

# FAR EAST

SPOTLIGHT

## THE KOREAN CRISIS:

AN ANALYSIS OF  
AMERICAN POLICY

China, Korea and the United States  
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As Asians See It  
As Americans See It

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## THE KOREAN CRISIS:

### AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN POLICY

#### CHINA, KOREA and the UNITED STATES

With United States troops on the Manchurian border and Chinese volunteers fighting with the North Korean Army the so-called "police action" begun in Korea six months ago has brought the peoples of the world to the brink of a disastrous World War. In the publication "Facts On Korea" issued by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy in July, 1950 it was stated:

"In sending American armed forces into Korea and Formosa the American government has decided to force its way back into Asia by war...We are witnessing a collective effort, under American leadership, to win back through force of arms positions in Asia from which the Western powers had recently been ousted by the action of the people who live there!

The Chinese people after years of struggle ejected the feudal Chiang Kai-shek and all foreign imperialism from their country. In September 1949 they created the Peoples Republic of China. They have expressed every determination to defend this Republic from all foreign encroachment. They remember that it was by the consolidation of its position in Korea between 1910 and 1930 that Japan was able to launch its attack on Manchuria in 1931. It was from Korea and Manchuria that Japan launched its full scale war on China in 1937.

Nor is today's "police-action" the first time that American policy has concerned itself with Korea. In 1905 the U.S. Government through an agreement between U.S. Secretary of War, William Howard Taft and Count Katsura, the Japanese Premier, made it possible for Japan to entrench itself in Korea. In return the United States received assurances from Japan giving it a free hand in the Philippine Islands. Prior to this, in 1882, U.S. Admiral Schufeldt had forced upon Korea a treaty which disrupted Korea's relations with China and strengthened Japan's position in Korea.

The Chinese people have many times in the past been recipients of American assurances that it would respect China's territorial integrity and the right of the Chinese people to choose their own government without interference. Most famous of these assurances was President Truman's statement of Dec. 15, 1945, outlining U.S. policy in China in which he said:

"The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of Sovereign Nations."

"United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife."

"....The United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be appropriate."

Four years later on July 30, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson in reviewing American policy in China in the preceding four years indicated that the facts of American policy were the exact opposite of the declared policy in the statement of President Truman in 1945. In his letter of Transmittal serving as an introduction to the State Dept. publication, "United States Relations With China", more popularly known as the White Paper on China Acheson wrote:

"Since V-J Day, the United States Government has authorized aid to Nationalist China in the form of grants and credits totaling approximately 2 billion dollars... In addition the United States Government has sold the Chinese Government large quantities of military and civilian war surplus property with a total procurement cost of over 1 billion dollars,...The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States...nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it."

On January 5, 1950, when the question of Formosa was being discussed in the United States Senate President Truman declared:

"In the joint declaration at Cairo on Dec. 1, 1943; the President of the United States, the Prime Minister and the President of China stated that it was their purpose that territories Japan had stolen from China, such as 'Formosa,' should be restored to the Republic of China.

"The United States was a signatory to the Potsdam Declaration...which declared that the terms of the Cairo declaration should be carried out. The provisions of this declaration were accepted by Japan at the time of its surrender.

"The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly the U.S. Government will not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Formosa..."

Lest there be any misunderstanding of U.S. intent, Secretary Acheson enlarged on the President's statement that same day. He added a specific repudiation of the idea that the disposition of Formosa had to wait on a peace treaty with Japan. He said:

"The world must believe that we stand for principle and that we are honorable and decent people and that we do not put forward words, as propogandists do in other countries, only to throw them overboard when the change in events makes the position difficult for us..."

"It is important that our position in regard to China should never be subject to the slightest doubt or the slightest question...When Formosa was made a province of China, nobody raised any lawyer's doubts about that. That was regarded as in accordance with the commitments.

"Now, in the opinion of some, the situation has changed. They believe that the forces now in control of the mainland of China, the forces which undoubtedly will soon be recognized by some other countries, are not friendly to us, and therefore they want to say: 'Well, we have to wait for a treaty.' We did not wait for a treaty on Korea. We did not wait for a treaty on the Kuriles. We did not wait for a treaty on the islands over which we have trusteeship.

"...the United States of America, Mr. Truman said this morning, is not going to quibble on any lawyer's words about the integrity of our position. Therefore, the President says, we are not going to use our forces in connection with the present situation in Formosa..."

On June 27, 1950, however, the whole policy embodied in the foregoing assurances to the Chinese people was reversed. In the course of his message on the dispatch of U.S. forces to Korea President Truman switched to a new policy on Formosa:

"The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces permitting their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.

"As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.

"The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."

This pattern continued with unrelenting consistency.

On June 28, 1950, Carl Levin, wrote in the New York Herald Tribune: "Both the general (MacArthur) and defense officials here emphasized that United States military operations (in Korea) are to be confined exclusively to the area south of the 38th Parallel - the boundary between North and South Korea."

By October 1, 1950, this policy had also been reversed. Writing in the New York Times, A.M. Rosenthal, Time's correspondent at Lake Success said:

"Representatives of sixty countries heard Mr. Austin say that the United Nations goal of restoring peace to war torn Korea demanded taking of "appropriate steps" to eliminate the ability of the North Koreans to launch new attacks... Diplomats here said Mr. Austin's warning could be taken as clear notice that the United States felt that General MacArthur had the right to order a crossing of the Parallel and that, with or without surrender, United Nations forces would march across that line."

Each step of the road through Korea had its "assurances" and prompt reversals.

On Oct. 25, Reuters News Agency reported that Truman said that U.S. forces would not occupy the Korean-Manchurian border. On that same day the New York Times carried a UP dispatch saying:

"United States and British forces will halt their advance in North Korea forty miles from the Manchurian and Russian borders, the First Corps headquarters announced this morning."

Today U.S. troops stand on the very border of Manchuria and the New York Post on Nov. 21, carried the fantastic story that four U.S. generals made a point of spitting in the Yalu river in what amounted to a kind of vindictive ceremony.

After MacArthur's forces crossed the Parallel the United Nations in a move which followed the established pattern sanctioned the crossing.

It is important to note that the crossing of the 38th Parallel by U.S. troops was made with the full knowledge that the Chinese Government considered such a crossing a threat to its own vital interests. On Oct. 1, Premier Chou En-lai said:

"They (the Chinese people) will not tolerate foreign aggression and will not stand aside should the imperialists wantonly invade the territory of their neighbor."

In the Herald Tribune of Oct. 22, Joseph Alsop reported that at the same time the Chinese Government, in a move indicating how seriously they regarded the situation, called in the Indian Ambassador to China, E.D. Panikkar, and told him that the crossing of the 38th Parallel would necessitate Chinese intervention. This determination was immediately relayed to London and Washington. Mr. Alsop's column in which he reported the above episode is largely preoccupied in figuring out whether the Chinese were bluffing.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a further warning:

"The American war of invasion in Korea has been a serious menace to the security of China from its very start. The American invading forces in Korea have on several occasions violated the territorial air of China and strafed and bombed Chinese people and have violated the rights of a Chinese merchantman to sail the high seas and conducted a coerced search. Its attempts to enlarge the war in the East are known to everybody.

"Now the American forces are attempting to cross the 38th Parallel on a large scale. The Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea by the United States and accomplice countries and with regard to the dangerous trend towards extending the war."

