



national council of american-soviet friendship

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AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA

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Today we are considering two factors that very immediately concern our future, our immediate future and our long range future. They are the drive toward war on the part of our government and the struggle for peace on the part of the peoples of the world. Washington represents interests that are pushing us into war, and if their policy succeeds we are going to experience misery and devastation and death and worse. But, there are forces that can block, and that are blocking the war planners. These forces rightly appreciated and rightly related throughout the world can bring peace in our day.

The Asia policy of our government reveals very clearly the drive toward war on which the American authorities are taking us Americans. But Asia itself as a factor in the world's play and balance of forces — Asia itself, demonstrates how the peace pressures of the world are accumulating and how these are limiting the ability of the war planners to carry out their policies.

I'm going to talk about this Asia as a factor in our future in terms of two concrete specific aspects of our government's Far Eastern policy; the design of the Korean war and the Japanese peace treaty.

An analysis of the Korea policy reveals it as a policy geared to war. There are five aspects of this Korean design that I want to call attention to — there may be others, but these I want particularly to mention.

First the Korean war is completely, almost completely an American affair. In its inception it was American, with pressure on, and planning with the Rhee government for the attack on the North Koreans and with the preparations for and the actual manipulations of the United Nations as a tool of American policies. In its implementation it is American; 470,000 American military personnel in Korea, and from the other countries 30 to 50 thousand. And there was military action by the United States forces before and beyond the directives of the United Nations. So that is one aspect of the pattern.

The second is that the Korean outbreak was an occasion for openly stating and intensifying our government's total war policy in Asia. You remember Mr. Truman's statement on Korea on June 27th — seven short paragraphs, four of them given to talking about American military action in other areas of Asia. And then MacArthur's visit to Chiang Kai-shek in July, 1950 and the statement they issued that plans had been made to coordinate U. S. and Chinese forces. And then MacArthur's letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars stating that the Pacific Ocean is our moat — we control the shores of Asia from Vladivos-

tock to Singapore. And MacArthur in January said, "the stake we fight for is more than Asia, it is more than Korea, it is all of Asia." And in April this year, U. S. military officially participated in the annual British-French military conference in Singapore, planning for the "defense of Southeast Asia and the deployment of troops in Southeast Asia." And then since Korea broke out, the stepped-up aid, military aid, to the Philippines, to France, to the Viet Nameese, to Chiang Kai-shek and the American military missions sent throughout Asia. Korea represents the next logical step in American foreign policy in the Far East - the direct use of American fire power against the people of Asia -- no longer just through puppets like the Bao Dai and Chiang Kai-shek.

The third aspect of this Korean pattern is that the Korean war is a renewal -- a continuation and intensification of an attack against the Chinese people. Even after the failure of the American policy of 1945 to 1949 in an attempt to get control of China's territory, manpower, and resources, our government continued its policy of enmity toward China. And it specifically and openly expressed its purpose as the overthrow of the present regime in China. Korea represents an effort to retrieve this defeat. MacArthur said in testimony on his dismissal in Congress, "If we had not gone into Korea, the military potential of China would have been available for use in other areas." Mr. Truman in January of this year sent a message to MacArthur. He said, "Successful resistance in Korea would serve the following purposes: to deflate the dangerously exaggerated political and military prestige of Communist China and (2) to afford more time for and give direct assistance to the organization of non-Communist resistance in Asia both outside and inside China." The same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message to MacArthur, and they said "Continue now to intensify the blockade of China, prepare now to impose a naval blockade on China and place it in effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea, under circumstances then obtaining. Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance over China, remove now restrictions of Chiang Kai-shek's troops." Marshall in his testimony to Congress said, "Our purpose is to inflict terrific casualties on the Chinese Communist forces, to break the morale of their armies, to destroy their best trained armies," and it was the United States that forced the United Nations to declare China an aggressor. So Korea represents a continuation of this attack on China.

