In 1955 we advocated the practice of economy. Our main thrust then was combating the unduly high standards for nonproductive [projects of] basic construction and saving on raw material in industrial production. In this we achieved great successes. At that time, the policy of practicing economy had not been conscientiously implemented in the different sectors of the national economy nor in government organs, military units, schools, and people's organizations in general. This year we require that economy be advocated and waste combated in every sector across the nation. We still lack experience in construction work. We have made great achievements over the last few years but we also had waste. We must step by step build up a number of large-scale modernized enterprises as the backbone. Without such a mainstay, it would be impossible for us to build our country into a mighty, modern industrial country within a few decades' time. But this practice should not be followed with the majority of enterprises; more efforts should be devoted to building small- and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, we should fully utilize the industrial base left behind by the old society and strive to effect the greatest economy so that we can do more with less money. Since November last year, when the Second Plenum of the [Eighth] Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party set forth, more emphatically than ever, the principle of practicing strict economy and combating waste, things have begun to take effect in these few months.<sup>99</sup> The campaign for economy this time must be conducted in a thorough and sustained way. Combating waste, like the criticism of any other fault or mistake, can be likened to washing one's face. Isn't it that one washes one's face every day?<sup>100</sup> The Communist Party of China, the democratic parties, the democratic personages with no party affiliations, the intellectuals, people engaged in industry and commerce, workers, peasants, and handicrafts people, in short, all our 600 million people must strive to increase production, practice economy, and combat extravagance and waste.<sup>101</sup> This bears major significance not only economically but politically as well. Among many of our working personnel there is now breeding a dangerous tendency of unwillingness to share weal and woe with the masses, but preferring, [instead,] to calculate personal fame and gain. This is very bad. In the campaign to increase production and practice economy we call for streamlining the [administrative] organs and transferring cadres to the lower levels<sup>102</sup> so that a considerable number of cadres will return to production. This is precisely one way to overcome such a dangerous tendency. We must see to it that all the cadres and all the people constantly bear in mind that ours is a large socialist country but also an economically backward poor country. This is a very big contradiction. To make our country prosperous and strong will take several decades of hard struggle, which includes, among other things, a policy of building our country through diligence and frugality, namely, practicing strict economy and combating waste.

## 12. The Path of China's Industrialization

The question of the path to industrialization discussed here mainly refers to the problem of the relationship among the growth of heavy industry, light industry,

and agriculture.<sup>103</sup> Our country's economic construction focuses on heavy industry; this is a [principle] that must be affirmed. However, full attention must be paid at the same time to developing agriculture and light industry.

Our country is a large agricultural country, with the rural population accounting for more than 80 per cent of the [total] national population. Only when the development of industry is promoted simultaneously with the development of agriculture can industry secure raw materials and a market and more funds be accumulated for building a powerful heavy industry. As we all know, light industry is extremely closely linked with agriculture; without agriculture there can be no light industry. However, that heavy industry must take agriculture as a major market has not yet been made to be clearly understood by people. With the gradual development of technological transformation in agriculture, however, and with agriculture becoming increasingly modernized, there will be more and more [demand on] machinery, fertilizer, water conservation [projects], electrical power projects, and transportation facilities geared to the service of agriculture as well as [of] fuel and building materials for the consumption by [rural] citizens. Then the fact that heavy industry takes agriculture as a major market will be more easily appreciated by people. If during the period of the Second and Third Five-Year Plans our agriculture can achieve still greater growth, thus bringing about a correspondingly greater development of light industry, the entire national economy will benefit. With agriculture and light industry moving forward, heavy industry will be assured of a market and of funds, and it will grow even faster. In this way, while the speed of industrialization may appear to be slower, actually it will not be slow, and it may even be quicker. In three five-year plans' time, or perhaps a little longer, it is still possible for our country to raise its steel output from the pre-Liberation peak annual output of some 900,000 tons in 1934 to twenty million tons [a year]. This will make the people happy both in the cities and in the countryside.

I do not intend to speak at length on economic questions today. We still lack experience in economic construction. As it has only been underway for seven years, we need to accumulate experience. We didn't have experience in revolution either when we started it. We took a few tumbles<sup>104</sup> and gained experience; only then did we win nationwide victory. We require that we gain experience in economic construction in a shorter period of time than it took us to gain experience in revolution, and, in addition, not pay as high a price. Some price has to be paid, but not as high, we hope, as we paid during the period of revolution. It should be understood that a contradiction exists over this issue, namely the contradiction between the objective law of the economic development of a socialist society and our subjective cognition [of it]. We can only resolve it through practice. This contradiction will also manifest itself as a contradiction between people, that is, a contradiction between those who more correctly reflect the objective law and those who reflect it more incorrectly. Therefore, it, too, is a contradiction among the people. All contradictions exist objectively. Our task is to give expression to them and resolve them in as nearly correct a manner as possible.

To turn our country into an industrial country, we must conscientiously learn from the advanced experience of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been



building socialism for forty years already, and its experience is very valuable to us. You see, who has designed and equipped so many important factories for us? Has the United States done so? Has Britain? Neither of them has. Only the Soviet Union was willing to do so, because it is a socialist country, and it is our ally. Aside from the Soviet Union, some fraternal countries in Eastern Europe have also lent us some assistance. It is entirely true; we must learn from the good experience of all countries, whether it is from socialist countries or capitalist countries; this is something we must affirm. Nevertheless, the main thing is still to learn from the Soviet Union. Toward learning there are two attitudes. One is the dogmatic attitude of transplanting everything regardless of whether it is applicable to one's country's condition or not. This attitude is no good. Another attitude is to use our brains and think a bit when we are learning so that we can learn things that fit in with our country's conditions, that is, absorb experiences useful to us. This is the attitude we need [to adopt].<sup>105</sup>

Strengthening the unity with the Soviet Union and the solidarity with all socialist countries is our fundamental policy and where our basic interests reside. Next come the Asian and African countries as well as all the peace-loving nations and peoples [around the world]. We should strengthen and develop our unity with them. United with these two forces, we shall no longer be isolated. As for the imperialist countries, we should also unite with their people and strive to coexist peacefully with those countries, do business with them, and prevent the eruption of a possible war. However, under no circumstances should we entertain any unrealistic idea about them.

## Notes

1. For Mao's idea of the periodization of the revolution and the meaning of the "bourgeois democratic revolution" in this context, see text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

2. According to a report in *Shishi shouce*, 17 (1956), reprinted in *RMSC* (1957), pp. 623–624, and *RMSC* (1958), pp. 650–651, in 1957 there were forty-six minority nationalities (i.e., ethnic groups besides the most populous Han nationality) that could be identified and named in the PRC, comprising a population of 35.5 million and territorially spread throughout some 60 per cent of the country. The tabulation here identifies the Zhuang (6.61 million +), the Uighur (3.64 million +), the Hui (3.55 million +), the Yi (3.25 million +), the Zhang (Tibetan, 2.77 million +), the Miao (2.51 million +), the Man (Manchu, 2.41 million +), the Mongol (1.46 million +), the Buyi (1.24 million +), and the Chaoxian (Chosan-Korean, 1.12 million +) as the ten largest. For a detailed study of China's minority nationalities, see J. Dreyer (1976).

3. The Chinese expression for the first of these sets of contradictions here, *di wo zi jian de maodun*, specifically includes the meaning of "contradictions between [my] enemy and me," and, in so doing, fully represents the keenness of Mao's combative edge on the subject of contradictions in society. Although the term can be, and has been, translated as "contradictions between one's enemy and oneself," we find that rendition not only cumbersome, but also somewhat excessively toned down. Even though Mao was, on the whole, being conciliatory here and in other speeches of the period, he was clearly conciliatory only toward issues and cases involving what he called "contradictions among the people"—i.e., the other type, or category, of contradictions here. His attitude toward "contradictions between the enemy and ourselves" was just as sharp as ever.

On this subject, we can also refer to the annotation of the term written by the Japanese scholar Takeuchi Minoru in *Mao Takuto senshu, dai-go-ken* (the Japanese translation of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, volume 5), vol. III, p. 144. Here Takeuchi points out that the conventional Japanese translation of the term, in which the word for "self" (*wo*) is rendered as *mikata*, meaning "friend" or "ally," is an inaccurate translation that fails to render fully Mao's meaning. Although the idea of "friend or foe" is a strong one, in the context of "contradiction between" it becomes imprecise and, in fact, incorrect. The notion of contradiction conveyed here is clearly the notion of antagonistic interests between the subject itself (in this case, one's self) and the subject's antagonists, and not merely a matter of one's distinguishing between "who one's enemies are, and who one's allies are."

The Chinese for the second set of contradictions, *renmin neibu de maodun*, in fact conveys an even more specific meaning of "contradictions internal to the people." This meaning is even stronger in some renditions where the possessive *de* is dropped and the expression becomes simply *renmin neibu maodun*. Such a translation of the term, we feel, would even more specifically convey Mao's concept of the term *renmin* (people) as an intrinsic philosophical-ontological as well as political-social entity, a sense that is not sufficiently conveyed by the customary translations of "contradictions among the people" or even "contradictions within the ranks of the people." However, since previous references have already been made to this document under these conventional translations, we have followed along. It is hoped that our annotation here and in the next note sufficiently clarify the specific and profound semantic meanings contained in these expressions.

The idea of drawing a distinction between these two categories of contradictions seems to have appeared first in the article "Once More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," which appeared in December 1956. This article is not included in our collection here, even though it is widely recognized that much of it bears the stamp of Mao's ideological influence, because it was officially issued under a name other than Mao's. In that article it was pointed out that "the contradictions internal to the people" (or, "the contradictions among the people") "include contradictions between this part of the comrades within the Communist Party and the other part, between the government and the people in a socialist country, [contradictions] among socialist countries, and among Communist parties." It goes on to suggest that the occurrence of such contradictions is not owing to "fundamental clashes of class interests," but to contradictions between correct and incorrect opinions, or "contradictions of a partial and local nature." Forecasting what Mao said here in this February 27, 1957 speech, the article further warned that under specific conditions, "one side of the contradiction gradually moves over to the side of the enemy," then "certain contradictions internal to the people . . . are capable of being gradually transformed into antagonistic contradictions. Ultimately, such contradictions will become totally transformed in nature, and will no longer belong to the category of contradictions internal to the people, but will become a part of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves." See *RMRB* (Dec. 29, 1956) for a transcript of this article.

4. The idea of the term "the people" (*renmin*) as used by Mao here and in CPC usage generally may be somewhat narrower and more politically specific than the way the term is interpreted in general. According to the Common Program adopted by the CPPCC (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 3), the term *renmin* refers (and applies) to "the working class, the peasant class, the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and all patriotic elements that have awakened and come over from the reactionary classes." For more on the variations in Mao's usage of the term "the people," see S. K. Chin (1972). See also J. B. Starr (1979), pp. 109–115, 202–205, which also discusses the term, although the discussion is based on a debatable reading of Mao's overall conceptualization of the term *renmin*, and of class relations.

5. The period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (*Kang Ri zhanzheng shiqi*) is also sometimes referred to as the period of the National War of Liberation Against Japan. It refers to the period beginning with the Lugouqiao Incident on July 7, 1937 (see text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 7), and ending with the surrender of Japan on September 3, 1945.

6. The term here, *Han jian*, has the double meaning of those who were traitors to Han,

or China, and those among the Han, or Chinese, people who were traitors. In this context it specifically refers to the Chinese collaborators with the Japanese during the War of Resistance period, including the people who helped the Japanese run the government in the Japanese-occupied territories, known as *lun xian qu*. Also included in this category are people who opposed the war against Japan in any number of ways. The most notorious was Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), who in 1938 began to promote a collaborationist “peace movement” and in the following year set up a rival government in Nanjing to the Nationalist government in Chongqing. People such as Zhou Fohai, who served in Wang’s government, were also known as *Han jian*. Wang died in Nagoya, Japan, in March 1944. See also text July 8, 1957, note 21.

7. The period of the War of Liberation, also known as the Third Revolutionary Civil War period, began in August 1945 and ended on October 1, 1949, with the founding of the PRC.

8. See text Oct. 24, 1949(2), vol. I, note 1.

9. In CPC usage, and in Mao’s usage, the defining characteristics of antagonistic (*duikang xing*) contradictions and nonantagonistic (*fei duikang xing*) contradictions are as follows: “In a class society, antagonistic contradictions refer to contradictions established on the basis of the fundamental opposition of class interests, whereas nonantagonistic contradictions are contradictions that emerge on the basis of a fundamental unanimity of interests. Antagonistic contradictions are produced on the foundation of a fundamental clash of interests between mutually antagonistic classes or cliques. When it has developed to a certain stage, a contradiction of this type is bound to manifest itself in terms of external conflict and antagonism, and can be resolved only through the form of antagonistic struggle. . . . Generally speaking, non-antagonistic contradictions are contradictions produced on the foundation of the basic unanimity of interests of the people. They do not need to be resolved through the form of external conflict. Therefore, antagonism is only one form, but not the entirety, of the struggle of contradictions.” (See *Zhexue mingci jieshi*, I, p. 141.) See also text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 18.

10. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.

11. The reference here is clearly to the PRC Constitution promulgated in 1954; see text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1.

12. Mao appears to be alluding to what is known as the “Three Big Mountains that lie on the back of the Chinese people.” (See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 5.) Here, however, he substitutes “the landlords” for the term “feudalism” in the conventional formulation. (See penultimate sentence in the following paragraph.)

13. On the subject of the “people’s democratic dictatorship,” see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, paragraph 9, and text June 14, 1954, vol. I, paragraph 6.

14. On the subject of the worker-peasant alliance, see texts Oct. 11, 1955(1) and (2) in volume I. The statement and substance of this part of this 1957 speech are clearly evocative of the fundamental statement that Mao made in June 1949 about the basic form of government and society in China in the socialist period. In his essay in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the CPC, entitled “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Mao spelled out the classic formulation that he repeats here, saying: “The people’s democratic dictatorship is based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of the workers and the peasants because these two classes comprise 80 to 90 per cent of China’s population. (See *SW*, IV, p. 421.)

15. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 9.

16. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80.

17. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 66.

18. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 13.

19. In the context of the next sentences, Mao was thinking primarily about the problem of people vacillating over the question of the validity of the socialist state system in China in response to the incidents at Poznan, Poland, and in Hungary in 1956. The problem

emerged largely as the so-called claim for a big democracy (*da minzhu*), or a more broad-based democratic political system, on the part of people in the democratic parties. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, text surrounding notes 18 and 26.

20. The terms *tai shang* and *tai xia*, translated here literally as “on stage” and “off stage,” are common ones denoting “in power” and “out of power.” The metaphor of a stage as the arena of political competition, however, is especially pronounced in Mao’s speeches and writings at this time.

21. The text here reads *xiang fu xiang cheng*, meaning “assisting each other and complementing each other.” In the essay “On Contradiction,” Mao speaks of aspects of a contradiction that are mutually opposed and also mutually complementary, or, in Chinese, *xiang fan xiang cheng*.

22. The formula of “unity-criticism-unity” evolved over the years in such a way that it would be impossible to trace the very beginning of the idea. However, this is not the only time that Mao alluded to the notion that, if the idea had already germinated long ago, it was during the Party rectification campaign of 1942 at Yanan (the *zhengfeng* campaign; see text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24, and text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9) that the formula came to be fully and successfully tested in practice and was established as a basic guideline in the Party’s work style and methods. In fact, in his speech to the Enlarged Work Conference of the Central Committee of the CPC in January 1962 (see text Jan. 30, 1962), Mao would be even more elaborate: “From the founding of the Party in 1921 to the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, it took altogether these twenty-four years for the understanding throughout the Party to be fully and completely unified. In the interim, we went through an all-Party rectification campaign that took three and a half years, from the spring of 1942 to the summer of 1945. That was a careful and meticulous rectification. The method adopted was a democratic method; that is, no matter who committed a mistake, as long as he acknowledged it, corrected it, things were all right. Moreover, everyone pitched in to help him acknowledge [the mistake] and correct it. This is called ‘learning from past mistakes to prevent future ones; curing the illness to save the patient,’ and ‘proceeding from the hope of unity, [we will] go through criticism or struggle [in order to] distinguish clearly between right and wrong, and thus arrive at a new unity on a new basis.’ The formula unity-criticism-unity was produced precisely during that time.” The major thrust of the formula, therefore, is that there must be a premise of unity (or seeking unity) that provides the basis on which criticism can be developed if the purpose of that criticism is to resolve contradictions effectively and to correct errors. The formula also emphasizes the point that the intention of criticism is to increase unity rather than to destroy the opposition, or the object of the criticism.

23. This refers particularly to the “Left” deviationist line of Wang Ming (see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 76, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23) in the CPC leadership in 1931–1934. In January 1931, with the support of the Comintern and its representative in China, Pavel Mif, Wang Ming (whose real name was Chen Shaoyu) and other Chinese Communists who had returned from the Soviet Union and who supported the Comintern policy in China, and were known as the “Twenty-eight Bolsheviks,” gained leadership in the CPC Central Committee. Besides pushing through an opportunistic policy of having the Red Army concentrate its efforts on warfare to take cities and provinces rather than on guerrilla fighting, this leadership was known for its sectarianism. Wang Ming allegedly submitted that the proper way to conduct intra-Party struggle in China was to follow the method with which Stalin had struggled against Trotsky in the Comintern and the Soviet Union, a method characterized by “ruthless struggle and merciless blows.”

24. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24.

25. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 63, cross reference to text Aug. 30, 1956, note 2, and text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 3.

26. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.

27. This refers to the dozen or so revolutionary military base areas (*genjudi*) in which Communist Party regular and partisan guerrilla units fought the Japanese from 1937 to 1944. The size and number of these base areas fluctuated, but on the whole they were

constantly in expansion with the enlargement of the Red Army (the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army later). By 1944, there were said to be more than sixteen such base areas, but at least sixteen can be identified and named. The largest and most significant of these—for the subsequent development of the CPC—was the base area known as the Shaan-Gan-Ning (Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia) border region, in which Mao's wartime headquarters, Yanan, was located. For a fuller discussion of this period and the base areas, see J. Harrison (1972), ch. 14.

28. This refers primarily to Mao's revolutionary base area in the Jinggangshan area of western Jiangxi, to which he withdrew after the failure of the "Autumn Harvest Uprising" in October 1927. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 1.

29. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 11, cross reference to text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

30. See text June 6, 1950(1), vol. I, note 11.

31. The essay Mao refers to here was written on June 30, 1949. See *SW*, IV, pp. 418, 419.

32. See text June 23, 1950, vol. I, last paragraph.

33. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, last paragraph of section I, and text Oct. 11, 1955(2), vol. I, last paragraph of section I. See also texts Jan. 17, Jan. 24, Mar. 9, Mar. 30, April 2, May 15, and June 15, 1951, in volume I.

34. This is the basic postulation underlying Mao's entire concept of contradiction and was clearly discussed in his "On Contradiction" of August 1937 (in *SW*, II). It echoes the dicta of Lenin in "Let Us Talk a Bit About the Question of Dialectics," where he says: "The essence of dialectics is the understanding of the fact that any unity is divided into two parts, and of the contradicting parts of the unity," and in "An Outline of the Book 'Logic' By Hegel" in which he says: "We can summarily and briefly affirm that dialectics is the doctrine of the unity of opposites. If we do so we can grasp the core of the dialectical method." (See respective essays in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, and V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 38.)

35. Here Mao seems to be casting an oblique barb of criticism against the Khrushchev-dominated leadership of the CPSU at the time.

36. See note 12.

37. Apparently, Mao's figures here conform to the officially published statistics of the PRC in *RMSC* (1957). On p. 426 (table 3), the "planned" output of steel for 1956 was given as 4.516 million tons. (On p. 434, an article from Xinhua News Agency, December 13, 1956, puts the actual 1956 steel output up to the end of November 1956 as 4.15 million tons.) On p. 429, it is indicated that the highest annual output of steel before Liberation came in 1943, when the output was 923,000 tons, and steel output in 1949 was placed at 158,000 tons. On p. 424, it is displayed that China's steel output in 1936 was 414,300 tons.

38. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 6.

39. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 35, cross reference to text July 9, 1953, source note; text Nov. 17, 1955, note 4 (both in vol. I); text Jan. 20, 1956, note 13; text Dec. 8, 1956, source note, note 6, and note 46.

In addition, it should be noted that the *SW*, V note for the subject in the document for the Jan. 18, 1957, speech (p. 383) explains: "The payment of a fixed rate of interest [*dingxi*] was a means employed by the state in the course of socialist transformation to implement its policy of redemption with regard to the national bourgeoisie's means of production. After the conversion of capitalist industry and commerce into joint state-private enterprises by whole trades in 1956, the state paid the national bourgeoisie a fixed annual rate of interest on the money value of their assets for a given period of time. In its nature this interest was still a form of exploitation." An annotation of similar import, but different wording, appears in *Xuandu A*, p. 364.

Originally the rate of fixed interest was to be set between 1 per cent and 6 per cent. However, for the purpose of simplification and standardization, the rate was eventually established at 5 per cent. (See "The Resolution of the State Council on Methods of Carrying Out Fixed Interest in the Joint State-Private Management of Enterprises," *Dagong bao* [Feb.

11, 1956], 2.) Beginning in December 1956, the discussion turned to the *duration* of the fixed-interest payments. Mao argued that the capitalists could be fully compensated for their assets by the combination of high profits they had received in the seven years since Liberation plus an additional seven years of fixed interest; others argued that a full twenty years of fixed interest at 5 per cent per year would be necessary to achieve a "true buying out." After some struggle, the issue was resolved in favor of a seven-year duration. Also, from June 1956 through June 1957, there was a struggle in the pages of *Dagong bao* and *Jingji yanjiu* (*JYJ*) over whether or not the payment of fixed interest was by nature a transformed manifestation of surplus value. After Mao had taken the position that fixed interest was exploitative, *JYJ* closed its books on the issue by stating, in contrast to Mao's position, that surplus value was not a form of exploitation, even though the realization of surplus labor was unique to capitalism. It also argued at the same time that the payment of fixed interest represented a special, not normal, form of surplus value and was not exploitative. (*JYJ* [June 1957], 127–128.) But some two months later, Lu Dingyi, head of the Propaganda Department and an alternate member of the Political Bureau, stated that fixed-interest payments were exploitative, and not a form of surplus value. (See *RMRB* [Sept. 27, 1957], 2.) In any case, in 1962, when the payments were to be stopped, they were continued for another five years, allegedly under the influence of Liu Shaoqi. (See "Liu Shaoqi's Crimes in Carrying Out the Capitulationist Line for Transforming the Capitalists at the Center of the People's Commerce," June 1967, trans. in *SCMP*, 619 [June 10, 1968], 1–79.) With the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, these fixed-interest payments were stopped.

40. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 11, and text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

41. See text Mar. 5, 1956, note 12, on the two ownership systems. On the question of the distribution between accumulation and consumption, *Xuandu A* (p. 183), provides this annotation: "At the stage of use, the net output value created by all the departments of production of a country over a given period . . . is divided into the two major parts of accumulation and consumption. Accumulation refers to that part that is used on expanded reproduction, nonproductive basic construction, and for the purpose of establishing a material reserve. Consumption refers to that [other] part that is used on individual consumption and social nonproductive consumption. This includes the wages and labor remuneration to the workers and staff and cooperatives' members, management expenses, and expenses [to develop] science, education, public health and health insurance, culture, and art."

42. It is important to note that here Mao makes it clear that he believes that the relations of production are part of the economic base and not in the category of the superstructure. In fact, a note in *Xuandu A*, p. 182 specifically states that "The economic base is the relations of production." This note goes on to delineate that the superstructure "consists of such systems as the political and the legal [systems] and viewpoints in politics, law, morality, philosophy, art, and religion." A major theoretical debate over this subject would be waged by Mao against the Soviet Union's leadership in its interpretation of Stalin's political-economic views in 1959 and 1960, epitomized in Mao's "Reading Notes on the Soviet Textbook on Political Economy." See also text Jan. 20, 1956, note 5.

43. The term Mao uses here is *ji feng bao yu*, which stands in contrast to *he feng xi yu* (gentle winds and fine rain, or drizzle). See text Aug. 24, 1956, note 29. Mao would be using these metaphors repeatedly in the months ahead.

44. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), text surrounding note 10, and point 6 (i.e., paragraphs 58–63).

45. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 5.

46. See text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 8.

47. See text Jan. 17, 1951, vol. I, note 1.

48. The term that Mao uses here, *fan an*, is a common one referring to "overturning verdicts." See also text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 65.

49. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80. See also note 33 in this document.

50. The *Xuandu A* (p. 364) annotation on this subject reads: "In 1957, in accordance with this proposal made by Comrade Mao Zedong, the Central Government and local

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72. The problem suggested by Mao here forecasts the question of having cadres who are “red” but also “expert” so that they can adequately and knowledgeably supervise the work of specialists in areas of science and politics. Although Mao does make the suggestion here of noninterference, by and large in the history of the CPC, the policy has been to have people of political qualifications—the *hong* or “red”—lead the people of technical expertise—the “specialist” or *zhuan*, or, as the case may be, the “amateur” (*waihang*) lead the “expert” (*neihang*). See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 34.

73. Mao’s criticism here is reminiscent of his remarks in the 1937 essay “On Contradiction” (see Section 3, *Xuanji*, I, p. 287) where Mao warns of the necessity to study Marxism in order to acquire a proper perspective and methodology for handling contradictions. There Mao, partially quoting Lenin, says that “the most essential thing about Marxism—the living soul of Marxism—is to have a correct viewpoint that analyzes concrete circumstances concretely.” Mao was in fact repeating a quotation he had made in the 1936 essay “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (see *Xuanji*, I, p. 107). Interesting for our context here (in that in early 1957 Mao was clearly concerned about the Hungarian Incident of the year before), the original Lenin statement was from a passage of the essay “Communism” in which Lenin criticized the Hungarian Communist Bela Kun. (See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (1950), vol. 31, p. 143.)

74. The term “Youth League” was in transition at the time of this speech. Technically, it still referred to the New Democratic Youth League (NDYL) (see text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 8, and text June 30, 1953, vol. I, source note). As we are informed by text Sept. 7, 1955, vol. I, source note, however, the proposal was made at the Third Plenary Session of the Second Central Committee of the NDYL on September 18, 1955 to have the organization’s name changed to “Communist Youth League.” (This information is confirmed in Hu Yaobang’s report of the Second Central Committee of the NDYL to the organization’s Third National Congress on May 15, 1957 (see *RMSC* [1958], pp. 267–275). The official change of name was adopted at this congress, so from May 1957 on, but not before, the organization would officially be known as the Communist Youth League. However, Hu’s report also contains the remark that the CPC had, at the time of its Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, written the name “Communist Youth League” into the new CPC Party Constitution ratified at that time. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 56.

75. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 21; see also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 87.

76. See text Mar. 16, 1953, vol. I, source note.

77. The term “regional nationalism” (*difang minzu zhuyi*) refers to an extreme kind of ethnic-cultural parochialism in which people of an ethnic group making up the majority of the population in a given area attempt to exclude the influence of other ethnic groups in the area and to thwart the assimilation and integration of nationality groups into the broader family of the nation as a whole. In 1957 it was described as “a kind of narrow national prejudice spread by . . . ruling personnel within a nationality . . . that emphasizes its own characteristics and adopts a hostile attitude toward other nationalities.” It is manifested in the lack of welcome that Han cadres posted to a minority nationality receive and in the obstruction to “democratic and socialist reform.” (See Jiang Bikun [1957], p. 18.)

78. For the Third Five-Year Plan, see text Nov. 11, 1956, note 4; the “Seventeen-Article Agreement” of this paragraph refers to the Agreement on the Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet signed after negotiations were concluded between the PRC government and the local leadership of Tibet on May 23, 1951. See text May 24, 1951, vol. I, source note.

79. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 6.

80. The term that Mao uses here is *benqian*, which has the additional meaning of “the principal” with which one starts a business.

81. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

82. The slogan “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” (*changqi gongcun, huxiang jiandu*) represents a concession of sorts made by the CPC and a United Front policy that was promoted sometime around the middle of 1956. Although we have not been able to ascertain if this is the first time the phrase has been used, the policy could have been set in motion by Mao’s comment in his famous “Ten Major Relationships” speech on April 25, 1956, where he said: “It would be advantageous if the Communist Party and the various democratic parties [practiced] long-term coexistence and mutual supervision.” (See text April 25, 1956, second paragraph under section 6: “The Relationship Between Party and Non-Party.”) From July 2 to July 4, 1956, the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the CPC held forums with leaders of the democratic parties at which opinions regarding this issue were exchanged. Thus by July 1956 the policy was already in place and was implemented through the United Front Work Department. (See *RMSC* [1957], pp. 242–243; also see the essay by Shen Zhiyuan, member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League, in *RMSC* [1957], pp. 243–246.) Furthermore, this is mentioned as a *fangzhen* (guideline) for the Party in Liu Shaoqi’s “Political Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China” delivered on September 15, 1956 (see [1957], p. 19), although Mao himself did not mention the policy in his own opening speech to the same congress (see text Sept. 15, 1956). (Mao did say in that speech that the Communist Party “must continue to strengthen its unity with all minority nationalities, all democratic classes, all democratic parties, and all people’s organizations,” but he did not mention the “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” formula explicitly.) It ought to be noted here, however, that given the fact that the policy had been in place for several months by the time of the current speech (i.e., February 27, 1957), here we see Mao not only summing up the experience of those months on the subject and reifying the policy, but also explaining it within the context of the turmoil of January 1957 and projecting its role in the Party rectification that was to be launched imminently.

83. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

84. The reference here is specifically to the theory of the heliocentric revolution of the planets in the solar system. This theory was first advanced formally by Niklas Kopperrigk (whose name is Latinized to Nicolaus Copernicus, 1473–1543), a Polish astronomer. Copernicus studied astronomy with the Italian scholar Regiomontanus, and in 1507 he published the thesis *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium* (On the Revolution of the Heavenly Spheres) in which he announced the theory that the sun remained constant in its position and it was the Earth and other planets that revolved around it in orbits. The heliocentric theory became the foundation for modern astronomy in the West. The other reference is to the theory contained in Charles Darwin’s (1809–1882) *The Origin of Species*, published in 1859, now commonly known as the theory of evolution, or the theory of natural selection. Annotations on these subjects are found in *Xuandu A*, (p. 364), but not in *Xuanji*, V, or in the translated versions of this document.

85. The term here is *maiban jieji*; sometimes it is rendered as *maiban zichan jieji* (the comprador-bourgeois class, or comprador bourgeoisie). A note in *Xuandu B*, p. 7 for Mao’s 1926 essay “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” explains: “After the imperialists invaded China, foreign capitalists employed a number of Chinese people to serve as their agents in carrying out their activities of economic aggression. These agents are known as *maiban* (buying agents, or compradors). The comprador class directly serves the interests of the capitalists of the imperialist countries and is a bourgeois class reared and kept by them. The comprador class [also] has many intimate and intricate connections with the feudal authorities at home.” A briefer annotation of similar import appears in *SW*, I, p. 19.

86. Mao’s statement here reflects his growing concern over the issue of revisionism and the possibility of a restoration of capitalism in China that would undo and turn back the socialist revolution. See Mao’s discussion in the next three paragraphs, and also text Mar. 12, 1957, penultimate paragraph.

87. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 29.

88. Mao's statement here foreshadows his critical comments about the need for intellectuals to realize the necessity to reform themselves in his speech in March at the National Conference on Propaganda Work (see text Mar. 12, 1957, sections 3 and 4), and especially his later usage of the metaphor of the "five layers of skin" (*wu zhang pi*) (see text April 1957[2], note 14). Also see text Oct. 13, 1957, paragraph 8.

89. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 28.

90. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

91. See text June 23, 1950, vol. I, end of paragraph 4.

92. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraphs 40–46.

93. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Versions I and II, and texts Jan. 27, 1957(1) and (2). No specific date has been given for the disturbances and protests among students and workers that Mao refers to in these speeches. It is highly possible, however, that they occurred in late 1956. There were certainly problems and petitions outside of Beijing in late 1956; see text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II, note 42 and surrounding text.

94. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 64.

95. We are not certain as to the specifics of the problems in the agricultural producers' cooperatives, but they are clearly the incidences that gave rise to Mao's comments in texts Jan. 18, 1957, Versions I and II, and Jan. 27, 1957(1) and (2) and Jan. 1957, where he says people are questioning the validity of cooperativization, and certain cadres are "voicing grievances on behalf of the peasants."

96. The *SW*, V (p. 421) note for this reads simply: "*Lao Tzu [Lao zi]*, chapter LVIII."

97. The term that Mao uses here is *di pan*, which is a somewhat slangish term whose meaning is fully rendered by the slangish usage of our translation here, "turf." This usage also reflects Mao's Leninist concept of imperialism not as a group of isolated, separate "imperialists," but as an integrated system of intense capital competition.

98. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note and text.

99. The Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC was held November 10–15, 1956. The subject of practicing economy and eliminating waste that Mao mentions here was dealt with in Zhou Enlai's report to the plenum and in the plenum's resolution. See *RMSC* (1957), p. 147.

100. Mao's remark here invokes a Chinese aphorism, *xi xin ge mian* (literally, "wash one's mind and reform one's face"), thus suggesting that there is something more serious than casual behind the act of washing one's face, even though it may be a daily exercise. The aphorism is from the "Xi ci" section of the *Yi jing* (Classic of Change).

101. Since 1951, when a campaign to increase production and practice strict economy was launched in conjunction with the Campaign to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (see text Oct. 23, 1951, vol. I, note 6), there have been many similar movements, or campaigns, under the label of *zengchan jieyue yundong* in the PRC. One such movement was launched in 1957 in conjunction with the rectification campaign, as suggested (or forecast) by Mao here. The major documents on this particular campaign to increase production and economize are in *RMSC* (1958), including an *RMRB* editorial of November 29, 1957 (pp. 481–483), a directive issued by the State Council on June 3, 1957 (pp. 483–484), and Vice-Premier Chen Yun's report to the Third Session of the Second National Committee of the CPPCC on March 3, 1957 (pp. 484–487). According to this last document, the rationale for launching an economization campaign in 1957 was based on the understanding that the budget and investment in a number of sectors of the national economy in 1956 had been particularly great, and while the intended economic effects of expansion had already been achieved, at the same time some extravagance and waste had resulted from the expansion, hence economization in 1957 was necessary so that the goals of the First Five-Year Plan might be achieved.

102. The term Mao uses here is *xiafang*, which refers to the transfer of personnel to lower levels. This was especially a policy adopted on a broad scale after the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC in September–October 1957, as part of the "cadres policy" proposed and resolved by that plenum. The purpose of the policy was to assist in

the critical agricultural reform, deepen the rectification of the Party, and further the reforming of the intellectuals. It is estimated that as many as three million cadres at all levels were transferred to lower levels. The idea of downward transfer connoted two types of transfer, the permanent type and the temporary kind, the latter of which was solely an educational policy.

103. See text April 25, 1956, section 1.

104. The term Mao uses here is *fan gendou*, which literally means turning somersaults, but here connotes "tripping up."

105. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 34.

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## Concluding Remarks at the Supreme State Conference (March 1, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 90–100. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 132–136; URI (1976), pp. 59–67. Available English Translations: URI (1976), pp. 69–79; *Issues and Studies*, X:12 (Sept. 1974), 110–115.

*Our sources (i.e., Wansui [1969]) and Wansui [n.d. 3]) in fact give the date of this document as March 2, 1957. However, according to both RMSC (1958), p. 326, and K. Lieberthal (1976), p. 92, the Eleventh (Enlarged) Supreme State Conference was held February 27 to March 1, 1957; thus the correct date of this "concluding speech" was more likely to be March 1 rather than March 2. In many ways, however, Mao was repetitive here of points that he had made in the more well-known and widely distributed speech made on February 27 at the beginning of this same Supreme State Conference. (See preceding document.) It should be noted that this speech—especially in the original Chinese—is representative of how casual and earthy Mao might be in his choice of expressions and his manner of speech. This is often observable in the "unofficial"—and therefore less likely to have been subsequently edited—versions of his speech.*

Comrades, I don't have much more to say; there are just a few points I want to speak on briefly.

There is the question of criticism. With regard to this issue, someone has just raised the question of the criticism of old cadres. Others have asked (at the small group discussions) whether Marxism-Leninism can be criticized. [They also asked with reference to] Marxism-Leninism whether it was all right not to designate Marxism as the leading ideology or, in other words, the guiding ideology, because designating it as the leading ideology will cause some people to be a bit fearful.<sup>1</sup> Well, concerning this question, our nation is now undergoing a tremendous change. I'm talking about the change from the kind of leadership we had in the past, the leadership of the Kuomintang and of Chiang Kai-shek in the old society, to its being replaced by a people's democratic dictatorship, under the leadership of the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants, which is our [present] state



system.<sup>2</sup> Well, this leadership by the working class is [exercised through] a Party. The present is still the age of parties. This class and this Party have a particular ideology, namely, Marxism—[or,] the ideology of Communism. The question, then, is how does the Party exercise leadership? How does it exercise guidance? That is not to say that everybody must join the Communist Party or that everybody must believe in the principles of the Communist Party and espouse a dialectical materialist world view. These things, such as this question of a [particular] world view, can [be done] only by making people understand gradually. In the beginning, very few people [will understand], then a few more, and still more later. You can't just demand that a great number of people believe [in these things]. You can't force people to believe in anything; I spoke about this day before yesterday.<sup>3</sup> In matters of the mind, you can't force a person to believe; nor can you force a person not to believe. For instance, it won't work to force people not to believe in religion, or to force people to believe in one religion but not in another. Would it work to force people to believe in the Marxist world view? That wouldn't work either. However, the Marxist world view is spreading daily. Every day some more people come to believe in it. Yet no matter what, I believe that several decades from now there will still be people who do not believe in it, who will not believe in that world view. Marxism is atheistic; those who believe in a God don't believe in it. What shall we do if, even after several decades or however many years, there are still some of these people who do not believe in it? From the very beginning, the Marxist-Leninist leadership should have made provisions for this; that is, they should have recognized that there would be some people who would not believe in it and in reality perhaps that's just the way it is, and just the way it has to be.

Can there be criticism or not? Marxists are not afraid of criticism. If Marxism can be repudiated through criticism, then it's of no use; if it can be proven that Marxism is not the truth, well, then it just won't work. If even Marxism were to fear criticism, then it would be no good. Therefore the question of whether or not Marxism can be criticized doesn't arise. As a matter of fact, the idealists criticize Marxism, and [people in] the religious circle also criticize Marxism; it's just that some of them don't say so, that's all. Some people integrate Marxism with religion, asserting that [Marxism] is compatible with their religion. If old cadres can be toppled by criticism, they deserved to be criticized. If you topple as soon as you are criticized, you are just made of paper and cotton, and paper and cotton are toppled by a puff of wind. You ought to be unafraid of criticism. So, at this time, to bring up [the problem of] being afraid of criticism is simply [an indication that you] have weaknesses. Do these weaknesses exist? I think both old cadres and new cadres have weaknesses. [Their] weak aspects should all be criticized; regardless of what kind of cadre or government [is involved], shortcomings and errors should be criticized. Moreover, this should become a habit; the people's government should make this a habit. Criticism [should be] nothing to worry about. If the criticism is correct, of course it's good. If the criticism is incorrect, then of course it doesn't matter. This is [what we mean by] "Those who speak out shall not be held guilty."<sup>4</sup> In matters [that fall] within the purview of the people, the people

should have the right to criticize. We deny this right only to counterrevolutionaries. [The provisions in] the Constitution should be enforced; [this includes] the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, and publication.<sup>5</sup>

Some people say that I didn't address myself adequately to the long-term coexistence and mutual supervision [between the Communist Party and other democratic parties].<sup>6</sup> Strictly speaking, this is also a kind of criticism. The day before yesterday I didn't talk much about this question, and some friends mentioned it today.<sup>7</sup> What is meant by long-term? As I thought about it, this question is rather easy to answer. Long-term? It means that as long as your Communist Party lasts, they [the other parties] will last, and [we must simply] act according to this assumption. However long the life span of the Communist Party may be, the life span of the democratic parties will be just as long. Today, old venerable Mr. Guo<sup>8</sup> said that we all should keep up with him; [this illustrates that] those without Party affiliations last longest. The Communist Party will be eliminated one day. We hope that day will not be too long, nor too soon, in coming. It's probably impossible for it to be too soon, but there is no need for it to be too distant either. All things that occur [have their definite life span], and because all things in this world are occurrences, [all things] have their definite life spans. The Communist Party, for one, is a thing. What are the ways of supervising [each other]? These simply fall within the scope of criticism and suggestion. We supervise [each other] by using these methods, right? We have all kinds of opportunities, don't we? For instance, today is an opportunity. There are all kinds of other opportunities to carry out criticism. The main method is criticism. In criticizing shortcomings, [one must] proceed from the desire for unity, and, through criticism, achieve unity and improve [our] work.<sup>9</sup>

Some people say, "You said on the one hand that big democracy<sup>10</sup> is not appropriate for dealing with the class enemy, but you also said on the other hand that it is permissible to have strikes and student boycotts. Aren't you self-contradictory?" The question is this: by "big democracy" we are referring to mass movements. It is something we have done in the past, and includes certain measures used in the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries. At present there are people who suggest that we don't need big democracy, that now [our] methods have already changed, and that the problems that remain are old ones. [They say that] the transformation of industry and commerce is not through democracy, and the ideological transformation of the intellectuals is not [through] big democracy either, but small democracy. For some even the word "small" is not adequate, and they add another "small" to it, making it "small, small democracy." [All this is to say that] gentle breezes and fine rain are better.<sup>11</sup> [But] what we are talking about now is [the kind of place where] not [even] small democracy is practiced, where there is no democracy whatsoever. What shall we do about places, factories, cooperatives, schools, stores, government organs, and units that are like that? They have no democracy of any kind, no big democracy, no small democracy, not even small, small democracy; they are riddled with outright bureaucratism.<sup>12</sup> There will be problems that cannot be solved even in a hundred years; problems just can't be [completely] solved. This has forced [a situation of] big democracy to appear, and

there are strikes in factories and schools. I don't think it's good to prohibit this kind of antibureaucratism [activity]. We should permit it, although the Constitution does not have an article on strikes.<sup>13</sup> This is not to say that we are advocating strikes in factories and schools on a national scale. We are not advocating this; we advocate opposition to bureaucratism and we advocate the practice of using criticism to solve problems that fall within the purview of the people. Do strikes count as a form of struggle? Yes, they do count as a form of struggle. When [the method of] using criticism for struggle fails, the use of this method [of struggle] against severe [cases of bureaucratism] and stubborn bureaucratists should be permitted. What, then, if the teachers are unable to control the students? There should be discipline. No matter whether it's a factory, school, cooperative, or store, every place should have [discipline]. This nation of ours, the Chinese people, have discipline and are very well-disciplined. The problem is that we haven't done work among them; political and ideological education is very deficient, and there is deficiency in many respects. Bureaucratism is very severe, and in some places and in quite a number of schools problems cannot be solved, and no education [has been given]. Education about discipline should be given to young people, especially the young people in schools. When disturbances occur in factories, and in technical workers' schools, they are all [caused by] the young workers. They only understand a few things and should be educated. But our education has not reached them. To strengthen discipline, we should carry out [the work of] education; teachers should unite as one with students, factory managers should unite as one with workers, and [teachers and managers] should show a concern for [students and workers]. When this is done, will there still be strikes? Wherever we have accomplished this, there will be no strikes. Therefore, the first point is to oppose bureaucratism. As for the second point, that is what we will now discuss. If bureaucratism is extremely serious in a particular place or in a localized area, in a particular factory, a particular cooperative, or a particular school, then, at such a time, whether or not there are actually strikes or student boycotts, strikes should be permitted within these limitations for the simple reason that there isn't even small democracy in these places. We permit [strikes] within these conditions. [However, when some of [you] comrades from the localities return to your respective areas, don't say that [according to] the meeting held in Beijing from now on we can have nationwide strikes (laughter), or nationwide boycotts of classes, and say that I said so. That's not so. Let's take the military as an example. In the military we once conducted sharp criticism: the soldiers criticized the officers and made the officers very uncomfortable; the soldiers criticized their company leaders; and cadre meetings criticized the army and division commanders. After extensive criticism, the division commanders, the army commanders, or the company commanders found their work easier to perform. The soldiers are the ones who carry the guns. They can use this method of criticism to criticize and make self-criticism. After that you [officers] should make a self-examination. Those who are company commanders should review the errors they have committed. You can't beat people; officers can't beat the soldiers. Things have been done this way in the military. We have a very great degree of democracy in our [People's] Liberation Army. Why can't our schools

do likewise? Why can't our factories do likewise? In our cooperatives, at present, commandism is very serious in many places.<sup>14</sup> Why can't our government organs practice [democracy] in this way? Is it that if we do, there will be rebellion all over the country, there will be chaos everywhere? Nothing of that sort, because the army is not in chaos. Then, how did we win wars? And what did we rely on to win wars? One, we had no atom bombs; two, we had no hydrogen bombs. We didn't have a single intercontinental missile; we didn't even have airplanes. In those days our weapons were inferior to those of our enemies; how then did we get united? We relied on exterminating bureaucratism, on curtailing bureaucratism, on forging a unity with the masses, and on following the mass line.<sup>15</sup>

About obeying leadership: Factories must follow the leadership and direction of the factory managers. Students must follow the direction of their teachers. They should have discipline in studying. But teachers must forge a unity with the students, be concerned about the students, and solve the students' problems. At present there are still many unsolved problems in the schools. For instance, there are too many classes, and the work load of the students is too heavy. As I see it, we Chinese are like this: Either you don't understand a single character, in which case you are called an illiterate, or, if you want to become literate, you are given a huge pile [of characters to read] every day. Therefore, when we talk about things like strikes and class boycotts, parades and demonstrations, and petitions, we regard them as one of the ways of regulating the social order, a kind of supplementary method. The usual method should be the overcoming of bureaucratism, and making criticism. But if this method can't be applied, it is possible, and should be permitted, to use the method [of strikes and boycotts] as a supplementary method to regulate our social order. It's a supplementary method to overcome contradictions among the people and to regulate social order.

We must broaden our horizons and understand the international situation and the enemy's situation. We are preparing to publish a journal, *Cankao xiaoxi* [Reference News].<sup>16</sup> Those present here have probably all seen it. What was the circulation of *Cankao xiaoxi* in the past? Two thousand copies. Now we are preparing to expand it into a major newspaper [with a circulation of] 300,000 copies. *Dagong bao*, for example, has a circulation of 280,000 copies;<sup>17</sup> this newspaper's circulation will be larger; it will be 300,000 copies. We are preparing to expand its circulation from 2,000 to 300,000. It will circulate down to the *xian* level. You just have to pay to get [a copy], that's all. Anyone who wants to buy this publication, either inside or outside the Party, may read it. Now some people will say that we are putting up money to run a newspaper for the imperialists, or that the Communist Party and the People's Government are unconditionally running a newspaper for the imperialists. And I'd say you just might put it that way; it's exactly that kind of a thing. Namely, we want to take what [the imperialists] say in berating us, the way in which they berate us, and [news of] disruptions occurring among them, and publish them in this newspaper, making it into an internal publication that 300,000 people can read. [And, since] each copy will not be

restricted to one reader, there will not only be [300,000 readers, but more]. What do you mean it mustn't be lost? What should be done if some people should lose this thing? Well, what does it really matter? (Laughter.) (Premier Zhou: Nobody does that now.) Nobody does that any more? Don't be so commandist! We just want our people to face the world and understand things in the outside world. As to whether they will be affected by [the imperialists'] propaganda or influenced by imperialism and become their people, I think it's possible that one or two will change. One or two might change, but we Chinese are so numerous. Just a while ago the venerable Mr. Ma Yinchu<sup>18</sup> said [we have] a population of 600 million. So, what does it matter if a few people change? Regarding the issue of Generalissimo Chiang:<sup>19</sup> Chiang Kai-shek has said a lot of things; he has many publications and speeches, of considerable length, I hear. I approve of publishing his complete collected works; some people oppose that, so we'll [just] publish his selected works.<sup>20</sup> This, of course, will not be made available publicly. Is it all right to make it available publicly? Perhaps it is not feasible to do so at present, [but] libraries are willing to buy it and take a look at it. If you want to study history, he is a historical personage and a reflection of social existence. Chiang Kai-shek's ideology and his collected works are reflections of social existence. We should criticize those things. How can we criticize him if we have not read his writings? Is it that all those who have read his writings will want to go to Taiwan and join that party of his? Is there any danger of that? I don't think there's any danger of that. If there are a few people who want to go join his party, that's all right! The point here is that we must broaden our horizons and brave the storm, and we must not hide in a greenhouse. Things that have grown up in greenhouses are not sturdy.<sup>21</sup> So now we should even better understand [the principle of] letting a hundred schools of thought contend, and letting a hundred flowers bloom.<sup>22</sup> Why should we let a hundred schools of thought contend and a hundred flowers bloom? [It's true that] some trouble will always come out of it, and some bad things will emerge in the process of contending. The day before yesterday I spoke about how one should look at bad things. Bad things have another function. On the one hand they are bad; on the other hand, they are good. Poisonous weeds have their good points.<sup>23</sup> They are not merely poison. I have given the example of the smallpox vaccination.<sup>24</sup> Bacteria, viruses are bad things, but they sometimes perform a useful function. They can cause people to develop immunities.

What other things are there [to talk about]?

Take [the situation in] Hungary.<sup>25</sup> Some people have criticized me for not having spoken enough [about it], for not having clearly explained its causes. What, in the final analysis, were the errors committed in Hungary? I talked a little about the errors the other day; but I didn't have time to talk about them very much. [Frankly,] we weren't very clear [about the situation]. We were not very clear about that Rakosi in the past, about what that comrade was doing.<sup>26</sup> There were also a good many things in the Soviet Union about which we were not very clear either. The Soviet Union was better, but Rakosi, at the time, was doing ridiculous things! Generally there were these various things, bureaucratism, dogmatism, alienation

from the masses, and errors in industrial policy. Didn't I mention [these] the other day? In [formulating] industrial policy there was [no consideration of] raw materials or markets; they ran large factories, workers' wages were lowered by 20 per cent, and the capitalists were simply overthrown. That's like overthrowing our Mr. Rong Yiren<sup>27</sup> and sending him to be a worker in Shenxin No. 9 Factory. The minute a Hungarian [type of] incident occurred, he would go out and organize a workers' committee. What kind of committee would he organize? He would organize a workers' committee. It's that simple, so obviously simple. (Laughter.) [In Hungary] the intellectuals hadn't been reformed; there wasn't even talk of reforming intellectuals. And thus the Petofi Clubs, the Correspondents' Association, and the Student Federation appeared.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the counterrevolutionary elements had not been suppressed, and there was no struggle between the masses and the counterrevolutionaries. Instead, only a small number of people were involved in the struggle, and the great bulk of the real counterrevolutionaries were not injured. And so, big democracy arrived in Hungary! This time, big democracy didn't last long, and yet how long will it take to recover? Some people say it will take three years. [The Hungarians] said that themselves. Their people told us that it would take them three years to recover from [the effects of] the big democracy in the one or two months between last October 23 and December. Big democracy is good, yes, but it will take three years before the recovery can be completed. Big democracy in Poland cut production in half. October, November—in October, production was cut in half; I don't know what the situation is like now. They may have recovered somewhat. Therefore, it is better to engage in small democracy. If we were to have big democracy, a fairly large number of those of us sitting here wouldn't be able to stand it. Isn't that true?

The population is to be limited to 600 million; and not a single person more? (Laughter.) This is a postulation. It refers to a period of time, for instance when conditions [for supporting a larger population] have still not been met, that is, food, clothing, housing, education, and so forth. At present there is an increase each year of over ten million [people]. You want to stop this increase, but it's very hard to say, because at this point we have anarchy! The realm of necessity has not been transformed into the realm of freedom.<sup>29</sup> In this area humanity is not at all conscious, and it has not found the solution. We can study this; we ought to study it, and the government should set up a department [for this purpose]. I said the other day that the government should establish a department or a commission. People's organizations should extensively study this problem [of population growth] and think up solutions. In short, humankind has to control itself and that's all there is to it. Sometimes [the population] can be increased a little; at other times the increase has to stop; Can it be made into planned production? (Laughter.) That is conjecture. The venerable Mr. Ma Yin[chu] has stated this point very well; he really stated it well today! He and I are comrades. Previously, [during the period of] "letting a hundred flowers bloom" his opinion didn't have a chance to bloom. He was prepared to state his opinion, when others opposed him. They said he should not be allowed to speak. Today one may say that he has talked to his heart's content.<sup>30</sup> But this problem still deserves further study; the government should set up

organizations [to deal with it] and provide certain measures. Are the people likely to make this demand, or is this merely our subjective [perception of a problem]? The people are demanding this. Not everybody is demanding it, but a great many people are. For instance, peasants demand this. When there are too many people in a family, they demand birth control. This demand exists in both the cities and the countryside. It isn't right to say there's no demand for it. Mr. Zou!<sup>31</sup> Hi, you two are sitting together now. (Laughter.)

Don't pour cold water on the scientists. Is this a good rule? I think it is. Don't pour cold water. How could we pour cold water on the scientists? Of course it's bad to pour cold water on the scientists. Likewise we should not pour cold water on any specialists, on such other specialists as political scientists, artists, and writers. Don't pour cold water on the scientists. We want active elements to remain active. Even when sometimes their work isn't done well, we shouldn't pour cold water, but should help them correct their mistakes. Only those individual [cases of] extremely stubborn and incurable elements should be handled differently, the incurable ones. Don't pour cold water on the scientists. For me to visit the Academy of Sciences? The venerable old Mr. Guo has put me in check<sup>32</sup> today. There is no way out of it, I'm afraid, since you put me in check. Otherwise you would already have labeled me as a bureaucratist. (Laughter.)

The problem that the purely technical viewpoint is on the upswing: Our comrades have raised this question, and have put it well. [We should] teach our cadres, scientists, technical personnel, technical cadres, and students not to have a purely technical viewpoint. A technical viewpoint is good. One should have a technical viewpoint. How can one handle technology without a technical viewpoint? Without [such a] viewpoint can there be technology? We want to develop science and technology, and we must have a scientific, technical viewpoint, we must develop it until everyone is enthusiastic about it. But to have a purely [technical viewpoint] is not good! It could lead to [the point where people would] serve either socialism or capitalism [without discrimination]. Therefore,<sup>33</sup> we now hope that our comrades will show concern for the new politics and for the new overall situation; however, we have to do the work on our part well. We can't put the blame entirely on them, because it is we who haven't done our work well. There are some things that they cannot accept, that is to say, our ideological work, political work, and educational work have made it difficult for people to accept [these things]. They don't have any interest in accepting these things from us [because] these things are simply a kind of dogmatism and lack persuasiveness, and they fail to arouse their interest. Therefore, we must improve our political work. In schools, in scientific research organizations, in factories, and in all places where there are scientific and technical personnel, and among students, we must strengthen and improve our ideological and political work.

Concerning what happens when the *dao* prevails in the state. What happens when the *dao* prevails in the state? It becomes a matter of shame for one to be poor and base. That is the problem.<sup>34</sup> This problem is indeed not a problem of the individual; this is the so-called [job] assignment problem. This problem has two

facets: one is the failure to assign [jobs] to some people; the other is the unsuitability of [some job] assignments. An unsuitable assignment means a position without authority, without anything to do, or an assignment that is incompatible with the person's learning and talent. People have acknowledged that the *dao* prevails in the state. It is good that the *dao* prevails in the state. By "state" we are referring to the People's Republic of China. What is this *dao*? It is none other than socialism, none other than dialectical materialism! (Laughter.) What is being poor and being base?<sup>35</sup> Being poor is having insufficient salary; being base is not having any work; this probably does not mean that they do not show an interest in physical labor; it means they don't have work or their work assignments aren't suitable, [and so] they use Confucius to criticize us.<sup>36</sup> (Laughter.) So, Confucius is still useful sometimes after all. (Laughter.) This is a problem related to shortcomings in the area of United Front work. Shortcomings in this area are numerous. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is preparing to convene a conference this year, a Central Committee plenum, especially to discuss the problems of the United Front.<sup>37</sup> I hope the comrades of the various parties and comrades without party affiliations will do some preparation in this respect, will give us suggestions, and will speak frankly. Gather information about the number of people who are "poor and base," their names, and their native places.

Furthermore, we have many shortcomings. We have encountered many difficulties in the course of our advance. But we must not forget that foreign countries also have their difficulties. For instance, the United States has its own difficulties. The famous character Wang Xifeng in *Honglouloumeng* [The Dream of the Red Chamber] once said, "The great have difficulties peculiar to the great."<sup>38</sup> When other people wanted to borrow money from her, she complained, saying, "The great have difficulties peculiar to the great." Old Woman Liu [came to] borrow some money, but because [Wang] spoke that way, she became greatly discouraged. It's true; the great do have their own difficulties. Things in the United States are not that easy to manage. As I see it, an economic crisis will come in the United States. An economic crisis [will come] in Britain, France, Western Europe, the free world, the Western world, and the Western nations. Their internal contradictions are very great, and economic crises will come. Such a thing is probably unavoidable. The moon in America is not necessarily that bright; that has still to be proven.<sup>39</sup> For a time, they had their atom bombs, they had a few more cattles of steel. They are strong now. Should we acknowledge this? We should. We have called them a paper tiger.<sup>40</sup> People don't understand why we say they're a paper tiger when they have so many things. What we are saying is that those things of theirs are established on an unstable foundation. Whose foundation is more stable? It is our foundation that is more stable; it is the socialist foundation. The socialist camp is not that secure [either]. We also have our defects and our shortcomings. Our people are dissatisfied with us on a good many [points]. Our economy is still backward, and our culture is still backward. Our socialist [society], taken as a whole, is still backward compared with theirs. But they are established on a foundation that embodies a greater contradiction. We mustn't forget this point.

Finally, this talk and my talk of the day before yesterday [need to be] supplemented and revised a bit in some places. Regarding what I said today, the comrades have brought up a good many opinions. We do not intend to publish all of what I said. [This is] because as soon as certain questions are made public, such as this matter of strikes in factories and boycotts in schools, then, okay, the entire nation would go on strike! (Laughter.) And our cadres are not prepared [for this]; our comrades are not prepared. [Therefore, you] comrades who have come to the meeting from the localities, when you return home, please see to it that people are prepared. Now it's easy for us to talk about these things; it's easy [for us] to sit here and talk. It is they who will bear the brunt of the events. We must make them prepared. Furthermore, [with regard to the strikes], the limitations that we are referring to are that they must be appropriate, localized, and in various individual cases [they should occur] where, because of [the existence of] that type of severe bureaucratism, problems have remained unsolvable for a long time. Finally, we intend to circulate this speech of mine to the *xian* level after it has been somewhat revised and properly edited, [so that] people inside and outside the Party will be able to read it. We are preparing to hold a conference on propaganda and education in a few days, that is, a conference on propaganda, on propaganda work, and newspapers.<sup>41</sup> [I] am preparing to talk [about this] once more with the people at that conference. That's all. (Applause.)

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29. In Marxist thought, “freedom” and “necessity” are two philosophical categories that represent the relationship between objective laws and human conscious activity. “Necessity” stands for the laws that govern the objective development of things, while “freedom” stands for the understanding of the objective laws and the resultant ability to transform the objective reality. Since human action is willful and purposeful, Marxist dialectics holds that in human action, to transform nature and in social struggle, there has to be a relationship between freedom and necessity. Before people are aware of the objective laws, their actions, however willful, are governed and dictated by these laws unconsciously, or blindly, and there is no freedom. After they become aware of the laws, their actions, though still governed and limited by the laws, are no longer unconscious. Rather, people then become capable of using the laws that they understand to serve a certain purpose. Thus they attain a certain degree of freedom. Thus freedom is linked to necessity, and under certain conditions, necessity can dialectically transform into freedom. The understanding of objective laws, or the objective necessity of things, is a prerequisite for the attainment of purposed consequences in human actions to transform the objective world. Yet until human action does in practice achieve the transformation of the objective world through conscious employment of laws that it has come to understand, necessity has remained necessity, and has not yet transformed into freedom. Freedom is therefore the product of the basic dialectical process of historical life. Through history, freedom is developed on the basis of the continuous growth and deepening of human grasp of objective laws through practice. In this way, human history is a continuous process from the realm of necessity (*biran wangguo*) to the realm of freedom (*ziyou wangguo*). This is recognized as a basic concept in the classical Marxist-Leninist idea of the process of world transformation. For classical origins of the idea in Marxism, see K. Marx, *Thesis on Feuerbach*, and F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (chapter 1, section 11, “Morality and Law; Freedom and Necessity”). See also a piece of writing by Mao in 1941, given the arbitrary title “[On] Freedom Being the Understanding of Necessity, and the Transformation of the World,” in *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, pp. 485–486.

30. One of the political-economic subjects that concerned Ma Yinchu most was the issue of population. He wrote an essay “New Theory of Population” in 1954–1955, intended for presentation to the Second Session of the First National People’s Congress in July 1955. This essay, however, was withdrawn and criticized as nothing more than an extension of the Malthusian Theory. He then revised the thesis and later, in July 1957, presented it to the Fourth Session of the First NPC. His theory mainly consisted of the idea that population control must play a most significant role in the achievement of comprehensive balance or equilibrium in China’s economy, which he explained through the paradigms of “circular progression” and “spiral upward mobility.” He argued that overpopulation will have a dire impact on capital accumulation for construction and on the productivity of labor. Having no transcript of Ma’s statement at this conference, we are unable to ascertain what he proposed, but it most likely was along the lines of the general thesis he would propose some three months later.

31. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version does not have this last portion of the paragraph. We have no documentary evidence for who it is that Mao is referring to here, but we surmise that it might be Zou Dapeng (b. 1908), an old member of the Communist Party whose pre-Liberation activities had been largely located in northeastern China. He was a delegate to the First Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and in 1949 he also was appointed to the post of director of the Information Administration of the GAC. After the Information Administration was abolished in 1952, he became director of the Liaison Department of the People’s Revolutionary Military Council. This unit was itself abolished in 1954 when the constitutional government was formed. In the summer of 1953, however, Zou had assumed the post of deputy general secretary of the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the CPC. For more information on Zou’s life, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 870–871.

32. The term here is *jiang jun*, which is a term used in Chinese chess equivalent to putting

the king in check in Western chess. While not the ultimate move in the game, it is part of the end game and connotes putting great pressure on the opponent to get out of difficulty. Mao often employs this term to refer to the pressure put on the Communist Party and the people’s government by other elements in society, not altogether maliciously, but enough to keep the CPC on its toes.

33. The text here reads *yin wei*, which translates as “because.” However, we believe that it may have been a typographical error for *yinci* (therefore), which makes better sense in this sentence.

34. This aphorism, *bang you dao* (when the *dao* prevails in the state), is derived from the sayings of Confucius. In this particular instance, it refers to section 13 of the chapter “Taibo” in *Lun Yu* (The Analects of Confucius). The term *dao* here is not the *dao*, or “nature’s way,” of Daoist philosophy; rather, it refers to the *wang dao*, or king’s way, or, in other words, an orderly state of affairs in the polity; when the *dao* prevails, i.e., when there is good government, there will be a stable society. Confucius said, in this chapter, that in such a state of affairs, it is a shameful thing for a man to be poor and in a condition of meanness and unable to better himself. At the same time, if the *dao* does not prevail and society is in disorder, then it is equally shameful for one to be rich and occupy a high position and not know to step down. Here Mao is saying that since the country, after the revolution, has achieved a state of stability and there is good government, it would be shameful for the country not to be able to provide for all people to have suitable jobs.

The *Wansui* (1969) text is a bit garbled here. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version reads in translation, in lieu of this first part of the paragraph: “Mr. Liu Wenhui says that someone has been grumbling, saying: ‘When the *dao* does not prevail in the state, it is a matter of shame for one to be rich and exalted; when the *dao* does prevail in the state, it is a matter of shame for someone to be poor and base.’” Liu Wenhui (b. 1894) was a military commander of the Nationalist forces in the Sichuan-Xikang region from the 1920s through the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. He surrendered to the Communists in late 1949. In September 1954 he became a member of the National Defense Commission and in December of the same year was elected to the Standing Committee of the Second National Committee of the CPPCC. For more biographical information on Liu, see *Zhonggong renming lu* (1967 edition), p. 609.

35. The phrase here, *pin che jian yan*, is quoted from the *locus classicus* of *bang you dao* mentioned above.

36. The term here is *Kong fu zi*, meaning Master Kong, the honorific for Kong Qiu (Confucius) which Mao uses especially when he intends to convey irony and sarcasm. Kong Qiu is often referred to simply as Kong Zi (which also means Master, or Teacher Kong, but this is not as much of a term of reverence as *Kong fu zi*). “Confucius” is the Latinization of these three characters, but is the name by which Kong Qiu is known to the West.

37. The Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC was held September 20–October 9, 1957. By “United Front,” Mao is referring to the general problem of Party rectification in order to allow the Party to be more effective in playing the leadership role in such broad social programs as agricultural production and cooperativization, and in transformations in the other sectors of the economy. See also text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.

38. For the character Wang Xifeng, see text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 18, and text Nov. 15, 1956, note 50. Old Woman Liu (or Grandma Liu, known in the novel as Liu *laolao*) was another character in the novel *Hongloumeng*. This particular episode referred to here by Mao is the subject of the sixth *hui* of the novel.

39. This is a reference to a saying in contemporary China that the moon is brighter (actually, in Chinese, rounder) in Western countries (meaning that everything is better in the West). This is taken to be a reflection of the slavish attitude some Chinese hold toward foreign things.

40. See text July 14, 1956.

41. The National Conference on Propaganda Work of the CPC was held March 6–13, 1957 (see text Mar. 12, 1957).

Telegram to King Suramarit of Cambodia  
(March 5, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Mar. 6, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 105 (April 10, 1957), 60. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Mar. 6, 1957), 10.

King Norodom Suramarit

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of Your Majesty's birthday and the National Day of the Kingdom of Cambodia, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend my warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of your country. May the friendship between China and Cambodia be further consolidated and developed on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,<sup>1</sup> and may the Kingdom of Cambodia prosper, its people thrive, and may Your Majesty enjoy good health.

(Signed as Chairman of the PRC and dated)

**Note**

1. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 1.

Speech at Forum of Directors of Propaganda and  
Cultural and Education Bureaus  
(Excerpt)  
(March 6, 1957)

**Source:** Quoted in *HQ* (Aug. 25, 1968), 19. Available English Translation: *PR*, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 26.

*This quotation is from the article titled "Ba xinwen zhanxian de da geming jinxing daodi" (Carry the Great Revolution on the Journalistic Front Through to the End), which was also carried as an editorial in RMRB (Sept. 1, 1968).*

*In this article, another quoted sentence, separated from this quotation by another set of quotation marks, and for which no specific citation is given, followed the quotation here. It translates as: "Striving to suit the taste of the enemy and the imperialists in speaking and in writing articles is to deceive the masses, with the result of making the enemy comfortable*

*while pulling the wool over the eye of [people in] our own class." Since we have no further description or transcript of Mao's speech at this forum, we are unable to ascertain whether or not this other sentence was also quoted from this speech.*

*It is assumed that this forum, which in the source is indicated as a forum of the directors of propaganda departments and cultural and education bureaus of nine provinces and municipalities, was part of the National Conference on Propaganda Work (see text Mar. 12, 1957).*

What is to be publicized in the newspapers depends on whether or not it is beneficial to the people.

Conversation with Directors of Propaganda and  
Cultural and Education Bureaus  
(Excerpts)  
(March 7, 1957)

**Source:** *Jiaoyu yulu*, pp. 13, 14, 16; *JYGM*, 4; *JYGM*, 7; *Jiaoyu geming*, p. 11; Other Chinese Text: *URI* (1976), p. 89. Available English Translations: Some passages quoted in P. Seybolt (1973), p. 25; also some passages in *CB*, 888 (Aug. 22, 1969), p. 20.

*The reason that there is more than one entry in the "Source" here is that this is a composite text of excerpts of what Mao said to this particular group of people, which is identified as directors of propaganda departments and cultural and education bureaus of seven provinces and municipalities. It is assumed that this was one of the meetings on the schedule of the National Conference on Propaganda Work (see text Mar. 12, 1957; see also text Mar. 6, 1957).*

*There is some overlapping among these four sources cited here. Each paragraph will be annotated to indicate the source(s) from which it is derived. The three sources will be indicated there by the numerals 1, 2, 3, and 4, corresponding to the sequence in which they appear in this source note.*

We don't need so many courses, not such high-level courses. Cut off one-half; eight subjects would be enough . . . <sup>1</sup>

We must lighten the load of teaching materials, and reduce the number of courses. [The emphasis on] classical literature must be reduced; the *Shi jing* [Book of Odes]<sup>2</sup> is in large part unpoetic. Reduce the number of subjects, and reduce the weight [in each]. All this is for the purpose of [promoting] comprehensive development.<sup>3</sup>

Teaching material should contain some local characteristics. We ought to increase somewhat the amount of teaching materials that bear a local, indigenous character.<sup>4</sup>

Textbooks on agriculture should be compiled by the provinces themselves. Let's



give some attention to local literature, and the same should apply in the case of the natural sciences as well . . . <sup>5</sup>

Education in political ideology must be strengthened. Each province should have one director of propaganda and one chief of the bureau of education in charge of the work of ideological education. We must take the matter of ideological leadership in our grasp . . . <sup>6</sup>

In the lower-middle schools and the upper-middle schools, the course on politics must be strengthened. We must compile textbooks on politics . . . <sup>7</sup>

The method of [having] (schools) wear hats<sup>8</sup> is still a good method; it [stems from] an advanced experience . . . <sup>9</sup>

The method of having primary schools set up lower-middle school classes affiliated with them is still a good method. It [stems from] an advanced experience. [In this way,] the children of peasants can go to school in the vicinity conveniently, and after they graduate they can easily go home and take part in production . . . <sup>10</sup>

As far as the problem of having cooperatives and the people set up schools for themselves is concerned, where the conditions are adequate, they should be permitted to go ahead and do it.<sup>11</sup>

You people are in charge of education. Is the Ministry of Education the Soviet Union's Ministry of Education or is it China's Ministry of Education? Why aren't the things of the old liberated areas used as blueprints for our teaching materials?<sup>12</sup>

## Notes

1. In sources 1 and 2. Also in URI (1976).
2. An ancient anthology of poems and songs, mostly of the pre-Spring and Autumn period of the Zhou dynasty but some going back as far as the Shang dynasty. This anthology, whose title is often translated as the *Book of Odes*, was reputedly compiled by Confucius, and established by him as one of the "classics." It contains 305 pieces of poetic literature, which are divided into the four forms of *feng*, *daya*, *xiaoya*, and *song*. The original anthology was lost in the Qin period, and when the "classics" were recovered either through text or oral tradition in the early Han dynasty, the three traditions of the Classic of Odes appeared: the Qi, Lu, and Han traditions. Later all these three were lost and only a fourth, later-emergent tradition, known as the Mao tradition, which is cited and listed in the "Yi wen zhi" (Catalog of Arts and Literature) in the *Han shu* (History of Han), remained. Thus when we talk today of the *Book of Odes* we are really talking about the Mao tradition thereof, sometimes known as *Mao shi*.
3. In sources 1 and 4, also in URI (1976). The "comprehensive development" that Mao speaks of here apparently refers to the overall, balanced development of students.
4. In sources 1, 2 and 4, also in URI (1976).
5. In sources 2 and 4, not in URI (1976).
6. Partly in source 1 and completely in source 2. Partly in URI (1976).
7. Only in source 2.
8. See text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 80. We are, however, unable to discover what "hat-wearing schools" refers to, and what specifically are the schools that are put into this category.
9. Only in source 2, also in URI (1976).
10. Only in source 4.
11. In sources 2 and 4, also in URI (1976).
12. Only in source 3, also in URI (1976). For the term "old liberated areas," see text Jan. 6, 1950(1), vol. I, note 7.

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## Conversation with Journalism and Publishing Workers (March 10, 1957)

**Source:** Quoted in *HQ* (Aug. 25, 1968), 11. Other Chinese Text: *Mao liang*, p. 311. Available English Translation: *PR*, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 20.

*See text Mar. 6, 1957, source note.*

Before [all] classes are eliminated, regardless of whether they are newspapers, magazines, broadcasting services, or news services, all [public media] have a class character; they all serve a certain class.

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## Conversation With People Who Work in Journalism and in Publishing (Excerpts) (March 10, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Dec. 28, 1983), 2, 4. Other Chinese Texts: Excerpt in *HQ* (Aug. 25, 1968), 11; in *Mao liang*, p. 311; in *Xinwen zhanxian*. Available English Translations: Excerpt in *CB*, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969), 47; *PR*, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 20.

*According to the RMRB source, this document consists of excerpts of a discussion Mao held with some delegates to the National Conference on Propaganda Work (see text Mar. 6, 1957, source note) who were in the fields of journalism and publishing. This representation is produced on the basis of recorded notes that have been kept at the archives of the Central Committee of the CPC.*

I. You say of yourselves that you have [only] a low level [of understanding] of Marxism, and [therefore] have little confidence about running newspapers in a socialist society.<sup>1</sup> [Well,] if you do not have confidence now, [don't worry,] in the future you will have confidence. With everything, in the beginning people are bound to have no confidence. When we were engaged in guerrilla warfare, before we did it, we hadn't even thought about [how it would be done]. Later, [though,] we were forced to the hills,<sup>2</sup> and we had no choice but to fight [as guerrillas], and so we simply toughened our scalps and did it.<sup>3</sup> Naturally, fighting a war is no fun matter, but as we continued to fight we slowly became accustomed to it. Who can

[be expected to] have confidence about issues that have [only] newly emerged? Even I have no confidence. Take the Korean War, for example.<sup>4</sup> Fighting against U.S. imperialism was quite a different thing from fighting against Japanese imperialism. At first, too, we had no confidence, but after a battle or two, we gained confidence. Right now we have to handle the problem of the contradictions among the people,<sup>5</sup> and that is not like the class struggle of the past (naturally there is a bit of class struggle mixed in there also); it is very natural that we would have no confidence [at this point]. It doesn't matter that we have no confidence; we can give the problem a good studying. So many books have been published that deal with socialism, books that teach people how to concretely promote socialism; [these are books that] did not exist when the socialist revolution occurred in Russia. There are also some books that write up just about everything there is to be said about socialist society, but that is utopian socialism, not scientific socialism.<sup>6</sup> Some things [about this] have not even appeared yet. Even though we can anticipate them, it still does not mean that it is [already] possible to propose concrete guidelines and methods for resolving [them].

We also talk about the problem that [as you modestly admit, you are] inadequately cultivated in Marxism. This is a very common problem, and the only way to resolve this problem is to do a good job of studying. Naturally, our studying must be voluntary. I hear that some literary writers do not at all like this thing called Marxism. They say that with this thing it is not easy to write a novel anymore. As I see it, this is also [nothing more than] "conditioned reflexes." With everything it is the same; once we are accustomed to the old things, there is no room for new things to enter into the picture, because the old has suppressed the new. If they say that once they study Marxism it would become difficult to write a novel, it is generally because Marxism is at odds with their old ideologies, and so there is nothing that they can write.

It is essential that we promote the study of Marxism among the intellectuals. We must advocate that all of us study it for ten years or so, and when we have learned much of Marxism, it will crowd out the old ideologies. However, we must also make it a vogue of studying Marxism; without it being a vogue, it would be difficult to do a good job of studying.

At present, there are two types of ideological deviations: One is dogmatism, the other is Right-deviationist opportunism.<sup>7</sup> The characteristic of Right-deviationist opportunism is that it negates everything, whereas with dogmatism, it is to knock everything back with a single [undifferentiating] blow,<sup>8</sup> as long as that thing conveys the slightest sense of doubt, and [dogmatism] affirms everything [indiscriminately]. Both dogmatism and Right-deviationist opportunism are one-sided. Both employ a metaphysical method of thought to observe and comprehend problems in a one-sided and isolated way. Naturally, it will be difficult to avoid one-sidedness altogether. One-sidedness in the methodology of thought is related to the fact that they have not done a good job of studying Marxism. We must take some ten years or so to study Marxism earnestly [so that we can] gradually discard the metaphysical way of thinking. In that way, there can be a great change in our ideological outlook.

II. The criticism of films that we have this time around is very beneficial,<sup>9</sup> but the door of the bureau of films is still not opened wide enough. There is a tendency toward affirming everything in the things they write [in that bureau], and as soon as there is any criticism by others, they have closed the door tightly shut again. As I see it, in the majority of the critical essays, the problems they raised are very beneficial to the reforming of our films [and film-making]. I, for one, do not particularly like to watch the films we have now. Naturally there are some good ones; we should not negate everything. The film-making bureau must accept every piece of criticism that conforms to the facts, otherwise there cannot be improvement in the work of film making. Of the pieces of writing published in your newspaper here,<sup>10</sup> most of those of the first period were critical ones, and most of those of the second period were affirming ones. Now we can organize [these] pieces of writing together and unify [the points of view]; the things that are good, let's affirm them; the ones that are not good, let's criticize them. It is wrong for the film-making bureau to ignore [the problems]. The debates this time around exposed the problem, and that is beneficial to both the film-making bureau and those who wrote [the essays].

III. Your newspapers have been done in a lively and interesting fashion. You publish things on [popular hobbies such as] music, chess, calligraphy, and painting;<sup>11</sup> [these are things that] even I like to read about. If the young people don't like to read about them, they can omit them. Each person has his or her own "conditioned reflexes." Not everyone is apt to like to read about everything.

IV. Some of the letters [to the editor] from the masses can be published. Let's give it a try and see. When the government and related professional or operational departments have different opinions [on something], the newspapers' publishers can study and discuss the matters with them and then make an explanation in the newspaper, and see what the results [of that] can be like. I am afraid it would not be good not to publish any of [these disagreements]. In that case the professional department [in question] will commit bureaucratism and will make no progress or improvement in its work.

V. There must be leadership for the newspapers; but the leadership must be in conformity with the objective circumstances. Marxism does things in accordance with [objective] conditions, and by conditions we include [consideration for] objective effects. When the masses like to read [something], it proves that the leadership has been good; if the masses do not like to read, then we couldn't say too much for the leadership, could we? There is correct leadership, and then there is incorrect leadership. Correct leadership does things in accordance with [objective] conditions, and conforms to realities; the masses will welcome that. Incorrect leadership does not do things in accordance with the [objective] conditions and is divorced from reality and [therefore] from the masses.<sup>12</sup> [If there is a leadership] that makes the editors of a newspaper feel that they have no freedom; and the masses

do not like to read the newspapers that are produced [under the editorial directive of the leadership,] then that leadership is bound to be a dogmatic leadership. We must oppose dogmatism. In the past we criticized and repudiated dogmatism through the form of rectification, which we have undertaken for more than a decade,<sup>13</sup> and [instead] we have independently done things in accordance with the spiritual essence of Marxism; only then were we able to attain the victory of the revolution in China.

VI. It is all right for there to be some specialized professionalism in the newspapers. Take, for instance, *Dagong bao*.<sup>14</sup> At the time of the opening up of the free markets,<sup>15</sup> I liked to read it a lot, because it published quite a lot about things like that, and moreover, it got [these things] into print speedily. However, overspecialization can sometimes lead to things being dry and boring, and that would diminish people's interest in reading [the newspaper]. Besides, the people engaged in professional specialization must also read some things outside of their specialty.

VII. Newspapers in a socialist country are bound to be better anyway than capitalist newspapers.<sup>16</sup> Some of the newspapers in Hong Kong [for instance]: even though they do not have the [bad] ideological qualities that we spoke of, they are rather meaningless nonetheless. The things they say are not truthful and they tend to exaggerate, and to propagate poisonous things.<sup>17</sup> There is little poison in our newspapers, and they are beneficial to the people. It is correct to say that the articles in newspapers [ought to be] "shorter, shorter, and even shorter still." As for [saying that they should be] "softer, softer, and even softer still," I think we must reconsider that. We don't want things to be too hard; if things are too hard people would not like to read about them. What we can do is to unite the soft and the hard. It would be very good writing if the writing could be easy and vernacular, intimate [to the people's experiences], going from small matters to the larger issues, from the things that are close at hand and relevant to the remote and farther away, so as to lead people gradually into a state of rapturous absorption.<sup>18</sup> Do you approve of Lu Xun or not? Lu Xun's writings are not too soft, but not too hard either; they are not difficult to read. Someone said that it is difficult to write miscellaneous essays;<sup>19</sup> this is precisely what is difficult about it. Somebody asked, what would Lu Xun do today if he were alive still? I think that if Lu Xun were alive today, he would dare to write, and yet also not dare to write. [If it were] under an abnormal atmosphere, even he would not write. However, the greater possibility is that he would write. The aphorism is good: "He who can stand being hacked to pieces dares to drag the emperor from his horse."<sup>20</sup> Lu Xun is a true Marxist, a through-and-through materialist. A true Marxist, one who is a materialist through and through, has nothing to fear. That is why he would write. There are some writers today who do not dare to write. There are two sets of conditions to this: One is where we have not created for them an environment in which they would dare to write, and therefore they are afraid of being rectified.<sup>21</sup> There is another set of conditions, and that is that they have not yet learned their materialism well. If someone is a

materialist through and through he would dare to write. In Lu Xun's time, to ["suffer rectification["] meant to be put in prison<sup>22</sup> or to be executed. Yet Lu Xun was not afraid. As for how miscellaneous essays are written nowadays, we have yet no experience. I think we should trot out Lu Xun and have everyone learn from his example and do a good job of studying [him]. His miscellaneous essays range over many subjects; he talks of politics, the literary scene, art, and so on. Especially toward the latter stage, he spoke mostly of politics; the only area lacking is the economy. Lu Xun's things were forced out of him. Even his studying of Marxism was thrust upon him. He was born of a scholarly family,<sup>23</sup> and people said that he was a "leftover evil of feudalism"<sup>24</sup> and that he was no good. Yet Lu Xun continued to write. Today we can write essays about the economy as well. Whether an essay is good or not depends on the effect it has. From time immemorial we have drawn conclusions on the basis of results.

VIII. Is your news welcomed?<sup>25</sup> I fear that someone among you raised the question of whether news issued from the news agencies has a class nature. Before classes are eliminated, [news], regardless of whether it is from the news agencies or from the newspapers, has a class nature.<sup>26</sup> The "freedom of the press" that the bourgeoisie touts is a lie. There is no such thing as total objectivity in news reporting. Nowadays the news agencies and newspapers in the United States also report a bit about the conditions of the economic construction in New China. It is because it wants to do some business, so it makes a few gestures so others can see; this is because the economic crisis is putting pressure on it.

IX. When we launch a criticism in the newspapers we must prepare a ladder for [the] people [who are being criticized]. Otherwise, when the masses surround them, they will not be able to step down.<sup>27</sup> This is true also of the opposing of bureaucratism.<sup>28</sup> During the time of the "Three-Anti's"<sup>29</sup> many department heads were able to step down because the Center brought them a ladder. In the past it was necessary for us to have engaged in the movement that we did, it was essential, but [at the same time], once we engaged [in those movements] too many people were hurt. We ought to learn a lesson from this. It would not be conducive to the interests of the vast majority of the people for us to promote ["big democracy["] today.<sup>30</sup> Some people always want to employ big democracy against other people to ["rectify["] them; but when it comes to rectifying themselves, then it is the smaller the democracy the better. I think that in resolving problems in the areas of literature and journalism, we should adopt a small, small democracy. [That is, to] add on top of small democracy yet another "small." This means a drizzle, a fine rain, going on incessantly.<sup>31</sup>

X. When it comes to running a newspaper, the Communist Party is not as good as people outside the Party. The history of running newspapers for us, [even] if we count [the experience] at Yanan as a beginning,<sup>32</sup> is a very short one; and we have had no experience in running newspapers on a nationwide scale. This is true [also]

of running schools, promoting publishing, and scientific research. There are about five million intellectuals nationwide;<sup>33</sup> of these, those who are Communist Party members make up no more than one small finger. There is some truth to the saying that the Communist Party cannot lead [in the area of] science.<sup>34</sup> At present we are amateurs leading professionals. We are promoting administrative leadership, political leadership. As for the concrete scientific technologies, such as geology, the Communist Party knows nothing of them. But, then, neither does the Kuomintang. After being in power for more than twenty years,<sup>35</sup> the Kuomintang only cultivated some 200 talents in the field of geology. We have been liberated for only seven years and we have [cultivated] over ten thousand. In the current period of transition, we can but have the conditions of administrative leadership as they are now, but in the future things will change. At present we must win over 80 per cent and more of the intellectuals to have them study Marxism. We ask of them that they acquire a preliminary comprehension of Marxism; not that they would understand it completely all at once. Even Marx himself, the founder of Marxism, did not fully understand [it] all at once. In 1848, when the “Communist Manifesto” was published, it was only the beginning of the formation of the system of Marxism. To ask that the intellectuals all accept Marxism at once would be unrealistic. Even when we speak of understanding Marxism, we actually mean understandings of different degrees. I myself haven’t read very many Marxist books. To be an expert we must read a bit more; but we do not have that much time or energy, [so] it is permissible for us to read a bit less [than desired]; the important thing is to pay attention to the methodology of research. Nowadays many cadres do not have the habit of reading. Rather, they put their surplus energies in playing poker, going to the movies, and dancing. We should not waste our time.

XI. We must do concrete analyses of concrete issues. This is true of the question of the speed at which news appears [in the papers]. With some news it is not a matter, as far as we are concerned, of how quickly or slowly it gets published, rather it is simply a matter of not publishing it at all. For example, with the news of land reform, we simply didn’t publicize it in the newspapers, lest some immature and mistaken experience got publicized. At the end of the year before last, [the transition to] joint state-private enterprises by whole trades<sup>36</sup> was carried out in Beijing in just a few days, and the announcement was made that [it] had entered [the stage of] socialism. Well, to begin with, we should have given very careful thought to news like that. But later, once it became publicized, every other place began to engage in the same thing all at once, without regard for their own conditions. That became very passive.

XII. [Even] when we are making criticism on problems among the people, we can carry a relatively sharp edge. I would like to write some articles for the newspapers myself, but that won’t be possible until I can resign from this post as Chairman [of the Republic].<sup>37</sup> What I can do is to open a special column in the newspapers, and be a columnist. In writing articles we must be sharp and

incisive; a knife must be sharp if it is to cut paper. However, in being sharp our purpose must be to help people and not hurt people.

XIII. On the issue of the hundred schools contending,<sup>38</sup> as for that which is totally academic, just having debates back and forth in the newspapers isn’t going to make much of an impact. When it comes to that which is a matter of policy, then I am afraid we have to make a differentiation of the circumstances. However, it is difficult, too, to draw the parameters, because there are so many policies. For example, on the propaganda regarding birth control and people marrying later in their years that you speak of, once there are a few more articles in the newspapers, there will be people who think that we are going to revise the Marriage Law,<sup>39</sup> and they will rush off to get married. In this sense, it is tough running a newspaper. In the old society, with the things that were in the newspapers, it made no difference whether the common people read them or not; but today, when something is published in the newspapers, it is entirely different. If we discover that the propaganda had produced some bad effects, we can write an article to explain and clarify. However, quite often our newspaper articles are not timely enough. As for how the parameters are to be drawn, why don’t each of your newspapers go home and study the problem yourselves?

#### Notes

1. Here Mao is using, and playing around with, the common saying *xin zhong you shu* (literally, having a sum in one’s mind). He first uses the negative derivative of the saying *xin zhong wu shu* for “having no confidence” and then the regular, positive form of the saying for “having confidence.” We have not been able to trace the classical roots of the saying.

2. See text April 1957(2), note 62.

3. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 2.

4. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 1.

5. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

6. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 46.

7. Here Mao appears to express a keen awareness of the two-sidedness of the struggle confronting the CPC in its rectification at the time (and the criticism coming from the Right). From the remainder of the conversation/speech, however, Mao does not appear to have taken the attacks from the Right to be of primary importance at this time. Also, he does not speak of it as “revisionism” here as he does in the speech two days later. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 33, and also text April 10, 1957, note 5.

8. This appears to be a variation of Mao’s criticism of people (especially those in the Soviet Union and over the case of repudiating Stalin) whom he says are “killing things off in a single blow.” See text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 11; text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 37; and text Mar. 12, 1957, note 22.

9. According to the source, (p. 4, note 1), this “refers to the criticisms that were proposed in the discussion on the subject of film making launched in the *Wenhui bao* of Shanghai.”

10. Also according to the source (note 2), this refers to Shanghai’s *Wenhui bao*. See text June 14, 1957, note 1.

11. This is a very common saying, *qin qi shu hua*, identifying these four items, music

(literally, the musical instrument *qin*, or dulcimer), *qi* (“chess,” or the Chinese game of *weiqi*, known more commonly on the international scene as *go*), calligraphy, and painting (ink painting), as the “four arts” (*si yi*) and the most common pastimes in China. While the term referred originally to the pursuits of the scholarly in traditional China, it has come to mean “diversionary pursuits” or hobbies in the generic sense. The saying is derived from the book *Fa shu yao lu* (Essential Records of the Books of Law).

12. See text April 1957, text surrounding note 21; text July 8, 1957, note 57; and text July 1957, note 7. See also text May 2, 1956, source note, and text Nov. 15, 1956, note 45, as well as text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.

13. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24. See also text July 8, 1957(2), note 50.

14. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 7.

15. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 9.

16. Here Mao appears to foreshadow his criticism, made later in the year, that certain newspapers (and the people who managed them) “didn’t know the difference between a socialist newspaper and a capitalist newspaper.” See text June 14, 1957(1), middle section, and text July 8, 1957(2), text surrounding note 45.

17. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38.

18. This is a saying, *yin ren ru sheng*, that literally means “leading people into wonderland,” which is derived from the book *Shi shuo* (Words of the Age) and from the seventh *hui* of the novel *Jinghua yuan* (Romance of the Flower in the Mirror), written by Li Ruzhen in the Qing dynasty.

19. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 26 and surrounding text.

20. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 50.

21. See text May 15, 1957, note 27.

22. See text Mar. 20, 1957, note 39.

23. The saying here is *shu xiang mendi*, which literally means “an exalted noble house filled with the fragrance of books.”

24. The words here are *fengjian yu ye*. The term *yu ye* refers to the extremely derogatory term *ye zhong*, which means “the seed of evil” or “the son of sin.” It is often used to refer to children who were born of an “act of sin” and were unwanted, but somehow remained among the living to plague history. Mao is probably referring to accusations made against Lu Xun by other writers in the controversy over “proletarian literature” around 1926. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 27.

25. According to the source (note 3), this refers to the news issued by Xinhua News Agency.

26. This sentence is the passage that is represented in the *HQ* excerpt (and in the various other sources and translations). The *HQ* excerpt, however, which adds: “It all serves a certain class,” is not here. See also text July 8, 1957(2), note 25.

27. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 51.

28. Bureaucratism was one of the three targets of the CPC rectification at this time. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 2.

29. See text Nov. 1951-Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note.

30. See text Nov. 15, 1956.

31. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29.

32. See text Oct. 26, 1949(2), vol. I, note 1.

33. See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 4, and text Mar. 20, 1957, note 41.

34. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 72 and surrounding text.

35. See text Mar. 20, 1957, note 6.

36. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 6.

37. It appears, however, that Mao might have involved himself in the writing of articles for the newspapers (specifically for *RMRB*) later in the year after all. See text April 10, 1957, source note.

38. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

39. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 5; see also text April 1957, note 57.

## Speech at the National Conference on Propaganda Work

(March 12, 1957)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 403–418. Other Chinese Texts: *Xuandu A*, pp. 365–380; *Buyi*, pp. 130–142; *Wubian zhexue zhuzuo*, pp. 193–224; excerpts in *Jiaoyu geming*, p. 10; in *Jiaoyu yulu*, pp. 10, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29; in *Mao liang*, pp. 43–44, 245–246; quoted in *HQ* (Aug. 25, 1968), 13. Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 422–435; K. Fan (1972), pp. 197–209; *SR*, pp. 480–498; excerpts in J. Chen (1970), p. 114; in *CB*, 888 (Aug. 22, 1969), p. 7; in *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 6786 (Aug. 14, 1967); *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 6803 (Aug. 31, 1967); *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 6809 (Sept. 6, 1967); *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 7012 (Mar. 27, 1968); *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 7095 (June 18, 1968); *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 7125 (July 18, 1968); *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 7285 (Dec. 25, 1968); in *PR*, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 22; in *SCMP*, 3770 (Aug. 29, 1966), 5–6; *SCMP*, 4000 (Aug. 14, 1967), 17–18; *SCMP*, 4195 (June 11, 1968), 13–14.

*A National Conference on Propaganda Work was convened by the CPC from March 6 to March 13, 1957, in Beijing. Over 380 people involved in propaganda and cultural and educational work at two levels—the Center and the province (and municipality)—attended the meeting. As suggested by texts March 6, 7 and 10, the conference held many committee and subcommittee meetings as well as plenary sessions. In all, over 100 speeches and discussions were given, and more than 120 people outside the CPC who were involved in work in science, culture, arts, journalism, and publishing as well as education were also heard from.*

*Mao delivered this speech at a critical stage of the Party rectification campaign in the spring of 1957. The subject of a new CPC rectification campaign had been broached in late 1956 and was clearly, if not expressly, put on the agenda at the January 1957 Conference of Party secretaries. By the time of the Supreme State Conference in late February, the campaign was underway, guided by the principles and policies suggested by Mao in the February 27 speech. The connection between the current Conference on Propaganda Work and this context of Party rectification is rendered especially clear by the fact that on March 5, the day before the convening of this conference, Lu Dingyi, director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, published an essay in *RMRB* commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the Party rectification campaign in Yanan in 1942. Thus Party rectification was clearly the focus of the Propaganda Work Conference here, and also, by reflection, at the center of Mao’s thought at this time. All this led up to the promulgation of the CPC Central Committee’s “Instruction on the Rectification Campaign” of April 27, 1957 (see *RMRB*, May 1, 1957, and *RMSC* [1958], pp. 29–30), which denoted the high point of this campaign.*

*Throughout the course of this rectification campaign, and, as we have seen, in almost all his significant speeches and writings of the period, Mao evinced a concern for the subject of how intellectuals fit into the picture of socialist transformation and construction. Nowhere is it clearer and more explicit than in this speech at the Propaganda Work Conference. This is probably partly because the people at this*

meeting were mostly intellectuals, being personnel in charge of propaganda work, which included education and literacy, journalistic, and publishing matters, at the central as well as local levels. Another facet of this connection between the intellectual issue and the Party rectification is historical. In January 1956 a conference of CPC Party secretaries at the Center and the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region levels was convened to discuss and study the question of the CPC's relationship to intellectuals (see text Jan. 20, 1956, source note). At this conference, the ways in which the intellectuals of China fit or did not fit into the plans of socialist construction were discussed, as were the subjects of the improvement of the treatment of intellectuals by the Party, the relationship of the Party leadership to Party-member intellectuals as well as to intellectuals outside the Party. From that point on, the intellectuals' issue became part of the subject of the CPC's work style, and hence, at this time, of Party rectification. Furthermore, by the February 27, 1957, speech, Mao had himself made the idea of "Letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend"—which he himself had broached in a speech to a Supreme State Conference on May 2, 1956,<sup>1</sup> and which Lu Dingyi had made into a slogan by way of a title of a report delivered on May 26 of that same year—the semi-official guiding ideology behind the rectification policy. In other words, the idea was to let the intended "Hundred Flowers"-type of liberating of diverse opinions outside the Party serve as a test for the CPC as it went through the current rectification, as well as some kind of a teaching instrument for the Party itself.

At the same time, however, it is also clear that in addition to letting this subject play its part in the CPC's rectification, Mao was also concerned about the intellectuals as a group in its own right. There is clearly a deep concern about how the CPC membership, the Chinese people, the democratic parties (whose membership was in many cases largely made up of intellectuals), and particularly the intelligentsia reacted to the problems that shook the international Communist movement in 1956. At the same time that the CPC was undergoing a critical test in early 1957—the test of whether or not, through rectification, it was storm-worthy and would weather the dangers of 1956—there was also a test for the intellectuals—whether they would come out on the side of socialism. In a sense, the connection between the two issues was obvious: By suggesting that the CPC must at this time rectify itself to overcome such things as bureaucratism, dogmatism, and a "commandist" work style, and that in so doing it must learn to relate to the people outside the Party, and to intellectuals in particular, in a conciliatory and "gentle-winds-and-fine-rains" fashion, Mao hoped to firm up the confidence of some "middle-of-the-road" intellectuals who might not otherwise pass that test the way Mao hoped they would, and pull them to the side of the socialist revolutionary cause while making it obvious to them, as he does in this speech, that the question of whether they are on the side of socialism and the proletariat or on the side of capitalism and the bourgeoisie is an either-or question, with little room for vacillators.

This was pretty much the course followed in early 1957, until May. (The turning point, one might say, is reflected in Mao's May 15 essay—see text May 15, 1957.) From that point on, the conciliatory policy began to recede rapidly, and the idea of Party rectification for the CPC itself (which was still quite obvious in the April 27 "Instructions") began to give way to the idea that it was not just the CPC but the "whole people" (i.e., including, and perhaps in particular, the intellectuals outside the CPC) who needed to undergo rectification. The so-called entire people rectification campaign (quanmin zhengfeng yundong) was launched, and the Hundred Flowers effectively came to an end.<sup>2</sup>

This speech therefore must be read in this context. The conciliatory tone of the speech and its focus on the feasibility of uniting with the bourgeois intellectuals to build socialism are quite consistent with Mao's approach to the issue throughout this period.

However, within this continuing spirit of conciliation toward the national bourgeoisie, certain changes in Mao's thought are also apparent. His statement that the changes associated with the socialist transition were much more profound than those associated with the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation represents a change from his earlier position. And, although he continues to argue, as he did in his February "Correctly Handling" speech, that the period of "large-scale, stormy, and turbulent class struggle" was basically at an end, his stress on class struggle in the ideological realm and on the as yet undetermined outcome of that struggle are harbingers of future developments in his thought.

Mao's stress on class struggle in the ideological realm and the methods for such struggle are the key issues here. For Mao, the unwillingness or inability to recognize class struggle in the ideological realm was one of the key factors defining revisionism, which he was beginning to see as an increasingly dangerous tendency at this time. In this context, it is instructive to note that Mao mentioned "revisionism" in the February 27, 1957, speech precisely in the context of the claim made by the democratic parties to "coexist on the long term [with the CPC] and to exercise mutual supervision [with the CPC]." (See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 82 and surrounding text.) Ultimately, this issue would be spelled out in a speech given by Mao on May 15, 1957, (see text May 15, 1957), at the height of the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Interestingly, the Hundred Flowers campaign in 1957 was mostly handled by the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, then under the directorship of Lu Dingyi. This provides us with an additional note on the significance of the current speech. Mao's recognition at this particular time of the need to encourage criticism from outside the Party, to recognize the multiplicity of interests among the people; and to persuade, rather than coerce, the people into accepting Marxism and the leadership of the Party represented an important break with Stalinist Marxism and, not surprisingly, aroused significant opposition within the Party. Indeed, Mao's suggestion for a policy of collaboration with bourgeois intellectuals through persuasion and "gentle breezes and fine rain" brought him under attack as a Rightist during this period. Exactly when it was that Mao began to turn against this principle is not certain, although by the summer of 1957 the CPC leadership apparently already had to turn its attention to the perhaps unexpectedly severe criticism of the Party and of socialism that emerged from this policy of "gentle winds and fine rain" and letting the "Hundred Flowers" bloom. In the remainder of 1957 and into 1958 and 1959 during the period of the Great Leap Forward, Mao became much more occupied with the idea of combating revisionism and the attendant pessimism for socialist achievements that revisionism "inherently entailed," and the issue of dealing with bourgeois intellectuals gently with persuasion rather than coercion receded. It quite naturally continued to recede as the "struggle between two lines" took shape and developed. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, the apex of this struggle, Mao was clearly no longer of the view that large-scale, turbulent, violent class struggle was over, and he had adopted policies of dealing with bourgeois intellectuals, and even Party members, that were far more coercive (indeed, one may say exactly opposite) than the ones he had recommended in the mid-1950s. It would not be until the late 1970s and the 1980s that the CPC leadership would once more adopt as conciliatory and liberal a policy toward bourgeois intellectuals as the ones suggested by Mao in his speech here.

Comrades!

This has been a very good conference. At the conference many questions have been brought up that have acquainted us with many things. I would now like to offer a few opinions with regard to the questions the comrades have been discussing. We are now in a period of great social change. Chinese society has long been

in the midst of great change. The period of the War of Resistance Against Japan was one of great change and so was the period of the War of Liberation.<sup>3</sup> However, in terms of the nature [of the change], the change we are now undergoing is much more profound than those we went through previously. We are now engaged in socialist construction, with hundreds of millions of people taking part in the movement of socialist transformation. Interrelations among the various classes throughout the country are undergoing a change. The petty bourgeoisie in agriculture and the handicraft industries and also the bourgeoisie in industry and commerce have undergone changes. The social and economic systems have changed; the individual economy is changing into a collective economy and the system of capitalist private ownership is being transformed into one of socialist public ownership.<sup>4</sup> A [social] change of this magnitude must, of course, be reflected in people's thinking. [One's social] being determines [one's] consciousness. This great change of social system is reflected differently among the people of different classes, [social] strata, and social groups. The broad masses of the people are enthusiastic in their support of this great change, for real life itself has proven that socialism is the only way out for China. Toppling the old social system and establishing a new one, namely, the system of socialism, is a great struggle involving a tremendous change in the social system and in the relationship among people. It should be said that the situation is basically healthy. But as the new social system has just been set up, it still needs time for consolidation. We should not think that the new [social] system is fully consolidated once it has been set up; that is impossible. It has to be consolidated step by step, and in order to [fully] consolidate it eventually, we must bring about the socialist industrialization of the country, persevere in making socialist revolution on the economic front, and carry on the constant and arduous socialist revolutionary struggles and socialist education on the political and ideological fronts. In addition, we still would need various [specific] international conditions to complement this. In our country the struggle to consolidate the socialist system as well as the struggle to decide whether socialism or capitalism will be victorious will still take a very long historical period. However, we should all realize that this new socialist system is bound to be consolidated. We are bound to build our country into a socialist state with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture. This is the first point I want to make.

The second point: The situation regarding the intellectuals in our country. There are no accurate statistics available of the exact number of intellectuals in China. Someone has estimated that there are about five million intellectuals of various types, including both the higher and ordinary intellectuals. Among these five million intellectuals, the overwhelming majority are patriotic, love our People's Republic of China, and are willing to serve the people and the socialist state. A few intellectuals are not so happy about the socialist system and do not really welcome it. They are as yet skeptical about socialism, but still, when confronted with the imperialists, they are patriotic. Intellectuals who bear hostile sentiments toward our state are extremely few. These people do not like our state with its dictatorship of the proletariat and have a lingering fondness for the old society. They stir up trouble at the first opportunity and want to overthrow the Communist Party and restore the old China. These are the people who, [faced with a choice] between the proletarian

line and the bourgeois line, between the socialist line and the capitalist line, stubbornly choose to follow the latter. This latter line is in fact impracticable, so actually they are those who are prepared to capitulate to imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism.<sup>5</sup> Such people can be found in political circles, in the circles of industry and commerce, education and culture, science and technology, as well as in religious circles. They are the extreme reactionaries. Such people account for only approximately 1, 2, or 3 per cent of the total number of five million.<sup>6</sup> The overwhelming majority of intellectuals who account for well over 90 per cent of the five million support the socialist system to varying degrees. [However,] many of these people who are supportive of the socialist system are still not quite clear on how to work under the socialist system and on how to understand, handle, and answer many of the new problems.

As far as their attitude toward Marxism is concerned, it might be said that out of the approximately five million intellectuals, a bit more than 10 per cent, including Communist Party members and sympathizers outside the Party, are relatively familiar with Marxism and have taken a firm stand, that is, the stand of the proletariat. Among the five million, these people are a minority, but they are the core and have strength. The majority [of intellectuals] have the desire to study Marxism and have learned a bit, but are still not familiar with it. Some of them still have doubts and have not yet taken a firm stand. They will vacillate whenever they come up against a storm; these intellectuals who comprise the majority of the total of five million are still in the middle of the road. Those who are dead set against Marxism and have an attitude of hostility toward Marxism are an extremely small minority. There are some people who do not openly show their disapproval of Marxism, but in fact they do disapprove. There will be people of this type for a long time to come, and we should allow them to disapprove. For instance, some idealists may agree with the socialist political and economic system but disagree with the Marxist world view. This holds true for the patriotic personages in the religious circles as well: they are theists and we are atheists. We cannot force these people to accept the Marxist world view. In short, the attitude of the approximately five million intellectuals toward Marxism [can be described] this way: Those who support and are relatively familiar [with Marxism] are a minority; those who are opposed to it are also a minority; the majority support it but are not familiar with it, and their support comes in varying degrees. There are three different stands involved here: the firm, the wavering, and the opposed. It should be acknowledged that such a situation will exist for a very long time. Failure to recognize this situation will cause us to impose too great a demand on others while lowering the task we set for ourselves. Our comrades who are engaged in propaganda work have the task of disseminating Marxism. This is a gradual [task of] propaganda and should be done well so that people are willing to accept it.<sup>7</sup> We cannot force people to accept Marxism; we can only persuade them to accept it. If, in a period of several five-year plans from now, a fairly large number of our intellectuals can accept Marxism and understand more about Marxism through their practice in work and living, through their practice of class struggle, of production, and through scientific practice, that will be fine. And that is our hope.

The third point: The question of remolding the intellectuals. Ours is a culturally underdeveloped country.<sup>8</sup> For a country of our size, approximately five million intellectuals are too few in number. Without intellectuals, our work cannot be done well; therefore we must do a good job of uniting with them. In a socialist society, the major components of society are three kinds of people: workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Intellectuals are mental laborers; their work is to serve the people, that is, to serve the workers and peasants. The majority of intellectuals were able to serve old China and they can serve new China; they were able to serve the bourgeoisie and they can serve the proletariat. At the time when they were serving old China, the left wing of the intellectuals were in resistance, the middle-of-the-roads wavered, and only the right wing stood fast. Now that they have switched over to serve the new society, the situation is reversed. Their left wing stands fast, the middle-of-the-roads waver (this is wavering in the new society and is different from that in the past), and the right wing is in resistance. Intellectuals are also educators. Our newspapers educate the people every day. Our writers and artists, our scientists and technicians, and our professors and teachers are educating the people and the students. Because they are educators, people who teach others, they are obligated to first be educated [themselves]. This is especially so during the current period of great change in the social system. In the past few years they have had some education in Marxism; some of them have even studied hard and have made remarkable progress. But the majority of them are still far from [the goal of] completely replacing their bourgeois world view with a proletarian world view. Some people have studied a few Marxist books and consider themselves as learned [in this regard], but they have failed to absorb what they have studied; the things they have read are not implanted in their minds. They are unable to apply them, and their class feelings remain as before. There are still other people who are very conceited; having studied a few sentences, they swell with pride and are strutting around with their tails in the air.<sup>9</sup> However, once a storm blows up, their standpoint will show a glaring difference from that of the workers and the great majority of laboring peasants. The former will waver while the latter will stand firm; the former will equivocate while the latter will take a clear-cut stand. Therefore it is wrong to assume that those who educate others need not be educated themselves and no longer have the need to study, or to regard socialist transformation as restricted to the remolding of others, of the landlords, the capitalists, and the individual producers, but not of the intellectuals.<sup>10</sup> Intellectuals need to be remolded; not only do those whose basic stand has not been changed over need to be remolded, but everybody should study and be remolded. When I say everybody, I am including us who are here. The situation is constantly changing. We need to study in order to adapt our thinking to the new situation. Even people who already understand quite a bit about Marxism and who take a relatively firm stand on the side of the proletariat still have to go on studying, to absorb new things and to look into new problems. If intellectuals do not rid their minds of unsound things, they will not be able to shoulder the task of educating others. Of course, we can only teach and learn at the same time and be both a teacher and a student. To become a good teacher, one must first be a good student. Many things cannot be learned from books alone;

they must be learned from the producers, the workers, and the peasants.<sup>11</sup> In schools, one has to learn from one's students, from the objects of one's own teaching. As I see it, the majority of intellectuals in our country are willing to learn. Based on their willingness to study, it is incumbent upon us to help them with good intentions, to study, to help them in an appropriate way and not to force them with coercive methods.

The fourth point: The question of intellectuals integrating with the worker and peasant masses. Since the intellectuals are to serve the worker and peasant masses, they must first of all learn to understand them and get acquainted with their lives, their work, and their ideas. We advocate that intellectuals go among the masses and go to the factories and countryside. It is very bad if they never meet any workers or peasants all their lives. All the personnel in our state organs, our writers, artists, teachers, and scientific researchers should do the best they can to avail themselves of all kinds of opportunities to get closer to the workers and peasants.<sup>12</sup> Some of them may just tour around the factories and villages to have a look; this is called "looking at flowers while passing by on horseback."<sup>13</sup> In any case it is better than not going and not looking at all. Others can stay for a few months in the factories and villages, where they can make friends and conduct investigations; this is called "dismounting to look at flowers." There are still others who can stay on there for a long time, two or three years for instance, or even longer, and just live there; this is called "settling down."<sup>14</sup> As a matter of fact, there are some intellectuals who already live among the workers and peasants; for instance, industrial technical personnel already [live] in factories, and agricultural technical personnel and teachers of rural schools already [live] in the rural areas. These people should do their work well and become one with the workers and peasants. We should make it a common practice to get into close contact with the worker and peasant masses; this is to say that we must have a great number of intellectuals doing this. Of course, it cannot be 100 per cent; some intellectuals cannot go down for this or that reason. Nonetheless, we hope that as many people as possible will go. Nor can everyone go at once; they can go there gradually and in groups. Previously, in the Yanan days, we had the intellectuals make direct contact with the workers and peasants.<sup>15</sup> At that time many intellectuals in Yanan had confused ideas and came up with all sorts of weird arguments. We held a conference to urge them all to go among the masses. Subsequently a great number of them did and achieved very good results. Before it is integrated with practice, the knowledge that intellectuals gain from books is incomplete, or very incomplete. It is mainly by reading books that intellectuals absorb the experience of people before their time. Naturally books have to be read. However, problems still cannot be solved by reading books alone. One has to study the current situation, study practical experience and data, and make friends with the workers and peasants. It is no easy job to make friends with the workers and peasants. Now there are some people who are going to factories and villages, and in terms of consequences some of them have achieved good results but others have not. What is involved here is a question of one's standpoint or a question of one's attitude, that is, the question of one's world view. We advocate letting a hundred schools [of thought] contend.<sup>16</sup> There can be many schools or trends in each branch of learning, but as far as world view is concerned, there are



basically only two schools in our time; the proletarian school and the bourgeois school. It is either the proletarian world view or the bourgeois world view. The communist world view is simply the world view of the proletariat; it is not the world view of any other class. Most of the intellectuals we have today came over from the old society and have a nonlaboring [class] family background. Even those who came from worker or peasant families received a bourgeois education before Liberation, and their world view is basically that of the bourgeoisie; they still fall into the category of bourgeois intellectuals. These people, if they do not discard what they have acquired in the past and replace it with a proletarian world view, will remain different from the workers and peasants in terms of viewpoint, standpoint, and feelings. They will find themselves incompatible with the workers and peasants, and the workers and peasants will not speak their minds to them. If the intellectuals integrate themselves with the workers and peasants, and once they become their friends, they will be able to make the Marxism that they have learned from books truly their own. When studying Marxism, one must not only learn it from books, but, most importantly, one can acquire a real understanding of it only through class struggle, through practice in one's work, and through close contact with the worker and peasant masses in order to acquire a real grasp of it. If our intellectuals have studied a few Marxist works and have acquired a certain understanding [about them] through their contact with the worker and peasant masses and through the practice in their work, we may then have a common language, not only the common language of patriotism, the common language of the socialist system, but possibly also the common language of a communist world view.<sup>17</sup> If that is the case, our work can certainly be done much better.

The fifth point: Concerning rectification. By rectification we mean rectifying our thinking style and our work style. Rectification campaigns were launched within the Communist Party during the War of Resistance Against Japan, then during the War of Liberation, and once again in the early period of the People's Republic of China.<sup>18</sup> Now the Central Committee of the Communist Party has decided to launch an intra-Party rectification campaign this year.<sup>19</sup> Non-Party personages are free to participate or can stay out if they don't wish to take part.<sup>20</sup> This rectification is primarily to criticize a few incorrect ways of thinking and styles of work; one is subjectivism; another is bureaucratism; and yet another is sectarianism. The method for the current rectification campaign is the same as the one we used in the rectification campaign during the War of Resistance Against Japan. That is to say, we are first to study a number of documents; then, based on the studying of the documents, each person is to examine his or her own thinking and work and to unfold criticism and self-criticism so that shortcomings and mistakes can be exposed and what is good and right can be promoted. In the course of rectification, we must be strict and earnest, on the one hand; we must conduct serious and not perfunctory criticism and self-criticism with regard to shortcomings and mistakes, and we must correct them. On the other hand, we must [adopt the policy of] gentle breeze and fine rain and learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the illness to save the patient.<sup>21</sup> We oppose the method of "finishing people off with one blow."<sup>22</sup>

Ours is a great, glorious, and correct Party. This is what must be affirmed. Nevertheless, we still have shortcomings; this fact must also be affirmed. We should not affirm everything about ourselves, only that which is correct; at the same time, we should not negate everything about ourselves, only that which is mistaken. Accomplishment is the major aspect of our work, but there are also still quite a few shortcomings and mistakes [in it]. Therefore we need to conduct a rectification. We will criticize our own subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism. Will this damage our Party's prestige? I don't think so. On the contrary, this will only serve to enhance the Party's prestige. The rectification campaign launched during the War of Resistance Against Japan was proof [of this]. It enhanced the prestige of the Party, the prestige of the comrades, the prestige of the veteran cadres, and also helped the new cadres make great progress. By comparison, which of the two parties, the Communist Party or the Kuomintang, is more fearful of criticism? It is the Kuomintang that fears criticism. It prohibited criticism, but that did not help to save it from being defeated. The Communist Party is not afraid of criticism because we are Marxists. The truth is on our side, and so are the basic masses, the workers and peasants. As we have said before, the rectification campaign is a "widespread movement of education in Marxism."<sup>23</sup> Rectification means that the whole Party learns Marxism through criticism and self-criticism. In the course of the rectification campaign, we certainly can learn more about Marxism.

The transformation and construction of China depend on us for leadership. If we rectify our work style, we will be able to have more initiative in our work and can become more capable and do a still better job. Our country needs a great many people who sincerely serve the people and the cause of socialism and are determined to carry out reforms. We Communists should all be people of this kind. In the past, in old China, it was a crime to talk about reform, [and those who did] were either beheaded or taken to prison. During that time, however, there were some people who were determined to initiate reform. Dauntlessly, they published books and journals, educated the people, organized the people, and carried on indomitable struggles under all kinds of difficult conditions. The state power of the people's democratic dictatorship opened up the way for rapid development in our country's economy and culture. It has only been a short few years since our state power was established, yet people can already see that unprecedented prosperity has emerged in the areas of culture, education, and science. To achieve the goal of building the New China, we Communists are undaunted by any difficulty. But it is not enough to rely on our own strength alone; we need to have a group of people with high aspirations and noble intentions<sup>24</sup> outside the Party who can follow the socialist and communist orientation and join us in a fearless struggle to reform and build our society. It is a huge task to ensure that the several hundred million Chinese people live a better life and to build this economically and culturally backward country of ours into a rich and powerful state with a high level of culture. It is precisely to enable us to shoulder this task better and work better together with all those people outside the Party with high ideals and noble intentions and who are determined to institute reforms that we must have rectification, now and in the future, to continuously rid ourselves of mistakes. Those who are materialists

through and through are fearless. We wish that all those who join us in the common struggle can courageously take up responsibilities and overcome difficulties, being unafraid of setbacks, or critical opinions and ridicule from other people. Nor should they be afraid of criticizing us Communists or giving us their proposals. "Whoever is not afraid of death by a thousand mutilations dares to pull the emperor from his horse."<sup>25</sup> This is the fearless spirit that we need to have in our struggle for socialism and communism. For our part, we Communists should create favorable conditions for these people who cooperate with us, establish good comradely relations with them in our common work, and unite with them in our joint struggle.

The sixth point: the question of one-sidedness. One-sidedness means tending toward absolutes in one's thinking, in other words, viewing problems from a metaphysical perspective. When evaluating our work, it is to be equally one-sided to affirm everything or to negate everything. There are now still quite a few people within the Communist Party and a good many outside the Party who take such an approach to problems. To affirm everything is to see only the good and not the bad, only to praise and not criticize. To say everything in our work seems good does not conform to the facts. Not everything is good; there are still shortcomings and mistakes. However, not everything is bad either; that is also inconsistent with the facts. Here analysis is necessary. To negate everything means to think, without analysis, that nothing has been done well, that the great undertaking of building socialism, the great struggle in which hundreds of millions of people are engaged, seems to be a complete mess and something for which nothing good can be mentioned. Though many of those who hold such views are still different from those who harbor hostile feelings toward the socialist system, these views, nevertheless, are very mistaken, very harmful, and can only discourage people. It is equally mistaken to assess our work either from a viewpoint of affirming everything or from a viewpoint of negating everything. We should criticize such people who hold a one-sided view of problems; of course, they are to be criticized and helped in the spirit of learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the illness to save the patient.

Some people argue that since the rectification is to be conducted and everyone is asked to express their opinions, one-sidedness will be unavoidable, so it seems you don't really want people to speak up when you mention overcoming one-sidedness. Is this argument correct? It is difficult to require everyone to be completely free from one-sidedness. People always examine problems, handle problems, and express opinions in the light of their own experience; unavoidably they show a bit of one-sidedness sometimes. But is it possible to demand that people gradually overcome one-sidedness and demand that they acquire a relatively comprehensive approach to problems? I think we should demand that people do so. If we don't, if we don't demand that more people, day after day, year after year, take a more comprehensive approach to problems, we would stagnate, and would be affirming one-sidedness, which runs precisely counter to our purpose in launching the rectification. By one-sidedness we mean simply the violation of dialectics. We call for a gradual popularization of dialectics and demand that everyone gradually learn to apply this scientific method of dialectics. Some of our articles today are

extremely spirited but are devoid of substance; they neither analyze problems nor give reasoned arguments, and thus carry no conviction. The number of articles of this type should be gradually reduced. When writing an article, one should not always think, "How brilliant I am!" but should adopt an attitude of placing oneself on a completely equal footing with the readers. Even though you have taken part in the revolution for a long time, you will still be refuted by others if you say something wrong. The more you put on airs, the less people will pay attention to your stuff and the less they will care to read your articles. We should do our work in an honest way, analyze things, write with conviction, and not strike a pose in order to intimidate people.

Some people say that one-sidedness can be avoided in writing lengthy articles but not in short essays.<sup>26</sup> Is a short essay necessarily one-sided? As I mentioned earlier, one-sidedness is usually unavoidable; a bit of one-sidedness is nothing to be afraid of. To demand that everyone take a very comprehensive approach when looking at problems would hamper the development of criticism. However, we still have to strive for a relatively comprehensive approach to problems and try to avoid one-sidedness, whether in lengthy articles or short ones, including short essays. Some people argue, how can an analysis be made in a short essay of a few hundred or a couple of thousand words? I say, why not? Didn't Lu Xun do it? The analytical method is a dialectical method. By analysis we mean analyzing the contradictions in things. A sound analysis would be impossible if [we] lacked knowledge of life and had no real understanding of the contradiction being discussed. Lu Xun's later short essays were most penetrating and powerful and were free from one-sidedness.<sup>27</sup> This is because by then he had learned to use dialectics. Some of Lenin's articles can also be called short essays; they were satirical and very pointed, but they were not one-sided. The overwhelming majority of Lu Xun's essays were directed at the enemy; some of Lenin's essays were directed at the enemy and some at comrades. Can Lu Xun's type of essay be used to cope with shortcomings and mistakes among the people? I think it can. Of course, a distinction should be made between the enemy and ourselves, and we should not adopt an antagonistic standpoint toward comrades and treat them as we would an enemy. We must speak sincerely and warmly with an attitude of protecting the cause of the people and raising the consciousness of the people; we must not speak with an attitude of ridicule or attack.

What if one does not dare to write? Some people say that they do not dare to write even when they have things to say, for fear that they might offend others and be criticized. As I see it, such apprehension can be dispensed with. Our form of government is a people's democracy, which provides an environment conducive to writing for the people. The policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend gives new assurance to the development of science and art. If what you write is correct, then you needn't fear any criticism; you can further explain your correct opinion through debate. If what you write is wrong, then criticism can help you correct [the mistakes], and there is nothing bad about it. In our society a revolutionary and combative criticism and counter-criticism is a good device to expose contradictions, solve contradictions, develop science and art, and enable us to do a good job in all our work.

The seventh point: “To give free rein” or “to impose restrictions”? This is a question of principle. Letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is a fundamental as well as a long-term policy. It is not a temporary policy. During the discussion, the comrades were against “imposing restrictions,” which I think is quite correct. The opinion of the Party Center is that we can only “give free rein” and not “impose restrictions.”

In leading our country we can adopt two different methods, or in other words, two different policies; that is, either to give free rein or to impose restrictions. To give free rein is simply to allow everyone to express his or her opinion freely so that he or she would dare to speak up, dare to criticize and dare to contend; it means being unafraid of mistaken arguments or poisonous things; it means promoting argument and mutual criticism among all sorts of different opinions, allowing freedom for both criticism and countercriticism; and it means not coercing people with wrong views into submission, but rather convincing them through reasoning. To impose restriction means not allowing others to air different views or to express mistaken opinions; and if they do, to “finish them off in one stroke.” This is not a method of solving contradictions, but one that widens contradictions. To give free rein or to impose restrictions? We must choose one of these two alternative policies. We choose the policy of giving free rein, for it is a policy that will facilitate the consolidation of our country and the development of our culture.

We plan to use this policy of giving free rein to unite with the several million intellectuals and change their current outlook. As I said previously, the overwhelming majority of intellectuals in our country want to make progress and are willing to remold themselves, and they are capable of remolding. The policy we adopt will play a very important role in this. The problem with the intellectuals is first and foremost a problem of thought.<sup>28</sup> To adopt crude measures or coercive methods to deal with problems of thought is harmful rather than beneficial. The remolding of the intellectuals, especially the transformation of their world view, is a process that takes a long period of time. Our comrades must understand that ideological remolding involves long-term, patient, and careful work. We cannot expect to change people’s ideology that they have formed over decades of their lives by just holding a few classes or holding a few meetings. To convince people you can only use persuasion and not coercion. The result of coercion is always that while people may be reduced to submission, they are nevertheless not convinced. To forcibly make people submit simply won’t work. It is permissible to use this method when dealing with the enemy, but it is absolutely impermissible to use it in dealing with comrades and friends. What if we don’t know how to use persuasion? Then we have to learn. We have to learn to overcome the various mistaken ideas through the methods of debate and reasoning.

Letting a hundred flowers bloom is a way to develop art, while letting a hundred schools of thought contend is a way to develop science. This policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend is not only a good way to develop science and art, but, when applied more widely, is also a good way to carry out all our work. It can help us commit fewer mistakes. There are many things we don’t know and therefore do not know how to handle; but through debate

and struggle we can acquire an understanding of these things and will understand how to resolve these problems. As a result of debate between all sorts of different opinions, truth can develop. The same method can be used to deal with venomous, anti-Marxist things, because in struggling against these anti-Marxist things, Marxism can develop. This is development through the struggle of opposites, development that conforms with dialectics.

Haven’t people always talked about the true, the good, and the beautiful?<sup>29</sup> The opposites of the true, the good, and the beautiful are the false, the evil, and the ugly. Without the false, evil, and ugly, there cannot be the true, good, and beautiful. Truth stands in opposition to falsehood.<sup>30</sup> In human society and in the realm of nature, unity invariably divides into different parts; it’s just that under different concrete conditions the contents and form [of such a division] may differ. Erroneous things and ugly phenomena will always exist at any time. And at any time there will always be such opposites as between right and wrong, between the good and the evil, and between the beautiful and the ugly. The same holds for fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds.<sup>31</sup> The relationship between them is one of a unity of opposites and a struggle of opposites. Distinction is possible only when there is comparison. And only when there is distinction and struggle can there be development. Truth develops in its struggle with falsehood. This is the way that Marxism develops. Marxism develops in its struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologies and can only develop through struggle.

We are for the policy of “giving free rein”; so far, rather than being too free, it has not been free enough; we should not be afraid of giving free rein, nor should we be afraid of criticism or poisonous weeds. Marxism is scientific truth, it is not afraid of criticism and cannot be overturned by criticism. The same is true of the Communist Party and the People’s Government; they too, are unafraid of criticism and cannot be overturned by criticism. There will always be things that are wrong, and they are nothing to be afraid of. In the recent period a number of demons and ogres have been put on the stage.<sup>32</sup> On seeing this situation some comrades feel greatly worried. I say it is all right to have a little of this, for a few decades from now such demons and ogres as those who are now on the stage will disappear altogether and you won’t be able to see them even if you want to. We ought to promote what is right and oppose what is wrong; nevertheless, we should not be afraid of people coming into contact with things that are wrong. Merely issuing executive orders, forbidding people to have contact with abnormal or ugly phenomena, forbidding them to be exposed to mistaken ideas, or to watch demons and ogres, cannot solve the problem. Of course, I am not advocating that we promote demons and ogres; what I am saying is “it is all right to have a little.” It is not unusual for certain erroneous things to exist, and there is also no need to be fearful of them. This can help people to learn better how to fight them. Even great storms are nothing to be dreaded. It is in the midst of great storms that human society moves forward.

In our country, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology and anti-Marxist ideology will continue to exist for a long period of time. The socialist system has already been basically established in our country, and we have won a basic victory in

transforming the ownership of the means of production. But we have not yet achieved complete victory on the political and ideological fronts. The question of who will win out in the realm of ideology, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, has not yet been really solved. We still have to wage a protracted struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologies. It would be a mistake not to understand this situation and to abandon the ideological struggle. All mistaken ideas, all poisonous weeds, and all demons and ogres must be criticized, and under no circumstances should they be allowed to spread unchecked. However, such criticism should be fully reasoned, analytical, and convincing; it should not be crude and bureaucratic, or metaphysical and dogmatic.

For a long time now people have leveled a great deal of criticism against dogmatism; this is how it should be. But they have tended to neglect criticizing revisionism.<sup>33</sup> Both dogmatism and revisionism run counter to Marxism. Marxism must move forward and develop as practice develops. It must not stagnate and stop moving; once it comes to a standstill and repeats the same old stuff, it loses its vitality. However, the fundamental principles of Marxism cannot be violated; once they are violated, an error is bound to be made. It is dogmatism to take a metaphysical approach toward Marxism and see it as something rigid. It is revisionism to negate the fundamental principles of Marxism, to negate its universal truth. Revisionism is one type of bourgeois ideology. Revisionists obliterate the distinction between socialism and capitalism, between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. What the revisionists advocate is actually a capitalist line rather than a socialist line. Under the present circumstances, revisionism is more harmful than dogmatism. One of our major tasks on the ideological front right now is to launch a criticism against revisionism.

Eighth, the last point: Party committees in every province, municipality, and autonomous region should take hold of the problem of ideology. This is the point that some comrades present here wish me to take up. At present Party committees in many places have directed no effort, or very little effort, to taking hold of the problem of ideology, mainly because they are too busy. However, this problem must be taken hold of. By "taking hold" I mean that this problem should be put on the agenda and studied. The large-scale, stormy, and turbulent class struggles waged by the masses during the revolutionary period within our country have basically already come to an end, yet there is still class struggle, mainly the class struggle on the political and ideological fronts, and it is still very acute.<sup>34</sup> The question of ideology has now become an extremely important issue. The first secretaries of Party committees in every locality should personally take the problem of ideology in hand; only when they pay serious attention to this problem and study it can it be correctly solved. All these places should hold conferences such as this propaganda conference to discuss local ideological work and the problems related to all its aspects. Not only Party comrades but also people from outside the Party should participate in the conferences, including people who hold different opinions [from us]. The experience of our present conference has demonstrated that this will only do good and not harm to these meetings.

## Notes

1. No text of this speech has ever been made available.
2. For a detailed history of this period and the struggles associated with the Hundred Flowers policy, see R. MacFarquhar (1974); see also the writings of M. Goldman on this period and on the Party policy toward intellectuals. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 15; text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 3; text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 28; text Mar. 1, 1957, note 22; and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 81, for references to recent allusions to this subject in Mao's speeches and writings.
3. See text Feb. 27, 1957, notes 5 and 7.
4. See text Mar. 5, 1956, note 12.
5. Mao appears to be invoking the notion that these delinquent intellectuals who prefer the capitalist line and favor the restoration of the old China are capitulating to the so-called Three Big Mountains that stand athwart the path to success in the socialist transformation of the Chinese people. These three things that Mao mentions here—feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism—are identified by Mao as the essential "enemies to be overthrown in this [i.e., the new democratic] revolution" in April 1948 (see *SW*, IV, p. 235). Interestingly, Mao speaks of these three items in his major speech of this period, the Feb. 27 "On Correctly Handling" speech (see section 1, paragraph 5), and he would also speak more specifically of the "Three Big Mountains" (a phrase derived by way of his coinage of the term "The Two Mountains" in his 1945 essay "The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains") in July 1957 (see text July 9, 1957).
6. This low estimate of the number of diehard reactionary intellectuals who oppose socialism was an estimate that Mao came increasingly to accept in the last half of 1956. It was, however, a controversial assessment, and Mao's expectations here, together with his earlier assessment that the majority of China's petty-bourgeois elements were ready to make the transition to state-controlled, socialism-oriented enterprises, were harshly challenged in the latter half of 1957.
7. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 1, paragraphs 6 and 9.
8. See Mao's formulation of the theory of "poor and blank," text Jan. 20, 1956, note 31.
9. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.
10. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 4, paragraph 4.
11. Here the *Xuandu A*, edition reads: "The poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants."
12. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 83 and surrounding text.
13. See text Mar. 16, 1953, vol. I, note 1.
14. The phrase that Mao uses here (and in quotation marks), "*an jia le hu*," literally means to settle one's family down and put down a household, or homestead.
15. See text Oct. 26, 1949, vol. I, note 1.
16. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.
17. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 4, paragraph 4.
18. The first of these rectification campaigns was the rectification campaign in Yanan in the various CPC-held bases of resistance against Japan in 1942. The targets were subjectivism, sectarianism, and the "eight-legged" writing style in the CPC. It attacked the Wang Ming line. (See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24.) The second one, the one conducted during the War of Liberation, refers to the intra-CPC rectification in 1948, which was conducted in conjunction with the land reform movement in the various liberated areas. This was also known as the *san cha san zheng* (Three Investigations—class distinction, ideology, and work style—and Three Rectifications—organization, ideology, and work style) movement. The third rectification campaign was carried out in the CPC in 1950. Its main purpose was to strengthen the revolutionary ideological education of the large numbers of new Party members while also dispelling the sense of complacency that might otherwise have affected veteran Party members in the euphoria of victory and the possibility of their developing a coercive and "commandist"

work style. Apparently, from early 1957 the issue of commandism and coercive work style indeed developed and remained a problem to be dealt with. Mao discussed the purposes of this rectification at the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee. (See text June 6, 1950, vol. I; see also text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 10.)

19. The fourth rectification campaign was ultimately launched following the promulgation of its guidelines by the Central Committee of the CPC on April 27, 1957, and affirmed by the Supreme State Conference on April 30, 1957. See K. Lieberthal (1976), p. 96, and *RMSC* (1958), pp. 29–30. It should be noted, as we have pointed out in the source note comments here, that when the directive was issued in April 1957, it was described as a directive for an *intra-Party* rectification campaign. However, by the second half of 1957, this had developed into an “all-people” (*quanmin*) rectification campaign, which is how the campaign is described (with the directive coming under it as a heading) in *RMSC* (1958).

20. See *RMSC* (1958), p. 29, section 3, last paragraph.

21. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 43 and text Mar. 1, 1957, note 11, on the first aphorism here; text Feb. 27, 1957, note 26, on the second.

22. This is a not-so-oblique reference to the manner in which the Khrushchev-led CPSU leadership handled the case of assessing and criticizing Stalin. Mao had used precisely this phrase to describe the conduct of the CPSU on this matter in 1956 and 1957. See text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 11, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 37.

23. The *SW*, V (p. 435) note for this reads: “‘On Production by the Army for its Own Support and on the Importance of the Great Movements for Rectification and for Production,’ *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. III.” More specifically, this essay is on pp. 275–279 of *SW*, III.

24. The term Mao uses here is *zhishi renren*, which, strictly speaking, refers to something more than people with determination and aspiration, but to people who are completely devoted to a cause and ready to lay down their lives (*sheshen chengren*) for it. It is equivalent, both semantically and historically, to the term *shishi* in Japanese. The saying is derived from the chapter “Weiling gong” in the book *Lun yu* (Analects of Confucius).

25. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 50; see also text Mar. 1, 1957, note 38.

26. The term here is *za wen*, or writings of miscellaneous forms. This and another term, *san wen* (scattered writings or miscellaneous essays), were popularized during the mid-1920s and the 1930s as genre, usually describing shorter, topical essay-type writings that are often in a much more vernacular language, and are set apart from classical writing in that they do not conform to the patterns and forms previously prescribed for classical poems, *fu*, or novels. The notion of being “miscellaneous” (*za*) or “scattered” (*san*) derives from this juxtaposition.

27. For Lu Xun, see text Apr. 25, 1956, note 15. Lu Xun began to devote himself to the writing of shorter, topical essays, often satirical in character, after 1926, especially in response to the criticism and attack of some members, such as Cheng Fangwu and Li Tiesheng, of the Chuangzao she (Creation Society) in the debate over “revolutionary literature” and the “literature of the proletariat” (*puluo wenxue*) in Shanghai literary circles of the time. See also text Mar. 12, 1957, note 24.

28. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 32.

29. The significance of Mao’s mentioning these three qualities here is that not only are truth, goodness, and beauty (*zhen, shan, mei*) basic goals of life and philosophical entities, but, in the modern Chinese tradition, they are often held up as the fundamental objectives as well as the key principles of artistic and literary (i.e., “intellectual”) creativity.

30. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 18.

31. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38.

32. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.

33. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, paragraph 7.

34. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 1, paragraph 18.

## Telegram to U Win Maung

(March 12, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Mar. 13, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 105 (April 10, 1957), 60. Available English Translation: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Mar. 13, 1957), 1.

President U Win Maung,  
The Union of Burma

Your Excellency:

On receiving the happy news of Your Excellency’s election as President of the Union of Burma, I extend my warm congratulations. May the Union of Burma be prosperous and strong, and may the relations of friendship and cooperation between China and Burma attain even further development.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

## Letter to Zhou Enlai

(Excerpt)

(March 17, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 136. Other Chinese Texts: *Jiaoyu yulu*, pp. 16–17; *JYGM*, 4; *URI* (1976), p. 101. Available English Translations: P. Seybolt (1973), pp. 25–26; *URI* (1976), p. 103.

*The P. Seybolt (1973) source gives the date of July 7, 1957, for the letter. The Jiaoyu yulu and JYGM sources provide no salutation.*

Enlai, XX, XX, and XX:

It is required that ideological and political leadership be strengthened and ideological and political education be improved in both universities and middle schools. We must cut down on [the present] curriculum, restore political courses to the middle schools, and cancel courses on the Constitution.<sup>1</sup> New textbooks on ideology and politics should be compiled. We must resolutely transfer from the Party and governmental systems a whole batch of cadres who are capable and also

suitable for work in schools to work in the universities and middle schools. We must give the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Education the responsibility of assuming leadership in ideological and political work. With regard to these various points, please have the Central Committee discuss [them] once and make a decision. I have arrived in Tianjin.

Mao Zedong  
March 17, 1957<sup>2</sup>

#### Notes

1. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1.
2. These final sentences, starting with “with regard to . . .,” and Mao’s signature, do not appear in the *Jiaoyu yulu* and *JYGM* sources.

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### Speech at Tianjin Municipal Party Members and Cadres Meeting (March 17, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 137–144.

According to the source, Mao was joined on the platform at this meeting by Huang XX, Wu XX, Wan XX, and Li XX.<sup>1</sup> After being introduced by Huang, Mao asked the audience if they had any questions, and Huang urged them to write down questions that they would have for Mao. Mao’s speech then followed.

*This document and the ones that follow show that from March 17 to probably April 1957, Mao “took the show on the road.” As seen in the preceding documents, the CPC was besieged with contradictions in early 1957, some emerging from the Hundred Flowers Campaign, and some quite critical. The imminent task was to find the proper way of handling these contradictions, and Mao had set the guidelines, both theoretically and practically, in his speech of February 27, 1957. Then, having confirmed these guidelines in the March 12 speech at the National Conference on Propaganda Work, Mao was faced with the task of bringing the message out, to affirm for CPC cadres “out in the field” the line that had been adopted at the Center. He apparently took up the responsibility himself and traveled a fairly wide arc from Tianjin to Shandong to Nanjing, Anhui, and finally Shanghai. Mao’s mission was to explain the guideline for resolving contradictions, the continuation of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, and the premises of the CPC rectification that was soon to be launched officially. A key issue in all of this was the question of how cadres within the CPC should approach the Party’s relationship with forces, particularly “democratic” organizations, outside the CPC, especially in the context of the criticism that*

*the CPC was already receiving. Mao’s attitude was basically conciliatory. He warned against the Communists taking too hard a line in their own defense, and against employing harsh measures in dealing with dissident opinions, and proposed that the Communist Party should accept criticism. At the same time he reassured CPC cadres that in the area of politics, the Communist Party was qualified to lead, while it must modestly learn from others in many areas.*

*While on this trip, Mao also remained very much in line with the position on class struggle that had been adopted by the Eighth Party Congress, and that Mao accepted when he made the February 27 and March 12 speeches. This is the position that “class struggle was basically over.” There is little in this speech to suggest that Mao had actively begun the process of criticizing, and eventually repudiating, this position. (See commentary to text Feb. 27, 1957.) Yet it would be incorrect to assume that Mao merely accepted this position without an analysis of the idea. There are delicate clues in these speeches as to the way Mao’s mind could have been working on the subject. For instance, while in the February 27 and March 12 speeches and in this March 17 speech Mao spoke of “class struggle” in general terms, in the March 20 speech at Nanjing he would provide the qualifying description, saying that “the violent mass-based class struggle” was over (emphasis added). Also, in the March 18 speech in Shandong (the next one in this collection), Mao would make another significant qualification. (See text Mar. 18, 1957, source note.) Moreover, in the current speech, particularly in paragraphs 7 and 8, we can discern that Mao was thinking through the theoretical implications and not just the policy issues of the position that class struggle had drawn to a close. At the beginning of paragraph 9, Mao alludes to “all sorts of things that have been revealed because of [the position that] class struggle has basically come to an end.” Thus it is possible, we think, to see here very early signs of a critical attitude that would eventually bring Mao, under the force of developing situations in April and May, to adopt a position that repudiated what he had previously accepted and apparently supported. We must, however, be careful not to draw premature conclusions on this issue.*

What shall I talk about? Comrades, what questions do you have?

There are many comrades here with whom I have never met. Today [I come to] discuss a few things with you comrades, and I hope that you will raise some questions for me [to talk about]. Since your questions have not yet come up, and there is still time, let me first say a few things. Let’s just talk about “Letting a hundred flowers bloom,” “letting a hundred schools of thought contend.”<sup>2</sup> Is that all right?

[I want to talk about that] because this is a problem with which our entire Party is concerned, and with which everyone in society is concerned; the democratic personages in the society<sup>3</sup> and people of all circles are concerned. Among our comrades, opinions regarding this problem may not be entirely unanimous. Some comrades feel that this guideline is acceptable, and they approve of it; some other comrades [may feel that it] looks to be all right, but they just have that bit of uneasiness in their minds. [Their fear is:] “Let a hundred flowers bloom”—there will be many flowers; maybe something bad would emerge, and how can we let that happen! “Let a hundred schools contend”—we, the Communist Party, count only as one “school”; if we let ninety-nine other schools lay siege to us, how are we going to make it? [Am I right?] Is there such a problem? Comrades, there are those who have a better understanding of the problem, there are those who understand a bit but not very much, and then there are those who are doubtful [about

it] and those who do not approve [of it]. There are all sorts of opinions in our Party.

What kind of work has our Party been doing primarily in the past? Don't we have the work of construction today? [Well], in the last few decades, our primary work has been the work of class struggle. Class struggle is not the work of construction. Class struggle is to overthrow several systems, namely, imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, feudalism,<sup>4</sup> systems like that. That was a revolution. The socialist revolution is to overthrow the capitalist system. All these things belong to the sphere of class struggle. Fighting Chiang Kai-shek, Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,<sup>5</sup> suppressing counterrevolutionaries,<sup>6</sup> the land reform,<sup>7</sup> and, in the cities, also the democratic reform, and [let's not forget] socialist transformation—all these belong to the sphere of class struggle. That was pretty grand, wasn't it?

In the last few decades, since the beginning of this Party of ours, up to the first half of last year, [it has been a matter of] socialist transformation. There was this upsurge in the latter half of the year before last and again in the first half of this year<sup>8</sup>—at the time the sound of the gongs and drums reached the very skies, and things were very exciting<sup>9</sup>—our Party's energy has chiefly been put in this area. This struggle took a very long time. We can start counting from the time of our forefathers—the time of the Opium War, the year 1840<sup>10</sup>—let us say we start counting our opposition to imperialism from that time on, and down to 1940 makes it 100 years. Up to last year, 1956, would make it 116 years. [It took] that much time [to change] the superstructure [and] the relations of production; to change the old relations of production into new relations of production; to change the old superstructure into a new superstructure. The relations of production are primarily a matter of the ownership system. Our ownership system now is a socialist ownership system. The superstructure is the government, the state power's organs, the army. All this has changed; this is a very great struggle. In the past, when we were engaged in this struggle, people didn't believe in us at the beginning. Who would believe that the Communist Party could succeed? At the beginning, when the Party first came into existence, people didn't believe; they didn't believe either in the middle period, because in the middle period we experienced defeat and failure. We went through the defeat of the Northern Expedition war,<sup>11</sup> and after that, the failure of the land revolution.<sup>12</sup> We went through two major defeats, and people didn't believe [in us]. How about now? Now people believe [in us]; they say the Communist Party is capable. Capable in what ways? [They say:] You are capable in politics, and you are capable in a military sense; you have these two areas [of superiority]. People say that the Communist Party has these two fields, and it can win in the examination. Or did the imperialists beat [us] in the examination? In comparison with us, in the examination against us, who has won? Did we win, or did Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang? Who won? Who is triumphant and who is defeated? We won. You won, so what more is there to say? That's very good. As for construction, people have always said that they fear the Communist Party is no good [in this regard]. Now what? We have carried out revolution and we have carried out construction at the same time. Just now I said "chiefly"—we had the class struggle chiefly, [but that] doesn't mean that there was no construction. There was construction. We don't have expertise in this area, but though we

say we have no expertise, we still know a bit. That's because in the past when we were engaged in the class struggle, we picked up a bit, more or less, in the base areas.<sup>13</sup> However, when it comes to building large factories, designing, applying, equipping—when it comes to that stuff, we know nothing. [We need] science, the natural sciences, engineering technology; we have to teach university students; we have very few university professors. How many university professors are in the audience? Are there any? Please raise your hands, those of you who are university professors. Not one? Aren't there any? There's got to be a few. One; there's one over there. So pitifully few! Comrades. (Huang XX interjects: Some just didn't raise their hands.) Some didn't raise their hands? Sure, now that you do not have much power you do not dare to raise your hands.

Right now there are people who say that the Communist Party is no good at promoting science, the Communists are no good as teachers in the universities, the Communists are no good as doctors in the hospitals, the Communists are no good as engineers or technicians promoting engineering sciences in the factories. There's just these few ["no goods"]. How does this go? Did you hear these things? Comrades, I have heard words like that. I say that these words are correct; they are true to the facts. That's true—we have no scientists, no engineering and technical personnel, no doctors, no university professors. We don't even have that many teachers in the middle schools. We have some people in the area of literature and art, but even there it is a thirty-seventy split. That is like Stalin's committing errors; [didn't we say that] Stalin was 30 per cent wrong and 70 per cent correct?<sup>14</sup> We have 30 per cent know-how, and 70 per cent ignorance. [Even] in the area of literature and art, the advantage lies outside the Communist Party. Almost all the university professors are outside the Communist Party; the same goes for doctors. Isn't that so? There are two million people in the educational circles, [including] in the universities, the secondary schools, and the primary schools. By the "teachers" among the so-called public education personnel we mean more than two million people.<sup>15</sup> What does the Communist Party do? The Communist Party nominally plays the role of leader in the schools, but in reality it is incapable of leading, because you just don't know how to [run education]. That is what we ought to acknowledge; this is one area in which we are just no good!

They are correct in what they say, but what they say also does not cover the whole picture. I say that they are correct in half, and there is another half in which they are incorrect. The Communist Party can't lead; that is correct. The Communist Party, [however], can lead, too; and that they said nothing about. Why is it that the Communist Party can lead, too? I say, if we have no knowledge, then how about we let you do it? The Kuomintang also knows nothing. "Generalissimo Chiang,"<sup>16</sup> Chiang Kai-shek, also knows nothing. The Kuomintang, as a party, is about where we are with regard to those several fields that were mentioned just a moment ago. It, too, was engaged in class struggle. This party specializes in promoting class struggle, and it doesn't do any construction. While we were engaged in class struggle, over these last seven years we also promoted some construction on the side. In twenty years [the Kuomintang government] promoted only several tens of thousands tons of steel. We've been at it for seven years, counting this year, eight

years, and how many tons of steel do we have? We could reach five million tons of steel. According to the plan [we should have] 4.12 million tons, but we might surpass that.<sup>17</sup> Maybe [we] wouldn't reach five million tons, and [we'll have] only four million-plus tons. Then, [let's see,] they got only several tens of thousands tons in twenty years, and we have four million tons in eight years. This is to say we have promoted plans.<sup>18</sup> In addition, the Finance Department feeds these people, gives them rice to eat. The Kuomintang does not have any plan on the one hand, and doesn't provide rice on the other. Comrades, if I didn't eat rice, I couldn't talk, and [if you didn't eat rice] you couldn't be listening. No matter [who you are], a scientist, a university professor, a doctor, or an engineer, [you've] got to eat. The Kuomintang has rice, but it doesn't give it to those people to feed them. It specializes in promoting class struggle. [It gave the rice] to the army, to the politicians. I say, we have one Li Fuchun, and another, Li Xiannian.<sup>19</sup> Are there two others like them in the world? One manages planning, the other is in charge of finances. They have put all these scientists, university professors, engineers, doctors, all of them into the plan. Then they spin out long-range plans, annual plans, what not, and it is on this that they give them leadership—they lead them with their plans. What else is there that makes it possible for [the Communist Party] to lead them? There is politics with which [we] can lead them; we will lead them with Marxism-Leninism. However, in any case, right now we have no expertise, but in the things of the world, expertise can be learned, and right now we have to learn. At this moment the work of class struggle is basically drawn to a close; when we say [“]basically[”] drawn to a close we mean, [of course] that it is not entirely ended. The large-scale mass-character class struggle is basically at an end. [This is something] we have said earlier at the “Eighth Congress.”<sup>20</sup> Our Party as a whole calls for promoting this construction, and [for us to do that] we must learn science, learn to be professors in the universities, learn to conduct experiments in the scientific organs, to study science. [We] must learn to become engineers, technicians, and doctors, to struggle against nature, and lead the whole society in the struggle against nature, so as to change the outlook of China. After the political outlook has been changed, we must [also] change the economic outlook. We took several decades' time to change the political outlook; to change the economic outlook—to make a bit of a general change so that [things will be] somewhat different from [the way they were] before—will also take several decades. [This will be like] when in the past we didn't know how to carry out class struggle. Who knew how to [carry out] class struggle? Not too many people knew. I for one didn't know. I was a primary school teacher, who didn't even think about joining the Communist Party. [I] believed in the stuff that the capitalists' propaganda fed us, and I entered a bourgeois school, believed in that whole set of things. Later, I guess it was being forced to go up to Liang Mountain.<sup>21</sup> How about you? [I guess] you all made up your minds long ago; once your mothers gave birth you became Communists, did you? If to be a Communist [is just like] passing on a responsibility, my mother never passed that responsibility on to me.<sup>22</sup> So, then, it was by learning, wasn't it? Land reform, whatever; all that [we] knew nothing about, nothing about anything, about fighting a war. After many defeats, through many changes

and transformations, and with the increase in experience, then we learned, and became good at promoting class struggle. Isn't that so? We went through many defeats, [didn't we?] Now, we want to promote construction, and it's going to take several decades too. Can we [expect to] pay less of a price than when we learned to carry out class struggle? That's because we paid a very heavy price indeed. We had several failed revolutions. The Revolution of 1927 failed.<sup>23</sup> Before the Long March of ten thousand *li* we had lost all the base areas in the South,<sup>24</sup> and there was not much work in the white areas either.<sup>25</sup> That was because [of a] “Leftist” [deviation]. The failure of 1927 was owing to a Rightist [deviation]. The class struggle went [too far to the] Right. What came later, then, was owing to the Leftist [deviation].<sup>26</sup> With these two lines we learned. That's why Chen Duxiu and Wang Ming<sup>27</sup>—(Chen Duxiu therefore went over to the enemy. Later, this person died. Wang Ming, still, hadn't gone over to the enemy's side)—no matter what, people like that bring our Party a great deal of good—not they as individual people, but the movements that they led failed at a certain time. This gave the whole Party, and the people of the country as a whole, a very important education. So, the cost was very great. Will we pay such a heavy price now in our construction? For instance, in the case of Hungary, with its erstwhile leaders, its class struggle was a failure, and its construction work was also a failure. But because of the trouble of last October; I say the trouble was good. Many people don't like this Hungary at all, but I'm very happy about it.<sup>28</sup> A bad thing is a good thing. Is it better for there to be trouble in Hungary, or not? There is no such thing as a choice between having trouble or not; in any case, if there is to be trouble [there will be trouble], and that's that. A sore that contains pus is bound to break out! As I see it we can take [advantage,] because we have learned that it took paying a heavy price before we could learn to [carry out] class struggle. Therefore, now if we are not promoting Right-deviationist opportunism, why is it that we paid a very heavy price?<sup>29</sup> Isn't it that when [we] engaged in Left-deviationist opportunism we suffered for it? [When we] engaged in dogmatism, in Leftist-deviationist opportunism, we suffered for it. If now we didn't repeat the mistakes of the past, then in the time of construction we may be able to pay less of a price; we can avoid the situation [that took place] in Hungary.

Let us now think long and hard [about the situation]; we have great need for giving some thought to the situation that is called<sup>30</sup> [“]the class struggle has basically come to an end.[”] There is such a thing. In the past when the class struggle was at a climax, such as when the socialist transformation, or the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, was at a climax, people couldn't see quite clearly our shortcomings. [They are] our shortcomings, [and] we know [them well]. In the areas of construction, of science, of building schools, we [are not particularly capable]; on these things people have to forgive us; [on the whole] people are rather forgiving toward us. In the society today, that opera is no longer sung.<sup>31</sup> Is it [still] there, Wan XX? That is suppressing counterrevolutionaries. There is not much of that drama left. But there is still a bit. There are military commanders in the audience, and military cadres. If there were no more of that opera left to sing at all, then for what use are you being kept around? Naturally there is still some of that



opera left to sing, but at the moment we are not singing it. This is called keeping the troops for a thousand days.<sup>32</sup> Right now we have not heard any cannons fired, so we have let many of the problems in society be exposed. There is a problem; because of these gongs and drums, these gongs and drums of the class struggle, there is much fanfare and excitement. The gongs and drums have been making enough noise to reach the skies since the earlier half of last year, so later the “Eighth Congress” drew a conclusion, and thus this thing floated to the top, and was placed on the agenda, our Party’s agenda. Then people doubly expected of us; what is it that you the Communist Party do? [They want to know.] We say: “Comrades, I, too, have a skill; we call it class struggle. Ha! Ha! Don’t always look down on me; I’ve done it for several decades, too.”<sup>33</sup> (Laughter) But if we keep on just saying this, it wouldn’t be so good, because people [have already] conceded this item to you; they say: [“]You are good at politics, and at military affairs. You have worked at it for several decades, and you have worked hard and endured much.[”] That is no problem; our names are listed on the book of merits. And yet, comrade, now you are teaching at a university; how do you teach? How do you do surgical operations in a hospital? [Well, you say], I haven’t learned [these things]. How do you run a middle school? How do you resolve this scientific problem or that? What is atomic physics? Engineering, design, application, equipment installation, circulation, and so on—that stuff we simply know nothing about. We have just begun to learn. It will take a period of time to change this situation; it will probably take three five-year plans, at least another fifteen years, before there can be a transformation.<sup>34</sup> An even greater change will take an even longer time, because this thing has to be learned, and it takes time [to learn]. Well, then, can we learn it? I think we can; we are bound to. There is nothing tricky or fancy about it; with such things as natural science, with surgery, if you haven’t learned [how to do it] you wouldn’t be able to do it. [If] I were to operate, it would be like a *xiangsheng* performer talking about surgery,<sup>35</sup> and I would be sure to become a doctor like that. However, if you would just learn, you will be able to achieve the goal of learning. Are there people learning now? There are people learning now, and we are going to send out [even more] people to learn. For example, the university student today, today’s Communist Party member, or Communist Youth League member,<sup>36</sup> they are learning. In another fifteen years they would be the university professors or the engineers. Perhaps it wouldn’t [even] take fifteen years. There are fifteen years [for] them [to] graduate.<sup>37</sup> Then there are today’s scientists, engineers, university professors, and middle-school teachers; some of them are willing to join the Communist Party, and where the conditions are appropriate we can accept them into the Communist Party. Therefore, given another three five-year plans we can learn. [Between this and] the class struggle, which is easier to learn? I think perhaps this thing is easier to learn. It’s got to be easier than the fighting in the war, or the suppression of counterrevolutionaries. In that suppression of counterrevolutionaries, you can’t even see them [too clearly]; if you say there aren’t any, some will show up; if you say there are some, they don’t have names [branded on their foreheads] saying that they are counterrevolutionaries. [In the] Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea [movement we] had to fight the Americans’ style of war; in

reality we had little confidence [in winning]. The United States is such a big heap, and we took such a small [force, like one] finger, to fight with it. As I see it, it will take [a person] to graduate from middle school, go to university for five years, and then, on coming out [of the university], work for five to ten years, and then [that person] can be a university professor, or an engineer, or an engineering technician, or he or she may even qualify to do surgery. That’s why some people [who] cannot perceive all these changes [say that] perhaps the Communist Party will never learn. I think we can learn, and right now our task is just that, to learn. Then who is [our] teacher? [Our] teacher is none other than the democratic personages outside the Party right now. They are our teachers. We will learn something from them. As long as our attitude is good and we don’t put up bureaucratic airs,<sup>38</sup> don’t put on the [posture that says:] [“]I’ve been making revolution all these years; where were you all this time?[”] and just don’t bring up all this stuff, [we can learn from them]. We [should] pack up all that stuff, because all that is rather meaningless. What [“]several decades[”]? Let the historians write about that. Everyday, when we meet each other we say those two sentences: [“]I have been making revolution for several decades[”] and so on,] and that is it; there is nothing else. Then that makes it as if it were not done, because that thing is over, that thing is basically over [—I mean] the question of class struggle. Right now we are talking about science. If you have some strong points, I’ll learn from you. Do I know anything? I don’t know anything. [Let us] first admit that we don’t know anything.<sup>39</sup> Then what have you been doing in the past? Then [we can say] because in the past [we were] promoting class struggle, we were a bit busy. That answer should be enough, just one sentence. That is that [we] failed to study when [we were] young.<sup>40</sup> Because [we] failed to study when [we were] young, we do not know anything [now]. Can you teach [me] now? Some teachers are not quite so straightforward, but as long as we ask them to teach us nicely, they’ll teach us. I remember that in the old days when a person started with a teacher he had to burn incense and prostrate himself in homage, and kowtow three times.<sup>41</sup> Does that still happen in Tianjin? Perhaps there still is something like that [in Tianjin]; is there still some kowtowing? (Huang XX interjects: No, we don’t have to kowtow anymore.) So, there’s no more kowtowing. (Huang: [Now we] sign teacher-apprentice contracts.) So, now you sign teacher-apprentice contracts. Now this ordeal of kowtowing is dispensed with. But let me say, if we have to do it, what shall we do? If [they] demand it, if [they demand that] we kowtow three times before [they] teach us, then would we kowtow or not? At such a moment the problem arises. If [they] insist on that rule? I say we should kowtow three times [to them]. You want to learn some skills, and his rule is that you must kowtow! Right now there is no need to kowtow, but [we must] learn from them earnestly and sincerely, and [we must] respect the teacher. [We must] respect them! [We must] study hard! That would be tantamount to kowtowing. This spirit is necessary, still. Right now we have in our Party a habit that is not quite good, and that is that our minds are filled with that [phrase of] the past: several decades [of making revolution]. New habits have not yet been nurtured and formed [to replace the old], and when there is nothing to do we become idle. What do you do here [in Tianjin]? Do you play *majong* or do you play cards?<sup>42</sup> Or is it going to the theater or cinema?<sup>43</sup>

Or dancing? After all, there is nothing to do. We have not formed the habit of reading, of studying. We have not put our surplus energies into studying. This is [speaking of the] general. As for our personnel in the schools, the factories, the scientific research organizations, the hospitals, [and so on,] as long as you can learn and study it would be good if you would [do so, even if you can] learn only a bit; it would be good if you could just understand a bit of the content [of the organization]. If you don't understand anything [about the place] and you are there to do leadership work, how can you blame people for saying that we are no good? If you know nothing at all, you must learn; and if you put on those airs, it wouldn't be good. We ought to learn. Let a hundred flowers bloom; [that] has to do with the area of art. There is such a guideline; that's just it, but over a period it was particularly eye-catching. Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend; that is a competition. What happens if something bad comes out of the blooming? Right now there are many bad things, many weird arguments.<sup>44</sup> I say it is all right; with regard to these weird arguments, all we need to do is criticize them and that should do. People are afraid that the flowers that bloom would not be good-looking, that this flower is poisonous. [They say, about] letting a hundred schools contend, that the Communist Party is just one school and there'll be another ninety-nine schools besieging us. Of course the intention [of the policy] is not so. In the social sciences, on the question of world view, there aren't a hundred schools contending; rather, it is a contention between two schools. One school is the proletariat; the other school is the bourgeoisie. Within these hundred schools, if we were to categorize them by their nature, we can divide them into [these] two schools and let them contend. In the world today, [there is] bourgeois ideology; there is an ideological struggle between these two schools. Does the petty bourgeoisie count as a school in the realm of social sciences? Of course it can count as a school. However, on the fundamental point, the petty bourgeoisie is in the same school as the bourgeoisie; it belongs to the category of the bourgeoisie. Is there contending within the school of the Communist Party? In fact there is. In history there was this school [called the] Second International.<sup>45</sup> It held up [the signboard of] Marxism over its head, [but] in reality it was revisionist. There is still revisionism now—Yugoslavia. Are there any [revisionists] in our country? Yes, we do have this type in our country; we can find people like that [here]. These people can be labeled Right-deviationist opportunists. We need not [go out and] say that we are talking about there being revisionists in China, as if we had a revisionist faction. Right now we do not have [such a thing,] but in the past we did. Chen Duxiu was just such a thing.<sup>46</sup> Chen Duxiu was a revisionist, a Right-deviationist opportunist. [So was] the latter-day Wang Ming—[Wang Ming in his] later years. Do comrades know about the errors of the Second Wang Ming line?<sup>47</sup> The second time, that is, in the early years of the period of fighting against Japan, the early phase of the War of Resistance;<sup>48</sup> that was revisionism. At this time we can [give an] example: didn't Zhong Dianfei write an essay? He wrote about the question of films, [in which he] negated everything, [negated] the achievements of the past.<sup>49</sup> Then there are some comrades who affirm everything and cannot see shortcomings or mistakes. [They] won't allow other people to criticize the shortcomings and mistakes in our work.