The Washington Post in an editorial of Nov. 8, commenting on the many warnings given by the Chinese Peoples Republic said:

"After all, the U.N. forces were approaching the 275 mile Korean-Manchurian frontier, along which are dams which supply Manchuria with light and power. A similar situation on our border would have incited the whole of our population."

Since the birth of the People's Republic of China U.S. policy has been characterized by an adamant refusal to recognize the government supported by the people of China, a policy of obstructing the Peoples Republic of China from taking her rightful seat in the United Nations, aid to the Kuomintang blockade, embargo and the announced policy of Acheson in the White Paper to the effect that:

"...ultimately the profound civilization and democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke. I consider that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end."

In two months, August-October 1950, 22 air attacks by American planes were made on Chinese territory. Such attacks were acknowledged in the United Nations by U.S. delegate Warren Austin upon the complaint of the Peoples Republic of China through numerous cables to that body by Premier Chou En-lai.

In the face of the experience of the Chinese people and their Government with the worthlessness of the many assurances and solemn commitments of the United States is it any wonder that to President Truman's latest "solemn commitment" of Nov. 16, that:

"We have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities in China" - and that

"We will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of hostilities in the Far East"

Augmented by Sec. Acheson's worried hope that America's designs would not be misunderstood by the Chinese, the Peking radio broadcast of Nov. 17, replied:

"Acheson can be assured. There is no misunderstanding. America has lied and smashed her way across the world to Chinese territory and into it, has seized Taiwan and is threatening our neighbor Vietnam. The Chinese people are not deceived by what they see through the curtain of lies and bellicosity."

## POLICE ACTION ? OR WAR ?

U.S. Defense Department statements of American casualties in Korea show what has developed from President Trumans's so-called "police action". On Sept. 20, the figures were 13,000 killed, wounded and missing; on Oct. 4 they were 19,903; on Oct. 11, 24,163; on Nov. 4, 28,235; on Nov. 17, 29,996.

On Oct. 10, the New York Herald Tribune wrote: "Army officials, today disclosed that Korean Campaign casualties returning to U.S. for hospitalization are being cared for in 10 hospitals throughout the country; at the same time they designated 4 other Army hospitals which will start receiving wounded from Korea in the near future and announced the early reopening of 2 more for the same purpose."

On Oct. 15, New York Times correspondent James reported: "The war is a long way from being over as is evident from this Fourth Field hospital somewhere near the 38th parallel. Set up to take care of 300 patients, for the past few days the hospital has been deluged with nearly three times that number of casualties. Patients come in at the rate of hundreds a day."

According to the New York Post of Oct. 13, there were then 304,000 American military personnel in Korea - Army, 140,000; Marines, 21,000; Navy, 72,000; Air Force, 71,000.

But victory, even with this huge force, was admittedly far away. Hanson Baldwin, military analyst for the New York Times wrote Oct. 29: "The mop up and rehabilitation job in Korea is just starting. Intensive, protracted guerrilla fighting still lies ahead and only the future can tell whether we can clinch and consolidate the political-economic-military victory we have won....Curfews are still necessary in most of the war-ravaged Korean cities. Each night there is firing, some of it against the guerrillas and some of it by jittery, trigger-happy troops....Therefore we may face many months of guerrilla fighting....Sizeable reinforcements of Koreans who were in the Communist Manchurian armies have started to appear in the battle areas in Northwest Korea where the South Koreans have reported stiff fighting."

The destruction U.S. forces have caused in Korea is not only appalling but is now admitted to have been indiscriminate and often senseless.

Hanson Baldwin reported that "virtually all the important industries of North Korea - 18 strategic targets - have been destroyed by our bombing. Railroad yards and docks have been damaged or destroyed; most of the railroad rolling stock has been wiped out; warehouses and oil tanks have been burned out; more than 400 tunnels and 400 bridges have been sealed, destroyed or damaged and great parts of Korea's principal cities lie in ruins....North Korea's industry is in ruins; there is nothing except electric power plants to complement the food producing areas of the agricultural South."

On Nov. 11th the New York Times wrote: "The Korean war to date has caused property losses to 1,500,000 South Koreans and has destroyed more than 150,000 homes."

On Oct. 20, Robert Martin, Overseas News Agency correspondent in Korea, reported "The first flush of victory is beginning to wear thin now, and Air Force strategists, examining the massive destruction wrought by raids against North Korean industrial targets, are beginning to wonder if they should not have listened more

carefully to warnings against total destruction of the enemy's industrial potential. In three months, the B-29 Super-Fortresses and carrier based planes dropped more than 25,000 tons of bombs, demolishing or severely damaging every major factory in North Korea, including the biggest chemical producing center and largest fertilizer plant in Asia. Railroad yards and harbor installations have been wrecked, and nearly every important bridge has been knocked out....The spokesmen and air force officers agree that bombing of North Korea's industry, which they admitted were probably not converted to war production, had little if any effect on the outcome or course of the war."

As early as Aug. 21, Life magazine's John Osborne had reported from the Korean front:- "No American, after seeing the actualities of war in Korea, could ever call it a police action or dismiss it as merely the first of many 'dirty little wars' that we must learn to take in our stride."

On Aug. 23, Max Werner, military commentator wrote in the New York Compass: "For a campaign of its size, the Korean war is unusually extensive, ruthless and costly." On September 1, he judged that "the war in Korea has now become a real war in the sense of forces involved and of mass of weapons on both sides."

This is war, war against the Korean people, with military personnel and war material supplied almost entirely by the United States.

#### WHO IS THE "ENEMY" ?

The American troops in Korea are regarded as invaders by all Koreans and are resisted as such. Since the outbreak of the war there is overwhelming indication that the Americans (and other "UN forces") are not considered allies by either the residents of South Korea nor by the people north of the 38th Parallel. The fact that the troops from the north met with no resistance from the local population as they moved into and across territory south of the Parallel and that the 100,000 troops of Syngman Rhee's forces dwindled to around 20,000 in the first week of the war give the lie to the assumption that the US and UN forces were defending the interests of the people of Korea.

Even as early as July 3, Lt. Col. Thomas MacClure, of the American Military Advisory Group to the Rhee regime, told the United Press in Detroit that "it would take at least 100,000 American service men and a year to win the Korea war, because the natives of both the North and the South hate Americans". On July 5, UP correspondent Peter Kalischer cabled from Korea, "It has become safer to fight up front than to travel behind the lines, because of the jittery, trigger happy South Koreans. The defenders have fled in terror upon seeing Soviet built tanks, yet have taken many a pot-shot at US bombers in the sky."

In the July 24, Life magazine, Carl Mydans described a US action and the attitude of the people: "We pulled off the main road and pulled in behind a patrol to look for a battalion which was out in the hills. Along the way we saw only a few farmers. None waved, and some turned their backs...."

An AP dispatch dated July 25, described how the U.S. Army ceased to expect any cooperation from the people, began to take their hostility for granted and began to adopt brutal methods against the Korean populace: "All Korean civilians have been ordered out of the fighting zone southeast of Taejon....In an area once cleared of civilians, any one in civilian clothing may be shot. All Koreans, North and South, look alike to Americans. Soldiers sometimes take pot-shots at suspicious white-clad figures....Many villages suspected of harboring enemy troops and artillery have been blasted and burned. How many people stayed too long in their thatched-roofed cottages is not known."