The fourth aspect of the Korea affair is this: The Korean affair was used in an effort to secure and hold European allies for the larger war that is coming. Marshall in his testimony in Congress said, "Now as to allies, they have moved at a very slow pace until our reaction to the Korea affair, and that stimulated and accelerated, and brought to a head in an effective manner the North Atlantic treaty organization." And then he went on to speak of the "extraordinary difficulty we had in lining them up, having them all line up with us where we had to have them before the Security Council of the United Nations." And Bradley said something which is very important too to keep in mind: "This is the first time we have had a United Nations field command. We should be very careful to preserve such a command, and make it as effective as possible, and do everything we can from breaking up the United Nations command and discouraging them from taking United Nations action in the future." Marshall went on too -- "the advantage we would gain from the present method of fighting where we now are is that we will retain our allies and bring them to a more satisfactory reaction before the United Nations as their confidence in our leadership is increased." So that Korea served in the effort to link up European allies for war.

The fifth part of this pattern is that the Korea war served the United States as concrete and specific preparation for World War III. There are four things: One, it is a holding operation - and I could quote quite a number of our government officials to that effect. Second, it is giving the U. S. control over the manpower of other nations. Specifically in this testimony, there were pages indicating how we now have got control of the Europeans, we have now got control of Chinese and Korean manpower. The third thing in this preparation for war is that it gives an opportunity to get procurement lines established. Bradley in his testimony said - "It wasn't until after Korea began that we were able to get over the difficulty of setting up procurement lines for our defense program."

Another thing, it gives us opportunity to train our men with actual battle experience. As Senator Cain said, "the best way to learn to fight a war is in a war." And then there is the trying out of new equipment.

A fourth thing about this preparation for a third World War -- it keeps appropriations coming from Congress. This is what Senator Long said: "It is almost impossible, unless your men are actually fighting, to get the American people to keep an Army, Navy and Air Force that could beat a nation like the Soviet Union." And Bradley said, "Yes, before the Korean outbreak the most we were able to get out of the American people was about 13 billion dollars. Since Korea we've been able to get \$65 billion out of them." So the Korea affair is a part of an over-all policy of our government -- a policy geared to conflict and war. There is no planning whatever in it for any peaceful cooperation. There is blatant use of our allies -- never thinking in terms of their needs. Marshall said Korea is only a symbol, Korea is only an incident. Wilson said Korea is only a skirmish. Bradley said Korea is just one engagement.

But in this Korea thing there are pressures that are affecting the warmakers, the American warmakers in Korea, creating problems, defeats and dilemmas for them. I want to mention five of them. One, the Asian people are giving the great American military establishment some headaches. Second, there is resistance and reluctance on the part of the allies: they are not coming through with the aid and cooperation our warmakers want. The third, the Korean people are not with the Americans or the U. N. -- you wouldn't have "Operation Killer" -- "kill everything that moves" -- if the Korean people were with you. Fourth, the American people are apathetic and reluctant. The blood donations are not so large. The Congressmen in their testimony said "everyone of us Senators every day get thousands of letters from the American people asking, 'Why are we in Korea?'" And the New York Times the other day talking about the great evasions of the draft in this country said "While you can't say it's popular, you cannot say it's unpopular to evade the draft." ~~Then the fifth thing is that there are other potential Koreas popping up all over the world:~~ Iran, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Malay, Egypt and Indonesia where the warmakers are facing more potential challenges.

But, there is evidence that the United States has no intention of leaving Korea to the Koreans. The military preparations are going on to stay in Korea. In August, Van Fleet announced to a press conference, "By next spring we will have our South Korean soldiers put through all their training." And then on the 12th of this month, CBS in an evening broadcast said that in 24 months the South Korean troops will be ready to take over. The next day the New York Times reported that appropriations for the Korean war are put off until the next session of Congress. And then there is pressure that our government is putting on the United Nations, and will put on them in Paris as they meet there this next month, to increase their aid in Korea. And Bradley testifying before the Foreign Affairs House Committee in July said, "If the allies get peace in Korea it would certainly increase the chances of Communist aggression elsewhere; whereas the present war in Korea is occupying the Communists fully."

Now there are also economic reasons, not only military but economic reasons for staying, and our government is preparing to hold on to Korea as a colony. In June, before the war broke out, General Roberts told the American public that we are training 100,000 Koreans who will do the shooting for us, to act as our watchdog to protect our investments in Korea. A year ago this October, Mr. Truman announced that ECA was in Korea planning for the long range economy of Korea to gear it to the American economy. And this August we got information about why we are where we are in Korea, because of the tungsten deposits, and we are rushing machinery to mine this tungsten, which is so important to the American war effort. So both economically and militarily, the evidence is that the U. S. interests do not plan to leave Korea.

