

II. THE ORIGINS OF CAPITALIST RESTORATION AND THE RISE OF N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

It is important to realize that the transformation of the Soviet Union from a socialist country into a capitalist one did not come about spontaneously through gradual degeneration. The restoration of capitalism was the product of an acute class struggle passing through several different stages.

The first stage in the actual process of capitalist restoration was the period of inner Party struggle under the proletarian dictatorship, which ended with the death of Stalin in 1953. During these years the working class was firmly in power and proletarian policies were being followed in most areas. However, class struggle did continue and during this period a number of bourgeois elements came forward to engage in struggle with the proletariat.

From the beginning socialism in the Soviet Union developed under the most difficult conditions. The first country in history to begin building a workers' society, the USSR was in several respects ill-prepared for this colossal task. The Soviet workers inherited from the tsars, landlords and capitalists a backward economy which had taken few steps along the path of industrialization. This backwardness was further compounded by the havoc of World War I and three years of bloody Civil War and imperialist intervention. Though more concentrated in large-scale industry and the first working class to overthrow capitalism and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet workers were still few in number, being less than 10% of the total population. The peasantry, revolutionary in spirit, was also economically and culturally very backward. In addition, as we noted before, the Soviet Union was forced to develop socialism surrounded on all sides by enemies.

Faced with a harsh situation, the Soviet workers resolved to build up and industrialize the country on a socialist basis as rapidly as possible, even though they knew this would entail many sacrifices. But as we saw in our encounter with the renegade "expert", dedication and enthusiasm were not enough. Because under the old society workers were denied even the most basic education (most were illiterate in 1917), technical and managerial experts were essential to solve the problems at hand, and these people, of course, had to be recruited at first from the

ranks of the old exploiting classes. Many of these people were, like our renegade, openly hostile to the revolution, and, as we have noted, they formed one major component of the social basis for capitalist restoration.

It was necessary to win them over but at the same time keep them under strict political control. A two-edged policy was adopted, begun under Lenin and developed by Stalin.

On the one hand, bourgeois experts were "bribed" with high salaries and better living conditions when they had to be relied upon to assume positions of managerial and technical authority. This meant that representatives of the old society were given broad authority in performing day to day administrative and technical tasks. Bourgeois managers were even given the right to punish recalcitrant workers in the course of maintaining labor discipline. Thus, to a certain extent, the old exploiting classes were in a position to sabotage socialist construction from within, and to continue to lord it over the workers.

On the other hand, the managers and technicians were kept well separated from the levers of political authority. This meant primarily that the Communist Party remained a party of the working class. At all levels, from the central government down to the individual factory, the experts in charge were supervised by Party militants who could and did mobilize the workers to expose corruption and sabotage.

Even more importantly, the central planning apparatus and all other agencies of central political authority were firmly controlled by the Party, which set economic and political goals with the long-term interests of the masses at heart. Since responsibility for implementing the Plan was in the hands of bourgeois experts, the central planning authorities were careful to set production goals precisely and in great detail. Thus, while the workers had to accept the administrative and technical authority of the experts, the experts themselves were forced to submit to the collective will of the workers as expressed from above by the Plan and enforced from below by millions of Party members and militant workers.

This system represented a necessary compromise. It did not and could not result in a final

defeat for the bourgeoisie. As Stalin continually stressed, "The bourgeoisie was still far from being crushed." Its goal was still to attack and destroy the Communist Party both from without and from within.

From outside the Party, bourgeois experts and managers made several attempts to sabotage and wreck socialist construction. Among the most celebrated of these was the series of events known as the Shakhty Affair. This occurred in 1928 in the Shakhty district of the Donetz Coal Basin. The Shakhty saboteurs "deliberately mis-managed the mines in order to reduce the output of coal, spoiled machinery and ventilation apparatus, caused roof-falls and explosions, and set fire to pits, plants and power-stations."¹

Mindless of the workers' safety and working conditions, these wreckers deliberately ignored labor protection laws. After their exposure, Stalin summed up the affair as an indication of the "intensification of the class struggle." He noted that "bourgeois wrecking is undoubtedly an indication of the fact that the capitalist elements have by no means laid down their arms..."² He added that communists could not fully defeat such activity "unless we develop criticism and self-criticism to the utmost, unless we place the work of our organizations under the control of the masses."³

But such wreckers were in fact not the main danger at the time. Closely allied to them were the opposition factions which emerged in the Party, as Soviet communists engaged in debate and struggle over their future course. The bourgeois forces pinned their hopes on these factions and encouraged them in their efforts to divide and demoralize the Party.

The main question to be decided by the Party at this time was whether to go forward and build socialism in alliance with the peasantry or to stand still and be overcome by the spontaneous forces of capitalism. The Trotskyites argued that it was impossible to build socialism in a country where the majority of the population were peasants. They argued that the Soviet state must engage in "primitive socialist accumulation", with industrialization taking place at the expense of the peasantry. This "left" line was really, rightist in essence because it destroyed the alliance between the proletariat and the poor peasants which Lenin had declared to be the basis of proletarian power in the Soviet Union. In preaching "the idea that 'unresolvable conflicts' between the working class and the peasantry were inevitable", the Trotskyites really "pinned their hopes on the 'cultured leaseholders' in the countryside, in other words, on the kulaks."

The Bukharinites, on the other hand, expressed such hopes openly. Also lacking faith in the ability of the Soviet working class to build a socialist society, Bukharin, a leading Party member, advocated a policy of capitulation to the spontaneous development of rural capitalism. He opposed collectivization of agriculture and instead called upon a few kulaks to "Get Rich!"

The essence of Bukharin's theory was to deny the class struggle under socialism. He presumed that under the dictatorship of the proletariat, class struggle would gradually subside and that then the kulaks might peacefully "grow into socialism." As Stalin was quick to point out, however, this ignores the undeniable fact that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is the sharpest form of class struggle."⁴ Or, as Lenin explained:

*"The abolition of classes requires a long, difficult and stubborn class struggle, which after the overthrow of the power of capital, after the destruction of the bourgeois state, after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, does not disappear (as the vulgar representatives of the old Socialism and the old Social Democracy imagine), but merely changes its forms and in many respects becomes more fierce."*⁵

The Trotskyites, Bukharinites and other traitors and wreckers met with defeat. The masses of militant workers and Party cadres united overwhelmingly behind the proletarian line of Stalin and the Party's Central Committee. The purges of the 30s, despite weaknesses and excesses, marked an even greater victory for the proletarian line. By 1939 it had become crystal clear that all openly disruptive and factional activity could and would not be tolerated. (For more information on this important period, we recommend the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*, published in 1939 and also Stalin's writings of the 20s and 30s especially his "The Right Deviation in the CPSU(B)."