Who are these people? They are Chen XX and Ma XX.<sup>50</sup> On January 7, there was an article in *Renmin ribao* [written by] Chen XX and Ma XX. I say that these comrades are good-hearted and well-intentioned. They are loyal to the core and seek to pursue what is right. They are protective of the Party. When they saw the gongs and drums outside making noise to high heaven opposing us, they volunteered to come out and fight even though they received no orders. These people who volunteered to come out and fight are people with spirit. They abhor the things that they cannot stand. And we ought to recognize that this is their good point, but their guideline and method are wrong. Are there such things in Tianjin? You can go dig around a bit. "Left" and Right; that which affirms everything and that which negates everything; these are two types of one-sidedness. To affirm everything we did, without analyzing it—this thing is wrong. The dogmatists of the past were just like that. Rakosi was like that, and so was Stalin.<sup>51</sup> Can you say Stalin was entirely dogmatist? No, you can't say that. This man, he did a lot of things, but he did have [some] dogmatism. This dogmatism of his influenced China, making us fail in our revolution during a certain period. If we were to do things as he bade us, we would not have been able to carry out the revolution in the later stage, and we wouldn't be holding a meeting here. Who built the building? Not us. We wouldn't have had the opportunity [to hold this meeting] because it would still be the government of the Kuomintang [and the] imperialists [running things in China]. Stalin had [things on] both sides; he also had [some] dogmatism—[wanting us to] transplant the [experience of the] Soviet Union in everything. We must learn from the Soviet Union. The things of the Soviet Union, both the mistakes and the achievements, are very worthy of being learned from. The slogan that we propose now is to learn from the Soviet Union's advanced experiences.<sup>52</sup> We didn't say that we should learn from their backward experiences. When did we ever propose such a slogan? However, even though it was not proposed, some things like that came over with the [good ones] all the same, [especially] in the last seven years. Nonetheless, in general, we can't say that we weren't selective at all . . . <sup>53</sup> because we have been critical of dogmatism, and the source of dogmatism comes from Stalin.

With regard to the many types of opinion in the society—the many kinds of things that have been exposed because the class struggle is basically at an end, all sorts of dissatisfaction, [such as] dissatisfaction with the Communist Party—[people] saying that we are not capable—these are things that I just discussed. To start with, if [we are] no good [we] should admit that [we are] no good. [People] say that we cannot lead [in the field of] science.<sup>54</sup> In terms of the specifics of the profession, we [indeed] are unable to lead. However, in terms of the progress that science must make as a whole, in that area we can lead; we can [use] politics to lead. [We'll use the] state planning to lead it. That is why we have a task, to study. What guideline should we adopt with regard to these mistaken arguments? There are many mistaken arguments in the society. We should adopt the guidelines of "letting a hundred flowers bloom, letting a hundred schools contend." We shall resolve them in discussion, in dialogue—which one is correct and which one is incorrect. We have only one such method—all other methods are inappropriate.

But right now in our Party there is a sentiment, and that is to keep thinking about the method of the past, or what one may call the military way of doing things.<sup>55</sup> If you don't obey, then you'll be handled by military justice, hauled outside, and just beheaded. [They say:] "Just handle by military law, since we are used to that kind of simple methods." [That is] the method of Wan XX. (Transcriber's note: This refers to the methods of suppressing counterrevolutionaries.) This method no longer works. It is [a method] for dealing with the class enemy. [They say:] We are dealing with the class enemy, with those people who owe debts of blood or something like that, so [we can simply] have them dragged out and beheaded, to satisfy the military law. It is because we are accustomed to this kind of method; we are used to it, [because] we have been engaged [in class struggle] for several decades. [But] even in class struggle itself things are not really quite that simple—there are many other more careful methods. It's just that when it comes to handling enemies we have very much of this surge of energy. But now, we are not dealing with the enemy, but with problems among the people.<sup>56</sup> [We are dealing with] the democratic parties, democratic personages with no party affiliations, national capitalists,<sup>57</sup> university professors, doctors, [and so on,] and this simple method just won't work. This is another set [of methods]. We must go through study. [Where] they are correct, such as in the things of science, of technology, we have only one way out, and that is to learn from them. And if we would learn, it is entirely possible that we could learn [it all]. Given ten or fifteen years, we will learn, [and then we will] lead them not only in politics but in technology as well. As for the many diverse kinds of opinions, we can [broadly] divide them into two categories. One is with regard to science. Whether or not we understand [science]—we do not now, but in the future we will—it will still be this same guideline, [i.e.,] we cannot "do things by military law"; the method of Wan XX won't work. We can only adopt the guideline of "letting a hundred flowers bloom" and let everybody discuss things. In every science there can be several schools; [let them] contend [among themselves] and then truth will emerge. The same is true in the problems of the social sciences. In all things that belong to the realm of science, [we must] use the method of debate, and not the method that says, if something doesn't look right to us, we simply go over and straighten it out.<sup>58</sup> Rather, we must change this, and we need a process of persuasion. There is nothing at all scary about these arguments; what is there to be afraid of? How is Hu Feng? Wasn't Hu Feng arrested [and put into prison]? That was because he promoted a clandestine organization.<sup>59</sup> Hu Feng is still alive, and there's bound to be a day when we'll have to let him go. After sitting in jail for a period, his error would be atoned and his sentence would be fulfilled.<sup>60</sup> But Hu Feng's thought did not die. In the society, Hu Feng's thought is in the heads of many people, and that is bourgeois thought. With regard to questions in the area of science, in the area of ideology, of the spirit, such as [the question of] religion, [of] Marxism-Leninism, [of] whether [one has a] bourgeois world view or [a] proletarian world view, and in the area of art, in such matters we cannot use the methods of brute force. There are two methods; one is called suppress into submission, and the other is called persuade into submission. Between these two methods we have to choose one. Shall we adopt the method of suppression, or the

method of persuasion?<sup>61</sup> Today some of our comrades cannot wait; they seem to have the urge to go and suppress for a bit. [But if you] suppress, [they] would not submit; suppression cannot get people into submission. All it can do is to suppress the problem such that we are put in a position of disadvantage, and then another comes;<sup>62</sup> he puts one up on the account and [says] the Communist Party has committed an error. You beat the Americans back across the thirty-eighth parallel; that was using a method of suppression; that was correct.<sup>63</sup> [Against] the counterrevolutionaries you used the method of suppression; that was correct. With regard to the Kuomintang [and] Chiang Kai-shek, and the landlord class, you used the method of suppression, [but] why are you using the methods of suppression against science? Against literature and art? Against religion? Against dissenting opinions? If we used the method of suppression, we would be unreasonable, and we would not have a leg to stand on. We would lose. That is why we should adopt the method of persuasion instead. Then, if [we wish to persuade] but we don't know how to speak, what should we do? We learn, that's what. In the South we have a saying: The beggar hits the dog. What we call *jiao hua zi* [beggar] you call *yao fan de*. To him, hitting the dog is a special technology. Back home we have a saying, "*jiao hua zi* beating the dog; he practices at this field all day." Right now we don't know or understand much, we don't know how to handle the situation, we don't know how to argue and persuade. We will learn to argue and to be persuasive, learn to write persuasive, reasonable articles, learn to make persuasive reports. ["I am just [like that; one head of steam], rushing ahead." One time a comrade said to me: "Why bother with so much reasoning? I am not used to that. I am just like that, one head of steam rushing ahead."<sup>64</sup> He said he was just a head of steam. I said, your head of steam cannot resolve problems. Even if you had two, three heads of steam, you could not resolve problems. [Instead] you must analyze, study [the problem, then] when you write you would have the power of persuasion. As for having all sorts of erroneous opinions published in the papers and magazines, and having forums, criticisms, and discussions—will that put our country into disorder and topple the people's government? I say it will not, absolutely not. This is because they are not counterrevolutionaries; they are not spies and special agents.<sup>65</sup> The majority among them are willing to cooperate with us, and even the extremely small minority who are hostile toward us are not spies. Nonetheless, they are hostile toward us. Many people still do not believe in the Marxist world view; they learned a bit of it, but in reality they do not believe in it. Then there are some who believe in it a bit, but not completely. This includes some Communists. In our Party there are comrades who have some [Marxism] but have not completely learned Marxism through and through.<sup>66</sup> [They] still do not understand [fully]. See, there are people with both types of one-sidedness. [There are those who are] dogmatists, affirming everything, and won't let anybody else say anything bad or critical; even though we do have shortcomings, other people aren't suppose to say anything. Then there are those of the other type, [for whom] everything is bad; [they] negate everything. We can see that those two types of one-sidedness, both kinds of metaphysical [viewpoints], do indeed exist.

We are now issuing the *Cankao xiaoxi* [Reference news].<sup>67</sup> All of you comrades in the audience have seen this thing, haven't you? Not quite so many [of you] I guess? Really? So many. People are bound to say things about this; [they will say that] the Communist Party and the People's Government are volunteering their services to the imperialists, that they are not charging a plumb cent but are publishing a newspaper on behalf of the imperialists at no charge to criticize the Communist Party itself; isn't that so? It would appear so. I read it every day. Many things are critical of us. Right now we are going to expand its circulation to 300,000 copies. It is possible that a million people would read it. [In the countryside we are] issuing it on the *xian* level for people to read. To what level will it be circulated in the cities? This is to temper us.<sup>68</sup> Both inside and outside the Party, people ought to be tempered. We ought to broaden our horizons. [We should be] tempered to know something about the world outside, about how the enemy scolds us, about what things are like in the enemy's house. [People] say there will be disorder. [I say] there will not be disorder. [To fear disorder] is to lock ourselves up in a room, close our eyes, close our ears. That would be very dangerous. That is why some people say that as soon as the circulation of *Reference News* is expanded, the flames of the reaction will flare up even more. That is why that comrade wished that every item of international news [in the publication] be accompanied with a comment. (That is something your own Comrade Huang XX of the municipal [Party] committee told me.) That would be too much trouble. Comrades! [Imagine] writing comments on every item! Our purpose is precisely to get people to think for themselves, to convene forums, to discuss things. Perhaps many weird arguments would come up; I think that the more weird arguments, the better. Just don't let yourselves be locked up, blockaded. Marxism was created and developed out of the struggle with forces that opposed it, and it must continue to develop even now. For instance, we are handling things in China; if we do not grow and develop, we wouldn't be able to handle things successfully. When Marxism's principles and theories are brought to China to be implemented, they must carry the flavor of China, and things have to be resolved according to the conditions of concrete problems. [Some people] have no confidence in letting a hundred schools contend and are afraid that with a hundred flowers blooming some poison will be emitted.<sup>69</sup> I don't see it that way at all. If we adopted a method of suppression and did not let the hundred schools contend or the hundred flowers bloom, that would make our nation unlively, simplistic, unreasonable. It would make our Party avoid studying the ways to be reasonable and persuasive; we would not learn to persuade. As for [the questions:] Can Marxism be criticized? Can the People's Government be criticized? Can the Communist Party be criticized? Can veteran cadres be criticized? I think there is nothing that cannot be criticized; whoever wishes to criticize [can do so as far as I am concerned.] What kind of people are afraid of criticism? Chiang Kai-shek's party [is afraid of criticism]; Chiang Kai-shek's fascism [is afraid of being criticized]. We are Marxist-Leninists. They are the Kuomintang and we are the Communist Party. Their "veteran cadres" such as Chiang Kai-shek—they call them "veteran cadres" too—those "veteran cadres" cannot be criticized! That's because they are not standing firmly on solid ground. We have more capital. Here

in this place [of ours] we don't have [anybody or anything] that is idle and just plops down for several decades. [We've been working hard, but] when we do our work, we shouldn't hang it on our faces every day and say ["I've been working [at this] for several decades."] And yet the people, they know. Are the veteran cadres that vulnerable to criticism? Would they topple with just a breath of criticism? One puff and they are down? You are all veteran cadres! Are there many new cadres? I guess there are some. Right now we are focusing on talking about the veteran cadres. I think [they] can't be toppled by blowing, by an ordinary wind, unless it is a twelfth-grade typhoon.<sup>70</sup> A twelfth-grade typhoon can blow a tree down, or a house, but I don't think even that can blow down a veteran cadre. Even a twelfth-grade typhoon won't blow down the Communist Party, or the People's Government, or Marxism, or the veteran cadres, or even new cadres, if they are correct [in their ways]. As for your mistakes, it's just right for it to get a little bit of wind; there should be a bit of wind. We don't have an electric fan in the house! That's because it's wintertime. When summer comes we've got to get an electric fan here. I guess in the summer people are going to have some problems. Let me use washing one's face as an analogy. Do you wash your face once every three days? Or once every day? Such a thing no one cares to study. No one studies why people have to wash their faces once a day, or even twice a day in some cases. That's because of dust! That's because not only is the skin a line between [yourselves] and the outside—[you may call it a] "thirty-eighth parallel"<sup>71</sup>—it is in contact with the air. It is "the Yellow River as a boundary." Thus it makes up a face. Moreover, it is also a secreting organ. It secretes so many things. As I see it, the face is the dirtiest thing in the whole body. That's because it has seven holes, from which certain things exude, and there are also many other tiny secreting organs. Therefore it has to be washed every day. Then, doesn't the Party have to be washed?<sup>72</sup> The Party must wash its face too! The poisonous weeds are nothing to be afraid of;<sup>73</sup> it is not scary to have anti-Marxist-Leninist ideas exposed; rather, that would be useful. We need to have those things come out to face us, so we can struggle against them, and [then] we can develop. This is like our taking vaccination shots.<sup>74</sup> Just now we said that the circulation of *Reference news* has to be expanded. Don't we now advocate that people ought to take vaccination shots? What is the vaccine? It is a virus, a microbe. We plant just a bit of that something inside the person, and let the two fight it out, and an immunity will be produced, and then later the person would not have chicken pox. Those who have the measles will not have chicken pox because they have developed a "power of immunity." It is very dangerous for a person not to have any illness all his life. Someone wrote an article that said that I [didn't know] what I was talking about, and said something about small illnesses, or whatever. What I said is that for the people who have not had any illness all their lives, they would be in great danger if one day they do fall ill. That is because too few viruses and bacteria have crept inside them. As for people who are regularly sick, those people are more secure because they have struggled. Only when the proletarian ideology struggles against the bourgeois ideology can it develop; only when Marxism struggles against anti-Marxist

thought can it develop.<sup>75</sup> This is precisely why we need to let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools contend. For all kinds of art to develop we must let a hundred flowers bloom, to compete with one another, to make for comparisons. Let the hundred schools contend [also], to compete with one another, to criticize, to discuss, and then, only then, will the correct things develop. Therefore we should not be afraid of this; don't be frightened. We must go out into the fresh air; we mustn't always stay in the house equipped with heated air.

Then there is also [the matter of] the cooperatives. I hear that that too is [an object of] doubt on some people's parts. Now all kinds of doubting thoughts have come out. For some people to say strange things is no cause for alarm. We will have to slowly convince those people who doubt. This cooperativization will take five years of work, and last year was only one year. In terms of the nationwide scope, it will take five years before this socialist system can be consolidated; at least five years. On the whole, we will need at least five years or so to consolidate the ownership system of socialism, to get used to it. Only with the creation of the cooperative can the per *mu* output of the poor peasant equal that of the well-to-do middle peasants of the past.<sup>76</sup> It will take some time. People saw it for a year; some cooperatives have not been run well and have failed; the income of the well-to-do middle peasants has become reduced, [so they are] pessimistic and despondent. All this is not entirely without foundation. It is [true] that some cooperatives have not been run well and some well-to-do middle peasants' incomes have become less. We have to persuade them, and let them see. If they still hold the viewpoint that socialism has no superiority [then], you can also keep your own viewpoint. Just wait and see. As long as the majority approve of us, that's all right.

[Finally,] there is also [the subject of] the rectification. Our [Party] Center is prepared to launch a rectification this year, next year, and the year after next. It will be to rectify such things as subjectivism, sectarianism, and bureaucratism.<sup>77</sup> [If you want] to have a change in these unhealthy phenomena, the method would be rectification. Rectification is nothing to be afraid of. We did it once in Yanan.<sup>78</sup> As long as it is not linked up with the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, there is nothing to be afraid of. [What it means is] simply to study and learn a bit, to do some research, to examine ourselves for a bit, to have some discussions in small group meetings. It can prompt us to study Marxism, to get rid of this subjectivism, this sectarianism, this bureaucratism. Naturally, those comrades who have been more seriously guilty of these mistakes will feel a bit excited. We must help them, [but] not with a method of holding big meetings, or of struggling. We will not adopt the method of struggling, but the method of helping them correct their mistakes. We can try it out; first try it out in certain organs and in some individual places. The Center has not yet issued a directive.<sup>79</sup> When the directive is issued, there is bound to be a time for preparation. For instance, this year can be the time for preparation, time for experimental implementation. Then next year we can formally begin. The Party, internally, will do it this way; those outside the Party [who want to do it willingly] may take part [on a] voluntary [basis].<sup>80</sup> Right

now the Center's directive has not yet been issued, so we have to wait a bit yet. It will take a bit more discussion. Since we have talked about this question today, [I thought] I'd just give you a report in passing.

All right. For how long have I talked? Comrades, it's nighttime already. One hour!

Aren't you going to give me even one question? Just me talking? Are there any questions? [Are they being] gathered? Let's see, are there any? (Huang XX: Aren't there questions? Whoever has a question may raise it. It's all right to write a note too!) No one is willing [to raise a question]? You people! Oh dear. You just don't want to let me go! Next time, you prepare some questions, some topics. I am just passing through, passing through this place of yours. [I've] passed by this place very often, just that I didn't look up any comrades to discuss things. [This is] because there has been a meeting in Beijing, isn't that so? Did you hear news of that? A Supreme State Conference was held, and I spoke a long piece.<sup>81</sup> Today, I just gave you comrades here the short script.

That's all.

Good. Comrades, good-bye.

## Notes

1. We think this refers to Huang Huoqing, Wu Yannong, Wan Xiaotang, and Li Gengtao, respectively. Huang (b. 1906) joined the CPC in 1926, and, before moving into the Yanan area, was active in the Hunan-Hubei border region soviet area. Under the Yanan regime he was a group director of the Social Department of the CPC Center and a bureau chief of the Labor Department. In January 1955 Huang became the mayor of Tianjin, and in October of that year he assumed the position of first secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee. He held these positions until 1958. Wu Yannong had been active in political and Party positions in Tianjin since 1950. In July 1956 he became a secretary of the Secretariat of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee. Wan Xiaotang (died 1960) was in a similar position from July 1956 onward, and in December 1956 he was reappointed as deputy mayor of Tianjin and public security chief. Li Gengtao was a secretary of the Secretariat of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee at this time. For more detailed biographical information on these four people, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 395–397, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 690–691, on Huang; *Zhonggong renming lu*, appendix, pp. 100–101, on Wan; *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 254, on Wu; and Gao Chongyan (1970), pp. 553, 557, passim, on Li.

2. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

3. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1, and text Winter 1949, vol. I, source note.

4. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 5.

5. See text Oct. 23, 1951, and text Sept. 12, 1953, in volume I.

6. See text Oct. 23, 1951, and many documents on the subject in 1950–52 in volume I, especially text Dec. 19, 1950, source note, and text Jan. 17, 1951.

7. See text Feb. 18, 1951, and text Oct. 23, 1951 in volume I. This and the two other subjects Mao mentions in this passage are sometimes known as the Three Major Movements of 1950–51.

8. Mao is referring to the "upsurge of socialism in the countryside" in the second half of 1955. See various documents of the period in volume I, but especially texts Sept. 25, 1955, and Dec. 27, 1955(2).

9. See text April 1957(2), note 59, and text Oct. 13, 1957, notes 7 and 9.

10. See text May 20, 1951, vol. I, note 3; text Feb. 14, 1957, note 1, and text Mar. 20, 1957, note 15.

11. See text April 1956, note 7.

12. This refers to the land reform policies in the Jiangxi Soviet and other soviet areas in the early 1930s. See text July 31, 1955, vol. I, note 7. The broader ten-year period from 1927 to 1937, however, is also known as the land revolutionary war period, coinciding with the term Second Revolutionary Civil War because the focus of the Communist program of that period was to carry out agrarian revolution by setting up rural bases while conducting armed guerrilla struggle.

13. See text Aug. 15, 1951, vol. I, source note. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, notes 27 and 28.

14. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 12, and text Oct. 9, 1957, text surrounding note 63.

15. Here Mao played on the word *jiao* (meaning both “education” and “teaching”). The text reads: *suowei gongjiao renyuan de 'jiao' you er bai wan ren zhi duo*.

16. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 19.

17. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 37.

18. The Chinese here is a bit garbled. Mao's thrust seems to be: “This is *because* we engage in making plans.”

19. See text April 1956, note 3, for Li Xiannian. Li Fuchun (1900–1976) was at this time a vice-premier of the PRC and vice-chairman of the State Planning Commission of the State Council, of which he became head in 1959, and was about to reach the apex of his political career. Li Fuchun was one of the oldest members of the CPC, having joined and cofounded, with Zhou Enlai, Li Weiham, and others, the European branch of the CPC while in France in 1922. Li held various positions of great importance within the CPC and also in the state apparatus of the PRC, specializing, as Mao indicates here, in state planning. For more biographical information on Li, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, appendix, pp. 35–36, and D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 494–498.

20. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 1. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, source note, and text Mar. 20, 1957, note 7.

21. See text April 1957(2), note 62.

22. The Chinese text here is garbled. It reads: *jiaodai renwu, jiu shi gongchandang. Wo mama meiyou jiaodai zhe ge renwu gei wo*.

23. The Revolution of 1927 refers to the situation in the last stage of the First Revolutionary Civil War period (1924–1927). In the Maoist interpretation, by late 1926, the Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Chen Duxiu, had engaged in dangerous Right-deviationist opportunism and was following in the wake of the bourgeoisie (under the auspices of a United Front with the Kuomintang) (see text Aug. 12, 1953[1], note 7, and text Nov. 12, 1956, note 7). In March 1927, in the middle of the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek began taking action directly and indirectly against the Communists in the Jiangxi area, at Ganzhou, Jiujiang, Anqing, Nanchang, and so on. His forces also arrived in Shanghai. On April 12, Chiang conducted a search-and-massacre operation on the Communists in Shanghai (this is known as the “*Si-yi-er* [April 12] Counterrevolutionary Coup”). The “purging” of Communists spread to Nanjing, Wuxi, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, and generally throughout South and Southeast China. In the meantime, the Communist movement, especially Chen Duxiu's leadership, found temporary refuge in Wang Jingwei's Kuomintang government at Wuhan. By mid-June, however, and particularly after Wang's meetings with Feng Yuxiang at Zhengzhou on June 10 and then at Xuzhou on June 19, Wang had made an about-face, and came to an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek. On July 15, Wang's government officially declared action to be taken against the Communists, and even larger-scale massacres and purges of Communists took place in all areas under Kuomintang control during the remainder of 1927 and in 1928. Under the suppression of Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing regime, the Communist organizations were decimated and scattered, and over the next few years they would continue to be attacked by Chiang's “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.

24. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 28, and text Feb. 19–24, 1953, vol. I, note 6.

25. The term “white areas” (*baiqu*) refers to the areas under Kuomintang control during the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927–1936).

26. The text, *jieji douzheng you liao, hou tou shi yinwei “zuo,”* translates as it does here, but appears garbled and quite difficult to understand. There could be words missing here. See also text Jan. 15, 1953, vol. I, source note.

27. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23, and text April 1956, notes 12, 13, and 14; also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 23.

28. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 7.

29. The Chinese text is again garbled. It reads: *Na mo xianzai women ruguo shi bu gao youqing jihui zhuyi, weishenmo cengjing [?] fu henda daijia ne?* There could again be words missing here.

30. The Chinese text, we believe, is missing one word. We have translated it as if it reads *you zhemo yi zhong qingkuang, [jiao] zuo jieji douzheng jiben jiesu*.

31. The metaphor here is the Beijing (Peking) opera, which is generically rendered as *qi* in Chinese. A more idiomatic English translation would be: “They no longer sing that tune in the society.”

32. Mao is referring to the classical adage: “One keeps the troops fed for a thousand days just so they can be used for one hour” (*yang bing qian ri, yong zai yi shi*). The aphorism derives from the Yuan-dynasty opera *Han gong qiu yue* (Autumn Moon over the Han Palace), but the better-known source is perhaps *Sanguo yanyi* (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), the hundredth *hui* (chapter).

33. The term that Mao uses here is *lao zi* for “I.” It is a slangish, arrogant way of referring to oneself, tantamount to an insulting “Your father I.”

34. See text Feb. 16, 1957, note 24.

35. *Xiangsheng* is a popular performing art in which two actors carry out a comic, witty dialogue on stage, playing off puns and double meanings of the words. It sometimes also refers to the art of ventriloquism.

36. See text Feb. 17, 1957, note 74.

37. The Chinese text here is quite difficult to understand. It reads: *You shi wu nian ta biye de shihou*.

38. The term here is *jiazi* (frame, or posture). However, to *bai jiazi* (to “strike a pose”) is probably more appropriately translated as “to put on airs.” See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 61.

39. Mao is using a classical aphorism here: “With not a single hole opened” (*yi qiao bu tong*), which refers to people with no skills or ability to understand things whatsoever. The adage is derived from the chapter “Gui zhi” (Cherish the Straight) in *Lu shi chunqiu* (Lu Buwei's Spring and Autumn Annals).

40. Mao is employing the saying *shaonian shi xiu*, which is commonly used to explain, in the PRC, why some people could not be learned—because they had no opportunity for education when they were young.

41. The term for “burning incense” is *shao xiang*, which refers to burning, or lighting, joss sticks in a worshipful ceremony. The custom applies not only to scholarly learning but to the skill and handicraft trades as well.

42. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 12.

43. Again Mao's word here is the generic *qi*, which could also include opera, especially Beijing opera. The term *qi* generally refers to all dramatic performing arts.

44. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, paragraph 9; and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 34.

45. See text Aug. 24, 1956(1), note 3.

46. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 16.

47. See text April 1956, note 12.

48. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 5.

49. See text April 1957(2), note 27.

50. We believe that this refers to Chen Qitong and Ma Hanbing. See text April 10, 1957, note 2.

51. See text Mar. 7, 1952, vol. I, source note, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 65.
52. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 34.
53. The Chinese text here has, in parentheses, the notation that “several characters are illegible.” Apparently these have been omitted.
54. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 35.
55. See text Mar. 20, 1957, note 56.
56. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3, and text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II, note 33.
57. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1; text Winter 1949, vol. I, source note; and text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3, for the meaning of these terms here.
58. The term Mao uses here is *zheng*, which elsewhere has the connotation of “rectify.” (See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II, note 46, and text May 15, 1957, note 27.)
59. See text May–June 1955, vol. I.
60. The term Mao uses here is *ban fang*, which we have translated as “jail.” See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 46, for the meaning of this term. Also, Mao says here *ta de zui jiu man liao ma*. We have taken a bit of liberty in translating *zui* as “sentence.”
61. Mao is playing on the word *fu* (submission, or obedience). The terms he juxtaposes are *ya fu* and *shuo fu*. We have translated literally in the first instance and abbreviated in the second instance.
62. The Chinese here is garbled. It reads: *Er zai laige* but provides no further clue as to who is “coming.” It is possible that words are missing from the text.
63. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 13.
64. Again Mao is using the term *lao zi* (see note 33). The Chinese reads: *Lao zi jiu shi yi chong*. We have fleshed out the connotation of *chong* in the translation.
65. See text Jan. 17, 1951, vol. I, note 1.
66. The Chinese text does translate as we have done here, but it sounds a bit awkward. It reads now: *Women dang litou de tongzhi you yi she, dan shi meiyou wanquan Ma-ke-si zhuyi de*. By substituting the word *hai* (yet) for the character *dan*, and by slightly altering the punctuation, this could be read as “There are some comrades inside our Party who have not yet fully learned Marxism through and through.” This would seem to be a much simpler translation.
67. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 55.
68. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraphs 28 and 44, and text July 8, 1957(2), note 13.
69. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38.
70. See text May 15, 1957, note 21.
71. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 13.
72. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 100.
73. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38.
74. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 28.
75. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 50.
76. See text Mar. 20, 1957, note 20.
77. Here Mao speaks of *san feng* (three work styles) that need to be rectified. The same term is used in referring to the three things to be rectified in the campaign for Party rectification in Yanan in 1942. At the time the term referred to “subjectivism in the style of study, sectarianism, or factionalism, in the style of Party work, and the stereotyped, or ‘eight-legged’ character, or style of writing in the Party.” Two of these are repeated here. In any case, the idea of rectifying three things certainly had a familiar historical ring to it within the CPC. Also see text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 7.
78. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24, and text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9.
79. The directive would eventually come on April 27, 1957, and be published *RMRB* on May 1, 1957. See *RMSC* (1958), pp. 29–30, for text.
80. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 20, and surrounding text.
81. See text Feb. 27, 1957.

## Speech at Conference of Members and Cadres of Provincial-Level Organizations of CPC in Shandong

(March 18, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 144–153. Other Chinese Texts: *Xuanji*, V, pp. 419–422 (excerpt); *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, pp. 799–800 (excerpt). Available English Translation: *SW*, V, pp. 436–437 (excerpt).

*The Xuanji source and the Mao zhuzuo xuandu source, which are similar, are essentially a paraphrase/excerpt of the final paragraph of this document. Although the words are not exactly the same as this paragraph, all the essential phrases and sentences are there, and the meaning is generally intact. For this reason we have not presented the Xuanji “version” separately.*

*In Xuanji, V this is put together with an excerpt from another speech given the following day, and both are presented under the title “Jianchi jianku fendou, miqie lianxi qunzhong” (the SW, V title in translation: “Persevere in Plain Living and Hard Struggle, Maintain Close Ties with the Masses”). This title is made up by the editors of Xuanji, V. The Xuanji, V source also simply gives March 1957 as the date for both speeches. The following document, the first of the two speeches, was made by Mao to a conference of CPC cadres and members at Jinan (Shandong Province) on March 18; the second one was given by him on the following day (March 19) to a conference of CPC cadres and members at Nanjing.*

*On the whole, this and the Tianjin speech of March 17 are very similar, so much that we leave it to the reader to do textual comparisons, of which there are many. There are also a few important differences, however, which we believe are indicative of the way in which Mao was working out the subtler points in the general issues that were occupying his thoughts at the time. (See text Mar. 17, 1957[2], source note.) An important passage in this March 18 speech is toward the end of the second paragraph where Mao begins to qualify the significance of the formulation that “class struggle has basically come to an end.”*

Just now Comrade Shu X<sup>1</sup> gave me a topic and asked me to talk about certain things. When you get a topic you’ll have to write the essay. But the topics that he gave me are many, so what should I do? There are so many topics. I’ll just talk about one, about the question of thought.

Since the latter half of last year, there has been some disorder in the thought of [some] people in our Party and in society. For instance, they say that the number of people criticizing the Communist Party has increased; personages outside the Party are now more willing to speak up than they have been in the past, and they now dare to discuss our Party’s shortcomings. (It would be best, comrades, if you didn’t take notes. If you take notes it would interfere with your listening. It’s not that I want to keep some secret here. I’m just exchanging opinions with you. If you take things down, you will be [too] busy; it is more comfortable for you not to take

notes.) [They say] the Communists cannot lead [in the area of] science, and they begin to have doubts even about whether socialism has any superiority or not. Some people say that socialism has no superiority, that the cooperatives have not been run well; and indeed some cooperatives have not been run well, and sure enough the Communist Party doesn't understand too much about science. In addition, in the past the Soviet Union was better, but since last year it has become not quite so good; we don't understand what the reasons are. In short, [it] was better the year before last, but last year it was not so good, and this year it has improved a bit. The Soviet Union is still the Soviet Union. Some intellectuals say the United States is better than China, that the United States is better than the Soviet Union; [that] the United States produces more steel than the Soviet Union. In addition, there have been quite a large number of disturbances on the part of the people. This last year, and especially the latter half of the year (I don't know what it was like in Shandong; I hear that there were some [disturbances] here too), [there have been] workers' strikes, student strikes' parades, and demonstrations, and discipline was a bit lax.<sup>2</sup> It's not that the discipline is generally poor in the factories and the schools and among [those] who are on duty in the cooperatives; in general it can still be counted as good; it's just that it's a bit poorer. On the newspapers—I don't know how things are with your newspapers in Shandong—in Beijing, in Shanghai, in Tianjin, in the magazines and newspapers, the number of short essays and of derisive and satirical articles has increased.<sup>3</sup> They criticize [our] shortcomings with freezing irony and burning satire.<sup>4</sup> Under these conditions we can see how, as Comrade Shu X has said, some people are just not able to see the cooperative in a positive light, and [they believe that] it doesn't have any superiority, that all is one solid sheet of darkness. Then there are some people who believe that it is too good, and when they [assume that it is] very good, they will no longer pay any attention to its shortcomings. Under these circumstances, even some Communists have followed other people's lead. Some Communist Party members and members of the Communist Youth League<sup>5</sup> follow the lead of the bourgeoisie, negating everything without making analysis, and see the conditions in a poorer light. Some other Communists can't take that, therefore, and they say that all this has been the result of two things: "letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend."<sup>6</sup> Do you have something like that here? Did you promote "letting a hundred flowers bloom"? In other places, it was promoted for a little bit. In "letting a hundred flowers bloom" they just got to letting a dozen or so flowers bloom. (Laughter.) They have not yet bloomed altogether.<sup>7</sup> And in "having a hundred schools contend," only ten or twenty have come out to contend so far. So, right in the middle of blooming, right in the middle of contending, they say that certain things are not going so well, and some comrades can't take it, and they want to pull in the reins.<sup>8</sup> They say that there has been too much letting go, and things need to be reined in a bit; that is, that we should not let anything go anymore, or [at least] let go less. [They say] that in the "letting a hundred flowers bloom" [policy] we should also pull in the reins a bit. [There is] this idea that advocates pulling in the reins. That's why [we can see] that there are, in our Party, these two types of people: one type says whatever people are saying outside, and follows other people's lead.

Another type simply wants to pull in the reins; when [someone] doesn't obey them they just want to suppress them. This is the current situation. It is an internal factor. Naturally, what [has happened] abroad has also influenced us. The Twentieth Congress [of the CPSU] criticized Stalin;<sup>9</sup> the Polish and the Hungarian Incidents;<sup>10</sup> that there is an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist storm in the international scene; Tito's speeches,<sup>11</sup> Kardelj's speeches<sup>12</sup> (did the newspapers in Shandong publish this article?) have all led to some confusion in [people's] thinking. In addition, there have been many mistakes in our work, whether it is in the work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries, or in land reform, or in cooperativization, or in socialist transformation. We have had mistakes of subjectivism, mistakes of bureaucratism, and mistakes of sectarianism,<sup>13</sup> and these have led to some confusion in thinking. There is no major confusion [though]. As for China, I say it is not as chaotic as things are in Hungary and Poland. In comparison with other socialist countries we are not in as much chaos as they are; for example, for a while there was a great deal of chaos in Viet Nam. Let us now analyze the factors. [We can see that] there are [factors that have to do with] foreign countries; but the primary [reason] is that we are, ourselves, situated in such a period, in such a set of circumstances, which is that the large-scale class struggle has basically come to an end, and that socialist transformation has been basically accomplished.<sup>14</sup> [This is] a conclusion that the Eighth Congress has drawn,<sup>15</sup> and this conclusion conforms to the situation. In the past we opposed Chiang Kai-shek nationwide. [We had] a War of Liberation; that was a large-scale class struggle. Land reform, suppressing counterrevolutionaries, Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea—those were [also] large-scale class struggles.<sup>16</sup> Socialism is class struggle, too. Against what class was the struggle [then?] It was struggle against the bourgeoisie, against the individual economy that is connected to the bourgeoisie. We want to abolish the bourgeoisie and eliminate the individual economy upon which capitalism is based. This is such a great struggle. By the first half of last year, it came basically to an end. With the concluding of this great struggle, the problems internal to the people<sup>17</sup> became exposed. The basic reason is still just this. When the problems internal to the people increased, they became exposed, and many problems of thought were exposed; thus there was some confusion and chaos in [people's] thinking. Were there problems of thought in the past? I think there were, in particular, when we first came into the cities, during the period when the major cities were liberated.<sup>18</sup> All you comrades have experienced that—those few years, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953—weren't those years chaotic? Were those few years more chaotic, or is it more chaotic now? In reality those few years were more chaotic. Even the bourgeoisie at that time felt very uneasy, like fetching water with fifteen buckets, seven going up and eight coming down.<sup>19</sup> However, the divergencies of opinion in the past were overcome with fear and covered up by the large-scale class struggles. They were overcome with fear by such things as the War of Liberation, the routing and suppression of the bandits, the [Movement to] Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, and the land reform. Many people were too scared to open their mouths. It isn't that there were no problems [then]; [in fact,] there were very many problems at the time. We have resolved quite a few problems. For instance, in these last six or seven



years, the democratic personages<sup>20</sup> have made very great progress; this is because, in these struggles, we have cooperated with them. We ought to recognize that they have made progress. In the first half of last year the class struggle basically came to an end. By [“]basically came to an end[”] we mean that there is still to be class struggle, especially in the aspect of ideology. [“]Basically came to an end[”] is [what we were talking about], not [“]completely came to an end.[”] This has to be made clear; there must be no misunderstanding. This tail will drag on for a very long [time]. In particular, [there will be] the class struggle in the aspect of ideology; [in other words] the struggle between proletarian thought and bourgeois thought. I say that [it] is not “letting a hundred schools contend,” but letting two schools contend. Among the hundred schools there are two—one is the proletariat, the other the bourgeoisie. This contention will be a contending over several decades.

That is why the problem of correctly handling the contradictions among the people has now been put on the agenda [for our discussion].<sup>21</sup> Correctly handling contradictions among the people does not mean a large-scale class struggle. As I just said, there [still] is class struggle, [and it will be] especially expressed in the [area of] ideology; we are going to treat it as an internal contradiction. With regard to the national bourgeoisie,<sup>22</sup> we are going to treat it as an internal contradiction, not as a problem of, [say,] the spies and special agents of the Kuomintang. Oh, the bourgeoisie. Like Miao Hainan, whom you have here [in Shandong].<sup>23</sup> We distinguish Miao Hainan from Chiang Kai-shek, and from spies and special agents. We won't say he is a spy; or that he is Chiang Kai-shek; he's just Miao Hainan. We will cooperate with him. In this way, [if] he says okay, [if] he says he is willing to cooperate with us, things can be done easily between us. We are willing, and you are also willing. As I said earlier, [in addition to] the guideline of “letting a hundred flowers bloom, letting a hundred schools contend,” there is also the guideline of “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision.”<sup>24</sup> In our Party there are quite a few comrades who do not quite understand [this], and some comrades do not quite agree with such a guideline. As for whether the comrades in the audience agree or not, I'm not all that clear, because I have just arrived here and normally we don't work together in the same place. When I looked [at the situation] in other places, say, in Beijing, among many high-ranking comrades, department heads [and so on], I would say that maybe out of every ten people there would be the one who agrees, the one who has thought things through; of the rest, [there might be] several people who agree to a considerable degree, but not all that much. [In any case,] there are all degrees [of agreement or disagreement]. As for the comrades at the levels of departments [at the provincial level], bureau chiefs, division heads [and so on], most of them express doubts at the beginning. [They ask:] What do you mean by “letting a hundred flowers bloom”? Let so many flowers bloom? (Laughter.) [As for] “letting a hundred schools contend,” that's very dangerous. Our Communist Party is just one school; what shall we do if the other ninety-nine schools besiege us? (Laughter.) We'll have to ask the Liberation Army for help then, to [help us] fight our way out, fight a bloody way out, and only then would we be able to escape.<sup>25</sup> They also do not agree with “long-term coexistence.” [They say:] those democratic parties,<sup>26</sup> haven't they already had some seven or eight

years, and isn't that enough? Let them dig a hole and be buried. After all, who is supervising whom? Must we invite them to supervise the Communist Party? What qualifications do you have that would let you supervise the Communist Party? Now, do you think that these comrades are reasonable? As I see it, they do have a quite a bit of reason [behind them]. What qualifies the democratic parties for supervising the Communist Party? Who won the country over, anyway? Was it the working class and the peasants as a class who won the country (with the Communist Party leading them), or did you, the democratic parties, win the country over? Therefore, it makes quite a bit of sense to listen to them. However, it is still better to adopt this guideline. What reason is there in that, then? “Letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend” is a method, as well as a guideline. It is a method to make literature and art, and science, prosper. No matter how many flowers you have, you've got to let them bloom. If so, then other flowers that are pretty, or flowers that are not pretty, even very ugly flowers, and poisonous weeds—they can bloom too.<sup>27</sup> What'll happen if that poisonous weed blooms? [So what,] there are poisonous weeds in the world, and what are people to do? Do people die when they touch the poisonous weeds? In that way there will be a comparison, and with comparison, things will be easier to handle. [Things] are not so simple; rather, they are very complicated. All kinds of flowers (all sorts of art) may bloom. Then people will say: Does that mean that ghosts will come? That demons and ogres will come up to the stage?<sup>28</sup> How do your operas play here? Do you have demons and ogres? They have them in other places, especially in Shanghai. Things that have been [labeled as] backward and have not been performed [for some time] are once again being performed on the stage [here]. For example, when people play the opera about Judge Bao,<sup>29</sup> they always have to beat someone on the buttocks on the stage. [Now,] haven't we said that we are going to abolish corporal punishment? However, our [“]Judge Bao[”] still has to whip people's asses on the stage. These things will be slowly eliminated. It is all right to let them be performed for a bit for the time being? I think it is all right to let them be performed. When there are too many of these things, people will start talking, and when more and more people start talking, then fewer and fewer people will come to watch, and these things will not be performed. In the past we banned [things] rigidly and prohibited people from performing these plays, with administrative decrees. It would have been better if we had let them compete among themselves. The “letting a hundred flowers bloom” method is better. As for “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision,” that is to say, it is because our Party's contributions [to the nation] have been too great. [We are] a political party of the workers and peasants. Our Party's composition is primarily that it is a party of workers and poor peasants. In terms of its nature it is the vanguard of the proletariat. Because [the Communist Party] enjoys very great prestige in China, there is a danger, [which is that the Party] would be susceptible to [the urge to] simply take things over for other people and do their things for them, and to employ simplistic administrative decrees [in dealing with problems]. After all, [we've got] lots of people, and we have great prestige in the society, [don't we]? That is why we have invited those [gentlemen] to come and supervise us, and moreover, [we

are allowing for] long-term coexistence as well. As long as we are around, they'll be around. Thus we need not say: assuming that the Communist Party has only a hundred years, we'll only allow them [to exist for] fifty years; and if the Communist Party has only fifty years, then we'll only allow them [to exist for] twenty-four years. In any case, we must have them die first [before we do,] by several decades. Is there such a necessity? Would things be better if they died first? Is that so? Would we have more food? (Laughter.) More steel? More lumber? More concrete? Would that let this auditorium be built better? Not necessarily. Would our auditorium be better built if the democratic parties were destroyed? This therefore proves the point: it is better to have some democratic parties to put up a rival performance to ours.<sup>30</sup> [Even if] it is a matter of [having people] say strange things, how many times a year do they have to say strange things [about us], to pick on our shortcomings? [See,] that's just the reasoning [behind this]. That is why right now we aren't [talking about] pulling in the reins, but about continuing to let go. Right now, we have as yet not let go enough; it is not that we wish to suppress [them], [in fact,] it is precisely our wish not to suppress [them]. Problems of thought and mental problems cannot be resolved by violent and suppressive methods. We ought to launch democratic discussions together, discussions on equal footing, and debate one another. That would be a method of persuasion, not of suppression. Of the two methods, one of suppression and the other of persuasion, which shall we adopt?<sup>31</sup> This method of suppression is a method used to deal with the enemy. Those of us who have been in war know. Since fighting began at the time of Jinggangshan,<sup>32</sup> wherever we have been, say, at Dabieshan,<sup>33</sup> we could only use this method to deal with the enemy. When we dealt with the Americans in North Korea, that is, [during the movement to] Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, we used the method of suppression. What method do we use against counterrevolutionaries and spies? We suppress them! Then we persuade them; but first we flush them out. The method of suppression is for dealing with the enemy. The method to resolve a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves is to take action!<sup>34</sup> [But for] contradictions among the people, [the method is] not to take action. Gentlemen use their mouths, not their fists.<sup>35</sup> (Laughter.) Within the people we use reasoning, not fighting. Military resolution is not a viable method, nor is using an administrative decree to ban something forcibly. In reality, [what you are doing when you use administrative decrees] is holding this Liberation Army [in readiness] on one side. In name you are not using military force, but in fact there it is, sitting over on your side. When you use an administrative decree, and if you didn't have the Liberation Army, that administrative decree wouldn't work, [would it?] Who would listen to your administrative decree? What you are doing is to use its [that is, the Liberation Army's] menacing presence to make administrative decrees work. Later, we had the Liberation Army [in our hands]—several million men—and also the common people. We had the basic masses [on our side], that is, the workers and the peasants. So first of all we have the basic masses, and second, we have the armed forces. And that is really why those democratic personages couldn't get along [with the situation]; they don't have either of these two things. First, they don't have the basic masses, and second, they don't have the armed strength. If we adopt a method of

opening up, and not of pulling in the reins to rein them in; if we adopt a method of persuasion, our country will prosper. This is because now [we are talking about] contradictions among the people, and we do not adopt the methods that are used to deal with the enemy to deal with [problems] among the people; we do not use methods that we use to handle the enemy to handle the people—we've got to distinguish between the two things. What is a dictatorship? Don't we talk about the dictatorship of the proletariat? A dictatorship is for dealing with the enemy, while democracy is for dealing with the people. The relationships among the people are democratic relationships.<sup>36</sup> Naturally, by democracy we mean democracy under centralized leadership.<sup>37</sup> We are not talking about dispensing with leadership. Right now there are places where discipline is a bit lax, where discipline is lacking. That would be a bit too much. We must overcome this problem, [but] we must use the method of persuasion. [We must] talk with them nicely, hold meetings. If things can't be cleared up in one meeting, hold another, and another. Can we win the students, the workers, and the peasants over with persuasion? I think we can. As long as we have reason on our side we must use the methods of reasoning and persuasion. If we do this incorrectly, we would expand the boundaries of dictatorship to within the people, and use the method of suppression. Then whenever there is a contradiction or a problem, we will use the method of suppression, and then our country will suffer damage, great damage. Moreover, one day we are bound to turn back! [If you use] suppression, and suppression doesn't work, [then] the gentlemen will [go from] using their mouths [to] using their fists. [But if] you use your fists, one day you are bound to have to pull your fists back, because that is not a method to resolve the problems among the people; it is a method to resolve the struggle between the enemy and ourselves.

Are [things] scary? When the contradictions among the people have come up and developed, and you say don't suppress, don't use administrative decrees, isn't it very dangerous? As I see it, there is no danger. [When there are] differences of opinion, truth can be derived only because there is a correct resolution through debate and democratic discussion. Only then can things in the area of the arts be more lively, more vibrant; only then can creativity be more developed, and only then can there be growth in the areas of literature and art, and in the sciences. This effect will not be visible in one or two years; it may be several decades—ten years, several years, even several decades—before the effects can be seen. Then we have to make preparations for really bad people and bad viewpoints [in the meantime]; that is to say, in the areas of the arts, poisonous weeds, weeds that carry toxic matter, and very unpleasant-looking flowers would grow up. What should we do if they do come up? We say that even that thing can have its usefulness, because that would allow the people of the world to see that indeed there are such poisonous weeds, such [ugly] flowers. How can a person insist on seeing only the good things every day, and nothing bad? Truth develops out of the struggle with error.<sup>38</sup>

This is true of Marxism. It is true of our Party. It developed out of the struggle with erroneous opinions. If we don't allow erroneous opinions to be expressed we won't know what they are. This thing, beauty, is developed out of the struggle with ugliness. Good people are developed out of the struggle with bad people. There

will be truth and error in ten thousand years; there will be beauty and ugliness, good people and bad. Some people are indeed bad, and that's no good. But they are also the teachers of good people. When there are bad people there will be examples for others, and others will learn not to be bad like them. When there are good people we can learn from good people, but without a comparison between good people and bad ones, people won't be able to distinguish clearly between good and bad. A young kid, several years old, will always first ask, when he watches a play, who is the good guy and who is the bad guy. (Laughter.) That is why we shouldn't be afraid of things such as bad people, or erroneous lines of reasoning. We have no need to fear. In this way our Party's mistakes and our government's mistakes can be more easily overcome. It is the opposite of this that is no good and that is cause for great fear—and that would be a method of suppression.

Our Party is used to struggling against the enemy. Our Party has engaged in class struggle for several decades, and we know how to do this stuff. The results have proven that we know how to do this, [and] that is that we have triumphed. Several decades! That is why other people also admire us for this. They feel: The Communist Party, in what ways is it good? You are not bad in politics, and in military matters you are all right also. There are these two things in which we have the admiration of others. Well, then, did they admire us right from the start? Not quite. When our Party was just founded no one admired us.<sup>39</sup> At the time we proposed the slogans: Down with imperialism! Down with feudalism! Down with the warlords! People only listened for a brief moment but fundamentally paid us no attention. Later, [we] committed errors, and [we had to] go on the ten-thousand-li Long March,<sup>40</sup> and we were left with a few scattered people.<sup>41</sup> When we proposed, at that time, the things about overthrowing the imperialists, people still did not pay us much attention. Still later, we promoted certain things and they began to take shape. By 1948, many people in the society had changed, as if the Communist Party had arisen all of a sudden, and the Communist Party was [deemed] quite admirable. In particular, when the [issue of] who is winning and who is losing was settled in 1949, then we got ourselves even more admirers. Nonetheless, comrades, [on the question of] construction, people do not admire [us]; [they say:] Can the Communist Party really promote construction? They have to wait and see. And when [they] wait and see, [some see] that we are capable, and [they say:] It looks as if these people can do a few things; they just have that gust of brute animal strength. (Laughter.) Who admired us in promoting construction? Right now, on the question of construction we have slowly and gradually built up some trust [for ourselves]. [People say:] Look at you; you've struggled with this for six or seven years, and it does look as if you have a tiny bit of talent. But when it comes to science, it is still a different matter. On such things as physics, chemistry, and mathematics, they [still] say: You're no good; let me try. How shall we deal with this? What do you think? All of you in the audience are scientists? Is that so? (Laughter.) Our Party does not have many scientists. Because we don't have many scientists, university professors, engineers; because although we have a few artists of all sorts, we still don't have too many; or writers; we are not good in these areas. Most of the university chancellors and presidents are personages outside the Party.

Who is president of Shandong University? (Reply: Chao Zhefu.)<sup>42</sup> Is Chao Zhefu a member of the Party, or is he outside the Party? (Reply: He is a member of the Party.) Even if you are a university president who is a member of the Party, you still have to listen to people outside the Party—you don't have the professors. (Laughter.) Some are vice-presidents, and people outside the Party are not easy about it. Among our Party members, many are students and teaching assistants; there are a few, but only a few, among the lecturers, and there are very few among the professors. Then, is it, after all, the students leading the teachers, or the teachers leading the students? Is it for the teaching assistant to lead the professor, or for the professor to lead the teaching assistant? That is why this problem has come up very naturally, and I say there is reasoning behind it. They are correct in what they say: the Communist Party is just no good [here]; we have so very few people, or even none, among the professors, the scientists, the engineers, and also in many areas of literature and the arts. Why? It is because in the past we have been busy. For several decades we have been engaged in the class struggle; we've been busy with the class struggle, and we haven't had any opportunity to engage in [these other things]. In the past, [to promote] these things you had to have a turf.<sup>43</sup> In the past, there were people who wouldn't let us come to places such as Jinan. Such places as Shandong University, Qilu University,<sup>44</sup> and so on; they just didn't permit us to come here. Beijing is where I once lived, [but even then] thirty-one years ago I wasn't allowed to go there. I was not allowed in the cities. If I went into the cities, they would invite me to move into the prison.<sup>45</sup> (Laughter.) That is why we admit all these things. But can we learn? As for the class struggle, we learned for twenty-four years, up to the Seventh Congress,<sup>46</sup> that is, from 1921 to 1945, and it was not until twenty-four years had passed before we drew a conclusion. Only then could we say that we had basically learned this thing. We had committed many mistakes. And since then, we have added all these years since the Seventh Congress. So, about promoting construction, science, about learning to be professors, and doctors in the hospitals, and conducting surgery, can we learn that? In comparison with the class struggle, which is the more difficult? As I see the class struggle, I think it is the more difficult. With that thing, once you beat it, it ran away. (Laughter.) This surgery business; it's easy; the patient can't run away. (Laughter.) The natural sciences: you can graduate from the university in five years; then, if you work five years afterward, that makes ten years, and another five years would make fifteen years. Wouldn't you turn into an engineer then? Such a person, can he be a university professor? Yes, he can. In ten or fifteen years we will learn. Now we have already learned quite a major part about such things as designing and carrying out the construction and installing the equipment; we've also learned quite a bit about managing the factories. As the class struggle basically draws to an end, what will our tasks shift to? They will shift to these [things about] promoting construction. Thus the whole society will engage in a struggle against nature, and the whole population of 600 million will engage in a struggle with nature, so that China will prosper and become an industrial nation. It is possible to learn; don't be afraid. "Let a hundred flowers bloom, and let a hundred schools contend," "Long-term coexistence and mutual supervision." It is good to have criticism. It would not be good

to have no criticism, or to suppress criticism. It is this mistake that Stalin committed. Stalin did a lot of good things, but he also did some bad things. He confused the two; he used the methods that are for dealing with the enemy to deal with the people, with contradictions among the people. He wouldn't let people say bad things about the government, or about the Communist Party; if you said anything bad or if there were any rustling in the air, any movement in the grass, he would say that you were a spy and have you arrested.<sup>47</sup> That is why, [while] we are not advocating workers' strikes and students' strikes, demonstrations, and petitions now, we do have to oppose bureaucratism. We have to overcome bureaucratism, and then things like workers' strikes and students' strikes will decrease. Still, there will always be some. What should we do then? If there is one, then let's use the methods of dealing with [contradictions] among the people to deal with it. Then, do we still need the Liberation Army? Shouldn't we then just disband it? Would that do? "One keeps the troops fed for a thousand days, so that they can serve the need of one hour."<sup>48</sup> [The troops are there] in preparation to deal with the imperialists. The Liberation Army is to be used against the imperialists, not against the people. The Liberation Army is the children of the people. How can the people's children be used against the people, their father? (Laughter.) That wouldn't make sense, would it? The people's children against the people; the people fighting the people? That won't do! The Liberation Army is a tool of class struggle; it is a weapon of the dictatorship. We must distinguish ourselves from the Kuomintang. What kind of people are more afraid of criticism? Is the Communist Party more afraid of criticism, or is the Kuomintang? I think it should be the Kuomintang. It is that party of theirs that is most afraid of criticism. They are very scared of such things as "letting a hundred flowers bloom." Only we are bold enough to propose [such slogans as] "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend" and "long-term coexistence." We said we wanted to coexist with them a few years, and they would have none of that. At the time, they convened a national council; even I became a councillor. There were several Communists who were councillors.<sup>49</sup> What credentials did we have? We didn't [attend] as representatives of the Communist Party. Rather we were called social worthies and celebrities. (Laughter.) It's just very nice-sounding; we were sage, and well respected.<sup>50</sup> (Laughter.) They didn't acknowledge us as delegates of the Communist Party. You say long-term coexistence? They'll not have any of that, not even if you said short-term coexistence. (Laughter.) That is why [I say] only we talk of such slogans as "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend" and "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision." The proletarian political party is more impartial and unselfish, because its purpose is to liberate the whole human race. It is only when the entire human race is liberated that it can itself be liberated. The Communist Party ought to be the least afraid of criticism. We can't be toppled by criticism; no wind can blow us down. We are not afraid of typhoons, not even a twelfth-grade typhoon.<sup>51</sup> A twelfth-grade typhoon can blow away a big auditorium [like this one]; it can blow away a tree this big (gesture: about 2 meters in diameter), but it can't blow away the Communist Party, or the people's government, or Marxism, or the veteran cadres. As I see it, none [of this] can be blown away, or toppled. (Laughter.) So, if

even a twelfth-grade typhoon can't topple [us], what [do we have to fear] about a fifth-grade, or sixth-grade, or seventh-grade [typhoon]? (Laughter.) Have you been to Qingdao? I haven't yet. I'd like to go there one of these days. I've been to Beidaihe. With a seventh-grade breeze in the ocean, it's very comfortable for swimming.<sup>52</sup> Normally, if there is no wind or wave at all, swimming can be very strenuous; you've got to crawl step by step. When a typhoon comes up, a wave can be as tall as two persons stacked up. I have never seen a twelfth-grade typhoon. Criticism; we can't be toppled by criticism. The Communist Party, the working class, the peasants, can't be toppled by criticism, because the truth is in our hands. In comparison with any other class, our road is more correct. We have the basic masses of the workers and the peasants [on our side]. How can a party, or a government, that has the basic masses of the workers and the peasants as its foundation be toppled by criticism? How can Marxism be toppled by criticism? Something can be toppled by a small puff, and that is bureaucratism. With bureaucratism, perhaps you don't even have to have a typhoon, but just raise your hand, like this, and it will topple. (Laughter.) I think it would be good if that stuff, bureaucratism, subjectivism, and sectarianism, were toppled. That stuff will be blown down. Sometimes, we the Communist Party, need to get some help from forces outside the Party—we call that attack from without and within! [We'll then] blow off some of this stuff of bureaucratism and subjectivism and what not.

Just now Comrade Shu X mentioned the question of the superiority of socialism, because some people are doubtful about the superiority of socialism. [Sometimes,] whenever we talk about superiority, we [seem to say] that all is superior, and there is not a bit of shortcoming; or, if we say there is no superiority, then there is not a bit of good. These are two kinds of one-sidedness. They exist inside our Party as well as outside. [When we talk of] two systems struggling against each other, who wins and who loses, we are talking of the question of who is the winner between the two systems of socialism and capitalism, and who is the loser. Has that been resolved? What do you think? Has the issue been decided? According to what we said at our Eighth Congress, we should say that basically the issue has been decided. Who won? Who lost? Capitalism lost; socialism won, socialism has basically triumphed. [But] is it the final victory? No, not quite yet. As a social system, in this competition between the two systems, socialism has basically triumphed, but it has not yet attained the ultimate victory; it has not yet become consolidated; we have to wait and see. People still have to wait and see; the capitalists have to wait and see, so do the peasants, the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois peasants, and the urban petty-bourgeois handicraft workers. Within our Communist Party, too, some people have to wait and see. In the struggle between the two systems, who has won and who has lost? Who has claimed the victory and who has gone down in defeat? In a basic sense, [we may say socialism] has triumphed, but the final victory won't be here until after a period; perhaps it will take two or three five-year plans.<sup>53</sup> It will take at least five years for the cooperatives to be consolidated. Right now, in general, the cooperatives have had only a bit more than one year's history. As for the struggle between the two ideologies, the struggle in the ideological aspect between the bourgeois ideology and the proletarian ideology, between Marxism

and anti-Marxism,<sup>54</sup> who won and who lost? Things are a bit poorer here. That is why right now things are quite confusing and chaotic. In the area of ideology—my general topic today is called the problem of ideology—this is reasonable. Albeit that there has been transformation in the social system, nonetheless there is still quite a bit of the [old] ideology that is persisting rather stubbornly. In particular, in the aspect of world view, there is still the struggle between two types of ideology—would it be a bourgeois world view? Or a proletarian world view? Would it be materialism or idealism? Would it be dialectical materialism, or metaphysical idealism, or metaphysical materialism? Such a struggle between two ideologies will take an even longer time [to be resolved].

How many intellectuals do we have throughout the country today? Around five million; that's the figure.<sup>55</sup> Of these, about two million are in the schools—the universities, the middle schools, and the primary schools. In addition, the intellectuals in the Party system, the government system, the military system, the economic system, the commercial system, the industrial system, plus intellectuals in the areas of literature and art, put together number, some say, as many as five million. Of these, only a small minority believe in Marxism. Our country is an educationally backward country,<sup>56</sup> but if we have five million, we can't say that's too few. That is why we have to make good use of the ranks of these intellectuals. This group of intellectuals, we may say, is a group of bourgeois intellectuals; they have studied in bourgeois schools. I was such a person myself; that is, a bourgeois intellectual, having attended a bourgeois school, having been influenced by bourgeois society. As for my being an element of the proletariat, that was something that came later. I guess that may be true of the many comrades in the audience who are intellectuals. When your mother gave birth to you she didn't confer upon you the task to be a Communist or to believe in Marxism, [did she?] I have had that experience, too: when my mother gave birth to me, she didn't say that to me.<sup>57</sup> (Laughter.) She didn't know that there is [such a thing as] Marxism in the world, or that there is a Communist Party. [I became a proletariat only] because later on, in the social struggle, [I was] forced to flee to Liang Mountain.<sup>58</sup> That Liang Mountain of mine is called Jinggangshan. You each have your own Liang Mountain. That Liang Mountain [in the story] is right here in this Shandong of yours. Those who truly believe in Marxism are a minority, about 10 per cent or so. Of the five million [intellectuals] there are about 500,000, or maybe a little bit more. By this I mean the ones who really and truly understand Marxism. And then there must be several percent who are fundamentally opposed to Marxism, and who take a hostile attitude toward us. However, they are not spies and special agents. These are democratic personages, but they harbor discontentment in their hearts, and they are [therefore] fundamentally opposed to us. Are there people like that? I think there are. This is also a minority. More than 80 per cent [of the intellectuals] are moderates. They are not quite interested in [understanding] real Marxism. You ask them to go down to the countryside; they are not interested. [You send them] to the factories to take a look, they come back after just a casual stroll. [You talk of] uniting as one with the workers and peasants; they make it two pieces.<sup>59</sup> We say we should unite as one piece; they say it is better to make it two pieces, that one piece can't be made.

That's just because they can't blend in with [the workers' and peasants'] feelings. The feelings of the intellectuals are not congenial with the laboring people; there is just that one layer of separation. These people's world views have not changed. The fundamental reason still lies with their bourgeois world views. That is what this ideological chaos and confusion is all about. Why are they confused ideologically? They are vacillating; [like] grass on a wall, they fall to either side when the wind blows.<sup>60</sup> When the wind doesn't blow, it stands there, but once the wind blows, it falls. There was a gust of wind in Hungary,<sup>61</sup> and there was a gust of wind at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU; where else have there been gusts of wind? In the world, there are bound to be gusts of wind. They can fall to that side, or they may fall to this side. They are also very arrogant; that tail of theirs is cocked pretty high.<sup>62</sup> He thinks that since he is an intellectual, he must be quite somebody. In this country of ours, intellectuals are valuable. Therefore, on this question of world view, they are not true proletarian intellectuals; these are still nothing but bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals. The general category is [“]bourgeois intellectuals.[”] Some people could take it if you called them petty-bourgeois intellectuals but wouldn't accept it if you called them bourgeois intellectuals, but [in fact] the basic category is still the category of the bourgeoisie. [The time it will take to make the transformation] is probably three five-year plans (we have already gone through several years). In general, it will take more than another decade, and then Marxism will attain a decisive victory. We must win them over [in the meantime]. Do you know who is teaching [in the schools] now? They are the ones who are teaching. They are all teachers. They run the newspapers. They teach in the schools. They are people who do the work of designing and plan making and all sorts of other things in our economic organizations. They are the engineers. We can't get away from them, not for a single day. Comrades in the audience, there are intellectuals among you, too, even though there are relatively few. If you said that we can leave the intellectuals, that wouldn't do. We can't get away from them; there would be no one teaching. There are about two million people working, teaching in the universities, secondary schools, and primary schools,<sup>63</sup> in all sorts of newspapers. There is literature and art. [The people who] sing the part of the young military character in the Shandong-style [opera]—the Shandong big drum<sup>64</sup>—those wouldn't count as intellectuals, would they? But Mei Lanfang should count as one; Mei Lanfang is an intellectual.<sup>65</sup> You have here a [“]Shandong's Mei Lanfang,[”] what's his name? You are Shandongese and you don't know about Shandong's Mei Lanfang?

Let me say something again about the question of class intellectuals. In the process of leading the revolution, the working class has already preliminarily won over a batch of intellectuals to serve itself. Marx was won over like that himself. Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and people like that were all bourgeois intellectuals who served the working class. That is true of our intellectuals in China. Right now there are some who understand Marxism; didn't I just say that out of the five million there are about 10 per cent, or about 500,000, [who are like that]? That is [our] core strength among the intellectuals.

There are all sorts of classes. Which class has a future? Only the working class

has a future. How many [people] do we now have [in the] working class? Before the revolution, before Liberation, there were only several million. These several years the number has increased to twelve million. Right now there are twelve million industrial workers in the factories; only twelve million out of a population of 600 million. This is a bit more than one-fiftieth. [That is,] among every fifty people there is only one worker. The number is so small, but it is only this, [the working class,] that has a future. All other classes are transitional classes. [All they do] is walk, walk along. Where do they walk to? They walk to the place of [the working class]. For instance, the peasants: the peasants will in the future become mechanized and will transform into agricultural workers; [they will go through] collectivization, and collectivization, in the future, when we get to socialism, will transform into nationalization [and come under] the system of ownership by the whole people.<sup>66</sup> Right now there is the system of ownership by the peasants' cooperatives. In the future, in a few decades, they will be changed to be like factories; they will become agricultural factories. In this factory, you plant maize, millet, rice, sweet potatoes, peanuts, and soybeans. As for the bourgeoisie, everyone knows about the bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie is right now in the midst of transition. It, too, must become transformed into workers. The several hundred million peasants and handicraft workers have now already transformed into collectivized peasants; in the future they will be [further] transformed into peasants [under the] state ownership system, and agricultural workers, using machinery. Among these five million intellectuals, with the exception of a small minority, other intellectuals, though vacillating on the subjects of their world views and on ideological problems, are generally in agreement over the question of the socialist system [being the system of our society]. They support the socialist system. In general, except for a minority, they support and are willing to serve socialism. Then, good. The working class has already won them over; it has, through the Communist Party of China, won [these] intellectuals over to its side, so that they are now cooperating with us. Nonetheless, this cooperation, this serving socialism, is one thing. The [question of] world view and of [the notion of] a world of the spirit is another altogether. It will take some time to make them change their world view, to change [to embrace] Marxist dialectical materialism and historical materialism—that is, Marxism.

Right now, the bourgeois ideology and bourgeois world view on the part of the great majority of the intellectuals have not changed, or have not yet changed in any significant way, [even though] some minor changes have taken place. As I just said, they are incompatible with the laboring people, and they have not united as one [with the people]. The writers and artists [who] are willing to go down to the factories or go down to the countryside come back hastily after having gone down for just a bit. Their attention is not there; they have no great interest in the peasantry, or in the workers. They'd rather return home to be at one with [other] intellectuals. I call these people halfhearted. Half of their heart wants to serve socialism; this half is good. Because there is this half of the heart, we can [deal with] the other remaining half of the heart slowly. That [other] half of the heart is still a bourgeois kingdom, bourgeois thought. As soon as I talk [like this] with these intellectuals,

they jump up. "Are you saying that I am halfhearted?"<sup>67</sup> I say: That's right; that's what I say. Even if you jump up on the roof, that's still what I'll say, because you are still vacillating, teeter-tottering like that. You are willing to serve the working class, but you are not [putting your] whole heart into it; you are just halfhearted. What proof [do I have]? [The proof is in the fact that] you are forged into two separate pieces with the workers and the peasants; you are not united as one with them. You have no friends among the workers and the peasants; your friends are intellectuals. It is better for intellectuals to be friends with the workers and peasants than for them to be friends with other intellectuals. However, they wouldn't do [what you tell them to do]. Even if you tried to drive them down [to the factories and the countryside] they wouldn't go, or if they did, they'd be back in just a couple of days. The working class requested that the intellectuals serve it wholeheartedly—this is the demand it has proposed—that they undergo a change on the issue of their world views, that they abandon their bourgeois world view. I said in the newspapers that we must abolish capitalism and establish socialism; it is abolishing one thing and establishing another.<sup>68</sup> If that thing isn't abolished, this other thing cannot be established. That's why there is a task, a task to abolish [capitalism]. When there is abolishing, there is bound to be a bit of pain. We'll let you, the capitalists, propose all [your opinions and conditions] now. Among the capitalists there are many intellectuals. We must make use of them. The working class needs to have a large number of intellectuals serve it wholeheartedly. Not 100 per cent, but it ought to be the vast majority. [It demands that they] believe in Marxism and share our interests with us. Right now we do have some common interests; namely, common interests on the question of socialism [being dominant]. With the exception of some people who do not have any common interests with us, and who are happy when they hear that the cooperatives have not gone so well, and are at ease when they hear that the cooperatives are doomed—who are gleeful when they hear the Communist Party runs into trouble—there is a small number like that, but the majority [are the way they are] because in fact they are suspended in mid-air; they are willing to cooperate with us. That is why our task is to win them over.

Our Party now proposes to [launch a] rectification. If we are to win over the intellectuals, win over people outside the Party, we've first got to rectify our own work style. The Central Committee is preparing to hold a meeting this year. Right now it has not been decided, and I can [only] speak of it a little bit today. We have not done any work of this rectification for many years. The "Three-Anti's" and the "Five-Anti's" were very intense,<sup>69</sup> [but] they did not resolve the problems in terms of ideology. We are preparing to carry out a rectification, and then we can expect to win over [some people]; when the Communist Party's work style is rectified, then we can win over the broad masses of people outside the Party. When we talk about this ["democratic personage,"] we have a question: will there be cooperation or not? This is not his question; the question is not whether he will cooperate with us; the question is whether we will cooperate with him. There is another question: It's nice to talk of cooperation, we'll cooperate with you, [with] the democratic personages, [with] Miao XX;<sup>70</sup> but there is a question of whether or not [they can be] used. Some people say they are not particularly useful, or even that

they are trash. But even trash can be used! Why can't trash be used? I cannot speak in the specific today, or say that Miao XX is a piece of trash. Miao XX is probably a very useful person. Even people who are not very useful can be used. Someone gave that a name, calling it trash; even trash can be used. [The purpose of] holding a meeting is not so that we can take care of matters just for a bit, for the time being. [It is not as if] every year we just hold a political consultative conference,<sup>71</sup> a people's congress, to handle things for a moment, and forget it after the gate is passed.<sup>72</sup> I guess each year we do have about a week or two [of that]. That attitude would be a negative attitude. I say we must adopt a positive attitude. These democratic personages are in general all intellectuals outside the Party. There are also old intellectuals, intellectuals left behind by the old society.

Right now, how many university students come from workers' or peasants' background? According to the national statistics there are 20 per cent. [That means] in every hundred university students there are twenty who come from peasants' and workers' backgrounds, and the remaining 80 per cent are children of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists.<sup>73</sup> As for middle school students, we are not clear about that; about forty-sixty split, I suppose. That is, 60 per cent from landlord, rich peasant, and capitalist backgrounds and 40 per cent from workers' and peasants' backgrounds. Or maybe it is a fifty-fifty split. Do you have any statistics on this? I don't have statistics in this particular area. Among middle school students who have graduated to upper middle school, I fear perhaps there are more of their people—more with backgrounds in the exploitative classes. When will the university students have 100 per cent workers' and peasants' backgrounds? It will be at least after three five-year plans, at least another eleven or twelve years, before there can be a fundamental change in this situation, or maybe even longer. Two more five-year plans will not be enough; perhaps another three more five-year plans. That seed of his must become extinct; of that there is no question. What seed does the bourgeois have [now]? What seed does the landlord class have [now]? They have no more seed. Our purpose is to make them extinct. That is, in the future there will be no more capitalist system, no more landlord exploitative system. Then after that, for ten thousand years it will be the workers' and peasants' system—all will be workers' children.

It is the proletariat who has the brightest future. [However,] right now we are in the hiatus between the harvesting seasons.<sup>74</sup> Our comrades must know that we must not be separated from them [i.e., from the intellectuals]; not even a single step. If we are separated from them we'll have no one to teach, no one to serve as engineers, no one to do scientific research; they make up most of the university professors, as well as the teachers in the middle schools and primary schools, as well as writers and artists. If we are separated from them we won't be able to move even one step. That is why we should do a good job of uniting with them. Only in several five-year plans' time can the changes take effect, and by that time they, too, would have changed—the capitalists would have changed into workers and the landlords into peasants. Their children will also have changed; right now, already, they are changing.

Rectification is a method of resolving the contradictions within the Party through self-criticism, as well as a method to resolve the contradictions between the Party and the people. [We aim to] rectify three styles: to rectify dogmatism, sectarianism, and bureaucratism.<sup>75</sup> In addition, some other problems will be attached to that to be rectified as well. For instance, the problem of corruption. There is corruption in the government organs; especially the problem of corruption in the base level [organs], the cooperatives, the factories, and mines. [There is also] the question of the decrease in the spirit of serving the people wholeheartedly, and of the recession of the revolutionary will. The fight over status, over fame, over profit has increased. The daredevil spirit of the past, the spirit that we had in the past, when we were engaged in a class struggle, a struggle against the enemy, the spirit of putting our lives on the line, has begun to disappear from some comrades. [Instead, now people] care about what they eat, what they wear; they compare salaries, and when they do not get the grade they want come grade assessment time,<sup>76</sup> they weep. Don't all people have two eyes? In the eyes there is water, called tears. The water in a tea bowl is called tea [but the water in one's eyes is called tears]. When grades are assessed, and the assessment doesn't come out satisfactorily, they will cry two strings of tears from their eyes. (Hand gesture: eliciting a round of laughter.) When they fought Chiang Kai-shek, in the time of the Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea campaign, in the time of the land reform, and in the time of suppressing counterrevolutionaries, they shed nary a single tear. Nor did a single tear flow when they promoted socialist construction. But as soon as their individual interests get touched, they cried and tears flowed nonstop. (Laughter.) I hear, even, that there are those who wouldn't eat for several days. I hear that here, right here in your place, [there is someone who] didn't eat for three days. We say it's all right not to eat for three days, but if it extends to a week, then things get a bit dangerous. In any case, [they] fight over fame, over status, compare salaries, clothes, luxuries—some such things have come out. This counts also as contradictions among the people. Their tears are flowing; they starve themselves and weep over individual interests. There is an opera called *Lin Chong ye ben* [Lin Chong Flees in the Night] in which there is a line that says: "A man's tears are not lightly shed; but only because he had not yet come to the moment of heart breaking."<sup>77</sup> We now have some comrades who are men, or maybe there are some women as well. Look now: A man's tears are not lightly shed; but only because they have not yet come to the assessment of grades, to this juncture. Comrades, perhaps this work style is also something that you should rectify. Let us all go back to give him a bit if advice. It is right to say a man's tears should not be lightly shed. Where is the heart-breaking point? That would be the moment when the survival of the working class and the peasant class is threatened; at that time it should be all right to shed a few tears. As for that grade of yours, whatever it is, even if the assessment was wrong you must swallow it; your tears should not flow out; let them flow inward. (Laughter.) Swallow it. Sure enough, there are many unfair things. In reality it is possible that a mistake in the assessment could have been made, but that doesn't affect the big picture! As long as there is rice to eat it should be okay. Communism; communism takes for its principle ensuring that people do not die of starvation. If

a person doesn't die of starvation, he is our revolutionary comrade! We must struggle heroically; even in ten thousand years we must struggle.<sup>78</sup> When there is the Communist Party we must struggle. When the Communist Party no longer exists, when [parties] have been eliminated, there will still be need for leaders, a batch of people who do administrative work, and they, too, must serve the people. In short, we must serve the people wholeheartedly, not halfheartedly, nor with two-thirds of our hearts and two-thirds of our minds. People whose revolutionary will has faltered and receded must pick themselves up and dust themselves off. This year, we prepare. This year is a stage of preparation, for issuing notices and announcements, saying that we are going to have a rectification. The various localities can also carry out experimental rectification. If there are corrupted elements, they'd better quickly stop what they are doing. If you were going to grab something in the first place, now you may quickly put it [back where it belongs] and we won't count you as guilty of corruption. If you spit it out this year, then by next year, when we officially [launch the] rectification, you can say that this year you are no longer corrupt. Or some might ask, if someone has already become corrupt and already eaten something, how can he spit it out? If it is already digested, then it would have already become shit; what, then, is the person to do? Well, even if the thing has become shit, you can still, depending on the circumstances, expel it in stages. For the peasant in the cooperative, it wouldn't do for [those who have been corrupted] not to spit things out. Even just, say, thirty *rmb* would be a big problem. Then you just spit it out in three stages: this year you spit out ten *rmb*, next year another ten, and another ten the year after that. If you started spitting this year and came clear through the rectification, then next year you won't be counted as someone guilty of corruption. That is why we are issuing notices and announcements this year! When bureaucratism has been rectified, our relationship with the people and with the lower levels will improve. It is not easy to be a director of a department at the province level! There are many people under a department head. Normally, you don't take too much care of controlling them. Once you start to have a rectification, those people will start to talk. There must be some department heads or bureau chiefs or division directors among you in the audience! Is it to throw a bomb, and that's called rectification? I think not! I don't think we ought to bomb the place like that; just change it around a bit. With regard to our shortcomings, the shortcomings among the people, we are not going to promote big democracy,<sup>79</sup> or any big movement. That would be for dealing with the class enemy. We promote small democracy. If one "small" is not enough, then let me add another, and call it "small, small democracy." In any case, it should be gentle breezes and fine rain.<sup>80</sup> We are certainly not going to have a typhoon. Rather, it's going to be endless drizzle, and endless tiny breeze. (Laughter.) Let's have it blow for three years; one year—this year—for preparation, then next year, and one more year after that. Let's have a fine drizzle, a tiny bit of a breeze, to blow away such things of ours as bureaucratism and subjectivism. We will proceed from [the wish to] protect comrades, from the wish for unity, and through appropriate criticism, arrive at a new unity.<sup>81</sup> That's all I have to say, comrades.

## Notes

1. By Shu X here, Mao was clearly referring to Shu Tong (b. 1906), who was first secretary of the Shandong provincial committee of the CPC and of the political commission for the Jinan military region at the time. He was a veteran cadre in the political departments of various units of the Red Army throughout the 1930s and a participant in the Long March (see text Feb. 19–24, 1953, vol. I, note 6). In the 1950s he held key positions in East China. He was a member of the East China Military and Administrative Council in 1950 and held this membership through the ECMAC's various reorganizations until 1954. He was also responsible, at least in part, for several major criticisms of erroneous lines and people in Shandong in 1959 and 1960. For more biographical information on Shu, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 768–770, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 770–771.
2. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 93.
3. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, note 35; Mar. 17, 1957(2), notes 49 and 50; April 10, 1957, note 2; Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 12.
4. Mao is using the aphorism *lengchao refeng*, which derives from the novel *Hou Han tongsu yanyi* (Popular Romance of the Later Han Dynasty), twentieth *hui*. *Lengchao* or "cold irony" refers to the attitude of sneering and making fun of something from the side, indirectly, or even sometimes by parody, whereas *refeng* or "heated satire" refers to direct satirical attacks often done publicly with no camouflage.
5. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.
6. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.
7. Mao is playing on the words *qi fang*, which mean "blooming together" and appear in the slogan "let a hundred flowers bloom" (*bai hua qi fang*), but are not generally translated in the English renditions of the slogan.
8. See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14.
9. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.
10. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.
11. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 17.
12. Ibid.
13. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 77. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 61, and text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 7.
14. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note.
15. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 1. See also text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note and text surrounding note 20.
16. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), notes 5, 6, and 7. See also text Oct. 23, 1953, vol. I, source note and text.
17. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.
18. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 30.
19. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 13.
20. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1, and text Winter 1949, vol. I, source note and text.
21. See text Feb. 27, 1957; see also text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note.
22. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.
23. Miao Hainan (b. 1902) was at this time vice-president of the Shandong provincial people's government (or deputy governor of Shandong Province). In his earlier years, Miao had studied textile industrial management in Britain, and on returning to China he had become a prominent industrialist in Shandong Province. In 1948 he surrendered his property to the Communist regime. He was, in the 1950s, a staunch supporter of the CPC policies in the United Front area, being a member of the Democratic Association for National Construction (see text Jan. 27, 1957[1], note 59). In June 1957 he would criticize Zhang Bojun's position (see text July 1, 1957, notes 3 and 28, and text Oct. 13, 1957, note 132). For more biographical information on Miao, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 407–408.



24. See text Autumn 1956, note 3, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 82.
25. Mao is here using the popular, and rather slangish saying *Sha chu yitiao xuelu*, which is often used in novels to describe a ferocious fight to escape encirclement in battle; thus, a desperate escape.
26. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.
27. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38.
28. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.
29. Bao Cheng (999–1062) was a bureaucrat of the Northern Song dynasty. He was famous for his courageous and straightforward remonstrances of the emperor, and his honest criticism of several people of great power and court influence in the time of Emperor Renzong. He was also, at one time, circuit magistrate for the Jiangning (today's Jiangsu and the Nanjing area) and Kaifeng districts. In this capacity he was well-known for his legendary ability to solve cases that intrigued and baffled other investigators, his tenacity in finding out the truth and not relying on conventional "justice" principles, and his record of reversing hasty verdicts and sentences that unjustly wronged certain victims. Legend has it that the people of the capital spoke of Bao and "King Yan" (*Yanluo wang*) (the mythological king of the underworld in Buddhist terminology) in the same breath (see text April 25, 1956, note 38). Many popular stories and operas have used Judge Bao's cases as plots. Bao can be reckoned as the most renowned "honest magistrate" (*qing guan*) of China's traditional society. He is almost always referred to as *Bao gong* (Master Bao) in popular literature, which is what the text has here. We have rendered that as "Judge Bao."
30. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 57.
31. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 61.
32. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 19.
33. Dabieshan is a mountain range in western Anhui Province.
34. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.
35. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 68.
36. See text April 25, 1956.
37. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80, and text July 8, 1957, note 35.
38. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 18, and text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, paragraph 2.
39. The CPC was officially founded on July 1, 1921, in Shanghai. The First Congress of the CPC was held on that day. At the time, according to CPC official records, there were fifty-seven members, of whom twelve were delegates of Communist cell groups from various places.
40. See text Feb. 19–24, 1953, vol. I, note 6.
41. Mao's phrase here is *xixi lala shengxialai jige daren*, in which the term *jige daren* does not mean "several grownups, or adults" but is a slangish phrase with the ironic connotation: "several people—and we thought that was a lot!"
42. Chao Zhefu (1898–1970) was also a vice-president of the Shandong provincial people's government at this time. He was director of the Department of Education of the North China People's Government from 1948 to 1949. For more biographical information on Chao, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, appendix, p. 66.
43. The term here is *dipan*. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 97, for an explanation.
44. Shandong University is a public, national university that was founded in 1926 in Qingdao. In 1950 Huadong (East China) University was merged with Shandong University. Qilu University was a private university established in 1917 in Jinan, Shandong. For more information on these institutions, see *RMSC* (1951), "you" section, pp. 32–33.
45. The term Mao uses here is *ban fang*. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 46.
46. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 3; text April 30, 1956, note 2, and text Jan. 1957, note 9.
47. For other criticisms that Mao made of Stalin, see text Nov. 15, 1956, Version II. See also text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 14.

48. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 32.
49. Mao is referring to the period of the Second CPC-KMT United Front. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 7. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 72. See also text Dec. 8, 1956, note 8.
50. Mao is here playing on the words *xian* (sage, or sagacious) and *da* (achieve fame and respect), which make up the term *xianda*, or "a celebrity." The phrase Mao uses here is *you xian you da*, which breaks the term down in a slightly sarcastic way.
51. See text May 15, 1957, note 21.
52. See text Summer 1954, vol. I.
53. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 34.
54. The term Mao uses here is *fei Ma-ke-si zhuyi*, which, strictly speaking, translates as "non-Marxism" (a sort of meaningless term). We felt it more appropriate (and, we believe, more in line with Mao's argument) to be more specific and render the term as "anti-Marxism."
55. See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 4, and text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 41.
56. Mao says here that China is a *wenhua luohou de guojia*. *Wenhua* is most commonly translated as "culture." While in a very specific sense (i.e., in defining "culture" specifically as socialist culture), Mao could have meant that China was "culturally backward"—and he does indeed make that argument in the 1960s, as a preface to the Cultural Revolution—we do not think that this is what he means here. Instead, we believe he is using the term *wenhua* in the sense of "literacy" or "education." (See text May 1955, vol. I, note 1.)
57. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 22 and surrounding text.
58. See text April 1957(2), note 62. See also text surrounding text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 21.
59. The phrases that Mao uses here are, first, *da cheng yi pian* (to forge, as in forging a piece of steel, into one piece), and, second, *da cheng liang pian* (forging into two, or separate, pieces).
60. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 24.
61. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.
62. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.
63. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), text surrounding note 15.
64. This art form is colloquially known as Shandong *dagu* (the big drums of Shandong). In this kind of opera, the most prominent accompaniment to the dialogue as well as to the musical passages is made with a large drum.
65. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 18.
66. See text Mar. 5, 1956, note 12.
67. The word Mao uses here is *laozi* for "I," which is an arrogant slang term. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 33.
68. This appears to be a harbinger of the notion of *xing wu mie zi* (promote the proletariat and destroy, or abolish, the capitalists), which would become much more of a slogan in the early 1960s in Mao's writing and speeches. It is also a harbinger of Mao's more pointed discussion on this subject in late 1957 and early 1958; see text Jan. 4, 1958.
69. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note and text.
70. This most likely refers to Miao Hainan. See note 23.
71. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, source note.
72. See text June 23, 1950, vol. I, note 8.
73. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, paragraph 8.
74. The aphorism here is *qing huang bu jie*. See text May 8, 1950, vol. I, note 2.
75. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 77.
76. See text Jan. 18, 1957, version I, note 1. This remark refers specifically to a general program to assess the grade standings of civilian officials in 1956, and it is probable that at the same time an assessment of military ranks was also conducted. (See text Mar. 19, 1957, note 2.) Since it is likely that the CPC cadres' conferences of March 18 and 19 (at Jinan and Nanjing, respectively) were attended by military cadres, it is possible that Mao was referring

mostly to the latter. For subjects of grievances that may have led to the “shedding of tears” mentioned by Mao, which seems to have emerged out of the military ranking system and any assessment that followed, see text Mar. 19, 1957, note 2.

77. This refers to a scene in the Kunju opera *Baojian ji* (Story of a Sword) composed during the late Ming by Li Kaixian (1501–1568). In this scene, Lin Chong, a heroic military official, was being chased by assassins sent by the corrupt official Gao Qiu, whom Lin had offended. Lin receives a letter from the bandit-chief, Chai Jin, who invites him to join his band of “merry men” at Liangshan bo. Li then sighs and sings the lines quoted here. (See note in *SW*, V, p. 439.) See also text April 1959(2), note 61. The story line of this opera is derived from the novel *Shuihu zhuan* (Water Margin).

78. In a note in *Mo Takuto senshu, dai-go-ken* (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, volume V) (Japanese translation), p. 185, Takeuchi Minoru reminds us that Mao’s 1963 poem, “In Reply to Guo Moruo” (to the tune of *Man jiang hong*), ends with the lines: “Ten thousand years are too long; seize the day; seize the hour!”

79. See text Nov. 15, 1956, section 4 in both versions. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, Versions I and II, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1) and (2).

80. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29.

81. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.

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Speech to Conference of CPC Cadres  
(Excerpt)  
(March 19, 1957)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 420–422. Other Chinese Text: *Mao zhuzuo xuandu*, II, pp. 800–802. Available English Translation: *SW*, V, pp. 437–439.

*See text Mar. 18, 1957, source note. This conference was held in Nanjing. This document from Xuanji is very similar in content to, and could be a paraphrase of, paragraphs 35, 37, and 38 of the next speech (text Mar. 20, 1957). Indeed, we know from Xuanji that what is presented here is an excerpt. However, since the similarity is not complete, and the two sources give different dates for the speech(es), we have decided to treat these two documents separately, as if they were texts of two different speeches (although again the sources indicate that the audience may have been the same people in the two cases).*

We must maintain the surge of energy that we had in the period of the revolutionary wars in the past, that surge of revolutionary fervor, that spirit of placing one’s life on the line, and [must] carry the work of the revolution through to the end. What is meant by laying one’s life on the line? In the novel *Shuihu zhuan* [Water Margin] there is this character called Shi Xiu the Death-defying Third Brother;<sup>1</sup> [that character epitomizes] what we mean by “laying one’s life on the line.” In the past, when we were making revolution, we had exactly that spirit of laying our lives on the line. Everybody has one life; it may be sixty years, or seventy, eighty, or ninety years, depending on how long a life you have. As long as you are still able, you should do some work, and when you work you must have a surge of

revolutionary fervor and a spirit of placing your life on the line. Some comrades lack this fervor, lack this spirit, and have come to a halt. Such a phenomenon is no good; we must carry out education among these comrades.

Political and ideological work must be strengthened throughout the entire Party. There are many comrades from the armed forces attending this meeting today. What is the situation in the armed forces? Aren’t there some differences between political work in peacetime and in wartime? In time of war, [the armed forces] must be closely linked with the masses; officers and soldiers must be forged into one, and the military and the people must be forged into one. At a time like that, the people will still understand and forgive us even if we have some shortcomings. This, [however,] is peacetime now; we are not fighting a war; we are simply in training. Unless we uphold [the principle of] maintaining close ties with the masses, it will very naturally be difficult for the people to forgive our shortcomings. At present we have implemented a system of military ranks as well as some other systems.<sup>2</sup> However, the higher ranks must still unite as one with the lower ranks; the cadres and the soldiers should still be forged into one, and permission should still be granted to the lower ranks to criticize the higher ranks and for soldiers to criticize the cadres. For instance, a Party congress<sup>3</sup> should be held to give them a chance to make criticism. Comrade Chen Yi<sup>4</sup> made a good remark during the “Three-Anti’s” [Campaign].<sup>5</sup> He said, “Since it has been all right for us to issue orders and commands for so many years, wouldn’t it be all right to allow the lower ranks to give us some criticism, say, a week of criticism, now?” His point was that it should be all right. I agree with what he said, that is, let the lower ranks criticize us for a week. Before everybody starts criticizing, make some preparations. Make a few reports to discuss whatever shortcomings one may have; there probably won’t be more than a few, say, one, two, three, or four items. Then let the comrades speak, make some supplementary [comments], and offer some criticisms. The masses are fair-minded, they will not throw aside our past history altogether. Even squad leaders should give the soldiers a chance to criticize. It would be best if this were done once a year, to have a few days like this of criticism meetings. This sort of democracy in the armed forces is something that we promoted once in the past, and the results were beneficial. Don’t let [the fact that] there is now the ranking system and certain other systems impair the close relations between the higher and the lower ranks, between the officers and the soldiers, between the military and the people, between the army and the local [civilian authorities]. There is no doubt that the relationship between higher and lower ranks should be an intimate one; it ought to be a relationship between comrades. The relationship between cadres and soldiers should be intimate; they ought to unite as one. The relationship between the army and the people and the local Party and governmental organizations should also be a close one.

Our comrades ought to take heed. Don’t rely on your official status, on your high position, or on your senior standing [in the Party] for a living. When speaking about seniority, about the number of years for which one has been making revolution, this qualification is a reliable one, but, at the same time, we mustn’t rely on it. You have a senior standing, [you’ve been a revolutionary] for several decades,

that may be true. Yet, if one day you do something stupid, or say something ridiculous, the people will still not forgive you. No matter how much good you've done in the past [or] how high your position was, if you fail to do your work well today, if you settle matters incorrectly, and thereby do harm to the people, the people still cannot forgive you for this. Therefore, our comrades must not rely on seniority for a living, but rather on correctness in solving problems. We must rely on being correct, not on seniority. Since we cannot rely on seniority for a living, let us give up the notion of relying on it altogether, as if we had never been officials at all; that means that we won't put on any lordly airs or any bureaucratic airs. Let's put these airs away, and meet the people and [the people at] the lower levels face to face. Our cadres, especially the veteran cadres, must pay attention to this point. Generally speaking, new cadres do not have this burden and are relatively uninhibited. Old cadres must place cadres on an equal footing with themselves. There are many things at which old cadres are not as good as new cadres and which they should learn from them.

### Notes

1. For *Shuihu zhuan*, see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 31. This character, sometimes also known in translation as Shi Xiu the Desperate, was a character whose exploits were described in the forty-fourth to forty-sixth *hui* of the novel.

2. "The system of military ranks was initiated in September 1955 and abolished in May 1965." (SW, V, p. 439, note 2.) Until 1955, the Communist armed forces, first the Red Army in the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War (i.e., 1927–1937) and during the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937–1945) and then the People's Liberation Army (PLA), had no elaborate ranking system for more than two decades. There were only three major categories, the commissioned officers (the general staff and field grade officers), the noncommissioned officers, and the soldiers, or servicemen. In 1955, as part of the PLA modernization program introduced by Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai, a ranking system incorporating many features emulating the Soviet Union's system was installed. A total of fourteen grades of commissioned officers, from grand marshal to second lieutenant, and three grades of noncommissioned officers, and three grades of soldiers, making a total of twenty grades in all, were delineated. The ranking system in the PLA also stipulated differences in the salaries to be given to the personnel at the various ranks. In the late 1950s, there was much dissatisfaction with the system, because the salary discrepancies between various ranks, particularly between the general staff and the colonel staff, were too great. Dissatisfaction also arose within the civilian bureaucracy because many military officers were ranked higher than civilian officers in the general ranking system, and finally also because it was seen as a drastic erosion of the tradition of the volunteer worker-peasant Red Army. In 1959, following the dismissal of Peng Dehuai after the Lushan Conference, there was a reversion to the old, pre-1955 methods of organization of the PLA. In May 1965, the Standing Committee of the Third NPC formally resolved to abolish the ranking system and revert to a system in which one's military standing was attached directly to the unit under one's command, with a distinction between commander (cadre) and combatant (soldier) preserved.

3. Mao is probably referring back to the Eighth National Congress of the CPC held about half a year before, on September 15–27, 1956. The Second Session of the Eighth Congress was held in May 1958. This, however, was an abnormality. Conventionally, CPC national congresses were held in only one session, with plenary sessions of the Central Committee filling the hiatus in between congresses.

4. For biographical information on Chen, see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 54. As a career military officer, Chen may have been in attendance at this conference.

5. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note.

## On the Problem of Ideological Work

(March 20, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 153–163. Other Chinese Text: *Wansui* (n.d.), pp. 55–60 (excerpts).

*According to the source, this is a speech made by Mao to a conference of CPC members and cadres in Nanjing attended by members and cadres from the two provinces of Jiangsu and Anhui and personnel in the armed forces (PLA) in Nanjing. For the context of this conference, see text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note. The present title appears as such in the Wansui (n.d.) source, and appears as a subtitle in the Wansui (n.d. 3) source. Some passages in the last few paragraphs here are quite similar to text Mar. 19, 1957.*

*The historical context of this speech is explained in text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note. Again there are many similarities between this speech and the ones of March 17 and 18, and more detailed textual comparison can be made by the reader. (Where we have made some textual crossreferences in our annotations, we have generally made them to Mao's writings or speeches of a bit earlier times [e.g., the February 27, 1957 speech] but not to something as close as the March 17 and March 18 speeches.) What is of particular significance in this speech, however, is the specific position that Mao takes on the notion that "violent, mass-based class struggle" is over. It would appear that Mao goes further in this March 20 speech than he had in the speeches of the previous few days. Also, it is here that he begins to tackle the question of the ending of class struggle in terms of the implications it has for whether the transformation of the relations of production is a primary contradiction of the moment. In the first few paragraphs, he appears to almost come close to declaring that while the nature of socialist transformation is that of class struggle, in terms of focus and methodology, it is more of a material socioeconomic struggle. The final sentences of paragraph 5 are of tremendous significance. One may indeed even find here clues to the accusation made against Mao in early 1957 that he was a Right deviationist. Paragraphs 5 and 6 also shed some light on Mao's position in the first part of 1957 on the primary contradiction in China's society at the time. (For this controversy, see text Oct. 7, 1957, note 16, and other annotations and commentaries in that text as well as text Feb. 27, 1957, source note, and text Mar. 17, 1957[2], source note.) Mao, it appears, was, as late as March 20, 1957, quite in line with the position adopted by the Resolution of the Eighth CPC Congress in September 1956, a position that he later criticized and ultimately repudiated, and one that subsequently Maoists accused Liu Shaoqi and company of "sneaking into the Party resolutions." It has been a matter of much inconclusive speculation as to when precisely Mao changed his mind about the resolution (the Maoists tend to put this at a much earlier date) and about the Hundred Flowers Campaign and CPC rectification, and as to what specific developments triggered that change of mind. Here, however, is a clear enough suggestion that Mao's mind had not changed much before March 20, 1957.*

I have become a Mr. Itinerant Lobbyist.<sup>1</sup> I have traveled quite a ways, and everywhere I have been I have said some words.<sup>2</sup> At this time there are some questions that call for a reply, and so I have brought my itinerant lobbying to this place of yours. This place [of yours] is called Nanjing; I have been here before.<sup>3</sup> This place, Nanjing, is, I think, a good place. It has [the aura of] being encircled by dragons and possessed by tigers.<sup>4</sup> However, there is a [learned] gentleman by the name of Zhang Taiyan<sup>5</sup> who said that the phrase "encircled by dragons and possessed by tigers" is an empty phrase made up by the ancients, a falsehood fabricated by the people of the past. As we look at it now, this is indeed an empty phrase as far as the Kuomintang is concerned. The Kuomintang did their thing here for twenty years and then it was drummed away by the people.<sup>6</sup> Now [Nanjing] is in the hands of the people. I think, [therefore,] that Nanjing is still a very good place.

The problems in all the different places are all more or less the same. We are now in a period of transition. The type of struggle of the past—class struggle—is basically concluded, basically at an end.<sup>7</sup> The struggle against imperialism, against feudalism, and against the Kuomintang,<sup>8</sup> [the struggle to] Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,<sup>9</sup> and [the struggle to] suppress counterrevolutionaries<sup>10</sup> are also class struggles. After [these were finished], we engaged in a socialist movement and a socialist transformation; they also have the nature of a class struggle.

Is cooperativization, then, also a class struggle? Naturally, cooperativization is not [a case of] one class struggling against another class. And yet cooperativization represents a transition from one system to another, from the system of the individual [economy] to the system of a collective [economy]. Individual production belongs to the category of capitalism. It is capitalism's turf. Capitalism is generated in that place, and it will constantly continue to be generated [in that place]. Cooperativization eliminates the turf<sup>11</sup> on which capitalism is generated, or, [if you will,] it eliminates the base in which capitalism is produced.

Therefore, in a general manner of speaking, in the past, over the last several decades, we have conducted one class struggle and transformed a superstructure. We have overthrown an old government, [namely,] Chiang Kai-shek's government. We have established the people's government and transformed the relations of production,<sup>12</sup> transformed the socioeconomic system. In terms of the economic system and the political system, the complexion of our society has been transformed. Look, the people we have in this meeting hall, we are not [people of the] Kuomintang; we are Communists. In the past, people like us were not able to come to this place; we were not allowed to go to any of the large cities [in our country].<sup>13</sup> From such a perspective, things have [indeed] been transformed, and, moreover, have been transformed for quite a few years [already]. This is [referring to] the superstructure, [to] the political system. As for the transformation of the economic system into a socialist economic system, that has taken place in the last few years. Now we can say that in that, too, we have been basically successful. This is the result of our struggle over the last several decades. If we take the history of the Communist Party [as our standard], there has been [a period of] thirty-some years.<sup>14</sup> If we go back to start counting with the anti-imperialist [struggle] of the Opium

War, there has been [a period of] more than a century.<sup>15</sup> All we did [in this time] was one thing—we undertook a class struggle.

Comrades, [in having a] class struggle to transform the superstructure and the socioeconomic system, that is merely to open up a path for the transformation of other things. Today, we are faced with new problems. Domestically speaking, that struggle of the past is now basically concluded; but internationally speaking, it has not yet come to an end. Why do we still need the Liberation Army? Mainly it is for the purpose of dealing with foreign imperialists; we fear that imperialists will come here with aggressive [plans]; they do not harbor good intentions [toward us]. Domestically, too, there are still a small number of remnant counterrevolutionary elements in our country who have not yet been found out. Some of them, who have been suppressed in the past, such as the landlord class and the remnants of the Kuomintang, would rear their heads again if we didn't have the Liberation Army. The landlords, the rich peasants,<sup>16</sup> and the capitalists, now they are [more] law-abiding. The capitalists are still a bit different [from the rest]; we handle them as a problem internal to the people [in any case].<sup>17</sup> When the national bourgeoisie<sup>18</sup> accepts [the rule of] socialism, it is [still] a different thing from the peasants accepting cooperativization. Can they be said to be of the same type? [When it says that it has been] coerced, that means that there is something of involuntary compulsion here. Moreover, the [national bourgeoisie] has accepted transformation under conditions that were quite to its advantage. Therefore, for the time being, we are situated in a period of transition and transformation that can be described in the following manner: from class struggle [we] have come to a struggle against nature. If we are to improve our livelihoods, if we are to engage in construction, we must struggle against nature. [We are making the transition] from revolution to construction, from the anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolution in which we [were engaged] in the past and the socialist revolution that came after, to a technological revolution, a cultural revolution.

For our country to engage in construction we must have technology. We must have machinery; we must have science. In this regard, in the past we used our handicrafts; we used tools that we wielded in our hands to produce tables, chairs, stools, and benches. We used our own hands to plant grain and cotton; everything was done with our own hands. Now we must change to using machines. This technology, of using machinery, is therefore itself a very great revolution. Without such a revolution, our country will still be a poor country, an agrarian country, if it is only the politics and the social system that have been changed. We would still be a country of handicrafts, of handicraft technology. For this reason we must carry out a cultural revolution. I think that all of us can understand and are aware of such a transformation of circumstances. Yet it appears as if there are still some people who are not quite clear about such a change, not quite aware of it.

Today, some new problems have cropped up; [some] problems of science and technology, some cultural problems. From among the people some demands have been proposed to us, and some disturbances among the people have occurred. Where are these problems found? New problems have emerged among the workers with short-term jobs,<sup>19</sup> among households with [economic] difficulties in the

countryside, among the students, in the area of cooperativization. Within a small portion of the workers there are strikes, and among the students, a small portion have gone on strike [as well], or they have taken to parades and demonstrations and petitions. Some rehabilitated servicemen, too, want to make trouble. This is true also of some members of cooperatives, among the well-to-do middle peasants<sup>20</sup>—the number is not large, but they are dissatisfied, and they want to leave the cooperative. There are also some other issues about which they are not satisfied, and so they make trouble for us.

What is to be done? How should we handle trouble coming from the people? We need to talk about this problem and clear it up.

Contradictions should be divided into two categories: The first category is called contradictions between the enemy and ourselves; the second category is contradictions among the people.<sup>21</sup> In the last several decades, we have resolved the first [category of] contradictions; now we must resolve the second [category of] contradictions. [Contradictions] herein are manifested in many areas; for example, [our proposed transition] now from an agrarian country to an industrial country is also a contradiction.

We are lacking in technology; we have no machinery, and we do not have culture.<sup>22</sup> Our lives are poor. Some people say: "We have arrived at socialism; I suppose we are about to lead a good life." Haven't we said that socialism has already been achieved? Last year, the Communist Party held a congress and declared that socialism has been basically achieved.<sup>23</sup> So [people] suppose that they will begin to lead good lives. This is [a symptom of] not understanding what socialism really means. As a social system, socialism means [a certain set of] relations of production. We have established relations that are different from the relations of the past. In the people's carrying out of production, in the past it was [governed by] a set of relations between the capitalists and the workers, or between the landlords and the peasants. Now we have established a set of socialist relations, and we carry out production under such a set of mutual relations. As for production, we have only just begun. This new relationship has just been established and has not yet been fully established; the cooperatives have not yet become consolidated. People use this method to carry out production<sup>24</sup> that is, [they use] a set of socialist relationships to carry out production. This is because the old method of the past is inappropriate and is not conducive to production or to development. It was poorer then, and it made the people<sup>25</sup> of China poor and illiterate to boot over a long period, and despised by people all over the world. Right now this relationship is just beginning to change, and [we have] not [developed] production yet. Without production means without livelihood; without much production means without a good livelihood. How many years will it take [before we can have a good life]? I think about a hundred years. If it takes a hundred years, I will no longer be on this earth [by that time], and therefore I will not be able to enjoy a good life. Naturally, we will not take so long [to make some improvements, however]. We'll take this in several steps. [I think in] about a dozen years or so things will be a bit better, then in twenty, thirty years, things will be even better, and when fifty years have passed, things will be passable, will begin to look like something. Then, in a

hundred years, things will be really good. That would be very different from [the way things are] now. One hundred years is a very short time. Even if it takes ten thousand years, [we'll do it, because] people will always have to go on living.

[Since we have] just had the revolution, and just started promoting socialism, how can [we expect] this livelihood to have improved? How can grain have increased? Has grain increased? It has. In 1949, the year the People's Government was established, we only had 220 billion catties of grain, and by last year we had more than 360 billion catties of grain; [this meant] an increase of more than 140 billion catties.<sup>26</sup> However, [we must also consider,] how many mouths does [this grain have to] feed? With this country of ours, the good thing is that we have many people; the shortcoming, too, is that we have [too] many people. With more people, there are more mouths, and when there are many mouths, much grain will be needed. So these 140 billion more catties of grain have disappeared; sometimes we even feel as if there is no grain. In 1949, there was not [enough] grain; today there is still not [enough] grain to eat, still not enough. We would like to lead a good life. Right now we have promoted a twelve-year plan for production, a plan for scientific [development], a plan for agriculture, a plan for industry<sup>27</sup>—we take work, and production, a step at a time. Those among us who are older would find this problem easier to understand. The young people find it not so easy to understand; [they behave] as if as soon as they get to this earth everything should be in good shape. That is why we have to carry out education among them; we have to carry out education among the broad masses of the people, and particularly among the young people. [We] must put into practice the education of carrying out an arduous struggle and striving hard, and building things up from scratch.

Now we are building things up from scratch.<sup>28</sup> Our ancestors gave us very little [to work with]. Who are our ancestors? [They are] the imperialists, feudalism, and Chiang Kai-shek; they were our predecessors, the government that came before us. What they gave to us was to scrape the flesh off the body of the people.<sup>29</sup> However, they have left, and that is good. They left, and vacated a piece of territory. This land of ours is 9.6 million square kilometers, starting in the east with the seacoast and reaching the Kunlun Mountains and the Pamir Plateau in the west.<sup>30</sup> To the north, it reaches Heilongjiang, and to the south, Hainan Island. It is just such a piece of land. Let us put our shoulders together with the people of the whole country, with the state, and with the young people, and make a go at it for several decades. Let's not say too long; let's get at it for fifty years. In this century, we have engaged in revolution for the first half century; for the latter half, let's get going in construction. There are some forty years left in this century. So, the central task [for us] at present is [that of] construction.

We must distinguish clearly between the two categories of contradictions. The first category, of contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, cannot be confused with the second category, of contradictions among the people. On the subject of the socialist society, [we must recognize that] it does have contradictions, and contradictions do exist [in it]. Lenin once made a directive on this point. He recognized that there are contradictions in socialist society. In the beginning, Stalin—in the period immediately after Lenin's death—[allowed for] a relative

liveliness and activity in the domestic life in the Soviet Union. It was somewhat like what we have now [in our country]. They had all sorts of [political] parties and factions, even some well-known people like Trotsky. He had many people [with him], but he was sort of like a democratic personage within the Communist Party. Moreover, he played the role of a cheeky troublemaker and made trouble for us. There were also quite some other people in the society who were allowed to say all sorts of things, including criticizing the government. There was such a period. Then later, things didn't work. Furthermore, things became very dictatorial. [Stalin] would not allow for criticism. He was afraid of people who wanted to criticize, of letting a hundred flowers bloom.<sup>31</sup> He would only allow for the blooming of fragrant flowers.<sup>32</sup> He was afraid also of letting a hundred schools contend. At the slightest hint of suspicion,<sup>33</sup> he would say that it was a counterrevolutionary [incident] and would have people arrested or executed. This is to confuse the two types of contradictions, to mistake the contradictions among the people for contradictions between the enemy and ourselves.<sup>34</sup> Your Comrade Xu Jiatun<sup>35</sup> of Nanjing said many students came to submit petitions to him. Their ranks, [he said,] were very orderly. [Your] provincial governor, Peng Chong,<sup>36</sup> also said that they were very well disciplined. Along the way they have been very good. When they got to his place, as soon as they got in the door, they yelled "Down with bureaucratism"<sup>37</sup> and wanted certain problems resolved. In regard to these problems, as I see it, if these were brought in front of Stalin, I think a few people would have been arrested, and a few heads would surely have rolled. You call for the downfall of bureaucratism; is that not counterrevolution? In fact there was not a single counterrevolutionary; [all of them] were very good students. Moreover, that problem [indeed] ought to be resolved; there is indeed a bit of bureaucratism.<sup>38</sup> This is because, without the disturbance created by those overseas Chinese students,<sup>39</sup> the problem was not well resolved. With this round of petitions by the students, they helped us, and the students got educated. Many cadres, too, got educated, and the overseas-Chinese students also got educated. Those who had made trouble and hit people no longer did so. Why must we hit people day after day? Because in the past we did not do a good job of educating them; we did not mobilize the masses to criticize them. Some other problems of this type: there were also some so-called rehabilitated servicemen making trouble. Comrade Zeng Xisheng is in your neighboring province of Anhui; in his place the rehabilitated servicemen made some trouble and got to him.<sup>40</sup> He made a forty-minute speech and the problem was resolved. In the beginning there was a gust of [ill] spirit<sup>41</sup>; afterward, this gust of [ill] spirit disappeared; God knows where it went. In any case, there was no longer much of a problem. The problems were resolved. One of them, through investigation, was found to be a person who passed himself off as a soldier; he was very bad; he was a leader [of the troublemakers].

With regard to the disturbances made by the people, we simply must not adopt a method of doing things that we did vis-à-vis the landlord class, the Kuomintang, and the imperialists. We must adopt, [instead,] an entirely new method. With the exception of those who have violated the law—for example, if someone took a knife and killed somebody or hurt somebody, or if he went to an office and smashed

the furniture to pieces, in which case this person should be dealt with according to the processes of the law—other people, even if they had made a mistake, or if they were leaders and led others in making trouble, we should [use the method of] persuasion and education. We must not expel them from their factories. We mustn't expel them from one school, [because] they would just go to another school. We mustn't expel them from the [state] organs and organizations; isn't that the same principle? If you expelled [a person] from a factory, he would simply go into the shop next door. [After all,] he has to alight in some place. You can't expect him to go live in Sun Yat-sen's Tomb.<sup>42</sup> There is no food in that place, nor a house [to offer shelter]. He simply could not live in such a place. He cannot live in the wilderness, and so he must have a place to alight, to settle down. For you to expel him from your [unit] is simply to use your neighbor's land as a garbage dump.<sup>43</sup> You might feel a bit more comfortable; but I say that it is no good for you to be too comfortable like that. There is nothing to be feared for a [government] organ, a school, or a factory to have a few troublemakers.

Let us talk a bit once more about the first category of contradictions, i.e., the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, the contradictions between the enemy and the people, the contradictions between the people and the enemy and the counterrevolutionaries. Both of the existing viewpoints [on this] are improper. One is a Right-deviationist viewpoint that thinks that there is peace and no trouble any more in the world. With regard to some reactionaries and evil people who should be dealt with in accordance with the [penalty stipulated by the] law, [people with this viewpoint] fail to handle them according to the law. This is not good. This is the viewpoint of Right-deviationist opportunism. Right now, this happens in every province, and all provinces should pay attention. Among the democratic personages<sup>44</sup> and in the democratic parties<sup>45</sup> there are some of our friends who have [such a] Right-deviationist perspective on this matter. Sometimes they are even more Rightist than those in our [Party] who [have a] Right-deviationist viewpoint. This is because some counterrevolutionaries were their old friends. Now some of them are incarcerated<sup>46</sup> and some have been executed, so they are a bit sad, because their relatives and their friends have been executed. There are these viewpoints that we must explain clearly; it is not good at all for us to have such viewpoints in the Party. Secondly, there are viewpoints that exaggerate—"Leftist" viewpoints. [People with this kind of a viewpoint] say that there are still, today, many counterrevolutionaries. This is not correct. We must affirm that there are still some hidden counterrevolutionaries. [We must also affirm that] the [work of] eliminating counterrevolutionaries in the past has been basically correct. Things would be terrible if we had not eliminated counterrevolutionaries. A thing such as [that which happened in] Hungary will not take place in our China.<sup>47</sup> One reason for this is that we have eliminated counterrevolutionaries, whereas that was not done in Hungary. Therefore, to say that there are still many counterrevolutionaries today is to have an exaggerated viewpoint that does not conform to the [actual] circumstances.

With regard to the contradictions of the second category, [namely,] contradictions among the people, because the class struggle has basically concluded, this category is more clearly exposed; [indeed,] it is relatively out in the open. The

opinions among our comrades are not uniform on the problems of this category either. There are all sorts of different opinions; we must, as yet, through explanation, discussion, and study, unify the opinions of our comrades on this problem. We were mentally unprepared for the trouble that the people are making for us. This is because in the past we were shoulder to shoulder with the people in opposing the enemy. Now the enemy is gone, and we cannot see the enemy. That leaves just ourselves and the people. When the people have problems, if they don't come to you, to whom should they go? In the past, it was making trouble against the enemy; that was revolution. The thing now is not called revolution any longer. What happens if you made revolution against me and got rid of me? Are you going to invite Chiang Kai-shek back? Still, however, there are troubles that have to be made. This is because there are things that you have not yet resolved properly. In all cases where things have been resolved properly, there may be nine places out of ten where things have been properly resolved, there may be nine out of ten problems that have been resolved properly, [but] there still [can] be one place where things have not been resolved properly, or one problem, and that place is going to have trouble.<sup>48</sup> This troublemaking is normal. You haven't resolved things properly; why should he not make trouble? Permit me to ask you, if he is not to make trouble for you, for whom would he make trouble? Should he make trouble for "Generalissimo Chiang?"<sup>49</sup> [But Chiang] has already gone to Taiwan. That is why they have to make trouble for the directors of the factories, for the directors of the cooperatives, for the *xiang* government, the municipal government, the people's government, and for the principals in the schools—this is because you have not resolved things properly. We have bureaucratism, subjectivism, and sectarianism, in our work.<sup>50</sup> We have many people, and our opinions are not unanimous; that is why there is bureaucratism. Here, too, there are "Leftist" and Rightist viewpoints. With regard to the people making trouble, there are those, too, who advocate that we should deal with it with the old methods. [They say: "No matter what, we have only one set of methods. We've been at this for several decades already. Do you know how long I've<sup>51</sup> been at this business of making revolution? Isn't that so? [I'll] always have a method, and that is the method that we use in dealing with the enemy.["] Sometimes we'll use [that method] for a bit too, to suppress things for a while—call out the police. There are a few places where the police have been summoned to make arrests. When the students strike, summon the police to arrest some [of them]; that is the method of the Kuomintang; the Kuomintang would use such a method. Then there are those who are completely at a loss as to what to do<sup>52</sup> and have no method at all. In the past when they dealt with the imperialists they were very proud, full of power and might, and positively dauntless. [They said: We've got] millet plus rifles;<sup>53</sup> we're not afraid of you imperialists, you Chiang Kai-shek, or your airplanes and cannons. They were not afraid of imperialists, but [now] they are a bit afraid of the people making trouble. I say [to them]: You are not afraid of the imperialists; how can you be afraid of the common people?<sup>54</sup> But things are just that strange; they are afraid of the common people. They might not be afraid of the imperialists, but as soon as the common people make any trouble for them, they are at a loss for methods [of dealing with the situation]. This is

because they have not learned this one thing; they have not yet learned it well. What they learned in the past was the stuff with which to deal with the imperialists, and with Chiang Kai-shek. If you talk of beating up the local tyrants and dividing up the land,<sup>55</sup> they would be good at it, but if you talk of handling the trouble that the people make, they haven't learned this well; they haven't taken that lesson. That's why [all this is] very much worth studying. We should raise this problem openly with [people both] inside and outside the Party and launch a discussion, and then methods will come out.

Comrades, after all, is it easier to handle the imperialists, or is it easier to handle the common people? Is it harder to deal with the enemy, or is it harder to deal with the people? With the enemy, for how long have you been trying to throw him out? And he just won't go. He is slippery as an eel. [His] spies and special agents have wormed their way into the [government] organs, the schools, the factories, and to the countryside, and they just won't leave. No matter what, the common people are not spies; they are not imperialists, or landlords, or capitalists. They are the common people. They are the laboring people, and [it should be] very easy to explain things to them reasonably. That is why, in the case of our Comrade Xu XX and Comrade Peng X, when the overseas-Chinese students beat people and many students were unhappy and made a petition to them, they used [the method of] persuasion, and in the end they resolved the problem very nicely.

I say that with regard to the country as a whole, our policy is to "make comprehensive planning with due consideration to all sectors so that proper arrangements may be made,"<sup>56</sup> and to strengthen ideological education. This, we may say, is a strategic guideline, because this is "making comprehensive planning with due consideration to all sectors, and making proper arrangements" for 600 million people. This includes the landlords, the rich peasants, the national bourgeoisie,<sup>57</sup> as well as the counterrevolutionaries who have not been executed—you have to make arrangements for them too. With regard to all types of people who have lost their jobs, you'll have to make appropriate arrangements for them; you have to make it possible for them to go on with their lives, and have something to do. Of this, there are about five million intellectuals.<sup>58</sup> As a country, China has too few intellectuals, but there is this batch, about five million of them. Among them, less than one million have joined the Communist Party; there are still four million outside the Party. What work do they do? They work in our government system; there are also some in the armed forces. In the educational system there are two million [of them] counting [those in the] universities, the middle schools, and the primary schools. In the financial and economic systems there are a million [of them,] and then there are people working in the sciences, in literature, and in the arts. There are writers, poets, artists, painters, opera singers; and then there are also journalists, people who run newspapers, and so on. There are many in Shanghai.

Such a big heap of intellectuals. Some have become workers and peasants,<sup>59</sup> accepted Marxism, and joined the Communist Party. Some have not joined but are very close to us. Those who actively and enthusiastically support Marxism and approve of Marxism make up a small portion, perhaps 10 per cent or a little bit more. According to [reports from] Jiangsu [Province], they make up 17 per cent

[there]. People on the other end have hostile feelings [toward us,] but they are not spies. They oppose us and do not approve of Marxism. They reluctantly accept the socialist system because they can't do anything about it—that's the general trend. There are people like that, perhaps a few per cent. There are, in the middle, then, 80 per cent [of the intellectuals]; maybe not quite as much; 70 to 80 per cent. They are the middle-of-the-roaders, the vacillators. They have a little bit of approbation for Marxism, and they have read a few [Marxist] books, but it's just that they didn't sink in—they did the reading on the surface here (gesture: touches his forehead) but didn't [let things] sink inside.<sup>60</sup>

There is a method for testing the intellectuals. People say that we must draw a bit of a distinction—are these, after all, petty-bourgeois intellectuals, or are they bourgeois intellectuals? That is to say, it is a bit more comfortable to wear a petty-bourgeois hat than to wear a bourgeois one.<sup>61</sup> However, I say that is not so. I, for one, was a bourgeois intellectual. I entered a bourgeois school, and the atmosphere of the society I was in was a bourgeois atmosphere. The stuff they promoted then were things of idealism. I believed in Kant's idealist [teachings].<sup>62</sup> Can you say that is petty bourgeois? What you read is bourgeois; what you believe in is bourgeois; can you call yourself a petty bourgeoisie? Sometimes it is possible to draw [such] a distinction, and indeed the distinction ought to be drawn. However, when it comes to [the question of] world views, the distinction cannot be easily drawn. What would you say the world view of the petty bourgeoisie is? Is it semimaterialism? As for me, Marxism was something that penetrated [my mind] only later; it was learned later. Moreover, it was only after a very long time, through struggling with the enemy, that [I] became reformed gradually. There is one thing that can be [taken as a] test for the intellectuals, and that is, put them together with the workers and the peasants, and see who [among them] blend in with the laboring people.<sup>63</sup> Some of the intellectuals can do that [—can] blend in [with the laboring people, but] the vast majority of the intellectuals are still far from that. [Even if they] wanted to blend in, they couldn't. They have no congenial feelings for the workers and the peasants. [They are] not [their] friends. When the workers and the peasants have things [to say], they do not unburden themselves to [these intellectuals], and they, [in their turn,] have only contempt for the workers and the peasants. The intellectuals have a tail;<sup>64</sup> it needs to be doused with a bucket of cold water. When you douse a dog with a bucket of cold water, it grips its tail [between its legs]. Under any other set of circumstances, it will cock [its tail] very high; it will look proud. Because [these intellectuals] have read a few books,<sup>65</sup> they are indeed a bit proud. When the laboring people see that proud air of yours, when they see your face, they feel uneasy.

Our task is to win over 70 to 80 per cent of those vacillating middle-of-the-roaders. They in general have approved of the socialist system, but when it comes to adopting Marxism as the world view, they have not yet completely accepted that. I say that they are not serving the people wholeheartedly, but halfheartedly. They have put half of their heart to serving the people, and that is good, but there is the other half of their heart which is put goodness knows where. If you say they support Taiwan [that is not true]—they do not support Taiwan. However, whenever they

talk of any foreign country, they'd say that the United States is better. [They'd say:] "See, the United States has so much steel; American science is very well-developed." I say, the foreign countries are good, the capitalist countries and the Western countries are good. Are they good? They are good. They have so many pieces of machinery, so much steel and iron, and we don't have anything. However, if they are good it is their business, not yours. If the United States has so much steel, that is the American people's steel, not our Chinese people's steel. What good does it do us to toot their horn everyday? [The United States may] produce 100 million tons of steel a year [but so what for us?] We don't [produce that]. If we could produce several tens of thousands of tons of steel a year we would be very glad. Right now we have only four million tons of steel. According to the First Five-Year Plan,<sup>66</sup> we may complete [the production of] 4.12 million tons of steel, and we may surpass that and produce a bit more. We might have several hundred thousand tons over four million tons of steel. In 1949 we had only something between 100,000 and 200,000 tons of steel. The highest annual output was in 1934. The major part of that was [produced by] the Japanese. And even then there were only 900,000 tons. Chiang Kai-shek promoted [that] for twenty years. There is sense when I say Chiang Kai-shek ought to be toppled; it is not that we just happened to send him packing. He'd been promoting [steel production] for twenty years, and he had only several tens of thousands of tons of steel, and some of that was produced at the end of the Qing dynasty by Zhang Zhidong and so on.<sup>67</sup> We've been promoting this for several years, and if you count this year, eight years; and we can produce more than four million tons of steel. That's why, if we add [even just] one ton of steel it is our business, and we are glad. It doesn't make us glad even if you, the United States, increased [production] by several million tons of steel. The more you have, the less happy we'll be. Why are you increasing steel [production] by so much? What for? When you increase that much steel [production] you'll be very dangerous [because you'll] want to fight us. And there are some of our own intellectuals who are sitting there blowing [the horn for] the United States's steel production; steel, steel! That much! This is [a point on which we] must persuade them; we must persuade the intellectuals.

Some intellectuals are serving as teachers. Scientists are all teachers; university professors are all teachers, and middle school and primary school teachers are all teachers; they are educating the people. The journalists and those who run newspapers [also] educate the people. The broadcaster, the writer, and the artist are all teachers for the people. Technicians and engineers are indispensable in our factories. If we looked down on these several million intellectuals and thought that we could dispense with them, that viewpoint would not be right. We can't get away from them; if we separated ourselves from these several million intellectuals, we would not be able to act. We can very well say that we can't leave them, not for a single step. [If we separated ourselves from them,] we wouldn't be able to run the schools. And many of our newspapers would not be published. [In] our literature and art, the Communist Party did not produce a Mei Lanfang,<sup>68</sup> or a Zhou XX; recently a Yuan XX joined the Party,<sup>69</sup> but the Party still has no Mei Lanfang, or Zhou XX, or Cheng Yanqiu.<sup>70</sup> We don't have university professors, for one thing.



We are beginning to have some engineers, but only very few. Some technical personnel are also beginning to join the Communist Party, [but] a very large batch are still people outside the Party.

Therefore, no matter how they vacillate, the several million intellectuals we have<sup>71</sup> are useful people. They are our people's assets<sup>72</sup> and our people's teachers. At present only they are serving as teachers; we have no other teachers. This is because they are left behind by past generations; they are left to us by the society. In terms of their social backgrounds, they are all of the landlord class, the rich peasant class, and the bourgeoisie. But they can be educated and pulled over [to our side]. We should not involve ourselves with a theory of the unique importance of class origin.<sup>73</sup> [If we did,] then Lu Xun would belong to the class of landlords,<sup>74</sup> rich peasants, and the bourgeoisie. Marx, [too,] would belong to the [class of] the landlords, the rich peasants, and the bourgeoisie. Lenin, too. Good gracious! What should we do? So, [you see,] we simply cannot dwell on the theory of the unique importance of class origin. This is because now they—the landlords, the rich peasants, the bourgeoisie—no longer have their social roots. We have dug up their social roots, their social base. Now they are in midair; that is why they are ready to be transformed.<sup>75</sup> We must not be afraid of them.

Some comrades who come from worker and peasant backgrounds and [some who are] worker and peasant cadres get a bit angry when they see intellectuals; they are afraid that they are [the type of people who are] too hard to swallow and too tough to chew.<sup>76</sup> It is true that the intellectuals are a bit troublesome. This is because intellectuals are intellectuals; their troublesomeness is that they have read a few books, and we have not read a few books. Because you have read fewer books, his tail cocks up and struts in the air.<sup>77</sup> Then things become difficult to handle and some are just outright impossible. That's why it is true when some people say things [with the intellectuals] are hard to handle; they are difficult to handle. And yet, if you choose instead to say things are easy to handle, that could be true also. In these last seven years, these several million intellectuals have made some progress, isn't that the case? After all, [I think they have] made some progress.

What are the democratic parties? The democratic parties—they are [made up of] intellectuals. There are very few worker and peasant cadres in the democratic parties. What worker and peasant cadres are there [in the parties]? The democratic parties—the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, the Democratic League, the Democratic Association for National Construction, the September Third Study Society, the Peasant-Worker Democratic Party—all are [made up of] intellectuals.<sup>78</sup> That's why our Party proposed [the slogans] "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend," and "Long-term coexistence and mutual supervision."<sup>79</sup> Comrade Jiang XX wanted me to say something about this problem.<sup>80</sup>

We have reasons for proposing these guidelines. [We say:] "Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools contend." [The question is,] do we want to "bloom," or do we want to "retrench"?<sup>81</sup> Right now people outside the Party are precisely saying that we have not let things "bloom" enough, and they are deeply afraid that we would retrench. And as for our comrades [within the Party]? [It seems that] they are looking at what has been going on and it doesn't seem quite right, so

they have a bit of the idea of retrenching. They have a bit of the idea of calling back the troops.<sup>82</sup> How about us? The opinion of the Central [Committee] has been discussed with the comrades from all provinces. Last year in November, the Second Plenum [of the Central Committee] was held, and this year in January we held a conference of provincial [Party] committee secretaries,<sup>83</sup> and we obtained a consensus, which held that the guidelines of "let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools contend" should be upheld and continued. [This opinion is that] we should [continue to] "let go," and not to "hold things back." What is wrong ought to be criticized. An erroneous opinion, a wrong piece of work, or, in an essay or article or a piece of writing, where there is a part that is in error, then that part must be criticized. However, we must use the method of persuasion.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, [there are the questions of] whether we use "winning over by persuasion" or "putting down by suppression." We must adopt one of the two methods. Should we "let go" or should we "hold back"? Between these two we must pick one. We think that we should still be "letting go," not "holding back." Then, when we "let go," that would let a lot of things out. Many of these things will not be what we like; what then should we do? Should we then "suppress"? Or should we employ another method, [namely,] to persuade them? Some comrades' hands are a bit itchy; they would like to "suppress," and trot out the stuff that was employed in dealing with the class struggle. [They would like] to handle things according to the law of the military,<sup>85</sup> and to use a simplistic method. Or, they don't want to call in the troops, but want to use administrative decrees; where they see something not quite to their liking, they would like to "suppress" it a bit. The Central [Committee] believes that this is not good. Suppression will never [really] bring people to [honest] submission. Since time immemorial, there has never been a case where people were brought to [real] submission by pressure.<sup>86</sup> When we dealt with the enemy, we did use pressure, [but] after the suppression, we still engaged in "persuasion." For example, with people who were captured [in battle], once their arms were laid down, we persuaded them.<sup>87</sup> As for the counterrevolutionaries, as long as they are those who are to be executed, we still would want to win them over, to educate them and reform them. The policy of heavy pressure<sup>88</sup> is not conducive to the resolving of problems. [In handling the] problems among the people [we] cannot adopt a policy of heavy pressure. Then, with this "letting go," we also use [the method of] "persuasion"; [and we say] we don't want to use administrative decrees to exert heavy pressure; would there be chaos all over the country? We say that there will not be chaos. Would there be criticism conducted from all sides? [That people will] criticize our shortcomings in the newspapers, magazines, and meetings? Would it be possible that we might be so severely criticized that we would not be able to come down? Would there be criticism to topple the people's government, like it did in Hungary? Would things be like that? I say that things would not. Conditions in China are different from the way they were in Hungary. [Our] Communist Party enjoys a tremendous prestige, and the people's government is held greatly in respect. Marxism is truth; that cannot be toppled by criticism.<sup>89</sup> [Our] old cadres also cannot be toppled by criticism. Therefore [our] old cadres need not fear criticism. It is very good for our old cadres to be subjected to a little bit of criticism.

If we have [the smell of] bureaucratism on us, if we have shortcomings, let us first allow for a criticism within the Party, and then let [people] outside the Party criticize. [Let them] criticize our shortcomings, and [help to] change our bureaucratism around a bit, to change around [our] shortcomings. Won't that be good then? Will [we] be toppled? No! We won't. How can the people's government be blown away and toppled? Last year there was a tornado in Shanghai. Something big was swept up in the gale; some house [I think], and something containing petroleum. They were swept up to the sky. There was such a gust of wind, but the Shanghai people's government was not blown away. No matter how big the typhoon,<sup>90</sup> as I see it, the people's government, the Communist Party, Marxism, old cadres, new cadres, as long as you are wholeheartedly in the service of the people, you will not be blown away or toppled [by the wind]. As for those who are halfheartedly serving the people, half of them will be blown away and toppled. Those who don't have a single idea [of serving the people but, instead,] are opposed to the people should be blown away and toppled.

What should we do about the poison? With "a hundred flowers blooming," many poisonous things will come out.<sup>91</sup> [As they say:] "From the mouth of the serpent comes a flower." I say, with regard to the things that carry poison, [let us refer to] the essay titled "Once More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."<sup>92</sup> All of you, comrades, I think, have read this. In it there are a few sentences that read like this: If there are shortcomings with the system of democratic centralism, it should be criticized. Without a doubt, the centralism of democratic centralism must be built on a base of widespread democracy; and the Party's leadership must be a leadership that is closely connected to the people's masses. If in these areas there are shortcomings, then we must resolutely criticize and overcome them. However, the criticism of these shortcomings can only be for the purpose of consolidating the leadership of the Party, and not by any means, as the enemy hopes for, to create the "dissipation and chaos" of the proletariat.<sup>93</sup> [Now,] is this correct or not? It is very good that [you recognize that] this is correct. You can take this thing and go discuss it with the democratic personages, and let the university students go discuss [it]. What this essay said is: Criticism is all right. But the consequence and purpose of criticism is for the consolidation of the system of democratic centralism and of the Party's leadership, not by any means to create dissipation and confusion among the ranks of the proletariat, as the enemy hopes for.

This is a matter of principle. The principle must be such. However, we must also pay attention to a matter of flexibility. When we allow people to speak up [we must expect] that some very unpleasant-to-the-ear things will come out of their mouths; and when a hundred flowers are blooming, some quite unsightly flowers may be in the blooming also. There will be something like workers' strikes, students' strikes, petitions, parades, demonstrations, and in the midst of that there could be some disturbance. The purposes of these things may not necessarily conform to [the original purpose of criticism]. When the masses make trouble, [you can't expect the intellectuals to understand them, after all,] 80 per cent of the intellectuals are people who have not learned Marxism and still harbor a bourgeois world view; how could they understand this? When they have meetings and when they criticize,

there are likely to be some disturbances. It won't do if, at such times, and everywhere, we just trotted out some [dogma] to put things down: "Look here! I have a book here; have you read it?" You must [instead] learn the way in which our Comrade Peng Chong and Comrade Xu Jiatus resolved the problem.<sup>94</sup> If at such times they had merely trotted out that line to recite, and just recited it over and over and said nothing else, you can bet that he would not be able to keep on being mayor. Since they have to resolve concrete problems, it is inevitable that sometimes they may do things a bit overboard.

Among literary works there are things that are not in tune. In Shanghai, there is the performance of an opera "Exchanging a Leopard Cat for a Crown Prince."<sup>95</sup> I have not seen this opera, [but I know that it describes a situation in which] all sorts of demons and freaks and monsters come onto the stage.<sup>96</sup> I say it's all right for some of them to come up. Many people simply have never seen demons, or monsters, or freaks; I myself have seen all too little of them. [In fact,] I would very much like to see "Exchanging a Leopard Cat for a Crown Prince." In order to become well-versed in the things of the world, we have to see it.<sup>97</sup> Just that we should not see too much of [such things]. We should not get involved with demons and monsters and freaks everyday, today, tomorrow; just dealing with them all the time. [Let us simply] deal with them just that one bit, [so as to] broaden [our] horizons, and get a taste of that artistic ideology that was left behind from the feudal period. This is different from fairy tales. For example, [the story of] "Making Big Trouble in the Heavenly Palace" is something that everyone approves of; no one opposes it.<sup>98</sup> Then there are also "Cleaving the Mountain To Save Mother," "Water Overflows Gold Mountain [Temple]," "Severed Bridge," and so on; those are fairy tales.<sup>99</sup> But even then no one disapproves of them. Even if there are other things [that deserve disapproval], let's not be too worried about them; let them be promoted for a period and [naturally] there'll be someone to offer criticism. Should we be impatient and worry just because of the appearance of a few novels, a few poems, or the performance of something like "Exchanging a Leopard Cat for a Crown Prince"? We can slow down a bit [ourselves]; let the society criticize and assess, and let these works and operas gradually and appropriately change, rather than ban them with administrative decrees. Comrades, please don't be mistaken and think that what I am doing here is actually to advocate the promotion of demons and monsters and freaks. I am not advocating these things; rather, I want to eliminate them. But the method of elimination, [I suggest,] is [first] to let them appear, let the public openly criticize them in society. There is bound to be one day when they will slowly disappear, or gradually be transformed. In the past we did use an administrative decree to ban certain things, and for seven years these were prohibited.<sup>100</sup> But now they have slowly reappeared. So, we can see that that ban of ours did not work.

Finally,<sup>101</sup> let me talk a bit about the need to launch a discussion, both inside and outside the Party, on these problems that our Party has proposed. We must say the same things inside the Party as well as to [people] outside the Party. For example, such words as [about being] halfhearted must be spoken with them [i.e., with people outside the Party] as well. "I am saying that you are halfhearted; what

are you going to do about it?" "No! That won't do! You say that I am halfhearted. I won't stand for that!" [You say:] I won't stand for that; I want to fight. Well, we are not afraid even of fighting. You are halfhearted, and I say you are halfhearted; and you are uneasy about it? You have half a heart that is good. You still have half a heart. This is talking of world views; I am not talking about your [attitude] toward the socialist system. You support the socialist system, but not necessarily in every [aspect of it] either. For example, on the system of the cooperatives, some of you have doubts. However, on socialism in general, on the five-year plans, if you asked them if they approved of them or not, they'll say that they approve. Do they approve of the Constitution or not?<sup>102</sup> Yes, they do. In general they support the Communist Party, but when you touch on the world view [issue] and the [issue of] dialectical materialism, on these things they would not approve, or only approve partially. That is why we speak of them [being] halfhearted. Therefore, you have yet one more task to perform: you must undergo transformation. There is a duality about you; one aspect is that you approve of socialism, [but] the other aspect is that your approval is not thoroughgoing. That's why you are halfhearted. You wish to draw close to the people, but then again you just can't come close completely; you can't blend into one piece with them. Even after you have gone to the village for a casual stroll and you come back, things have not changed that much.

I hear that something [of interest] once took place here in this Nanjing of yours. This is something that came up during the time of the "Three-Anti's."<sup>103</sup> A writer, some general secretary in the Federation of Writers, went down [to the countryside] to get a [firsthand] experience of [how] life [is]. He brought the rice from the city down to the countryside to eat. When he was returning, he sent letters to Nanjing ahead of time, and after the Nanjing Writers' Federation had received the letters, [the members] lined up to greet him, standing in two rows to either side [of the street]. And this writer of ours, who had [supposedly gone down to the countryside] to experience life [firsthand], walked [between the two rows of greeters] in the middle of the street. In any case, he was quite proud and self-important about that. Then there was another: during the "Three-Anti's" he got married, and he insisted that on his wedding night he must sleep in the bed Chiang Kai-shek had slept in in the president's residence. He insisted on going there to sleep for the night, one night. In any case, there are all sorts of weird things in this world of ours. With the "Three-Anti's" and "Five-Anti's" these strange things have all been exposed. The authorities in Nanjing sent these materials to Beijing, and we got to see them. The state of mind of people like them [is quite strange, but] he must have his interest about it—this is, after all, the bed in which the president had once slept. This president's name is Chiang; he is Chiang Kai-shek. As I get married today, I must, simply must, sleep there for this one night.

We must use the democratic parties and the democratic personages. Just now we spoke of the intellectuals. The democratic parties are [made up of] some intellectuals. We have to use them. Some people [might] say: It'll be good to use them. However, they are not useful; they are old trash. [Well,] even [if they were] trash we must utilize [them]; even trash has its good points.<sup>104</sup> We ought to use them, and we ought to hold meetings. This time, a political consultative confer-

ence<sup>105</sup> was convened in Beijing, and I spoke once to [the conference]. We don't want that each year, when there is a meeting, we just take care of things for a bit—we just take care of things perfunctorily, and that's it. Rather, we must utilize the [method of] meetings. Let each province hold one or two meetings each year, and we will make use of these meetings to do work among them, [i.e., among the intellectuals] to persuade them so that they will work in our interests. This is [also] because they are connected to some [other] people, and through them we can persuade those [others as well]. This would be a positive attitude, not a negative attitude of [simply] making use of them. This is [what is meant by] "use," "restrict," and "reform."<sup>106</sup> Our comrades like the latter two items; one is called "restrict" and the other is called "reform." But they don't like the first item, which is called "use." [They say: "I am going to 'reform' you; and I am going to 'restrict' you.]" Naturally those were [appropriate] words to be used for the capitalists. Now, with regard to the democratic personages, it would not be appropriate to use these words: "utilize," "restrict," and "reform." However, our comrades, in reality, are using that "restriction," but not "reforming" and not "utilizing" them. They can do work that we are not capable of. We must be honest and sincere with them. In many things we should not have two ways of handling affairs, one for within the Party and another for [dealing with people] outside the Party. For example, whatever I have just said to you comrades here, I can say to them just as well. Of course, every party has certain things that it will not tell [people] outside the party. The democratic parties have things that they do not tell us, and we have certain things that we do not tell them. Nonetheless, we can share all the things that relate to policy. What is said in the Party, the same will be said [to people] outside the Party; the [documentary] material is entirely [open to] viewing. Some documents, such as those describing workers' strikes and student strikes, protests and demonstrations, documents that expose our bureaucratism, and so on, can be reprinted and circulated to them for their viewing. Normally they don't get to see these things, and this way, [I think,] things would in fact be better. Sometimes two parties can hold joint meetings, so that people from [our] Party and people outside the Party can take part at the same time. Recently, a propaganda conference was held in Beijing, and that meeting went quite well.<sup>107</sup> It was attended by 150 to 160 personages outside our Party, making up one-fifth [of the attendance]. If you hold [such a meeting here], you can let that percentage be higher; let them make up two-fifths. On such matters as [these] policies, we do not promote two sets of methods; let them see the material.

Arduous and heroic struggle.<sup>108</sup> Comrade Jiang XX also spoke about that for a bit, and so did I earlier. It will take such and such number of years before our people's lives can be improved. Right now we must promote [the will to undertake] arduous and heroic struggle. However, this doesn't mean that our women comrades can't wear color-patterned dresses. Color-patterned dresses can still be worn. According to some studies that people have made, color-patterned clothing is cheaper [to manufacture]. Right now people make two sets: they wear color-patterned clothes underneath, covered on top by a blue-cotton jacket. That is spending too much money. We have to economize. To wear color-patterned clothes is a way

to economize. In all sorts of things we have to do a great deal of work on the point of economizing and on the point of arduous and heroic struggle.

Even now we can see that some comrades have not stirred themselves up in spirit. They only do a little bit of work, and when there is no work to do they just play poker and *majong*.<sup>109</sup> I hear that playing poker has become quite a fad, and that sometimes people play through the whole night. You must cultivate the habit of reading. I am not opposed to playing poker, or to dancing, or to going to the opera; just that [I] don't [want you to] do too much of these things. We would not be able to make use of our strong points [if we steep ourselves in these things]. Our strong points are in class struggle, in politics, and in military matters. Our shortcoming today is in the fact that we lack education,<sup>110</sup> and lack [knowledge in] science and technology. We must learn in these areas. These are words that I said in the essay "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" in 1949.<sup>111</sup> I said then that the things in which we were strong in the past, the things that we knew well, and the things we understood would soon be set aside, not to be used; whereas the things that we didn't understand were placed in front of us. Therefore, [I said,] we have a task; a task to study. Seven years have now gone by, and I feel even more strongly that we must promote and advocate studying. We must form a habit of reading, let reading occupy our spare time from work, and let us use all our spare energy on this. Then the taste for playing poker would not be so great. The taste would have crept into the books, into studying.

Some comrades show that their revolutionary will has receded and lack the spirit of "placing one's life on the line." What is meant by "placing one's life on the line"? In *Shuihu* [*zhuan*] there is a character called "Shi Xiu the Death-Defying Third Brother."<sup>112</sup> And that is what we mean by "placing one's life on the line." In the past, when we were making revolution, we had a spirit of putting our lives on the line; we had that burst of energy. In these last few years, gradually, some comrades no longer have that energy. Some make trouble; another thing is [when] grades are assessed.<sup>113</sup> Some make so much of a fuss that it is quite unbecoming; for instance, they won't eat for three days. I say it is all right [if you didn't eat for] four days. You don't eat for three, four days, someone sends food to you. I say: That's too early. Let him starve for four, five days, for a week, and then you'll have problems. What's so serious about going three days without food? Why are you so anxious to send over milk and eggs? Some people weep bitterly. They compare their own ranking with others', compare salaries, and compare how pretty their dresses are.<sup>114</sup>

I'm afraid that we might have to make some adjustments in wages. The Central Committee has not yet made a decision on this. Didn't we propose a wage reform last year, and didn't wages get raised? There ought to have been a raise in the wages, but in some cases, there has been a bit too much of a raise, for instance, in the administrative system, and perhaps in the educational system as well. This is not in reference to the workers, not to the factories, but to the administrative system. We have 1.7 million administrative personnel (including the *xiang* cadres, but not including the cooperatives,) and two million people in the educational system. In addition, there is the commercial system and the business system outside the

factories. Also, there are X [personnel in the] Liberation Army.<sup>115</sup> Altogether, a bit over ten million people. This is the number of people who make up our state. In the past there were several million industrial workers, and now that figure has increased to twelve million. Because our country is large, we have a bit more [administrative] personnel. There's no problem with that. However, more than ten million is a bit too many. That's why, when the conditions are ripe, that is, when we can see enough ways out,<sup>116</sup> we are prepared to send some people back to the factories, back to the cooperatives. In the main, production is in two sectors. One is industry and the other is agriculture. We rely on these two departments for production. Right now it appears as if there are some improprieties in wages, and that has made some people dissatisfied. With regard to this problem, I think, if there is more talk in the society, it would be better to handle, because when there is more talk, we would have the basis upon which to bring about an adjustment. We must maintain the spirit that we had in the past when we were making revolution and making class struggle, that gust of energy, that surge of zeal and enthusiasm. Revolutionary zeal is to carry out this work to the end. Every person has one life—it depends on how long you live. Some sixty, some seventy, eighty, or even ninety. There is an artist by the name of Qi Baishi.<sup>117</sup> He is ninety-eight. It depends on how long you live. There comes a time when you really can't work anymore, then you don't work, but as long as you can still work, you've got to do some work, more or less. And when you do work, you've got to have enthusiasm. To lack enthusiasm, to stall and go stagnant; some [such] phenomena are no good, and we ought to conduct education. In some cases [the problem] is that the organization is too big, [too] many people all huddled together in a heap, without work to do. If they don't play poker, they have no way out at all. You pile them in such a big heap, and with only a few things to handle; what do you expect—wouldn't they play poker?

We must strengthen ideological and political work. How are things in the armed forces? Today there are many comrades in the armed forces [attending this meeting. Let me ask you:] Isn't there some difference between political work in normal times and political work during wartime? In the war, we have to draw close to the masses. The officers and the soldiers must be forged into one.<sup>118</sup> The army and the people must be forged into one. That is because, in wartime, [even] if we had some shortcomings, people would understand and forgive us. Now it is a ["normal"] time. We have no enemy in front of us, and we are not fighting battles. We are in training. At such times, if we had a shortcoming, people naturally would not be so easy to forgive us. Just as with comrades in government work and in local Party work, at this time, at a time when class struggle is over,<sup>119</sup> people will find it even harder to forgive us [for shortcomings we may have]. At present we have implemented a system of military ranks and other sorts of systems. While we carry out these systems on the one hand, however, we must, on the other hand, still have [the officers of] higher ranks forge as one with [the officers of] lower ranks, and [both] forge as one with the soldiers. Moreover, we must permit [the people of the lower ranks] to criticize. For example, when we hold a Party delegates' conference we must give them a chance to raise criticism. Comrade Chen Yi said it well [once]. During the time of the "Three-Anti's," he was in the East China military region.

He said: “We have already exercised dictatorship for several years; can we now allow people to exercise dictatorship over us for a week? It was all right for us to give the commands for lo, these many years. Is it now all right for the [people of the] lower ranks to say some things to us, to criticize us for a bit, for a week—just one week?” His idea was that it should be all right. I agree with this. [Let’s] toughen our scalps<sup>120</sup> and let the [people in the] lower ranks criticize us for a week. Before they criticize, let’s do some preparations; make some reports. [Let’s examine] what shortcomings we have. It’s no more than one, two, three, or four . . . those three or four items. Then let comrades speak. Let them supplement [our reports] and do some criticism. [We have] achievements to [our] credit; the people will not simply throw away our history. Give the soldiers a chance at the company and platoon commanders. [I think] it would be best if we can have such a thing once a year, have a few days of a criticism meeting. We’ve done that before, and the results were beneficial. [We must have] democracy in military affairs, in the armed forces. This way, we will not harm the close relationship between the higher ranks and the lower ranks, between the officers and the soldiers, between the military and the people, between the military and the local [people], just because we now have a military ranking system and other types of systems. Without a single doubt, the higher and lower ranks ought to be closely linked; there should be a comradely relationship between them. The officers and the soldiers, the military cadres and the fighting personnel ought to be intimately forged as one; there should [also] be an intimate, close relationship between the armed forces and the people, and with the Party and government in the localities.

Ideological work must be emphasized throughout the entire Party. The general topic I am speaking of today is the work of ideology, the problem of ideology. This is because this problem has been particularly outstanding recently. In particular, with the [proposals of] “letting a hundred flowers bloom, and letting a hundred schools contend” and “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision,” people have asked: Are we still going to let go some more? We’re afraid it might be dangerous. [You say:] Long-term coexistence? Why must we have long-term coexistence? “You, the democratic parties; where were you when we were making revolution?” As soon as we bring that up, they’ll have nothing to say; they’ll be doomed. We say: Let’s not bring that up at this time. Let’s not rely on our official position in the government, or on your high position and status for a living. Don’t rely on your veteran status for a living. [You may say you] have veteran status, [you have] made revolution for so many years. These credentials are reliable, but don’t rely on them. You may have a veteran status, [you may have been making revolution for] several decades; all this is true, but come the day when you did a stupid thing, said something foolish, and at such a time people would not understand or forgive. If you didn’t resolve a matter properly, you may have done many things in the past and you may have a high position, but because you didn’t do things properly today you may have harmed the people, and on this point they cannot forgive you. Therefore, we must not rely on old veteran status for our living; we must rely on resolving problems correctly for a living. Rely on correctness, not on status. What do you rely on, correctness, or status? If you rely on status you

can’t make a living, because the things you are engaged in may not be correct; you may not be correct in resolving a problem. Even though you may have status, people cannot forgive you. That’s why, let’s just simply not rely on status at all. [Let’s make as if] we have not become any kind of an official at all, and [let’s] not put on an air of a master.<sup>121</sup> The air of a master we should not display, but should pack it up. Let’s meet the people face to face, meet the [people in the] lower levels face to face. Let’s not strike a bureaucrat’s pose and not rely on old veteran status for a living. This is something to which veteran cadres must pay particular attention. The new cadres don’t have this baggage; they are freer. They say: “Old doesn’t [necessarily] mean that you are better. You may have engaged in revolution for several decades, but at that time, when you were engaged in revolution, I was still crawling on the floor!” On this, [to be sure,] they can’t argue with us. That’s why they don’t have this baggage.

With regard to those new cadres, we have to treat them on an equal footing [with ourselves]. In many things we are not as good as they are. For instance, in terms of knowledge, we must learn from them. The generation of today are the only people who can educate the working class and the peasants in terms of knowledge. That’s because, what intellectuals do we have now? None! Right now, about 80 per cent of the university [students] are children of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists. In the middle schools—according to statistics from Jiangsu, 60 per cent of upper middle school [students] are children of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists, and even in the lower middle schools, 40 per cent [of the students] are children of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists. Only in the primary schools is the situation reversed. [There,] the children of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists make up approximately 20 to 30 per cent, and there may be 70 or 80 [per cent] who are workers’ and peasants’ children. It will take a very long time, probably ten or twenty years, before this situation can be changed. That is why the intellectual today is a bourgeois intellectual. That is why we must patiently win them over. On the one hand, we must persuade them and make them progressive, let them accept Marxism—that is to say, educate them. If they are to be teachers, they must [themselves] learn. On the other hand, we must learn from them, learn from today’s bourgeois intellectuals, because there are no other intellectuals but them.

The proletariat must have its own intellectuals. Our country is led by the proletariat; only it has a future; all other classes are making transitions toward it. For example, the peasants must in the future transform into agricultural workers. After several decades, the cooperatives will become state farms,<sup>122</sup> and the cooperatives’ members will become agricultural workers. The capitalists are undergoing transformation right now, and in a number of years they will also have transformed into workers. The whole society will be one of workers, and that is why only the worker has a future, and all others are transitional classes. The proletariat must have its own intellectuals; it must have intellectuals who will serve it wholeheartedly, not halfheartedly. Our rough estimate is that by the completion of three five-year plans<sup>123</sup> we may, out of the five million intellectuals,<sup>124</sup> expand the number that we have won over from the dozen or so per cent, or the 15 per cent, or 17 per cent of the present time, to about one-third. (These figures [of 15 or 17

per cent] do not include some who have joined the Communist Party and are not counted here. Joining the Communist Party does not necessarily mean that the person has completely accepted a Marxist world view. Some people who have not joined the Communist Party, on the other hand, have in fact accepted a Marxist world view. For example, Lu Xun was such a person. Was Lu Xun better, or was Chen Duxiu better? Or was Zhang Guotao better? Or was Gao Gang better?<sup>125</sup> I think Lu Xun was better. One was a Communist; the other was a personage without party affiliations. On an individual basis, joining the Communist Party does not necessarily make a person better than those outside the Party; some personages outside the Party are better than Communist Party members.) [We'll win over one-third of the intellectuals;] they may join the Party, or they may accept a Marxist world view outside the Party and draw close to the workers and peasants. Then there will still be the other two-thirds. In these dozen or so years, they, too, will undergo some change. From being halfhearted, [they may] become a bit more [full hearted]. [There may] be a thirty-seventy split.<sup>126</sup> [They may] drop off some more of their [bourgeois] tail and make some progress. We must strive for this future. Because I am talking of the problem of ideology, I got connected to the problems of the intellectuals.

As for the many problems of cooperativization,<sup>127</sup> I'll not speak [of them today]. Cooperativization is a good thing; we can affirm that it has superiority. This is because many of our cooperatives have proven this point; of that there can be no doubt. But some comrades have doubts, and among the personages outside the Party there is some difference of opinion. On this point we must make explanations to them.

## Notes

1. The words that Mao uses here are *youshuo xiansheng*. The term *youshuo* refers to the historical practice, especially common in the classical period of the Warring States (i.e., the times of Confucius, Mencius, and other classical philosophers), when teachers of schools of thought and strategies for organizing society and running governments took their ideas around to "sell" to the courts of many of the "warring states," hoping that these ideas would be adopted by some ruler. We recognize that the translation here, "lobbyist," is somewhat anachronistic. There is a subtle echo between Mao's self-description and his admonition to cadres in the CPC at this time (which he repeats later in this speech) that they must adopt the method of *shuo* (persuasion) rather than coercion in dealing with people who offer criticism.

2. See texts Mar. 17, 1957(2), Mar. 18, 1957, and Mar. 19, 1957. We have no knowledge of the full extent of Mao's itinerary.

3. Mao is probably referring, a bit facetiously, to the period of negotiations with the KMT which were held in Nanjing in late 1946. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 5.

4. The term is *long pan hu ju*. It originally referred to conditions that make a place strategically (primarily in the military sense) important. In time, with the reference to the dragon here, the political significance took over, and the term became relevant particularly to places that are or have been imperial capitals. The phrase eventually also came to be used in the jargon of geomancy. Mao uses this description for Nanjing because it had been the site (under different names) of several imperial capitals of older times. This is also a reference to a passage in the book *Liu chao shiji* (The Exploits of the Six Dynasties) in which Zhuge

Liang was supposed to have used this phrase to comment on the geographical features of Jinling (as Nanjing was once known). The same idea about Jinling has also been conveyed in a line in the poem "Yong wang dong xun ge" (Ballad on the Eastern Inspection tour of Prince Yong), written by the famous Tang-dynasty poet, Li Bai (Li Bo).