Now what does the United States want in Korea? I think it is implicit in what Bradley stated -- "keep the Communists fully occupied." But it was explicitly stated by the

Council against Communist Aggression in a statement issued in August; they said, "Our best chance to win in Asia is active stalemated hostility" -- neat phrase -- "active, stalemated hostility in Korea which will tie down the Communist forces until the French and Viet Nameese in Indo-China and the British in Malay have crushed the Communist rebels, and the Filipinos have eliminated them from their islands." American military action in Korea is a part of this "best chance to win in Asia." Korea is an integral part of that. Now this active stalemated hostility - that is what our warmakers want. It kept China and Korea out of the peace conference in San Francisco; they were still "enemy". It keeps China and Korea labelled as "aggressors" and gives part of an excuse for the defense pacts in the Pacific. And it keeps the United States on an active war footing, with a base on the mainland near Manchuria which is China's great industrial base -- a 2 billion dollar base in Manchuria. It keeps the United Nations active military force in being, controlled by the United States; and that's something they haven't got in Europe yet -- an active United Nations military force. And they're not going to give it up. And also it builds up a combat-hardened American fighting force; and it keeps America holding on to Korea as an economic colony.

These cease-fire, or truce, or peace negotiations might serve to enable the United States to bring its military action in Korea to a lower level and thereby free some of the troops for use elsewhere. And also, we must remember that these "peace talks" are a factor in the 1952 elections. The Truman administration will say -- we did try for peace.

Now I want to talk about the Japan policy. That too is a part of the drive toward war. And the peace treaty is the next logical step in our Japan policy. The treaty as we know was completely an American affair. I'm not going into details on that. The San Francisco conference and the things that preceded it did not -- neither the treaty nor the conference -- take up the substance of the other nations' relations with Japan. Almost every nation sent in objections to the treaty. These were not taken up. These objections remain as points of friction and disagreement between the allies as problems our country has to solve, both with its allies and its non-allies. Reparations, the building of Japan as a military country, the restoring of Japan to economic aggressive competition with other countries, the stationing of foreign troops in Japan, the restriction of Japan's viable areas, the admission of the three French satellites, the non-admission of China, the disposal of Formosa and other territory -- these were objections sent in by the other countries. And these remain, they were not taken up.

On some of the basic questions in relation to Japan, India made a very interesting statement in its letter to the United States telling why it was not coming to the conference. The government of India laid stress upon two fundamental objectives. They were: (1) "The treaty terms should accord Japan a position of honor, equality and contentment in the community of free nations" and (2) "The treaty should be framed so as to enable all countries especially interested in the making of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the treaty terms sooner or later." Now this treaty meets neither of these criteria. They weren't even considered in San Francisco. China, Korea and the Soviet Union certainly are vitally interested in peace in the Far East, and cannot subscribe to this treaty. Nehru's approach will appear as reasonable. It's an approach in terms of eventual peace. But the American approach continues to treat Asia as a colonial area, which is now fast becoming an anachronism. And the United States approach is sowing the seeds if not nurturing the sprouts of international conflict.

Also I want to quote what the Chinese said about this treaty: "Asian affairs should be considered by Asian people themselves, and should not be controlled by imperialists. That the American government which represents only a handful of big wealthy people should cross 10,000 kilometers of the Pacific to control and enslave the Asian people which total more than one-half of all mankind is a mad design that cannot be justified and will not be practical." That's China speaking.

Then there was an American spokesman who indicated the nature of this treaty. James Reston in his column on the first of September from San Francisco said: "The treaty is a compromise, intended to keep an unsatisfactory situation in Japan from getting worse

and devised to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding any further into the vacuum created by the collapse of Japanese power in World War II."