But the bourgeois forces were bound to re-emerge in new garb. The Party leadership knew that the policy of buying off bourgeois experts could only be a temporary solution. It was necessary to further revolutionize the relations of production. So the Soviet Union began to train its own experts and managers recruited from the ranks of the workers and peasants. By the mid-30s, a new technical and administrative stratum had emerged, a group with greater loyalty to the revolution. But these new managers, technicians, officers and intellectuals were trained by the very bourgeois experts they replaced, picking up not only their expertise, but often their world view as well. And even more importantly, as we noted before, these new experts continued to occupy a class position which was, in a strict sense, petty bourgeois.

Thus, despite the class origin of the new experts and the fact that most were sincerely working to build socialism, there was a tendency for them to become isolated from the masses. Many began to expect the privileges of their former teachers, and often they tended to approach their work in pretty much the same way, in an individual rather than a collective fashion. They sought guidance and criticism mainly from those above them and put technical considerations ahead of politics.

The emergence of this new group coincided with the renewed threat of imperialist attack in the middle and late 30s. This threat created a need for the broadest unity of all classes, meaning that the non-proletarian strata, including the managers and experts, had to be brought into a broad national patriotic front. To achieve this it was not enough just to declare such a front, but for the Party itself to cement this unity, concretely giving real day to day political leadership to all the patriotic classes.

Just as in China during the new democratic phase of the revolution, when many individuals from the non-proletarian strata entered the Chinese Communist Party, often carrying with them certain elements of their class prejudices, so, too, the CPSU had to further open membership to people from the non-proletarian groups in order to continue leading the struggle. As early as 1936, when recruitment was resumed after several years' suspension, and especially after 1938, when the danger of war increased, large numbers of technical specialists and other intellectuals were welcomed as comrades.*

Most of these new members were experts of working class origin, and the new policy was no doubt essential in building the kind of national unity needed to defeat the Nazi invasion. Nevertheless, the policy of keeping technical and political authority separate had been seriously compromised. Inevitably, the individualistic outlook and style of work of the non-proletarian recruits penetrated the Party. Communists who had always looked upon technicians, managers and other petty bourgeois types with suspicion now found themselves working side by side with them in a common cause. It is hardly surprising that some lost sight of where unity ended and struggle began.

In fact, during the war period a new breed of Party leader was created in some places—one who in a businesslike and "practical" style emphasized the development of technique and expertise, and who downplayed politics with a certain contempt for theoretical principles. Though this did not mark this group as a new bourgeois center, such a mood was certainly one sign of difficulty.

This new attitude also stemmed from a general complacency that developed among certain Party cadres. The Soviet communists certainly had much to be proud of, but after the war many began to feel they could now rest a bit on past laurels. Some believed they deserved some special consideration and praise as a reward for services rendered to the revolution. They began to grow away from the masses and to lose faith in the ability of the workers to remold society.

Stalin had, in fact, warned against this tendency as early as 1937. Knowing that placing politics in command is the fundamental principle of Marxism-Leninism, Stalin criticized the fact that some "Party comrades have been totally absorbed in economic work . . . and simply gave up paying attention to such things as the international position of the Soviet Union, capitalist encirclement, strengthening of the political work of the Party . . ." ⁸ At its 10th Party Congress in 1973, the Communist Party of China also warned against a similar situation arising in its Party committees, noting that such absorption in detail leads inevitably to revisionism. Stalin noted that successes also had their "seamy side." He warned that

"the condition of successes—success after success, achievement after achievement, the overfulfillment of plans after the overfulfillment of plans—gives rise to feelings of carelessness and self-satisfaction, creates an atmosphere of showy triumphs and mutual congratulations which kill the sense of proportion and dull political instinct, take the spring out of people and impel them to rest on their laurels." ⁹

This, unfortunately, described the state of many Party members and leaders in the post-WW 2 period.

At this time, the Party line was basically correct, but in its application there were frequently deviations from the proletarian stand and method. Policies were increasingly implemented from above without mobilizing the initiative of the people. In the factories, for example, the Party exercised less and less control over management. Some Party members argued that the Plan could resolve any problems arising in socialist construction. Yet as the economy developed, planning mechanisms were themselves becoming more and more bureaucratic. Administrative methods adopted by necessity had become a hindrance to effective economic development and a roadblock to the development of mass initiative.

The proletarian response to the problem of bureaucracy was to revitalize the Party and mobilize the workers, involving the masses themselves as much as possible in the planning process. But the answer of the managers and technicians who provided a social base for those high Party officials increasingly influenced by bourgeois ideology was altogether different. These forces demanded a more "self-regulating" and "rational" economy, an economy governed by the capitalist law of value and not by the collective will of the working people.

Nikolai Voznesensky, Chairman of the State Planning Commission and member of the Party Politbureau, was the most forthright and bold exponent of this view. ¹⁰ Although the Soviet economy was still to some degree governed by market demands and the law of value, much progress had been made in consciously organizing

*While no statistics were released for the Party as a whole, recruitment figures for two of the republics, published at the 18th Congress in 1939, show that new members from the "intelligentsia" and "office worker" categories formed 42.8-44.5% as compared with 1.7% per cent in 1929. Between 1939 and 1941, available figures indicate that approximately 70% of all recruits came from the technical and managerial strata. ⁷

production in the interest of the working class. Certain products such as consumer necessities and basic industrial machinery were sold at prices far below their cost of production. Other goods, such as vodka or luxury items, were sold way above their cost in order to finance such "subsidies." Voznesensky, however, believed that the planning machinery and strict political control necessary to implement such policies would inevitably be bureaucratic and wasteful. This was because he had no faith in the ability of the working class to take control of production and regulate it themselves.

Voznesensky argued for a policy of "value balances", where the distribution and production of goods would be determined in a more "natural" way. In his view, prices should reflect the costs of production so that the law of value might then freely regulate production. Were goods, including heavy machinery and other means of production, to be priced according to their cost, Voznesensky argued, central political-administrative control would no longer be so burdensome, thus supposedly eliminating the basis for bureaucracy. Enterprises could be guided from above by purely economic levers. This argument prefigured by a generation Kosygin's 1965 capitalist economic "reform." It also indicates that the new revisionists shared with previous renegades the idea that the dictatorship of the proletariat can be divorced from the conscious class struggle and that socialism can gradually grow into communism by the action of spontaneous forces.