5. Zhang Taiyan (a.k.a. Zhang Binglin) (1868–1936) was a prominent philologist, as well as a late Qing-dynasty republican revolutionary. Zhang fostered the ideas of democratic revolution in the 1890s through his work as correspondent for *Shiwu bao* (Current Affairs) and *Changyan bao* (Advocate For Free Speech). To avoid prosecution by the Qing government, he was forced to go to Taiwan, and subsequently Japan, where he met Sun Yat-sen. On returning to China, he organized, with Cai Yuanpei, the Aiguo xueshe (Patriotic Study Society) and became an editor of *Su bao* (Jiangsu journal), which became a chief mouthpiece for the radical anti-Qing revolutionaries at the turn of the century. For publishing Zou Rong's essay "Geming jun" (The Revolutionary Army), Zhang and others on the *Su bao* staff were persecuted and arrested in June 1903. Released from prison in 1906, he went to Japan and continued to participate in revolutionary activities, joining Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary organization, the Tongmenghui. Zhang later became editor of the organ of that association, the *Min bao* (People's journal). After the Republic of China was formed in 1911–1912, Zhang for a time served as a political counselor for Yuan Shikai, but he opposed Yuan's monarchy-restoration scheme and was placed under house arrest until Yuan's death in 1916. After that, Zhang spent most of his time in scholarly pursuits. Although he held radical political ideas, he was quite conservative on cultural and literary matters, and throughout his life, he promoted classical learning. For more biographical information on Zhang, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1967), pp. 92–98.

6. Chiang Kai-shek established a government of his wing of the Kuomintang in Nanjing in April 1927. Subsequently, with the success of Chiang's Second Northern Expedition in 1928, and as the northern warlords were quelled, the Nanjing government was established as the central government. Thus there were twenty years from 1928 to 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek, defeated in the civil war, fled from Nanjing when the PRC was founded. In a sense it was not entirely correct on Mao's part to think of the KMT as having been in power in Nanjing for all these twenty years. The period was interrupted by the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937–1945), during much of which the KMT wartime government was in Chongqing.

7. See text Feb. 27, 1957, text surrounding note 43. See also text Mar. 17, 1957(2), paragraph 8, and text Mar. 18, 1957, paragraph 2. However, we should pay particular attention to the qualifications that Mao made in the middle part of paragraph 7 of the March 17 speech, and, even more elaborately and specifically, toward the end of paragraph 2 of the March 18 speech.

8. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 5.

9. See text Oct. 8, 1950, vol. I, note 1, and text Oct. 23, 1951, vol. I.

10. See text Dec. 19, 1950, vol. I, and text Jan. 17, 1951, vol. I.

11. The term Mao uses here is *dipan*; see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 97.

12. As we mentioned briefly in the source note, the question of the transformation of the relations of production is a critical theoretical issue of contention between Mao's viewpoint and that of others in the CPC, e.g., Liu Shaoqi. Mao seems to suggest here that he (at this time) saw the relations of production as part of the superstructure. This would be inconsistent with what seemed to be his prevailing idea in these years. See text Jan. 20, 1956, note 5; text Feb. 27, 1957, note 42; and text July 8, 1957(2), note 38. See also text Oct. 7, 1957, note 16.

13. Mao seems to be alluding tangentially to the contest of strategies within the CPC from the late 1920s to the mid-1930s, over the question of whether the Party should attempt to rebuild the Communist revolutionary movement in the cities or focus on the revolution in the countryside. From 1927 (and especially after Mao's victory in the intra-Party contest of strategies in 1934–1935) to practically 1949, the Communist revolutionary movement had been organized primarily in the rural areas, and not in the cities, much less the large cities in China, which were controlled by either the KMT or the Japanese. See also text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 30.

14. The Communist Party of China was formed with the convening of its first congress in July 1921. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 39.

15. The Opium War (*Yapian zhanzheng*) refers to the First Anglo-Chinese War in 1839–1841, triggered by Lin Zexu's burning of British-owned opium sold to Chinese people. Often the Second Anglo-Chinese War of 1856–1860 is also known as the Opium War, or part of the Opium Wars. See also text Feb. 14, 1957, note 1. See also text Mar. 17, 1957(2), paragraph 5.

16. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, source note, notes 1 and 2.

17. See text Feb. 27, 1957, notes 3 and 4.

18. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.

19. The term is *lin shi gong*, which translates as “temporary employment.” This refers, we believe, to people with no steady employment in the urban-industrial sector.

20. The term *fuyu zhongnong* (well-to-do middle peasants) refers to the economically upper layer of the general peasant stratum known as “middle peasants.” (See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 1.) By the terms of Mao's October 1933 essay on class distinctions in the countryside (see *SW*, I, p. 138), this layer was described as “practicing exploitation to a small extent.” This was affirmed by the Central People's Government resolutions on class distinctions published in 1950 (*RMRB* [Aug. 21, 1950], 1). By definition in the latter, the term applied to those within the “middle peasant” stratum that derived not more than 15 per cent of total annual family income from exploitative means. This layer is distinguished from the other two layers of middle peasants, namely, the average middle peasant (*zhong zhongnong*) and the lower-middle peasant (*xia zhongnong*). In the early 1960s, they became known as *shang zhongnong* (upper-middle peasant) or *lao shang zhongnong* (old upper-middle peasant).

21. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

22. The term Mao uses here is *wenhua*, which also often has the more specific connotation of “literacy.” (See text May 1955, vol. I, note 1.) Here we think Mao means primarily “book learning.”

23. See text Sept. 15, 1956, source note. Mao is referring to both the political report made by Liu Shaoqi to the Eighth Congress and the Resolution of the Central Committee in response to that report. See *RMSC* (1957), pp. 9–26, for the report itself, and pp. 55–58, for the resolutions on the report. See also R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. (1962), pp. 164–203, for an English translation of the report. On the controversy that developed later in 1957 on the interpretations in this political report and in the resolutions, and especially on the point that Mao speaks of here, see text Oct. 7, 1957, and text Oct. 9, 1957(1).

24. These last few sentences, starting with “As for production,” appear only in the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) text.

25. The remainder of this paragraph, starting with “the people,” and also the entire next paragraph, do not appear in the *Wansui* (n.d.) source, and are found only in the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) text. In the *Wansui* (n.d.) source the words *bu qing* (not clear) appear in parentheses.

26. The official release on grain production in the PRC in 1956 was made by the National Bureau of Statistics (*Guojia tongji ju*) on August 1, 1957, and published in *RMRB* (Aug. 2, 1957). The amount cited in this report is 365 billion catties (not including soybeans). See *RMSC* (1958), p. 457. Note also that, according to *RMSC* (1957), p. 422, the grain output of 1955 already reached 368 billion catties.

27. Mao is referring to the Forty-Article National Program for Agricultural Development. See text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3; text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 56. Mao, however, is extending this to other areas of production and development as well, and so far, we do not know of specific twelve-year plans formulated for production in these other areas (besides agriculture) at this time. See, however, text Oct. 13, 1957, and text Dec. 1, 1958, note 3.

28. The aphorism here, whose classical source we have not been able to trace, is *bai shou qi jia*, which refers to people making their own (family) fortunes without any bequest or assistance from their ancestors. Literally, it means “raising a family with empty hands.”

29. The Chinese here is different in the two texts. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source has *jiu shi ba renmin shenshang de rou guaxue liao*, whereas the *Wansui* (n.d.) source has *dang* instead of *rou*. We have translated from the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source, which, we believe, conveys a clearer, more sensible meaning.

30. The Pamir Plateau is located where China's and Afghanistan's borders meet. The term Kunlun Mountains here refers to the mountain range north of the Himalayas, which is separated from the Himalayas by the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau. It is the largest mountain range in China and originates in the Pamir Plateau. There are also other mountains and small ranges (e.g., one in Guangxi Province, and another in Fujian Province) that are called Kunlun, but these are not what Mao is referring to here.

31. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

32. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

33. The words Mao uses here are *feng cui cao dong*; see text April 1957, note 10.

34. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 44.

35. Xu Jiatusun (b. 1915) became the secretary of the CPC Party Committee of Nanjing Municipality in November 1954, and the Party secretary of Jiangsu Province in July 1956. On April 20, 1957, shortly after this speech, Xu attended the Third Plenary Session of the First Committee of the CPPCC of Jiangsu Province, at which he made a speech on Mao's viewpoint on the Hundred Flowers Campaign. For more biographical information on Xu, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 636, and W. Bartke (1981), p. 439.

36. Peng Chong (b. 1915) was a veteran CPC member who joined the Youth League in 1933 and the CPC in 1934. In the early 1930s he was engaged in underground organization work for the CPC, and he made his mark as a political organizer in the military during the War of Resistance Against Japan. In 1938 he became a regimental commissar in the New Fourth Army. After the establishment of the PRC, Peng served primarily in the Fujian area (his native province) for a few years. In August 1954, he became second Party secretary of Nanjing Municipality and deputy mayor. In July 1955, he became mayor of Nanjing. Peng's highest political post, subsequently, was as member of the Political Bureau of the CPC's Eleventh Central Committee and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, starting in August 1977. For more biographical information on Peng, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 721–722, and W. Bartke (1981), p. 285.

37. Bureaucratism was one of the three major targets of the CPC rectification campaign at this time, the others being sectarianism and subjectivism. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 77.

38. The Chinese text here differs in the two sources. We have translated from the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source. The *Wansui* (n.d.) source would translate as: “[We should] resolve the problem of bureaucratism a bit.”

39. The term here is *huaqiao xuesheng* (see text Oct. 23, 1951, vol. I, note 3), by which, we think, Mao meant Chinese students who have returned from abroad, or students studying in China who came from overseas-Chinese family backgrounds (which tend to be more affluent than the average Chinese rural household). This is the first indication that the petitions and disturbances of early 1957 (in the Nanjing area anyway) involved primarily *huaqiao* students.

40. Zeng Xisheng (b. 1905) was first secretary of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee from 1956 to 1962. Zeng joined the CPC in 1926 and was an active CPC special agent in Shanghai in the critical years 1927–1931. In 1931, he went to the Jiangxi Soviet area, and throughout the periods of the First and Second Revolutionary Civil Wars and the War of Resistance Against Japan he was a key intelligence officer of the CPC.

From 1952 to 1955, Zeng was chairman of the Anhui People's Government. During 1957–1958, Zeng was very active in the anti-Rightist campaign and in the promotion of the Great Leap Forward policies. He was a key figure in the ousting of Li Shinong as vice-chairman of the Anhui People's Government and as secretary of the Anhui Provincial Committee of the CPC (see text May 17, 1958, note 63). In 1962, when Li's case was reviewed, Zeng was transferred to the post of second secretary of the East China Bureau of

the CPC Central Committee. After 1962, he was more in the background, although in 1966 he was appointed secretary of the Southwestern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. In August 1967, in the Cultural Revolution, Zeng was purged as a “capitalist roader.” For more biographical information on Zeng, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 860–862; and *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 713.

41. The term here is *yi gu qi*, in which *qi* can be “spirit” or “air.” The more common expression for this would be *yi gu feng* (gust of wind). See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 51.

42. Although Sun Yat-sen (see text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, note 7, and text Nov. 12, 1956, source note) died in Beijing in April 1925, he was ultimately interred in a state burial ceremony in June 1929 in Nanjing, where a large tomb was built for him. (At that time Nanjing was the capital of the republic and seat of the KMT government of Chiang Kai-shek.) This tomb is located on the slopes of Zijingshan, which is east of Nanjing city proper.

43. The aphorism is *yi lin wei ao*. The word *ao* originally means an empty moat or ditch, and the adage refers to the practice of people allowing their dirty water to flow over into a neighbor’s low ground, thus forming an undesired ditch. It is derived from the chapter “Gao zi” in the book *Meng zi* (Mencius).

44. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1, and text Winter 1949, vol. I, source note and text.

45. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

46. The term here, *ban fang*, refers originally to the “squadroom” or the holding cell in police precincts.

47. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.

48. The remainder of this paragraph and the next six paragraphs do not appear in the *Wansui* (n.d.) version. There the omission is indicated by the words, in parentheses, *bu qing* (not clear).

49. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 19.

50. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 77.

51. The term Mao uses here is *lao zi*. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 33.

52. The aphorism here is *shu shou wu ce* (literally: “with their hands tied up, and without a single strategy”). The expression *shu shou* is derived from the “Chunshen jun zhuan” (Biography of Prince Chunshen) in the *Shiji* (Historical Record) and from “Guangwu di ji” (Chronicle of Emperor Guangwu di) in the *Hou Han shu* (History of the Later Han Dynasty). The full expression can be found in the classical novels *Pai an jingqi* (Thumping the Desk in Astonishment) and *Jinghua yuan* (Romance of the Mirror and the Flower).

53. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 5.

54. The term here is *lao baixing*, which refers to the common people, or common folk in imperial times. The word *lao* (literally, “old”) has the connotation of “honest,” whereas the term *baixing* (literally, “a hundred names”—or families) has both the connotation of “people” and “subjects”—that is, subjects of the ruler, whose “name” is above all the others.

55. Mao is obviously referring here to the struggle in the countryside during the land reform period from 1949 to 1951. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 2, and text Jan. 17, 1951, vol. I, note 1.

56. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 6, for the first half of this “slogan.”

57. On the “rich peasant” category, see text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, source note and note 1, and text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 2. On the “national bourgeoisie,” see text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.

58. See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 4, and text Mar. 18, 1957.

59. The expression that Mao uses here is *gong nong hua*, which is very difficult to translate directly. It does not necessarily mean that the intellectuals have actually become workers and peasants, but more likely that they have come to be identified with workers and peasants.

60. We have taken some liberty with the translation here. Mao’s words are *Dan shi, meiyou du jinqu, jiushi du zai zhege shangmian, meiyou jin dao litou qu*. (In both cases, *du* literally means “read.” Thus the literal meaning of this is “However, they did not read [the stuff] inside; they only read on this [the forehead], but not inside.”

61. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 33.

62. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 45.

63. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 59.

64. See text Jan. 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

65. Mao’s words here are *ji ju shu* (literally, “A few sentences in the books”).

66. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 37 and surrounding text on the steel output problem.

67. See text Aug. 24, 1956(1), note 2.

68. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 18; text Mar. 18, 1957, note 61.

69. We believe that Zhou XX refers to Zhou Xinfang, and Yuan XX to Yuan Xuefen. We do not have much information on Zhou. Yuan (b. 1922), was a prominent performer of the of the *Yue* opera genre, and was particularly well known for her performance of the play *Xianglin sao* (Sister-in-law Xiang Lin) adopted from Lu Xun’s original work *Zhufu* (Benediction). She and most of the other people mentioned here based their acting careers mainly in Shanghai, where they founded and ran acting schools. For more biographical information on Yuan, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 478–479.

70. Cheng Yanqiu (1904–1958) was another popular Beijing opera actor, having made his reputation, as Mei Lanfang did, in the pre–World War II era. Cheng was vice-president of the Chinese Drama Research Institute. For more biographical information on Cheng, see text May 17, 1958, note 6, and H. Boorman, et al., eds. (1967), I, pp. 292–293.

71. The *Wansui* (n.d.) source has *jiu bai wan zhishi fenzi* (nine million intellectuals). We dismiss this as a typographical error. Mao had been estimating the number of intellectuals in China to be about five million (in texts Mar. 12, 1957; Mar. 17, 1957; Mar. 18, 1957; and here in this speech). See text Mar. 12, 1957, especially paragraph 4. The simplified character for *ji* (several) is similar to the character for *jiu* (nine).

72. The term Mao used here is *caichan*, which translates more literally as “property.” See, however, text Feb. 27, 1957, note 80.

73. The term here is *wei chengfen lun*. Here the expression *chengfen* refers to *jieji chengfen* (class composition). The theory is one in which a person’s class background (or a thing’s class composition) is all-important and determines or even predetermines his or her behavior (and/or its nature), in such a way that things cannot be changed and cannot be expected to change in terms of class character. While Mao has always emphasized the need to do a class analysis of any situation, he appears here to refute this particular theory which is an inflexible, dogmatic, extremist application of the class analysis idea.

74. For Lu Xun, see text April 25, 1956, note 15.

75. This appears to forecast Mao’s theory of the need for people to adhere, like hair, to skin. See text April 1957(2), note 14, and text July 1957(2), paragraph 11.

76. The words Mao used here are *chi bu xiao, yao bu lan* (literally, “If eaten, cannot be digested; if chewed, cannot break into pieces”).

77. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

78. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1. The term Mao uses here for the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT is *Min ge*; see text June 8, 1957(3), note 2, for this organization. For the Democratic League, Mao has *Min meng*; see text July 1, 1957, note 10, on this organization. For what Mao here refers to as *Min jian* (namely, the Democratic Association for National Construction), see text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, note 7, and text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 59. For the Peasant-Worker Democratic Party, see text April 1957(2), note 37. The *Jiusan xueshe* (September Third Study Society), like the others in the list here, is one of the democratic parties represented in the CPPCC. It was formed out of discussion group meetings of democratic people in scientific and educational circles in Chongqing during the last part of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and was established as the *Minzhu kexue she* (Democratic Society of Scientists) in November 1944. On September 3, 1945, to commemorate the victory over Fascism, it changed its name to the current one. By that time, it had become more of a political association, and in the period after the victory over Japan, it continued to speak out on opposing a KMT dictatorship. Thus it played an



important role in propagandizing the cause of “socialist democracy” among the intellectuals, particularly among scientists and people in the medical professions. In June 1946, it resolved to join the CPPCC as a democratic party. For more information on the society, see *RMSC* (1957), p. 256.

79. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, and note 82.

80. This sentence does not appear in the *Wansui* (n.d.) source. Instead, this source has ellipses. Mao was quite possibly referring to Jiang Weiqing, who was first secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee at this time. A native of Yangzhou, Jiangsu, Jiang (b. 1907) was at first active in the Communist armed units and became deputy political commissar of the Nanjing garrison in 1949. From 1952 onward, he became involved with the Jiangsu People’s Government. He later opposed the Cultural Revolution and was criticized as a capitalist roader. In 1973 he was rehabilitated, and from 1975 onward he was reactivated in political positions in Jiangxi province. For more biographical information on Jiang, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 144–145, and D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), pp. 178–179.

81. The terms here are *fang* and *shou*, each of which has various meanings and, therefore, various translations. The primary one here, however, is “bloom” for *fang*, since that is derived directly from the “hundred flowers bloom” slogan. The others are derivatives of that. *Shou*, as opposed to *fang* in that primary sense, would have the connotation of “wither.” However, here Mao’s usages for *shou* are more active, and therefore call for the translations of “retrench,” “curtail,” “holding back,” etc. See text April 1957(2), notes 4 and 17, and text April 10, 1957, note 1; text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14; and text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 3.

82. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 9, paragraph 3.

83. The Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC was held November 10–15, 1956; see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 4. The other reference is to the conference at which Mao made two major speeches. See text Jan. 18, 1957, source note.

84. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 1. See also note 1 here.

85. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), paragraph 9.

86. Mao’s remarks here echo the classical adage: “The way of the true king is to bring people to submission by his virtue; the way of the hegemon is to bring people to submission by his might.” If there is any intended connection here, Mao would be invoking the traditionally honored and respected sense of *wang zheng* (kingly politics) for the policies of the CPC.

87. Mao was probably referring in his mind to important former KMT generals who had been won over to the side of the CPC. See, for instance, text May 5, 1951, vol. I, source note, and text Mar. 17, 1955, vol. I, source note.

88. The term here is *gao ya*, which literally would have been translated as “high pressure,” which does not make sense in the idiomatic usage of the term in English.

89. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, paragraph 2.

90. See text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraphs 5, 11, and 12. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, section 3, paragraph 3, and text May 15, 1957, note 21.

91. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

92. This article appears as an editorial in *RMRB* (Dec. 29, 1956). It is described as an article completed by the Editorial Department of *RMRB* “based on discussions of an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC.” It is also carried in *RMSC* (1957), pp. 151–159. An English translation can be found in R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. (1962), pp. 257–272.

93. This passage is found in the penultimate paragraph of section 3 of the article. See *RMSC* (1957), p. 157, and R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. (1962), p. 268.

94. Here the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source has Peng X and Xu XX.

95. The opera’s Chinese title is *Limao huan taizi*. This is a popularized and vulgarized Beijing opera version of the Yuan-dynasty opera *Limao huan zhu*, which involves the story of Emperor Renzong of the Song dynasty who was born of an imperial concubine Li Shen fei, and yet, through a sequence of mistakes and happenstances, believed himself to be the

son of the queen consort Zhang Xian hou. He does not discover the real identity of his mother until after many years. The operatic and dramatic versions of this story incorporate a large number of supernatural and superstitious references.

96. The terms used here are *yao mo gui guai*, which is more elaborate than the term that we often translate as demons and ogres. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 45.

97. The term Mao uses here, *jian shimian*, also has the connotation of “enrich one’s experience.” The *Wansui* (n.d.) text is garbled here. It reads: *wei liao zai shi, ren ke bu kan*, which does not make sense in the context.

98. This is an operatic or dramatic rendition based on the story of the Monkey King’s (Sun Wukong) disruption of the order of the heavenly palace at the birthday gathering for Xi Wang Mu (Queen Mother of the West); a story derived from the novel *Xi you ji* (Journey to the West). See also text July 8, 1957(2), note 9. The *Wansui* (n.d.) source here mistakenly puts the character *kong* for the character *gong* in the title.

99. These are all popular operas in the common repertoire, but each also involves a fairy tale of some sort. The first, *Pi shan jiu mu*, is derived from the Buddhist story of a Buddhist novice, Mu Lian, who strives to save his mother from the clutches of hungry demons. The second, *Shui man jinshan*, is derived from the popular romance Story of the White Serpent (*Baishhe zhuan*) in which a white snake transforms herself into a beautiful woman and falls in love with a young man. The marriage is broken up by the monk of Jinshansi (Golden Mountain Temple), who exposes the White Snake Lady for what she really is and suppresses her beneath the pagoda of the temple. She is ultimately saved by a torrent that overwhelms the temple.

Mao’s comments here foreshadow the controversy in 1961 over whether it is all right to have characterizations of supernatural things, such as ghosts and deities and spirits, in drama. The opera *Li Huiniang*, a *kunju* production written by Meng Chao based on the Ming novelette *Hongmei ji* (Tale of the Red Plum) by Zhou Yiyu, was performed in 1961 and gained popularity. There was also, however, criticism against it for portraying supernatural subjects, and it was branded as an “opera of ghosts” (*gui xi*). To defend the drama, Liao Mosha (a.k.a. Fan Xing) wrote an essay in *Beijing wan bao* (Aug. 31, 1961) entitled “It’s-All-Right-To-Have-Ghosts Theory” (*You gui wu hai lun*). In it he claims that the reason there are portrayals of such things as ghosts in dramatic performances is that such things did enter people’s thoughts in the past, and the existence of these things in the literature of past ages was an objective existence that could not be helped. Instead of worrying about their presence, the socialist should be concerned about the social messages implicit in the portrayal and the idea of struggling against the oppression of superstition. In a way, then, we can see Mao’s viewpoint here as in general agreement with that advanced by Liao Mosha. However, after a period of criticism in late 1961 and early 1962, Liao, together with Deng Tuo and Ma Nancun, was heavily criticized for his literary views. The opera *Li Huiniang* was also discredited, and the theory of “it’s all right to have ghosts” came under severe criticism and was repudiated. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 62.

100. The *Wansui* (n.d.) source here has a blank space for the number of years.

101. The remainder of this speech does not appear in the *Wansui* (n.d.) source and is found only in the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source. As indicated in the source note, a few paragraphs here are very similar to text Mar. 19, 1957.

102. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1.

103. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note and text.

104. See text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 11.

105. Mao is referring to the Third Session of the National Committee of the Second CPPCC, which was held March 5–20, 1957, in Beijing. We have no other record that Mao made a speech to the conference, however. For more on this conference, see K. Lieberthal (1976), pp. 93–94.

106. The slogan of “utilization, restriction, and transformation” (*liyong, xianzhi, gaizao*) of private capital was proposed in the movement of the socialist transformation of the capitalist enterprises in 1953. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 14.

107. See text Mar. 12, 1957, source note.
108. See text Mar. 18, 1957, source note. This slogan was put into the title of the March 18 speech by the editors of *Xuanji*; therefore it can be considered one of Mao's major themes in this cluster of speeches.
109. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), paragraph 8.
110. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 56.
111. See *SW*, IV, pp. 411–424. The essay was written on June 30, 1949, in commemoration of the twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the CPC. See particularly pp. 422–423.
112. See text Mar. 19, 1957, note 1.
113. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 1, and text Mar. 18, 1957, note 76.
114. See, in general, text Mar. 18, 1957, paragraph 14.
115. The text here has XXX. Since the number of Xs does not actually give any real clues to the original figure which is omitted, but only tells how many characters are omitted, we have, as is our custom, reduced it to one X.
116. The term that Mao uses here, *chu lu*, refers in this context more specifically to job arrangements and assignments. See text Jan. 1957, note 40.
117. See text Oct. 5, 1952, vol. I, source note, and text Sept. 5, 1956, note 1.
118. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 59.
119. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note, and text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note, and many passages in texts Mar. 12, 1957, Mar. 17, 1957(2), and Mar. 18, 1957.
120. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 2.
121. The term Mao uses here is *lao ye*, which has the connotation of the master of a household, or master over domestic servants and tenant peasants who are little better than serfs. The expression is certainly representative of the old, feudalistic traditional society of China. Mao also uses the expression *bai jiazi*, which we have translated here as “put on an air” and elsewhere as “strike a pose.” See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 38.
122. See text Mar. 19, 1953, vol. I, note 4.
123. See text Mar. 17, 1957, paragraph 8. See also text Nov. 11, 1956, note 4.
124. See note 71.
125. On Chen, see text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23, and text Aug. 30, 1956, note 16; on Zhang, see also text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23. On Gao, see text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, source note, and note 7.
126. See, text Aug. 30, 1956, note 12.
127. See texts Jan. 18, 1957 (both versions), and Jan. 27, 1957(1) and (2). See also text Mar. 17, 1957, paragraph 11.

### Speech at a CPC Cadres Meeting in Shanghai (March 20, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 164–168.

*For Mao's other speeches on this trip to East-Central China, and the historical context of this journey, see text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note. Again, parts of this speech are very similar to the speeches of March 17 and 18, as well as to a speech (text Mar. 20, 1957[1]) that Mao evidently made earlier the same day. The reader is left to do his or her own textual comparisons.*

Just now Comrade Ke Qingshi<sup>1</sup> spoke of this being a period of change and transition. In the past we had been engaged for a long period of time in revolutionary war, in class struggle, and this struggle, in domestic terms, has now basically drawn to a close.<sup>2</sup> The regime of the class enemy has been overthrown, and the reform of the socialist system has basically taken the place of the old system of the past. The new task that confronts us is [the task of] construction. Construction is also a kind of revolution; it is a technological revolution and a cultural revolution. [We must] unite the members of the entire society and the people of the entire nation to struggle against nature. Naturally, in the process of construction, we still will not get away from the struggle between one person and another. In this current period of transition, the struggle between one person and another will include class struggle. [When] we say the class struggle has basically drawn to a close, we mean that there is still some [of it] that has not yet drawn to a close. Particularly in the area of ideology, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will still extend for a considerable time. This is the kind of situation that we in our Party have discerned. During the Party's Eighth National Congress,<sup>3</sup> Comrade XXX's report and the Congress's resolution<sup>4</sup> both stated that the large-scale, mass-[based] class struggle has already basically drawn to a close. Following the basic resolution of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves in the domestic sphere, the contradictions among the people have begun to be more salient than they were in the past.<sup>5</sup> However, even now there are still many comrades who are not quite clear about this situation, and they are still using some of the old methods of the past to deal with new problems. We should say that for a certain period in the past the Central Committee did not make any detailed explanation of this problem. This is because this transformation had not ripened until only a little while ago. For example, in April last year at the Conference of Provincial and Municipal Party Committee Secretaries, [I] spoke of ten relationships;<sup>6</sup> of these, one had to do with [the relationship] between the enemy and ourselves, and another had to do with the [relationship between] right and wrong. At that time we had not yet had a chance to say that the class struggle has basically drawn to a close. It was not until the latter half of last year, when the Party convened a [Party] Congress, that we were able to speak on this point firmly. Now the situation has become even clearer, and therefore there is a need to tell the whole Party in detail: Don't use old methods to deal with new problems; you must clearly distinguish between the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves and the contradictions among the people.

Are there contradictions in socialist society? Lenin once spoke on such a problem, and his opinion was that contradictions would exist [in a socialist society].<sup>7</sup> Stalin, however, over a long period of time, in fact did not acknowledge that there would be contradictions in a socialist society. In Stalin's later stages, people were not allowed to say bad things, or to criticize the Party or the government. In fact, what Stalin did was to confuse the contradictions among the people with the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves.<sup>8</sup> He considered everyone who said bad things [about the Party] and gossiped [about the Party] as an enemy, and therefore [he] unjustly wronged many people. In the book “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” written in 1952,<sup>9</sup> Stalin himself said that in socialist

society there would be contradictions between the relations of production and the forces of production. Moreover, [he said,] if [the contradictions] are not properly resolved, they can be transformed into antagonistic [contradictions]. Even so, Stalin said very little about the contradictions internal to socialist society, or the contradictions among the people. I believe that we should, today, openly discuss this problem, not only inside the Party, but we should also make this problem clear in the newspapers, and draw appropriate conclusions; that would be better.

For example, there is the problem of the people making trouble. This, naturally, will not be a general, widespread [phenomenon], and there are only some individual [cases]. However, it will occur often enough, because this thing called bureaucratism will continue to exist. We must have a rectification, to resolve the problem of bureaucratism. Nevertheless, no matter what [we do], with such a large Party, such complicated work, and over such a broad scope of the whole country, it is inevitable that there will be some bureaucratism. Wherever there is an occurrence of bureaucratism, it is possible that the people there will make trouble. When there is trouble already made, how are we going to regard it? We should look upon it as something quite common, and we should not make such a fuss about it. We should perceive that this is a kind of method of regulating the social order under certain special circumstances. If problems that have remained long unresolved by the correct methods got resolved when the masses made trouble, why then would [we expect] the masses not to make trouble? Naturally, here we are not advocating that [they should] go and make trouble. Rather, we advocate that problems be resolved without troublemaking, but through the system of democratic centralism,<sup>10</sup> and according to the formula "unity-criticism-unity."<sup>11</sup> [However,] to carry out this thing that we advocate would require us to oppose bureaucratism. If in a certain unit the leaders have too bad a case of bureaucratism and are very stubborn, so that the masses are unable to raise their opinions, and yet [the people at] a higher level have not discovered [the situation] in time or corrected it, or if they simply have failed to replace that leadership, then it is quite likely that the masses there would make trouble. Under such peculiar conditions, what harm would it be for there to be a bit of trouble?

Whether it is about the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves or about the contradictions among the people, there are different viewpoints in our Party. There are those who [lean to the] Right, and those who [lean to the] "Left." On the problem of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, the Rightist viewpoint would be not to see any enemy at all. Aren't we now saying that domestically the class contradiction has been basically resolved? Well, there are some people who take ["]basically["] resolved to mean completely resolved. Therefore, they take no action against even the bad persons whom the people deeply abhor, those who really are spies, and are truly bad people. This type of ideology is of course wrong. It is also wrong, [on the other hand,] to exaggerate. Exaggeration is the viewpoint of the "Left." While the class contradiction has basically been resolved already, some people would insist that it has not, and that the class contradiction is very big. With regard to the contradictions among the people, some ignore this fact and believe [naively] that all is peaceful and calm. [They think:]

We the Communist Party are [the Party] that represented the people in struggling against imperialism and the Kuomintang, and after that we took up the struggle against the bourgeoisie. How could the people possibly turn around and oppose us? In the past [they] didn't imagine that the people would be dissatisfied, [they] did not imagine that the masses could march in protests and demonstrations, with workers' strikes and students' strikes. Even now they do not quite believe it. This is one kind of sentiment. Another feeling is that of fear. Once there is a tiny bit of trouble, [those people who have this feeling] get all worked up, [and think that] there will be great disorder and chaos throughout the land, that the people's government would collapse. If there is a tornado, will we, the Communist Party, be blown away? Will the People's Government be blown away? Will Marxism be blown away? We can, I believe, say with confidence that that will not happen. That is why there is nothing to be afraid of. Not only that, but if, objectively, there is indeed already a situation that makes troublemaking inevitable, it would be better to let troublemaking exist than to suppress [things] and not let troublemaking exist. Let our comrades give some thought to this, and see if you think that such a way of looking at things is indeed more appropriate. This is one problem.

Second, I'd like to speak a bit about the problem of the intellectuals. There are about five million intellectuals throughout the country.<sup>12</sup> In terms of their background, the education they have received, and their services in the past, they can be described as bourgeois intellectuals. Of them, about one-tenth, or a bit more, have joined the Communist Party. Through the years, some have become proletarianized and have accepted Marxism-Leninism but have not yet joined the Party. These make up about [an additional] several per cent. According to the estimate made by some comrades, these two parts put together make up about 15 to 17 per cent. On the other hand, there are also a handful that harbor antagonistic sentiments toward us. They are not counterrevolutionaries, and indeed, on certain problems, such as on the matter of opposing imperialism, they can in fact cooperate with us fairly well. However, they have doubts about Marxist thought and about the socialist system. They also make up several per cent. The remainder, some 70, 80 per cent [of the intellectuals], are in the middle. They understand a little bit, but not much at all, about Marxism. They may approve of socialism, but they may also waver easily. When it comes to accepting a Marxist world view, they will have some difficulty yet. They often put it as: "We, you." [That means that] they do not consider our Party as their party, as the majority of the workers and the poor and lower-middle peasants do. We can also see from their relationship with the workers and the peasants that their world view is by no means Marxist yet. When they go to the factories and to the countryside to take a look at things, they cannot blend as one with the workers and the peasants.<sup>13</sup> They go take a look, but there remains a distance [between them and the peasants, or workers]; they could not become friends with them. [Their relationship] remains a "we-you" relationship. They serve the people also, but not wholeheartedly yet. They are not of the same mind as the people,<sup>14</sup> they are not of two minds either; it's just that they only have half of their mind and heart on the side of the people. Our task is to win them over. We must make the entire circle of intellectuals take a step forward, within, say, three

five-year plans (there are eleven more years left),<sup>15</sup> in the areas of learning Marxism, and of integrating with the workers and peasants. [By the same token we must have] about one-third of the intellectuals either in the Party or turned into enthusiastic elements outside the Party [by that time]. And then [we must] take another step forward to win over the remainder of the intellectuals. We must thus transform the conditions of the intellectual circle gradually and methodically; change [the intellectuals'] world view.

To some of the intellectuals today, there seems to be as yet a problem with regard to the worker-peasant-soldier orientation in [the fields of] literature and the arts. This, too, is an expression of how the intellectuals' new view of life has not yet been established. We must explain to them that in our country, there is no one else except for the workers and the peasants. Besides these two types of people, the third type would be the intellectuals. The intellectuals serve the workers and the peasants. Their own character is changing right now [too]; they must gradually change into the working class' intellectuals. Therefore, in the area of literature and art, naturally there is only the worker-peasant-soldier orientation; there is no other orientation. You suppose you can promote a landlords' orientation, or a bourgeoisie's orientation, or an imperialist's orientation? Those forces have already withdrawn from the stage of politics and lost their social bases. As for the several hundred million petty bourgeoisie, they, too, have already entered [the form of] collectivization, and by now it no longer makes sense to call them petty bourgeoisie. They have already become collectivized peasants and collectivized handicraft workers. Of course, in their ideology, they still drag a little tail of the petty bourgeoisie<sup>16</sup>—especially in the cases of the well-to-do middle peasants and the upper-middle peasants,<sup>17</sup> their bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thought is still very heavy. Right now, where the intellectuals have doubts about the worker-peasant-soldier orientation, it is precisely a reflection of the thought within the well-to-do stratum in the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. Right now, no matter what, both the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie are down to just a tail, and no matter how long a tail may drag, it is bound to become extinct one day. Therefore, we do have the means by which to unite with the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals and win them over, but it will take time; it will take as long as ten or twenty years—we cannot be hasty; things cannot be rushed. With Marxism-Leninism we can only convince people by persuasion; we cannot force-feed it into [people], and force-feeding is not going to resolve any problems.<sup>18</sup>

Among some intellectuals there is, right now, a popular opinion that says: "The Communist Party cannot lead in the area of science."<sup>19</sup> Does this make sense? We say that it makes sense, halfway. At this time there are indeed very few engineers, professors, doctors, or other high-level technological personnel who are Party members. In general, at this time we really do not understand science. Our people not only do not have time, but they also do not have the money to go to universities to study, or to go abroad to study. Furthermore, the imperialists and the Kuomintang also did not allow us to stay in the cities to study science.<sup>20</sup> Many intellectuals say we cannot lead in science, but we are capable in promoting politics, and we are also good in military matters. Actually, that is something that [they say] only now.

In the past, before we had triumphed, when we were fighting guerrilla war, they didn't say that [of us]. At that time they thought that we were good at virtually nothing; that we were, in any case, of no account. The people have to see the facts. Therefore, before we have occupied the battlegrounds in science, it is impossible to have them acknowledge that we can lead in the area of science. However, at this time, their reasoning is also only half right. There is another half that they have failed to see. Although now we do not understand science, we can still lead the enterprise of science with state plans and with politics. China's industry and science have developed under the leadership of the Communist Party and the people's government; is this a fact or not? In this sense, [we can ask:] If the scientists are not working under the leadership of the Communist Party and the people's government, then under whose leadership are they working? Furthermore, science, like politics and economics, can be learned; if we have learned politics and military matters, we can also learn science. If it took us, from 1921 to 1949, twenty-eight years before we achieved victory in the political struggle and military struggle, we don't think it will take us as long a time to learn science [to the extent of] achieving the general standards of experts. Five years in a university and ten years of work; about fifteen years of effort would just about do.

Closely related to the problem of the intellectuals and the problem of science and art is the question of the guidelines of "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" and "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision."<sup>21</sup> With regard to these guidelines, we need as yet to do a great deal of propaganda work and explaining within the Party. Some comrades feel that these guidelines are too dangerous. Let a hundred flowers bloom—what if some ghosts come out of the blooming? As for long-term coexistence and mutual supervision, some people say: "What qualifications do the democratic parties<sup>22</sup> have to coexist with us over the long term? Better just make it short-term coexistence!" and "I am supervising you! How come I would need to have you come supervise me? When did you, the democratic parties, win the [battle for control of the] country?" All these opinions oppose "letting go" and instead advocate "pulling in the reins." Are these ways of thinking correctly?

The [Party] Center believes that the opinions of "pulling in the reins" are incorrect. With regard to developing science and art, the guideline of letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools of thought contend is a fundamental guideline, not a temporary one. In today's transitional period, this guideline has a special significance for uniting with and educating the intellectuals. That is, not only in the matters purely of science and art, but also on the questions that have to do with what is right and what is wrong in a political sense, as long as someone does not belong to the category of counterrevolutionaries, we should let him speak his piece. How, then, should we deal with those who have said something wrong? Shall we use the methods of suppression or the methods of persuasion?<sup>23</sup> The [Party] Center believes that the methods of suppression are no good. When you suppress into submission, it is really "suppressed" but "no submission"; there cannot be [real] suppression into submission. With regard to problems among the people,<sup>24</sup> problems of ideology, problems of the world of the spirit, we can only

use the method of persuasion, not the method of suppression. The dictatorship carried out by the proletariat can be used only against an enemy class or hostile elements, that is, against imperialists abroad and the remnant hostile elements at home. In general when the people say something wrong, or even when they make some trouble, we cannot adopt a dictatorial method in dealing with them; we can only use a democratic method. There is a very major line of demarcation here. Some of our comrades now think of using a “military solution” to deal with problems among the people at the drop of a hat.<sup>25</sup> This is very dangerous and must, absolutely, be corrected resolutely. If we don't know how to persuade [people] into submission, what shall we do? This means that we'll have to learn how. We absolutely must learn to reason and argue; that is something that can be learned. What if people still make trouble after we have used the method of persuasion? Will there be great general disorder in the country? I say no. As long as we insist on arguing reasonably, and reason fully, things will not fall into disorder. Furthermore, we need not always be afraid of trouble. There is some good in having a bit of trouble; we can gain experience [from that]. With regard to the essays and articles that contain poison, and other things that contain poison, we must criticize, and struggle [with them,] but we need not be afraid. When we struggle with these things that contain poison, we may ourselves develop, and Marxism may develop. Marxism has always developed in the course of struggling with antagonistic ideologies.<sup>26</sup>

[If] we are to struggle against antagonistic ideologies, we must first rectify our own shortcomings. We have great accomplishments. This Party of ours is a great Party, a glorious Party, an accurate Party—this is something that has to be affirmed. However, we also have quite a few shortcomings; this fact must also be affirmed. We should not affirm everything we have done; we should affirm the most significant and correct things. At the same time we certainly should not negate everything about ourselves; we should only negate some mistakes and shortcomings. To negate everything would be opportunist; to affirm everything would be dogmatist. Dogmatism is also [a kind of] metaphysics; it affirms everything without analyzing. If we analyzed our work, we would know that in our work, achievements are primary; but there are shortcomings; that is why we must carry out a rectification.

With regard to the rectification, the [Party] Center has not yet made a formal decision.<sup>27</sup> [However, we are] prepared to do things [in the following way]: This year we prepare; next year and the year after that—two years—are for implementation. We will adopt the method [that we used at] the time of Yanan,<sup>28</sup> [i.e.,] leisurely, and with the spirit of self-criticism, study and learn Marxism once, and, with the appropriate method, criticize the shortcomings of subjectivism, sectarianism, and bureaucratism<sup>29</sup> in [our] work style. The criticism will be within the scope of small meetings; we do not intend to hold large conferences. Whatever faults and problems we have, [we say so and acknowledge them] as faults and problems; we will neither understate [the situation] nor exaggerate it. Let us reflect for a bit on our own, with help from our comrades. In any case, we will use the method of “unity-criticism-unity.”<sup>30</sup> That is to say, starting on the premise of a wish for unity, going through criticism to arrive [once more] at unity. [Also,] learning from past

mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the illness to save the patient.<sup>31</sup> [Let's] use such an attitude to carry out the rectification and to raise [our] standards of Marxist thought. Since the Yanan rectification, there has in fact been a period of more than a dozen years when we have not carried out a systematic rectification throughout the Party. We estimate that the results of this rectification will let our Party achieve considerable progress. We would be criticizing our bureaucratism, our subjectivism, and our sectarianism ourselves; would that make us lose our prestige? I don't think so; in fact, I believe our prestige would increase. That rectification at Yanan is itself evidence [of this]. [It] increased the Party's prestige, and increased the comrades' prestige, [in particular,] that of the veteran cadres. New cadres also received an education [from it]. On the one hand you have the Communist Party; on the other you have the Kuomintang. Between the two, who is more afraid of criticism? The Kuomintang is afraid of criticism, and it [therefore] banned it, [but] in the end it did not [help to] save [the Kuomintang] itself. The Communist Party is not afraid of criticism because we are Marxists, and truth is on our side; the basic masses of the workers and the peasants are on our side. When we have completed the rectification, we will have greater initiative in our work, and our talents will increase. At the same time, we would [have learned to] be more modest, and those who did not originally know how to persuade people will gradually [experience an] increase in their ability to persuade people. [As for] the personages outside the Party, let them participate on a voluntary basis.<sup>32</sup> Let us get rectified first; then they'll come next. It would be very good if we can get 60 to 70 per cent of the intellectuals to take part in the rectification.

One of the missions of the rectification is to give play to and develop the tradition of arduous and hard struggle.<sup>33</sup> Some comrades' revolutionary will has deteriorated somewhat because the revolution has triumphed. Their warmth and enthusiasm for revolution is not quite up to measure; more and more people pay attention to their salaries, and to enjoyment and luxuries. We must rejuvenate these comrades once again through rectification. After such a long, protracted revolutionary struggle, it is understandable that [some comrades] are a bit tired and need some rest. [They] go to the theaters for a bit, or they go dancing for a bit, or wear some color-patterned clothes—there is no need to oppose that sort of thing. What we do oppose is pursuing status, hankering for special privileges, extravagance and waste, and separating oneself from the masses. In our work and our lives, whatever can be economized should be economized, and has to be economized. The class struggle—several decades of revolution—all of it is to pave the way for construction, and if [we are to promote] construction, we must cherish [every bit of] human resource and material resource. The period of construction will be very very long; this would be another war. We hope that in not too long a time, China will be better than it now is—richer, and stronger, than it now is. The revolution is for this goal. That battle was fought for [the sake of] this one, and that war was fought for this one. This war will be even more arduous and protracted. For instance, we will say at least ten thousand years. In order that construction can be better, and even better, we must uphold the work style of arduous struggle, uphold having a close and intimate connection with the masses, oppose extravagance and waste, [oppose] the

pursuit of special privileges, and [oppose] all other kinds of bad customs and practices such as putting on airs.<sup>34</sup>

The relationship [that we have] with [people] outside the Party should see some progress on [the way it was] in the past. This, too, will be one of the missions of the rectification. It is necessary that there be a bit of a distinction between [people in the] Party and [people who are] not in the Party. It would not be good to have no distinction [at all]. There should be some distinction; that is number one. Number two, [however,] is that we must not have a deep chasm. The current situation is that in many places the gap between [those in the] Party and [those who are] outside the Party has become too deep. We ought to fill up the gap. We must speak wholeheartedly with them about things that really touch the heart. We should not just say half, and leave the remaining half for discussion [“]at home.[”] In this way they will make progress even faster.

Will our adopting the aforementioned guidelines harm the Party's leadership? In the article “Once More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” there are these words: “However, the criticism of these shortcomings may only be for the sake of consolidating the system of democratic centralism, and consolidating the Party's leadership; by no means can it, as the enemy hopes, create the dissipation and chaos of the ranks of the proletariat.”<sup>35</sup> The things that I said just now, that it is all right to have a bit of trouble and that it is permissible to have some erroneous essays published, that we shall slowly criticize and educate and argue with reason—is there any contradiction between these two proposals? [No.] What we said in that essay was a matter of principle; what I am saying here is a matter of flexibility. What we must do is to apply principles flexibly. Otherwise, when there is a workers' strike in one place, [let us say,] we'd go there and yell: “Hey! You are undermining the Party's leadership!” [Or,] if the intellectuals criticized us, we'd scold them, saying: “Are you planning on dissipating the ranks of the proletariat? Are you planning on undermining the Party's leadership and undermining the system of democratic centralism?”<sup>36</sup> You only want democracy, don't you? And you don't want centralization, right?” Can we use this essay as a shield everywhere? We can't. In principle we do not promote workers' strikes and students' strikes, and we do not play advocate for essays that are wrong or drama that contains poison, and so on. However, when in fact some individual cases of workers' strikes and students' strikes have occurred, and when some individual erroneous essays have been published in the newspapers, or when some individual pieces of bad drama have been put on stage, there would be no great harm—in fact there would be advantage—in our [simply] adopting a policy of opening up and letting go with regard to such phenomena, and adopting a policy of persuasion and education. On the contrary, it would be to our disadvantage to adopt a method of suppression. The policy [of opening up and persuasion] makes it easier to regulate the social order and to adjust the relationships between the leaders and the led, between the government and the people, and between the Party and the people. The result of such an adjustment would precisely be to consolidate the Party's leadership] and the democratic-centralist system.

We hope that we will make our country a lively country where people dare to

criticize and speak up; where when someone has an opinion, he or she will dare to speak up. We must not make people afraid of speaking up. People like us must correct whatever mistakes and shortcomings we may have; it won't do for us not to correct them, because that would be unreasonable. No matter whether it is in the Party or outside the Party, we cannot carry out bureaucratism; we cannot coerce people into doing those things that are unreasonable. If we adopt such a guideline [of openness and letting go], I believe the political conditions among the people [will improve, and] the relationship between the people and the government, between leaders and the people they lead, and among the people themselves, will be a reasonable and lively relationship. In that case, our culture, our science, our economy, our politics, and [indeed] our country as a whole will most certainly prosper and develop more rapidly.

### Notes

1. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 13, and text Dec. 26, 1953, vol. I, source note.
2. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note; text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note; text Mar. 20, 1957(1), source note and note 1.
3. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 1.
4. This refers to Liu Shaoqi's “Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPC to the Eighth National Congress of the CPC,” a text of which can be found in *RMSC* (1957), pp. 9–26. On the Resolution of the Eighth Congress of the CPC, see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 52, and text Oct. 7, 1957, note 3. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 23.
5. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.
6. See text April 25, 1956. In fact, however, the occasion on which Mao had made his speech on the Ten Major Relationships was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau, not a conference of provincial and municipal Party committee secretaries. These people were invited to the Political Bureau meeting, however, where Mao addressed them.
7. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 8.
8. See text Mar. 18, 1957(2), note 44.
9. For Mao's later critique (“reading notes”) on this piece of writing by Stalin, and for more information on this subject, see text Mar. 22, 1958, note 11, and text Nov. 1958(2).
10. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80. See also text July 8, 1957, note 35, and text Oct. 9, 1957.
11. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.
12. See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 4, and text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 41.
13. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 59.
14. The expression Mao uses here is *yi tiao xin*.
15. See text Mar. 17, 1957, paragraph 8.
16. On the meaning of “drag a tail,” see text Dec. 8, 1956, note 37.
17. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 20.
18. The paragraph here suggests the same kind of foreshadowing of Mao's later-expressed idea of “skin and hair.” See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 75.
19. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 35.
20. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 13.
21. See text Autumn 1956, note 3, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 82.
22. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1. See also text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 78.
23. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 61.
24. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.
25. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), paragraph 9.
26. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 18, and text Feb. 27, 1957, paragraph 2 of section 8.

27. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 79.
28. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 24, and also text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9.
29. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 77.
30. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.
31. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.
32. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 20, and surrounding text, and text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 80.
33. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 108. See also text Mar. 18, 1957(1), source note.
34. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 38.
35. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 92.
36. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80.

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Telegram to Pakistan  
(March 21, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Mar. 23, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 106 (April 25, 1957), 35. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Mar. 23, 1957), 1.

Mr. Iskander Mirza,  
President,  
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the National Day of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend sincere congratulations to Your Excellency and to the people of Pakistan. May the Islamic Republic of Pakistan grow daily in prosperity, may the people of Pakistan have greater happiness with each passing day, and may Your Excellency enjoy good health. (Signed as Chairman of the PRC, dated in Beijing)

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Conversation with Soldiers  
[Excerpts]  
(April 3, 1957)

**Source:** Shi Licheng, "Mao zhuxi kanwang shibing," *RMRB* (May 27, 1957), 2. Other Chinese Texts: *Mao qunzhong*, pp. 13–15; *Mao guanhuai*, pp. 74–76.

According to the *RMRB* source, on April 3, 1957, Mao visited a detachment of the PLA stationed for training in the suburbs of Hangzhou. See text April 1957(2) for context of this visit. The following are excerpts from Mao's conversation with the soldiers. The article contained various exchanges; only the two relatively significant ones are presented here. In the first segment, Mao was conversing with a soldier named Wang Baoshan, an instructor of the detachment; in the second segment his audience was generally whoever was there.

The article was originally printed in *JFJB* (May 25, 1957). We have not, however, located this original source.

Mao: The comrades are just getting ready for a meal, aren't they?

Wang: Yes, they are just sitting down to lunch.

Mao: What sort of work are you occupied with at the present moment?

Wang: We are primarily engaged in training, and secondarily, in the work of education of military personnel [who are about] to be demobilized.

Mao: Do the old soldiers want to be demobilized?

Wang: The old soldiers are all very sorry to leave the troops. When they first heard that they were to be demobilized, they were reluctant to go. After education, however, they are now all happy and willing to return to the rural areas to take part in production.

Mao: That's very good . . .

Mao [in the mess hall]: Is there enough to eat at each meal?

Soldier: Yes, there is enough!

Mao: How much does a day's meal cost you now, forty-two cents?

Yu Jinshan: Yes, forty-two cents.

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Telegram to the People's Republic of Hungary  
(April 3, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 4, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 107 (May 10, 1957), 52–53. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (April 4, 1957), 1.

Comrade Istvan Dobi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Republic of Hungary,  
Comrade Janos Kadar, Premier of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government of the People's Republic of Hungary,  
Comrade Imre Horvath, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary:

On the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary, please allow us to express sincere and warm congratulations on behalf of the government

of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people to you and, through you, to the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government of the People's Republic of Hungary and the Hungarian people.

In twelve years, the Hungarian people have made great efforts and achieved successes in the areas of building socialism and defending peace. Not long ago, the Hungarian people, under the leadership of the Socialist Workers' Party and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government, and with the earnest and selfless assistance of the great Soviet Union, smashed the intrigues engineered by the imperialists and Hungarian counterrevolutionaries to stage a counterrevolutionary comeback.<sup>1</sup> This great victory by the Hungarian people not only has safeguarded the Hungarian people's cause of socialism, but has also made a great contribution to the camp for socialism and the cause of world peace.

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government have made numerous tremendous efforts in such areas as uniting all the democratic forces led by the working class, implementing an effective dictatorship of the proletariat, and restoring the national economy, etc. We are confident that there is no force that can frustrate the determination of the heroic Hungarian people who have a glorious revolutionary tradition in their march forward along the road of building socialism. The recent discussions between China and Hungary and between Hungary and the Soviet Union and the agreements reached have further strengthened the unity and cooperation among the three countries of China, the Soviet Union, and Hungary.<sup>2</sup> We sincerely wish that the Hungarian people, under the leadership of the Socialist Workers' Party and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government, will score new victories in the struggles to consolidate the socialist system, to further restore and develop the national economy, to strengthen the unity of the camp for socialism headed by the Soviet Union, and to defend European and world peace.

May the fraternal friendship between China and Hungary further develop and become consolidated.

(Cosigned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated)

#### Notes

1. The reference here is to the Hungarian Incident of October 1956; see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.

2. On January 10, 1957, delegations of the Chinese government and the Hungarian government and the Socialist Workers' Party of Hungary met for a discussion with a delegation of the Soviet Union government in Moscow. The Chinese delegation was headed by Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang, the Hungarian delegation by Kadar. Following this meeting, the Chinese delegation was invited by the Hungarian government to visit Hungary, and arrived at Budapest on January 16. For the resulting communiqué of this latter meeting in Budapest, see *RMSC* (1958), pp. 404–405. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 30.

### Speech at Banquet Given for Polish Delegation

(April 8, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 9, 1957), 1. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (April 9, 1957), 1; FBIS, *Daily Report* (April 9, 1957), AAA 1.

*A reception and banquet for the delegation of the government of the People's Republic of Poland was held in Qinzhengdian, in Zhongnanhai, Beijing. The delegation was headed by Josef Cyrankiewicz, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland. A communiqué of agreements made between the Chinese and Polish governments resulting from this visit can be found in RMSC (1958), pp. 408–409. Also, a Chinese delegation, headed by Zhou Enlai, had visited Poland January 11–16, 1957. (For the communiqué of that meeting, see RMSC [1958], pp. 407–408.) Also see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 30.*

*The remarks made by Mao at this banquet were not rendered as a direct quotation in the RMRB source. There is no clear indication whether this was the full extent of the speech. It is noted in the RMRB source that a toast made by Mao to the health of all members of the Polish delegation, to the health of Gomulka, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, and to the health of Zawadzki, chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Poland, followed these remarks.*

Poland is a country with which China has a profound and solid friendship. Poland is a member of the socialist camp. The friendship between China and Poland is increasing with each passing day. May everything go well with Poland, may the solidarity of the socialist states grow with each passing day, and may there be with each day a further development in the friendship between China and Poland.

### Speech at Banquet Given by Polish Delegation

(April 9, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 10, 1957), 1. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (April 10, 1957), 2–3.

*See text April 8, 1957, source note, for context of this reception.*

Comrades, friends:

We are grateful to Comrade Cyrankiewicz, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland, and the delegation of the Polish government led by him for bringing the brotherly friendship of the Polish people to the Chinese people. We ask the delegation of the Polish government to convey to the Polish people, on their return, similar sentiments of our friendship and the very best wishes from the Chinese people.



May the People's Republic of Poland undertake the building of socialism even more successfully.

May the Soviet Union, Poland, and China and [all] other socialist countries be even more firmly united together.

May the countries in the socialist camp join with other peace-loving countries and peoples throughout the world to strive more successfully for the cause of world peace and human progress.

I ask everyone to join me in proposing a toast:

To the health of Comrade Cyrankiewicz, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland, and to that of his wife, and to the health of the other comrades of the delegation of the Polish government;

To the health of Comrade Gomulka, first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party;

To the health of Comrade Zawadzki, chairman of the Council of State of Poland.  
Bottoms up!

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## Continue to Let Go, Implement the Policy of Letting a Hundred Flowers Bloom and Letting a Hundred Schools Contend

(April 10, 1957[R])

**Source:** "Jixu fangshou, guanqie baihua qifang, baijia zhengming de fangzhen," *RMRB*, Editorial (April 10, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *Shengping ziliao*, pp. 352–353 (excerpts).

*This editorial was not published under Mao's name and was never in fact acknowledged by the Chinese authorities as Mao's own work. However, many scholars have attributed this to Mao's writing, as they also have quite a number of other RMRB editorials in 1957 (see texts May 13, June 8, June 9, June 10, June 11, June 12, June 14(1), July 1, 1957). It is generally acknowledged that Mao had a keen interest at this time in giving personal direction to the editorial departments of the major newspapers in China, especially papers such as RMRB, that were affiliated with the CPC. It is also known that Mao had written, or rewritten, some RMRB editorial articles and essays, e.g., text June 14, 1957(1). In any case, the substance of these editorials (certainly of the one here) is reflective, indeed representative, of the deep political and ideological concerns that Mao had in mid-1957.*

*For a general description of the policy of allowing both CPC intellectuals and non-Party intellectuals to speak their minds with regard to the political and social orientation of the state under the aegis of the "contending and blooming" policy (sometimes known also as the Hundred Flowers policy), see text Autumn 1956, note 1.*

*In early 1957, prior to the time of this editorial, a number of problems had already surfaced with regard to this policy. Some intellectuals were taking too great a liberty with this policy, and at the same time certain CPC people did not seem to understand fully the purpose of the policy*

*and were therefore hesitant to give it their full support. Also, as seen in Mao's speech to the Hangzhou Conference of early April 1957 (see text April 1957(2), note 4), some intellectuals were suspicious of the CPC's intentions in implementing this policy. To understand the discussion in this editorial, therefore, it would be best to relate it to certain other texts in this volume: Jan. 27, 1957(1) and (2); Feb. 27, 1957; Mar. 1, 1957; Mar 12, 1957; and April 1957(2), especially text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, and text Mar. 12, 1957, point 7 (i.e., paragraphs 14–18). Indeed, quite a bit of this article reads almost as a repetition of Mao's February 27 speech (especially section 8 of that speech). To that extent, if this article was not written by Mao, it would have to have been at least an "authorized plagiarism" of Mao. On the issue of the criticism of the RMRB, reiterated at the end of this article, see also text April 1957(1).*

It has been more than half a year since the Party Center proposed the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend." How should we assess the early stages of the implementation of this policy?

We believe that although it has only been implemented for a very short period of time, we are already able to perceive that the early results of the implementation of this policy are good ones. Some people have expressed doubts and a wavering attitude toward this policy, and believe that we should stop the "blooming" and instead go into "retrenchment"; this opinion is entirely inaccurate.

"Letting a hundred flowers bloom, letting a hundred schools contend" is not a temporary, expedient measure; rather, it is a long-range policy necessary for cultural and scientific development. It will take a relatively long time before we can see this policy reap its tremendous results in cultural construction. Nevertheless, even in the last half year or so, the various departments in scholarship and culture have already become more active and lively than before. Exciting free debates have already unfolded in the circles of philosophy, literature, economics, historical studies, legal studies, and biological studies. More critical research has appeared in the studies of the ancient and traditional cultural heritage of our country and in the study of the scholarship and ideas of capitalist countries. The universities have expanded their curricula. In the area of literary creation, of cinematic, dramatic, operatic, musical, and artistic activity, and in the areas of organizing the various nationalities' artistic and literary legacy and the promotion of their artistic and literary traditions, too, there has been an expression of flourishing liveliness. Many people have felt that their horizons have been expanded and their thoughts invigorated. All these are very good phenomena. The problem that faces us at the moment is not that the "blooming" has been too free but that it has not been enough.<sup>1</sup> The task for the Party is to continue to let go, and to insist on implementing the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom, letting a hundred schools contend."

Some people disagree with the Party Center over this policy. To them, if this was carried on, the intellectual circles would be thrown into chaos, the direction of cultural and scientific development would be blurred, there would be a deluge of bourgeois thought, and the theory of Marxism would be shaken, in short, the prospects are unthinkable.

The article "Some of Our Opinions About the Literary and Artistic Work of the Moment," published in this paper by Comrades Chen Qitong, Chen Yading,

Ma Hanbing, and Lu Le on January 7, represents this tendency.<sup>2</sup> In that essay, they painted a dismal and horrifying picture of the conditions of the literary and artistic circles at the present time. They said, "In the last year, fewer and fewer people have promoted the literary and artistic orientation of serving the workers, peasants and soldiers, or the creative methodology of socialist realism,"<sup>3</sup> [and] "some authors have become afraid to write about themes that truly reflect the major current political struggles, and rare are the occasions of such things being promoted. . . . Therefore there has been a great weakening of the combativeness of art and literature. The complexion of our age has become blurred; the voice of the times has become subdued; the light of socialist construction, reflected in the mirror of literature and art, has been dimmed."

Quite obviously, such an assessment is an extreme distortion of reality. This has been pointed out in the article written by Comrade Chen Liao, printed here on March 1, the article by Mr. Mao Dun of March 18,<sup>4</sup> and the responses of the majority of our readers collected and published here on page seven of our April 4 issue. The question is, how did such an extremely distorted assessment come about? It was because until now, there are still quite a few comrades in the Party who do not in reality agree with the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend." Therefore, they have one-sidedly collected information about some negative phenomena, exaggerated them, and attempted to use them to prove the "damage" of this policy, thus to "counsel" the Party to change its own policy quickly. However, the Party cannot accept their "counsel," because their orientation is not Marxist, but rather anti-Marxist dogmatism and sectarianism.<sup>5</sup> They do not understand that at any time, incorrect ideas among the people cannot be dealt with by coercive methods and methods of prohibition. They can be dealt with only through rational discussion, criticism, persuasion, and education.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, at this time when our nation is just stepping into the transitional period of socialism, it is specifically significant that this policy be upheld.

Although in our country we have now realized the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce into joint state-private enterprises by entire trades,<sup>7</sup> the bourgeoisie still exists; although the cooperativization of agriculture and handicraft industries has been realized, for a long period of time into the future the petty-bourgeois ideology or even the bourgeois ideology that existed among the over 500 million former petty-bourgeois elements in our country will continue to exist. The majority of our intellectuals belonged originally to the category of bourgeois intellectuals, and they are as yet quite a distance away from being proletarianized in ideology. Under such circumstances, it is by no means surprising (in fact it is inevitable) that bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thoughts are expressed within the areas of culture and scholarship in our country. The task of the Party, of the Marxists, is to carry out appropriate and persuasive criticism of the various expressions of bourgeois and petty bourgeois thought through the method of rational discussion, thus to help the intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie to progress at an even more rapid pace than they have. To adopt

methods of coercion and prohibition at this point would not, to the Party and to the Marxists, be to carry out their responsibilities but rather to cancel their responsibilities. As far as these things that are the objects of coercion and prohibition are concerned, the result of such action will be coercion without submission, and prohibition without actual cessation. Therefore, such actions and such ways of thinking are incorrect.

Truth has always been developed out of the process of struggling against erroneous things.<sup>8</sup> Marxism itself was developed out of the process of struggling against anti-Marxist ideologies. Without such struggle there would be no emergence of truth, no development of Marxism. Therefore, the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend" can only help, and not hurt, the development of Marxism. If new, correct viewpoints were to emerge from the contending of the various schools, they would of course be beneficial to Marxism, but even if some incorrect viewpoints were to emerge, as far as Marxism is concerned, that would still be nothing to be scared of. Marxism welcomes the emergence of all thought, because the discovery of any truth (regardless of whether or not the discoverer agreed with Marxism) can only enrich Marxism. The Marxist, indeed, possesses a high degree of Party identity, but this Party identity shares nothing in common with sectarianism. Marxism is not afraid of being criticized by all sorts of incorrect ideas; history has shown that, even in the days when the bourgeois ideology ruled, the many theories opposed to Marxism have been unable to thwart the development of Marxism. Ideological struggle is the motivating force for the development of Marxism. Without struggle Marxism will stagnate, and will turn into its opposite, i.e., into dogmatism.

Some people ask: "Is there any inconsistency between upholding the policy of 'letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend' and recognizing Marxism's leading position in the realm of ideology?"<sup>9</sup>

The leadership of Marxism, like the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend," is demanded and determined by objective existence; it is not arbitrarily decided, nor can it be arbitrarily abolished. It is a fundamental historical fact that our country is a socialist country led by the working class. Since the working class occupies a dominant position in our politics and our economy, and is leading the entire people in socialist construction, then it is inevitable that Marxism, the ideology that is instructing the working class in socialist construction, would occupy a dominant position in ideology. In fact, if the working class did not occupy a dominant ideological position, it would not occupy a dominant position in politics and the economy. As aforementioned, although the class struggle in our country is already basically at an end,<sup>10</sup> the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the realm of ideology will continue for a long time. In this ideological struggle, unless Marxism takes the lead, the bourgeois ideology will. In a country led by the working class, the interest of the working class and the entire laboring people will not allow the bourgeois ideology to take the lead in the realm of ideology, i.e., to allow the bourgeois intellectuals to sound the

bell for a restoration of capitalism.<sup>11</sup> The question, therefore, is not whether or not Marxism should lead, but how Marxism should lead. Here we first need to recognize one point clearly: The ideological leadership of Marxism is totally different from the intellectual domination of the reactionary classes in history. The reactionary classes have used coercive measures to confine people's speech and to force them to believe in certain things and abandon certain other things. In a socialist country led by the working class, because the state represents the interests of the people's masses and has their support, it only deprives the reactionary classes and counterrevolutionary elements of their freedom of speech, while on the other hand it fully guarantees and protects the right of the people's masses to freedom of speech and creed.<sup>12</sup> The state led by the working class also employs all necessary measures to educate the people with advanced Marxist ideas. Needless to say, the leadership of Marxism accepts the existence of non-Marxist ideas as a basic premise; without non-Marxist ideas there would be no leadership by Marxism. Therefore, to educate the people with Marxism not only means not to rely on violence to "liquidate" non-Marxist ideas among the people; it also allows for, even requires, the conducting of discussion from various different ideological viewpoints among the people, so as to allow the people to arrive consciously at accurate conclusions through such discussion. Therefore, the implementation of the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend" is precisely a necessary method for the correct realization of the leadership of Marxism.

There have been non-Marxists in the past, there are non-Marxists today, and there will be non-Marxists in the future. This bestows upon the Marxist the tremendous responsibility of propagating Marxism. We can be sure that, since Marxism is objective scientific truth, and because the scientific truth of Marxism will win and win again, there will be more and more people who will come to believe in Marxism, and the numbers of true Marxists will increase. The Marxist must, on the strength of his or her own argument and by the fruits of his or her studying, convince the non-Marxist, prove the truth of Marxism, and enrich the contents of Marxism. When the Marxist debates with the non-Marxist, he or she must adopt a rational, analytical, and equal attitude, and must not adopt a threatening, one-sided, arbitrary, nonanalytical, metaphysical, dogmatic, or sectarian attitude. Subjectively speaking, Chen Qitong and the other three comrades wanted to convince the non-Marxists, but their own attitude was not a Marxist one; rather it was one of dogmatism and sectarianism. Therefore their criticism can result only in ideological chaos, and indeed, in reality they have caused a certain confusion in ideology. It should be acknowledged that the fact that there was no criticism of their articles for a long time after they had been published in the paper contributed greatly to this confusion. Marxists must propagate Marxism. It is precisely for this reason that not only should they criticize bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideas, but they should also criticize the dogmatist distortions of Marxism, as well as libertarian attitudes toward dogmatism. This is the point that we would like to put forward now in order to encourage our readers as well as ourselves.

## Notes

1. See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14, on the subject of whether there should be greater "letting go" or "retrenchment" in this policy.

2. Chen Qitong, a writer, was at this time deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army. In January 1957, Chen spoke up in the Union of Chinese Writers in defense of socialist realism in literature, arguing that although diverse styles must coexist, the writers in the CPC must uphold the principle of socialist realism and write to advance the interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. For more biographical information on Chen, see *Zhonggong renmin lu*, p. 591. We have not been able to find biographical information on the other three coauthors of this article.

3. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 44.

4. Mao Dun was the pen name for Shen Yanbing, one of the greatest novelists of twentieth-century China. Shen had been a chief literary figure in China since the May Fourth Movement, and a dominant figure in the left-wing literary circles in the 1920s and 1930s, represented by his membership in the Literary Research Society (*Wenxue yanjiu she*) and the League of Left-Wing Writers (*Zuo lian*). In July 1949, on the eve of the Communist victory in China, Shen became a vice-chairman of the All-China Association of Literary Workers (which in 1953 came to be known as the Union of Chinese Writers). In October 1949 he became a member of the CPPCC and of the CPGC, and, finally, minister of culture in the State Council. The latter was the highest government position Shen held, and he continued to serve in that position until 1965. It was then, as minister of culture, that Shen wrote the article mentioned by Mao here. In May 1957, at the Second Conference on Editorial Work of the Union of Chinese Writers, held at the height of the "contending and blooming" period, Shen criticized the editorial departments of CPC-affiliated publications such as *Renmin wenxue* (People's Literature) and *Wenyi bao* (Literary Gazette) for serious dogmatism, sectarianism, and bureaucratism in their editorial policies and work. On May 8, at a forum convened by the editorial department of *GMRB*, he even went on to criticize the CPC's dogmatism in guiding the line in literary circles. However, as the Hundred Flowers Campaign gave way to the Anti-Rightist campaign in the latter half of 1957, Shen "retrenched" and became a standard bearer for the campaign for the ideological remolding of writers to stem the tide of bourgeois ideology. On September 17, 1957, he delivered a speech at an enlarged meeting of the CPC group in the Union of Chinese Writers in which he lent his voice to the criticism of "Rightist writers" such as Ding Ling. Although Shen was replaced by Lu Dingyi as minister of culture in 1965, and at the time there was a rumor that he was being purged for his connection to the Xia Yan case, he seemed to have held up through the rigorous attacks and criticisms of writers in the Cultural Revolution period. For more biographical information on Mao Dun, or Shen Yanbing, see under the latter name in D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 759-764.

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Letter to Zhang Wei and Madam Zhang  
(April 15, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, p. 523.

*See text Sept. 19, 1950, vol. I, source note.*

Comrade Zhang and Madam Zhang:

I have received your letter and I am deeply concerned. Although your sickness is serious, it is always possible to be cured. I hope very much that you will rest up and allow yourself to be nursed back to health without worry and care, and strive for a turn for the better. With regard to the things [you told me in your letter] about how the various comrades—members of your family—are working hard to make progress, I will, naturally, do what I can to help them in their endeavor as you have asked me to; in doing so I will merely be fulfilling my responsibilities as your old friend. I hope that Madam Zhang would feel free to keep me informed about your circumstances at any time.

Mao Zedong  
April 15, 1957  
Beijing

Speech of Welcome for Voroshilov  
(April 15, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 16, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 108 (May 25, 1957), 3. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (April 16, 1957), 1–2.

*The visit to China of K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, lasted from April 15 to May 6, and then May 24–26, 1957. He gave a speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress on the second day of his visit, April 16. (Mao's invitation to Voroshilov to visit the PRC had been made at the beginning of the year; see text Jan. 6, 1957.)*

*Mao's speech here was delivered at Nanwan Airport, Beijing, where Mao personally welcomed Voroshilov and his entourage.*

*For other documents attending Voroshilov's visit, see RMSC (1958), pp. 396–401.*

Dear Comrade Chairman Voroshilov:

Your visit to our country is an honor for the Chinese people and a great event in the daily developing friendly relations between our two countries. On behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese government and the Communist Party of China, I extend to you and to the comrades accompanying you our warmest welcome and brotherly respect.

The great people of the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have opened the glorious road of socialist revolution to the proletariat of the world, and have set a great example for all of humanity in building socialism and communism. With the encouragement and support of the Soviet people, the Chinese people are themselves today forging ahead along the road of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The peoples of China and the Soviet Union have a deep, brotherly friendship with each other. In the cause of China's Revolution and construction, the Soviet people have given us the greatest sympathy and support. Please allow me to express my heartfelt gratitude to you and, through you, to the Soviet people, the Soviet government, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Comrade Chairman, you are the representative of the great people of the Soviet Union, and the closest friend of the Chinese people. We are confident that your visit will further strengthen the great friendship between the people of China and the Soviet Union, and will benefit the noble cause of promoting world peace and human progress.

Long live the unbreakable, brotherly friendship between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union!

Long live the great Soviet people!

Long live the unity of the countries in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union!

Long live world peace!

Telegram to Syria  
(April 15, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 17, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 108 (May 25, 1957), 62. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (April 17, 1957), 1.

President Shukri El Kuwatly,  
The Republic of Syria

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of your country's National Day, I express my warm congratulations and that of the Chinese people to Your Excellency and to the people of your

country. May the relations of friendship and cooperation between China and Syria develop with each passing day, and may the Republic of Syria be prosperous and strong.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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### Remark on Cooperation with the Kuomintang

(April 16, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 17, 1957), 1. Available English Translation: FBIS, *Daily Report* (April 16, 1957), AAA 9.

*We have included Zhou Enlai's remarks here to provide the context for the conversation. This exchange took place during a banquet given at the Beijing Restaurant by Premier Zhou Enlai for K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who was then visiting China (see text April 15, 1957(2), source note), at the moment when Wei Lihuang was presented and introduced to Voroshilov. On Wei and the significance of this event, see text Mar. 17, 1955, vol. I, source note.*

Zhou Enlai: The two parties, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, have cooperated twice in the past.<sup>1</sup>

Mao: We are yet prepared to carry out a third cooperation.

Voroshilov: Always be in cooperation.

#### Note

1. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 7.

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### Speech at Banquet For Voroshilov

(April 17, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 18, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 108 (May 25, 1957), 8; *Buyi*, pp. 144–145; *XHBYK*, 144 (Nov. 1958), pp. 4, 6, 7, 8, (quotations). Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (April 18, 1957), 2–3.

*For Voroshilov's visit, see text April 15, 1957(2), source note. This speech was made at the state banquet held in Voroshilov's honor by Mao at Huairan Hall.*

*This speech being what it is, a welcoming speech for a state banquet, it is understandable that much of what is said is diplomatic and formalistic. Nonetheless, there are still things of substance here that should not be overlooked. One may, for instance, remark at the consistency of Mao's approach to the (at least public) interpretation of the Russian October Revolution and on the Sino-Soviet alliance and friendship between the time of this speech and the speech Mao made much later in the year when he himself visited the Soviet Union (see text Nov. 6, 1957). This is notable, especially in view of the fact that at the same time, as seen in the January and February speeches of this year, there were already things in the Soviet Union that were arousing serious concerns on Mao's part.*

Dear Comrade President Voroshilov,  
Dear Comrades of the Soviet Union,  
Comrades, Friends:

We feel extremely joyous today for this happy gathering with the representative of our great ally, Comrade Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, and [with] the other guests who have come from the Soviet Union.

Comrade Voroshilov is one of the outstanding leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For decades, he has made persevering and untiring efforts for the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, for the strengthening of the forces of national defense of the Soviet Union and the development of the cause of communism, and has made excellent contributions [to these causes]. Comrade Voroshilov is the dearest and closest comrade and friend of the Chinese people, and with this visit to our country he has brought to us the brotherly friendship of the great people of the Soviet Union. On behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and the Communist Party of China, I extend a warm welcome to our honored guests.

Forty years ago, the people of the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the great revolutionary teacher, Lenin, and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, acted as pathbreakers for a new world and founded the first socialist state. This was a turning point in the history of the human race. In these forty years, the people of the Soviet Union not only have carried out magnificent socialist construction at home, but have also made incomparable contributions to the cause of peace [and] progress throughout the world. The laboring people of the whole world can see in the Soviet people the bright road to their own liberation and to the construction of a happy society for humanity. We, the Chinese people, have been following exactly the path of the Socialist October Revolution in achieving [our] victories and successes of today. The Chinese people have always seen the Chinese Revolution as a continuation of the great Socialist October Revolution, and take this to be a tremendous honor.

In the process of struggling to achieve national liberation, the Chinese people had the brotherly sympathy and support of the people of the Soviet Union. After the victory of the Chinese Revolution, the Soviet Union again gave all-round and tremendous help to the cause of China's socialist construction. These are all [things] that the Chinese people can never forget. Here, on behalf of the Chinese people and the Chinese government, I would again like to express [my] heartfelt thanks to the people and the government of the Soviet Union.

country. May the relations of friendship and cooperation between China and Syria develop with each passing day, and may the Republic of Syria be prosperous and strong.

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Comrade Voroshilov is one of the outstanding leaders of the Soviet state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For decades, he has made persevering and untiring efforts for the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, for the strengthening of the forces of national defense of the Soviet Union and the development of the cause of communism, and has made excellent contributions [to these causes]. Comrade Voroshilov is the dearest and closest comrade and friend of the Chinese people, and with this visit to our country he has brought to us the brotherly friendship of the great people of the Soviet Union. On behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and the Communist Party of China, I extend a warm welcome to our honored guests.

Forty years ago, the people of the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the great revolutionary teacher, Lenin, and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, acted as pathbreakers for a new world and founded the first socialist state. This was a turning point in the history of the human race. In these forty years, the people of the Soviet Union not only have carried out magnificent socialist construction at home, but have also made incomparable contributions to the cause of peace [and] progress throughout the world. The laboring people of the whole world can see in the Soviet people the bright road to their own liberation and to the construction of a happy society for humanity. We, the Chinese people, have been following exactly the path of the Socialist October Revolution in achieving [our] victories and successes of today. The Chinese people have always seen the Chinese Revolution as a continuation of the great Socialist October Revolution, and take this to be a tremendous honor.

In the process of struggling to achieve national liberation, the Chinese people had the brotherly sympathy and support of the people of the Soviet Union. After the victory of the Chinese Revolution, the Soviet Union again gave all-round and tremendous help to the cause of China's socialist construction. These are all [things] that the Chinese people can never forget. Here, on behalf of the Chinese people and the Chinese government, I would again like to express [my] heartfelt thanks to the people and the government of the Soviet Union.

In the socialist revolutionary struggle and in the process of the protracted construction of socialism and communism, the people of the Soviet Union have accumulated a most abundant [store of] experience. These experiences are a great treasure for the laboring people of the whole world. The Chinese people, both in their past revolutionary struggles and in their present cause of constructing socialism, have learned a great deal of valuable things from the Soviet Union. From now on, the Chinese people must still continue to reinforce their study of the advanced experience of the Soviet Union in order to speed up China's construction of socialism.<sup>1</sup>

The great peoples of the two countries of China and the Soviet Union are the most intimate brothers and the most reliable comrades-in-arms. In the noble cause of strengthening the unity of the socialist camp, defending world peace, and promoting the progress of humanity, we, the Chinese people, resolutely stand together with the people of the Soviet Union. Imperialism's forces of aggression are always trying by every possible method to sow discord between our two countries and to undermine our unity and friendly relations. But reality has proven that these plots of theirs can never succeed. No force in the world can separate us. The friendship of the 800 million people of China and the Soviet Union is eternal and impregnable.

Let us raise our glasses; [let us drink:]

To the invulnerable brotherly friendship of the peoples of the two countries of China and the Soviet Union,

To the further consolidation and strengthening of the grand unity of the great socialist family [of nations] with the Soviet Union at its head,

To the ever-growing development of friendly and cooperative relations among all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples,

To world peace,

To even more magnificent achievements in the Soviet Union's construction of communism,

And to Chairman Voroshilov's health and long life!

Bottoms up!

#### Note

1. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 34.

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### Letter to Yuan Shuipai (April 20, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, pp. 524–525.

*Yuan Shuipai, a.k.a. Yuan Shuibo (1916–1982), was a Jiangsu poet of renown during and after the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. During the period toward the end*

*of that war, he began writing poetry of political satire in which he criticized the KMT government. His poetic style, especially those poems written under the pen name Ma Fantuo, was characterized by its populism, particularly by the mountain-area folk-song genre (shange). At the time of this letter, Yuan was (we are told by the Shuxin source) the director of the literature and art department and the supplement of RMRB. Yuan held a number of elected positions in many literary associations and political bodies in the PRC from 1953 to 1965. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution he was criticized and sent to Ningxia for labor reform. He was rehabilitated in 1973, and regained prominence of sorts in the literary circles and in political standing. He ultimately became editor-in-chief of Renmin wenxue (People's literature) and a vice-minister of culture. He was, however, once more criticized and purged after the fall of the Gang of Four. For biographical information on Yuan, see Zhonggong renming lu, p. 476.*

Comrade Shuipai:

Your [poem] "Yao tou" [Shaking One's Head] is very well-written.<sup>1</sup> (Chen Yi's poem is also a good one.)<sup>2</sup> You should write more [of such things]. My feeling is that instead of being an editor, it might be better for you to go outside and do some traveling.<sup>3</sup> You could have somebody take over your responsibilities and job for the time being, go outside, run around for a few months, then come back and be an editor for a few months, and then go out again. Do you think this is a workable plan? Please give it some thought and discuss it with the comrades in charge [of your unit]. Li Xifan should go back to school, to teach on the one hand and to do some research on the other.<sup>4</sup> Once he went to the editorial board of the newspaper he became divorced from the masses and began to fall short in terms of an attitude of discussing things rationally and calmly. Please discuss this with him.

I send you my regards in comradely salute!

Mao Zedong

April 20, 1957

#### Notes

1. According to the *Shuxin* source, this is a political-satire poem written by Yuan and published in the April 18, 1957, issue of *RMRB*.

2. According to the *Shuxin* source, this refers to the poem "You Yuquanshan jishi" (An Account of the Tour of Yuquan Mountain), written by Chen Yi and published in the April 18, 1957 issue of *RMRB*. For more biographical information on Chen Yi, see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 54.

3. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), text surrounding note 83. Mao was not talking of ordinary "traveling" here, but was referring to Party cadres going to the masses at the "lower levels."

4. For information on Li Xifan, see text Oct. 16, 1954(1), vol. I, notes 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7, and text Oct. 1954(1), vol. I, note 3. According to the *Shuxin* source, Li was a graduate of the Chinese language and literature department of Shandong University in 1953, and in 1955 he was made an editor of the literature and art department of *RMRB*. See also *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 187. In these remarks, Mao appears to come back to the criticism of *RMRB*; see text April 10, 1957, paragraphs 5 and 6, and texts April 1957(1) and (2).



## Conversation with Japanese Delegates of the Special Committee on the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations

(April 21, 1957)

**Source:** “Mo Takuto shuseki to-no kaidan hokoku” (A Report on a Conversation with Chairman Mao Zedong), in *Nihon Shakai-to ho-chu shinzen shisutsu-dan hokoku-sho* (Report of the Japanese Socialist Party’s Delegation of a Friendly Visit to China), published by the Special Committee on the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations of the Japanese Socialist Party and the International Bureau of the Japanese Socialist Party (n.p., May 1957).

*The delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party, led by Asanuma Inejiro, the General Secretary of the Party, visited China from April 10 to April 22, 1957. The meeting reported here took place on the evening of April 21, (from 10:30 P.M. to midnight), at Qinzhengdian, Zhongnanhai, Beijing. Present at this meeting, on the Chinese side, were also Zhou Enlai, Zhang Xiruo, Xu Deheng, Ye Jizhuang, Liao Chengzhi, Qiao Guanhua, Lei Renmin, and Xiao Xiangqian.*

*There is no Chinese translation or version of this conversation. We also know of no full report in English on this conversation. It was briefly reported in the press release “Mao Considers PRC-Japan Peace Pact,” in Kyodo (Tokyo) (April 22, 1957, noon edition). This press release is translated in FBIS, Daily Report (April 22, 1957), LLL 1–2. An abbreviated transcript of this conversation, containing only the dialogue between Mao and Asanuma, the leader of the Japanese delegation, is also found in the book Nit-chu no kokko-kaifuku (The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations), pp. 120–139. This last information is provided for us by Helmut Martin, our German collaborator; no further publication data of the book has been provided. For a joint communiqué issued by the Zhongguo renmin waijiao xuehui (Chinese People’s Association for Foreign Relations) and the Japanese Socialist Party’s delegation during this visit, see RMSC (1958), pp. 421–422.*

Mao: How many of you are here for the first time?

Sada: About five of us have been in China before.

Mao: Then, we are old friends. I have been aware of the name of Mr. Asanuma, the head of the delegation, for some time.

Asanuma: At the general meeting of the Socialist Party in January, we resolved that there are not two Chinas, and that Japan must restore normal diplomatic relationships with China. Ever since we came to your country on the twelfth day of this month, we have met and talked with various people, and visited many places. I thank you for your hospitality.

Chairman Mao’s autobiography<sup>1</sup> and essays are being published in Tokyo. I was deeply moved by reading your autobiography. Although Japan has carried out reforms for democratization, I regret to say that it is still under American control. We are determined to work hard, and will soon assume control of [our] government

[for ourselves]. Since we [are bound to] employ democratic and peaceful means, the task is an arduous one.

Mao: I thank you, and welcome you all.

Asanuma: We have exchanged views with [the Chinese people] since [April] 12, and believe that we have learned what we wanted.<sup>2</sup> [The head of the delegation introduced its members to Mao].<sup>3</sup>

Mao: I agree with your opinion. We can be called friends. Many of your ideas found in the [Socialist] Party’s platform are in agreement with our views. It is imperative that China and Japan should maintain friendly relations, and it is important to assert that there is only one China.

Are there any problematic views in Japan that argue that there are two Japans? Japan must recover Okinawa.<sup>4</sup>

Another point on which we agree with you is that Asian and African countries must be united.

The Japanese Socialist Party is a powerful force. The principles of the socialist parties in Asia, such as in Burma, India, and the Arab nations, do not completely coincide with those of the social democratic parties of Western Europe. [The principles of] the Asian parties are more correct than those of European parties. Therefore, your assertions can obtain approval from a wide range of peoples overseas.<sup>5</sup> The day will inevitably come when you take over your own government. Please fight for that goal.

Asanuma: I would like to ask your views on two or three points. First of all, we have learned that our thoughts on Japan’s restoring normal relations with China are mostly shared by the Chinese. Japan is under American control; there are American military bases there. We have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. These are the obstacles to the recovery of normal diplomatic relations with your country. Upon our return to Japan, we would like to initiate a national movement toward full independence. We wish to state that the Taiwan problem is a Chinese concern and needs to be resolved by the Chinese.

We have been to Badaling today to see the Great Wall.<sup>6</sup> Since it was tiresome to climb with shoes, I took them off. Only then did I manage to reach the top. My point is that a goal can be achieved, if efforts are exerted.

Mao: I agree with you completely. The peak that cannot be climbed with your shoes on can be conquered if you take them off. The Taiwan issue is a difficult one. It may take a long time before this problem is solved. This is an obstacle confronting both China and Japan. It may be unavoidable that [progress] be delayed. We must exert our efforts [to make progress], but at the same time we should be prepared for the delay. In Taiwan affairs, the problem is not with Chiang Kai-shek, but with the United States. Japan’s difficulty is also [the presence of] the United States. The questions concerning relationships with the United States should be tackled not regionally but on a worldwide scale. The United States has established a network of military bases throughout Japan. They have bases not only in Japan but in many other places of the world. If Japan wishes to get rid of these military bases, you need friends and assistance from all quarters.

Japan is a powerful nation—Japan can win independence first. Japan is one of

the ten or so industrialized nations of the world. China is not yet one of them. Neither is India. Our nation is not yet industrialized. [Unlike us,] a nation like Japan can never be under foreign rule for a long time.

China's strength can be increased, but not right away. However, we are hopeful. China's growth in strength should be of benefit to Japan. China's capacity for trade has not yet developed. Being a poor nation, what commodities do we have to trade with Japan? After, say, seven, eight, or ten years, it may become possible for China to do a greater amount of trade with Japan. We may be able to ask for Japan's cooperation in developing Chinese mines, for example.

Zhou [Enlai]: That can be done soon, if Japan can break away from the trade embargo, (i.e., the Cocom restrictions.)<sup>7</sup> The question here is of course the attitude of the United States.

Mao: It would be fine if Japan could provide the capital and develop Chinese mines, and promises to hand back the mines to the Chinese after some years. This way, China could provide coal and iron ore [to Japan].

Asanuma: Japan is also under American control on the economic front. This must be taken into consideration. We are now buying from the United States coal, iron, rice, and soybeans. We would like to realize the economic exchange between Japanese industries and China as soon as possible.

Mao: Japan has advanced industrial and agricultural technologies, while China is rich in natural resources. If we can cooperate, both nations can prosper by all means. I hope for that day to come as soon as possible. Buying from the United States must cost more than buying from China, correct?

Sada: Not necessarily. [However,] we wish to engage in long-term, stable trade at proper prices. We wish to persuade the public that trading with China is more profitable.

Mao: If Chinese products are more expensive, there won't be any buyers.

Asanuma: Change is gradually taking place in the thinking of Japanese capitalists. There is a rising demand among the people [for expanded trade with China]. Japan's National Diet, as well as more than fifty prefectural assemblies, have adopted resolutions for promoting trade with China. This has become a national consensus of the Japanese people.

Mao: It is good that a public consensus has emerged.

Yamahana: The strength of the consensus has grown so much that the conservatives can no longer ignore it.

Mao: I am by no means saying that you should not carry out business with the United States. China is just one trade partner. You should trade with many countries.

Asanuma: We hope to expand the trade with Asian countries.

Mao: Japan needs to approach the Asian and African countries with greater effort. For example, it seems that its relationship with Indonesia has yet to be fully developed. [The Indonesian people] still fear Japan. There are many nations in Asia that are afraid of China, but they are also afraid of Japan. They are concerned that China will invade their country, maybe not now, but sometime in the future; that while China may not be aggressive in this generation, it may be so in the next

generation, etc. Such fears are also directed toward Japan.

Once, my Indonesian friend<sup>8</sup> asked me if Japan would become an aggressor [again]. What is your thought on this?

Katsumata: What was Chairman Mao's answer to that question?

Mao: I said, "World conditions may have changed much, and it will not be easy to launch an invasion. As a result of Japan's military expansion in the past, the Japanese people have suffered hardships. Without the militarist expansion, however, the Japanese people would not have been able to learn the lesson. Japan's occupation of more than half of the territory of China helped us. Naturally, it was an unhappy circumstance, yet it aroused the consciousness of the Chinese people. Militarism awakened us. It also awakened the Japanese people."<sup>9</sup>

Asanuma: Japan has adopted a new constitution and has renounced war, in its ninth article.<sup>10</sup>

Mao: I once read the Japanese constitution. It is a fairly good document under the circumstances. I suppose the movement for revising the constitution is not too strong.<sup>11</sup>

Asanuma: As a result of the lower house elections last year, the liberal forces have come to occupy one-third of the seats in both houses, making the revision [of the constitution] impossible. Recently, we were requested by the government to participate in the Committee on the Study of the Constitution. Our party rejected the invitation. The demand for revision comes from overseas as well.

Mao: Does that mean the United States?

Asanuma: That is correct. People [in Japan] are offended by the fact that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty controls [the fate of] Japan, in spite of the presence of such a constitution.<sup>12</sup> There are more than 600 military bases in Japan. In opposition to their continued existence, there has been bloodshed among the Japanese themselves at Sunagawa in recent months.<sup>13</sup> Hoping eventually to check the military bases, the movement against the unequal treaty<sup>14</sup> is growing strong.

Some of the people assert that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty must be maintained due to the parallel existence of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.<sup>15</sup> The present world structure relying on the military alliances of great powers does not, I believe, provide a real security and peace. What is your thought on this?

Mao, directing the question to Premier Zhou Enlai: Have you ever discussed this problem?

Premier Zhou: One of our principles is that of a collective security treaty.<sup>16</sup> We have been consistent in advocating this. Another important element is the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, whose goal is to oppose the revival of militarism. The most important object is to check the exploitation of militarism [by a third party]. This is what is important. This treaty differs from the one that Chiang Kai-shek had signed.<sup>17</sup> In other words, we oppose the American exploitation of [Japanese] militarism. Therefore, if Japan can achieve full independence, we can sign a mutual nonaggression treaty with Japan.

Mao, talking to Premier Zhou: I agree with you completely. We can conclude a mutual nonaggression treaty. Once Japan becomes fully independent of the United States, when there is no possibility of a militarist revival, and no likelihood

of exploitation of it by outsiders, in other words, when there exists no danger of aggression, Japan and China can sign a nonaggression treaty. Under those circumstances, the military clauses of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance can be revised, as they would have become obsolete.

Hozumi: Based on our past experience, the Japanese people have little confidence in nonaggression treaties. What Premier Zhou is saying, I believe, is a treaty that would positively create peace. It is possible to sign a Sino-Japanese peace and security treaty, before the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is abandoned. Such a development might facilitate the abolition of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Mao: That is possible. If the Japanese government agrees to it, the Soviet Union may not object either. This, however, cannot be handled by private organizations. Only at the intergovernmental level would this be possible.

Asanuma: The Japanese people are determined to defend the peace constitution.<sup>18</sup> So we feel that we must cooperate with other groups that aspire to peace. At present, the possession of military force by the two camps causes some concern [to us] in this regard. What do you think of disarmament?

Mao: I am for the complete abolition of armed forces. A police force is sufficient. I am in favor of full disarmament. There is no complication about it. Military buildup is costly, and threatens the common people. It also hinders economic construction.

Asanuma: Japan is located in a valley between the American and the Soviet piles of atom and hydrogen bombs. The United States has recently brought a nuclear-armed corps into Japan. Japan has thrice been baptized with atom and hydrogen bombs: Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Bikini Island.<sup>19</sup> Another test at Christmas Island is confronting us. A massive opposition movement is awakening in Japan. The attitude of the conservative government is changing, too. The Yoshida cabinet stated that the tests were inevitable, but the Hatoyama cabinet sent an encouraging message to the Nagasaki meeting last year.<sup>20</sup> The Kishi cabinet has sent a special envoy to Great Britain appealing for the cancellation of the test on Christmas Island, thus expressing its opposition.

Our wish is that the big powers conclude a treaty that bans the manufacturing and the testing of atom and hydrogen bombs.

Mao: I agree with you.

Premier Zhou: I support your opinions.

Mao: This is the only way. There is no better way.

Sone: Only yesterday there was a large demonstration in Japan. The test at Christmas Island has the same impact on Japan as the Russian test.<sup>21</sup> The first thing we hope to see is a signing of a test-ban treaty by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Until then, we wish that all tests be postponed.

Premier Zhou: The Soviet Union has already proposed the halting of tests.

Mao: The Soviet Union has proposed the halting of all tests, before moving on to signing agreements banning the deployment and the manufacturing of atom and hydrogen bombs, including mutual inspection.<sup>22</sup> If Great Britain wishes to carry out a test, they should do it in their own country. They have no need to bring it [the bomb] to Asia and test it. The organizations in China that aspire to peace support

your movement. The Pacific is for people of the East. The British activities are disturbing to us. It may be best that we take this opportunity and express our opinion to Great Britain. All peoples in Asia dislike the atom and hydrogen bombs. They are [together with] the Japanese [on this issue].

Narita: The utilization of atomic energy in Japan is limited only to peaceful goals. China's Five-Year Plan also calls for peaceful utilization. This, as I understand it, means that it will not be used as arms. I hope that is the case.

Mao: Besides that [issue], there is a problem of the American presence. Even if the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is abolished and Japan achieves full independence, and even if a peace treaty is concluded between Japan, the Soviet Union, China, and other Asian nations, this problem [of American presence] will not be solved. The United States would still exist even then.

We can of course advise the United States, but they would not necessarily listen to us. The presence of the United States is an objective fact.<sup>23</sup>

I believe that your Party's [the Socialist Party's] course is a correct one. You are taking the line of pursuing friendship with Asian and African countries, instead of aligning yourselves with West European states. Japan once entered into an alliance with European countries. The pact with Great Britain was a peace treaty,<sup>24</sup> while the current one with the United States is an unequal treaty. The only way out for Japan now is to be dissociated from the United States, and instead to go into peaceful and friendly relations with Asian nations.

The United States has atom bombs. What happens, if they call for a war? We will have to defend ourselves after all. In that event, we will need to be united into one force and defend ourselves against the United States with our utmost efforts. Things will be fair, if the Americans listen to us, but it is possible that they would not. The Soviet Union has already proposed an end to testing atom and hydrogen bombs. It is now up to the United States. The question is what should we do if the United States would not stop testing.

Naturally it is best if the Americans listened to us and concluded a treaty with us. One new phenomenon of the world after the Second World War is the expansion of American force. U.S. military bases exist not only in Japan but also in Taiwan, Western Europe, and other Asian and African regions. It is clear that they intend to build military bases wherever possible. Of course they have the atom and hydrogen bombs. China, Japan, and India may have atom and hydrogen bombs in the future, but by that time the Americans would have far more than they do today. The Soviet Union now holds a [comparable strength].

The best policy is [for everyone] not to own any bombs. The second best option is for us to have what they have. The worst condition is where they alone own them, while we do not.

War is not possible now, as both the Soviet Union and United States possess [atom bombs]. If the United States alone owned the bombs, it would threaten other nations, and force them to become subservient to the United States.

Let us now look at where the United States stands at present. (1) There is the Pan-American Treaty in Central and South America.<sup>25</sup> (2) There is the Tripartite Treaty of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, which is aimed at

defending [these areas] against Japan.<sup>26</sup> (3) There is the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, aimed against China and the Soviet Union. (4) There is the Baghdad Treaty, [affecting] Southeast Asia.<sup>27</sup> (5) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization exists in Europe.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the "American hands" can be counted in tens and hundreds, and they control many parts of the world, including South Korea and Taiwan.

Katsumata: We in Japan legislated a basic atomic energy act that limited its usage to nonmilitary purposes. I hope that you will understand our intentions. Peaceful use of atomic energy means that [the atomic industry] must be open to public [inspection] and cannot conceal any secrets. I believe India could agree with our view. We plan to propose this idea first in Asia.

Mao: That is fine. We have no money, or other economic resources. It takes a lot of capital and electricity [to develop the atomic industry], but we have neither of them.

Narita: We hope that you will restrict it to peaceful use, when you have sufficient economic resources [to develop it].

Mao: It depends on how the United States would react.

Narita: This may be idealistic talk, but I believe big nations have a responsibility [to do this]. This is what the Japanese believe.

Mao: I agree with you fully.

Narita: I hope that you will put it into practice by all means.

Mao: Although China has a military force of three million men, it is like having no defense at all in the face of the United States' atom and hydrogen bombs. We are in the same situation as Japan is. So we are against the atom bombs. There is a chance to ban their use.

There was a pact in the past banning the use of poisonous gas, and consequently it was not used during the war. Thus it is possible to ban atom bombs. It may be beneficial to think what it would be like in the Third World War.

Liao Chengzhi:<sup>29</sup> In a book titled *Sen-kyuhyaku rokujyn nen* [The Year 1960] by Tsuji Masanobu, the author tells us that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union would vanish from the world in the Third World War. A conference [of the remaining countries] would be convened in Hong Kong [according to Tsuji].

Sada: Japan's full independence will not be possible unless we achieve economic self-reliance. We came here to discuss the possible ways of incorporating the two nations' economic plans. We have already met with members of the State Planning Committee, and [we have also met] with Lei Renmin<sup>30</sup> and found out that such a scheme is necessary as well as achievable. I hope that you will review the contents of our discussions, and promote Sino-Japanese economic cooperation as China's national policy. Naturally, for it to succeed, we must get rid of Cocom. Cultural and technological exchange is also necessary. Especially in terms of agricultural relations, I think Japan can learn from China's cooperativization movement, and China can learn from Japan's technology. Japan has some established ties with the United States in the industrial sector, but it has none in agriculture. The technological exchange in this area, therefore, can be performed effectively.

Premier Zhou [to Mao]: We would like to send several specialists to Japan to

survey [the situation]. I think summer is the best time for this to be done.

Mao: What is the outlook? Can they go?

Premier Zhou: The Japanese side says they would do their best to make it possible.

Mao: That is fine. Let us send them by all means.

Hozumi: Along with Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, what we need is the establishment of mutual economic cooperative systems among Asian nations. This was approved in theory at the Bandung Conference<sup>31</sup> but has not made any progress. The Asian peoples' anxiety is that American capital and Japanese technology will come together to establish a dominant economic position in Asia. We would like to promote cooperative economic activities among the Asian nations.

Mao: That is fine. I hope that you improve your relationships with Asian countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

Katsumata: We promise that we will send forty agricultural engineers to your country. We made this promise yesterday at the Department of Agriculture and Land Development.

Mao: We would like to coordinate these plans with China's Five-Year Plan through studies on both sides. There is another point [I would like to make], namely about the power of the people. The people's power is our best guarantee for overcoming the enemy. What is the power base of the Socialist Party, for example? Having no [power over the] government and atom bombs, you rely on the people. In terms of financial strength, your Party controls no large bank.

Why was our Party able to secure control of the government? How could we wage a war against an army supported by a foreign nation? Because we had the strength of the people. While in Yanan, all we had were a few worn-out guns. The Kuomintang, on the other hand, had an army of over four million, and the support of the United States. Nonetheless, we were the victors.

The British forces in India were powerful, and rich with capital, yet they had to withdraw their forces from there. That was the result of the people's movement. Nehru chased away the British by relying on people's strength.

One can draw a conclusion from this. Although the United States is abundant with iron and steel, and has atom bombs, we can be superior to them once the peoples of the world become united. The Americans have a bad reputation in political matters, and the peoples [of the world] do not support the American [causes].<sup>32</sup>

Sada: May I ask you about the secret of solving the domestic contradictions reported in the newspapers,<sup>33</sup> and also about the possibility of a third United Front between the Communists and the Kuomintang?<sup>34</sup>

Mao: This is extremely simple and clear. In short, the class struggle is already resolved. The so-called class struggle consists of the fight against the Kuomintang, against imperialism, and against feudalism, and [the struggle] of socialist transformation. Most of these struggles have been completed successfully.<sup>35</sup>

Here is one contradiction—once the class struggle was over, a new struggle began. Namely, it is the fight against nature, and to construct [the country] with the

united effort of 600 million people. For the purpose of [national] construction, the relationship among people must be defined, and rearranged [to meet the demands] properly. The method of class struggle cannot be used toward this goal. A peaceful method, using persuasion, has to be adopted. There may arise various problems where there are some discontented people. The solution should be found not in repression, but in persuasion.<sup>36</sup> There are numerous difficulties, for example, in cooperatives, factories, and schools. Problems exist between the masses and the government. The government is suffering from bureaucratism.

Some officials are used to the class struggle of the past, and try to solve problems through repressing the masses in spite of the peace existing among classes. They do not help the masses in solving problems, nor do they attempt to persuade them. This explains why discussions on a wide variety of subjects are necessary in and out of the Party, and in the mass organizations, particularly in questions concerning ideology, because ideologies cannot be treated crudely. One cannot coerce people as to what they can believe and what they cannot. Among our staff, some still employ coercive measures, and many people are uncomfortable with it. Whether or not one believes in Marxism depends on one's consciousness, and cannot be forced. Persuasion works—an enthusiastic persuasion. An example is that one cannot push a religious person into abandoning religion through oppression.

There is a formula in China. One begins with a desire for unity, works through criticism and struggle, reaches a new basis, and achieves a new unity.<sup>37</sup> This is the formula by which the contradictions among the people can be resolved. The process [of the formula] is difficulties-criticism-unity.<sup>38</sup> We employ the unity of the entire people to fight a new struggle against nature and for [more] iron, steel, and coal. This is simple reasoning.

Asanuma: I saw at the Agricultural Exhibit [a display of] Chairman Mao's words: "Water conservancy is the basis of agriculture." The transformation of nature is an ideal of socialism. We hope that we can end the struggles among peoples, nations, and classes, and proceed to fight against nature.

Mao: I agree with you.

Asanuma: We must end war, and achieve peace, in order to do that.

Mao: We now have two slogans, "Let a hundred flowers bloom," and "Let a hundred schools contend."<sup>39</sup> There are some comrades who do not understand them. So persuasion is needed.

If one intends to develop science and technology, there is no other way but to encourage free competition and active debate. The Chinese Communist Party is a massive, strong party. Once it does not function well, this scares the people. When people are scared of a party, that is bad. The tensions in and around the Party must be relaxed, and reason has to prevail after thorough debate. Only then, the Party and the people can come together, and the Communist Party and democratic parties can come closer to one another.<sup>40</sup> The people's fear would disappear, and they may begin to communicate with the Party. I suppose you would agree with this reasoning.

Asanuma: I guess the difficulties emerge after you win [control of] the government.

Mao: That is right. Once you get hold of the government, the problems become much tougher. Be careful when you win [control of] the government.

Sada: We will learn from your country when the time comes.

Mao: Not everything is going well here. It would take a long time [before things get settled]. Only after [such a long period] will those things that concern us be led to the right paths. Such is the current political situation in China. [However,] we have hope.

The socialist system enables us [to have hope]. There is a good possibility for China's economy and science to make progress.

Asanuma: Thank you for your discourse on these various topics.

Mao: I sincerely wish that your party platform will be achieved.

Asanuma: We are an opposition party with no right of independent diplomacy, but we would like to make the points of agreement [that we achieved today] public.

Premier Zhou: Fine. I can consent to that.

Mao: Please do as you see fit.

## Notes

1. The word "autobiography" must have been used here loosely by Asanuma, and simply refers to the biography written by Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (originally published by Random House, 1938; rev. ed. Grove Press, 1968), and possibly secondary stories of Mao's life available in the Japanese language.

2. In fact, according to the source, the Japanese delegation arrived in Hong Kong the morning of April 11, and in China proper, at Guangzhou, in the evening of the same day. Major groups of Chinese people with whom the delegation had met before their meeting with Mao, which came on the last day of their sojourn, were members of the Zhongguo renmin waijiao xuehui (Chinese People's Association for Foreign Relations), the Chinese and Japanese press corps, Premier Zhou Enlai, the State Economic Planning Committee of the State Council, members of the CPPCC, and the mayor of Beijing Municipality and his staff. The delegation, besides visiting a number of institutions, also held discussions with Chinese representatives on the subjects of the fishing industry, trade, agricultural technology exchange, and electrical and electronics technology exchange.

3. According to the source, the members of the Japanese delegation were: Asanuma Inejiro (leader, General Secretary of the Japanese Socialist Party), Katsumata Seiichi (chairman, Special Committee of the Japanese Socialist Party on the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations), Sada Tadataka (director of the International Bureau of the Japanese Socialist Party), Sone Susumu (director of the Entrepreneurial Planning Bureau of the Japanese Socialist Party), Hozumi Shichiro (director of the Foreign Relations Bureau of the Japanese Socialist Party), Yamahana Hideo (vice-chairman, Special Committee of the Japanese Socialist Party on the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations), Narita Tomoki (vice-chairman, Policy Review Committee, and director, Bureau of Party Operations, Japanese Socialist Party), Sasaki Ryosaku (codirector, Bureau of Party Operations, Japanese Socialist Party), and two secretarial attendants, Komeyama Yuji and Sato Takumi.

4. Okinawa is an island group in the center of the Ryukyu chain some 550 km SSW of the southernmost part of Japan. The Kurile Islands and the Ryukyu Islands were both occupied by the Japanese and used as bases for launching its Pacific and Southeast Asian offensives in the Second World War. In April 1945 American troops launched an amphibious counteroffensive against the Ryukyus, and through bitter fighting consolidated their conquest of Okinawa in June. It was the occupation of Okinawa that made the massive air offensive of the American bomber forces on the Japanese islands themselves in May–August

1945 possible, and which, as much as the dropping of the atom bomb, brought Japan to its knees. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union occupied the Kurile Islands and the U.S. occupied the Ryukyus. On January 29, 1951, the Liberal Party in Japan issued a call for the returning of both island chains to Japanese control. In 1954, the U.S. returned to Japan the Amami Islands in the northern section of the Ryukyu chain but continued to hold onto Okinawa Prefecture. A popular movement was mounted in Japan for the return of Okinawa and the cessation of millions of Japanese nationals being held under foreign rule. In 1969, the reversion of Okinawa to Japan was promised in a few years, and on May 15, 1972, President Nixon announced the reversion of the remaining Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, to full Japanese sovereignty.

5. The Japanese text here is extremely confusing and elusive. The reader must be cautioned that there are at least three layers of filtering between Mao's original words and the English translation here, namely, from the Chinese to the Japanese interpreter, the Japanese recording of the conversation, and the translation of this into English.

6. Badaling is in the northwestern part of Beijing Municipality.

7. Cocom refers to the trade embargo that the United States and its allies set up against the Communist countries, including the PRC, after the Korean War. The term Cocom stands for "Coordinating Committee."

8. This probably refers to Sukarno, who visited China in October 1956. There is no further information on this particular point regarding Japan in what might have transpired in Mao's conversation with Sukarno, but for other topics see text Jan. 27, 1957(2), text surrounding note 13.

9. Mao is, of course, referring to Japan's militaristic posture in the 1930s extending into the 1940s. This military expansion started in Korea and northern China with the Mukden (Changchun) Incident of 1931 and, with the establishment of the Kanto Army in Manchuria, led to the Lugouqiao Incident (also often known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on July 7, 1937, which triggered China's War of Resistance Against Japan. See also text May-June 1955, vol. I, note 55.

10. This refers to the constitution adopted by the Japanese Diet on May 3, 1947. It was adopted as an imperial amendment to the Constitution of 1889. In February 1946, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and head of American forces occupying Japan, had his staff draft a new constitution for Japan. It was this draft that was adopted, with minor modifications, in 1947. Article 9 of the constitution specified that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right." For a brief description of the constitution, see E. Reischauer (1978), pp. 105-107.

11. Mao and Asanuma are here referring to the Japanese conservatives' attempt to mount a movement to have the 1947 Constitution amended to make clear the sovereignty of the Emperor, and to remove the limitations on the development of a military defense force (these limitations were collateral to Article 9).

12. This refers to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Pact signed by the two governments on September 8, 1951. This was a separate but corresponding treaty to the peace treaty signed by Japan and forty-eight other countries in San Francisco on the same day. The terms of the mutual security pact, which allowed U.S. troops to remain indefinitely in Japan and required Japan not to permit any other nation to have military bases or authority in Japan without U.S. consent, were insisted on by the U.S. government as a price for ending outright political as well as military occupation. The opposition parties in Japan were generally opposed to this pact, and it caused a major political crisis when the issue of its renewal was raised in 1960.

13. In February 1957, there was a mass demonstration in Sunagawa against the presence of the U.S. military base there. The demonstrations that followed raised the issue of the constitutionality of the maintenance of the self-defense forces and the presence of U.S. troops in view of the provisions of Article 9 of the constitution. The issue was first raised in the lower courts but became entangled there in technical interpretation. It was not until 1959 that the Sunagawa case was settled.

14. Asanuma is invoking a term that historically referred primarily to the treaty systems imposed by the Western imperialist powers on the nations of Asia and Africa in the nineteenth century. These treaties were often concluded after the Western powers had militarily subjugated or threatened the Asian or African nation in question. The terms, such as the opening of Chinese ports to Western trade at unfair fixed tariffs advantageous only to the Western power(s), extraterritoriality rights for Western nationals, protection for Western religious and cultural encroachment, or even outright ceding of territory leading to colonization, as with Hong Kong, were, in the main, established without reciprocal advance of interests to the other side. Thus the term "unequal treaty" has been used for the entire category.

15. See text Jan. 2, 1950, vol. I, note 1.

16. There was, to our knowledge, no broad-based collective security treaty existing at this time. Zhou appears to be alluding to the Chinese preference for such a broad multilateral agreement for peace rather than a plethora of bilateral agreements between the United States and regional powers. This therefore probably refers to the principles of peaceful coexistence among Asian and African countries proposed by China (via Zhou Enlai) at the Bandung Conference of April 1955. (See text April 27, 1955[2], vol. I, source note, and also text Jan. 28, 1955[2], vol. I, note 1.)

17. Chiang Kai-shek concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1945 delineating each country's rights in Manchuria and China's northwestern provinces. This was also called the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. It is different from the treaty referred to here, signed on February 14, 1950, by the Soviet Union and the PRC. One primary concern of the earlier treaty was the possible revival of Japanese militarism. (See early part of note 1, text Jan. 2, 1950, vol. I.)

18. The term "peace constitution" derives from the content of Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution (see note 10).

19. The United States tested its atom bombs in July 1946 on the Bikini Island area of the South Pacific. This caused considerable unrest in Japan as the memories of the use of atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 were still vivid.

20. We are not sure what Mao means by the "Nagasaki meeting." Our conjecture is that it is most probably a reference to the annual Japanese commemoration of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and national mourning for the victims of those bombings. These annual commemorations are usually held on the anniversary of the August 6 Hiroshima bombing. The anniversary of the Nagasaki devastation is August 9.

21. This appears more likely to be a reference to the Soviet Union's breakthrough in hydrogen-bomb testing in 1954 than to the first Soviet atomic explosion of September 1949.

22. Seen from the perspective of 1957, one could say that since the early post-World War II years, there have been major differences between the Soviet and U.S. approaches to nuclear weapons test control and disarmament. The United States, under the so-called Baruch Plan, which was presented to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, favored a course of action that would first establish control over the manufacturing of weapons and then bring disarmament by a scaling down process, under United Nations supervision. The Soviet Union, fearing that its own scientific and technological catch-up efforts would be curtailed by such a plan, and that in the end, especially in the event of the arms control plan, the United States would be left with a technological monopoly, favored, under a plan proposed by Andrei Gromyko, a "disarmament first, control second" approach. More immediate to Mao's statement here, the Soviet Union had made a disarmament proposal in the United Nations General Assembly on November 17, 1956. On December 16, 1956, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on disarmament sponsored by the United States, Britain, France, and Canada. The USSR opposed it. On January 14, 1957, during the Eleventh General Assembly Session of the United Nations, another U.S. proposal was put forward, once again opposed by the Soviet delegation, but with a softer line. At the same time, the Soviet Union moved a resolution similar to its own proposals of November 1956. On January 25, the U.S. proposal was adopted as a twelve-nation resolution (notably Yugoslavia

joined the other sponsors of the proposition). These developments were most certainly in the back of Mao's mind as he made the statement here. In addition, he might have had some idea of the state of Soviet thinking on the subject at the time. On June 14, 1957, the Soviet Union made another proposal which included a two- or three-year moratorium on nuclear testing, and supervision by an international commission using instrumental detection stations on the territories of the nuclear powers. This appears to be Mao's frame of reference here. It should be noted that throughout 1957 the terms of proposals and counterproposals on disarmament were very much in flux, and in these writings of Mao's, in which he would refer to the subjects of disarmament and nuclear test bans quite often, the specific conditions and references were also changeable. For a more detailed view of the subject as a whole, from the perspective of U.S. diplomats and participants in the process, see Keesing's Research Report (1972), and G. Seaborg (1981).

23. The Japanese text here, if literally translated, is very awkward and fatuous: "The continuing presence of the United States in the world is the result of the objective power of existence."

24. This refers to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902—the first modern military pact signed on equal terms between a Western and a non-Western nation. It is probably worthwhile to note that the term "peace treaty" is not quite accurate as a description of this pact.

25. This appears to bring in both the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty, adopted by the Inter-American Conference at Rio on September 2, 1947, which provided for mutual assistance against aggression within a defense zone from Greenland to the Antarctic, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, established at the Ninth Pan-American Conference at Bogota on April 30, 1948.

26. This was signed on September 1, 1951.

27. It is obvious that there is some confusion here. The Baghdad Pact, signed in February 1955, was a defense alliance between Turkey and Iraq and was soon joined by Britain, Iran, and Pakistan. From 1955 to 1957, the United States supported the Baghdad Pact but did not join it. In June 1957, the U.S. joined the military committee of the pact. It was reorganized as the Central Treaty Organization in August 1959, and the U.S. still remained outside the circle of full members. It is difficult to see, however, how the Baghdad Pact affected Southeast Asia. We believe that either Mao himself or the transcriber of this conversation made a mistake and confused the Baghdad Pact with the Manila Pact, or that Mao had spoken of both the Baghdad Pact and the Manila Pact and the two were telescoped together in the transcription. The Manila Pact, also known as the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Organization (SEATO) was signed on September 8, 1954, and was engineered by the U.S. to forestall further Communist gains after the defeat of France in Indochina.

28. For NATO, see text Feb. 12, 1955, vol. I, note 5.

29. See text Sept. 4, 1956, note 7.

30. Lei Renmin (b. 1912) was, at this time, vice-minister of foreign trade. In September 1951, Lei had become a vice-minister in the Ministry of Trade, which at the time was responsible for domestic commerce as well as foreign trade. In April 1952, Lei was a member of the PRC delegation to the Moscow International Economic Conference. The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade was formed in May 1952, and Lei became a member of the council, subsequently becoming the vice-chairman in 1954. When in August 1952 the Ministry of Trade was divided into the ministries of Commerce (domestic) and Foreign Trade, Lei became a vice-minister in the latter ministry. He served in the post until the mid-1960s, frequently as acting minister in the absence of Ye Jizhuang. Lei is known particularly as an astute and capable negotiator in international trade matters, and shined at the Geneva Conference in 1954 (see text July 23, 1954, vol. I, note 1). From March to May 1955, Lei headed a Chinese trade delegation in Japan. For more information on Lei, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 472–473, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 827–828. See also text Jan. 18, 1955, vol. I.

31. See text April 27, 1955, vol. I, source note.

32. Here again the Japanese text is very elusive. The translation is the best approximation of what it might have meant.

33. This refers to the contradictions in opinion with regard to the Hundred Flowers Campaign in China since late 1956. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), and text Feb. 27, 1957.

34. See text April 16, 1957.

35. Here Mao is referring to, and discussing at some length, the proposition that class struggle, as a particular stage and form of the socialist revolution, had basically come to an end. This proposition was made at the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956. See texts Feb. 27, 1957, source note; text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note; text Mar. 18, 1957; and text Mar. 20, 1957(1), source note and note 7. It should be noted that this is probably the first time that Mao brought this subject into a discussion with "foreigners."

36. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 1.

37. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.

38. This appears to be an unusual manner of expressing the slogan that is conventionally rendered as "unity-criticism-unity." In the absence of a Chinese version of this conversation, it is impossible to ascertain if Mao made this semantic deviation himself, or if the deviation occurred in the translation to Japanese. See preceding note.

39. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.

40. For democratic parties, see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1; the "coming together" that Mao speaks of here is the goal and responsibility of the United Front Department; see text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.

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## Reply to Ambassador of the Confederation of Switzerland

(April 22, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 23, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 108 (May 25, 1957), 63. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (April 23, 1957), 6.

*Fernand Bernoulli had been minister of the Confederation of Switzerland to the PRC since September 13, 1954. At this time, the status of his legation was upgraded to ambassadorial rank.*

Mr. Ambassador:

I am very happy to receive the letter of credence from the Federal Council of Switzerland that you have presented and thank you for the greetings that you have conveyed to the people of the People's Republic of China and to me from the President of the Confederation of Switzerland.

The Chinese people have always borne a friendly feeling toward the Swiss people. The Chinese people and government have always valued the contribution which Switzerland, as a permanently neutral state with a long historical tradition, has made to the defense of peace.

It is comforting to us that since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Switzerland in 1950, the friendly relations between our two countries have already developed. At the beginning of last year our mission to your country was upgraded to an embassy. The areas of cultural and economic exchanges, as you, Mr. Ambassador, have said, have also been strengthened. Mr. Ambassador, these successes undoubtedly could not have taken place without the efforts which you yourself made while you were Minister of the Confederation of Switzerland to our country. Your country's government has now upgraded its mission to our country to an embassy. We trust that this will bring about further development of the friendly relations already existing between China and Switzerland.

I warmly welcome Your Excellency as the First Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Confederation of Switzerland to the People's Republic of China. In your work of strengthening the friendship and cooperation between China and Switzerland, you will certainly receive my assistance and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish Your Excellency continued success in your work. May your country's people be happy and may your head of state enjoy good health.

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### Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (April 25, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 26, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: URI (1976), pp. 143–144. Available English Translation: URI (1976), pp. 145–146.

*At this time Anton Nedyalkov replaced D. Dimov as ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the PRC. The RMRB source does not convey a salutation for this speech.*

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria appointing you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the People's Republic of China, and express sincere gratitude for your greetings.

The Bulgarian people are an industrious and courageous people who love peace and freedom and who are loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism. The Bulgarian people achieved liberation by a protracted and heroic struggle against foreign oppression. In the twelve years since the people's political power was established,<sup>1</sup> the Bulgarian people, under the leadership of the glorious Communist Party of Bulgaria and the government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, have attained splendid achievements in socialist construction, changing Bulgaria from a backward agricultural nation to an industrial-agricultural country

with modernized industry and cooperativized agriculture. Bulgaria has also made great contributions in the causes of the consolidation of the unity of the big socialist family headed by the Soviet Union and the maintenance of world peace. The Chinese people have deep respect and admiration for these successes and contributions of our brothers the Bulgarian people and are happy and inspired by them.

In recent years, the friendship between the Chinese and Bulgarian people and their mutual cooperation in the areas of politics, economy, and culture have already been greatly developed. I am deeply confident that such friendship and cooperation will, on our common path of building socialism, be consolidated and further developed with each passing day. This not only facilitates the prosperity and happiness of our two peoples, but also benefits the unity of the big socialist family headed by the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the forces for world peace and democracy.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the People's Republic of China. In your work of consolidating and strengthening the friendship and cooperation between China and Bulgaria, you will receive my complete support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

[May you meet with total success in your work.]<sup>2</sup>

### Notes

1. There is a bit of confusion as to which date Mao is referring to by the twelve years here. The "Fatherland Front" government during the late Second World War period, which was Communist-led but not exactly a "people's government," was established in Bulgaria on September 9, 1944. The monarchy was rejected in a postwar referendum on September 8, 1946, and the People's Republic of Bulgaria was formally established on December 4, 1947.

2. This last sentence is indirectly quoted in the *RMRB* source.

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### Reply to Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (April 26, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (April 27, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: URI (1976), pp. 147–148. Available English Translation: URI (1976), pp. 149–150.

*At this time Nguyen Khang replaced Hoang Van Hoan as ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to the PRC. The RMRB source does not convey a salutation for this speech, and it is possible that this is an excerpt.*



Since the founding of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the Vietnamese people have persevered for eight years in waging an arduous war of resistance against imperialist aggression, and have achieved a tremendous victory.<sup>1</sup> In the two years since the restoration of peace,<sup>2</sup> the Vietnamese people, under the leadership of the Viet Nam Workers' Party and the government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, again achieved great successes in the cause of economic recovery and construction. I am confident that the Vietnamese people from now on will achieve new and even greater victories in the development of its national economy and the peaceful unification of its homeland.

Indeed, as you have said, Comrade Ambassador, for a long time the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples have been closely united in an earnest and brotherly friendship. In recent years, the relations between our two peoples and governments have become increasingly close, and economic and cultural cooperation and all sorts of contacts and exchanges between them have been increasingly expanded and developed. I am confident that the fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples will be further consolidated and developed. This not only will be beneficial to the enhancement of the prosperity and happiness of our two peoples, but will also be beneficial to strengthening the unity of the great socialist family headed by the Soviet Union, and to Asian and world peace.

#### Notes

1. This refers to the Communist-led nationalist resistance movement of the Vietminh (Vietnamese Independence League) under Ho Chi Minh against the French from December 1946 to July 1954.

2. This refers to the period since the Geneva settlement on Indochina in July 1954; see text July 23, 1954, vol. I, note 1.

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### Summary of a Conversation with Leaders of Democratic Parties and Democratic Personages Without Party Affiliation

(April 30, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 172–175. Other Chinese text: *Ziliao xuanbian*, p. 184 (excerpt).

*For the chronological context of this conversation, see text June 8, 1957(2), source note, and text June 8, 1957(3), note 3.*

We have been thinking of having a rectification for several years now but had not found an opportunity. Now we have found [the opportunity]. In matters that

involve a lot of people, you cannot get things going unless you promote [it as a] movement. We need to create an atmosphere; without an atmosphere [things won't work]. Today an atmosphere of criticism has been formed, and it should be continued [so that we may] analyze contradictions in all areas, taking as a subject [correctly] handling the contradictions among the people.<sup>1</sup>

In the past, what contradictions there were in the areas of industry, agriculture, culture, and education had been blind. Now let us line up these contradictions, and settle the account. In the past, whenever we mentioned contradictions, it sounded terrible. Actually there is nothing so terrifying about it. Chiang Kai-shek's four million troops, or [the fact that] the U.S. army reached the Yalu River; none of that was too terrifying.<sup>2</sup> We live amidst contradictions everyday. There are contradictions everywhere, and there are rival performances everywhere.<sup>3</sup> It is just that [people] simply won't admit [contradictions], or they confuse the two kinds of contradictions.<sup>4</sup> [We] have to acknowledge contradictions, and analyze them; [then we] will find the solutions. Now newspapers are discussing the matter of contradictions every day. Some people worry that the people's government will be overthrown, but the situation has already lasted for two or three months, and the government has not been overthrown. Furthermore, the more contradictions are discussed and the more [the discussions are developed], the more consolidated the people's government will become. Right now the departments of higher education and education are attacked viciously. The more they are attacked, the better things will be. Let us sort out contradictions into categories. [Those who want] to attack should make use of this opportunity. As long as you can find evidence, you are on solid ground. Some problems that have remained unsolved for years, even decades, might be solved in a matter of months as soon as there is debate. Others have not suggested that your rice bowl should be broken, nor have they wanted to kill you off in one stroke of the cudgel.<sup>5</sup> What they simply wanted is that there be an improvement in the relationships. Let us sort out the contradictions into categories in all aspects—higher education, general education, literature and art, science, and so on. The [area of] public health also can stand being attacked a bit.<sup>6</sup> Let's attack a bit harder, and a bit in real earnest. If it is published in the newspapers, it could catch the public's attention, otherwise bureaucratism<sup>7</sup> will never be resolved. [If we are] to find a method [to resolve it], we'll have to have [the people] inside and outside the Party do things together at once. In the past, holding small meetings did not work out. We need to hold a conference as large as the Eleventh Expanded Session of the Supreme State Conference, and the Propaganda Conference.<sup>8</sup> Party members should attend the conference together with those outside the Party, so as to combine two elements to make a chemical reaction, and then they will become yet another [different] thing. Then [the rectification] will work. Each province and municipality must hold [a conference of this kind]. It should be reported by the newspapers [so as to] dispel the atmosphere of depression. Then, at that time, it would be more natural to bring up [the subject of] rectification. The overall subject of the rectification is to handle [correctly] the contradictions among the people, and to fight against the three isms.<sup>9</sup>

There is a special stipulation in the directive [issued] by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that [cadres] should take part in labor.<sup>10</sup> This rule

doesn't suggest that all of you in the audience must go to work on a farm, but it might be possible for you to go to clean the streets a bit. [Taking part in labor] is mainly so that we can express an attitude, that we want to get rid of bureaucratism and subjectivism. On top of that, it is [also] a way to be part of labor.<sup>11</sup> [You] always have to mingle as one with the workers and the peasants, and take some part in labor, no matter if it is more or less. The peasants said, you were with us during [the period of] the land reform,<sup>12</sup> but now that you've become officials, you no longer pay us any attention. The heads of the cooperatives did not take part in labor in the past, and they were very unpopular. The masses were very unhappy. The common people will not trust you and will not be frank with you unless you take part in labor and blend as one with them.<sup>13</sup> Now the cadres of districts and *xiang* take part in production together with the masses, and at once the masses have become frank with them. What the masses tell to the deputies of the National People's Congress and the committee members of the CPPCC will never be the complete truth. In particular, we are all intellectuals, and [as such] we are totally incompatible with the laboring people. There is one way to become one with them, and that would be to take some part in labor, whether it is for more or for less. For example, in the south it is not hard to hoe the weeds or plant rice. Those who are aged and sick of course do not have to go. Our country has a characteristic, and that is that there is a population of as many as 600 million people but there are only 1.6 billion *mu* of arable land. Unless we adopt some special methods, I'm afraid this country may not get any better.

Rectification will have an impact on [people] outside the Party. We stipulate that non-Party members participate [in the rectification] on a voluntary basis and may withdraw from it similarly.<sup>14</sup> In the past two months, this is precisely the form it has taken. This is the means of rectification: I attack you, you [in turn] do it to me. If there is any opinion, let it be expressed. Those in the Party become one with those outside the Party.<sup>15</sup> This is the rectification, which has already gone on for two months.

The contradictions in the work of the United Front,<sup>16</sup> such as [on the subject that people have] a position but actually no power, have remained unresolved for several years. It was very difficult to resolve [these problems] in the past. Now we have a possibility of resolving them. The chief reason that [the problems] were not easy to resolve in the past is that we could not get through the ideological difficulties. In the past, the members of the Communist Party had positions, powers, and duties, while the democratic personages had positions but no powers or duty [along with that]. Now it should be that everyone would have positions, as well as powers and duties [to go along with that.] When they are put together with the Communist Party, it is indeed difficult for democratic personages to be what they are [supposed to be]; there are quite a few things that make them angry, and it is not easy to get things done. Now [the relationship] between those in the Party and those outside the Party should be transformed into a relationship of equality. [The democratic personages] should have positions, and powers as well, not only formally but in reality. From now on, no matter where, those who hold official positions should be in charge of things. (Ma X X<sup>17</sup>: I am fortunate that there was an organization in the past. Everything about me is old; if I were really to take charge of things, the situation would not be [the way it is] now.) What you said is not thorough. Contradictions do

exist, [and you] won't resolve [them] if you gloss over them. . . . [I] want Comrade X X to be in charge of seeking out non-Party personages, and [the members of] the Democratic League and the September Third [Society]<sup>18</sup> to have a discussion meeting with them and to solicit their opinion on the issues of having powers as well as positions, and on [installing a] system of Party committees at the schools.

Right now we should not [focus on] promoting materialist dialectics, let's promote a bit of political relations [first] and tackle the three isms. Don't dig into [the issues of] world view and methods of thought lest we dilute [the matter of] political relations. We will focus on materialist dialectics later. This problem will influence the democratic parties and the democratic personages. [On the subject of] materialist dialectics, we cannot expect a large number of people to accept a Marxist world view all at once, but we can hope that one-third of the five million intellectuals, which means 1.5 million intellectuals, would accept materialist dialectics in three five-year plans,<sup>19</sup> and that would be very good. From now on, when people study [materialist dialectics] they must do it on a voluntary basis. They must study [it] by themselves, or they may, [again] voluntarily, form small [study] groups. A textbook on materialist dialectics should be edited once every year. Some [contents] have become dated, and something new has to be spoken on old subjects. The [problem of] world view is a long-term [problem]. The five million intellectuals who served the old society in the past must now turn around to serve the new one. What they hold is an old world view. Only a few of them have a new world view. It is unnatural and impossible [to expect] that many [of them] will come to believe in a new world view in a short time. We estimate that within the next ten years, there will still be a little over one-third or a little less than two-thirds of the intellectuals who will hold the old world view. But [as long as], first, they love the country, and second, they believe in socialism, that would be all right. Some professors talk about Marxism-Leninism in their lectures, but it is only for the sake of their jobs. They know they don't believe in dialectics. There is a Leftist professor in Shanghai who said they he has been very disturbed in spirit since Liberation, like "fifteen buckets fetching water, with seven going up and eight coming down."<sup>20</sup> Those who teach social sciences are put in a passive position everyday. History has to be rewritten and retaught. In the old society they just needed to take the textbook out [to teach]. One textbook could serve many years. Also they did not have so many meetings. [The situation with] the natural scientists is a bit better. Intellectuals, especially in the social science areas, had a hard time during periods of major social upheavals. There is a matter of the economic base here. The economic base on which the five million intellectuals depended and to which they were attached in the past has been destroyed. Imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism have long been overturned,<sup>21</sup> and even national capitalism has been fundamentally eliminated and the system of individual ownership is already gone; where, then, is the duality?<sup>22</sup> That is not right. "If the skin did not exist, to what would the hair adhere?"<sup>23</sup> When the old skin is no longer there, the hair will have to adhere to a new skin; it cannot be suspended in midair. The hair must attach itself to the skin of the working class. Today the five million intellectuals eat the rice of the workers and peasants; they eat the rice of the system of

ownership by the state and that of the system of collective ownership. There are now twelve million workers in industry, and fourteen million people working in the Party, in government, in the armed forces, in education, and in economy work (excluding the heads of factories and of cooperatives). That is a total of twenty-six million. The fourteen million don't directly take part in production; it is the other twelve million that actually do. All of the others have to make a transition to becoming workers.<sup>24</sup> At the time of Liberation, there were only some 5 million industrial workers; at the beginning, the Soviet Union also had only 3.5 million [industrial workers.] Social progress is not determined by the numbers of people. There are several hundred million peasants, but that doesn't serve to decide whether society progresses or not. The peasants ultimately will have to become agricultural workers, and the cooperatives will become state farms.<sup>25</sup> This could be something that will take place in decades. The hair of the five million intellectuals must attach to the skin of the twelve million [members of the] working class. It won't do for the hair to be separated from the skin; it has to eat someone's rice. Right now the intellectuals are not quite aware that the root of their wall (economic base) has long been dug out [from under them] and is hollow. The economic base of the past [doesn't exist any more]; as soon as there was an earthquake, they became suspended in midair. Their old economic base is no more, and yet their brains have not turned around yet. Thought is a matter of creeping into [the brain] over many years. Now the hair is already attached to the new skin and yet, in ideology, they still think that Marxism-Leninism is no good. We must not force people to believe in a Marxist-Leninist world view; it will take a process to get people to believe [in things]. In terms of the old world view, the bourgeois [world view] and the petty-bourgeois [world view] are the same thing. [Some people] say that the petty bourgeoisie produced a dualism whereas the bourgeoisie produced monism.<sup>26</sup> Some feel more comfortable if they are being regarded as petty-bourgeois intellectuals but are uncomfortable being regarded as bourgeois intellectuals. Actually this is a kind of blind faith, and a matter of social custom. For example, I was a bourgeois intellectual and was influenced by bourgeois social customs, as well as receiving a bourgeois education. I once believed in Buddhism, and then Kant, and then anarchism. All these are idealist, so I was a bourgeois intellectual. A petty-bourgeois intellectual is a bourgeois intellectual. There is only one old world view; we cannot differentiate a so-called petty-bourgeois world view from it.<sup>27</sup>

People engaged in industry and commerce may learn from textbooks of general political knowledge, but a book is a book; ideology is another thing altogether. Some people will never be able to change; [that is a matter of] conditioned reflex. Giving birth to a child is actually not painful, but public opinion in society says it is painful, and so people feel that it is painful. To make the painful not painful, the doctor will have to do a lot of work; another kind of conditioned reflex will have to be produced. Don't think that all the intellectuals, [people in the] democratic parties, and [even] members of the Communist Party, believe in communism. Quite a large number of people in the Communist Party do not believe in communism; they may not even believe in socialism; rather, what they believe in is democracy. They are not ready for the socialist revolution. Xue Xun, the former deputy chairman of [the People's Government of] Hebei Province,<sup>28</sup> was against unified purchasing

and marketing<sup>29</sup> and advocated free trade instead. We cannot do without promoting unified purchasing and marketing, but to do too much of it is no good either. For next year we are prepared to have most of the cooperatives deal with grain, oil, and meat by themselves, except for some areas where economic crops [are produced]. A large number of [Communist] Party members don't believe in socialism. When they promote socialism, it's just that they have been swept up by the mainstream and they came in that way. I for one do not believe that [people in] the democratic parties all believe in socialism. A large number of people do not believe in socialism but would not admit that publicly. Some of the Communist Party [members], [members of the] democratic parties, and [even] workers (the composition of the workers is complicated too; their numbers have increased from five million to twelve million; they are not of one mind) have yet to wait and see if socialism will succeed and if the Communist Party is competent. [Furthermore, there are] quite a large number of people who [feel that] now that they have boarded a pirates' ship (communism's ship), they have no choice, and that whether or not the boat will capsize depends on heaven.<sup>30</sup> That is very natural.

What we did in the past was class struggle; this is true both during the period of the democratic revolution and during the period of socialist revolution. That was that human beings declared war on [other] human beings, fought against [other] human beings, and there was rebellion among [the ranks of] human beings internally. That took several decades of [people's] energies, or, if you start with the Opium War, it has been more than a hundred years.<sup>31</sup> From the viewpoint of the masses, the Opium War was a class-struggle; from the viewpoint of Lin Zexu, it was a struggle between the Chinese exploiters and the foreign exploiters.<sup>32</sup> We have devoted our energies to this [i.e., to class struggle] for the last few decades—since the establishment of the Communist Party it has been thirty-six years.<sup>33</sup> Some say that the Communist Party cannot lead in the area of science and is only good at class struggle, that the Communist Party has only technique but no learning.<sup>34</sup> This comment is [only] partly true. Whether or not [it can be said that] we have only technique but no learning depends on what kind of learning you mean. For instance, class struggle is a major field of learning; no one can say that we do not have it. We have learned it from making mistakes over many years, and through self-examination. There will still be class struggle in the future. Things such as the war with imperialism and having diplomatic relations with capitalist nations are all of the nature of class struggle. Now we are entering into another war—that is, we are declaring war on nature. We have to understand the natural sciences; what can we do without understanding them? In my article written in 1949 I said that what we were familiar with would soon become useless, and that we must learn what we do not yet know.<sup>35</sup> If you do not know something, [admit that] you do not know; don't pretend to know [what you don't know]. Study conscientiously and modestly; it might take several decades' time, just as when we learned class struggle in the past. From the establishment of the Party to the Seventh Congress (1921–1945)<sup>36</sup> it took twenty-four years; we shed so much blood and suffered so many setbacks before we learned about class struggle. Today, as we learn the new war of construction, we must start again from the very beginning. Can we learn it? I am

positive that we can learn it. There are many experts in some parties, such as the Democratic League and the September Third Society; and there are quite a few in the Association for Democratic Construction.<sup>37</sup> In general, [we are faced with] a new task in the new age; the class struggle is done, and we are [now] declaring war on nature.<sup>38</sup> It is still a transition period right now. The old relations of production have been destroyed, [and yet] the new economic base has not been consolidated. [Perhaps we] will have to fight this battle for several decades, approximately twenty to thirty years. That is because we have no experience, and no cadres. We do, [however,] have the experience of the Soviet Union as a precedent. Maybe we will do a little bit better than the Soviet Union, or worse, or the same. People, I myself included, have to wait to see how we do. We can't boast that we are 100 per cent correct. It was said that the Communist Party, especially the department of higher education, changes policies in the evening that are made in the morning,<sup>39</sup> and that while the Kuomintang had too many taxes, the Communist Party has too many meetings. It has to be changed if there are too many meetings. [The budget] for basic construction this year has changed by some two billion [rmb]. The budget should be decided by November of this, the first, year, and submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and then sent to lower levels to be discussed in December. January of the following year would be time for production. To submit [the budget] to the National People's Congress is actually to get post facto approval. We are in want of experience and have to study; [we have to] study the natural sciences and planned economy, and we have to accumulate experience; we need to accumulate several decades of experience. That sometimes we change policy too often is because we have no experience. In the beginning, in my mind, I also did somewhat have a fondness for grandiose achievements,<sup>40</sup> and it was not until March and April last year that I began to change. I talked with comrades from more than thirty departments, and then later I addressed the Supreme State Conference about the ten major relationships.<sup>41</sup> Five of those had to do with the area of economy.

Beijing is a nice place, but it is also a bad place. The people in positions of responsibility in the Communist Party should stay in Beijing eight months out of the year and go out of Beijing four months each year. You might do so too. The characteristics of the central organizations are, first, that they are empty, and, second, that they cover everything. The shortcoming is that they are hollow. It becomes comfortable once you leave Beijing.

## Notes

1. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note and note 3.
2. This, of course, refers to the U.S. counteroffensive in the Korean War. See text Sept. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 8.
3. The term Mao used here is *dui tai xi*. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 57, for meaning and usage.
4. In the first part of this sentence Mao is implicitly referring to the question of acknowledging that there are contradictions in socialist society. The second part refers to the two categories of contradictions: those among the people, and those "between the enemy and ourselves." (See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note and note 3.) Mao dealt with these two

questions similarly in the same breath earlier. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), paragraph 13.

5. The Chinese idiom *da po fanwan* (translated as "breaking one's rice bowl" here) means to deprive someone of a job. On the meaning of *yi gun zi dasi* (kill someone off at one stroke), see text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 11; text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 37; and especially text Mar. 12, 1957, note 22.

6. See text 1953(1), vol. I.

7. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 61.

8. By the Eleventh Expanded Session of the Supreme State Conference, Mao is referring to the conference held February 27–March 1, 1957, at which he delivered the "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People" speech. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note. By the Propaganda Conference, Mao is referring to the National Conference on the Propaganda Work of the CPC, held March 6–13, 1957. See text Mar. 12, 1957, source note.

9. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 77.

10. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 79.

11. More often we would translate the phrase that Mao uses here, *canjia laodong*, as "take part in labor." However, in light of the repetition of the phrase in the sentence here and the particular way in which Mao uses it, we have constructed this more peculiar and unconventional translation at this point.

12. This may be a broad reference to land reform before 1949 (in the liberated areas) as well as after 1949. See text June 6, 1950 (1), vol. I, note 7; text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 5; and text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 2. See also text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 12.

13. The phrase here is *da cheng yi pian*, which we have sometimes translated as "forged into one." See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 59. Another phrase that Mao used earlier in this paragraph, *hun zai yi qi*, conveys a similar meaning, but without as much of a "physical" sense of solidarity. We have translated that as "mingle as one."

14. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 80, and text Mar. 12, 1957, note 20 and surrounding text.

15. The phrase here, again is *da cheng yi pian*. See note 13.

16. See text Nov. 1, 1951, vol. I, and text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.

17. This is most likely Ma Xulun. See text June 19, 1950 (1), vol. I, source note.

18. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1. For the Democratic League, see text July 1, 1957, note 10. For the Jiu san xueshe, or the September Third Study Society, see text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 78.

19. See text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

20. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 13. We do not know which Leftist professor in Shanghai is Mao's subject of discussion here.

21. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 5.

22. Here Mao seems to be referring to a theory that the intellectuals, and their "class character," insofar as they are identified with (though not as) a class, have a duality; that is, they can be identified with the bourgeoisie in one sense, but also with the proletariat, or the working class, in another. On "national capitalism," see text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.

23. See text Apr. 1957(2), note 14. The "hair-skin" analogy that Mao uses here was foreshadowed in texts Mar. 20, 1957(1) (see note 75 of that text) and Mar. 20, 1957(2), (see note 18), and, one might argue, as far back as text Feb. 27, 1957 (see note 88). It was apparently explicitly used for the first time, however, in Mao's speech at the Hangzhou conference, which is included as text Apr. 1957(2) in this volume. We have kept the annotation to this saying in that text because the Hangzhou conference was in fact earlier than Mao's conversation with democratic personages.

24. This echoes, but does not directly reflect, Mao's statements in paragraph 6 of text Mar. 20, 1957(2). In later writings in the summer of 1957, Mao would resume discussion of this point.

25. See text Mar. 19, 1953, vol. I, note 4.

26. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 35; see also text Oct. 13, 1957, note 58.

27. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), paragraph 20.

28. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 28.

29. See text Nov. 4, 1953, vol. I, note 16; see also text Jan. 18, 1957, note 29.

30. Mao is using here a colloquial and somewhat vulgar saying, *shang liao zei chuan*, which refers to people who have unwittingly boarded a ship that turns out to be steered by pirates or dishonest sailors whose intentions are to rob or even murder the passengers. The saying has come to mean finding out that one has put oneself in a perilous position or even, more specifically, unwittingly put in one's lot with people, or a faction, with whom one does not have common cause, and yet being unable to do anything about the mistake. We have not been able to trace the origin of the saying.

31. See text May 20, 1951, vol. I, note 3; text Feb. 14, 1957, note 1; and text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 15.

32. On Lin Zexu, see text Feb. 14, 1957, note 1.

33. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 39, on the founding of the CPC.

34. Mao is here playing on the aphorism *bu xue wu shu*, which is used to describe people who are lacking both in learning and in skills (here, "technique.") The phrase that Mao uses is *you shu wu xue* (have skills, but not learning). The aphorism is derived from the ancient history *Han shu* (History of the Han Dynasty), where it was originally used in reference to Huo Guang (d. A.D. 68), a famous official of the time of Emperor Wudi of the Han dynasty. On the criticism that the Communists cannot lead in the area of science, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 35, and text Mar. 20, 1957(2), note 19 and surrounding text.

35. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 111.

36. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 3; text Aug. 30, 1956, note 2; and text Jan. 1957, note 9.

37. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, note 7, and text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 63; see also note 18 here.

38. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note; text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note; text Mar. 18, 1957, paragraph 21; and text Mar. 20, 1957(1), source note and note 7.

39. This is an aphorism, *zhao ling zhi gai*, that describes inconsistency and whimsical inconstancy in policymaking. The saying is derived from an essay written by Chao Cuo (200–154 B.C.), a grand minister of the Western Han dynasty of Emperor Jingdi's time who was famous for his agronomistic policies.

40. The phrase that Mao uses here is *hao da xi gong* (having a hankering for great things and for achievements). It is derived from the Ming-dynasty opera *Wansha ji* (Tale of the Washerwomen) written by Liang Shenyu. In the opera, which deals with the story of the famous historical romance of Fan Li and Xi Shi, the phrase was used to describe Fu Cha, the king of Wu, who is the villain of the piece. See text Jan. 11, 1958, note. 20.

41. Again, see text Apr. 25, 1956. Note again, however, that the occasion for this famous "On the Ten Major Relationships" speech was not a Supreme State Conference, but an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau.

### Letter to Hu Qiaomu

(April 30, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, p. 526.

*Hu was alternate secretary at the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC at this time. See text May 22, 1950, vol. I, note 2.*

Comrade Qiaomu:

This article is useful.<sup>1</sup> Please have it reprinted in *Renmin ribao*. The article from Nanjing and the other from Shanghai have not yet been reprinted.<sup>2</sup> Please send them my way [so that I can] write some comments [to them].

Mao Zedong

April 30

### Notes

1. This refers to the article "Cong yichuanxue tan baijia zhengming" (On "Letting a Hundred Schools Contend" from the Perspective of Genetics) written by Li Yuqi of Beijing University. It was published in *GMRB* (Apr. 29, 1957), and when Mao read it, he proposed that it be carried in *RMRB*. He also suggested a new title for the article: "Fazhan kexue de biyou zhi lu" (The Road that Must Be Taken in the Development of Science), and he wrote an explanatory comment prefacing the publication of the article in *RMRB* on May 1, 1957. See *Shuxin*, p. 526, note 2.

2. We have not been able to identify these articles.

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### Criticism of *Renmin ribao*

(April 1957)

**Source:** *HQ*, 2 (Aug. 25, 1968), 14. Other Chinese Text: *Mao liang*, pp. 310–313. Available English Translations: *PR*, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 22; *CB*, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969), 48.

*See text Apr. 10, 1957, source note; text Apr. 1957(2), notes 36 and 39; text Jan. 1958(5); and especially text Jan. 12, 1958(2), paragraph 7.*

Party newspapers should provide prompt publicity for the Party's policy. It was a mistake [of *Renmin ribao*] not to give coverage on the conference on propaganda work.<sup>1</sup> This conference was held jointly by people inside and outside the Party. Why was it not given coverage by the paper? Why wasn't there an editorial on the Supreme State Conference?<sup>2</sup> Why was the Party's policy kept secret? There is something fishy here. What is the fishy thing? In the past people said that the newspaper was run by pedants. Now people should say that the paper is run by some dead people. Most of you are viewing the Central Committee's policies negatively. You oppose and object to the policies of the Central Committee. You disapprove of the politics of the Central Committee.

## Notes

1. See text Mar. 12, 1957, source note; see text Jan. 12, 1958(2), paragraph 7, for more detailed explanation.

2. This most probably refers to the enlarged Supreme State Conference held February 27–March 1, 1957, at which Mao delivered his “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” speech. See text Feb. 27, 1957. K. Lieberthal (1976), p. 93, notes that the *RMRB* picture of the rostrum at this conference (*RMRB* [Mar. 3, 1957]) did not include a number of top-ranking cadres. Indeed, none of the major speeches made by Mao at this conference was carried by the *RMRB* at the time. The *RMRB* carried only the much revised version that appeared much later.

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Interjections at the Hangzhou Conference  
of the Shanghai Bureau  
(April 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 100–109. Other Chinese texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 168–172; URI (1976), pp. 151–158. Available English Translations: JPRS, *Miscellany*, I, pp. 63–71; URI (1976), pp. 159–169.

*According to K. Lieberthal (1976), p. 95, this conference at Hangzhou was probably held in the first week of April 1957. Lieberthal's argument is sound. From text April 3, 1957, we know that Mao was in Hangzhou by that date (although there is no confirmation of Lieberthal's speculation that the conference probably began on the 1st of the month). By April 8, Mao was back in Beijing for the banquet for the Polish delegation (see text Apr. 8, 1957). His schedule of receptions and other activities in Beijing was quite full for the remainder of the month, so it is unlikely that he left Beijing during that time. Lieberthal also remarks that if the conference was held April 1–7, then it could not have been attended by many of the top-ranking CPC cadres other than Mao. What is also important is that this speech would have been given (or prepared) at about the time that the April 10 RMRB editorial (text Apr. 10, 1957) appeared, even though in the absence of a definite date for the speech we have followed the editorial conventions of these volumes and placed it here, at the end of April 1957. In other words, it would make better chronological sense to read this as coming sometime immediately before the April 10 editorial. The crux of this conference was to promote the Hundred Flowers campaign. In addition to Mao's speech here, a speech was also made by Ke Qingshi, CPC Party secretary of Shanghai Municipality, which helped to ignite the campaign in Shanghai. According to the Wansui (1969) and Wansui (n.d. 3) sources, this is a transcript of interjections made by Mao during the discussion(s) on the question of ideology at this conference. They were reorganized, presumably after the conference, under five topics.*

1. The situation among the intellectuals after the Supreme State Conference and the Propaganda Conference:<sup>1</sup> There has been some relaxation of the tense atmo-

sphere [among the intellectuals]; intellectuals outside the Party have taken the first steps in drawing closer to us. Their indecisive mood is [now] brightened up somewhat. The reports are not a panacea; we must still administer medicines specific to each individual [case]. If we do not give [the intellectuals] what they want, we will find ourselves in a passive position; give them what they want, and then let them themselves be responsible for the quality of their contending themselves, for better or worse.<sup>2</sup> In any case, there will come a day when rectification will fall upon our own heads.<sup>3</sup> Our method is to rectify ourselves first, to put the Party in good order, and, through rectification, make ourselves more modest and reasonable. The issue of the day is not exactly our problem. [The situation among] the intellectuals is like this: When the Leftists want democracy (relation [of control])<sup>4</sup> from them, when students want democracy from their professors, at such times they have to come to us for help. When we relax control, they will begin a contending of their own accord; when we tighten control, they will make demands on us.

Last year the democratic parties<sup>5</sup> in Shanghai recruited over eleven thousand members, and their internal problems have thus increased. Only the proletariat is not afraid of a coup d'état; if we make mistakes, we rectify them. [But the democratic parties] are faced with more problems in their midst.

We must relax control; we must brace ourselves and let them attack. [Let them] attack [us] for a year. Who asked us to be so dogmatic? Better to let [our dogmatism] be attacked and finished off. If the attack is excessively severe, let all the demons and ogres come out and make a big stir.<sup>6</sup> The Communist Party has to let itself be scolded for a while; let them scold [us] for a few months, and let us think things over. At the time of the Three-Anti's Movement Comrade Chen Yi said, “We have had our dictatorship for so many years, surely we can stand other people's scolding for a week?”<sup>7</sup> The point is that if you [intellectuals] pour [abuses] on us like a torrential downpour, we too would be caught by surprise and panic.<sup>8</sup> Some intellectuals are still afraid that [the Communists are] casting a long line to catch bigger fish.<sup>9</sup> Some people say, “That's right. the Communist Party enjoys great prestige. As soon as one or two sentences are published in the newspaper [by the Party], [it will be like] the wind when it sweeps across the grass and causes it to rustle;<sup>10</sup> people will be scared.”

People outside the Party will be scared and people inside the Party will also be scared. Even when [we are] correct [we] should show some modesty. [We do] pull great weight; this we must understand. When people say [we are] casting a long line to catch bigger fish, there is some reason for it. We let people criticize us now and analyze [the criticism] later. Intellectuals are like birds which, having narrowly escaped the arrow, are startled at the sound of the bow;<sup>11</sup> they insist on [waiting to] see [for themselves]; perhaps they will [wait and] see for twenty years. Within the Party as well, people want to [wait and] see for themselves. [With the policy of] curing the illness to save the patient,<sup>12</sup> for example, some people did not believe it until they later witnessed the facts. [We] have to undergo many tests. The politics of the Communist Party must be tested; leaders must be tested by those they lead. In the past, intellectuals served the old rulers; now the relations of production have

been changed, and they no longer have a social base. In the past, intellectuals entrusted themselves to feudalism, capitalism, and the system of individual production. Intellectuals served the class from which they came. The class from which they came has now been destroyed, so they are suspended in midair; their feet are not on solid ground. Now they are clinging to our body. Through the Communist Party, the workers and peasants let them work and earn a living. We shall still have to spend more than ten years cleansing [their] brains, and the method [we use] is unity-criticism-unity.<sup>13</sup> They don't want to be subjected to criticism, but they can't bring themselves to say so. Right now there are over ten million people suspended in midair; their brains are old[-fashioned]. This is nothing to be afraid of. Suspended in midair, they very much need us to reach out and draw them in. If we stretch out our arms warmly toward them, [we can draw them over] somewhat faster. [However,] it will not be such a simple matter to get the majority over. Those who welcome change the most are the proletariat. The peasants' greatest hope is for changes to occur with regard to Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. imperialists, and the landlords, but they do not wish for change in the small-scale, private ownership system. The democratic parties and intellectuals, when they see the all-too-sudden and rapid advent of a cultural revolution, may also change. The hair and the skin have been separated, but the spirit is still lodged in the original hide. The hair is stuck to the body of the proletariat; their spirits are often ill at ease.<sup>14</sup> If they were not changing they would not be ill at ease. Not being at ease is a sign of change. Some intellectuals' world views cannot be transformed even over a long period. . . . To test the world views of writers is to see if they can become one with the workers and peasants, or if they remain separated from them. [Some, when they are] sent to the countryside,<sup>15</sup> cannot speak truthfully to the peasants. The world view of bureaucrats within the Party also poses a problem, [namely,] they are divorced from the masses. They support Marxism, and yet they are completely at odds with the masses; what kind of Marxism is that? There is a group of people in society whose only worry is that there is no chaos in the land. They harbour anti-Communist thought, and they advocate fighting their way out. It will take decades to reform them. Some will remain unreformed even when they die, but the majority can be reformed. There are some who are old diehards who will remain unreformed until death.

2. [We] must relax controls. To be afraid of relaxing controls suggests that we have not adequately stated our reasons or that we have not convinced [people]. This is an antibureaucratism [campaign] with leadership.<sup>16</sup> Whenever speaking out is not allowed and there is no preparation whatsoever [for it], the result, [ironically,] will be a massive outburst of views.<sup>17</sup> We are for allowing people to speak out. The worst that can happen is nothing more than some temporary disturbance. [We] work for the people, and yet the people are not satisfied. Some people can't understand this and become very distressed. There will always be dissatisfied people. Some people are satisfied and others are not. When people compare things with the past, some are quite satisfied; they will still be dissatisfied when they compare things with [what could be in] the future, or when they compare [themselves] with those who are at present better off. This sort of situation will remain even after ten

thousand years. If everybody were satisfied we might as well just go to sleep. We have not even allowed people to speak up yet, so how do we know there will be disturbances? In the class struggle of the past we were extreme in our vigilance; now [let us] deviate a bit toward the Right. The solitary airing of a single school's [view]<sup>18</sup> has dominated for many years; now let there be some turmoil and we'll see what happens. It is not good to let obvious mistakes go uncriticized for a long period of time. When there is too much grass once can use a tractor. Chiang Kai-shek was not grass; [we had him] beaten in three years. Ten per cent of China's intellectuals understand Marxism; 80 per cent are patriotic and support socialism.<sup>19</sup> One can see that poisonous weeds are only the minority.<sup>20</sup> Those that look poisonous but are not, and those that are in between—that is, between wild weeds and fresh flowers—are the majority. This is a reflection of social reality.

This problem is a new one; the cadres have not yet experienced it. [Let's] try it, and see what it's like, and if we acquire a taste for it, then there will be no more worries. Even if it is not explained clearly, will the people continue to oppose the Communist Party? The majority [may] look poisonous but are not. Poisonous weeds are the minority.

I am not encouraging people to make trouble, [nor am I] running a conference to promote troublemaking. Troublemaking such as attacking [government] offices must be punished. [Nevertheless,] some disorder is inevitable. Right now, people outside the Party are in high spirits. After a time the spirits of those inside the Party will also rise; [spirits] are low at first, but then they will rise.<sup>21</sup>

By solving some problems, we gained some experience. Every principle and policy of the Party must be taken to the masses to be tested.<sup>22</sup> We should let the cadres go and test [things out] in their work.

