

From the
RUSSIAN
REVOLUTION
to **YALTA**



**A Review of
Soviet Foreign Policy
by PAT SLOAN**



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is the hallmark of a pamphlet dealing with the USSR issued by the RUSSIA TODAY SOCIETY, and written by an authority on the subject.

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by Pat Sloan

The picture on the front cover shows the arrival at a London station of the first Russian Army, Navy and Air Force Mission to visit this country—on July 8, 1941.

From left to right is Mr. Maisky, Major-General Golikov, behind Golikov is Rear-Admiral Kharmalov, on the right is Colonel Skliarov of the Soviet Air Force.

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YALTA

1. On the Eve of Victory

MOSCOW, Teheran, Crimea—the names of these historic conferences will go down to history as three of the biggest nails in the coffin of fascism.

At the Moscow Conference the Foreign Secretaries of the three greatest of the United Nations issued their joint declarations on the punishment of war criminals, on Austria, on Italy, and on other matters relating to the organisation of victory over fascism. At Teheran, D-Day was fixed. And at Yalta both the military and the political measures for the final blow at fascism were agreed upon.

We in Britain have a twenty-year alliance with Soviet Russia. So has France. Our foreign policy has been closely co-ordinated with that of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. since 1941. After Teheran, China was consulted. The decisions of Yalta gave a due place to the future position of France. The United Nations remain united in spite of all prophecies and wishes to the contrary; and other countries, like China and France, are more and more taking their places alongside the "Big Three" in the plans for present and future co-operation.

But a few voices can still be heard uttering the question: "After Germany is finished, will Russia have a go at us?" or, alternatively, "After Germany is defeated, do you think we'll have a go at Russia?" Such voices should have been silenced long ago, by Teheran and by D-Day. The decisions of Yalta should finally quell them. It is not in the interest of any of the United Nations that wars should continue when fascism has been finished.

Disagreements between the United Nations may still arise. Between Britain and the U.S.A., the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., and Britain and the U.S.S.R. But the story of Moscow-Teheran-Yalta makes it clear that, whatever differences there may be, agreement on the main issues continues and grows more concrete.

Deceived for 25 Years

IT must not be forgotten, however, that for nearly 25 years, from 1917 till Mr. Churchill's famous declaration of support for Russia on June 22, 1941, Russia was a special object of

hostility on the part of certain leading groups in this country. Today millions of people realise that, for a quarter of a century, they were deliberately deceived about Soviet Russia, her foreign and internal policy, her social and economic system, her strength, her attitude to democracy, and the power of her armies. And just because so many people now know they were deceived, millions of people today want to know the real facts about this present and future ally of ours, our ally in victory and in building the future peace.

From 1917 to 1939 the peace of Europe was permanently in jeopardy, through the absence of trust and co-operation between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. If these two countries had been as united before the war as they are today, it is not an exaggeration to say that the present war could have been prevented. Now that this unity has been achieved, its preservation in the post-war world can achieve what the past thirty years failed to achieve—a lasting peace.

Therefore it is very necessary that the British people should understand the foreign policy of their Soviet ally. Especially since there are certain groups, even today, who still try to mislead them concerning Russian policy.

And the first fact about Soviet Russia which must be fully understood is that the whole people of that country, from Marshal Stalin to the least skilled and least educated citizen, seriously want peace, and a peace that shall be permanent. And they want this permanent peace, not simply to recuperate from the vast and tragic losses of this war, with its inhuman suffering caused by a ruthless enemy; but because of certain basic reasons, connected with their way of life, and their forms of social, economic and political organisation.

There is one thing of which the people of Britain can be absolutely certain, without an atom of doubt: It is that our Soviet Allies will exert the whole of their post-war effort, the whole of that energy which has been so efficiently directed to the task of winning the war, to the organising of a peace which is permanent.

A Great Ally

THERE is no feature of the present situation more hopeful than the fact that Britain and the U.S.A. have as an Ally a country which covers one-sixth of the earth, in which every man, woman and child wants to co-operate with us in the post-war world to make peace permanent. And this Ally is the greatest military power in Europe.

On the basis of the twenty-year Anglo-Soviet Alliance, the decisions at Teheran and Yalta, and the projects for a World Security Organisation which are now being worked out by Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., China, France and other Allied nations, the history of the next 25 years can be very different indeed from the 25 years which preceded them.

2. Why the Russians Want Peace

THE bald statement that every Soviet citizen is interested in achieving permanent peace may seem at first sight a sweeping declaration, an exaggeration. But there are certain facts concerning the Soviet way of life which are the basis for such a statement, and which prove that it is no exaggeration.

The Soviet Union differs from other countries in certain vital respects: The land and industry of the country are all owned and controlled (according to a nation-wide Plan) in the public interest. The elected public authorities, locally and nationally, control these things on behalf of their electors, the people. All Soviet citizens live on earnings from work; nobody lives on rent, dividends or profits. All citizens may work for a living, but no citizen is allowed to employ another citizen for profit.

At first sight these facts have no connection with foreign policy. But on investigation we see that they have a profound effect.