John Osborne of Life magazine outlined the situation as it had developed a month later, on Aug. 21: "This is a guerrilla war, waged amongst and to some extent by the population of the country....I know the constricting doubt and fear that every American in Korea comes to know as he watches those silent strangers, to whom he cannot speak, filing down the roads...The soldiers...every time they see a column of peasants coming toward them...reach for their guns, and sometimes use their guns."

In the New York Times on Sept. 3, Hanson Baldwin wrote: "Some of our chief military problems in Korea stem from three factors - the superior battle-field intelligence of the enemy, the presence of guerrillas and Communist sympathizers behind our lines and infiltration through our lines, often in the guise of refugees, of enemy soldiers. We would suffer none of these disadvantages if we had the full enthusiastic support of the Korean population - something that obviously is lacking."

Even after the "victory", the retaking of Seoul on Sept. 26th, crossing of the 38th Parallel on Oct. 9, the problem of securing Korean cooperation persisted. On Nov. 2, the U.S. Ambassador to Rhee's regime, John Muccio, told the United Nations Interim Committee on Korea, "When the UN forces arrived in the northern areas they generally had found no one left to help keep order", (New York Times, Nov. 2, 1950) Hanson Baldwin said "Without air superiority the United States forces would not be in Korea today". (New York Times, Nov. 2, 1950) "When it is recalled that the air attacks have been all over Korea, against the population of Korea, it is evident that the Americans were not counting on or expecting popular Korean cooperation."

Michael James, reported to the N.Y. Times on November 11: "There simply is not enough air and armour to handle each one of the innumerable bands that have taken over in North Korea's forbidding hills and mountains."

In Pyongyang, captured capitol north of the 38th Parallel, a "wave of sabotage" was reported on Nov. 6th (N.Y. Herald-Tribune) "Army men searching for hidden arms and ammunition expressed concern over the possibility of a surprise revolt within Pyongyang...American soldiers are ordered to carry weapons at all times; the guard details at radar stations were doubled after two such posts were attacked last night. Three anti-tank mines planted during the night at a bridge over the Taedong River were detonated...Twenty caches of arms, ammunition and explosives were found."

The New York Times wrote Nov. 6,: As in the early stages of the war, UN troops were being hampered by thousands of refugees attempting to cross the Chongchon River. Many possibly carried concealed arms, for front line reports said there again was much infiltration. The British Commonwealth Brigade yesterday was reported heavily engaged with enemy forces along the Chongchon, at least some of whom apparently had passed around the UN position disguised as refugees." The same paper wrote Nov. 7,: "General MacArthur's communique yesterday told of 'continued operations' against the Communist led guerrilla groups scattered throughout North and South Korea. These, headquarters now say, constitute a serious problem for the UN forces...Guerrillas - the majority of them North Korean Army troops cut off by the rapid UN encircling movements after the amphibious landing at Inchon last Sept. were being encountered in all sections of Korea, in groups of from a score to several thousand."

Lindsay Parrott wrote in the N.Y. Times of Nov. 8,: "Communist guerrillas ambushed a train and truck convoy twenty miles north of Wonsan. Marines and Puerto Rican troops in the neighborhood took considerable casualties in the attack...Observers at the front reported that for the last week it had been dangerous for isolated vehicles to use the coastal road from Wonsan northward, because many enemy guerrilla fighters were in the hills..." (7)



Guerrillas, as everyone knows, are the people in arms. We are fighting the Korean people on their own soil, and they are fighting back.

### U.S. RACISM MAKES ENEMIES IN KOREA AND ASIA

This war against the people of Korea is full of instances of racist contempt that insults all Asian peoples. It is marked by an upper-class arrogance that takes no account of the common man. Again and again, statements by important U.S. figures have shown that they place no value on the Koreans except as they may be of use to U.S. strategy. Here are some instances.

In February and March 1948 General John R. Hodge, commander of the US forces in Korea, testified before the U.N. Temporary Committee on Korea. Describing the Koreans, General Hodge said, in language that a Southern Bourbon might have used about Negroes: "We found here a decadent nation...Many of them thought that freedom included freedom from work, that they would not have to work any more." (Volume III, page 135 of UN Commission Report).

On July 26, 1950, Walter Sullivan, N.Y. Times correspondent wrote from Korea: "Almost invariably officers and men refer to the Koreans as 'gooks', a term used during World War II for Pacific Island natives. National pride burns fiercely in Korean breasts...The US soldiers' attitude has made most of the South Korean populace indifferent and might make them hostile."

Hanson Baldwin in the N.Y. Times of Nov. 3, talks of "the hordes of Asia or armies of barbarians as in Korea".

Homer Bigart, writing from Pyongyang, in the N.Y. Herald-Tribune of Oct. 23, tells "How the Americans Selected the New Mayor of Pyongyang - "It's kind of an odd story, like a fairy tale; Col. Melchior said 'I went scouting around while the battle was still on and I finally spotted this old gentleman, a hotel keeper. Well, you can always tell a man's station in life by the clothes he wears. I could tell by his type of dress that he was a high type person. He was wandering around by himself and we collared him. \* (See below) " The elite, all conservatively dressed and wearing collars, followed him down the river that afternoon and waited on the bank until Col. Melchior saw them and waved them across. 'We sat on a bunch of logs and discussed government'...The group nominated Deuk Rin, teacher in a girl's school, as Mayor. The others were pedagogues, bankers and business men. Today Col. Melchior sat with the governing committee and told them what he wanted done. Of first priority was creation of a police force and reestablishment of courts..."

The basic US attitude was formally expressed to the "liberated" Korean people by General MacArthur in September 1945 as the United States occupied South Korea: "The entire administrative power on the territory of Korea, south of Parallel 38, is under my jurisdiction. The population should unreservedly obey the order issued over my signature. Those acting against the occupation troops or violating order and tranquility will be mercilessly and severely punished. For the period of the military occupation English is introduced as the official language."

On June 5, 1950, Brig-General Roberts, commanding general of the American Military Mission gave a press interview in which he said: "In Korea the American taxpayer has an army that is a fine watch dog over the investments placed in this country and a force that represents maximum results at minimum costs. The Advisory group was a living demonstration of how an intelligent use of 500 combat-hardened American officers and men can train 100,000 people who will do the shooting for you." (\*I told him to get together some business men and other high type persons and form a slate. It was just a shot in the dark.' The innkeeper went across the river to the main part of town and collared some high type people.) (8)

On Nov. 1, Hanson Baldwin, in the N.Y. Times also wrote of the Koreans as something to be used by America: "The use of foreign man power in or with our army - in Korea 24,000 South Koreans were integrated into our divisions - will be essential if the nation is to survive the 'time of troubles' that lies ahead". According to a U.P. dispatch in the N.Y. Herald-Tribune for Nov. 5, Mrs. Helen Taft Manning, sister of Robert Taft and head of Bryn Mawr history department told an audience at that college: "The real threat to civilization is that communism has been taken over by primitive peoples who have no concept of individual rights and responsibilities. It would be foolish to pretend that the forces of barbarism, such as those we are presently facing in Eastern Europe and Asia, have not again and again prevailed over a higher form of civilization."