Being afraid on the one hand and fearless on the other, being happy on the one hand and unhappy on the other, having solved the problems and not having solved them this is dialectics. It is like waging war; in the beginning one is apprehensive, but the more one fights, the braver one becomes. If we had not committed a few mistakes of line [in the past, we] would not be this good today. If good things abound, we will become conceited, and bad things will occur. That was what happened in the Soviet Union. Wang Ming made serious mistakes; he did not make a self-criticism and thus his prestige was destroyed.<sup>23</sup> If you make a mistake, you are tense for a week; after making self-criticism, everything will be all right. Furthermore, this criticism will also have an immunizing effect. I intended to thoroughly attack Old Mr. Deng's view on the [formation of] cooperatives.<sup>24</sup> Attacking is the way to help a cadre. At worst I will lose a vote, and [the person whom I have attacked] will not want to nominate me.

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Qitong and Zhong Dianfei<sup>28</sup> represent two one-sided views. I too am one who does not worry about one-sided views. . . .<sup>29</sup> This could be transformed into a cyclical theory, but dialectics is not a cyclical theory.

Excessive one-sidedness will prompt the emergence of dialectics. These people want nothing other than for us to have bad luck; so let us anticipate an even worse situation. At present it seems that we have become somewhat Rightist; but we must persuade the masses not to use [over]simplified methods that do not thoroughly solve the [problem of the] disturbances. It will not do to take excessive measures in settling things. Who says that we wanted demons and ogres? The masses want to see [them]. We cannot suppress them; we can only put on more good shows. We should let [our] society be a little more complex, and put the emphasis on science.<sup>30</sup> Some people say that if we expelled the troublemaking students we would be even more vicious than the Kuomintang. We ought to be smarter than the Kuomintang. It is good that we have a Kuomintang for comparison. They are digging [their own] graves; we should not follow the example of the Kuomintang. To this day I still feel bad because the Guangdong students were prevented from coming to the capital with their petitions.<sup>31</sup> The Kuomintang exercised dictatorship over the people. The Communist Party believes in democracy. This point should be clear. Some people use dictatorship as an atom bomb to wave it over the people's heads [to threaten them]. This is bad.

3. Let a hundred flowers bloom, and let a hundred schools of thought contend. We must change the relationship between the Party and the intellectuals. Some people think it is not yet time [for blooming and contending]; they contradict [our] political and ideological work. Large-scale political struggle has already basically come to an end.<sup>32</sup> The Eighth Congress has drawn a conclusion.<sup>33</sup> Now is precisely the time to bring up this policy.

Between the Party and the non-Party [people] there is a very deep chasm. I think it is not good to say that there is no chasm, no line of demarcation; however, [it] should not become an abyss. To have an abyss means being divorced from the masses.

One out of every thousand factories in Shanghai has had disturbances, it was not one out of every ten thousand.<sup>34</sup> It would be better [to have disturbances] in one out of every hundred, for them bureaucratism could be wiped out.

[If we spread the contending and blooming] from inside the Party to outside the Party—and have those inside the Party and those outside the Party discussing things together—then the [curtain] will go up on the opera.<sup>35</sup> In this way many people will be pushed onto the political state.<sup>36</sup>

Whose newspaper is *Renmin ribao*?<sup>37</sup> It needs rectifying.

Some people feel that [since] it won't do to be either Left or Right, it is difficult to do anything. To know that it is difficult to do things is good [because] it makes people use their brains. Otherwise there will be only talk of dictatorship and centralization (in other words, suppression).

Should there be struggle within the Party? Of course there should be struggle. The peasants hoe weeds year after year. Our criticism of errors must be carried out persuasively and not just by exerting pressure. It will not do to rely on a few articles.

We must convince people with reason, not by relying on our qualifications.

Toward the enemy we use force; toward the people we use reason. To be without reason is to be nonhistorical. It will not do to rely on position, no matter how high they are. We must study more and do more research. It is very dangerous for cadres to pull rank and be authoritarian.

Can we do without the democratic parties? No. The Soviet Union does not have them, and [therefore] contrary opinions cannot be heard. However, [the Soviet Union] did win the war, and they did not kill the intellectuals. The Soviet Union does not want to have a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend. Democratic party [people] are all big intellectuals; the Peasant-Worker Democratic Party does not have peasants and workers.<sup>38</sup> They must be given some work to do.

Unite with both ends and criticize the middle. Not to have criticism is a Right deviation. Zhong Dianfei's essay has been published for a long time and there is [yet] no criticism of it.

The criticism in *Wenhui bao* must be comprehensively analyzed.<sup>39</sup> These criticisms are beneficial [to us].

We must speak the truth to people of the democratic parties. If they have shortcomings, tell them. Belonging to the democratic parties has its difficulties. One hears and sees nothing; nor can one tell what cards the Communist Party intends to play. [We] can also talk about some of the Party's shortcomings. If we strike down the democratic personages, they will rise up to oppose us. It is necessary to learn [from them] with modesty.

Many meetings have been held, but no news of them has appeared. [Is it] the *Renmin ribao* or is it *Guomin ribao*?<sup>40</sup>

Chen Qitong [claims to] represent 90 per cent of the comrades within the Party, so therefore I have no mass base.

There should be a line between the Party and people outside the Party, but there should not be a wall. First secretaries should regularly receive personages outside the Party and show them our cards. [People say that we are] leading the enemy deep into an [ambush];<sup>41</sup> [they should be] allowed to say that. If we don't let this be said, we are [accused of] not being democratic. But if we do, [we are accused of] leading the enemy in deep. [So] what should we do? We should take [our concern for] 600 million people as the point of departure, and we must be more ambitious. There are five million intellectuals; we must win them over. Mo Po is a sectarianist.<sup>42</sup> He has to be handed over and investigated. We should investigate his Party membership registration. Why [does he] reject traditional Chinese painting? He is promoting ugly arts, not fine arts. [Even] the Kuomintang had traditional paintings. With what party is he [affiliated]? Probably a third party! Social reality cannot be denied. [If] there is counterrevolution in social reality, we must suppress it. Problems have long existed within the scope of democracy. How can the Stanislavsky method be applied to [the performance of] *Huoshao hongliansi* [The Burning of Red Lotus Temple]<sup>43</sup> [If] Jiang Feng and Mo Po practice dialectics, why do they reject traditional Chinese painting, and engage only in going-it-alone?<sup>44</sup> Even a husband and a wife should be properly matched!<sup>45</sup> Veteran cadres

must consider this: In the past we used a set of methods, but now we are dealing with internal problems among the people.<sup>46</sup> I have read several issues of the *Xin min bao*<sup>47</sup> It is not yellow journalism, [but] it is a bit soft. [It] can not provide leadership in science; but we must not reject it outright. We have to seek advice; even Liu Bei had to seek [the advice of] a Zhuge Liang.<sup>48</sup> Personages outside the Party talk [only] after careful deliberation. Sometimes they are wrong, [but] we must not reject them outright and reach a point of no return [in what we say].

4. On the issue of recognizing certain problems: There are over two hundred letters opposing the article written by Fan Ruizhuan. I don't see any decadence in the article. If *Shang gan ling* [Shang-gan ridge] is to be played every day, and she's separated from her husband, what is she to do?<sup>49</sup> To write essays, you have to have somebody pressure you, just as donkeys have to be ridden to get anywhere. The five conditions are leadership, selective reporting, preparations, persuasiveness, and benefit. Of all these conditions, only persuasiveness is relatively concrete. The others are quite difficult to change; but [in doing so we] must not be dogmatic.

Can we debate Party policies? Everyone says that articles published in *Renmin ribao* are correct, [but] the article by Chen Qitong and others is not correct. In my opinion it would be better if each province ran two newspapers, one run [by people] outside the Party, [so that there can be] rival performances.<sup>50</sup>

Wherever intellectuals gather in large numbers, there are bound to be some matters that are hard to handle; but it is impossible [for them] not to congregate. Of the six million people in Shanghai, only two hundred or more X X are in opposition;<sup>51</sup> [they are] obviously a minority. Newspapers should not give encouragement every day either. Several meetings should be convened each year, in the spring, summer, autumn, and winter. Cultural and educational undertakings are for educating the people; they have to be supervised regularly; we cannot simply treat the head when there is a headache and treat the foot when the foot hurts.<sup>52</sup> Some people in the motion picture studios say that they will strive to bring forth fragrant flowers and not produce poisonous weeds. This spirit is not correct. We are not afraid of producing one-third poisonous weeds. [To speak of] avoiding poisonous weeds is an empty phrase.

One-sidedness: It will never be possible, not even in ten thousand years, to [fulfill the] condition that all people outside the Party avoid one-sidedness and become experts in dialectics. Last time when I spoke, I began by [examining] myself. There will always be work that is well done and work that is not.

The question of intellectuals joining the Party: We should strive to have one-third [of the intellectuals] come into the Party. Members of the democratic parties may have concurrent membership [in our Party], but their leadership personnel should not join [our] Party. Within six years, we aim to have one-fourth [of the intellectuals] join [our] Party, and by the Third Five-Year Plan [period],<sup>53</sup> one-third. We must proceed with steady steps and try to get 15 per cent into the Party this year. If we don't win over a group of intellectuals into our Party this year it will not be good for socialism. Letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is a policy for winning over the intellectuals. If we [then] bar them from our organization, it will not be compatible [with this policy].

Our Party has no great writers, great poets, great professors; we must recruit them. In the past we have failed to do this; now we must try harder. Gorky had only two years' schooling,<sup>54</sup> and Sun Yat-sen did not receive very much education either.<sup>55</sup> People can be cultivated.

There is a reason for the vacillations in our educational effort. We do not have experience, but things will become stable after some vacillation. The lower middle-school curriculum should include history, geography, [the study of] cultural relics, and so on. In the past, middle- and primary-school students learned foreign languages. They should do this. There are too many subjects in lower-middle schools. One-third of them can be eliminated. How can classroom instruction be [turned into] the contending of a hundred schools of thought We should focus on one or several subjects.

The investigation [of] the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries was for the years 1955 and 1956.<sup>56</sup> The more distant past need not be checked.

It is incorrect to speak of a contradiction between a progressive social system and backward forces of production.

The question of birth control: Malthus's conclusion is wrong.<sup>57</sup> On the other hand, does overpopulation necessarily lead to war? In China, birth control [measures] depend on which province [you're talking about]. Jiangsu is densely populated, [whereas] the Northeast is not. We don't need to change the marriage law;<sup>58</sup> we should just persuade [people] not to marry at an early age.

I once said that there would still be revolution after a thousand years. But this is not certain.

After ten thousand years, the relations of production are bound to change. In the future it will not be a matter of nationalization, but globalization.

If we handle the contradictions among the people poorly, we will be overthrown. There have already been some individual cases [involving] *xiang* governments and [Party] branches.

5. The question of leadership: The relationship between the Communist Party and the intellectuals must be improved. It is the responsibility of the Communist Party that it has not been close to the intellectuals. It's not the Propaganda Department's fault; the First Secretary [of the Party] must shoulder the blame.<sup>59</sup> The First Secretary not only has to grasp ideological leadership, but also has to read articles on history, on philosophy, on literature . . . [and on] the periodization of history. Others are all [actively engaged in contending and] making a lot of noise with their gongs and drums;<sup>60</sup> if the First Secretary has not done any reading, how can he solve the problems? Some people say that one should be less involved in doing other things, and grasp ideological work. One must read journals, literature, natural sciences, and social sciences. Get into the habit, and you will gradually become interested [in reading]. Within the Party we must also have discussion. [You may say that] there is no time for discussion; but even if you do not have discussions, you will still [find that you] lack time. In the phrase let a hundred schools of thought contend, some people read it only as contend; [they] do not understand that it is for the purpose of [training] people to take over. Zhou Yu was only a little over twenty years old and Cheng Pu was past fifty; when confronted

by powerful enemies, who was made commander-in-chief?<sup>61</sup> One must be educated to be in charge of cultural and educational work. When Zhuge Liang was very young, he was not entrusted with important tasks. Let, he was. If in those days one could break the rule [of seniority] and appoint [young people], why not now? Last year, when we were evaluating grades,<sup>62</sup> some people had a lot of complaints. There were many obstacles to breaking the rules [of seniority] and promoting people. Soldiers don't have much [formal] education; it is difficult [in their case to acquire an education]; however, they too must study in their spare time. Now we are fighting a different [kind of] war. Generals, colonels, captains, lieutenants, enlisted men at all levels must be reallocated to different outfits. Cadres of all levels must learn social sciences, literature, and natural sciences. Otherwise, when the great general rides into battle, after only a few flourishes, his weapon will fall to the ground. Party committees in the universities have to be reorganized. Cadres assigned to take over [schools] have done their job; now they can be transferred. A few can remain in the universities to be in charge of [miscellaneous] affairs. [You should] Let a hundred schools of thought contend; don't take the positions of presidents [of universities] for yourselves.

Propaganda work must be done. You must be forced to talk.<sup>63</sup> Go talk in the universities; talk with the professors and students first. If we don't talk today, nor tomorrow, nor this year, nor next year, nor in ten thousand years, how will that do?

Invite the heads of the Department of Culture and Education, of the Department of Propaganda, and Party committee secretaries to give talks. They should at least be somewhat better [at it] than the political instructors.

The question of fixed interest:<sup>64</sup> The nature of enterprises has changed. The dual nature [of the national bourgeoisie] no longer exists. When the skin is removed, to what can the hair adhere?<sup>64</sup> The hair is grafted onto the proletarian body, but the spirit remains. If the payment of fixed interest is for too brief a period and the amount is too small, it'll not be worth it because there will be something hanging over our heads for a long time. Now we pay back one hundred million [rmb] a year for ten years, and in the future we will pay ten million [a year]. As long as they [the capitalists] do not ask to cancel it, we shall continue to pay them back. The small capitalists would like to have their labels.<sup>66</sup> [as capitalists] removed. Don't do this. As soon as this is done for the small capitalists, the big capitalists would not be at ease. Eventually they will voluntarily cancel [the interest payment].

Anybody can criticize shortcomings among our six hundred million people. If the criticisms are not correct, they may be ignored. The correct ones must be accepted. Writings opposing the [movement to] suppress counterrevolutionaries or opposing cooperativization can be refuted. This is not setting an ambush for the enemy, but rather letting them fall into the snare of their own accord. Sun Dayu<sup>67</sup> said so-and-so were counterrevolutionaries; it would be best to publish this in the newspapers. To publish articles by Hu Feng and Tito<sup>68</sup> in the newspapers is to alienate them from the masses. This is also a way of helping [people]. One must have certain techniques in doing political work. We should not be afraid of publishing [incorrect views], but rather we must [publish and then] refute them.

All provinces must exchange experiences [with each other].<sup>69</sup>

## Notes

1. See texts Feb. 27, 1957, and Mar. 1, 1957, for information on the Supreme State Conference. See text Mar. 12, 1957, for information on the National Conference on Propaganda Work of the CPC.

2. On the term contending, see text Autumn 1956, note 1.

3. See texts Mar. 18, 1957, and Mar. 19, 1957.

4. Here the Chinese simply has one character, *fang*, in parentheses. The meanings of the word are manifold, but all are interrelated. The character is the one for blooming, as in "let a hundred flowers bloom" (see texts Autumn 1956, and speeches of January and February 1957), and for "letting go" or "giving free rein" (see text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14, and text Apr. 10, 1957, paragraph 1 and note 1 as well as the title). Here the appearance of this single character seems to carry forward the idea introduced in the March 12 and April 10 texts, and we have therefore translated it as "relaxing controls," or "letting go." What Mao seems to be saying is: "Letting go, that is also what blooming, as in 'let a hundred flowers bloom' means." See also text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraphs 15–17.

5. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

6. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.

7. See text Mar. 19, 1957, notes 4 and 5.

8. This rather simple statement here appears to reflect a critical turning point in the development of the Hundred Flowers campaign, that is, from the policy of liberalization toward the Anti-Rightist campaign of retrenchment. Mao appears to express the very beginnings of reservations about the blooming and contending, but these reservations would not be full force and hardened until about two and a half months later. Mao here is using the weather metaphor, hinting that the actions and methods of the intellectuals (especially, perhaps, the bourgeois intellectuals) in response to the CPC policy are quite improper. Whereas the CPC method had been, in Mao's view anyway, "gentle winds and fine rain" (see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 43), the intellectuals had reacted with a "torrential downpour" of criticism.

9. This is a common saying referring to the patience and devious plotting of the fisherman, or of anybody setting a trap.

10. This is an aphorism, *feng chui cao dong*, that means "the slightest suspicion-rousing action." It is derived from the twenty-third *hui* of the novel *Shuihu zhuan*, and from volume 23 of *Paian jingqi* (Tales of Desk-Thumping Astonishment).

11. This aphorism, *jing gong zhi niao*, is derived from "Wang Jian zhuan" (The Biography of Wang Jian) in *Jin shu* (the History of the Jin Dynasty) and refers to the acute sensitivity and heightened vigilance of people who had previously suffered injury. It is approximate to the English saying, "once bitten, twice shy."

12. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.

13. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.

14. This is an allusion to the classical saying "pi zhi bu cun, mao jiang yan fu" (if the skin no longer exists, to what should the hair adhere?). This saying is derived from the segment on the fourteenth year of the reign of Duke Xi of the state of Lu in *Zuo zhuan* (the Zuo Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals). In the original context, there was a famine in the state of Qin, and the government there attempted to borrow grain from the state of Jin. An officer of Jin, Guo Xie, opposed the loan, using the aphorism as his argument. Guo was referring to the fact that in the past, Jin had promised to cede five towns to the state of Qin but had failed to carry out the promise. Therefore friendly relations between the two states no longer existed as a base, and it would be useless for the state of Jin to try to mend the fence by lending grain to the state of Qin. Mao, here and in other writings, refers to the hair as the individuals in society and to the skin, or skins, as social class structures or modes of production. In the case of the intellectuals, Mao argues, they are hair with no skin of their own; in other words, they must adhere to the skin of some other class in society in order to

have their own social existence. In the past, Mao asserts, the intellectuals had adhered to five other skins, including that of the bourgeoisie, the feudal authority, and the imperialists. However, since the revolution and the removal, or at least erosion, of the bourgeoisie, the intellectuals had to jump ship and turn around to adhere to the skin of the proletariat. However, Mao also argues that the intellectuals are often unhappy with the new skin, and while physically they adhere to the body of the proletariat, their souls lie elsewhere. See text July 8, 1957, text surrounding note 44. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 88.

15. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 102.

16. Mao is referring to the Party rectification campaign in process at this very time.

17. Here Mao seems to be introducing another dimension of the meanings of the word *fang* (see note 4), which conveys the idea of “airing,” or “speaking out.” Hence our differences in translation of the same word in consecutive sentences.

18. Mao’s words here, *yi jia du ming*, play off the slogan *bai jia zheng ming*, which means have a hundred schools contend. See text Jan. 1957, point 9, last paragraph.

19. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 6.

20. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

21. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source has *xian gao hou gao* (lit.: first it is high, and then it is high.) Although this may be interpreted as “[spirits] are high to begin with and then they got even higher,” we believe such a translation would be dubious. Instead, we think the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version quite possibly contains a typographical error.

22. See text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.

23. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 23.

24. This refers to Deng Zihui; see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, notes 21 and 42.

25. Ba Jin was the non de plume of Li Feigan (b. 1904), an anarchist writer perhaps most famous for the novels *Jia* (Family), *Chun* (Spring), *Qiu* (Autumn), and *Ji liu* (The Torrent), and many short stories he wrote in the 1930s and 1940s. He was vice-chairman of the Union of Chinese Writers and a member of the presidium of the All-China Federation of Art and Literary Circles. For more biographical information on Li, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1970), II pp. 297–299. For the meaning of the term “*za wen*” (miscellaneous short essays), translated here simply as essays, see text Mar. 12, 1957, notes 26 and 27.

26. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 25. See also surrounding text.

27. For more information on Lu Xun, see text Apr. 25, 1956, note 15. Mao is referring to a new tomb which had been built for Lu Xun in July–September 1956 at Hongkou Park, Shanghai. Mao had written an inscription for this new tomb, released in *Nanfang ribao* on July 23, 1956.

28. For Chen Qitong, see text Apr. 10, 1957, note 2. Zhong Dianfei was a screen writer who had worked in the art and literature section of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee. At this time he was transferred to the editorial board of *Wenyi bao*, where he published an article, “Dianying di luogu” (Gongs and Drums in the Cinema), *Wenyi bao* 23, (Dec. 15, 1956). This article attacked sectarianism and leadership by formula in the cinematic arts and created a great stir. It was praised by Luo Longji and by the KMT writers in Taiwan, and Zhong was subsequently criticized in August 1957.

29. The term here is *pianmian wuyou lun*, whose contextual meaning is unclear to us. This last part of the paragraph, complete with the ellipses, is rather garbled and confusing.

30. We believe that Mao is talking not of technological science here, but rather of a scientific way of looking at social issues.

31. See text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 54.

32. See text Feb. 27, 1957, text surrounding note 43, i.e., section 1, last paragraph.

33. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 1.

34. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 93.

35. The term here is *xi jiu chang qi lai liao*, which literally means “the singing of the opera will begin.” What it means is that exciting things will be able to take place.

36. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 20.

37. See text April 1957(1).

38. The Zhongguo nonggong minzhu dang (Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic Party) was one of the democratic parties in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. It was founded on September 1, 1930, in Shanghai on the basis of the political grouping that had been known variously as the Provisional Action Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party and Action Committee for Chinese National Liberation. It was originally under the leadership of Deng Yanda, a politician and military strategist who participated in the Northern Expedition. Deng was executed by the KMT on November 29, 1931, in Nanjing. The leadership of the party then fell to Zhang Bojun and Peng Zemin. Its political advocacy centered on socialism, land reform, repulsion of imperialist influence, and democratic government by way of general elections rather than by party representation.

39. For more information *Wenhui bao* and its criticism, see text July 1, 1957.

40. The meaning of the term *guomin ribao* here is rather vague. There was a *Guomin ribao* (Citizen’s Daily) published by the KMT in Hong Kong, beginning in 1939, to muster support for the War of Resistance and to popularize KMT policies. It was edited by Tao Baiquan (and later, in 1940, by Chen Xunyu). However, we are unsure as to whether or not Mao was referring to this paper (it is not likely that he was). He might also be using the term sarcastically to refer simply to “*guomin dang*” newspapers, (i.e., newspapers edited by the KMT). A third possibility is that he was referring to “*Minguo ribao*” instead of “*Guomin ribao*.” A *Minguo ribao* began publication in 1916 in Shanghai and eventually, through the late 1920s, gained national stature. It was a KMT paper. In 1932, it was suppressed by the Japanese.

41. See note 9.

42. We are unable to identify this artist or author. It is very likely that Mo Po was a non de plume.

43. The Stanislavsky method of acting, named for its creator Konstantin Sergeevich Stanislavsky, Russian actor and director, is a method of acting based on the tenet that if the actor understands and psychologically justifies the physical action on stage prior to the acting, it will render the action more realistic and less theatrical. It draws heavily from Pavlov’s theories of behavior. *Huoshao hongliansi* is a popular Shanghai opera derived from a story in Buddhist lore about the destruction of a temple of libertine monks.

44. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source has “Jiang Lai,” which we believe to be a typographical error. Jiang Feng was a former principal of the Central Art Academy in Beijing. He was a painter who opposed Party policy on art, which he, together with a group of colleagues in the academy, attacked in 1957. He was criticized, along with writers such as Ding Ling, in the anti-Rightist campaign.

45. The words Mao uses here are *pei dui* (literally, to fit into a pair). The language here, together with the term “go-it-alone” earlier, is an echo of a passage in text Jan. 27, 1957(1) (see text surrounding note 43).

46. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

47. The *Xin min bao* began publication in 1929 in Nanjing. The publishers were Chen Mingde and Deng Jixing, a husband-wife team. During the War of Resistance period, it was based in Chongqing and Chengdu. After the war, it was published in five places: Nanjing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Chengdu, and Beijing. Its main attraction was in its nonnews columns and pages, which contained many literary pieces of the popular vein (e.g., serial novels by writers such as Zhang Henshui and Zhang Huijian). It has never adopted much of a political nature, although in 1948, because it carried news of the expansion of the Communist forces, it was banned by the KMT government. In 1950, it was revived in Beijing.

The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source as the phrase *bu yao* (lit.: do not want) instead of the verb to be *bu shi* (not) in the *Wansui* (1969) version. We believe that the *Wansui* (n.d. 3) version is incorrect.

48. Liu Bei was the monarch of the state of Shu-Han (reigning A.D. 221–233), one of the three Warring Kingdoms that existed for the brief period between the Han and Jin dynasties (i.e., A.D. 220–280). Zhuge Liang, also known as Zhuge Kongming, or simply as Kong Ming,

was probably the most famous military strategist of that period and one of the most famous Chinese historical figures. He was a well-known scholar even before he became chief minister to Liu Bei, but in spite of his fame among scholars he was pretty much of a hermit, residing in Longzhong. Liu Bei went to visit him three times, and only on the third time did Zhuge Liang submit the full range of his plans for the reorganization of the government and the strengthening of the kingdom's defenses to Liu Bei, whereupon Liu Bei invited him to be his "secretary of state." The story of the three visits was told in Zhuge Liang's own later memorial to Liu Bei's successor, the essay known as *Qian chushi biao* (First Memorial on Sending the Troops Off to War).

For more information on the times of Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang, see text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 3.

49. Fan Ruizhuan is an actress of the Shaoxing opera. *Shang gan ling* is an opera adapted from a novel of the same name by Lu Zhuguo, about a battle in the Korean War—an episode that occurred at the place known to Americans as Heartbreak Ridge.

50. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 57.

51. We do not know what XX stands for.

52. This is a common saying connoting piecemeal remedies that do not succeed in taking care of the overall situation.

53. See text Nov. 11, 1956, note 4.

54. See text Apr. 25, 1956, note 14.

55. See text Nov. 12, 1956, source note. It is not altogether true that Sun did not receive much education, although a great part of his education was acquired outside of school. He was much better known as a political figure and as a revolutionary, for which he received no specific formal education. He did receive more formal education than most of China's other chief political figures (certainly no less, and probably quite a bit more, than Mao). Sun was educated in the medical profession, although he did not long remain a practitioner of that trade.

56. Here Mao means not that the investigations went on for only those two years, but rather that when the investigations were carried out, during those two years, they were supposed to take into consideration only whether or not the subjects had been involved in counterrevolutionary activities during that period, and not much earlier activities. For information on this investigation campaign, see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 50.

57. Thomas D. Malthus (1766–1834), a British classical economist (see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 46). His main thesis regarding population was that population has a tendency to grow at a much faster rate than the growth rate of the means of production and subsistence (such as food production), and that this discrepancy leads to social conflict and war, which are somewhat vain but temporarily effective ways of restoring equilibrium. See also text Mar. 1, 1957, notes 18 and 30.

58. The Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted by the Seventh Meeting of the Central People's Government Council on April 13, 1950, and promulgated on May 1, 1950. For translation in English see T. Chen (1967), pp. 270–274. See *RMSC* (1951), section "Shen," p. 1. Also see text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 5.

59. While it appears quite clear that Mao is not pointing at any single person specifically, but perhaps at the position of the first secretary of the Party generally, it is still useful to bear in mind that the general secretary of the CPC at this time was Deng Xiaoping, a post to which he was elected in September 1956 and which he held until April 1969. The director of the Propaganda Department at this time was Lu Dingyi.

60. The expression *da zhang luo gu* (to bring out the gongs and the drums in a big way) is a common saying meaning doing things with fanfare, or a lot of noise. It was originally a theatrical reference in that in traditional opera, when a scene involving some fanfare is reached (such as when a major character is about to appear on stage or in a battle scene), the accompanying music is likely to involve the use of the biggest gong and the loudest drum (*da luo da gu*). Here Mao may be speaking with a somewhat sarcastic reference to the essay by Zhong Dianfei in *Wenyi bao* (see note 27). See also text Oct. 13, 1957, note 9.

61. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 3.

62. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 1; also see text Mar. 18, 1957.

63. Here Mao used, according to the source, the phrase *bi shang liangshan* for "forced to." The term derives from the novel *Shuihu zhuan* (see text Oct. 11, 1955[1], vol. I, note 39), in which the headquarters, or hide-out, of the bandit group that made up, collectively, the heroes of the novel was a place called Liangshan bo (the Fens of Liang Mountain). From that, the term *bi shang liangshan* (forced to go up to Liangshan) has taken on the meaning that can appropriately be translated as "forced to the hills" (i.e., forced to become a bandit or brigand). It obviously connotes desperation and a situation in which someone has only one way out.

64. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 39.

65. See note 14.

66. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 33; see also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 71.

67. Sun Dayu was a professor of foreign languages at Fudan University in Shanghai. He was criticized in the Anti-Rightist campaign in 1957.

68. See text May–June 1955, vol. I, source note, and text Jan. 18, 1957, note 17.

69. The *Wansui* (n.d. 3) source adds here: "Don't cut off communications with one another."

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## Conversation with Voroshilov at Tiananmen

(May 1, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 2, 1957), 2.

*For Voroshilov's visits to China, see text April 15, 1957(1), source note. Although not clearly indicated in the source, the occasion of this conversation was obviously the May 1 (May Day) parade at the capital, Beijing, which is traditionally held in the public square in front of Tiananmen, or the "Gate of Heavenly Peace."*

Voroshilov (reviewing the honor guard): These girls march in step just like trained soldiers . . .

(As a troop of Young Pioneers<sup>1</sup> pass by) Ah yes! The children are our future. China's children are extremely lovable. As long as they are always ready to serve the country, all problems will be solved . . .

(As formations of workers' ranks pass by and he is greeted by the vision of thousands of red flags fluttering in the breeze) These red flags represent the large amounts of blood that the working class has shed for the sake of the revolution and for the happiness of the human race of the world . . .

(As a team of workers marches past, bearing a model of a bridge) At Wuhan I saw the Yangtze River Bridge.<sup>2</sup> It is simply terrific. There are still no such bridges [anywhere else] in the world.

Mao: It was constructed with the help of the Soviet Union.

Voroshilov: We had only twenty-five people there, and there were several

hundred thousand Chinese people there. The real work was done by the Chinese people themselves.

Mao: Your help was very important.

Voroshilov: It is easy to help people such as the Chinese. You merely have to lend them a hand and they will accomplish a good deal themselves . . .

(Watching a model of an electric generator hoisted around in the parade by a group of workers) This generator can activate the energy in the hearts of the people . . .

(To Mao as a troop of peasants passes by) I visited the Peasant Training Institute<sup>3</sup> at Guangzhou this time; to this day, the training institute is still very well preserved.

Mao: It's been thirty-two years now.

Voroshilov: Seeing this scene at Tiananmen today demonstrates the fact that these thirty-two years have not been wasted. The efforts of the people over these thirty-two years have now blossomed and are bearing fruit. . . . China has achieved so much in merely seven years since [its] Liberation . . . The reason that the people are so happy, so joyous today is that all the things that no dynasty or emperor had been capable of achieving in history have now all been achieved under the leadership of the Communist Party. Only when there is a Communist Party are they capable of achieving the results they have achieved today . . . .

(Reviewing some handicraft products) In such a big country as China, handicraft industries are very important.

Voroshilov: China's capitalists truly amaze me. As I went to many places [in China], many capitalists came to see me and said: "We feel lucky that there is Marxism-Leninism and that there is the Communist Party; only because of this can we lead such happy lives as we do now. We are determined to follow the socialist path and to follow the Communist Party." These words truly astound me. Your policy of transforming capitalists is simply too brilliant.

(Mao invites Voroshilov to rest)

Voroshilov: As long as I am standing together with you, Comrade Mao Zedong, I feel as if I were younger by twenty-five or thirty years.

Mao (as students pass by): The world relies on young people.

Voroshilov: The young people are our future and our happiness.

Liu Shaoqi: There are many children of landlords and capitalists among the students in China,<sup>4</sup> but their class consciousness is very high.

Voroshilov: Ideological work is very important. As long as the problem of ideology is solved, everything else will be all right.

(Noticing that the orchestra at the other end of Tiananmen had not moved for hours) This can be achieved only by a disciplined people such as the Chinese. They [the orchestra] are simply like trees that have grown from the ground, standing so firm and not moving a bit for hours on end. . . . So many people are standing in the square. They have stood there for such a long time. Did they have anything to eat? Anything to drink?

(At the end of the parade)

Voroshilov: It is a very important matter to unite the strength of all the people in the country and to undertake the construction of the country, and the Communist

Party members should function as models in every aspect of the work. Every movement, every act of the Communist Party members, is noticed by the people. Whether it is a good impression or a bad one, it will be remembered forever by the people.

## Notes

1. The Young Pioneers refers to the organization known officially as the Zhongguo shaonian xianfeng dui (Chinese Young Pioneer Corps). In the 1930s, the CPC began to organize young (teenage) units in its base areas, according to the local (*xiang* or *xian*) unit, and under the jurisdiction of the Qingnian jiuguo tuan (The National Salvation Youth League). During the War of Resistance Against Japan period, it came to be known as the Shaonian kangri xianfeng dui (Young Vanguard Against Japan Corps). In October 1949, returning to a more civilian, boy-scout type of existence, the organization came to be known as the Zhongguo shaonian ertong dui (Chinese Youth and Children's Team). It was formed under the leadership of the New Democratic Youth League. All young people, boys and girls from ages nine to fifteen, were allowed to join the organization as young people (ages twelve to fifteen) or as children (ages nine to twelve). At the Youth League Congress in June 1953, the name was officially changed to "Zhongguo shaonian xianfeng dui."

2. Voroshilov is speaking of the construction of the bridge connecting Hanyang and Wuchang. (See text June 1956, notes 6 and 7.) The bridge was still under construction at the time of this conversation and would be completed in October 1957. On October 15, 1957, it was opened to traffic. The planning and survey work on the bridge began as far back as 1950, and the actual construction project began in September 1955. In addition to the double-decked, 1,700-meter main bridge crossing over the Yangtze River from Hanyang to Wuchang, with one deck for railroad transportation and the other for motor, bicycle, and pedestrian traffic, the project also included the building of two bridges across the Han River, and a number of overpasses for railroads in the area. Owing to the scale of the project and to its geographically critical location—Wuhan is known as the "connector of nine provinces." This was considered the most representative engineering achievement of the PRC in the 1950s. For information on the bridge at the time of its completion, see *RMS* (1958), pp. 561–563.

3. See text Sept. 25, 1956, note 4.

4. Liu is echoing a remark made by Mao in a January 18, 1957 speech. See text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 8.

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## Conversation with Members of the Japanese Women's Delegation

(May 1, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 2, 1957), 1. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (May 2, 1957), 3.

*This comment was made on the evening of May 1 (May Day), 1957, at a celebration held by the people's organizations at Tiananmen Square. The Japanese women's delegation, when*

*greeted by Mao, expressed their opinion that women can help to sow seeds of friendship between the Chinese and Japanese peoples. This is Mao's response.*

*In passing, let us note that Voroshilov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (see text May 1, 1957[1]), was also present. As he was enjoying a fireworks display, Voroshilov elicited the agreement of Mao when he made this comment: "If the countries of the world were to come to an agreement on arms reduction, who knows how much gunpowder they could save to be turned over to manufacturing fireworks. Then there will be no end to firework displays."*

Right; friendly cooperation between the two countries can very well be fostered through [the efforts of] our women.

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### Speech at Banquet for Voroshilov (May 3, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 4, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 109 (June 10, 1957), 10; *URI* (1976), pp. 175-176. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (May 4, 1957), 1-2; *FBIS, Daily Report* (May 6, 1957), AAA 3-4; *URI* (1976), pp. 177-178.

*For Voroshilov's visits to China see text April 15, 1957, source note. This speech was made at a banquet given in Voroshilov's honor by Soviet Ambassador P. F. Yudin.*

Dear Comrade Voroshilov,  
Dear Comrade Ambassador,  
Comrades, Friends:

Today, after Chairman Voroshilov and his entourage have made friendly visits to various places in China, here we are together with them again. We feel a special closeness and happiness on the occasion.

Chairman Voroshilov, with tremendous enthusiasm and indefatigable vigor, visited many places in our country within about twenty days. He had intimate meetings with our country's broad masses of workers, peasants, students, and people of all circles and relayed to the hundreds of millions of Chinese people the fraternal feelings of the people of the Soviet Union. All this has been a great inspiration for the Chinese people and has left a deep, indelible impression on the Chinese people.

In these few days, the entire world has once again seen the rock-solid unity and close and profound friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples. This unity and friendship is not only a favorable factor in our two countries' cause of socialist

and Communist construction, but also an important part of the unity of all socialist countries and a dependable guarantee of the causes of world peace and human progress. The Chinese people, like the Soviet people, will continue to exert all possible efforts to strive for the continuous consolidation and development of the relations of unity, friendship, and cooperation between our two countries.

Comrade Voroshilov will soon conclude his friendly visit to China. On behalf of the Chinese people, I wish to take this opportunity to express once again our profound thanks to him, and to ask him sincerely to convey the most heartfelt friendship of the Chinese people to all the people of the Soviet Union.

Let us drink,

To the ever-growing prosperity, wealth, and strength of our great ally, the Soviet Union,

To new achievements made by the great Soviet people in the causes of building communism and defending world peace,

To the health of the leading comrades of the Soviet government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

To the unbreakable, fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples,

To the great unity of the socialist family headed by the Soviet Union,

To world peace,

To Comrade Voroshilov's health and long life,

Bottoms up!

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### Conversation with Voroshilov on the Latter's Departure (May 6, 1957)

**Source:** Li Yueran, "Mao zhuxi songbie Fu lao," in *RMRB* (May 7, 1957), 1.

*According to the source, Mao visited Voroshilov around midnight on May 6, 1957, to bid him farewell on his imminent return to the Soviet Union. For information on Voroshilov's China visit, see text April 15, 1957, source note.*

(Mao inquired of Voroshilov whether he had slept well and whether he was sufficiently well-rested.)

Voroshilov: Very well-rested. I am truly sorry to cause you this disturbance so late in the night. You should have gone to bed long ago.

Mao: I should come to see you.

[As the two men approach the doorway to the reception room, each courteously encouraged the other to go first.]

Voroshilov: Since you came here [to see me], you are [my] guest. Please go first.

Mao: Let's go in together.

[In the room, Voroshilov, now seated, places an ashtray on the armrest of Chairman Mao's sofa.]

Voroshilov: This is more convenient for you; you won't have to stand up to flick the ashes off your cigarette; the table is a bit far from your seat.

[Voroshilov wants to move the table closer.]

Mao: Please do not bother. I can manage.

Voroshilov: Really? Please don't be so polite.

Mao: You must be tired out with these twenty days [of activity], aren't you? The schedule might have been a bit too tight. You have not had enough rest, have you?

Voroshilov: My dearest friend, Comrade Mao Zedong, I am not tired at all. Everything is fine. Once in a while I got a bit dizzy from the sun. In Guangzhou, I ate a bit of snake meat which perhaps stirred up a battle between the dragon and tiger in my stomach and just when I came back to Beijing I felt slightly uncomfortable. But that was over quickly. Whenever I think of the welcome and hospitality that we have received from the warm and hospitable Chinese people, I forget every bit of weariness that I might have had.

(Mao inquired about Voroshilov's health, suggesting that since he still had to make a long trip, his weariness may be increased if he did not get enough rest.)

Voroshilov: I hear that every day you work during the night. I am deeply concerned. No matter what, you must stop staying up nights. In the past, I have also worked through entire nights and, as a result, my physical condition was damaged considerably. I wish you would do this: When the sun rises you say hello to it; when it sets you bid it goodbye and go to rest.

Mao, (smiling): That's good, we must do things according to the sun's schedule. . . . Don't worry, I am already accustomed to working at night.

Voroshilov (shaking his head): No, you mustn't do that.

(Voroshilov asks Mao how many cigarettes he smokes each day.)

Mao: Not too many. Sometimes I hold one in my hand but do not light it, or I may light it but not smoke it and simply watch the smoke rise. In spirit, I will feel as if I had been smoking.

(Voroshilov hands Mao a cup of tea.)

Voroshilov: My dear Comrade Mao Zedong, if ever you wish to take a break, you can come any time to our place. You can go wherever you want, such as to Sochi in southern Russia, or to the Crimea on the shores of the Black Sea.

Mao: I am deeply grateful, that is a very good idea.

[As Voroshilov leaves Mao and approaches the automobile waiting to take him to the plane:]

The Chairman: I will not bid you goodbye, I will simply say, for the time being, [farewell and] see you again soon. I wish you a safe trip!

## Telegram to Czechoslovakia

(May 8, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 9, 1957), 1. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (May 9, 1957), 1.

*The RMRB source does not carry the salutation and signature in the customary format, but provides the information that it was addressed to A. Zapotocky, President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, Z. Fierlinger, Chairman of the National Assembly (of the Republic of Czechoslovakia), and V. Siroky, Premier of the Republic of Czechoslovakia. It was sent by Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai.*

On the occasion of the commemoration of the National Day of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, please allow us to express our sincere and warm congratulations on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China to you and through you to the government and the people of the Republic of Czechoslovakia. The Chinese people are elated to see that the Czechoslovakian people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, have scored tremendous successes in the cause of socialist construction. Furthermore, we rejoice in, and are inspired by, these successes.

Not long ago, the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, headed by Prime Minister Siroky, paid a friendly visit to our country, and a treaty of friendship and cooperation, and agreements on cultural cooperation and cooperation in health-care work were signed between our two countries.<sup>1</sup> These not only furthered the development of and strengthened the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and Czechoslovakian people, but moreover facilitated the solidarity of the countries in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, and the cause of safeguarding world peace.

[May the Republic of Czechoslovakia increase daily in prosperity and strength, and may the unbreakable brotherly friendship between the Chinese and Czechoslovakian peoples become more consolidated and develop with each passing day.]<sup>2</sup>

### Notes

1. The Czechoslovakian delegation visited China in March 1957. A seven-article Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between China and Czechoslovakia was signed on March 27, in Beijing, attended by a communiqué on the same day. See *RMSC* (1958), pp. 409–412.

2. This last paragraph appears in indirect quotations in the source.



## Letter to Li Shuyi

(May 11, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, pp. 527–528; partially represented in *Mao shici jiangjie*, pp. 209–210. Other Chinese Text: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 178.

*This letter serves as the context for the poem therein “embedded.” The poem itself is the most romantic of Mao’s many writings, and the history behind it, and behind this letter, is also perhaps one of the most sentimentally laden and romantic in Mao’s life since 1949, and deserves to be recounted briefly here. (More on the poem itself in text May 11, 1957[2].) The recipient of the letter, Li Shuyi, who was a Chinese-language teacher at the No. 10 Middle School of Changsha, Hunan Province, at the time of this letter, had been a friend of Mao’s family, and especially of Mao’s late wife, Yang Kaihui, since their youth. She was married to Liu Zhixun, who joined the CPC in 1923, and was at one time secretary of the Peasant Association of the province of Hunan. According to information provided by a report of an interview with Li Shuyi in Mao shici jiangjie, pp. 208–214, Liu left Li in May 1927 to begin to take up the fight against the KMT. He left Changsha in disguise, went to Wuhan, then took part in the Nanchang Uprising, and eventually died in the Battle of Hong Hu in Hubei in September 1932. It was not until the following summer, however, that Li heard rumors of her husband’s death. (Confirmation of the news did not come until after Liberation, when Li was told by Xie Juezai of the circumstances surrounding Liu’s death.) In her sorrow, Li “had a dream, and awoke in tears, amid which [she] wrote a poem, to the pattern of Pusaman,” in Liu’s memory. Afterward, Li went with her son Xiaoang to Guizhou to escape the KMT’s persecution. After Liberation, there was an exchange of letters between Mao and Li Shuyi (see text April 18, 1950, vol. I). Then, during the New Year’s period (Spring Festival, or chunjie) of 1957, Li wrote another letter to Mao, speaking of her feelings on reading Mao’s poems, and reminding Mao of a poem that Mao had once written and given to Liu Zhixun. (Mao apparently had himself forgotten about this poem, and it was Chen Yi who reminded him that indeed such a poem existed, and that he had seen it during the Jinggangshan days.) In the same letter, Li sent Mao a copy of the poem she had written in 1933 when she heard the unconfirmed rumors of her husband’s death. She also told Mao, in the words quoted earlier, of the circumstances under which the poem was written. This poem reads, in translation:*

Lonely in my chamber, I awake, too early;  
 For during the night my melancholy for being apart from you is provoked.  
 These things are much too sad for words to express;  
 They merely stun me, and shatter my morning dreaming.  
 Where shall I find thee, my knight errant?  
 For six years now there has been no news of you!  
 As I wake, my memories fly to the day when you took leave,  
 And my dress is soaked with unsullied tears.

*Mao then wrote the following letter, and a poem of his own (text May 11, 1957[2]), in response to Li’s poem and letter.*

Comrade Shuyi:

I have received your gracious letter. You are too modest. You and I are of the same generation; my relationship with you is not of an elder to a younger person; therefore, your attitude is not appropriate and you should change it.<sup>1</sup> Since “Wu Gorge” is already mentioned, the readers already know the place being referred to, and it appears to me that there is no further need for the term “Three Gorges” to appear.<sup>2</sup> After reading your opus, I am greatly moved [by many memories]. The poem recited by Kaihui is not all that good, and I think we can just drop it.<sup>3</sup> Here I send you a poem, titled “You xian” [The Roaming Immortals], as a present. In the case of this type of roaming immortals, the author does not include himself in the category; in this sense this is different from the [“]roaming immortals[”] poems of the ancients.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, there are [still representatives of such poems] among the [traditional] *ci*; such as the poems on the Seventh Night [Festival]. [Poem omitted here; see text May 11, 1957(2).]

If it is possible for you to do so during the summer vacation, or in the winter vacation, please go to Banchang on my behalf and take a look at Kaihui’s grave.<sup>5</sup> In addition, when and if you go to see Zhixun’s grave, please convey my sincere thoughts of regret and mourning. When and if you see Mr. Liu Wuting, please convey my regards. If you or Mr. Wuting run into any difficulties, please let me know.<sup>6</sup>

Please take good care of yourself for the sake of the nation!

Mao Zedong

May 11, 1957

## Notes

1. Mao’s reference here is to the sentence in Li’s 1957 letter to him, in which she said: “For quite a long time now I have not written to pay my respects to you.” (The tone in this sentence, and the words used, such as *nin* for “you,” and *qingan* for “pay my respects,” are terms of deference more appropriate when it is a younger person writing to an older person of a higher generation.) (Information on this from *Mao shici jiangjie*, p. 209.)

2. In a stretch of the Yangtze River, between the provinces of Sichuan and Hubei, the river runs through three celebrated gorges, known respectively as the Jutang Gorge, the Wu Gorge, and the Xiling Gorge. This is collectively known as the Three Gorges. The Wu Gorge is in the middle, in the eastern part of Wushan *xian* of Sichuan and Badong *xian* of Hubei. The gorge gets its name from Wushan (Wu Mountain), through which it runs. We have no idea what piece of writing serves as the context of Mao’s reference here. It is not Li Shuyi’s poem, or Mao’s poem included in this letter. It is possible, but not confirmed, that it refers to the third poem alluded to here, i.e., the poem “recited by [Yang] Kaihui.”

3. “Kaihui” is Yang Kaihui, Mao’s second wife. See text May 11, 1957(2), note 1. We are not sure about the reference to “the poem recited by Kaihui.” It might be the poem that Mao had written some years earlier for Liu Zhixun (see source note), which might have been shared by Li Shuyi and Yang Kaihui.

4. This refers to a genre of poetry whose main subject is the fantasizing of the experience of immortals. This genre often uses the literary device of depicting a world of immortals to draw a sometimes satirical description, by contrast, of the human world and its sufferings, and dichotomizing the world of the immortals from the real world. It began with the poem

“Yuan you” (Far-off wanderings) by the Chu poet Qu Yuan in the Warring States period and has been developed through the centuries by such poets as Cao Zhi (of the Wei Kingdom during the period of the Three Kingdoms), Guo Po (of the Jin dynasty), and Qin Guan (Qin Shaoyou, of the Song dynasty). The most famous of these was Qin’s “Jiaoqiao xian,” which depicts the legend of the bridge of magpies created on the seventh night of the seventh month (the legendary *qi ji*) for the reunion of the two stars in heaven, the Weaving Girl and the Cowherd Boy. This poem set the pattern for many poems on the same topic for centuries to come. Although he employed a different set of legends for the imagery structure of his poem here, Mao appears very much to have retained the spirit of this genre.

5. Banchang village, in Dongxiang *xian*, near Changsha, Hunan Province, is Yang Kaihui’s birthplace. According to *Mao shici jiangjie*, p. 212, Li Shuyi did go to visit Yang’s grave at Banchang as Mao’s representative on July 10, 1958, and wrote a memorial essay for Yang.

6. Liu Wuting is Liu Zhixun’s father and Li Shuyi’s father-in-law. See text April 18, 1950, vol. I, note 2.

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### In Reply to Li Shuyi: A Poem (May 11, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Jan. 7, 1958), 8. Other Chinese Texts: *Poems of Mao Tse-tung*, p. 88; *Poems*, p. 55; *Shici*, pp. 32–33; *Mao shici*, pp. 13–14; Jin Fang (1965), p. 50; *Mao shici jiangjie*, p. 69; *RMRB* (Dec. 8, 1976), 2. Available English Translations: *Poems of Mao Tse-tung*, p. 89; *Poems*, p. 54; J. Chen (1967), p. 347; *Mao Poems*, p. 33; H. Engle and P. Engle (1972), p. 100.

See text May 11, 1957(1), source note.

*The poem is set in the ci pattern of “Dielianhua” (Butterflies Courting Flowers), which originated from a Tang-dynasty ci pattern titled “Jiaodazhi” (Magpies Stepping on a Tree Branch). (For a general discussion of ci patterns, see text Jan. 12, 1957, note 1.)*

*The poem itself does not seem to have an official title, save the title under which it is often published, “Da Li Shuyi” (Reply to Li Shuyi). In fact, according to Mao shici jiangjie, p. 210, when this poem was first published for a limited readership, in the Bulletin of Hunan Normal College, it was published with the title “Zeng Li Shuyi” (For Li Shuyi). It was not until later in the year, after the poem had been published in a number of newspapers with that title (e.g., in our earlier RMRB source, for instance, and in Wenhui bao) that Mao made the decision to change the title to “Da Li Shuyi” (In Reply to Li Shuyi)—which Li believes is a more appropriate title, because in the poem Mao actually did write poetically in response to questions and subjects brought up in Li’s poem which Mao had received. In translation, e.g., in the J. Chen (1967) source, it is sometimes given the title “The Immortals.” This is because in Mao’s letter to Li attending the poem, he mentions this as a “poem about the roaming immortals” (you xian). (See text May 11, 1957(1), note 4.) This is unquestionably one of the most romantic and elegant poems written by Mao. It has become*

*the subject of an outpouring of “exegetical” literature, the best known of which are Zhou Zhenfu’s essay, “A Further Explanation of Chairman Mao’s Poem, Dielianhua” in Yuwen xuexi (Language and literary studies), no. 2 (1958); an essay by Zhang Kejia, the editor of the magazine Shikan (Poetry), in which the poem written by Li Shuyi appeared in January 1958; and Zhang’s essay in Beijing ribao (Jan. 10, 1958). An entire issue of Wenyi bao (no. 7, 1958) was also devoted to the discussion of this poem.*

My proud poplar is lost to me,<sup>1</sup> Gone, too, your willow.<sup>2</sup>  
With gossamer lightness they have wafted to the highest of heavens.<sup>3</sup>  
Of Wu Gang<sup>4</sup> they ask  
What hospitality he offers;  
Wu Gang brings forth a cask of cassia wine.<sup>5</sup>

Chang E in her loneliness<sup>6</sup>  
Unravels her billowing sleeves<sup>7</sup>  
As through the vast emptiness of space  
She performs her dance for these virtuous souls.<sup>8</sup>  
It is interrupted suddenly by word coming from Earth,  
That the Tiger has been subdued.<sup>9</sup>  
And the tears that they shed  
Break into a torrent of rain.<sup>10</sup>

#### Notes

1. The Chinese term for poplar is *yang*, which here clearly alludes to Yang Kaihui, Mao’s wife during the early years of the Chinese Communist revolution. She was the mother of Mao’s two sons, Mao Anqing and Mao Anying. She was executed by the Hunanese warlord He Jian in 1930 when the Red Army pulled out of Changsha. She was a classmate of Li Shuyi at the Fuxiang School for Girls in Changsha, and when Li was married to Liu Zhixun, Yang served as their go-between. For more information on Li and Yang’s friendship, and about the circumstances of Yang’s death at the hands of He Jian, see *Mao shici jiangjie*, pp. 211–212. Li also explains the proper use of the word “proud” (*jiao*) by Mao here. She says: “Some people thought that it was a mistake for the other word *jiao*, which means ‘beautiful’ [in a cute way]. In my view, this word ‘*jiao*’ [for ‘proud’] is really too good! For a woman to give her life (head) for the revolution; is there anything else for which we can be more proud?”

2. The Chinese term for willow is *liu*, and, like *yang* here, alludes to a person—Liu Zhixun, Li Shuyi’s husband who is the subject of her poem sent to Mao. See text May 11, 1957(1), source note, on Liu’s life.

3. The Chinese here reads *cong xiao jiu*, which literally translates as “ninth heaven.” It refers to a concept in the *daojiao* religion that the heavens are divided into nine strata of which the ninth, i.e., the highest, was occupied by the Jade Emperor alone. The saying itself seems to derive from the poem of the Tang-dynasty poet Li Gao, “To the Fairy Master.” (See also, however, text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 8.) In Chinese folk religion, it is believed that after death, the soul of a person (disembodied by death) is allowed to roam free of its previously corporeal confinements for a short period of time, until religious ceremonies are performed to summon the soul back to the grave where it should be. This practice was known as *zhao hun*, and is the subject of a famous poem by the Warring States period poet, Qu Yuan. Again Li Shuyi, in her remarks in the interview report in *Mao shici jiangjie*, provides a deeper meaning for this line. She reminds the reader that in her own poem lamenting Liu Zhixun (a copy of which she sent to Mao, and which then elicited Mao’s

response)—see text May 11, 1957(1), source note—she had written: “Where shall I find thee, my knight errant? For six years now there has been no news of you!” Mao’s lines here, saying that it is to the highest of heavens that these revolutionary martyrs have gone, is therefore, Li says, to be read as an answer to Li’s own query. They thereby make this poem by Mao a true “reply to Li Shuyi.”

4. Wu Gang is the subject of a legend which, according to Li Shizhen, the author of the famed Chinese pharmacopia *Bencao gangmu*, emerged from the novellas of the Sui and Tang dynasties. Wu is reputed to be a man of the Xihe district during the Han dynasty. In studying as an apprentice under some mage to become immortal, he commits a grave error and is punished by being banished to the moon, with the “labor” of cutting down the cassia tree on the moon, which was 5,000 feet in height. Since the tree grows back instantly every time it is chopped, even before the next blow of the hatchet can be administered, Wu Gang’s banishment is eternal. The legend can also be found in the book of folk tales, *Yaoyang zazhu*.

5. Mao seems to be making a rather deft literary link here. As noted in note 4, Wu Gang is banished to cut down the cassia tree. In another setting, the Wei poet Cao Zhi (192–232), in his poetic essay *Xianshen bian* (The Immortals), wrote that “cassia wine” was the drink of the immortals. Cao’s poem obviously antedates the legend of Wu Gang, but both may be derived from an even older, but by now untraceable, legend that a cassia tree existed on the moon.

6. Chang E was originally known as Yun E. Hers is the legend of Hou Yi, the famous archer of the Xia period (2205–1766 B.C.) who obtained from the Western Mother-Goddess (Xi Wang Mu) the elixir of everlasting life. Chang E, his wife, stole it and fled to the moon with it. The irony of the lesson is that while she had gained eternal life through theft of the elixir, Chang E had no one to spend this life with, for she found herself intensely lonely on the moon. (The legend of Chang E and the legend of Wu Gang are, of course, entirely separate from one another, although they are confused when Mao brings them together here.) The legend of Chang E plays many roles in Chinese romantic literature—as the fairy goddess who has a deep caring for the love affairs of people in the human world and yet is unable to experience real love herself, or as the remote and unapproachable object of romantic desire. The most famous of such poetry involving this legend is the poem “Chang E” by the Tang-dynasty poet Li Shangyin. The legend itself can be found in the book *Huainan zi*.

7. Mao here invokes yet another legend, that of the Emperor Xuanzong of the Tang dynasty (reigning 712–756), who, according to the story in *Yuefu shiji* (Collection of the Yuefu Poems), was led on a tour of the moon by the mage Luo Gongyuan. There, at the moon palace, he was treated to the vision of several hundred fairy goddesses dancing to the tune of “The Coat of the Rainbow-Colored Feathers.” Emperor Xuanzong, associated with the story of Yang the Imperial Concubine (see text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 7), was himself an oft-discussed romantic figure in Chinese literature. The most famous literary allusion to this legend was the poem “Chang hen ge” (Ballad of the Eternal Remorse) by the Tang-dynasty poet Bai Juyi, written about Yang the Imperial Concubine.

8. “These virtuous souls” refers, of course, to Yang Kaihui and Liu Zhixun. However, in an article written in the collection of exegetical essays on this poem (published in *Wenyi bao*, no. 7, 1958), the critic Xie Sijie argues that there was an obvious literary intent on Mao’s part here to blend the legends of Chang E and Wu Gang with the experience of Yang Kaihui and Liu Zhixun, to the extent that Yang becomes identified as Chang E and Liu as Wu Gang, both as Communists, pursuing tasks whose value cannot be required. For example, Xie points out, the elixir that Chang E is supposed to have stolen is an allusion to Communist truth, for whose possession Yang was persecuted to death, when all around her were reactionaries.

9. The “tiger” refers to the enemies of the revolution (and to the KMT in particular). This is not the first time Mao has used the term “tiger” to describe the forces of reaction in China, albeit a “paper tiger.” (See text July 14, 1956, note 1). Here Mao uses the words *renjian* for what we have translated as Earth. More strictly speaking, the term has the meaning of “the realm of men,” or, in an even more deeply poetic sense here, “the world of those that yet live.”

10. Here Mao seems to be alluding to the tenet in Chinese folk religion that meteorological phenomena reflect and respond to the sentiment of the people in the world of human affairs. It is also a stunning reference to the cathartic impact that news of (and realization of) the victory of the socialist revolution has on those who have fought for it, who have long awaited it in their silent suffering, and who have had loved ones give their lives for it. The word “torrent” echoes the word “a-sudden” in the preceding line.

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## Telegram to Rajendra Prasad

(May 12, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 14, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 109 (June 1957), 88. Available English Translation: HNA, *Daily News Release* (May 14, 1957), 1.

President Rajendra Prasad,  
The Republic of India

Your Excellency:

On receiving the happy news of your reelection as President of the Republic of India, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend my warm congratulations to Your Excellency and to the Indian people. I am confident that, with Your Excellency’s reelection as President, the relations of friendship and cooperation between China and India will be further developed. May Your Excellency and the Indian people attain new successes in the cause of building the Republic of India and in safeguarding peace.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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## Concerning Disturbances Among Workers

(May 13, 1957)

**Source:** “Tan zhigong naoshi,” *RMRB* editorial (May 13, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *Shengping ziliao*, pp. 357–358 (excerpts).

*This RMRB editorial was not published under Mao’s signature. Many scholars, however, have attributed it to Mao. See text April 10, 1957, source note. The subject of Mao’s concern here—disturbances in the midst of (and arising out of) the rectification campaign, and the*

*question of what the correct attitude toward these disturbances should be—were things that began to emerge in Mao's mind as far back as January 1957, and certainly became sufficiently significant subjects by February for Mao to deal with them specifically in his February 27 speech. (See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 9; also see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraphs 40–46.) Like the April 10 RMRB editorial (text April 10, 1957), this one largely echoes Mao's February 27 speech, but in this case there are fewer incidences of outright verbatim repetition. The overall argument and the expressions used, nonetheless, clearly follow upon those in the earlier speech. The term used in the title of this editorial is zhigong. This term is today often translated as "workers and staff," but at the time of this editorial's appearance, it was translated only as "workers." What it does refer to, in either case, and regardless of semantics, are people who work in the enterprises in society who are not leaders (directors or managers). The term therefore includes both workers who are on the line and those who engage in clerical and organizational work. The term is largely a descriptive one and is not a "class term."*

Recently a number of incidents such as petitions and strikes have taken place among the staff and worker personnel and the masses in some enterprises. Although these incidents are very rare, and they are very small-scale when they do take place, we ought to pay them attention and also learn in them the correct method of handling the contradictions among the people.<sup>1</sup>

In our country, workers are the masters of the state. In our enterprises, the leaders manage the enterprises on behalf of the state, which itself is led by the working class. Therefore, the leaders' and the workers' fundamental interests are the same.<sup>2</sup> There is no antagonistic contradiction between them. Naturally, contradictions between correct and incorrect viewpoints, contradictions between partial and overall interests, and contradictions between immediate and long-range interests may exist between them, but they are all contradictions among the people. They ought to be, and can entirely be, resolved through the method of "unity-criticism-unity."<sup>3</sup> In that case, why have strikes and petitions occurred?

If we analyzed the causes of the disturbances, we would come to one conclusion: The places where there have been disturbances have mainly been where there are relatively severe cases of bureaucratism. The workers, when they were unable to resolve problems through the normal method of "unity-criticism-unity," were forced to take to causing disturbances.

In the main, disturbances on the part of the workers have revolved around issues of personal interest, such as the problems of wages, jobs, livelihood, etc. Such problems are not difficult to resolve. Those demands by the workers that are reasonable should be met, those that are unreasonable and that cannot be met should be clearly identified as such and explained. If this were done, disturbances would have been avoided. However, because some comrades have taken on bureaucratic airs and practices, the problems have become complicated. With regard to reasonable and feasible demands, [some comrades] have failed to meet them because of bureaucratism and because they do not feel the hardships of the masses personally.<sup>4</sup> As for those that are unreasonable and impossible to meet, it is also because of bureaucratism that they have failed to explain things clearly to the masses and in such a way as to bring the masses into their confidence fully; on the contrary, they

have even lied to the masses or put them off with bureaucratic jargon. On critical matters involving the major interests of the masses, the leaders have not been consistent in word and deed and have not been fair in their handling of affairs. All these circumstances are bound to incur the serious dissatisfaction of the masses.

When errors of bureaucratism happen here or there they are always in direct contradiction with the interests of the masses. Nevertheless, when the masses are dissatisfied with the bureaucratism of their leaders, they do not immediately create a disturbance. In general they first submit their opinions, write things on the bulletin boards or send letters of complaint to higher levels of authority; in any case, they tend to hope that the problems may be resolved through the means of "unity-criticism-unity." If the leadership was able, at such moments, to maintain a clear and calm mind, and really listened to the masses' opinions so as to conduct an earnest review of its own work—if it were to admit and correct its own mistakes, or earnestly explain to the masses where it does not [believe it] has erred, the problems would easily disappear. But things are not so easy when you come up against a bureaucratistic person. Whenever such people hear opinions that contradict their own, they have "conditioned reflexes," they always feel that the people who raise such oppositional opinions are "ideologically backward," or even that they are harboring evil intentions. They never think of being humble and examining their own consciences. Not only do they not respect or thank the people who raise opinions, they think of all sorts of methods to attack them. In this way they completely bar the door to resolving problems by means of "unity-criticism-unity," and the masses are forced to resort to disturbances.

When there are disturbances among the masses, how should they be resolved? Should we ban them?

Quite obviously, banning them is the wrong approach. Banning disturbances will not only not serve to resolve the contradictions that lay behind them, but will serve instead to intensify these contradictions. We do not advocate disturbances, because under any circumstances disturbances within the people's own state are bound to hurt the people. However, if disturbances have occurred, these disturbances should be utilized to resolve contradictions, to overcome bureaucratism, to educate the leadership, as well as to educate the masses.

With regard to the demands raised by the masses during disturbances, they should be dealt with by the same principle as that which applies to demands raised when there are no disturbances, i.e., those that are reasonable and feasible should be met, those that are unreasonable, or that are reasonable but impossible to be met for the time being, should be explained. We must neither refuse to meet demands that ought to be met simply because disturbances have occurred, nor give in to demands to which we should not concede for the same reason.

Nevertheless, the more important thing is that we must explain to the masses the distinction between the correctness and the errors of the leadership. As we said earlier, if the masses have caused disturbances, it must first be because the leadership has committed errors. Unless the leadership deliberately wishes to persist in its error to the end, it must boldly and squarely admit its errors to the masses and suggest specific methods earnestly to correct the mistakes and over-

come its bureaucratism. This is the key to resolving the problem.

Naturally, where the masses are in error it should also be pointed out. The facts prove that the masses are reasonable. If their errors are correctly analyzed the masses are willing to admit them. On the other hand, if there are individual bad elements among the masses who deliberately cause trouble, their faces will be exposed and will be recognized by the masses.

Disturbances can [be used to] resolve contradictions, to overcome bureaucratism, and to educate both the leadership and the masses. Therefore while disturbances have their bad aspect, they also have a good side.<sup>5</sup> However, we must also say that under normal circumstances, problems within the people's state and the people's enterprises can and should be resolved without disturbances. The leaders of all enterprises should take a lesson from the incidents of strikes and petitions, should improve their own work, and should try to avoid having such things recur.

To avoid such recurrences we must first of all overcome bureaucratism, and to do so we must expand the democratic management of the enterprises and strengthen the masses' role of supervision. We intend to take another opportunity to discuss this question. However, even with a good system we must have a good work style. We will here make a few preliminary suggestions about the work style of the leadership:

First, the leadership must lay down its airs and go to the masses to share their fortunes. When one assumes the post of a leader and gets involved in leadership work, and thereby stands at a position apart from that of the masses, one's greatest danger is then to become divorced from the masses, to not understand the living conditions of the masses and the conditions that influence their way of thinking. If the leaders paid constant attention to linking up with the masses, and, instead of imposing leadership on the masses from above, went among the masses to lead the masses; if the leaders were not only caring about the masses' hardships but shared their fortune and hardship, the masses would be content with such leaders and the leaders would at all times be informed of the masses' opinions. Then the separation between the leaders and the masses would not occur so frequently.<sup>6</sup>

Second, the leaders must see the masses as their own people. Many comrades in leadership positions have their "difficulties that cannot easily be discussed." Look, many things are difficult and impossible to achieve, yet they dare not say so. Things may be quite obviously impossible to get done, yet they go ahead with their promises. Things may be obviously difficult, but they say that everything is all right. As a consequence, things fall apart and the masses say that you cheated them. And in truth that is exactly what happened. Why do they not dare to tell the masses their difficulties? If there are difficulties, by all means speak up. If something cannot be done, say it cannot be done. The workers' masses are your own people. If you treated them as such, and made a clean breast of everything, the masses are reasonable and capable of thinking things through. Isn't there a case where many workers originally petitioned for new

housing but later withdrew their petitions when they heard that the state was in difficulty? Didn't many technicians go to do manual labor when there was a reduction in jobs?

Third, one must be modest and careful, and be willing to listen to opposing opinions. In the old society there was a saying, "No parents in the world can be wrong." As far as their behavior toward the masses is concerned, some comrades today appear to believe that "no leaders in the world can be wrong." The truth is the very opposite: There are no leaders in the world who can be totally immune from error. The intelligent leader may be able to make fewer errors or to avoid making big mistakes. To do so he or she must constantly listen to opposing opinions and thus discover errors in his or her own decisions and correct them in time. All opposing opinions are valuable, whether they are publicly raised in meetings or revealed behind one's back in private grumblings. If an opposing opinion was a correct one, it would help the leadership to correct its own mistake; if it was a wrong one, it nonetheless reflects some of the true conditions of the ideas among the masses, and would allow [the leadership] to apply a remedy befitting the symptoms;<sup>7</sup> in what sense, then, can it be bad?

The socialist social system has liberated the forces of production from the old relations of production and has endowed our enterprises with the most powerful life force. In the last few years, the rapid development of production and construction in our country is evidence of the superiority of our social system. It also shows that the relationship between the leadership personnel and the workers' masses in our enterprises is on the whole normal. We are confident that as long as we promote democracy and strengthen the link between the leaders and the masses, we will overcome bureaucratism, and effectively resolve the contradictions that exist within socialist enterprises. In this way the [problems of the] opinion of the workers' masses will be correctly resolved at all times, by means of the approach of "unity-criticism-unity," and they will not be accumulated to erupt eventually as disturbances. In this way, too, the workers' masses' activism will be given full play, and the cause of socialist construction will also develop even more speedily.

## Notes

1. See text Feb. 27, 1957.
2. By definition, this is the fundamental criterion for the term "contradiction among the people." See text Feb. 27, 1957, notes 3 and 4.
3. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.
4. Here is an echo of a sentiment expressed by Mao in January and February 1957. See text surrounding text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 83, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 102. On the subject of bureaucratism, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 64, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 94.
5. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 10, especially paragraph 4.
6. Here the classic principles of the "mass line" are reiterated. See note 4, and also text Mar. 1, 1957, note 15.
7. This is an aphorism, *dui zheng xia yao*, derived from the preface to the poem "For Li Muzhou" by the Tang-dynasty poet Liu Zongyuan.

## The Situation Is Changing

(May 15, 1957)

**Source:** Xuanji, V, pp. 423–429. Other Chinese Texts: Wansui (n.d. 3), pp. 175–178; URI (1976), pp. 211 (excerpts); Wansui (1967b), p. 15 (excerpt); Buyi, p. 146 (excerpt); quoted in HQ (Aug. 25, 1968), 12–13; RMRB (Sept. 1, 1968), 1; Jiaoyu yulu, pp. 25–26; Mao liang, pp. 313–314; Shengping ziliao, pp. 358–359. Available English Translations: SW, V, pp. 440–446; URI (1976), pp. 213–214; quoted in PR, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 21; CB, 891 (Oct. 8, 1969), 24; CB, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969), 48.

For an analysis of the precise date of this document, see R. MacFarquhar (1974), p. 392, note 1. The Wansui (1967b) source varies slightly from the Xuanji version and is dated May 1957. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source gives the date wu yue zhong xun (roughly translatable as “Mid-May”).

This document was written by Mao and circulated to Party cadres during the struggle over Party rectification and the future role of bourgeois intellectuals in China's socialist transition. In addition to providing useful information concerning Mao's role in these struggles and his reaction to the attacks on socialism and the Party by the bourgeois intellectuals,<sup>1</sup> it is also important for the light that it sheds on Mao's view of Marxist theory in practice at the time. It demonstrates Mao's continued recognition and emphasis of the need for controlled social conflict, in this case to test the attitudes of the bourgeois intellectuals and the mettle of lower-level Party cadres, a method that Mao would develop into a full-fledged strategy after the Chengdu Conference of March 1958, and especially around the time of the Second Session of the Eighth Congress of the CPC. Even more importantly, the document demonstrates Mao's increasing concern at this time with the danger of revisionism.

In the very early stages of struggling against the policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Mao and the CPC had come to the conclusion that revisionism was a major danger in the world Communist movement, although as an imminent threat it was secondary to dogmatism. This conclusion was drawn in the critical CPC document, “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” which was published as a RMRB editorial on January 1, 1957. At least in public, the attitudes and policies of the CPC in the first half of 1957, and Mao's own perceptions and announcements, were dominated by this conclusion. But the “aspect” of revisionism was never totally set aside. As seen in the speeches of January 27 and February 27, and a number of subsequent speeches and conversations, Mao had brought up the reminder that revisionism, also, had to be dealt with. In the next few months, Mao focused more and more on the dangers of revisionism. See, for instance, the speech to the National Conference on Propaganda Work (text Mar. 12, 1957). However, this document reveals the beginnings of a critical change in Mao's thought. As a result of the attacks on the Party and the Party's response, Mao was beginning to reevaluate the significance of the danger of revisionism. He was beginning to see it as potentially even more dangerous than dogmatism. Mao's transitional position at this time was understandably contradictory. On the one hand,

he seemed to hold that Party revisionists were more dangerous than Party dogmatists because they reflected bourgeois ideology and liberalism and because they were connected with bourgeois intellectuals. But, on the other hand, because he continued to hold the position that the dangers of Leftist errors linked to dogmatism were as serious as Rightist dangers linked to revisionism, and because he saw the number of revisionists as being relatively small, he did not perceive revisionism as a significant enough social force to be the primary danger.

But the beginning of Mao's recognition of the dangers inherent in revisionism at this time is the beginning of his struggle against revisionism, which itself would culminate domestically in the Cultural Revolution, and, in terms of international relations, in the Theory of the Three Worlds (see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 17). As Mao began to develop a broader understanding of what constituted revisionism and the dangers associated with it, he not only came to see it as an increasingly serious danger, but also saw more and more Party and state leaders practicing revisionist policies. Therefore, for Mao, revisionism subsequently came to represent increasingly the main danger to the Chinese Revolution. In a very real sense, one may see this as the dominant concern for Mao in the last two decades of his life, and the underlying influence in the development of the late stage of “Mao Zedong Thought.” Any evaluation or reevaluation of Maoist ideology in the post-Mao era in the PRC would have to come to terms with this influence. Although the PRC leadership of the 1980s has yet to tackle this head-on, a number of things provide a clear enough indication of the general orientation. For example, there is the essay “Xiuzheng zhuyi de lai yuan ji qi biao xian xingshi” (The Origins of Revisionism and the Forms in Which It Is Manifested) in HQ (Jan. 1980), 42–45; and the RMRB (April 12, 1982) reevaluation of the CPC posture on the “Khrushchev line” in CPSU policies of the 1950s and 1960s, and especially of the nine polemical “open letters.”

As such, then, this piece of writing was in effect the first step taken to bring into the open (at least within the Party) the issues that would quickly spell an end to the Hundred Flowers Campaign by the midpoint of 1957, and turn the orientation of the campaign against bourgeois ideology and revisionism, paving the way for the alarmingly rapid change of direction culminating in the anti-Rightist campaign, which was in reality also an antirevisionism campaign. A bit of strategic hesitancy is reflected in the fact that this was an intra-Party document (i.e., not intended to be circulated immediately outside the CPC). Another factor that might have prompted this caution was that, as it gradually built up during the early months of 1957, the issue of campaigning against revisionism was (and would continue to be) an issue of great delicacy for China's relations with the Soviet Union. At the time of this essay, Voroshilov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was in between his two rapidly sequential visits to the PRC (see text April 15, 1957, source note, and text May 26, 1957, source note). It is understandable that Mao would have wanted to play his hand somewhat more covertly while Voroshilov was in China.

The unity and struggle of opposites exist everywhere in the life of society.<sup>2</sup> As a result of the struggle, opposites are transformed into each other and a new unity is established; [when this is done] the life of society will have moved one step forward.

The rectification [movement] in the Communist Party<sup>3</sup> is a struggle between two work styles [which coexist] within a single unity. Such is the situation both within the Communist Party and among the people as a whole.

There are all kinds of people in the Communist Party. There are Marxists; they make up the great majority. They have their shortcomings too, but these are not

serious ones. There are some people who have mistaken, dogmatic thought. Most of these people are loyal to the Party and to the country, only their method of looking at problems has a "Left" one-sidedness. When they overcome this type of one-sidedness, they will take a big step forward. Then there are some people who have erroneous revisionist or Rightist opportunist thought. These people are more dangerous because their thought is a reflection of bourgeois thought within the Party. They long for bourgeois liberalism and negate everything; they are linked to the bourgeois intellectuals in society in a hundred and one ways. In the past few months, people were all repudiating dogmatism, but they have allowed revisionism to go unchecked. Dogmatism should be repudiated; unless dogmatism is repudiated many errors cannot be corrected. Now we should begin to pay attention to criticizing revisionism. When dogmatism goes toward the opposite, it is either [toward] Marxism or [toward] revisionism. In our Party's experience, the former makes up the majority [of the cases] while the latter only occurs in individual [isolated] cases. This is because [the dogmatists] are an ideological faction of the proletariat contaminated by the fanatical viewpoint of the petty bourgeoisie. Some [things] that are attacked as "dogmatism" are, in fact, errors in work. Some [things] that are attacked as "dogmatism" are in fact Marxist [but] come under fire because some people have mistaken them for "dogmatism." There is reason for the real dogmatist to hold that "Left" is better than Right; namely, they want revolution. But as far as losses to the revolutionary cause are concerned, the "Left" is no better than the Right; therefore it must be firmly corrected. Some errors have resulted from carrying out the policies of the Central Committee; [therefore] the lower levels should not be excessively reprimanded [for these errors]. Our Party has a large number of new members who are intellectuals (the Youth League has even more);<sup>4</sup> a portion of them indeed have rather serious revisionist thought. They deny the Party character and class nature of the press; they jumble up the differences of principle between proletarian journalism and bourgeois journalism; they mix up journalism that reflects the collective economy of socialist countries with journalism that reflects the economy of capitalist countries [which is marked by] its anarchic situation and the competition among cliques. They admire bourgeois liberalism and oppose Party leadership. They approve of democracy, but oppose centralism.<sup>5</sup> They oppose the centralized leadership, planning, and control over cultural and educational undertakings (including journalism) which are necessary (though they should not be excessively centralized) to realize a planned economy. They and the right-wing intellectuals in society complement and respond to each other; [they] are linked together, as close as brothers. There are all types of people who criticize and repudiate dogmatism. There are Communist Party members—Marxists, and there are so-called Communist Party members, that is, rightist elements within the Communist Party—revisionists. Then there are people in society, among the Left, the middle-of-the-roaders, and the Right, [who criticize dogmatism]. The middle-of-the-roaders make up the great majority of society; they make up approximately 70 per cent of the whole body of non-Party intellectuals; the Left makes up about 20 per cent; the Right makes up 1 per cent, 3 per cent, 5 per cent, up to 10 per cent, depending on the situation.<sup>6</sup>

In the most recent period, in the democratic parties<sup>7</sup> and institutions of higher education, it is the Rightists who have manifested themselves as the most determined and ferocious. They think that the middle-of-the-roaders are their people, and that they won't go along with the Communist Party; in fact, they are dreaming. Among the middle-of-the-roaders there are some people who waver, who can [go either] left or right. At present, under the influence of the ferocious attacks of the Right, they don't want to say anything; they want to wait a while. Right now the attack of the Right has not yet reached its peak; right now they are in high spirits. Neither the Rightist elements within the Party nor those outside the Party understand dialectics: When a thing reaches its extreme, inevitably it turns into its opposite.<sup>8</sup> We must let them rave on for a period; let them reach their peak. The more reckless they become, the more beneficial it is to us. Some people say that they are afraid of being hooked like a fish, others say that we are leading the enemy deep into a trap, concentrating them in order to wipe them out.<sup>9</sup> Right now a large number of fish are coming to the surface by themselves, so we needn't fish [for them]. These are not ordinary fish; in all probability they are sharks. They have sharp teeth, they like to eat people. The shark's fin that people eat is the navigational device used by this type of fish. The struggle between the Rightists and ourselves will focus on the fight for the middle-of-the-roaders; the middle-of-the-roaders can be won over. Regardless of what the Rightists say about supporting the people's democratic dictatorship,<sup>10</sup> supporting the people's government, supporting socialism, supporting the leadership of the Communist Party, it is all false; we must remember never to believe it. Regardless of whether they are Rightists in the democratic parties, Rightists in the educational field, Rightists in the field of literature and art, Rightists in the field of journalism, Rightists in the scientific and technological fields, or Rightists in the industrial and commercial circles, they are all like this. There are two groups who are the most determined: The Left and the Right. They fight against each other for the middle-of-the-roaders; they fight each other over the right to lead the middle-of-the-roaders. The intent of the Rightist elements is first to fight for a part and then to fight for the whole. First they fight for the leadership rights over the fields of journalism, education, literature and art, and science and technology. They know that the Communist Party is not their match in these fields, and that indeed is the situation. They [think they] are "national treasures," not to be provoked. [They also think that] the "Three-Anti's" [campaign], the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, and the ideological reform [campaign] of the past<sup>11</sup> were all absurd, and that these campaigns were merely asking for trouble.<sup>12</sup> They also know that a large number of university students are the sons and daughters of landlords, rich peasants, and the bourgeoisie,<sup>13</sup> and they believe that these people are the masses who will rise at the Rightists' summons. This is possible with that portion of the students who have Rightist thought. But to imagine this of the great majority of the students is simply dreaming. There are also signs of the Rightists in the journalistic field calling on the masses of workers and peasants to oppose the government.

[When] people oppose labeling,<sup>14</sup> what they oppose is merely the Communist Party labeling them, but it is all right for they themselves to label the Communist

Party members, and to label the Leftists and the middle-of-the-roaders in the democratic parties and the Leftists and the middle-of-the-roaders in all walks of life in society. In the past few months what a number of labels have been thrown out by the Rightists and appeared in the newspapers! The opposition of the middle-of-the-roaders to labeling is genuine. We must remove all labels that we have inappropriately put on middle-of-the-roaders in the past, and from now on we must not assign labels indiscriminately. During the "Three-Anti's" [Campaign], the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, and the ideological reform [campaign], some real errors were made; they must all be corrected publicly, regardless of which people [are affected].<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, in the one matter of labeling, the Rightists would have to be dealt with differently. Even so, we must label them correctly; only those who are really Rightists should be labeled as Rightists. With a few individual exceptions, we need not refer [to them] by name; [rather we must] give them some leeway to turn around in order to make it easier to compromise with them under appropriate conditions.

The above-mentioned [designation of] 1 per cent, 3 per cent, 5 per cent, or up to 10 per cent [of the population] as being Rightists is an estimate; they could be more, or less. Moreover, the situation in each unit is different; there must be solid evidence; [we must act] according to facts;<sup>16</sup> we cannot go too far. Going too far would be an error.

The bourgeoisie and a good number of the intellectuals who once served the old society will always stubbornly assert themselves; they would like always to hang on to their old world, and as far as the new world is concerned, they just never fit in. We must reform them; it will take a very long time, and [in doing this] violent methods cannot be used; an assessment, however, must be made that the majority of them have made great progress since the early period after Liberation. Most of the criticisms of us that they have put forth are correct, and must be accepted. There is only a portion that is incorrect and that must be explained. They demand [that we have] confidence in them; they demand to be given authority [commensurate with] their positions. This is correct. We must have confidence in them, we must give them authority and responsibilities. Some of the criticisms of the Rightists<sup>17</sup> are correct. We cannot disregard them totally. Whatever is correct must be accepted. The characteristic of the Rightists is that their political attitudes are Rightist. They have a certain kind of cooperation with us, a cooperation in form, but in reality they do not cooperate. There are some things on which they cooperate and some things on which they don't. At ordinary times they cooperate, but as soon as there is an opening they can exploit, such as the present opportunity, then in reality they would not want to cooperate any longer. They have broken their promise that they are ready to accept the leadership of the Communist Party; they attempt to shake off this leadership, and, the fact is, without this type of leadership, it will be impossible for the building of socialism to be accomplished, and our people will suffer an extremely great catastrophe.

Throughout our country we have several million bourgeois elements and intellectuals who once served the old society, and we need them to work for us. We must take another step forward to improve our relations with them in order to make

them serve the socialist cause even more efficiently, in order to reform them further, to proletarianize them gradually, to transform them into the opposites of what they are. For the great majority of them, this goal can definitely be reached. Reform means both unity and struggle; using the method of struggle to reach the goal of unity.<sup>18</sup> Struggle is mutual struggle. The present moment is one in which a large number of people are carrying out struggles against us. The criticisms of the majority of people are just, including [even] the sharp criticisms of Professor Fu Ying of Beijing University,<sup>19</sup> which haven't been published in the newspapers. The purpose of the criticisms of these people is that they hope to improve mutual relations; their criticisms are well-intentioned. [However,] the criticisms of the Rightists are frequently malicious, for they harbor hostile sentiments. Good intentions and malice are not things that [need to be] guessed at; they can be [easily] discerned.

The current criticism campaign and rectification campaign were started by the Communist Party. Poisonous weeds and fragrant flowers have grown together; demons and ogres [on the one hand] and unicorns, phoenix, turtles and dragons<sup>20</sup> [on the other hand] have grown up together. This is what we had anticipated, and it is also what we had hoped for. After all, good things have been in the majority and bad things, the minority. People say [we are] angling for the big fishes; we say [we are] hoeing up poisonous weeds; it is the same thing put in different words. In trying to accomplish their goals, the Rightists with anti-Communist sentiments threw caution to the winds and wanted a vicious typhoon of a force above the seventh grade [that would] ruin crops and devastate houses to blow across the face of this land of China.<sup>21</sup> The more unreasonable they become, the more quickly they will be hurled toward the opposite side of the pretenses that they have tried to keep up in the past—the pretenses of cooperating with the Communist Party and accepting its leadership, and that will allow the people to recognize that they are nothing more than a small handful of anti-Communist, antipeople demons and ogres, and that's it. At that time, they will dig their own graves. What's wrong with that?

The Rightists have two ways out. One is to tuck their tails tightly between their legs and mend their ways.<sup>22</sup> The other is to continue to make trouble and [thus] seek their own destruction. Gentlemen of the Right, you may choose where you want to go; the initiative (for a short time) is in your hands.

In our country, there are several criteria by which to distinguish between the true and the false and between the well-intentioned and the malicious in the politics of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals.<sup>23</sup> The principal [ones] are to see if they truly want socialism and if they truly accept the leadership of the Communist Party. They accepted these two points long ago. Now some people want to reverse their decisions.<sup>24</sup> This is not acceptable. Once they reverse their decisions on these two points, the People's Republic of China will no longer have places for them. There is an ideal of the Western world (the so-called free world), so I invite [such people] to go there!

Why is it that a great deal of poisonous and polluted reactionary opinion has been allowed to appear in our newspapers?<sup>25</sup> This is to allow the people to become acquainted with these poisonous weeds and gases<sup>26</sup> in order to dig them up and to



eliminate them. [People may ask:] “Why didn’t you say these things earlier?” [You ask] why they weren’t said earlier? Didn’t we say early on that all poisonous weeds must be rooted out?

[Again people may ask:] “You have divided the people into Left, center, and Right. Aren’t you out of keeping with the [real] state of things?” With the exception of the desert, wherever there are people, there is a Left, a center, and a Right. It will be like this even after ten thousand years. Why is this out of keeping with the state of things? Dividing up [the people] gives the masses an orientation by which to observe people; [this] is to [our] advantage in winning over the middle-of-the-roaders and in isolating the Rightists. “Why don’t we win over the Rightists?” We should win them over. But it is possible to win them over only when they feel isolated. At present their tails are poking all the way into the sky, and they are vainly trying to wipe out the Communist Party; how can we make them conform willingly? After [they] are isolated, they will begin to become divided. We must divide the Right. We have always divided the masses up into a Left, a center, and a Right, or what has been called the progressives, the middle-of-the-roaders, and the backward [elements]. This wasn’t started today; it’s just that some people are forgetful!

Do we want a major “rectification”? This will be determined by the future conduct of the gentlemen of the Right. Poisonous weeds must be rooted out; this is the digging up of poisonous weeds in [the realm of] ideology. To “rectify” a person is another matter. Until a person [perpetrates a] “serious violation of the law and disruption of order,” he will not be “rectified.”<sup>27</sup> What do we mean by “[perpetrating a] serious violation of the law and disruption of order?” It means that the interests of the nation and of the people have suffered serious damage, and moreover that this damage was caused by a situation where [people] repeatedly ignored warnings and pigheadedly did things their own way.<sup>28</sup> In cases of people who have made ordinary mistakes, we should even more [staunchly adhere to the method of] curing the illness to save the patient.<sup>29</sup> This is the proper limit generally, both inside and outside the Party. “Rectification” is also curing the illness and saving the patient.

How long must we wait to complete the task of the Party’s rectification? The present situation is moving forward very quickly; relations between the Party and the masses will improve rapidly. The way it looks now, in some [places] it can be completed in a few weeks, in some [places] in a few months, and in some [places] (for example, in the countryside) in about a year. As for studying Marxism and raising the ideological level, this will take a longer period.<sup>30</sup> Our unity and struggle with the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals will be a long-term [practice]. After the Communist Party’s rectification movement has reached a certain stage, we will suggest that the various democratic parties and people from all walks of life in society carry out rectification [movements among themselves]. This will speed up their progress and make it easier to isolate the small number of right-wing elements. At present it is the non-Party people who are helping us with our rectification. In a little while we will help the non-Party people with their rectification. This is what is meant by mutual assistance.<sup>31</sup> It will rectify incorrect tendencies, push them toward their opposites, and turn them into correct tendencies.<sup>32</sup> This is precisely what the people hope of us. We should live up to the people’s expectations.

## Notes

1. For details of these struggles, see R. MacFarquhar (1974), pp. 224, 261–262.
  2. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 34.
  3. See text Mar. 12, 1957, source note and note 19.
  4. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.
  5. Here Mao is speaking of the expression “democratic centralism”; see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80.
  6. This description may instructively be compared to Mao’s assessment in March of the percentage of intellectuals in society who support socialism. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 6.
  7. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.
  8. See text Sept. 25, 1956, note 14.
  9. See text April 1957(2), note 9.
  10. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 13.
  11. On the “Three-Anti’s” Campaign, see text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 10; on the campaign to suppress or eliminate (liquidate) counterrevolutionaries, see text Dec. 19, 1950, vol. I, source note. As for the campaign for ideological reform, Mao is referring not to one specific reform, but to a general, on-going campaign to oppose and reform bourgeois ideology in the CPC. (Up to this point, the policy had mostly been to reform what was perceived to be lingering remnants of bourgeois ideology in the Party, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, is a crucial document on the subject. From the second half of 1957 on, however, the target of reform was expanded to focus on the bourgeois intellectuals outside the CPC. It was deemed that there were also people within the CPC who had close linkages with these bourgeois elements outside. Eventually, in the early 1960s, the point of attack would revert to the “major bourgeois elements in the Party,” leading ultimately to the Cultural Revolution.) Even so, when we look back on the history of the “ideological reform campaign of the past” (as Mao puts it here), the question of whether the primary target is within the CPC or outside has been as much a question of tactical timing as of principle. After all, the key target of ideological reform and criticism in late 1953, shortly after the announcement of the August 12, 1953 speech, was Liang Shuming, a non-CPC intellectual, whereas the key target in 1954 was Hu Feng, a CPC intellectual.
  12. The saying used here, *taisui tou shang dong tu*, literally translates as “breaking the ground on Taisui day.” Because the cycle of Jupiter around the sun is eleven times greater than that of the Earth, that planet’s “year” is known in Chinese as “the great year” (*taisui*). By extension, this became a name for the planet Jupiter itself. An old superstition proscribed ground-breaking and construction on days when Jupiter and Earth were in alignment, for to do so was obviously to invite misfortune. This superstition was expressed in the chapter “Nansui” (Year of Peril) in Wang Chong’s *Lun heng* (On Equilibrium). The phrase thus means foolishly to create trouble for the high and mighty without considering the consequences. Mao is here saying that the Rightists consider themselves as the high and mighty, thus the campaigns that disturbed them were bound, in their view, to bring disaster on the CPC.
  13. See text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 8.
  14. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 33.
  15. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 33.
  16. The term here, *shishi qiu shi* (literally, “to find evidence for the truth from hard facts”), is a phrase often used by Mao in two different contexts: (1) to exhort Communists to be realistic about what can and cannot be done; (2) to exhort them to be careful that they must stand on solid ground before accusing or labeling anyone of anything. The second context is obviously applicable here.
- The saying, already a common one in Chinese, derives from the “Hejian Xian Wang De zhuan” (Biography of Liu De, Prince Xian of Hejian) in *Han shu* (History of the Han Dynasty). Much later it became the slogan of the *Han xue* or *kaozheng* (textual verification

and criticism) school of philosophy and historiography of the mid-Qing dynasty, and a favorite dictum of the great Qing scholar Zhang Xuecheng (1738–1801).

In text Jan. 27, 1957, paragraph 38, Mao says: “Realism [our translation for *shishi qiu shi* there] and subjectivism are opposed to each other.”

17. Up to this point Mao had been suggesting that the opinions of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals (fellow travelers of the Right) must be heeded. Here Mao seems to make a further concession to the viewpoint of the Rightists. For the consequences of this stand, see R. MacFarquhar (1974).

18. See text April 21, 1957, note 37.

19. Fu Ying was a professor of physical chemistry (particle physics) at Beijing University and a member of the Board of Physics, Mathematics, and Chemistry in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Fu remained nonaligned and never joined the CPC. In 1959 he was invited as a special personage to serve as a member of the Third National Committee of the CPPCC. He was reelected to the same post in 1964 and 1978.

20. For the meaning of the term *niugui sheshen*, translated here as demons and ogres, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54. The term “unicorn, phoenix, tortoise, and dragon” (*long, feng, gui, lin*) refers to the “four *ling*” (spiritual creatures, or omens of unusual grace and blessing) and is found in the chapter “Li yun” in *Li ji* (Book of Rites). Here it signifies upright people who serve the interests of the people and are a blessing to society. The same good-bad comparison between these two phrases applies to “fragrant flowers” and “poisonous weeds.” (See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.) For Mao’s repeated argument that good things emerge out of the struggle against bad things, and truth emerges out of the struggle against error, see texts Jan. 27, 1957, paragraph 17, and Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, paragraph 2.

21. Typhoons, the generic name given to violent storms originating in the western Pacific, are rated in terms of magnitude (and therefore by their potential for severity of devastation) on a numerical scale of one to ten. A seventh-grade typhoon rates as an exceptionally strong and ruinous wind. Mao used the term early in the year to describe the surge of sentiments of uncertainty and dissatisfaction with CPC policies, e.g., in text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraphs 5, 11, and 12. However, it is interesting to note that while Mao consistently spoke of the problems in early 1957 as “small typhoons” or even “miniature typhoons” (e.g., see text Feb. 27, 1957, section 3, paragraph 3), here he escalates the severity in speaking of a “seventh-grade typhoon.”

22. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 33.

23. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, paragraph 8.

24. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 65; also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 48.

25. The term Mao uses here, *wuyan zhangqi*, is a common saying that literally means “dark smoke and poisonous gas, or miasma.” The expression connects to Mao’s criticism of the bad things emanating from society at that time as “ill winds” (*waifeng*), opposed to the *zhengqi* (spirit—or “gas” of justice and righteousness). See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 51. Here Mao appears to go back to the criticism of newspapers such as *RMRB*; see text April 1957(1).

26. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

27. The character for “rectification” here is *zheng*, which has a double meaning. In the formal sense (e.g., when it is used in *zhengfeng*, meaning rectification of work style), it means correction, reorganization, setting aright, or completing an entirety. In the colloquial sense, however, it also means giving out bad treatment to somebody. Here, in speaking of the “rectification” of the individual, Mao appears to be employing the second meaning when he says “he will not be rectified.”

28. This saying, *yi yi gu xing*, is derived from the characterization of Zhao Yu, an official of the period of Emperor Wudi of the Han dynasty, in the chapter “Hao li liezhuan” (Biographies of Stern Officials) in *Shi ji* (Records of the Historian).

29. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.

30. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 5, paragraph 4.

31. Mao appears to be referring to the question of expanding the rectification from within

the CPC to a “rectification of the entire people” (i.e., focusing more on the people outside the CPC), which is a critical turning point in the course of rectification in 1957. See source note and note 11 here; also see text Mar. 12, 1957, source note. He also seems to be alluding indirectly to the phrase “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” between the CPC and other parties. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8.

32. The terms Mao uses here are *waifeng* (our translation here is “incorrect tendencies”; elsewhere we sometimes have “ill wind”) and *zhengfeng* (a twist on the term *zhengqi*), which we translate as “correct tendencies” here. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 51.

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## Telegram to Norway

(May 15, 1957)

**Source:** HNA, *Daily News Release* (May 18, 1957), 4.

*We have not found any Chinese text of this telegram. The HNA source is reprinted here as it originally appeared.*

On the occasion of the National Day of the Kingdom of Norway, I, on behalf of the Chinese people and in my own name, tender my warm greetings to Your Majesty and the Norwegian people. I wish Your Majesty health, the Kingdom of Norway prosperity and the Norwegian people happiness.

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## Reply to Ambassador of the People’s Republic of Hungary

(May 17, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 18, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: URI (1976), pp. 187–188. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (May 18, 1957), 5; FBIS, *Daily Report* (May 21, 1957), AAA 4–5; URI (1976), pp. 189–190.

*At this time Sandor Nogradi replaced Agostan Szkladan, whose position had been vacated in late 1956, as ambassador of the People’s Republic of Hungary to the PRC. The RMRB source does not carry a salutation for this speech.*

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the People’s Republic of Hungary appointing you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the People’s Republic of China, and am sincerely grateful for your greetings.

The industrious and heroic Hungarian people who have a glorious revolutionary tradition have attained great successes in the twelve years since their liberation in the cause of socialist construction and the defense of peace.

Not long ago, forces of imperialist aggression and Hungarian reactionaries took advantage of the discontent of the broad masses of people toward the mistakes committed by the leadership in the past and put in motion a plot for counterrevolutionary restoration aimed at overthrowing Hungary's socialist system.<sup>1</sup> However, under the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government, and relying on the aid of the Soviet Union [extended in the name of] internationalism, the Hungarian people totally crushed this counterrevolutionary plot. This great victory of the Hungarian people not only safeguarded Hungary's people's democratic system and the cause of socialism, but also contributed tremendously to the entire camp for socialism and to world peace.

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government have made tremendous efforts in uniting all the democratic forces under the leadership of the working class and in the areas of realizing a dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring the national economy, and have attained tremendous successes. I am confident that the Hungarian people will be able to overcome all difficulties and march forward uninterruptedly along the glorious and happy road of socialism.

The Chinese people have always felt deep concern for the struggle waged by the Hungarian people for the sake of building socialism and safeguarding peace. Moreover, they regard the Hungarian people's victory as their own, and are joyful and inspired by it. The Hungarian people can always count on the wholehearted support of the 600 million Chinese people in their struggle to protect and build socialism. The Chinese people would like to express their heartfelt gratitude for the aid that the Hungarian people have given China in many areas of its socialist construction. In recent years, the brotherly friendship between our two peoples and their mutual cooperation in the areas of politics, economics, and culture has already had very great development. The continuous growth of such relations of brotherly friendship will not only be helpful to the prosperity and happiness of our two peoples, but will also strengthen the large socialist family headed by the great Soviet Union and the forces for world peace and democracy.

Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of Hungary to the People's Republic of China. In your work of further developing and strengthening the friendly cooperation between China and Hungary, you will receive my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish you complete success in your work.

#### Note

1. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.

## Reply to Ambassador of the People's Republic of Mongolia

(May 17, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 18, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: URI (1976), pp. 191–192. Available English Translation: URI (1976), pp. 193–194.

*At this time Sonomin Lubsan replaced Bayabatoryn Ochirbat as the ambassador of the People's Republic of Mongolia to the PRC. The RMRB source does not carry a salutation for this speech.*

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the Presidium of the Greater People's Hural of the People's Republic of Mongolia appointing you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the People's Republic of China, and extend to you a warm welcome.

Under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the government of the Mongolian People's Republic, the Mongolian people have, through thirty-six years of effort, achieved numerous accomplishments in the cause of socialist construction. The Chinese people rejoice in it and are inspired by this.

In the last few years, the sincere and brotherly relations of friendship between the peoples of China and Mongolia have been consolidated and developed with each passing day. The close cooperation between China and Mongolia in the areas of politics, economy and culture not only has brought to the people of the two countries enormous practical benefits, but also has had immense significance in enhancing the solidarity of the great socialist family headed by the Soviet Union and in the cause of safeguarding world peace. Comrade Ambassador, in your work for the consolidation and development of the friendship and cooperation between China and Mongolia you are assured of my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China.

I wish you success in your work.

## Speech to Delegates of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Youth League

(Excerpt)

(May 22, 1957)

**Source:** *Jiaoyu yulu*, p. 5. Other Chinese text: URI (1976), p. 195. Available English Translation: URI (1976), p. 197.

This actually refers to the Third National Congress of the Chinese New Democratic Youth League (May 15–25, 1957, Beijing). The name of the league was changed at this meeting to the Chinese Communist Youth League. This change has ideological connotations, signifying that the phase in which its responsibility was mainly to promote the goals of new democracy was over, and that it must turn toward leading the society along the path of Communist revolution. (For this and for an earlier Communist Youth League reference, see text June 30, 1953, vol. I, source note.) It is the eighth congress if one takes into consideration all of the congresses of the former Socialist Youth League, the former Communist Youth League, and the New Democratic Youth League, all earlier incarnations of the Communist Youth League. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.

You must be people who stand firmly on the earth and hold up the heavens.<sup>1</sup> To hold up the heavens means being able to master Marxism-Leninism, standing on a high plane so as to see far into the distance;<sup>2</sup> to stand firmly on the earth means to have a firm mass base and to become one with the masses.

#### Notes

1. This is a literal translation of the Chinese saying *ding tian li di*, which means being upright and uncompromising in one's moral principles, as well as being heroic and courageous. The original source of this saying is unknown; one derivation is a line in the Yuan-dynasty opera *Zhao shi gu er* (The Orphan of Zhao). It is interesting to note also that later Mao made the comment that in the New China, women "hold up half the sky."

2. Mao is here modifying the Chinese saying *gao zhan yuan zhu*, which means being far-sighted. The saying is derived from the book *Yeshou bao yan* (The Words of the Old Man of the Country Basking in the Sun).

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### Speech at Reception for Delegates to Third Congress of the New Democratic Youth League

(May 25, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 26, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *Xuanji*, V, p. 430; *XHBYK*, 110 (June 25, 1957), 57; *URI* (1976), p. 199; *Lun qingnian*, p. 14; excerpts in *Buyi*, p. 143; *Wansui* (1967b), p. 15; *Hongyi zhanbao*. Available English Translations: *SW*, V, p. 447; J. Chen (1970), p. 82; *URI* (1976), p. 201; excerpted in *CB*, 891 (Oct. 8, 1969), 23; *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 1110 (July 3, 1968); *NCNA, Daily Bulletin*, 6901 (Dec. 7, 1967), cover; quoted in *HNA, Daily News Release* (May 26, 1957), 6; *FBIS, Daily Report* (May 27, 1957), BBB 3.

See text May 22, 1957, source note. *Wansui* (n.d. 3) also lists this speech in its table of contents, but indicates that the actual text is omitted.

Your congress has been very successful. I hope you will unite and become the core of leadership for youth throughout the entire country.

The Chinese Communist Party is the core of the leadership for the entire Chinese people. Without such a core, the socialist cause could not be victorious.

This congress of yours is one of unity and will have a great influence on youth throughout the country. I extend to you my congratulations.

Comrades, unite; and resolutely and courageously struggle for the great cause of socialism. All words and actions deviating from socialism are totally wrong.

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### Telegram to Afghanistan

(May 25, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 27, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 110 (June 25, 1957), 100; *URI* (1976), p. 203. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (May 27, 1957), 1; *FBIS, Daily Report* (May 28, 1957), AAA 16; *URI* (1976), p. 205.

The *RMRB* source does not carry the customary salutations and signature. The telegram is addressed to King Muhammad Sahir Shah.

On the occasion of the Independence Day of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, on behalf of the people and government of China and on my own behalf, I extend my sincere congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of Afghanistan.

We are happy to see that the friendly relations between China and Afghanistan have already developed in the last year. We are confident that such friendly relations will surely be consolidated continuously and will be strengthened from now on through the common efforts of both sides. May the country of Afghanistan prosper, may the people of Afghanistan be happy, and may Your Majesty enjoy good health.

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### Farewell Speech to Voroshilov

(May 26, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 27, 1957), 3. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 110 (June 25, 1957), 94; *URI* (1976), pp. 207–208. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (May 27, 1957), 3; *URI* (1976), pp. 209–210.

*For Voroshilov's visit to China, see text April 15, 1957, source note.*

Dear Comrade Voroshilov, Comrades, and Friends:

After a warm and friendly visit of more than twenty days to various areas in our country, Comrade Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, and his entourage went on to pay friendly visits to the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. Now they are leaving our country for a visit to the Mongolian People's Republic, and we have come to see them off with a profound feeling of sorrow on this parting.

Comrade Voroshilov's visit to China has added a new and brilliant page to the glorious history of the relations of friendship between China and the Soviet Union. He brought with him the brotherly feelings that the Soviet people have for the Chinese people; this warm encounter with broad masses of the people of China vividly demonstrated once again the profound and solid friendship that has long existed between the Chinese and Soviet peoples. We hope that Comrade Voroshilov will bring back with him the most sincere and friendly wishes that the Chinese people have for the Soviet people to all the people of the Soviet Union.

Comrade Voroshilov! As you will soon leave us, please allow me to express again, on behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese government, and the Communist Party of China, our utmost gratitude to you and, through you, to the Soviet people, the Soviet government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although we will be parted for the time being, the hearts of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union will forever be closely linked together.

Dear Comrade Chairman! I wish you good health, and a safe journey, and may you achieve even greater successes in the noble cause of promoting the prosperity and happiness of the Soviet people and safeguarding world peace.

Long live the eternal unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples!

Long live the great solidarity of the various socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union!

Long live world peace!

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### Letter to Sun Yan

(June 8, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, p. 259.

Comrade Peijun:<sup>1</sup>

I have received your letter of May 16. I am gratified to learn that you have already graduated from junior middle school. As for the matter of your graduating

to a higher level of studying, it would not be appropriate for me to write to the school [on your behalf]. Whether or not you succeed in passing the matriculation examination and getting placed is up to the school. If it is not possible for you to advance to a higher level of schooling, you may still do some studying at home. I send, enclosed, 300 *yuan* (*rmb*) for your mother;<sup>2</sup> in the future I may send some more funds. Do not worry.

Mao Zedong

June 8, 1957

### Notes

1. According to the *Shuxin* source, Peijun is the name that Sun Yan used in school.

2. This refers to Chen Yuying, who had been a nursemaid in Mao's household when Mao was married to Yang Kaihui (see text May 11, 1957[2], note 2).

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### Organize Our Forces to Counter the Reckless Attacks of the Rightists

(June 8, 1957)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 431–433. Available English Translation: *SW*, V, pp. 448–450.

*This is, according to the Xuanji source (p. 431), an intra-CPC directive drafted by Mao on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC. For more detail on the issue of the attacks made by the "Rightist" elements on the CPC at this time—attacks which apparently prompted Mao's rather severe indictment here—see text July 1, 1957. In particular, it appears that it was mainly the actions of a group of intellectuals led by Zhang Bojun (see text July 1, 1957, source note, note 3, and note 27) that precipitated this counteraction on Mao's part. According to information from Ciyu jianshi (p. 209), Zhang's group held an emergency meeting on June 6, resolving on a platform of bringing the criticism of the CPC's policies into the colleges and universities.*

*In addition to the timing, the importance of this document is that here (probably for the first time openly and explicitly), Mao called for the democratic parties each to hold its own meeting to undertake rectification. In other words, Mao is demanding that the rectification campaign, which had been largely intended as a CPC campaign (with the participation of people outside the CPC only on a voluntary basis, as declared by the CPC Central Committee's directive on April 27—see *RMSC* [1958], p. 29, section 3, last paragraph—and possibly with "the help of" people in the democratic parties), should now be expanded to a wider campaign in which people in the democratic parties would themselves become targets to be rectified. (See text May 15, 1957, source note and note 31, and text Mar. 12, 1957, source note.) In light of the fact that we find no evidence of this being discussed on these terms at a series*

*of forums (zuotanhui), convened by the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, in which the leaders of the democratic parties took part (see RMSC [1958], p. 30), and that these meetings were held over a whole month's time, from May 8 to June 3, we are led to the distinct impression that Mao had decided not to wait for the overly optimistically anticipated results to emerge out of these forums, but to move ahead of the others in the Central Committee in making the demand (proposal) included in this document. The fact that his proposal is quite specific in the steps to be taken suggests that Mao had already given the matter thought for some time. Furthermore, Mao made it clear that whereas the CPC rectification had been intended to combat bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism, the rectification to take place in the democratic parties and among the people at large was to combat bourgeois ideas.*

Approximately fifteen days are enough time for the great contending and blooming<sup>1</sup> in the [state] organs at the provincial and municipal levels and in the institutions of higher learning. The reactionaries are making reckless attacks. The wavering elements among the members of the Party and the League either have betrayed [us] or are vacillating and thinking about betraying [us]. The activist elements and middle-of-the-roaders among the broad masses of the Party and League membership are rising up to oppose them.<sup>2</sup> They are using big-character posters as a weapon; both sides are gaining experience in the struggle, and their members are getting tempered. The number of reactionary elements is no more than a few per cent; the most active fanatic elements are no more than 1 per cent. Therefore they are nothing to be afraid of. We mustn't be frightened by a brief period in which the sky seems dark and gloomy. The reactionaries will go to factories and schools other than their own to carry on their activities, so we must make preparations beforehand to prevent their entry. We should convene meetings of principal cadres and veteran workers in the plants to explain that there are some bad capitalists, bad intellectuals, and reactionaries in society who are in the process of making reckless attacks on the working class and the Communist Party and who are seeking to overthrow the political power led by the working class. They must remember not to fall into their trap. If some people want to instigate [trouble], they should be barred from entry [into the factory or school]. If they put up reactionary slogans in the streets, the masses should be mobilized to tear them down. The workers should see the overall situation clearly and should not make trouble. Questions of welfare and wages should not be brought up in this period so that we can deal with the reactionaries in unison.

Please pay attention to the reckless attacks by the reactionaries within the various democratic parties.<sup>3</sup> Each party should be organized to hold its own forums<sup>4</sup> in which Leftists, middle-of-the-roaders, and Rightists all participate so that correct as well as incorrect opinions are all exposed. Reporters should be sent to report on them. We should tactfully prompt the Leftists and the middle-of-the-roaders to make statements to counterattack the Rightists. This should be quite effective. Each party newspaper should prepare several dozen essays to be published one after another once the high tide [of Rightist attacks] in that area begins to recede. We should pay attention to organizing the middle-of-the-roaders and Leftists to write articles, but until the tide recedes, the party newspapers should not publish many

articles representing the correct view.<sup>5</sup> (They may publish some articles by middle-of-the-roaders.) The masses must be allowed to make rebuttals in big-character posters. Meetings of professors should be organized in institutions of higher learning to make suggestions to the Party, and, as much as possible, the Rightists should be made to spit out all their poison and have it published in the newspapers.

Let them make speeches to the students, and let the students freely express their attitudes. It would be best to let the reactionary professors, lecturers, teaching assistants, and students spit out their poison and pour out everything they have to say. They are the best teachers. At the appropriate time, we must promptly organize separate group meetings for members of the Party and the League to distinguish between different criticisms; [we will] accept those that are of a constructive nature and will correct our own mistakes and shortcomings, whereas those criticisms that are of a destructive nature we will refute. At the same time we should organize some non-Party personages to lecture, to speak for the correct side. Afterward, somebody holding a responsible position in the Party who is of fairly high prestige can make an analytical and persuasive speech to change the atmosphere completely. A month or so should be sufficient to complete the entire process if we do things well. Afterward we can shift to a ["gentle breezes and mild rain"] type of rectification within the Party.<sup>6</sup>

This is a great political struggle and ideological struggle. Only by thus doing will our Party be able to assume the initiative, train capable people, educate the masses, and isolate the reactionaries, putting them on the defensive. In the past seven years we have taken the initiative in form, but in reality in at least half of the cases the initiative was phony. The reactionaries faked surrender, and many of the middle-of-the-road people did not submit to us willingly. But now the situation has begun to change. We find ourselves defensive in form, but actually we have begun to take the initiative because we are undertaking rectification seriously. The heads of the reactionaries have become so inflated that they are extremely reckless; they seem to be extremely active, but because they've overstepped themselves, they've begun to lose the support of the people and have begun to find themselves on the defensive. Different conditions prevail in different locations; you can apply your tactics and make your arrangements flexibly.

In any case, this is a great battle. (The battlefield is within the Party as well as outside it.) If we don't win this fight, we won't be able to complete the building of socialism, and moreover, there is some risk of a "Hungarian Incident" emerging.<sup>7</sup> In taking the initiative to launch a rectification campaign now, we are taking the initiative to [artificially] induce a potential "Hungarian Incident." We are fragmenting it and letting it take place and be handled in individual organizations and schools; we can fragment it into many small "Hungarys." Moreover, [then] the Party and the government basically won't be corrupted and put into disarray; only a small part will be corrupted and put into disarray (it is just fine for this part to be corrupted and put in disarray, [it will be like] squeezing the pus out of an abscess), and this will be extremely beneficial. It was unavoidable. Since there are still reactionary elements in society, since the middle-of-the-road elements have not yet learned the lesson that they are now being taught, and since the Party has not yet

received the kind of tempering it is now undergoing, one of these days there surely would be trouble.

Currently the domestic situation is excellent. We are able to hold together firmly the workers, the peasants, the Party, the government, the armed forces, and the majority of students with us. The international situation is very good; the United States is in a difficult position.<sup>8</sup>

### Notes

1. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.
2. This refers to the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League; see text May 15, 1957, note 4, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74, for the latter.
3. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.
4. A different set of forums, convened by the CPC Central Committee's United Front Department, had been held May 8–June 3. See source note.
5. Mao is responding here to the fact that newspaper articles, such as those in *Wenhui bao*, had been the chief vehicles for the “bourgeois intellectuals’ ” attacks on the CPC. See text July 1, 1957, middle section of paragraph 6.
6. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29. This paragraph here forecasts the last paragraph of text July 1, 1957.
7. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.
8. Mao may be referring here to the mounting pressure that the U.S. government was experiencing from its European allies and Japan on the issue of trading with the PRC. This pressure had been increasing through March and April 1957. On April 18, Britain's Foreign Affairs Under-Secretary Ian Harvey told the House of Commons that Britain would “act on its own economic interests to bring into line varying trade restrictions with Communist China and with the USSR.” This forced the U.S. government to announce on April 20 that it had proposed a review of trade policies “in an effort to meet the views of . . . allies.” It reiterated, however, that the U.S. would continue its unilateral embargo on all trade with the PRC. In May, a special NATO committee was formed to discuss the issue. Afterward, at the end of May, Britain announced a policy to modify its restrictions on exports to the PRC. This prompted statements of disappointment from the U.S. State Department, and from President Eisenhower, at a press conference on June 5. For more information, see F. Schurmann (1974), pp. 259–265.

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## What Is This For?

(June 8, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 8, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *RMSC* (1958), p. 73–74; *Shengping ziliao*, pp. 362–363, (excerpt).

*This is an RMRB editorial that was not published under Mao's signature, but is alleged to have been written by Mao. For some of the impact of the Rightist attacks on the CPC that prompted this article, see text July 1, 1957. This article is often considered the first salvo in the anti-Rightist campaign of the CPC in 1957.*

Because Lu Yuwen,<sup>1</sup> member of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang and aide to the general secretary of the State Council, expressed some dissenting views at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee Group of the “Revolutionary KMT”<sup>2</sup> on May 25 when the meeting was discussing how that Party could assist the Communist party in its rectification campaign,<sup>3</sup> some people wrote an unsigned letter to him to threaten him. The letter read, in part, “In the newspapers we read your speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Kuomintang and we are very angry at you about it. We are opposed to your views; we are in total agreement with the opinions of Tan Tiwu *xiansheng*.<sup>4</sup> We think that you are precisely the type described by Tan *xiansheng* as a person without shame. You have now climbed onto the throne of being an aide to the general secretary of the State Council. In the past you have contributed greatly to erecting the wall and digging the gulch between the Communist Party and non-Party people, and now you even have the audacity to act as [the Communist Party's] jackal.<sup>5</sup> You are really without shame. We are warning you, turn back while you still have the chance, or the people will not forgive you.”

It is a very grave thing for such an incident to occur in the midst of the Communist Party's rectification campaign. Each of us should give it a thought: What is this about anyway?

What did Lu Yuwen actually say at the May 25 meeting? In summary, [what he said was this]: (1) He told people that they should not confuse bourgeois democracy with socialist democracy and must not weaken or eliminate the leadership of the Communist Party; (2) He said that when the State Council met it should have documents well-prepared for it beforehand so that in its discussions it may avoid following the style of the assemblies in bourgeois countries—quarreling all day long, discussing but not making any decisions—and that we must not use the excuse of formalism to stop people from discussing; (3) He said that he personally got along very well with Communist Party members and there was no wall or gulch [between him and them]; that if there were walls and gulches between some people and some [Communist] Party members, then these should be “taken down, or filled up, from both sides,” with both sides taking the initiative; (4) He said that with regard to certain criticisms, the Communists were entitled to a chance for rebuttal, and that such responses should not be considered as acts of vengeance or counter-attack; (5) He suggested some specific opinions regarding the issue of how it is possible for people outside the [Communist] Party to hold [official] positions and also hold commensurate power.<sup>6</sup> We, like many of our readers, feel compelled to ask: In what way is expressing these realistic and reasonable opinions “playing the role of a jackal” and “having no shame”? Why must he “turn back while he has a chance” or “face the wrath of the people”?

When people describe Lu Yuwen's speech as “being a jackal,” naturally, in the minds of the letter writers, they consider the Communist Party as the “tiger.” Indeed, in leading the Chinese people in the battle against their mortal enemies—imperialism and the forces of feudalism,<sup>7</sup> the Communist Party has been as ferocious as a tiger, and no power can daunt it or make it give way. To the Chinese

people, however, the Communist Party is their best friend. It has helped the people in overthrowing the counterrevolutionary forces that had been riding on the people's backs, helped them take back such means of production as land and factories, thus allowing the people to shake the brutal yoke of the exploiting classes and to take back control of their own historic destiny in their own hands, and, at this very moment, to march in the direction of the long-range goals of socialism and communism—the enrichment and happiness of the people. The broadest majority of the people have never in the past been filled with as bright a hope or as great a joy in living as they have in the period of Communist leadership. [Of course], the Communist Party has had its mistakes and weaknesses; the Communist Party's rectification campaign is precisely intended to rectify these mistakes and weaknesses. All people who hold sincerely good intentions toward the [Communist] Party and toward the cause of socialism are actively proposing opinions to help the Communist Party in its rectification so as to strengthen the cause of socialism and to consolidate the [Communist] Party's leadership of the people's masses.<sup>8</sup> And yet, precisely at such a time, some people are branding speeches that defend socialist democracy and the Communist Party's right to leadership as "shameless to the extreme" and "playing the role of a jackal," and comparing Communists to fear-inspiring and man-eating "tigers." Doesn't the political countenance of such people cause us to sit up and be vigilant? These people warn Lu Yuwen to "turn back while there is time"; just think—what do they mean? Where, in what direction, is he supposed to "turn back?"<sup>9</sup> Naturally, such people are apt to claim, in other places, that they are the ones who are truly supportive of socialism and of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, can we possibly believe that people who harbor such deep hatred for the vanguard of the laboring people can actually be helping the Communist Party in its rectification and supporting the cause of socialism?

The reason that we believe this threatening to be a major incident in current political life is that this letter indeed is a warning to the broad masses of the people. It is a signal that some people are taking advantage of the [Communist] Party's rectification campaign to carry out severe class struggle. This letter tells us that although the large-scale class struggle in the country has become a thing of the past, class struggle itself as a whole has not yet died down and that this is particularly true on the ideological front.<sup>10</sup> [Comrade] He Xiangning,<sup>11</sup> an old alumna of the revolution, has put it well: "Today we are in a new age; under the leadership of the Communist Party and Chairman Mao, we are stepping toward socialism. [However], is it true that at such a time everything will be all of the same color?<sup>12</sup> That there will no longer be Left, Right, and the center? No. That will not be." She points out that a very small minority of the people are dishonest about their attitude toward socialism; their hearts in fact hanker for capitalism; the vision in their minds is that of a European or American style of politics, and these people are today's Rightists. Under the pretext of "helping the Communist Party in its rectification," this small minority of Rightists is challenging the leadership of the Communist Party and the working class, or even blatantly clamoring for the Communist Party to "step down." They attempt to seize this opportunity to overthrow the Communist Party and the

working class, and to topple the great cause of socialism. They want to drag history backward, back to a bourgeois dictatorship—in fact backward to the situation of semicolonialism that existed before the revolution—and to resubjugate the Chinese people to the reactionary rule of imperialism and its running dogs. However, they have forgotten that today's China is no longer the China of the past. The broad masses of the people will never permit history to be dragged backward. In every place in the country where the rectification campaign is being carried out, these Rightist elements are seeking to take advantage of the rectification campaign to isolate the Communist Party and people who support socialism, but it is they who are actually isolated as a result. In the various democratic parties and among the high-level intellectuals, there are a few Rightist elements who, as Lu Yuwen described, are hoping to use the methods of maligning and threatening and "confining people's speech by pretending to have a 'fair' attitude," or even to adopt the means of writing a threatening letter to achieve their goals. But isn't this overdoing it too much? Things, when they reach their extreme, will take a reverse course;<sup>13</sup> don't they understand this truth?

It is very obvious that albeit that some people are calling for the Communist Party to "step down" and others are writing threatening letters to those who support the Communist Party, such things cannot shake the Communist Party and the people's masses in the slightest. The Communist Party will persist in its rectification and in listening to all the well-intentioned criticism of the people outside the Party, and the people's masses will persist in following the road of socialism under the Communist Party's leadership. The threats and insults serve only to remind us that class struggle is still going on in our country, and that we must still use the viewpoint of class struggle to perceive all current phenomena, so as to reach accurate conclusions.

## Notes

1. For more biographical information on Lu Yuwen (1900–1968), see URI (1969), I, p. 482.

2. The Zhongguo guomindang geming weiyuanhui (Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang) was formed in Hong Kong in January 1948; its charter membership comprised splinter groups of the KMT who were opposed to Chiang Kai-shek's policies—e.g., the Sanmin zhuyi tongzhi lianhe hui (League of Comrades of the Three People's Principles) and the Zhongguo guomindang minzhu cujin hui (Association of the Chinese Kuomintang to Promote Democracy). In 1949, the group joined the CPPCC and became one of the largest "democratic parties" in the PRC. (See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1, and text Winter 1949, vol. I, note 2.) For the conditions of the organization in 1956–1957, see *RMSC* (1957), pp. 249–250. The name of the organization is abbreviated to *Min ge*, which we have translated as "Revolutionary KMT" here.

3. The official line of the CPC rectification campaign was to have the non-CPC personages, parties, and organizations "assist the CPC in its rectification." At the first of thirteen forums of democratic parties convened by the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, May 8–June 3, 1957 (see text June 8, 1957[2], source note), Director Li Weihuan announced that the purpose of the forums was to "Ask all of you to help us [i.e., the CPC] carry out rectification, help us correct our shortcomings and amend mistakes, and to promote our rectification through the form of the United Front." (See *RMSC*



people, however, the Communist Party is their best friend. It has helped the people in overthrowing the counterrevolutionary forces that had been riding on the people's backs, helped them take back such means of production as land and factories, thus allowing the people to shake the brutal yoke of the exploiting classes and to take back control of their own historic destiny in their own hands, and, at this very moment, to march in the direction of the long-range goals of socialism and communism—the enrichment and happiness of the people. The broadest majority of the people have never in the past been filled with as bright a hope or as great a joy in living as they have in the period of Communist leadership. [Of course], the Communist Party has had its mistakes and weaknesses; the Communist Party's rectification campaign is precisely intended to rectify these mistakes and weaknesses. All people who hold sincerely good intentions toward the [Communist] Party and toward the cause of socialism are actively proposing opinions to help the Communist Party in its rectification so as to strengthen the cause of socialism and to consolidate the [Communist] Party's leadership of the people's masses.<sup>8</sup> And yet, precisely at such a time, some people are branding speeches that defend socialist democracy and the Communist Party's right to leadership as "shameless to the extreme" and "playing the role of a jackal," and comparing Communists to fear-inspiring and man-eating "tigers." Doesn't the political countenance of such people cause us to sit up and be vigilant? These people warn Lu Yuwen to "turn back while there is time"; just think—what do they mean? Where, in what direction, is he supposed to "turn back?"<sup>9</sup> Naturally, such people are apt to claim, in other places, that they are the ones who are truly supportive of socialism and of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, can we possibly believe that people who harbor such deep hatred for the vanguard of the laboring people can actually be helping the Communist Party in its rectification and supporting the cause of socialism?

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[1958], p. 30.) However, it is also noteworthy that by the time of this document, i.e., by early June, Mao himself had already called for the democratic parties to carry out their own rectification (see text June 8, 1957[2], source note) and had spoken about the CPC helping non-CPC people with their rectification instead of the other way around (see text May 15, 1957, note 31).

4. Tan Tiwu was a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang. She was also a delegate, from Hunan Province, to the National People's Congress and a member of the GAC. The title used here in referring to Tan is *xiansheng*, a common term of respect that usually, but not necessarily, refers to a male, and is translated as "Mr." In this case, since Tan is a woman, that would be inappropriate. The term becomes more one of respect and honor when it applies to a female, since then it reverts to its literal meaning: "earlier born," i.e., "elder." Since we cannot use "Mr." here, we have chosen to keep the transliteration rather than force an inappropriate translation.

5. We have, in this translation, taken some liberties with the language to render the meaning in a more familiar Western metaphor. The Chinese here, and in other parts of the text where the word "jackal" is used, reads *wei hu zuo chang*, or "being a *chang* for a tiger." This is derived from a superstition, explained in the book *Zheng zi tong* (A Compendium of the Meaning of Words), that when a person is eaten by a tiger, his soul dares not depart, but becomes a ghost known as *chang*. This spirit would then follow the tiger wherever it roams and act as its herald, seeking vulnerable bodies for it to devour further.

6. This refers to the criticism raised at the May 8 (the first) forum convened by the United Front Department (see note 3) by Zhang Bojun, chairman of the Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic Party (Zhongguo nonggong minzhu dang) and a vice-chairman of the Chinese Democratic League (Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng). Zhang claimed that while the democratic parties had "official" positions in the PRC system of government, they had no real power, thus their position is rendered merely titular. On May 13, 1957, Zhang and Luo Longji, another vice-chairman of the Democratic League, convened a forum of the Central Committee of the Democratic League at which several "work groups" were established to study problems of working out a *modus vivendi* with the CPC, in which the Democratic League would have a greater role in political matters, and greater power to go with it. One of the problems specifically had to do with *you zhi you quan* (having commensurate power to go with titles and positions). See also text May 15, 1957, paragraph 6.

7. Here Mao invokes two of the so-called Three Big Mountains. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 5.

8. This was articulated as the goal of the policy of the CPC in the area of United Front work at the time. See note 3.

9. Mao's rhetorical question is obviously directed against the possible swing toward revisionism (see text May 15, 1957, source note), or a restoration of capitalism.

10. See text Feb. 27, 1957, text surrounding note 43.

11. The honorific term used here for He is *xiansheng*, as in the case of Tan Tiwu earlier in this document (see note 4). He Xiangning also is a woman, and the title "Mr." would be inappropriate. In this case, however, because the editorial speaks favorably of He (which it does not of Tan), we have put "Comrade" as a substitute for *xiansheng*. He Xiangning (1880-1972) was the wife of Liao Zhongkai, a prominent member of the KMT who was the chief architect of the KMT-CPC alliance of the early 1920s. Liao was a good friend of Sun Yat-sen and helped him greatly in the effort to reorganize the KMT along Leninist lines. He was assassinated in 1925. He Xiangning, his widow, and Liao Chengzhi, his son, were also been very active in the PRC government and in the CPPCC, representing the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT. He Xiangning was also chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission from 1949 to 1959. For more biographical information on He, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1968), pp. 67-68. Also see text Sept. 4, 1956, note 7.

12. The Chinese term here is *qing yi se*. For the meaning, see text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 12; see also text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 55.

13. See text Sept. 25, 1956, note 14; see also text May 15, 1957, note 8.

## We Must Have Positive Criticism, and Also Accurate Counter criticism

(June 9, 1957)

Source: *RMRB* (June 9, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *Shengping ziliao*, pp. 363-364, (excerpt).

*This is an RMRB editorial that was not published under Mao's signature but was considered to have been Mao's writing.*

Positive and constructive criticism will always be needed in the people's cause. The rectification campaign of the Communist Party of China is precisely a systematic campaign of criticism and self-criticism. To encourage criticism and to dispel the worries of those who are offering criticism, the Party's directive on the rectification campaign<sup>1</sup> pointed out that we must implement resolutely the principles of "telling all that one knows; saying everything that one wishes to say; those who speak up must in no way be incriminated, those who listen [to criticism] should learn a lesson; if there are errors, corrections would be made; if not, there should be encouragement."<sup>2</sup> Criticisms, however pointed, ought to be enthusiastically welcomed, as long as they are intended to strengthen the socialist cause, the people's democratic dictatorship,<sup>3</sup> and the solidarity between the Party and the people. Any restriction on such criticism or any attack or retaliation on people who make such criticism is totally wrong and ought to be opposed resolutely. Every member of the Communist Party should firmly commit to heart the adages of ancient China that say "Good medicine is bitter to the taste but good for curing the illness; an honest word bends the ear the wrong way but is a true guide to good behavior."<sup>4</sup>

[However], criticism that is entirely well-intentioned still may not be correct or may not be entirely correct. Under such circumstances, there is need for proper explanation, which means appropriate counter criticism. It is obvious that accurate counter criticism does not hinder the development of criticism itself. It has nothing in common with restriction on criticism or retaliatory attacks on those who criticize. It is entirely normal to permit accurate counter criticism; it is prohibiting accurate counter criticism that is abnormal.

As for badly intended criticism, criticism whose purpose is to sabotage the socialist cause, to undermine the people's democratic dictatorship, and to destroy the solidarity between the Party and the people, such criticism does not conform to the people's interest or to that of the Party's rectification campaign. It is therefore naturally even more necessary to have accurate counter criticism for such destructive criticism.

Some people have picked up the ready-made terminology in the policy toward

scholarship and culture and have applied the phrase "let a hundred schools of thought contend, let a hundred flowers bloom" to the development of all sorts of criticisms, or even simply call them great "contending and great blooming."<sup>5</sup> This kind of usage is, of course, permissible. However, if we are to speak of "contending" and "blooming," then, simply from the meaning of the words, we should be able to see that one type of opinion should be allowed to be published just as much as opinions of another type. In other words, if we permit criticism, we must also permit counter-criticism; otherwise, how can we talk of "contending" and "blooming"?

And yet, at the present stage of the rectification campaign, some unhealthy, and even extremely vile signs of things have appeared, which are that some people are doing all they can in attempts to prohibit others from expressing opinions different from their own. The incident of Lu Yuwen receiving a letter of threats is an example.<sup>6</sup> Today this newspaper carries news of an incident at Fudan University in Shanghai where Shu Zongqiao and company have prevented Ta Yijin from expressing his views; this is another example.<sup>7</sup>

There are indeed people today who, though they speak praisefully of "contending" and "blooming" with every breath, in fact attempt only to let themselves speak and not to allow others to speak in response. They generalize all the ideas of Marxism as "dogma" and contemptuously describe all socialist systems and organizations as "bureaucratic" systems and organizations.<sup>8</sup> According to them, to speak up in their way is to "contend" and "bloom." However, if someone were to point out that what they say was in fact to deny Marxism and repudiate socialism, they would immediately respond, "Why are you standing out to make such an explanation? Isn't that obstructing the masses' activism in contending and blooming?" "We are helping the [Communist] Party in its rectification! Isn't all criticism, even the incorrect criticism, beneficial to the Party?" They would also say, "Did you say that I have been wrong in my description of the facts? Why don't you 'correct your errors if you have them and simply accept the encouragement if you do not'?" Aside from these, there are also people, such as Chen Mingshu,<sup>9</sup> who would make the following direct exhortation: "Only if we talk exclusively of the weaknesses [of the Party] and do not mention its strength can we say that we are conforming to the 'spirit of rectification'!" This is to imply that those who speak of both the weaknesses and the strengths, of both mistakes and achievements, and those who speak up in the debate and explain the situation are people who stand in the way of the "rectification." In this way they abruptly seal up the mouths of those who stand in opposition against them, or, at least, place others in a [disadvantaged] position where, if you argued against them you would be "immodest."

Let us think about it a bit; can this be called "helping the Party in its rectification"? If a doctor arbitrarily exaggerated, or incorrectly diagnosed, a patient's condition and declared that so-and-so is in a critical condition; that so-and-so is no longer capable of being healed, and if this so-and-so said, "Although I have some small illness, I am still basically healthy, and what you say about my condition does not conform to the facts," and if the doctor then said, "This precisely indicates that you are unwilling to accept treatment, and you are striking at the doctor's activism,

which proves that you simply cannot be cured," can we say that there ought to be such unreasonable doctors under the sun?

Since the beginning of the rectification campaign, the vast majority of the criticisms and proposals that have already been suggested with regard to the Party and the government are accurate ones and ought to be heard, studied, and accepted. However, incorrect opinions that are not beneficial to the cause of socialism have also appeared in no small numbers. For example, at this very moment, there are people who are advocating that the leadership of the Communist Party ought to be abolished; there are people who curse socialist construction, saying that it has been totally wrong, and others are advocating the "fairness" of extending capitalist exploitation for another twenty years.<sup>10</sup> Since there are these two very different types of criticism, everybody who is responsible to the people's cause cannot muddle-headedly and indiscriminately take all criticism to be beneficial to the people, and must not fail to offer dissenting opinions with regard to those inaccurate and destructive "criticisms." To fail to offer counter-criticism against incorrect opinions, to fail to carry out debate, will not only result in a failure to clarify the situation, but will also inevitably cause damage to the cause of socialism. Mr. Deng Chumin<sup>11</sup> said, "In the wake of great contending and great blooming there must be great struggle." This is entirely correct. The socialist transformation of our country has only just been completed in its basic areas; the class struggle has not yet come to an end<sup>12</sup> and bourgeois ideas are still competing with proletarian ideas for [control of the] battleground and leadership in every area.<sup>13</sup> Under these circumstances, we must not fail to expose, in debate, the substance of every type of criticism, using the method of Marxist class analysis. Otherwise we will not be able to understand them correctly or deal with them accurately.

There is a type of people who disapprove of counter-criticism, who are coining in anticipation a word for the counter-criticism which may appear, calling it "curtailment."<sup>14</sup> For example, in *Wenhui bao* in Shanghai somebody has already said, "Lately we have seen some traces of 'curtailment.'" Of people who say these things, many are motivated by [simple] misunderstanding, but others have ulterior motives. If people are to describe criticism that they like as "blooming," and counter-criticism that they do not like as "curtailment," describe saying negative things [about the Party and government] as "blooming" and saying positive things as "curtailment," or even go as far as to insult and threaten those who speak these positive things, the people will be compelled to ask: "Where has the people's freedom of speech, and particularly the laboring people's socialist freedom of speech, gone?"<sup>15</sup> If the laboring people's socialist freedom of speech is not allowed to "bloom," then are those people who claim to support so-called "blooming" not actually "curtailing" the laboring people's socialist freedom of speech? We are of the opinion that in the interests of the people, all opinions and speech that are beneficial to socialism must be allowed to bloom in a great way; they must be allowed to bloom, and cannot be curtailed!

Truth is not afraid of rebuttal; that which fears rebuttal is not truth.<sup>16</sup> It is cowardly to be afraid of criticism, and equally cowardly to be afraid of counter-criticism. If prohibiting criticism is dictatorial, then is prohibiting counter-critic-

ism any less dictatorial? To eliminate dictatorial practices we must be evenhanded about criticism and counter-criticism. For the purpose of overcoming the weaknesses in the cause of socialism and the shortcomings in the work of the Party, we must continue to open up broadly the avenues of speech and opinions, resolutely develop positive and constructive criticism, and determinedly sweep away any obstacle that stands in the way of beneficial criticism. At the same time, to defend the cause of socialism and to oppose those “criticisms” that sabotage socialism, we must also resolutely develop correct counter-criticism. Only in this way can the Party’s rectification campaign develop healthily.

## Notes

1. See *RMSC* (1958), pp. 29–30.
2. The three sayings here are: *Zhi wu bu yan; yan wu bu jin, yan zhe wu zui, wen zhe zhu jie*, and *You guo ze gai; wu ze jiamian*. The first is a common saying whose roots we have not been able to trace. For the second, see text Mar. 1, 1957, note 4. (Our translation is a bit different here.) The third is derived from the “Yi” section of *Yi jing* (Classic of Changes) and from a poem by the Song-dynasty scholar Chen Fuliang. It is probably also linked to the classical Confucianist saying: *Guo ze wu dan gai* (If there is a mistake, fear not to amend it) in the chapter “Xue er” in *Lun yu* (Analects of Confucius). These appeared together as “three principles” in the rectification campaign in the CPC Central Committee’s directive (see note 1), section 3.
3. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 13.
4. These aphorisms, *liang yao kukou li yu bing, zhongyan ni er li yu xing*, are derived from *Kong zi jia yu* (The Domestic Instructions of Confucius), a book whose origins are no longer traceable, but which exists in ten volumes in the *Siku quanshu* (The Complete Compendium of Books of the Four Treasuries) of the Qing dynasty.
5. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.
6. See text June 8, 1957(2).
7. At a faculty forum at Fudan University (Shanghai) on June 7, 1957, Ta Yijin, professor of political economy, was the last to speak. Responding positively to opinions expressed earlier by biology professor Tan Jiajing, he agreed that efforts ought to be made to shorten the distance and improve relations between the CPC and the masses. He also suggested that people outside the CPC, when called upon by the CPC to aid in its rectification campaign, should respond positively, and that they should, when noting the weaknesses of the CPC and the errors of its cadres, employ a method of “gentle winds and fine rain criticism, instead of blowing these mistakes out of proportion.” He suggested that non-CPC people should affirm the leadership of the CPC and carefully study the CPC’s directive with regard to the rectification campaign. His speech was interrupted by Shu Zongqiao, who was an assistant professor of journalism. See *RMRB* (June 9, 1957), 1.
8. This refers to the fact that two of the three targets of the CPC’s “intra-Party” rectification were dogmatism and bureaucratism. Thus, when the CPC opened its doors to criticism by people outside the Party under the aegis of “helping the CPC conduct its rectification,” many violently began to accuse the CPC of these two areas of “mistakes.” See text May 15, 1957, paragraph 3.
9. Chen Mingshu (1890–1965) was a prominent military figure from Guangdong Province in the 1920s. He was governor of Guangdong in 1929–1931 under the KMT government and took command of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nineteenth Route Army in 1931. He was best known for leading the Fujian revolt in 1933. In 1949 he became a member of the CPPCC. He was also, at this time, a vice-chairman and member of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. He was severely criticized in the

anti-Rightist campaign in 1957 and was labeled a Rightist until 1963. For more biographical information on Chen, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1967), I, pp. 213–217. See also text June 12, 1950, vol. I, source note, and text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 32.

10. This may be a reference to the debate over the policy of “fixed interest.” See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 39.

11. Deng Chumin (b. 1888), was a sociologist who taught at Zhongshan University (Sun Yat-sen University) in Guangzhou and at Dade College in Hong Kong in the 1930s and late-1940s. He was editor of *Minzhu bao* (Democracy News) and *Weimin bao* in Chongqing during the War of Resistance period. In 1948 he became a member of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League (*Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng*) and the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. At the time of this editorial he was chancellor of Shanxi University and a member of the Shanxi Provincial People’s Government. For more biographical information on Deng, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 946–947.

12. The “theoretical line” adopted by the PRC (or at least by Mao’s faction in the PRC) throughout this period is that “while the large-scale, heavy-winds and torrential-rains type of mass class struggles has basically come to an end, class struggle itself continues” (see text Feb. 27, 1957, text surrounding note 43; see also text June 8, 1957[3], note 10). Mao had reiterated this “formula” for understanding the situation several times in the months preceding this editorial. What is noteworthy is that here the editorial completely drops the first part of the formula, which had served as a crucial qualifier earlier.

13. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, paragraph 2, and text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 2. In those places Mao had reinforced this idea by saying that “the struggle to decide whether socialism or capitalism will be victorious will still take a very long historical period.” According to *Ciyu jianshi*, p. 208, on April 27, 1957, the day that the CPC Central Committee issued its directive on the rectification campaign, Liu Shaoqi spoke to a conference of Party cadres in Shanghai and claimed that “the question of whether socialism or capitalism is victorious has already been basically settled.” Thus the statement in this editorial, which reflects Mao’s more pessimistic, and therefore more combative, stance, may contain a certain polemical edge against Liu Shaoqi’s position.

14. The term is *shou*, which has previously been translated as “retrenchment.” See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14, and text April 10, 1957, note 1.

15. This paragraph echoes the concern over the constitutionally stipulated and guaranteed freedom of speech for all parties in the PRC, articulated in texts Jan. 27, 1957(1) and (2), and Feb. 27, 1957.

16. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 17, and text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, paragraph 2.

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## The Workers Are Speaking Up (June 10, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 10, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *Shengping ziliao*, p. 364 (excerpt).

*This is an RMRB editorial that was not published under Mao’s signature but is alleged to be Mao’s writing.*

In the last couple of days, many workers in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, Anshan, and so on have held forums<sup>1</sup> at which they have angrily reprimanded the small minority of Rightist elements for their anti-Communist, antisocialist opinions. The public opinion of the working class is attracting increasingly intense attention on the part of the people throughout the country. Prior to this, some workers have expressed opinions about issues such as the request on the part of some elements that the terms of fixed-interest payment be extended<sup>2</sup> and the state's representatives [in the joint state-private enterprises] be withdrawn. At the moment, what has provoked the workers to speak up is a political topic that is of more major significance and involves a broader area of problems. This time, at the various localities, the workers are very active in speaking up, and their mood is one of great enthusiasm. Many workers have asked to be allowed to speak and to write letters to the newspapers. What has been printed in the newspapers is but a small portion of the workers' opinions. It is obvious that the broad masses of the workers have discerned that an evil wind has blown up in the political life of our nation.<sup>3</sup> This evil wind threatens the position of leadership occupied by the working class, so the [politically] conscious workers' masses have no choice but to rise to the challenge.

Of the opinions published in recent days by people in the various democratic parties<sup>4</sup> and people with no party affiliation, by industrialists and business people and by intellectuals, the vast majority are accurate criticisms made, with good intentions, toward the Communist Party and the People's Government. However, there are some, a minority, which are not so. This minority of incorrect opinions attempts to lead people away from the direction of socialism, and seeks to weaken the people's democratic dictatorship,<sup>5</sup> the system of democratic centralism,<sup>6</sup> and the leadership of the [Communist] Party. Moreover, people who have published such incorrect opinions have also sought to create an atmosphere forbidding people to offer rebuttal or even carrying out threats against those who do offer rebuttal.<sup>7</sup> It is precisely such a set of conditions that has provoked the workers' masses' anger and made it impossible for them to remain silent even in the midst of their intense laboring.

The broad masses of the workers see very clearly that if these Rightist careerists were allowed to have their way, the state led by the working class would be endangered and the cause of socialism would be injured. The workers' masses realize what the bloody struggle conducted by the working class of our country in the last few decades under the leadership of the Communist Party was all about. They know that in the protracted struggle of the past, different people have taken different attitudes, and they know who those are who are deserving of the greatest trust as well as who those are who deserve the least confidence. They also know what overthrowing the leadership of the Communist Party will mean to the workers' masses, no matter how nicely people put it.

From the speeches made at the various workers' forums in the localities, we can be fully cognizant of the sincere support that the leadership class in our country—the working class—gives to its own vanguard, the Communist Party of China, and its unbounded love for the socialist system. It, too, has opinions concerning the work of the [Communist] Party and the People's Government; it, too, wants to help the Party in its rectification and to help Party organizations correct their mistakes

and overcome their weaknesses. However, it also realizes that when there are people who are carrying out activities opposing the socialist system and the leadership of the Communist Party, the priority is to unite solidly and repel the attack of such people. Therefore, it has expressed a resolute determination to struggle against all opinions and speech that oppose and slander the Communist Party and socialism.

Most recently an argument has appeared that seems to say that after the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce has been basically accomplished the bourgeoisie will have lost its dual character and will no longer be in need of further transformation. From this argument [those who adopt it] conclude that the bourgeoisie no longer needs to learn from the working class, and the working class has nothing worth learning either. Rather it is the working class who ought to emulate the many good qualities of the capitalists. However, no sooner is this said than the test of reality is upon us. As regards the various antisocialist opinions and arguments of the present, who, after all, is the more discerning? Who has a more resolute and uncompromising attitude? The resolute standpoint adopted by the working classes has a profound educational effect on the intellectuals throughout the country. Why is it that, with regard to the same thing, some university students and professors may hold one opinion whereas the workers hold another, quite different one? A certain anarchistic fanaticism may indeed sweep a minority of the intellectuals off their feet for a time, but among the workers and the laboring people it has become completely isolated. The fervor of the working class is expressed not only in its heroic labor in construction, but also in its resolute struggle against antisocialist opinions and speeches. This fact not only proves that our country needs to be led by the working class, but also that the working class is fully equipped with the necessary consciousness and determination to lead our country.

There is also currently another argument that since we have given freedom to the bourgeois ideas to "contend," we cannot at the same time allow the working class to "contend." Allegedly, if the working class "contended," it would hinder other people's "contending." Strange indeed! That in a country led by the working class, the working class should need to be given freedom of speech by others. Naturally such an argument has no leg upon which to stand. To begin with, when the working class "contends," it does not mean that others are thereby not allowed to "contend." The working class is entirely entitled to disagree with others, just as others are entitled to disagree with the working class. Within the framework of the Constitution and the law, nobody interferes with anyone else. Second, if the working class "contends" and thereby topples some incorrect views and opinions, so that the bourgeoisie no longer has any reason to "contend" on such matters, then in what way would such "hindrance" for incorrect views and opinions be harmful to the state or to the people?

## Notes

1. At about the same time that the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the CPC held forums to discuss the rectification campaign with democratic parties, the

same department, in conjunction with the No. Eight Office of the State Council, also convened forums of people of industrial and commercial circles. (These were held May 15–June 8, 1957, whereas the forums with the democratic parties were held May 8–June 3; see text June 8, 1957[3], note 3.) Here the text suggests that while those were going on, or perhaps immediately after those forums were held, the workers of certain regions held their own forums locally and separately.

2. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 39.
3. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 51.
4. See text July 1, 1957, and text July 1957.
5. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 13.
6. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80.
7. See texts June 8, 1957(2), paragraph 1, and June 9, 1957, paragraph 5.

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## People of the Country, Unite on the Basis of Socialism (June 11, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 11, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *Shengping ziliao*, pp. 364–365 (excerpt).

*This RMRB editorial was not published under Mao's signature but has been attributed to Mao by some scholars.*

The great solidarity of the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China was formed in the tempering of the two revolutions: the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution.<sup>1</sup>

The struggle to oppose the rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism has united the broadest masses of the people of China.<sup>2</sup> This alliance includes workers, peasants, intellectuals, and all sorts of urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie,<sup>3</sup> and all patriotic people. It is because it has stood most firmly and courageously at the forefront of this struggle that the Communist Party of China has become the nucleus and the leading strength of this alliance. It is by relying upon the strength of such a unity that the great victory of the democratic revolution was finally achieved.

Why is it that the great unity of the Chinese people could continue to stand even after the victory of the democratic revolution has been achieved? Why is it that the various classes and [social] strata that took part in the democratic revolution did not fall apart from one another as a result of their conflict of interests? This is because a new goal for common effort in the struggle has emerged to confront the Chinese people. This goal is to strive for the victory of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. Although the rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism has been overthrown, China is still a poor, culturally and economically backward country. Unless this state of backwardness is changed, China will

inevitably suffer defeats and once again suffer the enslavement by and oppression of imperialism. Every patriot, recalling the conditions in which the Chinese people had lived when they were dominated by imperialism, is filled with the sense of anguish and humiliation. In order that China may never again revert to that sort of existence, we must make China a rich and strong, industrialized country. To achieve this goal, there is only one way to go—that of socialism.<sup>4</sup>

Can there be any possible path besides that of socialism for us to take? Can we possibly take the road of capitalism? Under present historical conditions, what would taking the path of capitalism signify? It would mean to become a colony in an imperialistic world, or, at best, to become a semicolonial sidekick. It would mean to open our doors to the imperialist countries, to allow imperialism and the running dogs that they are accustomed to using—namely, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism—to once more establish their rule in China. Therefore, in the wake of the democratic revolution, in reality China has only two paths to choose from: Either march forward toward socialism or regress to the state of the old China and its misery. There is really no third way.

Socialism is, first and foremost, the enterprise of the working class. It is the enterprise of the worker-peasant alliance<sup>5</sup> under the leadership of the working class. However, in China's particular historical circumstances, socialism is capable of gaining—indeed it has already gained the support of patriotic peasants. Although the national bourgeoisie, owing to its class character, inevitably had a conflict of interests with [the working class on] the matter of thoroughly eliminating all exploitative systems, even so, because of the series of efforts put out by the Chinese working class, most of them, after certain doubt, hesitation, meandering, and wavering, have come to realize that socialism is the only way out for the Chinese nation and have therefore expressed a willingness to accept socialism. For many intellectuals who have received a bourgeois education and who have been profoundly affected in many aspects by the bourgeois ideology, it is by no means an easy task to accept socialism. With the progress of socialist transformation and the establishment of the socialist system, changes must come to the old way of thinking and the old ways of life which were suitable only under the system of private ownership; but a lot of people are unable to get immediately accustomed to new things. However, the overwhelming majority of the intellectuals have not retreated in the face of this. Rather, they have come more and more to recognize the progressiveness and fairness of the socialist enterprise. They have come more and more to realize that the individual ought to be transformed in order to accommodate for the progress of society, and not expect that the social system should adapt itself to fit the individual.

It is unthinkable for us to take the path of socialism without the leadership of the working class or the leadership of the Communist Party. In leading the cause of the socialist revolution, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented the policy of uniting with all forces with whom unity is possible<sup>6</sup> on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance. The great revolutionary unity of the people of the country is a great force. By relying on such a force, we have in this country already won basic victories in socialist revolution and socialist transformation, and, moreover,

have also achieved a tremendous accomplishment in the first step of large-scale socialist construction.

At this time, not only has socialism become the irresistible creed of the overwhelming majority of the people in China, but it has also become the locus of development of their actual lives, from which they cannot veer. Without socialism there would not be our homeland's independence, or its enrichment and empowerment; nor would there be the freedom and happiness of our people, or any guarantees for the [fundamental livelihood, i.e., the] clothing, feeding, housing, and transportation of the [more than] 600 million people. To the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people this is already a very plain truth. Is there anything, any attraction, that can lure the Chinese people from the path of socialism? To illustrate this problem, let us take a look at the recent situation in which the people in the various circles have helped [our] Party to undergo its rectification campaign.<sup>7</sup> Certain Rightist elements who hoped to use the rectification campaign to oppose socialism and sabotage the socialist cause thought that their arguments were sure to elicit support widely among the industrialists and merchants. The truth, however, as it turned out to be, and as it was proven by the conditions that prevailed at the forum of industrial and commercial circles held in Beijing, is that the vast majority of the people of industrial and commercial circles did not, after all, become confused by the honeyed words of the Rightist elements. They have refused to part with the path of socialism. These Rightist elements also once thought that they could take advantage of the lack of social experience on the part of young students to find their allies among the student masses.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, the facts have proven that as soon as the Rightists' arguments exposed their own antisocialist true features among the student masses, they were rejected and spurned by the vast majority among the masses. The Rightist elements have attempted to break open the great unity of the Chinese people through the industrialists and merchants or the intellectuals and young students. Such an attempt has already met with ignominious defeat. Naturally, nothing can be made of their wild dreams of carrying out any activity among the workers and the peasants. Such a dream will only be met by an attacking force of doubled ferocity and strength.

There is still in existence in our country today a handful of Rightist elements who oppose socialism. These Rightist elements are taking every opportunity to carry out their activities; this is nothing to marvel at. Large-scale, mass-based class struggle has already become, in our country, a matter that has been fundamentally resolved, and yet there is still class struggle;<sup>9</sup> there is class struggle on the political front, and on the ideological front. Although the capitalist system is gone forever from our country, there are still some people who have not yet given it up entirely; they still do not believe that the socialist system will triumph, and they are still digging away at chances to change the course of history.

The experience of the revolution in the past provides evidence that whenever the wheels of history are rolling forward rapidly, there will always be some people who will be thrown out from the car. They are the ones who cannot adapt to objective changes. Nonetheless, in the moment just before they are thrown out, they often reject the notion that they are going to be ejected, but rather opine that

the car is soon going to be derailed and that it will soon come to disaster. They see themselves, instead, as people who have a historic role to play, that they are people who will be at the right spot at the right time, that they, indeed, are the ones who know the way of the times. The socialist revolution is a tremendous transformation unprecedented in history. It is surely inevitable that things of this nature will occur in such a major change. Certain temporary flaws and things indicating momentary loss of harmony and coordination [in the society] that are bound to happen during a time when society itself is undergoing the process of such a major change and reorganization are seen by these Rightist elements as evidence of the ill fate of socialism—that the people have become separated from the Communist Party, that the people have come to harbor a distaste for socialism. They think that as soon as they leap off the train of socialism, millions and millions of people will follow their example.

These Rightist elements are way off the mark in their calculations. The cause of socialism, supported by the broadest masses of the people, is bound to win greater and greater victories with every day. The great unity of the people of the entire country built upon the foundation of socialism will also surely become more and more consolidated with each passing day. The Communist Party of China has suggested a policy for correctly handling the contradictions among the people in order to carry out the rectification of the Party.<sup>10</sup> It has appealed to the people of all circles in the society to assist it in the Party's rectification, and to overcome the Party's various shortcomings in its own work. All this is for the purpose of consolidating the people's solidarity. As a result of the Party's earnestness in pursuing this task, the unity of the broad [masses of the] people throughout the country will surely become more consolidated.

In order that the unity among the people may be truly consolidated, we must carry out the necessary struggle against the Rightist elements who insist on opposing socialism, and draw a clear line of distinction between them [and ourselves]. The broadest masses of the people in our country support socialism, support the people's democratic dictatorship<sup>11</sup> and the leadership of the Communist Party. Some people are as yet, for the time being, unaccustomed to certain aspects of the new social system, and therefore at the moment feel a certain amount of doubt, wavering, or reservations [toward these things]; this is understandable. As time goes on, they will eventually adapt themselves to the new way of life and will actively take part in the construction of the new life. Therefore, their temporary doubt, wavering, and reservations are entirely different from the hatred that the Rightist elements have for the socialist system. The two must be strictly differentiated. When certain people suggest well-intentioned criticism with regard to certain phenomena in the life of our society and our country or with regard to the shortcomings and mistakes in our Communist Party members' work, these criticisms, no matter how pointed they may be, are all extremely beneficial to the Party and the People's Government. We must accept all accurate criticisms in order to correct our mistakes and improve our work. Even though such criticisms may at times be themselves not entirely accurate, they are nevertheless entirely different from the Rightist elements' fundamental opposition to our social system and state system and their opposition to the leadership of the Communist Party. These must

again be strictly differentiated. The most fundamental black-white questions in our nation's life are: Do we want socialism? Do we want the people's democratic dictatorship? Do we want the leadership of the Communist Party? The great unity of the Chinese people is founded on a general consensus with regard to these questions. The Rightist elements aim to confuse people in their understanding of these basic problems. Therefore, all people who are truly patriotic and are willing to stand by socialism should draw a line of distinction between themselves and the Rightists so that they may have a clearer fundamental understanding on these matters of who is right and who is wrong. Only in this way can the great unity of the Chinese people on the foundations of socialism be even more consolidated.

Certain Rightist elements looked upon themselves as heroes whose every word or deed would affect the safety of the nation. Nevertheless, even they have inevitably found out, in the end, that unless they fundamentally altered their attitude toward socialism, they would become entirely isolated and would turn into pitiable worms, sulking and snivelling in one corner by themselves. In other words, they would be ejected from the train of time. In contrast to their fate, the train of socialism, which is built upon the alliance of workers and peasants and which forms the unity of the broadest masses of the people will, day and night, rumble ever onward under the leadership of the locomotive of the Communist Party, and march on toward a future of unlimited splendor.

#### Notes

1. See text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2. The "socialist revolution" refers to the stage beginning with the establishment of the PRC in 1949.

2. This is, again, a reference to the so-called Three Big Mountains; see text Mar. 12, 1957, note 5.

3. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.

4. See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 2.

5. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 14.

6. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 7.

7. See text June 8, 1957(3), note 3.

8. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 8.

9. See text Feb. 27, 1957, text surrounding note 43; also see text June 9, 1957, note 12.

10. See text Feb. 27, 1957.

11. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 13.

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### On Dealing with Well-Intentioned Criticism Correctly

(June 12, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 14, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *Shengping ziliao*, p. 365 (excerpt).

*This RMRB editorial was not published under Mao's signature but has been attributed to Mao by a number of scholars.*

Our Party has always educated its members to pay constant attention to the criticism coming from the masses. In the most recent period, our Party, in order to carry out the rectification campaign, has especially sought the criticism of people outside the Party on a broad scale.<sup>1</sup> From the Center to the various provinces and municipalities, Party organizations of the various organs and in all colleges and universities have convened forums or adopted other measures so as to listen to the criticisms and suggestions of people outside the Party and the broad masses of the working personnel [within the Party]. Therefore, the criticisms of the people outside the Party for the Party itself and that of the general working personnel for the leaders [in the Party] are actively launched throughout the country.

Our Party is a party that serves the interests of the people. Our Party does not have—nor should it have—any private ulterior interests other than the interest of the broad masses of the people. Any shortcoming that we may have, or any mistake we may commit can produce results that are detrimental to the people; therefore, we must resolutely eliminate and erase [such shortcomings and mistakes]. As we all know, the reason that the broad masses of the people do not waver in the least in their confidence in our Party is simply that we are able constantly to erase our own shortcomings and mistakes and thereby make progress. The opinions that [people in] all aspects [of society] outside the Party have with regard to our Party's work are an indispensable mirror for us; therein we can often see reflected many things which we ourselves are at times unable to see; [such reflections] make it easier for us to improve our work. The more modest we are in listening to the opinions of the masses outside the Party, and if we strive to correct our own mistakes, the more consolidated the unity between the Party and the masses will become. It is precisely on such grounds that our Party has decided, as it launches its own rectification, to give a free hand to activating the masses to carry out the criticism of the Party.