The following are some of the ways in which the internal system of the Soviet Union affects foreign policy:

First, with regard to armaments, munitions, and all other kinds of military supplies. In the U.S.S.R., since the whole of the supplies of the Red Army are manufactured in publicly-owned enterprises, and not by concerns which are run for private profit, it follows that nobody makes profit out of war production, or out of production in preparation for war. There is not a single Soviet citizen today who can say: The war has given me a market for "my" factory's products, and has thus given me profits which I did not make in peace-time. Whereas, in contrast, wherever war production is carried on for profit, and wherever war gives a stimulus to profitable production, there must obviously be people who benefit from war as compared with peace. It is today a recognised fact of history that when the Disarmament Conference took place between the wars, the armament firms of all countries were extremely active in their work to ensure that no serious disarmament of the nations

should take place. The Soviet Union was the one country without private arms manufacturers, and it was the one State to propose complete and universal disarmament.

No "Interests Abroad"

SECONDLY, nobody in the Soviet Union has "interests abroad" in the form of investments in distant countries. Since Soviet citizens are not allowed to own shares in industry, there are none of those temptations to bring pressure to bear on the Government to interfere in this or that part of the world to defend investments there, or to defend markets there, or to defend a private firm's control of raw materials there. Nobody in the Soviet Union is allowed to indulge privately in foreign trade. Nobody makes a profit from exporting goods to other countries—so there is nobody competing for markets in other countries. And there are no vast privately-owned concerns, competing with similar concerns both at home and abroad, stretching out hands all over the world to grab supplies of this or that raw material before their competitors can get there.

Thirdly, consider it from the point of view of the ordinary working citizen. Since 1931, the third year of the First Five-Year Plan for the economic development of the country, there has been no unemployment. Therefore everyone has enjoyed a job in peace-time. Therefore no worker in the Soviet Union, man or woman, was forced into the unpleasant position in which war meant a job while peace meant unemployment. On the contrary, in the Soviet Union, the Five-Year Plans meant jobs for all in peace-time.

Fourthly, under the system of economic planning, a rising standard of life was being provided for everyone. Everyone who wanted work had a job, and as production was increased from year to year, the quantity of goods available steadily increased. Everyone had work, and everyone knew that next year life would be better than this year. Peace meant steadily increasing prosperity for everyone. War and even the preparation for war meant the opposite: If a Soviet factory was engaged in preparation for war, then it could not produce goods for raising the standard of life of the people. Therefore war and war-preparations are felt as a burden by every Soviet citizen without exception; war and war-preparations offer benefits to no Soviet citizen. Therefore, as has already been stated, it is no exaggeration to say that in the Soviet Union every citizen has everything to gain from lasting peace. No citizen of the Soviet Union can hope to be made better off by war than by peace.

Racial Equality

FIFTHLY and lastly: According to the law of the Soviet Union, as embodied in the Constitution, every form of racial and national discrimination is a crime. In the U.S.S.R. there are no "superior" and "inferior" races, no racial and national antagonisms, no oppression on the part of one nation by the people of another. Therefore yet another cause of war is removed, national antagonism, which must inevitably cause the governments of certain nations to try to force their will on the peoples of other nations.

In the Soviet Union, to sum up, there is nobody who profits from war or war preparations, from exporting to foreign markets or from importing from abroad, or from foreign investments; therefore war and war preparations, and the possible fruits of war (colonies, markets, etc.), offer no prospect of profit to any Soviet citizen, and there are no racial or national conflicts, since racial and national discrimination is regarded as a crime.

On the positive side we may say that every Soviet citizen, without a single exception, knows that peace means a steadily rising standard of life for all, based on the full employment of all able-bodied adults who wish to work, under the system of economic planning. Every Soviet citizen knows that war, and even preparation for war, means a sacrifice of those things which would otherwise play a part in raising the standard of life of the nation. Therefore every Soviet citizen finds peace preferable to war. Therefore Soviet policy has always been a policy aimed at preserving peace. And this is why the Soviet Union has always been ready to co-operate with all States ready to form alliances for the preservation of peace against would-be aggressors. This is why, in the future, the Soviet Union will be eager to build up such a combination of peace-loving States that war is made impossible.

Permanent Peace

IN the future the Soviet Union will work for permanent peace.

This is also the declared policy of the others of the United Nations. We see that the United Nations' policy of preserving peace coincides with the personal interests of every Soviet citizen. That is why we can be so certain that the Soviet people will stand firm by this policy.

3. Russia's Record

IN view of the many misrepresentations of Soviet policy which were current between the wars, it is worth while recalling Russia's record from 1917 to 1939 in its consistent attempts to

make peace permanent. True, from September 1939 onwards, when world war was already a fact, Soviet policy then had to be adapted to a new and perilous situation and was aimed mainly at securing the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. in face of the growing crisis. And from June 1941 Soviet policy has been one of winning victory in the shortest possible time. "Everything for the Front" has been Russia's slogan in this period. But when victory is won Soviet policy will again be directed to the same basic aim as before the war, fundamental to the Soviet system, namely the fight for lasting peace.

No attempt is made here to go into the details of Russia's peace policy from 1917 to 1939. But a short summary is essential, for post-war Soviet foreign policy will be a continuation of pre-war Soviet foreign policy in this respect: It will be a continuation of the fight for permanent peace. The fact that Britain and the U.S.A. are now allied with the U.S.S.R. for the post-war period as well as for the war raises hopes in our hearts which surpass anything we could have anticipated prior to 1941.