On Oct. 28, the N.Y. Compass reported: "Brig-General William Roberts, who trained the South Korean Army told a recent Los Angeles Town Hall luncheon meeting:

"It is my conviction that only as a last resort should white men be sent to Asia to fight...My observations in Korea indicate that we can use native troops with good effect. Maybe we could even use North Korean prisoners - just turn them around and make them fight the other way. And why could we not use Filipinos? Or Japanese? We could use these native troops instead of our own. We could pay them as little as five dollars a month and a bowl of rice a day - no fight, no rice! We could go to town with them."

On Aug. 16, the N.Y. Times reported Congressman Everett Scrivner (R. of Kansas) as having suggested "subsidizing Chinese soldiers and hiring Chinese provincial generals to fight on the side of Chiang Kai-shek. 'We would probably have to pay the Chinese soldiers under these generals one dollar American a month'".

The result of racist U.S. attitudes has been reported by American correspondents in the field: On July 7, United Press reported from the Korean front: "The U.S. Army officers, bitter over the failure of American-trained South Korean troops to stand up and fight the Communists, said today they suspected deliberate sabotage of Republican weapons...(they) were mystified by unordered retreats carried out without permission and in many cases without even making contact with the enemy... Many weapons would not work. Three of the last anti-tank guns in South Korean hands after the fall of Seoul had no firing pins. It was with great disappointment that the Americans watched the virtual rout of this army, an army they had thought one of the best in Asia".

The attitude of the South Korean troops, as well as the reason for it, was partly, if probably unconsciously described by a Life correspondent on July 10: "It was not as though they were all turning tail and running away. It was as though they thought all the chaotic disintegration was happening to some one else".

A month later, on Aug. 11, Overseas News Agency correspondent Robert P. Martin described the demoralizing effect of continued bad relations with the South Koreans: "Mutual hatred and fear are sapping the vitality of Americans and South Koreans who are nominal allies". On Sept. 3, in the midst of renewed propaganda boasting about the "renewed" South Korean army, Joseph Alsop wrote in the N. Y. Herald-Tribune of the mutual relations of the U.S. and the South Koreans. Describing the actions of a U.S. sergeant in a combined American-South Korean attack he wrote: "The company's first sergeant urged the men on, shouting 'Come on, hubba hubba' and physically driving one or two of the attacking South Koreans who hung back". On Sept. 13, he reported: "At least one division, the South Korean Capital Division, temporarily disintegrated".

Racism has permeated the statements and actions of American military leaders, columnists and commentators, correspondents, and educationalists; not one of these can plead ignorance of the culture and civilization of Asia. Is it any wonder that the constantly insulted peoples of Asia are united in their determination to resist, to any end however bitter, the attacks, physical and ideological, being made against them by the United States? Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese people who have demonstrated their determination, strength and ability to be free, said last July, "Henceforth the Chinese people have stood up; we will never any more be an insulted people". All Asia responds.

#### WHAT ARE THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS FIGHTING FOR ?

Nor can the American men sent off to Korea to attack this people, to destroy and to kill and to be wounded and killed see why they are there. No Koreans ever threatened the United States. Many press dispatches indicate that the American soldiers in Korea do not like this war, that they cannot understand it despite what they are told, that they feel more like victims than liberators - and that they take out their bewilderment by striking out blindly at the people. It is significant, incidentally, that the restrictions General MacArthur clamped down on correspondents referred mainly to stories describing morale, not to actual information on operations.

In the story that first brought General MacArthur's wrath down on the correspondents, Associated Press reporter Tom Lambert quoted a "battle weary officer" as saying, on July 12, "I never saw such a useless damned war in my life".

Richard Johnston reported in the N.Y. Times of Aug. 12, after several weeks of combat: "The average GI seems not to know why he is fighting in Korea". One young infantryman told him: "The recruiting officer didn't say anything about this. I'll fight for my country but damned if I see why I'm fighting to save this hell hole". A 19 year old corporal said: "I keep asking myself what I'm doing here. The funny thing is I can't answer my own question".

John Osborne wrote in the Aug. 21 Life: "the American troops were fighting 'in a land and among a people that most of them dislike, in a war that all too few of them understand, and none of them want". In the introductory paragraphs of his dispatch Osborne wrote: "This is a story that no American should ever have to write. It is the ugly story of an ugly war...Much of this war is alien to the American tradition and shocking to the American mind". "The nature of the war", Osborne continued, "is such as to force upon our men in the field acts and attitudes of the utmost savagery. This means not only the usual inevitable savagery of combat in the field but savagery in detail - the blotting out of villages where the enemy may be hidden; the shooting and shelling of refugees who may include North Koreans in the anonymous white clothing of the Korean countryside, or who may be screening an enemy march". (Osborne's emphasis).

No wonder even Hearst correspondent Bob Considine had to report on Aug. 29: "It's the kind of war that turns the stomachs of Americans, and turns some of their minds as well".

#### WHY "NORTH KOREANS" FIGHT ?

Just as the American policy makers had underestimated the strength of the Chinese people's forces that fought the Chiang Kai-shek armies, so they underestimate the strength of the Korean people's forces. Margarite Higgins wrote from Korea,

in the N.Y. Herald-Tribune July 13, "Americans are not adequately prepared in equipment or morale for a really tough fight. Many officers and men thought the North Korean Communists would be a pushover for American troops...They are far better than we anticipated. They have combined primitive guerrilla warfare with a shrewd use of modern weapons, particularly tanks".

N.Y. Times correspondent Richard Johnston wrote on July 13, that the North Koreans were "determined, superbly directed and battle hardened troops whose resourcefulness has given them the unquestioned initiative". On the 16th he wrote of an American saying: "They're using every trick in the book, and they know what they are doing."

Seeking an explanation of the way the war was going, Arthur Krock, conservative chief Washington correspondent of the N.Y. Times in his column dated July 10, quoted "Situation In Asia" by Owen Lattimore, that the North Korean army was grounded politically "...on peasants who had land to defend and industrial workers who considered the new Government their own, since it had been based on protection of their interests". This was in contrast to the South Korean army, which "consists of men who served in the police under the Japanese, the most hated of all those who collaborated with the Japanese".

Krock regarded the contentions made by Lattimore as having been fully borne out by events. He wrote: "One does not have to agree with Lattimore's past or present Far East policy to recognize the proved authority of these passages".

A N.Y. Times editorial on July 25, declared that the North Koreans had "...advantage not only of initiative but also of training in tactics enabling them to convert regular army units at a moment's notice into guerrilla forces". Guerrilla warfare, as all history teaches, can be effectively waged only by the side that has the support of the people.

Hanson Baldwin, in the N.Y. Times of Sept. 10, wrote of the North Korean Army: "Soldier for soldier, the enemy in Korea seems to be outfighting us...The enemy's knowledge of the country, his better use of terrain, his infiltration tactics, superior intelligence, cross country mobility and his tough and rugged foot troops, supplied by long lines of human porters, still give him a man for man advantage, despite our air superiority". All these advantages imply popular support for the North Korean forces.

All the experience so far demonstrates that there is no "North" and "South" Korea, but one Korean people fighting against an alien aggressor who is trying to destroy all that they themselves have created - people's governmental administrations, a new land reform program, a new industrial society based on industrial assets taken over from their former oppressors, the Japanese, and beneficial trade relations with China and the Soviet Union.