The evidence shows that the Party was entirely correct in doing so. The overwhelming majority of the masses trust and love the Party, and they have suggested many pointed criticisms and positive constructive proposals with regard to the Party. From the perspective of the present situation, the criticisms that have been suggested by the various sectors with regard to the Party organizations and Party members have been, for the overwhelmingly great part, good, accurate, and beneficial to the Party. Indeed, under the guise of helping the Party rectify itself, certain opinions have appeared that are malicious and destructive, and that indicate hostility for socialism and for the Communist Party. A small number of Rightist elements are trying to lead the criticism of the masses onto a deviant path and to use the criticism campaign to achieve their aims of weakening the cause of socialism, weakening the people's democratic dictatorship<sup>2</sup> and the leadership of the Party. Therefore, we must deal the opinions of the Rightists a resolute counter-attack so that the criticism of the masses may continue to develop healthily. Nonetheless, there cannot be any doubt that we must not give up on giving all



well-intentioned criticisms encouragement and support simply because certain incorrect opinions of the Rightists have emerged or because we have dealt such incorrect opinions a counterblow. We must never obfuscate the fundamental difference between the well-intentioned criticisms on the part of the broad masses and the antisocialist criticisms on the part of a small number of Rightists. In particular, we must not, cannot, allow certain Party members who have a low level of awareness and a poor work style to take counterattacking the Rightists as an excuse for ignoring the masses' criticisms or even to carry out attacks or retaliation against those who criticize. On the contrary, we must take all necessary steps to continue to encourage and support the broad masses in their criticism, to continue earnestly to erase any misunderstanding or worry that they may have, and to rely resolutely on the supervision and the assistance of the broad masses to correct [our] mistakes and improve [our] work.<sup>3</sup> On this matter we must not have the slightest wavering. Otherwise, we will have confused right for wrong, and will cause the rectification campaign to fail before it has run its course, and that, indeed, will precisely be to achieve the goal that the Rightist elements hope to achieve.

What do we mean by well-intentioned criticism? Is it criticism that is entirely correct? Of course not. Even if the person who brought forth the criticism did not bring forth an entirely correct opinion because he or she did not have a full or correct understanding of the circumstances, such a criticism is still at least beneficial for the elimination of the barrier between [ourselves] and that person, as long as he or she raised that opinion for the positive purpose of improving [our] work. We must strictly differentiate between criticism of this sort and the Rightist elements' antisocialist criticism. Although criticism of this sort may not be entirely correct, we must still pay attention to those aspects in which they are reasonable and those parts in which they are accurate, and not wipe them out entirely simply because they are in some ways incorrect. Nevertheless, because such criticisms do have areas in which they are incorrect, we should indeed, at the opportune moment and by the proper means, carry out the necessary explanation to the criticizing individual, or criticize him or her, so that he or she may come to understand the truth of the matter and the full complexion of the facts.

The criticism of the masses has taken on a very pointed form. Is this good or bad? There is nothing bad about that. We should be good at analyzing such pointed criticisms calmly and must not throw a tantrum because they are pointed. The question is with substance and not form. Pointed criticism can be entirely accurate; mild criticism, on the other hand, can be entirely incorrect. Naturally, there are some critics who pursue the pointedness [of their criticisms] in a one-sided way, and inevitably their criticism becomes one-sided. Nevertheless, as long as such criticism is still, fundamentally, well-intentioned criticism, then we still should affirm those parts in it that are accurate, and calmly carry out discussions with the critic; in this way we are bound to arrive at mutual understanding, and we will be able gradually to help the critic to overcome his or her one-sidedness.

As mentioned earlier, because even well-intentioned criticism may not be always entirely correct, and because such critics may, owing to a weakness of stance or incompleteness of their understanding, even at times over a short period

agree with the opinions of the Rightists, it is sometimes difficult for people to differentiate instantly between well-intentioned criticism and the malicious criticism of the Rightists. Therefore, to differentiate between these two types of criticisms, we must adopt an attitude of caution and carry out comprehensive analysis. We must not only learn to do this type of differentiation well ourselves, but we must also help all well-intentioned critics learn to draw the line between [themselves and] the Rightists.

We have said that among the criticisms of the broad masses the overwhelming majority are accurate ones or at least partially accurate ones. These criticisms have helped us expose many shortcomings and mistakes in our work. We should be bold in accepting all accurate criticism. Whoever, for the sake of face or arrogance, refuses to accept accurate criticism cannot be a true Communist. We should, without a moment's hesitation, admit to those shortcomings and mistakes that have been accurately pointed out by the masses, and should take quick action to use practical measures to realize all those reasonable demands and suggestions that they have raised. Wherever there are mistakes that can be corrected immediately we should correct them immediately; wherever there are problems that can be resolved instantly we should correct them instantly. Party organizations at all levels, on the basis of the principle of "correct as you go along in your rectification" suggested by the Center's directive on the rectification [campaign], have already accepted certain criticisms from outside the Party and begun to resolve some of the problems.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, on the whole, the effort in this area has not yet been enough. As soon as we have begun to carry out a counterattack against the Rightist elements' antisocialist opinions, therefore, we should free at least one hand to resolve, in earnest, all problems that need to be and can be immediately resolved. Naturally, there will be some criticisms and suggestions whose accuracy may not be easily clarified at once, or cases where there are relatively complicated questions, or problems that involve a broader area. For such matters we should not make a hasty decision. On all such matters it is entirely possible to discuss things clearly with the masses and gain their understanding. However, the accuracy of many criticisms and suggestions is obvious. There should not be any difficulty in accepting these criticisms and realizing these suggestions. With regard to problems of this sort we must take action immediately, and resolve them or at least begin to resolve them. We must not procrastinate or put them off, and allow the shortcomings or mistakes to continue or even develop any further, and thus hurt the valuable enthusiasm of the masses for helping the Party to carry out rectification.

Even though the small number of Rightist elements intend to use their destructive opinions to interfere with our rectification campaign, our rectification campaign must be carried through to the end. The task of absorbing the masses outside our Party into the effort of helping us carry out rectification must also be carried through to the end. The more we are capable of accepting all well-intentioned and accurate criticism and the more we are capable of correcting our mistakes and improving our work rapidly, the more consolidated the unity between the Party and the broad masses will become, and the more isolated the Rightist elements will be.

To oppose and isolate the small handful of Rightist elements and, at the same time, to become closely united with the broad masses and with all personages outside the Party who have raised well-intentioned criticisms of our Party so as to struggle, hand in hand, for the improvement of the Party's work and the reinforcement of the socialist cause—this is a necessary condition for guaranteeing the healthy development of our rectification campaign.

## Notes

1. See text June 8, 1957(3), note 3.
2. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 13.
3. This appears to be partly a reference to the idea of “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” between the CPC and the democratic parties (see text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, last paragraph), except that semantically here, the democratic parties are “bypassed,” and the idea seems to be suggested that the CPC would go directly to the “broad masses” for “mutual supervision.”
4. The reference here is to the instruction, included in Section 5 of the “Directive on the Rectification Campaign” issued by the Central Committee of the CPC on April 27, 1957, where it says: “The plans for rectification should observe the principle that rectification and [routine] work should not interfere with one another; we must also allow the carrying out of rectification to be integrated with the correcting [of mistakes] and improvements in [our] work and with the concrete resolving of contradictions among the people. We must prevent ourselves from rectifying [the Party] behind closed doors, [which will surely] affect our work [detrimentally].” (See *RMSC* [1958], p. 30.) The specific term used by *RMRB* here, *bian zheng bian gai*, however, is not in the “directive.”

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## The Bourgeois Orientation of *Wenhui bao*<sup>1</sup> During a Certain Period (June 14, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 14, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 178–179; *URI* (1976), pp. 215–216; *Mao liang*, pp. 311–312 (excerpt); *HQ* (Aug. 25, 1968), 19 (excerpt). Available English Translations: *URI* (1976), pp. 219–220; J. Chen (1970), pp. 55–56.

*Although this article was published in RMRB under the byline of “Editorial Department,” it is widely recognized as Mao’s writing. The URI source cites the Red Guard material Xinwen zhanbao (Combat Bulletin in Journalism) 6 (June 14, 1967), published by the Shoudu xinwen pipan lianluozhan (Liaison Station for the Critique of Journalism at the Capital), as evidence that “this is an editorial department’s article rewritten by Chairman Mao for Renmin ribao.”*

The article reprinted below, entitled “Noted for [Future] Reference,”<sup>2</sup> appeared in the *Wenhui bao* on June 10. For a certain length of time in the past Shanghai’s *Wenhui bao* and Beijing’s *Guangming ribao*<sup>3</sup> have published great quantities of excellent news reports and articles. However, within a short period, the fundamental political orientation of these two papers has become the orientation of the bourgeois press. During a certain period of time, these two papers took advantage of the slogan “Let a hundred schools of thought contend”<sup>4</sup> and the rectification campaign of the Communist Party to publish a large amount of articles that expressed, but failed to criticize, the bourgeois viewpoint, as well as news reports of an inflammatory nature. These can be verified in the papers themselves. Some people [on the staff] of these two papers have made a great mistake in their views of the newspaper. They have obfuscated the differences in principles between the press in capitalist countries and the press in socialist countries. On this point, some editors and reporters of some other newspapers are in the same boat; so are some instructors in the journalism departments of some universities. It is not just *Wenhui bao* and *Guangming ribao* that have this problem, only that these two have manifested it most strikingly. Erroneous viewpoints can be rectified through study, [careful] consideration, and criticism, and we are waiting for them [to do this]. Judging from the situation at these two papers in the last few days, their policy seems to have already been somewhat altered. Non-Party newspapers, of course, should not be run in precisely identical ways as Party newspapers; they should have their own special characteristics.<sup>5</sup> But their basic orientation should be in conformity with other papers. This is because the press in socialist countries is, through the means of news [reporting], a reflection of the socialist economy, that is, a planned economy based on a system of public ownership. It is quite unlike the press in capitalist countries which is, through the means of news [reporting], a reflection of an anarchistic economy, an economy of competition among contending groups. As long as class differences exist in the world, the press will always remain an instrument of class struggle. We hope to develop debate on this question so that everyone will arrive at a common understanding of the issue. Among news reporters, there are some Communist Party members and Communist Youth League members<sup>6</sup> who also have the viewpoint of the bourgeois press. They, too, should consider, study, and criticize this erroneous viewpoint. Dogmatic viewpoints in journalism and stereotyped styles of writing<sup>7</sup> should also be criticized. Things like this are quite troublesome. Party newspapers, including this paper, have committed errors of this kind. Criticism of this kind of error must also be developed in the ensuing debate. In this way, we will have to create a two-front struggle against the “Left” and the “Right” on journalistic matters. Having noticed the obvious and harmful tendencies of some people on the [staff of the] *Wenhui bao* who take the bourgeois standpoint and wage class struggle against the proletariat, Yao Wenyuan’s<sup>8</sup> article simply points subtly to the bourgeois orientation of *Wenhui bao*. It is a fine article and for this reason it is reprinted here. In addition, we are taking this opportunity

to express our views to our fellow [newspaper] workers at *Wenhui bao* and *Guangming ribao* for their consideration.

## Notes

1. *Wenhui bao* was a newspaper based in Shanghai, affiliated with the China Democratic League (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1, and text July 1, 1957, note 10). At this time the publisher and editor-in-chief of *Wenhui bao* was Xu Zhucheng, who was replaced by Jin Zhonghua in the anti-Rightist campaign later in the year. It was specially oriented toward the reporting of policies and conditions of primary and secondary education in China. Mao spoke of the need to criticize the *Wenhui bao* earlier; see text April 1957(2), note 38.

2. This refers to the article “Lu yi beikou—du bao ou gan” (Noted for [Future] Reference: Incidental Thoughts on Reading the Newspapers), written by Yao Wenyuan, which appeared on the same page as this editorial essay in *RMRB* (June 14, 1957). This article is also reproduced in *URI* (1976), pp. 217–218.

In this article Yao refers to a statement that Mao had made several days earlier in his speech to the delegates of the Communist Youth League (see text May 25, 1957; Yao’s essay was dated June 6, 1957). Yao points out that this news item and statement were dealt with in dramatically different ways by the three newspapers, *Renmin ribao* (People’s Daily), *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily), and *Wenhui bao*. In particular, he points to the difference in type size of the headlines in the three papers for this item. Yao argues that although it was somewhat speculative, the different treatment of the same item in three papers can be attributed to the different degrees of attention and significance which the three papers attached to the item, implying that the *Wenhui bao*, in particular, downplayed the importance of Mao’s statement because it had become jaded about socialist and Communist slogans. On this subject, see *Wenhui bao*’s “self-criticism” essay published on July 4, 1957, after the criticisms against it had been launched. (See text July 1, 1957, note 2. See also *RMSC* [1958], p. 147.)

3. *Guangming ribao* (Guangming Daily) was founded in 1949 in Beijing as an organ of the Democratic League (see note 1). In 1952 it was reorganized as a common organ for the majority of the democratic parties. At the time of this article its publisher was Zhang Bojun and its editor-in-chief was Chu Anping. It was specifically oriented toward the reporting of literature, science and technology, and educational policies.

4. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.

5. This is an oblique reference to the *RMRB* (actually the carrier of the editorial here), which is a CPC-affiliated paper, and which has also been criticized; see text April 1957(2).

6. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.

7. See text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 106, and text Aug. 24, 1956(1), note 12.

8. Yao Wenyuan (b. 1931), one of the top leaders of the CPC in the early 1970s who was, after Mao’s death in 1976, labeled one of the “Gang of Four,” and who has been repudiated and purged from the Party by the post-Mao CPC leadership, was a chief motivator of the Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the CPC, onetime chief editor of *GMRB*, and leader of the Red Guard factions. He was the person who wrote the article “On the New Historical Play ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office,’” which is generally considered to be the first salvo that triggered the Cultural Revolution. At the time of his article for *RMRB* here, Yao was a correspondent for *Wenyi bao* and a member of the editorial board of the magazine *Meng ya* (Sprouts, see text Nov. 11, 1956, source note). Yao’s literary criticisms from a radical political standpoint first began to capture national attention when he participated in the denunciation of Hu Feng in May 1955. For a biographical sketch of Yao, see *URI* (1970), II, p. 764; W. Bartke (1981), pp. 589–590; and *Zhonggong renming lu*, supp., p. 58.

## Is It a Question of Standpoint?

(June 14, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 14, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *RMSC* (1958), pp. 74–75; *Shengping ziliao*, p. 366 (excerpts).

*This RMRB editorial was not published under Mao’s signature, but it is attributed to Mao by some scholars.*

One thing is plain to see for everybody in the current rectification campaign, and that is people often see the same thing in very different, [sometimes] even opposite, ways. Why is this?

We believe that while there can be many reasons for this, the most significant is that people have different standpoints.

Some people will say, we are at the moment dealing with contradictions among the people, [are we not?]<sup>1</sup> Why, then, raise the question of standpoints?

We believe that [even] in dealing with the contradictions among the people, the question of standpoints is not excluded. At the present time in our country, there are different classes among the people. Although the members of the bourgeoisie are being transformed into laboring people and the overwhelming majority of the petty bourgeoisie have already joined cooperative organizations, the ideological influences of both of these classes will continue to exist over a long period of time. To raise the question of standpoint and to understand one another’s true ideological substance are precisely necessary conditions for correctly handling the contradictions among the people. Otherwise, if we have not even clarified each other’s standpoints, how can we seek to be truly unified?

Our country is in the midst of constructing socialism. In the process of constructing socialism, the members of the former bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie will all eventually be transformed into workers and cooperativized peasants (this includes the intellectuals among them). This is the only forward direction. It is only when everyone progresses in this direction that we can hope to become unified ideologically. Naturally, it will take some time to get all the members of the former bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie to be turned over to the standpoint of socialism, but apart from this viewpoint there is no way in which ideological unity can be achieved, nor can the contradictions between the new standpoint and the old standpoint among the people be correctly handled.

In the formula “unity-criticism-unity,”<sup>2</sup> there has to be a standard for unity; the same goes for criticism. The basic criterion is socialism. If we do not carry out criticism from the standpoint of socialism, we will not achieve unity based on the foundations of socialism.

Some people say that the intellectuals have already made tremendous progress over the last few years, and that still many people have underestimated this fact. We believe

that there is indeed such a situation, and indeed many Communist Party members have erred in this regard and must be corrected. However, at the same time, many intellectuals have overestimated their own progress.<sup>3</sup> Were it not so, the many ideological confusions in the current rectification campaign would be difficult to explain.

Let us suggest an example. In our democratic revolution, socialist revolution, and the socialist construction,<sup>4</sup> are achievements, after all, the principal [aspect]? This should, to begin with, be unquestionable. After all, the victory of the democratic revolution, the victory of the socialist revolution, and the triumph of the socialist construction are the fruits of the struggle and labor of the millions of the people throughout the country; they are objective facts whose existence does not depend on human will. Albeit that they are in various ways limited and contain various shortcomings and mistakes, the foundations of socialist society, established through the strenuous effort of the people of the entire country, and the socialist economic enterprises and the socialist cultural and educational enterprises developed by the joint effort of the people of the entire country have allowed our homeland to achieve rapid progress and have, in a fundamental way, altered the complexion of our country. Nevertheless, it is precisely this fact [i.e., the unquestionable fact of the achievement and triumphs of the revolution and socialist construction] that has become a matter of doubt among many intellectuals at the present time. Among the people in each of the political circles, the journalistic circles, the educational circles, the literary and artistic circles, the scientific and technological circles, and the industrial and commercial circles, and among the young people and the students, there are a few (including a handful of Communist Youth League members<sup>5</sup> and Communist Party members) who have suspicions about this matter. Moreover, in certain areas, under some people's instigation, an atmosphere has been created in which people are forbidden to say that achievements have been the major [aspect], and whoever says that is considered to have committed the great crime of ["]being dogmatic ["] and ["]iterating Party stereotypes.["]<sup>6</sup>

Why has such a phenomenon appeared? Isn't there a problem of standpoint here?

We believe that the question of whether or not achievements have been the major [aspect of our experience] is a fundamental question well worth discussion. We propose that a [general] debate on this fundamental issue be launched in all circles throughout the country. This is because it is not a big problem for us, at this point, to admit the existence of shortcomings and mistakes. The task of this rectification campaign is precisely to mobilize the forces of the entire Party, indeed, those of all the people in the country, to struggle against these shortcomings and mistakes. The thing is that it has now become a fundamental problem of people denying [our] successes. This is because, if people were to think that the socialist revolution and the socialist construction were fundamentally mistaken and a failure, then what would confront people would be darkness; New China would be nothing but a mess of darkness; so would socialism, Marxism, and the Communist Party. If things were so, then the problem would not be a matter of rectification at all, but a matter of destroying the people's socialist enterprise, destroying the people's confidence and that of the nation as a whole.

Are we merely making shocking statements to attract attention? Please take a look, everyone. Is it not true that such a confusion has already been generated in all those spheres that have been touched by the influence of that ill wind<sup>7</sup> that forbids people to say that "successes have been the major [aspect of our experience]"?

There is nothing particularly fearsome about the creation of such a temporary confusion. After all, the objective facts cannot be overturned by sophistry and false arguments. Those Rightist elements who are, to begin with, resolutely opposed to socialism have revealed their original faces before the masses as a result of their deliberate fabrication of this confusion. This, of course, is nothing bad. Those people who have, for the moment, fallen into confusion, will eventually come back to the side of truth after an ideological struggle; this, too, is nothing bad. Nonetheless, no matter what transpires, to such people, a temporary ideological confusion of this nature cannot help but be a deep and indelible lesson.

The big intellectuals, who [reputedly] can discern the very end of a hair, not only are unable to see the whole cartload of firewood;<sup>8</sup> they are unable to see the earth-shattering historical upheavals and must wait for the common worker or peasant to correct them. With people like this, even if we were not to say that they are fundamentally mistaken in their standpoint, at least we could say that they have not taken a firm stance, couldn't we?

A single lesson does not make for a final resolution of the problem of standpoint. It would require many more lessons for people ultimately to change their standpoints, particularly if they are always deluding themselves that the problem has long been settled. Still, a lesson is a lesson. This also shows how indispensable this present debate and struggle is even if some people would, for the moment, feel terribly uncomfortable.

## Notes

1. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

2. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.

3. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 10.

4. See text June 11, 1957, note 1.

5. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.

6. The Chinese here is *dang bagu*, which usually refers to "stereotyped Party writing." (See text Dec. 27, 1955[2], vol. I, note 106.) Here Mao is obviously not referring to anything that is specifically written out, or a style of writing, but to the things that are seen by people from outside the Communist Party as stereotypical lines commonly iterated by Party members to rationalize the CPC's policies and measures.

7. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 51.

8. The Chinese aphorism here is *ming cha qiuhao zhi mo*, derived from the book "Liang Wei Wang" (King Wei of Liang), part I, in *Meng zi* (Mencius). *Qiuha* refers to a hair in autumn. According to Zhu Xi's annotation of *Meng zi*, hairs on animals become particularly fine in the autumn; therefore the end of a hair in autumn epitomizes the minutiae of things. To be able to discern the smallest of things but at the same time miss something as big as a cartload of firewood would, in a rough way, be to "not see the forest for the trees."

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Telegram to the Republic of Egypt  
(June 16, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 17, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 112 (July 25, 1957), 160; *URI* (1976), p. 223. Available English Translation: *URI* (1976), p. 225.

*This telegram is cited, but not translated, in HNA, Daily News Release (June 17, 1957), 7.*

President Gamal Abdel Nasser,  
The Republic of Egypt

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the National Day of the Republic of Egypt, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend my sincere congratulations to Your Excellency and to the great Egyptian people. May the friendship and cooperation between China and Egypt become more consolidated and develop with each passing day. May Your Excellency and the Egyptian people achieve new successes in your cause of seeking to enhance the prosperity and strength of the Republic of Egypt.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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Reply to Ambassador of the  
Democratic People's Republic of Korea  
(June 21, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (June 22, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *URI* (1976), p. 227. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (June 22, 1957), 8; *URI* (1976), pp. 229–230.

*At this time, Li Yung Ho replaced Choe Il as ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the PRC. The RMRB source does not carry a salutation for this speech.*

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which you have presented and am grateful for your warm and sincere greetings.

The Chinese people have always been concerned for the achievements and developments made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in all areas. The tremendous efforts made by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in defending the Korean Armistice<sup>1</sup> and its many reasonable proposals for the realization of the unification of the state of Korea and the establishment of contacts between the northern and southern parts of Korea not only were supported by all the Korean people, but also have won the sympathy and support of all peace-loving people in the world. The exchange of visits between the state leaders of Korea and those of many socialist countries and the development of friendly relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other socialist countries in recent years have had great significance both in the consolidating and strengthening of the solidarity of the great family of socialism headed by the Soviet Union and in the cause of safeguarding world peace.

In the past several years, the traditional brotherly friendship between the Chinese and the Korean peoples has become more consolidated and developed with each passing day. The close cooperation between China and Korea in the areas of politics, economics, and culture has already brought tremendous practical benefits to both peoples. The Chinese people will continue to strengthen their friendly relations with the Korean people and will continue to support them in their cause of striving for the peaceful unification of their country . . .<sup>2</sup>

. . . Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the People's Republic of China. You will receive my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China in your work.

**Notes**

1. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 2.
2. In the *RMRB* source, the paragraph that follows begins with: "Eventually, Chairman Mao Zedong says." This suggests that it is possible that there is something in between the paragraphs here that is not reported.

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The Bourgeois Orientation of *Wenhui bao* Should Be Criticized  
(July 1, 1957)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 434–439. Other Chinese Texts: *RMRB* (July 1, 1957), 1; *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 179–181; *Xuexi wenjian*, pp. 52–57; *URI* (1976), pp. 231–235; *Jiaoyu yulu*, pp. 7–9, passim (excerpts); *Wenyi hongqi*, 3 (excerpt); *Mao liang*, p. 414 (excerpt). Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 451–456; *URI* (1976), pp. 237–242; *PR*, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 22 (excerpt); *CB*, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969), 28 (excerpt).

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President Gamal Abdel Nasser,  
The Republic of Egypt

Your Excellency:

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(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Reply to Ambassador of the  
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*At this time, Li Yung Ho replaced Choe Il as ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the PRC. The RMRB source does not carry a salutation for this speech.*

I am very happy to accept the letter of credence from the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which you have presented and am grateful for your warm and sincere greetings.

The Chinese people have always been concerned for the achievements and developments made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in all areas. The tremendous efforts made by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in defending the Korean Armistice<sup>1</sup> and its many reasonable proposals for the realization of the unification of the state of Korea and the establishment of contacts between the northern and southern parts of Korea not only were supported by all the Korean people, but also have won the sympathy and support of all peace-loving people in the world. The exchange of visits between the state leaders of Korea and those of many socialist countries and the development of friendly relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other socialist countries in recent years have had great significance both in the consolidating and strengthening of the solidarity of the great family of socialism headed by the Soviet Union and in the cause of safeguarding world peace.

In the past several years, the traditional brotherly friendship between the Chinese and the Korean peoples has become more consolidated and developed with each passing day. The close cooperation between China and Korea in the areas of politics, economics, and culture has already brought tremendous practical benefits to both peoples. The Chinese people will continue to strengthen their friendly relations with the Korean people and will continue to support them in their cause of striving for the peaceful unification of their country . . .<sup>2</sup>

. . . Comrade Ambassador, I warmly welcome you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the People's Republic of China. You will receive my full support and that of the government of the People's Republic of China in your work.

**Notes**

1. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 2.
2. In the *RMRB* source, the paragraph that follows begins with: "Eventually, Chairman Mao Zedong says." This suggests that it is possible that there is something in between the paragraphs here that is not reported.

The Bourgeois Orientation of *Wenhui bao* Should Be Criticized  
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**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 434–439. Other Chinese Texts: *RMRB* (July 1, 1957), 1; *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 179–181; *Xuexi wenjian*, pp. 52–57; *URI* (1976), pp. 231–235; *Jiaoyu yulu*, pp. 7–9, passim (excerpts); *Wenyi hongqi*, 3 (excerpt); *Mao liang*, p. 414 (excerpt). Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 451–456; *URI* (1976), pp. 237–242; *PR*, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 22 (excerpt); *CB*, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969), 28 (excerpt).

This is an editorial for RMRB written by Mao. The reader should note the cross reference to text June 14, 1957. From the contents of the document, we have some reason to believe that text 1957(1), i.e., “Directive on Journalism Work,” was produced around the same time as these RMRB editorials of July 1957, and that indeed the directive may have been issued in conjunction with these highly critical editorials. Therefore we suggest that the reader refer to text 1957(1) when studying these documents of July 1957.

This document is particularly significant in that it represents Mao’s first and main criticism of the so-called Zhang (Bojun)–Luo (Longji) Counterrevolutionary Alliance, which he identifies for the first time here. This criticism became a major component and benchmark of the anti-Rightist campaign in 1957, much as the campaigns against the “Gao-Rao Alliance” and the “Hu Feng Clique” marked the year 1955. For a broader description of the problems that existed in 1957 between the state and the intellectuals, the CPC and the other political parties, particularly with the China Democratic League of which the Zhang-Luo Alliance was seen as a representation, and of the involvement of other people such as Zhang Naiqi (see text Jan. 27, 1957, note 73), see Deng Xiaoping’s “Report on the Rectification Campaign” (RMSC [1958], pp. 33–42; available English translation, R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. [1971], pp. 341–363). Much scholarship has been devoted to the uneasy relationship between the political regime and the CPC, on the one hand, and intellectuals, on the other. Most significant among them are J. Grieder (1981) and M. Goldman (1981); on the specific subject of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the situation in 1957, and the Zhang-Luo affair, one should also refer to R. MacFarquhar (1960) and J. Chen (1960).

Since the editorial department of this newspaper published [the editorial] “The Bourgeois Orientation of *Wenhui bao* During a Certain Period” on June 14,<sup>1</sup> *Wenhui bao* and *Guangming ribao* have both undertaken some self-examination on this question.<sup>2</sup>

The staff at *Guangming ribao* held a number of meetings and seriously criticized the mistake in orientation of managing editor Zhang Bojun<sup>3</sup> and editor-in-chief Chu Anping.<sup>4</sup> Once this critical attitude became clear, the standpoint of the newspaper was fundamentally turned around from Zhang Bojun and Chu Anping’s anti-Communist, antipeople, antisocialist bourgeois line to the socialist revolutionary line. This has restored the confidence of the reading public and the newspaper’s image as a socialist paper. Still somewhat inadequate are the technical aspects of editing and layout. The technical aspects of editing and layout and the political aspects of editing and layout are two different things. As far as *Guangming ribao* is concerned, it is inadequate in the former and more than adequate in the latter. Problems of technique are totally capable of being corrected. Improving the techniques of editing and layout and giving the paper a new appearance would please the readers.<sup>5</sup> This matter is a difficult one; this paper has long intended to do this and has made some slight progress, but it is not yet entirely satisfactory.<sup>6</sup>

*Wenhui bao* has written articles of self-criticism and seems to have changed its orientation; it then wrote a number of news reports and articles reflecting a positive line. All these, of course, are good. But we still feel this is not enough. It is like in the case of performing a play: Some actors portray bad characters with great realism, but when it comes to playing the good characters they just can’t seem to do too well—their manners and gestures are forced, and are not very natural. This

is a matter of considerable difficulty [for them]. If the east wind doesn’t prevail over the west wind, the west wind will prevail over the east wind.<sup>7</sup> On the question of line, there is no room for compromise. Among the editors and reporters there are many who were accustomed to life in the old pattern; it is not at all easy for them to be transformed suddenly. [However,] since [they are caught] in the general trend of circumstances, they have to be transformed even if they don’t want to. The change is mandatory; they do not have to be happy about it. [When they] say they accomplished this easily and pleasantly, it is just an expression of the usual politeness. This is human nature, and it can be excused. The serious question is [the problem of] the editorial department of *Wenhui bao*. This editorial department assumed command during the period when that newspaper was beset with a bourgeois orientation. Its heavy baggage cannot be easily thrown off. As to whether or not there is [someone] acting as an even higher commander [than the editors], those who attack [the paper] say there is, but those who defend it deny it. Moreover [this high command] has reportedly been identified; he is Luo Longji of the Zhang-Luo Alliance.<sup>8</sup> Between these two commanders, there is still a third commander—the head of *Wenhui bao*’s Beijing office, Pu Xixiu.<sup>9</sup> She is a very capable woman general. People are saying that [if you put the three together]—Luo Longji, Pu Xixiu, and the editorial department of *Wenhui bao*, you will get the Democratic League’s Rightist network within the *Wenhui bao*.<sup>10</sup>

The part played by the Democratic League during the course of the contending of the hundred schools [of thought] and the rectification [campaign] was especially despicable.<sup>11</sup> Its organization, planning, program, and line, all caused it to be divorced from the people and were anti-Communist and antisocialist. Then there is the Peasant-Worker Democratic Party<sup>12</sup>—it was exactly the same. These two parties played a particularly conspicuous part in this tempestuous period. The [storm] was stirred up by the Zhang-Luo Alliance itself. Other parties were also involved in stirring it up, and there were some other people who were also quite despicable. But they were small in number, and their chains of command were not as evident. Even among the members of the Democratic League and the Peasant-Worker Democratic Party, not all, nor even the majority, [were involved in stirring up the storm].<sup>13</sup> Those who summoned the gale and the rain,<sup>14</sup> stirred the seas and made waves,<sup>15</sup> made plans behind closed doors, started fires among the lower levels, formed alliances between upper and lower levels,<sup>16</sup> and sought to coordinate [activities] over all sections of the country, and who counted on the circumstances and took as their ultimate goal to create general disorder in the nation and to unseat [the Communist Party] and take its place themselves, to step by step to carry out their plans until their great cause was accomplished—these were really only a relatively small group of people—the so-called bourgeois Rightists. Some of them were fully conscious, the majority were in the dark, and a minority were backbone cadres of the Right wing. Because they were backbone cadres of the Right wing, their powers were still considerable even though their number was small. Throughout this entire spring, black clouds have abruptly rolled across the skies of China; all of them originated from the Zhang-Luo Alliance.

The [All-China] Journalistic Workers’ Association held two meetings. The first



was a negation; the second was a negation of the negation.<sup>17</sup> [Both were held] in little more than a month, reflecting the speed with which the situation in China was changing. The meetings were held successfully. In the first meeting, [“]dark clouds hung over the city walls as though the walls were about to collapse[”] and the bourgeois reactionary line in journalism was set out.<sup>18</sup> At the more recently convened second meeting, the atmosphere changed; [although] the Rightists still stubbornly resisted, it can be said that the majority have found correct bearings.

On June 14, *Wenhui bao* made a self-criticism and acknowledged that it had made some errors.<sup>19</sup> Making a self-criticism is good, and we welcome it. But we think *Wenhui bao*'s criticism is not adequate. This inadequacy is of a fundamental nature. That is to say, *Wenhui bao* has not [really] made a self-criticism at all. On the contrary, in the June 14 editorial it defended its errors: “We had one-sidedly and mistakenly understood the Party’s policy on contending and blooming, and we thought that as long as we unconditionally encouraged contending and blooming we would help the Party carry out rectification; [we thought that] to publicize more positive views and carry out counter criticisms of mistaken ideas would affect [adversely] the contending and blooming.” Is this the way things were? No. During the spring, *Wenhui bao* carried out the anti-Communist, antipeople, antisocialist policies of the Central Committee of the Democratic League, launched reckless attacks on the proletariat, and ran counter to the policies of the Communist Party. Its policy was to topple the Communist Party and send the country into chaos so as to unseat [the Communist Party] and take its place. Were they really “aiding the rectification?”<sup>20</sup> No, that’s a lie; nothing but a deception. Was it wrong to publish no positive views or only a few during a period of time, and to make no counter-criticism of mistaken views?<sup>21</sup> In the period from May 8 to June 7, this paper and all other Party papers, carrying out the directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, did exactly that. The purpose was to let the monsters and ghosts, demons and ogres<sup>22</sup> “contend and bloom,” to let the poisonous weeds grow up tall and full so that the people could see them,<sup>23</sup> and [when they see them] get startled to find that such things still existed in the world, [then] they would take action to wipe out these ugly things. This is to say, the Communist Party perceived that this round of class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is unavoidable. [We] let the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals launch this battle; for a period of time the newspapers published few or no positive views; the reckless attacks of the bourgeois reactionary Rightists were not countered; all Party organizations in all organs and schools wherein rectification took place did not, as a rule, counter this kind of reckless attack for a certain period.<sup>24</sup> This was to enable the masses to see very clearly whose criticisms were well-intentioned and whose so-called criticisms were maliciously intended. This way they could concentrate strength and wait for the time to ripen when they could launch a counterattack. Some say this is a secret plot. We say it is an open plan. This is because we had told the enemy beforehand:<sup>25</sup> Only when demons and ogres are allowed out of the cage can they be destroyed; only if the poisonous weeds are allowed to come out of the soil can they be pulled out. Don’t the peasants weed several times a year? After the weeds are pulled out they can be used for fertilizer. The class enemies

are bound to find the opportunity to express themselves. They are not reconciled to the loss of their world and to their property being communized.<sup>26</sup> No matter how the Communist Party gives prior warning and publicly informs its own enemy of its basic strategy, the enemy will still launch the attack. Class struggle is [a fact that] objectively exists; it is independent of people’s will. This is to say, it is unavoidable. Even if people will to avoid it, it can’t be done. The only thing to do is to follow the dictates of the situation and obtain victory. Why do the reactionary class enemies throw themselves into the net? [It is because] they are reactionary social cliques; they are blinded by the pursuit of profit,<sup>27</sup> and they take the absolute superiority of the proletariat to be an absolute inferiority. [They believed that] by setting fires everywhere, they would be able to stir up the workers and the peasants, and the students would put up big-character posters in an effort to take over the schools; there would be great contending and great blooming, the situation would reach the explosive point, the country would be plunged immediately into disorder, and the Communist Party would be done for. Such was the estimate of the current situation that Zhang Bojun presented to six professors in Beijing on June 6.<sup>28</sup> Isn’t this being blinded by the pursuit of profit? By profit we mean the seizure of power. They have quite a few newspapers, and one of them is called *Wenhui bao*. *Wenhui bao* acts according to the reactionary policies we have described above. On June 14, however, it [made an attempt] to deceive the people, making it seem that it was proceeding with good intentions. *Wenhui bao* said: “The reason these errors in understanding have taken place was that in our heads there were still remnants of bourgeois ideas of running a newspaper.” Wrong! It should have said: “[Our heads] were full of [bourgeois ideas].” [It] served for several months as a mouthpiece for the reactionaries in their reckless attack on the proletariat; the orientation of the newspaper changed to an anti-Communist, antipeople, and antisocialist orientation, that is, a bourgeois orientation. Would “remnants” of bourgeois thinking have been adequate to this task? What kind of logic is this? A generalized conclusion was derived from a specific premise; this is the logic of *Wenhui bao*. To this day *Wenhui bao* remains unprepared to criticize the reactionary news reports that flew in the face of facts, and which it has published in huge quantities, or the many reactionary opinions that it has printed, or the reactionary editing and layout [techniques], large amounts of which were used [by it] to serve as a tool for the attack on the proletariat. *Xinmin bao* is different.<sup>29</sup> It has already made quite a number of relatively conscientious self-criticisms. *Xinmin bao* committed fewer errors than *Wenhui bao*, and as soon as it discovered its errors it conscientiously corrected them. This demonstrates the sense of responsibility that the reporters and the people in charge of this newspaper have toward the people’s causes. As far as the readers are concerned, this newspaper has begun to show initiative. Where has *Wenhui bao*'s sense of responsibility gone to? When will you begin to make the attempt to do the things *Xinmin bao* has done? Debts must be paid. When will *Wenhui bao* begin to pay these debts? It looks as if *Xinmin bao*'s self-criticism has presented *Wenhui bao* with a whole pile of difficult problems. The readers will ask *Wenhui bao* when it is going to catch up with *Xinmin bao*. At the present time, *Wenhui bao* is in a completely defensive position. Before *Xinmin bao* made its self-criticism, it looked

as if *Wenhui bao* would still be able to muddle along for a while, but since *Xinmin bao* made a self-criticism, things have become difficult for *Wenhui bao*. Passivity can be turned into initiative—that means taking *Xinmin bao* as the teacher and conscientiously following its example.

We now return once more to the term “bourgeois Rightists.” The bourgeois Rightists are those anti-Communist, antipeople, antisocialist bourgeois reactionaries of whom we have spoken previously. This is a scientific statement that is in accord with the facts. They are [only] a handful of people who are found among the democratic parties,<sup>30</sup> the intellectuals, the capitalists, and the young students. They are also found in the Communist Party and the Youth League.<sup>31</sup> This has become apparent during this stormy period. Although their number is extremely small, in the democratic parties, especially in certain democratic parties, they do have strength and cannot be taken lightly. These people not only talk; they also act. They are guilty. The saying “one who speaks up should not be blamed” doesn’t apply to them.<sup>32</sup> They are not only [“]those who speak[”]; they are actors as well. Are they to be punished? At present it appears to be unnecessary because the people’s state is quite secure and among [these bourgeois Rightists] there are many prominent figures. We can be lenient and not mete out punishment for them. On the whole, it’s enough to call them “Rightists”; we need not call them reactionaries. Only under one condition—that is, if they don’t learn from their mistakes after repeated admonition, if they continue to carry out destructive activities, and to break the criminal laws will they be punished. Learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, curing the illness to save the patient,<sup>33</sup> turning negative factors into positive ones—these principles are still applicable to them. There is another kind of Rightists—those who speak but don’t act. They speak in the same way as those described before but they don’t engage in destructive activities. Toward this sort of people we must be even more lenient. Their erroneous talk must be thoroughly criticized; there can’t be any holding back. We should, however, allow them to retain their own views. All of the types of people discussed above will still be allowed freedom of speech.<sup>34</sup> For a great and secure country to keep a small group such as this around won’t do any harm once the broad masses [of the people] have understood their errors. It should be understood that the Rightists are those people who can teach us with [their] negative examples. In this respect, poisonous weeds have merit. The poisonous weeds have merit precisely because they have poison and because they have once spread it forth to harm the people.

The Communist Party will continue the rectification. Each democratic party has also already begun rectification. After the reckless attacks of the Rightists have been repulsed by the people, it will be possible for rectification to proceed smoothly.<sup>35</sup>

## Notes

1. See text June 14, 1957.
2. See text June 14, 1957, notes 1 and 3. The results of these “self-examinations” were published in the article “*Wenhui bao* bianji bu de chubu jiancha” (The Preliminary Exami-

nation of the Editorial Board of the *Wenhui bao*) in *RMRB* (July 4, 1957), and in the article “*Guangming ribao* zai Zhang Bojun, Chu Anping xuangai zhengzhi fangxiang qijian suo fan cuowu de jiancha” (An Examination of the Mistakes Committed by *Guangming ribao* During the Period in which Zhang Bojun and Chu Anping Insidiously Altered Its Political Orientation), in *GMRB* (July 15, 1957). See *RMSC* (1958), pp. 145–149 and 150–156 respectively.

3. Zhang Bojun (b. 1896) was at this time publisher of *Guangming ribao*. He was educated in philosophy at Berlin University and joined the faculty of Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) University on his return to China in 1923. In 1926, he became the secretary of Deng Yanda, the director of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army in the Northern Expedition. Later he took part in the August First Insurrection. In 1927 he joined Deng Yanda and others in forming the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua geming dang) in Shanghai. This was the forerunner of the so-called Third Party and was renamed the Provisional Action Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1929. In 1938, Zhang was instrumental in forming the Association of Patriots for National Unification and Construction (Tongyi jianguo tongzhi hui), and in the formation, in 1941, of the League of Democratic Political Groups, which became, in 1944, the China Democratic League. In 1947, after the disintegration of the Political Consultative Conference of 1946 (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 2), Zhang and others formed the Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic Party (Zhongguo nonggong minzhu dang) of which Zhang became the chairman. He was also the first vice-chairman of the Democratic League. He was a member of the CPPCC Congress in 1954, and minister of transportation from 1954 to 1958. At the time of the CPC rectification campaign of 1957, he organized a series of criticisms of the CPC, arguing for the implementation of “Western-style” democracy in the form of a bicameral parliament, a “political planning” *yuan* or senate, and the “mutual supervision” between the CPC and other parties. More specifically, according to *Ciyu jianshi*, at the forum convened by the United Front Department of the CPC on May 8, 1957, Zhang was a vocal critic of the CPC’s policies and called for a separation of Party power from governmental power. He then organized further criticism with the members of the Democratic League on May 13, and finally organized an emergency meeting of “Rightist elements” on June 6. Since his main collaborator in these suggestions was Luo Longji, the CPC later labeled these as the creations of the “Zhang-Luo Alliance.” For more biographical information on Zhang, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 671–673.

4. Chu Anping (b. 1906) was the editor-in-chief of *Guangming ribao* at this time. He was a member of the September Third Study Society (Jiusan xueshe)—one of the major democratic parties—and of the Democratic League. He was a member of the CPPCC and a delegate from Jiangsu Province to the First National People’s Congress. He had served variously as editor on *Zhongyang ribao* (a KMT organ in Nanjing and later in Chongqing) and professor at Zhengzhi University and Fudan University. He wrote the critical article “Dang tianxia lun” (On the Nation as the [Private] Domain of the [Communist] Party) in 1957 and was identified as a member of the Zhang-Luo Alliance. In November 1957, he was relieved of his *GMRB* post. For more biographical information on Chu, see *URI* (1969), I, p. 193.

5. To understand this reference to the ostensibly picayune criticism of newspaper layout, see text June 14, 1957, note 2.

6. Here, by “this paper,” Mao is referring to *RMRB*.

7. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 39.

8. Luo Longji (1896–1965) was at this time a chief correspondent of *Guangming ribao*. He was educated at Qinghua University and subsequently in the United States and Britain at the University of Wisconsin, Columbia University (Ph.D. 1928), and the London School of Economics. He was at one time the editor-in-chief of the *Xin yue* (New Moon) magazine. In 1931, he formed, together with Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) the “Rebirth Society,” which later was reorganized as the Chinese Socialist Party. In 1935 he became the editor-in-chief of the Catholic paper *Yishi bao* in Tianjin. During the War of Resistance period he

taught at Southwestern Associated University in Kunming and left the Chinese Socialist Party to join the Democratic League. In 1949 he became second vice-chairman of the Democratic League. He also became the minister of timber industry. In 1957, he became a vocal critic of the CPC and collaborated with Zhang Bojun in the suggestions for political change described in note 3. He also suggested that a committee be established under the NPC and the CPPCC to reexamine the cases of people who had been criticized, purged, or dismissed, or in any sense labeled as counterrevolutionaries by the CPC. For more biographical information on Luo, see URI (1969), I, pp. 473–474.

9. Pu Xixiu was the wife of Luo Longji. Pu began her journalistic career in the 1930s as a reporter/distributor for the *Xinmin bao* in Nanjing (see text April 1957[2], note 46). She followed the newspaper to Chongqing during the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan. After the war, she became affiliated with the Democratic League. She also became an editor/correspondent for *Wenhui bao*. In 1961 she became the chief correspondent for the Hong Kong *Wenhui bao* stationed in Beijing. She was also an alternate member of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League. Pu was the second of three sisters. Her older sister, Jiexiu, was a professor of chemistry at Zhongguo daxue (University of China) in Beijing and a member of the Association for Democratic National Construction (Minzhu jianguo hui). Her younger sister, Anxiu, was Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai's wife. During the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957, Pu Jiexiu denounced the "Zhang-Luo Alliance" in spite of the fact that her sister was married to Luo Longji. For her part, Pu Xixiu was criticized as a Rightist. It was not until 1959 that the label was removed.

10. The China Democratic League, or CDL (Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng, sometimes abbreviated as *Min meng*), was formed under the original name of League of Democratic Political Groups (Minzhu zhengtuan tongmeng) in 1941 and renamed on September 19, 1944. It was led by Zhang Lan, Shen Junru, Huang Yanpei, Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, Deng Chumin, etc. (See text Mar. 15, 1950, vol. I, and text June 9, 1957, note 11.) Toward the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the CDL was instrumental in laying the intellectual foundations for the vision of a multipartisan government for a unified postbellum China. This became a significant factor in the attempts in 1946 to bring about a negotiated compromise between the CPC and the KMT. Throughout the stormy years of the Civil War, the CDL continued to maintain its position on advocating a coalition government—a position which it had adopted in January 1947 at the Second Plenum of its Central Committee. In 1948, when the CPC appealed to the various political parties to organize a new People's Political Consultative Conference, the CDL was one of the first to respond positively. Many of its members, including people such as Liang Shuming, however, were disappointed at the military outcome of the Civil War and to the very end hoped to be able to bring about a peaceful settlement that would result in a coalition government rather than a Communist regime. This general philosophy persisted, although the CDL, as a body, accepted the Common Program adopted by the CPPCC in 1949 (see text Sept. 21, 1949, Vol. I, note 3), which gave the CPC de facto administrative dominance over the state as a whole, if not over individual political parties. The CDL continued to play an important role in the CPPCC thereafter. For more on the CDL, see *RMSC* (1957), pp. 250–252.

11. Although Mao and the CPC seem to be making a blanket indictment of the Democratic League here, readers should note that the events of 1957 culminated in the position taken by the Democratic League in which it claimed correctly that it had, within itself, a struggle between two lines, and that while a substantial part of the CDL membership and leadership had been swayed by the Zhang-Luo clique, the CDL as a whole had been able, in the latter half of 1957, to purge itself of the Zhang-Luo influence and rectify itself. This position was represented by Shi Liang, one of the original founders of the CDL, and was adopted first in the CDL's own Report on the Nationwide Rectification Campaign on September 13, 1957, and again at the CDL's Conference to Criticize the Zhang-Luo Alliance held on January 19, 1958.

For some of the claims that the CPC has since made regarding the structural damage caused by the Zhang-Luo Alliance in such areas as education (i.e., the disbanding of CPC

Party committees in middle schools and universities) in 1957, see *Ciyu jianshi*, pp. 67–68. The documentary sources of these claims made in *Ciyu jianshi* are not made known, but they are partially reflected in several CDL-issued essays. For these essays and others mentioned earlier, see *RMSC* (1958), pp. 93–108.

12. The Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic Party, or CPWDP (Zhongguo nonggong minzhu dang), came from the genealogy of a number of predecessors—the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua geming dang), formed in 1927, which became the Provisional Action Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo guomindang linshi xingdong weiyuanhui) in 1929–1930, which became the Chinese Action Committee for National Liberation (Zhonghua minzu jiefang xingdong weiyuanhui) in 1935, which finally became the Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic Party in February 1947. It joined in the formation of the League of Chinese Political Groups (the forerunner of the Democratic League) in 1941 and became a participatory organization of the CPPCC in 1949. (See note 3.) What is significant here is that while both Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji were prominent members of the CDL, Zhang was also the chairman of the CPWDP. In the spring of 1957, the CPWDP held a National Work Conference at which it expunged from its charter the statements regarding its acceptance of the leadership of the CPC and the guidelines of Marxism-Leninism. For a review and "self-criticism" of sorts of the CPWDP regarding its actions and positions in 1957, see *RMSC* (1958), pp. 123–127. See also text Apr. 1957(2), note 37.

13. See note 11.

14. The term Mao uses here, *hu feng huan yu*, is derived from the first chapter (*hui*) of the classical novel *San guo yanyi* (Romance of the Three Kingdoms). In its original context it referred to the magical powers of a mage of the Daoist sect, Zhang Jiao. It has come to connote the ability, and the tendency, of someone to create a storm in the realm of human affairs, or to make great and terrible things happen.

15. The expression here, *tui tao zuo lang*, appears to be a variation of the more common aphorism *tui bo zu lan*, which is derived from the chapter "Zhi dao" (The Way of Governance) in *Zhuzi quanshu* (The Complete Book of Master Zhu [Xi]). The meaning is "instead of allaying troubles and calming things down, to abet them and make them even more serious." The variation here appears to bear a keener edge than the original, since its second half, *zuo lang*, links it to the common saying *xing feng zuo lang*, meaning "stirring up waves."

16. The term for "forming alliances" is *chuanlian* here. The expression originally referred to the work that was done by CPC cadres in the 1940s, as the land reform program was launched in the Shanxi-Chahar-Henan border region (revolutionary base) and in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia base area. This emphasized the method of going deep among the peasant masses, hearing their grievances and sympathizing with their sufferings, "striking roots and making contacts, or alliances" (*zhagen chuanlian*), i.e., linking up with the peasants, especially the poor peasant masses, and then doing ideological mobilization and education work among them to increase their political awareness and win them over to the side of land reform. This term, especially as in the full form *zhagen chuanlian*, became very popular during the Cultural Revolution, at the height of which many Red Guard groups were roaming the country "making revolution." These were mobile and unstable groups of people, and *zhagen chuanlian* became a euphemism for their itinerant style of political action; since they were fairly rootless, they considered themselves primarily in terms of "sinking roots" among the masses. Meanwhile, their work of propagating and expanding the Cultural Revolution was seen (by the participants) as an effort in the revolutionary education of the masses (especially the rural, peasant masses), thus connecting them historically to the *zhagen chuanlian* types of the 1930s and 1940s. The meaning in the document here, however, is not quite as laudatory and positive. Mao seems to be using it to refer to clandestine and covert alliance forming.

17. This refers to the meetings held on May 16, 1957, and June 24, 1957, respectively. Both meetings were convened in Beijing by the Research Department of the All-China Journalistic Workers' Association and the journalism departments of Beijing

University and the People's University. (The second meeting was sponsored also by the journalism department of Fudan University.) The first was attended by journalists from Beijing, Shanghai, Liaoning, and Shanxi. The second was attended by journalists from Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei, and Liaoning. The nature and outcome of the two meetings were drastically different. At the first meeting, the control of the CPC over its own papers and its dominant influence over other papers and magazines, the monopolization of the Xinhua News Agency "for purposes of class struggle directed by the Communist Party," and the absence of autonomy for the non-CPC organs were severely criticized. At the second meeting, it was the positions taken by the first meeting that were reversed and repudiated. The "bourgeois ideology in the journalistic front" was criticized. Hence Mao's characterization here of "negation" and "negation of the negation." Mao is obviously stretching out the philosophical meaning of these terms somewhat. For a description of the philosophical significance of these terms, see text Jan. 1957, note 25.

18. This line, *heiyun ya cheng cheng yu cui*, is derived from the poem "Yanmen taishou xing" (Ballad of the Governor of Yanmen) by the Tang-dynasty poet Li He, describing the precarious conditions of a border fortress besieged by invading forces. Here Mao is reflecting on his own description of the situation in the spring of 1957, contained in the last sentence of the preceding paragraph.

19. Mao might have been referring to a self-criticism that was held as a discussion. The results of such a self-criticism, as far as we can tell, were not published until July 4. (See note 2.) This is reinforced by Mao's next statement here that the *Wenhui bao's* editorial on June 14 defended itself rather than admitted its "error."

20. See text June 8, 1957(3), note 3.

21. See Mao's criticism of *RMRB*, in text April 1957(1).

22. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.

23. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

24. See text June 8, 1957(2), paragraph 2, middle section.

25. On this subject of people feeling that they were, or fearing that they might be, trapped by their "contending," see text surrounding text April 1957(2), note 9.

26. The Chinese terms that Mao uses here are *wangguo* and *gongchan*. The first of these phrases literally means to lose one's country, and generally refers to the state of a people whose country has been conquered by another. Here Mao seems sarcastically to be referring to the losing (on the part of the bourgeoisie) of control over the state. *Gongchan* is the term for communism. Here Mao again seems somewhat sarcastic and seems to be referring not to "communism" itself, but to the bourgeoisie's fearful image of communism, that is, forced egalitarianism and sharing of property, or communization, through the method of confiscation. See also text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 6.

27. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 29.

28. On June 6, 1957, Zhang Bojun convened a meeting at the CPPCC's Cultural Club which was attended by six academicians, all of whom were leading members of the Democratic League. They were Zeng Chaolun (deputy minister of higher education), Fei Xiaotong (deputy director of the Central Institute of Ethnic Studies; see text July 1957, note 23), Huang Yaomian (professor at the Beijing Normal University), Wu Jingchao (professor at the People's University), Tao Dayong (professor at Beijing Normal University), and Qian Weizhang (vice-president of Qinghua University). For descriptions of this meeting, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 672, and *Ciyu jianshi*, p. 70. The "anti-Rightist" struggle was launched, in a way, two days after this meeting was held, on June 8, by the publication of the *RMRB* editorial "What Is This For?" (See text June 8, 1957).

29. See text April 1957(2), note 46.

30. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

31. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.

32. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 4; see also text June 9, 1957, note 2.

33. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.

34. See text June 9, 1957, paragraph 9.

35. See text June 8, 1957(2), paragraph 2, last section.

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## Conversation with Workers at the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory

(July 8, 1957)

**Source:** *SCMP*, 1626 (Oct. 8, 1957), 26–27.

*We have no Chinese copy of this conversation. What we have here is a representation of an excerpt from the SCMP English translation of an article written by Liu Xianhuang which was published on August 5, 1957, in Sichuan nongmin bao (Peasant News of Sichuan), Chengdu, as a reprint from Laodong bao (Labor News) of Shanghai (date unspecified in SCMP). This article reports that Mao visited the Shanghai Machine Tools Factory on July 8, 1957, and spent several hours talking to workers and getting to understand the operations of the factory. As reported, he was accompanied by, among others, Ke Qingshi (see text Jan. 27, 1957[1], note 13, also text July 9, 1957, note 7), who was then first secretary of the CPC Municipal Committee of Shanghai.*

Expansion is very rapid. The country needs factories like this one. Hope you will do a good job and speed up socialist construction. . . .

No instructions at all [will I give today]. You are all running this factory. You have so many young people. You are able to turn the factory into a better one.

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## Speech at Conference for People of All Circles of Shanghai

(July 8, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 109–122. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 181–187; URI (1976), pp. 243–253; *Keji geming* (A), pp. 8–9 (excerpt). Available English Translation: URI (1976), pp. 255–269.

*There is no additional information available on this conference, whose existence is implied by the title of this article. A news item in RMRB (July 9, 1957), 1, reports that Mao met with people from all circles in Shanghai on the evening of July 7. Moreover, according to Xuanji, V, p. 440 fn; Mao delivered a speech at a cadres' conference in Shanghai on July 9 (Xuanji, V, pp. 440–455), which appears from textual cross checking to be very similar to the one*

*here. We are unable to ascertain whether these were different records of one and the same speech, in which case there is a confusion in the date citation of one publication, or that Mao gave two speeches dealing with the same topics and differing only slightly in detail on two successive days, in front of two different audiences. As in the case of much of the material in the Wansui volumes, in this speech there is vagueness and inconsistency in the text, and many names of people, for instance, are omitted and replaced by Xs. Where we have been able to identify and clarify these, we have done so in the annotations. Where we have not been able to do so, we have left the Xs in their original place. The title of this document in Wansui (n.d. 3) indicates that this is a "transcript" of a set of "the main points" of the speech.*

Comrades, how are you!

In the latter part of March of this year, a hundred days ago that is, I had a talk here with comrades in the Party.<sup>1</sup> At the time I came to set fires. Within this period of a hundred days or so the situation has changed greatly, and the consciousness of the people has been raised considerably. Well, this is [because] a battle has been fought! At that time we anticipated these things, and I talked about them here. But at the time [I] didn't talk about lighting fires. I said, rather, that when people criticized [us], we should toughen our scalps<sup>2</sup> and listen, and after listening for a time, analyze [the matter] and reply. If what is said is correct, then we should accept it; if it is not correct, then we should criticize it. We should always have faith that the majority are good people. [In whatever context] the whole world, the 600 million people of China, the Communist Party, the Communist Youth League,<sup>3</sup> the democratic parties,<sup>4</sup> the intellectuals, the industrial and commercial circles, the students, workers, or peasants (the workers and peasants are the basic [components of] our masses)—the majority are good people. They are all good-hearted and sincere, they are honest and not deceitful, and they have no ulterior motives. By "majority" I mean not just 51 per cent, but over 90 per cent. Right now, for example, take the students: There are more than 7,000 thousand people at Beijing University, and [counting] both professors and students, the Rightists amount to only 1 or 2 or 3 per cent.<sup>5</sup> What does this 1 or 2 or 3 [per cent] refer to? It refers to the 1 per cent who are the intransigent, backbone elements [of the Right]: There are only seventy-some of them. All in all there are only about fifty-some people who regularly cause disturbances and turn things upside down: They don't amount to even 1 per cent. They organized small groups, such as "The Hundred Flowers Study Society," "The Philosophes' Study Society," "The Hegel-Engels Study Society," and "The Confucius-Mao Zedong Study Society."<sup>6</sup> Later [they] felt that [some of these names] weren't appropriate, [so] they went back to simply calling [themselves] "The Hundred Flowers Study Society." The students' "leader" is named Tan Tianrong. He's now become a nationally known personage.<sup>7</sup> This time we really managed to produce some heroes! Both the Leftists and the Rightists have produced heroes.

It's certainly not easy to set a fire to burn oneself. I've heard that around this area there were some people who had second thoughts and [therefore] didn't set a big fire. I think [in] Shanghai [they] set a fire that was about [right], [but] it was

just not quite enough, not quite satisfying. [If you] knew early on that it would be so wonderful, why didn't you set big [fires]? Let those poisonous weeds grow up;<sup>8</sup> let those demons and ogres<sup>9</sup> come out. Why be afraid of them? At the time we said not to be afraid, but within our Party there were some comrades, such as XXX and others, who were loyal and faithful to the Party and the nation, but simply feared there would be chaos everywhere. They simply didn't see the overall situation and didn't reckon on [the fact that] the great majority of the people, over 90 per cent of them, are good people. [The people] are with us, and there's no cause for fear. They may scold us, but they won't hit us. They use their mouths to curse, but they don't use their fists to hit [people]. As for that extremely small minority, such as the backbone elements of the Right whom I have just mentioned and who constitute less than 1 per cent of the students at Beijing University, there is in addition another 1 to 2 per cent who applaud and support them. Among the professors and associate professors the situation is a little different: Approximately 10 per cent or so of them are Leftists. These two sides [i.e., Leftists and Rightists] are fairly evenly matched, and the middle-of-the-roaders account for around 80 per cent. We shouldn't be afraid of these middle-of-the-roaders. We have some comrades who are afraid that the house is going to fall down, and that the sky is going to fall down. Since ancient times there have only been a few people who [actually] feared that the sky was going to fall down, and one such example was "the men of Qi who feared the sky would collapse," in Henan.<sup>10</sup> Aside from him, no one has ever [actually] feared that the sky would fall down. More than 90 per cent of the people are our friends and comrades, [so we] mustn't be afraid. To fear the masses is senseless. What is meant by leadership personnel? Group leaders, squad leaders, heads of schools, professors, teaching assistants, lecturers, Party committee secretaries, Party committee members, and [Party] branch secretaries, and ourselves as well, are all leadership personnel. People like us, after all, have a little political capital, that is, we've done at least something for the people. Now in setting the fire ablaze, the purpose is to burn ourselves to make ourselves better. Each one of us has faults, including me. "Man being neither saint nor sage, who can be without error?"<sup>11</sup> Therefore [we] should periodically set fires. From now on, in my opinion there should be a fire within no more than three years, and again within five years. Within the space of one five-year plan fires should be set at least twice. Didn't [the Monkey King] Sun Wukong become even better once he had been tempered in Taishang Laojun's Eight-Diagram Furnace?<sup>12</sup> Haven't we said that it's necessary to temper [oneself]?<sup>13</sup> To forge is to hammer iron [in order to shape it], and to smelt is to smelt iron in a blast furnace [in order to purify it]. When steel is smelted in an open-hearth furnace, the steel that is produced by the smelting must still be forged. That drop hammer [used in forging] is really powerful! In the Soviet Union I saw a three-thousand-ton drop hammer, and [even] a ten-thousand-ton drop hammer. People like us also must be tempered. Everybody says that they want to go through a spell of tempering. Ordinarily, [people] talk very glibly about tempering, [and they say things such as:] "I have shortcomings, and I'd very much like to be tempered." But when it comes to real tempering, then they don't do it. This time [everybody] should do some tempering. Even if it isn't [with] a ten-thousand-ton

drop hammer, at least it should be [with] a five-thousand-ton drop hammer! For a time the sky was dim and the earth was dark, and the sun and moon didn't shine.<sup>14</sup> There were two gusts of wind.<sup>15</sup> One was the criticism from the vast majority who were good people, and we welcomed [it]. They criticized the shortcomings of the Communist Party and demanded that the Communist Party rectify itself. Besides that, there was an extreme minority who were Rightists. They were the ones who attacked us. The attack by the majority was justified and correct. That was one kind of tempering. As far as we are concerned, the Rightists' attacks were also a kind of tempering. If you really want to talk about tempering, then [we] should be grateful for the attacks by the Rightists. For our Party, for the broad masses, all the democratic parties, the young students, the working class, and the peasants, the Rightists have [played] the greatest [role] in educating us. In regard to these Rightists, we are now [conducting a campaign of] "encirclement and suppression."<sup>16</sup> Every city has some Rightists, and they want to overthrow us.

The revolution is the people's revolution. It's a revolution of 600 million people led by the proletariat. How can a single Party [alone] make a revolution? The democratic revolution is an undertaking of the people. The socialist revolution is an undertaking of the people, [and] the building of socialism is an undertaking of the people.<sup>17</sup> They [the Rightists] want to deny the achievements of the undertakings of the people. This is one [point]. The second is [the question of] in which direction [we should go], the direction of socialism, or the direction of capitalism?<sup>18</sup> Third, if we are to promote socialism, who [should] take the lead?<sup>19</sup> Should the proletariat lead or should the bourgeoisie lead? The proletariat is so large, and its vanguard is the Communist Party. [But] the bourgeoisie also has a number [of people], and it too has organized political parties. Is it the Communist Party that will lead, or is it the Rightists who will lead? Is the Communist Party [any] good? Do we want it or not? The people say they want it; the Rightists say they don't want it. I think that [it would be] very good to promote a great debate on these three questions. Is the revolution correct? Is the construction [of socialism] correct? Has there been any achievement? Are the achievements the primary aspect? Or are the mistakes the primary aspect? This is the first question. Isn't there a great debate now getting under way? This question has not been debated. The democratic revolution went through a long period of debate. Throughout the democratic revolution, starting from the final years of the Qing dynasty, and through the 1911 Revolution to [the movement] against Yuan Shikai, to the wars of the Northern Expedition, to the War of Resistance Against Japan,<sup>20</sup> there was constant debate. (During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the question of whether to resist Japan or not also was debated. One faction said [we] couldn't resist because China didn't have enough guns. This is the theory that weapons decide everything.<sup>21</sup> Another faction said not to be afraid, that people are still the main thing, that even though our weapons were not as good as theirs, we could still fight.) Later, there were the Chongqing negotiations,<sup>22</sup> the old Political Consultative Conference,<sup>23</sup> and the Nanjing negotiations;<sup>24</sup> these were all debates. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to keep fighting without stopping for an instant. The result of the fighting was that he lost. [One can say,] therefore, that the [entire] democratic revolution underwent

debate; it underwent long-term mental preparation. [Compared with that,] the socialist revolution has been a brief commando attack. Within the space of six or seven years, reforms in the area of social institutions have been basically completed. [As for] the transformation of people, there has also been some progress, but it's still inadequate. There are two aspects to socialist transformation. One is the transformation of institutions; and the other is the transformation of people. Institutions include not only the system of ownership but also the superstructure, that is, the government, the organs of political power, and ideology. For example, the newspapers belong to the [realm of] ideology. Some people say that newspapers have no class nature, and that [therefore] newspapers are not tools of class struggle.<sup>25</sup> This statement is incorrect. At least, during the next several decades, before imperialism is eradicated throughout the world, it is not good to talk like this. Newspapers as well as other things, such as philosophy and various ideologies, all reflect class relationships. Schools, educational enterprises, literature, and the arts all belong to [the realm of] ideology and the superstructure. Natural science is divided into two parts. Pure natural science makes no class distinctions, but applied natural science, [and the question of] who makes use of natural science, have a class nature. The head of Beijing University's "Hundred Flowers Study Society," Tan Tianrong, is a fourth-year student in the physics department. Idealists have become so numerous now among people who study physics! The Chinese [language and literature] department and the history department [are the two departments with the] largest number of idealists. There are also a great many idealists among people who run newspapers. [But] you should not assume that it only involves these [people]. There are also many idealists in the social science fields, in the fields of philosophy and political economy. Furthermore in natural science there are also many idealists. Their world view is idealism. If you talk about what water is composed of, then they are materialists. [They will say that] water is composed of two elements; [there] they will handle things according to the reality of the situation. [But] if you talk about how to transform society, and how the Communist Party is to carry out rectification, then they say we must do away with the Communist Party. We say the Communist Party should be rectified for the better, but they say the Communist Party should be eliminated. At that time our policy was like this: Just listen and don't speak. For a period of several weeks [we] toughened our scalps [and held firm]; all we did was open our ears a little more, and we didn't say a word ourselves. And we didn't inform the Party committees [about how to proceed], either, didn't tell the [Party] branch secretaries, didn't tell the Party branch staff committees, and didn't tell the [Youth] League committees, letting them have a free-for-all, with each person making his or her own decision. We have enemies right there in the Qinghua University Party Committee. As soon as you hold a meeting here they report to the enemy. They are called "insurrectionist" elements. This matter of "insurrection" among Communist Party members has pleased both sides. Among the student Party members at Beijing University there has been a 5 per cent collapse; in the [Youth] League, the collapse has been a little greater, perhaps 10 per cent or even a little more. In my view this collapse is a most natural thing to happen. Whether it's 10 per cent, 20 per cent, 30 per cent, or 40

per cent, in a word, there has been a collapse and we're happy about it, and that's that. Those kinds of bourgeois mentality and idealism have wormed their way into the Communist Party and the Youth League. They call themselves Communists, but in reality they are anti-Communists, or vacillating elements. Their "insurrection" makes us happy, [because it means that] we won't have to clean them out. They have run away [from the Party] on their own. As for the enemy, they were very happy, too. But once we encircled the Rightists, the situation turned around. Many people who had connections with the Rightists but were not Rightists [themselves] came [out] and exposed them. Wasn't this insurrection [too]? There are some Rightists who will engage in insurrection too. Now the Rightists don't have an easy time of it anymore.

I gave a talk here several months ago. It's less than a hundred days since then, and yet such a great change has taken place in the situation. This struggle is primarily a political struggle, and in terms of its nature, the struggle is a class struggle. There are various forms of class struggle. This one is primarily a political struggle and not a military struggle, or an economic struggle. Are there any elements of an ideological struggle? There are, but the political struggle constitutes the essential element. The ideological struggle involves an additional, subsequent stage, which should be like a gentle breeze and fine rain.<sup>26</sup> The Communist Party is undergoing rectification, and the Youth League is undergoing rectification, too. After undergoing ideological struggle, [their members] will be raised to a higher level [of awareness]; [they will] really study Marxism-Leninism and will really help each other. Is there any subjectivism? Is there any bureaucratism?<sup>27</sup> [We should] really put our minds to work and think and take notes [on these matters]. By doing [this] for a few months we will raise [our understanding of] Marxism, and [our] political and ideological level a step higher.

Another month or so of struggle is needed. If the Rightists keep on publishing [their views about the struggle] in the newspapers as they are now doing<sup>28</sup> and continue for [the rest of] the year, next year and the year after, it would become difficult [for them] to get things done; there won't be so many things left [for them] to publish. That's all there is to the Rightists. When just about everything has been published, they will publish a little bit secretly and a little bit openly; if they have something [to publish], then they'll publish it, and if there's nothing [to publish], then they won't publish [anything]. July is [going to be] a tense month for the anti-Rightist [campaign]. After July, come August, there should be a gentle breeze and fine rain. The Rightists like violent winds and driving rain most, and like least of all a gentle breeze and fine rain.<sup>29</sup> We, on the other hand, advocate a gentle breeze and fine rain. They claim that the Communist Party is not fair, saying: "In the past, [when] you rectified us, it was with violent winds and driving rain; now [when] you rectify yourselves it's with a gentle breeze and fine rain." But when we conducted ideological transformation in the past, including the criticism of Hu Shi and Liang Shuming,<sup>30</sup> the directives issued within our Party all called for a gentle breeze and fine rain. The affairs of the world always progress in twists and turns, and social movements always advance in a spiral.<sup>31</sup> As for the Rightists, [we]

should dig them out; even now [we] should continue to dig them out and must not relax our efforts. At present the Rightists will try to clutch at any straw there is because they are drowning. Only now do they find out the good points of a gentle breeze and fine rain. In the past, they wanted a violent wind and driving rain to come. They said that a gentle breeze and fine rain, [like the light] rain that falls every day during the season when the plums are ripening, would cause the rice seedlings to rot, and there wouldn't be any food grain, and there would be a natural disaster, and therefore it was not as desirable as a violent wind and driving rain. Now it is summer, the time of driving rains. Come August there can be a gentle breeze and fine rain, because there won't be many things left to dig out.

We in China have always received a two-sided education, a positive and a negative education. Japanese imperialism was [our] number one great "teacher." In the past, there were the Qing dynasty, Yuan Shikai, and the Beiyang warlords,<sup>32</sup> and, later, Chiang Kai-shek. They were all very good "teachers" of ours. Without them, the Chinese people couldn't have been turned around through education. It's not enough to have the Communist Party alone as a teacher. We say a good many things, and a good many middle-of-the-road people don't listen. [They] want to do something else. For example, they just won't listen to [the slogan] "unity-criticism-unity."<sup>33</sup> Or, when we talk about suppressing counterrevolutionaries, [we say that our] achievements, [as compared to our mistakes], are the primary aspect, but they won't listen either.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, when we talk about democratic centralism,<sup>35</sup> they won't listen either. [When we] talk about the people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat, they won't listen.<sup>36</sup> [When we] talk about the need to unite with the Soviet Union and socialist countries as well as with the peace-loving people of all countries, they won't listen. There is another thing they particularly refuse to listen to, namely, that "poisonous weeds must be uprooted." Let the demons and ogres come out, and let everybody get a good look at them. After everybody has had a good look, they will recognize that these freaks and monsters are no good and should be overthrown. When poisonous weeds grow up [you] have to hoe [them]. The peasants hoe weeds every year, and after hoeing them up [they] can use them as fertilizer. Haven't we said this before? We have, haven't we? But poisonous weeds will still come up. Every year the peasants hoe weeds; that is, they send a message to the weeds. But the weeds just won't listen, and the next year they grow again. Even if you hoed for ten thousand years, they'd still come up for ten thousand years. [Even over] 100 million years, weeds will grow every year. [They] feel that we are the poisonous weeds, while they themselves are fragrant flowers and therefore are not among the things [that should be] hoed. They want to hoe us up. It simply has not occurred to them that they themselves are the ones that should be hoed up.

Socialism has come so rapidly that the general line [for building socialism],<sup>37</sup> though having been studied by all sectors, has not been fully debated either inside the Party or in society at large. It is like a cow eating grass. The grass is swallowed first, and only later on is it slowly brought back up and chewed carefully. Our revolution has already accomplished basic reforms in the area of institutions. The

economic base, that is, the ownership of the means of production, was first [to be transformed];<sup>38</sup> second, there was the superstructure, that is, the organs of power, ideology, and so forth. These have all been basically transformed, but no debate has yet been launched. At this time a debate is being launched through the newspapers, forums, large meetings, and big-character posters. Big-character posters are good things, and I think [their use] should be handed down [to future generations]. Look, Confucius's *Analects* have been handed down. The Five Classics and the Thirteen Classics have been handed down. The Twenty-four Histories have been handed down, and *Shiwu guan* [The Fifteen Strings of Cash] has also been handed down.<sup>39</sup> In my opinion, big-character posters must also be handed down. Take rectification in the factories, for example. I think it's good to use big-character posters, and the more the better.<sup>40</sup> If there are ten thousand posters, that's first class. If there are five thousand, that's second class. If there are only two thousand, that's third class. If there are only a few scattered here and there, that's the bottom class.<sup>41</sup> Big-character posters have no class nature, just as language has no class nature. The vernacular language has no class nature.<sup>42</sup> The proletariat speaks the vernacular, and the bourgeoisie also speaks the vernacular. The proletariat has drama written in the vernacular language, so does the bourgeoisie; even the traitors who sold out China<sup>43</sup> used drama that was written in the vernacular language—during the [War] of Resistance Against Japan there were plays written in the vernacular. The proletariat can use big-character posters, so can the bourgeoisie. We believe that the majority of people stand on the side of the proletariat. Thus this tool, big-character posters, benefits the proletariat and does not benefit the bourgeoisie. [The fact] that for a time the sky was dim and the earth was dark, and the sun and moon did not shine, would seem to be beneficial to the bourgeoisie. By "a time," we mean two weeks, or three weeks, and no more. By toughening our scalps we also mean just for that two or three weeks, when one can't sleep, and can't eat. Didn't you say you wanted to be tempered? [Going through] a few weeks of one's life while one can't sleep and can't eat is tempering. It's not [a matter of] actually putting you into a blast furnace to be heated. There are many middle-of-the-roaders who vacillated for a while, and that's very good. By vacillating for a while, they gain experience. Vacillation is characteristic of middle-of-the-roaders; otherwise, why would they be called middle-of-the-roaders? At one pole is the proletariat, and at the other pole is the bourgeoisie, and in between there are a good many middle-of-the-roaders. The two poles are small, and the middle is large. But at bottom the middle-of-the-roaders are all good people; they are the allied army of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie wanted to get them to be its allied army, and for a time it seemed a little [as though they were]. The proletariat wanted to get them to be its allied army, and that, too, seemed to be the case for a time. The middle-of-the-roaders also criticized us, but it's well-intentioned criticism. The criticism made by the Rightists was a pretext for making trouble, and the middle-of-the-roaders became confused. The big-character posters that we just talked about are a matter of form. They are one type of weapon for fighting a war, a light weapon like the rifle, the revolver, and the machine gun. [Things like] *Wenhui bao*, *Guangming ribao*,<sup>44</sup> and some other newspapers are the

airplanes and the heavy artillery. *Guangming ribao* and *Wenhui bao* got a very profound lesson this time around. In the past they didn't know what a proletarian newspaper was and what a bourgeois newspaper was, what a socialist newspaper was and what a capitalist newspaper was.<sup>45</sup> They couldn't make a clear distinction. Even if they were able at one time to make a clear distinction, the leaders of these papers still wanted to turn them into bourgeois newspapers. They hated proletarian newspapers and hated socialist newspapers. Does a school guide its students in a socialist direction, or does it guide its students in a capitalist direction? Do [the organs in] the industrial and commercial circles lead these people in the industrial and commercial enterprises (large, middle, and small capitalists) in a proletarian direction, or do they lead them in a bourgeois direction? Should there be transformation or not? Some people are extremely afraid of this transformation. [They] say that transformation gives one such a feeling of inferiority, and that the more transformation one undergoes the more inferior one feels. I don't think that it should be interpreted that way. [It] should be that the more transformation one undergoes, the more self-respect one feels. One should say it [generates] a feeling of self-respect. It is because they have consciousness that people want to be transformed. There are some people who consider themselves to have a very high level of class consciousness, and feel that they themselves don't need transformation.<sup>46</sup> Instead, they want to transform the proletariat, and want to transform the world in their own image, while the proletariat wants to transform it in its own image. As I see it, the majority of the people, more than 90 per cent, are willing to be transformed. Of course, in doing so they will have to go through a process of hesitation, consideration, constant delaying, and vacillation. The more they are transformed, the more they will want to be transformed. The rectification of the Communist Party is [an example of] transformation. In the future there should still be rectifications, once in three years, and again in five years. You say that once this [point of] rectification has been completed, there won't be any more. Do [you] mean to say that once this period of rectification has been completed, bureaucratism will no longer exist? It only takes two or three years before people forget, and bureaucratism will appear again. People forget easily, and that's why, after a time, there must be rectification again. Do you mean to say that the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals left from the old society don't need to be rectified and don't need to be transformed? You say you don't want to be transformed, then [let's] change the name; it would be all right to call it rectification, too. Aren't all the democratic parties at present undergoing rectification?<sup>47</sup> What's so bad about having the entire society undergo rectification?

Right now, with the democratic parties, the question is one of rectifying the [political] line—rectifying the Rightist opportunist line of the bourgeoisie. I think this rectification is on the right track. With the Communist Party the [primary] question is not one of line, but one of work style. For the democratic parties right now, the question of work style is secondary. The primary [question] is which road [they] follow. Will they follow the line of Zhang Naiqi, Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, Chen Renbing, Peng Wenying, Lu Yi, and Sun Dayu?<sup>48</sup> Or will they follow some



other road? This matter should be cleared up first of all. These three questions should be cleared up: [First,] the question of the achievements of the revolution and of [our] achievements in [socialist] construction. After all, has the work done by several hundred million people been done well? [Second, about our] future direction,—is it [toward] socialism or is it [toward] capitalism? [Third,] if we are to follow [the road to] socialism, then which party should we be led by? Do we want the Zhang-Luo Alliance<sup>49</sup> to lead, or do we want the Communist Party to lead? Let's have a big debate about it and clear up [our political] line. Within the Communist Party there is also a question of line. It concerns the "insurrectionists." The "insurrectionists" are the Rightists in the Communist Party and the Youth League. With them, the question is one of line. Dogmatism is not a question of line at present, because it hasn't taken the form of a [political] line. At one time in our history, dogmatism did take the form of a [political] line, because it took the form of institutions, it took the form of policies, and it took the form of programs.<sup>50</sup> The present dogmatism has not taken the form of institutions, policies, or programs. It's a thing that has some rigid aspects to it, but now that it has been beaten with the hammer and heated by the fire, it has become a little more pliant. In every organ, every school, and every factory, aren't people talking about "going downstairs"?<sup>51</sup> Don't adopt the work style of the Kuomintang, the habits and airs of the overlords. Have the directors of cooperatives go down into the fields and till the fields together with the masses, and have factory heads and Party committee secretaries go into the workshops.<sup>52</sup> In this way, bureaucratism will be greatly reduced. Put up big-character posters, hold meetings, and hold discussion meetings, to sort out the problems that should be corrected or criticized and solve them. [Then] study a little more Marxism, and raise [your political level] a step.

We, the Chinese people, are a good people. This people [of ours] is very reasonable, very warm-hearted, very intelligent, and very courageous. We hope to create this kind of situation, that is, one that is both centralized and unified [on the one hand], and lively and active [on the other]; with democracy, and also centralism; with freedom, and also discipline.<sup>53</sup> There [should be] both aspects, not just one. [We] shouldn't seal everyone's lips and not permit anybody to speak. [We] should encourage [people] to speak; [everyone] should be active and full of life. The vast majority of people should not be held to blame for speaking up.<sup>54</sup> No matter how caustic or how severe their censure may be, there [should be] no blame, and [people should] not be subjected to rectification and [should] not be given "tight shoes"<sup>55</sup> to wear. The "tight shoes" should be given to the Rightists to wear. Don't be afraid of the masses; rather, join together with the masses. Do you swim? It would only take a hundred days, one hour every day, to learn, if it is done continuously, without fail; [then, even if] you originally couldn't swim at all, [I] guarantee that you would learn to swim. First of all, you don't need a teacher, and you don't need that rubber life preserver either. [If you] have a rubber life preserver you won't learn. The people are like the water. To draw an analogy, the leaders, from the small group heads at various levels right up to the comrades here, are just like people who

are swimming; they mustn't leave the water, and they mustn't go against the [flow of the] water. You should go along with the water, go along with the character of the water. Don't go and abuse the masses for they are not to be abused. Don't stand in opposition to the masses, [but] always stand on the side of the masses.<sup>56</sup> It is possible that the masses will commit errors; when they do commit an error, [you] should talk to them patiently. If they won't listen, just wait a bit, and when you have an opportunity, talk [with them] again. Just don't leave them. [This] is equivalent to not leaving the water when we're swimming, and not going against the [flow of the] water, and going along with the character of the water.

All wisdom comes from the masses.<sup>57</sup> I've always said that intellectuals are the most lacking in intellect. The intellectuals cock their tails in the air [and strut around],<sup>58</sup> and they think, "If I don't rank number one in all the world, then I'm at least number two. Workers and peasants are of no account!" You [intellectuals] say, "These Ah Dou's<sup>59</sup> can't even recognize a few characters." But the ones who resolve problems aren't the intellectuals but the laborers. It is the most advanced section of the laboring people, [that is,] the working class, that resolves problems. Does the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie? Or does the bourgeoisie lead the proletariat? Does the proletariat lead the intellectuals? Or do the intellectuals lead the proletariat?<sup>60</sup> The intellectuals should become proletarian intellectuals—they have no other path. I've said: "If the skin did not exist, what would the hair adhere to?" This was said by a Shanghai capitalist, and I expanded on what he said.<sup>61</sup> [But] what he said and what I said have different meanings. He said that his things had all been handed over to joint state-private management,<sup>62</sup> [and he said,] "If the skin did not exist, what would the hair adhere to?" [What he meant was, "How] can [you] still say that I'm a capitalist; how can you still say that I'm an exploiter?" The intellectuals come from the old society, and they lived off the five "skins." In the past the intellectuals' hairs adhered to these five "skins": Imperialist ownership, feudal ownership, and bureaucratic-capitalist ownership,<sup>63</sup> and there was also national capitalist ownership and ownership by small producers. In the past [the intellectuals] adhered either to the first three skins or to the last two skins. Now "the skin does not exist [any longer]"; there is no longer any skin. The imperialists have run away, and [their] things have been taken over. Feudalism has been overthrown; the land went to the peasants, and now [it] belongs to the cooperatives. Bureaucratic-capitalist enterprises have come under state ownership. National capitalist enterprises [have become] joint state-private [enterprises]; they have become basically socialist. Ownership by small producers (peasants and handicraft workers) has now also been changed, and has come under collective ownership, although at present it has not yet been consolidated, and it will take a few more years before [it] can be consolidated. Especially in the transformation of people; the transformation of people will require a little more time [than that], because these five "skins" influenced these capitalists and influenced these intellectuals. In their minds they are always remembering those things, and they remember them even in their dreams. People who came [to the new life] from along the old ruts have a lingering fondness for the ways of that old life. This is normal human nature. What

“skin” should the intellectuals adhere to now? They should adhere to the public ownership “skin” and adhere to the body of the proletariat. Who will give them food to eat? It is the workers and the peasants. The intellectuals are the teachers hired by the proletariat. But if you want to teach your [usual] stuff, if you want to teach the eight-legged essay,<sup>64</sup> if you want to teach Confucius, if you want to teach capitalism and [still] be able to eat and draw a salary, well, the working class won't permit it. The intellectuals have already lost [their] social and economic base, which is to say that they no longer have those five skins [to adhere to]. Now, unless they land on a new skin. [ . . . ]<sup>65</sup> Right now there are some intellectuals who are floating around in the air. They are like fifteen buckets being used to get water from the well—with seven going up and eight going down.<sup>66</sup> They can't get up to the heavens and they can't get down to the ground.<sup>67</sup> [They] all [just] float around in the air. [They] no longer have the five skins [to adhere to], and [they] can no longer go back to their old home, yet they are not sincerely willing to adhere to the body of the proletariat. To adhere to the body of the proletariat one must have a proletarian mentality, must have some feeling for the proletariat, must be on good terms with the workers, must make friends [with them]. But they won't do it. They still long for the old things. We are at present persuading them. After going through this round of extensive criticism, I think they will become more or less [politically] conscious. Right now we are persuading people within the middle of the road. People with a middle-of-the-road position should be [politically] conscious, and they shouldn't cock their tails too high in the air. [I say to the intellectuals:] Your knowledge is limited; you're intellectuals and yet you're not intellectuals; it would be more fitting to call you semi-intellectuals. Because that's all this knowledge of yours amounts to; as soon as you come to great principles,<sup>68</sup> you commit errors. With so much knowledge, why do you commit errors? Why do you waver? “A blade of grass atop a wall; as the wind blows it bends to one side and then the other.”<sup>69</sup> Why do you waver? Right now [I'm] not going to talk about Rightist intellectuals.

That's [a case of] fundamental error. The middle-of-the-road intellectuals also commit errors, [but] the error they commit is that of wavering and of not having clear bearings [of where they are going]. For a time [they] have lost their direction, and their minds aren't clear. One can thus see that [their] knowledge isn't very great. In this respect, the ones whose knowledge is great are the workers and the former semiproletariat among the peasants. As soon as they look at something, they know [what that is about]. That stuff of Sun Dayu's, as soon as they saw it they knew it was wrong. All [you] have to do is to say three sentences and they know it is wrong. There is no need to write such long essays. Whose knowledge do you think is greater? The knowledge of an illiterate person is greater. In making decisions concerning the overall situation, and decisions on our general direction, [we] should listen to the proletariat. I'm a person who [operates] like that. Whenever people like us want to take up something, whenever [we] want to decide on an important issue, we absolutely must consult them, we absolutely must go around to the various areas and talk with them to see whether this thing can be done or not.

[We must] talk things over with them and also with the cadres who are close to them; we must simply go to the local areas. Beijing is [a place] that produces nothing at all. It has no raw materials; the raw materials are all taken from the workers and the peasants, and from the local areas.<sup>70</sup> The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is a processing plant, which [must] take these raw materials and manufacture [something]. If it doesn't manufacture [something] good, then [it] will commit errors. The source of knowledge lies with the masses. In the final analysis it is [a question of] two words, “mass line.”<sup>71</sup> What does it mean to truly resolve the contradictions among the people?<sup>72</sup> It [means] to be practical, to seek the truth in the facts<sup>73</sup> [and follow] the mass line. That is to say, not to become separate from the masses; [to maintain a relationship with the masses] like the relationship of fish to water<sup>74</sup> or the relationship of swimmers to water.

Should the Rightists be finished off with one blow?<sup>75</sup> What should [we] do about Sun Dayu and his like? It's quite necessary to strike them a few blows. [If] you don't strike [them] a few blows, they'll play dead. Chase them a bit, attack them a bit, attack them a few times; it is necessary. Keep attacking them until they think of turning back [from their errant ways]; attack them seriously so that they will be completely isolated. Then there will be a possibility of winning them over. Because they are still intellectuals, and furthermore are big intellectuals, such people will be useful if they are won over. They can all do at least something [useful]. Furthermore, they have also been very helpful this time; they have served as “teachers” for us, and have educated the people. They used the negative method and educated us by negative [example]. We are really not prepared to throw them into the Huangpu River;<sup>76</sup> rather, we want to cure the illness to save the patient.<sup>77</sup> Perhaps there are some people who are not willing to come over [to our side]. [If] they are not willing to come over, that's all right too. They'll just take [their stubbornness] to their graves. How old is Sun Dayu now? Let's say he lives to be a hundred. [That means] he still has [ahead of him] fifty years of stubbornly refusing to change. [He's] very stubborn. [If] this fortress can't be broken into, just forget it. Attack him constantly? We don't have that much energy. Right now we have [other] things to do. How can we attack him every day for fifty years? If there are some people who are unwilling to change, then let them take [their stubbornness] to their graves and go see King Yan.<sup>78</sup> They can say to King Yan, “I really have backbone. I am a loyal supporter of ‘the five skins.’ I've struggled against these bastards, the Communist Party, the left wing of the Chinese people, and the broad masses. [They] wanted me to go through a self-examination, but I've been able to resist them all.” But now even King Yan in the netherworld has changed. The first King Yan is Marx, the second is Engels, and the third is Lenin. Now the netherworld is divided into two places, the netherworld of the capitalist world is the old one. In the netherworld of the socialist world it is these people who have taken the place of King Yan. I think that even when these [stubborn] people go to see King Yan, they will suffer rectification.<sup>79</sup>

I've talked a lot, and that's all I'm going to say. Thank you for listening to this talk of mine.

## Notes

1. We know of no specific meeting between Mao and Shanghai cadres in the latter part of March 1957. By Mao's calculations of "a hundred days," this should refer to the end of March, and Mao does use the term *xiaxun* (the third of three ten-day periods in each month) here. Mao attended the cadres' conferences in Jinan, Shandong Province, and Nanjing on March 18 and 19 (see texts Mar. 18 and Mar. 19, 1957), and then, in early April, the Hangzhou Conference of the Shanghai Bureau of the CPC (see text April 1957[2], source note, and K. Lieberthal [1976], p. 95, for the assertion that this conference must have been held in the first week of April). The Japanese scholar Takeuchi Minoru speculates that Mao may have stopped over in Shanghai for several days prior to the Hangzhou Conference. (See *Mao Takuto senshu, dai-go-ken*, vol. III, p. 255.)

2. The Chinese term that Mao uses here, *ying zuo toupǐ*, literally means "to toughen one's scalp." It refers figuratively to bracing oneself for an expected setback or attack or to bearing down for a task that lies ahead.

3. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.

4. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

5. See text May 15, 1957, note 6.

6. We do not know anything further about these groups. Mao may or may not have been completely accurate in his description of these names. In May and June 1957, the students of Beijing University waged a criticism campaign against the CPC, calling their own movement a "New May Fourth Movement." The "Hundred Flowers" in the name "Hundred Flowers Society" obviously refers to the slogan "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom" in the so-called Hundred Flower (Contending and Blooming, or *ming fang*,) Campaign, which preceded the rectification campaign of 1957. See text Autumn 1956, note 1. According to the report of the New China News Agency (NCNA, *Daily Bulletin* [July 12, 1957]), the Hundred Flowers Society had the openly declared purpose, not of helping the CPC to rectify itself (the nominal aegis under which many of the criticisms of the time existed), but to initiate a thorough political reform movement and a movement for "freedom and democracy." It also reportedly declared that "Marxism is out of date," and suggested "learning from capitalist countries." Later, according to *RMRB*, other similar groups were formed, such as the "Hundred Flowers Tribunal" and the "Free Tribunal," which were amalgamated into an editorial committee for the publication *Public Square* and served as a launching pad for the spread of the dissenting campaign to other institutions of higher education. For a broad description of these matters, see R. MacFarquhar (1960), ch. 8.

7. Tan was the founder of The Hundred Flowers Society mentioned here. Later in the speech Mao identifies him as a senior (fourth-year student) of Beijing University in the department of physics. See R. MacFarquhar (1960), pp. 135-143, *passim*. Tan is certainly not the only "student leader" who became "nationally known"; another would be Lin Xiling (see text Oct. 13, 1957, paragraph 4).

8. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

9. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.

10. The saying here, *Qiren you tian*, refers to a story in the chapter "Tianrui" (Heaven's Blessed Omens) of the book *Lie zi*, which is somewhat apocryphally attributed to the philosopher Lie Yugou of the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.) The story tells of a man who worried so much about the possibility of the sky falling down and the earth cracking up that he could neither eat nor sleep.

11. This saying, *renfei shengxian, shu neng wu guo*, appears in chapter 1, *Tangzi yishu* (The Posthumously Compiled Book of Master Tang), written by Tang Bin, a Qing-dynasty scholar. It is itself a derivative of the saying *Shu neng wu guo, guo er neng gai, shan mo da xian* (Who among the living can be without wrong? There is no greater good than that which is manifested by the person who, having erred, mends his ways), which appears in the section

on the second year of the reign of Duke Xuan of the state of Lu in *Zuo zhuan* (The Zuo Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals).

12. According to Daoist legend, when that religion's founder, the philosopher Lao Zi, died, he became a principal deity of the Daoist heaven and was given the title Taishang Laojun (Old Master of the Highest Realm). In the novel *Xi you ji* (Journey to the West, or translated as *Monkey* by Arthur Waley), Taishang Laojun had a furnace constructed according to the Eight Diagrams of Daoism, in which he made elixirs with a variety of special properties. Sun Wukong, the Monkey King, was a central character in the novel, a mischievous, rebellious, and indomitable character, and was apparently a favorite of Mao's. During a party attended by the deities, he stole Taishang Laojun's elixir and as punishment was sentenced to be destroyed in the Eight-Diagram Furnace. But after forty-nine days in the furnace he emerged unscathed, stronger than before. The story is told in the seventh *hui* (chapter) of the novel *Xi you ji*. See also text May-June 1955, vol. I, note 7, for more on Sun Wukong.

13. The Chinese term for tempering consists of the characters *duan* (for forging) and *lian* (for smelting). Here, Mao uses the combined term first and then breaks it down into each of its metaphorical components.

14. See context to this reference in the text surrounding note 18, text July 1, 1957. The two sayings that Mao uses here are *tian hun di hei* and *ri yue wu guang*. The first appears to be a variation of the more common *tian hun di an*, which is derived from the Yuan-dynasty opera (*Yuan qu*) *Huo lang dan*; the second is derived from the book *Tong shi* (History of Grievances), chapter 3.

15. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 51.

16. Here Mao uses the term applied by the KMT to its several campaigns against the Communists' base in Jiangxi between 1930 and 1934. The fifth of these campaigns was interrupted when the Communists broke through the encircling KMT troops and began the famous Long March.

17. See text June 14, 1957(2), note 4.

18. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 1, paragraph 15; text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 1, and text June 11, 1957, paragraphs 3 and 4.

19. Mao is here echoing the central concerns of several *RMRB* editorials in June 1957, which have been attributed to Mao. See particularly texts June 10, 1957, June 11, 1957, and June 14, 1957.

20. According to CPC terminology, the period of democratic revolution covers the period from the movement to bring down the Qing dynasty to the inauguration of a new period of socialist revolution, signified by the founding of the PRC in October 1949. This general period, however, is further divided into the old, bourgeois democratic revolution and the New Democratic Revolution, with the May Fourth Movement and the founding of the CPC as the boundary between the two. See text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2. In the period prior to and surrounding the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the focus of political debate was between reformism, represented by reformist constitutionalists or monarchists such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and revolution, represented by Sun Yat-sen, Song Jiaoren, Huang Xing, etc. Following the 1911 Revolution (see text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, note 8, and text Nov. 12, 1956, note 2), the political debate continued. On the one hand, there were reformists who saw the imminent task as one of consolidating the interests of the bourgeois revolution; on the other, there were people who were skeptical of China's preparedness for a republic and advocated the adoption of a constitutional monarchy. There were also royalists who were loyal to the idea of a Qing restoration on one extreme of the spectrum, as well as nascent socialism and anarchists on the other. This debate galvanized forces into action during two crucial periods. The first was in 1913, when Yuan Shikai, the ambitious warlord who had assumed the presidency in 1911, attempted to concentrate all power in the presidency and virtually turn China into a dictatorship, and the second was in 1915-1916, when Yuan, going one step further, attempted to restore the monarchy with himself as emperor (see text Jan. 27, 1957[1], note 36). While the first round of opposition

resulted in disastrous defeat, the second was moderately successful, causing Yuan to suspend and then cancel his plans. Following Yuan's death in 1916, however, China fell into complete disarray with each province, and sometimes segments of provinces, controlled and governed by a warlord. For a decade there was virtually no central authority, although nominally there was a national government in Beijing. In 1924, following the formation of the United Front between the CPC and the KMT and the death of Sun Yat-sen, preparations began for a Northern Expedition to unify China once again (see text April 1956, note 7). Following the March 20, 1926 coup in which Chiang Kai-shek consolidated his leadership over the party (then the KMT-CPC coalition), the Northern Expedition was launched in July. There were a large number of tactical and strategic debates throughout the two years of the Northern Expedition. Here Mao is probably referring to the debates that concerned the CPC most, viz., regarding the question of whether the CPC should remain in the coalition, especially since after the March 20 coup they had been reduced to a position of tactical disadvantage; and regarding the strategy that the CPC ought to adopt in establishing bases and fostering revolutionary forces as the expeditionary forces moved northward through China. Finally, during the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-1945) (see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 5), a second United Front between the CPC and the KMT was formed (see text Aug. 12, 1953[1], vol. I, note 7), and again, as in the period of the Northern Expedition, the questions regarding the role and strategy of the CPC gave rise to significant debate within the Party. For reference to these debates see Mao's various articles on the subject in *SW*, II.

21. The term that Mao uses here, *wei wuqi lun*, refers to the attitude adopted by the KMT in the early stages of the War of Resistance Against Japan. While many patriotic groups were arguing for a United Front and an all-people's war of resistance, the KMT, and especially the faction led by Wang Jingwei, argued that China's military preparation was totally inadequate to defend the country, and thus advocated passive, rather than active, resistance (see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 6). This "capitulationist" line was, in part, subscribed to by Chiang Kai-shek, and even by the opportunistic elements, such as Wang Ming, in the CPC. Mao's severe criticism of this "theory" can be found in several articles, notably "On Protracted War," "Problem of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan," and "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," in *SW*, II.

22. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 9, and text Sept. 16-18, 1953, vol. I, note 5.

23. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 2.

24. See text Sept. 16-18, 1953, vol. I, note 5.

25. Mao is referring here to a position taken by the meeting of the All-China Journalistic Workers' Association on May 16, 1957. See text July 1, 1957, note 17. See also text Mar. 10, 1957, section 8 and note 24.

26. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29; see also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 43.

27. Mao is speaking of two of the chief targets of the CPC rectification campaign in the first half of 1957. See text Mar. 12, 1957, source note and note 19, and text Mar. 18, 1957, note 2.

28. See text June 8, 1957(2), note 5, and text June 10, 1957, note 4.

29. See text April 1957(2), note 8; see also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 43.

30. See text Oct. 16, 1954, vol. I, note 7, and text Sept. 16-18, 1953, vol. I, note 1; see also text May 15, 1957, note 11.

31. These three interrelated metaphors, "progress by twists and turns" (*quzhe de fazhan*), "progress in a spiral fashion" (*luoxuan xing de fazhan*), and a third, which is not cited here, "wave-like progress" (*bolang xi de fazhan*), are three terms that Mao often uses. They provide a glimpse at the basic epistemological viewpoint adopted by Mao toward social development and history. For "wave-like" progress, see text Nov. 15, 1956, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 88.

32. See text May-June 1955, vol. I, note 55.

33. See text Feb. 27, 1957(2), note 22.

34. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraphs 58-61, and text Feb. 27, 1957, section 2.

35. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80.

36. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 13.

37. See text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 1.

38. See text Jan. 20, 1956, note 5, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 42.

39. *Lun yu*, known as the *Analects of Confucius*, is a compilation of the sayings and dialogues of Confucius and heads the "Four Books" (*Si shu*) that make up the core of the study of Confucianist philosophy and ethics since Song times. The "Five Classics" are the original canons of Confucianism; five of the six "classics" whose compilation was ascribed to Confucius himself. These were: *Yi jing* (Book of Change), *Shu jing* (Book of History, also known as *Shang shu*), *Shi jing* (Book of Odes), *Li ji* (Book of Rites), and *Chunqiu* (The Spring and Autumn Annals). The missing one is *Yue jing* (Book of Music), which has been lost. Much later, in the Song dynasty, the list of works considered to be canonical for Confucianism was expanded to include six other works, viz., *Zhou li* (The Rites of Zhou), *Yi li* (Book of Rituals), *Lun yu* (The Analects [of Confucius]), *Meng zi* (Mencius), *Xiao jing* (Book of Filial Piety), and *Er ya*, a special section of the original *Shi jing* that was split off from the restored versions of the original classic. Meanwhile, the *Chunqiu* was separated into its three component commentaries—the Zuo commentary, the Gongyang commentary, and the Guliang commentary. Thus the "Thirteen Classics" were formed. The "Twenty-four Histories" refer to the following: *Shi ji* (The Records of the Grand Historian), *Han shu* (History of Han Dynasty), *Hou Han shu* (History of the Later-Han Dynasty), *San guo zhi* (Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms), *Jin shu* (History of the Jin), *Song shu* (History of the Song Dynasty), *Nan Qi shu* (History of the Southern Qi Dynasty), *Liang shu* (History of the Liang Dynasty), *Chen shu* (History of the Chen Dynasty), *Wei shu* (History of the Wei Dynasty), *Bei Qi shu* (History of the Northern Qi Dynasty), *Zhou shu*, (History of the Zhou Dynasty), *Sui shu* (History of the Sui Dynasty), *Nan shi* (General History of the Southern Dynasties), *Bei shi* (General History of the Northern Dynasties), *Jiu Tang shu* (Old History of the Tang Dynasty), *Xin Tang shu* (New History of the Tang Dynasty), *Jiu wudai shi* (Old History of the Five Dynasties), *Xin wudai shi* (New History of the Five Dynasties), *Song shi* (History of the Song Dynasty), *Liao shi* (History of the Liao Dynasty), *Jin shi* (History of the Jin Dynasty), *Yuan shi* (History of the Yuan Dynasty), and *Ming shi* (History of the Ming Dynasty). These were formalized during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor in the Qing dynasty (1736-1795) and represented the "official histories" of China from the ancient mythical periods of the Yellow Emperor (covered by *Shi ji*) down to the mid-seventeenth century.

Unlike the above, all of which have at least semi-official status, *Shiwu guan* (The Fifteen Strings of Cash) represents only a Qing-dynasty opera written and composed by Zhu Sushen. Another name for it is *Shuang xiong meng* (Dream of the Twin Bears). The contents of this opera, it appears, are immaterial here. Mao seems to be simply adding it to the list to indicate the inclusion of popular as well as scholastic literature in the genre of classical writing.

40. The *da zi bao* (or "big-character poster") has become a well-known device by which, in certain revolutionary movements within the PRC, news and critical positions taken by certain groups have been made public. This consists largely of handwritten, oversized flyers or broadsheets which are posted on bulletin boards or more makeshift display apparatus in public areas. Their widespread usage by the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s almost brought the term into international (and English) usage.

Here, however, Mao is referring not only to the phenomenon of *da zi bao* itself, but to its being used by different groups of people in the current rectification campaign and the "contending and blooming" campaign that preceded it, specifically, the so-called Democracy Wall Incident at Beijing University on May 19, 1957, and its repercussions. (See R. MacFarquhar [1960], pp. 132ff.)

41. The text here reads *qi le deng*, which appears to be a misprint for *qi mo deng* in which *mo* translates as least, or bottom.

42. Here Mao seems to be echoing some of the arguments advanced by Stalin on the subject of the class nature of language in Stalin's book, *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics*.

43. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 6; also see note 21 here. Mao is alluding to the kind of stage-plays that were written in the territories occupied by the Japanese during the wartime period and which either underplayed the issues of national humiliation and dealt mainly with nonpolitical matters, or actively promoted the capitulationist line. Wang Jingwei, the most notorious of the traitors, was known to be a great aficionado of the stage, and in his younger days wrote several plays himself. Also, see text Oct. 13, 1957, text surrounding notes 53, 54, and 55.

44. See text June 14, 1957(1), notes 1 and 3, and text July 1, 1957.

45. See text June 14, 1957(1), middle section.

46. See text June 14, 1957(2), note 3.

47. For a description of the rectification campaign as it spread to the various "democratic parties" (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1), see Deng Xiaoping's Report on the Rectification Campaign and other documents in *RMSC* (1958), pp. 33-41, 42-43, 91-130. Also see text May 15, 1957, source note, and text June 8, 1957(2), source note.

48. For Zhang Naiqi, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 73; for Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji, see text July 1, 1957, notes 3 and 8; for Sun Dayu, see text April 1957(2), note 66.

Chen Renbing, Peng Wenying, and Lu Yi were all, like Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji, leading members of the Democratic League. They were all based in Shanghai; Chen and Peng being members of the faculty at Fudan University and Lu being a member of the Shanghai municipal committee of the Democratic League and editor-in-chief of *Xinwen ribao* (News Daily). For more on the problem of the Democratic League, see text July 1, 1957, notes 10 and 11.

49. See text July 1, 1957, source note.

50. It is likely that Mao was thinking primarily of the dogmatism of the ultra-Leftist deviationist line of the leadership of the Stalinists, led by Wang Ming, in the early 1930s. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 23.

51. Here Mao is taking advantage of the double entendre of this term. Ostensibly the term *xia lou* (going downstairs) refers to making self-examination in order to get the approval of the masses, but Mao also seems to be linking it to going down from an isolated, lofty position to mingle both physically and psychologically with the masses in the fields and factories. Thus he seems to say that the best way to achieve the former purpose of *xia lou* is to do what the latter meaning suggests. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 83.

52. Here Mao is echoing again an idea that he had spun in his various speeches to the secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party (CPC) committees. (See texts Jan. 18, 1957, and Jan. 27, 1957[1] and [2]. See also, in a more recent vein, texts May 13, 1957, and June 12, 1957.)

53. This is once again a reference to "democratic centralism," but here Mao makes a vivid elaboration and clarification of the methodology of "democratic centralism." See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80.

54. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 4.

55. The phrase *chuan xiao xie*, literally, "wearing small shoes," is a common expression in northern China which means being given a hard time. On the meaning of "rectify," or *zheng*, here, see text May 15, 1957, note 27.

56. Mao appears to be drawing a lesson here from an aphorism, *shui neng zai zhou, yi neng fu zhou*, derived from the chapter "Wang ji" (King's Methods) in the book *Tang ji* (The Chronicles of Tang) in *Zizhi tongjian* (The General Mirror for the Edification of Government). In both places the aphorism conveys the idea that the common people are the water and the ruler is like the boat. "While the water may keep the boat afloat," the saying warns, "it is also that which causes the boat to capsize."

57. This is a key observation relating to what is known as the "mass line," formulated by Mao in 1943 (see *SW*, III, pp. 117-122) and adopted in 1956 as the guideline for the Hundred Flowers Campaign (see text May 2, 1956, source note, and text Nov. 15, 1956, note 45) and subsequently the Party rectification of 1957 and the anti-Rightist campaign. Up to this time, Mao had not extrapolated extensively or explicitly on the "mass line" in his

writings or speeches since its formulation in 1943, or since the adoption of it in 1956, as a guideline for the more recent struggles. There was, however, in the last part of 1956 and the spring of 1957, a growing recognition of this issue in Mao's works. In his various speeches to secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees in January 1957, for instance (see texts Jan. 18, 1957, and Jan. 27, 1957[1] and [2]), he iterated the instruction that party cadres must go to the lower levels (i.e., "to the masses") in order to get better information on which basis to formulate policies. This theme, much in tune with the mass line (one may even say that it was a derivation or epitomization of the mass line) was echoed in the essay "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People" (see text Feb. 27, 1957) and in the section directed at the issue of intellectuals in Mao's speech at the CPC Conference on Propaganda Work (see text Mar. 12, 1957). The concept of the masses as a critic and "corrective" for the Party naturally became even more integrally a part of Mao's awareness during the Party rectification campaign going on at this time. Note, for instance, the language of several of the *RMRB* editorials published in May and June 1957, even though these have not been directly attributed to Mao. (See, in particular, texts May 13, 1957, and June 12, 1957.)

58. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

59. Ah Dou was the nickname of Liu Chan, the second king of Shu-Han in the Three Kingdoms period (A.D.220-280). He is remembered chiefly as an idiot, a negligent and inept ruler, and a buffoon who easily gave up all ambition as a ruler for the petty pleasures thrown his way by the enemy who dethroned him.

60. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 72, and text surrounding that note for a comparison with what Mao says here. The change in attitude in the intervening period is evident.

61. See text April 1957(2), note 14, and also text Oct. 13, 1957, paragraph 7. We do not know to whom the term "Shanghai capitalist" here refers.

62. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 6.

63. Mao is again invoking the so-called Three Big Mountains; see text Mar. 12, 1957, note 5.

64. See text Aug. 24, 1956(1), note 12, and text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 106.

65. Here it appears that some material is missing, although there is no ellipsis in the original text.

66. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 13.

67. This, *shang bu jue tian, xia bu jue di*, is a saying derived from the section "Qian wen yan" in *Yi jing* (The Book of Changes). The original aphorism reads slightly differently.

68. The term Mao uses here is *da daoli*; see text Sept. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 14.

69. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 24.

70. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 9.

71. See note 57.

72. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

73. See text May 15, 1957, note 16.

74. This is a classical metaphor for a mutually dependent and amiable relationship, originating in the saying *ru yu de shui* in *San guo ji* (The Chronicle of the Three Warring Kingdoms) written by Chen Shou in the Jin dynasty. In the biography of Zhuge Liang in the *Shu ji* (Chronicle of Shu) in this book, the phrase is used to describe the delight with which the ruler of the kingdom of Shu, Liu Bei, recruited the services of Zhuge Liang. See also text April 1957(2), note 47, for more on Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang.

75. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 22; also see text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 11, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 37.

76. The Huangpu River, known more popularly in the West as the Whampoa River, is the river on whose delta Shanghai is situated.

77. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.

78. See text April 25, 1956, note 38.

79. It would appear that here, again, Mao is invoking the other meaning for the term *zheng* (or rectification); see note 54, and text May 15, 1957, note 27.

## Repel the Attacks of the Bourgeois Rightists

(July 9, 1957)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 440–455. Available English Translation: *SW*, V, pp. 457–472.

*See text July 8, 1957(2), source note. This document, according to the Xuanji source, is a speech made by Mao to a cadres' conference in Shanghai. To guide readers toward a comparison of the text of July 8, 1957(2) and this one, we have crossreferenced everything that appears in both documents to the footnote as it appeared in the preceding document, rather than to the original appearance of that footnote in this document collection, as is our usual practice. Other discrepancies of major textual or political significance have also been annotated. We have, however, left it up to the reader to do a fuller textual comparison.*

*The July 1 indictment of Wenhui bao (text July 1, 1957) is often considered the first of Mao's public salvos of the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957. This argument rests on the following observations: (1) There is still some hesitancy in Mao's intra-Party circulated essay of May 15 (text May 15, 1957), even though that essay points out the shape of the major concern of the anti-Rightist campaign, namely, "bourgeois" attacks on the CPC at the height of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Rightist inclinations to hanker for and attempt a restoration of capitalism, and revisionism. (2) The essay of June 8, which was not just a follow-up on the May 15 essay, but made it clear that the attack on the CPC by the "bourgeois intellectuals" must be repelled by a counterattack, or, by direct implication, through an anti-Rightist campaign, was nonetheless also an intra-Party directive, and probably had not yet brought the issues out fully into the public eye of the masses. (3) The RMRB editorials of June (i.e., texts June 8, June 9, June 10, June 11, June 12, June 14[1], June 14[2], 1957), were not officially published under Mao's authorship.*

*The campaign proceeded with terrible swiftness and determination. By the time of the two documents here (i.e., texts July 8[2] and July 9), the campaign had already reached a resounding peak. Having identified the main target, the Zhang-Luo Alliance, and having "called it out" by name in the July 1 article, Mao proceeds, just a week later, to insist on drawing the battle lines, and describes the specific tactics to be employed in the campaign. In this way, it is clear that by July 8 (or 9), the anti-Rightist battle was already joined and in full swing. The essay that probably came later in the month (text July 1957) can then be seen as a first-stage interim summation of the campaign, and the October essays as a full-term report.*

In March, I spoke here with cadres in the Party.<sup>1</sup> From then until now, one hundred days have elapsed. In these one hundred days, there has been a great change in the situation. We fought a battle with the bourgeois Rightists and the people's consciousness has been heightened; moreover, it has been heightened considerably. We anticipated these things at that time. For example, I said here that once everyone started criticizing, that is, once they started lighting fires, wouldn't it be painful? We must toughen our scalps and hold firm.<sup>2</sup> This thing here, which

is on everyone, is called the head. The head has a layer of skin, called the scalp. Toughening our scalps and holding firm means that when you criticize me I'm going to toughen my scalp and hold firm, listen for a while, then analyze [the matter] and reply. If what has been said is correct, it should be accepted; if what has been said is incorrect, it should be criticized.

We must always have faith that the majority of people, whether it be in the entire world or in China, are good. By ["the majority"] we mean not [just] 51 per cent of the people, but more than 90 per cent of the people. Among the 600 million people in our country, the workers and the peasants are the basic masses. In the Communist Party, the Youth League, the democratic parties,<sup>3</sup> and [among] the students and intellectuals, the majority are always good people. They are always good-hearted and sincere, honest, and not deceitful, and they have no ulterior motives. We should recognize this; it has been proven true in every movement. For example, taking the current [incident], in terms of students there are more than seven thousand people at Beijing University; the Rightists amount to only 1, 2 or 3 per cent.<sup>4</sup> Who are these 1, 2 or 3 per cent? They are the intransigent, backbone elements. All in all, those who regularly cause disturbances and turn things upside down are only about fifty people, and they don't even amount to 1 per cent. The other 1 or 2 per cent are those who applaud them and support them.<sup>5</sup>

It's certainly not easy for a person to set fire to himself. I now hear that you have some comrades around this area who had second thoughts and felt that a big fire had not been set.<sup>6</sup> I think that the fire set in Shanghai was just about right, [but] it was just a bit on the side of being not enough; it wasn't quite satisfying. If you knew early on that it would be this wonderful, why didn't you set some really big [fires]? Let some of those poisonous weeds grow up, let some of those demons and ogres come out on stage.<sup>7</sup> What is there for you to be afraid of? In March I said we shouldn't be afraid. There are some comrades in our Party who feared there would be chaos everywhere. I said these comrades are loyal and faithful to the Party and the nation, but they simply didn't see the overall situation, they didn't reckon that the great majority of the people, that is, over 90 per cent of the people, were good people. Don't be afraid of the masses, they are with us. They may scold us but they won't use their fists to hit us. The Rightists are extremely small in number; like those at Beijing University I just spoke about, they are only 1, 2, or 3 per cent. This refers to the students. If we talk about professors and associate professors, then it's a little different; there are probably about 10 per cent who are Rightists. The Leftists also form about 10 per cent. These two sides are fairly evenly matched. The middle-of-the-roaders account for around 80 per cent. What is there to be afraid of? We have some comrades who have many fears; they fear the house is going to fall down, and they fear the sky is going to fall down. Since ancient times only "the man of Qi feared the sky would collapse";<sup>8</sup> only that man in Hunan feared the sky would fall down. Except for him there has never been anyone who feared the sky would fall down. As for the house, I don't think this house is going to fall down. It was just built, how is it going to fall down so easily?

To sum up, no matter what the area, more than 90 per cent of the people are our friends, our comrades, and we mustn't be afraid. How can we be afraid of the

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We must always have faith that the majority of people, whether it be in the entire world or in China, are good. By ["the majority"] we mean not [just] 51 per cent of the people, but more than 90 per cent of the people. Among the 600 million people in our country, the workers and the peasants are the basic masses. In the Communist Party, the Youth League, the democratic parties,<sup>3</sup> and [among] the students and intellectuals, the majority are always good people. They are always good-hearted and sincere, honest, and not deceitful, and they have no ulterior motives. We should recognize this; it has been proven true in every movement. For example, taking the current [incident], in terms of students there are more than seven thousand people at Beijing University; the Rightists amount to only 1, 2 or 3 per cent.<sup>4</sup> Who are these 1, 2 or 3 per cent? They are the intransigent, backbone elements. All in all, those who regularly cause disturbances and turn things upside down are only about fifty people, and they don't even amount to 1 per cent. The other 1 or 2 per cent are those who applaud them and support them.<sup>5</sup>

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To sum up, no matter what the area, more than 90 per cent of the people are our friends, our comrades, and we mustn't be afraid. How can we be afraid of the

masses? Fearing the masses is senseless. What is meant by leadership personnel? Group leaders, squad leaders, [Party] branch secretaries, heads of schools, and Party committee secretaries are all leadership personnel.<sup>9</sup> Then there is comrade Ke Qingshi,<sup>10</sup> who is one such person, and count me as one too. People like us, after all, have a little political capital. That is, we've at least done something for the people. Now that fires have been lit to burn [things], more than 90 per cent of the people hope that our comrades will be burnt for the better. Each of our comrades has some faults; where is there anyone without faults? "Man being neither saint nor sage, who can be without error?"<sup>11</sup> We are bound to make some errors when we speak, or when we are managing affairs; for instance, [errors] of bureaucratism, or some such. These things are often unconsciously [committed].

We should "set fires" regularly. How should things be handled from now on? Do you think that from now on we should have a fire once a year or once every three years? I think it should be at least like a lunar leap year and the intercalary month in a lunar leap year; [i.e.,] every three years there is a leap [year] and every fifth year there is another leap [year].<sup>12</sup> In each five-year plan [period] we can have at least two [fires]. Didn't Sun Wukong [the Monkey King] change for the better once he had been tempered in Taishang Laojun's Eight-Diagram Furnace?<sup>13</sup> Wasn't Sun Wukong a powerful individual? [Look,] he is known as The Great Immortal Who Quelled the Heavens, and yet even he had to be burned in the Eight-Diagram Furnace. Aren't we talking about tempering [i.e., forging and smelting]? To forge something is to hammer it into shape; to smelt is to smelt iron in a blast furnace or produce steel in an open-hearth furnace. The steel that has been smelted must be forged.<sup>14</sup> Now forging is done with a drop hammer. How powerful this [method of] forging is! We must also be forged and smelted. There are some comrades who, when asked if they are in favor of being tempered, say they are very much in favor of it: "Ah, I have shortcomings, I'd very much like to be tempered a little." Everyone says he or she wants to go through a period of tempering. Ordinarily people find it easy to talk about being tempered. But when it comes to being really tempered, when you really want to forge them with a drop hammer, they will quit; they become frightened. This [current] period is one of tempering. For a time, the sky was dim and the earth was dark, and the sun and the moon didn't shine.<sup>15</sup> There were two gusts of wind that came up;<sup>16</sup> one was [caused by] the majority who were good people; they pasted up big-character posters and said that the Communist Party had shortcomings that needed correcting.<sup>17</sup> Another was caused by the extreme minority, the Rightists—they are the ones who attacked us. The two assaults come from one direction, but the attack by the majority was justified; it was correct. This was one kind of tempering for us. The attack by the Rightists was also a kind of tempering for us. To really talk about being tempered, we should be grateful for the Rightists' [attacks] this time around. It is the Rightists who have given our Party, the broad masses, the working class, the peasants, the young students, and the democratic parties the greatest education. In every city there are some Rightists, and these Rightists want to overthrow us. Toward these rightists, we are now [conducting a campaign] of "encirclement and suppression."<sup>18</sup>

Our revolution is the people's revolution; it is a revolution of 600 million people

led by the proletariat; it is the people's undertaking. The democratic revolution is the people's undertaking, the socialist revolution is the people's undertaking, and the building of socialism is the people's undertaking.<sup>19</sup> So, then, are the socialist revolution and building of socialism good things? Have there been achievements? Are [our] achievements the primary aspect, or are [our] mistakes the primary aspect? The Rightists deny the achievements of the people's undertaking. This is one point. The second is: In which direction [should we travel]? Traveling in one direction will [lead to] socialism; traveling in another direction will [lead to] capitalism.<sup>20</sup> The Rightists want to reverse directions and travel the capitalist road. Third, if we are to promote socialism, who should take the lead?<sup>21</sup> Should the proletariat lead or should the bourgeoisie lead? Should the Communist Party lead, or should these bourgeois Rightists lead? The Rightists say they don't want the Communist Party to lead.<sup>22</sup> I think this is the time for a great debate, a great debate on these three points. It is good to have a debate. These questions have not been debated.

The democratic revolution went through a long period of debate. From the end of the Qing dynasty to the Revolution of 1911, through the [movement] against Yuan Shikai and the wars of the Northern Expedition to the War of Resistance Against Japan, there was constant debate.<sup>23</sup> Should we resist Japan? One faction [adopted the] theory that weapons decided everything.<sup>24</sup> They said China didn't have enough guns and that we couldn't offer resistance. Another faction said, don't be afraid, the people are still the main thing, and although our weapons are not as good as those of [the enemy], we can still fight. The War of Liberation which ensued afterward also went through a [process of] debate.<sup>25</sup> The Chongqing negotiations, the old Political Consultative Conference at Chongqing, and the Nanjing negotiations were all debates.<sup>26</sup> Chiang Kai-shek didn't listen to our opinions or the people's opinions. He wanted to fight. The result of the fight was that he lost. Therefore [one can say] that the entire democratic revolution underwent debate, underwent a long-term mental preparation.

The socialist revolution came in a rush.<sup>27</sup> In [just] six or seven years, the socialist transformation of the capitalist system of ownership and the small-producer individual ownership system has been basically completed.<sup>28</sup> But, [with regard to] the transformation of people, although there has been some transformation it has a long way to go. Socialist transformation has two aspects: One aspect is the transformation of institutions, and the other is the transformation of people. Institutions include not only the system of ownership but also the superstructure, the most important [parts] of which are the organs of political power and ideology.<sup>29</sup> For example, newspapers belong within the realm of ideology. Some people say newspapers don't have a class nature and that newspapers are not tools in the class struggle.<sup>30</sup> Such talk is incorrect. At least until imperialism has been eliminated, newspapers, [like] everything [that touches on] ideology, will reflect class relationships. Schools, education, literature, and the arts all belong [within the realm of] ideology. They are all part of the superstructure, and they all have a class nature. Natural science is divided into two parts. Natural science itself may not have any class nature, but the [question of] who studies and uses natural science has a class



nature. In the universities, idealists are most prevalent in the Chinese [language and literature] department and the history department. There are also the largest number of idealists among the people who run newspapers. You should not assume that it is only in the social sciences that there are a great many idealists; there are many idealists in the natural sciences as well. Many people who are engaged in the natural sciences have an idealist world view. If you want to talk about the composition of water, then they are materialists. [They will say that] water is composed of two elements, and they will carry out their work according to the reality of the situation. [But] if you talk about how to transform society, they are idealists. We say rectification is to rectify the Communist Party for the better, [but] there are some among them who say that the Communist Party should be eliminated. This round has revealed many instances of this phenomenon.

At the time of the attack by the Rightists, our policy was like this: Just listen and don't speak. For several weeks, we toughened our scalps, opened our ears a little more and just listened; we didn't say a word. Moreover, we didn't notify the League members, we didn't notify the Party members; neither did we notify the [Party] branch secretaries. We let them have a free-for-all with each person forming his or her own opinions. Some enemies have wormed their way into the Party committees in the schools and into the [Party] general branch [offices]. There are enemies in the Qinghua University Party Committee. As soon as you hold a meeting [there], they report to the enemy. They are called the "insurrectionist elements." Aren't there [people who were called] insurrectionist generals?<sup>31</sup> These people are the "insurrectionist literati." This affair pleases both the enemy and ourselves. On the enemy's side, when they see Communist Party members "revolt," [they think] the Communist Party will collapse and they are very pleased. How much has collapsed this time? I don't know about Shanghai. Probably about 5 per cent of the Party members in Beijing schools have collapsed; among the [Youth] League [members] the collapse has been somewhat greater, perhaps 10 per cent or a little more. This kind of collapse is most natural in my view. Whether it's 10 per cent, 20 per cent, 30 or 40 per cent, in a word, there's been a collapse and I'm very happy about it. You who have infiltrated the Communist Party and the Youth League with your heads full of bourgeois ideology and idealism may call yourselves Communists, but you are in reality anti-Communists or wavering elements. Therefore, from our point of view, when we see "insurrectionists" we are also happy. In what year have the Party and the League ever been purged to this extent? They ran away on their own; they didn't want us to clean them out. But now the situation has changed, it has turned around. As soon as we have encircled the Rightists, many people who were not Rightists themselves but had liaison with the Rightists rose to expose [them], and they are no longer "insurrectionists."<sup>32</sup> Now the Rightists aren't having an easy time of it and there are some Rightists who have revolted. [Only] one hundred days have elapsed since I spoke here in March, and [yet] the situation has changed so much. This anti-Rightist struggle is primarily a political struggle in nature. There are various forms of class struggle. This one is primarily a political struggle, it is not a military struggle or an economic struggle. Are there any elements of an ideological struggle? There are, but I think the political struggle is the primary

element. The ideological struggle will be primarily in a subsequent stage when it will be like a gentle breeze and mild rain.<sup>33</sup> The rectification of the Communist Party and the Youth League is an ideological struggle. Their [the members' ideological] level must be raised a step; [they] must really study Marxism and really help each other. Are there any shortcomings? Is there any subjectivism? Is there any bureaucratism?<sup>34</sup> We must really put our minds to work and think things over, write some notes, and, by doing this for a few months, raise the level of [our understanding of] Marxism and our political and ideological level a step higher.

The counterattacks against the Rightists will continue another few weeks or a month or so. If the Rightists' opinions are published like this in the newspapers<sup>35</sup> for [all of] this year and [all of] next year and [all of] the year after that, then it would become difficult [for them] to get things done. There is only so much to the Rightists; the Rightists have just about published all of their opinions; after all, there aren't that many things to publish anyway. Hereafter they'll publish a little bit secretly, a little bit openly; if they have something [to criticize], then they'll publish it, and if there's nothing [to criticize], then they won't publish [anything]. I think July is still going to be a tense month in the counterattack against the Rightists. The Rightists like violent winds and heavy rains most; they dislike gentle winds and fine rain.<sup>36</sup> Didn't we propose [to have] gentle breezes and mild rain? They say a gentle breeze and a mild rain, like the rain that falls every day during the season when the plums are ripening, would cause the seedlings to rot and famine would ensue, and that it is better to have violent winds and heavy rain. Didn't you have someone in Shanghai who wrote an article entitled "The Crow's 'Morning' Cry"?<sup>37</sup> That "crow," it is he who brought forth this suggestion. They also say, "You, the Communist Party, are unfair; in the past when you rectified us it was a violent wind and heavy rain, now when you are rectifying yourselves it is gentle breezes and mild rain." As a matter of fact, when we promoted ideological reform in the past, including the criticism of Hu Shi and Liang Shuming,<sup>38</sup> all the directives issued within our Party called for a gentle breeze and mild rain. The affairs of the world always have twists and turns, as when one is walking on a road there are always curves and bends. Have you been to Moganshan?<sup>39</sup> From top to bottom there are altogether eighteen twists and turns. Social movements always advance in a spiral.<sup>40</sup> At present the Rightists still have to be dug out; we can't relax; it's still a violent wind and a heavy rain. Because they brought on the violent winds and heavy rains, it seems this is our revenge against them. Only at this time have the Rightists found out the good points of gentle breezes and mild rain. They look for straws to grasp because they are drowning. They are like a man who is about to be drowned in the Huangpu River<sup>41</sup> who would want to grasp onto anything, even a rice stalk. I think that "crow" would now find a gentle breeze and a mild rain very welcome. Now it is a time of heavy rains, but once July has passed there will be gentle breezes and mild rains in August because there won't be many things left to dig out.

The Rightists are very good teachers by negative example. We in China have always had this kind of thing. There are positive teachers and there are teachers by negative example. People need both the positive and the negative sides to educa-

tion. Japanese imperialism was our number one great teacher by negative example. Before that, there was the Qing government, Yuan Shikai, the Beiyang warlords,<sup>42</sup> and, later, there was Chiang Kai-shek. They were all very good teachers by negative example to us. Without them the Chinese people couldn't have been turned around through education. It wouldn't have been enough just to have the Communist Party as a positive teacher. Now it's the same way. We say many things that they don't listen to. Who are the so-called nonlisteners? There are a good many middle-of-the-roaders who don't listen, [but] it is the Rightists especially who don't listen. The people in the middle believe some [of what they say] and doubt some. The Rightists simply don't listen. We've said a great many things to them but they don't listen; they [prefer] to do something else. For example, [when] we advocated "unity-criticism-unity,"<sup>43</sup> they didn't listen. We said in the suppression of the counterrevolutionaries, achievements were the primary aspect, but again they didn't listen.<sup>44</sup> When we say we want democratic centralism<sup>45</sup> and a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat, they still won't listen.<sup>46</sup> [When] we talk about the need to unite with all socialist countries and the peace-loving peoples of the world, they won't listen. In a word, [we've] talked about all these things but they won't listen. There is another thing they particularly refuse to listen to; namely, that poisonous weeds must be uprooted. Let the demons and ogres come out and exhibit [themselves]. After they have exhibited themselves, everyone will declare that the demons and ogres are no good and should be overthrown. Let the poisonous weeds come up, then they can be uprooted and used for fertilizer. Has this been said before? Hasn't it been said before? The poisonous weeds will still come up. Every year the peasants talk with the weeds. That is, every year they hoe them several times, but those weeds just don't listen; they still want to grow. If you hoe them for ten thousand years they'll still want to come out; if you hoe them for a hundred million years they'll still want to come out. The Rightists weren't afraid of hoeing because when I spoke at that time we were only talking about hoeing weeds, we didn't actually do any hoeing. Moreover, they thought of themselves not as poisonous weeds but as fragrant flowers. [They thought] people like ourselves were poisonous weeds; they weren't the ones who should be hoed up, rather they wanted to uproot us. They just never realized that they were the things that needed to be hoed up.

We are now debating the three questions I discussed above. The socialist revolution has proceeded rapidly. The general line of the Party during the transitional period has not been submitted to a full debate;<sup>47</sup> there hasn't been a full debate in society either. This must be done just like a cow eating grass: First [the cow] chomps on it and swallows it into a pouch where it is stored; only later is it brought back [into the mouth] and chewed slowly and carefully. In the area of institutions, first concerning the system of ownership of the means of production,<sup>48</sup> and, second, concerning the superstructure—the political system and ideology—we have carried out a socialist revolution, but we have not launched a full debate. At this time a debate is being launched by means of the newspapers, discussion meetings, large meetings, and big-character posters.

Big-character posters are a good thing. I think [their use] should be handed

down. The *Analects* of Confucius was handed down. The Five Classics and the Thirteen Classics and the Twenty-four Histories have all been handed down.<sup>49</sup> Should the big-character posters not be handed down? I think they definitely should be handed down. For example, should big-character posters be used in future rectification in the factories? I think it's good to use big-character posters, the more the better.<sup>50</sup> Big-character posters have no class nature just as language has no class nature.<sup>51</sup> The vernacular language has no class nature. When people like us make a speech, we use the vernacular; Chiang Kai-shek also uses the vernacular. No one speaks classical literary [Chinese] anymore. We don't say [things like] "Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and application?" or "Is it not delightful to have friends coming from distant quarters?"<sup>52</sup> The proletariat speaks in the vernacular and the bourgeoisie also speaks in the vernacular. The proletariat can use big-character posters and the bourgeoisie can also use big-character posters. We believe that the majority of people stand on the side of the proletariat. Thus the big-character posters are a tool that benefits the proletariat and does not benefit the bourgeoisie. [The fact that] for a period of two or three weeks the sky was dim and the earth was dark, and the sun and the moon didn't shine, would seem to be beneficial to the bourgeoisie. [But] when we [spoke of] toughening our scalps and holding firm, [we had in mind] just these two or three weeks when we'd be unable to sleep and unable to eat. Didn't you talk about [wanting to be] tempered? A few weeks of not being able to sleep or eat; this is tempering. It's not a matter of [actually] putting you into a blast furnace to be burnt.

There are many middle-of-the-roaders who vacillated for a while, and this is good. By vacillating for a while they gain experience. Vacillation is a characteristic of the middle-of-the-roaders; otherwise, why would they be called middle-of-the-roaders? At one pole is the proletariat, and at the other pole is the bourgeoisie. [In between] there are a good many middle-of-the-roaders. The two poles are small, while the middle is large. But the middle-of-the-roaders are ultimately good people. They are the allied army of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie also wants to win them over to become their allied army. For a time it almost seemed [as though they had succeeded]. This was because the middle-of-the-roaders also criticized us, but their criticisms were well-intentioned. When the Rightists saw the middle-of-the-roaders criticizing us, they [saw an opportunity] to make trouble. Here in Shanghai, Rightists such as Wang Zaoshi, Lu Yi, Chen Renbing, Peng Wenying, and even a Wu Yin<sup>53</sup> were the people who started to make trouble. Once the Rightists started making trouble, the middle-of-the-roaders became confused. The venerable grandparents of the Rightists are Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, and Zhang Naiqi, and they all originated in Beijing.<sup>54</sup> In the Beijing area, the more confusion the better; the more thorough the confusion, the better. This has been one kind of experience [we have had].

The big-character posters that we just talked about are a matter of form. It is a matter of choosing a form of combat. The big-character posters are one combat weapon. They are a light weapon like the infantry rifle, the revolver, or the machine gun. As for airplanes and heavy artillery, they are probably in the class with *Wenhui bao*, *Guangming ribao*,<sup>55</sup> and some other newspapers. There was a period when

Communist Party newspapers also published Rightist opinions. We issued an order that all Rightist opinions should be published in their original form. We used this method as well as others to enable the broad masses to receive an education from both the positive and the negative sides [of things].<sup>56</sup> For example, personnel at *Guangming ribao* and *Wenhui bao* got a very profound lesson this time around. In the past they couldn't clearly distinguish what was a proletarian newspaper and what was a bourgeois newspaper, what was a socialist newspaper and what was a capitalist newspaper.<sup>57</sup> For a certain period, the Rightist leaders [on their staffs] turned these newspapers into bourgeois newspapers. These Rightist leaders hate socialism. They are not leading their school in a proletarian direction; they are leading it in a bourgeois direction.<sup>58</sup>

Do the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals who came over from the old society want to be transformed? They are inordinately afraid of transformation. They say transformation gives one what they call a "feeling of inferiority," and the more one is transformed, the more inferior one feels. This is an erroneous way of putting things. It should be that the more one is transformed, the more self-respect one has; transformation should [give one] a feeling of self-respect. This is because one's own consciousness [sees] the necessity for transformation. The "class consciousness" of those people is very high. They believe they themselves should not be transformed; on the contrary, they want to transform the proletariat.<sup>59</sup> They want to transform the world in the bourgeois image while the proletariat wants to transform the world in the proletarian image. As I see it, the majority of people, more than 90 per cent, after going through a process of hesitation, thinking it over, reluctance<sup>60</sup> and vacillation, will eventually become willing to be transformed. The more they are transformed, the more they will feel the necessity for transformation. The Communist Party is still being transformed. Rectification is transformation. In the future there should still be rectification. Are you saying that once this rectification has been completed there won't be any more? After this rectification there won't be any bureaucratism? It takes only two or three years for [people] to forget and then bureaucratism will reappear. People [all] have this characteristic—they forget things easily. Therefore, after a time, there must again be rectification. If [even] the Communist Party has to be rectified, [is it possible] the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals who have come over from the old society won't need rectification and won't need to be transformed? [They] are in even greater need of rectification, in even greater need of transformation.

Right now, aren't the democratic parties undergoing rectification?<sup>61</sup> The entire society should have a rectification. What's wrong with having a rectification? [A rectification] is not a matter of rectifying the trifles, but of rectifying the big things, rectifying the [political] line. Right now the main emphasis of the rectification in the democratic parties is on rectifying the [political] line, on rectifying the bourgeois Rightist counterrevolutionary line. I think the rectification is on the right track. Right now, the main emphasis of the rectification in the Communist Party is not the question of rectifying a [political] line, but the question of rectifying a work style. But for the democratic parties right now, the question of work style is secondary. The primary question is which line will [they] follow. [Will they] follow

the counterrevolutionary line of Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, Zhang Naiqi, Chen Renbing, Peng Wenyong, Lu Yi, and Sun Dayu,<sup>62</sup> or will they follow some other line? This matter is the first thing that should be cleared up. The three questions that I have mentioned should be cleared up: In the final analysis, were the achievements of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, the things done by several hundred million people, good or not? Should we follow the socialist road, or should we follow the capitalist road? If we are to promote socialism, which Party should lead [us]? Do we want the Zhang-Luo Alliance to lead,<sup>63</sup> or do we want the Communist Party to lead? Let's have a big debate about it and clear up the question of [our political] line.

Within the Communist Party there is also a question of line; concerning the "insurrectionists"—the Rightists in the Communist Party and the Youth League—it is a matter of line. Dogmatism is not at present a question of political line because it hasn't taken [that] form. In the history of our Party there have been several instances where dogmatism [took the form of] a question of political line. This is because [in these instances] it took the form of systems, policies, and programs.<sup>64</sup> At present, dogmatism has not taken the form of institutions, policies, and programs. [Dogmatism] is a thing that has certain rigidity to it, but now that it's been hammered and heated by fire it's become a bit more pliant. Aren't the leading personnel in every organization, school, and factory "going downstairs"?<sup>65</sup> They have given up the work style of the Kuomintang and the habits and airs of overlords. They are no longer acting as officials and overlords. The directors of cooperatives till the fields together with the masses, the factory heads and Party secretaries go into the workshops and labor together with the workers.<sup>66</sup> [In this way] bureaucratism will be greatly reduced. There will be future rectifications of this kind. Put out big-character posters, hold discussion meetings, and take those matters that should be corrected or criticized and sort them out and solve them. A further step would be to raise [the level of our political awareness] and learn some Marxism.

I believe the majority of our Chinese people are good people, our Chinese nation is a good nation. This nation of ours is very reasonable, very warm-hearted, very intelligent, and very courageous. We hope to create this kind of environment: one that is both centralized and unified [on the one hand] and lively and active [on the other]; that is, there must be centralism and there must be democracy, there must be discipline and there must be freedom.<sup>67</sup> There must be both aspects, not just one aspect. We shouldn't just have discipline or just have unity. We shouldn't seal other people's lips, not permit others to speak, and not permit what is incorrect to be criticized. We should encourage speaking out; [everyone] should be active and full of life. When someone presents well-intentioned critical opinions, "the speaker should not be blamed."<sup>68</sup> No matter how pointed or how severe the curses may be, there [should be] no blame, the [people] should not be subjected to rectification and they should not be made to wear "small shoes."<sup>69</sup> Small shoes are uncomfortable things to wear. At present who should be given small shoes to wear? We should give them to the Rightists to wear. Giving the Rightists some small shoes to wear is necessary.

Don't be afraid of the masses; rather, join together with the masses. There are

some comrades who fear the masses as they fear the water. Do you swim? I go everywhere encouraging [people] to swim. Water is a good thing. If you would just work at it an hour every day, without fail, go today, tomorrow, for a hundred days, I guarantee you would learn to swim. First of all, you must not have a teacher, and second, don't take a rubber life preserver with you. If you use a rubber life preserver you won't learn. "But this is my life [you are talking about], I don't know how!" [someone says]. You first swim in the shallow area. If you are learning [to swim] for a hundred days, then, after thirty days in the shallow area, you'll learn to swim. Once you've learned [in the shallow area] then no matter whether you go in the Yangtze River, or the Pacific Ocean, they're all the same, they're just water. Some people say that if you're swimming in a swimming pool and you go under [someone] can immediately pull you out and you won't die, but to swim in the Yangtze River would be something else again because the water flows so swiftly; once you sink, how can you be found? This argument is used to frighten people. But I say this is the talk of people who don't know anything about [swimming]. Our great swimmers, swimming pool instructors, and teachers at first wouldn't dare go in the Yangtze, but now they all do. Don't people now also swim in your Huangpu River? The Huangpu and the Yangtze are free swimming pools. To draw an analogy, the people are like the water and the leaders at all levels are like the swimmers. You mustn't leave the water. You must go with [the flow of] the water, you mustn't go against the water.<sup>70</sup> Don't scold the masses; the masses are not to be scolded: The worker masses, the peasant masses, the student masses, the majority of the members of the democratic parties, the majority of the intellectuals—you cannot scold them. You cannot stand in opposition to the masses, you must always take the same road as the masses. It is possible that the masses will make mistakes, but when they do make mistakes, we must discuss things with them sensibly. If they don't listen, we should wait a while, and when we have an opportunity, talk with them again. But don't part from them, just as in swimming we must not part with the water. When Liu Bei won over [Zhuge] Kongming he said it was like "a fish taking to water."<sup>71</sup> Things like this actually occur; this is not just written about in novels; this relationship of fish to water is written in the histories as well. The masses are like Kongming and the leaders are like Liu Bei. One leads and the other is led.

All wisdom comes from the masses.<sup>72</sup> I've always said that the intellectuals are the most lacking in intellect. This is [simply] to state the bottom line [of the facts]. The intellectuals have their tails cocked in the air.<sup>73</sup> Their tails are even longer than that of Sun the *Acarin*. Sun the *Acarin* was capable of seventy-two transformations, and his tail was so long that ultimately he turned it into a flagpole!<sup>74</sup> When the intellectuals cock their tails, my goodness! [They think], "If I don't rank number one in all the world, I'm at least number two!" The workers and peasants are of no account! You are just a bunch of "Ah Dou's" who can't even recognize a few characters.<sup>75</sup> But, it is not the intellectuals who resolve the problems relating to the overall situation; in the end it is the laboring [masses] who will resolve them. Moreover, it is the most advanced section of the laboring [masses], the proletariat, who resolves them.

Does the proletariat lead the bourgeoisie, or does the bourgeoisie lead the proletariat? Does the proletariat lead the intellectuals, or do the intellectuals lead the proletariat?<sup>76</sup> The intellectuals should become proletarian intellectuals—they have no other way out. "If the skin did not exist, what would the hair adhere to?"<sup>77</sup> In the past the "hair" of the intellectuals adhered to five layers of "skin," that is, they lived off five layers of skin. The first layer of skin was the imperialist system of ownership. The second layer of skin was the feudal system of ownership. The third layer of skin was the bureaucratic-capitalist system of ownership. Wasn't the democratic revolution for the overthrow of these Three Big Mountains?<sup>78</sup> It was for the overthrow of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. The fourth layer of skin was the national capitalist system of ownership. The fifth layer of skin was the system of ownership by small producers, that is, the system of individual ownership by peasants and handicraft workers. The intellectuals in the past adhered to the three former layers of skin or to the latter two layers to earn a living. Right now, do we still have these five layers of skin? "The skin does not exist." The imperialists have run away and all their property has been taken over. The feudal system of ownership has been abolished and the land has reverted to the peasants and now has been cooperativized. Bureaucratic-capitalist enterprises have reverted to the state. The industrial and commercial enterprises of the national bourgeoisie have been put under joint state-private management, and they have basically (but not completely) become socialist.<sup>79</sup> The system of individual ownership by peasants and handicraft workers has become a system of collective ownership, albeit that this system has not yet been consolidated, and it will take a few more years before it can be consolidated. These five layers of skin no longer exist, but they still influence the "hair." They still influence these capitalists and influence these intellectuals. In their minds they are always remembering these layers of skin and they remember them even in their dreams. Those who came over from the old society and the old orbit of things always have a lingering fondness for the old life and the old habits. Thus, the transformation of people will take a longer period.

To what skin do the intellectuals now adhere? They adhere to the skin of the system of public ownership. They adhere to the body of the proletariat. Who gives them food to eat? It is the workers and the peasants. The intellectuals are the teachers hired by the working class and the laboring people. You teach their children, but you won't listen to the masters. If you want to teach them your usual stuff, if you want to teach them the eight-legged essay<sup>80</sup> and Confucius, or if you want to teach capitalism's stuff, and produce a bunch of counterrevolutionaries, the working class won't stand for it; they'll dismiss you and next year they will not hire you back.

A hundred days ago I spoke here about how the intellectuals from the old society were now without any foundation. They have lost their former social and economic foundation, that is, they no longer have those five layers of skin, and unless they land on a new layer . . . <sup>81</sup> right now there are some intellectuals who are like the fifteen buckets used for getting water [out of a well] with seven going up and eight going down.<sup>82</sup> They are flying in midair, they can't go up to the heavens and they

can't go down to the ground.<sup>83</sup> I say, call these people "the gentlemen on the beam."<sup>84</sup> He flew his way up to a beam, but when he wanted to leave he found there was nothing there to return to. Those several layers of skin are gone; he couldn't go back to his old home. The old home no longer exists, but they're not willing to adhere to the body of the proletariat. To adhere to the body of the proletariat, you must study a little of the ideas of the proletariat, and you must become friends with the workers and peasants. But they won't do it; they know there's nothing [where they came from], but they still long for the [old] things. What we are doing at present is to exhort them to become conscious and turn around. After going through this round of extensive criticism, I think they will become more or less conscious.

Those intellectuals with a middle-of-the-road position should become conscious; they shouldn't cock their tails up too high; that intellect of yours is limited. I say these people are intellectuals and yet they're not intellectuals; it would be more fitting to call them semi-intellectuals. This is because your intellect is only so great—as soon as you start talking about great principles you commit errors.<sup>85</sup> Right now, I'm not going to talk about those Rightist intellectuals; they are reactionaries. The error committed by the middle-of-the-road intellectuals is that of wavering, of not seeing their direction clearly and losing their bearings for a time. If you have so much intellect, why do you commit errors? If you are so strong, and hold your tail up so high, why do you waver? They're [like a] blade of grass atop a wall; when the wind blows, they can bend in either direction.<sup>86</sup> One can see that their intellect isn't very great. In this respect, the ones whose intellect is great are the workers and the semiproletariat among the peasants. As soon as they saw Sun Dayu's stuff, they knew it wasn't correct. Whose intellect do you think is greater? It is, after all, those who are barely literate people; their intellect is greater. In making decisions concerning the overall situation, or decisions on our general direction, we should ask the proletariat. I am like this: Whenever there is a thing to be done, or some big plan to decide on, I have to consult the worker and peasant masses; I must talk with them and discuss things with them. I must discuss things with the cadres who are close to them to see whether [this thing] can be done or not. This means we simply have to go to the various localities. This is impossible to do sitting here in Beijing. Beijing is a place that produces nothing at all! There are no raw materials there. The raw materials are all taken from the workers and the peasants, they're all taken from the localities. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party can be compared to a processing plant; it takes in raw materials and manufactures something.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, it had better produce something good; if it produces something bad it is committing an error. The source of knowledge lies with the masses. What does it mean to say "correctly handle the contradictions among the people?"<sup>88</sup> It means seeking truth from facts<sup>89</sup> and following the mass line.<sup>90</sup> In the final analysis it is [a question of] the two words, "mass line." Do not become separate from the masses. Our relationship with the masses is like that of the fish to the water or like the relationship of swimmers to water.<sup>91</sup>

Should the Rightists be beaten to death with one blow?<sup>92</sup> It's quite necessary to

hit them with a few blows. If you don't hit them with a few blows they'll just play dead. In dealing with this sort of person, can you [do anything] without attacking them or pursuing them for a bit? An attack is necessary, but the purpose of our attack is to get them to turn around. We will use all sorts of methods to attack [them] in earnest, to isolate them completely, and then there will be a possibility of winning them over. I'm not saying all of them [can be won over], but we can at least get some of them to change around. They are intellectuals, and some of them are big intellectuals; winning them over will be useful. If we win them over we can let them have something to do. Furthermore, at this time they have already been very helpful. They have served as teachers by negative example; they taught the people by negative example. We are assuredly not preparing to throw them into the Huangpu River, but [are prepared] to adopt the attitude of curing the illness to save the patient.<sup>93</sup> Perhaps there are some people who are not willing to come over [to our side]. A person like Sun Dayu, if he is so stubborn and is unwilling to reform, just forget about him. Right now we have many things to attend to, and if we attack him all the time, attack him for fifty years, there's no way we can get anything done! These people who are unwilling to reform, you can take [your stubbornness] to your graves and go and see King Yan.<sup>94</sup> [You] can tell King Yan how you were a supporter of the five layers of skin, how you had so much "backbone," how you have resisted and wouldn't succumb to the attacks of the Communist Party and the masses of the people. But you should be aware that now King Yan has changed. The first King Yan is Marx, the second King Yan is Engels, and the third King Yan is Lenin. Now [the netherworld] is divided into two regions. The King Yan of the [netherregion of the] capitalist world is probably still the same old one, but in the [netherregion of the] socialist world these people [Marx, Engels, and Lenin] are King Yan. I think that after a hundred years these Rightists who stubbornly refused to change will still have to be rectified.<sup>95</sup>

## Notes

1. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 1.
2. Ibid., note 2.
3. See text July 8, 1957(2), notes 3 and 4. Here Mao omits the "industrial and commercial circles," which are included in the list in text July 8, 1957(2).
4. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 5.
5. Here text July 8, 1957(2), names a list of Rightist student organizations formed at Beijing University and identifies one of the leaders as Tan Tianrong (see text July 8, 1957[2], notes 6 and 7). All this is omitted here in text July 9, 1957.
6. The text here appears to be quite different from that of a corresponding passage in text July 8, 1957(2). In fact it is almost diametrically opposite in meaning. The major discrepancy is the inclusion of a phrase, *gan dao*, here, which is missing in the July 8 text. This renders the meaning that those who had second thoughts *felt that* the big fire had not been lit, whereas the other text (July 8) gives the meaning simply (without *gan dao*) that the fire had not been lit.
7. See text July 8, 1957(2), notes 8 and 9.
8. Ibid., note 10.
9. The list in text July 8, 1957(2) is more complete.

10. Ke Qingshi is not mentioned in the July 8 speech. For information on Ke, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 13. It should be noted that Ke was, so to speak, a "local" for this conference.

11. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 11.

12. In the Chinese calendar system, which predominantly follows the lunar cycle, the months are shorter than the months in the Western, or Gregorian, calendar. To make up for the discrepancy between the lunar and the solar cycles, an extra month is inserted into each "leap year," which is known as the intercalary month. The specific location of the intercalary month and the determination of which year would be a "leap year" follows a general cyclical pattern but is not always entirely scientific.

13. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 12. The name *Qitian dasheng*, or Great Immortal Who Quelled the Heavens, is a nickname that, according to the novel *Xi you ji*, the Monkey King took for himself (see *hui* 4 of this novel). This does not appear in text July 8, 1957(2).

14. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 13.

15. *Ibid.*, note 14.

16. *Ibid.*, note 15.

17. *Ibid.*, note 40. It should be noted that in text July 8, 1957(2), there is no reference to big-character posters at this place in the document; rather, as we can see from the footnote numbering, the mention of big-character posters comes much later.

18. *Ibid.*, note 16.

19. *Ibid.*, note 17.

20. *Ibid.*, note 18.

21. *Ibid.*, note 19.

22. In text July 8, 1957(2), the passage here dulls Mao's argument a bit by putting it in the following manner: "Do we want it [i.e., the leadership of the Communist Party] or not? The people say they want it; the Rightists say they don't want it." Here Mao apparently has in mind not just the pattern of criticism of the CPC by the Democratic League (see text July 1, 1957, note 10) and the students, but the explicit rejection of CPC leadership by the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party (see text July 1, 1957, note 12).

23. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 20.

24. *Ibid.*, note 21.

25. The War of Liberation is not mentioned in the corresponding passage in text July 8, 1957(2).

26. See text July 8, 1957(2), notes 22, 23, and 24.

27. In text July 8, 1957(2), Mao describes, in a corresponding passage, the socialist revolution as a "brief commando attack."

28. In a corresponding passage in text July 8, 1957(2), Mao was much less specific, and spoke of reforming "social institutions."

29. In the corresponding passage in text July 8, 1957(2), the words *zhu yao shi*, conveying the meaning "most important parts of which," are omitted. Instead the text reads *jiu shi* (meaning "that is"). The phonetic similarity should not be missed. Because of this phonetic similarity, the speculation that text July 8, 1957(2) and text July 9, 1957 are, in fact, the same speech (rather than two similar speeches given on separate though consecutive days) is reinforced, though still not entirely proven. (That is, rather than representing two different ways of putting things on Mao's part, which is more possible if he had given two speeches, the textual discrepancy is more likely a phonetic, or listening, error committed by those who recorded the speech.)

Whatever the case may be, the textual discrepancy here, whether inadvertent or deliberate, has an ideological significance. The text July 8, 1957(2) passage can be read as suggesting that the government, etc., make up the entirety of the superstructure, whereas the passage in the present text suggests that these (and here "government" is not mentioned) are only parts, albeit the chief parts, of the superstructure.

30. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 25.

31. Mao is being very sarcastic here. The term *qiyi jiangjun* (insurrectionist generals)

refers primarily to the military commanders originally on the KMT side who, like Zhang Zhizhong, for instance (see text May 15, 1951, vol. I, source note), "surrendered" to the Communists in the War of Liberation period. Thus it refers to people who went over to the side of the Communists. The "insurrectionist literati" (*qiyi wenren*), of course, did exactly the opposite. These terms do not appear in text July 8, 1957(2).

32. While Mao makes a positive statement here about the exposed Rightists, the July 8 text in a corresponding passage reads very differently. There Mao poses a rhetorical question related not to the exposed Rightists but to those who exposed them, asking whether these people should not be considered "insurrectionists" in their own right. It appears to us that the July 8 text makes better sense.

33. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 26.

34. *Ibid.*, note 27.

35. *Ibid.*, note 28.

36. *Ibid.*, note 29.

37. "The Crow's 'Morning' Cry" (*Wu zhou ti*) is the title of an article written by Xu Zhongnian in *Wenhui bao* (June 18, 1957), reprinted in *RMRB* (June 23, 1957). The title is a play on the title of an old opera, *Wu ye ti* (The Crow's Nocturnal Cry), which tells the story of Liu Yiqing, Prince of Lincuan during the time of Emperor Wendi of the Song dynasty during the Southern dynasties period in Chinese history. Liu offended, and was imprisoned by, the emperor, and the story goes that one night his wife received from the calling of a crow the omen of Liu's imminent release.

In this article Xu accuses the CPC of being prejudiced in its acceptance of news and criticism from people outside the Party—that it was happy to receive good news (i.e., compliments) and rejected bad news (i.e., criticisms); that it was severe in rectifying others and mild in rectifying itself, that the gentle winds and fine rain in the CPC rectification did the people no good—in other words, Mao is here, ironically, synopsisizing Xu's article. Xu also suggests that "strong medicine" must be used to cure the CPC's illness—this last being a play on the CPC slogan of "curing the illness to save the patient." This article is not mentioned in text July 8, 1957(2).

38. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 30.

39. Moganshan (Mogan Mountain) is a mountain ridge in northern Zhejiang Province, a branch of the Tianmu mountain range. It was here, according to legend, that the famous swords of ancient time, "Moxie" and "Ganzhang," were forged, in the time of the Spring and Autumn period (circa 770–480 B.C.) for King Fucha of the Kingdom of Wu. (The names may also be the names of two famous swordsmiths of the time of King Kailu, Fucha's father, who gave their names to the swords they forged.)

Moganshan is now a resort area and houses a famous convalescence clinic where Mao may have been in the winter of 1953. (See text Winter 1953, vol. I.)

40. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 31.

41. *Ibid.*, note 76.

42. *Ibid.*, note 32.

43. *Ibid.*, note 33.

44. *Ibid.*, note 34.

45. *Ibid.*, note 35.

46. *Ibid.*, note 36.

47. *Ibid.*, note 37.

48. Here, in a corresponding passage, text July 8, 1957(2), mentions the term "economic base," which is missing here. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 38.

49. *Ibid.*, note 39. Text July 8, 1957(2) also mentions, at this point, an opera, *Shiwu guan*, which is omitted in the present text.

50. *Ibid.*, note 40.

51. *Ibid.*, note 42.

52. These are the two sentences that begin the first segment in *Lun yu* (The Analects of Confucius) (see note 49). Mao apparently uses them as a general representative of all sorts of classical Chinese writing. In Chinese they read as *xue er shi xi zhi, bu yi yue fu? You peng*

*zi yuanfang lai, bu yi le fu?* The first chapter of *Lun yu* is known as the “Xue er bian.”

53. For Lu Yi, Chen Renbing, and Peng Wenying, see text July 8, 1957(2), note 48. Wang Zaoshi (b. 1903), like Chen and Peng, was a prominent member of the Democratic League in Shanghai and professor at Fudan University. He was educated at Qinghua University and the University of Chicago and received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin in political science. In 1935 he was a founding member of the “People’s Front,” which was later organized as the “Chinese People’s Association for National Salvation.” He held various positions in the PRC government since 1949 and was also the manager of the Freedom Press in Shanghai. At this time, he was planning, with people such as Zhang Bojun, to revive the Association for National Salvation, and he was listed as a Rightist element. For more biographical information on Wang, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 62. Wu was an actress with the Shanghai Film-Producing Company at this time.

54. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 48.

55. Ibid., note 44.

56. See text July 1, 1957, paragraph 6, and text surrounding note 21. This explanation about the behavior of the CPC’s own newspapers (presumably including *RMRB*) does not appear in text July 8, 1957(2).

57. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 45.

58. In text July 8, 1957(2), the general positions of this paragraph and the preceding one are reversed.

59. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 46.

60. The text here diverges from that of text July 8, 1957. Here the Chinese reads *bu da yuanyi*, whereas the July 8 text reads *bu duan youyi*, thus the varying translations. The phonetic proximity of the two phrases leads us to speculate, however, that the mistake was made by one of the transcribers.

61. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 47.

62. Ibid., note 48; see also notes 53 and 54 above.

63. Ibid., note 49.

64. Ibid., note 50.

65. Ibid., note 51.

66. Ibid., note 52. While the tone employed here vaguely appears to convey that Mao was describing things that had already happened, the text July 8, 1957(2) passage is couched as a directive, or command.

67. Ibid., note 53.

68. Ibid., note 54.

69. Ibid., note 55.

70. Ibid., note 56.

71. Ibid., note 74. Zhuge Liang’s honorific (*zi*) is Kongming.

72. Ibid., note 57.

73. Ibid., note 58.

74. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 21. Sun the *Acarin* is another title for Sun Wukong, the celebrated Monkey King in the novel *Xi you ji* (Journey to the West). It is the Buddhist title (meaning “disciple” or “one who pursues the way of self-discipline and merit”) given to him in the novel and is a title by which the character is popularly known in Chinese folklore. On the double-meaning for “tails” here, and the subject of the intellectuals showing their tails, see also text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 20.

75. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 59.

76. Ibid., note 60.

77. Ibid., note 61. In text July 8, 1957(2), Mao mentions a Shanghai capitalist who is not identified. Here he omits the reference altogether.

78. Ibid., note 63. In text July 8, 1957(2), Mao does not mention the term “Three Big Mountains” specifically.

79. Ibid., note 62.

80. Ibid., note 64.

81. Ibid., note 65.

82. Ibid., note 66.

83. Ibid., note 67.

84. The term *liang shang junzi* originally refers to burglars and petty thieves. The story in “Chen Shi zhuan” (The Biography of Chen Shi) in *Hou Han shu* (History of the Later-Han Dynasty) recalls that one night a burglar broke into Chen Shi’s house and concealed himself behind a lofty beam. Chen discovered the burglar, but instead of exposing him, he assembled his family and admonished them, saying that a burglar does not become a burglar by nature or by the innate evil of his character, but by gradually sinking into the habit. He then referred to the burglar as a “*junzi* [a noble man, or a gentleman] on the beam.”

Here Mao obviously extends and twists the original meaning of the term somewhat to arrive at the notion of people who are suspended, in a quandary, and unable to go anywhere unless they alight on a specific “skin.” However, it may also be indicative of a moderate sense of compassion for these people and reluctance, at least for the time being, to condemn them outright. This description became popular after Mao used it here, perhaps particularly because it was picked up and reiterated by Deng Xiaoping in his Report on the Rectification Campaign (see section 2 of “Report” in *RMSC* [1958], p. 34, and translation in R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. [1962], p. 346) on September 23, 1957, which was addressed to a larger audience than Mao’s speech here.

85. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 68.

86. Ibid., note 69.

87. Ibid., note 70.

88. Ibid., note 72.

89. Ibid., note 73.

90. Ibid., note 71.

91. Ibid., note 74. See also note 71 above.

92. Ibid., note 75.

93. Ibid., notes 76 and 77.

94. Ibid., note 78.

95. Ibid., note 79.

## Telegram to the People’s Republic of Mongolia

(July 9, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 10, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 121; *URI* (1976), p. 271. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (July 10, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 273.

Comrade Jamsarangiyn Sambuu, Chairman of the Presidium of the Greater People’s Hural of the Mongolian People’s Republic,  
Comrade Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People’s Republic,  
Comrade Sodnomiyn Avarzid, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People’s Republic:

On the occasion of the thirty-sixth anniversary of the victory of the Mongolian People’s Revolution, on behalf of the government and the people of the People’s

Republic of China, we extend our sincere and warm congratulations to the government and people of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The Chinese people are happy to see that the Mongolian people, under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the government of the Mongolian People's Republic, have achieved tremendous success in the building of socialism and, furthermore, have made positive contributions to the consolidation of the solidarity of the great socialist family headed by the Soviet Union, and to the cause of safeguarding peace in Asia and the world.

May the Mongolian people victoriously fulfill and fulfill with excess their plan for national economic and cultural construction for 1957.

May the brotherly friendship between the Chinese and Mongolian peoples become ever more consolidated and developed.

(Cosigned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council, dated in Beijing)

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### Interjections at a Meeting During the Qingdao Conference

(July 17, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 192–194.

*In the source, this document and the original for text July 18, 1957, as well as text July 20, 1957, are put together under one heading: Interjections during the Qingdao Conference. The source indicates that this meeting (perhaps a session of the conference) was held in the afternoon on July 17, 1957. For more on the Qingdao Conference and its historical importance, and the significance of this and the following two documents, see text July 1957(1) ("The Situation in the Summer"), source note.*

The Rightists are actually reactionaries. We don't call them reactionaries, but call them Rightists instead so as to polarize them more easily.

This year, there was a 1.7 raise, and 0.7 in reserve.<sup>1</sup>

We are now trying to pass the third gate.<sup>2</sup> It will take at least ten more years to pass this third gate. From history we have inherited a batch of bastards.<sup>3</sup> All the way here [they] have been beating the gongs and the drums.<sup>4</sup> What [they say about] supporting [us] for seven years was all a falsehood; now, at this juncture, they are cocking their tails.<sup>5</sup> Every year, when we convene the people's congress, or the political consultative conference meetings,<sup>6</sup> we always have to deal with them in one way or another. When it comes to passing legislation, they all raise their hands; then, when they go down to make inspections, they find faults, and also promote organized activities. We expected that at any time some of them would rebel, but all along we had found no method to expose them. Now that we have proposed

handling the contradictions among the people,<sup>7</sup> and with the rectification, the leaders of the Rightist elements have cocked up their tails and [come out] opposing communism and opposing socialism. When you beat down the Monkey King's tail, the monkeys on Huaguo Mountain will not be so cocky.<sup>8</sup> [We should, therefore,] grab [them] and reform [them], so as to shift gradually the power of leadership into the hands of the Leftists and the people who are to the Left of center. In the basic levels of every province and municipality, [we must] take over the leadership power that was in the [hands of] the democratic parties<sup>9</sup> and the educational circles. We can give some thought to implementing a Party committee system in the schools, but we absolutely must lead in the schools. In the past, the power of leadership was not consolidated; some of the leadership power was in the hands of others, and we lacked the power of combat, and for a time things were really topsy-turvy. For example, in Qinghua University, the Party members and the [Communist] Youth League made up 80 per cent [of the student body].<sup>10</sup> The Party's leadership, however, was not consolidated. In scientific and technological circles, in the circles of journalism, of literature and art, of publishing, and even in athletics and sports and public health circles, there are people on the Left, in the center, and on the Right. If we do not occupy the leadership roles in [these] battlefield positions, we won't be able to promote [a relationship with the] intellectuals. In the past, we promoted the Five Major Movements and the Three Major Transformations,<sup>11</sup> but we didn't do so well with the educational circles. In the past, the provincial [Party] secretaries were afraid of seeing the university professors, but now they have [had a chance to] see them for a bit and something describable has come out of that. When we have groped around for a bit more time, things will become even clearer.

Both the enemy and ourselves are not quite on the mark in assessing the political situation. The enemy, on his side, has miscalculated the political situation; and our own assessment of ourselves has not been quite accurate. During the period of contending and blooming,<sup>12</sup> [we] felt that our strength was a bit too small, with regard to the workers, peasants and soldiers—our basic estimate was on the low side. From the current perspective, among the workers, peasants, Party [members], and Youth League members, only a few [people] are watery,<sup>13</sup> the majority are good. We, too, were confused by false appearances.

Every time there is a people's congress or a [meeting of the] political consultative conference, there has to be a struggle. In name, [the Rightists] are on the stage sharing the political power, and in general they are [supposed to be] following us, but in fact they are reactionaries, and [their] support is false. When, last year, after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU,<sup>14</sup> we proposed the "Two Hundreds" guideline,<sup>15</sup> and then, on top of that, there was the Hungarian Incident,<sup>16</sup> they began to cock their tails. The first ones to perceive the problem were several comrades, including XXX.<sup>17</sup> [They] said that while it was all right to let a hundred flowers bloom, the [actual] blooming was not so reassuring, and some demons and ogres had come out of the blooming.<sup>18</sup> After Zhou Enlai came back in February, Luo Longji publicly criticized the premier's report on foreign relations; that was unheard of.<sup>19</sup> To top it off, there was trouble in several schools, factories, and cooperatives in the countryside. Then [people] thought the situation was getting



out of hand. In fact, there were just a few people. Even in the universities, nine fingers remained good; only one went rotten.<sup>20</sup> It took only a month or so of the anti-Rightist [campaign] to get this all out in the open. If we estimated that about 20 per cent of the democratic parties<sup>21</sup> [were bad], there were still 80 per cent. In six or seven months, we will become completely clear about this. All things must be analyzed; if you analyze, you have a [solid] bottom [to fall back on,] and then our minds will be at ease.

The enemy also overestimated his own strength, while underestimating the workers and peasants, and the Leftists. In this the Rightists are like us. It would not be possible to instigate a Hungary here in China. [As to] blooming and letting go,<sup>22</sup> we should still be resolved [about it] or else you just can't have things [really] bloom.

In addition, we must take hold of broadcasting, the telephones, telegram and posts, and telecommunications; we must not allow the democratic parties to develop [those things]. [As for the] democratic parties, we must take hold of the Rightists among them and hit [at them] firmly, and, in the midst of the hitting, establish leadership authority. [We should] take hold of this period and tackle it for a year. If we get to June next year when there is a reelection of the National People's Congress, then, at the time, even if we renominated them, [i.e., the Rightists,] they would be embarrassed themselves.<sup>23</sup> Through the course of opposing the Rightists, [the membership of the National People's Congress] is bound to switch over in substantial numbers. In the localities, political reorganization must begin early next year, and by March, all the provinces should have done a good job of [preparing for] the reelection. Our estimate is to hit for a year. However, it is not good to keep blowing this, and in such a concentrated way, in the newspapers. There are other things we must do and promote. Although there are many Rightists, the leaders have already been hit. In striking at the Rightists, the main thing to do is to hit the leaders. When the leaders are hit, the [rest] will not find it easy to make trouble. Later we can adopt a policy of ["peeling the bamboo shoot."]<sup>24</sup>

With regard to some people, such as XXX, XXX, XXX, and XXX, how shall we hit them?<sup>25</sup> XXX is opposed to the people<sup>26</sup> but does not openly oppose communism. He doesn't make trouble, but he would not change his diehard ways [either]. Although the Rightists are small in numbers, we must not underestimate them; with regard to the Rightists, we must peel the bamboo shoot.

The majority among the intellectuals are not Marxists,<sup>27</sup> and would not have much feeling for socialism and the cause of the workers and peasants. However, they have all these kinds of tendencies. As long as they lean [toward the Left] for a bit today, and a bit [more] tomorrow, in ten years' time they will be reformed. A proposal came from Shandong [Province]: We must do propaganda work with regard to the anti-Rightist matters among the workers and the peasants. The landlords and the bourgeoisie all appear to be speaking on behalf of the workers and the peasants; we must talk about how the Rightists attacked, and how we have grabbed a batch of Rightists (such as Luo Yiqun in Guangdong [Province]).<sup>28</sup>

With regard to workers, peasants, and handicraft workers, in general we should not put the hat of Rightists on them.<sup>29</sup>

Is there any hope for cooperativization? There are these well-to-do middle peasants<sup>30</sup> who we had hoped would join the cooperatives slowly and gradually, but [they joined in a rush, and] we couldn't have kept them back if we wanted to. Then when they have joined, [they say] they want to withdraw. Should we allow them to withdraw? From the perspective of the class line, the small number who do not wish to be in the cooperatives can be allowed to withdraw. In Linyi Special District in Shandong [Province], of a million or so households, about ten thousand withdrew.<sup>31</sup> In the past, [that area] had the greatest number of incidences of trouble; now it is a relatively peaceful place in terms of the province's [condition]. Don't make fun of those who withdraw, and don't put the hat of Rightists on them. Let them come [in] later if they wish. In general, those who want to withdraw make up 1 per cent. [Let us] permit those who are willing to withdraw to withdraw; [let's] make that our resolution for this autumn, and [let's] see how [things work out].

How are we going to carry out the rectification in the countryside and in the factories? We must collect the problems and questions that need to be resolved, and prepare some opinions. The Central Committee intends to hold a plenum on August 15, with the [special] district secretaries taking part, to study the problem of rectification and of the system.<sup>32</sup> The Party Congress can be held at the end of January or February before the Spring Holiday.<sup>33</sup>

[That people] have the responsibility but not the authority, [the problems of] the personnel system, and [the problem of] assessing grades and assessing salaries<sup>34</sup> are all problems of a political nature, problems of adjusting relationships.

From now on, in the anti-Rightist struggle, we have to hang on to just two words: "deep" and "transformation." Internally we must be gentle; toward the enemy we must be firm and relentless. In the [special] district committee in Xuzhou,<sup>35</sup> [for example], 50 per cent of the basic-level cadres are good. The remaining 50 per cent can be divided into three categories: Those with light and minor mistakes make up 20 per cent; those with somewhat more serious mistakes and whose hands are not clean make up 29 per cent; and only 1 per cent are people who have seriously violated the law and breached discipline. For the first two types they can get downstairs of their own accord.<sup>36</sup> The method would be to hold a few cadres' meetings to affirm accomplishments and review shortcomings. What is correctly handling contradictions among the people?<sup>37</sup> It's nothing but the words "mass line."<sup>38</sup> It simply means that we must never be divorced from the masses, we must listen to the masses' opinions, and analyze them. It's just like swimming; you must go with the nature of the water. Or one could say this must be like the relationship of fish to water.<sup>39</sup> If the cadre is divorced from the masses, he would not be able to live. In the past, in the war, among the armed forces we promoted the Three Great Democracies; why can't we promote the Three Great Democracies<sup>40</sup> in the factories and in the countryside now? The troops held guns in their hands, and yet they didn't damage the cadres' prestige. Why can't the *xian*, district, and *xiang* cadres [today] do the same? With regard to the cadres, we must support on the one hand and help on the other. Mistakes have to be corrected, but we also don't want to harm the cadres. Let everyone do a bit of criticism, and then, with one self-criticism, they should be able to pass the gate. We should teach the basic-level cadres how to pass

the gate. In the countryside and the factories, we cannot adopt the methods in the urban organizations and the schools; rather, we must adopt the methods of [holding] three-level [joint] cadres' meetings, cooperative members' representatives' meetings, [Party] branch congresses as well as workers and staff congresses, and so on. That is, we would use the method [proposed by] Comrade Chen Boda.<sup>41</sup> At the beginning, when Chen Boda promoted his ways in Fujian (Province), the district and *xiang* cadres all disapproved; later, however, the majority of cadres got elected. Elections must not call for guarantees for Party members or Youth League members; what is needed is full and complete fermentation, with the masses making the nominations. Each province may promote some experience [in this regard].

Factory cadres must go down to the workshops and even to the [workers'] dormitories [to observe and gain experience].

The relationship between cadres and the masses ought to be a relationship of reasoning, not [one of] my hitting you and you feeling pain<sup>42</sup> or my suppressing and your submitting; the result of carrying out democracy would be to enhance [our] prestige, not lower it. In the past, when democracy was carried out in the armed forces, we won the war.

Where there is virulent counterrevolution, it must be suppressed. Where the suppression and purging of counterrevolutionaries has not been thorough, we will have to kill a few people. [When we said] execute fewer people we did not mean not executing anyone altogether.<sup>43</sup> To execute a few people is absolutely necessary. In the two *xian* of Xianju and Linhai in Zhejiang [Province], 80 per cent of the cooperatives were disbanded, and they are preparing to have a million people make trouble each year—or maybe they should prepare for a bit even more.<sup>44</sup> In Changge *xian* in Henan [Province], when they built an airport, the peasants were driven away, and four people were killed.<sup>45</sup> This is a remnant of the work style of the Kuomintang. Some remnants of the work style of the Kuomintang are [in fact quite] in conformity with realities, [but] we must absolutely rectify [the situation] well, even though it will take a process to thoroughly rectify well. The rectification this time—[some] hope to rectify things and set them straight all in one stroke, to settle the problems once and for all; I don't believe that can be done. Now we should expand [our estimates of] the numbers [of people] who are going to make trouble. Out of 600 million people, we are prepared that each year three million will make trouble. After the Rightists have made these troubles in these few years, we'll get to the bottom, and we'll no longer have any anything to fear. There will be a period of instability in the transitional period; if we can stabilize the social order generally in another five and a half years' time, that would be good. We must always trust the majority among the masses; what Chen Boda spoke of is not a narrow experience.

## Notes

1. We have not been able to determine what Mao's frame of reference was here when he spoke of a "raise" and a "reserve."
2. On the subject of "passing the gate," see text June 23, 1950, vol. I, note 8.

3. The phrase here is *wangba dan*. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 25.

4. The phrase here is *qiao luo da gu*. See text Oct. 13, 1957, notes 7 and 9.

5. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

6. Here Mao appears to be referring to the convening of meetings of these organizations at the local levels, not just at the national level. The political consultative conference meetings would be of local chapters of the CPPCC. For the national CPPCC, see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, source note.

7. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note and note 3.

8. Huaguo Mountain (*Huaguo shan*), or Mountain of Flowers and Fruits, was the place of origin, of sorts, of the character Monkey King of the classical allegorical novel, *Xi you ji* (Journey to the West). The name given for the character in the text here is *Sun xing zhe* (Sun the Acarin, or Monk-Acolyte; see text July 9, 1957, note 74); the character is also known by his name, Sun Wukong. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 21, and text May–June 1955, vol. I, note 7. See also text April 25, 1956, note 40, text July 8, 1957, note 12, and text July 9, 1957, note 74. In the first two chapters of the novel, Sun is described as a puckish, unruly demon spirit that took the form of a monkey and made himself lord and master of a population of apes and monkeys at Huaguo Mountain. He is later subdued by the Buddhist "Goddess" (Bodhisattva) Guanyin, who sends him on the journey as a protector of Xuanzhuang the Monk. Here Mao is alluding to how the rambunctious intellectuals, as leaders of an unruly crowd, must also be subdued and tamed so as to be made useful for the socialist cause.

9. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1. See also text April 30, 1957, *passim*.

10. On the Communist Youth League, see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74. However, Mao's estimate of the preponderance of Communist Party members and Communist Youth League members within the student body of Qinghua University appears exaggerated.

11. On the "Five Major Movements," see text Oct. 9, 1957, note 5. On the "Three Major Transformations," see text Oct. 23, 1951, vol. I.

12. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

13. The phrase Mao uses here is *shao shu shui*. We are unable to pinpoint Mao's meaning for *shui*.

14. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.

15. This refers to the guideline of "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend." See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

16. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.

17. We are not certain who XXX stands for.

18. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.

19. See text July 1, 1957, note 8. See also text Oct. 13, 1957, note 143.

20. See text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 26.

21. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

22. The word here is *fang*, which has a dual meaning of "blooming" (as in *bai hua qi fang*) and "letting go" (as opposed to "pulling in the reins," or *shou*). On the latter meaning, see text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14; text April 10, 1957, note 1; text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 81, and text April 1957(2), notes 4 and 17.

23. The Fifth Session of the First National People's Congress would be held February 1–11, 1958.

24. The phrase here, which Mao continues to use often in the remainder of 1957, is *bo sun zhengce*. A young bamboo shoot has many layers, and a "peeling the bamboo shoot" policy would be one of exposing things layer by layer.

25. We are not certain who these Xs stand for. However, it is quite possible that Mao was thinking of Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, and others in Zhang's group. See text July 1, 1957, notes 3 and 28.

26. Again, while we are uncertain about this, one might hazard to suggest that XXX may stand for either Zhang Bojun or Luo Longji.

27. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 6.

28. We have not been able to find information on Luo Yiqun.

29. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 33, on the usage of "wearing hats" or "putting a hat on someone."

30. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 20.

31. Linyi is in southern Shandong Province.

32. As far as we can tell, Mao's expectation that the CPC Central Committee would hold a plenum in August 1957 was not realized. The Third Enlarged Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC was held, however, September 20–October 9, 1957. See text July 1957(1), note 43. This is not the first time that Mao had expressed an anticipation of the plenum in his writings. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 37.

33. The Spring Holiday (*chunjie*) or Spring Festival is the New Year's Day (*yuan dan*) of the lunar calendar.

34. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 1, and text Mar. 18, 1957, note 76.

35. Xuzhou is in the northern part of Jiangsu Province, where Jiangsu shares a border with Shandong.

36. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 51 for the meaning of "going downstairs."

37. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note and note 3.

38. See text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7; text May 2, 1956, source note; and text Nov. 15, 1956, note 45. See also text April 1957(2), text surrounding note 21; text July 1957(1), note 7; and text July 8, 1957, note 57.

39. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 74.

40. See text July 1957(1), note 27.

41. See text Nov. 18, 1954, vol. I, note 1, and text Jan. 11, 1958, note 32.

42. Here the Chinese character *tong* (through) may be a typographical error, where Mao intended to use the homophone *tong* (hurt, or pain).

43. Mao is referring to the policy on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in 1951. See text May 8, 1951, vol. I.

44. Xianju and Linhai are in the southeastern part of Zhejiang Province. They are about 30 km apart from each other.

45. Changge *xian* is in central Henan Province, approximately 15 km north of Xuchang.

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## Interjections at a Meeting During the Qingdao Conference (July 18, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), p. 194.

See text July 17, 1957, source note.

Strange! [They are] not afraid of imperialism, but they are afraid of bourgeois ideology.

In Beijing, 1,500 came out of the fight. Throughout the nation [we've] got to get ten Beijings from the fighting.<sup>1</sup> All big trees have [big] roots. Liu-Sha-He is a son of a big landlord.<sup>2</sup> This is a new-style purging of counterrevolutionaries. We must do a careful job of taking care of the strategy for the struggle with the [special] district secretaries and the *xian* secretaries.<sup>3</sup> Big-character posters are good things. Why aren't we afraid of big-character posters? Because we are always [in] the

majority. The factories must absolutely not hinder production. The more rotten the place is, the greater the collapse, the better the place is to get things done. The provinces must send experienced cadres down [to those places where they must] toughen their scalps.<sup>4</sup> [Let there be] great contending and great blooming for two weeks.<sup>5</sup> [We'll] just listen and not say a word.

[We'll] have two rectifications in each five-year plan [period]; one large[-scale] and one small.<sup>6</sup> Don't remove the rocks; right now we must yet rely on these rocks.<sup>7</sup> There has been an increase in grain production every year, but [the amount of the increase] gets smaller and smaller. Last year we used X catties that were stock-piled.<sup>8</sup> This year we've got to promote [production to the tune of] X catties. Clothing is also a major item. Now [the production] has halved; less and less. How can that be? Wherever there are counterrevolutionaries, they must be suppressed. Arrest them first, and then we can talk. [We] cannot be like XXX<sup>9</sup> [we must] by no means ever issue a self-indicting edict.<sup>10</sup>

Too many people in the handicraft-industry cooperatives are taken away from production. In Xingdeng *xian* in Zhejiang [Province], of a population of 70,000, there are 3,500 officials. That really is too much; they should reduce the number by 3,000 and leave [only] 500. There are also too many nonproduction personnel in the factories—they make up 30 per cent. In the Soviet Union [such personnel] make up 25 per cent; in the United States, it is only 3 to 5 per cent. Now we have to give some consideration [to this]; the superfluous have to be kept fed, and then, in several years' time, transferred over to production. The money that is saved can be used to expand the economic enterprise.

The scope of the rectification is to be expanded. The Party, the Youth League, the democratic parties, the people's organizations, the federations of industry and commerce, schools, literature and artistic circles, economic enterprise organs, and the cooperatives<sup>11</sup> all must undergo rectification. With the exception of a small number of well-known personages, all the Rightists are to be sent to labor education [and reform].

The Association of Communists should be bigger than the Communist Party.<sup>12</sup> Let the leading comrades at the Center go to be the presidents [of that association].

If, among those landlords, rich peasants, and counterrevolutionaries, there are those who have had their hats removed<sup>13</sup> but are once more making mischief, they should be made to wear that label once again. Let's get ourselves a set of rules for labor education. The death penalty should not be too lightly abolished. We must not give the landlords, rich peasants, and counterrevolutionaries their right to vote too prematurely. We'll not deal with the big ones, but just deal with the small. All these ["passes"] have to be checked firmly. That clique of the Monk of Tang; The Pig is more simplistic and can be forgiven; it won't do not to have a golden-head-band chant [with which to control] the Monkey King.<sup>14</sup>

It is in conformity with people's sentiments and in line with the principles of heaven to oppose the Right-deviationist ideas and to oppose the Rightists and the ultra-Rightists. The provincial and municipal [authorities] do not control the center of the democratic parties; that should be cut in two.<sup>15</sup>

## Notes

1. We are not exactly sure of what Mao meant by these figures. A tentative guess is that he was referring to the number of “counterrevolutionary bourgeois elements” who had been exposed in (“came out of”) the anti-Rightist campaign, and that he wanted to have the experience repeated elsewhere throughout the nation.

2. We are unable to identify Liu-Sha-He. The characters here do not resemble a real name, but appear to be a pseudonym.

3. The phrases *di shu* and *xian shu* here refer, we believe, to short forms of *di wei shuji* (special district Party committee secretaries) and *xian wei shuji* (*xian* Party committee secretaries). We do not know exactly what Mao means in an overall sense.

4. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 119; text July 8, 1957(2), note 2.

5. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

6. See text July 8, 1957, paragraph 8.

7. On the meaning of “removing rocks,” see text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 11.

8. The term *ku cun* (stockpiled) also has the meaning of “hold in reserve.” The original has *XX yi*, in which *yi* is the word for “a hundred million.” Following our custom, however, we have opted to render all indeterminable numbers in the text as simply *X* in our translation. In this case, *XX* merely means that two characters were changed to *X* in the text, but it does not give us any clue to the exact figures used in the original. The same applies to the number in the next sentence. The phrase there is *XXX yi*.

9. We believe that *XXX* here refers to Stalin.

10. See text Jan. 1957, note 38, and text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 1.

11. See text Mar. 12, 1957, source note, and text May 15, 1957, source note and note 31.

12. We cannot tell what Mao meant by the phrase *gongchan zhuyi zhe xiehui*, which we have translated as “the Association of Communists.”

13. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 33, for the meaning of “hats.”

14. In the novel *Xi you ji*, when the Buddha and the Bodhisattva Guanyin subdue the Monkey King (Sun Wukong), a golden headband is placed on his skull. This is no ordinary ornament, but can contract in response to a chanted curse that the Monk of Tang (Xuanzhuang) can use to control and tame the Monkey King. See text July 17, 1957, note 8. On the character Zhu Bajie in the novel, often known as “The Pig,” see text Oct. 11, 1955(2), vol. I, note 15.

15. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

## Interjections at a Meeting During the Qingdao Conference

(July 20, 1957)

Source: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 194–195.

See text July 17, 1957, source note.

It would no longer do for us not to do some work solidly and earnestly with the countryside. The countryside is a weak spot [in our situation]; it would only work if everybody loved their country. Let's make this principle clear.

One [thing] is that [our] economic foundation is very weak; another [thing] is that [our] politics are not secure. It will take five years before cooperativization can be consolidated; and it will take at least ten years to let everyone get gradually accustomed to the socialist system. The military and the people, and the Party and the people, must be forged into one.<sup>1</sup> Right now, the British and the Americans are interfering with us,<sup>2</sup> and that is to our disadvantage. It brings more trouble [for us], and we don't have anything to do business with.

It is not good to emphasize the seasons, and let's not get so much involved in things of formalism.<sup>3</sup> They can fight over them; we will not fight, not in a hundred years.

The grain consumption in the countryside has to be greatly reduced.

The October Revolution, the Second World War, the victory of the Chinese Revolution—all these victories took place under conditions when there wasn't an “International.”<sup>4</sup> What good did the nine-nation intelligence bureau accomplish?<sup>5</sup> What harm is there in not promoting it? Just [tell us] when there is a meeting and we will come, and that should be enough. Meet with the lords, and resolve problems individually.<sup>6</sup> The economic conference invited us to take part.<sup>7</sup> Some comrades seem to think that we just have to participate. Why? What it did was to bring about an industrial Europe and an agrarian Asia.<sup>8</sup> In general international conferences, we only send observers to take part.

It may not be to our advantage that *XXXX* is holding power [in the Soviet Union].<sup>9</sup> The first [problem] is international tension. Their “Marxism” is really strong, [so strong] that they take your money in one hand and release merchandise in the other.

Don't just listen to the negative side [of things]. Since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the problem of what attitude we should adopt toward *XXXX* has been raised. *XXXX* does have shortcomings, and [his] work style is not correct; to have several dozen Central Committee members rush right in [all at once] is unprecedented.<sup>10</sup> *XXXX* said there is no collective leadership, such as deciding on holding (?)<sup>11</sup> [There are] the questions of the delegation of industrial management power and [authority over] trade. In trade, Eastern Europe is adequately taken care of. Right now, without the Soviet Union, we can't get any industry accomplished. These are the things that *XXXX* and people on his side would say.

In terms of comparing policies, *XXXX* is a bit better.<sup>12</sup> In work style they are the same; six of one, half a dozen of the other.<sup>13</sup>

*XXX* wouldn't sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.<sup>14</sup> It was not until the Chinese scolded and the British lent a hand that it was done.

Four companies—two colonies (the Northeast and Xinjiang). *XXXX* did good things about these, but there are still two pieces that have not been resolved.<sup>15</sup>

It was Nehru who proposed the abolition of the intelligence bureau, and Roosevelt who proposed to abolish the Third International.<sup>16</sup> Now they want to establish an international organization again; what's the rush? [It's like having] a special group waiting to start a [new] magazine—you've got to listen to him on all things; [his ideas are] forcibly imposed on others, and there is no exchanging of opinions.<sup>17</sup>

I talked with Mikoyan for eight hours.<sup>18</sup> We said; we hope you are stable. If you are not stable, things will not be easy to accomplish. He said, too, that he hoped we would be stable. He said that we should be cautious and careful, [because] we have Rightists. Many things just cannot be anticipated.

One time Bulganin said something not quite properly.<sup>19</sup> Khrushchev<sup>20</sup> pointed out that there were errors of principle [there], and that displeased Bulganin.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, when Bulganin went abroad, Khrushchev was always tagging along, feeling that he too was an "attendant" premier; this is the reason for Bulganin's opposition to Khrushchev.

Tito is very shrewd.<sup>22</sup> It is hard to tell whether or not Khrushchev is going to get the best of him in the game. Right now things are to Tito's advantage; Tito's double-facedness is incorrigible.

Our contradiction with Khrushchev is [over] the problem of Stalin's supporters, and [over] the ways in which we view the contradictions among the people.<sup>23</sup>

In the past, for several decades, they have not gone down to take a look around; right now, they are criticizing XXXX for looking at flowers on horseback,<sup>24</sup> but looking at flowers on horseback is still better than not going down at all. Shepilov approved of [the idea of] internal contradiction, and wrote a draft resolution on stripping Khrushchev of his positions.<sup>25</sup> Things have got to the point of irreconcilability between them; Molotov<sup>26</sup> and others criticize Khrushchev for being a "Trotskyist," and for being "Rightist deviationist."

We have absorbed the experience of the international Communist movement; we will not promote mortal struggle inside the Party.

In the Song dynasty there was erected a monument—don't kill cadres indiscriminately.<sup>27</sup> Even among feudal dynasties there are some who are smarter than others; and indeed, after that, fewer were killed.

## Notes

1. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 59.

2. We are not sure of Mao's point of reference when he speaks of U.S. and British interference. The language, though not garbled, is somewhat ambiguous. The final part of the sentence appears, however, to allude to some trade-policy problems, and that would suggest the continued debate on the U.S. ban on trade and travel to China, a matter of some controversy in June and July 1957. See text June 8, 1957(2), note 8.

3. Again, Mao's meaning here is unclear. The term *jieqi*, translated as "the seasons," is ambiguous. However, Mao's statements here appear to have some connection with paragraph 5 of text July 1957(1).

4. The reference here, we believe, is to the Communist International (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*), or the "Third International," commonly known as the Comintern. The organization, especially under Stalin, had in the 1930s become largely an instrument for Soviet interference with the affairs of other Communist parties. In May 1943, the Presidium voted to dissolve the Communist International, and the member parties ratified the decision.

5. Mao is referring to the Communist Information Bureau (*Informatsionnoe Biuro Kommunisticheskikh Partii*), generally known as the Cominform. It was set up in September 1947 by representatives of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. In 1948-1949 the

organization effectively broke up over the dispute between the Soviet Union and Tito's Yugoslavia. Finally, in April 1956, the dissolution of the Cominform was announced.

6. Mao is referring to a political form in the late-Zhou dynasty, the Spring and Autumn period, and the Warring States period during which "China" was divided into many feudal states and principalities, and the leader of the nobility (sometimes known as the "hegemon" in the Warring States period) would try to settle disputes among factions or individual feudal lords (known as the *zhu hou*, the term Mao uses here) by convening a mediating conference.

7. Mao is referring to the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, or the Comecon. This organization was founded in 1948 (as a response, of sorts, to the launching of the Marshall Plan by the United States) by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Albania and the German Democratic Republic joined subsequently. Interest in expanding membership and making policy concrete was enhanced after the Hungarian and Polish crises in 1956 (see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27); hence Mao's comments here that Chinese membership in the Comecon was discussed at this time.

8. Mao's sarcastic remark stands in front of a very deep-seated problem of perspective on the theory and strategy of revolution in the Communist movement as a whole. The dispute stems from "classical" Marxist theory, in that Marx himself held the view that non-European countries, and particularly Asian societies, were culturally characterized by a socioeconomic system that differed from that which European societies had gone through in their stages of historical development. In the preface to *Critique of Political Economy*, in a list of historical ages (or stages) that included "classical antiquity," "the feudal mode of production," and "the capitalistic mode of production," Marx included the designation "the Asiatic mode of production," which he regarded as a very early stage in the development of humanity, closest to tribal society, which grew out of primitive communism. Marx argued that the European societies of the classical period had bypassed this stage, whereas the Asian countries had yet to grow out of this stage. During Marx's own lifetime, and in the writings of Engels, the problem was developed. With the passage of time, Marx and Engels tended to draw a less rigid dichotomy between Asian and European societies, and to see a role for the Asian countries in the world revolutionary transformation. (For example, writing of the Taiping Rebellion in China in 1853 in "Revolution in China and in Europe" in the May 20, 1853 edition of the *New York Daily Tribune*, Marx argued that capitalism was developing as a single world economic system, and that upheavals in the non-European parts of this system could have repercussions that would bring about revolutions in Europe itself.) Nonetheless, in general, Marx and Engels seemed to hold to a "Eurocentric" view of revolution and a view that, no matter what the revolutionary role for Asian societies might be, as societies, in the scheme of the broad stages of history, they were backward. (For example, India's progress would depend on its becoming "Europeanized.") This view had a profound effect on "orthodox" Marxists such as Karl Kautsky, who tended to emphasize economic and social determinism in their interpretation of Marx's ideas. Eventually, it would be up to Lenin, who shifted the emphasis from determinism to revolutionary voluntarism, to suggest theories of a "noncapitalist path of development" for societies previously considered backward, and to award to these societies, in his theory, a more direct and even vanguard role in the revolution.

In 1914, Lenin wrote the article "Backward Europe, Advanced Asia," which spelled out some of these ideas. Even here, however, Lenin still assumed that the European proletariat would play the critical role in world revolution, and it was the victory of the European industrial working class that would set free "both the peoples of Europe and the peoples of Asia." It was not until the outbreak of the First World War that Lenin further developed his ideas on the role of the colonial world (under imperialism) in the world revolution. Yet the problem lingered on, right down to the debate at the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920 between Lenin and M. N. Roy, who held the quintessential "Asiacentric" position, and even down to Stalin's time. On the whole, the burden of Marxist-Leninist theory going back to the mid-nineteenth century tends to expose an attitude that Mao sarcastically puts here as "industrial (advanced?) Europe, agrarian (backward?) Asia." The importance of this to Mao, who seeks to identify a "Chinese road to socialism" that

nonetheless is consistent, in his mind, with Marxism-Leninism, should not be lost. (Incidentally, the issue of whether Marx considered China as an example of the Asiatic mode of production was a subject of a heated debate in the pages of *The China Quarterly*, nos. 11, 12, and 16, between Karl Wittfogel and Maurice Meisner.)

9. XXXX here quite clearly refers to Khrushchev. Mao is being sarcastic in the remainder of this paragraph.

10. On the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, see text Feb. 9, 1956, source note. We believe the reference to XXXX here may be a reference to Trotsky.

11. The question mark is in the original text. This may indicate that some words are missing here.

12. The comparison that Mao makes here, we believe, is implicitly a comparison between Khrushchev and Stalin. Ostensibly Mao would retain this guarded approval of Khrushchev until the end of 1957. On this subject, see text Nov. 17, 1957, source note.

13. The Chinese saying that Mao uses here, *ban jin ba liang*, literally means “half a cattie, or eight *liang*” (*liang* being a Chinese weight measure sometimes translated as a tael; there are sixteen *liang* to a *jin*, or cattie). The idiomatic translation here is therefore apt.

14. On the treaty, see text Jan. 2, 1950, vol. I, note 1. It is our own speculation that XXX here stands for Stalin, who did take a tough bargaining stance at the time of the treaty. This would then be, in our memory, the first time that Mao semipublicly accuses Stalin of having taken an obstructive posture toward Sino-Soviet relations in the earliest years of the PRC. This would be a serious matter, both in international relations and in Mao’s assessment of Stalin, which was deteriorating in 1957.

15. Mao is referring, we believe, to the “joint corporations” that were set up by the Soviet Union as a result of the treaty agreements (see note 14). The critical tone that Mao adopts here, and his linking of these “corporations” to “the two colonies,” stem from the fact that while ostensibly these “corporations” were established to “assist China’s development in construction,” they were concessions that Stalin had wrenched from Mao at the treaty negotiations, and they symbolized continuous Soviet domination of the PRC in the early years of the republic’s history. Moreover, they were located in Xinjiang, one of the two regions that, in Mao’s mind, became semicolonies of the Soviet Union. XXXX here refers, we believe, to Khrushchev again.

16. We do not know for sure how it is that Roosevelt proposed the abolition of the Comintern, although it is understood that the dissolution of the Comintern, or Third International, after Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the Soviet Union’s becoming a member of the Allied Powers were at least in part motivated by Stalin’s eagerness to demonstrate to his new allies (Roosevelt and Churchill) that the Soviet Union had no intention to interfere with the affairs of other countries. The question of the Comintern as an “instrument for the exportation of revolution” was at stake. Similarly, we have no specific information on how Nehru may have proposed the abolition of the Cominform, but, incidentally, at the time of the dissolution of the Cominform, Moscow had a growing interest in cultivating Nehru as an advocate of neutralism and, perhaps, as a spokesperson for anti-Western sentiments in the non-aligned movement.

17. We are uncertain about Mao’s point of reference here. We cannot tell if he is speaking metaphorically, or of a specific plan for a specific magazine.

18. Anastas Mikoyan, then first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, headed a delegation that visited China on April 6 and 7, 1956. See text April [6], 1956, source note.

19. Nikolai Bulganin was chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR at this time.

20. The Chinese in this paragraph has the abbreviation *Ke* for Khrushchev, instead of the full *Ke-lu-xiao-fu*.

21. Similarly, the Chinese in this paragraph has the abbreviation *Bu* for *Bu-er-jia-ning*.

22. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 17.

23. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note and note 3.

24. See text Mar. 16, 1953, vol. I, note 1. XXXX here is probably again a reference to Khrushchev.

25. The lines of opposition between Khrushchev and his supporters and his opponents were drawn clearly in the spring of 1957. In addition to disagreements over the “secret speech” that Khrushchev had made on Stalin at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956 (see text Feb. 9, 1956, source note), further lines of antagonism were drawn as a result of Khrushchev’s demand in early 1957 for the establishment of local economic councils and the dissolution of economic ministries in Moscow. In June 1957, at a Politburo meeting at which Khrushchev was outvoted, an effort was made to oust Khrushchev from his position as first secretary. He refused to resign and convened a meeting of the Central Committee where he turned the tables on his opponents. The leaders of this “anti-Party clique” were identified as Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov. We do not have corroborating evidence for Mao’s claim here that it was Dmitri Shepilov who drafted the resolution to oust Khrushchev. As for the question of acknowledging “internal” contradictions, see text April 30, 1957, note 4.

26. Viacheslav Molotov gained considerable influence in the CPSU apparatus after Stalin’s death and Beria’s ouster and subsequent execution (see text Oct. 11, 1955[1], vol. I, note 67). When Khrushchev consolidated his own position with a temporary alliance with Bulganin in late 1955, however, Molotov was found precariously in the opposition. He was accused of an “ideological error” in September 1955 and was forced out of his own position as foreign minister in June 1956. This precipitated the Molotov-Malenkov “anti-Party clique” affair (see note 25), which brought about Molotov’s downfall and removal from the Central Committee of the CPSU.

27. Mao’s words here are, of course, anachronistic. The term “cadre” (*ganbu*) would not apply in the Song dynasty (960–1279). We do not have any historical information on such a monument.

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## Telegram to the People’s Republic of Poland

(July 20, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (July 22, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 120–121; *URI* (1976), p. 275. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (July 22, 1957), 1; *SCMP*, 1576 (July 24, 1957), 44; *URI* (1976), p. 277.

Comrade Aleksander Zawadzki, Chairman of the Council of State of the People’s Republic of Poland,  
Comrade Josef Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Poland,  
Comrade Adam Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Poland:

On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the National Day of the People’s Republic of Poland, on behalf of the government of the People’s Republic of China

and the Chinese people, we extend our fraternal and warm congratulations to you, and through you to the Polish people.

The Chinese people have followed with joy the great successes which our brothers the Polish people, under the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party and the government of the People's Republic of Poland, have achieved in safeguarding and developing the socialist cause in Poland and in defending world peace. The Chinese people are happy to see that the exchange of visits between the premiers of China and Poland<sup>1</sup> has further consolidated and deepened the profound friendship between the Chinese and Polish peoples, and has promoted the development of friendly and cooperative relations between China and Poland in the areas of politics, economy, and culture.

May the Polish people achieve even greater successes in their cause of building socialism, consolidating the people's democratic system,<sup>2</sup> and safeguarding peace in Europe and the world. May the fraternal friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and Polish peoples be further developed and consolidated.

(Cosigned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council, dated in Beijing)

#### Notes

1. See text April 8, 1957, source note, and text April 3, 1957, source note.
2. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 4.

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### Telegram to the Confederation of Switzerland (July 30, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 1, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 125; *URI* (1976), p. 287. Available English Translations: *FBIS, Daily Report* (Aug. 1, 1957), AAA 9; *URI* (1976), p. 289.

President Hans Stenli,  
The Confederation of Switzerland

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of your country's National Day, I extend to Your Excellency and to the Swiss people my sincere congratulations. May the friendship between China and Switzerland grow with each passing day, and may the Swiss Confederation prosper and the Swiss people thrive.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

### The Situation in the Summer of 1957 (July 1957)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 456–465. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 187–191; *URI* (1976), pp. 279–281 (excerpts); *Wansui* (1967b), p. 16 (excerpt); *Buyi*, p. 147 (excerpt); *Jiaoyu yulu*, p. 30 (excerpt). Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 473–482; *URI* (1976), pp. 283–285 (excerpts); J. Chen (1970), p. 56 (excerpt); *CB*, 891 (Oct. 8, 1969), 25 (excerpt); *SCMP*, 4000 (Aug. 14, 1967), 18 (excerpt); *SCMP, Supplement*, 191 (May 26, 1957), 21 (excerpt).

*The Xuanji version and the Wansui (n.d. 3) version are the only complete versions of this document that we have been able to acquire so far. They are quite similar to each other with only a handful of minor discrepancies which we have annotated. There is an "appendix" in this document. A paragraph appears at the beginning of the excerpts of this essay in URI (1976), p. 279. It does not appear in the Xuanji version or the Wansui (n.d. 3) version, which we are using here as our main original source. We cannot tell where it may fit in the text; therefore it appears at the end as an appendix.*

*According to the editorial note in Xuanji, V (p. 456), Mao wrote this essay during the time of a meeting of provincial and municipal CPC Party committee secretaries at Qingdao, Shandong Province. This essay was printed up for circulation at this conference and was subsequently reprinted for circulation among the leading cadres in the CPC. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source indicates that "these are some main points of a speech made to provincial and municipal Party committee secretaries." The exact dates of the conference are not known, although K. Lieberthal (1976), p. 98, suggests that it might have been held July 16–22, 1957. That would make it immediately after the Fourth Session of the First NPC, which was held in Beijing. Mao had evidently left Beijing before the conclusion of that congress and was in Shanghai in the early part of July (see texts July 8 and July 9, 1957, source notes). We have suggested in text July 9, 1957, source note, that this document, which probably appeared in the third week of July, served as an interim summation of the anti-Rightist campaign, which was already developing to a peak in early to mid-July. According to Lieberthal's summary, the Qingdao Conference dealt with other issues, particularly economic matters (specifically the Twelve-Year Program for Agricultural Development), but it was clearly the anti-Rightist campaign that most occupied Mao's thoughts at the time. This document reflects the dominance of this concern. While the immediate impact of the anti-Rightist campaign was to reverse the course of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, to "ferret out" the bourgeois Rightists (identified by their eagerness to do what the Hundred Flowers had originally ostensibly asked for, i.e., to criticize the CPC's policies), and to bring down on them the force of the CPC's—and Mao's—countercriticism, the longer-term impacts, naturally, are even more significant. In the intermediate range, what the anti-Rightist campaign achieved, by its very character, was the confirmation of a Leftist radicalism that provided the theoretical basis for the developments in the two years that immediately followed—i.e., the Great Leap Forward. There were political and economic factors that made up the Great Leap Forward, as well as developments in China's relations*

with other countries, especially with the Soviet Union, that provided the context for that “program,” but it would be difficult to overlook the influence that the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 had on making up the theoretical rationale for the Great Leap. As a continuation of this, in the even longer run, the anti-Rightist campaign formed the framework of the “two-line,” or “two-roads” struggle, which became the consummate issue of Mao’s political life in the last two decades of his life and of the PRC’s history in these decades. It climaxed with the Cultural Revolution, which may well be the ultimate issue by which Mao’s legacy to China will eventually be judged. The idea of the two-line struggle as the litmus test for all ideological and political issues began to show up in Mao’s writings of May 1957, and its shape became quite clear by June 1957 when in RMRB editorials the people were told that there had to be a choice between the road of socialism and the road of capitalism—that there was “no third way.” The middle ground is being eliminated; moderation and eclecticism is no longer tenable; or, as Mao put it in the July 8 (9) speeches, “both sides, the bourgeois Rightists, and the Communists, are fighting over the middle-of-the-roads.” This present document further clarifies that situation of polarization, and unequivocally articulates the crucial term in all of this: “The struggle between two roads.” Moreover, here Mao reinforces a crucial accusation that he had made concerning the “insurrectionists” in the CPC in the July 8 (9) speeches (see text July 9, 1957, paragraph 9); here he points the finger, saying: “By the bourgeois Rightists we include some people who have wormed their way into the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League whose political outlook is completely similar to the Rightists outside of the Party and the League.” (Italics added.) In other words, the “two-line struggle” is not to be one simply between the CPC and what lies outside, but will be one inside the CPC as well; which is exactly how it, at least for Mao, worked out for the next twenty years.

With all this in mind, it is easy to see the central significance of this document. In a speech in October 1957 (text Oct. 7, 1957, paragraphs 3 and 11), Mao mentions a “Qingdao document” which, he said, is an essential supplement to the critical speech of February 27, 1957, i.e., “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” (text Feb. 27, 1957). While he did not say exactly what this document was, we can reasonably speculate that he was referring to this essay written during the conference at Qingdao. What Mao meant, we think, is that while the “On Correctly Handling Contradictions” speech provided one side—the conciliatory side—of the principle of dealing with conflicts in the socialist development of the PRC, the other side—i.e., the combative side—is not to be therefore ignored, but needs also to be presented, as it was in this Qingdao essay. The two sides, in a completely dialectical “unity-of-opposites” way, make up the total picture, or, as Mao himself would put it: “Yin and Yang make up the Dao.”

During the period of socialist revolution in our country, the contradiction between the anti-Communist, antipeople, antisocialist bourgeois Rightists and the people is a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves.<sup>1</sup> It is an antagonistic, irreconcilable, life-and-death contradiction.

The bourgeois Rightists who carry out reckless attacks on the working class and the Communist Party are reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries. [Our reason for] not referring to them as such but calling them Rightists is that, first, we hope in this way to facilitate the winning over of the middle-of-the-roads, and second, we hope to split the Rightists, to make it possible for some of the Rightists to change and come over [to our side].

Those bourgeois Rightist elements who cannot in the end be transformed are

the diehards. As long as they don’t act as secret agents or do any more sabotage, we’ll also give them some work to do and won’t deprive them of their civil rights.<sup>2</sup> This is done in view of the fact that extreme policies adopted in many historical situations did not bring good results. We ought to be a bit more farsighted. After a few decades we will look back on this episode and see that our treatment of the bourgeois Rightists profoundly influenced and greatly benefited the cause of the proletarian revolution.

Our goal is the creation of a political environment where there will be both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of purpose and personal ease of mind and liveliness<sup>3</sup> so that we can further the socialist revolution and socialist construction,<sup>4</sup> more easily overcome difficulties, more rapidly build modern industry and modern agriculture for our country, make the Party and the nation more secure, and be better able to cope with stormy hazards. The general theme is the correct handling of contradictions among the people and the correct handling of contradictions between the enemy and ourselves.<sup>5</sup> The method is to be practical and realistic<sup>6</sup> and follow the mass line.<sup>7</sup> A method derived from this is the method of bringing together Party and non-Party [persons] to hold some meetings related to major government policies, of having an open rectification, and of publishing in the newspapers criticisms of many of the mistakes and shortcomings of the Party and the government. The democratic parties,<sup>8</sup> the educational circles, the journalistic circles, the science and the technological circles, the literary and artistic circles, the [public] health circles, the industrial and commercial circles, the working class, all levels of the peasant class, the handicraft workers, and other urban and rural laborers should all conduct rectification and socialist education [campaigns] and carry them out gradually, by stages and by groups. In this regard, for the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals, it is a question of making them accept socialist transformation, and for the petty bourgeoisie (the peasants and the urban and rural self-employed laboring people), especially for the well-to-do middle peasants, it is also a question of getting them to accept socialist transformation; for the working class and the basic ranks of the Communist Party, it is a question of improving [their] work style. This is a question of two social categories of a different nature. If there is this difference, why do we use the slogan of rectification for both cases? This is because the slogan of rectification is more easily accepted by the majority of the people. We say to the people, even the Communist Party and the working class are undertaking a rectification, shouldn’t you also have a rectification?<sup>9</sup> We will then have the initiative completely in our hands. The methods of rectification are criticism and self-criticism, presenting the facts, and explaining the reasons. The goal of the rectification is to guide the struggle in such a direction as to set the correct political orientation, to elevate the ideological level, to correct shortcomings in our work, to unite the broad masses, to isolate and split the bourgeois Rightists and all antisocialist elements. The bourgeois Rightists spoken of here include those people who have wormed their way into the Party and the Youth League but whose political outlook is absolutely the same as those Rightists outside the Party and the League. They betray the cause of the proletarian revolution and carry out reckless attacks against the Party. Therefore they must be



completely exposed and expelled so as to purify the Party and League organizations.

We must have firm faith in the majority of the masses and, first and foremost, in the majority of the basic masses of the workers and peasants.<sup>10</sup> This is our fundamental point of departure. Take the business and student circles; during the period when the Rightists were making their reckless attacks, the majority [among them] could have been deceived for a time and been made to waver. A few weeks later, the counterattack against the Rightists was launched, and the majority awoke and came over [to our side]. And so the majority of people in these two categories can also be trusted in the end; they are capable of accepting reform. Quite a few comrades have made the mistake of underestimating the strength of the proletariat and overestimating the strength of the bourgeois Rightists. Today, there are still many among the cadres in the [special] districts, *xian*, districts, and *xiang*, and in the factories who are like that. We should thoroughly persuade them not to underestimate the strength of their own side, and not to exaggerate the enemy's strength. In the countryside, the landlords and rich peasants are now being reformed. Some of them are still causing trouble, and it's necessary to increase our vigilance vis-à-vis them. The majority of the well-to-do middle peasants are willing to remain in the cooperatives; [only] a minority clamor for withdrawal from the cooperatives and want to pursue the capitalist road. We should distinguish [these groups] and treat them differently. In the countryside it is necessary to pay attention to the class line; it is<sup>11</sup> necessary to enable those who were originally poor peasants and hired hands to occupy the dominant position in leadership organs, and at the same time we should pay attention to uniting with the middle peasants. I approve of [the idea of] having the Central Committee immediately issue a directive for carrying out a broad-scale socialist education [campaign] among the entire rural population to criticize the Right opportunist thought within the Party,<sup>12</sup> the departmentalism<sup>13</sup> of certain cadres, and the capitalistic and individualistic thought of the well-to-do middle peasants, and deal a blow to the counterrevolutionary activities of the landlords and rich peasants. In this regard, the major spearhead is directed at the wavering well-to-do middle peasants, to carry out a round of struggle through reasoning against their capitalist thought. From now on, once a year [we should] carry out a determined struggle through reasoning, coordinate it with the rectification of district and *xiang* cadres, and coordinate it with the rectification in the cooperatives of the third category<sup>14</sup> so as to consolidate the cooperatives step by step. In the countryside the peasants should also be allowed first to "bloom and contend,"<sup>15</sup> that is, to raise opinions and present arguments. Afterward [we can] choose the good [ideas] and follow them; those that are not good can be criticized. This should be promoted step by step with the condition that work teams<sup>16</sup> are sent by the higher levels to help local cadres direct the rectification in the countryside. In the countryside, as in the cities, there is still a struggle between the two roads, [in which people choose] either socialism or capitalism to follow. This struggle will take a long time before complete victory can be won. This is the task of the entire period of transition.<sup>17</sup> In the countryside, [the principle of] running the household diligently and frugally should be advocated simultaneously with [the

principle of] running the cooperatives diligently and frugally;<sup>18</sup> love of country and love of cooperatives must be encouraged alongside love of family.<sup>19</sup> To resolve the problem of running the household diligently and frugally, we should rely particularly on the women's associations to do their work. In the next few years the [annual] requisition of thirty-five billion catties of grain and [annual] state purchase of fifty billion catties of grain must resolutely be achieved; there cannot be any shortage, [although] it can be adjusted to some extent according to whether the harvest is abundant or poor.<sup>20</sup> In the countryside, as production increases year by year and the number of households short of grain decreases year by year, the amount of grain sold [through state unified marketing] should also go down yearly.<sup>21</sup> The excessive sale of grain in some urban areas should likewise be appropriately reduced. Only in this way is it possible for the state grain reserves to increase over successive years so as to meet emergencies that may arise. If we fail to obtain approximately eighty-five billion catties of grain there will be an impact on market prices and on the smooth implementation of the entire plan of the national economy. Moreover, there will be no way to cope with emergencies. This would be very dangerous. This year, before the autumn harvest, a round of struggle must be waged in the countryside to oppose individualism and departmentalism, both of which ignore the interests of the nation and the interests of the collective.

If there are counterrevolutionaries, they must be suppressed.<sup>22</sup> Few should be executed, but we definitely will not abolish capital punishment and will not have a general amnesty. Those who have served their sentences and have been released but who have committed new crimes must be arrested and sentenced again. Serious criminals such as gangsters, hoodlums, thieves, murderers, rapists, grafters, and embezzlers, those who destroy public order, those who seriously violate the law, as well as persons who are publicly recognized as bad people must be punished. At present, some personnel in the judicial and public security departments have been neglecting their official responsibilities with regard to people who should have been arrested and sentenced in the first place and have failed to arrest or sentence them. This is not right. A heavy sentence for a light offense is incorrect; so is a light sentence for a heavy offense. At present it is the latter that presents us with a dangerous situation. Gambling must be prohibited. We must seriously and completely ban secret societies.<sup>23</sup> Rightist student leaders must be thoroughly criticized, but in general it is best to let them remain at their original places [and be reformed] under supervision; they can serve as "teachers." The above points hold good for the period of transition, and it is the responsibility of the provincial and municipal [Party] committees and the Party committees in the autonomous regions [to see that they are carried out]. Provided that the policies, laws, or decrees of the Central Committee are not violated, local judicial and public security organs as well as cultural and educational departments should be under the direction of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees and provincial, municipal, and autonomous region people's committees.<sup>24</sup> This cannot be violated.

The correct handling of contradictions among the people is a general theme. By talking [about it] at length people will become accustomed to this, and what at first seemed strange will no longer be strange. If we straighten out our thinking about

the issue of contradictions among the people, publicize it clearly, correctly handle a number of these problems, get results, and acquire experience, we won't be afraid of it anymore.

To repeat once more, the so-called question of the correct handling of contradictions among the people is in fact the question of following the mass line about which our Party has frequently spoken in the past. Communists must be good at talking things over and doing things with the masses, and at no time should they become divorced from the masses. The relationship between the Party and the masses is just like that between fish and water.<sup>25</sup> If the relationship between the Party and the masses is not well-handled, the socialist system cannot be constructed, and even if the socialist system is constructed, it won't be secure.

The military has had many rectifications. They have put into practice the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Major Points for Attention;<sup>26</sup> they have put into practice the Three Great Democracies—military, political, and economic;<sup>27</sup> in wartime mutual-aid teams have been formed in the squads; the officers have been integrated with the soldiers and the army with the people. Beating and verbal abuse are forbidden, as is the shooting of deserters. Because of this, morale has been greatly raised, and there is no battle that we can't win. If the troops who carry weapons are capable of doing this, why can't the factories, villages, organizations, and schools promote democracy and use persuasive rather than coercive methods to resolve their own problems (contradictions)?

We aren't afraid of the imperialists, why should we be afraid of the common people? Those who are afraid of the common people, who believe that the masses cannot be reasoned with and that they can only be coerced, not persuaded, are not true Communists.

Except for renegades and people who have perpetrated serious violations of the law and breaches of [social] order, all Party members will be protected during the rectification. We will help them with sincerity and great effort to correct their errors and shortcomings, improve their work methods, increase their work capacity, and raise their political and ideological levels. Communists must have vitality, must have a firm revolutionary will, and must have the spirit to overcome any difficulty with a dauntless and unyielding will that fears no difficulties. They must conquer individualism, departmentalism, absolute egalitarianism, and liberalism; otherwise they are not Communists worthy of the name. There are some people who have lost their vitality, lost their revolutionary will, and persist in their mistakes. In a situation where they will not mend their ways after repeated warnings, the Party committees should deal with them appropriately. Serious cases should be disciplined.

The first secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees (other secretaries are to do the same) should undertake within a period of six months to a year to make a personal study of a cooperative, a factory, a commercial establishment, and a school so as to become knowledgeable and to acquire the right to speak [on these matters] in order to be better able to guide the work in general. Secretaries of Party committees in the [special] districts, *xian*, and districts should do likewise.

The significance of this round of criticism of the bourgeois Rightists should not be underestimated. This is a great socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts. It is not enough for us to have had the socialist revolution in 1956 on the economic front (in the ownership of the means of production); nor is it secure. The Hungarian affair is proof of this.<sup>28</sup> It is necessary to have yet a thorough socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts. The Communist Party naturally cannot exercise leadership among a certain group of people (namely, the Rightists) within the democratic parties, intellectual circles, and industrial and commercial circles, because they are the enemy; among the majority (the middle-of-the-roaders) the [Party's] leadership is not secure; there are still some cultural and educational units in which the Party's leadership is not secure; there are still some cultural and educational units in which the Party's leadership has not been established at all. It is necessary [for the Party] to build a solid leadership among the middle-of-the-roaders and consolidate it as soon as possible. The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals are unwilling to submit to the Communist Party. The Rightists among them are determined to have a test of strength with us. After the test, after they are defeated, they will understand that their position is lost and there is no hope. Only then will the majority of them (the middle-of-the-roaders and some of the Rightists) gradually become honest and gradually cast off their bourgeois standpoint, come to stand on the side of the proletariat, and make up their minds to depend on the proletariat for their livelihood.<sup>29</sup> As for the minority who would not reform to their dying day, the only thing to do is let them take their reactionary views with them to their coffins.<sup>30</sup> We should heighten our vigilance, however. We must realize that as soon as they have an opportunity they will again create disturbances. This struggle may yet be drawn out for as long as another ten to fifteen years. The time can be shortened if things are done well. Of course, this is not to say that in ten to fifteen years the class struggle will be extinguished. As long as imperialism and the bourgeoisie continue to exist in the world, the activities of the counterrevolutionaries and the bourgeois Rightists in our country will not only bear the nature of class struggle but will always correspond to [the activities of] the international reactionaries. The present struggle, after a necessary period, should change from the form of strong winds and violent storms to the form of gentle breezes and light rain in order to make it a more profound and thorough struggle ideologically.<sup>31</sup> We have already won the first decisive battle during the past few months, especially in the last two months.<sup>32</sup> But we still need a few more months to dig deeper and achieve complete victory. We definitely cannot withdraw our troops [from the battlefield] too hastily.<sup>33</sup> We must realize that if this fight is not won, there will be no hope for socialism.

The great national debate<sup>34</sup> has resolved, or is now resolving, such major issues as whether or not the revolution and construction work has been correct (whether or not the achievements of the revolution and construction are primary); whether or not we should travel the socialist road; whether we want the Communist Party to lead; whether we want the dictatorship of the proletariat; whether we want democratic centralism;<sup>35</sup> and whether or not our country's foreign policies are correct. It's very natural for a great national debate of this kind to develop. [This

kind of debate] occurred in the Soviet Union in the twenties (a debate with Trotsky and others over whether or not socialism could be constructed in one country);<sup>36</sup> it is now being staged in our country in the seventh year of the fifties. If we are unable to win complete victory in this debate we will be unable to continue to advance. [But] as long as we triumph in this debate, it will give our country's socialist transformation and socialist construction a great push forward. This is a great event that carries worldwide significance.

It must be understood that it will take another ten to fifteen years to build a modernized industrial base and a modernized agricultural base in our country. Only after undergoing a fairly complete development of the socialist forces of production over a ten- to fifteen-year period can our socialist economic and political system be considered to have acquired a fairly adequate material foundation of its own (at present, this material foundation is far from adequate); only then can our state (the superstructure) be considered adequately consolidated, and only then can a socialist society be considered as having been basically constructed. At present it has not yet been built; we are still ten to fifteen years away from it. To build socialism, the working class needs its own corps of technical cadres, its own corps of professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, writers, artists, and Marxists theoreticians. These must be a vast army; a small one won't be adequate. This task should be fundamentally accomplished within the next ten to fifteen years. The task after this ten- to fifteen-year period will be to develop further the forces of production and further broaden the ranks of the working class intellectuals to prepare to catch up with and overtake the United States in the economic sector through eight to ten five-year plans. Members of the Communist Party and of the Youth League<sup>37</sup> and the entire people should all understand this task, and they should all study hard. Wherever possible, they must energetically study technology, study vocational knowledge, study theory, and create a new army of working class intellectuals (this new army will include all those intellectuals who have come over from the old society and who, having been truly reformed, have taken a firm working class stand). This is the great task history has assigned to us. Until this vast new army of working class intellectuals is created, the revolutionary cause of the working class will not be fully secured.

The experience gained at the level of the Center and at the level of the provinces and municipalities in connection with the three tasks—rectification, criticism of the Rightists, and the struggle to win over the middle-of-the-road masses—has been a great thing. With this experience, things will be easier to manage. The task in the next few months is to teach the [special] districts and the *xian* levels to gain this experience. From now through this winter and next spring [the task] will be gradually to teach the districts and *xiang* levels to gain this experience. In the cities [the task] is to teach the [people at the] district level, in the factories and mines at the basic level, and in the neighborhood committees how to gain this experience. As a result, things will suddenly become clear to everyone,<sup>38</sup> and for many people the mass line will no longer sound like an empty phrase, and the contradictions among the people can be more easily resolved.

The first secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party

committees and the committees as a whole must take complete control of this great struggle. They must take control of the work of reforming, politically and ideologically, the democratic parties (political circles), educational circles, journalistic circles (including all newspapers and magazines), scientific and technological circles, literary and artistic circles, [public] health circles, and industrial and commercial circles completely in their own hands. Each province, municipality, and autonomous region should have its own Marxist theoreticians, its own scientists and technical talents, its own writers, artists, and literary and artistic theorists, and its own outstanding newspaper and magazine editors and reporters. The first secretaries (and the other secretaries as well) should pay special attention to newspapers and magazines; they shouldn't be lazy. Each person should read at least five newspapers and five magazines so that they can compare them; only then will they be able to improve their own newspapers and magazines.

This criticism of the Rightists has greatly shocked all the democratic parties, the intellectual circles, and industrial and commercial circles. It should be seen that the majority of them (the middle-of-the-roaders) are tending toward accepting the socialist road and the leadership of the proletariat. This tendency varies in degree with different kinds of people. It should be realized that although they still have only a tendency to accept genuinely such basic points as the socialist road and the leadership of the proletariat, as long as this tendency exists, [it means that] they have taken the first step on the long journey from the bourgeois standpoint to a working-class standpoint.<sup>39</sup> If there is a year-long rectification (from this May to May of next year) they can make a giant stride. In the past, these people were not mentally prepared to participate in the socialist revolution. For them this revolution happened too suddenly. Even among Communists there are some people who felt this way. For these people and for the broad masses of the people, rectification and the criticism of the Rightists will be a profound socialist education.

Big-character posters can be used in all places except at the counters in stores, in the countryside (districts and *xiang*), in primary schools, and in army battalions and companies. Under the conditions prevailing in our country, this is a form of struggle that benefits the proletariat and not the bourgeoisie. There is no basis for the fear of big-character posters. In institutions of higher education, in [Party and government] organs at the Center, and at the provincial and municipal, [special] district, and *xian* levels, as well as in large urban enterprises, big-character posters, forums, and debates are three excellent forms for exposing and overcoming contradictions and promoting the progress of the people.<sup>40</sup>

At no time during the rectification should production and work be interrupted. When there is rectification in any locality, it should not take place in all units within that locality simultaneously but should be carried out by stages and by groups.

We must not fear the menacing billows and threatening waves; we must toughen our scalps and bear it.<sup>41</sup> In an individual unit, the crest of the wave will have passed in about two or three weeks, and then we can move to the new stage of counterattacking the Rightists. During the two- or three-week period the leadership in each unit will toughen its scalp and hold firm in the face of the reckless attacks of the Rightists, will just listen without rebutting, will concentrate [on what is being said]

to analyze and study it, gather its strength and prepare for the counterattack, and unite the Leftists while winning over the middle-of-the-roaders and isolating the Rightists. This is an excellent Marxist strategy.

The stage of great blooming and great contending (rectifying and, at the same time, reforming), the stage of counterattacking the Rightists ([also] rectifying and at the same time, reforming),<sup>42</sup> the stage that emphasizes rectification and transformation (while continuing the blooming and contending), and the stage when everybody studies documents, engages in criticism and self-examination, and raises his or her own political consciousness, are the four stages through which rectification at the four levels, the Center, the provinces and municipalities, the [special] districts, and the *xian* must go. Then there is the rectification at the basic levels of the city and countryside. This round of rectification will give the entire Party and the people of the entire country a completely new look.

In August, the first secretaries of the provincial and municipal [Party] committees, and of [Party] committees at the autonomous region and [special] district levels should please take a period of time to investigate the rectification of the cooperatives, production, grain [supply], and other problems in the countryside, so as to be prepared for the plenum of the Central Committee in September.<sup>43</sup> Please study the Forty-Article Program for Agricultural Development<sup>44</sup> article by article and see whether any revisions are necessary.

#### Appendix:

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the people's government for the district; in the countryside by the *xiang* people's congresses. The purpose of these committees was to reconcile conflicts among the people and to pass judgment on minor criminal cases. During such conciliation, the committees must conduct education and propaganda on the government's policies and statutes.

25. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 74.

26. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 6.

27. The slogan *san da minzhu* (Three Great Democracies) was raised in 1948 in Mao's intra-CPC directive "The Democratic Movement in the Army." The purpose of political work among the military units, Mao argues there, was to achieve, through a democratic "sensitizing" campaign, the enhancement of political unity among the military personnel, better living conditions, and better military techniques. To attain these goals, he proposes that the PLA implement "The Three Democracies": Political democracy, which meant that the soldiers should be allowed to voice criticism against bad practices by bad elements within the political cadres of the military and to nominate people from among themselves to fill low-level cadre positions; economic democracy, which meant that the soldiers should elect their own representatives to assist the political cadres in the management of the military units' supplies; and military democracy, which meant that in training the format of instruction should be mutual, rather than one-sided, between officers and the enlisted personnel. See *SW*, IV, pp. 191-192.

28. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27. See also other documents surrounding this date (mid-November 1956) and texts Jan. 18, 1957, Jan. 27, 1957(1) and (2), and Feb. 27, 1957, for Mao's vision of repercussions of the Hungarian Incident in the world Communist movement and particularly in China.

29. See text April 14, 1957(2), note 14, and text July 8, 1957(2), text surrounding note 61.

30. See text July 8, 1957(2), penultimate paragraph.

31. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29; see also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 43.

32. This refers to the fact that the struggle against the Rightists and bourgeois ideology, of which this article is an interim summary, was inaugurated in early June 1957. (See texts June 8, 1957, and June 8, 1957[2].)

33. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 9, paragraph 3.

34. Mao is referring here to the expansion of the "blooming and contending" movement to the countryside in May and part of June 1957.

35. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80; see also text July 8, 1957(2), note 35.

36. "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Chapter 9, Section 5" (*SW*, V, p. 482). In 1924, on the completion of the initial phase of its economic recovery, the USSR faced the task of formulating strategies and fundamental policies for a new era of socialism. In view of the unpromising prospects for imminent successful revolution in the various capitalist powers, the Soviet Union, in Lenin's last days, raised the slogan of "building socialism within one country." On Lenin's death, this policy, then carried out under Stalin, was severely opposed by the leadership group represented by Trotsky and Zinoviev, who denied the peasants' socialist activism for revolutionary change and advocated "permanent proletarian revolution" and pushed forth the strategy of promoting international revolution as a tactic to consolidate the socialist revolution in the USSR. Trotsky, moreover, accused Lenin and Stalin of advocating a narrow nationalism and "victory in one country." The debate was carried through 1925 and 1926. In 1927, Trotsky was expelled from the CPSU. The main lines of this debate are summarized, by Stalin and from his perspective, in several key works, most importantly *The Foundations of Leninism* and "Political Report to the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU (Bolshevik)." For the work cited here in *SW*, V, see text July 31, 1955, vol. I, note 26.

37. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.

38. Here Mao uses the phrase *huoran kailang*, which is derived from the essay "Tao hua yuan ji" (Story of the Plum Blossom Stream) by the Jin-dynasty scholar Tao Qian, which means literally "the vista all of a sudden opened up."

39. See text June 14, 1957.

40. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 40.

41. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 2.

42. See text June 12, 1957, note 4.

43. The Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC was eventually held September 20-October 9, 1957. Deng Xiaoping presented the main summary and Report on the Rectification Campaign at this meeting. For more details on this plenum, see K. Lieberthal (1976), pp. 99-101.

44. See text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3. Also note that a major outcome of the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC was a final decision on this Forty-Article Program, also known as the Twelve-Year Program.

45. Fei Xiaotong (b. 1911) is a prominent Chinese ethnologist and anthropologist. He was a member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic League (see text July 1, 1957, note 10), director of the Division of Culture of the Democratic League; deputy director of the Specialists Bureau of the State Council, and vice-president of the Chinese Institute of Ethnic Studies. He was educated at Qinghua, the London School of Economics, and later in the United States. During the War of Resistance he taught at Southwest Associated University and at Yunnan University, Kunming. He was an adherent of the so-called Zhang Bojun-Luo Longji clique (see text July 1, 1957, source note). The article cited here, "Zhishi fenzi de zaochun tianqi" (The Early Spring Atmosphere of the Intellectuals), was published in *RMRB* on March 22, 1957. In addition Fei also published, in 1957, the article "Zaochun' qian hou" (Before and After [the] "Zaochun" [Article]); for these he was labeled a Rightist, a label which he carried until 1959. For more biographical information on Fei, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 113, and W. Bartke (1981), p. 69.

46. Jian Bozan (b. 1897) was an eminent Chinese historian. Jian was involved in Republican politics early in his career during the period of the Northern Expedition and was sent abroad to Europe in the 1930s. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, however, he began to devote himself to historical study. While his political involvement and career resumed after 1949, when he returned to the mainland of China from Hong Kong, he was primarily known as a professional historian. He taught first at Yanjing University and later at Beijing University, where he eventually became chairperson of the history department in 1954. In subsequent years he was also instrumental in the establishment of the Philosophy and Social Sciences Faculty of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. He was a prolific writer and can easily be identified as one of the two (the other being Wu Han) most politically influential leaders in the circle of professional historians. Like Wu Han, he was identified as a Rightist, and denounced during the Cultural Revolution, as a culprit who had led historical studies toward idealism, bourgeois and even feudal ideology. The reference here may be to Jian's role in organizing a forum on "contending and blooming" at the Academy of Sciences on April 30, 1957, at which he made a speech denigrating the influence of politics on young intellectuals. For more biographical information on Jian, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 974-975, and URI (1969), I, p. 142.

47. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 29.

## Explanations Regarding "The Situation in the Summer of 1957"

[July 1957]

Source: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 191-192.

According to the source, this is a set of explanations that Mao made regarding the speech he gave at the Qingdao Conference (see text July 1957[1]). The source indicates that Mao

made these explanations during a "report" session. No specific date is provided. "July 1957" is in brackets here because it is a conjecture.

Many people are not clear [about the meaning] of the first paragraph [of this speech].<sup>1</sup>

Zhang Bojun is the same as Trotsky, but different from Zinoviev.<sup>2</sup> This is a [matter of] class antagonism. It is [also] different from [the conflict] within the bourgeoisie of the United States. What we fought against during the period of the "Leftist" deviation was the oppositional faction within the Party.

[It was an] extraordinary oppositional faction; it was an oppositional faction [that came from] an antagonistic class.

I have exercised dictatorship for one year, for several years. Why can't you exercise dictatorship for a week? What would be wrong with that? If we did not give [people] an opportunity, who would dare to criticize [us]?<sup>3</sup> There is democracy in the Soviet Union, but there is a little too much centralism, and not enough democracy.<sup>4</sup> Is it possible to have a bit more democracy? Centralism and discipline are primary during wartime, but [the relationships between] the two, [i.e., between centralism and democracy,] should be a bit more well-adjusted in peacetime. They are a unity of opposites,<sup>5</sup> not a one-sided matter. We'll have to wait for a decade, or fifteen years. There should not be any material foundation.<sup>6</sup>

It is feasible to ban gambling, but not to prohibit dancing and playing cards.

Our estimate regarding the bourgeois intellectuals refers to the majority who are allies of the working class.<sup>7</sup>

Some comrades just won't ever understand. ([Like] Chen Qitong.)<sup>8</sup> With regard to units that just will never develop, what is there to fear that there are several tens of thousands of Rightists in a population of 600 million? It is like fighting a war, because we expect to win, but we do not [totally] wipe out [the enemy].<sup>9</sup> There is also [a matter of our] not having too much confidence. However, this time, the fight against Rightists has hit the nail on the head. When things began to change in May,<sup>10</sup> that was the beginning. Now it is time to draw a conclusion.

When we attack people, we have to draw a distinction. With some people, there is no reason that they should not be attacked. With some others, they should not be attacked. [There are] reports of cadres being attacked; we must be analytical [about this]. [What we want is to attack them like the story of] the beating of *jinzhi*.<sup>11</sup> That is exactly what we are doing now.

In the matter of blooming and contending,<sup>12</sup> we must have the [authorities of] upper levels send [down] work groups. There must first be spot experiments,<sup>13</sup> and then things can be done in an orderly and methodical way.

The experience from Yuci of Shanxi Province<sup>14</sup> [indicates that things] in a cooperative become easier to cope with when there is big blooming and big contending and big debate.<sup>15</sup> (Of course, this has to be [done] with the [proper] leadership, and in an orderly fashion.) [As the saying goes,] "a lamp will not brighten up unless it is lit; [an idea] will not be clear unless it is spoken."<sup>16</sup> Unified purchasing and unified marketing<sup>17</sup> did not go through a vote by the citizens.

There was trouble in Hungary because they did not [pay attention to] dealing

with the superstructure.<sup>18</sup> Our regime was established under the condition of an anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolution. Those bastards<sup>19</sup> also sneaked into [our regime]. The representatives left behind by abolished classes remain unconvinced by us and won't take their defeat lying down.

Socialism will not triumph unless [we] win the war. [An incident like that] in Hungary will [also] happen [in China] if there are two million [bourgeoisie] in [the field of] education, two million in the economic sector, one million in the government, and two million among the bourgeoisie.<sup>20</sup> There are thirty million bourgeoisie. Emperor Shihuang of the Qin [dynasty] came out on the short end because he only buried 460 Confucian scholars.<sup>21</sup> Zhang Liang and Chen Ping, who were used by Emperor Gaozu of the Han [dynasty] later, were not pulled down in the rectification.<sup>22</sup> It was "a lack of thoroughness in suppressing counterrevolutionaries."

[The argument that] we have no shortcomings, that in the past it was the mass line [that was followed,] are false claims.<sup>23</sup> We have to fight for a [true] mass line.

We should send cadres into the literary circle and the circle of education in order to develop new Party members.

It is very bad for the provinces and municipalities consistently to have no interaction with one another and not to exchange experiences among themselves. You should read five sets of newspapers; one of them should be from a neighboring province. Only then can you make comparisons. The provinces should send delegates to take part in each other's congresses.

The big-character posters are just like acting in a play.<sup>24</sup> We can't bring them back [since they are already posted].

When we talk of tactics, they are [made] for the sake of reaching a strategic aim. Depending on the extent of the masses' [political] consciousness and experience, the policies that are adopted are called tactics. Big blooming and big contending develop in a wave-like pattern; there are ups and downs.<sup>25</sup>

We will carry out two rectifications in every five-year plan period.<sup>26</sup> That way we can avoid having [too] many problems piling up.

What causes more gambling is primarily that the situation has become peaceful after the Five Major Movements and the Three Major Transformations.<sup>27</sup> Don't ban dancing and playing cards, but gambling, as well as the drama of the retribution of killing one's son, have to be banned.<sup>28</sup>

## Notes

1. See text July 1957(1).

2. On Zhang Bojun, see text July 1, 1957, notes 3 and 28. Grigori Zinoviev (who operated in the Communist International under the pseudonym Apfelbaum) was one of the old Bolsheviks, having been at the founding of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party [Bolshevik] in 1912, as one of Lenin's chief assistants. During the time of Lenin's illness in 1923, and even after Lenin's death in January 1924, Zinoviev was a member of the triumvirate that assumed control in the Soviet Union—the others being Joseph Stalin and Lev Kamenev. By January 1925, Stalin had denounced "Trotskyism" and had Trotsky removed from his post as commissar of war. As Stalin's own personal power began to grow



to excess, his colleagues began to align themselves with Trotsky. This did not stop Stalin's march to supreme power, however. Zinoviev was removed from his position as chief of the CPSU organization of Leningrad in February 1926 and was expelled from the Politburo in July 1926. Trotsky and Kamenev were expelled from the same body in October of that year. In 1927, this "Leftist" opposition attempted to discredit Stalin but without success. In October 1927, both Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Central Committee of the CPSU, and in November, after a series of anti-Stalinist demonstrations were crushed, they were expelled from the Party. Trotsky was removed to Kazakhstan, where he resided for a year before he was expelled from the country in January 1929. In 1935, following the mysterious assassination of Sergei Kirov, Stalin unleashed mass purges against what he saw to be the disturbing remnant of the Leftist opposition. After show trials in August 1936, January 1937, and March 1938, many prominent old-guard Bolsheviks who had come to oppose Stalin's regime were executed, among them Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin.

3. According to an earlier document in 1957, this way of putting things (i.e., that it should be all right for someone other than the Communists "exercising dictatorship" for a while) was ascribed to Chen Yi. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), paragraph 37.

4. Mao is alluding to the principle of "democratic centralism"; see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80. See also text Mar. 20, 1957(1), paragraph 27, and text July 8, 1957, note 35.

5. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 33, and text Feb. 27, 1957(1), note 34.

6. Mao's meaning in this passage is unclear. It appears, however, to correspond to paragraph 15 in the speech "The Situation in the Summer of 1957" (text July 1957[1]) where Mao said: "Only after undergoing a fairly complete development of the socialist forces of production over a ten- to fifteen-year period can our socialist economic and political system be considered to have acquired a fairly adequate material foundation of its own (at present, this material foundation is far from adequate)." It is possible that the language of the transcript of Mao's "explanatory remarks" here was garbled, and that there are words missing in the transcript. For example, it would make better sense if the transcript had read: *Yingdang shuo meiyou wuzhi jichu* (the word *shuo* added by conjecture here), in which case we would translate the sentence as: "We should say that there is no material foundation [yet]."

7. See text July 1957(1), paragraphs 4 and 13. See also text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 4 and note 6, and text Mar. 20, 1957, note 41.

8. On Chen Qitong, see text April 10, 1957, note 2. Mao is playing on words here. His comment, which we have translated as "just won't ever understand," is, in Chinese, a slangish *si bu tong*, which rhymes with "Chen Qitong," which is in parentheses.

9. The rather odd juxtaposition of "because" and "but" here is in the original Chinese. It does appear to us that the sentence is somewhat garbled.

10. This could also be a reference to the article of that title, "The Situation is Changing," written by Mao in mid-May 1957. See text May 15, 1957.

11. This is an allusion to the opera *Da jinzhi*, which is based on the story of a princess of the Tang dynasty. According to the story, the daughter of Emperor Shuzong of the Tang dynasty (r. 756–762) was married to a *zhuangyuan* (the number-one candidate in the imperial examinations). Used to having her way with things, the princess offended her husband, who feigned drunkenness and struck her. The princess complained to her grandmother, the empress dowager, who chastised her son, the emperor, for allowing such a thing to happen. The emperor's response was that while the princess may be of exalted place as *jinzhi yuye* (a golden branch and a leaf of jade), i.e., royal blood, as a wife she was also obliged to obey her husband. Moreover, since she had misbehaved to begin with, the action of the emperor's son-in-law was justified. Here Mao's meaning appears to be that the attack on the cadres should be made, and taken in the spirit that even though they may be cadres, they nonetheless deserve and need to be attacked or reprimanded out of a sense of loving them and giving them a chance to learn to mend their ways.

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experimentation). See also text Oct. 13, 1957, note 139, for Mao's comment that the rectification should start with three years of spot experimenting.

14. Yuci is in central Shanxi Province, about 18 km southeast of the provincial capital of Taiyuan. We have no information regarding Mao's reference to Yuci's experience, but Mao did speak of the rectification in the rural cooperatives (the agricultural producers' cooperatives) and especially the so-called third-category cooperatives, in paragraph 5 of text July 1957(1).

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21. Emperor Shihuang (sometimes "Shihuangdi") (259–210 B.C.) was the founder of the Qin dynasty. He unified the warring states and established China's first centralized absolutist bureaucratic state system, ruling as Chinese history's first "emperor." While traditionally vilified as a tyrant by Chinese historiography for his harsh policies of unification and centralism, Emperor Shihuang is something of a cultural hero in the historiography of the Chinese Communist regime and in Mao's mind. One of the emperor's policies, instigated by his "Legalist" chief adviser and minister Li Si, was to ban Confucian teaching by burning classical texts and writings of Confucian scholars that were circulated privately in the society (copies were preserved by the government's official archives in a magnificent library in Xianyang, the imperial capital) and burying alive "offensive" Confucian scholars. The exact number of scholars thus executed is not known, but Sima Qian, the renowned historian of the succeeding Han dynasty, suggests that some 460 were killed. This is known in Chinese history as the infamous *fen shu kang ru* (book burning and burying alive of scholars).

22. Zhang Liang (d. 189 B.C.) was a grand minister of the early Han dynasty. He was a descendent of the nobility of the state of Han. When the state was conquered and destroyed by the Qin, he made several unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Emperor Shihuang. Legend has it that eventually he received from a mysterious hermit Huang Shi Gong (The Old Man of Huangshi) a legendary book on the military-strategy teachings of Jiang Tai Gong (the chief strategist of the ancient Zhou emperor, King Wu) and used his knowledge to assist Liu Bang in overthrowing the Qin dynasty. Liu eventually became the founder of the Han dynasty, Emperor Gaozu. Zhang was made one of his chief ministers. Chen Ping (d. 178 B.C.) was another of Liu Bang's chief lieutenants in the war to overthrow the Qin dynasty and also in the war against Liu's archrival Xiang Yu, whom Chen had at one time served. Chen was made the Marquis of Quy by Emperor Gaozu and Gaozu's successor. He also plotted to overthrow the usurping Empress Lu's cabal and was instrumental in putting Emperor Wendi on the throne in 180 B.C.

Here Mao is using the term "rectification" in an obviously anachronistic, but humorously interesting, way.

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27. See text Oct. 9, 1957, note 5, and text Oct. 23, 1951, vol. I.

28. We have not been able to ascertain the allusion to the term *sha zi bao*. The word *bao* suggests the idea of "retribution for something," but the actual story could not be traced. It is most likely a reference to some production of the Beijing opera genre or a Kun opera.

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**Telegram to Tunisia**  
(August 2, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 3, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 125; *URI* (1976), p. 291. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Aug. 3, 1957), 1; *SCMP*, 1586 (Aug. 8, 1957), 28; *URI* (1976), p. 293.

President Habib Bourguiba,  
The Republic of Tunisia

Your Excellency:

I am glad to learn of the founding of the Republic of Tunisia and Your Excellency's election as its president. On behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I express sincere congratulations to Your Excellency and to the people of Tunisia.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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**Letter to Lin Ke**  
(August 4, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, p. 530.

According to the source, Lin Ke was, at this time, a secretary in Mao's office.

Lin Ke:

Please get for me the two articles by Lenin; "Zuo shenmo" [What Is to Be Done?] and "Siyue tigang" [April Theses] (1917),<sup>1</sup> so that I can read them. These few days I have caught a cold and have yet to recover from it, and I am feeling quite ill at ease, [therefore] I have no desire at this time to read things in English. I hope you are not feeling lonesome. You can read some books on theory. You need to learn some theoretical matters. You appear to have some, but not keen, interest [in the subject],

and you ought to cultivate [this interest]. You should read some, at a leisurely pace, and your interest is bound to be enhanced. [If you can treat this reading] as you would chewing sugar cane for the second time around, and let things move gradually into a state of enjoyment, it would be good. [This I send to you] for reference.

Mao Zedong  
August 4, 1957

**Note**

1. *What Is to Be Done?* is a book-length essay written by Lenin in 1902 and can be found in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (1970 ed.), I, pp. 119–272. The "April Theses" refers to the strategic proposals contained in or incorporated as part of Lenin's speech on April 4, 1917, the day after he returned to Russia from abroad. The title of the speech, as it was published in *Pravda* on April 7, 1917, is "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution." This speech and the theses can be found in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, II, pp. 41–47. Mao's interest in these two essays at this time is instructive in the context of the anti-Rightist campaign. The book *What Is to Be Done?* is subtitled *Burning Questions of Our Movement*. In the book, Lenin attacked Bernsteinism-Economism, whose advocates had advanced the slogan of "freedom of criticism" after Marx's and Engels' deaths. Here we find Lenin saying: "The only choice is between bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course. . . . To belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen the bourgeois ideology." Lenin pointed out that the essential task of the Party was to struggle for the purity of socialism and to combat bourgeois influence among the working class. Then, in April 1917, Lenin faced the revolutionary strategic need to wrest political power, peacefully if possible, from the provisional government. In the "April Theses," he suggested a theoretical strategy for doing so. He described the situation in Russia at the time as one in which "the country is passing from the first stage of the revolution, which . . . placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie . . . to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants." The critical element for this transition, Lenin suggested, was the growing class consciousness and organization of the proletariat. The political form that would embody this transition would be the establishment of a soviet republic. Here Lenin announced the famous slogan: "All power to be transferred to the soviets." It is obvious that Mao was seeking to draw strength for the current struggle against "bourgeois Rightists" in these two "classical works" of Marxism-Leninism.

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**Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**  
(August 13, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 15, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 121; *URI* (1976), p. 295. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Aug. 15, 1957), 2–3; *URI* (1976), pp. 297–298.

Comrade Kim Du Bong, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,  
Comrade Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

28. We have not been able to ascertain the allusion to the term *sha zi bao*. The word *bao* suggests the idea of "retribution for something," but the actual story could not be traced. It is most likely a reference to some production of the Beijing opera genre or a Kun opera.

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**Telegram to Tunisia**  
(August 2, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 3, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 125; *URI* (1976), p. 291. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Aug. 3, 1957), 1; *SCMP*, 1586 (Aug. 8, 1957), 28; *URI* (1976), p. 293.

President Habib Bourguiba,  
The Republic of Tunisia

Your Excellency:

I am glad to learn of the founding of the Republic of Tunisia and Your Excellency's election as its president. On behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I express sincere congratulations to Your Excellency and to the people of Tunisia.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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**Letter to Lin Ke**  
(August 4, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, p. 530.

According to the source, Lin Ke was, at this time, a secretary in Mao's office.

Lin Ke:

Please get for me the two articles by Lenin; "Zuo shenmo" [What Is to Be Done?] and "Siyue tigang" [April Theses] (1917),<sup>1</sup> so that I can read them. These few days I have caught a cold and have yet to recover from it, and I am feeling quite ill at ease, [therefore] I have no desire at this time to read things in English. I hope you are not feeling lonesome. You can read some books on theory. You need to learn some theoretical matters. You appear to have some, but not keen, interest [in the subject],

and you ought to cultivate [this interest]. You should read some, at a leisurely pace, and your interest is bound to be enhanced. [If you can treat this reading] as you would chewing sugar cane for the second time around, and let things move gradually into a state of enjoyment, it would be good. [This I send to you] for reference.

Mao Zedong  
August 4, 1957

**Note**

1. *What Is to Be Done?* is a book-length essay written by Lenin in 1902 and can be found in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (1970 ed.), I, pp. 119–272. The "April Theses" refers to the strategic proposals contained in or incorporated as part of Lenin's speech on April 4, 1917, the day after he returned to Russia from abroad. The title of the speech, as it was published in *Pravda* on April 7, 1917, is "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution." This speech and the theses can be found in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, II, pp. 41–47. Mao's interest in these two essays at this time is instructive in the context of the anti-Rightist campaign. The book *What Is to Be Done?* is subtitled *Burning Questions of Our Movement*. In the book, Lenin attacked Bernsteinism-Economism, whose advocates had advanced the slogan of "freedom of criticism" after Marx's and Engels' deaths. Here we find Lenin saying: "The only choice is between bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course. . . . To belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen the bourgeois ideology." Lenin pointed out that the essential task of the Party was to struggle for the purity of socialism and to combat bourgeois influence among the working class. Then, in April 1917, Lenin faced the revolutionary strategic need to wrest political power, peacefully if possible, from the provisional government. In the "April Theses," he suggested a theoretical strategy for doing so. He described the situation in Russia at the time as one in which "the country is passing from the first stage of the revolution, which . . . placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie . . . to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants." The critical element for this transition, Lenin suggested, was the growing class consciousness and organization of the proletariat. The political form that would embody this transition would be the establishment of a soviet republic. Here Lenin announced the famous slogan: "All power to be transferred to the soviets." It is obvious that Mao was seeking to draw strength for the current struggle against "bourgeois Rightists" in these two "classical works" of Marxism-Leninism.

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**Telegram to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea**  
(August 13, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 15, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 121; *URI* (1976), p. 295. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Aug. 15, 1957), 2–3; *URI* (1976), pp. 297–298.

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Comrade Kim Du Bong, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,  
Comrade Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Comrade Nam Il, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

On the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the liberation of Korea, on behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, we extend sincere and warm congratulations to you and, through you, to the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to the Korean people.

Under the leadership of the Korean Workers' Party and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Korean people have, through the victorious completion of their postwar three-year plan, attained very great successes in the causes of national recovery and reconstruction. The Chinese people rejoice in this.

The tremendous efforts made by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to uphold the Korean Armistice Agreement<sup>1</sup> and to realize the peaceful unification of the country not only have been supported by all the Korean people, but have also won the sympathy and support of the peace-loving peoples throughout the world.

May the Korean people achieve even greater successes in the struggles for the peaceful unification and the independence of their homeland, and for the realization of the First Five-Year Plan.

May the unbreakable, brotherly friendship between China and Korea become more consolidated and developed with each passing day.

(Cosigned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

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### Telegram to the Republic of Indonesia

(August 15, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 17, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 126; *URI* (1976), p. 299. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Aug. 17, 1957), 6; *URI* (1976), p. 301.

President Sukarno,  
The Republic of Indonesia

Your Excellency:

On the happy occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend my warm congratulations to Your Excellency and to the Indonesian people.

The deep and solid friendship between China and Indonesia has already been further consolidated and developed through Your Excellency's friendly visit to China last year.<sup>1</sup> May the friendly relations between China and Indonesia be continuously strengthened, may Your Excellency and the Indonesian people achieve even greater successes in the causes of defending your country's sovereignty and strengthening its national unity, and may the Republic of Indonesia prosper and may its people be happy.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text Oct. 2, 1956, source note.

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### Telegram to the People's Republic of Romania

(August 21, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 23, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 121; *URI* (1976), p. 303. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Aug. 23, 1957), 3; *URI* (1976), p. 305.

Comrade Petru Groza, Chairman of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the People's Republic of Romania,  
Comrade Chivu Stoica, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Romania,  
Comrade I. G. Maurer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Romania:

On the occasion of the thirteenth anniversary of the National Day of the People's Republic of Romania, on behalf of the government and the people of the People's Republic of China, we extend our sincere and warm congratulations to you and, through you, to the government and people of the People's Republic of Romania.

The Chinese people note with joy in their hearts the tremendous successes that the Romanian people, under the leadership of the Romanian Workers' Party and the government of the People's Republic of Romania, have attained in the struggles to develop a socialist economy and culture, to raise the people's standard of living, and to safeguard world peace. May our brothers, the Romanian people, attain new and even greater successes in their struggle to build

socialism and defend European and world peace. May the fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Romanian peoples be further developed and consolidated. (Cosi gned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

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### Telegram to the Federation of Malaya

(August 30, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Aug. 31, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 116 (Sept. 25, 1957), 202; *URI* (1976), p. 307. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Aug. 31, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 309.

Tengku Abdul Rahman,  
Paramount Ruler,  
The Federation of Malaya

Your Majesty:

On learning the happy news of the proclamation of the independence of the Federation of Malaya, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I express my warm congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of Malaya. May the Federation of Malaya prosper and the people of Malaya be happy. (Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

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### Telegram to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam

(August 31, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 2, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Text: *XHBYK*, 117 (Oct. 10, 1957), 121-122. Available English Translation: *FBIS, Daily Report* (Sept. 3, 1957), AAA 8.

Comrade Ho Chi Minh,  
President of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam,  
Comrade Ton Duc Thang,  
President of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam,  
Comrade Pham Van Dong,  
Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam:

On the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, on behalf of the government and people of the People's Republic of China, we extend our warm congratulations to you and, through you, to the government and people of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

The Vietnamese people, under the leadership of the Viet Nam Workers' Party and the government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, have attained new successes in the last year in restoring and developing their national economy. The Chinese people rejoice in and are inspired by this. The unrelenting efforts made by the government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in striving for the thorough realization of the Geneva Agreement<sup>1</sup> not only are supported by the Vietnamese people, but have also won the sympathy and support of the people of China and throughout the countries of the world.

The contributions made by the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to the further consolidation of the solidarity of the socialist camp, in particular the recent friendly visits made by President Ho Chi Minh to the various socialist countries, and the new successes attained by the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in developing its own friendly relations with its neighboring states and other peace-loving countries in Asia, are bound to facilitate the maintenance of peace in Asia and throughout the world.

May the Vietnamese people attain even greater successes in their struggles for the independence, peace, and unification of their homeland, and the restoration and development of the national economy.

May the unbreakable fraternal friendship and cooperation between China and Viet Nam be further developed and consolidated.

(Cosi gned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text July 23, 1954, vol. I, note 1.

### Conversation While Swimming in the Yangtze River

[Excerpts]

(September 5, 1957)

**Source:** Gong Qiang, "Mao zhuxi si du Changjiang" (Chairman Mao Crosses the Yangtze River Four Times), in *Xin tiyu*, 13 (July 6, 1958), 16-17; reprinted from *Changjiang ribao* (June 13, 1957). Other Chinese Texts: *Shengping ziliao*, p. 371; *Mao qunzhong*, p. 18; *Zhong Mei guanxi*, p. 29; *RMRB* (July 25, 1966), 1. Available English Translations: *PR*, 9:31 (July 29, 1966), 4, 7; *CB*, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969), 4.

*The Gong Qiang article here contains recollections of four occasions, from spring-summer 1955 to September 1957, when Mao swam in the Yangtze River. It contains a number of conversations that took place on these occasions. Only one of these, which we have selected and represented here, bears any major significance. It took place on the fourth, and last, of these occasions. With the exceptions of the Xin tiyu version and the Mao qunzhong version, the sources listed here give only excerpts of this passage.*

People say that the Yangtze River is very big. In fact, something that is big is not [necessarily] formidable. You did not allow me to swim [across the Yangtze River], but now I have done it, haven't I?<sup>1</sup> Isn't United States imperialism very big? But we stood up to it and so what? Therefore, some big things in the world are in fact not that formidable.

#### Note

1. See text June 1956, note 1.

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### Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria (September 8, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 9, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 119 (Nov. 10, 1957), 120; *URI* (1976), p. 311. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Sept. 9, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 313.

Comrade Georgi Damyanov,  
Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,  
Comrade Anton Yugov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,  
Comrade Karlo Lukanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

On the occasion of the thirteenth anniversary of the National Day of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, on behalf of the Chinese government and the Chinese people, we extend our sincere and warm congratulations to you and, through you, to our brothers the government and the people of Bulgaria.

The Chinese people note with great joy the successes achieved by the Bulgarian people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian government and with the close cooperation of the great Soviet Union and of the people's democracies,<sup>1</sup> in the causes of building socialism in their homeland and in safeguarding European and world peace.

In the last year, there has been broad development in the friendship and cooperation between China and Bulgaria in the areas of politics, the economy, and culture. We are confident that the development of this friendship and cooperation is bound to strengthen the force of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and furthermore will make an important contribution to the cause of human progress.

May our brothers the Bulgarian people achieve even greater successes in the cause of building socialism and safeguarding European and world peace. May the unbreakable friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and Bulgarian peoples be further consolidated and developed.

(Cosigned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 4.

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### Conversation Concerning Rectification Campaign at Shanghai Mechanics Institute [Excerpts] (September 17, 1957)

**Source:** *Mao qunzhong*, pp. 23–33, passim. Other Chinese Texts: *Mao guanhuai*, pp. 88–95 (excerpt); *URI* (1976), p. 315 (excerpt). Available English Translation: *URI* (1976), p. 317 (excerpt).

*According to a news report reprinted in FBIS, Daily Report (Sept. 19, 1957), BBB 1, Mao was making an inspection tour of Shanghai at this time. Mao qunzhong contains two articles, written by Lu Wencai, the first secretary of the Huangpu District Committee of Shanghai Municipality of the CPC, and Chou Qiqin, the principal of the Shanghai Mechanics Institute, respectively. We have excerpted only the more meaningful passages of conversations from these two articles. Mao guanhai contains the article written by Chou, but not the one written by Lu.*

*The articles and their original publication sources are as follows:*

*Lu Wencai, "Xiang Mao zhuxi huibao gongzuo" (Briefing Chairman Mao on Our Work), Zhongguo qingnian bao (Oct. 4, 1957);*

*Chou Qiqin, "Mao zhuxi guanhuai zuo women" (Chairman Mao is Concerned About Us), Zhongguo qingnian, 22 (1957).*

*The URI source contains only one excerpt of these conversations and its translation. Another excerpt of the conversations was presented in Jiaoyu geming, 4 (May 6, 1967), 4 (translated in P. Seybolt [1973], p. 26), where it was mistakenly dated as July 1957.*

*In this representation here we have combined in one document excerpts from both the Chou and Lu articles. The annotation following each section indicates whether it was*



originally in the Chou article or the Lu article, and the page in Mao qunzhong on which the passage(s) appears. We have also represented only Mao's words.

When did blooming and contending<sup>1</sup> start in your organization? How is it going?

Did they hang you up in a lantern?<sup>2</sup> Well, in that case, did you cry? It is good to be made unable to sleep. If one is to be tempered,<sup>3</sup> one must expect to be unable to sleep well for one or two weeks.<sup>4</sup>

Did you go down [to the lower levels] to look for yourselves?<sup>5</sup>

(The above: "Lu," p. 24-25.)

Have all the teachers, students and staff been involved in the contending and blooming together?<sup>6</sup>

What questions have emerged out of the contending and blooming?

To get the young students to do general janitorial work and sweep the floors is not such a bad thing!<sup>7</sup> I think we have to intensify the ideological and political work regarding the young people so as to educate the young people not to look down on labor any more. [They] must be willing to take part in physical labor before [they] can build up our country well!

How old are you?<sup>8</sup> Have you become an old bureaucrat?

It seems that none of you can count as being old! The oldest among you<sup>9</sup> is no more than forty-some years old. As long as you don't become old bureaucrats, then even if you get older you can still promote revolution.

This question of changing the educational system; is it a problem of just your school alone?

For a young worker to be promoted from being an apprentice to being a seventh-grade worker in only five, six years' time; is that not too rapid a promotion?<sup>10</sup>

With regard to young people, even if they are young workers, because they have not tasted the hardships of the old society, it is all the more necessary to intensify [their] class education and have the level of their ideological awareness raised.

With regard to the young people, we must definitely intensify [their] class education and enhance their class consciousness.<sup>11</sup> Let them learn from the good veteran workers.

The example of the Shanghai Boiler Factory is a very good one. When you in your organizations and schools carry out ideological education of the young people, you can take that as a reference.<sup>12</sup> Today we should all take a rest [for now]. We had a very good discussion today. I have come to understand the conditions of an entire district, a factory, and a school.<sup>13</sup>

(The above: "Chou," pp. 29-33.)

## Notes

1. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.

2. Here Mao is responding to Lu Wencai's information about how lanterns were used to criticize cadres in Huangpu District. It refers to a very popular game in China, known as *deng mi*, in which riddles, usually of a literary vein, are attached to lanterns which are publicly displayed. People would then try to solve the riddle and win prizes. The solution to each

riddle will be inside the lantern. This game is most popular during festivals such as the *shangyuan* festival near lunar New Year's time. Presumably Lu had informed Mao that in the district of Huangpu (see text July 8, 1957[2], note 76) the public put up lanterns with riddles alluding to the behavior of certain cadres to be criticized. The people would then try to guess to whom the riddle was referring.

3. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 13.

4. Here Mao echoes a sentiment which he iterated in the July 8 and 9 speeches of 1957. See text July 8, 1957(2), paragraph 8, and text July 9, 1957, paragraph 14.

5. Here Mao is referring to the four Shanghai Municipal Party Committee secretaries who were accompanying him on this visit. They were Ke Qingshi, Chen Pixian, Mao Tianshui, and Xu Jianguo. On Mao's idea of sending cadres down to the lower levels to see and experience things firsthand, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 56; text Feb. 27, 1957, note 102 and surrounding text, and text July 8, 1957(2), notes 52 and 70.

6. Here Mao is referring to the Shanghai Mechanics Institute, of which Chou is the principal.

7. Here Mao is referring to the story of a student at the Shanghai Mechanics Institute by the name of Jiang who was assigned the duty of being tutor and instructor for lower-division students in a previous year and who wanted the school to continue to assign him easy tasks so that he could prepare for university entrance examinations. According to Chou's report, he was very annoyed at the school for refusing to do so. Chou had suggested to him that it would be difficult to give him a job even as a janitor, whereupon Jiang whipped up support from some of his fellow students to criticize the school and the cadres for giving him demeaning treatment.

8. Here Mao is referring to Chou Qiqin.

9. Here Mao is referring to Chou, Lu, Wang Weiguang, and Liu Donghai. The latter two were the manager and Party secretary at the Shanghai Boiler Factory. The term "old bureaucrat" had been used as a criticism again Chou.

10. Here Mao is responding to the report made by Wang Weiguang regarding a worker, Gu Liufa's criticism of the CPC, and the cadres at the Shanghai Boiler Factory. Gu had been rapidly promoted from 1950, when he entered the factory as an apprentice, to 1956, when he became a seventh-grade worker. This paragraph also contains interesting information regarding workers' wages. (As an apprentice, Gu supposedly was given a stipend of 7 *rmb* per month; as a seventh-grade worker, he was making 105 *rmb*.)

11. See text July 1957(1), note 12.

12. Here Mao is referring to the conditions reported by Wang Weiguang and Liu Donghai.

13. This passage appears in both the Lu and Chou articles.

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## Remarks on a Big-Character Poster Display

(September 18, 1957)

**Source:** Ji Yin and Xi Ping, "Mao zhuxi kan dazi bao" (Chairman Mao Reads Big-Character Posters), in *RMRB* (Sept. 22, 1957), 2; and Huang Zonglin, "Mao zhuxi lai kan dazi bao" (Chairman Mao Came to Read Big-Character Posters), in *Mao guanhuai*, pp. 96-98. Available English Translation: *SCMP*, 1626 (Oct. 8, 1957), 27 (excerpt).

*This is a composite representation of excerpts of a conversation reported aggregately in the two articles cited above. We have selected only the more meaningful passages. The Ji Yin-Xi Ping article also appears in Mao qunzhong, pp. 34–38. The Huang article, as cited on Mao guanhuai, p. 98, was published originally in Zhibu shenghuo (Life at the [Party] Branch), 19 (1957), Shanghai. The conversation took place during a visit to the No. 1 State-Run Cotton Mill in Shanghai. Mao's visit to this factory was reported in FBIS, Daily Report (Sept. 19, 1957), BBB 1, and in RMRB (Sept. 19, 1957), 1.*

This big-character poster<sup>1</sup> is very well-written.  
Have the cadres who have been criticized plucked up their spirits?  
(The above from the Ji Yin-Xi Ping article.)

The old workers are correct in what they are saying.  
When did the contending and blooming<sup>2</sup> begin? At what stage is it now?  
We must draw close to the masses more often.<sup>3</sup>  
(The above from the Huang article.)

#### Notes

1. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 40.
2. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.
3. See text July 8, 1957(2), notes 57 and 71.

### Speech at Banquet for Radhakrishnan (September 19, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 20, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 118 (Oct. 25, 1957), 134; *URI* (1976), p. 319; *RMSC* (1958), pp. 414–415. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Sept. 20, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 321.

*This speech was made during a banquet held in honor of India's Vice-President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan by Zhou Enlai, premier of the People's Republic of China.*

*Another banquet was held by Indian Ambassador Nehru on the following day. Mao apparently also made a toast at this latter banquet which was not reported in direct speech, and whose contents were far less significant than this speech here. (See *RMRB* [Sept. 21, 1957], 1.)*

Your Excellency,  
Vice-President,  
Comrades, Friends:

The Vice-President of the Republic of India, the outstanding Indian scholar and statesman, China's good friend, Dr. Radhakrishnan, has come to our country to pay

a friendly visit. We express to him our warm welcome. We are grateful to him for bringing to the Chinese people the profound friendship of the great Indian people.

Since ancient times the great nations of China and India have been good friends and good neighbors. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,<sup>1</sup> which are jointly initiated by our two countries, have also provided our traditional friendship with a new foundation and new development. Our two peoples are each building their own state and striving for world peace. For the sake of these common goals, our two countries are carrying on a close and friendly cooperation. The uniting together of the one billion people of China and India constitutes a great force and is a guarantee for Asian and world peace.

One important characteristic of our age is the upsurge of movements for national independence in the Afro-Asian countries. Colonialists are trying every method to reverse this trend. However, as was demonstrated to the whole world last year by the Egyptian<sup>2</sup> people and now by the Syrian people,<sup>3</sup> all the schemes and provocations by the colonialists are bound to meet with disastrous defeat. The Chinese people resolutely support all the Afro-Asian peoples in their struggles to attain and maintain national independence.

The Chinese people historically have held the industrious and intelligent Indian people in the highest esteem. We congratulate the Indian people on their every success in the construction of peace. We admire the Indian people for their brilliant contributions to the cause of international peace. We especially thank India for its righteous support of China in international affairs. We have no doubt that India will assume an ever more important role in the world.

I propose [a toast]: To the Republic of India's prosperity and the happiness of the Indian people,

To the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples,

To world peace,

To the health of His Excellency Vice-President Radhakrishnan of the Republic of India,

To the health of His Excellency President Prasad of the Republic of India,

Bottoms up!

#### Notes

1. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 1.
2. See text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6.
3. It should be noted that at the time of this speech by Mao, the Syrian crisis of 1957 was only in its unfolding stage. Alleging "plots," Syria and the United States ousted each other's embassy officials on August 13–14, and as Cold War tensions mounted, President Eisenhower accused the USSR, on August 21, of seeking to take control of the Syrian government. Subsequently, on September 7, Eisenhower reiterated the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged the employment of U.S. armed forces in the event of Communist aggression in the Middle East. (This had been announced by the President in the form of a request for such authorization in a message to the U.S. Congress on January 5, 1957.) On September 5, the United States announced plans to airlift arms to Jordan and to accelerate fulfillment of commitments previously made to increase the armaments of Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. On September 7, the Syrian government accused that U.S. actions were threatening

*This is a composite representation of excerpts of a conversation reported aggregately in the two articles cited above. We have selected only the more meaningful passages. The Ji Yin-Xi Ping article also appears in Mao qunzhong, pp. 34-38. The Huang article, as cited on Mao guanhuai, p. 98, was published originally in Zhibu shenghuo (Life at the [Party] Branch), 19 (1957), Shanghai. The conversation took place during a visit to the No. 1 State-Run Cotton Mill in Shanghai. Mao's visit to this factory was reported in FBIS, Daily Report (Sept. 19, 1957), BBB 1, and in RMRB (Sept. 19, 1957), 1.*

This big-character poster<sup>1</sup> is very well-written.  
Have the cadres who have been criticized plucked up their spirits?  
(The above from the Ji Yin-Xi Ping article.)

The old workers are correct in what they are saying.  
When did the contending and blooming<sup>2</sup> begin? At what stage is it now?  
We must draw close to the masses more often.<sup>3</sup>  
(The above from the Huang article.)

#### Notes

1. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 40.
2. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.
3. See text July 8, 1957(2), notes 57 and 71.

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### Speech at Banquet for Radhakrishnan (September 19, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 20, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 118 (Oct. 25, 1957), 134; *URI* (1976), p. 319; *RMSC* (1958), pp. 414-415. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Sept. 20, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 321.

*This speech was made during a banquet held in honor of India's Vice-President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan by Zhou Enlai, premier of the People's Republic of China.*

*Another banquet was held by Indian Ambassador Nehru on the following day. Mao apparently also made a toast at this latter banquet which was not reported in direct speech, and whose contents were far less significant than this speech here. (See *RMRB* [Sept. 21, 1957], 1.)*

Your Excellency,  
Vice-President,  
Comrades, Friends:

The Vice-President of the Republic of India, the outstanding Indian scholar and statesman, China's good friend, Dr. Radhakrishnan, has come to our country to pay

a friendly visit. We express to him our warm welcome. We are grateful to him for bringing to the Chinese people the profound friendship of the great Indian people.

Since ancient times the great nations of China and India have been good friends and good neighbors. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,<sup>1</sup> which are jointly initiated by our two countries, have also provided our traditional friendship with a new foundation and new development. Our two peoples are each building their own state and striving for world peace. For the sake of these common goals, our two countries are carrying on a close and friendly cooperation. The uniting together of the one billion people of China and India constitutes a great force and is a guarantee for Asian and world peace.

One important characteristic of our age is the upsurge of movements for national independence in the Afro-Asian countries. Colonialists are trying every method to reverse this trend. However, as was demonstrated to the whole world last year by the Egyptian<sup>2</sup> people and now by the Syrian people,<sup>3</sup> all the schemes and provocations by the colonialists are bound to meet with disastrous defeat. The Chinese people resolutely support all the Afro-Asian peoples in their struggles to attain and maintain national independence.

The Chinese people historically have held the industrious and intelligent Indian people in the highest esteem. We congratulate the Indian people on their every success in the construction of peace. We admire the Indian people for their brilliant contributions to the cause of international peace. We especially thank India for its righteous support of China in international affairs. We have no doubt that India will assume an ever more important role in the world.

I propose [a toast]: To the Republic of India's prosperity and the happiness of the Indian people,

To the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples,

To world peace,

To the health of His Excellency Vice-President Radhakrishnan of the Republic of India,

To the health of His Excellency President Prasad of the Republic of India,

Bottoms up!

#### Notes

1. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 1.
2. See text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6.
3. It should be noted that at the time of this speech by Mao, the Syrian crisis of 1957 was only in its unfolding stage. Alleging "plots," Syria and the United States ousted each other's embassy officials on August 13-14, and as Cold War tensions mounted, President Eisenhower accused the USSR, on August 21, of seeking to take control of the Syrian government. Subsequently, on September 7, Eisenhower reiterated the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged the employment of U.S. armed forces in the event of Communist aggression in the Middle East. (This had been announced by the President in the form of a request for such authorization in a message to the U.S. Congress on January 5, 1957.) On September 5, the United States announced plans to airlift arms to Jordan and to accelerate fulfillment of commitments previously made to increase the armaments of Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. On September 7, the Syrian government accused that U.S. actions were threatening

its security, and subsequently charged the United States with intervention in the affairs of Jordan. On September 19, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles spoke at the United Nations, declaring that it was the Soviet Union's arms buildup in Syria that endangered Turkey in the first place.

In October, this series of conditions, together with other actions that had taken place, brought about a full-scale Syrian-Turkish crisis and a war-brinkmanship situation. In May 1957, Turkish troops had been moved toward the Syrian border, and Syria had issued a warning to Turkey not to prepare for war with Syria. On October 3, President Nasser of Egypt told the United Nations that Egypt would not permit a violation of Syrian integrity. On October 10, Syria accused Turkey of aggressive action on the border. On October 11, Lebanon sided with Syria, and on October 14, Egypt sent troops to Syria. This prompted the United States to declare, on October 16, that if there were an attack on Turkey by the Soviet Union or its proxy, the United States would employ its own military forces in response. On the same day, Syria asked the United Nations to investigate the border situation. In subsequent days, the crisis simmered down as both sides backed off, and the Arab League, on October 31, declared its support for Syria.

For Chinese diplomatic involvement in the Syria-Turkey/USSR-United States crisis in the Middle East in 1957, see *RMSC* (1958), pp. 432-433.

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### Telegram to the Kingdom of Norway (September 22, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Sept. 24, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 119 (Nov. 10, 1957), 28; *URI* (1976), p. 323. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Sept. 24, 1957), 3; *URI* (1976), p. 325.

King Olav,  
The Kingdom of Norway

Your Majesty:

We are grieved to learn of the untimely death of His Majesty King Haakon VII of the Kingdom of Norway. I hereby extend my condolences.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

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### Conversation with Hungarian Delegation (Excerpts) (September 27, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 15, 1957), 3.

*This is quoted in a news report of a speech made on October 11, 1957, by Janos Kadar, premier of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government of the People's Republic*

*of Hungary and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, in Budapest. The main subject of this speech was to report on the delegation's visit to China.*

*The delegation of the Hungarian government visited China from September 27 to October 5, 1957. A discussion between Mao and the Hungarian delegation was held on September 27 (see news report on this discussion and related events in *RMRB* [Sept. 28, 1957], 1; no full text of the discussion or any speech made by Mao has been published). A joint communiqué of the agreements between the two countries resulting from talks during this visit was published in Beijing on October 4, 1957. (See *RMSC* [1958], pp. 405-406.)*

*These excerpts were not represented entirely in direct speech in the *RMRB* news report of October 15.*

Our Hungarian comrades have struggled very well. The incident that took place in Hungary last October<sup>1</sup> had its positive aspects. . . . I am convinced that the Hungarian Party and the state are stronger today than they were before the incident took place. . . . Since this counterrevolutionary incident, the People's Republic of Hungary has become stronger. The entire international workers' movement, too, has drawn good [lessons of] experience from the Hungarian Incident.

#### Note

1. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.

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### Telegram to King Olav V (September 30, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 3, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 119 (Nov. 10, 1957), 128; *URI* (1976), p. 327. Available English Translations: *FBIS, Daily Report* (Oct. 7, 1957), AAA 30; *URI* (1976), p. 329.

King Olav V,  
The Kingdom of Norway

Your Majesty:

On behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend my congratulations to Your Majesty and to the Norwegian people on the occasion of Your Majesty's succession to the throne.

May Your Majesty enjoy good health, and may the Norwegian people grow in prosperity and happiness.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated in Beijing)

Conversation During an Inspection of the Yangtze River Bridge  
[Excerpts]  
(September 1957)

**Source:** Gong Qiang, “Mao zhuxi xinbu guo Changjiang” (Chairman Mao Strolls Leisurely Across the Yangtze River), in *Mao qunzhong*, pp. 20–22; originally published in *Changjiang ribao* (Sept. 25, 1957). Other Chinese Text: *Mao guanhuai*, pp. 80–82.

According to the source, this event took place in early September 1957, the exact date is unknown. However, to follow the editorial conventions of this collection, we are placing this at the end of September 1957. For the Yangtze River Bridge, see text June 1956, notes 6 and 7, and text May 1, 1957, note 2. Gong Qiang records several passages of conversations; we have excerpted here only two of the more significant exchanges, and present here only the words spoken by Mao. See also text Sept. 5, 1957, source note.

Where is the Huanghe [Yellow Crane] Pavilion?<sup>1</sup>  
It should be rebuilt.<sup>2</sup> This is a historic relic.

Good, you are following the mass line.<sup>3</sup>

How many workers did you<sup>4</sup> have [on this project] at the peak? How many technical personnel?

It was possible for us to build such a bridge when there were Soviet experts among us. Today, if there were no Soviet experts, would we be able to build [the same]?<sup>5</sup>

#### Notes

1. The Huanghe lou (Yellow Crane Pavilion) is a famous structure located originally at the Huanggao ji (Yellow Bird Rocks) on the Yangtze River in Wuchang *xian*, Hebei Province. Situated high on the rocks, it commanded a breathtaking view of both the Yangtze River and the Han River. It has also been the subject of several literary works, the most famous of which is the poem “Huanghe lou” by Cui Hao.

2. Mao had just been told that the Yellow Crane Pavilion was taken down when the bridge was built.

3. Mao is responding to the method by which the cadres in charge of the construction of the bridge and its surroundings were going to choose a color for the railings. They painted various posts in different colors so that the people could see the samples and suggest a selection. For “mass line,” see text July 8, 1957(2), notes 57 and 71.

4. “You” here refers to Yang Zaitian, deputy director of the Bureau for the Construction of the Wuhan Bridge, and Du Jingyun, director of the Political Work Department of the bureau.

5. See Mao’s exchange of compliments with Voroshilov, text May 1, 1957.

Conversation with Syrian Journalists  
(October 1, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 2, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 119 (Nov. 10, 1957), 3; *URI* (1976), p. 331. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Oct. 3, 1957), 30; *URI* (1976), p. 333.

*This conversation was held on the evening of October 1, 1957, the PRC’s National Day, at the traditional fireworks display at Tiananmen Square. Mao was talking to the delegation of journalists from Syria, who were present on the central rostrum of Tiananmen (see text May 1, 1957, source note). The delegation was headed by Tawfic Yazji, chief of the Department of Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Syria. The RMRB news report also contains indirect descriptions of other parts of the conversation. According to it, Mao also met and spoke with Egyptian guests and young people visiting from the United States.*

The people of the whole world support you; they support your opposition to the imperialists’ plots for aggression.<sup>1</sup> People are happy to see the unity among Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. All the Arab peoples should unite.

#### Note

1. See text Sept. 19, 1957, note 3.

Letter to Lin Ke  
(October 2, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, pp. 531–532.

*See text Aug. 4, 1957, source note.*

Lin Ke:

I have not seen you for many days. Are you getting a bit bored with the solitude?

For you to dig into the habit of reading books, newspapers, or periodicals and to absorb from a broad range of material, for you to scan widely is beneficial, for me as well as for you.<sup>1</sup> My hope is that you will pay a slightly greater amount of

attention to articles on theory, and to gradually nurture interest in this area. Now that we are more advanced in our age, it is the proper time for us to dig down and study assiduously. The only thing is that we must watch out, and, on principle, not allow that to impair our health. Please find for me a copy of *Liu chao wenjie* [An Outline of the Literary Works of the Six Dynasties]<sup>2</sup> and some collections—of various types—of the writings of people of the Six Dynasties.

Mao Zedong  
October 2

### Notes

1. See text Aug. 4, 1957.
2. This is a collection of seventy-two pieces of *pianji* (parallel-construction euphuistic) writings of the Six Dynasties period (i.e., from the Eastern Jin dynasty to the Sui dynasty, ca. A.D. 317–618). Most of the pieces were short and fairly well-known. Typically, *pianji* writing is descriptive (often ornately so) and emotionally evocative and allegorical. The selection and compilation of this set was done by Xu Lian in the Qing dynasty.

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### Telegram to the German Democratic Republic (October 6, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 7, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 119 (Nov. 10, 1957), 120; *URI* (1976), p. 335. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Oct. 7, 1957), 11; *URI* (1976), p. 337.

Comrade Wilhelm Pieck, President of the German Democratic Republic,  
Comrade Johannes Dieckmann, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic,  
Comrade Otto Grotewohl, Premier of the German Democratic Republic,  
Comrade Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany:

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic, we extend sincere and warm congratulations to you and to all the German people.

The Chinese people have always been deeply concerned about the arduous and tremendous struggles carried on by the German people, under the leadership of the government of the German Democratic Republic and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, for the sake of building a unified, peaceful, and democratic Germany, for the completion of all sorts of socialist construction within the country, for the consolidation of the unity of the socialist camp, and for safeguarding European and

world peace. The Chinese people are moreover delighted at and inspired by every one of the successes of the German people.

The relations of friendship and cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic have had new development in the past year. We are confident that the further development of our two countries' relations of friendship and cooperation will not only benefit the Chinese and German peoples, but is bound to make a powerful contribution to the great unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and in the cause of safeguarding world peace.

Long live the unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and German peoples!  
(Cosigned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council, dated)

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### Speech at the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee (October 7, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 122–126. Other Chinese Texts: *URI* (1976), pp. 339–342. Available English Translations: *JPRS, Miscellany*, I, pp. 72–76; *URI* (1976), pp. 343–348.

*By September 1957, the anti-Rightist campaign had been underway for some four months. Much criticism had already been launched against the "bourgeois Rightists." During this time, however, there had been several significant shifts in the campaign. Starting out as (1) a counterattack against "bourgeois Rightists" who had spoken out too vocally and too harshly against the CPC in the Hundred Flowers Campaign earlier in the year; (2) an attack primarily on intellectuals; and (3) criticism of people largely outside the CPC and in the democratic parties, the campaign, by September, had become, in addition to all of the above, also a campaign against people in positions of responsibility in government organs and in industrial and commercial circles, where class interests could be, and were, most directly tested, as well as a campaign against certain as yet not fully or directly named persons and groups inside the CPC. The idea that there were "allies" of the "bourgeois Rightists" inside the Party, broached in Mao's essays of criticism in early to mid-July, was, by September, a given in the campaign of criticism and exposure against such elements. On the policy and strategy front, this "realization" paved the way for clearer polarization and radical factionalization. It is this that set the stage for the radical orientation of policy in the year ahead. Albeit that Mao and the Maoists may have considered this phase, theoretically, still as a phase in the "unity-criticism-unity" formula, clearly at this time, the primary responsibility was to carry through with the criticism stage, and to draw as clearly as possible the distinction between the "enemy" and "self." The Third (Enlarged) Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, attended by the full and alternate members of the Central Committee and over 400 first secretaries of the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party commit-*

attention to articles on theory, and to gradually nurture interest in this area. Now that we are more advanced in our age, it is the proper time for us to dig down and study assiduously. The only thing is that we must watch out, and, on principle, not allow that to impair our health. Please find for me a copy of *Liu chao wenjie* [An Outline of the Literary Works of the Six Dynasties]<sup>2</sup> and some collections—of various types—of the writings of people of the Six Dynasties.

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Long live the unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and German peoples!  
(Cosi gned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council, dated)

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*By September 1957, the anti-Rightist campaign had been underway for some four months. Much criticism had already been launched against the "bourgeois Rightists." During this time, however, there had been several significant shifts in the campaign. Starting out as (1) a counterattack against "bourgeois Rightists" who had spoken out too vocally and too harshly against the CPC in the Hundred Flowers Campaign earlier in the year; (2) an attack primarily on intellectuals; and (3) criticism of people largely outside the CPC and in the democratic parties, the campaign, by September, had become, in addition to all of the above, also a campaign against people in positions of responsibility in government organs and in industrial and commercial circles, where class interests could be, and were, most directly tested, as well as a campaign against certain as yet not fully or directly named persons and groups inside the CPC. The idea that there were "allies" of the "bourgeois Rightists" inside the Party, broached in Mao's essays of criticism in early to mid-July, was, by September, a given in the campaign of criticism and exposure against such elements. On the policy and strategy front, this "realization" paved the way for clearer polarization and radical factionalization. It is this that set the stage for the radical orientation of policy in the year ahead. Albeit that Mao and the Maoists may have considered this phase, theoretically, still as a phase in the "unity-criticism-unity" formula, clearly at this time, the primary responsibility was to carry through with the criticism stage, and to draw as clearly as possible the distinction between the "enemy" and "self." The Third (Enlarged) Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, attended by the full and alternate members of the Central Committee and over 400 first secretaries of the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party commit-*

tees and personnel of positions of responsibility from the departments of the Central Committee, culminated the three months of discussion begun at Qingdao<sup>1</sup> and marked a clear turning point toward the development of the Great Leap Forward. For example, it “basically passed” the Revised Draft of the Forty-Article Twelve-Year National Program for Agricultural Development. The plenum was held September 20–October 9, 1957. For basic information on the plenum, see RMSC (1958), p. 182, and K. Lieberthal (1976), pp. 99–101. The major policy-document to come out of this plenum was Deng Xiaoping’s “Report on the Rectification Campaign” (see RMSC [1958], pp. 33–42; English translation in R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. [1962], pp. 343–363), which was presented to this plenum on September 23.

While the plenum itself focused on specific policies regarding such issues as the rectification movement, wages and labor insurance, the relationship between the agricultural cooperatives and agricultural production and industrial, commercial, and financial management, Mao’s speech here, near the end of the plenum, focused on a different level. Mao did not deal with specific policies but, rather, addressed the issue of identifying the basic contradiction during the transition period—that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. By identifying the contradiction in this way he rejected the formulation in the Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress that had stated that the main contradiction was that between the advanced social relations and the backward forces of production.<sup>2</sup> Although Mao had mentioned his opposition to that formulation previously,<sup>3</sup> in this speech he drove the point home more clearly, not merely mentioning the error as he considered it to be, but beginning to draw out the specifics of the error. Of particular interest here is Mao’s linking of the error to Stalin’s understanding of the relationship between the forces and relations of production during the transition period. Although it is not clear why at this time Mao began to link his criticisms of this error more directly to Stalin’s earlier error—whether the logic of furthering China’s economic development forced him to confront the previously developed doctrines and the issue, whether he turned to an analysis of Stalin’s works in anticipation of his upcoming November trip to the Soviet Union, or whether it was some combination of these and other factors is not known—what is clear is that in the next few years Mao’s criticisms of Stalin’s political-economic doctrines would become increasingly specific and increasingly severe.

China [has had] two revolutions. In the period of the democratic revolution,<sup>4</sup> [the struggle] was against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism.<sup>5</sup> The struggle against the capitalist thought of the national bourgeoisie was waged only within the Party. At that time there were two roads, the road of liberation and the road of colonialism. The socialist revolution, [on the other hand,] is [a revolution] to eliminate classes and to eliminate exploitation. It is a proletarian revolution. I don’t believe there is any theoretical problem in saying that the primary contradiction is between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.<sup>6</sup>

In 1953, at the Finance and Economic Work Conference, the general line was set forth.<sup>7</sup> Initially, however, we didn’t dare to propagate it throughout the entire Party. At first we [only] discussed it down to the *xian* level. At the end of 1953 it was openly discussed at the Political Consultative Conference, and following this, the Propaganda Department drafted a program for the dissemination of the general line. In the three and a half years since then, we have dealt the bourgeoisie a severe blow and also struck a blow at the individual economy; therefore, this has been

reflected in the Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress which declared that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie has been fundamentally resolved.<sup>8</sup> This statement was not incorrect, [but] being fundamentally resolved is not the same as being completely resolved. The problem of political power has been resolved and the problem of the system of ownership has been fundamentally resolved, but the economic and political [problems] have not been completely resolved.

Among the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals, the Rightists in the democratic parties,<sup>9</sup> and a portion of the well-to-do middle peasants, [there are those] who stand among the people but who oppose [the people]. At one time this was not completely seen with such clarity, but it wasn’t that we completely failed to see it either. (At one time we did propose reform in any case.) At that time they were obedient and compliant, so we said that [the contradiction] had been fundamentally resolved. [But] today because they want to rebel, we must emphasize this contradiction. By [the time of] the Qingdao Conference<sup>10</sup> this year, it could be seen clearly, and [we] pointed out that in the cities and the countryside there was still a struggle between the two roads. [Since] this type of class struggle has not been extinguished and since the Rightists are making frenzied attacks this time, it should be said that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is the primary one. But strategically, it is still better to deal with it in the way the Qingdao document<sup>11</sup> puts it; as long as those who are participating in the conference know what is primary and what is secondary, it will be all right. We have not talked about this for a long time, and if we now add it [to the agenda] we will create great havoc, which would not be good. We should now continue to talk about it for three months in the manner in which the Qingdao [document] has put it.

Bourgeois ideology also exists among the workers. We can hold the bourgeoisie accountable for the three major “isms” within the party.<sup>12</sup> [The contradiction between] the two roads between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between socialism and capitalism—is the primary contradiction in the period of transition.<sup>13</sup> For the time being, [however,] we will not mention this in the newspapers. If we mention it, it would possibly dilute [our attention to] the many contradictions among the people, wouldn’t it? Besides that, there are the problems of bureaucratism within [the Party], sectarianism, and subjectivism—the things Ren Baige<sup>14</sup> has talked about; we can write about this [general] problem from a theoretical point of view.

The contradictions in the relationships among the working people—[in the] relationship between the Party and the masses, [in the] relationship between the cadres and the masses, between the individual and the collective, between the young and the old, and among the workers themselves—are phenomena that exist in large numbers. If we suddenly declared that the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is primary, will that affect the blooming and contending or not?<sup>15</sup> Not necessarily, but it will cause squabbling among the laboring people.

There are two groups among the people. One has exploited people and the other hasn’t. One group has come under bourgeois influence slightly, while the other



group has come under its influence heavily. In a few hundred years we won't be able to hold the bourgeoisie responsible for this any longer. It will have become a struggle between the advanced and the backward [elements].<sup>16</sup> When we say that large-scale class struggle has been fundamentally resolved,<sup>17</sup> what we are speaking of are problems of the political system and the system of ownership. The problem of the superstructure, [i.e.,] ideology and political influence, is still largely unresolved. [The problems of] individualism, bureaucratism, and idealism are also [parts of] the superstructure; they, too, have to be resolved.

Last year, after the capitalists began to clang the gongs and beat the drums,<sup>18</sup> if we had immediately brought up the idea of opposing the bourgeoisie, it would have been hard [for people] to speak out, it would have been unpopular and disadvantageous to us. Subsequently, once the contending was in full swing, [opposing the bourgeoisie] was easier to do. Once we gained experience, it was easier to get things done. We proposed to let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend, and they let loose. In the past the bourgeoisie had been very compliant, but now they raise a great clamor. We only proposed a contending and blooming, but the Rightists came out with a great contending and blooming. We proposed a contending and blooming in literature, art, and the academic areas, but they wanted to expand this to [include] politics. This year the Communist Party, in cooperation with the Rightists, has found a better method and a more appropriate form, [that is,] big contending, big blooming, big-character posters,<sup>19</sup> and big debates. At Yanan<sup>20</sup> we didn't have this kind of great courage; we didn't have any experience. We did not prohibit [these things], but there was no blooming either. We had never engaged in a socialist revolution before and had no experience. The great contending and great blooming [this time] has broadened our experience. In the future we will still need to have contending and blooming, [but when we say] "let a hundred flowers bloom," [we are] not including counterrevolutionaries. But [as far as] having a blooming every year, it will still be done. To suppress the people as though they were enemies is very dangerous. In discussing contradictions among the people [our purpose] is precisely to guard against adopting the methods of suppression and coercion.<sup>21</sup>

The first point: In the period of transition it must be affirmed that the primary contradiction is that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The second point: For a specific period we will not discuss this in the newspapers. We will continue to propagandize the struggle between the two roads, but we will not put in these two characters<sup>22</sup> so as to avoid giving rise to a lot of trouble.

The contradictions among the laboring people are at present being resolved through a great contending, great blooming, and great debating. As soon as we say that class contradictions are primary, it will have an effect on the process of rectification and transformation.<sup>23</sup>

Three classes are contained within the people: The proletariat, the bourgeoisie, and the petty bourgeoisie. Class contradictions exist among these three groups of people. Such contradictions are at one and the same time contradictions among the people and class contradictions. There is a difference between class contradictions and contradictions between the enemy and ourselves.<sup>24</sup> Generally speaking, con-

traditions among the people are nonantagonistic whereas contradictions with the bourgeoisie have an antagonistic side. The central question concerns the contradictions among the three groups of people. Among them there are some [contradictions] that are covertly antagonistic. For example, the contradiction with Zhang Bojun<sup>25</sup> and others is an antagonistic contradiction. In dealing with this kind of antagonistic contradiction we should adopt a policy of paring the bamboo shoot. Each year we will pare off a little bit. This year we have pared a [layer of the outer] skin but could not have pared it all the way. If for two years we do not propagandize socialism,<sup>26</sup> [this contradiction] will come out again. It will be necessary to pare some more in the future. The essay "On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People"<sup>27</sup> was not in error, but it was not complete without [being supplemented by] the Qingdao document.<sup>28</sup> The principal problem of the present is not with the vestiges of feudalism or the remnants of imperialism ([although these] contradictions still exist). In Hunan 7,000 landlords and rich peasants were arrested; no one said anything. But when it comes to arresting a Zhang Bojun, there are problems. The socialist revolution involves the problem [of dealing with] the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals number thirty million people, including their families, and they pose a big problem. The population of the working class is at most forty million, figuring three people in each family. The targets of the socialist revolution are the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intellectuals, and the upper-stratum petty bourgeoisie (in the countryside they are the well-to-do middle peasants). The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals both have their Leftists, but the great majority are middle-of-the-roaders, while the right wing accounts for only 1 or 2 per cent.<sup>29</sup> For more than 90 per cent of them it is a question of education and of criticism. The contradictions among the people which we have set forth include class contradictions, and the capitalists still retain their rights as citizens.<sup>30</sup> It cannot be said that the socialist revolution is [mainly] anti-imperialist or antifeudal any longer, but imperialism and vestiges of feudal forces are the allies of the bourgeois Rightists. Thus the landlords love the *Wenhui bao*,<sup>31</sup> which is antisocialist.

The Rightist elements at present number 60,000 [in one version it is 50,000].<sup>32</sup> In the future there will be at most 150,000 to 200,000. Those among them who can be separated from the rest should be split off. If we can split off some engineering and technical personnel, natural scientists, and scholars, it would be even better. We should work on them. Some of them can be seriously criticized but treated with leniency, as, for example, Rong Yiren.<sup>33</sup>

It is now quite clear: In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism,<sup>34</sup> the primary (or the fundamental) contradiction is the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism. This means that social relationships—relationships among people—have been resolved fundamentally but not completely. The landlords, rich peasants,<sup>35</sup> counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements approve of capitalism. Those who exploit others approve of capitalism. This is also a contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The struggle between the two roads is resolved only through long-term struggle. "Primary" and "fundamental" have the same meaning.

The Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress declared that the primary contradiction is that between the advanced social system and the backward forces of production, but we cannot reason this way. Today there are contradictions, and in the future there will still be contradictions. When the cooperatives have all been transformed into state farms<sup>36</sup> that pay wages, there will still be contradictions. Socialism is composed of two sectors: the system of public ownership and the system of collective ownership.<sup>37</sup> In the future, contradictions will also arise between the two. The socialist system and the forces of production basically conform to each other, but there are still areas that do not conform completely; there are still shortcomings; [thus] to speak of perfect conformity is incorrect. Once Stalin mentioned complete conformity, problems emerged (page 14 of the report).<sup>38</sup> Religion as a kind of ideology, for example, is not in conformity with socialism, but we still want to repair temples. Repairing temples is done to achieve the goal of destroying temples. Why do we say that there is general conformity? Because [under this system] the development of the forces of production is possible. Through five years of development India increased its steel production by 300,000 tons. We have raised ours by four million tons.<sup>39</sup> Our system does not impede the development of the forces of production. After several decades, when the contradictions between the collective and the state-owned [sectors] are resolved, there will still be new contradictions. When we arrive at communism we will no longer need the law of value,<sup>40</sup> nor will we need an army—the international environment permitting, of course. The statement in the Resolutions of the Eighth Party Congress cannot be found anywhere in Marx, Engels, or Lenin, but there is no harm in it either. The meaning [of the statement] is that we need to develop production quickly to strengthen the material basis of socialist society. It's just that it was not expressed clearly; it is characterized by a semantic error. [The statement] did not conscientiously explain the contradictions clearly. This statement drew comparisons with foreign countries and with the future. But we don't need to alter it now. We don't have to talk about this issue right now. [Indeed,] Lenin said that there was a contradiction between the Soviet regime and backward technology. We won't discuss this now. It will be all right as long as this is explained clearly later. Strictly speaking it is of course incorrect to say that the socialist system has not conformed to the forces of production. In our case, it is precisely the socialist system which has developed the forces of production. Many economists say that there is a contradiction between our system and the forces of production. They say that the socialist system has fallen behind the forces of production. This kind of talk is bad.<sup>41</sup>

## Notes

1. See text July 1957(1), source note.
2. By this we mean the CPC's resolution on the Political Report of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC held in September 15–27, 1956. See *RMSC* (1957), pp. 55–57. The specific point here is in section 1 of the resolution (p. 55). An English translation of the resolution is available in *Eighth National Congress* (1956), pp. 113–114. For more on the congress, see text Sept. 15, 1956, source note, and K. Lieberthal (1976), pp. 85–86. It is probably worth noting that the political report to that Congress was made by Liu

Shaoqi, who was chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CPC at the time. The drafting of the resolution also bore the stamp of Liu Shaoqi.

3. In particular, Mao discussed these contradictions, in terms of their “nature” rather than their ordinal magnitude, in his speech “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” (see text Feb. 27, 1957). Implicit in Mao's assertion here in this speech, delivered in October 1957, that the essay of late February should not be studied singly, but would make sense only if considered together with the “Qingdao document” of July (see text July 1957[1], source note), is the notion that since the last half of 1956, and particularly from February 1957 onward, Mao had progressively recontemplated the implications of the resolution of the Eighth CPC Congress on this issue and had moved farther and farther away from the position of the resolution. See also text Nov. 15, 1956, source note and note 1.

4. Here Mao is referring not to the old traditional notion of a democratic revolution, which is an “old general type of bourgeois-democratic revolution,” but to “one of a special new type” for which Mao coined the term “New Democratic Revolution.” See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 2; see also text June 11, 1957, note 1, and text July 8, 1957(2), note 17.

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6. Mao is setting the stage for the introduction of a new struggle between two roads, or a “two-line struggle,” the idea of which was suggested in July but is clearly consummated here. See text July 1957(1), source note. See also text June 15, 1953, vol. I, source note.

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12. This refers to the so-called three winds that were the targets of rectification in the CPC earlier in 1957, namely, bureaucratism, subjectivism, and sectarianism. (See later in this paragraph; see also text Mar. 18, 1957, note 2.)

13. See text July 1957(1), note 17.

14. Ren Baige was, at this time, mayor of Chongqing, deputy chairman of the Provincial People's Government of Sichuan, and first secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Party (CPC) Committee. Ren was criticized during the Cultural Revolution and purged from the CPC in 1968. He was then rehabilitated in 1975. For more biographical information on Ren Baige, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, p. 147. We are not able to identify to what in Ren's writings, or speeches, Mao is referring here.

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20. Mao is referring to the fact that contending and blooming came as a result of the

rectification of the CPC in 1942–1944 in Yanan also. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24.

21. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 1.

22. It is not clear from the text to which two characters Mao is referring here. From the context we believe it may be the characters *zhuyao*, which translate as the term “primary” in relation to the stature of the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

23. The term in the text here is *zheng gai*, which we think indicates in Mao’s mind a separation (and yet curiously at the same time a combination) of the two things, rectification and transformation. “Rectification” clearly refers to the rectification campaign of late 1956 to early 1957, which, as seen in the documents of early 1957, was originally intended as an intra-CPC rectification campaign. Only in April did Mao, and the CPC Central Committee, begin to call for a rectification of people and organizations, such as the democratic parties, outside the CPC. (In fact, even the CPC Central Committee directive on the rectification campaign, issued on April 27, skirted the latter issue.) Subsequently, however, it did become a rectification campaign for the entire people (or society), or *quanmin zhengfeng yundong*. (See text May 15, 1957, source note.) The second half of this term (i.e., the *gai* in *zheng gai*) refers primarily to the anti-Rightist criticism campaign, since as Mao himself put it repeatedly, the purpose of criticizing the Rightists, and particularly the bourgeois intellectuals, is to transform, or reform, them. The semantic separation is meaningful; the suggestion appears to be that for the Party, the proper mode of change is “rectification” (*zhengdun*), whereas for those outside the Party, the proper mode is *gaizao* (reform, or transformation). However, the two terms are also capable of being put together, in that *zhengdun* (rectification) is also a *specific* mode of transformation.

24. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

25. See text July 1, 1957, source note and note 3.

26. We believe that what Mao is referring to specifically here is the propaganda line that (1) socialism is superior to capitalism, and (2) socialism is the only way out for China. These were issues that Mao dealt with in black-and-white terms in the speeches and writings of May–July 1957, but they go back even earlier. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 1, paragraph 15; text Mar. 12, 1957; text June 11, 1957, note 4; and text July 8, 1957(2), note 18.

27. See text Feb. 27, 1957.

28. See note 3.

29. See text May 15, 1957, note 6, and text Mar. 12, 1957, note 6; also see text July 8, 1957(2), note 5.

30. See text July 1957(1), note 2.

31. See text June 14, 1957(2), especially note 1; text July 1, 1957, source note and notes 1, 2, and 19.

32. Again, see text Mar. 12, 1957, note 6.

33. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 38; see also text Mar. 1, 1957, note 27.

34. See text July 1957(1), note 17.

35. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, notes 1 and 2.

36. See text Mar. 19, 1953, vol. I, note 4.

37. See text Mar. 5, 1956, note 12; see also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 41.

38. Here Mao is referring to Stalin’s position on the conformity of the relations of production to the forces of production laid out in his *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* and *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. The criticism made by Mao in this passage is laden with Marxist theory-interpretation significance. The key lies in what Mao thought of the relations of production in the phase of socialist transition. The position that Stalin took (as Mao read it) appeared to be that in the Soviet system during the socialist phase, the relations of production, as part of the “system” of socialism (and part of the superstructure) are basically in conformity with the proletarianized forces of production. This becomes a criterion by which the conclusion can be drawn that through the transformation of the system (from a capitalist-dominated one to a sovietized one) the socialist transition has already been

basically achieved. What remains to be done would be to focus on developing the forces of production, on the one hand, and to deal with those remnants of the superstructure (ideology, education, laws, etc.) that are yet partially inconsistent with the sovietized system, on the other. In Mao’s view, this, joined with the “revisionist” idea that the primary contradiction was the one between backward forces of production and an already advanced social system (see note 16), would give rise to what is labeled as the *wei shengchanli lun* (“forces of production above all theory”), which focuses only on development and expansion of the forces of production, with little or no attention at all to continuing the struggle to transform the relations of production. Mao himself believed that the stage of socialist transition is a stage of revolution, not just a stage of peaceful, material expansion and development. In this phase, Mao believed, the struggle is to be concentrated on the transformation of the relations of production. Moreover, Mao tended to see the relations of production as part of the economic base (see text Jan. 20, 1956, note 5; text Feb. 27, 1957, note 42; and text July 8, 1957[2], note 38). Thus he believed that, owing to the continued bourgeois influence in society (and in the economic system) during the stage of socialist revolution and transition, there was as yet an inconsistency (or contradiction) within the economic base itself that needed to be struggled over. It was therefore not merely an issue of contradiction between the superstructure and the base, but a twofold contradiction, one between the superstructure and the base, and the other in the base itself.

What is revealed here is an early, preliminary adoption by Mao of a political-economic position that he would work out in much greater detail in his 1959 and 1960 critical readings of Stalinist political-economic theory (in texts of November 1959, and in text 1960 [RN]).

In many ways, then, this becomes a critical passage in our reading of the development of Mao’s ideas and his strategy/theory of socioeconomic development. In the immediate sense, it brings up an additional dimension of the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957, of which this and the following document are important summations. Here Mao suggests that the struggle against the Rightists in 1957 is not just a struggle over the criticisms and counter-criticisms that were raised in the late spring and summer of that year, or over “democratic demands” or even leadership, but also over basic understanding of the course of the socialist revolution in China—what needs to be transformed, and how that entails an “antagonistic” struggle against bourgeois influences and revisionism (the retention and even restoration of capitalism). It provides the socioeconomic dimension of the anti-Rightist campaign. In the immediate range, it paves the way for the radical Leftist position that led into the Great Leap Forward, in which Mao adopted the theoretical “principle” that the tremendous material expansion of the forces of production is possible only on the premise of radical and continuous transformation of the relations of production (thus the “Three Red Flags,” the program of setting up people’s communes, the backyard furnaces all over the country, etc.). In the much longer range, this passage on the one hand forecasts Mao’s continuous disagreement with Liu Shaoqi over the basic interpretation of the revolution and on socioeconomic theory and strategy, which in turn takes shape as the “two-line struggle” that leads into the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, this passage forecasts Mao’s criticism of the Soviet Union’s understanding of Marxist political-economic theory (both the Stalinist view and the post-Stalinist Khrushchevian view), which also leads up to the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, at yet another level, this passage serves as a prism for what is ultimately formulated as Mao’s theory of uninterrupted revolution—the theory that the socialist transition is one of continuous, uninterrupted revolutionary (and not peaceful) transformation of the relations of production as well as of the superstructure and social system, not one of revolutionary processes punctuated by extended periods of consolidation and peaceful coexistence of disparate socioeconomic formations (e.g., of socialist forms together with capitalist forms). See also text June 15, 1953, vol. I, source note.

39. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 37.

40. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 83. The text here is a bit garbled, but Mao appears (as we have translated it) to adopt the position that since the law of value (and particularly the law of exchange of equal value) pertains primarily to the phenomenon of exchange

(between units of production representing value of labor), it is applicable only in the socialist stage when production and consumption (allocation or distribution) is governed by exchange value. In the stage of communism, exchange as such is no longer necessary, because by definition the principle of distribution has changed from “from each according to ability; to each according to labor” (i.e., value of labor) to “from each according to ability; to each according to need.” In any case, Mao eventually arrives at the view that while the law of value is a necessary “instrument of planning” in the socialist phase, even here the law should not be overemphasized or taken to be the only principle, since it focuses on the exchange value of production (and products), and the purpose of socialist transition is precisely to provide the process of transformation that would bring society out of the realm of exchange (prices) and into the realm of satisfaction. (See text 1960 [RN], section 45.)

41. This last passage appears a bit garbled. Mao appears to be saying that there is, at the same time, a view that is appositive in syntax but opposite in meaning to the one that he had criticized earlier, that is, a view that, instead of holding that the social system is advanced while the forces of production are backward, holds that the socialist social system is backward, behind the forces of production. Ironically, however, such a view would have the same strategic import as the former. The former implies that the primary necessity is to develop the forces of production to catch up with the advanced social system. The latter implies that the socialist social system inhibits the development of the forces of production (which have to be developed as a key to economic growth). In Mao’s view, then, the latter is also incorrect. Both reflect a kind of economism. Interestingly, Mao was at this time studying Lenin’s criticism of Bernsteinist economism (see text Aug. 4, 1957, note 1).

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Speech at the Conclusion of the Third Plenum  
of the Eighth Central Committee  
(Version I)  
(October 9, 1957)

**Source:** *Xuanji*, V, pp. 466–479. Available English Translations: *SW*, V, pp. 483–497; *CLG*, 10:2 (Summer 1977), pp. 57–62 (excerpts).

*This is a speech made at the Third (Enlarged) Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC. We have two versions of this speech; the other version is in Ziliao xuanbian, a Red Guard publication of the Cultural Revolution period. The two versions closely resemble each other in most parts, but there are important specific references to events and people in the other version that apparently have been editorially excised from the Xuanji version here. Also the last parts of the Xuanji version do not appear in the other one. Instead of doing a “parallel text” comparison here, we have therefore presented these two versions consecutively (and because of their length, as separate documents in this collection of translations). Readers must make the necessary textual comparison for themselves. The Xuanji version is published under the title “Zuo geming de cujin pai” (Be A Promoter of the Revolution), which is apparently a title concocted by the Xuanji editors. For an explanation of Mao’s concern and ideas at the time this speech was delivered, see text Oct. 7, 1957,*

*source note and notes 1, 2, 3, 6, 16, 38, and 40. The title given to this speech is particularly appropriate in light of Mao’s concern at the time for the revolution and the revolutionary aspect of things to be carried through, as explained in text Oct. 7, 1957, note 40. What is particularly important about this speech, given two days after the October 7 one, is that toward the end of this (October 9) speech, Mao simply puts the rectification campaign and the anti-Rightist campaign together, and virtually announces the formula of seeing the rectification campaign as an integral part of the anti-Rightist, anti-bourgeois campaign, namely, that part that deals with the manifestations of the Rightist, bourgeois ideology inside the CPC. This then takes the polemical line adopted by Mao in July one step further. Finally, this speech is also important in that in the last four paragraphs, Mao for the first time discusses clearly the “differences of opinion” between himself and the leadership of the CPSU under Khrushchev, thus projecting into what appears later as nine critical essays of polemical criticism of the CPSU (published as RMRB editorials in 1963–1964), especially the first of these, whose title is “The Origins and the Development of the Divergence Between Ourselves and the Leadership of the CPSU.” It also should be noted that many of the things that Mao talks about in this speech reflect the contents of Deng Xiaoping’s “Report on the Rectification Campaign” submitted to this plenum on September 23. See RMSC (1958), pp. 33–42; also RMRB (Oct. 19, 1957), 1.*

This conference is very good. An enlarged plenum of the Central Committee such as this, with comrades from provincial [Party] committees and [special] district [Party] committees attending, is in fact a three-level cadres conference. This is beneficial for clarifying policies, sharing experiences, and unifying our determination.

I am afraid that it will be necessary to hold a conference such as this once every year. This is because the work in a country as big as ours is very complicated. Last year was the one year we did not hold [such a conference], and we suffered for it: a Right deviation appeared. The year before last there was a welling up [of enthusiasm], and last year there was a relaxation of effort. Of course, the “Eighth Congress”<sup>1</sup> was held last year and there was no time [for a conference]. If conferences like this one are to be held again, we can bring in a few secretaries from *xian* [Party] committees and some district [Party] committee secretaries from some of the big cities; it would be all right, for instance, to bring in a hundred or so more people. I suggest that each province hold a provincewide, three-level or four-level cadres conference also, and bring in some cadres from the cooperatives in order to straighten out the problems. This is my first point.

The second point—let’s talk a bit about rectification. We must bloom<sup>2</sup> boldly, thoroughly, and resolutely; we must correct [ourselves] boldly, thoroughly, and resolutely. We must have the determination to do this. In that case, is it necessary to add a slogan about opposing the Rightists and opposing them in a big way? It would be all right not to add it. This is because the anti-Rightist [campaign] is already on course and in some places has already been concluded. The emphasis is now on blooming and rectifying at the basic levels, which is to say, blooming and contending, and rectification and transformation<sup>3</sup> at three levels—the *xian*, district, and *xiang*. As for the [various] levels at the Center, the provinces, and the municipalities, there are some departments in which blooming is still necessary, but the emphasis is on the problem of rectification.

This year the masses created a [new] revolutionary form. The masses' struggle is in the form of great contending, great blooming, great debating, and big-character posters.<sup>4</sup> The substance of our revolution has now found a very appropriate form. This type of format could not have appeared before, because in the past we were at war; then there were the Five Major Movements and the Three Great Transformations;<sup>5</sup> it was impossible to generate a format of relaxed debate such as this. Then, we were not permitted to have a year of relaxed debate, putting the facts [in front of everybody] and reasoning [things out]; now it is possible. We have found this form which fits the substance of the current struggle of the masses, which fits the substance of the current class struggle, and which is appropriate for the correct handling of the problem of contradictions among the people.<sup>6</sup> Now that we have grasped this format, things will be much easier to manage from now on. Whether they are big problems of right or wrong or small problems of right or wrong, whether they are matters of revolution or of construction, they can all be resolved through this format of contending, blooming, and debating; moreover, they will be resolved more quickly. The Leftists are engaging not only the middle-of-the-roaders in contending, blooming, and debating, but also the Rightists in contending, blooming, and debate in a totally open fashion, and in the countryside they are engaging the landlords and rich peasants<sup>7</sup> in contending, blooming, and debate. We should publicize [everything] in the newspapers and not be afraid of being "humiliated" by such [criticisms] as "the whole country has become the [private] domain of the Party"<sup>8</sup> and [such demands as] "the Communists must abdicate" and "step down from the sedan chair."<sup>9</sup> We have just "got on the sedan chair," and the Rightists [already] want us to "step down from the sedan chair." This type of format—great contending, great blooming, great debate, and big-character posters—is most appropriate to promoting the initiative of the masses and to raising the sense of responsibility of the masses.

Our Party has a tradition of democracy. If we did not have a tradition of democracy, we could not tolerate such great contending and great blooming, great struggling and great debating, and big-character posters. At Yanan, during the period of rectification,<sup>10</sup> people took notes, searched themselves for shortcomings, and helped each other. Seven or eight people would form a small group [to do this], and this went on for several months. All the people with whom I have been in touch are grateful for that rectification [campaign]; they say that the change away from subjectivism began at that time. During the period of land reform, whenever there was any problem we discussed it with the masses in order to clarify thinking. In our armed forces, company commanders used to see to it that soldiers had their blankets on [when they went to sleep], and they talked with the soldiers on a very friendly and equal basis. There was the rectification movement at Yanan, the land reform, and the democratic way of life in the armed forces; there was also the "Three Check-ups and Three Rectifications";<sup>11</sup> later there were the "Three-Anti's" and the "Five-Anti's" [campaigns],<sup>12</sup> and the ideological reformation of intellectuals; in all these [movements] there was an amply democratic format. However, such a format of great contending, great blooming, great struggles, great debates, to be followed by calm breezes and gentle rain,<sup>13</sup> discussions, and enlightenment;

such a format could only now be generated. Finding such a format is very beneficial to our cause; the task of overcoming subjectivism, bureaucratism, and commandism<sup>14</sup> (by commandism we mean beating people, cursing people, and forcing people to carry out [orders]), as well as the task of having the leading cadres mingle as one with the masses, will then be easy to achieve.

There has been a very significant development in our democratic tradition this year. In the future, we must hand down this format of great contending, great blooming, great debates, and big-character posters. This format gives full play to socialist democracy. This type of democracy can exist only in socialist countries and cannot exist in capitalist countries. On the basis of such a democracy, centralism is not weakened; as a matter of fact the system of centralism is even more consolidated, and the dictatorship of the proletariat further strengthened.<sup>15</sup> This is because the dictatorship of the proletariat must rely on a broad alliance, and will not work with the proletariat [standing] alone as a single class. In China the proletariat is small; it makes up only [a little] more than ten million people. It can carry out its dictatorship only if it relies on the poor peasants, the lower-middle peasants, the urban poor, the impoverished handicraft workers, and the revolutionary intellectuals, who together make up several hundred million people; otherwise it is impossible. Now that we have mobilized their enthusiasm, the proletariat's dictatorship has been consolidated.<sup>16</sup>

The third point concerns agriculture. The Forty-Article Program for Agricultural Development has already been revised and can soon be issued.<sup>17</sup> Comrades, please thoroughly organize a debate and a discussion in the rural areas. I asked some comrades whether the agricultural planning should be undertaken at the [special] district level. They said that it should also be done. [Then I asked] if it should also be done [at the] level of the district. They said that it should also be done. Should it be done at the *xiang* [level]? They said that it should [also] be done [at that level]; and the same applies at the level of the cooperative as well. Well, then, there are the following levels: the province, the [special] district, the *xian*, the district, the *xiang*, and the cooperative, six levels [in all], [at which agricultural planning ought to be done]. Please pay attention to taking a firm grasp of this agricultural planning and work on it. Programs and plans are one and the same thing; but [still] it would be a good thing [for us] to form the habit of calling it by the term "program." We must firmly implement [the principles of] of comprehensive planning,<sup>18</sup> of strengthening the leadership, of having the [Party] secretaries get down to work and having the entire Party participate in the running of the cooperatives.<sup>19</sup> In the latter half of last year, for instance, it was not the entire Party that participated in running the cooperatives, and the [Party] secretaries did not get down to doing much actual work. This year we must insist that things be done this way.