Voznesensky believed that socialism represents only the most rational and orderly organization of the economy through planning. He did not believe that planning had to be in the interests of the workers and politically controlled by them. When a rival economist put forward the view that post-war capitalism might stabilize itself by employing some planning techniques, Voznesensky criticized him for implying that capitalism could peacefully transform itself into socialism, completely ignoring the fact that planning by itself is not what differentiates the two systems. Moreover, by taking this seemingly "left" position, Voznesensky tried to establish his own reputation for "orthodoxy" so that some of his revisionist propositions pertaining to the Soviet economy might be more readily accepted.¹¹

Between 1947 and 1949, Voznesensky managed to put some of his notions into practice. His first move was a financial-reform which included a sharp rise in the retail price of many consumer necessities. This was followed by a reorganization of the central planning agencies which returned most quantitative planning (according to actual needs) to the local level, with the central *Gosplan* retaining only the ability to set quotas in monetary value terms. Then in 1949, Voznesensky proposed that production of producer goods (heavy machinery, etc.) be based upon sale at their price of production (in other words, at their "value").¹²

In response to this, Stalin argued that such a move would cripple Soviet economic development. Under capitalism the means of production are themselves commodities to be bought and sold by the capitalists. This means that their price is regulated by the law of value. As a result, only those producer goods which are profitable to produce can be sold. Under socialism, however, where the operation of the law of value is restricted, producer goods can be priced below their value and produced "unprofitably" but to the long-term benefit of the economy. As Stalin pointed out several years later, if the kind of line advocated by Voznesensky were correct,

"It would be incomprehensible why a number of our heavy industry plants which are still unprofitable and where the labor of the worker does not yield the 'proper returns', are not closed down, and why new light industry plants, which would certainly be profitable and where the labor of the workers might yield 'big returns', are not opened.

"If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why workers are not transferred from plants that are less profitable, but very necessary to our national economy, to plants which are more profitable—in accordance with the law of value, which supposedly regulates the 'proportions' of labor distributed among the branches of production."¹³

Not only would Voznesensky's proposal have crippled economic development, it would also have been a giant step in the direction of capitalist restoration. With the means of production priced at their "value", conscious regulation and planning would be increasingly difficult if not impossible. The means of production would then confront the workers as something alien to be bought and sold according to the needs of the capital market. In other words, the means of production would once again take on the character of capital.

Later that same year, Voznesensky's proposed Five Year Plan provided for further measures restoring autonomy to the individual enterprises and weakening the central planning apparatus. At this time, Stalin is reported to have said to Voznesensky: "You are seeking to restore capitalism in Russia."¹⁴

Voznesensky's ideas were not proposed in isolation. He spoke for a substantial segment of the economists, planners and managerial personnel. One of his most devoted followers was Minister of Finance, Alexei Kosygin, today Premier of the Soviet Union! In fact, it might even be said that the revisionist clique which took over the country in 1956 came from two sources: Khrushchev's Ukrainian political ap-

¹¹Voznesensky was soon dismissed from all his posts, arrested and executed. Though we don't mourn his death as do the social-imperialist leaders today, we recognize that a far more effective way of handling him would have been to publicly expose the class nature of his *line* while at the same time initiating mass criticism and struggle against it.

paratus (represented today chiefly by Brezhnev, who was Khrushchev's underling in the Dnieper valley) and Voznesensky's followers in the planning and managerial realm. Today, the Leningrad Institute for Finance and Economics has been renamed in honor of Voznesensky.

Stalin's dismissal of Voznesensky was also not an isolated incident. The Soviet communists were not unaware that bourgeois tendencies had come forward again during the war years. They knew that when the working class is on the defensive and in alliance with bourgeois forces, there is a tendency for communists to make "right" errors, just as in times of intense upsurge "left", adventurist, tendencies may take root. Led by Stalin, they launched a series of what might be termed "rectification movements" to restore the ideological and political fiber of the Party.

The war with Germany had left the ranks of the Communist Party severely weakened. Over three and a half million of the most dedicated and self-sacrificing Party members gave their lives in the fight against fascism, and by January 1946, only one-third of the Party's full and candidate members had been in the CPSU before the invasion.¹⁴ The majority of the new recruits represented the most dedicated and selfless fighters against Nazism—it took courage to join the Party in those days, for the Germans took special pains to single out captured communists for especially brutal treatment. But sheer enthusiasm could not make up for real deficiencies in Marxist-Leninist education.

Thus, toward the end of the war it was decided to severely limit further recruitment, and emphasis was placed on the education and political consolidation of existing membership. This was formalized by an important Central Committee decision in July 1946. According to Malenkov, this decision "to sift admissions to the ranks more carefully, to be more exacting regarding the qualifications of applicants", was taken to counteract the discrepancy "between the numerical strength of the Party and the level of political enlightenment of its members and candidates."¹⁶

The new recruitment policy was coupled with renewed "purgings" of Party members in the state and administrative apparatus, as well as by increased emphasis on ideological development. The famous "Zhdanovshchina"—a policy of strictly enforcing proletarian standards in literature and art, associated mainly with the Leningrad Party leader—Andrei Zhdanov—represented one aspect of this policy.

Another less celebrated campaign centered around improvement in the teaching of Marxist-Leninist political economy. This effort began as early as 1943, after the appearance of an important unsigned article on the subject in the theoretical journal, *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* (*Under the Banner of Marxism*).¹⁷ Such efforts continued throughout the post-war period right up to Stalin's death in 1953. During this period, the Communist Party and Stalin were searching for

the correct form through which the struggle against revisionism could be most effectively waged.

One other campaign of this period which should be mentioned was against "cosmopolitanism." This was directed toward combating the many bourgeois influences which had entered the Party and Soviet society from the West during the war. While generally aimed at remolding cadres and intellectuals, the campaign also exhibited an unfortunate anti-Semitic tendency. We do not know the source of this and other errors associated with the campaign. As we have seen, this was a period of very complex struggle conditioned by many factors which are even today only partly understood. Whether the campaign against "cosmopolitanism" played a productive role or not we cannot say. Nevertheless, it did represent an effort by the Party—perhaps distorted and sabotaged by opportunists at many levels—to fight against the influence of bourgeois ideology.

Stalin's most important move was to respond directly to the errors of the new revisionists. In 1952 his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, was published, devoted to a detailed refutation of revisionism, specifically of thinking similar to Voznesensky's. This book represents a thorough summing up of the Soviet experience on the economic front, and was at once a powerful weapon in the struggle at hand and a valuable theoretical contribution to future generations.

Today, the concrete experiences of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union and the development of class struggle under socialism, especially in China, have enabled Marxist-Leninists led by the Chinese and Albanian comrades to further develop and enrich the analysis laid out in Stalin's work. The main point that classes and class struggle continue throughout the whole period of socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat—which is only implied in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, has now been more thoroughly summed up and can be recognized as the key to a true understanding of the dynamics of socialist society.

Economic Problems consisted of several comments made by Stalin on the draft of a new political economy textbook which had been mandated by the Central Committee late in the war as part of the general campaign to heighten political consciousness. In his comments, Stalin argued that the law of value continues to operate under socialism but that its scope of application is limited. He held that although a planned economy had to take the law of value and the continued existence of commodity production into account, "the law of value cannot under our system function as the regulator of production."¹⁸ Socialism, instead, should move toward the complete elimination of commodity production and the establishment of products exchange based solely on human needs and not monetary exchange.