Now I want to look into this situation in Japan that is so "unsatisfactory" that we have to rush in to do something about it now. There are three or four things there. First, the very shaky economy of Japan. The United Nations economic report on Southeast Asia and the Far East issued in July pictured Japan as riding on the crest of a wave of Asian prosperity, but warned that the economy of Japan is showing signs of collapse and pointed out that it's present prosperity is based upon artificial factors, Japan already having supplied about 350 million dollars worth of war materials to the American war effort in Korea. International rearmament was the second thing they mentioned; just before MacArthur was dismissed he was asked to furnish the list of things that Japan could produce for a war in Europe. And the third artificial factor is the huge sums poured in by the United States since 1945 to keep Japan going. The fourth factor, also artificial, is the raw materials that Japan must receive from the United States with no assurance that she can continue to count on this source of supply. And the fifth, cutting off Japan from trade with China. So here you have the economy of Japan very shaky. So this treaty goes in to make that economy now a very definite part of the war economy of the United States. The second "unsatisfactory" situation in Japan is the increasing opposition to the occupation and to the American-dominated Japanese government, and to this treaty too. This evidence is in the suppression of the peoples' movements and the peoples' press, the new character of the student movement in Japan, the growing peace movement in Japan -- and here the Americans, by the second bilateral treaty with Japan, have the right to station troops in Japan and help put down internal riots, to meet this rising opposition of the people of Japan.

The third is the openly expressed opposition to the American imposed limitation on trade with China. Every opposition political party in Japan in the last election came out against that restriction. And even ministers in the present government have expressed opposition. The provision in the treaty that Japan should not give aid to any state against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action is further preparation to keep Japan from dealing with China.

But the fourth and probably the main factor in this "unsatisfactory" situation in Japan is the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950. That treaty is a treaty that profoundly affects Asian relations with the great industrial nations of the world. Now particularly in relation to Japan, it threatens the whole structure of the Japanese-American relations worked out by the MacArthurs and the Dulles.

(1) Specifically China and the Soviet Union agree to strive for the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. Now the growing strength and stability of the Peoples' Republic of China makes treaty relations with her a desirable and logical thing for the Japanese people. And there have been increasing open expressions of that among respectable circles of Japan. The United States had to hurry and get its kind of a treaty with Japan; otherwise it would have found it increasingly difficult to overcome the lure or the pull that China has for Japan.

(2) The treaty demonstrates a new kind of economic relationship that an Asian country can have with a great industrial power. The example of what the Soviet Union is doing in relation to China is dynamite. In this treaty, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950, the Soviet Union transfers to China, free, its rights and property to the Chinese-Changchun Railroad; and it also hands over the naval base at Port Arthur -- both transfers effective immediately on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, or by the end of 1952 at the latest. We're approaching that time. And it also gives credits to China for the restoration and the development of its economy. So here you have a great industrial power aiding an Asian nation to have a well balanced industrial and agricultural economy, glaringly different from the Marshall Plan kind of relationship our country has with other countries and glaringly different from the kind of economic relationship the United States has with Japan. Now the United States may talk about "Red imperialism" and "China being fooled or gobbled up by Russia", but they know that this new kind

of economic relationship will be a completely accomplished fact not later than the end of 1952. Hence the hurry to get their American-made treaty put over now.

Then the second thing that Reston says, is that the treaty is to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding any further into the vacuum. Well, in the first place there is no vacuum in Asia. There are just 1,100,000,000 people who live there -- no vacuum. And these people are no longer passive or exploitable. The people of Asia are no longer waiting for governments or regimes to carry out promises or reforms. The Asian people are taking things into their own hands and they're creating their new kind of societies. It's not the expansion of the Soviet Union that is worrying the United States, but it is the steady contraction of the free enterprise area of the world. So this treaty is an attempt to keep Japan itself within the free enterprise orbit, and to use Japan to keep or get all of Asia within the free enterprise orbit.