When will the planning be completed after all? I asked some comrades [about this]. At some places it has already been completed, but at other places it has not yet been fully completed. The emphasis now is on three levels, the province, [special] district, and *xian*. Can it be completed by this winter or next spring? If that cannot be done, it will have to be accomplished no matter what within next year, and it will have to be accomplished at all six levels. This is because we already

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have a few years' experience, and the Forty-Article Program for the Development of Agriculture for the entire country is almost completely done. The Forty-Article Program for the Development of Agriculture, the programs of the provinces, and those of the various other levels should all be taken to the countryside to be discussed. However, seven programs are too many to discuss all at once, so they should be taken to the masses separately and at intervals for contending, blooming, and debating. This refers to long-term plans. If we have a plan, and if, in the future, it does not fit [the situation], what should we do? [After we have] gained a few more years of experience, things will have to be revised. For instance, the "Forty Articles" will have to be revised in a few years. Things cannot remain unchanged. As I see it, generally things will undergo a small change every three years and a major change every five years.<sup>20</sup> Having a program is better than not having one. There are a total of twelve years [envisioned in the Forty-Article Program], two years have already passed, and there are only ten years left. If we do not take a firm grasp of things now, the targets stipulated in the "Forty Articles," [that is,] achieving 400 catties, 500 catties, and 800 catties of grain per *mu* on the three categories of land respectively, will be in danger of failure.<sup>21</sup> But if we take firm grasp of things, it is possible to accomplish this.

As I see it, China must survive on intensive and meticulous farming. In the future, China will become the country with the highest yield [per *mu*] in the world. Some *xian* are now already yielding 1,000 catties per *mu*; is it possible to develop to yield 2,000 catties per *mu* within half a century? In the future, will yield north of the Yellow River be 800 catties per *mu*, north of the Huai River 1,000 catties per *mu*, and south of the Huai River 2,000 catties per *mu*? [If we aim at] arriving at this standard by the early twenty-first century, there will still be several decades to go. Perhaps we won't need such a long time. We survive on intensive planting and meticulous farming;<sup>22</sup> even if we have more people, they will still have food to eat. As I see it, an average of three *mu* of land per person is too much; in the future [each person] will need only several *fen*<sup>23</sup> of land and will have quite enough to feed himself. Of course, we still have to control the birth rate; I am not here to encourage having [many] children.

Comrades, please get to the bottom of [the question of] the use of grain by the peasants. We must promote the [practice of] running the household diligently and frugally,<sup>24</sup> and be thrifty about food, so that there can be accumulation. If the nation has accumulation, the cooperative has accumulation, and the family has accumulation, with these three types of accumulation, we will get rich.<sup>25</sup> Otherwise, if we eat everything up, how can we be rich?

This year, wherever there has been a bumper harvest, wherever there has not been a [natural] calamity, the [proportion of] accumulation should be somewhat raised.<sup>26</sup> It is essential to save the surplus for relief in the lean years. In some provinces, the cooperatives have production costs that occupy 20 per cent of their gross product in addition to the public accumulation fund (5 per cent), the public welfare fund<sup>27</sup> (5 per cent), and administrative costs, and of this, the capital construction costs in turn occupy 20 per cent of the production costs. I discussed this with comrades from other provinces and they said that the capital construction

costs were probably a little too high. What I say to you today is all in the spirit of suggestion. If anything can be carried out, then let it be done. But if they cannot, then don't. Moreover, it doesn't have to be uniform for all provinces and all *xian*. You go study it. As for the administrative cost of cooperatives, in some places it has occupied too great a percentage [of the production] in the past and should be reduced to 1 per cent. By administrative costs we refer to the subsidies for the cooperatives' cadres and their official expenses. We must reduce the administrative costs and increase the expenditure on basic construction in the fields.

The Chinese people must have high aspirations. We should educate everybody in all the cities and rural areas in the entire country to have farsighted and grand goals and to have high aspirations. [If one] indulges in eating and drinking and eats up and drinks up everything, can that be considered as having a type of high aspiration? We must run our households with diligence and thrift, and have long-term plans. It is really unnecessary to give big banquets on [so-called] red and white "happy" occasions,<sup>28</sup> such as when one's son gets married or when someone dies. We should economize in these areas and should not be wasteful. This is a matter of reforming old habits. To change this habit, we must do it through a great blooming and great contending, or perhaps a small blooming and small contending, and argue things over. Then there is also [the habit of] gambling. These things were impossible to prohibit in the past, and only through great blooming and great contending and through debate can they be changed. I think that changing old habits should also be included in the planning.

There is also [the matter of] eliminating the Four Pests and paying attention to hygiene. I am very concerned with [the problem of] eradicating the Four [Pests]: rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes. We have only ten more years.<sup>29</sup> Can we make some preparations this year and do some mobilization [so that] we can start to work on this next spring? This is because flies are hatched during that season. I think we had better eliminate these things and make the whole nation pay a lot of attention to hygiene. This is a matter of culture, and we must raise the level of this culture greatly. We should hold a competition, and must resolutely eliminate these things so as to make everybody clean and sanitary. There can be discrepancies in achievement among the various provinces and also among the various *xian*. Anyway, we'll see who the hero is in the end. China must become a country of the four no's: first, no rats, second, no sparrows, third, no flies, and fourth, no mosquitoes.

Let's also have a ten-year program for birth control. It should not be promoted in the minority nationality regions, nor in sparsely populated areas. Even in the densely populated places we should also do some testing in selected spots, popularize [birth control] step by step, and gradually arrive at universal birth control. In [the matter of] birth control we must educate [people] openly, and at most there would be a great contending, great blooming, and great debate. The human race is in a state of total anarchy with regard to this problem of procreation; we cannot control ourselves. In the future, if we want to achieve total population planning, it cannot be done without [creating] a social force, without a consensus on the part of the people, and without the concerted effort of all.

Moreover, there is the problem of comprehensive planning. What I said just now



has to do with agricultural planning, but there is still the planning of industry, of trade, and of culture and education. It is absolutely necessary for there to be a comprehensive plan for industry, agriculture, commerce, and studying. We should bring them all together so they correspond with one another.

The experience [we have had in] planting experimental fields deserves to be propagated widely.<sup>30</sup> All the leading cadres of the *xian*, district, *xiang*, and cooperatives should each work on a small plot of land and experiment with it to see whether or not a high yield can be achieved, and what methods can be used to achieve a high yield.

We must get a clear picture of agricultural technology. We can't develop agriculture without learning the technology. Politics and vocation are a unity of opposites.<sup>31</sup> Politics is the primary thing and is in first place. We must combat the tendency of not paying attention to politics. However, to devote oneself exclusively to politics, and not know anything about technology or about one's vocation, won't do either. Our comrades, whether they are in industry or agriculture, in commerce, or in cultural and educational work, must all learn some technology and a vocation. I think that this will need a ten-year program also. Our cadres from all fields of work should all strive to be proficient at technology and at their vocations, to make themselves professionals, and to become both red and expert.<sup>32</sup> To say [that one can be] expert first and then red is to say [that one can be] white first before becoming red; this is a mistake, because that kind of person actually wants to remain white; [to say that he will become] red later is nothing but empty talk. At present even some cadres aren't red; they have a rich peasant mentality.<sup>33</sup> Some people are white; for example, the Rightists in the Party; they are white in politics and not expert in technology either. Some people are grey and others are pink. Those who are truly bright red, red like our five-star red flag,<sup>34</sup> those are the Leftists. However, it is not enough to be only red; one must also understand one's vocation and understand technology. At present many cadres are merely red, they are not expert, they do not understand their vocations, and they do not understand technology. The Rightists say that we cannot lead and that "amateurs cannot lead professionals." We refute the Rightists by saying, "we can lead."<sup>35</sup> Our ability is an ability in politics. As for technology, there are still many things that we do not yet understand; but technology can be learned.

Without a huge technological corps and a huge theoretical corps of its own, the proletariat is incapable of success in building socialism. Within the next ten years (the program for science was also [projected] for twelve years and there are ten years left), we must build up the ranks of proletarian intellectuals. Both our Party members and activists outside the Party must strive to become proletarian intellectuals. At all levels, especially at the provincial, [special] district, and *xian* levels, there must be plans to cultivate proletarian intellectuals. Otherwise, time will pass without people being cultivated. There is an old Chinese adage which says that "It takes ten years to cultivate a tree, but it takes a hundred years to cultivate a person."<sup>36</sup> [It says that] it takes a hundred years to cultivate a person. Let us subtract ninety years from that and cultivate people in ten years. It's wrong to say that it takes ten years to cultivate a tree; in the South it takes twenty-five years and in the

North even longer. On the other hand, it is possible to cultivate a person in ten years. We have already spent eight years, adding ten years to that would make eighteen years. We estimate that it is possible [in that time] to basically establish a corps of experts of the working class who possess Marxist ideology. After ten years, then, this corps will be expanded and [its standards] will be raised.

When we talk about the relationship between agriculture and industry, we, of course, take heavy industry as the core and give priority to the development of heavy industry. There is no doubt at all about this, and [we] will definitely not vacillate [on this matter].<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, given this condition, we must carry out simultaneous development of industry and agriculture, and gradually establish a modernized industry and a modernized agriculture. In the past we have often talked about building our country into an industrial country, but in fact this also includes the modernization of agriculture as well. For the moment, the emphasis should be on playing up agriculture. This problem has been discussed by Comrade Xiaoping too.<sup>38</sup>

The fourth point concerns two ways of doing things. We have at least two ways of doing things; one way will take longer to achieve our goals, and is thus somewhat inferior; the other way will take a shorter time to achieve our goals, and is thus somewhat better. One question involves speed, and another question involves quality. We must not consider only one method, but should always consider both methods. For instance, in building railways, we must have several plans regarding the route [of the railway] and choose one from among them. We can compare several different methods. At least [we should have] two methods to compare. For instance, should we have great contending and great blooming, or should we have small contending and small blooming? Should we or should we not have big-character posters? Which of these two methods is the better one? There are many such problems [to be solved]; it is just that people are unable to bloom.<sup>39</sup> There are thirty-four higher-level schools in Beijing, and in not one of them can there be any blooming, in not one of them can there be open and unrestrained blooming, because this is a matter of setting themselves on fire!<sup>40</sup> If people are to bloom, they have to be fully persuaded; moreover, there has to be considerable pressure [on them]. That means public appeals and holding a lot of meetings so that they can be ["checked"] and "forced to the hills."<sup>41</sup> In the past, when we were making revolution, there was this method and that, this policy and that, and there were many different opinions within the Party. Eventually we adopted a policy that was relatively suited to the circumstances. Therefore in both the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the period of the War of Liberation [we] were more advanced than any of the preceding periods.<sup>42</sup> Policies with regard to construction can also be either this way or that, and here, too, we must adopt the policy that is more suited to the circumstances.

The Soviet Union's experience in construction is relatively complete. By "complete" we mean including their mistakes as well. Without mistakes, it cannot be considered complete. Learning from the Soviet Union does not mean forcibly [uncritically] transplanting everything.<sup>43</sup> To forcibly transplant [everything] is dogmatism. It was [only] after we criticized dogmatism that we promoted [the idea of] learning from the Soviet Union, so there is no danger in it [for us]. After the rectification campaign in Yanan<sup>44</sup> and after the "Seventh Congress"<sup>45</sup> we put

emphasis on emulating the Soviet Union; this will not harm us, it will benefit us. We are experienced in making revolution, but we have only just begun [our work in] construction, and we have had only eight years' [experience]. The successes that we have achieved in construction are major ones, but we have not been without mistakes. We will still make mistakes in the future, but we hope to make fewer. In learning from the Soviet Union we must also study its mistakes. If we study those areas in which they made mistakes, we will be able to make fewer detours. Can we avoid the detours that the Soviet Union has taken, and [make our own] development faster in speed and better in quality than that of the Soviet Union? We must strive for this possibility. For instance, [in the matter of] steel production, can we achieve [an output level of] twenty million tons [per year] in three five-year plans or perhaps a bit longer? This is possible [if we put our] effort into it. To do it we will have to set up more small-scale steel plants. I think that more of those steel plants that produce thirty to fifty or seventy to eighty thousand tons [of steel] per year should be set up. They are very useful. Then there are those medium-sized [steel plants] that produce three or four hundred thousand tons a year; those should be set up too.

The fifth point is that last year we swept away a number of things. One thing was that we swept away [the slogan of] achieving greater, faster, better, and more economical results.<sup>46</sup> We don't want "greater," and we don't want "faster" anymore, and we also swept away the "better" and "more economical." I don't think that there is anybody who would oppose having "better" and "more economical" [results]; it is about the "greater" and "faster" that people are displeased, and some comrades have called it "adventurism."<sup>47</sup> Originally "better" and "more economical" were [put into the slogan] to modify "greater" and "faster." "Better" refers to better quality, "more economical" refers to spending less money, "greater" refers to doing more projects, and "faster" also refers to doing more things. This slogan sets limitations on itself, because there are the terms "better" and "more economical." Since the quality [of things] has to be good and less money is to be spent, then it will be impossible to have unrealistically "great" or unrealistically "fast" [results]. What delighted me was that at this meeting a couple of comrades touched on this problem. What's more, I also saw this article in a newspaper that mentioned this problem. What we are talking about is a realistic<sup>48</sup> slogan of "greater, faster, better, and more economical [results]" which has fact as its basis, rather than a [slogan of] "greater, faster, better, and more economical [results]" based on subjectivism. We will always want to do our best to achieve a little greater, and a little faster [results], but we are opposing "greater" and "faster" [goals] that are based on subjectivism. In the latter half of last year a gust of wind swept this slogan away, but I still would like to restore it [now]. Is that possible? Please study [this question] a bit.<sup>49</sup>

The Forty-Article Program for the Development of Agriculture, too, was swept away. This "Forty-Article" [Program] has not been popular since last year, but now it is being "restored."

Moreover, the Committee to Promote Progress was swept away.<sup>50</sup> I have said that there are the Communist Party's Central Committee, the Party committees at all levels, the State Council, and the People's Committees at all levels;<sup>51</sup> in a word,

there are many "committees," and the principal one of these is the Party committee. Is its character actually that of a committee to promote progress, or is it that of a committee to promote regression? It should be a committee to promote progress. I think that the Kuomintang is a committee to promote regression, and the Communist Party is a committee to promote progress. The committee to promote progress that was swept away by that gust of wind last year, can it be restored now? If everybody disapproves of restoring it and wants to organize a committee to promote regression, then since so many of you want to promote regression, there is nothing I can do about it. However, from what we saw at this meeting, everybody wants to promote progress, and there is not a single speech that said that regression ought to be promoted. What seeks to promote regression among us is that Rightist Zhang-Luo Alliance.<sup>52</sup> There can be temporary and partial regression for certain things which have indeed gone ahead too fast and have become inappropriate. This means backing off a step or slowing down a bit. However, our general policy is always to promote progress.

The sixth point concerns the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the contradiction between the socialist road and the capitalist road. There is absolutely no doubt that this is the primary contradiction in our society today.<sup>53</sup> Our present mission is different from [our mission] in the past. In the past our task was mainly to have the proletariat lead the masses of the people in opposing imperialism and feudalism.<sup>54</sup> That mission has already been accomplished. Well, then, what is the primary contradiction in the present? At present it is the socialist revolution; the thrust of the revolution is against the bourgeoisie, and at the same time, [it is aimed at] transforming the system of small-scale production, which means putting cooperativization into effect. The primary contradiction therefore is [between] socialism and capitalism and [between] collectivism and individualism; that is, generally speaking, the contradiction between the two roads, socialism and capitalism. The Resolution of the Eighth Congress did not mention this problem. There is one paragraph in the Resolution of the "Eighth Congress" that states that the primary contradiction is between the advanced socialist system and the backward social forces of production.<sup>55</sup> This way of putting things is incorrect. At the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee<sup>56</sup> we put forth the idea that after the victory in the whole country has been achieved, domestically the primary contradiction would become that between the working class and the bourgeoisie, while internationally [the primary contradiction] would be between China and imperialism. Subsequently, although this [idea] was not put forth publicly, in fact things were done accordingly. The revolution has already shifted to [being a] socialist revolution, and what we have been trying to achieve is precisely this socialist revolution. The Three Great Transformations represent a socialist revolution, principally a socialist revolution in the area of the system of ownership of the means of production. This has already been basically achieved. This is a sharp class struggle.

In the latter half of last year there has been a relaxation of the class struggle; that was [because] of a conscious effort to relax. However, once we relaxed, the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intellectuals, landlords, rich peasants and some well-to-do middle peasants attacked us; this is what happened this year. As soon as we

relaxed a bit, they attacked; that's all right too, and we have seized the initiative. This is exactly as an editorial in *Renmin ribao* says, "the tree prefers calm but the wind will not subside."<sup>57</sup> Well, they want to blow! They want to blow up a fierce typhoon.<sup>58</sup> Good, in that case we will form a "protective forest shelter belt." This is an anti-Rightist [campaign], and a rectification [campaign].

There are two tasks for this rectification [campaign]. One task is to oppose the Rightists; that includes opposing bourgeois ideology. Another task is rectification and transformation. Rectification and transformation also consist of a two-line struggle. Subjectivism, bureaucratism, and factionalism are bourgeois things. These three things exist within our Party; this debt must be put on the bourgeoisie's account. But can it still be put [on their account] a hundred or two hundred years from now? By that time it will probably be difficult to pin it [on them].<sup>59</sup> Will there be bureaucratism and subjectivism then? There will be, and then it will have to be put on the account of the backward [people]. There will always be the Left, middle, and Right, and the advanced, average, and backward, in a society. If, at that time, you [still] commit [the errors of] bureaucratism and subjectivism, then you are simply backward.

The rectification campaign should last until the first of May next year. There is still such a lot of time. Should it be relaxed a bit after May 1? I think that there should be some relaxation again. Is relaxing to be considered a Rightist tendency? I don't think it should be considered a Rightist tendency. It's like holding meetings. If you just go on holding meetings, holding them in the daytime and holding them at night, too, and do this nonstop for half a year, I think a lot of people will disappear. Therefore work, too, must be done in accordance with conditions; sometimes it should be intense, sometimes it should be relaxed. We achieved such a great victory last year, and people were very obedient and compliant, and beat their gongs and sounded their drums.<sup>60</sup> If you don't relax a bit, it would be difficult to convince people [that you are right], and [besides], there aren't adequate reasons [for you to say that you couldn't relax a bit]. We said that the problem of the ownership system was basically solved; we didn't say that it was completely solved. The class struggle has not stopped. Therefore it is not a matter of conceding principles, but a matter of the conditions calling for a bit of relaxation.

I think that the rectification [campaign] should be carried out until next May 1, and then should not be carried over into the second half of next year. Whether or not it should be carried out once again in the countryside in the second half of next year, whether or not there should be another debate, will depend on whether or not there is a need for it at the time, and should be left for discussion next year. It should be carried out again the year after next. If we do not carry out [rectification] the year after next, if we do not do it for a number of years, those old and new Rightists and those Rightists who have emerged just now would be restless and would want to act. Then there are also the right-of-center people, middle-of-the-roaders, and even some Leftists who will want to change. There are such strange people in the world; as soon as you relax your pressure and relax it for such a considerable length of time, Rightist sentiments will arise, and unsound or Rightist arguments will crop up. We must constantly carry on the education of our armed forces with regard to

the Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Great Points for Attention.<sup>61</sup> As soon as you leave a gap of a few months in which they are not enforced, things will get loose and out of hand. It is necessary to pump things up several times each year. As soon as new recruits arrive they should be educated. As for old soldiers and veteran cadres, if you do not carry out rectification, their ideology will change too.

Incidentally, let me talk a bit here about where our opinions differ from those of the Soviet Union. First of all, on the question of Stalin, we have contradictions with Khrushchev. He made Stalin appear so terrible! We do not agree with that, because he was made to appear so ugly! This is not a matter for their country alone; it is a matter that concerns all countries. We hang Stalin's portrait outside our Tiananmen;<sup>62</sup> this is in accord with the wishes of the laboring people of the whole world, and it demonstrates our basic differences with Khrushchev. As for Stalin himself, you should also give him [an evaluation of] 30 per cent [bad] and 70 per cent [good].<sup>63</sup> Stalin's achievements count for 70 per cent; his mistakes count for 30 per cent. Even this may not be accurate; [his] mistakes may only be 20 per cent or perhaps only 10 per cent, or perhaps a little more than [20 per cent]. In any case, Stalin's achievements are primary while his shortcomings and mistakes are secondary. On this point we and Khrushchev hold differing opinions.

Then there is the problem of peaceful transition [to socialism]. We and Khrushchev and his group have different opinions [on this matter]. We believe that all proletarian political parties, no matter what country [they may be in], have two strategies: First, a strategy of peace, and second, a strategy of war.<sup>64</sup> In the first strategy, the Communist Party demands peaceful transformation from the ruling class; it will emulate the slogan that Lenin proposed during the period between the February Revolution and the October Revolution.<sup>65</sup> We, too, once raised the issue of negotiating peace with Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>66</sup> This slogan, [proposed] before the bourgeoisie and before the enemy, was a defensive slogan—it shows that we wanted peace not war—to facilitate our winning over the masses. This is a slogan in which we take the initiative; it is a strategic slogan. However, the bourgeoisie will certainly not surrender its political power voluntarily; it will use violence [to preserve it]. In that case, the second strategy [must be used]. If they want to fight, and after they have fired the first shot, all we can do is fight [back]. The armed seizure of political power is a tactical slogan. If you say that it definitely has to be a peaceful transition, then you are no different from the social democratic parties. Japan's Socialist Party is like that. It has only one [tactic]; it will never resort to violence. All the socialist parties in the world are like that.<sup>67</sup> The proletarian parties, [however,] in general, are still better off with two [tactics]; the first is that a gentleman would rather talk than fight; the second is that when a mean person wants to fight, then I [the gentleman] will fight, too.<sup>68</sup> This way of setting our own conditions is free of defects and takes care of all angles. Otherwise, things won't work. There are parties in some countries today, such as the Communist Party of Great Britain, that issue only the slogan of peaceful transition. We've talked with the leaders of the British Party, but we have always failed to reach agreement. Of course they are proud; they say, "who says that the slogan of peaceful transition was suggested by Khrushchev; we suggested that long ago!"

Besides, our comrades in the Soviet Union do not comprehend our policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend.<sup>69</sup> What we are talking about is letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools contend within the confines of socialism and among the people; it does not include counterrevolutionaries. Of course the people may split up among themselves, and some people may become enemies. For instance the Rightists; in the past they were part of the people, now I think only one-third of these people belong to the people, and two-thirds of them belong to the counterrevolutionaries. Are we to deprive them of their voting rights? Except for some individuals who are to be dealt with legally and are to be sent down to engage in labor reform, in which case they will be deprived of their voting rights, generally it would be better not to deprive [them of their voting rights].<sup>70</sup> We can even allow some to become members of the Political Consultative Conference; after all, the Political Consultative Conference can [be expanded to] include more than a thousand members.<sup>71</sup> In form the Rightists still belong to the people, but in reality they are enemies [of the people]. Let us announce publicly that they are the enemy and that the contradiction between them and us is a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves,<sup>72</sup> because they oppose socialism, oppose the leadership of the Communist Party, and oppose the dictatorship of the proletariat. In any case, they do not meet the six standards.<sup>73</sup> They are poisonous weeds.<sup>74</sup> It does not matter when, but some poisonous weeds will always spring from among the people.

Finally, we must pick up our spirits and devote ourselves to hard work in order to learn. The phrase “devote ourselves to hard work” contains three [key] words; one is “devote,” another is “hard,” and the third is “work.” We absolutely have to pick up our spirits and devote ourselves to hard work. There are many comrades among us now who are not devoted to hard work. Some comrades devote their extra energy after work mainly to such things as playing cards, playing *majong*, and dancing. I don't think that's good. We ought to devote [our] extra energy after work mainly to studying and forming a habit of studying. What should we study? One [thing to study] is Marxism-Leninism, another is applied sciences, and a third is natural sciences. There's also literature, mainly literary theory. Leading cadres must understand some of this. Moreover, there is journalism, education, and so on. One should also know something about these. All in all, there are many [branches of] learning, and generally [each] should be slightly touched upon. This is because we must lead in all these matters! What kind of professionals are people like ourselves called?<sup>75</sup> We are called professional politicians. How could it be, if we didn't understand these things and did not lead in these matters? Each province has newspapers, but in the past they were not taken hold of, nor were the literary journals or literary organizations taken hold of in the past. Moreover, the United Front<sup>76</sup> and the democratic parties were not taken hold of, nor was education. None of these things were taken hold of. Consequently, fine, it has been exactly in these areas that rebellion has cropped up. Once [these areas] are taken hold of, the situation will change in a few months. Luo Longji<sup>77</sup> says, “How can the petty intellectuals of the proletariat lead the great intellectuals of the petty bourgeoisie?” This argument of his is wrong. He claims to be petty bourgeois; in fact he is

bourgeois. It is precisely the “petty intellectuals” of the proletariat who must lead the great intellectuals of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat has a corps of intellectuals serving it; the first one is Marx, then Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and then people like us, and many more. The proletariat is the most advanced class; it will lead the revolution throughout the entire world.

## Notes

1. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 1. See also text Sept. 15, 1956, and text Oct. 7, 1957, note 2.
2. The character here is *fang*. For the meaning and political significance of this word used by itself, see text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14; text April 10, 1957, note 1; and text April 1957(2), notes 4 and 17.
3. The term Mao uses here is *zheng gai*. See text Oct. 7, 1957, note 23.
4. See text Autumn 1956, note 1, and text July 8, 1957(2), note 40. It should be noted that here, in the speeches of October 7 and 9, 1957, Mao seems to have for the first time combined these four things in an almost sloganized manner, or, as Mao puts it here, formularized as a “format” for social struggle.
5. The first term here refers to the Five Major Movements conducted in the PRC from 1949 to 1952: the land reform movement, the movement to Resist U.S. [Aggression] and Aid Korea, the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries, the “Three-Anti's” and “Five-Anti's” movements, and the movements for ideological transformation. The second term refers to the socialist transformation in the three areas of agriculture, handicraft industries, and private industrial and commercial enterprises, the completion of which, in 1953, marked the conclusion of the “democratic revolution” and of the recovery of the national economy, and the beginning of the transition to socialism. The accomplishments of the Five Major Movements were summarized in Zhou Enlai's speech to the Fourth Session of the First People's Congress on June 26, 1957.
6. See text Feb. 27, 1957.
7. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, source note and notes 1 and 2. See also text Oct. 7, 1957, note 35.
8. This criticism emerged in an essay written by Chu Anping in early 1957. See text July 1, 1957, note 4.
9. The term for “sedan chair” is *jiao*. In traditional China, the *jiao* has, in the main, two uses. One is for brides on the day of their wedding, and the other is for personages of importance, particularly magistrates or government officials. In the first sense, then, to “get on the sedan chair” conveys a sense of “starting something new; to get committed.” In the second sense, it has the meaning of “take office.” It is possible that Mao's implicit meaning here encompasses both senses of the term.
10. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24.
11. The SW, V note for this provides the textual reference: “‘The Democratic Movement in the Army,’ Note 1, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. IV.” See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 18.
12. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note.
13. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29.
14. See text June 6, 1950, vol. I, note 11.
15. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80.
16. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see the well-known *RMRB* editorials “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” and “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.” (*RMRB* [April 5, 1956], and *RMRB* [Dec. 29, 1956].) See also text Jan. 18, 1957, note 22.
17. See text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3.

18. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 6.
19. This last expression, encapsulated in the two phrases *shuji dongshou quan dang ban she*, was the title of one of the editor's notes that Mao wrote for the book *Gaochao* (see text Dec. 27, 1955[2], vol. I). Since the appearance of this book and of Mao's notes, these phrases have become a slogan for a general involvement in the promotion of cooperativization.
20. This corresponds with Mao's suggestion earlier that there will be need for a *rectification* every three or five years. See text July 8, 1957(2), paragraph 8.
21. See text Dec. 21, 1955, vol. I, note 8.
22. This term, *jing geng xi zuo*, refers to a labor-intensive, only semimechanized but collectivized form of farming (predominantly grain agriculture) that operates on the basis of the most seedling-intensive planting that science would possibly allow, and as many crops, or harvests, as possible. But to make allowances for these, the agriculture would call for a much greater degree of labor involvement and care in both planning and taking care of the crops.
23. *Fen* is one-tenth of a *mu*; thus approximately .67 hectare.
24. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 57.
25. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 75.
26. See text Feb. 27, 1957, notes 65 and 68.
27. See text April 25, 1956, note 26.
28. In China, red is traditionally the dominant color for felicitous occasions, such as weddings and birthdays, which are therefore known as "red" occasions. White dominates and stands for the solemnity of events of bereavement and death, which are therefore known as "white" occasions. By custom, events of either type cannot be private affairs, but instead usually involve the participation of the family or clan in the broadest sense, as well as large groups of neighbors and friends.
29. See text Dec. 21, 1955, vol. I, note 9; also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 24. The program for eliminating the Four Pests was promulgated in the Forty-Article Program for Agricultural Development in early 1956 (Article 27) and was scheduled to be accomplished in "five, seven, or twelve years." Thus, by this time Mao refers to ten years remaining for the completion of this goal.
30. The cultivation of experimental fields (*shiyian tian*) refers to the program of having Party cadres go down to the basic levels in the countryside and take part in productive labor. This was understood to be part of the rectification campaign of 1957 and was inspired by the Party directives on the rectification campaign (see *RMSC* [1958], pp. 29–30), and the Party directives regarding having leading cadres participate in physical labor (May 10, 1957, see *RMSC* [1958], pp. 43–44). This notion is combined with the idea of having such cadres experiment with new cultivation techniques such as close planting or deep plowing to attain higher yields and thus render their experimental fields examples for the peasants. However, the emphasis was still on having cadres discard and reform their bureaucratic tendencies and get out of their offices. The program was possibly tentatively promoted in spots soon after the May 10, 1957 directives were issued. On November 29, 1957, the Hubei Provincial Committee of the CPC sent a report to the Central Committee on the subject, based on the experience of Hongan *xian*. This led to a chain of events resulting in the promulgation of the Central Committee's directive on experimental-plot cultivation on February 14, 1958 (see *RMRB* [Feb. 15, 1958], 1), which was incorporated eventually into the "Sixty Articles on Work Methods (Draft)" (Article 18).
31. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 34.
32. "Red" refers to a strong and correct adherence to socialist or Communist ideology. Earlier in the present plenum, Deng Xiaoping made the Report on the Rectification Campaign in which he proposed that the Party must cultivate cadres who are both red and expert. (See *RMSC* [1958], p. 35.) Subsequent discussions on this topic appeared in editorials in *Zhongguo qingnian bao* (China Youth Daily; Oct. 31, 1957), and *RMRB* (Mar. 23, 1958), and also, most importantly, in a directive issued by Mao on January 31, 1958 (see text Jan. 31, 1958). See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 72.

33. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, notes 1 and 2, and text Sept. 25, 1956(2), note 2.
34. This refers to the national flag of the PRC.
35. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 72. See also notes 75 and 77 here.
36. This is an aphorism adapted from the passage in the book *Guan zi*, in the chapter titled "Chuan xiu": "When one's plan is for a year, the best thing is to plant rice; when one's plan is for ten years, the best thing is to plant a tree; but if one's plan is for a lifetime, the best thing is to cultivate a person. The planting of grain brings in an equal harvest, the planting of a tree brings a tenfold return, but the cultivation of a person bring a hundredfold reward." This aphorism has become, in Chinese lore, the epitome of the humanistic value of education.
37. Mao is referring to the basic principle in determining the proper relationship among heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture that was articulated in April of the previous year in his own famous "On the Ten Major Relations" speech. See text April 25, 1956, section 1, first sentence.
38. Mao is referring to Deng Xiaoping's Report on the Rectification Campaign made at the present plenum on September 23, and more specifically to section 3 of that report. Deng was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC. For this report, see *RMSC* (1958), pp. 33–42, *RMRB* (Oct. 19, 1951), 1. For an English translation, see R. Bowie and J. K. Fairbank, eds. (1962), pp. 341–362.
39. The character here, again, is *fang*. See note 2.
40. See the opening discussions of Mao's speeches on July 8 and 9, 1957.
41. On the usage of the Chinese characters here, *jiangjun*, for "check" as in the game of chess, see text Mar. 1, 1957, note 32. On the meaning of the other saying that is translated here as "forced to the hills," see text April 1957(2), note 62. There is also a note on this latter item in *SW*, V, p. 497.
42. See text Feb. 27, 1957, notes 5 and 7.
43. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 27, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 34. Since late 1956, Mao had contended with the subject of China's need to learn from the Soviet Union in terms of revolutionary theory and experience. The idea of learning selectively became a general guideline in early 1957, but here, after the experiences of mid-1957, Mao speaks much more critically, and in a way much more negatively, of the idea of learning from the Soviet Union, emphasizing "learning from its mistakes" as much as from its achievements.
44. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9; also text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24.
45. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 2.
46. See text April 25, 1956, note 6.
47. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 22, and text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 10.
48. The term that Mao uses here is *shishi qiu shi*, which, it appears, took on sloganistic proportions in the latter half of 1957 (and would continue to have such importance, almost ironically, in the years of the Great Leap Forward). The usage of it in 1957, as we have seen earlier, and here as well, was primarily in the context of the rectification campaign, against subjectivism, one of the three main targets of that campaign in 1957. For the meaning of the phrase, see text May 15, 1957, note 16.
49. The quotation marks that appear in this paragraph in this translation do not appear in the original Chinese text. It is normally against the principle of this translation to put quotation marks where they do not exist in the original text. Nevertheless, in this case we have made an exception in order to provide what we feel is a more fluent and grammatical translation.
50. For reference, see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 10. On this subject, in general, see text Jan. 20, 1956, paragraph 2, and text Nov. 15, 1956, paragraph 3.
51. See text July 1957(1), note 24.
52. See text July 1, 1957, source note and notes 3 and 8.
53. See text July 1957(1), source note. See also text Oct. 7, 1957, paragraphs 1, 5, 8, 13, and 14. For the precise theoretical (and combative) significance of Mao's formulation here, see text Oct. 7, 1957, note 16.
54. See text Oct. 7, 1957, paragraphs 1 and 2.

55. See text Oct. 7, 1957, source note and notes 3, 16, and 38; see also text Nov. 15, 1956, source note and note 1.

56. See text June 6, 1950(2), vol. I, note 1.

57. “Han Ying (Western Han Dynasty), *Commentary on the Book of Songs*, Chapter 9.” (*SW*, V, p. 497, note 5.) The original, which translates as the tree prefers to be calm but, alas, the wind will not subside; the child would render its filial dues but, alas, the parent is no longer living, obviously holds a very different contextual meaning than the way in which it is cited here, where Mao uses it to suggest that the existence of class struggle is an objective reality, neither brought on deliberately by the human will nor to be eliminated in a similar fashion. The first adaptation of this classical saying to its current usage was done in an editorial in *RMRB* (June 22, 1957), 1.

58. See text May 15, 1957, note 21.

59. See text Oct. 7, 1957, paragraph 6.

60. See text April 1957(2), note 59.

61. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 6.

62. See text May 1, 1957, source note.

63. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 12. See also text Jan. 18, 1957, note 23, and text Mar. 12, 1957, note 22.

64. As suggested in the source note here, these final paragraphs in this speech forecast the polemical essays published by the CPC leadership as *RMRB* editorials in which the CPSU Khrushchev-dominated leadership was severely criticized. They became known as the “Nine Criticisms,” or *yi zhi jiu ping* (Criticisms No. 1 to No. 9). This particular paragraph seems to forecast specifically the fifth and sixth of the essays, titled “The Two Lines on the Subject of War and Peace,” and “Two Policies of Peaceful Coexistence that Are Fundamentally Opposed to Each Other,” respectively. (Published November 19, 1963, and December 12, 1963, respectively.)

65. After the February Revolution in 1917 in Russia, a dyarchy existed, consisting of the provisional government and the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviet. On returning to Russia in April, Lenin diagnosed that the task of pushing forward the revolution that had begun rested with the proletariat and not with the bourgeoisie, and thus with the Soviet, which represented workers and soldiers, and not with the provisional government. His strategy, embodied in the “April Theses,” was to employ the Petrograd Soviet as the base of Bolshevik revolutionary power, to effect the transition of political power from the bourgeois provisional government to the government of the proletariat. The slogan he advanced was “All political power to the Soviet.” This was understood as a “peaceful” slogan aimed at a political transition. It represented only one part of a dual strategy, because at the same time the Bolshevik party was not to give up its preparations for armed struggle. We have found out that in early August 1957, Mao was paying special attention to this piece of Lenin’s writing. See text Aug. 4, 1957, note 1.

66. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 5.

67. Although the characters Mao uses here, *shehui dang*, refer, strictly speaking, to “socialist” parties and are therefore translated here as such, we believe that he intended to refer to “social democratic” parties instead, which are not the same as socialist parties *per se*. Also, with regard to the situation in Japan, Mao probably did not mean to single out the Japanese Socialist Party as a pacifist, war-renouncing party; he had to be aware that Japan itself, as a whole, had “constitutionally” renounced war. The subject had come up during a conversation that Mao had with a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party on April 21 (see text April 21, 1957, especially note 10).

68. These sayings are derived from Lu Xun’s novel, *Ah Q zhengzhuan* (The True Story of Ah Q), chapter 3, where Ah Q suggests that a “moral victory” can be won by the antagonist who refuses to resort to physical violence. For the novelette, see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 38.

69. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.

70. See text Oct. 7, 1957, note 30.

71. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, source note.

72. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

73. Mao is referring to the six “political standards” that he suggested in his article “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” (see text Feb. 27, 1957) to distinguish between “poisonous weeds” and “fragrant flowers” and for the individual to distinguish between right and wrong in his or her own deeds and words. For details, see text Feb. 27, 1957, section 8, paragraph 8.

74. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.

75. The Chinese word here, translated as “professionals,” is *jia*, which could also mean “school” (as in *bai jia zheng ming*—let a hundred schools contend) and thus brings back connections to that slogan. The word refers to people who are recognized experts, or have established professional standing, in any particular field (but often refer especially to academic fields). Thus the Chinese for “scientist” is *kexue jia*, and for “artist,” it is *yishu jia*. Mao appears to be sarcastic here. Implicit in what he is saying is the reference to the presence of many *jia*, or recognized experts, in many academic and nonacademic fields among the “bourgeois Rightists” (many of whom were intellectuals), and yet, Mao seems to be warning them, when it comes to political matters, the CPC remains the expert. See also note 35 above.

76. See text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.

77. See text July 1, 1957, note 8. On this last paragraph refer also to note 35 here.

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### Speech at the Conclusion of the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee (Version II) (October 9, 1957)

**Source:** *Ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 192–195.

*See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), source note. Since the two versions of this speech are so similar in the main part, we have cross-referenced footnotes in this version (i.e., Version II) to footnotes in Version I where they correspond, rather than to earlier appearances of the subjects annotated in this volume.*

1. Let us render a judgment—has this conference, after all, been a good one? Or a bad one? The provincial Party secretaries say it has been a very good one. I’m afraid there are some comrades who might not necessarily see things that way. The meeting has been very long and very exhausting. Some comrades caught a cold; I, too, caught a cold. [Still], I’m sure the achievements are the primary [aspect]! [We have] exchanged experiences, clarified and affirmed [our] orientation, unified our will and determination; [all this] is of very great benefit [to us]. [I] did not attend two days [of meetings in] this conference and [I] have not yet even read all of the speeches made. I plan to read them all once over; some may call for being read twice. I’m also afraid that you may not [have the chance] to read all of them; I hope that you, too, would read [all of them] once over. There has been, this time around,

a very good experience in speech making. A meeting of this kind has to be held once a year. We are a large country; [our] work is very complicated. Each year<sup>1</sup> we should hold a conference like this one, with [people at] the four levels of the province, the [special] district, the *xian*, and the district participating. Add to that some of the cooperatives' directors. The Central Committee plans to have some *xian* Party secretaries take part [at its plenum] next year. I propose that we [hold a plenum] once a year. Last year we did not [hold a plenum] and we suffered for it; a Right deviation came upon us, and we lost energy in our work. (It was because we held the Eighth Congress<sup>2</sup> and [so] we had no time [to hold a plenum].) Once a year, [and] it takes about a month's time. Each province can hold a four-levels cadres' conference, so as to make things clear on the problems.

2. [Let me] say a few words on rectification. The slogan proposed by [the people from] Hubei: "Bloom boldly; bloom thoroughly; bloom resolutely"<sup>3</sup> is good. The *Nanfang ribao* in Guangdong [Province] took this as a title and wrote an editorial on it; that is very good. It even said that [in addition to] blooming boldly, thoroughly, and resolutely, [we must also] correct [things] earnestly. The anti-Rightist [campaign] is now already on track; there is no need to make a proposal that [we] oppose [the Rightists] boldly (in the main, there is still a need to oppose the Rightists in the base levels beneath the [level of the] *xian*). There is still some blooming to be done [at the level of] the provinces and the Center, but the main issue is still one of correcting.<sup>4</sup> This year's rectification [campaign] created a form of revolution, namely [that of] several bigs: "Big contending, big blooming, big competing, and big-character posters."<sup>5</sup> We have now discovered this form, which in the past had eluded us and which we were not able to produce. It was not permitted then for there to be layer-by-layer debates—because of the land reform<sup>6</sup> and because we were engaged in fighting a war we were not able to adopt the kind of situation that we are now in. Now we have obtained victory throughout the country, and the regime is a secure one; [so we can] use [the method of] putting the facts on the table and talking reason to handle the contradictions among the people.<sup>7</sup> We have found a form [of struggle] that is appropriate to the class struggle, and so from now on things will be much easier to handle. Whether it is a matter of big issues of right and wrong,<sup>8</sup> or [relatively] small issues of right and wrong; whether it is rectification, or construction; we can use the form of debating to resolve it. Not only [can we debate] with those in the middle, but [we can do it] with the Rightists, and [in the] countryside with the landlords and rich peasants.<sup>9</sup> Things can go into the newspapers, and [they can] deal with such things as [our] being scolded with terrible fury,<sup>10</sup> such things as [the accusation that] "the Party is taking the country to be its own domain" and "get off the sedan chair," etc.<sup>11</sup> This is a good form [of struggle]; it is conducive to developing and giving play to the masses' initiative, activism and sense of responsibility. In the past, too, there was discussion [with the masses in the form of] sinking roots and making alliances,<sup>12</sup> [such as in] the friendly talks between the company commanders and the [common] soldiers that were done on a basis of equality. That is a tradition of democracy, and without that tradition we could not possibly have the "several bigs." In the Yanan

rectification [campaign]<sup>13</sup> our method was to take notes, hold small group discussions, do self-examination—everyone felt that it helped him a great deal. We did it for several months, and that time we overcame subjectivism.<sup>14</sup> Since then, there has been the "Three Inspections and Three Rectifications" [campaign], the "Three-Anti's and Five-Anti's" [campaigns],<sup>15</sup> and [in each case the work of] sinking roots and making alliances expressed a certain democratic form. Yet the even greater democratic form of big contending, big blooming and big debating was produced [only] this time around. It is to the extremely great benefit of the Party's cause, and to [its] overcoming bureaucratism and commandism<sup>16</sup> that we have found this form. This is a tremendous development of the tradition of democracy, and it must be passed onward. Socialism must be able to make the fullest use of democracy; only socialism has this kind of democracy; other classes do not. If we can carry out centralization on such a basis it would strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and establish a consolidated system of centralism. Democracy is for the purpose of strengthening, not weakening, the system of centralism.<sup>17</sup> The size of China's [industrial] proletariat is small; it is only several tens of millions [of people], and [to carry out its] dictatorship [it] will have to rely on the several hundreds of millions of poor and lower-middle peasants, on the revolutionary intelligentsia, on the poor people in the cities; it must mobilize their activism and enthusiasm, and only then can it consolidate its dictatorship and strengthen the centralism.

3. Agriculture. When the Forty-Articles [Program] is issued downward after revisions have been made,<sup>18</sup> I hope that a debate will be organized properly about it in the countryside. [We must] raise the standards of [our people's] understanding [of it] and [have them] draw up the plans. I have made a bit of inquiry [about this] at [each level]—the provinces, the [special] districts, the *xian*, the districts, the *xiang*, and the cooperatives. The provinces, the *xian*, the *xiang*, and the cooperatives should draw up plans; same thing with the special districts and the districts. These six levels should take action, and promote things with a firm grasp. [We have said:] "Comprehensive planning (that's planning); strengthen leadership; with the [Party] secretaries taking action, the whole Party will get involved in running cooperatives."<sup>19</sup> In the latter half of last year we failed to give this much emphasis. This is an old slogan, [but] right now we must still emphasize it and carry it out. When should we be done with drawing up the plans? I have put this question to some comrades, and [find that] some have already made their plans while others have not yet completed [them]. I wonder if we should have the three levels of provincial, [special] district, and *xian* [plans] made up by next spring? Or, let us say, before "May First" next year. If it cannot be done, then let it be by the end of the next year. This is long-term planning—ten years to twenty years. After the plans are drawn up, they may not necessarily be found to be entirely suitable; in that case they can be revised in the future; revision is bound to be necessary. In general, I would say, a small revision in three years, and a major overhaul in five years.<sup>20</sup> It is better to have plans than to not have them. There are only ten more years [left in the plan]; if we do not take things firmly in our grasp, the [goal of reaching] "four [hundred], five [hundred], eight [hundred catties]" will stand in peril.<sup>21</sup> If we do

take things firmly in our grasp, [on the other hand,] we can accomplish that goal. We must rely on intensive planting and meticulous farming<sup>22</sup> to feed ourselves. Our country will become, in the future, the country with the highest [agricultural] yield in the world; even now we already have the thousand-catties [per *mu*] *xian* in Chaozhou-Shantou.<sup>23</sup> Is it possible to raise “four [hundred], five [hundred], eight [hundred]” to “eight [hundred], a thousand, two thousand”? I think that it is possible; with twenty, thirty more years’ time that would be possible. Things move with great speed in the twentieth century. We shouldn’t do things any more in accordance with the old calendrical almanacs. At the latest, [I think], we will be able to reach [those goals] in the early–twenty-first century. As I see it, in agricultural production, we don’t need so much land; as long as we have the people, things would be easier to handle. Each person needs no more than several *fen*;<sup>24</sup> to have three *mu* of land is somewhat excessive. Of course, there is still the matter of birth control. I am not encouraging population growth. The plans at every level should be brought to the countryside for discussion. Where there are many plans, they can be discussed in batches at one level at a time. We already have a solid foundation as far as grain is concerned. [For each person,] averaging out the grown-ups and children, 400 catties [of grain per year] should be enough. This does not include seed grain and feed for the livestock. The [secretary for the special] district committee of Xiangtan in Hunan Province made a speech, saying that there was this household of seven people, with 509 catties for each person, and they were able to consume only 400 catties of that, leaving a surplus of 109 catties for each person. In the South, 400 catties of rice is enough; in Hebei, they need only 320 catties, or 310 catties, or even 280 catties. The results of the debates in northern Hebei show that in the past, even the well-to-do middle peasants consumed only as much as 360 catties, and they made a lot of noise yelling and screaming that they didn’t have enough to eat; that they were being starved to death. We must do a good job of promoting [the principle of] running the household diligently and frugally.<sup>25</sup> Only with economy comes accumulation. The state, the cooperative, the family all need to accumulate.<sup>26</sup> Otherwise, if they all eat up what there is, how can they ever be well-off? Places that have not suffered calamities this year and where the harvest has been good must resolutely accomplish [the goal of] “supplementing the shortages with a bumper yield,”<sup>27</sup> and do more accumulation. [The province of] Hunan suggested that we accumulate 20 per cent as production costs (including the public accumulation funds and public welfare funds),<sup>28</sup> to the tune of a total of 600 million *rmb* for the province. This would not be ordinary production funds, but funds with which to purchase fertilizers and repair farming implements, including 28 per cent basic [construction;] (things in the mountainous regions will be different from those on the plains; there will be places where more can be done and others where there will be less.) This means 120 million *rmb* each year. If this can be done that would be very good. You give it some thought; if it can be done, then go and do it; if it cannot be done, then don’t. Otherwise, if too much deduction is made, there would be no superiority [to the system].<sup>29</sup> Administrative costs must, without fail, be reduced to come within the limit of 1 per cent, and let it be added to on top of the base level. We must educate people throughout the country so that every

single person has noble aspirations and determination, and lofty and noble goals. When we get to the twenty-first century, the situation in the whole world will be greatly changed. We must be able to see this. To eat a lot and drink a lot doesn’t count much for ambitions and aspirations; instead we must run the household diligently and frugally. If this can be done for about ten years things will be well. Even if you die, there are your sons and your grandsons [to carry on]. We should not do so much of red and white affairs.<sup>30</sup> As for coffins, the peasants probably still have to have them. (Those of us comrades at the Center, when we die we should be cremated; we need no coffins. [This is something to which we] have already signed our names [in agreement]. As for [those comrades in the] provinces, whether or not [they want] to be cremated, let them decide for themselves.) But in economizing, we must do things gradually and slowly. Habits can be changed, and things can also be resolved through big contending, big blooming and big debating. We will also make a twelve-year plan for that, to do some hard rectifying. Are we going to keep gambling? That, too, [can be resolved] only through debate, to change habits and customs. About the eliminating of the “Four Pests,”<sup>31</sup> I am interested, but there is no one responding to my appeal. Not much is said by our comrades [on this matter]. Fortunately, something good about this has been done by the [people in] Lechang *xian*, in Shaoguan [special] district [Party] committee in Guangdong Province, and that has become a model for the elimination of the “Four Pests.” We must do a good job of promoting [public] health; that is [a matter of] culture. We must promote it. To have two pairs of chopsticks to eat our rice is very good, just that it will take up some bamboo. Still, that is going to be good for the handicraft industries, and in that case, we’ll just do a bit more business. I propose that starting with next year, we’ll take two years to run the spot experimentation, five years to popularize [the plan],<sup>32</sup> and then three years to mop up. Can that be done? Or we can have three years of spot experimentation, five years of popularizing, and two years to mop up. The two ends will be smaller and the middle larger. Things can be irregular for different places. I am very interested in these four things. Let us turn China into a country of the Four No’s; what do you think? In the past the anarchists proposed the Three No’s, namely: “No government, no family, no classes.” In the future, [“]no government[”] can be realized; as for [“]no family[”], in a few hundred years, that, too, will not exist. The family is a unit of production, a unit of consumption and a unit of education. As of now, [it] is not a unit of production any longer. [But, for the] conditions [of production] to have all changed so that virtually there is no family any more, it will take about 1,000 years. Let us for the time being first promote the “Four No’s,” to eliminate the “Four Pests,” and turn our country into a country with a high standard of culture.

[On the subject of] the population and birth control, we must have a three-year period for spot experimentation and propaganda work, three years for expansion, four years for popularization and implementation. That is also a ten-year plan. Otherwise if we wait till the population reaches 800 million and then go about [controlling it] it would be too late. The preliminary step is to arrive at planned parenthood. In the minority nationality areas we must not popularize this; neither should we in the mountainous areas where the population is overly sparse. This,



too, calls for some big contending, big blooming and big debating. I propose that in the middle schools we add a course on birth control to the curriculum. It won't do for the human race to be totally anarchistic on [the matter of] procreation. We must have planned parenthood. Furthermore, on having each place making its own plans, it is also very important to have someone synthesize [all the] plans. In other words, the plans among the workers, the peasants, the commercial circles and the students (there is nothing about the military here)—should be integrated and promoted together, and not separately and individually. Please take a look at the document from Zhejiang. The experience of Hongan *xian* is very useful. It is a good method for the comrades in the leadership at every level of rural work to get involved in promoting some experimental fields.<sup>33</sup> I, too, would like very much to get involved in promoting an experimental field. If we have cadres at the *xian* level, the district level, the *xiang* level and the cooperative level all promote one plot of experimental field at each level, we will be getting to the bottom of technology.

We can't do without some professional [expertise]; we should learn some [of it]. It is not enough to be expert only in politics. In industry, in commercial matters, and in agriculture too, we must acquire some professional [expertise]. Today we are [just] talking about agriculture; here, too, we make up a ten-year plan. In ten years we must become familiar with both the technology and the professional expertise. We don't want to be first red and then expert; we simply must be both red and expert.<sup>34</sup> The cadres now are red first and then expert. Some are not even red, and have become Right-deviationist opportunists. In politics they are white; in technology they are not experts either. Some people propose that we become expert first and then red. That is a bourgeois viewpoint, and we want nothing of that. However we must build up a powerful corps of the proletarian intelligentsia in ten years. Stalin said: "The quality of the cadres determines everything." This is referring to technology. Professional [expertise] can be learned. You can learn it at fifty years of age; just don't be timid. The problem is with willingness to learn. What we are good at is that our red-star flag is very red;<sup>35</sup> we are competent in politics, but not yet in technology. The Rightists and we are engaged in a contest that is going on furiously, and we have not been able to bring them to submission by persuasion; that is why we have yet to do some learning. We must organize a corps of scientists and [people with] technology; the provinces, the [special] districts and the *xian* must each have its plan. In ten years time the Party committees will have transformed themselves into proletarian intellectuals. At every level there must be plans to turn into experts. [The saying goes:] "It takes a hundred years to cultivate a person."<sup>36</sup> Now we reduce that by ninety years; we want to cultivate a person in ten years. In the North it is not possible to cultivate a tree in ten years, but it is possible to cultivate a person [in that time.] It won't do to go without this, without a vast technological corps. Without that it will not be possible to construct socialism. We have been liberated for already eight years; give another ten years; that means cultivating people in eighteen years. [In this time we must] basically accomplish the production of a corps of scientists and people of technological expertise who also have Marxist ideology [in them], and thereafter it would be a matter of taking yet another ten years to expand and strengthen this corps. That

means arriving at the level of the Soviet Union in twenty-eight years; which is shortening it by twelve years.<sup>37</sup> Can that be done? It is possible, since we have the Soviet Union's experience [to emulate].

[On the subject of] the relationship between agriculture and industry, Comrade XX<sup>38</sup> has already spoken. We are not going to waver [on the idea] that priority is to be given to developing heavy industry, [but] on those conditions, [we will] simultaneously develop industry and agriculture, [so as to] establish [both] a modern industry and a modern agriculture. It is not sufficiently sound to speak only of modern industry (it includes modern agriculture). The propaganda work of the past is correct; from now on we must put more emphasis on propagandizing agriculture.

4. There are two methods [of doing things.] In everything there has to be at least two methods before comparison can be made. One would be a relatively poorer and slower method; the other would be a better and faster method. We would then be able to choose the better and faster method of the two. This is like building a railroad. In general, several lines must be compared and a choice has to be made before the final decision can be set. For example, [we can ask], is it better to have big contending and big blooming, or to have small contending and small blooming? Do we want to have big-character posters? Which of the big-character posters is better? There are choices in all of these. We must not have a big contending and big blooming in which, however, we simply couldn't let things go. There are several dozen colleges and universities in Beijing Municipality, and yet none of them was able to bloom smoothly and properly. A lot of work had to be done. One meeting, another meeting; in the end people had to be forced to the hills,<sup>39</sup> and they had to get involved in it, or else they would have lit the fire and burned themselves.<sup>40</sup> In the revolution in the past we also had two sets of methods and two sets of policies; it was not until the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan that we, through groping, found a set of correct methods, and then progress became faster. There are also two sets of methods and two sets of policies for construction;<sup>41</sup> we can do things this way, or that way. For example, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland . . . these countries all had different methods. Of the different methods of these countries, we can take [our pick] as reference and make our choice. However, in comparison, the Soviet Union's road of construction is the most accurate. We have experience in revolution, but on construction we have very little experience. The Soviet Union already has forty years of experience; we only have eight years. Basically speaking, the Soviet Union's experience is one of success, and it is relatively complete. By [saying] success, we also include mistakes; without making mistakes one cannot count as being complete. No one in the world can be free of error completely; we have made mistakes in the past, and we are likely to still make mistakes in the future. Naturally, [however], the achievements are primary. The Soviet Union is better than we are, and we must learn from the Soviet Union. It is to our advantage if we learn [from the Soviet Union]; we lose if we don't. There is a great benefit in our learning; there is a great harm in our not learning. Especially after we have already opposed dogmatism, there will not be much danger in our learning from the Soviet Union; learning can only be to our advantage, not to our

disadvantage. This is because the experience of the Soviet Union is the most complete.<sup>42</sup> For example, [it now has] satellites.<sup>43</sup> Now everyone says it is capable. In the past, in China alone, there were people, ([e.g.,] Long Yun)<sup>44</sup> who said that it [the Soviet Union] was no good. The United States also looked down on it. And yet, then, it sent off this thing, which is still orbiting after five days.<sup>45</sup> In the past, even I myself didn't believe in the propaganda about people going to the moon to visit, but now I do. That was because [I] only understand social sciences but not natural sciences. I am not an expert. I am only red, not expert. It now appears that we can go not only to the moon, but to Venus and Mars as well. They say we can go to the moon in five, ten years. If I still didn't believe that now, I would become just a diehard obstinate [unbeliever]. However, is it possible for us to discard the Soviet Union's detours? So that we can do things a bit faster than the Soviet Union, and a bit better in quality? The Soviet Union progressed from having only about four million tons of steel at the end of 1918 to only eighteen million tons in twenty years' time. We, [on the other hand, aim at] attaining twenty million tons of steel in three five-year plans or a little bit more time. This demonstrates that we are capable of doing things a bit faster. I propose that there is advantage in opening up more small steel factories from now on; for example, [open up those that produce] 200–300 thousand tons or 300–400 thousand tons.

5. Last year swept away [some things]. [The slogan of] greater, faster, better and more economical [results] was swept away.<sup>46</sup> No one is opposed to better and more economical, but greater and faster are no longer mentioned. In fact, greater, faster, better, and more economical are mutually controlling [factors]; better and more economical controls greater and faster. This is not like the speed of the satellite, or an unrealistic greatness and speed; an impossible greatness and speed; that we'll have none of. Yet if we turn things around, and just think of being good, and being economical, but have only just that little bit and at a deadly slow pace, that, too, would not work. What I am happy about is that at this meeting individual comrades have raised this complete slogan: Greater, faster, better, and more economical [results]. As I see it, we must seek truth from facts,<sup>47</sup> and we must promote a greatness and a speed that is realistic and not subjective. Last year this slogan was swept away; now we must restore it. Do you agree? We also swept away the Forty-Article Program for Agriculture. The Forty-Articles were not popular, but now they are being restored.

The Communist Party ought always to be a committee to promote progress.<sup>48</sup> We have many committees. The most fundamental one is the Committee of the Communist Party.<sup>49</sup> Now, are you, after all, a committee to promote progress? Or a committee to promote regression? The Communist Party is a committee to promote progress; the Kuomintang is a committee to promote regression. Last year at the Second Plenum a small group who promoted regression was organized.<sup>50</sup> In last year alone, this [group] spent 3 billion [rmb]; [I think] it is on this point alone that we can promote a bit of regression. If we promote regression too much we will be making a mistake. That is to say, we cannot excessively emphasize the opposition to adventurism.<sup>51</sup> This is because the Rightists are those who promote regres-

sion. We have different roots from those of the Rightists. We are always promoters of progress, forever. If we [at any time] want to promote regression, it is only to be temporary and localized. For example, the [idea of having] six million sets of double-shared plows—in the program for agricultural development<sup>52</sup> has been [dropped through the] promotion of regression. But, for the elimination of mosquitoes, flies, rats, and sparrows, I have and always will uphold it.

6. On the issue of the contradiction between the two roads<sup>53</sup> [—between the roads of] the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This is the primary contradiction;<sup>54</sup> there is no question about that. In the past [the struggle was] against imperialism and against feudalism; and that has already been resolved. Now it is the socialist revolution. The main thrust of the socialist revolution is to eliminate the bourgeois system of exploitation. In the countryside it is to reform the petty bourgeoisie. The central question [here] is to resolve the contradictions between individualism and collectivism, and between socialism and capitalism, through cooperativization.

7. The Resolution of the Eighth Congress did not deny that [there is a] class struggle in the transitional period of socialism in which [the contradiction between] the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is the primary contradiction. The analysis of the Eighth Congress was in reference to the forces of production. [It was said the primary contradiction was] the contradiction between an advanced social system and backward forces of production. Although this sentence is not sufficiently complete or sound, we gained benefit from [its being said,] and no harm has come [of it].<sup>55</sup> The Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee pointed out that the basic contradiction within the country was the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; from our current perspective that was very correct.<sup>56</sup>

## Notes

1. The Chinese original here contains, we think, a typographical error. It has the character *ge* where we believe it should read *nian*.
2. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 1.
3. The character translated here as “bloom” is *fang*. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 2.
4. The character here is *gai*, which is half of the term *zheng gai* which appears in the other version of this speech. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 3.
5. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 4. In the current version, however, the text reads *da zheng* (translated as “big competing”) where the other version has *da bian lun* (big debates).
6. In a comparable passage in the other version, Mao puts this campaign together with others and mentions the Five Major Movements, of which land reform is one. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 5.
7. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 6.
8. Here the Chinese original has a typographical error. The character for *shi* in *da shi da fei* is the character *shi* (meaning “thing”) where it should be the character *shi* (meaning “correct”).
9. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 7.
10. The Chinese here reads *ma de gouxue lintou*, which is an extremely vulgar aphorism literally meaning “having dog's blood rain down on one's head.” It is derived from the thirty-ninth *hui* of the Qing-dynasty reprimanding novel *Xing shi yinyuan* (A Tale of Causes and Effects to Awaken the Age).

disadvantage. This is because the experience of the Soviet Union is the most complete.<sup>42</sup> For example, [it now has] satellites.<sup>43</sup> Now everyone says it is capable. In the past, in China alone, there were people, ([e.g.,] Long Yun)<sup>44</sup> who said that it [the Soviet Union] was no good. The United States also looked down on it. And yet, then, it sent off this thing, which is still orbiting after five days.<sup>45</sup> In the past, even I myself didn't believe in the propaganda about people going to the moon to visit, but now I do. That was because [I] only understand social sciences but not natural sciences. I am not an expert. I am only red, not expert. It now appears that we can go not only to the moon, but to Venus and Mars as well. They say we can go to the moon in five, ten years. If I still didn't believe that now, I would become just a diehard obstinate [unbeliever]. However, is it possible for us to discard the Soviet Union's detours? So that we can do things a bit faster than the Soviet Union, and a bit better in quality? The Soviet Union progressed from having only about four million tons of steel at the end of 1918 to only eighteen million tons in twenty years' time. We, [on the other hand, aim at] attaining twenty million tons of steel in three five-year plans or a little bit more time. This demonstrates that we are capable of doing things a bit faster. I propose that there is advantage in opening up more small steel factories from now on; for example, [open up those that produce] 200–300 thousand tons or 300–400 thousand tons.

5. Last year swept away [some things]. [The slogan of] greater, faster, better and more economical [results] was swept away.<sup>46</sup> No one is opposed to better and more economical, but greater and faster are no longer mentioned. In fact, greater, faster, better, and more economical are mutually controlling [factors]; better and more economical controls greater and faster. This is not like the speed of the satellite, or an unrealistic greatness and speed; an impossible greatness and speed; that we'll have none of. Yet if we turn things around, and just think of being good, and being economical, but have only just that little bit and at a deadly slow pace, that, too, would not work. What I am happy about is that at this meeting individual comrades have raised this complete slogan: Greater, faster, better, and more economical [results]. As I see it, we must seek truth from facts,<sup>47</sup> and we must promote a greatness and a speed that is realistic and not subjective. Last year this slogan was swept away; now we must restore it. Do you agree? We also swept away the Forty-Article Program for Agriculture. The Forty-Articles were not popular, but now they are being restored.

The Communist Party ought always to be a committee to promote progress.<sup>48</sup> We have many committees. The most fundamental one is the Committee of the Communist Party.<sup>49</sup> Now, are you, after all, a committee to promote progress? Or a committee to promote regression? The Communist Party is a committee to promote progress; the Kuomintang is a committee to promote regression. Last year at the Second Plenum a small group who promoted regression was organized.<sup>50</sup> In last year alone, this [group] spent 3 billion [rmb]; [I think] it is on this point alone that we can promote a bit of regression. If we promote regression too much we will be making a mistake. That is to say, we cannot excessively emphasize the opposition to adventurism.<sup>51</sup> This is because the Rightists are those who promote regres-

sion. We have different roots from those of the Rightists. We are always promoters of progress, forever. If we [at any time] want to promote regression, it is only to be temporary and localized. For example, the [idea of having] six million sets of double-shared plows—in the program for agricultural development<sup>52</sup> has been [dropped through the] promotion of regression. But, for the elimination of mosquitoes, flies, rats, and sparrows, I have and always will uphold it.

6. On the issue of the contradiction between the two roads<sup>53</sup> [—between the roads of] the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This is the primary contradiction;<sup>54</sup> there is no question about that. In the past [the struggle was] against imperialism and against feudalism; and that has already been resolved. Now it is the socialist revolution. The main thrust of the socialist revolution is to eliminate the bourgeois system of exploitation. In the countryside it is to reform the petty bourgeoisie. The central question [here] is to resolve the contradictions between individualism and collectivism, and between socialism and capitalism, through cooperativization.

7. The Resolution of the Eighth Congress did not deny that [there is a] class struggle in the transitional period of socialism in which [the contradiction between] the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is the primary contradiction. The analysis of the Eighth Congress was in reference to the forces of production. [It was said the primary contradiction was] the contradiction between an advanced social system and backward forces of production. Although this sentence is not sufficiently complete or sound, we gained benefit from [its being said,] and no harm has come [of it].<sup>55</sup> The Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee pointed out that the basic contradiction within the country was the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; from our current perspective that was very correct.<sup>56</sup>

## Notes

1. The Chinese original here contains, we think, a typographical error. It has the character *ge* where we believe it should read *nian*.
2. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 1.
3. The character translated here as “bloom” is *fang*. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 2.
4. The character here is *gai*, which is half of the term *zheng gai* which appears in the other version of this speech. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 3.
5. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 4. In the current version, however, the text reads *da zheng* (translated as “big competing”) where the other version has *da bian lun* (big debates).
6. In a comparable passage in the other version, Mao puts this campaign together with others and mentions the Five Major Movements, of which land reform is one. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 5.
7. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 6.
8. Here the Chinese original has a typographical error. The character for *shi* in *da shi da fei* is the character *shi* (meaning “thing”) where it should be the character *shi* (meaning “correct”).
9. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 7.
10. The Chinese here reads *ma de gouxue lintou*, which is an extremely vulgar aphorism literally meaning “having dog's blood rain down on one's head.” It is derived from the thirty-ninth *hui* of the Qing-dynasty reprimanding novel *Xing shi yinyuan* (A Tale of Causes and Effects to Awaken the Age).

11. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), notes 8 and 9.
12. See text July 1, 1957, note 16.
13. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 10.
14. Subjectivism (*zhuguan zhuyi*) was only one of three targets of the Yanan rectification.
15. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), notes 11 and 12.
16. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 14.
17. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), notes 15 and 16. See also text Mar. 20, 1957, notes 61 and 62. The other version of this October 9 speech does not put things in such a way, as this version does, to make the connection with the important theoretical point brought out in text Mar. 20, 1957.
18. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 17.
19. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), notes 18 and 19.
20. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 20.
21. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 21.
22. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 22.
23. Chaozhou and Shantou (the latter also more commonly known as Swatow)—neither is mentioned in the other version of this speech—are in the coastal sectors of Guangdong Province. The term *qian jin xian*, referring to *xian* that manage to produce annual outputs of more than 1,000 catties of grain (produce) was first mentioned officially (as a target of development) in *RMRB* (Nov. 12, 1957), 2; and would become a popular phrase in the Great Leap Forward years.
24. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 23.
25. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 24.
26. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 25.
27. The term here is *yi feng bu qian* which refers to the practice of production units making up, during years of a bumper harvest, for shortages of “accumulation”—i.e., the submission of state-purchased or requisitioned grain—in past years when it might have had poor harvests. The character *qian* literally means a debt.
28. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 27.
29. The reference here is to the fact that public accumulation, in China’s socialist economy, takes the shape of deductions (*kou*) from the people’s production (and, therefore, income). This is deemed necessary. However, when the rate of accumulation is too high, (i.e., too many “deductions” are made), there will not be much left for the individual to consume, and standards of living will be lowered, leading to the feeling that the socialist system’s superiority over the system of capitalism is not evident. This all relates back to the issues that Mao raised in early 1957 (see texts Jan. 18, 1957 and Jan. 27, 1957[1] and [2]) where the question was raised of whether the peasants are suffering (i.e., in terms of standards of living) and whether the socialist system can, therefore, claim superiority.
30. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 28.
31. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 29.
32. This, in the context, refers to the plan to eliminate the “Four Pests.”
33. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 30.
34. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 32.
35. The other version of this speech is more correct in describing the flag as *wu xing hong qi*, whereas this has *hong xing qi*; see text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 34.
36. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 36.
37. This refers to the slogan of catching up to the Soviet Union’s level of production in forty years.
38. From the context and in view of information from the other version, XX here refers to Xiaoping, or, Deng Xiaoping. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 38.
39. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 41.
40. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 40.
41. The Chinese here, (on top of p. 195 of the source) repeats this sentence. We believe

that it is merely a typographical error and have eliminated the repetition in this translation. For the dates of the War of Resistance Against Japan period, see text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 42.

42. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 43. We should note here that in the other version Mao was much more harshly critical of the Soviet Union.

43. This is an extremely timely remark, the first space satellite produced by the Soviet Union to be successfully launched into orbit, known as Sputnik, was launched on October 4, 1957. The Chinese papers carried news of this phenomenal achievement released by TASS on October 5 in their own issues of October 6. On November 3 of the same year the Soviet Union launched the second Sputnik satellite successfully. Reports on both events can be found in *RMSC* (1958), pp. 301–302.

44. Long Yun was, before Liberation, a powerful warlord in Yunnan Province, and a sympathizer, though not adherent, of Wang Jingwei (see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 6) during the War of Resistance Against Japan period. For his anti-Chiang Kai-shek position, he was placed under house arrest by the KMT in Chongqing and later in Nanjing after Japan’s surrender. In 1949, he fled to Hong Kong, and later returned to Beijing, where he became a member of the Standing National Committee of the CPPCC. Later, he severely criticized the CPC’s policies of the “Three-Anti’s” and “Five-Anti’s” period (see text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952), and organized groups of minority nationalities to attack the CPC policies again in 1957. He was then labeled a Rightist. For more biographical information on Long, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1968), II, pp. 457–459.

45. The Chinese here reads *zhuan* which literally means “spinning,” but the secondary meaning of “orbiting” appears more appropriate here.

46. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 46.

47. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 48.

48. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 50.

49. Here the Chinese reads *gongchan dang weiyuanhui* which appears to refer, although in a rather unusual way, to the basic unit of CPC organization, the *dang wei*, or Party committee.

50. This refers to the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, held November 10–15, 1956. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 4.

51. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 47.

52. This refers again to the Forty-Article (Twelve-Year) Program for Agricultural Development (see note 18). The specific reference here is to Article 11 of the program. See R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. (1962), p. 123.

53. See text July 1957(1), source note.

54. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 53.

55. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 55.

56. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 56.

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### Telegram to Wilhelm Pieck

(October 9, 1957)

Source: *RMRB* (Oct. 11, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 119 (Nov. 10, 1957), 120; *URI* (1976), p. 349. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Oct. 11, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 351.

President,  
The German Democratic Republic  
Comrade Wilhelm Pieck:

On the occasion of your reelection to office as President of the German Democratic Republic, please allow me, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, to express my sincere and warm congratulations to you.

Comrade President, the prolongation of your term of office once again demonstrates the boundless confidence and genuine love that the people of the German Democratic Republic hold for you.

May you have new successes in the cause of unifying Germany on the principles of peace and democracy, in building socialism and in safeguarding European and world peace.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

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### Speech at Supreme State Conference (October 13, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (1969), pp. 126–145. Other Chinese Texts: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 223–231; URI (1976), pp. 353–368. Available English Translations: URI (1976), pp. 369–389; *CLG*, 9:3(Fall 1976), pp. 34–62.

Another version of this speech is in Xuanji, V, pp. 480–495, under the title *Jianding de xiangxin qunzhong de da duoshu* (*Have Firm Faith in the Majority of the People*). (English translation in *SW*, V, pp. 498–513). The version in Xuanji is clearly an edited version that was put together later. In it, some of the more personal and earthy comments that Mao made, and that we can see in the *Wansui* version, have been eliminated. On the other hand, it also clears up some of the textual confusions and lapses which, either by mistake or by convention (such as in those cases where names of other CPC leaders or cadres are often replaced by XXX in the *Wansui* edition) are found in the *Wansui* version. In general one may say that the *Wansui* version is a more “complete” version while the Xuanji version is a “cleaner” version. One should also note that while they differ quite substantially in length, by and large the two versions cover the same political points.

Since these two versions are clearly of the same speech and since there are no major omissions of significant political arguments in either version by comparison, we have opted in this publication to translate and present only the *Wansui* version, on the rationale that the Xuanji, V version, through *SW*, V, is already much more accessible to the general reader. At the same time, since the textual discrepancies between the two versions are too many and too complicated in detail, we are unable to annotate such textual discrepancies in every incidence. We believe that the reader must compare the two versions for himself or herself by reading both what we present here and what is in *SW*, V. We have, however, annotated

*discrepancies that appear to us to bear contextual or political significance. For example, as mentioned above, where some uncertainties in the text, or typographical errors in the Wansui version, have been clarified or brought to our attention by a comparison with the Xuanji version, these have been annotated. Another category of discrepancy that is significant is where in the Xuanji version Mao is reported as having used terms or descriptions—e.g., minzu ziben zhuyi (national capitalism) instead of minzu zichan jieji (national bourgeoisie)—which differ from the Wansui version and are unusual terms or descriptions for 1957. We leave the reader to decide for himself or herself, however, what to make of these terms.*

*For a contextual summary of the Supreme State Conference at which Mao made this speech, see K. Lieberthal (1976), pp. 101–102. The majority of what Mao said in this speech is not new to us. Here he repeats many of the things that he had been saying with regard to the CPC rectification of 1957, the contending and blooming process, the anti-Rightist campaign, the Zhang-Luo Alliance, the Wenhui bao affair, all of which had been discussed since June and July of the year. (See texts April 1957[2]; May 15, May 22, June 8, June 9, June 14, July 1957[1], July 1, July 8, July 9, Oct. 7, Oct. 9 in 1957.) On the surface, one may say that Mao was repeating himself once again here.*

*There are, however, several things that are significant about this speech. First, although he speaks of continuing the “counterattack” on the Rightists, Mao’s tone in this speech is a bit more moderate than the strident and severely polemical articles of June and July. At the same time, just as in September Mao began to formularize the summary of the entire rectification of 1957 by the phrases “great contending, great blooming, great debate and big-character posters,” in this speech Mao begins to set the formula for dealing with the Rightists who have emerged and “exposed themselves” in 1957—a four-stage process of “letting things bloom, counterattacking, remolding, and learning.” Given the continuous nature of the “blooming and contending,” (i.e., the Hundred Flowers Campaign,) the CPC rectification, and the anti-Rightist campaign, one may see this speech as an in media res summary of all the happenings of the earlier half of 1957. Significantly, here Mao speaks of many of the slogans such as “great contending, great blooming, great debate and big-character posters” and formulae such as continuing the rectification through May 1958, which had been suggested only rather tentatively in his own speeches or in the reports of other CPC leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, in July and September, in a tone that connotes that by this time, i.e., October 1957, the decision has already been made and ratified vis-à-vis these issues. This is apparently the product of the delayed effect of the many (thirteen in all) discussions and forums held among the democratic parties and people’s organizations in May and June under the aegis of the United Front Work Department (headed by Li Weihuan) and to which Mao briefly alludes as “the events of May” in this speech. These decisions were taken pretty much as given by Mao at this time (i.e., mid-October). The issue of scheduling the rectification campaign up to May 1958 was mentioned also in a very definite tone, in the October 9 speech (see text Oct. 9, 1957[1], two paragraphs after note 43). Therefore, this speech should be read in conjunction particularly with texts Oct. 7 and Oct. 9, 1957(1) and (2). Finally this speech is also significant in that here Mao, for the first time as far as we can tell, suggests specific ways in which the Rightists who have been “flushed out” in the course of 1957 should be dealt with. For example, he discusses the issue of whether or not some of them can be elected as deputies to the People’s Congress, and he also suggests that jobs must still be arranged for them. These suggestions would take on a particular significance in 1958, as the CPC and the nation prepared for the Great Leap Forward.*

In the current rectification [campaign] we have discovered a [proper] form [for carrying out such campaigns]. This form consists simply of the set [of methods] including great contending, great blooming, great arguing, great debates, and big-character posters.<sup>1</sup> This particular approach has been created among the masses. This approach is distinct from [others] in history.<sup>2</sup> During the rectification in Yanan there were also big-character posters, but at that time we dared not push ahead [with them]; I'm afraid [it was because] we were a bit frightened.<sup>3</sup> Later there was a Three Investigations and Three Rectifications [Campaign].<sup>4</sup> The three investigations consisted of investigating [a person's] past history, investigating that person's work [performance], and investigating that person's thought; I have forgotten what the three rectifications were [intended to] rectify. At that time the director of our Xinhua [News] Agency, Fan Changjiang, was put on the spot.<sup>5</sup> Only after he had gone through two months of rectification did he turn himself around.<sup>6</sup> Because [we had] mobilized the masses, during the Three-Anti's [Campaign,] there were many ministers who got themselves out on a limb; it was not until afterwards that we put up a ladder [for them], and helped them down.<sup>7</sup> In the past, in the army, in wartime [we] relied on the soldiers and on the local people; there wasn't any place where we could pay [the soldiers], and we didn't have any factories that manufactured rifles or artillery pieces, so [we] could only rely on the masses; therefore, for a long time, a kind of democratic work style took shape in the army and in the localities. Still, at that time, and during the entire revolutionary period, there was not this great blooming and great contending, great arguing, great debates, and big-character posters that we have now. [In the] Three-Anti's and Five-Anti's [campaigns] we didn't use big-character posters,<sup>8</sup> and during the Three Investigations and Three Rectifications [campaigns] there were no big-character posters. Going back further, during the Yanan period there appeared a few big-character posters but we didn't encourage this. What was the reason for this? I think that perhaps we were a little stupid at the time, don't you think? I'm afraid there is also an objective reason, namely that at that time there was the clamor of gongs and drums:<sup>9</sup> there was fighting, and class struggle was so acute. It wouldn't have been good if there had also been great arguments among ourselves. [But things] are different now. That kind of class struggle is already past, and has basically been concluded.<sup>10</sup> The entire nation is at peace. So only now has such a thing [as great blooming and great contending] appeared, and [only now] have we discovered this [proper] form. The substance of this revolution requires that it take this type of form. The present revolution is a socialist revolution; its purpose is construction. And once it has taken this kind of form, it can be popularized very quickly and learned very quickly. It can be learned in just a few months. Although there are several [fears],<sup>11</sup> there are two major ones. One is a fear of disorder. Are you afraid of disorder or not? Do you really have that much guts? I for one don't fully believe it, because we do have a lot of people who are afraid of disorder. [Even if] you say that you are not the least bit afraid of disorder, isn't it true that the democratic parties<sup>12</sup> are a little afraid of disorder? The other fear is the fear of being put on the spot. For those who hold positions as factory directors, directors of cooperatives, school principals, or Party committee secretaries, once the airing of views begins,<sup>13</sup>

and the fire gets going,<sup>14</sup> how will they be able to get off the limb? It's easier now, but in May, for example, it was very hard to persuade people [to let things bloom]. The thirty-four universities, colleges and institutes in Beijing didn't let things bloom until many meetings had been held.<sup>15</sup> Beijing University's Luo Longji may be considered one who was [relatively] willing to have an airing [of views], and yet even then many meetings had to be held [first].<sup>16</sup> Why is it that people need not be afraid? Why is the airing [of views] beneficial? Which is more beneficial, great blooming and great contending or small blooming and small contending? Or is, perhaps, having no blooming and no contending at all that what would be beneficial? Having no blooming and no contending is not beneficial; small blooming and small contending cannot solve problems; it's [got to be] great blooming and great contending. [As for] great blooming and great contending, first of all, there will be no disorder, and, second, no one will be put on the spot, except in [a few] isolated cases. Ding Ling, for example, she was put on the spot.<sup>17</sup> Or Feng Xuefeng, for example, who was director of a publishing house: He was setting fires there and so he was put on the spot.<sup>18</sup> But they are a minority; they are Rightists. When they set fires, their aim is to burn up the Communist Party. Feng Xuefeng is a Communist [Party member]. As for the others, they should have no fear. The foundation [of this policy] is to have faith in the majority of the masses. We should have faith that the majority of the people are good. What we should say is that the majority of the workers are good, the majority of the peasants are good, and the majority of the capitalists can be remolded. [As for] the intellectuals, members of the democratic parties, [members of] the Communist Party, and [members of] the Youth League,<sup>19</sup> we should have faith in the majority [among them]. They are not planning to throw our nation into disorder. When we talk about the majority, what actually do we mean by this majority? Is 51 per cent a majority? That's not the figure. [A majority] is 90 to 98 per cent. Right now throughout the country—and I am exploring this situation with the comrades from the localities—how many people actually disapprove of socialism? In this matter of promoting socialism<sup>20</sup> everyone is inexperienced. We are all inexperienced hands. In the past we have only successfully carried out a democratic revolution.<sup>21</sup> That [revolution] was of a bourgeois nature; it did not destroy the system of individual ownership, nor did it destroy the system of capitalist ownership;<sup>22</sup> all it did was to destroy the system of ownership by the feudal classes and by the comprador class<sup>23</sup> (by such people as Chiang, Song, Kong, and Chen).<sup>24</sup> Therefore there were many people who, during the stage of democratic revolution, were able to pass [the test of the revolution]. Even so, some people were not enthusiastic about a thoroughgoing democratic revolution, yet they were able to come through. There were people who were willing to take action for a thoroughgoing democratic revolution. For example, in Hubei Province there was this hired peasant laborer named Liu Jiemei. This was in the newspapers. He was a third-generation beggar, and later everything was turned around for him; he prospered, and has now become a cadre at the district-chief level.<sup>25</sup> [But] this time he was extremely dissatisfied with socialism, and very much disapproved of cooperativization; he wanted to practice "freedom," and opposed unified [state] purchasing and marketing.<sup>26</sup> Now he is putting on an exhibition, crying bitterly and

begging not to be expelled from the Party, and he's willing to reform. He is from Huanggang *xian* in Hubei, and an exhibition has been put on in that *xian*, with him as the guide. [His life] is divided into two parts; the beggar stage and the later stage when he prospered. People like that—I have discussed it with the comrades in Hubei—can probably be exempt from being stripped of their Party membership, because they are willing to reform, right? They can pass the test of the democratic revolution, but there are some people for whom this test of socialism is [more] difficult to pass.<sup>27</sup> This is because it is the last test; it is to destroy private ownership and change into collective ownership. Of course, this struggle will have to be carried on for many years. It is still difficult to determine at present how long the period of transition will be. Roughly speaking, I would say it will take three five-year plans, or a bit more. One five-year plan is already past, and we still need about ten [more] years.<sup>28</sup> But it seems to me that the current year represents a peak.<sup>29</sup> Will there be more crests of this kind after [this year]? The crests in the flow of the Huanghe [Yellow River] come every year in July and August, or in August and September. In these next fifteen years will there be a crest every year? [If so,] you people from the Ministry of Water Conservancy had better build some dikes. (Laughter.) It seems to me that it probably won't be like that; the crest is getting smaller and smaller. Even if a hundred thousand or so Rightists are found, out of a population of 600 million, it is still a very small number. I would say that among the people of the entire country there are 10 per cent who do not approve of socialism. A good number of comrades have looked into this thoroughly; some say that it's 15 per cent, and some say that it's not [even] 10 per cent; that it's only a few per cent. Ten per cent is probably a reliable [figure].<sup>30</sup> Those who in their hearts do not approve of socialism include the landlord class, rich peasants,<sup>31</sup> part of the bourgeoisie, part of the bourgeois intellectuals, part of the urban, upper-stratum petty bourgeoisie, and even certain individual poor peasants, lower-middle peasants, workers, and people like the Liu Jiemei whom we just talked about. How much is 10 per cent in a population of 600 million? It's sixty million. This figure is not small, and we should not take it lightly. On this [question] we have two points of departure; first, we have 90 per cent of the people approving of socialism, [and therefore] the working class has a vast ally army. The first ally is in the countryside and consists of poor peasants, lower-middle peasants, and some of the well-to-do middle peasants.<sup>32</sup> As I just said, some people say that 10 per cent oppose socialism, oppose cooperativization, and oppose unified [state] purchasing and marketing. (XXX interjects: It's 15 per cent among the middle peasants.) I'm talking about the population of the country as a whole. I've tried to get to the bottom of this with a few provincial [Party] committee secretaries. However, the so-called intransigent elements, which include ultra-Rightists and counterrevolutionaries, those who engage in sabotage, as well as those who, although they don't engage in sabotage, are still very intransigent and will probably take [their intransigence] with them to the grave—none of them will reform, none of them will hear anything of socialism. [For them] the moon in the United States is still better; in China the moon is just not quite as good.<sup>33</sup> How many people of this kind are there? Probably only about 2 per cent. You (pointing to XXX) just said, the proportion among three million

people is 2.2 per cent.<sup>34</sup> How much is 2 per cent of the entire national population? It's twelve million. If twelve million people were gathered together, that would be a very big army. If they had rifles in their hands, that would be an army of twelve million. So why isn't there great disorder throughout the land? Because [this army] is scattered in this cooperative and that cooperative, in this village and that village, in this factory and that factory, in this school and that school, in this Communist Party branch and that Communist Party branch, in this Communist Youth League branch and that Communist Youth League branch, in this branch of a democratic party and that branch of a democratic party. They are scattered everywhere, and they can't gather together. Therefore, our foundation consists of that 90 per cent of the people who approves [of socialism], including the proletariat, the semi-proletariat in the countryside, the poor peasants, the lower-middle peasants, the petty-bourgeoisie, bourgeois intellectuals, and upper-stratum petty bourgeois intellectuals. At the moment we're not counting two classes, the landlords and the compradors. Those two classes were the targets of the democratic revolution. Are we not opposed to imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism?<sup>35</sup> Imperialism is now outside our borders; we have already chased it out. Inside the country we have only feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, that is, the landlord and comprador classes, and these are [still] the targets of revolution. Within what framework is this revolution [to take place]? Which are the classes among which struggle will arise? It will be the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie, these three classes.

The numbers of the proletariat are small, but they have the vast ally army of the petty bourgeoisie, that is, the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants. The poor peasants are the semiproletariat; the lower-middle peasants are middle peasants who are propertied but [lead] a relatively hard life. They constitute 70 per cent or a little more of the rural population. In general the well-to-do middle peasants make up 20 per cent. At this time, the well-to-do middle peasants can be divided roughly into three parts: one part consists of those who approve of cooperativization, and they make up 40 per cent; [another consists of] those who are wavering, who could go either way, and who make up 40 per cent; [and the third part consists of] those who oppose [cooperativization] and who make up 20 per cent. There is also a division among the landlords at present; not all landlords oppose socialism now. Because of the education of the last few years, there has emerged a group of landlords who do not make trouble with regard to the food [situation], who approve of unified [state] purchasing and marketing, and who approve of cooperativization. A group [like this] has also emerged among the rich peasants. We should not [mistakenly] think that at present all landlords oppose socialism, that all rich peasants oppose socialism, that all capitalists oppose socialism, and that all high-level intellectuals oppose socialism. In fact that is not the case. We should carry out an analysis. The intransigent elements probably constitute 2 per cent, and therefore we should have faith in the majority. Look at it, [those who support socialism are] 90 per cent! Through work and through great debates, we can get 8 per cent more; then [the figure] will become 98 per cent, and those intransigent diehards only amount to 2 per cent. Of course [we] must keep in mind, as Comrade

XXX just said, that they are still a very big force!<sup>36</sup> The landlords have less prestige [than ever], and the comprador bourgeoisie have lost [all their] prestige. The bourgeoisie and the proletarian intellectuals,<sup>37</sup> the rural petty bourgeoisie (the well-to-do middle peasants), the upper-stratum urban petty bourgeoisie (a few relatively well-to-do owners of small enterprises), and the intellectuals of that class—these people do have prestige. For example, in the rural areas, well-to-do middle peasants have prestige, because the well-to-do middle peasants are relatively strong producers, and the poor peasants cannot catch up with them. As for the bourgeoisie, bourgeois intellectuals, and upper-stratum petty-bourgeois intellectuals, these intellectuals get along quite well in China. Haven't [we] said that they are our nation's wealth? Indeed they are: In any facet [of life] you cannot do without them.<sup>38</sup> Without them you can't open schools. Without them you can't have professors. Without them you can't have middle-school and primary-school teachers. If you run a newspaper you need reporters; if you put on an opera you need performers. We must have scientists, engineers, and technicians. The number of people in this class is not great—a few million; even [with] their families included there are [only] a few tens of millions—probably thirty million people. I hear that the number of those who are truly capitalists is seven hundred thousand, not including their families. There may be four to five million intellectuals.<sup>39</sup> I would say that, altogether, let's make it six million; at five persons to a family (because they are fairly well-to-do they tend to have more sons and daughters)—five times six [million] is thirty million. This class is relatively well-educated and is the most skilled. This is also precisely why the Rightists cock their tails in the air [and strut around].<sup>40</sup> Didn't Luo Longji say it? [He said] the petty intellectuals of the proletariat simply cannot lead the big intellectuals of the petty bourgeoisie.<sup>41</sup> He himself insists on saying that he is of the petty bourgeoisie, and that he is a big intellectual of the petty bourgeoisie. As I see it, not only the petty intellectuals of the proletariat, but the [entire] proletariat, whose members can't recognize more than a few characters,<sup>42</sup> is better and smarter than Luo Longji. The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals, the upper-stratum petty bourgeoisie and the intellectuals of that class, including the middle-of-the-roaders [among them], are not willing to accept the Communist Party or the proletariat.<sup>43</sup> They support the Communist Party and they support the Constitution; oh yes, they support them all right, and they raise their hands [in approval]. But in reality, in their hearts they are not willing to accept it. Here we should do some analysis: the Rightists are opposed [to us] while the non-Rightists<sup>44</sup> are partially willing to accept [us] and partially unwilling. Aren't they saying that we can't provide leadership in this, and that we can't provide leadership in that? It's not only the Rightists who think this way; other people do too. In sum, [they are saying that we're] just about finished. The Communist Party has no choice but to move abroad, and the proletariat has no choice but to go to the moon, since, [according to them,] we are no good at this and we are no good at that! No matter which area of activity you talk about, they say that we're no good at it. I say that in going through the present debate, the primary goal is to win over those who are partially willing to accept [us] and those who are really unwilling, to make them understand what, ultimately, is [meant by] this

business [about] the laws of social development. [To convince them that they] must yet listen to that not-so-highly-educated proletariat, and in the countryside listen to the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants. [If you] talk about education, or talk about skills, the poor peasants<sup>45</sup> are not as good as the well-to-do middle peasants; but [if you] talk about revolution, it is precisely [the poor peasants] who are the capable ones. Can we persuade the majority of this [fact]? [We] can persuade the majority of people, [we] are entirely capable of persuading the majority of people. [As for] the majority of the bourgeoisie, the majority of the upper-stratum petty bourgeoisie, I just said that only 40 per cent of the well-to-do middle peasants approve of cooperativization, 40 per cent are wavering, and only 20 per cent disapprove. We can persuade these waverers. We can persuade the majority of the many university professors, middle- and primary-school teachers, artists, writers, scientists, and engineers. [If we] use the approach of persuasion, those who are not so willing will slowly become willing. It seems to me that it will still take a number of years, probably ten years. For example, [with regard to] the Soviet Union, [people were] never willing to accept them [before]; now that they've put up a "moon" it appears that they may indeed have a bit of ability.<sup>46</sup> (Laughter). In the Soviet Union they also went through this stage, [with people] saying that the Communist Party was not capable, that it couldn't provide leadership in this, and couldn't provide leadership in that. They solved [this problem] a long time ago now; their revolution [took place] forty years ago. Ours is still only eight years past, so it's no wonder. Since 90 per cent of the people support socialism, we shouldn't fear disorder; there won't be disorder, disorder will not develop. As long as you're not the kind of people such as Feng Xuefeng and Ding Ling, you shouldn't be afraid of being put on the spot. How can you be put on the spot? You can get out of it! All we need to do is to carry out [the democracy in] the Three Great Democracies;<sup>47</sup> if you have [a mistake], then just correct it.<sup>48</sup>

On this basis, it is greatly beneficial for great blooming, great contending, great arguing, great debates, and big-character posters to appear at the present moment; this form has no class character.<sup>49</sup> Big-character posters, great blooming, and great contending, whatever—the Rightists, too, can engage in great blooming and great contending, and the Rightists can also put out big-character posters. I say [let's] thank the Rightists, for the appellation "great" [here] was invented by them. Blooming and contending were invented by us. [In my speech] on February 29 this year I didn't say anything at all about great blooming and great contending, or about great arguing, great debates, or about big-character posters—this word "great" wasn't [in my speech].<sup>50</sup> Last year XXX had an article,<sup>51</sup> and in May last year we talked here about a hundred flowers blooming—that was just "blooming"—and about a hundred schools contending—that was just "contending." That word "great" was not there. Moreover, [the idea] was limited to a hundred flowers blooming in literature and the arts, and a hundred schools contending in academics. It did not extend to politics. Afterward, the Rightists needed to extend it to politics, and so, they turned everything over to [a question of] blooming and contending. They called that the time for blooming and contending, and moreover, they wanted to engage in great blooming and great contending. One can see, therefore, that this



slogan can be used by the Rightists, by the middle-of-the-roaders, as well as by the Leftists. Which class, after all, will great blooming and great contending and big-character posters benefit? In the final analysis they benefit the proletariat; in the final analysis they do not benefit the Rightists. The point is that 90 per cent of the people do not wish the nation to be in disorder, but wish to [continue and] accomplish the building of socialism. Among [the other] 10 per cent of the people there are a good many who are wavering. As to the intransigent elements, they constitute only 2 per cent [of the people]. How can they possibly cause disorder? Therefore a slogan such as great blooming and great contending, approaches and methods such as big-character posters, great blooming and great contending, and great debates will, in the final analysis, be of benefit to the self-transformation of the majority of the people. [Of the] two roads, the socialist road and the capitalist road, [these methods will] in the final analysis benefit the socialist.<sup>52</sup> I say it's like putting on a play. Formerly, during the period of resistance against Japan, there was a Society for the People's Rejuvenation [Xinmin hui] in the North, which was organized by Miao Bin.<sup>53</sup> Miao Bin was an old friend of mine who belonged to the Reorganization Clique.<sup>54</sup> Miao Bin later became a traitor and organized the Society for the People's Rejuvenation, and they put on plays. It was reported in the newspapers; they went to Taiyuan to put on plays to laud Japan's Imperial Army and oppose the Chinese.<sup>55</sup> So, because traitors put on plays, should we then not put any plays on? We should still put them on. There's also the matter of the old-style poetry. You, venerable old Mr. Huang,<sup>56</sup> you are an expert [in this]—this is something that can be used by anybody. In those poems written by a professor at Beijing University there is a line that reads "XXXX is running wild and roughshod over others." He can use anything to oppose the revolution. Even at that time I said [we] shouldn't take excessive action against such a person. At the time, with the ideas he then had, he just had to write a little poetry to insult people. I had great appreciation for those poems of his. (Laughter.) We mustn't be afraid of disorder, and we mustn't be afraid of being put on the spot. Of course, the Rightists will be put on the spot, but they will also be able to get out of it. The Rightists will eventually get out of it, won't they? [On this problem of] getting out of it, according to dialectics, it seems to me to be [a case where] one divides into two;<sup>57</sup> the two-point theory<sup>58</sup>—some of the Rightists will be able in the future to get their Rightist labels removed.<sup>59</sup> Must they wear them forever? Will they never get to turn themselves around?<sup>60</sup> It seems to me that that's not necessarily the case. Perhaps there will be a fairly large number of Rightist elements who, having thought things through, will follow the general trend and change for the better, [becoming] more honest and a little less obstinate. We will then remove their labels, and we won't call them Rightists anymore. Furthermore, we should arrange jobs for [them]. The Rightists, by virtue of their opposition to socialism, are a kind of hostile force, but now we are not going to handle them the way we did the landlords and counterrevolutionaries in the past.<sup>61</sup> The basic indication [of this] is that we are not taking away their right to vote.<sup>62</sup> There will probably be certain individuals whose right to vote will have to be taken away. (The Premier: [they will have to undergo] reform through labor.)<sup>63</sup> For example, someone like Lin Xiling, what kind

of work is she doing now? She is sweeping floors at the People's University.<sup>64</sup> I hear that she wanted to do that work. That kind of person, a kid; [but] she's twenty-eight now, and not a kid any more. She lies and says that she's only twenty-one, but she's actually twenty-eight already. She couldn't get into the Youth League and she was unhappy. Now she's become isolated, and she does a little work at school, undergoing reform through labor. That's an individual case. But how can you expect Fei Xiaotong,<sup>65</sup> or even Wu Jingchao<sup>66</sup> of the People's University, to undergo reform through labor? It wouldn't quite be appropriate, would it? Such big intellectuals; their shoulders can't carry anything, their hands can't lift anything. Right now a good many of our cadres should go to do labor; Beijing has sent several tens of thousands of people down [to the countryside].<sup>67</sup> They must labor for several years, and this can be considered reform through labor, too. In the future, university students should first do a few years' labor; otherwise they will go through their entire lives without ever having done any labor, without ever having tilled the soil. Of course, I'm not here to make announcements to frighten you, demanding that you, venerable Mr. Huang Yan[pei], Mr. Chen Yuan,<sup>68</sup> and Zhang Wenbo,<sup>69</sup> all go down and do hard labor. (Huang Yanpei: Doing a little work around the house is all right.) Didn't the ancients say, "Clean the house and sweep the courtyard, and behave yourself appropriately in conversation and action?"<sup>70</sup> (Laughter.) All these things we've said before. Of course we didn't say it as explicitly and thoroughly as this, and in particular, we didn't go into it as deeply as this. This disturbance has made us get to the bottom of [the situation]. [Our analysis showed that] one side was [between] 90 per cent and 98 per cent and the other side was [between] 10 per cent and 2 per cent. Having gotten thus to the bottom of [the situation], we now have a clear, more confident picture of how things add up. Using this method of ours, we can avoid a Hungarian type of incident, and we can also avoid the kind of incident that is now occurring in Poland.<sup>71</sup> Poland has not yet solved this problem. They have to shut down a newspaper. We don't need to shut down newspapers; for us just an editorial will do. [Regarding] *Wenhui bao*, [we] wrote two editorials:<sup>72</sup> the first wasn't thorough and didn't explain things fully; however, after the second editorial, [*Wenhui bao*] started to correct itself.<sup>73</sup> *Xinmin wan bao* also corrected itself.<sup>74</sup> When Zhao XX<sup>75</sup> was chatting with me, I said, "You managed things very well." He said that actually he had committed errors. I said, "You've committed errors, and you've corrected them, so it's all right." The *Xinmin wan bao* is a very small paper; none of you read it, do you? This newspaper is worth reading. This [method] wouldn't work in Poland. They had to close down a newspaper. When they closed it, they provoked trouble. I don't know what the outcome has been these last two days. (The Premier: It's not over yet.) That problem of theirs, in a word, has not been solved yet. They haven't solved the [problem of] counterrevolution, they haven't solved the problem of Rightists [and of] bourgeois ideology, and they haven't solved the problem of the two roads.

The proletariat should train intellectuals of its own. Were you taken aback when you just heard that? Since a good many of you are not the proletariat's own intellectuals. Although the proletariat is small—before Liberation there were only four million industrial workers and now it's twelve million in the last eight years

it has increased by eight million. Don't belittle these people on account of their small numbers. The future lies with this class alone; all the other classes are [just] transitional classes. The first step is for the entire peasantry to make the transition to collectivization. The second step will be the changeover to state farms.<sup>76</sup> As for the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, they are both transitional classes. We don't want the bourgeoisie any longer; this class must be eliminated. I'm not talking about eliminating people; [but] they must be changed; we want them to change into proletarian intellectuals, and they can change gradually. I said on April 30, "If there were no skin, what would the hair be attached to?"<sup>77</sup> Otherwise, there's the danger of becoming gentlemen on the beam.<sup>78</sup> The main thing at that [meeting] was to talk about this problem:<sup>79</sup> about the classes undergoing a change. These few classes are all transitional classes. They will all make the transition to the side of the working class. A good many people have now joined trade unions, and this raises the question—doesn't one become [a member of] the working class by joining a trade union? [No; some people have]<sup>80</sup> joined the Communist Party, [but] they [still] want to oppose communism—Communist Party members opposing communism! Aren't Ding Ling and Feng Xuefeng Communist Party members who oppose communism? When one joins a trade union it doesn't mean that one has become a [member of] the proletariat. The teachers and staff members of schools have all joined trade unions. Isn't Qian Weizhang a trade union member?<sup>81</sup> Isn't Qian Duansheng a trade union member?<sup>82</sup> [Nevertheless,] they still need to undergo a process of remolding. A good many of the Rightists are talented people; on this point I actually have considerable appreciation for them. But it would not be acceptable for them to use this talent of theirs to oppose communism and to oppose socialism. How can we remold them? Take Fei Xiaotong for example. I had a chat with him, and I said, "Can't you change a bit?" (Laughter.) He has learned our method of putting down roots and forging links [through exchanging experiences], which was used in [the campaign for] land reform.<sup>83</sup> Altogether he has more than 200 friends who are high-level intellectuals. They are everywhere—Beijing, Chengdu, Wuhan, Shanghai, Wuxi. He says that is exactly where he suffers, and that he can't get out of that circle. Not only is he unable to get out, he has deliberately organized these people and represented them in [the course of] the great blooming and great contending. I said, "Don't deal with that 200; find another 200; go among the workers and peasants and look for 200 [friends]." He said he didn't know if [we] wanted him any more. I said, "Didn't you talk about the need for making an investigation? You can go make another investigation. If you go make an investigation from the standpoint of the working class, who wouldn't want you?" This is what I chatted with him about, at the beginning of June. So, it's good to have a few Rightist friends. We should make friends with a few Rightists [so as to] understand their state of mind somewhat. We should have friends in all circles, should have friends on the Left, in the center, and also on the Right. We should have friends among the workers, we should have friends among the peasants. At present, [members of] the democratic parties, university professors, [people in] literary circles, and a good many writers in the Communist Party do not have friends who are workers or peasants. This is a very great shortcoming. I think that one

should go among [the masses of workers and peasants]<sup>84</sup> to look for friends. Genuine friends are to be found where there are workers and peasants. [When you go] among the peasants, you shouldn't take things too lightly and look for well-to-do middle peasants to be friends with. You shouldn't seek out that Liu Jiemei and make friends with him; he represents the well-to-do middle peasants. You should look among the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants, look among the old workers. Old workers perceive very clearly the [correct] direction [to be followed]. Poor peasants and lower-middle peasants [also] easily perceive the [correct] direction. That's why I believe that the situation is hopeful with regard to China's affairs; I'm never pessimistic. Didn't I talk about this on February 29?<sup>85</sup> Disorder cannot develop. Didn't I say that we must not be afraid of disorder? [In any case], disorder can become a good thing. Whenever there is thorough blooming [of various opinions], [as when] the ghosts shrieked for a while at Normal University, causing total disorder, then, it would seem to me that there is hope with regard to the affairs [of that place].

We are prepared to have four stages in the rectification [campaign], and Comrade Deng XX<sup>86</sup> has just said something about them. These are: the great blooming and great contending; a counterattack against the Rightists; rectification; and transformation through rectification.<sup>87</sup> Finally, there is one more point: [we must] examine our thinking, study a little Marxism-Leninism, have a gentle wind and a fine rain,<sup>88</sup> and hold small-group meetings to carry out a little criticism and self-criticism. The May 1 document on rectification<sup>89</sup> talked about having a gentle wind and fine rain. A good many people didn't approve, and called for a violent wind and stormy rain.<sup>90</sup> The results were very useful. We had already anticipated this [happening] at the time, because it had been that way when we carried out rectification in Yanan. You talk about a gentle wind and fine rain, and you end up with a violent wind and a stormy rain. But, in the end, things will have to conclude in a gentle wind and a fine rain. At one factory, as soon as they started to put up big-character posters, several thousand were put up, and the authorities of the factory found it very hard to take. After a period of ten days or so like that, some people wanted to quit. The shop directors were thinking of resigning and said that they couldn't stand it any more, that they couldn't eat and couldn't sleep. Then the Rightists said, you can't argue against us, we are the ones to do the great blooming and great contending. And, at that time, we also said to them that we would let them talk, and that [we] wouldn't argue. That's why in May we didn't argue; we didn't argue at all before June 8,<sup>91</sup> and a full-scale blooming and contending took place. Probably more than 90 per cent of the blooming and contending was correct. A few per cent consisted of the opinions of Rightists. At the time we just had to toughen the scalp and endure it.<sup>92</sup> I guess all you democratic parties will also have experienced this by now. Every unit has to go through such a stage—every cooperative, and every factory; and now even in the military things are being done this way. Whether or not we will do it next year will be determined next year; we'll discuss it further, because, since the movement is to continue until May 1 of next year,<sup>93</sup> there will be the question of whether or not it will be necessary to do it again in the second half of the year. However, as long as it is not done, "free markets"<sup>94</sup>

will appear again. Some things in the world are just so strange, [if we go] three years without a rectification [campaign], then many weird arguments<sup>95</sup> are bound to reemerge from the Communist Party, the Youth League, the democratic parties, among university professors, middle- and primary-school teachers, news reporters, engineers, and in the scientific circles, and capitalist thinking will once more rear its head. It's like our sweeping floors; it's best to sweep this house every day; our faces have to be washed at least once every day.<sup>96</sup> From now on it seems to me we should have [rectification] roughly once a year. A month or so each time will do it.<sup>97</sup> There won't be the kind of high peak we're having now, [but] perhaps there will [still]<sup>98</sup> be a little crest in the flood at that time. This crest in the flood [we are experiencing now] wasn't created by us. There are some things we hadn't figured on. Haven't we said this? The Communist Party produced Gao Gang.<sup>99</sup> Don't you democratic parties have a single Gao Gang? I can't believe it. Currently, the Communist Party has produced people like Ding Ling, Feng Xuefeng, and Jiang Feng.<sup>100</sup>

[As for] the four stages of rectification, the first is contending [of views], the second is counter[attack], the third is transformation, and the fourth is study. These four stages [taken together] will probably take a few more months.

The need for remolding must be recognized.<sup>101</sup> Rightists just don't admit that they are in need of being remolded. They don't admit that they must be further remolded. Furthermore, they have influenced other people to be also rather unwilling to remold [themselves], saying that they have already completed their remolding. Zhang Naiqi<sup>102</sup> said, "How can one endure that [remolding]?" He refers to it as being gutted and skinned. You say that one must be completely reborn; he says that being completely reborn amounts to being gutted and skinned.<sup>103</sup> Many people in this country of ours, China, have forgotten what it was our goal to achieve, why we must do these things, what the good points of socialism are, and why we should carry out ideological remolding.<sup>104</sup> It's simply for the purpose of establishing a proletarian viewpoint. Intellectuals must be changed into proletarian intellectuals. These old intellectuals will simply have to change in the future, because new intellectuals will have arisen. Teaching assistants, lecturers, whatever, will all become professors one day. You talk about learning and say that they are not good [at that] now. But in the future, they will be. [Among] engineers and scientists, new people are emerging; this will challenge the old scientists, old engineers, old professors, and old teachers<sup>105</sup>—they'll have no choice but to move ahead. We figure that the great majority of people are capable of moving ahead, and that intellectuals are capable of becoming proletarian intellectuals.<sup>106</sup> The proletariat must create its own corps of intellectuals, in the same way that the bourgeoisie created its own corps of intellectuals. It won't do for the political regime of a class not to have [its own] intellectuals.<sup>107</sup> If the United States didn't have such intellectuals, how could their bourgeois dictatorship work? In the dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletariat must create its own intellectuals.<sup>108</sup> An editorial should be written about this, to clear up this question. As for those Rightists who won't change, and who aren't willing to be completely reborn—[we] probably shouldn't count Zhang Naiqi [among them]<sup>109</sup>—if you want them to become proletarian

intellectuals, well, they just won't do it. They say they have already changed for the better a long time ago, and that they are the red bourgeoisie. We say that you're still not good enough; that you're white; Zhang Naiqi is a white bourgeoisie. To be expert first and then red is simply to be white first and then red.<sup>110</sup> They don't want to be red right now; they want to wait to be red in the future. If you're not red now, then what color are you, anyway? Aren't you white? You should be red and expert at the same time. If you want to become red, it's quite easy. It's not difficult at all; all you have to do is to set your mind to it.<sup>111</sup> You really don't have to read a lot of books. The main thing is to put [your] emphasis on what it is that [we] call the proletariat and what it is that [we] call the dictatorship of the proletariat, [on why it is that] the future lies with the proletariat alone, and the other classes are all transitional classes, [and on] what direction this country of ours should follow. They don't understand this. Those things I said on April 30<sup>112</sup> haven't sunk in with them. "If there were no skin, what would the hair adhere to?"

I said that China has had five pieces of skin. Three [of them] are old ones: imperialist ownership, bureaucratic-capitalist ownership, and feudal ownership. In the past the intellectuals depended upon these three pieces of skin for their livelihood. In addition, they also depended upon national capitalist ownership and on individual, small-producer ownership.<sup>113</sup> The democratic revolution we had last time was nothing more than a revolution against these three pieces of skin. Counting from [the time of] Lin Zexu, that revolution has lasted more than a hundred years.<sup>114</sup> The socialist revolution is directed against the two [other] pieces of skin: national bourgeois<sup>115</sup> ownership and small-producer ownership (petty-bourgeois ownership).<sup>116</sup> None of these five pieces of skin exists any longer; the three pieces of old skin have not existed for a long time; the two pieces of newer skin no longer exist either. What skin remains? It is this skin—the socialist ownership—this system of public ownership. Of course, this is further divided into two parts; ownership by the whole people, and collective ownership.<sup>117</sup> On whom [do the intellectuals] depend for their livelihood now? The democratic parties, university professors, scientists, news reporters, no matter who, all live off the workers, live off the collectivized peasants, and live off the ownership by the whole people and collective ownership. In short, they live off socialist ownership, live off public ownership. That [old] skin is gone; so what about this hair? Now it's drifting around in the air, and even if it comes down it won't take hold. [Nevertheless,] they even despise this [new] skin, [saying that] this proletariat, these poor peasants and lower-middle peasants, are really too dull; that they don't know anything about the heavens above nor about the earth beneath their feet,<sup>118</sup> whereas they [the intellectuals] themselves are superior to the Three Teachings and Nine Schools [of philosophy].<sup>119</sup> At that time (April 30) I exhorted everybody. I used a metaphor. I said this was not a simple matter. [I said take] for example eating dog meat. It's with this matter that I have some [applicable] experience: I have never eaten dog meat in my life. I have never eaten it, and yet I oppose eating dog meat. [People may say,] if you've never eaten it, why do you oppose it? You just haven't had any experience [with it], have you? You say dog meat tastes bad; have you ever eaten it? How can you know that dog meat tastes bad, huh? You haven't ever eaten it, and yet you express your opinion

all over the place, saying dog meat tastes bad. Furthermore if dog meat is put in front of you, you take one sniff and run away. That's because social opinion has always said [that dog meat isn't tasty]. [Actually] the ancients ate a lot of dog meat. Mencius's economic program had a provision: raise dogs. He said, "If chickens, pigs, and dogs do not miss their breeding season, then those who are seventy will have meat to eat."<sup>120</sup> Only those who are seventy-years old might eat meat—you can't if you are only sixty-nine—[this was] because at that time the [society's] productive forces were weak, and there were only just so many things [to eat]. [Getting back to] Marxism, because there were so many in the past who opposed it—the imperialists opposed it, and Generalissimo Chiang<sup>121</sup> opposed it every day—people have become scared to death of the thing. There was a saying, "Communism does not fit the national conditions of China," which is like saying that dog meat does not fit the needs of the people. There must be a process [of change], and furthermore, there must be a campaign.<sup>122</sup> This year's campaign is opening up this road [to change].

At present there are some organs and schools where, after the Rightists had been opposed, the wind became calm and the waves still,<sup>123</sup> and although a good many suggestions<sup>124</sup> [for change] have been made, [people are] no longer willing to make changes.<sup>125</sup> I think [we] will need another upsurge of blooming and contending, putting up some big-character posters, and directly challenging [people];<sup>126</sup> challenging [people] is very effective. As for the transformation, a short period of time is required, say, one or two months. [Furthermore], we must study. With regard to studying, it won't be finished in just one or two months, of course. I'm only saying that this campaign will come to the end of a stage.<sup>127</sup> The Rightists have anticipated this. They say, this storm must eventually pass, and that's that. Quite correct! You can't be opposing the Rightists all the time, opposing them year after year, day after day. For example, in Beijing right now this anti-Rightist atmosphere is not that intense any more, because [the process of] opposing [the Rightists] has been more or less [carried through], although it hasn't yet been fully concluded. Don't slacken up. There are some people who will not surrender even till they die. Luo Longji and Zhang Naiqi, for example, would rather die than surrender. [So] I think that we will [have to keep trying to] persuade them. Talking to them a few times certainly won't convince them. But are you going to continue to hold meetings every day? Put them [aside] somewhere and let them do as they please. We have adopted a procedure under which we don't arrest people, and we don't take away their right to vote either. With these people, give them room to turn around, and split them up. Now, as for that group who are diehards, if they never become willing to reform, what should we do? Just forget about it. Their numbers are very small. Put them [aside] somewhere, put them [aside] for a few decades. The majority of the people will move forward, and after three five-year plans have been completed, there will be transformation in the face of this country of ours.

Let me talk now about the Forty-Article Program for Agriculture.<sup>128</sup> After two years' practice, the goal [we began with] still basically holds, namely "four-five-eight," that is, [an output per *mu* of] 400 catties north of the Yellow River, 500 catties north of the Huai River, and 800 catties south of the Huai River.<sup>129</sup> We must

reach this goal in twelve years. This is the basic point. The entire program is unchanged in its fundamentals, but a few things have changed. For example, some [problems] have already been resolved. The problem of cooperativization [is one that] has basically been resolved. In addition, there have been some changes in the order of the articles. Furthermore, in the past, there were some things that were not emphasized; machines and chemical fertilizers, for example. These two things we did not stress in the past, [but] now we must produce them on a large scale; we must give them more emphasis. In the next few days let's hold a joint session of the Standing Committee of the [National] People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the [Chinese People's] Political Consultative Conference to discuss [the program] a bit.<sup>130</sup> After the discussion it can be published in the newspapers and taken to the entire countryside for discussion. It can also be discussed in factories, and among the people in the various circles, and the democratic parties can also discuss it. This winter, or sometime in December, the Communist Party must hold a national Party congress,<sup>131</sup> and only at that time will [the program] be ratified. This was a proposal put forward by the Communist Party. This is something that was designed by the Political Planning Council, but not Zhang Bojun's Political Planning Council.<sup>132</sup> The Communist Party will submit it to the State Council, and the State Council will in turn submit it to the People's Congress. [Let's] hold a National People's Congress this winter in December or in January next year [so that we can] pass next year's plan and budget a little earlier [than usual]. In the past haven't we always done this in May or June? Now we should change it; do it earlier. At that time [we should] also pass the agricultural program. There is a great need to mobilize the entire peasantry to discuss this program. We must drum up a surge of energy. We have now begun to be somewhat energetic, but in the second half of last year and the first half of this year our energy began to sag. Now, with the rectification [campaign], this energy has again been aroused. I say to [you], comrades, that these Forty Articles, as well as the plan for industry, and the plan for culture and education have every hope [of success]. They are fairly well-suited to China's national conditions, and they are not subjective. If there are some subjective [elements] in them, then we'll just change them. For example, in the Forty-Article Program for Agriculture there was one [article calling for] six million double-shared plows.<sup>133</sup> This [proposal] was [the result of] a subjective [speculation], and now we've gotten rid of [that article]. There have been some revisions too. After all, [we've] gone through two years of practice! But in general there is hope [of success]. Our China can be transformed. Ignorance can be transformed into knowledge, and that which is sagging can be transformed and stirred up.

In the program there is an article on eliminating the Four Pests: rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes.<sup>134</sup> I am very interested in this matter. I don't know how you people [feel about it]. I suspect you also are interested in it, aren't you? Some people say that sparrows can eat insects, [but] in my view we should wipe them out, [because] they compete for food with people. On the one hand they do eat insects, but they also eat grain. As for rats, nobody approves of them. Nobody approves of flies and mosquitoes, either; they have a bad reputation. At present, there aren't too

many flies and mosquitoes in Beijing, but they have come out again. In the past we didn't do anything about mosquitoes; we have only concentrated on flies and sparrows. This is a large-scale sanitary and public health campaign, and it's [a campaign] to break down superstitions. It's not easy to get rid of things like these. If we mobilize the people of the entire nation to work on this, I think the spirit of these people of ours will be aroused. We must arouse this nation [of ours].

To achieve [an annual production of] twenty million tons of steel in three five-year plans: In ten more years [this goal] can be [reached]. This year it's 5.2 million tons; in five years we have had an increase of more than three million tons.<sup>135</sup> The figures for 1949 show that [production] then was only a hundred and some thousand tons;<sup>136</sup> during the three years of recovery (1950, 1951, 1952) we made more than a million tons; now, after five more years of effort, we have reached 5.2 million tons; and with another five years of effort we can surpass 10 million tons or an even slightly higher target and reach 11.5 million tons. Then, in carrying out the third five-year plan, can't we reach twenty million tons? It's just like playing *majong*—you double your stakes.<sup>137</sup>

Getting rid of the Four Pests will also require several years of spot experimenting<sup>138</sup>—probably three years of spot experimenting, five years of sudden and all-out attack, and two years of mopping up.<sup>139</sup> Of the twelve years [covered by the program], two have already passed and ten years remain. If we produce some accomplishments in this area, the mental attitudes of the people will change. Once we have moved ahead in this, I think, birth control will have some hope [of success]. I think that birth control will also [require] several years of spot experimentation, several years of sudden attack, and several years of mopping up. This matter, too, can be submitted to a great debate.

In getting rid of the Four Pests, [we] should engage on a large scale in great blooming and great contending, great debates, and [putting up] big-character posters. [We should debate] whether it is actually possible to eradicate the flies, mosquitoes, and rats in the countryside and in the cities. I say that this country of ours absolutely has every hope [of success]. The Rightists say that there is no hope. That is wrong; it's completely mistaken. They have no faith. There is a reason for this lack of faith. Of course they have no faith; it's because they don't want to undertake this task. We want to establish socialism, and I feel that there is absolutely every hope. This includes eradicating rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes; this includes eliminating illiteracy; and this includes planned population growth. There are many things to be done; in those forty articles there are a good many things. Who says that it is only a plan for agriculture; there's also a plan for industry, and there's also a plan for culture and education.

As for whether [we should] throw the Rightist elements into the ocean, we won't throw even a single one of them in. Didn't [we] just talk about the two kinds of people? One kind consists of those who have corrected their ways, and who can later get rid of their Rightist labels and return to the ranks of the people; the other kind are those [who will remain the same] right down to the time they see King Yan.<sup>140</sup> They'll say, I'm one who has not surrendered; King Yan, Your Highness, see how much backbone I have! These are the loyal vassals of the bourgeoisie who

do not surrender. The Rightists have ties to the remnants of feudalism; they are joined in spirit.<sup>141</sup> Although they have never exchanged letters and haven't held any meetings [together], they echo each other. The landlords were extremely happy [with] *Wenhui bao*. The landlords bought the newspaper and read it to the peasants, [saying] look, it's been printed in the paper! They just want to turn things around. Therefore, the remnants of feudalism, the remnants of the counterrevolution, and the Rightists are in actuality all joined in spirit. Moreover, [those] in foreign countries are joined in spirit with [those in] China as well.<sup>142</sup> For example, Taiwan and Hong Kong are very much in support of Chu Anping's [theory of] the [Communist] Party treating the country as its own [private] domain, Zhang Bojun's Political Planning Council, and Luo Longji's Rehabilitation Committee.<sup>143</sup> There is also Ge Peiqi. He's the most famous.<sup>144</sup> And there's the United States. They very much disapprove of our opposing the Rightists. They have great sympathy for the Rightists. I've already talked with you [about this]. I said, supposing the Americans captured Beijing, what would you do? What attitude would you adopt? What would you prepare to do? Would you organize a [collaborationist] organization with them, to maintain order,<sup>145</sup> or would you go into the mountains? I said that my idea is to go into the mountains; the first step is to go to Zhangjiakou, the next step is to go to Yanan. Didn't I talk about this two days before February 29?<sup>146</sup> Saying this is putting it in an extreme way. [If we] considered the problem thoroughly, we would not be afraid of disorder. Even if you occupied half of China, I wouldn't be afraid. Didn't Japan occupy the greater part of China? Afterward, didn't we create a new China? We say "thank you" to the Japanese. I've talked with the Japanese, and I said, this invasion of yours was very advantageous for us.<sup>147</sup> This invasion of yours stirred up an entire people to oppose you and raised their consciousness.

Besides these, there are a few other documents [dealing with] labor and wages and matters having to do with the overall system. These will be discussed with everybody [here], and they will be presented to the Standing Committee of the [National] People's Congress. There is also the [issue of the connections between] wages and labor insurance and benefits; this will also be discussed. I am afraid we should do a bit more experimenting first; consider it a draft [plan] and do some spot experimenting in the factories. Only then will we be able to make a final decision.

Rightists don't tell the truth, but we do. They are dishonest. They do things behind our backs. Who would know that Zhang Bojun was involved in so many things? The way I see it, the higher the official positions such people hold, the more they would rebel against us. What about as the head of a ministry? [People like that] couldn't serve as ministers any more, could they? If a Rightist became a minister, the people probably wouldn't approve of it, would they? Another [matter is], how do we arrange [jobs] for [the Rightists who are] People's [Congress] deputies? How should we arrange jobs for the Rightists? Well, as far as a job is concerned, they must have some sort of a job. With these well-known Rightists, it would probably be [too] difficult to place them in positions as People's [Congress] deputies. Can Ding Ling be elected a deputy? No, she cannot be elected a People's [Congress] deputy. Next year we will have elections, and we'll have to talk with

you about the slates for the elections. With certain people it's probably not good for them to be without any duties at all, either. Arranging [job assignments] for the Rightists is indeed a problem; we should consider it very carefully. There are some professors, such as Qian Weizhang, who are probably all right as professors but cannot serve as vice-presidents [of a university]. [Then] there are some [other] people who, for the time being, are probably not even good enough to serve as professors, [because] the students won't listen to them. Well, what should they do? We can assign them some other work in the schools, to allow them to remold themselves. They can become professors after a few years. We should give thought to all these problems. These are bothersome problems. This business of revolution is a troublesome business.

What is the situation in the various democratic parties, and at the basic levels? I'm afraid that even you people haven't gotten to the bottom [of the situation], just as we haven't gotten to the bottom of the situation in many areas. This time, this 2 per cent of intransigent Right-wing elements could muddy up the water quite a bit for a time, making us unable to see the bottom. On investigation, however, we immediately realize that in fact they only make up 2 per cent and that's all. As soon as a handful of alum is put in, we will be able to see the bottom. This rectification [campaign] is [like] putting a handful of alum [into the muddy water]. After great blooming, great contending, and great debates, we are able to see the bottom. We are able to see the bottom in the countryside, we are able to see the bottom in the factories, and in the schools, the Party, the [Youth] League, and the democratic parties. All of these have bottoms [that can be fathomed]. [With] people like Zhang Naiqi, [if] you want long-term coexistence, they are for short-term coexistence; [if you want] mutual supervision, they want no mutual supervision at all.<sup>148</sup> The Zhang-Luo Alliance<sup>149</sup> was most happy with this slogan of long-term coexistence. Long-term coexistence, mutual supervision, a hundred flowers blooming, and a hundred schools contending [were the things] they liked most. [But], as it turned out, [they] moved to their own opposite; long-term coexistence became short-term coexistence. I ask you all to give thought to the problem of dealing with the Rightists, and to discuss what method [we should use] to deal with them.

This meeting today has been one of a briefing nature. Will everyone please study, when you go home, the problem of rectification and the program for agriculture. The program for agriculture will be distributed to all of you.

## Notes

1. Mao is repeating in this introductory paragraph much of what he said thematically in his two recently delivered speeches of October 7 and 9, 1957. (See text Oct. 7, 1957, text surrounding notes 15 and 19, and text Oct. 9, 1957[1], text surrounding note 4.)

2. The *Xuanji* version reads "different from other forms that have been adopted in our Party's history."

3. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9; and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24. See also text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 10.

4. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 18; see also text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 11.

5. Fan Changjiang (a.k.a. Fan Xiwen, b. 1910) was one of the most famous Chinese

journalists in the 1930s and 1940s. In the 1930s he was a reporter for *Dagong bao* of Tianjin. In 1938 he was instrumental in the establishment of the Guoji xinwenshe (International News Agency) in Changsha, Hunan. When Changsha fell to the Japanese in 1939, he moved the agency to Guilin in Guangxi. Here he began to be connected with Communist circles. When the Communist organs were ousted from Guangxi by the KMT in 1941, Fan went to Hong Kong where he established the *Huashang bao* (Chinese Commercial News) and continued to use the Guoji xinwenshe as a source of news of China for the overseas-Chinese press. In 1942 he began to work for the Xinhua News Agency in its Central China branch bureau in the Jiangsu-Anhui border region. Throughout the 1940s and in the early years of the PRC, Fan worked in the field of journalism, at one time as the chief of the Xinhua Bureau in Nanjing, which was then under KMT control, and where, under the aegis of the United Front, Communist organs nominally operated as participants in the affairs of the Nationalist government. In 1949 Fan became editor-in-chief of the North China edition of *RMRB* and later was the managing editor of *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily) in Shanghai.

It appears as if Mao, or his scribe here, was a bit confused about Fan's history at this point. According to the record, Fan did not go to Yanan until 1947, when the negotiations between the CPC and the KMT had broken down, the "Second United Front" had come to an end, and Communist organs in KMT-controlled cities were again ejected. It was not likely therefore that Fan was directly a target of the Yanan rectification. Also, he was not chief of the Xinhua Agency in Yanan (in fact, Yanan fell to the KMT shortly after he arrived). It is perhaps for the reason of this confusion that this paragraph about Fan is not included in the *Xuanji* version of this speech. We do not know for sure why Mao mentioned Fan here in the original speech; one speculation may be that, as of 1956, Fan was assigned to positions of science administration in the PRC and came into direct contact with the scientists and technological intellectuals who played such a major role in affecting Mao's political viewpoint during this time. (One of these scientists, whom Mao mentions later in this speech, was Qian Weizhang, who, together with Fan, served on the State Council's Scientific Planning Commission at this time. Another was Zeng Chaolun, who was implicated in the Zhang-Luo Alliance; see text July 1, 1957, note 28.)

For more biographical information on Fan, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 262–264, and *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 391–392.

6. The term Mao uses here is *fanshen*, but it is used in a slightly different sense from how the term is most often used in the PRC. See text Feb. 17, 1951, vol. I, note 6.

7. The term that Mao uses here, which we translate as "put on the spot," is *xia bu liao tai*, which means to be unable to come down from the stage. The term is derived originally from the practice in Chinese operas whereby a performer, having done his or her part and ready temporarily to leave the stage, would be given a line or so to explain why he or she was leaving. To be left without a line for exiting therefore connotes, metaphorically, an inability to give good reason for extricating oneself from an embarrassing situation. The terms *shang tai* and *xia tai* (getting up onto the stage and leaving the stage) have also come to acquire social and political meaning, as when someone takes on political or other offices, he or she is said to *shang tai*, and when he or she quits or is removed from office, *xia tai*. (See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 20.) To be unable to leave office honorably is therefore *xia bu liao tai*. The image of putting up ladders is used here for providing excuses or reasons for these people's graceful exiting.

It should be noted that Mao also uses the term *xia lou* (coming downstairs) or its opposite, *xia bu liao lou*, which we translate as "out on a limb" here, and that this usage is different from the "going downstairs," which he used in an earlier speech. (See text July 8, 1957[2], note 51.)

8. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note and text.

9. The term here is *jin gu qi ming*, which means "with great clamor and fanfare." The gong (*jin*) and drum (*gu*) are two instruments used in traditional China on the battlefield to direct the movement of troops. When the drum is beaten, the troops advance; when the gong is sounded, as when, in the West, the bugle is blown, the troops retreat or regroup. The

beating of drums and gongs is also a customary part of the depiction of battle scenes in Beijing opera, especially when major characters (e.g., generals) come on to the stage. This aphorism has the same meaning as when Mao speaks of the masses going about the activities of 1957 in a *qiao luo da gu* (beating gongs and drums) or *da luo da gu* (big gongs and big drums) fashion. See text April 1957(2), note 59.

10. See text Feb. 27, 1957, text surrounding note 43; see also text Mar. 20, 1957, note 7.

11. The text here in the *Wansui* version shows a word missing or unclearly printed. The entire phrase is missing in the *Xuanji* version.

12. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

13. The term here is *fang*. See text April 1957(2), notes 4 and 17; text April 10, 1957, note 1; and text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14, for the several meanings of this term and various translations.

14. See texts July 8, 1957(1) and July 9, 1957; first paragraphs in both speeches.

15. See "Comment" in the source note here for reference to meetings and forums held in May and June. For details, see *RMSC* (1958), pp. 30ff. See also text June 8, 1957(2), source note; text June 8, 1957(3), note 3.

16. For Luo Longji, see text July 1, 1957, note 8. The concession that Luo was relatively willing to let the airing of views, or "blooming," appear was eliminated from the *Xuanji* version. Also, the language in the *Wansui* version here is a bit garbled.

17. See text Jan. 1957, note 19.

18. See text Oct. 16, 1954, vol. I, note 4.

19. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.

20. The *Xuanji* version here has "socialist revolution."

21. See text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23. It appears that Mao is speaking of the "old democratic revolution" as distinguished from the "New Democratic Revolution." However, it does sound a bit odd to hear Mao suggest that the CPC had (up to late 1957) so far succeeded only in carrying out the old, bourgeois democratic revolution—if indeed that is what he means here.

22. The *Xuanji* version here reads "the national bourgeois ownership system" (*minzu ziben zhuyi suoyouzh*); the words *minzu* are missing in the *Wansui* version.

23. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 85.

24. Chiang, Song, Kong, and Chen refer to the so-called "four big families" (*si da jiazu*) in the Nationalist republic. Chiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek, Song refers to Song Ziwen, Kong to Kong Xiangxi, and Chen to the Chen brothers, Guofu and Lifu, who were the leaders of the so-called C. C. Clique. These four families dominated the economics and politics of the KMT and the Nationalist government. There was also much interconnection between the four families in that Song Ziwen's three sisters were each married to powerful leaders of the republic (Qingling to Sun Yat-sen, Meiling to Chiang Kai-shek, and Ailing to Kong Xiangxi, respectively).

Song Ziwen (a.k.a. T. V. Soong) was minister of finance for the Nationalist Government, president of the Executive *yuan*, governor of the Central Bank of China, and minister of foreign affairs. Kong Xiangxi (a.k.a. H. H. Kung) was minister of industry and commerce, and minister of finance. For the Chen brothers, see text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 4. For more on Song and Kong, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1970), III, pp. 149–153, and (1968), II, pp. 263–269, respectively.

25. This was referred to in the *Xuanji* version merely as a "Party member who came from the background of a hired agricultural laborer."

Liu Jiemei was a native of Shangbahe *xiang*, Huanggang *xian*, Hubei Province. He became the director of the Agricultural Technical Instruction Station of Macao *xiang* in Huanggang *xian*. In 1957, at a three-level cadres' meeting, Liu criticized CPC policies. The *xian* committee of the CPC then organized an exhibition at which artifacts from Liu's home were displayed to compare his life before and after Liberation, land reform, and cooperativization. Liu's self-criticism appeared in *RMRB* on September 30, 1957.

26. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 29.

27. The Chinese term here is *guan*. See text June 23, 1950, vol. I, note 8.

28. For the scheduling of the five-year plans, see text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2; text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 117, and text Nov. 11, 1956, note 4.

29. The "crest" or "peak" here seems to refer to a climax in the emergence of Rightists.

30. See text Oct. 7, 1957, notes 29 and 32.

31. See text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, source note and notes 1 and 2. See also text Oct. 7, 1957, note 35, and text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 7.

32. For these classifications, see text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 1; text Sept. 25, 1956(2), note 2; and text Mar. 20, 1957, note 20.

33. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 39.

34. From the context and from the contextual information in the *Xuanji* version, XXX here seems to refer to Deng Xiaoping, although we have no text of any speech that Deng may have made at this conference. From the earlier sentence attributed to XXX quoted (in parentheses) here, the "three million" figure appears to represent a portion (the portion that opposes socialist transformation) of a particular subset of the middle-peasant stratum, probably the "well-to-do middle peasants," since that would likely be the smallest subdivision in that stratum and might fit the "three million" estimate.

35. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 5.

36. The *Xuanji* version identifies XXX here as Deng Xiaoping.

37. While the *Wansui* version here has "proletarian intellectuals," the *Xuanji* version reads "bourgeois intellectuals," which appears to us to make better sense in this context.

38. Mao is here repeating an assessment of intellectuals that he made in a speech in early 1956. (See text Jan. 20, 1956.)

39. See text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 4, and text Mar. 20, 1957, note 41.

40. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

41. See text July 8, 1957(2), notes 19, 48, and 60.

42. The Chinese term here is *da zi*, or "big characters," which connotes that the peasants cannot recognize simple characters even if they are enlarged for them. (The metaphor is spurious, of course, in that enlarging a character does not make it any more comprehensible.) The basic notion is that they are simply illiterate.

43. The *Xuanji* version here reads "not willing to accept the leadership of the Communist Party." The Chinese term is *fu qi*, meaning, colloquially, "to swallow it."

44. The *Xuanji* version here reads "middle-of-the-roaders" for "non-Rightists."

45. The *Xuanji* version here reads "poor peasants, the proletariat, and the lower-middle peasants."

46. Mao is referring to the Russian launching of the Sputnik satellite (hence a "moon"). See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), note 43 and text surrounding notes 44 and 45.

47. See text July 1957(1), note 27.

48. The expression here is *you ze gai zhi*, which is a variation of the saying *you guo ze gai*; see text June 9, 1957, note 2.

49. See text July 8, 1957(2), text surrounding note 40.

50. There is, according to record, no February 29 in 1957. Mao may be referring either to his article of February 27, 1957 ("On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People"), or to his speech of March 1, 1957. From the context here, the former likelihood is greater.

51. Mao is referring to the speech that Lu Dingyi, director of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPC, made on May 26, 1956, at a meeting of the academic circles in Beijing at the invitation of Guo Moruo, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The slogan of "Letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend" in the academic disciplines was proposed in this speech, which was printed in *RMRB* on June 13, 1956. See text Autumn 1956. For more biographical information on Lu Dingyi, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), II, pp. 661–665, and *Zhonggong renmin lu*, pp. 660–663.

52. See text July 1957(1), source note.

53. Miao Bin (1899–1946) was a KMT official who joined that party in the mid-1920s. He became an alternate member of the KMT's Central Executive Committee in 1926 and participated in the Northern Expedition. In 1927 he was suspected by Chiang Kai-shek of collusion with the Communists and escaped a dire fate in Chiang's purges of that year through the intercession of He Yingqin. Later, in 1928, he became a member of the KMT's newly organized Executive *yuan*. In the 1930s Miao began to advocate Sino-Japanese cooperation, and when, after the outbreak of war between China and Japan, a puppet regime was set up by the Japanese in Beiping (now Beijing), Miao went there and was given funds for establishing the Xinmin hui, which was a pro-Japanese propaganda group, and of which he became vice-president. In 1940, he fled to Nanjing and joined Wang Jingwei's puppet government there. He later also became the leader of the East Asia League, a Japanese-sponsored organization formed to promote Japan's ideology of the "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere." At the end of the war Miao held onto hopes of helping the Chinese government to negotiate peace with Japan and in fact took a trip to Japan for that purpose. These efforts failed, and in 1946 he was arrested in Shanghai. In the summer of that year he was executed by the KMT. For more biographical information on Miao, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1970), III, pp. 36–37.

54. The Reorganization Clique (*gaizu pai*) was a faction in the KMT organized, informally, in 1928, which opposed the growing power of Chiang Kai-shek which had grown even more solid after the purging of the Communists from the KMT in 1927. This organization, officially the Association for the Reorganization of the Kuomintang, was led by Wang Jingwei and backed, at first, by warlords such as Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. In 1930, an attempt was made to organize a government in Beijing to rival Chiang's Nationalist government in Nanjing. Although the organization per se began to lose its discrete identity through the 1930s by way of political compromises and accommodation made by its leaders with the Chiang faction, through the person of Wang Jingwei, who became the head of the Japanese-sponsored puppet government at Nanjing (after Chiang and the Nationalist Government had moved to Chongqing) in 1940, this "reorganization" faction continued to exist in spirit if not in name, became collaborationist, and challenged Chiang's authority until 1944.

55. Taiyuan is the capital city in Shanxi Province. Immediately after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937, that province and the Ping-Sui Railroad, which ran through its northern part, connecting central-northern China and its political nerve center to the vast regions and resources of the Northwest all the way to Mongolia and Xinjiang, became a prime target for the Japanese. This became one of two attack routes the Japanese mounted in the autumn of 1937, the other being directed at Central China in the Wuhan region. Throughout September and October 1937, battles raged in the key cities and the mountain passes in Shanxi. On November 8, the garrison of Taiyuan, under the command of Fu Zuoyi (see text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 6) surrendered to the Japanese. This concluded the major Japanese offensive in the region. We are unable to ascertain the specific event of which Mao spoke here. However, the falling of Taiyuan marked the consolidation of Japanese control over all of North China, and consequently also the beginning of total Japanese power, through the agencies of collaborationist entities, over the political developments in North China for the remainder of the war. See also text July 8, 1957(2), note 43, on the type of plays Mao describes here.

56. This is almost certainly a reference to Huang Yanpei; see text Feb. 17, 1951, vol. I, source note.

57. The term *yi fen wei er* (one divides into two) is a partial, but key, concept in Mao's view of the fundamental law of dialectical materialism—the law of the "unity of opposites" (see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27, and text Feb. 27, 1957[2], note 34), which he considered to be the "fundamental law of the universe" held to be true by all Marxist-Leninists. The law of the unity of opposites holds that everything in the universe is a unity of opposite aspects which exist within the unity under specific conditions and are related to one another in a mutually contradictory and yet also mutually dependent way, and that these contradictory

aspects struggle against one another constantly and under specific conditions, bringing about each other's transformation. The concept of "one divides into two" defines the dynamism within the law. It emphasizes the inevitable disintegration of the unity as a result of the struggle between its contradictory parts, and therefore the destruction of the old unity giving way to the emergence of a new unity. This is a constant and infinite process of change by which all things in the universe, particularly social realities, are constantly rejuvenated. It stands in opposition to an alternate concept of the law in which it is not the dynamism of change, i.e., the splitting of the unity into antithetical parts, but rather the synthesis of opposing entities, that is emphasized. This latter concept is known as the *he er wei yi* (two combine into one) concept, which was advanced by Yang Xianzhen in the 1960s. The debate between these two concepts became the philosophical core of the polemical and political struggle between Mao and Liu Shaoqi in the early part of the Cultural Revolution. Here Mao is applying the concept to his idea that the Rightists must also split into two factions. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 18.

58. The term Mao uses here is *liang dian lun*, which can be translated as the theory that holds that there are two points, or two aspects, to everything, or, a specific theory of dialectical dualism. For its meaning and its connection to Mao's dialectics, see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 35, where it is contrasted with the term *yi dian lun*.

59. The Chinese term for "label" here is *mao zi*; see text Dec. 8, 1956, note 33, for the usage of this expression.

60. The term here is again *fanshen*, and we have yet a third variation in the usage of the term. See note 6.

61. On the history of the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, see text Dec. 19, 1950, vol. I, and other relevant texts in that volume; see also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 10, and text Feb. 27, 1957, notes 44, 47.

62. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 9; text July 1957(1), note 2; text Oct. 7, 1957, note 30; and text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 70.

63. The Premier refers to Zhou Enlai.

64. As far as we can tell, Lin Xiling was a student at the People's University in Beijing (Renda) and was labeled as a Rightist in 1957.

65. See text July 1957(1), note 45.

66. Wu Jingchao is a noted economist. He was then a professor at the People's University and a leading member of the Democratic League. He was one of the six professors who attended the meeting convened by Zhang Bojun on June 6, 1957. See text July 1, 1957, note 28. See also text Mar. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 2.

67. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 102, for this particular practice and the usage of the term attached hereto.

68. Chen Yuan was a historian whose specialty was Inner Asia. He was also at this time chancellor of Beijing Normal University. For more biographical information on Chen, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1967), I, pp. 261–264.

69. Zhang Wenbo is another name for Zhang Zhizhong, a prominent member of the KMT military before 1949 and after 1949 a vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang. Having had an illustrious career in soldiering during the war against Japan, Zhang became a major go-between for the KMT and the CPC in both rounds of negotiations between the two parties (before the outbreak of the Civil War, late in 1945, and at the end of the civil war, in early 1949). In the first round, Zhang's most significant achievement was as Chiang Kai-shek's personal representative dispatched to Yanan to initiate negotiations with the CPC. Zhang escorted Patrick Hurley, the American ambassador, to Yanan and also escorted Mao to Chongqing at the end of August 1945 for negotiations. In the second round, some three and a half years later and at the end of a war that the KMT was losing, Zhang was asked by Li Zongren, who had nominally replaced Chiang Kai-shek as president of the Republic of China, to go to Beijing (then Beiping) to negotiate peace terms with the CPC. These negotiations, conducted in early April 1949, failed, and Zhang remained in Beiping. This was a major blow to the KMT regime. For more



biographical information on Zhang, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1968), I, pp. 41–46. See also text May 5, 1951, vol. I, source note.

70. This is a saying that describes the Confucian teaching on rules of everyday behavior. It is derived from the nineteenth segment of the book “Zi Zhang” in *Lun yu* (Analects of Confucius).

71. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27. We do not know, however, why Mao is referring to something happening in Poland at or about the time of this speech.

72. See texts June 14, 1957(2), and July 1, 1957, especially note 1 in the latter text.

73. See text July 1, 1957, notes 2 and 19.

74. The *Xuanji* version identifies this as *Xinmin bao* and not *Xinmin wan bao*. Given Mao’s identification of Zhao XX as in charge of the paper, however, we believe that the *Wansui* version is correct. The *Xinmin wan bao* is based in Shanghai.

75. The managing editor of the *Xinmin wan bao* was Zhao Chaogou.

76. See text Mar. 19, 1953, vol. I, note 4.

77. See text April 1957(2), note 14. Although the April 1957(2) text is placed at the end of April in this collection, it is believed that the Hangzhou Conference, at which that speech was made, was held in early April. Thus Mao’s reference to April 30 here would not be to that particular instance in the speech at the Hangzhou Conference, but to some other instance at which Mao spoke on the same subject. This reference to the date does not appear in the *Xuanji* version.

78. See text July 9, 1957, note 84.

79. Mao is referring to the Twelfth Supreme State Conference held in Beijing on April 30, 1957. Presumably Mao spoke on the subject at this conference, as he indicated here and also on another instance (at the Supreme State Conference in late January 1958; see text Jan. 28–30, 1958); but we have no full text of this speech. For more on this conference, see K. Lieberthal (1976), p. 96.

80. This phrase in brackets appears only in the *Xuanji* version. We have included it here because it helps to clarify Mao’s position of giving a negative response to his rhetorical question in the preceding sentence.

81. Qian Weizhang (b. 1910) is a noted physicist. After graduating from Qinghua University, he attended the University of Toronto in Canada where he received his doctorate in 1942. Later he worked at California Institute of Technology. On his return to China he became a professor at Qinghua University, where he later doubled as vice-president. He was a member of the Standing Committee of the All-China Federation of Professional Societies in the Natural Sciences and also a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League. In 1957, he participated in drafting a program proposing an alternative to the Twelve-Year Plan of the Scientific Planning Commission of the State Council. Qian was also one of the six professors who attended Zhang Bojun’s meeting on June 6, 1957 (see note 66, referring to text July 1, 1957, note 28). For more biographical information on Qian, see *Zhonggong renming lu*, pp. 994–995.

82. Qian Duansheng (b. 1900) is a political scientist. He came to the United States in 1919 and studied at the University of North Dakota, the University of Michigan, and ultimately at Harvard University where he received his M.A. (1922) and Ph.D. (1924). On his return to China he taught at National Beijing University and later, in the 1930s, at National Central University in Nanjing. During the war with Japan, he taught at Southwest Associated University in Kunming and made several trips to the United States. Throughout this period he was critical of Chiang Kai-shek’s political control. His most famous work, *The Government and Politics of China*, published by Harvard in 1950 and reprinted in 1961, was a good example. Although he did not hold political positions between 1945 and 1949, he was vocal and open in accepting the new Communist regime. After undergoing ideological reform in the early days of the PRC, Qian was appointed president of the new Beijing College of Political Science and Legal Studies. At this time, (i.e., 1957), he was a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League, a member of the CPPCC, and a delegate to the National People’s Congress. He was implicated as a member of the Zhang-Luo Alliance in 1957 (see text July 1, 1957, source note) and labeled a Rightist. He was stripped of official

and public positions, and although the label was ultimately removed in 1961, he did not regain any of these positions. For more biographical information on Qian, see H. Boorman et al., eds. (1967), I, pp. 376–379.

83. See text July 1, 1957, note 16.

84. The phrase in brackets here appears only in the *Xuanji* version. For reference to this point earlier, see, for instance, text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 65.

85. See note 50.

86. This refers to Deng Xiaoping; see notes 34 and 36.

87. The phrase for this last one is *zheng gai*; see text Oct. 7, 1957, note 23.

88. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29.

89. This refers to the “Directives of the Central Committee on the Rectification Movement,” which were passed on April 27, 1957, but appeared in *RMRB* on May 1, 1957.

90. See Mao’s explanation of this situation in the speeches of October 7 and 9, 1957; see also text Feb. 27, 1957, text surrounding note 43.

91. This refers to the publication of the editorial, “What Is This For?,” in *RMRB* on June 8, 1957. Mao also drafted an intra-CPC directive on the rectification on June 8. (See texts June 8, 1957[1] and [2].)

92. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 2.

93. Here Mao uses the term *wu yi*, which, besides meaning May 1, also refers to the labor festival May Day. See source note comment here and text Oct. 9, 1957(1), two paragraphs after note 43.

94. The quotation marks here appear only in the *Xuanji* version. For the meaning of “free markets,” see text Oct. 11, 1955(1), note 9. Mao is here using the term metaphorically to connote expressions and exchanges of ideas which are not regulated.

95. See text Jan. 18, 1957, paragraph 9, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), paragraph 34.

96. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 100.

97. See text July 8, 1957(2), paragraph 8.

98. The word for “still” appears only in the *Xuanji* version.

99. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, source note and note 5.

100. See text April 1957(2), note 43.

101. The *Xuanji* version here reads, “The bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals must recognize their need to be remolded.” See also text Feb. 27, 1957, section 4, paragraph 4, and text Mar. 12, 1957, note 10.

102. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 73.

103. Mao’s physical metaphor here actually extends to the description “reborn,” for which he uses the Chinese phrase *tuo tai huan gu*, which means “to relinquish one’s embryonic mold and change one’s bones.” The Chinese for “being gutted and skinned” is *chou gen bo pi*. The first aphorism is derived from the chapter “Tuoxie” in *Yanzi jian* (The Writing Tablet of the Swallow), and from the Yuan *qu* (opera), *Laisheng zhai* (The Debt for the After-Life). The *locus classicus* of the latter aphorism is not known.

104. See text May 15, 1957, note 11.

105. The term Mao uses here for what we translate as “challenge” is *jiangjun* which refers to the act of checking in the game of chess. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 32.

106. The *Xuanji* version here reads “some intellectuals are capable of becoming proletarian intellectuals.” (Italics added; not in original.)

107. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), paragraph 18, and Deng Xiaoping’s Report on the Rectification Campaign (*RMSC* [1958], pp. 33–34, 40).

108. The *Xuanji* version adds here, “including all those intellectuals from the old society who truly take a firm working-class stand after being remolded.”

109. The *Xuanji* version here presents an opposite meaning. It reads, “Zhang Naiqi is probably one of them.”

110. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 32, and surrounding text.

111. The *Xuanji* version adds, “To thoroughly transform your own bourgeois world view.” 112. See note 79.

113. The *Xuanji* version adds here, “that is, petty-bourgeois ownership.” 114. On the democratic revolution, see text July 8, 1957, note 20. On Lin Zexu, see text Feb. 14, 1957, note 1. See also text May 20, 1951, vol. I, note 3, and text Mar. 20, 1957, note 15.

115. The *Xuanji* version here reads “national capitalist ownership.” On the national bourgeoisie, see text Mar. 12, 1950, vol. I, note 3.

116. The phrase (petty-bourgeois ownership) is not in the *Xuanji* version.

117. See text Mar. 5, 1956, note 12.

118. The expression here is *shang bu zhi tianwen, xia bu zhi dili*; for the meaning of the expression *tianwen dili*, see text Dec. 8, 1956, note 25. The total expression refers to “utter ignorance.”

119. See also text Dec. 8, 1956, note 25.

120. This is a quotation from the chapter “Liang Wei Wang (I)” in the book *Meng zi* (Mencius). It should be noted that the *Wansui* version here contains a typographical error, where it substitutes the character *fu* for the correct character *su*, which means breeding. Zhu Xi’s annotation of *Meng zi* explains that it was customary in Mencius’s day for elderly people over the age of seventy to be given meat to eat everyday as a sign of respect from the younger people.

121. The term Mao uses here is *weiyuan zhang*. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 19 for an explanation.

122. The *Xuanji* version here reads “a campaign of socialist ideological revolution.”

123. The *Xuanji* version here reads, instead, “people have become settled down in comfort.” The aphorism in the *Wansui* version is *feng ping lang jing*, which is a common saying. Some glossaries and dictionaries of aphorisms cite its usage in the seventeenth *hui* of the Qing-dynasty novel *Er shi nian mu du zhi guai xianzhuang* (Strange Things Seen in Twenty Years of Living), and in the novel *Qi xia wu yi* (Five Martyrs Among Seven Heroes), also in the seventeenth *hui*; the origin of the aphorism is likely to be much earlier.

124. The *Xuanji* version here adds the qualifier “correct” to the term “suggestion.”

125. The *Xuanji* version says here, “some organs and schools in Beijing are affected precisely by this problem.”

126. See note 105.

127. A corresponding passage in the *Xuanji* version reads: “Furthermore, we must study. We must study Marxism-Leninism for a bit. We must have gentle winds and fine rain and do some criticism and self-criticism. That would be in the fourth stage [of rectification]. This studying, of course, is not going to be for [just] one or two months. I am only saying that this movement should come to the end of a stage so as to arouse interest in studying.”

128. See text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3, text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 56, and text Oct. 11, 1955(2), vol. I, note 18. See also text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 17.

129. See text Dec. 21, 1955, vol. I, note 8. See also text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 21.

130. According to the press release of the Xinhua News Agency on October 14, 1957, this Supreme State Conference adopted Mao’s suggestion here. However, we have records (see *RMSC* [1958], p. 326) only of meetings of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, which were held October 16 and 22 (the eightieth and eighty-first meeting) to discuss the Forty-Article Program for Agriculture. It may be that these meetings were “enlarged” to include the Standing Committee of the CPPCC.

131. This suggestion was not included in the *Xuanji* version. It was, in any case, either not adopted or not carried out. The next CPC Party congress (i.e., the ninth) was not held until 1969, and the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress, which was probably closer to what Mao was referring to here, was not convened until May 1958.

132. For Zhang Bojun, see text July 1, 1957, note 3. In May 1957, at a forum held by the United Front Department of the CPC (see text June 8, 1957[2], source note, and text June 8, 1957[3], note 3), Zhang criticized that whenever the State Council convened meetings with the democratic parties, it was to bring up “finished products” to be approved by the parties. He said that such meetings were better off not held. Furthermore, he suggested that, just as there were many planning and designing councils for industrial development

(referring perhaps to such things as the State Scientific Planning Commission), there ought to be corresponding planning councils (*sheji yuan*) in politics. He proposed that the CPPCC, the People’s Congress, the democratic parties, and the people’s organizations should be organized into four such “planning councils,” which should discuss and pass resolutions on political matters before they are implemented.

By “not Zhang Bojun’s Political Planning Council,” it is not clear whether Mao was referring to the State Council or the State Planning Commission.

133. See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), note 52.

134. See text Dec. 21, 1955, vol. I, note 9. The specific reference is to Article 27 of the Forty-Article Program; see R. Bowie and J. Fairbank, eds. (1962), p. 125. The earliest mention of these “Four Pests” antedates the Forty-Article Program (even the draft form of that program). In the October 9, 1957 speech just preceding this one, Mao made an emphatic announcement that he was very interested in the program to eliminate the Four Pests.

135. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 37.

136. The *Xuanji* version here reads “a hundred and ninety thousand tons.” Mao also went on, according to the *Xuanji* version, to draw a comparison between conditions in China and in India, saying, “In India, the [annual] production of steel in 1952 was 1.6 million tons, and now it is a bit over 1.7 million tons. After five years of effort they have only increased by a bit more than a hundred thousand tons.”

137. In the popular game of majong, which is as much a game of skill as a game of chance, one does not merely increase one’s stakes in a bet, but instead tries to create a hand of superior value that would increase the points (or cash value) that one would gain should one win the hand. This value is measured in terms of *fan*, which is the character Mao uses here. A hand which is described as *liang fan* (“two” *fan*), should it turn out to be the winning hand, would be worth twice as much all around (the winning player collecting from each of the losers in each hand) as a hand that is described as *yi* (one) *fan*, and a *san* (three) *fan* hand is worth twice as much as a “two” *fan* hand. Mao gives us, through his writing, reason to suspect that he is extremely knowledgeable in this popular game and is probably an avid (maybe even addicted) player. He uses the term *fan* as a synonym for the “doubling” of figures in many of his writings and speeches. This is particularly the case in 1958 and 1959, as will be seen in the following documents, when he deals with the statistics in rural and industrial development prior to and during the Great Leap Forward. For more on Mao’s reference to this game, see text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 12.

138. See text Winter 1954, vol. I, note 2.

139. See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), paragraph 3.

140. See text April 25, 1956, note 38, and text July 8, 1957(2), note 76.

141. The Chinese term here, which we translate as “joined in spirit,” is *tong qi*. Literally it means to be in communication with one another in breathing, or to share the same breath. It is sometimes used to mean “being accommodating to one another.” Interestingly, given the semantic roots of the various words in various languages here, it can very facily be translated as “conspire.”

142. The *Xuanji* version has “the reactionaries in Taiwan and Hong Kong.”

143. For Chu Anping and his theory, see text July 1, 1957, note 4. For Luo Longji, see text July 1, 1957, note 8. In a forum in May 1957 (see note 132 here), Luo suggested a method for “guaranteeing that those who speak up in the spirit suggested by the CPC would not suffer retaliation in the future” (see text Mar. 1, 1957, note 4, and text June 9, 1957, note 2), which is that the National People’s Congress and the CPPCC should establish a “Rehabilitation Committee” to review the cases of people who had been labeled as counterrevolutionaries in the “Three-Anti’s” and “Five-Anti’s” campaigns (see text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note) and who are criticized or deposed by the CPC in the future. On Zhang’s “Political Planning Council,” see note 132.

144. Ge Peiqi was a lecturer at the People’s University.

145. This refers to the organizing, by collaborationists, of many “committees to maintain

social order" (*zhian weichi hui*) in Japanese-controlled cities throughout China during the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945.

146. This obviously refers to text Feb. 27, 1957. See also note 50.

147. See text April 21, 1957.

148. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 82.

149. See text July 1, 1957, source note.

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### Telegram to King Mohammed Zahir Shah

(October 14, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 15, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 119 (Nov. 10, 1957), 128; *URI* (1976), p. 391. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release*, (Oct. 15, 1957), 5; *URI* (1976), p. 393.

Mohammed Zahir Shah,  
The Kingdom of Afghanistan

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of Your Majesty's birthday, I express sincere congratulations to you and take this opportunity to express my best wishes for Your Majesty's happiness and good health.