Although this presupposed a much more complete development of the productive forces, such development was not the only factor involved. Stalin emphasized that socialism must strive for "the maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of the entire population" and not just "the rational organization of the productive forces."¹⁹ The productive forces can only be developed with the continuous development, in a revolutionary direction, of the relations of production. By this Stalin meant that in the Soviet Union, it was necessary to progressively transform those sections of the economy still marked by remnants of capitalist forms. It was necessary to draw the collective farms ever closer to the state with the goal of changing these into state property, to begin eliminating the differences between town and country and to begin, particularly with producer goods, the direct exchange of products independent of the money economy. It was also necessary to continue to move in the direction of eliminating the distinction between mental and manual labor.

Economic Problems of Socialism was published shortly before the 19th Party Congress in 1952, and was used in a very extensive mass education campaign. This was the ideological basis for the political struggle being planned. Stalin had become convinced that the bourgeois elements, despite all the moves toward ideological rectification, were in positions of authority at all levels. Some were relatively open and easy to deal with like Voznesensky. But others were more clever, seeming to waver on various issues. These were political operators of consummate skill—people like Khrushchev. The difficulty Stalin confronted in flushing out these elements can be seen in an anecdote related by K.P.S. Menon, Indian Ambassador at the time, who visited Stalin on February 17, 1953, shortly before Stalin's death. During their conversation, Menon reported, Stalin began to doodle on a piece of paper, as was his habit. Menon noticed that Stalin repeatedly made drawings of wolves. Then he began to talk about wolves. Russian peasants, he said, knew how to deal with wolves. They had to be exterminated. But the wolves know this, said Stalin, and take steps to avoid extermination.²⁰

To unmask the real wolves, it was necessary to mobilize the masses in a great campaign of criticism and struggle. This, however, was not done. Right before his death, Stalin was planning a new "purge" campaign directed against the bourgeois elements. The wide circulation and use of *Economic Problems* seems to indicate that this movement would have had a mass character to some degree. Nevertheless, no movement did emerge, and during the entire post-war period the struggle basically remained within the upper reaches of the Party leadership. When Stalin died in March 1953, the wolves were still loose.

We want to pause here and assess Stalin's role in this whole struggle. Many people, including many honest anti-imperialists seriously studying

and attempting to master Marxism-Leninism, believe that Stalin should himself bear much of the blame for the revisionist takeover. After all, they argue, Stalin couldn't have been doing such a good job if only three years after his death many of his own associates went rotten and the whole country was handed over to revisionism. While agreeing that the Soviet Union has taken the capitalist road, and acknowledging that the events of 1956-1957 do mark a major turning point in that process, such people still emphasize what they see to be continuities between the Stalin era and the new period of patently bourgeois rule.

Let us make it clear. We believe that the Stalin question and the question of Soviet revisionism and social-imperialism are two *different* questions, both of which are important to the world communist movement. We recognize that the two are inter-related and that a clear understanding of Soviet revisionism, particularly with respect to its origins and rise to power, also demands some understanding of the Stalin question. But we do *not* believe that this inter-relationship is a strictly determinate one: the Stalin era did not *cause* the revisionist takeover. Soviet social-imperialism grew from the soil of the Stalin era, from the particular contradictions and struggles that exist under the dictatorship of the proletariat and assume the forms we have discussed during the period of socialist construction under Stalin's leadership. But many more things also took root in this soil, some good, others not so. To understand where the healthy flowers of workers' power, industrialization, economic planning, collective agriculture, lost out to the weeds of revisionism and capitalism is the very difficult task at hand.

In *Red Papers I* we wrote:

*"Stalin is the bridge between Lenin and Mao theoretically, practically, and organizationally. The successes of the world proletarian and people's movements are a part of our history, and they are our successes, they are the successes of our class. The mistakes and errors must also be ours. We admit the mistakes of our class and its leaders, try to correct them or, failing that, try to avoid repeating them. But we will not disassociate ourselves from these errors in the opportunist manner of many bourgeois intellectuals and armchair revolutionaries."*²¹

We still hold to this position.

Stalin did make a number of mistakes. No leader of any class, any nation, any movement can claim to not have also done so. Many of these mistakes were products of historical conditions more powerful than any one man; products of the whole backwardness of Soviet society, of the brutal and menacing imperialist encirclement, and of the savage Nazi invasion. These factors forced upon all Soviet communists, and not just Stalin, a brutal choice: move forward in ways for which the future will exact a heavy price or fail

to move forward at all. To their great credit, the Soviet communists, workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals, and, at their head, Stalin, never hesitated, never wavered in their choice.

Other mistakes were clearly avoidable and stand in part as Stalin's personal responsibility. The principal error from which all others stemmed was Stalin's theoretical failure to recognize how class struggle continues under socialism. In 1939, during his report to the 18th Congress of the CPSU(B), Stalin made the following statement:

*"The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today from any capitalist society is that it no longer contains antagonistic, hostile classes . . . Soviet society, liberated from the yoke of exploitation, knows no such contradictions, is free of class conflicts, and presents a picture of friendly collaboration between workers, peasants and intellectuals."*²²

This was a serious error.

Yet Stalin continued throughout this period to argue against "the rotten theory that with every advance we make the class struggle here of necessity would die down more and more, and that in proportion as we achieve success the class enemy would become more and more tractable."²³ In opposition to his theory, Stalin argued that the nearer to communism the workers came, the more desperate would their enemies be and resistance would in fact become sharper. But Stalin did not clearly identify this resistance as part of a class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Instead he singled out "remnants of the broken classes"²⁴ as the source of resistance. By themselves such remnants could only make feeble attempts to sabotage and wreck socialist construction, as in the Shakhty case. But "while one end of the class struggle has its operation within the bounds of the USSR, its other stretches to the bounds of the bourgeois states surrounding us. The remnants of the broken classes cannot but be aware of this."²⁵

Thus, Stalin pointed also to the continuation of capitalist encirclement as another source of resistance, singling out foreign agents, spies and individual traitors as the key enemy. Such forces did exist and, aided by ex-landlords and capitalists, they did do considerable damage. But these were not the main enemy and their identification as such tended to disarm the vigilance of the workers and led many to leave responsibility for the struggle with the security organs, allegedly better equipped for such forms of combat.

Though Stalin never in fact abandoned the class struggle, his lack of clarity on the precise nature of the enemy weakened the proletariat. Further, though Stalin argued forcefully (and correctly) that the law of value continues to operate under socialism, he did not draw the correct conclusion from this—that capitalist production rela-

tions must then also exist in some (often) hidden forms. And from this, that an actual capitalist class complete with political agents *inside* the Communist Party must also exist.