The people of Korea are not crushed nor eliminated. It was not the Korean people nor the South Korean forces (they crumbled from 100,000 to a 20,000 nucleus of former Japanese police in the first few weeks) but it was the use of overwhelming air power that enabled the American and other troops to move northward.

#### THE "SOUTH KOREAN DEMOCRACY" THE U.S. SAYS IT IS FIGHTING FOR

The U.S. Government asserts that the United States (the "United Nations") is acting to protect a free democracy in Korea against an outside and anti-democratic attack. Also, it affirms that the U.S. is working for the unity and independence of Korea.

About the "free democracy" our Government would "protect", much information was given in Facts on Korean Crisis (issued in July by the Committee For A Democratic Far Eastern Policy). To that report there can be added the eloquent testimony of Stanley Earl, former Secretary of the Oregon State CIO who returned from Korea in July after having served there as Labor Advisor to the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration.

To quote Mr. Earl: "The Republic of Korea was not a democracy---it was a complete full police state....Corruption and graft were every day occurrences in the Republic of Korea, from top to bottom....The Government of Korea was systematically looting the Republic of Korea...."

"Things were rotten...so rotten in Korea that I demanded a recall to Washington for consultation. I took the position that I would not stay in Korea further and lend the good name of the American labor movement to anything as corrupt as that which existed. I thought that the American labor movement was entitled to know the facts...

"I think the public is entitled to know what the boys are dying for over there...They are dying for the rotten Rhee Government..."

"There was no attempt to put down the corruption and graft. There was no attempt made to weed out the rotten, corrupt police who existed under the Japanese regime for 30 years."

Earl's evidence confirms that nothing had changed for the better since the evidence on police oppression given before the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in Jan. 1948, evidence that is printed in its official proceedings, but ignored when the same Commission, after much wrangling, finally endorsed the police state there. A witness at this hearing said: "According to the actual regulations there, a congregation of three persons or over must have the previous authority of the police, and the police appoint an inspector or some other man to be present at such a meeting...Many newspapers have closed and their editors imprisoned. When these editors are imprisoned, they have to give information on all articles they have written criticising local authorities, and the source of the information they have obtained". The chairman, Mr. Jackson of Australia, asked: "How are they forced - by torture?" The witness answered: "Yes, I can cite the example of a person who wrote an article and they forced him to give the source of his information by means of torture or beatings in the prison itself" (page 71, UNTCOK Report).

One of Stanley Earl's remarks illustrates most graphically, in terms of a concrete human incident, why the South Korean people would not fight to preserve Rhee' "democracy" and why even many of his soldiers turned their guns against him. Earl said in his July 19, 1950 broadcast: "I knew two Korean boys who joined the army so they could get rifles, so they could shoot Korean policemen, because they had been so brutally set upon by Korean police....And I think they had one object in life, and probably that was to kill Korean policemen. After seeing the way Korean policemen operated and tortured my friends, and my Union people, I almost think it was a laudable ambition".

Of all the groups in the South Korean population, labor had perhaps the greatest reason to hate Rhee's American-sponsored "Republic of Korea". Certainly they could find no "democracy" in Rhee's regime. Most laws which had restricted labor in the period of Japanese overlordship were still in force under Rhee and American military government with new oppressive legislation added. The official United Nations record contains the following passage, as part of the testimony given before the

UNTCOK in Seoul, January 1948, when the American occupation forces were in control:

Witness: "There is a law - law 19 - which is a law preventing strikes. A strike is a violation of that law..."

Mr. Menon: (The Commission member for India): "Is it a police law or one of any other authority?"

Witness: "It is a military government ordinance. It is a set of laws promulgated by General MacArthur. Proclamation 2 is from the general regulations promulgated by Gen. MacArthur, and Proclamation 19 was issued by the local military authorities..."

The South Korean economy, on which labor depends for livelihood, was grossly mismanaged and allowed to run down. UNTCOK Report quotes the vice-president of the South Korean Chamber of Commerce & Industry on Feb. 25, 1948, as follows:

"At present, in all the industries in South Korea, there is a shortage of raw materials, and part of the machinery is worn out. Only 30% of the capacity of both the light and heavy industries altogether are running at present."

Stanley Earl's July 19th broadcast corroborates vividly that the South Korean Gov't labor policy did not improve later. Freedom of assembly did not exist at all for labor:

"It was impossible to hold a union meeting in Korea without the police permission...and then the police were there armed to the teeth...at a desk...registered the people...took down on paper what was said, then that was analyzed to see if there was any leftist thought in there."

Earl told how a "red hunt" is always bound to destroy even labor leaders who protest their "anti-Communism":

"My labor people were arrested time after time, but these were the people who had fought the Communists in the labor movement and who had cleaned the Communists out of the labor movement. After they had done that job, then the corrupt politicians in Korea turned on them and said they were leftists....."

Finally, Earl told of another incident that happened at the beginning of the so-called "South Korean fight for freedom" which we are supposed to accept and which U.S. labor leaders, not pausing to examine whether this official line is in labor's interest, have rushed to make their own and are urging American workers to sacrifice their own benefits for: Here is the incident:

"The night I left Korea, I had a meeting in my home. Eight labor leaders came to my home and asked me to stay with them because they said they were afraid of being executed by the South Korean police..."

These were the same labor leaders who, according to Mr. Earl, had fought Communism in the labor movement. They were not, of course, leftists of any kind. Their association with unions - any kind of union - was enough to endanger their lives.

There is no evidence of any genuine democracy in the Rhee Republic of South Korea - a regime for which American citizens are becoming casualties by the thousands.

The official United States line says our action is defending Korea against an outside and anti-democratic attack. To any Asian - or any fair minded person - the

"outside" attack is being made by Americans. Nor by any stretching of the truth can Koreans of the north be called "outsiders" - nor can the almost total population of Koreans, north and south of the 38th Parallel who are today resisting the foreign troops on their soil, be called "outsiders". The Korean people - all over Korea - attacked the conditions which were worse than feudal and which held them under foreign rule for centuries. Their struggle for a free Korea had been kept alive through the dark days of Japanese rule; and their latest struggle against American rule, exercised through the puppet regime of Rhee, was on the verge of complete success in June, 1950; Rhee's Ambassador at Washington had just returned from Korea to report to the State Department that Rhee was about to collapse (May 1950 elections gave his group only 22 seats out of 210 in the Assembly) and to beg for immediate United States aid - "without which help he will utterly collapse".

The latest evidence of the rejection of the Rhee regime by the Korean people came on Nov. 3, 1950. Rhee's own Republic of Korea National Assembly refused, by a vote of 100 to 21, to confirm his appointment of a Premier. A petition signed by some of the members demanded the resignation of Rhee's entire Cabinet and blamed Rhee's Cabinet for the war and loss of property and lives. (Associated Press, Nov. 3 ).

Americans who have gloried in their struggle for liberation, their American Revolution, and in their struggle for unity in the Civil War of the 1860's should be the first to understand the Korean people's struggle for independence and unity. Americans have no business trying to stop or control its fulfillment.