When the Soviet Government was set up in Russia in November 1917, its main slogan was "Peace, Bread and Land." Thus, "peace" was one of the main aims of the Russian Revolution.

Notwithstanding this, the Soviets were not allowed to pursue their own internal policy in freedom and their foreign policy of peace without having first to face armed intervention from well over a dozen States, from 1918 to 1922.

During this period the Soviets renounced the unequal treaties which had been forced by the previous Tsarist Russian Government on neighbouring States, especially in the Near and Far East. They published the secret treaties which had led to the war of 1914. They repeatedly offered peace to the armies of intervention on one condition, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Russian soil. And they recognised the right of all nations to self-determination.

Disarmament Proposals

FROM 1920 in Europe, and from 1922 in the Far East, Soviet soil was clear of foreign armies. Immediately the Soviet Union set to work to sign pacts of non-aggression with all neighbouring States which were prepared to sign such pacts. And in the international field, the Soviets came out as champions for Disarmament.

At the World Disarmament Conference they astounded the world by seriously proposing the complete abolition of all armaments. This was regarded as bluff by most of the world's

Press, but we have already seen how, because of the structure and organisation of the U.S.S.R., such a policy was in the interests of the Soviet people as a whole, if only other countries could be persuaded to adopt a similar policy. When all the other States rejected this proposal the Soviet delegates voted for the American proposal for a one-third reduction in all armaments for all countries, the originators of this proposition themselves voting against it!

With the new wave of aggression which began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Hitler's seizure of power in Germany in 1933, the Soviet Union became the leading champion of collective security against aggression. When two of the world's three most aggressive States left the League of Nations the Soviet Union decided to join, because, as Stalin put it:

"Notwithstanding the withdrawal of Germany and Japan from the League of Nations—or perhaps just because of this—the League may become something of a brake to retard the outbreak of military actions or to hinder them."

Prior to this the Soviets had not been favourably disposed to the League. This is natural enough when we recall the fact that the very States which founded the League were at the same time waging a war of intervention against the Soviet Republic.


From the moment of joining the League, the Soviet Government did everything humanly possible as a League member to curb the activities of the aggressors:

It was the first Government to apply sanctions against Italy during the Abyssinian war, and did this in spite of the fact that Italy had been one of the largest participants in Soviet foreign trade up to that time.

Aid to China and Spain

ON the question of China, the Soviet Government was the one great Power to support that country consistently in the League, and was supplying China with arms for years while Britain and the U.S.A. stood aloof.

Moreover, at the present time, while avoiding war with Japan for obvious reasons, the U.S.S.R. has achieved by peaceful means a steady curtailment of Japanese fishing rights in the Far East, and has abolished, two decades before the Agreement was due to terminate, Japanese mining concessions in the island of Sakhalin. In this way the U.S.S.R., while not going to war with Japan, has fully fulfilled her obligation not to aid any country fighting against China, Britain or the U.S.A.



Mr. Churchill welcomed in Moscow by General Siniyov. Behind them stand Marshal Shaposhnikov and M. Molotov.

When Austria was violated, the Soviet Government called for a European conference—which never took place—to discuss steps to prevent further aggression in Europe.

In the case of Spain, the Soviet Government first joined the Non-Intervention Committee, at the urgent request of the French Government; it made proposals to that committee to make non-intervention effective; but when its proposals were not acted upon, and intervention continued, the Soviet Union then adopted its own independent policy of support to the Spanish Republic as a democratic victim of Fascist aggression.

France and Czechoslovakia

IN 1935 Pacts of Mutual Assistance were signed by the U.S.S.R., France and Czechoslovakia. These pacts were open for other States to join. In fact, when the threat to Czechoslovakia came to a head, the Soviet Government called upon the French Government to hold joint Staff talks; made its position clear on the floor of the League of Nations; and even gave the Czechs to understand that if they took up arms even without British and French support, they could rely on the full support of the Soviet Union.

But the fate of Czechoslovakia was decided at Munich by Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier and Chamberlain. The U.S.S.R. was not invited.

In 1939 the Soviet Union made a last desperate attempt to achieve unity with Britain, France and Poland against any further acts of Nazi aggression. The "Peace Front" negotiations broke down, mainly because the Polish Government, encouraged by Mr. Chamberlain, refused to participate in such a pact under conditions in which the Red Army would have been allowed from the start of the conflict to move west to stem the German advance eastwards.

It was only on completely failing to obtain a peace front with Britain, France and Poland, that the U.S.S.R. signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, endeavouring to postpone war as long as possible for its own people. If Britain, France and Poland had accepted the Soviet proposals in 1939, we should have had our alliance with Russia two years before we did, and Hitler would never have got away with as much as he did.

4. Russia and the War

SOVIET foreign policy, from September, 1939, onwards, was naturally adapted to the situation created by the conditions of a world war. No longer was the main question the one of

"preserving peace." In a war which already is affecting the whole world, one cannot speak of preserving peace. One can, however, work to prevent the war from spreading. And every Soviet pronouncement on world affairs, from September, 1939, to June, 1941, was aimed at this one task—to prevent the spreading of the war.

Contrary to much wild condemnation of Russia's policy which appeared in the British press during this period, Russia was never the ally of Germany. When invited to join the Axis, Russia refused.