Linked to this was Stalin's tendency to place too much weight on development of the productive forces and not enough emphasis on revolutionizing the relations of production. Although Stalin led the struggle against the opportunist policies of revisionists like Voznesensky, he still tended to believe that the transformation of Soviet society would mainly occur through the rapid development of production.

In his classic work, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, Stalin put forward the erroneous thesis that in the Soviet Union, "the relations of production fully correspond to the state of the productive forces."²⁶ This tended toward the abandonment of conscious revolution and encouraged the masses to view the simple development of production as the answer to all difficulties. The same line was put forward by Stalin in *Economic Problems of Socialism*, but here he also cautioned that "it would be wrong to rest easy at that and to think that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and the relations of production." This statement would seem to indicate that Stalin did understand the problem but that he failed to fully grasp the key role of class struggle here. Thus, in 1938 Stalin even argued that "the productive forces are not only the most mobile and revolutionary element in production, but are also the determining element of production."²⁷ While it is true that society cannot advance beyond the limits set by the development of the forces of production, this development does not by itself drag the relations of production forward. Class struggle and conscious revolution are necessary and fundamental. While Stalin recognized that this was the case in all previous societies, he did not fully grasp the extent to which this was true under socialism as well.

Because of these errors Stalin failed, almost from the beginning, to develop the means and forms for the workers themselves to be increasingly involved in initiating and working out the planning process and not just fulfilling its tasks. As we have already pointed out, the Soviet communists were somewhat lax in struggling to overcome the division of labor inherited from capitalism. To a very great extent this was pressed upon the Party by objective conditions. Forced to make concessions to the managers and technicians for political reasons, the workers were not so readily in a position to struggle over economic control. Yet the system of "one-man management", where administrative responsibility for all economic units was placed in the hands of single individuals, was surely a mistake. This kept the workers in a passive position and tended to depoliticize and demobilize mass initiative.

Marxist-Leninists do not advocate any kind of "workers' control" which is not based on the prior, firm establishment of central proletarian

political authority, that is, on the smashing of the bourgeois state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And then revolution in the relations of production at the factory level must be the product of a lengthy period of conscious class struggle. However, we still recognize that for workers to be involved in the management and planning of their own factories within the guidelines of a central state plan, new forms reflecting the rising socialist relations of production must be developed. The system of Revolutionary Committees combining experts, rank and file workers and party militants which was developed at a crucial stage of the Cultural Revolution in China, represented an advance in developing such forms and reflected a summing up of the "one-man management" experience.

Finally, Stalin did at times fail to recognize the difference between a contradiction among the people and a contradiction between the people and the class enemy. Despite his theoretical proposition that antagonistic classes no longer existed in the USSR, Stalin's strong class stand and his long revolutionary experience taught him to smell a rat when it was there. But without the full recognition that such rats come forward as part of the continuing struggle of antagonistic classes still existing within the Soviet Union, the correct method of mass struggle, conscious class struggle of the working people, could not be fully developed as the means for defeating the political and ideological lines of the representatives of the bourgeoisie.

And along with this developed the tendency to treat an unconscious dupe as harshly as the most responsible culprit. The method of "treating the patient to cure the sickness" was often not followed. As a result, people who could have been won over were lost. To the degree that this happened, it also had the effect of discouraging people from being up front with their politics and bold with their proposals out of fear that a single error might have disastrous consequences.

Overall, however, these errors are far outweighed by Stalin's many achievements and by the concrete gains made by the Soviet workers and people under his lead—in particular, the building of socialism and strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat through a very complicated series of struggles inside and outside the Party, the step-by-step collectivization of agriculture, a monumental task carried out successfully with no historical precedent, the heroic defeat of the Nazis and the many contributions to the cause of world revolution.

We must distinguish between two kinds of wrong policies. There are the policies of people like Khrushchev and Brezhnev aimed at destroying socialism and restoring capitalism. And then there are policies, such as Stalin's, which are really in the opposite camp—policies aimed not at restoring capitalism but at defending proletarian rule and building socialism, which nevertheless did not carry out the class struggle as effectively as

possible. revisionism and capitalist restoration can never be simply the product of one man's errors, but rather of class struggle.

While Stalin's mistakes meant that the struggle of the proletariat against the capitalist roaders was not waged as successfully as it has been in China, which has the advantage of learning from the Soviet experience, it must also be strongly stressed that at every stage, especially in the critical period of 1945-1953, it was Stalin himself who led the fight against capitalist restoration. That Stalin was unable to find the correct form to mobilize the masses in struggle to defeat the capitalist roaders is tragic but hardly a basis for his condemnation. In summary, then, we believe it is clear that Stalin played an overwhelmingly positive role in the fight to advance the socialist revolution and against revisionism and capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union.

With Stalin's death begins the second stage in the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, the period of intense class struggle under so-called "collective leadership." This period saw the rise to undisputed leadership of Nikita S. Khrushchev, the chief revisionist of them all. Khrushchev had worked almost exclusively as a Party official and as such was most capable of leading the capitalist coup. The son of a Ukrainian coal miner, he joined the Bolshevik Party in 1918, fought briefly in the Civil War and afterwards attended the "rabfak" (workers' college) in Kiev. In 1929 he was sent to Moscow to study at the *Promakademiya* (Industrial Academy) where he became Party Secretary.

In 1931 Khrushchev rose to district secretary, and at the beginning of March 1935 he was appointed First Secretary of the Moscow District and City Party Committee. On January 30, 1937, when the announcement of the verdict in the trial of the Trotskyites was made, Khrushchev, who was later to call Stalin a "20th Century Ivan the Terrible", told 200,000 people at a Red Square rally that "These infamous nonentities wanted to break up the unity of the Party and of Soviet power . . . They raised their murderous hands against Comrade Stalin . . ." He finished with the words: "Stalin—our hope, Stalin—our expectation, Stalin—the beacon of progressive mankind, Stalin—our banner, Stalin—our will, Stalin—our victory."²⁸ In January 1938, Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party and at the 18th Congress he became a full member of the Politbureau.