#### KOREAN PEOPLE STRIVE FOR PEACEFUL UNIFICATION

The UN Commission Report states: "The people of Korea...have a passionate longing for unity and independence and have a profound desire for the peaceful unification of their country. The division of Korea has resulted in adverse economic consequences in the south. The aftermath of World War II would have made the need for outside aid urgent in any case. But if the country were united, the south would not require such aid in the same degree". (Vol. 1, P. 34 of the Report)

Though the US succeeded in keeping one of the areas of Korea under a separate and puppet regime, the people all over Korea kept up their efforts for peaceful unification. In June 1949 a Korea United Democratic Fatherland Front was established to work for the peaceful unification of all Korea. 71 political parties and social organizations participated in this Front. On June 7, 1950 this Front made definite proposals for a meeting of legislators from Seoul and Pyongyang to plan for a unified election; Rhee forbade participation in this decision by any South Korean Legislature members. The UN Commission announced on June 10, that if the South Korea Government would not respond to the invitation to send delegates to the border to discuss peaceful unification it would send its own representative across the parallel to receive the text. The UN Commission sent a representative across the parallel to receive the text on June 10, and convey personally to the three Northern representatives the Commission's desire for peaceful unification". (Document 10 in US State Dept. White Paper on Korea July 1950) Rhee's regime arrested the three delegates from the north.

The evidence is ample that the people of Korea were making a democratic and non-violent attempt to unify their country. That they had a well-trained people's army should be easily understood by the heirs of the American Revolution; that that army was well prepared to repulse attacks from the south (hundreds of such attacks northward had been made in the months previous to June 25th) was only realistic.

Behind these unification efforts and behind these peoples forces, as bases for their aims and their strength, were the achievements of the people of Korea. Professor George M. McCune's book, "Korea Today", says of the northern administration:

"Reform programs were inaugurated over a wide area; nationalization of large industry, land reform, measures of financial and monetary change, social security and labor legislation..."

In industrial nationalization, the government "met the problem of the status of Japanese owned properties by a forthright program of confiscation". Such industries, and those owned by collaborators, were nationalized, while "Korean-citizen owned factories... (were) not to be included in the confiscation" and "a large segment of the economy was to remain in private hands". "Prices rose much less in North Korea than they did in the South." Profiteering was not tolerated. The benefit went to the ordinary people because, as McCune says, "a fairly stable price level is of particular benefit, of course, to wage earning groups."

Agriculture in North Korea was helped technically by "revival of the chemical fertilizer industry". A land reform was carried out based on "abolition of Japanese land ownership, of land ownership by Korean landlords and of land tenancy, and bestowing the right to exploit the land on those who cultivate it".

Labor legislation included "an eight hour day in general employment" for the first time in Korean history, regular vacations and rest days, and "compulsory social insurance". McCune says the labor movement in North Korea grew in numbers and strength and "in all phases of the relationship between worker organization and the state the attitude was distinctly partisan" (in labor's favor. - Ed.) and "distinctly in contrast to that in South Korea."

As opposed to South Korea, where collaborationists with the Japanese continued in power under the US occupation and Syngman Rhee, a North Korean government legislative convention was found to include "79 members who had served more than 5 years in Japanese jails because of independence activity, 28 who had served more than ten years and seven who had been in jail for 15 years". Collaborators were removed from authority even when their skills were temporarily needed (one of the excuses given for their permanent retention in South Korea). "A sizable portion of possible managerial personnel (in industry) was deemed unuseable by the standards of political purity which excluded collaborationists from positions of responsibility" and new administrators were trained from the ranks of the independence movement and from union labor.

According to radio reports from Korea, an order issued July 5, 1950, extended the land reform, till then in force only in North Korea, to all territories in South Korea from which the forces of the landlord-dominated Rhee Government had been driven. It stated:

"Land reform will be enforced according to the principle of confiscation (from landlords) without compensation and distribution (to tenants and smallholders) without compensation. The tenant system shall be abolished. Methods of distribution will be decided by general meetings of farmers... All debts and mortgages relating to the land shall be abolished... A farm village committee shall be organized in each village to enforce land reform. It shall be composed of from five to nine persons elected by general meeting of tenant farmers, landless peasants and farmers with little land."

The labor laws in force in North Korea were also extended to the South and minimum wages were raised at once. Palaces and recreational facilities formerly used



by the Rhee Government and the U.S. Military Mission for their own personnel in cities such as Seoul, were turned over to the labor unions for offices, educational and cultural institutions.

To characterize these principles and the achievements of the people in establishing the economic, political and social bases for the kind of a society that would meet their desires and needs as "anti-democratic" is fantastic.

### U.S. KOREA POLICY SPREADS WAR

The American action in Korea was the "logical" next step in our Government's prevailing Far Eastern policy. The theme of this policy is "Contain Communism". In practise this policy has been an attempt to stop or hinder the Asian people's movements for freedom and modernization, to support and use (even create, if necessary) domestic reactionary regimes, and to exploit for military strategic purposes the territorial position, man power and resources of Asian lands. Actual US acts have included (1) intervention in the internal affairs of Asian countries, (2) building of US bases, (3) agreements and treaties with Asian governments which have secured economic privileges for US interests, and (4) giving support to colonial powers seeking to maintain their Asian "possessions" and privileges.

Everywhere in Asia, before June 25, 1950, the American Government's Far Eastern policy was meeting with defeat. It had failed to secure Manchuria as an American base when it moved Chiang's 14 armies there in 1945 and 1946. The setting up of the Peoples Republic of China brought a new and powerful factor to the international scene. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950 was an example to all Asia of a new type of international relationship in which both parties secured benefits. Within Japan resistance to American policy was rising. Dissatisfaction with US Far Eastern Policy by such a conservative Asian Leader as Nehru, was more frequently voiced. In Viet-Nam, the peoples liberation movement under Ho-Chi-Minh was scoring telling victories against the American-supported French. In the "model Republic" of the Philippines popular resentment against Quering and U.S. domination had reached "dangerous" proportions.

And Korea itself presented the same problem: what do we do now? As in China, the people's struggle for independence and for unity was about to succeed; how could the United States avoid the same kind of defeat in Korea that its policy had met in China?

In Korea "the next step" in the implementation of its basic Far Eastern policy was one which our Government had hesitated to take in relation to China - that is, a direct American military attack on the people.

The Korea action is a first step in an open war policy. Even before the United Nations called upon "all members to render every assistance to the UN" in the execution of its resolution calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and calling for the authorities of North Korea to withdraw their armed forces to the 38th Parallel, Mr. Truman had ordered the US Air Force into action. In his statement on Korea which followed on June 27, he extended American military action in Formosa, to the Philippines and to French Indo-China, thus serving to make explicit the fact that American military strategic objectives went far beyond Korea.

In August there was a further extension of military intervention in Formosa; what had been ordered in June as a supposedly necessary part of the Korean operation now became preparation to defend Formosa against the Chinese People's Liberation forces. Chiang Kai-shek and MacArthur met and on August 1st issued statements. Said Chiang Kai-shek:

"An agreement was reached between MacArthur and myself... The foundation for a joint defense of Formosa and for Sino-American military cooperation has thus been laid. It is our conviction that our struggle against Communist aggression will certainly result in final victory. Now that we can again work together as old comrades-in-arms...not only will our determination in the struggle for this common cause be strengthened, but the peoples of all Asia will be aroused to fight Communist aggression."