In the meantime, knowing that a world war would sooner or later be bound to involve the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government took a series of measures which, however, they may have appeared at the time, had the effect of strengthening the strategic position of the U.S.S.R. *vis à vis* Germany prior to Germany's aggression of June 22, 1941. With regard to Poland, the Baltic States and Finland, Soviet policy was one of safeguarding its frontiers against enemies; and of taking the initiative before the enemy was fully prepared. Today it is clear how vital such a policy was for the later defence of Leningrad, and to a lesser degree, of Moscow also. It should be noted that at the same time certain territories were reunited with the U.S.S.R., which, in the period 1918 to 1920, had been separated from the U.S.S.R.—not by virtue of the freely expressed wishes of their inhabitants—but by the armed intervention of German troops (Finland and the Baltic), Polish troops (Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia), and Rumanian troops (Bessarabia).

In all the territories saved from the nazis, elections were held by secret ballot which showed that the entry of the Red Army was regarded by the vast mass of the people as a very real act of liberation. Today, after three years of nazi occupation, the Red Army has even more warmly been welcomed as a liberator.

Why Did Hitler Attack?

WHY, on June 22, 1941, did Hitler decide to attack the Soviet Union? Clearly, not because he regarded Russia as an ally. On the contrary, Hitler told the world that the powerful Red Army and Red Air Force in the East had prevented his winning the war in the West. It is worth remembering that Hitler's own explanation is that the power of the Soviet Union was the main deterrent that prevented his launching the whole of his forces against Britain at that time. Britain stood alone—but the very existence of the Red Army, under a Government that refused to be Hitler's ally, was a great help to the British people even in 1940, when Russia was still officially a neutral.

Only for that reason does Hitler say that he decided to try to put Russia out of action. But his policy was a boomerang. It was the beginning of a course of events which was inevitably, sooner or later, to put Hitler's Germany out of action.

On June 22, 1941, the Nazis invaded Soviet territory. On June 22, 1941, Mr. Churchill declared that we would give every possible form of support to Russia in the fight against Nazi Germany.

Within less than a year a 20-year Alliance had been signed between Britain and the U.S.S.R., for the winning of the war and the peace.

This was followed by Stalingrad, Teheran, the fixing of D-Day, the invasion of Europe from the West, the clearing of the U.S.S.R. of German troops, the collapse of Hitler's satellites, and the Yalta Conference.

In the great land battles it was the Red Army which had the main task of "tearing the guts out" of the enemy armies. But all along, the Soviet Government insisted that only joint blows from East and West could lead to the final defeat of Nazi Germany. Mr. Churchill's speech of June 22, 1941; the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance; the Moscow Declarations; and the Teheran and Yalta Agreements—these are great political landmarks in United Nation's policy since Russia's entry into the war.

The alliance of Britain, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., in the fight for democracy against fascism, and for a lasting peace against the instigators of future aggression, is a firm foundation for hopes of a better world in the future.

5. The U.S.S.R. and Democracy

FROM 1917 onwards the Soviet people have passionately believed in democracy, that is, in Government of the People, by the People, for the People. And, in spite of what misguided observers have said about Russia being a dictatorship, nobody has more emphatically stressed the democratic nature of the Soviet system than its two greatest leaders, Lenin and Stalin.

In the first year of the Soviet State Lenin summed up his faith in workers' democracy in the following words: "Proletarian democracy, of which Soviet government is one of the forms, has given a development and expansion of democracy hitherto unprecedented in the world, precisely for the vast majority of the population, for the exploited and for the toilers. . . . Is there a single country in the world, even among the most democratic bourgeois countries, in which the average rank-and-file worker,

the average rank-and-file village labourer, or village semi-proletarian generally (*i.e.*, the representative of the oppressed masses, the overwhelming majority of the population), enjoys anything approaching such liberty of holding meetings in the best buildings, such liberty to use the best printing works and largest stocks of paper, to express his ideas and to protect his interests, such liberty to promote men and women of his own class to administer and to 'run' the State as in Soviet Russia?"

Again, in his speech introducing the new Constitution in 1936, Stalin added his voice to that of Lenin in expressing a firm faith in Soviet democracy. "Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, *i.e.*, democracy for all. . . . That is why I think that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world."

What Is Democracy?

ONE may agree, or one may not agree, with Lenin's and Stalin's emphasis on the idea that only a democracy based on the working population is a real democracy. But nobody can deny, and this is the essential point, that both Lenin and Stalin have expressed a firm faith in Democracy.

It has always been the Soviet view that a true democracy, representing the majority of the population—those who live by their work, must inevitably be bound up with an international policy of peace, based on the right of all nations to govern themselves in their own way. It has always been the Soviet view that fascism, a ruthless and terroristic dictatorship of a small minority, including those to whom war is highly profitable, is the direct antithesis of democracy, and must inevitably launch out, sooner or later, in wars of conquest. Therefore Soviet policy has always associated democracy with a peace policy, fascism with aggression, and has worked for the unity and alliance of the democratic forces in all countries in the cause of peace; and against the fascist, pro-war, and aggressive forces.

This is why, in the present war, emphasis has always been given by Moscow to the anti-fascist nature of the struggle; based on the firm conviction that fascism and aggression must inevitably go hand in hand.

This is why, since June 1941, the Soviet Union has stood so firm in its view that lasting peace depends on defeating fascism on a world scale, as the embodiment of the world's most aggressive and warlike forces.