In the Ukraine, Khrushchev developed into something of an agricultural "expert." Before the war he had already revealed a "pragmatic" and empirical outlook with the successful promotion of measures aimed at raising material incentives and personal responsibility for collective labor, recruiting more experts into the central agricultural agencies, and granting some independence to farm technicians.²⁹

After the war agriculture emerged as a real problem area in the economy. This was due to several factors. First was the very primitive

agricultural economy inherited from tsardom. Second was the tremendous destruction of farm capital goods (buildings, plows, tractors, horses, etc.) during, first, WW I, revolution and civil war, then kulak resistance to collectivization, and finally by Nazi invasion. A third reason was inadequate investment in agriculture (12-14% of total investment) due to demand for military hardware and industrial producer goods. Even so, tractor power (in terms of horsepower) grew by about 36% between 1940 and 1950, a period which, of course, includes the invasion years.³⁰

Yet it was still clear that agricultural production had to start catching up. Two lines on how to do this emerged. One, the proletarian line of Stalin, called for an increased emphasis on collective labor, political agitation and education, and, where possible, a transition from collective to more advanced state farms. The other line called for greater material incentives coupled with increased emphasis on the development of private holdings and enhanced autonomy and payment for on-the-spot technicians to encourage the employment of bourgeois experts who could "better explain" to the peasants how to do what they had been doing for generations.³¹

These proposals were first advanced by Voznesensky, but he was soon joined by Khrushchev who was already experimenting with similar ideas in the Ukraine. Stalin opposed these measures, but not enough information is available for us to explain why he was as yet incapable of preventing their enactment. However, they were initiated and smaller work teams, often consisting of single families, became the principal unit of collective labor. The countryside was engulfed with private enterprise farming. The rich peasants who were still a considerable force and continued to constitute a social base for capitalist restoration, took advantage of the situation. During the war they had formed the main support for anti-Soviet, pro-Nazi puppet groups in the Ukraine. During the confusion of invasion and counterattack, they managed to grab additional private land.

With the exposure of Voznesensky, Stalin revoked these concessions to individualist tendencies and returned to his original position. Khrushchev, Voznesensky's ally, was recalled to Moscow. But his personal "machine" in the Ukraine was not dismantled. And his Moscow appointment to the Central Committee Secretariat in the long run only increased his power and influence in the Party. While continuing to hold to his bourgeois views in private, he was at the same time building up his own personal network of control. He was thus able to turn his dismissal from agricultural responsibilities to his advantage by using a new post in the Party to gain influence and prestige.

Khrushchev, then, was in an advantageous position. In sympathies, outlook and style he was linked closely with bourgeois forces among the bureaucrats, upper level managers, and corrupt

Party officials. But as a Party man *par excellence*, he was relatively free of narrow sectional interests. In short, he was the right man in the right place at the right time. With lightning rapidity, all the various bourgeois and many wavering forces fell in behind him. A rival bourgeois headquarters had emerged. And as the struggle developed, Khrushchev proved to be the most brazen and unflinching champion of the bourgeois takeover.

By 1956, Khrushchev was able to win over a majority of the Central Committee to his views. At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, he launched his vicious attack on Stalin, calling him "a coward, an idiot, and a dictator." This was designed to accomplish two things: first and foremost, to sow confusion in the ranks of honest communists by launching what was, in essence, an attack on the dictatorship of the proletariat; and second, to signal to his fellow capitalist readers and his bourgeois class base that the tide had turned and it was safe to crawl out from the woodwork.

But this attack on Stalin also called forth opposition. In the spring of 1957, a showdown came. V.M. Molotov and L. Kaganovich were able to assemble a majority in the Politbureau against Khrushchev. In fact, the majority may have been overwhelming. But Khrushchev, as ever a wily fox, held a hidden card. This was the support of the notoriously self-seeking and individualistic Defense Minister, Marshal Zhukov. When Zhukov apparently indicated that he would oppose the Politbureau majority with armed force, the more vacillating allies began to reach for a compromise. Soon Khrushchev had the majority. Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov were expelled as the so-called "anti-Party group." Bulganin and Voroshilov were to follow in the not too distant future. As for Zhukov, Khrushchev, seeing in him a future rival, dumped him too.³²

The members of the "anti-Party group" failed to bring the struggle out of the Politbureau and to the masses. While Stalin was alive, his recognized and well-merited prestige was a strong weapon against the revisionists; but the failure to develop mass forms was telling indeed. We do not know all the circumstances which prevented the proletarian forces from bringing the struggle into the open, developing mass action. Nor are we clear on exactly who did represent the proletarian line. Nonetheless, it can be stated that this failure was a major factor contributing to the revisionist takeover.

Even so, many workers could sense that something was wrong. Several instances of workers spontaneously quitting work and demanding an explanation of the expulsions have been documented, most particularly a stoppage at an electrical appliances plant in Kursk.³³ In Georgia, Stalin's birth place, there were riots. In other areas workers openly insulted the new leaders.

The seizure of power in 1956-57 by the bourgeois headquarters led by Khrushchev marks

the crucial turning point in the restoration process. It was at this juncture that political power passed out of the hands of the proletariat and into the hands of the bourgeoisie. The re-establishment of fully capitalist relations of production was now inevitable, for it is impossible for a bourgeois political line to lead society in any direction but that of capitalism. But first, of course, socialism, built carefully for 40 years, had to be destroyed. Thus began the third stage in the restoration. This was the period of the wrecking of socialism which extended to the fall of Khrushchev in 1964.

Of course, the first move in destroying socialism was Khrushchev's ideological attack on the political basis of proletarian power, Marxism-Leninism. This attack took three forms. First was his vicious condemnation of Stalin. Basically this was an attack on 30 years of working class rule. Idiots don't guide the building of powerful industry from scratch and cowards don't lead in defeating Hitler. Nor would a tyrant have led the poor peasants in collectivizing agriculture.

The second attack was the doctrine of the three peacefuls: peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition, and peaceful transition to socialism. According to Khrushchev, the world had now changed. The existence of nuclear weapons meant that everything had to happen without violence, including and especially people's revolution. Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence between different social systems, adopted as a correct tactic for socialist countries surrounded by a capitalist world, was now interpreted as the key to strategy in foreign policy.

Instead of aiding and encouraging the world revolutionary movement, the Soviet Union now asked the revolutionary people of the world to sit back and wait while the Soviet Union peacefully competed with the U.S. In this competition the obvious economic and political superiority of the Soviet system would somehow mystically ensure that one day other people could also be free. This bankrupt policy meant abandonment of the struggle against imperialism, abandonment of the struggles for national liberation and socialism. It meant that Communist Parties around the world would become reformist parties and that the Soviet Union, formerly the great rear base area of the world revolution, would now be the great col-laborator, and world rival, of world imperialism.

But the greatest of Khrushchev's self-styled "creative developments of Marxism-Leninism" was his theory of "the state of the whole people" and "the Party of the whole people". Khrushchev asserted that the dictatorship of the proletariat was no longer necessary in the Soviet Union. This goes counter to everything Marxism-Leninism has summed up about the state. As long as society remains divided into classes, the state is an instrument for one class to impose its will on all others and to keep class warfare in hand. Of course, as long as there have been exploiting classes they have tried to cover this up

with a lot of junk about divine right of kings or parliamentary democracy. Only the working class, because it represents the majority of the people, can come straight out and call its rule the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In fact, the theory of "the state of the whole people" was a cover and a giveaway for the fact that a bourgeois stratum, a handful of capitalist roaders, had usurped power from the working class.