General MacArthur, on his part, stated:

"It is my firm purpose to defend Formosa from Communist forces gathering on the mainland. Plans have been made to coordinate US and Chinese forces to meet any attack which hostile forces might be foolish enough to attempt."

The N.Y. Times of Aug. 5, writing about Averill Harriman's trip to see MacArthur after his Formosa visit, said:

"MacArthur will tell Harriman that American efforts in Korea will be useless if the United States does not fight Communism wherever it arises in Asia. MacArthur will emphasize that this means backing Chiang Kai-Shek in Formosa, the British in Hong Kong; and freedom loving peoples in French Indo China, Siam and Malaya.

Mr. Harriman, as reported in the N.Y. Times on Aug. 10, "expressed confidence that MacArthur would be able to repulse any attack Chinese Communists might attempt from the mainland."

On August 28, General MacArthur's letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was made public in which he stated:

"The Pacific Ocean has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it...it acts as a protective shield to the Americas and to all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands. From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific. At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and navy bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration on the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Additional bases can be developed in a relatively short time by an aggressive exploitation of all World War II Japanese facilities."

Since early August, American planes, tanks, oil, along with military personnel have been sent to Formosa. The N.Y. Times of Aug. 1, reported six aircraft carriers plus other units, were being taken out of moth balls in the US, giving the Chinese Communists an added impetus to strike during August. On August 3, the N.Y. Times reported that six jet fighters had arrived in Formosa from Okinawa; and a Chinese air force officer said "They aren't here for decorative purposes."

The N.Y. Herald Tribune on Aug. 4, reported "Major General Fox, Gen. MacArthur's chief deputy of staff, headed a group of 32 officers and men arriving here (Taipei, Formosa) to set up a permanent liason office with the Supreme Commander's Tokyo office. Fox said he would get full liason into operation and then return to Tokyo." On the 3rd the N.Y. Herald Tribune had reported "The arrival today of Major Gen. Howard M. Turner, commanding general of the 13th air force provided new evidence

that the American hands-off policy toward Formosa has been abandoned...."

Nor is American military preparation or planning confined to Formosa. On Aug. 19, the N.Y. Times said "Col. Lee V. Harris, US military attache at Saigon, sits in on a French-British military mission discussing ways and means of giving mutual military support in the event of a general war involving Southeast Asia.

In Manchuria and in Siberia American planes on duty in the Korean war, have dropped bombs on Chinese and Soviet towns. Mr. Austin admitted, on Aug. 31st, that American war planes had fired on Manchurian cities on Aug. 31st (NYT 9/1/50). Since then reports from China have told of at least 151 air attacks and one naval attack within Chinese territory made by U.S. forces during September and October.

#### WHAT KIND OF "UNITED NATIONS" ACTIONS ?

On June 24, 1950, the N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE contained the seemingly innocuous statement: "A formula whereby the United States could be made an agent for the United Nations in fulfilling Japan's security requirements is under consideration." That was the week Mr. Dulles was in Japan and Korea; and the same newspaper reported on the same day "Mr. Dulles proved himself a particularly strong ally on the question of Formosa as a strategic island linking American bases on Okinawa and in the Philippines." The N.Y. Times that week reported MacArthur's views: "In the West's defense planning Japan cannot be considered an isolated problem but must be included as a part of the whole Pacific security problem, particularly in connection with Formosa and Korea."

On June 25, the Korea Incident broke out. The United Nations was notified in the early morning hours, not by its own Commission in Korea, but by the United States, that Syngman Rhee and his government had announced it was being attacked by the forces north of the 38th Parallel. As the United Nations Bulletin records it -

"At the urgent request of the United States, Secretary General Trygve Lie called an emergency meeting...."

Without waiting to hear or secure any other evidence than the word of Rhee, or to appoint an investigation commission, or to get the views and possible assistance of Korea's nearest neighbors, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities and, on June 27, sanctioned military action, which the United States had already begun earlier that day on order of President Truman.

This was not the first instance in which the United States sought and received United Nations' sanction and covering for a deed already accomplished. The same procedure was followed in the founding of the Syngman Rhee government in 1948. In spite of the repeated statement that "the Government of the Republic of Korea was established under the auspices of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea", the fact is that that government was set up before the endorsement by the UN. Prof. McCune in "Korea Today" writes of the circumstances under which Rhee took power in 1948:

"The (United Nations) Commission did not...immediately disclose its attitude toward the claims of the National Assembly to form what would be the national government of all Korea..In effect, however, the Republic of Korea became the real government of Korea without waiting upon the decisions of the Temporary Commission. Under Rhee's leadership, the National Assembly acted, with the cooperation of the American command, to assume full responsibility..On Aug. 12, China (i.e. Chiang Kai-Shek) extended formal diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Korea, and on the same day the US Dept. of State released a statement which

amounted to giving de facto recognition... Thus the establishment of the Government... was an established fact well before the General Assembly was scheduled to meet in Paris."

In another passage, McCune said:

"The (South Korea) Assembly..hastily set up its constitution, president, committees and cabinet under the direction of Syngman Rhee in time for the formal investiture ceremony performed by Gen. MacArthur August 15, 1948. Final action on the part of the United Nations, which had originally planned a coalition Government (our emphasis - Ed.) came in December, and was, therefore merely a benediction."

As to the June 25, Incident, Arthur Krock wrote in the N.Y. Times of Oct. 5, of "the detailed and precise course pursued by the United States after the President was notified on June the 25th of the North Korean attack: he (1) promptly decided that the invasion must be met with force of arms; (2) ordered the 7th Fleet to Formosa while working out other steps; and (3) quickly authorized the State Department to request the aegis of the United Nations for American military intervention, which the Department proposed and which was successfully managed."

The Rhee regime, creature and puppet of the United States, is being "defended" not by the convinced will and action of the United Nations but under the forced cover of the United Nations whose members are made to feel the pressure of their dependence on United States aid. Even by July 14, as the N.Y. Times of that day records, "Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the UN appealed to fifty member nations which had endorsed the effort 'to halt the North Korean aggression' to 'consider the possibility of sending assistance including combat forces, particularly ground forces'." The N.Y. Times said the appeal was sent at "the request of the United States, which is anxious to stress that it is fighting in Korea as an UN agent."

The N.Y. Times of July 23, recorded that Mr. Lie had received eleven replies:

- "None pledged any ground troops"
- "France said the US could have a sloop"
- "Canada said it was sending three destroyers and would provide an air-transport squadron"
- "Bolivia offered thirty officers"
- "Sweden a field hospital"
- "Denmark an ambulance"
- "Norway shipping"
- "Greece six transport planes"
- "The Philippines said it would allow its citizens to volunteer for Korea"
- "Brazil, Argentine and Peru agreed to talk it over with the United Nations"

The N.Y. Herald Tribune of that same day reported: "The failure of other non-Communist UN members to come through with speedy offers of infantrymen is unfortunate...the response embarrassed and disappointed Mr. Lie and the United States delegation, though neither will admit it publicly." (19)

The reason why these nations responded is suggested by the approval in the U.S. Senate of an amendment to the Third Year Appropriation Bill for the Marshall Plan-

"That no part of the funds herein appropriated shall be used to provide assistance to any participating country which in the opinion of the President has failed, refused or neglected to support the United Nations in the Korean War by supplying armed personnel, materials of war, or service."