And because, in the Soviet Union, those propertied interests which give rise to fascism do not exist; because the Soviet Government is completely free from people of fascist or semi-fascist sympathies; it has been most noticeable that, since June, 1941, the Soviet Government has pursued the most consistently anti-fascist policy of all the United Nations.

The Vice-President of the United States of America, writing in the *New York Times* in April, 1944, stated frankly: "Fascism in the post-war world will inevitably push steadily for Anglo-Saxon imperialism and eventually for war with Russia. Already American fascists are talking and writing about the conflict."

In its internal political system, Britain is not fundamentally unlike the U.S.A. In both Britain and the U.S.A., there are fascist and pro-fascist forces at work, however small, aiming at a conflict with the U.S.S.R. in the future. But in the Soviet Union there are no fascists or pro-fascists; therefore there is nobody in the U.S.S.R. working for war in the future, everyone is interested in peace in the future.

And today, in its policy towards Spain, Yugoslavia, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Soviet Union pursues a single consistent policy: Opposition to fascism in all its forms and manifestations.

If we appreciate this fact, what may at first sight have appeared puzzling (for example, Soviet-Polish differences) become clear.

In the case of Spain, in spite of British friendship for General Franco and the Prime Minister's personal criticism at one stage of critics of Franco, the Soviet Government has firmly stood by its policy of 1936, of friendship for the Spanish Democratic Republic, and of open opposition to the Franco fascist regime. The Soviet Press has consistently taken this view, and has expressed the wish that the other Allies would do likewise.

A Yugoslav Warning

WITH regard to Yugoslavia, it is worthy of note that already a year before Teheran the Soviet press warned the Allies that General Mihailovitch, War Minister of the Yugoslav Government abroad, was acting inside Yugoslavia in co-operation with the forces of the Axis against the real liberation movement of the country. For more than a year the British and American Governments continued to countenance the sending of supplies to Mihailovitch. Only after the Teheran meeting did they change their view, recognised the true role of Marshal Tito and the treachery of Mihailovitch, and finally the Yugoslav emigre government was itself reconstructed and denounced Mihailovitch.

Thus, in the case of Yugoslavia, Moscow proved a reliable guardian of the true democratic interests of the Allies, and showed us the way; while at Yalta final agreement was reached on the democratic future of Yugoslavia.

The Italian situation was very different in character from that of Yugoslavia. Here the British-American forces were the liberators, and were fighting on what had been enemy territory. Yet the whole tendency during the first period following the occupation of Sicily was for the British and American military authorities to be extremely lenient to the local fascist officials, even at times protecting them from the wrath of local democrats.

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries in November 1943 agreement was reached on future policy in liberated Italy. A Declaration was issued which stated:

"It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed fascism . . . All institutions and organisations created by the fascists shall be suppressed . . . All political prisoners of the fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty . . . Democratic organs of local government shall be created . . . It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government."

This Declaration was not only important with regard to Italy, but it formed a blueprint for the restitution of democracy throughout liberated Europe. The fact that Soviet influence was strong in procuring such a declaration is born out by the fact that afterwards, when it came to execution, it was the Soviet Government which showed marked impatience at the rate at which the democratisation of Italy was taking place.

Italian Moves

FINALLY, dissatisfied with the position, the U.S.S.R. independently exchanged representatives with the Italian Government. This led to an outcry in certain newspapers, which should have known better, to the effect that the Soviet Government was trying to bolster up the prestige of Marshal Badoglio and the Italian king. To such allegations the Soviet Government's newspaper, "Izvestia," replied: "Everybody knows that it is not the Soviet Union which is preventing the democratisation of the Badoglio Government. On the contrary, it is well known that the Soviet Union is ready to contribute by all means to a favourable solution of this question in the very near future, so that such a solution should not be postponed, for instance, until the taking of Rome."

Explaining the reason for the Soviet Government's exchange of representatives with the Badoglio Government, "Izvestia" wrote: "As is well known, the Soviet Government hitherto had no direct contact with the Italian Government, while our Allies have had such contact since the very beginning of the Armistice.

"Thus the Soviet Union had an unequal status as compared with Great Britain and the United States. Now this inequality is being eliminated to a certain extent."

The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

Following Moscow's exchange of representatives, and following a Soviet proposal to Britain and the U.S.A., the Badoglio Government was reorganised to include many more genuine enemies of fascism. On the liberation of Rome a new Government was formed, Badoglio was excluded, and for the first time every Minister in the Government was a man with a clear record of continuous opposition to fascism. Moscow's diplomatic influence had served to strengthen and encourage the anti-fascist and democratic forces in liberated Italy.

Supporting Democracy

THE example of Czechoslovakia throws light on an entirely different aspect of Soviet policy in support of democracy in Europe. Democracy means the government of all peoples *by themselves*. Therefore, before entering non-Soviet territory, the Soviet authorities have been scrupulously careful to make their position clear.

Prior to entering enemy territory in the case of Rumania, for example, they made it clear that they were not coming to impose by force a new social or political system on Rumania. It is clear, however, that the Rumanian people, disgusted with those who led them into their ill-chosen alliance with Hitler, are now themselves reorganising their Government in view of their new policy of co-operation with the Allies.