Once this ideological offensive had been mounted, Khrushchev was in position to launch attacks on the very structure of socialist society. And as an agriculture "expert", Khrushchev's very first accomplishment was the complete sabotage of collective agriculture. It is not surprising that he focused his attack here—for, as Lenin persistently noted, the worker-peasant alliance was in fact the fundamental basis of proletarian rule in the USSR. And this was the most vulnerable area since collectivized agriculture represented a lower form (than state property) of social ownership.

Khrushchev set about destroying the collective farm system, which accounted for most agricultural production. These collective farms are a lower form of social property than state farms. They involve large numbers of farmers who own and work farm lands cooperatively and sell their products to the state. It had always been the aim of the state to draw these collectives closer to it, and where possible to replace them with state farms. The chief mechanism used in this was the state-owned Machine Tractor Station (MTS) network which provided the use of up-to-date agricultural machinery as well as offering agronomic and often political guidance to the collective farms. In *Economic Problems of Socialism*, Stalin, specifically argued against any attempts to break up these stations, as proposed by some of Voznesensky's followers.

But in 1957 Khrushchev decided to abolish this important institution. He ordered the sale of all MTS property to the collectives at bargain basement prices. This, of course, aided the wealthier collective farms at the expense of the poorer ones and destroyed the basis for any far-reaching and equitable technological development. It also cut loose the collectives from the control of central planning authorities, thus strengthening the anarchic capitalist element of the economy, and similarly increasing the influence of bourgeois experts and managers within each collective.

Khrushchev denied that there was any difference between collective and state farms. The few state farms which existed before 1958 represented only the most advanced units, economically and politically. But with the breakup of the MTS, Khrushchev decided that the weakest and most backward collectives, those who could not afford to buy their own machinery, would have to become state farms. These state farms were really being put into a position similar to that of a welfare recipient. Unable to make it "on their own", they were put

on a kind of state dole under which they could slowly but surely stagnate.

At the same time, Khrushchev encouraged the development of wealthy collective farms and within these collectives acted to strengthen the position of the collective farm chairmen and other officials. The result was, as Khrushchev had planned, that people left the state farms for the cities. Thus, the state farm system was undermined and the spontaneous forces of capitalism unleashed in the stronger and more developed collectives. Khrushchev's policy was really but a new variant on the "wager on the strong" advocated by the tsarist Minister Stolypin back in 1908 and by the renegade Bukharin in the late 20s. Where Stolypin and Bukharin relied on the few rich peasants to develop agriculture at the expense of the masses of poor peasants, Khrushchev sought to rely on a small number of wealthy collective farms.

And as if this were not enough, during the years 1953-1959 rural capitalism received a further impetus by drastic relaxation of restrictions on private plots, private livestock and of work requirements in the collective fields. By 1966, according to the Soviet apologist Pomeroy, private production on only 3% of cultivated land accounted for 60% of potatoes, 40% of meat and green vegetables, 39% of milk and 68% of eggs.³⁴

Having crippled socialist agriculture, Khrushchev turned to central planning itself. In one stroke he shut down the central planning ministries and placed their responsibilities in the hands of more than a hundred scattered, but equally bureaucratic, regional ministries known as economic councils. This was, of course, all done under the guise of anti-bureaucracy and local control, but what happened was that local self-interest dominated over careful, coordinated planning, expertise over political direction. The door was opened for the whole economy to be "rescued" from this chaos by reintroduction of that great "regulator": Profit.

But none of these attacks could have been successfully carried through had Khrushchev and Company not managed to capture and destroy the Communist Party. Their expulsion of loyal proletarian leaders was merely a prelude to a massive purge of honest communists at all levels. Nearly 70% of the Central Committee members elected at the 19th Congress in 1952 were out by the 22nd in 1961, while an additional 60% of those elected in 1956 were gone by 1966. This reflected an even greater purge at lower levels, particularly in the plants. For example, between 1963 and 1965, 100,000 were expelled, and over 62,800 were kicked out in 1966 alone!³⁵

At the same time, Khrushchev moved to open the Party to people who did not represent the advanced detachment of the proletariat, but instead would be used as a social base for socialism in words, capitalist restoration in deeds. Khrushchev's policy was the direct opposite of Stalin who purged capitalist elements from the Party and led the Party in recruiting staunch

representatives of the proletariat.

Almost immediately after Stalin's death, Khrushchev moved to lift the restrictive recruitment policy which had been followed by the Party since the war. Between 1953 and 1965 Party membership grew by over 70%, by far the greatest increase in its history.³⁶ Although this massive enrollment campaign was in numerical terms directed mainly to the recruitment of workers and peasants, its implications, however, were profoundly reactionary.

Under Lenin and Stalin only the most advanced workers, those who had distinguished themselves in the class struggle and who showed in practice a grasp of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, became Party members. And due to the supervision of technical and managerial work by the Party, a great percentage of Party militants—many of them ex-workers—were employed in the Party and Government bureaucracy. Stalin, in fact, spoke often of the drain this placed on the Party's resources.

Khrushchev, however, set out to destroy completely the system of separation between political and technical authority developed by Lenin and Stalin. Among administrators and Party leaders, technical skill replaced political orientation as the main criterion for membership. As one close observer of Party recruitment patterns has noted, there emerged "a marked trend in favor of professionally trained specialists and at the expense of line officials and clerical staff."³⁷

Evidence of this trend abounds in Party literature as well as in enrollment figures. The Khrushchev years saw a coordinated campaign to replace leading figures with new-type "experts". It was stipulated in some places that "only a Party member with a technician or engineer's certificate can be elected secretary of a Party branch."³⁸ Elsewhere *Pravda* noted favorably that "more and more engineers and designers have become secretaries of Party committees."³⁹ Whereas in 1956 only 38.9% of all "white collar" recruits were technical specialists, scientists, engineers, educators or doctors, by 1967 58.5 per cent fell into this category.⁴⁰ Such statistics take on added significance when it is noted that, according to one estimate, among every three engineers and technicians there is one Party member, but only one among every 17 or 18 workers.⁴¹

In other words, Khrushchev decided that the Party needed to be a Party of practical-minded experts. So he kicked out all the Stalinist "bureaucrats", "rabble-rousers", and propagandists. Where in the past the Party used to supervise technical and managerial work from without, it was now called on to take on these tasks itself, to abandon politics and develop expertise. In doing this an artificial division of functions was instituted at the local level between "industrial" and "agricultural" responsibilities.⁴² Cadres were overloaded with administrative and technical chores. The Party was paralyzed at the base and cut off from the masses. It became a

Party led by and serving technocrats managers and bureaucrats, a privileged stratum, an effective political representative of the bourgeoisie.