In addition there are problems that issue from the American-made treaty that are going to provide headaches for the American war planners. In the first place Japan is now an independent country. How is she going to use this independence? She is no longer just related to the United States. Immediately upon the conclusion of the treaty she announced the opening of 32 embassies, consulates and legations in other countries. She is going to be in a different position. How is she going to use that independence? Second, she's going to be rearmed. Is there any assurance she'll be on our side when the showdown comes? Third, is she going to keep the terms of the treaty? You have opposition parties in Japan and they're going to make this treaty an election issue. And the people of Japan know the meaning of the treaty. Is Japan going to be able to keep it? And will other nations who are allies of ours ratify and keep the treaty? Already there are signs that Asian nations like the Philippines, Iran and Indonesia have a very serious question. I hope all of you read the speeches of those three countries at the San Francisco conference. They're amazing, and give a preview of what's going to happen in their relations. And certainly Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand have their reservations about this treaty. Are they going to keep it? Then another thing: How much of Asia has the United States actually got? The New York Times had a headline "Four Asian Nations Support the Draft -- Pakistan, Ceylon, Laos and Cambodia" -- 4 Asian nations! 80% of Asia has not joined in the treaty and even those who signed it, as I indicated, have their reservations. And can and will the United States carry out the terms? The question of ratification -- immediately 54 senators said we're not going to ratify it now, we're going to wait and see. There's the financial aspect too -- can we afford to keep on supplying Japan with half-a-billion dollars a year to keep its economy going. And then there's a relationship to Korea in this. The New York Times on the 14th of September reported, "the principal reason stated for the State Department decision not to push for ratification of the Japanese Treaty was that the UN military campaign in Korea assuming a final failure of the cease-fire negotiations would be better served with Japan in her present state simply as an ally base." So the Japan treaty is solely in the interest of current American Far Eastern policy. It's a part of an attempt to recover the losses sustained in China and in Korea -- to overcome the defeats this policy has suffered in those countries. And it's an integral part of the containment policy of our country in the Far East.

Three things our country is trying to do in the Far East: To hinder, to halt or undo the Asian peoples' liberation movement; to secure Asian territory, manpower and resources for the implementation of our foreign policy; and to keep Asia within the free enterprise system. So the United States already has used military power in Asia, and is now stepping up the preparation to use more military power in Asia.

The United States is the major force in the drive toward war -- and some of the pattern of this drive has been suggested in this consideration of the war in Korea and the Japanese peace treaty.

But there are forces against war, forces on the side of the peoples' struggle for peace. I want to mention two of them: One, the problems, defeats and dilemmas which the war planners are having to meet in Asia, which is severely limiting their ability to

carry out their policies. And the second are the positive factors for peace. There are three of those: The increasing ability of the Asian people to defend themselves against imperialism. Second, the existence of a new kind of society in Asia -- peoples' society, already experienced in Outer Mongolia, China, Viet Nam and the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Korea. There you get a preview -- millions of Asians have already created for themselves and have tasted a peoples' democracy, which is a new political participation, a peoples' economy where they now enjoy the fruits of their labors and the resources of their land themselves, and a peoples' culture which now is a tool in the hands of the people for their struggle for a richer and a more decent life. And the third new thing is the new unity of the peoples of the world -- a new concept of internationalism, and this is very important for us to understand. This peoples' internationalism, which they contrast with free enterprise internationalism is not just a theory but is a functional concept which already has four concrete applications. I will just mention them: The Sino-Soviet treaty, built upon this new peoples' internationalism -- a new kind of relationship between countries. Just read any American treaty with China -- or British treaty with China and compare it with this. You'll see the meaning. (I hope you'll all get the pamphlet by China's Liu Shao-chi on "Internationalism and Nationalism" -- a basic document.)

The second actual thing that has come from this new peoples' internationalism is the Korean assistance to China against their common enemy, Japanese imperialism, from 1937 to 1945, and today the Chinese assistance to the Koreans against a common enemy, American imperialism. And there are more such Asian military cooperations brewing all over Asia. The third thing of this new internationalism is "a great new commercial empire in the making, with the vast resources of Eurasia, its manpower and raw materials at its disposal." (To quote the New York Times -- the peoples of two continents beginning to use the resources and energies of Eurasia for their mutual benefit.)

And the fourth thing is the including as intrinsic allies -- although the allies may not realize it -- the including as intrinsic allies in the peoples' struggle the progressive forces in the capitalist countries.

As Fred Field said in the March issue of New World Review, "It is not a lonely struggle that faces our American peace movement." No, we American peace forces move from strength, if we can but appreciate and rightly relate ourselves to this world-wide peoples' drive for peace of which Asia is a mighty part.

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