In the case of Czechoslovakia, it was Allied territory—not enemy territory—that was to be liberated. Therefore, long before the actual crossing of the Czechoslovak frontier, two Agreements were signed by the U.S.S.R. with the Government of Czechoslovakia. The first laid down that, as Czechoslovak territory was liberated, and came outside the actual zone of fighting, authority should immediately be handed over to the Czechoslovak organs of administration. The second laid down that any Czechoslovak money used by the Red Army should be in quantities agreed upon with the Czechoslovak Government; and that all such cash should be credited to the Czechoslovak Government when the final settlement of accounts took place.



The Signing of the British-Soviet Pact, July 12, 1941. From left to right: I. Maisky, M. Molotov, Anthony Eden, Winston Churchill, Clement Attlee.

The respect for the right of the Czechs to govern themselves which was shown by the Soviet Government was in sharp contrast to the first British and American approach to France; where troops were landed and French money printed without a previous agreement having been reached with what, in fact, was the most representative of all the emigré Governments, the French Provisional Government.

The restoration of democracy and the right of all nations to govern themselves, these are the basic principles of Soviet policy in Europe. And it is precisely because of this policy that the Soviet Government, in April 1943, fell foul of the Polish Government in London. The main dispute between the Soviet and Polish Governments was not a frontier dispute, it was a dispute concerning the genuineness of the democratic claims of the Polish Government in London.

When, in April 1943, Hitler published one of his major lies, concerning alleged Soviet murders of Polish officers at Katyn; the Polish press broadcast Hitler's allegations and appealed to the International Red Cross to carry out an investigation (under Nazi supervision!). They did these things without even asking the Soviet Government to express its views.

Note to Poles

IN his note to the Polish Government at that time Molotov stated: "The slanderous campaign hostile to the Soviet Union launched by the German fascists in connection with the murder of the Polish officers, which they themselves committed in the Smolensk area on territory occupied by German troops, was at once taken up by the Polish Government, and is being fanned in every way by the Polish official press . . .

"The fact that the hostile campaign against the Soviet Union commenced simultaneously in the German and Polish press, and was conducted along the same lines, leaves no doubt as to the existence of contact and accord between the enemy of the Allies—Hitler—and the Polish Government."

It is to be remembered that the Soviet Press also alleged that General Bor, the representative in Poland of the Polish Government in London, was in fact carrying on inside Poland an armed struggle against other forces of liberation, in exactly the same way as General Mihailovitch was doing in Yugoslavia. Did Molotov word his note too strongly? Well, facts emerged later in Britain which tended to confirm the Soviet view of the pro-fascist tendencies of the Polish Government in London.

On the one hand, revelations by Members of Parliament and the Press showed that Nazi Poles were actually having liberty

of political action within the ranks of the Polish Army in Britain. It was clear that the Polish Government, far from preventing, was permitting this.

And secondly, when the tragic Warsaw uprising was taking place, the Polish Commander-in-Chief, General Sosnkowski, issued an Order which stated that the Allies had betrayed Warsaw. The interesting point is that this was not merely anti-Soviet, but anti-Allied propaganda of the most blatant sort. And it coincided word for word with what Hitler's propagandists had been broadcasting to Poland. It was too much. General Sosnkowski had to leave Britain for cattle farming in Brazil.

The Soviet Government, desiring to hand over power to the Poles as soon as Polish soil was liberated by the Red Army, was faced with a different problem from that of Czechoslovakia. They refused on principle to negotiate with the Polish Government in London—regarding it as being under fascist domination, a view further confirmed by its loyalty to the fascist Constitution of 1935—and therefore signed an agreement with the Polish National Committee, which was based on the underground movement against the Nazis in Poland itself.

The Agreement signed with this committee corresponded in all its main details with the Agreement with Czechoslovakia. In both cases the Red Army was to hand over power to representatives of the people of liberated territory as soon as each area came out of the actual field of battle. The Polish Committee of Liberation pledged itself to operate the democratic Constitution of 1921, and launched out on a programme of internal reform, closely copied, a few days later, by a rather similar declaration of policy from the Polish emigré Government.

As to the differences between the Poles in London and the Committee of Liberation, especially over the question of the Constitution, the Soviet Government told the Poles themselves that they must settle these differences. At the same time, the Polish Prime Minister in London, after a personal visit to Moscow and an interview with Stalin, expressed publicly his conviction that Stalin really did desire to see a "free, independent and democratic Poland."

Since then the formation of the Provisional Polish Government on Polish soil, consisting of those who had led the struggle against the Nazis at home and who had denounced the record of the pre-war Polish Government and the 1935 fascist Constitution has settled the matter. It was jointly agreed at Yalta that this "Provisional Government . . . should . . . be organised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad," and that

such a broadened Government would receive full recognition by the British and American Governments. Thus an unpleasant controversy within the ranks of the United Nations has been brought to an end.

Bulgaria and Rumania

IN Bulgaria and Rumania, countries liberated entirely by the efforts of the Red Army, governments have been formed based on the democratic forces within the country. In Bulgaria, the new government has won strong approval from the U.S.S.R. for the businesslike way in which it has tried and shot its collaborationists, those who sold the country to Hitler.