But of course all this was carried out under the guise of fighting bureaucracy. Here the increased recruitment of workers and peasants played an important role. The main goal was to disguise the change in political line under cover of "further developing ties with the masses." But in fact most of the new workers recruited were selected with no regard for their political stand and ideological development. This served to flood the Party with ideologically unprepared members at a crucial turning point in its political history. As a result, centers of opposition could be broken up, confused and demoralized and the Party was transformed from a militant vanguard of the proletariat into an organizer for the bourgeoisie, relying not on winning people to an advanced political understanding but on a combination of coercion and cooptation.

Moreover, of those workers recruited many entered on the basis of technical promise. These were almost immediately promoted to managerial positions (for which Party membership had now become a requirement) or were shipped off to technical institutes for further training. In addition, a significant percentage of those recruited as "workers" were actually foremen.⁴³

On the collective farms a dramatic change was also evident. Here the percentage of Communist Party members "directly engaged in production" increased from 66.7% in 1956 to 82.7% by 1965, although these figures are somewhat distorted by their failure to indicate the ratio of supervisory to genuinely productive personnel.⁴⁴ The thrust of this policy, as elsewhere, was anything but proletarian, appearances to the contrary. The new pattern of recruitment revealed that the Party had now chosen to abandon its position of proletarian *political* leader in the countryside. The new Party members were instead given the role of organizers of production under the leadership of capitalist-oriented collective farm chairmen* and bourgeois experts who were at the time streaming onto the farms from the recently dissolved MTS. (More on this later.)

Having robbed the working class of its political vanguard, Khrushchev set out to promote trade unionism among the workers. One of the most fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism is that the proletariat cannot free itself from exploitation and oppression without *political* organization, without a party of its own. Trade unions, primarily defensive organizations concerned with the economic struggle, cannot lead the working class in the struggle for its complete emancipation since they do not really challenge the fundamental distribution of power under

capitalism: they fight for higher wages, not for the abolition of wage labor; for better working conditions, not for the complete transformation of the relations of production; and for a greater political voice for the working class, not for the dictatorship of the proletariat. As Lenin put it bluntly in *What is to be Done?*, the spontaneous ideology of trade unionism is bourgeois ideology.

That is why, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Party, representing the overall interests of the proletariat, must continue to play the leading role in guiding both the work of running the economy and raising the political consciousness of the masses.

Under socialism trade unions continue to exist, not only to defend the interests of the workers against bureaucratic abuses, but in Lenin's words, to serve as a "school of administration, school of management, and school of communism," which unites large numbers of workers under Party leadership. When the Soviet Union was still a socialist country, the main efforts of the trade unions concerned raising production. Today the Chinese have learned that trade unions can also be effective schools of Marxism-Leninism and that their main task under socialism must be the political education of the working class.

Production is important, but as the Chinese put it, this can only be carried out in a socialist way under the slogan, "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production." In the Soviet Union under socialism the negotiations of collective contracts between the enterprise and the union were not an exercise in bargaining, but a way of educating the workers about the goals of the Plan and of mobilizing them to fulfill it. Class struggle was not absent, but it took very different forms from those typical of capitalist labor-management relations.

Since Khrushchev, the trade unions have been called upon to focus their attention on more traditional defensive functions: agitating for better working conditions, housing, etc. With the reorganization of the Party and with the restructuring of the national economy along regional lines, the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 declared that "the rights and functions of the trade unions in the decision of all questions touching the living interests of the working people had significantly widened."⁴⁵ And the 1967 anniversary theses declare that "the further consolidation of the trade unions and the enhancement of the role they are playing in the life of Soviet society constitute an important condition furthering the building of communism."⁴⁷

What this actually meant was that the political horizon and field of action of the working people had been significantly narrowed. The flood of complaints about working conditions which followed the "strengthening" of the trade unions indicates the growing sense among the workers that they were no longer basically in control of the means of production and of the state—they

*In 1953, 80% of collective farm chairmen were CP members. In 1956 this had risen to 91% and to 94% in 1959. By 1965 all but a handful of collective farms were chaired by CP members.⁴⁵

also indicate a total alienation from the Party.

Seeing the spontaneous struggle of the workers against deteriorating conditions, the revisionists sought to channel and contain this struggle within narrow economic bounds. Today the trade unions serve to focus the attention of workers on "the basic problems of production"

seeking to develop "advanced methods of organizing production and labor."⁴⁸ In other words, while diverting the workers from political struggle, the trade unions whip the workers into shape for the further development of capitalist production.

1. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 292.
2. J.V. Stalin, "Mastering Bolshevism" (1937).
3. Stalin, "Mastering Bolshevism."
4. *HCPSU*, p. 284.
5. Stalin, "The Right Deviation in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union".
6. V.I. Lenin, "Greetings to the Hungarian Workers", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 389.
7. Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 442-3.
8. Stalin, "Mastering Bolshevism".
9. Stalin, "Mastering Bolshevism".
10. Information on Voznesensky obtained mainly from the following: Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin Since Stalin*; Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*; and Sidney Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-making in Soviet Russia*.
11. The rival economist was Eugene Varga.
12. See Conquest, pp. 95-111.
13. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*.
14. Leonhard, p. 177.
15. T.H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967*. Princeton, 1968, p. 275-6.
16. Quoted in Rigby, p. 283.
17. *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, July-August, 1943. This was translated into English and published in the U.S. under the title *Political Economy in the Soviet Union*.
18. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*.
19. Stalin, *Economic Problems*
20. Leonhard, *The Kremlin Since Stalin*, p. 49.
21. Red Papers I. p. 15.
22. Stalin, "Report to the 18th Congress of the CPSU(B)."
23. Stalin, "Mastering Bolshevism".
24. Stalin, "Mastering Bolshevism".
25. Stalin, "Mastering Bolshevism".
26. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*.
27. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*.
28. *Pravda*, January 31, 1937.
29. See Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia*, pp. 30-58.
30. Ploss, p. 26.
31. See Ploss, Chapter I.
32. Leonhard, pp. 242-5.
33. Leonhard, p. 251.
34. William Pomeroy, *50 Years of Socialism*.
35. In addition, Khrushchev admitted to some 200,000 expulsions between the 20th Congress in 1956 and the 22nd in 1961. All figures from Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, pp. 309, 322.
36. Rigby, p. 300.
37. Rigby, p. 337.
38. *How the Soviet Revisionists Carry Out All-Round Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR*, Peking, 1968, p. 60.
39. *How the Soviet Revisionists Carry Out All-Round Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR*, Peking, 1968, p. 60.
40. Rigby, p. 338.
41. *How the Soviet Revisionists*, p. 61.
42. See Leonhard.
43. Rigby, p. 330.
44. Rigby, p. 336.
45. Rigby, p. 334n.
46. *New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, 1962.
47. *50th Anniversary Theses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*.
48. I. Lazarenko, "Labor Remuneration, Labor Incentive Funds and Soviet Trade Unions"