May the friendly relations between China and Afghanistan develop with each passing day.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

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### Telegram to the Soviet Union

(October 15, 1957)

**Source:** *FBIS, Daily Report* (Oct. 22, 1957), BB 25-26.

*We have no Chinese text of this telegram. This is a representation of the text of the telegram as it appeared originally in the FBIS report, which was itself a reprint of the release by the Soviet Home Services, Moscow (Oct. 19, 1957). There is therefore much in this document that does not conform to our own translation and editorial conventions. Another FBIS report, not integrated into Daily Report, provides also the salutation and signature form. It indicates that the source was Pravda (Oct. 19, 1957).*

*This is a joint telegram addressed to K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; N. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; and N. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR; it was signed by Mao, as Chairman of the PRC and Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC, Liu Shaoqi, as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and Zhou Enlai, as Premier of the State Council of the PRC.*

On behalf of the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China, and the CPR Government, we convey to you and, through you, to the great Soviet people, the CPSU, and the Soviet Government, our heartfelt gratitude for the friendly congratulations on the eighth anniversary of the proclamation of the CPR. The Soviet people have always displayed and are displaying the greatest sympathy and give unparalleled aid to the Chinese people, who are marching along the highway laid by the great October Socialist Revolution in the cause of the people's democratic revolution and socialist construction. The Chinese people will always cherish the fraternal friendship of the Soviet people and will continue persistently to study the valuable experience of the Soviet people in revolution and construction, with a view to completing victoriously the glorious task of socialist revolution and socialist construction. The great unity of the eight hundred million people of China and the Soviet Union has already become a most important factor in the solidarity of the camp of socialism, led by the Soviet Union, and the powerful bulwark of peace all over the world. We shall always be together with the Soviet people; we shall always unite all the peace-loving countries and the peace-loving people of the world for the joint struggle for the preservation of peace in the world and the progress of mankind.

In warmly marking the great festival of our people we see with boundless joy that the Soviet people are marking the fortieth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution with brilliant achievements and unprecedented enthusiasm. We wish to make use of this opportunity to wish the Soviet people even greater successes in the construction of communism and in the defense of peace all over the world.

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### Telegram to Syria

(October 17, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 18, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 121 (Dec. 10, 1957), 210; *URI* (1976), p. 395. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Oct. 18, 1957), 14; *URI* (1976), p. 397.

*For the background to some things mentioned in this telegram, see text Sept. 19, 1957, note 3.*

Mr. Shukri Quwatly,  
President,  
The Republic of Syria

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, we were honored to receive your telegram of congratulations. On behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I express my gratitude to Your Excellency.

At a time when United States imperialism is goading Turkey to carry out provocations against Syria in a plot to start a war of aggression, I hereby reiterate the firm and just stand of the Chinese government and people resolutely to support the Syrian people in their just struggle to defend their independence and peace.

May the friendly relations between China and Syria develop with each day, may the struggle of the Syrian people to oppose colonialism be victorious, and may the Republic of Syria prosper and Your Excellency enjoy good health.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated, in Beijing)

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Telegram to the People's Republic of Bulgaria  
(October 19, 1957)

**Source:** FBIS, *Daily Report* (Oct. 23, 1957), KK 3-4.

*We have no Chinese text of this telegram. This is a representation of the FBIS report in its original form (the annotation, however, is our own), which was a release by the Home Service, Sofia (Oct. 19, 1957).*

*This is a joint telegram to G. Damyanov, chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; A. Yugov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; and T. Zhivkov, minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria from Mao, as chairman of the PRC and the Chairman of the CPC; Liu Shaoqi, as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the PRC; and Zhou Enlai, as premier of the State Council of the PRC. The original report does not carry salutations or signatures.*

On behalf of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, and the government of the Chinese People's Republic, we transmit to you and through you to the Bulgarian people, the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the government of the Bulgarian People's Republic heartfelt thanks for your greeting telegram on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese People's

Republic. We see with pleasure that recently the relations of friendship and collaboration between the Chinese and Bulgarian peoples have further developed after the visit of the Bulgarian government delegation led by Anton Yugov.<sup>1</sup> Taking the opportunity of this occasion, we wish to the fraternal Bulgarian people new successes in the building of socialism and the consolidation of peace in Europe and throughout the world.

**Note**

1. Anton Yugov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, headed a delegation of the Bulgarian government touring China in September and October 1957. A joint communiqué between the two governments was signed on October 11 in Beijing. (See *RMSC* [1958], pp. 412-413).

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Telegram to Tito  
(October 21, 1957)

**Source:** FBIS, *Daily Report* (Oct. 22, 1957), MM 16.

*We have no Chinese text of this telegram. The representation here is of the FBIS report in its original form, which was released from Belgrade on October 21, 1957.*

I received your telegram on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. I am expressing cordial thanks to you and through you to the people of Yugoslavia on behalf of the Chinese people. I wish further successes in the building of socialism to the Yugoslav people. I wish a continuous development and strengthening of the fraternal friendship and the relations of friendly cooperation between the people of Yugoslavia and China, united in the common cause of the building of socialism and the preservation of peace in the whole world.

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Telegram to Kim Il Sung  
(October 27, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Oct. 30, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 121 (Dec. 25, 1957), 213; *URI* (1976), p. 399. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Oct. 30, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 401.

Premier,  
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Comrade Kim Il Sung:

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the entrance of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the War to Resist U.S. [Aggression] and Aid Korea,<sup>1</sup> we were honored to receive your message of congratulations. On behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people, I express my heartfelt gratitude to you and, through you, to the government and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The unbreakable, fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples has tremendous significance for guaranteeing the peaceful construction of our two countries and for defending peace in Asia and the world.

May the Korean people achieve new successes in their great cause of building socialism and striving for the peaceful unification of their homeland.

May the fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples be continuously consolidated and developed.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC, dated, in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text Oct. 8, 1950(1), vol. I, note 1.

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### Comment on Report from Lijia zai<sup>1</sup> on the Huai River Control Project<sup>2</sup> (October 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Dec. 3, 1973), 1 (citation). Available English Translation: Cited in *CR* (Jan. 1967), 36.

The Foolish Old Man moved the mountain;<sup>3</sup> [it is in this way that we will] transform China. Lijia zai is a good example of this [spirit].

#### Notes

1. Lijia zai is located in Junan *xian*, Shandong Province.
2. The Huai River Control Project was inaugurated in 1950. See text May 9, 1951, source note.
3. The story of "The Foolish Old Man who Moved the Mountain" is a folktale derived

from the book *Lie Zi*. It epitomizes the value of perseverance and the belief that through hard work and unflagging determination, human effort is bound to overcome natural obstacles, however forbidding they may appear. Mao made this story the subject of his famous speech of June 11, 1945 (see *SW*, III, pp. 271–274).

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### Speech at Moscow Airport (November 2, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 3, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 13; *Buyi*, pp. 148–149; *Zai Sulian yanlun*, pp. 1–2; *URI* (1976), pp. 403–404; *XHBYK*, 144 (Nov. 25, 1958), 2–3, 8 (excerpt). Available English Translations: *HNA*, *Daily News Release* (Nov. 3, 1957), 1–2; S. Schram (1969), pp. 435–436; *URI* (1976), pp. 405–406.

*For the three weeks from November 2 to November 21, 1957, Mao was in the Soviet Union as head of the Chinese delegation to the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, and to the Twelve-Nation Congress of Communist Parties and Workers' Parties in Socialist Countries which was held November 14–16, and to a Sixty-Four Nation Congress of Communist Parties and Workers' Parties held November 17–19. This is the first of many speeches that Mao would make in the Soviet Union during his visit. Although Mao's official capacity on this visit was a celebratory one, it is clear enough now that much of what he did in the Soviet Union had to do with ascertaining to his own satisfaction the position of the leadership of the CPSU on a number of critical issues: on Stalin and Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin; on the Soviet Union's position with regard to the revolutionary movements in Eastern Europe and the counterrevolutionary activities there; ideological issues with regard to the ideas of "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful transition"; and so on. It is evident that Mao did not obtain satisfaction on these issues during the visit, and in spite of the generally conciliatory attitude that he, quite naturally, adopted while in the Soviet Union, he would, in later years, look back on this visit as a time when he was able to confirm the divergence of orientation and opinion between himself (and his own faction in the leadership of the CPC) on the one hand and the Khrushchev-led CPSU "revisionist" leadership on the other. Although it is not apparent from the surface of the language of these speeches, this was a crucial period of transition leading toward the eventual rift between the Soviet Union and the PRC.*

*Donald Zagoria has written an early discussion on the subject of this conference and the eventual dispute between China and the Soviet Union. See D. Zagoria (July–Sept. 1961).*

Dear Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Voroshilov, and Comrade Bulganin,  
Dear Comrades and Friends:

On this occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution, we comrades of the Chinese delegation, entrusted by the Chinese

people, have come to Moscow to express our high respect and warm congratulations to our brothers in the Soviet Union.

I visited the Soviet Union at the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950.<sup>1</sup> At that time the governments of our two countries signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, at which point the close union between our two great socialist countries began.<sup>2</sup>

[When] the delegations of the Soviet Union, headed by Comrade Khrushchev and Comrade Voroshilov visited China successively, they both invited me to visit your great country once again.<sup>3</sup> Recently the government of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union invited the Chinese government and the Communist Party of China to send a delegation to participate in the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution. For these friendly invitations, my comrades and I myself would like to express our deepest gratitude.

The October Revolution Festival is a great triumphal festival for the people of the Soviet Union and also a great triumphal festival for the proletariat, the masses of the working people, and all oppressed people throughout the world. The victory that the people of the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the great Lenin and the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union, won forty years ago created a new era in the history of the human race. In the course of forty years of construction, the Soviet Union has achieved brilliant successes at an extraordinarily rapid pace, and in many areas it stands in the foremost rank among the countries of the world, setting an outstanding example for peoples who are in pursuit of progress and happiness. The launching of the first artificial Earth satellite by the Soviet Union was no simple matter.<sup>4</sup> Since then a new era has begun in mankind's [efforts] to conquer nature further.

The socialist camp headed by the great Soviet Union is the strong bastion that guarantees peace in the world, and the faithful friend of all people who refuse to be oppressed and enslaved by imperialism. Right now U.S. imperialism is directing its spearhead of aggression and war against the Arab nations, against independent Syria.<sup>5</sup> Such an aggressive intent carries with it the danger of igniting a world war. The Chinese government and the Chinese people firmly support the just struggle of the Syrian people and of the Arab people as a whole. The Chinese government fully agrees with the grave and just warning that the government of the Soviet Union has issued to the aggressors.<sup>6</sup> All people throughout the world should be on the alert and strive to keep in check the imperialists' war conspiracy and to safeguard world peace.

The October Revolution has enabled the Chinese people to find the road to complete emancipation and prosperity and strength. In [advancing] their own cause, the Chinese people have received tremendous sympathy and generous assistance from the people of the Soviet Union. The people of our two countries have formed a fraternal alliance through our common struggle. There is no force in the world that can separate us.

Comrades, we will stand together forever and strive for world peace and the victory of our common cause.

Glory to the Great Socialist October Revolution!  
 Glory to the great Soviet people and the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union!  
 Long live the great friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples!  
 Long live world peace!

#### Notes

1. On this earlier visit Mao arrived in Moscow on December 16, 1949 (see text in vol. I on this date).
2. See text Jan. 2, 1950, vol. I, note 1.
3. See text April 15, 1957, source note, and text Oct. 12, 1954(1), vol I.
4. See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), note 43.
5. See text Sept. 19, 1957, note 3.
6. On February 11, 1957, the government of the Soviet Union proposed to the governments of the United States, Britain, and France the issuing of a joint declaration for maintaining the security and peace of the Middle East and the nonintervention in the domestic political affairs of the countries in that region. It proposed that the signatories of this declaration should guarantee to observe the six basic principles of neutrality in their policies vis-à-vis the events in the region. The Chinese declaration supporting this proposal was issued on February 17, 1957 (see *RMSC* [1958], p. 432).

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### Speech at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

(November 6, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 7, 1957), 1–2. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 121 (Dec. 10, 1957), 20–22; *Zai Sulian yanlun*, pp. 3–10; *Buyi*, pp. 150–155; *URI* (1976), pp. 407–413; *XHBYK*, 144 (Nov. 25, 1958), 1–8 (excerpts). Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Nov. 7, 1957), 1–5; *K. Fan* (1972), pp. 211–219; *URI* (1976), pp. 415–422; *CCSD*, pp. 147–148 (excerpts).

*See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note.*

Dear Comrades:

On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution, I and all the comrades in the Chinese delegation, representing the National People's Congress and the State Council of the People's Republic of China and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and on the behalf of the entire Chinese people and all members of the Communist Party, respectfully extend warm fraternal congratulations to the great Soviet people, the Soviet government, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and respectfully

extend warm fraternal congratulations to all the comrades and friends present.

As [our] revolutionary teacher Lenin repeatedly pointed out, this great revolution carried out by the Soviet people forty years ago launched a new era in the history of the entire world.

There have been all kinds of revolutions in history. But none of the revolutions of the past can be compared with the October Socialist Revolution.

The establishment of a society in which there is no exploitation of people by [other] people has been the dream of the world's laboring people and of progressive humanity for hundreds and thousands of years. The October Revolution changed this dream into reality for the very first time in one-sixth of the earth's territory. This revolution proves that, without the landlords and the bourgeoisie, the people are completely capable of building, in a planned way, a new life of freedom and well-being. At the same time, it also proves that once there is no more imperialist oppression, it will be completely possible for the world's peoples to live together peacefully.

The Soviet people have traveled a difficult road in the past forty years. The imperialists have attempted by every possible means to wipe out the world's first socialist republic. For a time, the enemies of the Soviet Union appeared to be stronger than the Soviet Union, and twice they launched armed attacks on the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> But the heroic Soviet people, led by the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union, thoroughly smashed the attacks of these aggressors.

The invincibility of the Soviet Union is due to the fact that the Soviet Union is a country that has replaced the capitalist system with a socialist system, a country that has replaced the dictatorship of the exploiting classes with the dictatorship of the proletariat, a country that is developing its social forces of production at a speed unattainable by the capitalist countries, and a country that genuinely practices proletarian internationalism, opposes national oppression, and aids [the cause of] the liberation of oppressed peoples. Such a country has the enthusiastic support of all of its own people as well as the enthusiastic support of all the peoples of the world. The degree to which these two kinds of support [have manifested themselves] is unprecedented in the history of any country [in the world].

The face of the Soviet Union has changed completely in [the past] forty years. Before the revolution, the economic and technological strength of Russia was relatively backward. Now the Soviet Union has become a top-ranking powerful industrial country in the world. The Soviet people's standard of living has been rising continuously. Education, science, and culture in the Soviet Union are developing on a far more extensive scale than in the capitalist countries. The Soviet Union has built the world's first atomic-powered electric plant, manufactured the world's first batch of passenger jet planes and the world's first batch of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and also launched the world's first and second artificial satellites.<sup>2</sup> The whole world acknowledges that the success of the Soviet Union in twice launching artificial satellites has opened up a new epoch in humanity's conquest of nature. All of these are not only a matter of pride for the Soviet people, but also a matter of pride for the proletariat of the whole world, and [moreover,] for the whole of humanity as well. Only a few reactionaries are unhappy about these things.

The creative application of Marxist-Leninist theory by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in resolving its tasks in practice has ensured that the Soviet people will achieve continuing success in their work of construction. The program to struggle for the Communist construction of the Soviet Union put forward by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is an example.<sup>3</sup> The wise measures taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in such matters as overcoming the cult of the individual, developing agriculture, reorganizing the management of industry and construction, expanding the authority of the federated republics and local organizations, opposing the anti-Party clique,<sup>4</sup> consolidating Party unity, and improving Party and political work in the Soviet army and navy will without any doubt promote the further consolidation and further development of all endeavors undertaken by the Soviet Union.

In the successes achieved by the Soviet people, the people of the various countries in the world see their own future ever more clearly with each passing day. Fundamentally speaking, the path of the Soviet Union, the path of the October Revolution, is the bright, common path of development for all of humanity. The broad masses of the people in the countries of the world warmly celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution because the history of these forty years has convinced them that the proletariat is bound to defeat the bourgeoisie, that socialism is bound to defeat capitalism, that the oppressed peoples will certainly be able to defeat imperialism. Naturally, difficulties and twists and turns still face the people, but Lenin said it well thirty-six years ago: "The important thing is that the ice has been broken; the route is open, the way has been shown."<sup>5</sup>

The people's revolution led by the Communist Party of China has always been a component of the world proletarian socialist revolution begun by the October Revolution. The Chinese Revolution has its own national characteristics, and it is absolutely necessary to take these characteristics into consideration. However, whether in our revolutionary enterprises or in the cause of socialist construction, we have made full use of the rich experiences of the Communist Party and the people of the Soviet Union. The Chinese people feel fortunate because, even though there are still many difficulties facing them, the experience of the October Revolution and socialist construction in the Soviet Union has enabled us to make fewer mistakes and avoid many [others] and to carry out our own undertakings comparatively smoothly.

The situation is very clear: Since the October Revolution, if the proletarian revolutionaries in any country overlooked or did not conscientiously study the experience of the Russian Revolution, did not conscientiously study the experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat or of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, and moreover, did not apply these experiences analytically and creatively in accordance with the concrete conditions of their own country, they would not be able to master Leninism, which represents Marxism developed to a new stage, and would not be able to solve the problems of revolution and construction in their own country correctly.<sup>6</sup> In such cases, they would either fall into the error of dogmatism or the error of revisionism.<sup>7</sup> We must oppose both of these erroneous tendencies at

the same time, but at present opposing the tendency toward revisionism is, in particular, the [more] urgent task.<sup>8</sup>

It is equally clear that since the October Revolution, if the government of any country refuses to be on friendly terms with the Soviet Union it can only harm the real interests of its own people.

In the world today, there is a chain of countries in Europe and Asia, encompassing a population of more than 900 million, that have already taken the road of the October Revolution and have been victorious, and have formed a powerful socialist world system. Capitalism lost its superiority long ago, and socialism has long become an invincible force.

The socialist system will eventually replace the capitalist system; this is an objective law independent of human will. No matter how the reactionaries try to block the advance of the wheel of history, sooner or later revolution will occur, and it is bound to be victorious. "Lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own feet" is a common Chinese saying to describe the action of some blockheads.<sup>9</sup> The reactionaries of the various countries are precisely such a bunch of blockheads. Their persecutions of the revolutionary people will only end up arousing the people to broader and fiercer revolution. Didn't the various persecutions of the revolutionary people by the tsar and by Chiang Kai-shek have precisely this effect of promoting the great Russian Revolution and the great Chinese Revolution?

Besides staking their own future on the oppression of the people in their own countries and the peoples of [their] colonies and semicolonies, the imperialists still count on war. But what can they expect out of war? In the past half-century we have already gone through two world wars. After the First World War, the great October Socialist Revolution took place in Russia. After the Second World War, more revolutions occurred in Eastern Europe and the East. If the stout-hearted fellows of imperialism are determined to start a third world war, they will achieve no other result than hastening the destruction of the capitalist system throughout the world.

The governments and peoples of the various socialist countries are the builders of a new, peaceful life. We have absolutely no need of war, and we resolutely oppose a new world war. The Soviet Union, China, and the other socialist countries have consistently worked hard for the relaxation of tense international situations. The proposals repeatedly put forth by the Soviet Union on the question of disarmament, on the question of prohibiting the manufacture, use, and testing of weapons of mass destruction,<sup>10</sup> represent the common stand of all the socialist countries and at the same time conform to the interests of the people of all countries in the world. We firmly stand for the peaceful competition between socialist countries and capitalist countries and for the resolution of internal affairs in each country by the people of that country according to their own will and wishes.<sup>11</sup> We firmly maintain that all countries should practice the well-known five principles [of peaceful coexistence,<sup>12</sup> that is,] mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

U.S. imperialism obstinately wants to interfere with the internal affairs of other

countries, including the internal affairs of the socialist countries. For example, in China, it interferes with the liberation of Taiwan, and in Hungary, it engineered the counterrevolutionary rioting.<sup>13</sup> It is particularly blatant in its interference with the internal affairs of the countries in the intermediate zone between the United States and the socialist camp.<sup>14</sup> The United States at this moment is still planning to invade independent Syria through Turkey or Israel and is still conspiring to subvert the anticolonialist government of Egypt.<sup>15</sup> This maniacal policy of aggression pursued by the United States not only has created the crisis in the Middle East but also has created a new crisis of world war. All the people in the world who love peace and freedom stand on the side of Syria, opposing the American and Turkish aggressors, just as they stood on Egypt's side and opposed the British, French, and Israeli aggressors in October of last year. The government of the Soviet Union has already issued a serious warning to the United States and Turkey, demanding that they immediately cancel their plans for aggression. The Chinese government and the Chinese people resolutely support Syria's struggle to defend [itself] and resolutely support the just position of the Soviet Union.

The jackals of imperialism should remember: The era in which they could manipulate the fate of humanity as they wished, when they could carve up Asian and African countries as they liked, is gone for good.

In the past, U.S. imperialism put all its strength [into the attempt to] wreck the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people, and it still continues to do so. But in the end, they had no way to stop 600 million Chinese people from courageously taking the socialist road. In the short span of eight years, China has already achieved successes in the various fields of construction which it had not been able to achieve for the past hundred years. In China there is a small handful of bourgeois Rightists who attempt to oppose [taking] the socialist road, oppose the Communist Party's position of leadership in national life, and oppose the close alliance that China has established with the Soviet Union and with the various socialist countries. These maniacal and vain efforts of theirs have already been thoroughly defeated under the counterattack of the people of the entire country.

To rapidly develop China's socialist cause on an even more consolidated foundation, the Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, are in the midst of carrying out a vigorous rectification campaign. This is to launch, in the cities and countryside, a big nationwide debate [relating to] such issues as the two roads, socialism and capitalism;<sup>16</sup> the fundamental system and major policies of the state; the work style of Party and government personnel; and the lives and welfare of the people. This [is conducted] in a guided and free manner employing the methods of presenting facts and reasoned discussion and, by such means, to resolve correctly the various contradictions and problems that actually exist among the people<sup>17</sup> and that now need to be resolved. This is a campaign for the socialist self-education and self-transformation of the people. This campaign has already achieved great victories. Wherever it has been carried out, the people's socialist consciousness has rapidly risen, erroneous thinking has been rapidly clarified, shortcomings in work have been rapidly overcome, unity among the people has been rapidly strengthened, and labor discipline and productivity have increased



the same time, but at present opposing the tendency toward revisionism is, in particular, the [more] urgent task.<sup>8</sup>

It is equally clear that since the October Revolution, if the government of any country refuses to be on friendly terms with the Soviet Union it can only harm the real interests of its own people.

In the world today, there is a chain of countries in Europe and Asia, encompassing a population of more than 900 million, that have already taken the road of the October Revolution and have been victorious, and have formed a powerful socialist world system. Capitalism lost its superiority long ago, and socialism has long become an invincible force.

The socialist system will eventually replace the capitalist system; this is an objective law independent of human will. No matter how the reactionaries try to block the advance of the wheel of history, sooner or later revolution will occur, and it is bound to be victorious. "Lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own feet" is a common Chinese saying to describe the action of some blockheads.<sup>9</sup> The reactionaries of the various countries are precisely such a bunch of blockheads. Their persecutions of the revolutionary people will only end up arousing the people to broader and fiercer revolution. Didn't the various persecutions of the revolutionary people by the tsar and by Chiang Kai-shek have precisely this effect of promoting the great Russian Revolution and the great Chinese Revolution?

Besides staking their own future on the oppression of the people in their own countries and the peoples of [their] colonies and semicolonies, the imperialists still count on war. But what can they expect out of war? In the past half-century we have already gone through two world wars. After the First World War, the great October Socialist Revolution took place in Russia. After the Second World War, more revolutions occurred in Eastern Europe and the East. If the stout-hearted fellows of imperialism are determined to start a third world war, they will achieve no other result than hastening the destruction of the capitalist system throughout the world.

The governments and peoples of the various socialist countries are the builders of a new, peaceful life. We have absolutely no need of war, and we resolutely oppose a new world war. The Soviet Union, China, and the other socialist countries have consistently worked hard for the relaxation of tense international situations. The proposals repeatedly put forth by the Soviet Union on the question of disarmament, on the question of prohibiting the manufacture, use, and testing of weapons of mass destruction,<sup>10</sup> represent the common stand of all the socialist countries and at the same time conform to the interests of the people of all countries in the world. We firmly stand for the peaceful competition between socialist countries and capitalist countries and for the resolution of internal affairs in each country by the people of that country according to their own will and wishes.<sup>11</sup> We firmly maintain that all countries should practice the well-known five principles [of peaceful coexistence,<sup>12</sup> that is,] mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

U.S. imperialism obstinately wants to interfere with the internal affairs of other

countries, including the internal affairs of the socialist countries. For example, in China, it interferes with the liberation of Taiwan, and in Hungary, it engineered the counterrevolutionary rioting.<sup>13</sup> It is particularly blatant in its interference with the internal affairs of the countries in the intermediate zone between the United States and the socialist camp.<sup>14</sup> The United States at this moment is still planning to invade independent Syria through Turkey or Israel and is still conspiring to subvert the anticolonialist government of Egypt.<sup>15</sup> This maniacal policy of aggression pursued by the United States not only has created the crisis in the Middle East but also has created a new crisis of world war. All the people in the world who love peace and freedom stand on the side of Syria, opposing the American and Turkish aggressors, just as they stood on Egypt's side and opposed the British, French, and Israeli aggressors in October of last year. The government of the Soviet Union has already issued a serious warning to the United States and Turkey, demanding that they immediately cancel their plans for aggression. The Chinese government and the Chinese people resolutely support Syria's struggle to defend [itself] and resolutely support the just position of the Soviet Union.

The jackals of imperialism should remember: The era in which they could manipulate the fate of humanity as they wished, when they could carve up Asian and African countries as they liked, is gone for good.

In the past, U.S. imperialism put all its strength [into the attempt to] wreck the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people, and it still continues to do so. But in the end, they had no way to stop 600 million Chinese people from courageously taking the socialist road. In the short span of eight years, China has already achieved successes in the various fields of construction which it had not been able to achieve for the past hundred years. In China there is a small handful of bourgeois Rightists who attempt to oppose [taking] the socialist road, oppose the Communist Party's position of leadership in national life, and oppose the close alliance that China has established with the Soviet Union and with the various socialist countries. These maniacal and vain efforts of theirs have already been thoroughly defeated under the counterattack of the people of the entire country.

To rapidly develop China's socialist cause on an even more consolidated foundation, the Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, are in the midst of carrying out a vigorous rectification campaign. This is to launch, in the cities and countryside, a big nationwide debate [relating to] such issues as the two roads, socialism and capitalism;<sup>16</sup> the fundamental system and major policies of the state; the work style of Party and government personnel; and the lives and welfare of the people. This [is conducted] in a guided and free manner employing the methods of presenting facts and reasoned discussion and, by such means, to resolve correctly the various contradictions and problems that actually exist among the people<sup>17</sup> and that now need to be resolved. This is a campaign for the socialist self-education and self-transformation of the people. This campaign has already achieved great victories. Wherever it has been carried out, the people's socialist consciousness has rapidly risen, erroneous thinking has been rapidly clarified, shortcomings in work have been rapidly overcome, unity among the people has been rapidly strengthened, and labor discipline and productivity have increased

rapidly. We are in the midst of carrying out this people's self-education campaign, stage by stage and group by group, among 600 million people and, in a few more months, we will most likely be able to achieve victory [in this campaign] on a nationwide scale.<sup>18</sup> From now on we plan to initiate a rectification campaign every year or every two years<sup>19</sup>—the duration of these campaigns can be greatly reduced, and they can serve as a primary method of resolving the various social contradictions in our country during the entire transitional period.<sup>20</sup> There is a basic point of departure in implementing this method, that is, one must firmly believe that the great majority of the masses will stand on our side, and that they are reasonable. This point has already been verified by all our experience in the campaign.

In accordance with the Leninist principles of forging close ties with the masses, recognizing the creative spirit of the masses, and conducting criticism and self-criticism, we have arrived at a method of rectification through many years of revolutionary practice; the current socialist self-education campaign once again testifies to the correctness of this method.

The socialist construction of China has received the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union in many areas. On the occasion of the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, please let us express our heartfelt gratitude to the Communist Party, the government, and the people of the Soviet Union, who have given such friendly help to China.

In the period right after its founding, the People's Republic of China concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup> This is a great alliance between two great socialist countries. We share a common fate and a common source of life with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp. We feel that strengthening the unity of the various socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union is the sacred international duty of all socialist countries.

The imperialists headed by the United States are using all possible means of sowing discord in an attempt to destroy the friendship and unity of the socialist countries. However, reality can only bring disappointment to the imperialists. The socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union has become more and more united. Since the beginning of history it had never been possible for relations between countries to have such an identity of interests, such mutual respect and confidence, such mutual assistance and encouragement as [has been the case] among the socialist countries. This is because the socialist countries are of a completely new type, they are countries in which the exploiting classes have been overthrown and the laboring people hold power. In the relationships between these countries, the principle of combining internationalism with patriotism has been put into practice. We are tightly bound together by common interests and common ideals. Marx, in his inaugural address to the International Workingmen's Association, said "past experience has shown how disregard of that bond of brotherhood which ought to exist between the workingmen of different countries and incite them to stand firmly by each other in all their struggles for emancipation will be chastised by the common discomfiture of their incoherent efforts."<sup>22</sup> This instruction of Marx's, more than ninety years ago, will never be out-of-date for us.

Dear comrades! The very fact that representatives of the working classes and

the broad masses of the people from various countries of the world are participating today in this gala occasion of the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution held by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union in itself demonstrates the great unity of the forces of the people of the world, and symbolizes the flourishing of the international socialist movement. Let us continue our efforts to strengthen the unity of the various socialist countries and the unity of the laboring people and oppressed peoples of the world, so that we may welcome new and greater victories [with open arms]!

Long live the great October Socialist Revolution!

Long live the solidarity and friendship of the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union! Long live the great banner of Marxist-Leninist internationalism!

Proletarians and peace-loving people of the world unite!

## Notes

1. This appears to be referring to the allied intervention in the civil war in the Soviet Union in 1917–1921. Immediately after the signing of the separate peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Russia and Germany in March 1918, the allied powers resolved that they must have Russia keep the war going on the eastern front and therefore could not countenance a separate Russia-Central Powers peace, which was in violation of Russia's obligations to the allied powers via the Pact of London (September 1914). The allied intervention began with the Japanese landing in Vladivostok on April 4, 1918. It soon began to take the form of rather active, if sometimes indirect, assistance given to the anti-Bolshevik offensive launched by the Czechoslovakian legions in May 1917, and the establishment of the Socialist Revolutionary Party's government at Samara in June 1917. The allied intervention was publicly launched in June 1918. For a more detailed history of this subject, see John Bradley (1968).

2. See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), note 43.

3. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.

4. This refers to the attempt made by Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov in June 1957 to oust Khrushchev from his position as First Secretary of the CPSU. This failed and resulted in a purging of these people, and in addition, Pervukhin and Saburov, from the Central Committee of the CPSU. See text July 20, 1957, note 25.

5. See V. I. Lenin, "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," *Selected Works*, III, p. 584.

6. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 27; see also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 34.

7. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 50, and text May 15, 1957, source note.

8. This formulation resembles a passage in the declaration made by the Twelve-Nation Congress (see note 11). In paragraph 7 of section 3 of that declaration (see *RMSC* [1958], p. 288) are the statements: "At the same time that it opposes dogmatism, the Communist Party believes that under current conditions, the primary danger is in revisionism, or Right-deviationist opportunism. It is an expression of a bourgeois ideology; it paralyzes the working class's revolutionary will, and it asks for the preservation or restoration of capitalism. However, dogmatism and sectarianism can also become the primary danger for this party or that party in individual stages of development. It is up to each Communist Party to make the judgment for itself as to which danger is the primary danger at any given period." Given the fact that Mao had spoken of the danger of revisionism as far back as April and May (see text May 15, 1957, source note), and given that Mao had used the term "Right-deviationist opportunism" as a synonym for revisionism as far back as March (see text Mar. 10, 1957, note 7), one might be led to speculate that Mao had something to do with inserting this paragraph into the declaration.

9. See text April 25, 1956, note 39.

10. See text April 21, 1957, note 22.

11. The slogan of “peaceful competition” emerged as a platform adopted by the Congress of Communist Parties and Workers’ Parties being held at the time of this speech, which Mao was attending (see text Nov. 2, 1957, source note). In section I, paragraph 2 of the declaration of the Twelve-Nation Congress, the statement was made: “In our own age, the development of the world is determined by the course and the results of a competition between two opposing social systems.” (See *RMSC* [1958], pp. 286–290, for a Chinese translation of this declaration.) The communiqué of the Sixty-four Nation Congress was even more explicit. An addendum of the communiqué was the “Peace Declaration,” in which the second-to-last paragraph reads: “Let countries with differing social systems launch, from now on, a competition between themselves in the areas of developing the sciences and technologies of peace. Let them prove their own superiority not on the battlefield, but in the competition to gain progress and to enhance the standards of living of their people.” (See *RMSC* [1958], pp. 290–292, for a Chinese translation of this declaration. The aforementioned declaration was also carried in *RMRB* [Nov. 22, 1957], whereas this one was carried in *RMRB* [Nov. 23, 1957].) These declarations reflected a major concern of the congresses held in Moscow at this time, which was to offer a challenge to what was perceived as a dangerously escalating arms race instigated by the imperialists, and the warlike aggressive intervention of the United States and its allies in the Middle East, and to the threat of another worldwide military conflagration. It was in that sense, and to that extent, that Mao and the CPC leadership of the time felt that this platform of peace could and must be supported. Subsequently, however, the term “peaceful competition” became, in the CPC’s viewpoint, the epitome of the Soviet Union’s Khrushchevian revisionism. In subsequent years, the CPC, and especially Mao himself, would see the idea of peaceful competition as one that advocated that class struggle and revolutionary struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism would no longer be necessary. All the socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union and the PRC, would have to do would be to prove “peacefully” (i.e., without revolutionary means) the superiority of socialism by means of surpassing the advanced Western capitalist societies in terms of production and standards of living. This also had domestic implications in that in each country the class struggle to eliminate capitalism would no longer be necessary and could be suspended in favor of a competition simply to develop the forces of production. This became an issue of bourgeois revisionism against which Mao struggled and criticized. See also text Oct. 7, 1957, note 16, and text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 64.

12. See text Jan. 28, 1955(2), vol. I, note 1.

13. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.

14. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 17.

15. See text Sept. 19, 1957, note 3, and text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6.

16. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), source note.

17. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

18. By early October, the decision had been made to carry the campaign (which by this time was actually a combination of the CPC rectification campaign and the anti-Rightist campaign, in the name of a rectification campaign of the entire people [*quanmin zhengfeng yundong*]) up to May 1, 1958. See texts Oct. 9, 1957(1) and (2).

19. In July, the proposal was to have a rectification campaign every three or five years (see text July 8, 1957, paragraph 8), but by October, a new proposal was made to have some sort of rectification every year; see texts Oct. 9, 1957(1) and Oct. 13, 1957, text surrounding note 97.

20. See text July 1957, note 17.

21. See text Jan. 2, 1950, vol. I, note 1.

22. The founding assembly of the International Workingmen’s Association, often known as the First International, was held in St. Martin’s Hall, London, on September 28, 1864. For Marx’s inaugural address in its entirety, see D. McLellan, ed. (1977), pp. 531–537; for the passage cited here, pp. 536–537.

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## Comment on the Death of President Zapotocky of Czechoslovakia (November 14, 1957)

**Source:** FBIS, *Daily Report* (Nov. 15, 1957), HH 1.

*According to this source, this comment was made during a visit to the Czechoslovakian embassy in Moscow. The Chinese delegation headed by Mao also laid a wreath in the hall of mourning installed by the Czechoslovakian embassy. The names of other Chinese delegates who accompanied Mao on this visit to the Czechoslovakian embassy were listed in FBIS, Daily Report (Nov. 15, 1957), AAA 3.*

*This comment was made to the Czechoslovakian ambassador to the Soviet Union, J. Voshalik. We have no Chinese text of this comment. This is a representation of the FBIS text.*

Your President is looking down upon us as if he were still alive and, in truth, he is alive. Please convey, on my behalf and on behalf of our entire delegation, our deep sympathy to the Czechoslovak people, to the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, and to the members of the government and the National Assembly. We wish to express our grief at the death of Comrade Zapotocky.

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## Speech at the Congress of Communist Parties and Workers’ Parties in Socialist Countries (November 14, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 203–204.

*See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note. Mao’s explicit comments on Stalin and the Stalinist era in the development of the Soviet Union in this speech are particularly noteworthy.*

I would like to speak a little on the issue of “taking the Soviet Union as the head.” Here we are gathered as so many people, so many parties—we have to have a head. In terms of the affairs and business internal to our camp, to be mutually coordinated, to have cooperation and mutual assistance [for one another,] to convene meetings, we need to have a head. Turning to the conditions outside our camp, we have an even greater need for a head. What we are confronted with is a rather strong and powerful imperialist camp, and it has a head. If we are scattered, we will have no strength. Even for a small group inside a party, if it does not elect

a group leader, this small group would not be able to [so much as] hold a meeting. We are faced with a powerful enemy. The question of who, in a worldwide sense, would be victorious and who would be defeated has not yet been settled. There will yet be serious struggle and the danger of war. We must watch out for the crazy people. Naturally, in the world, the good people are the majority and there are [only] a few crazy people. However, there are crazy people. If incidentally there emerges this crazy person and he sends an atom bomb your way, what will you do? Therefore, we need to have such a country, such a Party, that could convene a meeting at any time. To be the head and to convene the meetings are almost the same thing. So, since we need to have a head, who'll be it? If not the Soviet Union, then who? Should we go by the alphabet? [Start with] Albania? [Or] Viet Nam? Comrade Ho Chi Minh?<sup>1</sup> Any other country? We, China, cannot be the head. We are not qualified; we have [too] little experience. We lack experience in revolution, and we also lack experience in construction. In terms of population we are a big country; in economic terms we are a small country. We have not sent up even half a satellite.<sup>2</sup> It would be very difficult for us if we were to become the head; when we convene a meeting, other people will not listen [to us]. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a party with forty years of experience. Its experience is the most complete. Its experience is in two parts. The by far greater part and the basic part is correct; one [small] part is in error. Both parts count as experience, and both are beneficial to the human race. Some people say only the good experience counts as good, and the bad experience is useless. As I see it, to perceive things in this way is not too accurate. Shortcomings are also of much help to the [other] countries as lessons. Some comrades, because [the Soviet Union] committed some mistakes during the period of Stalin, have a poor impression of the comrades in the Soviet Union. I'm afraid this is not quite correct.<sup>3</sup> There is nothing harmful about these mistakes any more; in the past they were harmful, but now their character has been changed, changed to be of benefit to us. They make us aware of lessons to be learned and mistakes to avoid. As for the great amount of correct experience [that the Soviet Union has,] everyone knows about that, and I need say nothing more.

In the last few decades, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, generally speaking, has been correct. This is something that even our enemies have to admit. In this last year, the imperialists stirred up a wave of trouble and put a black smudge of sorts on our faces.<sup>4</sup> This year things are much better; there are no more dark clouds in the sky. And there are quite a lot of dark clouds in the sky of the Western world.<sup>5</sup> Our situation has become easier to handle, but Dulles is having a harder time getting to sleep.<sup>6</sup>

There were some unpleasant things in the relationship among the Communist parties of various countries in the past. That was the case not only of other countries, but of China, too. Nonetheless, I suggest that we must look at the big picture. What kind of a country is the Soviet Union? It is a socialist country. . . . It was transformed from a relatively backward country to an advanced country in the world. Without the Soviet Union, we could all be swallowed up by others. Naturally, we must say

that it does not necessarily stand that without the Soviet Union, all the socialist countries would be swallowed up by the imperialists, and all [of us] would be digested, or that all the nations would be destroyed. However, we must not fail to see that right now our enemies are all fully armed, whereas [on] our [side] only the Soviet Union is fully armed. Moreover, we are very happy that the Soviet Union has advanced to the forefront [and surpassed our enemies]. The Soviet Union has sent up a small moon of 500 kilograms.<sup>7</sup> We must all prod our comrades in the Soviet Union a bit, and we hope that the satellites that they send up there henceforth will be heavier than 500 kilograms. I say if you send up one that is 50,000 kilograms, things will become even easier to handle. You send up something 50,000 kilograms, and you could possibly [make them] sign a peace agreement. Will you do it, our XXXXXX? (Laughter.) (XXXXXX interjects: With everybody pitching in together, that is possible.)<sup>8</sup> That is correct, too—that there has to be a common effort, [but] mainly it will be your effort. (Laughter.) [If] we send up a really big thing in not too long a time, we'll be leaving the capitalist world way, way behind us, and our lives will be better and easier; [in fact,] the lives of the entire human race will be better and easier; we'll be "free from fear." Didn't Roosevelt say something about "freedom from fear" in one of his speeches?<sup>9</sup> Sometimes even a bourgeois politician will say a few good things. Nonetheless, what they say is one thing; what they do is another. To be "free from fear" we'll have to send up something of 50,000 kilograms or even a bigger thing. And in this, first of all we'll have to depend on the Soviet Union. This is [what I mean by] the big picture; the other things, our little spats; those are the small issues. The small principle must obey the greater principle. If we speak of having anything to complain about, I for one have a bellyful of things to complain about, mainly regarding Stalin. However, I have never spoken of it before, and even today, all I'll say is that there is something to complain and be angry about, but I am not prepared to elaborate on what it is. In fact, I don't have anything to be angry about anymore, or at least there is not much of that anymore. Time has gone by, and Stalin is dead. We must admit, now, that the work style of our comrades in the Soviet Union has changed a great deal, and that it will continue to change, continue to improve. The development of the Soviet Union is in the shape of a curve. It follows the dialectical method. Lenin's dialectics, [then] Stalin's metaphysics (a certain part, a rather large part),<sup>10</sup> and now once again it has reverted to dialectics. I am very happy to have read some of the essays written about dialectics by comrades in the Soviet Union—they discussed the contradictions in socialist society and the contradictions among socialist countries; in Stalin's time no one would dare to speak [of such things]. I have come to Moscow twice; the first time it was unpleasant.<sup>11</sup> The phrase "fraternal party" sounded good, but in fact there was no equality. Now I feel an atmosphere of equality; I wonder if you, comrades, all have that feeling? For instance, when we discuss the documents [of this congress], we now ask for people's opinions not just once, but again and again. Didn't XXXXXX propose organizing a drafting committee just now?<sup>12</sup> Opinions that did not get adopted can be proposed a second, and a third,

time. In the end, if the great majority [still] does not believe it can be adopted, [the opinion] can still be tabled, and then we can find out in practice which is correct. If practice proves that we are wrong and the [other] opinion proposed is correct—say, for instance, this draft jointly proposed by the two parties of the Soviet Union and China is wrong—then we'll admit our mistake. That is a relationship of equality.

That is why I think, number one, that right now we have a need to acknowledge the Soviet Union as head, and acknowledge the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the convener of meetings; and number two, that there is no longer any harm in that now.

Comrades, that is the opinion I propose. If you must criticize it, please by all means do so. The freedom of speech is [guaranteed by] all [our countries'] constitutions. If you do not agree with me, please criticize.

### Notes

1. For earlier references to Ho Chi Minh in this volume, see text Jan. 1957, note 37, and text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 1.

2. Mao was, of course, alluding to the then recent achievement of the Soviet Union in launching the Sputnik satellites. See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), note 43.

3. Here Mao may be referring primarily to Tito and Yugoslavia. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 17 and surrounding text.

4. Here Mao is referring, we believe, to the Hungarian and Polish incidents of 1956. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 17.

5. There is little indication here of what it is that Mao is referring to specifically. It could be the issue of the U.S. government's restrictions on trade and travel to China, which had brought on considerable difficulties in the earlier part of 1957, or it may be a reference to the Western countries' involvement in volatile international disputes, such as the Syrian crisis. (See text Sept. 19, 1957, note 3.) For another look at Mao's analogy of dark clouds as trouble, see text July 1, 1957, note 18.

6. For an earlier reference in this volume to John Foster Dulles, U.S. secretary of state, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 21.

7. See note 2.

8. We cannot tell for certain whom XXXXXX stands for. As usual, this simply means that six Chinese characters have been omitted from the text. It is possible, from the placement of the term *women* (translated as "our" here) before the Xs, that the word *tongzhi* (comrade) may be included among those omitted. It is therefore possible, but not necessary, that Mao might be referring to "Ke-lu-xiao-fu tongzhi," or "Comrade Khrushchev."

9. Mao is referring to the frequently quoted statement "We have nothing to fear but fear itself," which Franklin D. Roosevelt made in his inaugural address upon assuming the presidency of the United States on March 4, 1933.

10. See Mao's frequent criticisms of Stalin in 1956 and 1957 in this volume, but more specifically see text Nov. 15, 1956, Version 2, paragraphs 12 and 13.

11. Mao's earlier visit to the Soviet Union was made from mid-December 1949 to February 1950. See texts Dec. 16, 1949, and Feb. 17, 1950, both in volume I. For another critical reflection on that earlier visit on Mao's part (and one focusing on what Mao considered to be Stalin's obstructive role), see text July 20, 1957, note 14.

12. Mao is referring to the committee responsible for drafting the "Moscow Declaration," which would eventually be issued from this congress. See text Nov. 18, 1957, note 46.

## Speech at the Congress of Communist Parties and Workers' Parties in Socialist Countries

(November 16, 1957)

Source: *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 204–205.

See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note.

I think that our declaration is good.<sup>1</sup> We used a very good method to attain our goal, and that is the method of consulting [one another and talking things over. The declaration] upholds the sense of principle and yet has flexibility; it is a unity of principle and flexibility. Thus, an atmosphere of consultation has now been formed, whereas in the last stages of Stalin[']s time] that was impossible. We have not forcibly imposed anything on anybody. It is not good to adopt a method of forcible imposition [in matters] among the people,<sup>2</sup> especially among comrades. We have now replaced the method of suppression with the method of persuasion.<sup>3</sup> We spent quite a bit of time on this, but this time is necessary. When we adopt a method of consultation we are not advocating anarchism; we are not a debating club. Our method is to have a center, and yet also everybody [else]; it is a unity of the center and everybody [outside of the center]. If we did not have a center, say, if we did not have the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we would turn into anarchism; if, [on the other hand,] we did not have everyone [else] raising opinions, but had only one party raising an opinion,<sup>4</sup> then things just would never be complete. Right now there is a center, and yet also everybody else, all of us; in a certain sense, it can be said that we have centralism, and also democracy.<sup>5</sup> It cannot be said that this congress of ours did not have democracy; I think that there is a full measure of democracy [here].

This declaration is correct. It does not contain any element of revisionism or opportunism. When we see Marx in the future, he [might] ask us, what kind of a declaration did you make? How would he evaluate this declaration? There are two possibilities. One is that he, the old gentleman, would throw a temper tantrum and say: You have ruined things; there are elements of opportunism here, and [you have] violated my doctrine. The other possibility is that he would say: Not bad; it is not opportunistic; it is correct. Perhaps Lenin would stand up to speak on our behalf. He might say: [Dear] Marx, [dear] Engels, the two of you passed away earlier. I happen to have passed away a bit later, so I got to know these people well. They now know how to get things done; they are now very mature. See, XXXXXX, my successors, convened this meeting, and it was done well.<sup>6</sup> Not only should all the countries be grateful to them, but I, too, must thank them, be grateful to my successors. He might also mention that the drafting committee worked very hard. Does this declaration contain any adventurism?<sup>7</sup> What would Marx and company

say? There are also but two possibilities here. One would be that they'd say it does contain [adventurism], the other would be that they'd say it does not. However, in my estimation, they'd say that it does not. Let's study it a bit. What adventurism is there in this? We strive for peace, and for solidarity. I see no adventurism in that. Thus, from this perspective, there is no adventurist quality, no opportunistic quality [in the declaration]. Then what kind of a declaration is it? It is a Marxist-Leninist declaration. This declaration sums up several decades of experience, and especially the experience of the last few years. Some experiences are derived from pain and suffering, and these pains and sufferings have educated us; we need not be angry at these pains and sufferings. On the contrary, we must be grateful about these pains, because they have made us use our brains, think, and strive to avoid those pains. And indeed, we have avoided these pains [now], haven't we?

### Notes

1. This refers to the "Moscow Declaration," which issued from this congress. See text Nov. 18, 1957, note 46. Mao's remark suggests that the declaration, or at least a draft, was completed by November 16 and made the subject of discussion at this November 16 session of the congress.

2. On the particular theoretical significance to Mao of the term "among the people" (*renmin neibu*), see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3, and text Nov. 15, 1956, Version 2, note 33. Mao appears to be making a critical allusion to Stalin here. See text Mar. 18, 1957(2), note 44.

3. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 61.

4. Mao's expression here, *zhi shi yi jia ti yijian* (having only one party raise an opinion), echoes his criticism of *yi jia du ming* (with only one school contending). See text Feb. 26, 1957, note 33, and text April 1957(2), note 18. It also foreshadows a later expression: *yi yan tang* (hall where only one voice is heard).

5. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 80, and text July 8, 1957, note 35.

6. We do not know what XXXXXX stands for here.

7. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 22.

## Speech to Chinese Students and Trainees in Moscow

(November 17, 1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 210–212. Other Chinese Texts: Excerpt 1: *RMRB* (Nov. 19, 1957), 1; *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 14; *URI* (1976), p. 423; *Buyi*, p. 156; Excerpt 2: *RMRB* (Nov. 20, 1957), 1; *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 14–15; *Wansui* (1967b), p. 16; *Wansui* (n.d.), pp. 69–70; *Buyi*, pp. 156–157; *Mao qunzhong*, pp. 39–43; *Zai Sulian yanlun*, pp. 13–17; *XHBYK*, 144 (Nov. 25, 1958), 3; *XHBYK*, 143 (Nov. 10, 1958), 7; *Jiaoyu yulu*, p. 4; *Lun qingnian*, pp. 11–12, 27, 32; Excerpt 3: *RMRB* (Nov. 20, 1957), 1. Available English Translations: Excerpt

1: *FBIS, Daily Report* (Nov. 19, 1957), AAA 4–5; Excerpt 2: *SCMP*, 1662 (Dec. 2, 1957); *CB*, 891 (Oct. 8, 1969), 26; *CCSD*, p. 154; *PR*, 1: 37 (Nov. 11, 1958), 9; S. Schram (1974), pp. 407–408.

*The Wansui (n.d. 3) text is the most extensive and complete version of this speech that we have acquired. No official and complete publication of this speech appeared for years after it was made, and the Wansui (n.d. 3) publication (a compilation made by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution) is not an official publication. As seen in the above, however, excerpts of the speech were published shortly after the Moscow Congress at which it was delivered. These appeared in two major "versions"; one in RMRB (Nov. 19, 1957) and the other in RMRB (Nov. 20, 1957). We refer to these as Excerpt 1 and Excerpt 2. Excerpt 3 is part of the reportage in RMRB (Nov. 20, 1957) that appeared there detached from the rest of the story (i.e., from Excerpt 2). All three have been quoted in subsequent secondary and tertiary sources. The parts of the speech (of the Wansui [n.d. 3] version) appearing in these excerpts will be indicated in our annotations following the text by referring to the excerpts as they are numbered.*

*See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note; text Nov. 14, 1957; text Nov. 16, 1957; and text Nov. 17, 1957(2). This speech stands as a major proclamation at the time of the Moscow Congress and, having been cited in many places, is one of the more familiar of Mao's pronouncements. Often the focus on the significance of this speech has been on Mao's reiteration of the "East Wind prevailing over the West Wind" slogan, which encapsulated the East/West dichotomy. (At times that dichotomy itself substituted for the socialist/imperialist dichotomy.) This issue dominated China's line on foreign policy throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as having long-term significance in this area until the thaw in China's official relationship with the West in the 1970s.*

*Also of significance, of course, is Mao's declaration of solidarity with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we do not believe that this should be exaggerated. After all, Mao was visiting the Soviet Union as head of a delegation attending the celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution and could not have been predisposed to being blatantly discourteous. Indeed, one may cynically point to the absence of specific mention of the achievements of the Soviet Union under the post-Stalin leadership in this speech. In any case, the pronouncement here does not seem to be an adequate mask for the criticisms that Mao was making in regard to the Soviet Union's leadership at this time (and had made as far back as July 1957). At the same time, it is obvious that Mao's dissatisfaction had not yet reached the level sufficient for him to be openly critical on this occasion.*

*What is often overlooked, and yet significant, is Mao's comment about domestic affairs in China. The pronouncement that Mao has differences with those people who believe that the socialist revolution in China had been consolidated by the changes in the system of ownership in 1956, and Mao's own view that it was not consolidated until political and ideological issues had also been resolved, not only sums up the movements of 1957, but serves as an important footnote for the later split in the CPC, and Mao's eventual formulation of the slogan "let politics take command."*

Comrades, the world is yours, and also ours; however, in the final analysis, it is yours. We are all now so very old, like this. Nonetheless, we each have our strengths; we, the old ones, have experience. You young people abound with the freshness of the morning air and are just at the age of blooming and prospering.

You are like the sun at eight or nine o'clock in the morning; [our] hopes rest on you.<sup>1</sup>

The direction of the wind has changed in the world. The climate last year was not good; this year it has turned for the better.<sup>2</sup> In the struggle between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp, either the West Wind prevails over the East Wind, or the East Wind prevails over the West Wind.<sup>3</sup> Have you read [the novel] *Hong lou meng* [The Dream of the Red Chamber]? This expression was spoken by [the character] Lin Daiyu in *Hong lou meng*.<sup>4</sup> There are two camps, with an intermediate zone in between. There are 400 million people in the Western world. Among them are many of our people, so we can dig under the foundation of their wall. There will be "earthquakes" there.<sup>5</sup> We have more than one billion people, and among us there are their people also.<sup>6</sup> Take, for example, the Rightists in China. These people are relatively few; in China they make up about 2 per cent [of the population].<sup>7</sup> In both sides there are people of the opposite side. This is like what was said in a *ci* poem written by the wife of Zhao Mengfu<sup>8</sup> of the late Song dynasty and early Yuan dynasty:

Here are two clay bodhisattvas,  
Let's break both of them and blend the pieces with water  
To make two new clay bodhisattvas.  
There is me in your body;  
There is you in mine.

This analogy is of course not entirely appropriate, but there is one point that is correct, and that is that there are our people inside the imperialist camp, and there are their people among us as well. Still, there are more of our people in their camp, and only a few of their people in ours.

According to the statistics of the United Nations, there are a total of 2.7 billion people in the world. We make up about one billion. The imperialist [countries] make up about 400 million. How many millions remain? ([Response:] 1.3 billion.) These 1.3 billion [people] are basically distributed in three continents—in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Among these 1.3 billion people, more than 700 million have already achieved national independence, such as [those in] India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, the Gold Coast, and so on. There are still 600 million over on the other side, such as in Japan, Iran, Taiwan, South Korea, South Viet Nam, Turkey, and so on. Within the imperialist camp, Germany, Italy, and Japan do not want to fight a war, and they cannot fight a war anyway. The British and the Americans are not cooperating [with each other]. The 1.3 billion people in this intermediate zone are fought over by the two camps. The majority of them lean toward our side, because the British and the French have [the legacy of] an old colonialism, and the United States has a new colonialism. We have no [history of] being colonialists at all, and we have not built military bases in those areas.<sup>9</sup>

Our country, China, is a big country, and yet also a small country. In political terms, and in population, [we are a] big country, but in economic terms [we are a] small country; we are not even a match for Belgium. I suppose you are probably unhappy [to hear me say this,] but what is there to be unhappy about? If we can match [Belgium], we can; if we can't, we can't.

In the hundred years since Marx's and Engels's time, this congress is the grandest [convening of the socialist parties]. The Communist parties of sixty-four countries are all taking part. In these last few days, a number of socialist countries have been meeting and have discussed many things. This meeting has been held very successfully; many issues have been decided. [We have] decided that the Soviet Union would be the head of the socialist camp; I imagine you would have no objections to that, would you? These two days we have been completely occupied with holding the congress of the Communist parties of sixty-four countries. Today is Sunday and we have a day's rest. I expect that [the congress] can be concluded tomorrow.<sup>10</sup>

The October Socialist Revolution is a great turning point in human history. There have been many turning points in the history of the human race; for example, the Battle of Stalingrad was a turning point in the Second World War.<sup>11</sup> The two satellites going up to space,<sup>12</sup> and the Communist parties of sixty-four countries meeting for a congress; these are also major turning points. This is a war between two worlds. The West Wind cannot prevail over the East Wind; the East Wind is bound to prevail over the West Wind.<sup>13</sup> A genuine and thorough socialist revolution cannot be achieved in a single day. Some people believe that in our country the true victory of the socialist revolution was [won] in 1956, but from my point of view, that is incorrect; [we] should [say that it is] in 1957. In 1956 the system of ownership was transformed; that was relatively easy.<sup>14</sup> To put it that way makes it look as if we have the people's government on this side and the workers' masses on the other, with the capitalists in the middle, and, with the two sides pinching together, [the capitalists] were then simply picked up and brought over [to our side].

Some foreigners say that our ideological reform is brainwashing. As I see it, they are correct in what they say. It is washing brains, that's what it is! This brain of mine was washed to become what it is. After I joined the revolution, [my brain was] slowly washed, washed for several decades. What I received before was all bourgeois education, and even some feudal education. I read quite a lot of Confucius's writings.<sup>15</sup> At that time we simply didn't know anything about Marx or Engels, only about Washington and Napoleon. You are better. You are very fortunate. You are just big kids, and yet you already know Marx, Engels, Lenin. . . . At that time, none of us knew anything about how the Chinese Revolution was to be promoted!

We all have to "cut our tails." I, too, advise you to "cut your tails." There is a saying in China: "Grip your tail between your legs and be a man." This expression is very reasonable; now human beings have evolved, and you can't feel the tail anymore, but there is still an invisible one. The Rightists, to be precise, have their tails cocked too high.<sup>16</sup> The young people ought to have two things: one is that they should abound with the freshness of the morning air, and the second is that they should be modest and careful.

This year, at home, from May to June, the entire sky was filled with dark clouds. Our policy was to toughen our scalps and stand up to it.<sup>17</sup> We let the Rightists abuse us. They raved at us, saying that Communists were "bastards,"<sup>18</sup> that "the Communist Party just cannot lead the Chinese Revolution," and that "there is little achievement

and lots of mistakes” in the construction of socialism; we got all that published in *Renmin ribao* [People’s daily]. We even issued a directive to the government organs and the schools, telling them to toughen their scalps and not open their mouths. At home many big-character posters were put up<sup>19</sup>; you here didn’t have any, did you? There were several tens of thousands put up in Beijing University. The *Renmin ribao* became a “small-character paper.”<sup>20</sup> So, good! If they want contending and blooming, we let them contend and bloom.<sup>21</sup> We let [them] go to the people to make reports and let the people discuss it. The Rightists have been toppled. We still have some shortcomings in our work. You have not done any work [yet, so] you don’t really know. When you go to be a factory director, a Party committee secretary, a school principal, a professor, or an engineer, then you’ll see. As soon as you get into some line of work, there are bound to be mistakes. We acknowledge that there’ve been mistakes in the last eight years. This rectification this time is a very major event. We must rectify [our mistakes] conscientiously. What really counts in this world is “conscientiousness,” and “conscientiousness” is precisely what the Communist Party is most particular about.<sup>22</sup> The cadres have been sent down to the lower levels to blend in with the masses.<sup>23</sup> The peasants all say that the old Eighth Route Army has returned.<sup>24</sup> Among the basic-level cadres, only 1 per cent have serious shortcomings, or have become alienated from the masses; the overwhelming majority are good. Some have mistakes, but they can be rectified.

Our country now has a population of 640 million; it is already past the 600 million mark. To get 640 million people to act together with enthusiasm and vigor, to change the outlook of the age and the customs of the entire society, [indeed,] to transform the world, is a matter of great complexity. Have you seen the Forty Articles on Agricultural Development?<sup>25</sup> Now a new Forty Articles has appeared. The old Forty Articles was basically correct, but in some parts it contained elements of subjectivism. In the new program, the [target concerning] chemical fertilizer [production] has been increased to 15 million tons. We must have all the cooperatives surpass the well-to-do middle peasants’ level<sup>26</sup> in production and in consumption within the Second Five-Year Plan.<sup>27</sup> I convened quite a large gathering of provincial [Party] committee secretaries and [special] district [Party] committee secretaries to talk with them and ask them if [that goal] can be achieved. They said it is entirely possible, and some even said that we can exceed that goal. Take, also, the problem of eliminating the Four Pests. This is not a simple matter. Someone proposed that we should not beat up the sparrows, so let us be lenient in this area<sup>28</sup> and not beat up the ones in the cities. Are there people from Sichuan Province among you? There are huge numbers of rats in Sichuan. In Beijing, after we were finished with killing off the flies, in two years they came back. On this matter we must have determination; everybody must take action, and all of us must be stirred with enthusiasm and vigor to change society’s outlook and customs. On such things, if the East Wind does not prevail over the West Wind, the West Wind will prevail over the East Wind.

Right now our forces of production are still very low. We only produce 5.2 million tons of steel. After a five-year plan has passed, there will be 12 million tons, and in yet another five-year plan’s time, the production of steel will come to 22 to 24 million tons. I asked Comrade XXX.<sup>29</sup> He said that in fifteen years’ time, Britain

could produce approximately 30 million tons. In that case, in three five-year plans, we’ll be able to overtake Britain, and the Soviet Union will be able to overtake the United States.<sup>30</sup> At that time the outlook of the world would have greatly changed. It will take fifteen years, or a little bit more time than that, to accomplish this task. This task, therefore, falls on your shoulders. I, too, have a five-year plan; [I’d like to] live for five more years. If I can live for another fifteen years, I’d be completely content and satisfied. If we can accomplish [our tasks] in excess of the targets, that would, of course, be even better. However, there are unexpected storms in the skies, and people are liable to experience sudden reversals of fortune.<sup>31</sup> This, too, is a matter of natural dialectics. If Confucius were still alive today—if someone who had lived more than two thousand years ago is still not dead—[that would be awful, wouldn’t it?] What kind of world would this be? That is what I said to you at the very beginning: The world belongs to you. Let me say one more sentence right now: I congratulate you. The world is yours.

I will say only three more sentences: First, you must be intimately united with our friends of the Soviet Union; second, young people must be courageous but also modest; and third, I wish you good health, study well, and work well in the future.<sup>32</sup>

## Notes

1. The first, fourth and fifth sentences in this paragraph make up the first paragraph of Excerpt 2. Sentences 2 and 3 are omitted.

2. See text Nov. 14, 1957, text surrounding note 4.

3. This sentence, and the first in this paragraph, make up the first sentences of the third paragraph of Excerpt 2. On the saying “the East Wind prevails over the West Wind,” see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 39.

4. Ibid. See also text Oct. 16, 1954(1), vol. I, source note, and text Oct. 1954, vol. I, note 1.

5. This last sentence appears toward the end of the third paragraph of Excerpt 2. It does not, however, appear in Excerpt 1, the second half of which resembles the third paragraph of Excerpt 2 in many aspects.

6. In this context, “we” refers to the countries in the socialist camp. This is made explicit in the *RMRB* (excerpts) versions.

7. See text May 15, 1957, note 6, on Mao’s estimate of the percentage of Rightists in Chinese society. The figures are not exact and did not remain stable in 1957.

8. Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322), often better known as Zhao Ziang or Zhao Songxue, was not only a renowned poet, but a great master of late medieval Chinese painting. We do not, however, have information on this poem attributed to his wife. On Mao’s usage of this saying, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 18.

9. This paragraph corresponds to, but is textually not similar to, the greater part of the third paragraph of Excerpt 2 and the second half of Excerpt 1, which resemble each other. There is sufficient discrepancy in the text to warrant our presenting the Excerpt 2 version here as follows: “The world population is now 2.7 billion. The population of the socialist countries is nearly one billion, the population of the former colonial countries that are now independent is more than 700 million, the population of countries that are in the midst of fighting for their independence or their complete independence and capitalist countries that do not belong to the imperialist camp is 600 million. The population of the countries in the imperialist camp is [therefore] no more than approximately 400 million; furthermore, they are internally divided.”

10. This paragraph corresponds, but is not textually similar, to the first part of Excerpt 1, which is represented here as follows: “The Communist Parties and Workers’ Parties of



sixty-eight countries are taking part in the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution. This is an event of immense significance. It demonstrates the solidarity of the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union, and the solidarity of the Communist Parties and Workers' Parties throughout the world. The socialist camp must have a head, and this head is the Soviet Union. The Communist Parties and Workers' Parties of all countries, too, must have a head, and this head is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

This also resembles the second half of the second paragraph of Excerpt 2, but with one significant discrepancy. This passage of Excerpt 2 is represented as follows: "The strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism. Our socialist camp must have a head; this head is precisely the Soviet Union. The enemy also has a head which is the United States. Without a head, strength would be weakened."

The *RMRB* excerpts have the number of the Communist parties participating in the Moscow congress as sixty-eight, instead of sixty-four, the number in *Wansui* (n.d. 3). The latter is correct. This number is corroborated in other documents of the time. See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note. For a full list of these countries, see *RMSC* (1958), pp. 290–292.

11. In June 1942, Adolf Hitler launched a major offensive along the "Eastern," or Russian, front. Avoiding Moscow and Leningrad, which had proved impregnable the previous year, he directed the German panzer divisions southward, with the aim of cutting the Soviet Union in two and severing the oil supply to the Red Army from the Caucasus. A major objective was therefore Stalingrad, on the Volga River. By late August, German forces were in control of the oil centers at Maikop, and on August 22, the battle for the city of Stalingrad began. The Russians dug in with orders to defend the city to the last man. By mid-September, the Germans had fought their way to the center of the city, but there they became bogged down. In November 1942, two Russian armies launched a pincers-like counteroffensive, crossing the Volga from the east and attacking on two sides, north and south. With troops on the banks of the Volga stranded and unable to break through to support the forces in the city, the Germans found themselves in a hopeless situation. On February 3, 1943, 120,000 Germans surrendered, and for the remainder of the year, the German forces, driven out of Russia, had to fight defensive actions all along the Eastern front as troops withdrew into Germany. This makes the Russian victory at Stalingrad, though hard won, a turning point in the Second World War, even though one might also count the British breakthrough in Egypt and the Allied landings in French Northern Africa in late 1942, as well as the defeat of Japanese fleets in the Pacific in 1943, as equally significant events that turned the tide against the Axis powers.

12. See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), note 43, and text Nov. 14, 1957, note 2.

13. This paragraph, up to this point, resembles the first half of the second paragraph of Excerpt 2, and also a passage in the middle of Excerpt 1 that reads: "The solidarity of the international Communist movement, and the launching of the two artificial satellites by the Soviet Union—these two events signify a new turning point in the balance of power between the two great camps. The October Revolution created a new world."

14. This passage resembles the first lines of the fourth paragraph of Excerpt 2, which, however, goes on to add the following significant comment: "It was not until 1957 that the victory of the socialist revolution in the political and ideological areas was achieved."

15. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), paragraph 20, and text April 30, 1957, paragraph 6.

16. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

17. See text Mar. 20, 1957, note 119, and text July 8, 1957(2), note 2.

18. The term to which Mao alludes here is *wangba dan*, which literally means "turtle's eggs." For the vernacular usage of the expression, see text Jan. 18, 1957, note 25.

19. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 40.

20. Here Mao is using the term *xiao zi bao* to contrast, somewhat humorously, with the term *da zi bao* (for "big-character posters"). His outlook, in fact, may not have been entirely humorous. Although it is not entirely clear from this context, Mao was not completely happy with the way things were published in *RMRB* in 1957, and the term *xiao zi bao* here may be a word of criticism, suggesting that in Mao's view the *RMRB* had been at fault and had played a nonconstructive role

in the rectification campaign. See text April 1957, and text Jan. 12, 1958, note 26.

21. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

22. The passage here, and particularly the last sentence, resembles the last half of the fourth paragraph of Excerpt 2. There is also a section here, beginning with "You have not done any work [yet]," that resembles a passage of what has been identified as a conversation that Mao had with these students and trainees. See text Nov. 17, 1957(2), paragraph 8.

23. The term here is *da cheng yi pian*. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 59.

24. On the history of the Eighth Route Army, see text Sept. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 13.

25. On the Forty Articles, or the National Program for Agricultural Development, 1956–1957, see text Oct. 11, 1955, vol. I, note 56; text Oct. 11, 1955(2), vol. I, note 18; and text Dec. 6, 1955, vol. I, note 3. Here Mao is referring to the First Revised Draft of the Forty Articles, which was adopted by the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC in September 1957 and promulgated on October 26, 1957. (The original Forty Articles was published on January 26, 1956.) Subsequently the programs would go through a second revision in May 1958 at the Second Session of the Eighth CPC Congress.

26. See text Mar. 20, 1957, note 20.

27. See text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 117, and text Aug. 30, 1956, note 8.

28. The expression that Mao uses here is *wang kai yi mian* (literally, leave one side of a net open). The aphorism is derived from the saying *wang kai san mian* (leaving three sides of the net open), which is from the "Di wang benji" (Chronicle of Ancient Emperors and Kings) in the book *Shiji* (Historical Record) by Sima Qian. On the subject of eliminating the Four Pests, see text Dec. 21, 1955, vol. I, note 9; on including the elimination of the Four Pests in the Forty Articles, see text Oct. 13, 1957, note 134.

29. The context here does not provide evidence of who XXX may be.

30. This passage resembles the fifth paragraph of the "conversation" version. See text Nov. 17, 1957(2), paragraph 5. The idea of surpassing Britain is picked up again by Mao in early 1958. See text Jan. 28–30, 1958, note 2.

31. Mao is using here the very common saying, *tian you bu ce zhi fengyun, ren you dan xi zhi huo fu* (literally, There are unfathomable winds and clouds in the sky; there are, in a person's life, calamities and good fortunes that change from day to night). We have been unable to trace the classical source of this aphorism.

32. This final paragraph is similar to the first paragraph of the "conversation" version, i.e., of text Nov. 17, 1957(2). Also, Excerpt 2 ends with a sentence that is not in the present document: "The world is yours; the future of China is yours."

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## Conversation with Chinese Students and Trainees in Moscow

[Excerpts]

(November 17, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 20, 1957), 1; and Yao Xitang, "Zai Lieningshan shang huijian Mao zhuxi" (Meeting Chairman Mao on Lenin Hill), in *Mao guanhuai*, pp. 83–87.

*See source note to preceding document in this volume. The Yao article contains certain passages that are not found in the RMRB (Nov. 20, 1957) article. We include only the more important passages from these two articles here. At the end of each paragraph in the text*

we have indicated the source of that paragraph. For other Chinese texts or appearances, and available English translations of the RMRB article, see the source note of the preceding document. None is available for the Yao article, which is a reprint from *Zhongguo qingnian*, 24 (1957). This document repeats, or duplicates, some passages of text Nov. 17, 1957(1).

I have only three sentences to say to you: First, young people must be courageous and modest. Second, I wish you good health, study well, and work well in the future. Third, be closely united with our friends of the Soviet Union.

The world belongs to the younger generation. The Soviet Union is the leader of the socialist countries and the head of the socialist camp.

The peoples of China and the Soviet Union should be closely united. China and the Soviet Union are [two] great countries; as long as we are united as one, the enemy will fear us.

[The above, RMRB.]

Twelve socialist countries have arrived at a new agreement for solidarity among themselves, and the delegates from the Communist parties of sixty-four countries, too, will soon arrive at an agreement for solidarity.<sup>1</sup> Are you happy about this?

In another fifteen years, the Soviet Union will catch up with and surpass the United States, and we, China, will also catch up with or surpass Britain. Then imperialism will have nothing to be so fierce about.<sup>2</sup>

The Chinese people are resolved to catch up with and surpass imperialism. The [task of implementing] the next several five-year plans in China<sup>3</sup> and the responsibility of transforming the world fall upon the shoulders of this generation of young people of yours. . . . You have a much easier [task of] learning now than we had in the past; we learned about Marx only very lately. In the beginning all we learned was the stuff of the bourgeoisie. It was only through decades of effort that we transformed ourselves and came around, and only then did we slowly come to grasp Marxism. It is not easy to learn something. Therefore modesty is absolutely necessary . . . .

You are probably very relaxed now, because you have not yet done anything. When you become an engineer, or a factory director, or a secretary of a Party committee, then you will know that there are many difficulties.

. . . You lack tempering, and therefore you must earnestly undergo protracted tempering.<sup>4</sup> Do not be in the least arrogant, and don't strut around with your tails cocked in the air.<sup>5</sup>

. . . I can go into the water and swim at twenty-two degrees centigrade. Can you? I swam across the Yangtze River and twice swam across the Qiantang River . . . .<sup>6</sup> Are any of you from Hunan? I swam across the Xiang River three times<sup>7</sup> and climbed many high mountains in Hunan as well as in Jiangxi.

[The above, Yao.]

## Notes

1. See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note, and text Nov. 17, 1957(1), note 10. See also text Nov. 6, 1957, note 10, for the declaration that embodies the solidarity that Mao speaks of here.

2. This appears to be an echo of the "peaceful competition" platform of the congresses at this time; see text Nov. 6, 1957, note 11.

3. For scheduling of the five-year plans, see text Feb. 10, 1953, vol. I, note 2; text Dec. 27, 1955(2), vol. I, note 117; text Aug. 30, 1956, note 8; and text Nov. 11, 1956, note 4.

4. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 13.

5. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.

6. See text June 1956, note 1; see also text Sept. 5, 1957, source note.

7. See text May 30, 1956.

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## Telegram to the King of Morocco

(November 17, 1957)

**Source:** RMRB (Nov. 18, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: XHBYK, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 53; URI (1976), p. 432. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Nov. 18, 1957), 1; FBIS, *Daily Report* (Nov. 18, 1957), AAA 6; URI (1976), p. 433.

King Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef,  
Morocco

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of the twenty-eighth anniversary of Your Majesty's coronation and your country's National Day, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend to Your Majesty and to the Moroccan people our warm congratulations. May the country of Morocco prosper and its people have happiness.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

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## Speech at the Congress of Communist Parties and Workers' Parties in Socialist Countries

(November 18, 1957)

**Source:** Wansui (n.d. 3), pp. 205–210. Other Chinese Texts: Xuanji, V, pp. 496–498 (excerpt, hereafter referred to as Excerpt 1); Xuanji, V, pp. 499–500 (excerpt, hereafter referred to as Excerpt 2); RMRB (Sept. 1, 1963), 1 (excerpt, hereafter referred to as Excerpt 3). These excerpts come from three main sources. Two are in Xuanji, V: "Dangnei tuanjie de bianzheng fangfa," pp. 496–498; and "Yiqie fandongpai dou shi zhi laohu," pp. 499–500. The third is RMRB (Sept. 1, 1963), 1.

There is no explanation for the noninclusion of the third excerpt in *Xuanji*, although it is clearly indicated in *Xuanji* (pp. 496, 499) that what is included are excerpts. Since these three passages have each been included and translated or quoted in many secondary sources, to keep them clearly apart we refer to them as Excerpts 1, 2, and 3. They also appear, respectively, in the following Chinese secondary or tertiary sources: Excerpt 1: URI (1976), p. 436 (excerpt); *Buyi*, p. 158 (excerpt, slight variation). Excerpt 2: *XHBYK*, 143 (Nov. 10, 1958), 6–7; *RMRB* (Oct. 31, 1958), 2; *Mao liang*, pp. 393–394; URI (1976), pp. 435–436 (excerpt). Excerpt 3: *XHBYK*, 144 (Nov. 25, 1958), 3 (excerpt); URI (1976), p. 437. Available English Translations: Excerpt 1: *SW*, V, pp. 514–516; *JPRS*, *Selections*, pp. 44–46; URI (1976), pp. 440–441 (excerpt). Excerpt 2: *SW*, V, pp. 517–518; URI (1976), pp. 439–440 (excerpt); *PR*, 1: 37 (Nov. 11, 1966), 9; *SCMP*, 3771 (Aug. 31, 1966), 23–24; *CCSD*, pp. 153–154. Excerpt 3: *PR*, 6: 36 (Sept. 6, 1963), 10; S. Schram (1974), pp. 408–409; URI (1976), pp. 441–442; *PR*, 37 (Nov. 11, 1958), 9 (excerpt); *CCSD*, p. 154 (excerpt).

*This was apparently the last major speech made by Mao in 1957, and it serves as an apt coda to a tumultuous period of some eighteen months.*

*It is significant that the first excerpt of this speech presented here was given the title “The Dialectical Method of Creating Unity Within the Party” in Xuanji, V (and SW, V), for the concept of Party unity, both in a domestic sense (for China and the CPC) and in an international sense (for the world Communist movement) was clearly accepted by Mao at this time to be the proper strategy over the long term and the chief task for the immediate future. Nevertheless, Party unity had to be forged on a fundamental condition—the resolution of contradictions among the people and at the same time the distinction between different categories of contradictions—those among the people and those “between the enemy and ourselves.” The purpose of creating such a specific unity was outlined back in February 1957 in Mao’s “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” (see text Feb. 27, 1957), and in 1956–1957 this purpose was worked out at the level of politics. The events of 1957 in China—the backlash of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the anti-Rightist campaign, the problem with Wenhui bao, and the “Right-wing” intellectuals exemplified by the Zhang-Luo Alliance (see text July 1, 1957)—exacerbated the problems faced by the effort to forge this type of unity. Consequently, we see Mao pushing the issue to a higher level of right-wrong dichotomy at the end of 1957. Party unity must become the basis for future campaigns, for promoting the cause of socialism in China and the world, but, as we see in the politics of 1957 and in Mao’s pronouncements here, it must be a unity that pulls together all the people who are on the side of socialism (whom Mao continues to insist are in the vast majority) and at the same time combats and stands against those (in the minority, presumably) who are opposed to socialism. Internally, Mao believed that compromises on technical and procedural matters could be made, but not on the grand issue of socialism. Throughout 1957, Mao’s efforts had been directed toward holding the Party together on the basis of socialism and at the same time honing its combative edge.*

*This practical political issue also bounces back to the level of ideology, and for that reason, in late 1957, Mao worked out a clearer distinction between his vision of the dialectical law of unity of opposites, which is anchored on the principle of “one divides into two,” and the alternate vision, in which the principle of “two combine into one” plays the major role.<sup>1</sup> The latter becomes, in Mao’s mind, the epitome of revisionist tendencies and the chief saboteur of a correct socialist Marxist-Leninist ideology.*

*Although it was not until late fall of 1958 that Yang Xianzhen published the “two combine into one” thesis, and not until 1964 that the two sides of the ideological debate were engaged in full battle, the seeds for this major controversy and, through it, the Mao–Liu Shaoqi struggle were sown back in the events of 1957.*

*In this context, what Mao means by the dialectical method for creating Party unity becomes clear. He also interestingly draws the distinction, in the second excerpt here, between opportunistic errors and adventurist errors, or Rightist and Leftist errors. It is clear, in the long run, that revisionist errors have the tendency to fall into, or develop into, errors of the first category. Moreover, at an earlier point in his visit to the Soviet Union, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet (see text Nov. 6, 1957), Mao had put forth the suggestion that dealing with, or opposing, revisionism was the more urgent task at hand.<sup>2</sup>*

*It is important, too, that this speech was made in an international context, for Mao seems here to be projecting these crucial issues of distinction into the arena of the world Communist movement. The well-known slogan that he reiterated at this time, “the East Wind prevails over the West Wind,” cannot, when all the major pronouncements by Mao in late 1957 and early 1958 are taken into consideration, be seen simply as an optimistic assessment of the relative strength or solidarity of the socialist bloc, or as a brave challenge to the Western world. It is obvious that Mao desired to project to his fellow socialists in the international platform the sense that there is a correct direction in which things may develop—i.e., hard-line socialism, which will prevail over the antisocialist ways of development. The optimistic assessment also includes, therefore, a tacit exhortation not to give up the fight for socialism, and not to make any premature compromises with antisocialist tendencies. In light of this, and particularly in view of the fact that this summation came at the end of a long period of turmoil in China, which itself was in no small measure affected by the Polish and Hungarian incidents of 1956,<sup>3</sup> we may again, with the benefit of historical hindsight, see the significance of this speech for the later split between China and the Soviet Union on the issue of revisionism and the direction of the world Communist movement. This speech was both a summation of the “two-line struggle” in 1957 and a stage-setter for that struggle in the years ahead. (See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note.)*

Comrades:

Let me say a few words. I beg of you, comrades, to permit me to say a few words extemporaneously. Because a few years ago I had a bout with the XXX disease,<sup>4</sup> although in the last two years I have improved a bit, it is still inconvenient for me to stand when I speak; [Therefore, please forgive me for sitting down.]

I would like to speak on two questions; the question of the situation and the question of unity. At the moment I sense that the international situation has come to a turning point. There are two currents of wind in the world at the present moment: the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying: If it is isn’t the East Wind that prevails over the West Wind, it will be the West Wind that prevails over the East Wind.<sup>5</sup> I think that the characteristic of the present situation is that the East Wind prevails over the West Wind, which is to say that the forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to those of imperialism.<sup>6</sup>

The October Revolution of forty years ago was a turning point in the history of the entire human race, so how come we are speaking of yet another turning point now? Yes, there still are and still will be [turning points in the present and future]. When we were fighting against Hitler, for a time, for a stretch of a year or two,

Hitler gained the upper hand. At that time Hitler not only occupied the greater part of Europe, but even invaded the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union had to yield a large piece of territory. Thus we can see that for a moment Hitler had gained the upper hand. The Battle of Stalingrad then became a turning point.<sup>7</sup> From then on, Hitler went downhill, and the Soviet Union fought all the way to Berlin, with the force of splitting bamboo.<sup>8</sup> Isn't that a turning point? As I see it, the Battle of Stalingrad was the turning point in the entire Second World War.

Last year, [and in] the last few years, the Western world has been very ferocious. Taking advantage of some problems within our camp, especially the Hungarian Incident, they smeared dirt on the faces of [the people in] our camp, and many dark clouds rose over our skies. Nevertheless, the Hungarian counterrevolution was suppressed. In the incident of the Suez Canal also, the warning issued by the Soviet Union had the effect of preventing an aggressive war.<sup>9</sup> The purpose that the West has in smearing dirt on our faces, as I see it, is mainly that they want to "fix" the Communist parties of our various countries.<sup>10</sup> In this regard, they did indeed attain their goal partially. For instance, in the United States, Forster, that despicable traitor of communism, fled from the Party.<sup>11</sup> In some other Communist parties, too, there were quite a few people who fled. The imperialists were overjoyed at this. I think that we should be happy about it too; when traitors leave us, what's wrong with that?

This year, 1957, however, the situation is greatly different. Our skies are totally bright, whereas there are nothing but dark clouds in the sky over the West.<sup>12</sup> We are very optimistic, and they? They are nervous and anxiety ridden. When [we sent] two satellites up into the sky, they couldn't sleep.<sup>13</sup> For more than sixty Communist parties to hold a congress in Moscow is unprecedented; there has never been anything of such a grand scale. However, in the countries within the socialist camp, in the various Communist parties, and especially among the people in the various [socialist] countries, there are quite a lot of people who still believe that the United States is great. [They say,] look, it still has so much steel, so many airplanes and cannons, and we have fewer than it does. Numerous newspapers and broadcasting stations in the Western countries toot that horn every day—the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe,<sup>14</sup> and so on make it sound so miraculous, and therefore an illusion has been created that has duped quite a large portion of the people. We have to expose this deception for what it is. We have ten points of evidence to prove the following question: In the final analysis, are they better, or are we? Is it the East Wind that will prevail over the West Wind, or is it the West Wind that will prevail over the East Wind?

The first item: When they were fighting against Hitler, how much steel did Roosevelt and Churchill have in their hands? About 70 million tons. And yet they could not swallow Hitler; they couldn't do anything. Still, in the end, they had to find a way, so they adopted the method of traveling. They went to Yalta and asked the Soviet Union to help.<sup>15</sup> How much steel did Stalin have at that time? Before the war, he had 18 million tons. According to what XXXXXX has told me,<sup>16</sup> because [the Soviet Union] had lost a great deal of territory in the war, steel production was halved, and only 9 million tons were left. So you have someone

with 70 million tons of steel coming to ask for a favor from someone with [only] 9 million tons. What were the conditions? To draw a line at the Elbe River designating the territory to the east of it as the zone to be attacked by the Red Army;<sup>17</sup> in other words, they gritted their teeth and resolved to allow this large region to leave their system, and allowed for the possibility that this vast region could turn to the socialist system. This thing is very convincing. It demonstrates that the quantity of material strength does not decide a question entirely; rather, it is the human [factor] that is primary, and so is the [question of the] system. At Yalta they also discussed fighting against Japan. Once again it is that the Americans couldn't swallow Japan, and so again they asked the Communists to help. [This time they conceded] China's Manchuria and part of Korea as the Red Army's attack zone, and furthermore they decided to let Japan return half of Sakhalin Island and the whole Kuril archipelago.<sup>18</sup> That, too, was gritting their teeth, standing the pain, and making a concession! All that for the sake of eating up their companion—the Japanese imperialists.

The second item: the Chinese Revolution. In early 1949, when the Kuomintang was beaten within an inch of its life by us, they cried out loudly to Truman for help. Please, my dear American lord and master, wouldn't you send a few troops [to save us]? Truman said: I can't send any, not a single soldier. So the Kuomintang pleaded again: Couldn't you [at least] say a few words? Please say: If the Communists get to the territory south of the Yangtze River, it would no longer be possible for the United States to sit on its hands. Truman said: No. That won't do; I can't say that; the Communists are very forceful. So all Chiang Kai-shek could do was open fire with his cannons, and now he is in Taiwan.<sup>19</sup>

The third item: the Korean War. When [it] started, the Americans had 800 pieces of artillery in every division, whereas the Chinese Peoples' Volunteers<sup>20</sup> had only fifty-some pieces of artillery for all three divisions combined. Nonetheless, once the fighting commenced, it was like herding ducks. In just a few weeks [we] drove the Americans along for several hundred kilometers; drove them from the Yalu River to south of the thirty-eighth parallel.<sup>21</sup> Later the Americans concentrated their forces for a counteroffensive and we, together with Comrade Kim Il Sung, retreated to the thirty-eighth parallel, where we stood off against [the American forces] and constructed our field positions. Once we fought, the Korean War as a whole took nearly three years. [In all that time] the American airplanes were like [swarms of] wasps, whereas we didn't have a single airplane on the front lines. [Then] the two sides agreed to negotiate a truce. But where? They said [they wanted negotiations to be held] on a Danish ship. We said [they should be held] at Kaesong, on our territory. They said: Okay. Because [the negotiations were held] on our territory, every day when they came to have the meetings, they had to come under a white flag, and after the [day's] meeting, they had to go back under a white flag. Subsequently, they felt uncomfortable [about that—about coming and going] under a white flag every day. So [they] said: Let's change the venue a bit. Let's change it to a place in the middle between the battle fronts of both sides, to a place called Panmunjon.<sup>22</sup> We said that is okay with us. However, after a bit over a year of negotiating, the Americans were still reluctant to sign [an agreement], and they

were stalling. Finally, in 1953, we broke through a twenty-kilometer line of defense on the thirty-eighth parallel, and the Americans were alarmed, and immediately signed. [So, you see,] the mighty United States, the United States with so much steel—so that's all it could do. Actually, it was, [on our side,] three countries fighting this war—Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union supplied weapons. However, on the enemy's side? There were sixteen countries.

The fourth item: the war in Viet Nam. The French were being thrashed to within an inch of their lives by Ho Chi Minh.<sup>23</sup> They were shitting and pissing in their pants. Someone can attest to that [right here]; Comrade Ho Chi Minh is here in the audience. The French wanted to quit; the Americans insisted on staying in, because they had a lot of steel. Nonetheless, the Americans also did nothing but supply weapons and keep up a situation of tension. They won't supply troops. And therefore, there was the Geneva Conference, [which resulted in] giving the greater part of Viet Nam to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.<sup>24</sup>

The fifth item: the Suez Canal Incident. Two imperialist [countries] attacked [Egypt], and there were several days of fighting. When the people of the Soviet Union<sup>25</sup> made a few statements, they withdrew. Naturally there was also a second factor [at work there] and that is that the whole world was speaking up, opposing the aggression of the British and the French.

The sixth item is Syria. The Americans made plans to attack, but again the people of the Soviet Union made a few statements, and, furthermore, they appointed a general by the name of Rokosovsky. [The Soviet Union] did these two things, and they, [the Americans,] said it doesn't [look as if it would be] good to fight.<sup>26</sup> This matter is not concluded yet, and we still have to be vigilant [about it]. It is possible that there will yet be trouble in the future, but at least for the time being, there is no fighting.

The seventh item is that the Soviet Union sent up two satellites.<sup>27</sup> How much steel does the country that sent up [these] satellites have? Fifty-one million tons. Isn't the United States supposed to be very powerful? Then why have you not yet sent up even a potato?<sup>28</sup> [You say] you have a hundred million tons of steel; you brag so much. [You say, too, that] you have made a pioneering plan; [it looks like your] pioneering plan will have to change its name, and become known as a falling-behind plan.

From these seven things, I think, we can derive a concept, and that is that we have left the Western world behind us. Are they far behind us? Or just a tiny bit behind us? As I see it—and maybe I am a bit adventurer [in this]—I say that we have left them behind us once and forever. Before the Soviet Union launched the satellites, the socialist countries were already enjoying an overwhelming advantage over the imperialist countries in the areas of the support of the people and the size of the population, and when the Soviet Union launched the satellites, it gained an overwhelming advantage in the most important area—the area of science and technology—as well. People say that the United States will catch up, and that it will also send up satellites. That is true. XXXXXX's<sup>29</sup> end report, for one, said that the United States will send up satellites. Right now, however, they are debating whether it would be one year, or two years, or five years, before they can catch up

with the Soviet Union. [Well,] I don't care if it is one year, two years, or five, in any case you have been left behind. Our comrades of the Soviet Union, XXXXXX, it seems, would sleep only at night, and not in the daytime. Certainly all the people of the Soviet Union would not be sleeping all the time, day and night, for one, two, or five years, would they? You might catch up with [where] the Soviet Union [is now] in one year, or two years, or five years; but [then] the Soviet Union would have forged ahead [some more].

Comrades, let me talk a bit about things in our own country. This year our country got 5.2 million tons of steel.<sup>30</sup> In five years' time, we could achieve 10 to 15 million tons of steel; in another five years' time, possibly 20 to 25 million tons; and in yet another five years' time, it could be 35 to 40 million tons. Naturally, I may have exaggerated here. When in the future another international congress is held, you might criticize me for subjectivism. However, let me say that I have a considerably [strong] basis [for these projections]. We have many Soviet experts assisting us, and the Chinese people want to put up a big effort. The Chinese people, in term of politics and the population, are a large nation, but in terms of the economy, it is still a small country. They wish to strive and are extremely enthusiastic about their work to transform China into a truly great country. XXXX has told us that in fifteen years' time the Soviet Union can catch up with and surpass the United States. We can say, also, that in fifteen years' time, we [in China] can catch up with or surpass Britain. This is because I have had two discussions with Pollitt and XXXX.<sup>31</sup> I asked them about the conditions in their country, and they said that right now Britain is producing 20 million tons of steel annually, and in fifteen years' time could climb up to an annual production of 30 million tons. As for China? In fifteen years' time, it may [produce] 40 million tons. Wouldn't that be surpassing Britain then? So, in fifteen years, in our camp, the Soviet Union could surpass the United States, and China could surpass Britain.

In the final analysis, we must strive for fifteen years of peace. Then, by that time, we would have no match in the world, and no one would dare to fight with us. The world would then be able to attain enduring peace.

At the moment, [however,] we must take into consideration another set of conditions, which is that the maniacs who want to start a war may fling their atom bombs and hydrogen bombs all over the place. If they fling theirs and we fling ours, everything will be in an absolute mess, and people will lose their lives. The problem is that we must base our considerations on the worse possible [contingency]. Our Political Bureau has met several times to discuss this problem. If there was going to be fighting right now, China has only hand grenades, and not atom bombs, but the Soviet Union has [atom bombs]. Let us speculate: If war broke out, how many people would die? There are 2.7 billion people in the entire world, and one-third of them may be lost; [let's say] more than that, [let's say that] perhaps one-half would be lost. It isn't that we want to fight; it's they who want the fighting, and as long as there is fighting, [they would] want to fling their atom bombs and hydrogen bombs around. I once debated this issue with a foreign statesman.<sup>32</sup> He believed that if there was an atomic war, the entire human race would be annihilated. I said, if worse came to worst, one-half would die, and there would still be one-half left.

[But] imperialism would be razed to the ground, and the whole world would become socialist. After a number of years, [the world's population] would get back to 2.7 billion, and it is certain to go beyond even that. We in China have not yet completed our construction. We hope for peace, but if imperialism insists on fighting a war, we have no alternative but to dig our heels in and fight before we go ahead with construction. [If] you keep on being afraid of war day in and day out, what will you do when war comes? To begin with, I [say] that the East Wind prevails over the West Wind, and that war is not likely to break out, and now I add these explanations on the contingency that war does not break out; [and in doing so] we have covered both possibilities.

I said that there are ten pieces of evidence. Just now I have spoken of seven; let me continue with the other three:

The eighth item is that Britain has withdrawn from a very large piece of territory in Asia and Africa.<sup>33</sup>

The ninth item is the Dutch withdrawal from Indonesia.<sup>34</sup>

The tenth item is that France has withdrawn from Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, and its hands are tied in Algeria.<sup>35</sup>

Are the backward countries stronger, or are the progressive countries stronger? Is India stronger, or Britain? Indonesia, or the Netherlands? Algeria, or France? As I see it, all the imperialists are [like] the sun at six o'clock in the afternoon, while we are [like] the sun at six o'clock in the morning. So, there come the turning points; that is to say, the Western countries have been left behind. We have gained the upper hand in a big way. Most certainly it will not be the West Wind that prevails over the East Wind, because the West Wind is so feeble. The East Wind is bound to prevail over the West Wind, because we are powerful and strong.

The problem is that you just cannot decide things with the quantity of steel and iron; rather, first and foremost, things are determined by people's hearts and minds. It has always been like that in history. In history, the weak have always beaten the strong; those without guns [have always] defeated those who were fully armed. At one time, the Bolsheviks did not have even a single gun. Our comrades of the Soviet Union told me that at the time of the February Revolution, [the Bolshevik Party] had only 40,000 members, and even at the time of the October Revolution, it had only 240,000 members. In the first passage on the first page of the book *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): A Concise Textbook*, there is a [description of] dialectics: from a small group to the entire nation.<sup>36</sup> In the beginning, [the Bolshevik Party] was a small group of just loosely several dozen people, and later it became the leadership of the entire country. Comrades of the Soviet Union, I hope that when you revise the *History of the Communist Party* you will not edit out these sentences. That is true of us in China as well. At the beginning, we, too, had a loosely organized small group of Communists of several dozen people, and now we, too, are leading the entire country and leading a big party of 640 million people.<sup>37</sup> A small group of several dozen Communists has now developed into [a Party of] 12 million members. In saying these words, I especially hope to exchange opinions with comrades in the Communist parties in capitalist countries, because right now they are still in considerable difficulty; some parties

are very small, and in the case of some parties, large batches of party members are withdrawing from the party. I say that this is nothing surprising, and it may be a good thing. Our road is tortuous; it is [a matter of] moving upward in a spiral.<sup>38</sup>

I have to speak also of a problem of the paper tiger. When Chiang Kai-shek took offensive against us in 1946, many of our comrades and the people throughout the country were very worried about whether the war could be won. I myself was also worried, but we had confidence in one thing. At that time, an American correspondent by the name of Anna Louise Strong came to Yanan. During my interview with her, I discussed many problems: Chiang Kai-shek, Hitler, Japan, the United States, the atom bomb, and so forth.<sup>39</sup> I said that all allegedly powerful reactionaries were no more than paper tigers. That was because they were divorced from the people. Look, wasn't Hitler a paper tiger? Wasn't he overthrown? I also mentioned that the tsar was a paper tiger, the emperor of China was a paper tiger, and so was Japanese imperialism. You see, they have all been toppled. U.S. imperialism has not been toppled yet; it still has the atom bomb. But as I see it, U.S. imperialism is also a paper tiger and will be likewise overthrown. Chiang Kai-shek was very powerful; he had a regular army of more than four million strong. We were then in Yanan. How many people were there in Yanan? Seven thousand. And how many troops did we have? We had 900,000 guerrillas, all cut off [from each other] by Chiang Kai-shek in scores of base areas.<sup>40</sup> However, we said that Chiang was nothing but a paper tiger, and we were certain to defeat him. To struggle against the enemy, we have developed a concept over a long period of time; that is, strategically we should despise all our enemies, while tactically we should take them all seriously. In other words, we must take [the enemy] lightly as a whole, but we must take it seriously in each specific case. If we do not hold the enemy in contempt as a whole, we shall commit opportunist errors. Marx and Engels were only two individuals, [but] in their time they already predicted that capitalism would be overthrown throughout the world. Nevertheless, if we fail to take the enemy seriously in each specific case and with each specific enemy, we shall commit adventurist errors.<sup>41</sup> A war must be fought battle by battle, and the enemy can only be destroyed piece by piece. Factories can only be built one by one, and peasants can only plow their fields plot by plot; the same holds true in eating a meal. Strategically we take the eating of a meal lightly; we are sure to be able to finish it. But when it comes to actual eating, we eat the meal mouthful by mouthful. You cannot swallow a whole banquet in one gulp. This is called solving [a problem] bit by bit, and it is also known in military writings as smashing the enemy forces one by one.

I'm finished with talking about the first problem. Now let me say a few things about the second problem—the problem of solidarity.

I am very happy; I feel very fortunate that our congress has been so united. These congresses reflect the rising youthful vigor and vitality of the proletariat and the people throughout the world, and the trend toward the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind. We do have many shortcomings and mistakes, but our achievements are the primary aspect, and it is something whose effects we see every year. Thus, it is reflected in the gust of vigor and vitality in our congress of the

Communist parties of sixty-some countries. Moreover, we have a consensus that we must have a head, and that head is the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Chinese have a common saying: without a head the snake cannot move. Look, every one of us has a head, and every Party in every country has a head. There are collective heads and individual heads. The Central Committee and the Political Bureau are collectives; the first secretary is an individual. We must have both; otherwise we would have anarchy.

I like the speech that Gomulka made yesterday.<sup>42</sup> He said: To acknowledge that the Soviet Union is [our] head is a truth; it is not artificial, but it is something that is formed naturally through history. Nevertheless, in his country, there are some people who emotionally have problems [with this,] and for the time being they don't want to say things like this and have to express it in another form—for example, [they would] say that [the Soviet Union] is the first and the most powerful socialist country. In his country there is a contradiction; there is yet some discord among the progressive elements and quite a lot of other people. Therefore there is still work to be done among them. . . . I hope that Poland, the Soviet Union, China, and all other countries will become completely unified, and will gradually improve the relationship among us. . . .

I'd like to talk a bit about the question of methods with regard to the problem of unity. I say that we have to adopt an attitude of uniting with [all] comrades, no matter what kind of people they are, as long as they are not antagonistic elements or saboteurs. We must adopt a dialectical method toward them and not a metaphysical method. What is the dialectical method? It is to analyze everything and to recognize that human beings will always commit errors, and not to negate everything about somebody just because he has committed an error. Lenin once said that there is not a single person in the whole world who hasn't committed a mistake.<sup>43</sup> Everybody needs the support of [other] people. Even a sturdy fellow needs three other people to help him; a fence has to be propped up by [at least] three posts. Even though the lotus is beautiful, it needs the green leaves to enhance its beauty.<sup>44</sup> This is a Chinese aphorism. There's another Chinese aphorism, which says that three smelly tanners together become a Zhuge Liang. One Zhuge Liang alone will always be imperfect; he will always have defects.<sup>45</sup> Just look at this Twelve-Nation Manifesto of ours<sup>46</sup> [we've gone through] the first, second, third, and fourth drafts, and we are still not through with the revisions in the language [of the text]. I think that the kind of thinking that claims omniscience and omnipotence, or being like God, is ill-advised. Therefore, what kind of attitude should we adopt toward those comrades who have committed mistakes? We should make an analysis and adopt a dialectical method, not a metaphysical method [in dealing with them]. Our Party was once bogged down in metaphysics—dogmatism—and it destroyed all those people whom it disliked.<sup>47</sup> Later on we criticized dogmatism, and gradually we learned a bit more about the dialectical method. The basic perspective of the dialectical method is the unity of opposites.<sup>48</sup> If we recognize [the validity of] this point of view, then what should our attitude be toward those comrades who have made mistakes? The first thing is to struggle with the comrades who have made mistakes to eliminate incorrect ideas thor-

oughly, and the second thing is to continue to help them. First struggle, then help. We must proceed from good intentions and help them correct their mistakes so that they have a way out.

[However, the way we] treat the other type of people is different. Toward people like Trotsky, and in China toward people like Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, and Gao Gang,<sup>49</sup> we are unable to adopt a helping attitude, because they are incorrigible. Moreover, people like Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek, and the tsar are also all incorrigible and can only be cut down because, as far as their relationship with us is concerned, [it is a relationship of] absolute mutual rejection between them and ourselves. In this sense they do not have a dual character; they have only one nature.<sup>50</sup> As for the imperialist system and the capitalist system, the same holds true for them in the final analysis. In the end they will inevitably be replaced by the socialist system. The same is true for ideology: materialism must take the place of idealism; atheism must take the place of the belief in a God. This, [however,] refers to strategic goals. At the tactical level things are different; there will be compromise. Didn't we compromise with the Americans on the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea? Didn't we compromise with the French in Viet Nam?<sup>51</sup>

At each tactical stage we have to be good at fighting as well as good at making compromises.<sup>52</sup> Now, let's turn back to the relationships among [our] comrades. I propose that if there is any alienation among comrades, discussions ought to be held among them. Some people seem to think that once people join the Communist Party they become sages, and that there are no differences, no misunderstandings among them, that there cannot be any analysis of them, that [they are] like one single sheet of iron, with everything being uniform and standardized, and that therefore there is no need for discussions.<sup>53</sup> It is as if once you join the Communist Party you simply have to be 100 per cent Marxist. In reality there are all sorts of Marxists; there are 100 per cent Marxists, 90 per cent Marxists, 80 per cent Marxists, 70 per cent Marxists, 60 per cent Marxists, and 50 per cent Marxists; some people are only 10 or 20 per cent Marxist. Can we have two people or a few people talk things over in a small room? Can we proceed on the premise of unity and set up discussions in a spirit of helpfulness?<sup>54</sup> This, of course, isn't the same as negotiating with imperialists (although we will also have to negotiate with imperialists); these are negotiations among Communists themselves. Let me give you an example. Aren't our twelve nations setting up negotiations at this time? Aren't the sixty-some parties setting up discussions?<sup>55</sup> In fact they are negotiating, which is to say that within the boundaries of the principle of not doing harm to Marxism-Leninism, they are accepting certain acceptable opinions from others and are giving up some opinions of their own that can be relinquished. In that case we will have two hands [to work with]; one hand is engaged in struggle with the comrades who have made mistakes; the other hand is engaged in uniting with them.<sup>56</sup> The purpose of [this] struggle is to uphold Marxist principles; this is called being principled; this is the one hand. The other hand is engaged in [forging] unity; the purpose of uniting [with them] is to give them a way out, to compromise

with them; this is called flexibility. The unity of principle and flexibility is a Marxist-Leninist principle; it is a unity of opposites.

No matter what kind of a world it is, and, of course, especially [if it is a] class society, it will always be full of contradictions. Some people say that contradictions can be “found” in socialist society. I think that this proposition is incorrect. It’s not whether or not contradictions can be found; it’s that [socialist society] is full of contradictions. There is no place without contradictions, and there isn’t anybody who cannot be analyzed. To accept [the proposition] that a person cannot be analyzed would be metaphysical. Just look, even within an atom there is a unity of contradictions; there is the unity of the two opposing elements—the nucleus and the electrons. Within the nucleus there is the unity of opposites of the proton and the neutron; there are protons and there are antiprotons. There are the neutrons and there are antineutrons. In any case, the unity of opposites is present everywhere. There has to be widespread propaganda about the concept of the unity of opposites and about the dialectical method. I suggest that the dialectical method should be moved out of the circle of philosophers and shifted to the broad masses of the people. I propose that this problem be discussed at conferences of the political bureaus and the central committee plenums of the [Communist] parties of the various countries, and at the meetings of local [Party] committees of all levels of the [various] parties. In fact our [Party] branch secretaries know the dialectical method. When they prepare to make their reports at the [Party] branch meetings, they often jot down two items in their little notebooks: the first consists of good points, the second consists of shortcomings. One divides into two:<sup>57</sup> This is a universal phenomenon; this is the dialectical method.

Perhaps you dislike my speaking of problems of this sort at a meeting like this. I am not a person who knows the direction in which the wind is blowing,<sup>58</sup> and I have already spoken for such a long time. So perhaps I should just stop. But let me just say a few more words. . . .

Stalin led the [Communist] Party of the Soviet Union in accomplishing great works. His achievements are primary, and [his] shortcomings and mistakes are secondary. However, over a long period of time, he did develop metaphysics and damage dialectics.<sup>59</sup> The personality cult was metaphysics; no one was permitted to criticize him. As I see it, the forty years of the Soviet Union are a dialectical process [in themselves]. There were Lenin’s dialectics, [and then with] Stalin there were many metaphysical viewpoints. Some [of these] viewpoints were enacted, and when they reached a point of extreme, they were bound to move toward their opposite, and bring back dialectics again. I am very happy that XXXXXX said, at the commemorative celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution,<sup>60</sup> that contradictions do exist in socialist society. I am very glad that the philosophical circles in the Soviet Union have produced many articles that discuss the internal contradictions in socialist society. These articles also discussed the problem of the contradictions between socialism and capitalism; these are problems of contradictions of two different types altogether.

So, let me end my talking here. Finally, just one last sentence: I agree with the two declarations.<sup>61</sup>

## Notes

1. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 18, and text Oct. 13, 1957, note 57.
2. See text Nov. 6, 1957, note 8.
3. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.
4. There has been, as far as we know, no official announcement of Mao’s illness; thus we do not know for certain what XXX stands for here. The reader may refer, however, to text Winter 1953, vol. I, for some unconfirmed information on this subject.
5. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 39.
6. This passage, starting with: “At the moment,” is the first paragraph of Excerpt 3.
7. See text Nov. 17, 1957(1), note 11. See also text surrounding that note; it resembles the passage here.
8. The saying *shi ru po zhu* (literally, with the force of splitting bamboo) is derived from *Jin shu* (History of the Jin Dynasty) and refers to an irresistible force.
9. For the Hungarian Incident, see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27. See also text Nov. 14, 1957, note 4. For the Suez Canal Incident, see text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6.
10. The word *zheng*, which we have translated as “fix,” has the connotation of “making things difficult for.” It also has the meaning of “to rectify.” See text May 15, 1957, note 27.
11. See text Oct. 6, 1949, vol. I, note 1.
12. See text Nov. 14, 1957, note 5.
13. See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), note 43. See also text Nov. 14, 1957, note 2.
14. Voice of America came into existence on February 24, 1942, as a broadcasting service that had the function of combating the propaganda of Germany and Japan, with which the United States was then, of course, at war. It served as the mouthpiece of American war aims. After the Second World War ended, it continued as an integral part of the propaganda and information dispensing effort of the United States to foster worldwide understanding of U.S. policies. In 1953 it was incorporated into the U.S. Information Agency. A major part of the program of Voice of America has been to broadcast American programs beamed into the PRC.
15. The Yalta Conference of Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill was held February 4–11, 1945. The primary outcome of this conference, which would be the last for “The Big Three” in the Second World War period, was to arrive at a general understanding of the disposition of the postwar world, especially in Europe and East Asia, among the eventual victors. On European matters, the key decisions were made on Poland, Yugoslavia, and the recognition of the demarcation of “occupational zones” of the British, American, Soviet, and French forces in Germany. On Asian issues, the gist of the conference’s decisions was that the Soviet Union would essentially recover in East Asia, and particularly in Northern Asia, the positions of dominant influence that Russia had held before the 1917 Revolution. The terms that affected China—Russian control in the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the reestablishment of a Russian naval port at Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dalian, and the affirmation of the status quo in Russian-controlled Outer Mongolia—were to be confirmed further by a separate agreement between the Soviet government and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government in China (which Stalin thereupon implicitly recognized by dint of this agreement). The United States was to obtain Chiang Kai-shek’s concurrence with these terms. (In fact, the terms were made known to Chiang only in June 1945, months after the Yalta Conference, and were not ratified until Japan surrendered, on August 14.) Thus the decisions that were made at Yalta regarding Asian matters were largely the result of agreements that remained secret for months..
16. We cannot tell whom XXXXXX stands for. See, however, text Nov. 14, 1957, note 8.
17. See text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 13.
18. Among the agreements made at the Yalta Conference, the southern half of Sakhalin Island, which Russia had lost to Japan in the war of 1904–1905, was to be regained by the Soviet Union, together with the Kuril Islands immediately north of the home islands of Japan.



19. The Chinese text here is garbled. It reads *Jiang Jieshi zhi hao kai pao* (in which the character for *pao* is the one that translates as “run”). We have read this to be a typographical error for *pao* as cannon—to *kai pao* in this sense means to open fire. However, it could also be a more literal “run away” if the original character is adopted, and especially if the order of the characters *kai pao* were reversed to read *pao kai*.

20. See text Oct. 8, 1950(2), vol. I, note 1.

21. See text Sept. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, notes 7 and 8.

22. See text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, note 1, and text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 2.

23. After Japan's surrender in August 1945, France momentarily reestablished its authority in Indochina, which it called Cochin China, and seized control of Saigon in late September 1945 with paratroopers. Moreover, the French celebrated this victory by mounting a campaign of terror against Vietnamese thought to be leaning toward national independence. In November 1946, the French moved to take Haiphong, opening a full-scale offensive against the Vietminh, a war that would last eight years. In mid-March 1954, battle was joined at Dienbienphu, a small town near the Laos-Viet Nam border. The Vietminh forces of Ho Chi Minh, aided and supplied by the PRC, soundly defeated the French. The political impact of the defeat broke the will of the French government and the electorate in France, leading to the Geneva settlement (see text July 23, 1954, vol. I, note 1). One of the terms of this settlement was that Viet Nam would be militarily divided at the seventeenth parallel. Vietminh troops were to occupy territory north of the division, and French forces were to be sent south and repatriated. French colonialism in Viet Nam was finally liquidated.

24. See text July 23, 1954, vol. I, note 1.

25. On the Suez Canal Incident, see text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6. Here the Chinese text reads *Sulian ren*, which appears a bit garbled. We have translated this as “the people of the Soviet Union”; the term appears to be referring simply to the Soviet Union.

26. We have not been able to identify the Russian general here rendered as *Luo-ke-so-fu-si-ji*. Also, the text here is a bit unclear. The sentence reads: *Tamen shuo bu hao da liao*. We have taken the term *tamen* (they) to refer to “the Americans.”

27. See text Oct. 9, 1957(2), note 43. See also note 13 of this document.

28. The Chinese term here is *shan yao dan*, which is a slangish term for “potato.” However, it appears that this may also be a reference to hand grenades.

29. This could be a reference to “Comrade Khrushchev.” See text Nov. 14, 1957, note 8.

30. This passage resembles the penultimate paragraph of text Nov. 17, 1957(1). See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 37 on the PRC's steel output.

31. We cannot ascertain whom XXXX stand for here. On Pollitt, see text Nov. 20, 1950, vol. I, source note. On the notion of catching up with Britain in fifteen years, see text Nov. 17, 1957(1), text surrounding note 30.

32. According to subsequent Chinese sources, this refers to Jawaharlal Nehru, who visited China in October 1954. The most authoritative discussion on this issue in American scholarship is J. Gittings (1968), pp. 80ff.

33. In the 1940s and 1950s, many Asian and African countries that had previously been colonies, dominions, or territories of Britain became independent nations. These chiefly include, India (declared independence in 1947), Pakistan (1947), Burma (1948), Sri Lanka (1948), and Malaya (1957), as well as the Sudan (1956) and Ghana (1957). While national independence (and decolonization) movements in many other places previously under British rule were well underway by 1957, many did not obtain full independence until later—e.g., Nigeria (1960), Uganda (1962), and Kenya (1963). Many nations in Africa and the Middle East became independent in the mid- to late 1960s. Singapore became independent in 1965.

34. See text Oct. 2, 1956, note 1.

35. Syria and Lebanon gained their independence from France in 1944, Morocco and Tunisia in 1956. Algeria would not gain full independence from France until 1962. The French had considered Algeria not as a colony but as an integral part of France, with the French residents there considering the land as much their homeland as that of the native

Algerians, whose armed revolt against French rule began in the autumn of 1954. Supported by the French colonialists, the French government resolved to crush the uprising, leading to a brutal struggle that continued until 1962 when Charles de Gaulle decided to end the bloodshed. In March 1962, a referendum in France approved a ceasefire, and a plebiscite to determine Algeria's future. On July 3, 1962, the independence of Algeria was proclaimed.

36. This refers to what is more often called *History of the CPSU, Short Course*. See text July 31, 1955, vol. I, note 26.

37. Here, “party” refers, of course, not to the membership of the CPC, but to the entire population of the PRC. See also text Nov. 17, 1957(1), third paragraph from the end.

38. See text July 9, 1957, text surrounding note 29.

39. Anna Louise Strong (1885–1970) was one of the most famous “international friends” of the Chinese Communist Revolution. She went to China in 1925 on the first of six visits in her lifetime. Her most famous visit was in August 1946 when she went to Yanan and interviewed Mao (see *SW*, IV, pp. 97–101), during which Mao iterated the famous slogan “all reactionaries are paper tigers.” (This sentence is the title given to this excerpt by the editors of *SW*, V.) Strong returned to China in 1958 at the age of 72 and was the editor of the propaganda journal *Zhongguo tongxun* (China news bulletin). She died in Beijing in March 1970.

40. See text Aug. 5, 1951, vol. I, source note.

41. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 22.

42. On Gomulka, see text Nov. 15, 1956, note 31.

43. See V. I. Lenin, “‘Left-Wing’ Communism—an Infantile Disorder,” in *Selected Works*, III, p. 358. See also text July 8, 1957(2), note 11.

44. See text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 18.

45. This is a common, but rather vulgar, aphorism of no clear origin. For Zhuge Liang, see text April 1957(2), note 47.

46. This is also known as the Moscow Declaration, or Moscow Manifesto, of 1957. It was the product of the Twelve-Nation Congress held in Moscow, November 14–16, 1957 (see text Nov. 2, 1957, source note), attended by the delegations of the CPC and the Communist or Workers' parties of Albania, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Viet Nam, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. The CPC later claimed that this manifesto represented the CPC's valiant effort at that time to organize other socialist and Communist parties in a United Front against “Khrushchevian revisionism” and to uphold the line of the October Revolution, setting the ground rules for their concerted effort to promote socialism. (See *RMSC* [1958], pp. 286–290. See also text Nov. 6, 1957, note 11.)

47. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 50; see also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 23.

48. See text Feb. 27, 1957(2), note 34.

49. See text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23; text Aug. 30, 1956, note 16, on Chen and Zhang; and text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 5 and source note, on Gao.

50. See text Oct. 13, 1957, note 58, and text Nov. 15, 1956, note 35. Here Mao does not, however, put the criticism in such an esoteric set of philosophical terminology; rather, he simply uses *yi chong xing* for “singularity” and *liang chong xing* for “duality.”

51. The compromise with the United States on Korea appears to refer to two things: first, the original agreement at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945 at the end of the Second World War in which the thirty-eighth parallel was designated as a demarcation between the two zones, controlled by the Soviet Union and the U.S. respectively, in which the surrender of Japanese forces would be accepted. The second reference is to the armistice at the end of the Korean War in July 1953. (See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 2.) The compromise on Viet Nam refers to the terms of the Geneva Agreement of July 1954 (see text July 23, 1954, vol. I, note 1).

52. This echoes Mao's argument that in war and peace, preparation should be made for both at once. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 64. This has implications also for the position

on the “peaceful competition” theory. See text Nov. 6, 1957, note 11.

53. The Chinese term for analysis, *fenxi*, connotes separation, or distinction. Therefore, when Mao speaks of things being capable of analysis, or says that “analysis” should be made of something, he generally means that certain aspects or sections of these things should be separated from one another and not lumped together indiscriminately.

54. This can easily be read as a paraphrase of the formula “unity-criticism-unity.” If so, the “discussions” that Mao prescribes here are in fact intended as criticism discussions. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.

55. See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note; see also text Nov. 17, 1957(1), note 1.

56. The word Mao uses here is *shou*, which literally means hands. However, it also connotes “method,” as in *shoufa*, or “means,” as in *shouduan*. Hence there are different ways of translating this term.

57. See text Oct. 13, 1957, note 57.

58. The phrase Mao uses here in his self-description is *bu shi shiwu* (literally, does not know how current things are developing). It refers to people who are ignorant or stubborn, and who cannot adapt to changing circumstances. The aphorism is derived from *Hou Han shu* (History of the Later Han Dynasty). Mao’s self-disparagement here is, of course, not entirely genuine.

59. See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version 2, paragraph 13.

60. The current congress doubled as a celebration for the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution (which in the Western calendar actually takes place in November). See text Nov. 2, 1957, source note.

61. This suggests, we believe, that in the beginning, the Twelve-Nation Congress and the Sixty-four Nation Congress (see text Nov. 2, 1957, source note) were to issue separate declarations. See also note 46.

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### Letter to the Editorial Department of *Pravda*

(November 20, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 21, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 13; *Zai Sulian yanlun*, p. 11; *URI* (1976), p. 443. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Nov. 21, 1957), 1; *FBIS, Daily Report* (Nov. 21, 1957), AAA 2, BB 32; *URI* (1976), p. 445.

The Editorial Department,  
*Pravda*

Dear Comrades:

We, the delegates of the People’s Republic of China, participating in the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the Great October Socialist Revolution, have received numerous letters and telegrams from Soviet citizens during our stay in your great country, and some of these were even accompanied by precious gifts. These letters, telegrams, and gifts, in their warm and exuberant manner, all conveyed the most

sincere fraternal friendship and the best wishes of the Soviet people toward the Chinese people, the delegation from the People’s Republic of China, its members, and myself. We take these feelings on the part of the Soviet people as a symbol of the great, unbreakable friendship of the Chinese and Soviet peoples. Because it is difficult for myself and my comrades to answer so many letters and telegrams individually, please allow us to express, through your paper, the sincere gratitude of 600 million Chinese people, of all the comrades of the delegation from the People’s Republic of China, and of myself to the Soviet people and to all the Soviet comrades who have sent us these letters, telegrams, and gifts.

Mao Zedong,  
November 20, 1957  
Moscow

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### Telegram to Soviet Leaders

(November 21, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 22, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 13; *Zai Sulian yanlun*, p. 12; *URI* (1976), p. 451. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Nov. 22, 1957), 21; *FBIS, Daily Report* (Nov. 21, 1957), AAA 4–5; *URI* (1976), p. 453.

Dear Comrades Khrushchev, Voroshilov, and Bulganin:

As we are about to leave the territory of the great Soviet Union, on behalf of all the comrades of the Chinese delegation, I express, once again, sincere thanks to you, and through you, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government, and the people of the Soviet Union. I thank you for inviting us to participate in the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the Great Socialist October Revolution and to visit your great country, for your very warm hospitality for us, and for the profound brotherly friendship expressed by you toward us and all the Chinese people.

Please allow me, on behalf of the Chinese delegation and all the Chinese people, and on my own behalf, to wish good health for the leading comrades of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government; may the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, achieve even more brilliant successes in their cause of defending world peace, and may the great friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples become forever consolidated and continue to develop uninterruptedly.

(Signed and dated in Irkutsk)

Telegram to Antonin Novotny  
(November 21, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 22, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 52; *URI* (1976), p. 447. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Nov. 22, 1957), 17; *URI* (1976), p. 449.

Dear Comrade Antonin Novotny:

I am happy to learn of your election as President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, and extend to you sincere congratulations in the name of the Chinese people and myself.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia headed by you has made outstanding contributions to the building of socialism, to consolidating the unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, and to the cause of defending world peace. The conferring of the highest position in the state on you by the Czechoslovakian people demonstrates the boundless confidence and love that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovakian people hold for you.

May you attain great successes in leading the socialist construction of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and in the great cause of safeguarding world peace. (Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

Telegram to Yemen  
(November 23, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 25, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 53; *URI* (1976), p. 455. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Nov. 25, 1957), 12; *URI* (1976), p. 457.

King Imam Ahmad Ibn Yahya Hamid Eddin of Yemen

Your Majesty:

On the occasion of the National Day of the Kingdom of Yemen, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I express sincere congratulations to Your Majesty and to the people of your country. (Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

Telegram to People's Republic of Albania  
(November 26, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 28, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 52; *URI* (1976), pp. 459-460. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Nov. 28, 1957), 17-18; *FBIS, Daily Report* (Nov. 29, 1957), AAA 4-5; *URI* (1976), pp. 461-462.

Comrade Haxhi Lleshi, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania,  
Comrade Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania,  
Comrade Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor:

On the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the independence of the Albanian people and the thirteenth anniversary of the liberation of Albania, on behalf of the Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China, we extend our sincere and warm congratulations to you and, through you, to our brothers the Albanian people and the government of the People's Republic of Albania.

Forty-five years ago, the heroic Albanian people waged an unswerving struggle for national liberation against the dark reign of Turkey, greatly inspiring oppressed peoples to be confident of victory in their own struggles for national liberation. Later, in the liberation struggle against Fascism, the spirit of heroism, staunchness, perseverance, and overcoming all difficulties displayed by the Albanian people under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor once more received the universal praise of the people of those countries who opposed Fascism.

In the last thirteen years, the Albanian people, under the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, have achieved tremendous successes in building socialism, raising the people's living standards, strengthening the solidarity of the countries within the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, and in the cause of maintaining world peace. The Chinese people rejoice in and are greatly inspired by these successes.

In recent years, the friendly and cooperative relations between the Chinese and Albanian peoples have attained a very great development. The exchange of mutual visits between [our two countries] by the delegation of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China headed by Comrade Peng Zhen and the delegation of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania headed by Comrade Rita Marko have further strengthened such friendly and cooperative relations.<sup>1</sup>

May our brothers the Albanian people attain even greater successes in the causes of building a happy life and safeguarding world peace and human progress. May

the fraternal friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and Albanian peoples become more consolidated and developed with each passing day.  
(Cosigned as Chairman of PRC and CC of CPC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. The delegation of the PRC headed by Peng Zhen visited Albania as part of an extended visit also covering the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The full tour lasted from November 15, 1956 to February 1, 1957. It arrived in Tirana, the capital of Albania, on January 11, 1957, and remained there until January 17. For details on this trip, see Peng Zhen's report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on March 31, 1957. (*RMSC* [1958], pp. 391–396.)

The Albanian delegation headed by Marko was in China from May 9 to June 1, 1957.

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### Telegram to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (November 27, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Nov. 29, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 122 (Dec. 25, 1957), 52–53; *URI* (1976), p. 463. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Nov. 29, 1957), 14; *FBIS, Daily Report* (Nov. 29, 1957), AAA 5–6; *URI* (1976), pp. 465–466.

Comrade Josip Broz Tito, President, and Chairman of the Federal Executive Council of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia,  
Comrade Petar Stambolic, President of the Federal People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia,  
Comrade Koca Popovic, State Secretary General for Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia:

On the occasion of the National Day of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, on behalf of the Chinese people and the government of the People's Republic of China, we extend our warm congratulations to you, and through you, to our brothers the Yugoslavian people.

The friendship between the Chinese and Yugoslavian peoples has been constantly growing in the past few years. This year, the visit made to Yugoslavia by the delegation of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China headed by Comrade Peng Zhen and the friendly visits to the People's Republic of China made respectively by Comrade Svetozar Vukmanovic, Vice-Chairman of

the Federal Executive Council, and by the delegation of the Federal People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia headed by Comrade Petar Stambolic have further consolidated and strengthened the fraternity and friendly cooperation between China and Yugoslavia.<sup>1</sup>

May the Yugoslavian people attain new successes in the cause of building socialism, strengthening the solidarity among socialist states, and safeguarding European and world peace.

(Cosigned as Chairman of PRC with Liu Shaoqi as Chairman of Standing Committee of NPC and Zhou Enlai as Premier of State Council and Foreign Minister, dated in Beijing)

#### Note

1. See text Nov. 26, 1957, note 1. The Chinese delegation arrived in Yugoslavia on January 17, 1957. Vukmanovic was in China on September 12, 1957. He was shortly joined by the delegation headed by Stambolic which arrived in Beijing on September 16, and left China by way of Guangzhou to Hong Kong on October 5.

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### Telegram to Sukarno (December 4, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Dec. 5, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 123 (Jan. 10, 1958), 92; *URI* (1976), p. 467. Available English Translations: *HNA, Daily News Release* (Dec. 5, 1957), 17; *URI* (1976), p. 469.

President Sukarno,  
The Republic of Indonesia

Your Excellency:

I have received news of the attack on November 30 on Your Excellency's life by bandits. I extend to Your Excellency sincere regards, and also express deep grief for those people who unfortunately lost their lives in this incident.

The Chinese people resolutely support Indonesia in the just struggle which it has undertaken to recover West Irian<sup>1</sup> and are confident that all plots to undermine the national interests of Indonesia will meet with failure.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

#### Note

1. See text Oct. 2, 1956, note 1.

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Telegram to the Republic of Finland  
(December 5, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Dec. 6, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 123 (Jan. 10, 1958), 92; *URI* (1976), p. 471. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Dec. 6, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 473.

President Urho Kekkonen,  
The Republic of Finland

Your Excellency:

On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Finland, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, I extend warm congratulations to the people of Finland and to Your Excellency. May the Republic of Finland prosper, and may its people be happy.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated in Beijing)

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Telegram to the African National Congress  
(December 12, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Dec. 14, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 123 (Jan. 10, 1958), 92; *URI* (1976), p. 475. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Dec. 14, 1957), 22; *URI* (1976), p. 477.

The Forty-fifth Annual Conference of the African National Congress,  
c/o Mr. O. R. Tambo,  
Secretary General,  
The African National Congress:

On the occasion of the convening of the Forty-fifth Annual Conference of the African National Congress, on behalf of the Chinese people, I express our sympathy and support for the struggle of the people of South Africa for fundamental human rights and against racial discrimination. Moreover I wish you continued successes in the cause of rallying the various peoples of South Africa to fight for peace and democracy.  
(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

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Letter to Sun Yan  
(December 17, 1957)

**Source:** *Shuxin*, p. 532.

*See text June 8, 1957(1).*

Comrade Peijun:<sup>1</sup>

I have received your letter. I agree with your view that you should not go to the countryside. Your mother is already sixty and is no longer capable of labor; naturally it would not be proper for her to be sent down.<sup>2</sup> You are yet young, and your mother needs to be taken care of, so it is all right for you not to go. Nonetheless, this matter should be decided by the Party. You may bring this letter, and together with your mother, go to the United Front Department of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and discuss the matter with the comrades who are in charge there. Ask them to make a decision. This letter of mine is merely a suggestion and does not constitute a decision.

Please give my regards to your mother!

Mao Zedong  
December 17, 1957

[P.S.] When you go to the United Front Department, you may bring up the history of your mother's taking care of Comrade Yang Kaihui,<sup>3</sup> so as to let the comrades there know better the truth of the circumstances.

**Notes**

1. See text Jan. 8, 1957(1), note 1.
  2. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 102.
  3. See text May 11, 1957(2), note 1.
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Telegram to the Congress for Afro-Asian Solidarity  
(December 26, 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (Dec. 27, 1957), 1. Other Chinese Texts: *XHBYK*, 125 (Feb. 10, 1958), 164; *URI* (1976), p. 479. Available English Translations: HNA, *Daily News Release* (Dec. 27, 1957), 1; *URI* (1976), p. 481.

*The Congress for Afro-Asian Solidarity began on December 26, 1957, in Cairo, Egypt. Anwar Sadat, head of the Egyptian delegation, was president of the Congress. It was attended by delegations from thirty-seven Asian and African countries.*

Members of the Congress for Afro-Asian Solidarity:

The convening of the Congress for Afro-Asian Solidarity will make a tremendous contribution to the great cause of enhancing the “spirit of the Bandung Conference,”<sup>1</sup> of promoting the solidarity of the Asian and African peoples, striving for and defending the independence of the Asian and African nations, and safeguarding peace in Asia, Africa, and throughout the world. I hereby extend my sincere congratulations to you.

(Signed as Chairman of PRC and dated)

#### Note

1. See text April 27, 1955, vol. I, source note and text.

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### Conversation with Security Guards (Winter 1957)

**Source:** *RMRB* (May 23, 1960), 3. Other Chinese Texts: *Mao jingwei*, p. 10.

*This conversation took place on an airplane during one of Mao's trips in the winter of 1957. It took place between Mao and Sun Lianzhong, a security guard accompanying Mao on this trip.*

Mao: Is it easy to study [physics and algebra]?

Sun: Physics is easy because it deals with things we do personally and things we can see; it is also easy to remember. Algebra, however, is difficult.

Mao: You must study algebra well! Many of the calculations in physics and chemistry have to be done with algebra. If you don't study algebra well, you won't do well in physics and chemistry either. Don't be afraid of difficulties!

Sun: We are not afraid of difficulties. We will certainly study well!

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### Directive on Journalism Work (1957)

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 221–223.

[Some say we have] no idea in our minds about how to run a newspaper,<sup>1</sup> [but] if this is so, [we will] have some idea when we have started, and have done it for a bit. [We] also had no idea at the beginning about how to fight a war, especially [the struggle to] Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,<sup>2</sup> but we got the idea after we had been fighting for a bit. Right now [we] are [dealing with] contradictions among the people, [which is] not class struggle (of course, there is class struggle mixed up within it).<sup>3</sup> The situation took shape suddenly, [so it] is inevitable that we would be without any idea [about it] in our minds. Before the situation and the problems emerged, [it] would be inevitable that [we would be] without any idea about them. Someone says that [they] have a low standard of Marxism-Leninism; this is a common feeling. [You] may study [Marxism-Leninism], but [you] must do so on a voluntary basis. There are some people who resent [having to] study [Marxism-Leninism]; [it is] like a conditioned reflex. Those who disagree say that [they] will be able to write essays after studying Marxism-Leninism.<sup>4</sup> They resent socialism, and they have an antagonistic mentality toward new things.

It is good that there are places where there are [many] intellectuals in one heap, but it is also bad. They can influence, and complement, one another. In [terms] of modes of thought, there are two deviations—dogmatism and opportunism—both of which are metaphysical. Chen Qitong and Zhong Dianfei are examples of such.<sup>5</sup> Right now, opportunism negates everything, and dogmatism, [on the other hand,] affirms everything. These two modes of thought consider many things in isolation; they are both one-sided. No matter which of these methods [you are talking about,] things are understood in isolation, and not in connection. It will be difficult, even impossible, always to avoid one-sidedness in modes of thought. [We may] say that [we will always] have a bit [of one-sidedness], more or less. [But we] have to strive gradually to overcome and abandon metaphysics. To accomplish this goal we will have to learn Marxism-Leninism; then our ideological outlook will undergo a great change.

What most of these articles that demand that the films are to be affirmed want is a reform [in the area] of films. Most of [the articles] conform to the facts, so the Department of Culture should accept them, otherwise it will be to affirm everything. [We have to] always affirm something that is right and criticize something that is wrong. XXX asks whether or not we can criticize [things that concern] the people's daily lives.<sup>6</sup> I think [we] can try it out [and see]. Some people ask, what can we do if the administration disagrees? You had better be prepared [for the disagreement] and consult with the department that is in charge, otherwise how can we deal with so many letters from the people? The newspapers need leadership, but the leader-

ship has to be correct. [It must] conform to the objective situation. Those who do not conform to the objective condition must be criticized. Marxism-Leninism handles things according to the [appropriate] conditions, and furthermore, it pays attention to objective effect. Why did the Chinese Revolution meet with success? It was because the Third International was dissolved; otherwise [the Chinese Revolution] could not achieve success.<sup>7</sup> Some leaders ruin things because they do not conform to the situation. It is only because Lenin refused to recognize the Second International that the October Revolution achieved success.<sup>8</sup> The Second International was revisionist, and the Third International was very good at the beginning, but it became dogmatist later. Among the leaders of [the Third International,] Stalin and Bukharin were not very good.<sup>9</sup> Dimitrov was a very good leader because, first, he opposed fascism and second, he emphasized internationalism.<sup>10</sup>

There have always been three groups in the international Communist movement: first, the real Marxist-Leninists; second, the revisionists; and third, the Third International—dogmatists. The intelligence bureau<sup>11</sup> did only one thing, and that was to cut off relations with Yugoslavia. It also criticized Japan and France, but that was useless. It is not that we do not want an international alliance, but what we want is the kind of alliance that we had at the beginning of the Third International. The main point [of this alliance] is that each nation should be independent and free, and not hinder or interfere with others.

The newspapers have to serve a certain class. Before classes are eliminated, [in the] capitalist countries, [newspapers] do not enjoy journalistic freedom. They are not being allowed to report any information about China. That is objective because a crisis is coming up. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to come out and spread an atmosphere of peace. The way the United States treats Chiang Kai-shek is different from the way we treated him before. The United States wants to bring out Hu Shi in order to pull down Chiang Kai-shek. When they are spreading an impression of peace talks, so will we, but [let's] not expose it. Chiang Kai-shek would have no standing [with his allies] if he did not oppose communism. We agree [that he should]; the more he opposes [communism], the better.<sup>12</sup>

[We should] prepare a flight of stairs before we criticize anyone, [so that we can] tell him to come down. There were no stairs in the "Three-Anti's [Campaign].<sup>13</sup> [When we were] engaged in [the] campaign we were just [too] ferocious. In the "Three-Anti's" [Campaign] we were left with 5 per cent [of the ferocity of a] tiger. Don't promote a campaign inside [the people or the Party]. Don't practice big democracy; [big democracy] will cause confusion. Big democracy is often not effective. We need to promote a small democracy, a small, small democracy.<sup>14</sup> Some people promote big democracy when they are dealing with others, but when it comes to dealing with themselves, they practice small, small, democracy. The most important thing is still [to have a] rectification.

This year we send out a notification, and next year [we will have the] rectification.<sup>15</sup> Let there be a constant drizzle.<sup>16</sup> There would not be anything to rectify if there were no dogmatism, bureaucratism, or sectarianism.<sup>17</sup> It is the same with those [guilty of] corruption. Once they spit out [what they have swallowed], it will not be considered as corruption. If, in a cooperative, someone [gained] 30 *rmb*

through corruption, but he then spit it out, then it would no longer count as corruption. Let's not have such a big rectification. Chen Boda<sup>18</sup> went to Fujian [Province], where he made a suggestion: that we should criticize those who have made mistakes, but then, after being criticized, they still could be elected [to official positions]. Right now many Party members strike a ferocious posture; this is because they don't have [political] capital, but they want to be officials, so all they can do is [strike a pose]. Right now we want the Party members to be more modest.

National newspapers are poorly run, but the non-Party newspapers are run well. This is because they have experience. Out of five million intellectuals, those who are [Communist] Party members make up only a small finger.<sup>19</sup> What can they do if they do not learn? It is the same in the areas of science and art. In the past all we did was engage in political struggle<sup>20</sup> now we are relying on this bit of [experience] to promote an administrative leadership. If we were to rely only on promoting administrative [leadership] like that, only two people would be enough throughout the country. One would be Li Fuchun, to do planning; and the other would be Li Xiannian, to take charge of feeding people, and that would be all.<sup>21</sup> All [of us] have to learn some skills. We must win over 80 per cent of the intellectuals, those in the middle [of the road], and we must enhance their ideological [standards]. They can do a lot of things; they can do even more than the Party members. Their ideological [standards] will be gradually enhanced. The *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 marked the beginning of Marxist ideology, not its completion. We have yet to make great efforts over the long run, and study well. Only 4 per cent of the works of Marx and Lenin have been translated into Chinese. Some people say it is 40 per cent. Many comrades have not read many books. The most important thing is to learn; do not waste your time. Some people play cards and watch plays after they have their meetings [but do nothing else]. [With regard to] Chen Qitong's article, instruction was issued in confusion. The *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily] was told to publish his article, and it did so because it was so soft. The form and method of Chen's article are totally wrong. Its guideline was to oppose [the policy of] letting a hundred schools of thought contend, and its method was rough and unreasonable. [The policy of] letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools of thought contend is mainly [intended] for application in the area of scholarship; it is very difficult to draw a boundary.<sup>22</sup> In the past, when we were engaged in class struggle, a certain writing style was nurtured. Such a style of writing, even in the past, was not good because it was very dry, and it did not use [the method of] reasoning.

[We] do not have experience in dealing with the contradictions among the people.<sup>23</sup> There are so many problems; the only thing to do is to discuss [the problems] with everyone. It is better to bring together those in the Party and those outside the Party from now on. There are many student strikes and worker strikes throughout the country, the largest of which involves a thousand people. We have a petty-bourgeois country, and [because of that,] turbulence is inevitable. Right now we have a feeling that there is much confusion in [the field of] ideology; [this fact] also reflects this big turbulence. Ideological confusion is to be expected when we are transforming [the system of ownership] from individual [ownership] to

collective [ownership], from private [ownership] to a system of basically public [ownership]. Furthermore, there is bureaucratism, which is a direct cause of the turbulence. [The problem with bureaucratism is that it] does not give reasons clearly [to the masses;] [we] have not become one with the masses<sup>24</sup> and have not shared weal and woe [with the masses].<sup>25</sup> The people in our country are very good; they obey discipline, and maintain order, and they are reasonable. [For example], during the Spring Festival,<sup>26</sup> when we told them that there was a shortage of nonstaple foodstuffs, they accepted it at once; once we asked them to increase [grain] production, they [increased production] by more than four billion catties.

## Notes

1. See text Nov. 15, 1956, versions 1 and 2, especially paragraph 10 in Version 1 and note 15 and surrounding text in Version 2.
2. See text Oct. 23, 1951, and text Sept. 12, 1953, both in vol. I.
3. See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version 2, note 33, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.
4. The Chinese text here appears somewhat convoluted.
5. On Chen Qitong, see text April 10, 1957, note 2. On Zhong Dianfei, see text April 1957(2), note 27.
6. We are unable to ascertain who XXX is.
7. See text April 1956, note 22. See also text July 20, 1957, note 4.
8. See text Aug. 24, 1956(1), note 3.
9. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin (1888–1938) joined the Bolshevik group of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party in 1906. In 1911 he emigrated to Germany. He met Lenin in 1912 and worked with him on the editorial committee of *Pravda*. From late 1912 onward, Bukharin followed an itinerant revolutionary career that would bring him to Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and eventually New York in 1916. In New York he was the editor of the Russian-language daily *Novy Mir* (New world). After the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, he returned to Moscow via Japan and Siberia and was elected to the Moscow Soviet and the Moscow committee of the Bolshevik Party. From December 1917 to 1929 he was editor of *Pravda*. In 1916 he became president of the Communist International, replacing Zinoviev. In 1928, however, he was accused of falsifying Marxism, removed from office, and expelled from the Party. He was readmitted in 1929, but once again expelled in 1937, accused, this time, of Trotskyism. He was tried at the last of the famous “purge” trials conducted at Stalin’s behest, found guilty of treason, and executed on March 13, 1938.
10. On Georgi Dimitrov, see text Sept. 30, 1950, vol. I, note 1.
11. See text July 20, 1957, note 5.
12. The Chinese text here is a bit garbled. It reads: *Women zancheng ta yue fan yue hao*, without any punctuation.
13. See text Nov. 1951–Mar. 1952, vol. I, source note and text. On the usage of “preparing a ladder for someone to come downstairs” as a metaphor of “letting someone down easily,” see text July 8, 1957(2), note 51, and text Oct. 13, 1957, note 7.
14. See text Mar. 18, 1957, last paragraph.
15. This refers, we believe, to the CPC directive on the rectification in 1957. See text June 9, 1957, note 1.
16. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29.
17. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 77.
18. See, in the next volume, text Jan. 11, 1958, note 32.
19. See text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 26.
20. Mao seems to be equating class struggle with political struggle here. See text Feb.

27, 1957, source note; text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note; and text Mar. 20, 1957, source note and note 7.

21. See text April 1956, note 3, and text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 19.

22. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

23. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

24. See text Mar. 18, 1957, note 59.

25. See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version 2, note 16.

26. See text July 17, 1957, note 33.

## On the Question of the Primary Contradiction in the Transitional Period

[1957]

**Source:** *Wansui* (n.d. 3), pp. 212–213.

*The source provides no date or occasion for this document, although it is placed in the 1957 section of Wansui (n.d. 3), or, more specifically, it is placed among other 1957 documents. From the information in the document itself, it is clear that this is most likely a speech (but an informal one, since there are interjections from people in the audience) or a conversation, and that the occasion must have been after July 1957, since the Qingdao Conference (see text July 1957[1]) is mentioned.*

Should we bring up the matter of the primary contradiction? Is it good to bring up this matter? (Kang Sheng:<sup>1</sup> [I have] talked with comrades XX and Qingshi [about this matter].)<sup>2</sup> People think that the primary contradiction in the transitional period is the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but they did bring up a bit of a question, and that is whether [the problem of the primary contradiction] will affect the rectification and reform, and, second, whether it would lead to a debate about the few statements regarding “the contradiction between the advanced social system and backward forces of production” that were made at the Eighth Congress.<sup>3</sup> Right now the primary [issue] is the struggle between the two lines, that is, the struggle between the two roads, the socialist road and the capitalist road. We have carried out two revolutions. The first one was an anti-imperialist, antifeudal democratic revolution, in which the bourgeoisie and the individual economy were not touched; the second one is a socialist revolution of a proletarian nature. There were two lines, that is, the road of democracy and the road of feudalism, in the first revolution. [Those two roads] are different from the two roads [we face] now. Right now this is a socialist revolution of a proletarian nature, and there is the contradiction between the two roads of capitalism and socialism. We should have no question about [the contradiction between the two lines of capitalism and socialism] in theory.

The socialist revolution has already been carried out for a while, since the general line was declared at the National Conference on Finance and the Economy



in 1953,<sup>4</sup> and in the winter [of 1953], the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee [of the CPC] wrote a propaganda outline for the general line. It's been only three and a half years since then to the upsurge of socialist transformation if we exclude this year, and only four and a half years if we include this year, but we have dealt the bourgeoisie a severe blow, and we have resolved the problem of the individual [economy] peasants. Such a situation was reflected at the Eighth Congress, where it was stated that we have already basically triumphed in socialist transformation, and that large-scale and mass-based class struggle has basically ended.<sup>5</sup> Can we say that [this statement] is not correct? The system of ownership has been resolved. The people are contentedly beating drums and gongs [to celebrate the change]!<sup>6</sup> The Eighth Congress pointed out that there are still some things not fully resolved in the economic system [such as the fact that] (the capitalists still take fixed-interests [payments])<sup>7</sup> and in politics (such as the ideological struggle), and we must continue to transform [things]. Some [people in] the democratic parties<sup>8</sup>—the Rightists, bourgeois intellectuals, and some well-to-do middle peasants—are discontented with the socialist transformation. It is not that [the distinctions] were not entirely clearly drawn at the Eighth Congress, or that the Eighth Congress slackened on their ideological transformation; [it is just that] they were submissive at that time, but now they want to rebel.

The article at Qingdao ("The Situation in the Summer of 1957") pointed this out clearly.<sup>9</sup> From now on, for strategic purposes, it is still better to adhere to the Qingdao formulation; it covers the questions that there is a struggle between the two roads both in the cities and in the countryside, and that class struggle has not died out, and so on. It is all right that those who attended the conference know about this issue. Don't turn heaven and earth upside down just because of the words "primary contradiction."<sup>10</sup>

Those cadres in a factory at Chongqing whom XXX spoke of could not stand up to the criticism of the workers and had to step down.<sup>11</sup> Now new workers have a bourgeois ideology, while our cadres have bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism.<sup>12</sup> These are all bourgeois ideologies and can be put on the bourgeoisie's account. These are all contradictions among the people.<sup>13</sup> The [people who cause] contradictions among the people include two types of people—one is the people who exploit people, and the other is the people who do not exploit people.<sup>14</sup> The overwhelmingly largest number is [made up of] those who are in the middle. Things would not be possible without the middle-of-the-roads, but [even among them] there is still a contradiction between the advanced and the backward.<sup>15</sup> Zhu Yuanzhang of the Ming dynasty, and Liu Zongyu of the [period of the] North and South dynasties were people of this sort.<sup>16</sup> The matters of political force and ideology have not been completely resolved yet. The three "isms" in the Party also belong to [the areas of] ideology.<sup>17</sup>

Big contending and big blooming is the best form of revolution. [To carry out] revolution we need to acquire experience. Let those who want to kick up a terrific row do it. We found this method [this year] after having gone through so many years of the revolution without finding it. This year, in cooperation with the Rightists, we invented this method: big contending and big blooming, and big-character posters.<sup>18</sup> The method of big contending and big blooming was proposed by them, and then we took it over. During the period in Yanan, there were [the issues of the] reporting with targets and

the light cavalry, so this method was not promoted.<sup>19</sup> [The policy of] letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is [intended] for the areas of art and scholarship.<sup>20</sup> As for the area of politics, there the Rightists proposed big contending and big blooming. We took that over, and that is very good.

It is, without question, correct [to say] that the primary contradiction in the transitional period is the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The second thing, however, is that the newspapers must not publicize the [matter of the] primary contradiction for a few months in order not to cause new confusion, or make trouble, that would [adversely] affect the rectification and reform. Newspapers must only publicize [the matter of] the struggle between two roads.

When we say "among the people" we mean several types of people—[there are] the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie. There are also several types of people in the Party. In fact, the contradictions among the people include class contradictions. When we speak of contradictions between ourselves and the enemy we are speaking of antagonistic class contradictions.<sup>21</sup> The bourgeois intellectuals are [part of] the people, but they have an antagonistic side. Right now, the primary contradiction is not the contradiction between [ourselves] and the landlords, but the contradiction among three parts of the people. Among, and within, these three parts of the people, there are some hidden antagonistic class contradictions, such as [with] Zhang Bojun and his like.<sup>22</sup> We have exposed them this year. We cannot finish peeling off [every layer] this year if we [simply] use the policy of peeling bamboo shoots.<sup>23</sup> The primary contradiction now is not with the landlords. Seven thousand people have been arrested in Hunan and there is no opposition from the people, but things might be different if Zhang Bojun were arrested. Today the contradiction between ourselves and the enemy is secondary. The main targets of the socialist revolution are the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intellectuals, and the petty bourgeoisie. The number of the bourgeoisie plus their family members is several tens of millions, and the number of the petty bourgeoisie is several hundred million. For these people, the primary issue is to be remolded. There is a large number of middle-of-the-roads among the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. With regard to these people, we cannot say that [the contradiction between them and us] is an antagonistic contradiction, as it is an antagonistic contradiction with someone like Zhang Bojun. Ninety per cent [of the contradictions] are contradictions among the people, [but] contradictions among the people include class contradictions. (XX: The contradictions between ourselves and the enemy include [contradictions with] landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and the Rightists.)<sup>24</sup> There are also some contradictions among the workers and the peasants; the contradictions among the workers and the peasants count as contradictions between the two roads.

How many Rightists are there? At most 150,000. [Since] there are not that many, we can't say that the primary contradiction [lies with them]. [I] estimate that even [within that figure] some can be [distinguished from the rest and] split off. [Such a split] will be good for us. It will be especially [good for us if] those who are of learning [are the ones to be split off from the Rightists]. The basic contradiction in the transitional period is the contradiction between the two roads, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The Eighth Congress spoke of the contradiction between the advanced social system and the backward forces of production. That was [in reference to] a matter of the forces of production, not to a matter of the relationship among human beings. The problem of the relations of production among human beings has already been [basically] resolved, but has not been completely resolved (see page 4 of the document of the Eighth Congress).<sup>25</sup> [As for the question that is] proposed—whether or not the socialist system is conducive to the development of the forces of production, our answer [to this question is that it] is generally conducive. Stalin thinks that [the socialist system] is completely conducive to [the development of the forces of production]; there are problems with that. In the future, a number of years from now, when the forces of production have been developed, there will [still] be some contradictions between the system of collective ownership and the development of the [forces of] production. Right now the relations of production are conducive [to the development of the forces of production]. How do we know they are conducive? [The basic fact is that] the cooperatives have [promoted the] development of production! When we compare our system with India, India increased steel production by three million tons in its first five-year plan,<sup>26</sup> and we increased ours by four million tons. Can you say our system is not good? Our relations of production are basically conducive to the development of the forces of production, but there are still some shortcomings. Several decades from now, when the forces of production have developed, the law of value will become useless, and there will be no need for currency.<sup>27</sup>

The statement (regarding the advanced social system and the backward forces of production) made at the Eighth Congress is harmless; it will not hinder us from rectification, production, opposing the Rightists, and improving our work. This statement is well-intentioned; its idea is to encourage us to develop production and enrich our material foundation. [This statement] does not talk about the contradiction among the people; it is [merely] to compare what we will be in the future with foreign countries. (Kang Sheng: When we wrote up that statement, we gave thought to whether we should write it or not at all. After thinking it over repeatedly, [we did write it up, and] we used a sentence from Lenin.) There is faulty wording in this sentence, but it is harmless. In reality it did not produce bad effects. We do not have to change it now, but in the future, at the proper moment, we shall discuss it a bit. We were going to change it at the time, but [the document] had already been released.

### Notes

1. Kang Sheng (1899–1975) was an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC at the time of this speech. A veteran member of the Communist Party who had joined the Communist Youth League as a secondary-school student in Shanghai in 1920 and the CPC as a full member in 1924, Kang had been involved primarily in intelligence and security work in the Party in the late 1920s and 1930s. He was trained in the Soviet Union from 1933 to 1937. He returned to China in 1937 and worked in the Organization Department, and later in the Social Affairs Department of the CPC in Yanan, the latter of which he headed until 1946. At the Seventh Congress of the CPC in Yanan in 1945, Kang was one of fifteen members of the Presidium of the congress. He was elected to the Central Committee of the CPC, as well as to membership in the General Secretariat and the Political Bureau. In 1949, he became a member of the Central People's Government Council, the highest executive arm of the Chinese government until 1954. At

the regional level, Kang represented Shandong Province and was a member first of the East China Military and Administrative Committee and, in 1952, the East China Administrative Committee. In view of all this, Kang's election as an alternate (but not full) member of the Political Bureau at the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956 appears to be a demotion of sorts. Kang eventually would return to prominence, however, as secretary of the General Secretariat of the CPC in 1962, and in 1966 as a member of the "Five-Men Group" of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Kang continued to play a major role in promoting Maoist policies during the Cultural Revolution period, especially after the purging of Peng Zhen. Kang died on December 16, 1975, in Beijing. For more biographical information, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 424–428, and *Zhonggong renmin lu*, appendix, pp. 86–87.

2. We cannot tell to whom XX refers here. Comrade Qingshi is Ke Qingshi. See text Dec. 26, 1953, vol. I, source note, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 13.

3. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 1, and text Oct. 7, 1957, notes 16 and 38.

4. See text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 1, and text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, note 8.

5. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note; text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note, and text Mar. 20, 1957, source note and note 7.

6. See text April 1957(2), note 59, and text Oct. 13, 1957, note 9.

7. See text July 9, 1953, vol. I, source note; text Nov. 17, 1955, vol. I, note 4; text Jan. 20, 1956, note 13; text Dec. 8, 1956; and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 39.

8. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.

9. See text July 1957(1).

10. Mao is referring here to the debate over what the primary contradiction is in the current stage of the socialist revolution. See text Oct. 7, 1957, notes 16 and 38.

11. We have not been able to ascertain who XXX is, or to identify the incident at the Chongqing factory.

12. See text Mar. 17, 1957(2), note 77.

13. See text Nov. 15, 1956, Version 2, note 33, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

14. The Chinese text here reads: *yi zhong shi boxue ren de renmin, yi zhong shi bu boxue ren de renmin*, which makes for the rather unusual translation here. Our conjecture is that the original probably should have read: *yi zhong shi boxue renmin de ren, yi zhong shi bu boxue renmin de ren*.

15. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 1.

16. Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398) was the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). He came from an extremely poor family and in his late teens was a Buddhist monk-acolyte for lack of an alternative livelihood. In 1352 he joined the rebel armies who had risen against the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty and he rose through the ranks, first of an army led by Guo Zixing, and subsequently of a larger force that fought in the name of Han Liner. For years he fought against rival rebel armies led by the redoubtable Chen Youliang and Zhang Shicheng, whom he was able to eliminate in 1363 and 1366. In the autumn of 1368, Zhu declared himself emperor, established the Ming dynasty, and routed the Yuan forces that fled north. Through another decade and a half of fighting thereafter, Zhu Yuanzhang was able to bring about the unification of China under the Ming regime. He ruled as Emperor Taizu from 1368 to 1398.

On the other historical figure mentioned here, we believe that a mistake has been made. Mao appears to be thinking of Liu Yu, not Liu Zongyu. Liu Yu (363–422) was the founder of the Song dynasty of the North and South dynasties period (not the Song dynasty of 960–1279). From a poor family, Liu entered military service and took part in a number of campaigns against rebel insurrectionary forces at the end of the Jin dynasty. In 420 he dethroned the Jin emperor and established his own dynasty, ruling as Emperor Wudi from 420 to 422. Our interpretation of Mao's somewhat ambiguous statement is that both Zhu Yuanzhang and Liu Yu, having come from the ranks of the common people, became emperors and rulers, and therefore can be categorized as "the people who exploit people," according to Mao's description earlier in this paragraph.

17. The reference is, we believe, to the three "isms," or three work styles in the CPC that

were targets of the rectification campaign in 1957, namely, bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism. See note 12.

18. See text Oct. 9, 1957(1), note 4.

19. The Chinese here is garbled. It reads: *Zai Yanan shi you shi de bao he qing qi dui*. We are not certain of the meaning of *you shi de bao*, or of *qing qi dui* (light cavalry). The “Yanan period” refers specifically, we believe, to the rectification campaign in Yanan. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, note 9, and text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 24.

20. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.

21. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 3.

22. See text July 1, 1957, note 3.

23. See text July 17, 1957, note 24.

24. These five “types” of people, abbreviated as *di, fu, fan, huai, you*, are collectively known as the “five bad elements.”

25. See text Aug. 30, 1956, note 1.

26. In 1950, India set up a planning commission headed by Prime Minister Nehru himself. The First Five-Year Plan was prepared in 1951, even before the first general election was held. It covered the period 1952–1956.

27. On the law of value, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 87, and text Oct. 7, 1957, notes 26 and 40.

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## Conversation with Security Guards

(1957)

**Source:** Quoted in Guo Zhang, “Zai Mao zhuxi shenbian gongzuo,” in *Zhongguo qingnian*, 3 (Feb. 1, 1959), 23.

*Guo Zhang was a security guard for Mao. This essay, written in recollection, contains many short and sometimes indirect quotations, among which only the one presented here is of interest and significance. This passage was spoken by Mao in 1957 (no further information on the date is provided in the source) in response to the request of the security guards for leaves to visit their families and relatives.*

*It is also reported in this essay that when the security guards returned from the country, they all wrote reports. Mao read their reports, underlined certain sentences in red pencil, and corrected the wrongly written words. When Mao found that the security guards were all offspring of workers and peasants and had had no schooling because of poverty, he said to them: “You are all good boys; pity is you don’t have much education.” Mao encouraged the security guards to study and suggested that he would hire some teachers to teach them.*

You are all from a peasant background and should not forget your class origin. When you return to your home villages, you must be modest toward others. You must honor your parents and hold the masses in respect. You must join the masses in doing productive [labor] and modestly learn from the masses. You mustn’t put on airs before the masses. . . . If I put on airs before you, you’ll be displeased. So if you put on airs before the masses, the masses will naturally also be displeased. Only when you maintain [an attitude of] modesty will the masses be willing to draw close to you.

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The initial line for each entry in this bibliography corresponds to the way in which the source has been cited in the volume. This is a presentation of the title of the source in full or, more often, an arbitrary abbreviation of the title, e.g.,

Buyi for Ding, Wang, ed. *Mao Zedong xuanji buyi* (Supplement to the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*);

and:

*RMRB* for *Renmin ribao*;

or

the name of the author followed by the date (year) of the publication of the material, e.g.,

J. Chen (1969) for Chen, Jerome, *Mao*.

Where a source is listed in section I, it is not repeated in section II, even if it also serves, in these volumes, as a reference source for our annotations.

When the notation (Red Guard publication) follows an entry in this bibliography, it means that the cited work is a publication of one of many Red Guard groups during the Cultural Revolution period. In some, but not all, of these cases, the source provides us with information concerning the original editor/compiler, publisher and/or publishing date of the item, and in such cases this information is presented in this bibliography. Where such information is not available, the notations “N.p.” or “N.d.” or both are used. These publications have been collected and published in *Red Guard Publications* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, Association of Research Libraries, 1982). This publication information will not be repeated for each of these entries in this bibliography. A valuable directory of these Red Guard publications is provided in Hong Yung Lee, *A Research Guide to Red Guard Publications, 1966–1969*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., forthcoming.

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