At Yalta the "Big Three" reaffirmed a principle which the Soviet Union has proclaimed for years, prior to 1939 as well as since 1941. They declared that: "The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice." This is a policy which the U.S.S.R. wholeheartedly welcomes, since it has always regarded fascism as the enemy of all peoples, even at a time when both the British and American Governments took a rather different view. Therefore we can be certain that the Soviet Union will continue loyally to work with us in carrying through this agreed policy in the future.

6. The Problem of Germany

THE Soviet Union has always been the champion of the right of all nations to equality, and to self-determination. Shortly after the German invasion of Soviet territory, Stalin made it clear that there was no racial or national prejudice in the U.S.S.R.: "The foreign press sometimes carries such twaddle that the Soviet people hate the Germans just as Germans, that the Red Army exterminates German soldiers just as Germans out of hatred for everything German and that therefore the Red Army does not take German soldiers prisoner. . . . The Red Army is devoid of all sentiments of racial hatred. . . . The Red Army annihilates them, not because of their German origin, but because they want to enslave our Motherland."

True, in the years that followed this statement, the peoples of the Soviet Union learnt some nasty lessons about the Germans. The extent of German brutality on Soviet soil was such as to arouse the most ferocious hatred. And the large numbers of Germans involved, either as direct participants or as indirect accomplices of Hitler, became increasingly clear as the war went

on, while hardly a report was received from Germany of any serious opposition to Hitler. Without going into the reasons for this, the fact remains that the vast majority of the German people proved themselves to be at best the passive accomplices of the Fuehrer in his organised bestialities.

Therefore, referring to the Germans in his speech of November 6, 1944, Stalin put the matter thus:

"The reason Soviet men and women hate the German invaders," he said, "is not because they are people of a different nationality, but because they have brought immeasurable calamity and suffering on our people and on all freedom-loving peoples. It is an old saying of our people: 'The wolf is not beaten because he is grey, but because he ate the sheep.' . . . By their savage policy, the Hitler clique have set all the peoples of the world against Germany; and the so-called 'chosen German race' has become the object of universal hatred . . . The ideology of equality of all races and nations, which has taken firm root in our country, the ideology of friendship among the peoples has emerged completely victorious over the Hitlerite ideology of bestial nationalism and racial hatred."

The Soviet Union looks forward to a world in which all nations shall enjoy full self-government, and in which the fullest democracy and the fullest racial and national equality shall exist on a world scale. But this is not the immediate problem with regard to Germany when the war is won.

The present war is a war of liberation, it is a war for the right of the European nations to self-determination, it is a war to end wars in Europe. Who, in Europe, constitute the main obstacle to national self-determination and equality? Obviously, the German Nazis and all who support their policy, actively or passively.

The main immediate problem, when Hitler is defeated, is to guarantee the future freedom, security and peace of all those nations who, since 1933, were deprived of their freedom and security by Nazi Germany. That is the *first* essential task on defeating the Nazis. And in fulfilling such a task it is obvious that on any question where there is doubt or disagreement, where there is a conflict between German interests and the interests of those who have suffered Nazi German oppression, it will be essential to give preference to those who have suffered oppression, and not to the Germans, who acquiesced in that oppression or actively supported it. On frontier questions, for example, the U.S.S.R. will consider first the demands of those who, since 1939, have been victims of aggression rather than the wishes and desires of the Germans.

Academician Varga has put the whole point both simply and clearly in an article on reparations. Insisting that Germany must pay reparations, he points out that "undoubtedly it would be unjust, if the people whose armies had caused unparalleled devastation were to live better after the war than the peoples who were made their victims." Since Germany is the main industrial country in Europe, it is obvious that, without having to pay reparations, Germany could revive her industry and her economy far more rapidly than the countries devastated since 1933. Would such a solution be just to the countries devastated by Hitler? Obviously not. Therefore any post-war settlement must imply the payment of reparations by Germany.

Germans to Work

BUT this means, undoubtedly, that millions of German workers will, in fact, be working for the benefit of the peoples of other European countries. And why not? For years they have worked for the destruction of the welfare of the European people. It is only just that some restitution be made.

On the question of war crimes, Soviet legal experts have been equally explicit. Not only do they propose the trial and physical extermination of the leaders, and of those guilty of the more outrageous crimes; but the trial and punishment of all who, directly or indirectly, have acted as oppressors and exploiters of the Soviet and other European peoples: The torturers; the looters who have carried off public and private property from the U.S.S.R. to Germany; the soldiers who have stolen the fur coats of Soviet women to give to their wives, and the wives who are the receivers of these stolen goods; those who have carried off Soviet citizens for slave labour in Germany, and those who have employed and benefited from this slave labour. All, say the Soviet legal experts, shall be judged for their crimes.

Finally, Germany shall be occupied by the Allies. That this is essential in the interests of future peace is clear from the indications that already the Nazi Party is preparing to carry on an underground guerilla struggle even after military defeat. Experience in Italy has shown, too, that the occupation of a fascist country by democratic armies is in the best interests of the people of such a country, for it provides once again an opportunity for the democratic forces to organise themselves. We may be sure that it is to those who since 1933 have risked death and torture in concentration camps for their heroic struggle against Hitlerism that the Soviet people will look for the new leaders of Germany, and the anti-nazi re-education of Germany.