MacArthur, under the UN flag, remains an American general. "Early in the war" says the N.Y. Herald Tribune of Oct. 5, "before he received specific authority from Washington (emphasis ours.--Ed.) General MacArthur sent his Air Force across the 38th Parallel to knock out the Communist Air Force. He then said he would not let North Korean planes come down to his Americans (emphasis ours.--Ed.) and then run back across a line that would grant them immunity. It is understood that General MacArthur feels precisely the same about North Korean ground forces."

Foster Hailey, writing in the N.Y. Times on Oct. 1, talks about "the shots fired by American soldiers at Inchon and Seoul echoed loudly in Western Europe; American successes in Korea are tremendously uplifting to Western Germany." Earlier this summer radio commentators' troubles in remembering to say "United Nations" often resulted in "United S-Nations coming over the air. When Seoul was recaptured, it was not the United Nations flag that was raised over the Capitol building, but the Stars and Stripes."

Not only in the military sphere but also in the economic, the United States openly and unblushingly assumes an exclusive and dominating role.

On Oct. 13, The Herald Tribune carried a UP dispatch saying that an ECA staff was in Korea making an on-the-spot survey to determine what it will cost to rebuild Korea's economy. It reports that Mr. Truman had told the ECA to concentrate on long range economic projects and let the Defense Department and the United Nations take over the job of sending immediate relief supplies. He suggested that ECA work with any United Nations rehabilitation project that might be set up. It stated that the ECA mission will look over the war damage and then work with the Korean Government in rebuilding Korea. The N.Y. Times of Oct. 15, in a dispatch from Tokyo, says "the expected early reunion of North and South Korea through UN armed action raises questions as to the economic future of that country that are under careful study here and in Seoul. Complete revision of the ECA approach to the problem is under consideration following the visit of Edgar A. J. Johnson, director of the ECA program in Korea."

United States interests are to have the contracts and the profits of rehabilitating Korea; the same industrial interests that grow rich on war materials furnished our government, now will increase their riches by restoring what American arms have demolished. It is only thousands of Koreans and GI's who are dead.

#### AS ASIANS SEE IT

The Koreans - and all Asians - actually see American military forces, 304,000 air, army, naval and marine forces, killing their people and devastating their land. They read and hear the proud boasts of American military reporters and analysts about "testing out our new arms in Korea", and brutally concluding that "napalm, the jellied gasoline 'hell bomb' has proved the most effective weapon against tanks and almost as effective against ground troops." "Napalm has proved the most outstanding single weapon employed in the Korean war...it is one of the simplest and most economical of all weapons." Says N.Y. Herald Tribune of Oct. 15, 1950: (20)

"This barbarous weapon recalls to every Asian that it was in Asia, not Europe, that the atom bomb was used in World War II. Not only do Asians hear and see the American government's contempt for them but they experience it on their own bodies in this barbarously devastating use of American arms. What have these people done against the United States to deserve this ferocious attack?"

The Koreans - and all Asians - see their political life being determined for them by the decisions of aliens. Syngman Rhee, never called to office by his people but brought back to Korea after forty years of professional exile and set up as President by the American Military Government, is reinstalled by General MacArthur after American arms have recaptured the capital city and an American flag flies over the capitol building! Nor have Asians been oblivious to the puppet role of Chiang Kai-Shek who was openly ordered around by Mr. Truman in his Statement on Korea, June 27. They are cognisant of the purely nominal "independence" granted the Philippines where the US maintains its fleet and air bases. Who considers Bao Dai in Vietnam an independent ruler?

The Koreans - and all Asians - observe outsiders in the process of deciding their economic future. From 1945 on they saw the Americans take over the former Japanese assets in South Korea and claim the Japanese assets north of the 38th Parallel because of American investments in and loans made to the Japanese enterprises. Koreans do not fail to see an economic objective in the American "crossing the 38th Parallel" - for how else but by force can the Americans wrest "their" Japanese assets from the hands of the Korean people? They now see the American ECA, in the midst of war, making a survey, deciding on the future economy of all Korea and planning to reorientate that economy away from the mainland toward Japan (American controlled) and the United States. The Americans claim that "present political obstacles make trade with China impossible"; but before June 25th the economy north of the 38th Parallel, based on the assets taken over when the Japanese were driven out and now owned by the people, was prosperously related to the mainland; it has been only the action of the United States that has upset that already mutually beneficial and natural economic relationship.

The Koreans - and all Asians - see that the nations which have sent fighting forces to serve under MacArthur in Korea are the old colonial enemies of Asia, nations which have used force in their attempt to hang on to "their" possessions in Asia. They take note of the economic and military help given, since 1945, by the United States, to Britain, France and the Netherlands for their warfare in Malaya, Indonesia and French Indo-China. These sums have run into the hundreds of millions of dollars and today are running into billions of the American taxpayers' money.

What Asia sees it calls imperialism. Is it surprising that they resist this common attack on their peoples, their lands, their economies, their national dignity?

#### AS AMERICANS SEE IT

An editorial in the N.Y. Times on Oct 1, said: "A great game is being played before an Asian gallery of more than a billion people. In China, in India, in Pakistan, among the less numerous peoples of the Asiatic mainland and the peoples of the islands, there will be a focusing of attention on Korea. This is the acid test of Western policy."

The people of Asia compare the phrases about "friendship", "welfare of the people of Asia", "defense of democracy", to the realities of U.S. Far Eastern policy.

The mounting American casualties in Korea, the increased taxes with mor heavier increases to come, the progressive militarization of our society, the attacks on the civil rights of the people, their right to discuss, to ask questions, to generate public pressure on issues - all these are "alerts" to Americans who cherish democracy.

On October 9, Louis Johnson told an American Legion audience in Los Angeles:

"We must build up our military strength to discourage aggression" (Who is aggressing?-Ed.) "This means the mobilization of men and munitions unprecedented in our history short of all-out war. It means heavy expense and onerous taxes...a heavy financial strain on our economy. Only universal military training could bring this country to the necessary level of preparedness."

"The tax and military service we may have to bear to meet the present emergency may become a permanent fixed cost on our price of freedom."

Secretary Matthews told us what Korea means:

"Korea is a symbol. To finance the new defense effort new taxes will have to be paid, controls endured, and the even tenor of our civil pursuits will be violently disturbed."

How many more Koreas will it take to alert Americans to what is happening - to our political traditions, to our way of life, to our destiny as a land of the free and the home of the brave, to our beloved land?

What is needed at this critical moment is an increased determination on the part of the American people to have peace. Such a peace with honor for the American people and recognition of the right of the Asian peoples to be masters of their own lives and determine their own governments is altogether possible. Neither the Korean nor the Chinese people are threatening the United States. Already the "police action" begun in Korea six months ago, over 6000 miles from our own borders has cost over 30,000 American casualties bringing sorrow and tragedy to American homes. Increased taxes burden our people and billions of American dollars are used for destruction rather than the houses, schools and hospitals that America needs. The atmosphere of war hysteria that prevails is undermining the civil liberties and right of free discussion that all Americans cherish.

The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy believes that a peaceful settlement of the Korean war is possible and calls for an end to hostilities in Korea on the basis of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, UN peace negotiations which would include representatives of the North Korean People's Government and the People's Republic of China, U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China and its admission into the United Nations.

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