Ilya Ehrenburg, in one of his articles, referred to the Germans coming to Russia as bandits and robbers; while the Red Army

will go to Germany as judges. The difference between nazism and democracy is no less than the difference between robbers and judges. The Soviet attitude to Germany is that justice must be done. And this, after the experience of the past years, demands first and foremost that justice be done on behalf of those who have been the victims of Nazi Germany's reign of terror.

The Declaration on Germany issued from the Yalta Conference summed up the tasks ahead in an uncompromising demand for: The occupation of Germany, the complete destruction of nazism and German militarism, the disarming and disbanding of all German armed forces, the final and complete breaking up of the German General Staff, the removal or destruction of all German military equipment, the elimination or control of all industry in Germany that might be used for war purposes, the punishment of war criminals, the exacting of reparations for damage done, the wiping out of the Nazi Party, laws and organisations, and the removal of all nazi influences from all branches of German life. Such steps are entirely consistent with Soviet policy, which aims at the wiping out of fascism and a lasting peace. At the same time, however, the Declaration makes it clear that: "It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for the Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations."

Thus the complete and utter wiping out of nazism and militarism in Germany constitutes the one hope for a democratic resurgence of the German people as the equals of other democratic nations.

7. Pointers to the Future

THE declaration of Mr. Churchill on June 22, 1941, was a revolution in British foreign policy. For the first time since 1917 Britain and the U.S.S.R. were co-operating in their foreign policy. And so long as we are interested in achieving a lasting peace, we shall continue to enjoy the closest co-operation of the U.S.S.R., both in war and peace.

If we look back to the period prior to 1939, it is hard to believe that today we can be such firm allies with the U.S.S.R. If we recall for one moment the attitude which existed in this country towards Russia in the days of the Finnish war in 1939-40, it appears as if a miracle had occurred. And while the differences between Britain and the U.S.S.R. have been substantial since 1941: Over the question of Yugoslavia, over Italy, over the recognition of the Polish Provisional Government, or

on the question of the system of voting to be adopted at the new world security organisation, one thing stands out above all others: These differences have all sooner or later been solved.

In November, 1943, the Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries reached agreement on the question of Italy, Austria, the need for a world security organisation, and the punishment of war criminals. At Dumbarton Oaks the foundation of the world security organisation was carried a step further, there only being serious disagreement on the question of voting. At Yalta the difference of opinion on the question of voting was solved and the date was fixed for the calling of the Conference to draw up the Charter of the new organisation. At Yalta, also, a firm declaration was issued on the summoning to trial of all German war criminals, and on the utter and complete destruction both of all nazi organisations in Germany and of the German General Staff.

A Joint Pledge

IN the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, there is a joint pledge "to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organisation of security and economic prosperity in Europe" and "to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war." At Bretton Woods the International Monetary Conference laid the foundations for a new world bank, with a view to assisting devastated countries to obtain the necessary goods for their programmes of reconstruction, and to assist Britain and the U.S.A., whose share of devastation has been comparatively small, to contribute towards this reconstruction. At Yalta it was laid down that the three Governments would "carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples," and would "jointly assist the people in any Liberated State or former Axis Satellite State where, in their judgment, conditions require" it.

The Atlantic Charter, drawn up before the Soviet Union was taking part in the war, declared the aim of freeing the peoples of the world from fear and want. The U.S.S.R. later adhered to the principles of this Charter. At Yalta the whole policy of the "Big Three" towards the liberated countries of Europe is declared to be in full accord with the principles of the Charter.

And the need to wipe out fascism completely, on which the Soviet Union has always so strongly insisted, is affirmed in the "Big Three's" declaration at Yalta to support policies which "enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism."

"War to End Wars"

TRUE, while the general principles are agreed upon, and the organisation of a basis for lasting peace is further forward than ever before, there are still some differences of opinion between the United Nations.

The Soviet Union sticks firmly to its view that General Franco must go the way of all fascists.

The Soviet Union also continues to refuse to take part in international conferences which include representatives of fascist states, such as Spain, Portugal, Argentine and others. This was one of the reasons why it did not attend the conference organised by the International Labour Office, and it is the reason why it stayed away from the International Aviation Conference. The fact that it was not present at the latter conference meant that British-American commercial rivalries dominated the discussion, and no useful decisions were reached. Had the Soviet Union been represented, determined to develop aviation as a boon to the world's peoples and not concerned with the profits to be made out of airlines, it is possible that the British-American rivalries would have been reconciled through Russia's determination to get things done.

In the future, as in the past, there will be differences of view on various questions between Britain and the U.S.A., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and Britain and the U.S.S.R. But the Yalta Conference, by making regular meetings of the Foreign Secretaries a regular procedure in the future, ensures that such differences will be debated and decided at frequent intervals.

The strides which have been made since the abortive British-Soviet negotiations of 1939 cannot be overestimated. At that time, though Mr. Chamberlain flew three times to see Hitler, not a single Cabinet Minister went to Moscow to discuss the "Peace Front" although the foremost members of the Soviet Government, such as Molotov and Voroshilov, were the Russian negotiators. Today it is agreed that every three or four months the Foreign Secretaries of Britain, U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. will meet in rotation in Moscow, London or Washington. This is a sign of the times, it is proof that British-Soviet-American co-operation is a possibility in the post-war period as it has been during the war; and if this co-operation for peace takes place, then history will surely record that the Second World War was indeed the "War to end Wars."

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